

RESTRICTED

B.R. 1736 (14/49)

BATTLE SUMMARY No. 21

**NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE CAMPAIGN
FOR
GUADALCANAL
August 1942 — February 1943**

1949

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Tactical and Staff Duties Division
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August, 1949

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE CAMPAIGN FOR GUADALCANAL

August 1942 - February 1943

CONTENTS

SECTION	Page
Foreword	ix
CHAPTER I	
Allied Assault Landings	
1 Introduction	1
2 Plan of operations	3
3 Passage to the Solomon Islands	6
4 Assault and operations, 7th August, 1942	7
5 Operations, sunset 7th-sunset 8th August, 1942	10
6 Japanese counter-measures, 7th-8th August, 1942	12
7 Decision to withdraw surface forces	13
8 Night action off Savo Island, 9th August, 1942	15
9 Japanese tactics, and remarks	26
10 Withdrawal of amphibious force	29
CHAPTER II	
First Japanese Offensive	
11 Japanese preparations	31
12 Allied naval dispositions, 10th-17th August, 1942	31
13 Movements of Task Force 61	32
14 Battle of the Eastern Solomons, 24th August, 1942	33
CHAPTER III	
Second Japanese Offensive	
15 Vice-Admiral Ghormley's policy, 27th August, 1942	39
16 U.S.S. <i>Saratoga</i> torpedoed, 31st August, 1942	39
17 Operations of U.S. Carrier Forces, 31st August-15th September, 1942	41
18 Loss of U.S.S. <i>Wasp</i> , 15th September, 1942	42
19 U.S.S. <i>North Carolina</i> and <i>O'Brien</i> torpedoed	42
20 U.S. reinforcement of Guadalcanal, 14th-18th September, 1942	43

CONTENTS

SECTION		<i>Page</i>
CHAPTER IV		
Third Japanese Offensive		
21	U.S. carrier raid on Shortland Islands, 5th October, 1942 ...	45
22	Battle of Cape Esperance, 11th-12th October, 1942 ...	46
23	Preparations and Assault, 13th-24th October, 1942 ...	49
24	Battle of Santa Cruz, 26th October, 1942 ...	50
CHAPTER V		
Fourth Japanese Offensive		
25	Events following the Battle of Santa Cruz ...	57
26	Naval situation, 10th November, 1942 ...	58
27	Japanese attack on Guadalcanal, 11th November, 1942 ...	58
28	Battle of Guadalcanal :	
	Night action, 12th/13th November, 1942 ...	60
	Operations, 13th/14th November, 1942 ...	63
	Night action, 14th-15th November, 1942 ...	66
CHAPTER VI		
Japanese on Defensive		
29	Events following Battle of Guadalcanal ...	69
30	Battle of Lunga Point (or Tassafaronga), 30th November-1st December, 1942 ...	70
31	Operations in Guadalcanal area, December, 1942-January, 1943 ...	73
32	Bombardments of Munda and Kolombangara Island ...	75
33	Japanese evacuate Guadalcanal ...	76
34	Conclusion ...	78

APPENDICES

	<i>Page</i>
A Allied warships mentioned in narrative, with Commanding Officers ...	80
B Japanese warships mentioned in narrative...	86
C Operation " Watchtower " : organisation of Allied surface forces ...	89
C (1) Operation " Watchtower " : United States and (estimated) Japanese Military Forces ...	90
C (2) Operation " Watchtower " : U.S. Marine Corps Landing Craft	92
D Organisation of Allied Surface Forces : Battle of Eastern Solomons ...	93
D (1) Organisation of Japanese Surface Forces : Battle of Eastern Solomons ...	94
D (2) Organisation of Allied Surface Forces : Battle of Santa Cruz	95
D (3) Organisation of Japanese Surface Forces : Battle of Santa Cruz	96
E Naval losses and damage (Allied and Japanese) ...	97
E (1) Shell hits sustained by H.M.A.S. <i>Canberra</i> : Battle of Savo ...	102
E (2) Casualties to personnel, H.M.A.S. <i>Canberra</i> : Battle of Savo ...	102
E (3) Damage received by U.S.S. <i>Hornet</i> , 26th October, 1942 ...	103
F " Phantom " Contacts ...	104
G Chronology ...	105

INDEX

FIGURES

(in text)

Note : These plans can only be taken as illustrating approximately the situations shewn, as deduced from written reports in which considerable discrepancies exist as regards positions, times, identifications, etc., and all information available (September, 1948).

BATTLE OF SAVO, 9TH AUGUST, 1942

1	First contact, <i>Chicago's</i> Group, 0145	} Section 8
2	Situation, 0151	
3	Situation, 0151-0200	
4	<i>Vincenne's</i> Group, 0200-0215	
5	<i>Ralph Talbot's</i> Action, 0217-0221	
6	Situation at dawn, 0550	

PLANS

(at end of book)

- Reference chart, Pacific Ocean, shewing Japanese controlled area, 1/8/42.
- S. Pacific Area ; Naval operations, 1st-13th August, 1942.
- S. Pacific Area ; Naval operations, August, 1942-February, 1943.
- Solomon Islands.
- Guadalcanal-Tulagi Area ; plan of assault landings.
- Tulagi Island and approaches to Gavutu Harbour.
- Guadalcanal Area ; Battle of Savo, 9th August, 1942.
- Battle of the Eastern Solomons, 23rd-25th August, 1942.
- Guadalcanal Area ; Battle of C. Esperance, 11th-12th October, 1942.
- Battle of Santa Cruz, 24th-27th October, 1942.
- Guadalcanal Area ; Battle of Guadalcanal (cruiser action), 12th-13th November, 1942.
- Guadalcanal Area ; Battle of Guadalcanal (battleship action), 14th-15th November, 1942.
- Guadalcanal Area ; Battle of Lunga Point, 30th November-1st December, 1942.
- Bombardments of Munda, 5th January, 1943, and Vila-Stanmore Area, 24th January, 1943.

ABBREVIATIONS

A/A	...	Anti-aircraft.
HA	...	Long-range guns for A/A fire only.
HA/LA	...	Long-range guns for A/A or horizontal fire.
SG	...	Radar, equivalent to British Type 271.

TIME

Time used is zone minus 11, i.e., 11 hours ahead of G.M.T. except where otherwise stated.

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- | | |
|-------------|---|
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| M.051784/42 | Landings at Solomon Islands, 6th-9th August, 1942, and subsequent night action.
(a) Verbal reports of eye witnesses.
(b) Rear-Admiral Crutchley's preliminary report.
(c) Report of Board of Enquiry into loss of H.M.A.S. <i>Canberra</i> . |
| M.05629/43 | Solomon Islands operations, 7th-29th August, 1942. Report by Wing Commander Dale, R.A.F. |
| M.052067/42 | United States preliminary report of Solomon Islands operations, including Savo Island night action. |
| M.016021/42 | Solomon Islands landings. |
| M.054149/43 | } Reports by Major-General Vandegrift, U.S.M.C. |
| M.053906/43 | |
| M.054264/43 | |
| M.054519/43 | |
| M.051987/42 | Solomon Islands campaign, 23rd-25th August, 1942. |
| M.052648/42 | } Battle of Eastern Solomons, 23rd-25th August, 1942. |
| M.052248/42 | |
| M.052330/42 | Torpedoing of U.S.S. <i>Saratoga</i> , <i>Wasp</i> , <i>North Carolina</i> . |
| M.052182/42 | Makin Island diversion, 17th-18th August, 1942. |
| M.01451/42 | } Battle of Cape Esperance, 11th-12th October, 1942. |
| M.052269/42 | |
| M.053057/42 | |
| M.052442/43 | Loss of U.S.S. <i>Chester</i> , 20th October, 1942. |
| M.053146/43 | Battle of Santa Cruz, 26th October, 1942. |
| M.053021/43 | Battle of Guadalcanal, 12th-15th November, 1942, U.S.S. <i>Enterprise</i> . |
| M.052664/43 | Battle of Guadalcanal : U.S.S. <i>Sterrett</i> . |
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FOREWORD

The salient events of the campaign for Guadalcanal were originally dealt with in two Battle Summaries issued in 1944, *viz* : B.S. No. 21 " Naval Operations at the Landings in the Southern Solomons, 7th-10th August, 1942," and B.S. No. 23 " Naval Operations of the Campaign for Guadalcanal, August, 1942–February, 1943."

When these two Battle Summaries were written the general trend of the operations could be followed, but much was still in doubt as to matters of detail, particularly as regards enemy forces taking part in night actions, and the losses and damage suffered by them.

Material captured from the Japanese, and interrogations of Japanese officers by U.S. officials since the end of the war, have enabled many doubtful points to be elucidated.

In the present narrative, the two previous Battle Summaries, amended in the light of information received from these sources, have been combined in one account of the whole campaign for Guadalcanal, including the assault landings.

¹ These narratives were compiled shortly after the events dealt with took place and contain many inaccuracies.

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CHAPTER I

ALLIED ASSAULT LANDINGS

1. Introduction (*Plans 1, 2*)

The campaign for the capture of Guadalcanal opened with Operation "Watchtower," assault landings by U.S. marines on the 7th August, 1942, and closed with the final withdrawal of the Japanese in the first week of February, 1943. The fighting in this area during those six months was of vital consequence to the whole war in the Pacific.

Apart from the strategical importance of the area to both sides, this was the first offensive operation undertaken by the Allies, after the impetus of the initial Japanese rush to the south had been checked. Hitherto, years of pre-war preparation and the effects of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbour, had given the initiative to the Japanese; the role of the Allies had been restricted to attempts to delay the enemy operations,—usually with totally inadequate forces hastily assembled to counter particular dangers as they occurred. The Guadalcanal campaign represented the first fair trial of strength, and as such a foretaste of things to come. Would the Americans, working from distant bases, be able to consolidate their positions obtained by the surprise of the 7th August? Or would the hitherto invincible Japanese army with its high standard of efficiency and ripe experience of combined operations be able to recover what it had lost? It took six months to obtain the answer to these questions. During that period four major attempts were made by the enemy to recapture Guadalcanal, while minor operations to reinforce and supply the troops on shore were carried out continuously by both sides. Desperate fighting took place at sea, in the air and on land, in which heavy losses were suffered by friend and foe alike. At one time the enemy came within an ace of success.

This Battle Summary gives some account of the salient features of the naval operations of the campaign. No detailed tactical analysis of the actions has been attempted, partly because even now (1948) much is still obscure,¹ and partly because such detail is outside the scope of a general survey of the campaign as a whole.

The general situation at the end of July, 1942, was as follows:—The Japanese initial drive to the southward had terminated with the conquest of Java in March, and of Burma in April.² A raid in Indian waters in the latter month had revealed the weakness of the newly constituted British Eastern Fleet and

¹ Of the seven principal naval engagements, five were night actions and two were fought between carrier-borne aircraft, the fleets being about 150 miles apart. The confusion inseparable from actions of these types, especially the former, renders it difficult to determine exactly what happened, even after the records of both sides have become available. A summary of enemy losses, as arrived at by analysis and intelligence reports soon after the events, and checked by Japanese documents and interrogation of officers after the war, is appended as a note to each engagement.

² The island of Corregidor in the Philippines held out till the beginning of May, but it was completely isolated by the Japanese, and its fall was only a matter of time.

their strategy then was directed to consolidating their gains and insuring against interference from America, by denying to the Allies all bases in the Pacific from which it would be possible to operate. With this end in view, large scale operations already in progress in Eastern New Guinea, with Port Moresby as their immediate objective, were extended to the south-eastward by the gradual occupation of the Solomon Islands, and expeditions were launched against Kiska in the Aleutians and Midway Island in mid-Pacific. Had these enterprises gone according to plan, the enemy might well have felt sufficiently secure on his eastern flank to turn his attention to Australia or India, but the campaign for East New Guinea received a heavy check at the battle of the Coral Sea in May, and the following month the expedition against Midway Island was decisively defeated. The severe losses and damage to aircraft carriers inflicted on the enemy in these two actions deprived him of the initiative, and offered to the Allies an opportunity which they were not slow to take.

The broad lines of the Allied strategy to be adopted had been worked out as early as April. This was based on the supreme importance of the Solomon Islands. In Japanese hands they could provide air and sea bases ideally placed for cutting the vital line of communication from America; in Allied possession, on the other hand, they would go far towards securing this line of communication, and would also form stepping stones for an advance to the north-westward towards the enemy bases in the Bismarck Archipelago and the Carolines. An additional attraction to an offensive in this area lay in its remoteness from Japan, which would force the enemy to accept the disability of fighting at the extreme end of a 3,000-mile line of communications, and should offer the Allies good opportunity for striking at his already overstrained shipping resources.

In pursuance of this design, the Americans had been gradually building up forces in the South Pacific based on Auckland, New Zealand. The depletion of the Japanese carrier strength off Midway Island offered an unexpectedly favourable opening for starting the offensive, and before the end of June orders were issued to Vice-Admiral Ghormley, U.S.N., the Commander in the South Pacific, to launch an attack on the Tulagi area (which had been seized by the Japanese in May) and to occupy the Santa Cruz Islands (300 miles to the eastward) at the earliest possible moment.

Time was indeed the essential factor in the situation. By their occupation of Tulagi the Japanese had to some extent departed from their principle of co-ordination and had allowed their sea and land forces to outstrip their air support, their nearest air base being at Rabaul—a distance of 675 miles to the north-west.

An airfield was, however, under construction at Kieta, roughly halfway between Rabaul and Tulagi, and, following a considerable landing on 4th July, another airfield had been commenced at Guadalcanal, only 20 miles south of Tulagi.¹ At the same time the enemy had landed at Buna, New Guinea, some 600 miles to the westward; both these operations—especially that at Guadalcanal—had been supported by considerable numbers of shore-based aircraft and seaplanes. It was clear that if the Allies did not act quickly, the enemy would be so firmly entrenched in the whole area that it would be extremely difficult to displace him. Above all, it was vital to strike before the new airfields at Kieta and Guadalcanal should be in operation. Intelligence reports indicated that submarines and small craft were the only naval forces kept in

¹ Seaplanes were operated from several places in the Solomons—Gavutu (Tulagi), Gizo, Rekata Bay, Kieta and Buka Passage—but these could be discounted.

the Tulagi area, and, in the absence of carriers, aircraft from Rabaul constituted the chief threat to Allied landing operations.

For these cogent reasons the beginning of August was provisionally chosen for the attempt, leaving less than a month for all preparations. This point should be borne in mind in studying the landings: it was impossible that the co-ordination and preparation of plans should be as thorough as could be desired.¹

The Solomon Islands consist of a chain of islands running in a southeasterly direction for some 600 miles from the Bismarck Archipelago, where the enemy were using Rabaul as their main base in these waters. Towards the south-eastern end of the group, and about 500 miles due east from the nearest point of New Guinea, lies the island of Guadalcanal (*see* Plan 3). Guadalcanal is some 75 miles long and 25 miles wide; on the north coast in the vicinity of Lunga Point the Japanese were developing the airfield already mentioned. To the northeast of the western end of Guadalcanal 13 to 20 miles distant lies the much smaller island of Florida, on the south coast of which is a small but secure anchorage, formed by the islets of Tulagi and Gavutu; here harbour facilities were being expanded to form an advanced naval base. The eastern approach to the waters between Guadalcanal and Florida is about 13 miles wide, and is traversed by three channels—Nggela, Sealark and Lengo channels—which lead through many patches and reefs to a deep water area, the 100 fathom line running within about 3 miles of the shore. Seven miles northeast of the northwestern point of Guadalcanal, the volcanic island of Savo, some 9 miles in circumference, rises 1,670 ft. from the sea. The waters within 20 miles of this island were destined to be the scene of no less than five fierce night actions—in some of which capital ships took part—in the four months which followed the Allied landings.

2. Plan of Operations (Plans 2-5)

Vice-Admiral R. L. Ghormley, U.S.N., commanding the South Pacific Area,² who was in command of the operation as a whole, issued his operation orders on 16th July. These orders defined the object as "successively seize, occupy and defend (1) Tulagi and adjacent positions; (2) the Santa Cruz Islands . . . in preparation for further offensive action."³

Vice-Admiral Ghormley organised his forces in two main forces, *viz.*:—

Task Force 61, an expeditionary force under Vice-Admiral F. J. Fletcher, U.S.N.;

Task Force 63, shore based aircraft, under Rear-Admiral J. S. McCain, U.S.N.

¹ Reporting after the campaign, Major-General Vandegrift, the military commander, remarked that the military plan had to be evolved before leaving the United States of America, without the knowledge of the Naval Authorities in the South Pacific.

² The "South Pacific Area" was the area south of the equator and east of 160° E. longitude and was part of the command of Admiral C. W. Nimitz, U.S.N., C. in C., Pacific Fleet. This boundary was altered to the meridian of 159° E. on 1st August, 1942, prior to the assault on the Tulagi area. On this day Admiral Ghormley established his headquarters at Noumea, New Caledonia. To the west of 159° E. was the "South West Pacific Area," under the command of General MacArthur.

³ The Tulagi area was successfully occupied, though six months was to elapse before the Japanese were finally expelled from Guadalcanal. The occupation of the Santa Cruz group had to be postponed to another occasion.

The expeditionary force consisted of 1 battleship, 3 aircraft carriers, 11 heavy and 3 light cruisers, 30 destroyers, 5 minesweeping destroyers, 4 fast transports (converted destroyers), 13 transports and 5 store ships. Task Force 63 was composed of aircraft of the South Pacific Force, temporarily augmented by aircraft from the South West Pacific Area, based on islands in the South Pacific.

Operations were to be conducted in three phases:—

Phase I.—Rehearsals in the Fantan area, Fijis, starting about 27th July.

Phase II.—Capture and occupation of Tulagi and adjacent positions, and immediate construction of landing fields on Guadalcanal.

Phase III.—Occupation of Ndeni, Santa Cruz Islands.

The areas seized were to be defended by the expeditionary force until relieved by other forces, and Vice-Admiral Fletcher was authorised to call on Task Force 63 for special aircraft missions.

Rear-Admiral McCain's aircraft were to continue their normal scouting operations over the Solomons area while the rehearsals were taking place at Fiji. During Phase II they were to cover the approach to, and operations in, the Tulagi-Guadalcanal area by search; to attack enemy objectives as arranged with Vice-Admiral Fletcher and to render air support on call; and to initiate air patrols from Ndeni the day before the assault and from the east coast of Malaita (65 miles east of Tulagi) the day after the assault. Rear-Admiral McCain was also directed to co-ordinate air reconnaissance with the supreme commander, South West Pacific (General MacArthur).

In addition, arrangements were made for special patrols by submarines of the Pacific Fleet and the South West Pacific Force to be maintained off Truk (the Japanese base in the Carolines) and Rabaul respectively during the operations.

Vice-Admiral Fletcher organised the expeditionary force in two forces, *viz.*, the Air Support Force and the Amphibious Force.¹ The Air Support Force was placed under the command of Rear-Admiral L. Noyes, U.S.N., and consisted of three groups:—

The *Saratoga* (Flag, Vice-Admiral F. J. Fletcher), 8-in. cruisers *Minneapolis* and *New Orleans*, five destroyers;

The *Enterprise* (Flag, Rear-Admiral T. C. Kinkaid), battleship *North Carolina*, 8-in. cruiser *Portland*, 6-in. cruiser *Atlanta*, five destroyers;

The *Wasp* (Flag, Rear-Admiral Noyes), 8-in. cruisers *San Francisco* and *Salt Lake City*, five destroyers.

This force, operating as convenient clear of the island, was to support the landings by providing fighter protection and by air attack on enemy targets. Arrangements were made with Rear-Admiral McCain for these to be bombed for several days before the assault.

The Amphibious Force comprised the remainder of the expeditionary force and was commanded by Rear-Admiral R. K. Turner, U.S.N., with his flag in the transport *McCawley*. It was this force which was to carry out the actual occupation. Broadly, the plan was to effect simultaneous landings on the north shore of Guadalcanal and in the Tulagi area² (*see* Plans 3 and 5 and

¹ *See* App. A (1).

² The islands intended to be captured were (a) Guadalcanal, and (b) Tulagi and Gavutu, and subsequently the neighbouring islands of Tanambogo, Florida, Makambo and Mbangi (*see* Plan 5).

App. B). This involved two distinct operations, separated from each other by some 20 miles of sea—somewhat analogous to simultaneous landings at Dover and Calais—for which, however, air support and surface protection would be provided from a common pool. The Amphibious Force was organised in six "Task Groups"³:—

Convoy "X-Ray," 14 ships, carrying troops and stores for Guadalcanal;

Convoy "Yoke," eight ships, including four fast transports (converted destroyers), carrying troops for Tulagi;

Fire support group for the Guadalcanal landing, the 8-in. cruisers *Vincennes*, *Quincy*, *Astoria*, four destroyers;

Fire support group for the Tulagi landing, the 5-in. cruiser *San Juan* (Flag, Rear-Admiral Scott, U.S.N.), two destroyers;

Five minesweeping destroyers;

Screening group, the 8-in. cruisers *Australia* (Flag, Rear-Admiral Crutchley, V.C.), *Canberra*, *Chicago*, 6-in. cruiser *Hobart*, nine destroyers.

The Amphibious Force was to arrive in the "combat area" half an hour before sunrise⁴ on zero day—eventually fixed as 7th August—Convoy "Yoke" making for Tulagi and Convoy "X-Ray" to the eastward of Lunga Point, Guadalcanal (*see* Plan 4). Keeping outside possible enemy gunfire—about 8,000 yards—the transports were to lie to, while landing craft were hoisted out and loaded (*see* App. C). While this was in progress the Fire Support Groups were to bombard enemy positions, Rear-Admiral Scott's group being reinforced by the five minesweeping destroyers, until the latter were required for sweeping duties.⁵

Landings under cover of a naval barrage were then to be made on the beaches east of Lunga Point, Guadalcanal (Beach Red), and on the southwest side of Tulagi (Beach Blue); the latter was to be followed by a frontal attack on Lever Bros. wharf at Gavutu.⁶

The screening group, commanded by Rear-Admiral Crutchley, who was also second-in-command of the Amphibious Force, was responsible for the protection of the convoys against surface, submarine and air attack, both while on passage and during the operations. The Fire Support and Minesweeping groups were to augment this force, except while carrying out their special tasks during the initial assault.

After the capture of the main objectives, Marine detachments in the fast transports were to round up enemy outposts on Florida Island, Savo Island and at Taivu and Kaukau Bay, further east in Guadalcanal (*see* Plan 3).

It was intended then to establish a naval headquarters under Rear-Admiral Turner at Guadalcanal, and to maintain a local defence force, providing anti-submarine patrols, examination service, etc. Aircraft were to be transferred to the airfield at Kukum as soon as it had been made serviceable. It was

¹ *See* App. A (2).

² Sunrise, 7th August, was at 0633. (Zone minus 11.) Zone minus 11 time is used throughout, except where otherwise stated.

³ The great depth of water enabled the initial approach to be made without the necessity for minesweeping.

⁴ *See* Appendix B: estimated Japanese military forces and U.S. employed.

anticipated—somewhat optimistically—that the Santa Cruz occupation force¹ would be able to leave for Ndeni after dark on the day of the assault (7th August); the remaining transports for Noumea on the following day, and the store ships three days later (11th August).

3. Passage to the Solomon Islands (Plan 2)

The Amphibious Force² assembled at Wellington, New Zealand; here transports from the United States were unloaded and restowed as necessary, while Rear-Admiral Turner's staff completed the planning of the assault and landings. All was ready by 22nd July, and the force sailed for the Fiji Islands that day. The carrier groups coming from Noumea and Tongabatu were met at 1400³, 26th July, in lat. 23° 15' S., long. 180°, and during the next five days two rehearsals of the Tulagi-Guadalcanal landings were carried out in great detail in Koro Island (Fiji). In the afternoon of 31st July, Rear-Admiral Turner held a meeting of the task group commanders, at which the date of the landing was fixed for 7th August, and Major-General Vandegrift, commanding the 1st U.S. Marine Division, explained his plan of operations ashore. That evening the Amphibious Force sailed to the southwestward.

Six thousand miles away Admiral Somerville⁴ with part of the Eastern Fleet was carrying out a diversion in the Bay of Bengal, designed to prevent the possible transfer of Japanese air forces from the Malayan to the South Pacific Area.⁵

The 1,200-mile passage from Fiji to the Solomons passed uneventfully (see Plan 2). Contact was made with the Air Support Force on the 1st August, and for the remainder of the passage this force acted in support of the Amphibious Force, and provided air reconnaissance and patrols. After passing Efate (New Hebrides) on 3rd August⁶ the force stood on well to the westward till noon, 5th August, when it was some 420 miles due south of Guadalcanal; course was then altered to 360° for Russell Island off the western approach to the area of operations. During the latter stages of the passage there was much cumulus and surface haze, which probably rendered visibility from the air very poor. Allied reconnaissance aircraft were by this time operating from Efate and Espiritu Santo (New Hebrides), as well as from bases in Fiji, New Caledonia, Australia and Milne Bay (New Guinea). An advanced base for patrol aircraft was being established at Ndeni (Santa Cruz Islands),⁷ and the seaplane carrier *Mackinac* was due at Maramasike Sound (Malaita) on the 7th August.

The 6th August, 1942—the crucial day of the passage—broke fair for the Allies; the sky was overcast and a damp mist made even surface visibility very

¹ The 8-in. cruiser *Quincy*, with four destroyers, four transports and one store ship.

² Except the minesweeping destroyers and fast transports, which joined at sea on 26th July.

³ Zone minus 12.

⁴ Admiral Sir James F. Somerville, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet.

⁵ Early in July, Admiral King, C.-in-C., U.S. Navy, had requested a diversion by the Eastern Fleet, to precede the proposed operations in the Solomons. On 10th August, 1942, Admiral Somerville informed Admiral Nimitz, U.S.N., C.-in-C., Pacific Fleet, that the diversion appeared to have been successful as the enemy had sent fighter float planes and an additional bomber squadron to Sabang (north of Sumatra).

⁶ U.S. tanker *Cimarron* joined on 3rd August, and fuelled the destroyers and the *Saratoga* and *Hobart*, which were short of oil, on 3rd and 4th August.

⁷ The seaplane carrier *Curtiss*, escorted by the destroyer *Macfarland*, arrived at Espiritu Santo 4th August; the *Macfarland* then proceeded to Ndeni, arriving 5th August.

poor. For enemy reconnaissance it was "hopeless."¹ At noon,² when in estimated position lat. 11° 55' S., long. 159° 03' E., the destroyer *Selfridge* was sent ahead to make a landfall at Bellona; rejoining before dark, she provided the squadron commanders with an accurate navigational position.

At 1615, 6th August, the Amphibious Force assumed the disposition for the final approach. In the van was Squadron Y, consisting of the *San Juan* (Flag, Rear-Admiral Scott) leading Convoy "Yoke," with the *Chicago*, *Canberra* and 11 destroyers (including the minesweepers). Six miles astern was Squadron X, Rear-Admiral Crutchley in the *Australia* leading Convoy "X-Ray" with the *Vincennes*, *Quincy*, *Astoria*, *Hobart* and nine destroyers.

At 2235 the *San Juan* altered course to 040° towards the northwest point of Guadalcanal, followed by the *Australia* half an hour later. The moon rose at 0224, 7th August, and though it lacked only five days to the new moon, it showed up the high land of Guadalcanal and Savo Island clearly and greatly assisted the approach.

An hour later, 0330/7th August, the two squadrons separated, the *Australia* leading Squadron X round to the eastward to pass south of Savo Island, while Squadron Y steered to the northward of the island for Tulagi. Contrary to expectation no enemy patrols were encountered in the passages either side of Savo, and both convoys reached their disembarkation area unobserved.

4. Assault and Operations, 7th August (Plans 4, 5)

Sunrise was at 0633, 7th August, and at 0615 the aircraft of the cruiser escorts of both convoys were launched to provide anti-submarine and anti-M.T.B. patrols for the transport groups.³ At the same time the U.S. carrier-borne aircraft arrived overhead. Sixteen fighters and 24 dive-bombers attacked the Tulagi-Gavutu area, and 20 fighters and 24 dive-bombers the area between Point Cruz and Togama Point in Guadalcanal. The task of the fighters was to destroy enemy aircraft, motor torpedo boats and submarines; any remaining ammunition was to be used on anti-aircraft installations. The dive-bombers were to attack naval vessels⁴ and shore batteries. The enemy was taken completely by surprise, and 18 of his aircraft were destroyed on the water in this initial sortie.

As the convoys neared the disembarkation areas, their escorts opened fire on gun positions, encampment areas and small craft moored close inshore. On the Guadalcanal side a motor auxiliary was set on fire by fighter aircraft and blazed furiously. Convoys "X-Ray" and "Yoke" reached their disembarkation areas at 0650 and 0720 respectively, and lay to outside the 100-fathom line, some four miles from the shore, while the attack boats were lowered, manned and equipped, and the Screening Force acted in accordance with special instructions previously issued by Rear-Admiral Crutchley. These provided each convoy group with an arc of destroyers to seaward, the cruisers being between them and the transports. Thus both the cruisers and the transports had an anti-submarine screen, while enemy aircraft attacking from seaward would have to pass two circles of fire before reaching the transports. In addition

¹ Rear-Admiral Crutchley's report.

² Zone minus 11. Clocks had been altered from Zone minus 12 to Zone minus 11 time on 2nd August.

³ A continuous anti-submarine patrol of both entrances and the combat area was maintained by these aircraft during each day on which surface forces were in the area.

⁴ Actually no enemy surface warships were present.

carrier-borne fighters were maintained over the area during daylight as defence against air attack, fighter direction being carried out by the *Chicago*.¹ The Air Support Force also maintained dive-bombers and fighters over each area, which were available on call to attack shore targets; these fighters too were to be used against enemy air attacks.

The times for the troops actually to reach the beaches had been fixed as 0800 at Tulagi and 0910 at Guadalcanal. At Tulagi prior to the main landing a small force seized the promontory at Haleta, Florida Island, in order to prevent the enemy from enfilading the boats on their way in to Beach Blue. After heavy bombardment by the *San Juan*, *Monssen*, *Buchanan* and the five mine-sweeping destroyers, these landings were accomplished without opposition and the northern portion of Tulagi Island was soon occupied. The assault which followed on the southern portion of the island and the town met with stiff resistance, which lasted till the next day. While this was going on, the *San Juan* and several destroyers sighted a periscope. Heavy depth-charge attacks were made and nothing more was seen of the submarine, though there was no direct evidence that she was sunk.

A landing supported by the minesweeping destroyers' fire was then made at Halavo on the coast of Florida to the east of Gavutu; the boats carrying this force, as well as the minesweepers, were engaged by shore guns on Bungana and Gavutu Islands (see Plan 4). At the request of Rear-Admiral Scott the *Henley* was sent to assist in silencing these guns. The landing at Gavutu took place at 1200 near the wharf, after preliminary naval bombardment. Enemy opposition was strong; covering fire of mortars and heavy machine-guns landed at Halavo was disappointing, and heavy casualties were suffered by the attackers, who were unable to advance beyond the dock area.

Before this landing took place, the minesweepers had swept the channel to Gavutu. No mines were found, and they then crossed to the southern side, and carried out a clearance sweep in Lengo Channel. Again no mines were found, and it was then considered safe to move the transports and supply ships close in to the beaches, in order to expedite the disembarkation.

Meanwhile, on the Guadalcanal side the 8-in. cruisers *Vincennes*, *Quincy* and *Astoria*, and the destroyers *Hull*, *Dewey*, *Ellet* and *Wilson*, had been moving close along the north shore of the island, keeping targets under almost continuous bombardment. Large fires were raging at Kukum (west of Lunga Point) where the enemy was known to have anti-aircraft batteries and a storage dump.

The amphibious tractors and landing craft left the assembly area with the first wave of troops at 0840, their line of departure being marked by destroyers, and the ends of the beach by coloured smoke bombs dropped by aircraft. For five minutes before the actual landing, a furious bombardment was put down on the area of Beach Red. In this brief interval, each of the three cruisers fired 45 rounds of 8-in. and 200 rounds of 5-in., while 200 rounds of 5-in. were fired by each of the four destroyers.

The troops reached the beach at 0920; no resistance was offered, and two minutes later the signal for a successful landing was made. During the forenoon they moved off towards Lunga to seize the line of the Tenaru River, while the unloading of troops and equipment continued at Beach Red. As successive positions were occupied without opposition, it became clear that the enemy had been completely surprised, and had taken to the interior of the island, without waiting to destroy their plants, stores, or material. The airfield was

¹ A fighter-direction group from one of the carriers had been previously embarked.

found intact, and the landing strip only required rolling to make it available for Allied aircraft.¹

At about 1120, 7th August, a message was received from a coast-watcher on Bougainville Island (350 miles to the W.N.W.) reporting a strong force of enemy bombers passing over the island to the southeast, and shortly after noon a signal from Vice-Admiral Fletcher requested that for the remainder of the day the fighters over the area should all be used against air attack. At 1315, U.S. fighters made contact with the enemy bomber formation about 15 miles west of Savo Island. One aircraft soon fell in flames near the island. At 1325 all ships in the "X-Ray" anchorage opened fire on about 18 Type 97 heavy bombers coming over in a tight formation, supported by nine Zero fighters. A pattern bombing attack was carried out, the leader giving the release signal. All the bombs fell to the northwest of the transports and no damage was done. Fighters continued to engage the enemy during their withdrawal, shooting down two and damaging two others.

An hour and a half later another attack developed. This was delivered by about 10 Type 95 bombers, which came in from the westward and attacked destroyers on the screen. No warning was received of the approach of this force. Ships at once opened fire and fighters dived down on the enemy, two of which were shot down; but the destroyer *Mugford* received a direct hit with a 250-lb. bomb, which put out of action the two after guns, and caused considerable damage and loss of life. It is probable that many of the enemy were accounted for by fighters during their withdrawal west of Savo Island.

Despite these interruptions the landing of stores and equipment at Guadalcanal continued throughout the day. In the northern area, however, things were not going so smoothly. The attack on the southern end of Tulagi had failed to dislodge the enemy, who was concealed in caves and air raid shelters blasted in the rock, from which he had to be driven by hand grenades and T.N.T.—a lengthy business. Until this was done the landing of stores could not be started. The enemy also controlled most of Gavutu Island, and Tanambogo had not yet been attacked. Both here and at Tulagi the enemy was subjected to further naval bombardment and dive-bombing; large fires were raging, but at nightfall he was still holding his ground.

At 1830,² 7th August, Rear-Admiral Crutchley ordered the Screening Group to take up night dispositions (see Plan 6) as follows:—

- Two destroyers to seaward of Savo Island covering the entrances as radar and anti-submarine patrols;
- Two groups, each consisting of three 8-in. cruisers, screened by two destroyers, to the eastward of Savo Island, covering the approaches north and south of the island to the transport anchorages;
- Close anti-submarine and anti-motor torpedo boat destroyer screens round the transports;
- The *San Juan* and *Hobart*, screened by two destroyers, between the transport anchorages as cover against enemy light forces entering the area from the eastward.

¹ "It was evident from the plans captured, from the amount of material and stores captured, and from the extensive works which have been started, that the establishment of a first-class air base on Guadalcanal had been the enemy's intention."—(Rear-Admiral Crutchley's report.)

² Sunset was at 1818, 7th August.

5. Operations, sunset 7th-sunset 8th August, 1942

With the close of the first day Rear-Admiral Turner could feel that a good start had been made. The situation at 2000, 7th August, was briefly as follows:—

About 10,900 men had been landed in Guadalcanal and were occupying the line of the Tenaru River on the west, and on the east a line about the meridian of 160° 06' E. longitude. No major contact with the enemy had taken place in this area.

In the northern area, Tulagi Island had been occupied, with the exception of the southeastern end. Halavo in Florida Island had been captured, and a footing had been established in Gavutu, though at heavy cost.

Two enemy air attacks had been repulsed with singularly little damage to the shipping, but heavier attacks had to be anticipated, and it was known that submarines were on their way to the area.

Throughout the day the enemy had suffered far heavier losses, both in men and aircraft than had the Americans; in addition, large quantities of supplies had been captured.

The unexpectedly stiff resistance in the northern area, however, made it necessary to throw in reinforcements, which could only be drawn from the troops earmarked for the Santa Cruz occupation, and this part of the operation (Phase III) had in consequence to be cancelled.

During the night an attack was made on Tanambogo by troops brought from Halavo by landing craft. Some got ashore, but a blazing oil dump lighted up the area and the attempt had to be given up, after suffering heavy losses. Those who could not land went on to Gavutu and reinforced the troops in the dock area. At Guadalcanal disembarkation of stores continued until the beach became so congested that it had to be suspended. No enemy interference of any kind occurred, and at 0500, 8th August, Rear-Admiral Crutchley ordered the outer patrols to re-assume the day screening positions off the anchorages. As enemy submarines might reach the area during the day, the minesweeping destroyers were placed as an anti-submarine patrol west of Sealark and Lengo channels.

At 1027, 8th August, a message from the coast-watcher on Bougainville Island¹ reported 40 heavy bombers proceeding to the southeastward, and shortly afterwards Rear-Admiral Turner ordered all transports to get under way. The Tulagi and Guadalcanal groups manoeuvred independently between Guadalcanal and Florida Island while awaiting the attack; this developed at 1200 when 23 large twin-engine torpedo bombers were sighted appearing from behind the clouds over Florida Island to the eastward. They made for Squadron X, and came in low to the attack. "A magnificent curtain of bursting high explosive was put up and enemy aircraft were everywhere crashing in flames."² Torpedoes were dropped mostly at long range, but many of the aircraft continued to close the formation to attack personnel with machine-guns. Simultaneously, a number of high level bombers supported by Zero fighters, released their bombs, but these inflicted no damage though they fell close to some of the transports. The destroyer *Jarvis* was hit by a torpedo starboard side forward, but was able to reach shallow water under her own

¹ Rear-Admiral Turner remarked on the great value of this report which enabled all ships to be under way and manoeuvring at high speed when the attack developed.

² Rear-Admiral Crutchley's report.

steam,¹ and the transport *George F. Elliott* was set on fire by an aircraft which flew—apparently deliberately²—into her superstructure. Efforts to control the fire had failed and she eventually became a total loss.

After the attack the torpedo bombers withdrew towards Savo Island; this course took them close to the Tulagi Squadron by which they were heavily engaged. Altogether at least 12, probably 14, were destroyed. Commenting on the action, Rear-Admiral Crutchley remarked, "The attack had been well pressed home by a strong force, but was badly designed in that all the aircraft attacked from the same direction, so enabling us to concentrate the full volume of our fire on them, and simplifying the avoiding action it was necessary to take." As soon as the enemy aircraft had withdrawn, the transports returned to the unloading areas, but at 1400 another force of enemy bombers was reported approaching and they again got under way. No attack developed, however, and at 1630 unloading operations were once more resumed.

Ashore meanwhile, in the northern area the occupation of Tulagi had been completed and Gavutu and Tanambogo Islands captured. Although given the opportunity the Japanese refused to surrender, and fought on fanatically to the last. The total enemy losses in the Tulagi area seem to have been 2,400 killed³ and 10 prisoners; the United States losses were approximately 300 killed and 200 wounded. In Guadalcanal the occupation area had been extended, and U.S. troops held from Tenaru to Kukum, including the airfield.

As the day drew to a close, the operation seemed to be going very much according to plan, though the unloading programme was considerably behind scheduled time. But at this stage a decision was taken which gravely affected the whole situation. Since the operation started the Air Support Force had been cruising some 75 miles to the southwestward of Guadalcanal, carrying out flying operations according to plan. During this period it had destroyed 47 enemy aircraft for a loss of 21 fighters. At 1807, 8th August, Vice-Admiral Fletcher signalled to Vice-Admiral Ghormley that owing to the reduction of the carrier fighter strength from 99 to 78 and the large number of enemy torpedo and bomber aircraft in the vicinity, and also because fuel was running low, he recommended the immediate withdrawal of the Air Support Force. This was approved by Admiral Ghormley and the force withdrew to the southeastward.⁴ This meant that Rear-Admiral Turner's force would be deprived of air cover the next day, when heavy enemy air attacks had to be expected.

At 1830, 8th August, Rear-Admiral Crutchley took up night dispositions similar to those of the previous night (see Plan 6). The destroyers *Blue* and *Ralph Talbot* were to seaward of Savo Island on radar and anti-submarine patrol; the *Vincennes*, *Astoria* and *Quincey* screened by the *Helm* and *Wilson* (known as the "Vincennes Group") to the north of a line drawn 125° from

¹ The *Jarvis* was subsequently lost while on passage to Vila for repairs.

² The desperation with which the Japanese fought is worth noting. Rear-Admiral Crutchley mentions that the crew of one aircraft which had been shot down opened fire with revolvers on the *Jarvis* when she approached their rubber boat to pick them up. They then shot themselves.

³ No count was made as the caves and galleries used by the Japanese were blown in, and no attempt was made to disinter the dead.

⁴ It will be remembered that the original plan anticipated that the majority of the transports would have left the Tulagi-Guadalcanal area by the night of 8th/9th August. It is not clear whether Vice-Admiral Fletcher was fully aware of the extent to which unloading had been delayed.

Savo Island, and the *Australia*, *Canberra* and *Chicago* screened by the *Patterson* and *Bagley* to the south of this line.¹

Just about this time a delayed report was received from Melbourne stating that a Japanese force of three cruisers, two seaplane tenders or gunboats and three destroyers had been sighted at 1125 that morning (8th August) in position lat. 5° 49' S., long. 156° 07' E. (50 miles north of Bougainville Strait) steering 120°, 15 knots. It was realised that this force could reach the Tulagi area during the night, but to do so it would have to pass through an area covered by Rear-Admiral McCain's air patrols,² and this, together with the course and composition of the enemy as reported, convinced Rear-Admiral Turner that they were bound for Rekata Bay, from whence they could initiate torpedo plane attacks.

In view of the deterioration of the prospects of the Amphibious Force consequent on the delays in unloading and the withdrawal of the Air Support Force, Rear-Admiral Crutchley was not surprised to receive a message from Rear-Admiral Turner at 2045, 8th August, requesting him to attend a conference on board the *McCawley*. He accordingly ordered the *Chicago* to take charge of the southern patrol, informing him that he did not know whether he would rejoin that night, and proceeded in the *Australia* to "X-Ray" anchorage.

6. Japanese counter measures, 7th-8th August, 1942³ (Plan 2)

Meanwhile the enemy, though taken completely by surprise by the arrival of the expeditionary force at Tulagi, had not been slow to react. At 0820, 7th August—just two hours after the first shot had been fired—the Commander-in-Chief, 8th Japanese Fleet,⁴ at Rabaul, ordered the 6th Cruiser Division, consisting of the 8-in cruisers *Kako*, *Kinagasa*, *Aoba* and *Furutaka* to proceed as soon as possible so as to arrive in position lat. 4° S., long. 157° 30' E. (about 180 miles N.N.E. of Bougainville Strait) at sundown (1820) that evening.⁵ During the forenoon the 8-in cruiser *Chokai* (Flag, Vice-Admiral Mikawa) accompanied by the light cruisers *Tenryu* and *Yubari* (18th Cruiser Division) and one destroyer, left Rabaul, and three submarines (I.121, 122 and 123) were ordered to leave early next morning to attack transports in the Guadalcanal area. Air attacks were also ordered, which have already been described (see Secs. 5 and 6 *ante*).

The surface forces from Rabaul made contact with the 6th Cruiser Division, and at 1120, 8th August, the force was sighted east of Bougainville by an Allied aircraft, which they claim to have driven off. At this time they were heading east-southeasterly, while recovering their own aircraft, a fortunate circumstance for them, as it probably gave rise to the information in the report of them which

¹ The 8-in. cruisers had been divided into two groups, partly as being the most effective method to cover the approaches both north and south of Savo Island, and partly because the *Vincennes* group had only arrived from the Atlantic shortly before the operation. They had consequently never worked under Rear-Admiral Crutchley, and for this reason both he and Rear-Admiral Turner considered it better that they should work under the tactical command of their Senior Officer (Captain Riefkohl) within the framework of Rear-Admiral Crutchley's plan.

² Actually bad weather had prevented these patrols from being carried out, but of this Rear-Admiral Turner was unaware.

³ From information derived from captured documents and the interrogation of prisoners.

⁴ Vice-Admiral Gunichi. Mikawa, I.J.N.

⁵ It is not known where the 6th Cruiser Division was at the time.

⁵ The 6th Cruiser Division was then operating from Kaviery.

seriously misled Rear-Admiral Turner as to their intentions.¹ (See *ante*, p. 12.) Passing between Isabel and New Georgia Islands they steered direct for Savo Island, and no doubt deemed themselves fortunate in not being again sighted by Allied air reconnaissance, which they must have expected would be covering the area. About sunset (1817) their own aircraft reconnoitred the Tulagi-Guadalcanal area, and reported the heavy cruisers south of Savo. This reconnaissance was repeated about two hours before the Japanese squadron was due to arrive off Savo, at which time the scouting aircraft were to illuminate the transport area by dropping flares. Information as to the position of the U.S. transports was also transmitted by observers on shore, who were aided by the light from the still burning *George F. Elliott*.

At 0100, 9th August—just as the meeting on board the *McCawley* was breaking up—the last stage of the approach was commenced from a position some 10 miles to the northwestward of Savo. In order to avoid confusion and accidents in the dark, the Japanese striking force was formed in one column in line ahead, the *Chokai* leading, then the 6th Division (in the order *Aoba*, *Kinugasa*, *Kako*, *Furutaka*) with the 18th Division (the light cruisers *Tenryu*, *Yubari* and the destroyer *Yunagi*) following some 5 to 10 cables astern.

Half an hour later, the southern U.S. radar patrol destroyer (the *Blue*) was sighted close on the starboard bow, moving slowly to the southward. Speed was immediately decreased to 12 knots in order to reduce the wakes, and all guns were trained on the unsuspecting destroyer, which was passed so close (about 500 yards) that the Japanese feared they were being lured into a trap; however, they held their fire and, once clear, increased their speed to 26 knots and steered to round Savo Island.²

7. Decision to withdraw surface forces

On arrival at "X-Ray" anchorage, Rear-Admiral Crutchley proceeded on board the *McCawley* for conference with Rear-Admiral Turner and Major-General Vandegrift. The situation at this time may be summarised as follows:—

All the principal objectives ashore were in the hands of the landing forces, but the unloading operations, already retarded by congestion on the Guadalcanal beach, had been further delayed by the enemy air activities and a considerable quantity of important stores still remained in the transports. At Tulagi unloading had barely started.

So far the only naval casualties had been the loss of one transport and serious damage to two destroyers; but it was known that air reinforcements were reaching the enemy at Rabaul, and seaplane tenders had been reported moving to the southward. Though heavy and more frequent torpedo and bombing attacks had to be expected, the Air Support Force was withdrawing, thereby depriving the Amphibious Force of all fighter protection. It was a difficult situation.

¹ The Japanese took no chances. After recovering their aircraft, they steered towards Rabaul till the Allied aircraft was out of sight.

² The northern U.S. radar patrol destroyer (the *Palah Tolbat*) was also present.

Footnote 2. Cancel last sentence of footnote "According to . . . shortly afterwards" and substitute:—

At 0136 the *Yunagi* was ordered to remain to the westward of Savo Island to deal with the patrols in case of need.

Savo Island, and the *Australia*, *Canberra* and *Chicago* screened by the *Patterson* and *Bagley* to the south of this line.¹

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¹ The Japanese took no chances. After recovering their aircraft, they steered towards Rabaul till the Allied aircraft was out of sight.

² The northern U.S. radar patrol destroyer (the *Ralph Talbot*) was also sighted about the same time some distance on the port bow. According to one Japanese account, their own destroyer was ordered to remain to the westward of Savo to deal with the patrols in case of need, but she seems to have been with the light cruisers during the action which developed shortly afterwards.

After consideration of all the circumstances, Rear-Admiral Turner decided that he must withdraw his surface forces at 0730 next morning (9th August).¹ Both Major-General Vandegrift and Rear-Admiral Crutchley agreed with this decision, and orders were then issued for the speedy disembarkation of certain specified items during the night. During the meeting the probable intentions of the enemy force reported northeast of Bougainville Strait at 1125 that forenoon were discussed by the two admirals. Rear-Admiral Turner was of opinion that it was bound for Rekata and mentioned that he had requested a full scale bombing attack on them there the next day.

It was 0115, 9th August, before Rear-Admiral Crutchley got back to the *Australia*, and after clearing the transport area he decided not to rejoin his patrol group for the few hours of darkness which remained, and ordered the *Australia* to patrol in the vicinity of Squadron X, keeping within the anti-submarine destroyer screen. Scarcely had she started this patrol when at 0146 green flares dropped by aircraft began to show up to the southward and southeastward of the transport area.² Then, for the first time, Rear-Admiral Crutchley learnt that at 0018, during his absence from the ship, a report had been broadcast of aircraft in the vicinity.³

Suspecting submarine or air attack the *Australia* kept as nearly as possible end on to the flares, *i.e.*, steering to the northwestward. Four minutes later (0150) a flare was seen in the direction of the channel to the southwest of Savo Island, followed by a few rounds of tracer fire, which were thought to be from the *Australia* group engaging the flare dropper. Suddenly a burst of heavy surface fire came from the east of the ship firing the tracers, and then a general night action began, which at 0156 appeared to move to the right and to increase tremendously in intensity.

Rear-Admiral Crutchley found himself in a peculiar position. He had received no enemy report of any sort, and though he could see a fierce night action being fought he had absolutely no knowledge of the number or nature of the enemy, or of the progress of the engagement; but he was confident that his five 8-in. cruisers and four destroyers inside Savo Island could effectively deal with any enemy force likely to be present.⁴ He therefore decided to await reports from the forces in action and ordered the *Australia* to patrol on courses 060°—240° about 7 miles west of X Transport Group where she would be well placed to intercept any enemy units which might penetrate our patrols, before they could reach the transports. He also ordered the destroyers not in contact with the enemy to concentrate on his flag.⁵ Still no reports came in

¹ This decision was subsequently fully approved by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy, Admiral E. J. King.

² The use of flares to illuminate the transports in the anchorages had been foreseen by Rear-Admiral Crutchley, who during the passage from Fiji had ordered all the destroyers of the escort force to prepare long-handled wire mesh landing nets to deal with them.

³ For some unexplained reason this warning had not been reported either to Rear-Admiral Turner or Rear-Admiral Crutchley.

⁴ From intelligence and reconnaissance reports. It is not known what intelligence was available, but it seems that there was no indication of the possibility of the employment of five 8-in. cruisers as a striking force. Had this been considered possible, presumably some different scheme of patrol would have been adopted, which would have allowed of the Allied 8-in. cruisers being kept concentrated.

⁵ Owing to communication errors, these destroyers concentrated 5 miles northwest of Savo Island. This was a concentration point established in Rear-Admiral Crutchley's special instructions, intended for use when good warning of enemy approach had been received. Actually, the concentration of the destroyers at this point, and not on the *Australia*, did not affect the issue of the action, and assisted greatly in the saving of life from our stricken cruisers.

and at 0226 he signalled to the *Chicago*, *Vincennes* and Rear-Admiral Scott in the *San Juan*, "Are your groups in action?" From the *Chicago* came the laconic reply, "Were, but not now"; from Rear-Admiral Scott, "This force not in action—appears to be the surface force between Florida and Savo Island." No reply came from the *Vincennes*, nor did subsequent attempts succeed in establishing communication with her, the *Quincy* or the *Astoria*.

By 0240 firing had ceased; three ships could be seen on fire between Savo Island and Florida. In response to an order from Rear-Admiral Crutchley to "report situation," the *Chicago* replied, "*Chicago* south of Savo Island. Hit by torpedo, slightly down by bow. Enemy ships firing to seaward. *Canberra* burning on bearing 250° 5 miles from Savo." Two destroyers standing by *Canberra*. At 0515 the *Ralph Talbot* reported she was badly damaged near the shore west of Savo, and shortly afterwards there was another burst of gunfire apparently east of Savo. That was all that was known of the events of the night; but the recent firing seemed to indicate that the enemy were still about, and Rear-Admiral Crutchley accordingly warned the escort forces to be prepared to give battle at dawn in the vicinity of the transport groups.

8. Night action off Savo Island, 9th August, 1942 (Plan 6)

To return to the forces off Savo Island. After Rear-Admiral Crutchley's departure the *Canberra* (Captain Getting) and *Chicago* (Captain Bode) with the *Bagley* and *Patterson* about a mile on either bow continued to patrol in line ahead on courses 310° and 130° at 12½ knots. The course was reversed every hour, the northwesterly turning point being about five miles to the southeast of Savo Island. The *Chicago* had been rear ship in the original formation; Captain Bode, who was the senior officer, decided not to alter this order and directed the *Canberra* to remain ahead of him and to conduct the patrol.²

To the north the *Vincennes* Group under Captain Riefkohl had adopted a somewhat different method of carrying out the patrol. This consisted of steaming at 10 knots clockwise round a square, the centre of which was lat. 9° 07' 15" S., long. 159° 57' 30" E., and the sides running 045° and 135°, course being altered 90° every half-hour. The cruisers were in line ahead in the order *Vincennes* (Captain Riefkohl), *Quincy* (Captain Moore), *Astoria* (Captain Greenman), with the destroyers *Helm* to port and *Wilson* to starboard 1,500 yards on the bows of the *Vincennes*.

It was a dark night, the visibility moderate, and at times very bad; the sea was calm, the sky overcast, the wind from the southeast, and after midnight there were frequent heavy rain squalls and lightning.³

The ships settled down to what promised to be a monotonous night of patrolling. All hands, especially the officers, were fagged after 48 hours of

¹ This position is obviously in error. Possibly "150° 5 miles from Savo" was intended.

² This proved unfortunate, as when the attack came the *Chicago*, being rear ship, was unable to conduct the action by "follow the leader" methods.

³ The visibility was very variable, especially as the night wore on. Unless this is realised, it is difficult to account for the sightings and failures to sight which occurred. For example, at 0155 the *Hobart* was able to identify a ship on fire as the *Canberra* at a distance of 10 miles, while three-quarters of an hour later the *Australia* states that owing to heavy rain squalls—which continued till daylight—"visibility was nil at times, and seldom more than 4 cables."

incessant strain, and on this account the second degree of readiness was assumed in all the cruisers.¹

Nothing of interest occurred till 2345, 8th August, when the *Ralph Talbot* on radar patrol to the northward of Savo sighted an aircraft flying low over the island, heading east. This she immediately reported. From this time onwards several ships heard aircraft at infrequent intervals, but no particular importance seems to have been attached to these reports, and—as mentioned before—they did not reach either Admiral till a couple of hours later.

At about ⁰¹⁴³0145, 9th August, the *Canberra*, leading the *Chicago*, with the *Patterson* on the port bow and the *Bagley* on the starboard bow, was nearing Savo Island, steering 310°, 12½ knots. Suddenly flares appeared in the direction of "X-Ray" anchorage and at almost the same moment the destroyers sighted ships slightly on the port bow of the formation, steering approximately 125°. Both destroyers altered course to port within a few seconds of each other,




Fig. 1. Situation on contact, ⁰¹⁴³0145, 9th August, 1942.

Note.—This plan is conjectural only, based on written reports.

¹ In the *Canberra* half the armament and damage control parties were closed up, the men off watch resting at or near their stations. No guns were loaded. The aircraft had been de-fuelled at dusk, but was bombed up with 4—100 lb. bombs. By day she had been in the first degree of readiness, hands getting their meals at their stations, since 1000, 6th August.

The Americans at this time had no stations quite corresponding to this state of readiness, and required somewhat longer than the Australian ships fully to man their armament.

intending to fire torpedoes to starboard, the *Patterson* broadcasting a warning as she turned.¹ Neither destroyer got her torpedoes off at this all-important juncture. The *Bagley* swung past the safe firing bearing before the primers could be inserted; she continued her swing, and fired four torpedoes from the port side some three to four minutes later, by which time the enemy had passed and could be but dimly seen. No hits were claimed. In the *Patterson* the order to fire torpedoes was drowned by the roar of the guns which opened fire at that moment.²

As the destroyers swung to port the *Canberra* sighted torpedo tracks passing on parallel courses from ahead on either beam; the rudder was put to port and the alarm sounded, and immediately afterwards ships were sighted ahead



Fig. 2. Situation at 0151, 9th August, 1942

Note.—This plan is conjectural only, based on written reports.

¹ This warning was received by the *Quincy*, *Wilson* and *Ralph Talbot*. No mention was made of it in the reports of the other ships concerned.

² It was not discovered on the *Patterson's* bridge that torpedoes had not been fired till some minutes later, and no further opportunity of getting them off occurred.

crossing from port to starboard.¹ Captain Getting, who had been in his sea cabin, was on the bridge within a few seconds; full speed was ordered and the rudder put hard to starboard in order to open port arcs; but it was too late. As the ship was swinging, and before the turrets could be trained, the enemy opened fire at almost point blank range. Within a minute the *Canberra* received about 24 hits by shell estimated as 5-in.; both boiler rooms were put out of action, all light and power failed, many fires broke out, and the 4-in. gun deck received particularly heavy damage, thus leaving the ship completely defenceless and disabled.² It is believed that one or two salvos from the port 4-in. guns and two torpedoes were fired at the enemy; X turret may have got off one round. By the end of this minute (about 0145) the captain had been mortally wounded³ and most of the bridge personnel disabled or killed; the ship was listing 10° to starboard⁴; fires were raging in both "A" and "B" boiler room flats; and the stoker petty officers' mess, dental surgery and both flats were filled with steam and smoke. There were fires also in the torpedo space and outside the warrant officers' and gunroom galleys, and the aircraft was blazing furiously. Steam failed and the ship came to a standstill.

In the *Chicago*, meanwhile, just as the *Canberra* started to swing to starboard, torpedo tracks were observed on the starboard bow. The rudder was put to starboard, but a few seconds later other torpedo tracks were sighted to port, and the helm was reversed. One torpedo, however, hit her well forward in the port bow. This caused serious structural damage, but did not affect her fighting efficiency for the time being. A few seconds later a shell hit her foremast. Nothing could be seen of the enemy from the *Chicago*, except gun flashes on both bows; she therefore fired four salvos of star shells, none of which, however, illuminated. Her movements are not quite clear, but she seems to have continued turning a complete circle under port rudder, and two or three minutes after the torpedo hit engaged a destroyer on the port bow at 7,200 yards range.⁵ After firing 25 rounds of 5-in., she lost the target and apparently continued her swing to port, finally steadying on a westerly course, while "a gun engagement to starboard drew to the northward." This may have been the *Yunagi* engaging the *Patterson* which after coming under a heavy fire during her initial alteration to port, had settled down on an easterly course to an engagement with the rear cruiser⁶ which lasted till about 0200; or may have been the opening of the attack on the *Vincennes*' Group, which was developing by this time (0152).

This attack was even more deadly than that on the *Canberra*. Taken by surprise, all three U.S. cruisers were virtually put out of action within the first few minutes. The enemy, who attacked from the southward, circled their rear, and passing to the eastward of them finally withdrew to the northwestward, leaving the *Vincennes* and *Quincy* sinking and the *Astoria* so heavily on fire that she had to be abandoned next forenoon.

¹ A keen-eyed look-out had reported ships on the port bow a minute or so earlier, but they could not be made out by the officer of the watch or anybody else on the bridge.

Page 18

Footnotes. Insert new footnote 5:—

⁵ This was probably the destroyer *Yunagi* which it is now known had been detached at 0136 to prevent interference by the *Blue*. The *Jarvis* (which had been damaged in the air attack the day before and had no means of communication) also chanced to be in this vicinity, on passage to Sydney.

⁶ Reported as *Yunagi* type but it is not. *Patterson* was hit early and had one gun put out of action. She claimed several hits on the enemy causing a fire amidships and extinguishing a searchlight.

The force was on the northwesterly leg of its patrol (*i.e.*, in the southern part of the area) when at 0145 the flares appeared to the southeastward, followed by gunfire to the right of them. Speed was increased to 15 knots and the alarm sounded; but before the ships' companies were properly closed up at general quarters, the force was illuminated by searchlights and a devastating fire opened from the port quarter, concentrated in the first place on the van ships. Captain Riefkohl had just time to order the formation to "open fire on opportune targets" when the *Vincennes* was heavily hit; fires broke out and her directors and all means of external communication were put out of action. She altered course to port to close the range, steadying on about 275°, and returned the fire, obtaining a hit on the left-hand enemy ship with her second salvo; but she was herself hit "innumerable times by 8-in. and 5-in. shells"¹ and after getting off seven to ten salvos in local control, her turrets were put out of action and she altered course to starboard in an endeavour to dodge the salvos. As she was turning, she was hit by at least two torpedoes on the port side near the bridge and in the vicinity of the forward engine room. Soon afterwards power on the main engines failed; fires were raging everywhere and these could not be dealt with, as the fire main had been fractured. While in this condition, the ship was illuminated and fired on from the starboard side by what were taken to be destroyers.² The enemy ceased fire at about 0215, leaving the ship blazing and listing heavily to port; a quarter of an hour later the order was given to abandon ship, and she sank at about 0245.

The next ship in the line—the *Quincy*—had sighted three cruisers rounding the south end of Savo just before the searchlights came on; their silhouettes showed three turrets forward, of which the middle was highest.³

She got off a 9-gun salvo at 6,000 yards' range as she received her first hit; while following the *Vincennes* round to port, and later to the northward, she received heavy punishment, and shortly afterwards hauled round to the eastward independently, in order to open her starboard "A" arcs. During this turn she was "repeatedly hit by large and small calibre shell throughout her full length." As soon as it would bear the starboard A/A battery fired three salvos of starshell, and turrets 1 and 2 got off two salvos; then all guns were disabled. By this time almost all the bridge personnel had been killed, fires were raging on the upper deck and between decks, no water was available above the main deck, and Nos. 1, 3 and 4 boiler rooms were out of action; No. 4 boiler room was also on fire, it is thought from a torpedo hit received while following the *Vincennes* round to the northward.⁴ The engine rooms

¹ Signalled report of Captain Riefkohl.

² It is not clear from the *Vincennes* report which way she was heading at this time. It seems probable that she had swung right round to the south eastward. The *Helm*'s report states that shortly after 0205 the *Vincennes* "had turned around and was firing in an easterly direction." If this supposition is correct, the "destroyers" were no doubt the Japanese light cruisers which after engaging the *Chicago*'s group, passed on a northerly course between the *Vincennes* group and Savo Island, to rejoin their heavy cruisers.

³ This report was of interest at the subsequent investigation into the action, as indicating the probable composition of the enemy force. The description applied to the *Chokai*, *Furutaka* and *Kako*.

⁴ It was during this turn that the *Vincennes* received her torpedo hits. The Japanese reports which have been seen do not mention any specific torpedo attacks, merely stating that their ships fired guns and torpedoes. When the *Quincy* eventually turned over a large hole, 15 or 20 feet long was observed in the port side of her bottom. There were no survivors from either Nos. 3 and 4 boiler rooms.

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² For further details as to shell hits, see App. F.

³ Captain Getting died of his wounds on 10th August and was buried at sea.

⁴ It was thought at the time that the ship had been hit by one or two torpedoes; but careful subsequent investigation established that this was improbable.

⁶ Reported as *Jintsu* type but it is now known that none of this class was present. The *Patterson* was hit early and had one gun put out of action. She claimed several hits on the enemy causing a fire amidships and extinguishing a searchlight.

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³ Subsequent investigation into the action, as indicating the enemy force. The description applied to the *Chokai*,

⁴ During this turn that the *Vincennes* received her torpedo hits. The Japanese reports which have been seen do not mention any specific torpedo attacks, merely stating that their ships fired guns and torpedoes. When the *Quincy* eventually turned over a large hole, 15 or 20 feet long was observed in the port side of her bottom. There were no survivors from either Nos. 3 and 4 boiler rooms.



Page 20

Fig. 3.

- Delete both references to "Yunagi".
- For "Tatsuta" read "Yubari".
- Amend Furutaka's course to 000° at 0151.
- Delete Furutaka from position shown for 0200.
- Insert Furutaka ahead of Tenryu at 0200.

P269/57

Note.—This plan is conjectural only, based on written reports.

continued to function so long as there was steam, but the remaining boiler room was hit at 0200, and had to be abandoned 20 minutes later.

The report of the senior surviving officer¹ gives a graphic account of the last moments of the *Quincy* :—

"When the flames which engulfed the forward control station subsided, an officer went to the bridge to see what the orders were regarding further firing and manoeuvring. He found a quartermaster spinning the wheel trying to turn the ship to starboard, who said that the Captain had told him to beach the ship. Just then the Captain rose up about halfway and collapsed, dead. No others were moving in the pilot house, which was thick with bodies. Upon receipt of this information the control forward and sky control stations, which had been inoperative for several minutes, were ordered to be abandoned. . . . By this time the ship was no longer being fired on, was listing rapidly to port, the forecabin was awash, water was coming over the gun deck to port, and fires were blazing intermittently the whole length of the ship. The party from aloft found nothing but carnage about the gun decks and dense smoke and

¹ Lieutenant-Commander H. B. Heneberger, U.S.N.



Page 21.
Fig. 4.

- For "Tatsuta" read "Yubari".
- Delete Furutaka from positions shown for 0200 and 0215.
- Insert Furutaka ahead of Tenryu.
- After "Possible course of Tenryu" add "and Furutaka".

P269/57

heat coming from below decks. . . . They assisted in cutting away life rafts . . . and were ordered to abandon ship by the senior officer present—the Gunnery Officer—as the water at this point was nearly all the way across the gun deck. About a minute later the ship capsized to port, the bow went under, the stern raised and the ship slid from view into the depths. This occurred between 0235 and 0240."

The *Astoria* fared little better than her consorts. As the *Vincennes* and *Quincy* came under fire, she opened fire at a radar range of 5,640 yards and one enemy vessel was observed to be hit.¹ As soon as the *Vincennes* and *Quincy* were seen to be altering course to port, the *Astoria* conformed; but as the enemy's bearing drew aft, she found she was fouling the *Quincy*'s range. She therefore altered hard under her stern, and steered to the northward, engaging the enemy to starboard. During this period she came under a very heavy concentration of fire; fires broke out throughout the ship and the fire main was severed; bridge, radar centres, and control positions were hit; smoke and flames compelled the evacuation of engine and boiler rooms, and her main armament, after firing about 10 salvos, was put out of action. After four or five minutes she altered course to the southwestward, and narrowly avoided a collision with the *Quincy*, which—blazing fore and aft and not under control—passed close down her starboard side and dropped astern. The secondary batteries continued to fire till their crews were killed or driven off by the fires

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¹ This was brought about by the *Furutaka* and the light cruisers, after the attack on the *Canberra*, coming into action on the port side, while the remaining heavy cruisers circled the rear.

P269/57




Fig. 3. Situation at 0151-0200

Note.—This plan is conjectural only, based on written reports.

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Fig. 4. Vincennes Group, 0200-0215

Note.—This plan is conjectural only, based on written reports.

heat coming from below decks. . . . They assisted in cutting away life rafts . . . and were ordered to abandon ship by the senior officer present—the Gunnery Officer—as the water at this point was nearly all the way across the gun deck. About a minute later the ship capsized to port, the bow went under, the stern raised and the ship slid from view into the depths. This occurred between 0235 and 0240."

The *Astoria* fared little better than her consorts. As the *Vincennes* and *Quincy* came under fire, she opened fire at a radar range of 5,640 yards and one enemy vessel was observed to be hit.¹ As soon as the *Vincennes* and *Quincy* were seen to be altering course to port, the *Astoria* conformed; but as the enemy's bearing drew aft, she found she was fouling the *Quincy's* range. She therefore altered hard under her stern, and steered to the northward, engaging the enemy to starboard. During this period she came under a very heavy concentration of fire; fires broke out throughout the ship and the fire main was severed; bridge, radar centres, and control positions were hit; smoke and flames compelled the evacuation of engine and boiler rooms, and her main armament, after firing about 10 salvos, was put out of action. After four or five minutes she altered course to the southwestward, and narrowly avoided a collision with the *Quincy*, which—blazing fore and aft and not under control—passed close down her starboard side and dropped astern. The secondary batteries continued to fire till their crews were killed or driven off by the fires

¹ The *Astoria* reported that shortly after fire was opened the column found itself under a cross fire from both port and starboard quarters. This was brought about by the light cruisers, after their attack on the *Canberra*, coming into action on the port side, just after the heavy cruisers had circled the rear.

Page 20

Fig. 3.

Delete
For

Amend Furutaka's course to 000 at 0151.
Delete Furutaka from position shown for 0200.
Insert Furutaka ahead of Tenryu at 0200.

P269/57

Note.—This plan is conjectural only, based on written reports.

continued to function so long as there was steam, but the remaining boiler room was hit at 0200, and had to be abandoned 20 minutes later.

The report of the senior surviving officer¹ gives a graphic account of the last moments of the *Quincy* :—

"When the flames which engulfed the forward control station subsided, an officer went to the bridge to see what the orders were regarding further firing and manoeuvring. He found a quartermaster spinning the wheel trying to turn the ship to starboard, who said that the Captain had told him to beach the ship. Just then the Captain rose up about halfway and collapsed, dead. No others were moving in the pilot house, which was thick with bodies. Upon receipt of this information the control forward and sky control stations, which had been inoperative for several minutes, were ordered to be abandoned. . . . By this time the ship was no longer being fired on, was listing rapidly to port, the forecastle was awash, water was coming over the gun deck to port, and fires were blazing intermittently the whole length of the ship. The party from

raging on the upper deck. Then, just as power failed, the enemy ceased fire and disappeared.¹

The part played by the screening destroyers in this action is difficult to follow. The *Wilson* (Lieut. Comdr. Price) originally on the disengaged (starboard) bow opened fire at once on the leading enemy searchlight at an estimated range of 12,000 yards. When the *Vincennes* altered course to starboard she conformed, and several minutes later had to alter hard to port, at 30 knots, to avoid a collision with a *Monssen* class destroyer which appeared close aboard on her starboard bow.² The *Wilson* continued firing at a range of 9,600 yards, expending in all 212 rounds, until the searchlights were switched off and no more targets were in view, when she shaped course for the destroyers' rendezvous north-west of Savo.




Fig. 5. Action between U.S. destroyer *Ralph Talbot* and enemy cruiser, 0217-0221, 9th August, 1942

Note.—This plan is conjectural only, based on written reports.

¹ No alterations of course or speed were mentioned in the *Astoria's* original (signalled) report of the actions. The movements mentioned above are taken from the account subsequently issued in the U.S. Combat Narrative on the subject. The *Bagley* placed her approximately 5 miles NE. of Savo Island when she went alongside 2½ hours later to take off survivors. This position is hard to reconcile with the last course she was known to be steering i.e. to the south westward, but she may well have turned right round to the northward during the last few minutes before power failed, without the fact being recorded. The point is of no great importance, the main lines of how the action went being only too clear.

² The *Wilson's* report does not state the time or how she was heading when this incident occurred. If, as seems probable (though she does not mention it), she had conformed with the *Vincennes* original alteration to port, the destroyer may possibly have been the *Helm*, which had held on, "ahead of the formation for some minutes" before turning to the south. The *Helm*, however, makes no mention of any narrow escape from collision. The incident was noticed in the *Vincennes* just as she was turning to the northward, which places the time at about 0159. The unknown destroyer may have been the *Yumagi* whose silhouette was not unlike the U.S. destroyers, but it has not been possible to establish this.

The *Helm* (Lieut.-Comdr. Carroll) hardly got into action at all. Just after the firing started, she received orders from the *Vincennes* for the screening destroyers to attack,¹ but from the first smoke from guns and fires obscured her view, and though it was realised that the attack was from the southeast, no clear picture of the situation could be obtained. She therefore "remained ahead of the formation for several minutes, then headed south. At about 0200 a ship was sighted on the starboard bow, partially illuminated by searchlight, distance about 8,000 yards. It appeared to be headed to seaward, passing close to the south side of Savo Island." Believing her to be an enemy, the *Helm* "changed course to the southeast and headed for the unknown ship at full speed. While closing the ship she was again momentarily illuminated, and her identity was established as one of our own destroyers."² Having meanwhile received orders for destroyers to concentrate, the *Helm* then turned to the north-westward for the rendezvous. Her course led her between the *Quincy*, stopped and heavily damaged, and the *Vincennes* which had turned round and was firing to the eastward. The *Helm* remained near the latter for some time, trying to locate the source of enemy fire. Several salvos fell very close to her, and orders had just been given to fire on the searchlights when they were switched off and firing ceased. This was at about 0215.

At 0220 firing broke out to the north-westward. The *Helm* headed for this action at 30 knots, but the firing died down after only a few salvos. Five minutes later a flash of lightning revealed a friendly destroyer, and the *Helm* carried on for the rendezvous, where she fell in with the *Wilson* and awaited further developments.

This brief action witnessed by the *Helm* was fought between the *Ralph Talbot* (Lieut.-Comdr. Callahan) and a Japanese light cruiser. The *Ralph Talbot* on seeing the attack on the *Vincennes* Group had left her patrol and stood to the southward towards Savo Island. At about 0217 a searchlight on the port beam illuminated her, and she came under fire at about 7,000 yards range. The fire was not returned, since Lieut.-Comdr. Callahan was certain the ship firing on him was friendly. He altered course to the westward, showing recognition lights and protesting by radio telephony, and the firing ceased but not before a hit was received on No. 1 torpedo tube, which killed two men and put the tube out of action.³ Just then the dim shape of an enemy cruiser was sighted on the port quarter crossing from port to starboard, on a north-westerly course. The *Ralph Talbot* altered course to starboard, and as the enemy—by then on the starboard quarter—switched on searchlights, fired three torpedoes.

¹ Captain Riefkohl in his report does not mention giving these orders. He was probably under the impression that his external communication facilities had been destroyed before they were passed (see p. 18-19 ante.).

² There are two possible explanations of this incident:—

If the *Helm* on her southerly course sighted the stranger on her "starboard bow... passing close to the southward of..... Savo Island," the course towards her must have been south-westerly not south-east, as stated. In this case the unknown ship might have been the *Bagley* which would have been approximately in this position steering to the westward at the time (see p. 26.) This makes it difficult to explain how the *Helm's* subsequent north-westerly course for the rendezvous could have taken her between the *Vincennes* and *Quincy*, but on the whole is considered the more probable.

If, on the other hand, she actually sighted the ship on the port bow, and steered to the south-eastward, the only possible American destroyer would be the *Patterson*, returning to the westward after her action with the light cruiser. It is also difficult to explain the *Helm* apparently seeing nothing of the enemy light cruisers but the variability of the visibility might account for this.

³ It is not known what ship engaged the *Ralph Talbot* at this time. It was probably the *FURUTAKA* or *TENRYU*.

Both ships opened fire practically simultaneously at 3,300 yards. After her second salvo, the *Ralph Talbot* was hit; she swung to port to fire her port torpedoes, but her control circuits had been cut and she got off only one torpedo in local control. She then received three hits in quick succession, and herself hit the enemy searchlights, which went out, and the action came to an end. The *Ralph Talbot*, listing 20° to starboard and with a big fire in the charthouse, stood towards the western shore of Savo Island.¹

This was the last seen of the enemy.

Little more remains to be told of this disastrous encounter. To return to the southern patrol group, in the *Canberra*—stopped, listing and ablaze—strenuous efforts were made to quell the fires on the upper deck by means of bucket chains. This was assisted by heavy rain squalls. Petrol tanks were slipped, the remaining torpedoes fired, magazines flooded and ready-use ammunition dumped overboard. The wounded were collected on deck and as many as possible placed in the cutters, and the ship was closed down amidships in the hope that the fire between decks would smother itself.

The *Chicago* meanwhile had stood to the westward at 12 knots, investigating the results of the torpedo hit, and shoring up bulkheads. The damage was not so serious as might have been expected, and a speed of up to 25 knots was considered safe. At 0200 she saw a gun action to the westward of Savo Island, and increased to full speed, but five minutes later the firing ceased and she again reduced to 12 knots, turning to the eastward at 0228. A minute later another gun action was seen to the northward,² and shortly afterwards she was rejoined by the *Patterson*, which had passed south of Savo Island on her way to the destroyer rendezvous. Soon after 0300 the *Canberra* hove in sight and the *Patterson* was detached to stand by her, the *Chicago* continuing to the eastward. The weather by this time had considerably deteriorated, being described by the *Patterson* as "heavy rain squalls, thunder and lightning, visibility less than one mile and sea choppy." After some delay, owing to some of the *Canberra's* ready use 4-in. ammunition exploding just then the *Patterson* secured alongside about 0330. A pump and four hoses were passed over, and fire fighting continued, but at 0345 orders were received from Rear-Admiral Turner that if the *Canberra* could not be made to steam in time to join the general withdrawal which was to start at 0630, she was to be abandoned and destroyed.³ "It was realised the position was hopeless and orders were given at approximately 0415 to stop efforts to save the ship and prepare for abandoning. The list had at this time increased to 17° and there had been internal explosions and rumblings. The hoses were passed back to *Patterson* and the transfer of the wounded was continued with all despatch."⁴ Shortly after 0500 the *Patterson* as the result of a radar contact on the port quarter hurriedly cast off, and dis-

¹ The *Ralph Talbot's* wireless had been put out of action, so she was unable to report what had happened till some hours later. She remained close in to the west shore of Savo, fighting fires, jettisoning gear and effecting repairs till almost 1100, when she was able to proceed to the anchorage under her own steam.

Page 24. Footnote 2. Delete footnote and substitute:—

² It is now known that at 0200 the *Yunagi* engaged the *Jarvis* (which had been damaged in the air attack the day before and was on passage for repairs), to the westward of Savo. It is difficult to account for the engagement noticed by the *Chicago* at 0229.

³ "This is urgent. If *Canberra* cannot join our retirement in time, she should be destroyed. Our departure urgent." Rear-Admiral Crutchley ordered the *Selfridge* to investigate the state of the *Canberra*, and to order abandonment if she could not be ready by 0730.

⁴ Report by Commander J. A. Walsh, R.A.N.

appeared to the westward, exchanging shots with a cruiser. This proved to be the *Chicago*, which had altered course to the westward at 0410 on seeing what she took to be heavy gunfire in the direction of Savo Island.² Identities were established before any harm was done, and both ships soon returned to the *Canberra*, arriving just as dawn was breaking at 0550. The *Blue*³ which had left her patrol area at 0515 (by orders from the *Selfridge*), arrived about the same time, and both destroyers then went alongside the *Canberra* and took off the remainder of her survivors,⁴ the *Chicago* returning to the anchorage. This was completed by 0700 and the *Canberra* was then torpedoed and sunk by the *Selfridge*, which had meanwhile arrived on the scene.⁴




Fig. 6. Situation at dawn, 0550, 9th August, 1942
(All positions approximate)

To the north meanwhile the destroyers had been arriving independently at the rendezvous north-west of Savo from about 0400 onwards, where they re-

¹ No other ship reports gunfire at this time. Possibly what the *Chicago* observed was a heavy thunder squall.

² No enemy ship came into contact with the *Blue* on her patrol to the west of Savo. After seeing gunfire and burning ships to the eastward, she sighted a ship rounding Cape Esperance to the southwest at 0250, to which she gave chase. This proved to be the *Jarvis* en route for repairs. This was the last seen of the *Jarvis* which presumably was lost at sea. The *Blue* then returned to her patrol.

³ See App. F.1.

⁴ The *Selfridge* fired four torpedoes, fitted with magnetic pistols. One detonated under the bows; the other three passed underneath the *Canberra* without exploding, though one exploded 5,000 yards beyond.

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² It is difficult to account for these two gun actions. The first might have been the *Ralph Talbot* (see p. 23) but the time as given by the *Chicago* is about 20 minutes early. The second may possibly have been enemy ships which had got separated firing on each other during their northwesterly withdrawal. There is no mention of any such incident in the Japanese reports which have been seen. P. 269/57.

³ Rear-Admiral Crutchley had received the following signal from Rear-Admiral Turner at 0307/9. "This is urgent. If *Canberra* cannot join our retirement in time, she should be destroyed. Our departure urgent." Rear-Admiral Crutchley ordered the *Selfridge* to investigate the state of the *Canberra*, and to order abandonment if she could not be ready by 0730.

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


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9. Japanese tactics, and Remarks (Plan 6)

So complete had been the surprise, and so devastating the results achieved by the Japanese, that for some time little was known by the Allies about the action, apart from their losses. The reports of survivors were difficult to reconcile as regards times, positions and the identities of enemy ships²; three weeks after the event, the estimate of the enemy forces present was seriously in error.³

Gradually, the general lines on which the action was fought have become clear, though even now (1948) there is doubt as to certain details. From the first, two pieces of evidence gave a clue as to the enemy's movements—

all reports agreed that hits on ships of the *Chicago's* group were of 5.5-in. calibre (or below);

the *Quincy* sighted three cruisers which could only have been the *Chokai*, *Furutaka* and *Kako*, just before the searchlights came on the *Vincennes*.

According to the Japanese reports, soon after passing the *Blue* they sighted the southern group of Allied cruisers. This must have been several minutes

¹ The *Bagley's* movements are not clear. After firing her torpedoes at the commencement of the action, she "turned left and scanned the passage between Guadalcanal and Savo." At this time her gyro compass failed. After this she "passed astern of the *Canberra*" and proceeded towards the destroyer rendezvous. She then stood towards an unidentified vessel on fire 5 miles to the northeast of Savo Island which proved to be the *Astoria*.

² The *Patterson* reported being engaged with a four-funnelled cruiser for almost a quarter of an hour. Actually no four-funnelled cruiser was present; her opponent was probably the *Tanaka* (possibly the destroyer *Yunagi*). The *Patterson's* identification was three cruisers of the *Mogami* (one funnel), *Natori* (three funnels), and *Sendai* (four funnels) classes respectively. The silhouette of the *Natori* resembled that of the *Tenryu*. The *Bagley*, which was only in contact for about four minutes, identified the enemy as two of the *Tenryu* class (correct) and two *Ashigaras*. She was the nearest ship to the enemy on first sighting and possibly caught a glimpse or two of the heavy cruisers drawing to the north-eastward.

As regards times, 8 ships recorded the first appearance of the flares, and 7 the original open fire. From these times the errors of the watches used in different ships have been deduced, and in the foregoing account times have been adjusted accordingly.

Surprisingly large discrepancies occurred in the various estimates of ships' positions at the beginning of the action. It has not been possible to reconcile these, but it is believed that the positions shown in the plans are approximately correct.

³ According to the information at the disposal of C.N.S., Melbourne, on 28th August, the estimate was 3 cruisers and three destroyers. (C.N.S. Melbourne, 0730 Z/28/8/42 to 1st. Sea Lord.)

before they themselves were sighted; all ships fired torpedoes, immediately afterwards turning to the north-eastward, towards the northern group, which had been the subject of continuous reports by the *Chokai's* observation aircraft. It is probable¹ that the heavy cruisers swung to the northward, close to Savo Island, shortly afterwards altering to a more easterly course to pass to the southward of the *Vincennes* group. The light cruisers following seem to have slightly over-run the turning point ^{at the time the group} when they were sighted by the *Chicago's* group, which they engaged in passing.

A few minutes later, the *Chokai* illuminated the *Vincennes* group—then on the port bow—with searchlights, and the five 8-in. cruisers opened fire at ranges between 5,000 and 6,000 yards; then, circling the rear, engaged the American squadron from the eastward, with the results already described. In so doing but little damage was suffered by the Japanese. The *Chokai*² was hit

Page 27. Lines 17 to 35. Delete and substitute:—

The light cruisers and the *Furutaka* (the rear heavy cruiser), meanwhile, either accidentally or by design, had got separated from the other heavy cruisers. It seems probable that the *Furutaka* overran her next ahead while engaging the *Chicago* group, and when clear turned sharply to about north by east. The *Tenryu* and *Yubari* conformed, altering together, one of them—probably the former—engaging the *Patterson* for some minutes. Apart from the fact that they steered to the northward, passing to the westward of the *Vincennes* group, which they engaged as opportunity offered, the Japanese accounts give no details; but they subsequently fell in with the *Ralph Talbot*, and severely damaged her.

group while the *Furutaka* stood on to the north-eastward, engaging the *Patterson* and then followed the *Tenryu*. It was one of these cruisers which subsequently fell in with the *Ralph Talbot*. P269/57

The destroyer *Yunagi*, according to two Japanese statements, was left to the westward in order to deal with the U.S. radar patrol destroyers, should they attempt to follow the Japanese squadron; on the other hand it is also stated that she passed between Savo Island and the *Vincennes'* group, and there are several references to Japanese destroyers in the American reports. In default of definite information it is suggested that she probably followed the squadron in as soon as she was sure the *Blue* was continuing on her patrol to the south-westward, and passing close to the eastward of Savo Island, fired the torpedoes which hit the *Vincennes* and *Quincy*. Deleted by P269/57

At about 0215, as mentioned before, the action came to an end. The possibility of attacking the transports was then considered by the Japanese Admiral, but the loss of the Flagship's charts was a deterrent to further night operations in pilotage waters, and fortunately he was unaware of the withdrawal of the U.S. Air Support Force. He therefore decided to retire to the north-westward, "because of the danger from Allied carrier plane attacks after sunrise."³

¹ This is not stated in the Japanese reports which have been seen, but it is shown in the action plot of the KAKO to account for the first contact occurring with the light cruisers. It would also account for the *Quincy's* report of three cruisers "rounding the south end of Savo" (see ante).

² The *Chokai*, owing to the difference of helm used, followed a track about a mile to the eastward of the 6th cruiser Division, finishing up in the rear.

³ Document captured by U.S.A. Had he pushed on to the anchorage, he would probably have got among the transports unopposed except by the *Australia*, *San Juan* and *Hobart*, the destroyers having proceeded to the north-west of Savo Island. It is to be noted, however, that he had already partially achieved his object, since the decimation of their surface forces compelled the Americans to bring their landing operations hurriedly to a close and withdraw their virtually unprotected transports.

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Surprisingly large discrepancies occurred in the various estimates of ships' positions at the beginning of the action. It has not been possible to reconcile these, but it is believed that the positions shown in the plans are approximately correct.

³ According to the information at the disposal of C.N.S., Melbourne, on 28th August, the estimate was 3 cruisers and three destroyers. (C.N.S. Melbourne, 0730 Z/28/8/42 to 1st. Sea Lord.)

before they themselves were sighted; all ships fired torpedoes, immediately afterwards turning to the north-eastward, towards the northern group, which had been the subject of continuous reports by the *Chokai*'s observation aircraft. It is probable¹ that the heavy cruisers swung to the northward, close to Savo Island, shortly afterwards altering to a more easterly course to pass to the southward of the *Vincennes* group. The light cruisers following seem to have slightly over-run the turning point ^{and then they were sighted} when they were sighted by the *Chicago*'s group, which they engaged in passing.

A few minutes later, the *Chokai* illuminated the *Vincennes* group—then on the port bow—with searchlights, and the five 8-in. cruisers opened fire at ranges between 5,000 and 6,000 yards; then, circling the rear, engaged the American squadron from the eastward, with the results already described. In so doing but little damage was suffered by the Japanese. The *Chokai*² was hit by a salvo which put No. 1 turret out of action killing 30 men, wrecked the operations room and destroyed all her charts, and the *Aoba* received a hit which set Nos. 1 and 2 twin mount torpedo tubes on fire.

~~The light cruisers, meanwhile, either accidentally or by design, had got separated from the heavy cruisers. Apart from the fact that after their action with the *Chicago* group they steered to the northward, passing to the westward of the *Vincennes* group, which they engaged as opportunity offered, the Japanese accounts give no details.~~

It seems probable that after engaging the *Canberra* the *Tenryu* altered course to the northward as soon as the *Chokai*'s group opened fire on the *Vincennes*' group while the *Tatsuta* stood on to the north-eastward for a few minutes engaging the *Patterson* and then followed the *Tenryu*. It was one of these cruisers which subsequently fell in with the *Ralph Talbot*.

The destroyer *Yunagi*, according to two Japanese statements, was left to the westward in order to deal with the U.S. radar patrol destroyers, should they attempt to follow the Japanese squadron; on the other hand it is also stated that she passed between Savo Island and the *Vincennes*' group, and there are several references to Japanese destroyers in the American reports. In default of definite information it is suggested that she probably followed the squadron in as soon as she was sure the *Blue* was continuing on her patrol to the south-westward, and passing close to the eastward of Savo Island, fired the torpedoes which hit the *Vincennes* and *Quincy*. ~~Deleted by P269/S7.~~

At about 0215, as mentioned before, the action came to an end. The possibility of attacking the transports was then considered by the Japanese Admiral, but the loss of the Flagship's charts was a deterrent to further night operations in pilotage waters, and fortunately he was unaware of the withdrawal of the U.S. Air Support Force. He therefore decided to retire to the north-westward, "because of the danger from Allied carrier plane attacks after sunrise."³

¹ This is not stated in the Japanese reports which have been seen, ^{but it is shown in the action plot of the KAMO} but it is difficult otherwise to account for the first contact occurring with the light cruisers. It would also account for the *Quincy*'s report of three cruisers "rounding the south end of Savo" (see ante.)

² The *Chokai*, owing to the difference of helm used, followed a track about a mile to the eastward of the 6th cruiser Division, finishing up in the rear.

³ Document captured by U.S.A. Had he pushed on to the anchorage, he would probably have got among the transports unopposed except by the *Australia*, *San Juan* and *Hobart*, the destroyers having proceeded to the north-west of Savo Island. It is to be noted, however, that he had already partially achieved his object, since the decimation of their surface forces compelled the Americans to bring their landing operations hurriedly to a close and withdraw their virtually unprotected transports.

For illumination the Japanese made use of flares dropped by aircraft to enable them to make contact,¹ and switched searchlights on to their targets when they were ready to open fire. Commenting on their use of aircraft flares, Rear-Admiral Crutchley remarked: "This in two quick encounters shows considerable finesse, but I suppose it would be possible by giving the aircraft by radio the bearing on which to drop the flare. The ship would require to have some identification light which showed from above."

Gunfire was opened practically simultaneously with the switching on of the searchlights, and was most accurate, the first or second salvos finding their mark. It is probable that a large number of torpedoes were fired, both before and after engaging with the guns. Many tracks were sighted by the *Chicago's* group, and it is known that at least four hits were obtained.²

Once again, it must be admitted, Japanese enterprise and efficiency had exceeded the expectations of their enemies. Prior to this action, the opinion had been held that the Japanese were not good at night fighting, and were therefore unlikely to seek a night engagement.³ This was no doubt a contributory cause of the complete surprise they achieved, to which must mainly be attributed their remarkable success. More immediate causes of the surprise were the failure of the pre-arranged air reconnaissance and the omission to inform Rear-Admiral Turner of this, and the failure of the radar patrol to locate them west of Savo Island. Perhaps too much reliance was placed on the latter, and on this account the alertness of the ships of the inner patrol fell short of what the event proved necessary. The fact that the *Canberra's* guns were not loaded,⁴ and the inability of the *Bagley* to get off her torpedoes on first sighting are indications that this was the case. Such omissions enhanced the advantage which must always rest with the attackers, acting at their selected moment, over the defence which has to maintain its vigilance over a long period. With this is bound up the difficult problem of giving personnel the rest necessary for full efficiency during prolonged operations, a problem which particularly affects flag and commanding officers. On the occasion under consideration, two practically sleepless nights—under way in pilotage waters—had been succeeded by two days of continuous fighting and strain; physical limitations forbade that all should have been at their best on the third night.⁵

It is regrettable that the necessary absence of Rear-Admiral Crutchley deprived the patrolling forces of the presence of a flag officer. Though it is

¹ The Japanese had evidently paid great attention to this method of illumination. During the whole night of the battle of Surabaya, Rear-Admiral Doorman's striking force was kept under observation by this means.

² *Chicago* (1), *Vincennes* (2), *Quincy* (1).

³ On 13th February, 1942, the Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet (Admiral Sir G. Layton) informed the Admiralty that evidence was accumulating which seemed to confirm the pre-war impressions that the Japanese were not good night fighters, and recommended that we should exploit this feature to the uttermost. This was subsequently promulgated by the Admiralty.

Reporting on the battle of Savo, Rear-Admiral Crutchley remarked, "The enemy skill at night fighting, despite the general belief to the contrary, was shown to be of the highest order."

It is noteworthy that before the loss of the *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* there had been a similar impression that the efficiency of the Japanese air forces was not of a high standard. Both incidents emphasise the danger of underestimating the enemy.

⁴ Actually this made no difference, as loading was completed before the guns could be trained on the enemy.

⁵ This in no way reflects on the personnel. Reviewing the whole operation subsequently, Rear-Admiral Crutchley reported, "The conduct of officers and men . . . during prolonged periods spent in the first degree of readiness in trying heat, has throughout been of the highest order."

difficult to see what he could have done if once attacked with the suddenness and weight experienced by the *Canberra*, it is probable that he would have taken some action on the reports of aircraft from 2345, 8th August, onwards which might have diminished the surprise two hours later.¹

But apart from the surprise achieved by the enemy and the fatigue from which the Allied officers and men were undoubtedly suffering, it must be recognised that the fighting efficiency of the Japanese on this occasion surpassed that of the Allies. To this must be added the almost complete breakdown of Allied signal communications.² Writing some three weeks later of the operation as a whole, Rear-Admiral Crutchley remarked, "We have found in the Japanese naval and air forces, determined, cunning and extremely efficient foes. The efficiency of the enemy ships at night fighting has obviously been reached only after much intense training. It must be admitted that the force³ I command has not attained such a high standard of efficiency in surface action, day or night. This inferiority is in no way due to lack of endeavour on the part of officers and men." This the Admiral explained by the facts that the task force had only recently been formed; that operations had denied time for weapon training; and that facilities for practices had been almost non-existent.⁴ "If we are to pursue a successful offensive I am convinced that whatever the cost, adequate periods *must* be set aside and proper facilities given for regular practices."

10. Withdrawal of amphibious force

In the anchorage, meanwhile, during this disastrous night, the unloading programme had received another setback. Soon after the Japanese flares appeared at 0145, 9th August, it became apparent that a serious naval engagement was in progress and all the transports got under way independently and stood out clear of the anchorage. A high standard of seamanship and coolness is evidenced by the fact that no untoward incidents occurred. At dawn they returned; day screening positions were taken up by the survivors of Rear-Admiral Crutchley's force and the unloading proceeded. A couple of hours later the destroyers began to arrive with the survivors of the lost cruisers; these were transferred to the empty transports *Fuller* and *Barnett*. Not till then were the results of the night action known.

If the position of the Amphibious Force had been difficult the night before, far more difficult was it on this morning of 9th August; but of such paramount importance to the army were the stores, that Rear-Admiral Turner decided to accept the risk of further attack and cancelled the withdrawal planned for 0730. This decision was amply justified by the event; except for one report at 0850 of enemy aircraft which caused the transports to get under way for a couple of

¹ As things stood, these reports do not seem to have been regarded as the responsibility of any one in particular, and individual ships were left to put their own construction on them. Of course, commanding officers would not have been aware that they had not reached the Admiral.

² Of the 11 ships on patrol, the *Patterson* seems to have been the only one which got off an enemy report, and this, though received by several ships, did not reach Rear-Admiral Crutchley. Practically no reports were made during or after the action, and as late as 0819, 9th August, Rear-Admiral Crutchley informed Rear-Admiral Turner that he "had no real information of the night battle."

³ This refers to the force as reconstituted after the losses in the Guadalcanal operations. This force included the survivors of Rear-Admiral Crutchley's original force.

⁴ For example, only the *Australia* had done target firing more recently than May, and no ship had done a night target firing within eight months. The *Chicago* had not carried out a surface firing since October, 1941.

hours, unloading proceeded without enemy interference of any sort. Apparently the Japanese had expended their energy for the time being, as no force of importance—air or surface—appeared off Tulagi for several days. But Rear-Admiral Turner could not know this, and that evening all surface forces left the area in two groups by Lengo Channel and shaped course for Noumea, leaving Major-General Vandegrift and his troops to consolidate the position ashore.¹ The leading group consisting of the transports of "X-Ray" Convoy—except the *McCawley*—escorted by the damaged ships *Chicago*, *Mugford*, *Patterson* and *Talbot*, and the *Dewey* and five minesweeping destroyers sailed at 1530, 9th August, followed some three hours later by Rear-Admiral Turner in the *McCawley* and the "Yoke" transports, escorted by the *Australia*, *Hobart*, *San Juan* and 10 destroyers.

The passage was accomplished without enemy interference. At daybreak, 11th August, the leading group was overtaken, and the two groups proceeded in company. The *Chicago* was, however, unable to keep up, on account of her damaged bow, and with the *Patterson* and *Mugford* was ordered to Noumea independently. That evening nine of the transports (including the four ex-destroyers) were detached to Espiritu Santo.

On 12th August the tanker *Cimarron* was met on passage to join the carrier forces, which were re-fuelling between the New Hebrides and New Caledonia, and Rear-Admiral Turner ordered the destroyers *Hull*, *Ellet*, *Dewey*, *Wilson*, *Monssen* and *Buchanan* to escort her, and rejoin the carrier groups from which they had originally been detached for the landing operations.

The remainder of the Amphibious Force arrived at Noumea without incident in the early afternoon of the next day, 13th August, 1942.

With the arrival of Rear-Admiral Turner at Noumea, ended the first phase of the Guadalcanal campaign. Tulagi and a fine airfield at Guadalcanal had been captured and garrisoned, but the Allies had suffered very serious losses in cruiser strength and the enemy surface forces had got away practically unscathed, though it became known later that during their return passage the heavy cruiser *Kako* was sunk by the United States submarine S.44 off New Ireland on 10th August.

For the time being the Allies had lost command of the sea and the American military forces in Guadalcanal, though in superior strength, were virtually cut off. They were short of heavy equipment, which it had been impossible to land before the withdrawal of the store ships, and were thereby prevented from dealing with the considerable Japanese forces still at large in the island—a grave anxiety in view of the certainty that the enemy would make strenuous efforts to re-capture what he had lost. For many weeks the Americans had to solve the problem of keeping their forces on shore reinforced and supplied—weeks of bitter fighting, ashore, afloat, and in the air—and it was not until February, 1943, that the enemy abandoned his attempts, and the operations of 7th-9th August could be finally pronounced an outstanding success.

¹ The situation as reported by Major-General Vandegrift on 10th August was as follows:— "We hold Tulagi, Gavutu, Makambo, Tanambogo, and have 5,000 men in that area which was taken only after bitter fighting due restricted area . . . Also hold Kukum to Koli Point, Guadalcanal. Digging in to defend beaches. Patrolling to mop up garrison 300 troops and 2,000 pioneers who withdrew to bush. Have disposed of a number and have suffered a few casualties. Airfield ready, fighters and dive bombers."

CHAPTER II

FIRST JAPANESE OFFENSIVE

11. Japanese preparations

The days following the withdrawal of the Amphibious Force from Guadalcanal were full of anxiety for the Americans. Fortunately, the Japanese had no land reinforcements immediately available, but their surface forces—secure in their local command of the sea—bombarded the American positions in the island day and night. The Americans, however, quickly transferred aircraft to the newly finished airfield at Guadalcanal; within a fortnight they were operating dive bombers with such effect¹ as to restrict the hostile surface craft to operations by night. This airfield—known as Henderson's Field—thus assumed a crucial importance, and it was on its capture or immobilisation that the successive Japanese efforts were centred throughout the campaign.

By the 19th August, 1942—just a fortnight after the American landing—the Japanese were ready for their first counter-attack. A strong striking force of carrier-borne aircraft was to neutralize Henderson's Field, after which reinforcements were to be landed from a convoy escorted by powerful surface forces.² In the event, the presence of the American aircraft carriers induced them to divide their air effort between the carriers and the airfield with disastrous results.

On the 19th August a convoy consisting of 4 transports (in which were embarked 700 troops of the Ikki detachment and 800 marines of the Yokosuka Special Landing Force), escorted by 4 destroyers, sailed from Rabaul with orders to arrive off Guadalcanal on the 24th. This force—the Occupation Force—was commanded by Rear-Admiral Tanaka, with his flag in the light cruiser *Jintsu*. Strong cover was provided by the 3rd Fleet, consisting of 2 battleships, 3 carriers, 4 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser and 17 destroyers. These were organised in two groups, the one including the light carrier *Ryujo*, the other the large carriers *Shokaku* and *Zuikaku*, which were stationed about 100 miles to the eastward, while the seaplane carrier *Chitose* operated her ship based seaplanes in the general vicinity of the Occupation Force. The entire force proceeded towards Guadalcanal under cover of shore based reconnaissance aircraft of the 25th Air Flotilla, which, operating from Rabaul, searched as far as the meridian 164° East Longitude.

12. Allied Naval dispositions, 10th-17th August (Plan 2A)

The effective naval forces during this period at the disposal of Vice-Admiral Ghormley (who had established his Headquarters at Noumea) consisted of three carriers (*Saratoga*, *Enterprise* and *Wasp*), the battleship *North Carolina*,

¹ The destroyers *Akikaze* and *Hagikaze* were seriously damaged on 19th August, and the *Kawakaze* was "strafed" on the 22nd.

² The Japanese Army authorities had seriously under-estimated the mettle of the Americans in Guadalcanal, and on this occasion their reinforcements amounted only to some 1,500 troops.

six heavy cruisers (*Minneapolis, New Orleans, Portland, San Francisco, Salt Lake City, Australia*), four light cruisers (*San Juan, Atlanta, Phoenix, Hobart*) and 20 destroyers.¹

After the occupation of Tulagi, the *Australia* (Flag, Rear-Admiral Crutchley, V.C.), *Hobart* and six destroyers, which had been present at the landing operations, had proceeded to Noumea; the remainder,² known as Task Force 61, under the command of Vice-Admiral Fletcher, U.S.N., were cruising in the area to the west of the New Hebrides.

Allied aircraft based on Espiritu Santo, Efate, and New Caledonia, as well as those of the South-west Pacific Area based in Australia and New Guinea, were keeping up a constant reconnaissance of the Bismarck-Solomons area, and the concentration of enemy forces at Rabaul did not escape notice. By 17th August it was clear that the greater part of the Japanese naval forces was committed to the South Pacific. This was estimated as two battleships (*Kongo* class),³ seven heavy cruisers, four light cruisers and between 20 and 30 destroyers. No intelligence had been received as to aircraft carriers, but it was suspected that two, or even three, might be used in support; in addition it was necessary to reckon on about 160 shore-based aircraft.

When the scale of the threatening attack was appreciated by the Americans, the carrier *Hornet* was ordered from Pearl Harbour to join Vice-Admiral Ghormley's forces, and she sailed on the 17th August. On the same day a diversionary operation was carried out, designed to draw part of the enemy forces away from the Solomons area. This consisted of a raid on Makin (Gilbert Islands),⁴ and induced the Japanese to detach a relief force.

13. Movements of Task Force 61 (Plans 2A, 7)

As the reports received began to indicate that the Japanese preparations were nearing completion, Vice-Admiral Fletcher's carrier forces moved to the northward. They were organised in three groups (see Appendix D):—Task Force 11 commanded by Vice-Admiral Fletcher himself, with his flag in the *Saratoga*, Task Force 16 under Rear-Admiral Kinkaid, with his flag in the *Enterprise*, and Task Force 18 under Rear-Admiral Noyes, with his flag in the *Wasp*. On the 21st August they were joined by Rear-Admiral Crutchley, V.C., with the *Australia, Hobart* and three U.S. destroyers. During the next two days, Task Force 61, operated to the south and east of Guadalcanal within 100 miles of the island.

On 23rd August the dawn reconnaissance flown by the *Enterprise* to a distance of 180 miles between the bearings of 345° and 045° located and attacked two enemy submarines proceeding to the southward at high speed on the surface.⁵ These were suspected of being part of a screen ahead of surface forces, and during the forenoon a shore based reconnaissance aircraft reported an enemy

¹ See App. A. Details of Allied Ships mentioned.

² Except the *Phoenix*, recently allocated to the station, which did not join up with Vice-Admiral Fletcher's force till 30th August.

³ *Kongo* (*Kirishima, Haruna, Hiyei*): built 1910-1914, reconditioned 1934-1939; 29,330 tons, 26 knots; eight 14.2 in., fourteen 5.9 in., eight 5 in., H.A. guns.

⁴ Two submarines—the *Narwhal* and *Argonaut*—landed 215 Marines who killed a number of Japanese and destroyed the radio station, a petrol dump and stores, and two seaplanes, while the submarines sank a gunboat and a transport.

⁵ One at 0655 in lat. 7° 30' S., long. 162° 15' E., the other at 0745, in lat. 6° 48' S., long. 163° 20' E. A third submarine was spotted and attacked by one of the *Enterprise's* reconnaissance aircraft that afternoon at 1500 in lat. 8° 54' S., long. 162° 17' E.

force of two cruisers, four destroyers and four transports at 1030¹ near Ontong Java (lat. 5° 30' S., long. 159° 30' E.) steering a southerly course at 17 knots. This was Rear-Admiral Tanaka's occupation force.

That afternoon the *Saratoga* launched a striking force of 6 torpedo and 31 dive bombers armed with 1,000 lb. bombs to attack this force, then estimated 320° 260 miles from Task Force 61; nine dive bombers, escorted by fighters, were also sent from Guadalcanal. But the enemy, on being sighted, had made a drastic alteration of course to the north-westward which the reconnaissance aircraft omitted to report and neither of these striking forces made contact. Both landed on Henderson's Field, the *Saratoga's* aircraft rejoining her next forenoon.

In the course of the day (23 August) a signal was received from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific,² pointing out that the spearhead of Japan's naval attack had been aviation, and designating "carriers and all other ships" as "prime objectives for destructive attack."

As it could not be foreseen exactly when the enemy would make their attempt, a fuelling programme had been worked out for Task Force 61, and in pursuance of this the *Wasp* (Flag, Rear-Admiral Noyes), *San Juan* (Flag, Rear-Admiral Scott), *Salt Lake City* and *San Francisco* were detached in the evening of 23rd August to refuel at sea from tankers in lat. 13° S., long. 164° E.

14. Battle of the Eastern Solomons, 24th August, 1942 (Plan 7)

At daybreak, 24th August, Vice-Admiral Fletcher was about 50 miles to the eastward of Maramasike (Malaita Island); the *Wasp*, some 250 miles to the southward, had just commenced fuelling.

The dawn search carried out by 20 scout bombers from the *Enterprise*, covering a sector from 290° to 070° to a distance of 200 miles, was barren of results, though a later patrol sighted and attacked (unsuccessfully) a submarine steering 180° in lat. 9° 21' S., long. 163° 35' E. at 1035. Half an hour before this, however (1005), a report from a shore based aircraft had come in, placing one carrier (*Ryujo*), two heavy cruisers and a destroyer on a southerly course in position 4° 40' S., 161° 15' E. at 0905. This was some 300 miles to the northward of the American carrier groups.³ Vice-Admiral Fletcher ordered steam for full speed by noon, and manoeuvred his groups to the north and

¹ Zone minus 11 Time is used throughout except where otherwise stated.

² Admiral C. W. Nimitz, U.S.N.

³ The forces engaged in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons were as follows:—

ALLIED (see Apps. A and D.)

- 2 carriers, *Saratoga* and *Enterprise*.
- 1 fast battleship, *North Carolina*.
- 4 heavy cruisers, *Portland, New Orleans, Minneapolis, Australia*.
- 2 light cruisers, *Atlanta, Hobart*.
- 11 destroyers.
- 101 land-based aircraft (including 32 based on Guadalcanal).

JAPANESE (see Apps. B and D(1).)

- 3 carriers, *Zuikaku, Shokaku, Ryujo*.
 - 1 seaplane carrier, *Chitose*.
 - 2 battleships, *Hiyei, Kirishima*.
 - 6 heavy cruisers, *Suzuya, Kumano, Chikuma, Tone, ATAGA, MAYA, TAKAO, MYOKO, HAGURO*.
 - 3 light cruisers, *Nagara, Jintsu, YURAI*.
 - 7 destroyers.
 - 5 transports. (4 converted destroyers and *KINRYU MARU*).
- Approximately 100 land based aircraft.

westward, whilst preparing air striking forces to send against the enemy.¹ Such additional enemy reports as were received during the forenoon were confusing, nor were they amplified or kept up to date. It was clear, however, that there was a considerable naval force, including at least one carrier, to the northward and that it was apparently organised in groups, spread roughly east and west.

Meanwhile the American Force had been under observation by Japanese aircraft² since 1100, or earlier, and there could be no doubt that the Japanese Commander was receiving full and frequent reports of its movements. The information received by Vice-Admiral Fletcher, on the other hand, was so vague that at 1300, 24th August, he ordered the *Enterprise* to send out a search group, and a force of 29 bombers and torpedo bombers was flown off to the northward. Half an hour later a similar force was launched from the *Saratoga*, with orders to attack the carrier reported during the forenoon. At the same time (1330), the *Saratoga's* radar detected a large group of unidentified aircraft bearing 350°, distant 112 miles, flying in the direction of Guadalcanal. An attack on Henderson's Field by twin and single-engined bombers, protected by Zero fighters,³ developed at 1440. Ten bombers and 11 fighters were shot down for a loss of three fighters.

The *Enterprise* search group, in the meantime, had sighted the carrier *Ryujo*,⁴ a heavy cruiser (the *Tone*) and three destroyers bearing 317° 198 miles from Task Force 61 at 1410, and 20 minutes later two carriers, four heavy cruisers, six light cruisers, eight destroyers⁵ bearing 340° 198 miles. Owing to faulty communications the first of these reports only reached Vice-Admiral Fletcher at 1518, the second not at all; but a subsequent report of an unsuccessful attack on a carrier, possibly the *Zuikaku*,⁶ made known to him the presence of this force at 1525. At 1440, a third group of four heavy cruisers, with destroyers, bearing 347° 225 miles from Task Force 61 was sighted; this report got through without delay.

The *Saratoga's* striking force brought off a successful co-ordinated attack on the *Ryujo* at 1530. Four of the dive bombers reported making hits, and the torpedo bombers, attacking as the last dive bombers were coming down, obtained one certain and on probable hit. Actually, according to the Japanese, the *Ryujo* received no less than 10 bomb hits; she burnt furiously for a while and then sank.⁷ On its way back to the *Saratoga*, the striking force fell in with seven Japanese dive bombers (probably returning after an attack on the *Enterprise* which had taken place during its absence) and shot down five of them. No casualties were suffered by the American aircraft during all these attacks.

About an hour later (1640) the Japanese counter attack, which cost them so dearly in aircraft as to defeat the whole attempt on Guadalcanal, struck at

¹ Frequent flying on and off operations, necessitating turns into the south-easterly wind, made it difficult to close the enemy to the northward. At noon, 24th August, Vice-Admiral Fletcher's Force was in lat. 9° S. long. 163° E. still 250 miles from the enemy.

² Four of these were shot down by the American Combat Patrol.

³ It is possible, but not certain, that carrier-borne aircraft were in this group.

⁴ *Ryujo*, 7,100 tons, 25 knots; 30 aircraft; twelve 5-in. H.A./L.A. guns.

⁵ This report of the main body, while the numbers were correct, erred in its classification. The actual composition was 2 carriers, 2 battleships, 4 cruisers, 12 destroyers.

⁶ *Zuikaku* (*Shokaku*), 20,000 tons, 28 knots; (?) 60 aircraft; ten 8-in., twelve 4.7-in. guns.

⁷ It was believed at the time that in addition to the damage inflicted on the *Ryujo*, a destroyer was sunk and a heavy cruiser damaged during the attack. No confirmation of this has been received from the Japanese.

Task Force 61. The first warning came at 1602, when the *Enterprise* picked up a large flight bearing 302°, 88 miles distant; the contact was then lost for 17 minutes, but reappeared on the screen at 1619 on the same bearing 44 miles distant, and preparations were made to meet the impending attack. Both carriers flew off their remaining striking forces, the *Saratoga's* (3 dive bombers, 5 torpedo bombers) to attack the enemy's battleship group and the *Enterprise's* (11 dive bombers, 7 torpedo bombers, 7 fighters) to finish off the *Ryujo*; the fighter patrol over the Task Force was strengthened, and the *Enterprise's* returning search group was ordered to keep clear.¹

At this time Task Force 61 was in two groups, steaming at 27 knots, with frequent alterations of course. The *Enterprise* with the *North Carolina*² 180°, 2,500 yards from her, was some 10 miles to the north-west of the *Saratoga*. Each group had its screen in close support, the cruisers 2,000 yards distant, and the destroyers inside 1,800 yards. Fifty-three fighters were in the air over the force. The weather was fine with excellent visibility; a moderate south-easterly wind was blowing and there was a slight swell. The sun was bearing about 325°. The first visual contact occurred at 1625, when one section of the fighter patrol sighted 36 bombers and many zero fighters, bearing 300°, 33 miles from the *Enterprise*. When they had closed to about 25 miles the enemy split into numerous sections, veering to the northward, and from then on became lost to the ships' radar screens, owing to confusion resulting from the great number of aircraft—friendly and hostile—operating in the neighbourhood.³

Previous estimates had placed the enemy at 12,000 ft. altitude, but when they were within 14 miles of their objective, one of the fighter patrol amended this to 18,000 ft. The fighter patrol, therefore, had to climb, and this combined with faulty communications with the Fighter Director Officer in the *Enterprise* resulted in the majority of the enemy being unmolested till they were in their dives.⁴

The initial attack was concentrated on the *Enterprise*. This was first observed in the *North Carolina* when the aircraft were beginning to dive at 15,000 ft.; a few seconds later a 20 mm. Battery Officer in the *Enterprise* sighted them at 12,000 ft. and "very properly opened fire without delay, thus giving immediate warning and point of aim to the other batteries." At the same time the *North Carolina* and screening ships opened fire with 5-in. guns. This first dive resulted in a near miss at 1641; for the next four minutes, except for two short breathing spaces, there was a continuous roar of aircraft diving on to the carrier.

The A/A fire of the Americans was excellent. Three dive bombers disintegrated in mid-air; others pulled out of their dives at 6,000 to 4,000 ft. or were so jolted by the bursting shell that they were thrown off their point of aim; a few jettisoned their bombs. Out of the 25 to 30 aircraft which attacked, 15 came down in determined dives, which were pushed home to 1,500 ft. or

¹ Some of these aircraft did not receive this order and it is possible that the enemy followed them in.

² The *North Carolina* was able to keep station with ease at 27 knots, her designed full speed.

³ The *Enterprise* returning search planes, the attack groups first launched by the *Enterprise* and *Saratoga*, 53 American fighters and numerous enemy groups.

⁴ A lack of radio discipline on the part of the fighter pilots was noted, many talking simultaneously or making non-essential remarks. Few of the orders of the Fighter Director Officer reached them and but little of their information reached him. Only five to seven fighters engaged the enemy dive bombers on the approach and about ten during their dives. The remainder were either engaged by Zeros, or first attacked the dive bombers during their retirement.

lower before release.¹ For nearly three minutes the *Enterprise* was unscathed ; then a near miss damaged her port quarter. A few seconds later she received three direct hits in quick succession—one on the corner of No. 3 elevator which penetrated to the third deck before it burst, and caused considerable damage, besides starting fires and killing 35 men ; one which struck about 20 ft. from the first, putting two 5-in. guns out of action and killing their entire crews,² and one—a lighter bomb—which exploded just abaft the island superstructure, and narrowly missing the after two 1.1 mounts, put No. 2 elevator out of action. Two blazing enemy aircraft just missed landing on the flight deck ; at least ten crashed into the sea near by, and others flew away smoking heavily.

Two minutes after the initial attack on the *Enterprise* (at 1643) the *North Carolina* was attacked by about 10 dive bombers from the starboard bow. So heavy was the fire with which she greeted them—while still engaging a group attacking the *Enterprise*—that only three succeeded in getting through to drop their bombs, two of which landed within about 20 yards of the battleship. During this attack about 8 low-flying aircraft either attacked with torpedoes, or simulated torpedo attacks from various directions, in order to draw the *North Carolina's* fire from the dive bombers. Their movements were well coordinated, but achieved no success, and some of them venturing too near were shot down. At this time practically all the *North Carolina's* A/A armament was firing³ and, to eye-witnesses in other ships, she appeared “ to be ablaze throughout.” At 1645 in the midst of this widespread firing a second dive bombing attack was made on her by six aircraft from the port quarter. Two of these were shot down by the after 20 mm. ; the remaining four placed their bombs within 150 yards of the ship—one close enough to knock down the gun's crew and flood the deck. Simultaneously 8 to 12 heavy bombers carried out an unseen high-level attack from 15,000 ft.⁴ ; their bombs fell harmlessly between her and the *Enterprise*, which by this time had opened to about 4,000 yards.⁵ This ended the attacks on Task Force 61, though firing at detached low-flying aircraft continued for some minutes longer. Out of 80 Japanese aircraft which had attacked not less than 70 had been shot down, about 23 by ships' gunfire and 47 by the carrier air groups.⁶

By 1649, 24th August, the firing was over, and the interest of Task Force 61 centred on the damaged *Enterprise*. So efficient was her damage control and fire fighting that within an hour she was steaming at 24 knots and landing on

¹ The dives were carried out in sections of as many as five aircraft with very short intervals between them—in many cases below seven seconds. Thus the A/A gunners had only the minimum time in which to clear jams, replenish ammunition and recover from shock of hits or near misses.

² Except a few members who had just left to fight the fires caused by the previous bomb.

³ Twenty 5-in. ; four-mounts (16 barrels) ; forty 20-mm. ; twenty-six 50 calibres.

⁴ This attack was unobserved partly because the high-level bombers were able to make use of cloud cover, and partly because attention on board the *North Carolina* was distracted by the low altitude and dive-bombing attacks in progress. The incident emphasises the necessity for maintaining an overhead lookout at all times.

⁵ The *Enterprise* had increased speed to 30 knots when the attack commenced. This, together with the avoiding action taken, had caused the *North Carolina* to fall astern. It was subsequently remarked that when a fast battleship is present with a carrier task force, speed should not be increased above 27 knots, because by so doing battleship support will be lost. The difference between 27 and 30 knots makes no appreciable difference in the manoeuvrability of ships in avoiding bombs.

⁶ These figures were Vice-Admiral Fletcher's final estimate. Claims for aircraft shot down amounted to about 50 by aircraft and 30 to 40 by ships' fire. Some of these were clearly duplications, but it is equally clear that the enemy suffered very heavy losses.

aircraft. Just after sunset (at 1821) her steering gear broke down, but after 38 minutes she was once more under control. Reports were coming in of another strong Japanese air striking force,¹ apparently seeking for the Task Force ; this, however, failed to make contact, and at 1940, 24th August, the whole Force withdrew to the southward.

While all this was happening, the *Saratoga's* small striking force flown off at 1625 had attacked the enemy's main body, claiming hits on a battleship and a cruiser with a 1,000 lb. bomb and a torpedo respectively, despite heavy A/A fire from the 16 or 18 ships forming the Squadron. Neither of these hits were admitted by the Japanese, but the seaplane carrier *Chitose* received damage from two dive bombers at 1745 which compelled her to return to Rabaul. All the American aircraft returned to the *Saratoga*, except two torpedo bombers which subsequently landed in San Cristobal Island. The force sent off at the same time from the *Enterprise* failed to find the *Ryujo* : the dive bombers proceeded to Guadalcanal for the night, and the torpedo bombers returned to the carriers, landing on after dark.

To sum up the day's operations, the enemy had lost an aircraft carrier (*Ryujo*) and the seaplane carrier *Chitose* had been damaged ; on the debit side, the *Enterprise* had been damaged. But the real importance of the victory lay in the virtual destruction of the Japanese air striking power. In the air, including the results achieved by shore based aircraft, the enemy had lost 90 aircraft against the American loss of 20 (11 pilots).² Not only was the enemy landing expedition robbed of all hope of success, but the Americans had definitely won control of the air. Though one of their carriers was damaged, they still had intact two practically full carrier air groups ; the *Wasp* Task Force was re-fuelled and proceeding north to rejoin Task Force 61, and the *Hornet* was approaching from the eastward.

The Battle of the Eastern Solomons wrote “ finis ” to the first attempt of the enemy to recapture Guadalcanal. Henderson's Field was ineffectively bombarded for about an hour that night by three destroyers,³ one of which was believed to have been damaged—perhaps sunk—by a moonlight air attack ;

¹ At 1700 the *Saratoga* aircraft returning from attacking the *Ryujo* sighted at least 18 enemy dive bombers, nine torpedo bombers and three fighters in latitude 7° 45' S., longitude 162° 10' E., on course 140°. This course would have led them to Task Force 61 within an hour, but they altered to south, and at 1721 were picked up to the westward by radar. They passed about 50 miles to the westward, then turned due east, till about south of the Task Force, when they altered to the north-west. Had they steered north, they would have made contact just when the *Enterprise's* steering gear broke down. Later on in the evening they were heard trying to find their carrier ; it is possible that some or all of them were lost.

² Losses in Battle of Eastern Solomons :—

CLASS	JAPANESE				AMERICAN	
	ESTIMATED		ACTUAL		SUNK	DAMAGED
	SUNK	DAMAGED	SUNK	DAMAGED		
Carriers ...	1	—	1	1	—	1
Battleships ...	—	1	—	—	—	—
Cruisers ...	—	2	—	—	—	—
Destroyers ...	1	—	—	—	—	—
Aircraft ...	101 destroyed		90 destroyed		20 destroyed	

³ *Isokaze, Kawahaze, Kagero*. No damage was actually inflicted on any of them.

and during the forenoon the occupation force continued to close Guadalcanal. This was attacked by shore based aircraft from Guadalcanal and Espiritu Santo, which sank the old destroyer *Mutsuki* and the 9,300 ton transport *Kinryo Maru*, and damaged the light cruiser *Jintsu*, forcing Admiral Tanaka to shift his flag to a destroyer. But the staggering air losses sustained the previous day had weighted the scales too heavily against them and by that afternoon all surface craft had turned round and were retiring to the northward at high speed.

How serious was the predicament of the enemy does not seem to have been fully appreciated at the time. It now seems clear that if the Americans had followed up their victory, the Japanese reverse might have been turned into a defeat which might have finally ended the struggle for Guadalcanal. No serious counter-offensive, however, was undertaken.

During the night, 24th–25th August, Task Force 61 continued to the southward, passing Task Force 18, returning after fuelling, at 0300, 25th August.

Task Force 18 then cruised in the area to the south-east of Guadalcanal, ready to repel further Japanese attacks, while the remainder of Task Force 61 was fuelling well to the southward. Two enemy submarines were sighted and ~~sunk~~ ^{damaged} while this was in progress, one by the destroyers *Grayson*, *Patterson* and *Monssen* and one by a dive bomber from the *Enterprise*, which secured a direct hit with a 1,000-lb. bomb. On completion of fuelling, the injured *Enterprise*, escorted by the *Portland* and destroyers was detached for repairs, the remainder of her Task Force (the *North Carolina*, *Atlanta* and two destroyers) joining the *Saratoga*'s group, which then returned to the northward and reinforced Task Force 18.

CHAPTER III

SECOND JAPANESE OFFENSIVE

15 Vice-Admiral Ghormley's policy, 27th August, 1942

The Battle of the Eastern Solomons was followed by a period of small scale reinforcements to Guadalcanal by both sides. The American command of the air rendered daylight operations increasingly hazardous and after the destroyer *Asagiri* had been sunk and two others—the *Shirakumo* and *Yugiri*—had been seriously damaged on the 28th August, the enemy virtually confined themselves to running in troops and supplies by night. On the other hand, the Japanese superiority in surface ships seriously reduced the flow of American supplies. It seemed clear that despite the failure of his first attempt the enemy would make another powerful effort before long,¹ and on 27th August Vice-Admiral Ghormley informed his Task Force Commanders of his policy:—"Until hostile strength and intentions are determined we must employ to the utmost of our limits land based aircraft, while improving the Tulagi-Guadalcanal position. What we would wish to achieve is the combination (no matter where the enemy may strike) of our shore-based planes and carrier aircraft against the following targets in order of priority, carriers, transports, battleships, cruisers, destroyers. Therefore the Carrier Task Forces should for the present operate generally south of latitude 10° S. unless a promising target is located within striking distance, meanwhile covering the movement of supplies and reinforcements into the Guadalcanal area. Shore- and tender-based planes should continue as extended and intensive a search as operating conditions permit. . . ."

Vice-Admiral Fletcher's Carrier Forces accordingly cruised in the area between latitudes 10° 30' S., and 13° S. and longitudes 163° 30' E., and 164° 30' E. (see Plan 2), in order to cover the line of communications between Espiritu Santo, where an advanced supply base had been established, and Guadalcanal. The importance of this line of communication was appreciated by the enemy, who by means of a well-planned submarine offensive inflicted serious damage on the Carrier Forces, in the course of the next few weeks.

16. U.S.S. "Saratoga" torpedoed, 31st August, 1942 (Plan 2A)

On 29th August, Vice-Admiral Fletcher was joined by Task Force 17, consisting of the carrier *Hornet*, the cruisers *Northampton*, *Pensacola* and

¹ "Our intelligence has advised that the Japanese now have in this southern area many of their naval commanders-in-chief. The Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleets, is thought to have reached the Rabaul area recently; the Commander-in-Chief, First Air Fleet, is reported to be commanding the Aircraft Carrier striking force now in the Bismarck-Solomons area; the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, is reported to be in command of a strong task force based on Truk; the Commander-in-Chief, Sixth Fleet, is reported en route to Jaluit; and the Commander-in-Chief, Eighth Fleet, is reported in the heavy cruiser *Chokai*, which has now been in the Bismarck-Solomons area for some weeks. The presence of all this talent must be an indication of the magnitude of the effort the Japanese are preparing to make. . . ."—Rear-Admiral Crutchley.

San Diego and screening destroyers, and the three carrier forces cruised in company during 30th August.¹

Shortly after midnight, 30th–31st August, the *Wasp's* group was detached to Noumea to take in fuel, provisions and stores. The other two groups remained in company, steering to the northward at 13 knots. There had been several reports of enemy submarines in this general area recently, and at 0330, 31st August, several ships obtained radar contacts of an unidentified object, which faded from the screens at 0345. A destroyer ordered to investigate failed to search the correct area owing to a communication error, and rejoined the formation an hour later. At 0639,² 31st August, the *Saratoga* altered course to the south-eastward, to conform with the *Hornet* which was then launching the dawn search into the wind. At 0655 the Fleet shaped course 140°, 13 knots, and half an hour later commenced zigzagging. At 0746, while steering 180° on the starboard leg of the zigzag, the *Macdonough*, 3,500 yards on the starboard bow of the *Saratoga*, sighted a periscope about 10 yards off, abreast of No 1 gun. She dropped two depth charges³ and broadcast a warning that a torpedo was approaching the *Saratoga* on course 050°. Full speed was at once ordered in the carrier, the rudder being put hard to starboard, but she swung sluggishly at the slow speed at which she was moving and at 0748 a torpedo struck her on the starboard side just abaft the island superstructure. By the end of two minutes she had swung to 290° and built up speed to 16 knots; but three minutes later (0753) power failed and she came to a standstill. During this time another torpedo was seen passing astern from starboard to port, and three torpedoes broached approximately 4,000 yards off (indicating a run of about 7,000 yards at 30 knots). The *Saratoga* had suffered serious structural damage and was listing about 4°; but she was able to proceed at 6 knots at 0836. Power again failed, however, shortly before 1100, and she was then towed by the *Minneapolis* for four hours while she reduced the list and effected temporary repairs. It is noteworthy that while in tow she was able to launch aircraft.

Immediately after the attack, the destroyers were ordered to circle around the wounded *Saratoga*. Later a depth charge attack on the submarine was organised, which is believed to have been sunk by the *Monssen* about 1000 that forenoon, though there was no evidence of success apart from air bubbles.⁴

¹ On the junction of the *Hornet*, the following organisation was adopted:—



On 31st August the *Saratoga* was torpedoed and the *North Carolina* then joined Task Force 17. On the same day orders were received from the Commander, South Pacific (Vice-Admiral Ghormley) to detach the *Australia*, *Hobart*, *Phoenix* and four destroyers to Australia.

Page 40. Footnote 4. Amend footnote to read:—

The fact that the Japanese never claimed the torpedoing of the *Saratoga* was considered an indication that the Submarine (I 26) did not survive, but it is now known that she

17. Operations of U.S. Carrier Forces, 31st August–15th September, 1942 (Plan 2A)

After this mishap, the *Saratoga* proceeded to Pearl Harbour for repairs, while Rear-Admiral Murray with Task Force 17 (*Hornet*), to which the *North Carolina* was now attached, withdrew to a position about 150 miles to the eastward of Espiritu Santo where fleet oilers were awaiting him. When complete with fuel, Task Force 17 returned to a covering position just south of the cruising area of the previous week.

At 1251,² 6th September, when in Lat. 13° 20' S., Long. 162° 40' E., one of the patrolling aircraft sighted a torpedo approaching the *Hornet* and dropped a depth bomb near it. This caused the torpedo to broach and explode, and a few seconds later another torpedo exploded about 100 yards from the first. A third missed the carrier and passed to port of the *North Carolina* as she was swinging to starboard. Later that afternoon two aircraft returning from an extended search sighted a submarine on the surface in Lat. 13° 29' S., Long. 163° 25' E. Each dropped a depth bomb, which fell within 25–30 ft. of the submarine and may have inflicted damage. Task Force 17 then cleared the suspected submarine area to the south-westward and, returning to the eastward during the night, spent the 7th September cruising in an area 120–180 miles south-east of the scene of the attack the previous day. While in this area the Force manoeuvred to avoid four different contacts, which may or may not have been submarines. At 0800, 8th September course was shaped to the northward till 2000 that evening and then for the fuelling position to the east of Espiritu Santo, where Rear-Admiral Noyes' Task Force 18 (*Wasp*) from Noumea was met on the 11th September. Having completed with fuel, both Forces—now known as Task Force 61—proceeded to the westward, embarking about 20 fighters from Espiritu Santo for Guadalcanal *en passant*. These were flown off at 0700, 13th September, from a position about 250 miles east-south-east of Guadalcanal (about 50 miles from where the *Saratoga* had been torpedoed), and the Force then withdrew to the eastward down the channel between Santa Cruz and Banks Islands, altering to the westward again early on the 14th September in order to cover an important convoy¹ under Rear-Admiral Turner which was leaving Espiritu Santo with reinforcements for Guadalcanal that morning.

About noon, 14th September, a report was received of an enemy battleship and cruiser group to the north-westward on a southerly course; Task Force 61 altered course to 330° to get within range and at 1430 the *Wasp* launched a tactical scout group and the *Hornet* an attack group. Soon afterwards, however, the enemy reversed their course, and neither group made contact. Flying Fortresses from Espiritu Santo found the enemy, however, and reported making two or three possible hits on one of the battleships. After recovering aircraft Task Force 61 retired to the east till about midnight 14th–15th September, when course was altered to the west in order to keep in supporting distance of the transports.

¹ In the latter part of August, the 7th Marines and 5th Defence Battalion had been embarked with all equipment and vehicles and 90 days' provisions in seven transports, combat loaded, at Tonga. Originally intended to garrison Ndeni, Santa Cruz Islands, this force had been warned to work out plans for a landing at Taivu Point (Guadalcanal) should the occasion arise, and had been ordered to Espiritu Santo, where it had arrived 12th September, to await further orders.

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² Zone minus 12 Time.

³ These were ineffective, as the depth was not set.

⁴ The fact that the Japanese never claimed the torpedoing of the *Saratoga* is an indication that the submarine did not survive.

17. Operations of U.S. Carrier Forces, 31st August–15th September, 1942 (Plan 2A)

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18. Loss of U.S.S. "Wasp," 15th September, 1942 (Plan 2A)

During the forenoon of 15th September, Task Force 61 continued to the westward on a mean course 280°, 16 knots. Soon after noon¹ the fighter patrol shot down a shadowing aircraft, which was passed in the water at about 1300 in Lat. 12° 30' S., Long. 164° 30' E.; it is probable that this aircraft got off a report before being destroyed.

At 1420 the *Wasp*, which was duty carrier, turned into the wind (about 120°) for flying operations reducing speed to 13 knots during recovery of aircraft. The *Hornet's* Force, 5 to 6 miles to the north-eastward, conformed to the *Wasp's* movements. By 1442 flying operations were completed, and the *Wasp* began turning back to the westward, increasing to 16 knots. Two minutes later, while she was swinging to starboard, three torpedoes were sighted close aboard, 3 points before the starboard beam. The rudder was put hard to starboard, but almost immediately the torpedoes hit in the magazine and petrol storage areas forward, while a fourth torpedo passed ahead on a course 060°. The shock of the first torpedo ruptured petrol lines and started fires, and immediately afterwards a petrol explosion sent flames 150 ft. into the air. "Planes on the flight and hangar decks were lifted and dropped with such force that their landing gear was broken. Planes triced to the hangar overhead broke loose and crashed on those below. Fires started on the hangar deck and in many places forward. Ready ammunition began to explode. Water mains forward broke under the shock. The ship listed to starboard 11°, but was soon brought back to 4°. Fires spread in oil and gasoline on the water alongside. In a few minutes a heavy internal explosion² shattered the ship forward." The ship was stopped, and then went astern, so as to get the wind on the starboard quarter; but violent internal explosions were taking place, and within half an hour the flames had spread to such an extent that she had to be abandoned, the Commanding Officer leaving at 1600.³

19. U.S.S. "North Carolina" and "O'Brien" torpedoed (Plan 2A)

Meanwhile the *Hornet's* force also had been attacked. At the moment the *Wasp* was hit (1444)⁴ Task Force 17 was just beginning to alter course from 120° to 280°. While the ships were turning the *Wasp* was seen to burst into smoke and flames. The *North Carolina* had just steadied on 280° at 1450 when she intercepted a broadcast warning from one of the *Wasp's* screening destroyers that a torpedo was heading directly for the force, course 080°. She started turning to starboard under 10° of helm, and half a minute later the *Mustin*, then about 500 yards 60° on her port bow reported "Torpedo passed astern headed for you." Full speed was ordered and the rudder was put hard to starboard, but she had only swung 15° when at 1452 a torpedo struck her port side.⁵ A heavy column of oil and water rose nearly as high as the tops and immediately a 5½° list developed. The list was removed in six minutes, but extensive flooding took place, and flash from the explosion penetrated to No. 1

¹ Zone minus 12 Time.

² It is believed that this explosion was the foremost magazine as it was accompanied by a column of dense white smoke similar to one seen when the *Arizona's* magazines blew up on 7th December, 1941.

³ There were about 26 officers and 167 men killed or missing out of 201 officers and 2,046 men on board.

⁴ Zone minus 12 Time.

⁵ The torpedo was not seen from the *North Carolina* until just before it hit. Its course was thought to be between 000° and 030°.

turret handling room and spaces in the vicinity. As a precaution the magazines were flooded. The hole in the hull was 32 ft. long by 18 ft. high, extending from just below the armour belt, and severe structural damage was suffered. Five men were lost. Despite the damage the *North Carolina* built up speed to 25 knots, and retained her position in the formation, manoeuvring radically to conform with the *Hornet*.

At the time the *North Carolina* was hit, the destroyer *O'Brien* was a few hundred yards on her port quarter, steaming at 19 knots to regain her station after the alteration of course to the westward. Two minutes later she sighted a torpedo two points before the port beam, distant about 1,000 yards, running at 27 knots, course 350°. This torpedo just missed her stern by 4 or 5 ft., but simultaneously another was sighted close aboard, which struck the stem blowing away the forefoot from about frame 10 up to the main deck. There was shock damage throughout the ship and flooding forward, but the *O'Brien* was able to proceed under her own power for Noumea; she broke in two, however, and sank while on passage.

20. U.S. Reinforcement of Guadalcanal, 14th-18th September (Plans 2A, 8)

Meanwhile, the second Japanese attempt on Guadalcanal had been launched and repulsed. On this occasion the plan was to capture Henderson's Field by land forces, which had been built up by infiltration, after which large reinforcements were to be landed to drive the Americans into the sea. A heavily escorted convoy of transports put to sea and lay off to the northward outside bombing range, ready to land after the capture of the airfield. The land assault on Henderson's Field commenced on the night of the 13th/14th September, and after heavy fighting was defeated by the U.S. Marines. The convoy thereupon withdrew to the northward.

The losses suffered by the American carrier forces on the 15th September, left Rear-Admiral Turner's convoy in an awkward position.¹ The general situation on leaving Espiritu Santo on the 14th had been far from reassuring. There was a considerable enemy concentration at Faisi; almost nightly raids by surface forces were taking place on Guadalcanal, and the strength of enemy air attacks had increased; clearly, another strong effort to recapture the island was about to take place.

It was particularly important that the convoy should not be detected, since, in addition to the air menace, strong enemy surface forces were known to be to the north-west, north and north-east of Guadalcanal, all within less than one day's steaming. The route chosen was south of San Cristobal and thence through Indispensable Strait and Lengo Channel. In approaching San Cristobal the force kept well to the eastward in spite of the submarines as giving the best chance of evading enemy air reconnaissance.

The reports which came in on the 14th and 15th were not encouraging, and at 1100, 15th, the convoy was located and shadowed for an hour by a 4-engined bomber. Since the troops embarked were the only reinforcements in the South Pacific which could be available for some weeks, Rear-Admiral Turner considered that he was not justified in risking an attack by strong surface forces during disembarkation, and decided to withdraw temporarily to await a more favourable opportunity. In the hope of drawing the Japanese surface forces

¹ The convoy under Rear-Admiral Turner, with his flag in the *McCawley*, consisted of 5 transports (the *Alchiba*, *Crescent City*, *President Adams*, *President Hayes*, *President Jackson*), in which were embarked nearly 5,000 men, with equipment and stores. It was screened by Task Group 65.3,—the heavy cruisers *Minneapolis* (Flag, Rear-Admiral Wright), *Boise*, H.M.N.Z.S. *Leander*, and destroyers.

within the reach of the U.S. shore-based aircraft, he held his course till after dark, and then sending one destroyer (the *Zane*) on with orders to signal by wireless during the night a report of his change of plan, altered course to the south-eastward.

That night (15th/16th) enemy cruisers and destroyers landed troops in Guadalcanal. On the 16th the picture was not clear to Rear-Admiral Turner, but the failure of the enemy to make his expected large scale landing or other attacks on the island induced him to turn to the northward towards the eastern end of San Cristobal at 1500, 16th, in order to be in a position to arrive at Guadalcanal on the morning of the 18th if conditions then warranted the attempt. Hazy weather and high winds from the south-east prevailed and the force was not sighted either by submarines or aircraft.

Early on the morning of the 17th the decision was taken to proceed with the plan. Conditions appeared to be shaping fair. It seemed probable that the enemy surface craft which had raided Guadalcanal on the night of 15th/16th would not be able to return in time to interfere with the landing on the 18th; news arrived of the destruction of a number of aircraft by Australian bombers on the airfield at Rabaul; and a message from Vice-Admiral Ghormley expressed the opinion that the enemy had temporarily withdrawn from the area.

During the afternoon a report was received that scouting aircraft had sighted at Gizo (200 miles from Guadalcanal) at 0900 that morning 10 four-engined flying boats, several fighters on floats, four cruisers, destroyers and transports—a total of about 20 vessels. Rear-Admiral Turner considered that "there was no great danger of attack from this enemy, since his surface escort would probably be employed in large part to protect his own transports."¹

Once the decision to carry out the reinforcements had been taken, all went well. The night was very dark, with frequent rain squalls, but the approach through the narrow and inadequately charted waters was skilfully accomplished and the transports arrived off Kukum Beach at 0550, 18th September and immediately commenced disembarkation. This was reported by enemy radio within three quarters of an hour.

A very careful organisation for unloading had been worked out, one-third of the embarked troops being detailed for handling cargo, and assistance in trucks and boats being rendered by the troops already ashore. While this was going on two of the destroyers—the *Monssen* and *MacDonough*—at the request of the General, bombarded various enemy positions to the westward of Kukum. Fires were started, but otherwise the results could not be estimated. By the close of the day the disembarkation of the 7th Marines, with all its weapons, essential equipment, most of its motor vehicles, three units of fire and 40 days' rations had been completed. In addition, about 150,000 gallons of much needed petrol, oil and stores had been landed at the same beaches from three auxiliaries which arrived during the day. At 2030 all ships got under way, and withdrew through Lengo Channel, arriving at their bases without incident between 20th and 22nd September.

At 0015, 19th, as expected, an enemy force of cruisers and destroyers arrived off Kukum, but it was too late and beyond bombarding the shore positions, there was nothing for it to do.

¹ A good example of taking account of the enemy's difficulties as well as one's own.

CHAPTER IV

THIRD JAPANESE OFFENSIVE

21. U.S. Carrier-borne raid on Shortland Islands, 5th October, 1942 (Plan 2A)

Between the second and third major Japanese efforts to recapture Guadalcanal there was an interval of about three weeks. The enemy continued to land small reinforcements and bombard the American positions in the island by night, while 300 miles to the north-westward his expeditionary force was getting ready at his advanced base in the Buin-Faisi (Shortland Islands) area. On 1st October, 1942, Task Force 17,¹ under the command of Rear-Admiral Murray, consisting of the *Hornet*, four cruisers and six destroyers, was ordered to leave Noumea the next day to launch an air attack on the concentration of shipping there. The raid was planned to take place on 5th October, and arrangements were made for attacks by shore-based aircraft of both the South-west and South Pacific areas to be carried out on Rabaul and the Buka-Kieta area, in order to contain the enemy air force and to prevent a counter attack on Task Force 17 during its retirement. Rear-Admiral Murray left Noumea on 2nd October and arrived in a position about 120 miles to the southward of Buin at 0430, 5th October.² There was a 16-knot wind from the south-east, with light cumulus cloud at 2,000 to 3,000 ft. A careful study of weather maps had led to the expectation of unsettled weather in the launching area, but improved conditions in the target area. The attacking aircraft were divided into two waves, the first consisting of 18, and the second of 15 bombers. Each group was escorted by eight fighters. About half way to the target the weather got steadily worse; heavy rains were encountered, and the ceiling at the target "became a solid overcast, with some clouds as low as 2,000 to 3,000 ft., prohibiting dive bombing against any objective." The bombers became separated and the escort also lost touch, but all proceeded independently. Three overran the target area, and finding themselves over Kieta, bombed the airfield there; 9 others flying through rain and murk, found neither land nor enemy ships and returned to the carrier with their bombs. Those which did reach their objective seem to have taken the enemy completely by surprise and claimed to have scored 1,000-lb. bomb hits on an 8-in. cruiser (*Nachi*³ class) and a transport, and 500-lb. bomb hits on a large seaplane tender and two transports. In addition an 8-in. cruiser might have been damaged by near misses.⁴ All the American aircraft returned safely to the *Hornet*, and Task Force 17 withdrew without incident.

¹ Task Force 17, carrier *Hornet* (Flag, Rear-Admiral Murray), 8-in. cruisers *Northampton*, *Pensacola*, A/A cruisers *San Diego*, *Juneau*, six destroyers.

² The endurance of the destroyers was insufficient for them to carry out the whole operation at the high speed necessary to reach the launching position in time. The heavy ships therefore increased to 28 knots at 1000, 4th, and went on alone, leaving the destroyers to follow at 19 knots, which would enable them to rejoin after the raid in time to increase the A/A fire against a possible enemy counter attack.

³ *Nachi*: 10,000 tons, 35.5 knots; ten 7.87-in., eight 4.7 in. H.A. guns; twelve 21-in. torpedo tubes.

⁴ According to Japanese sources, none of these ships was damaged.

Commenting on the operation, Rear-Admiral Murray remarked that "in the employment of a carrier task force in raids on enemy objectives, the state of the weather is one of the most important, if not the most important, consideration." On this occasion the forecast for the 24 hours preceding the raid indicated unsettled weather conditions in the launching area, with promise of improvement and possibly clear weather at sunrise in the target area. This led to the decision to equip the torpedo bombers with bombs instead of torpedoes. Actually, the weather was the reverse of what was predicted. The damage which might have been inflicted on the enemy had torpedoes been carried instead of bombs, is, of course, a matter of conjecture; but "had the assumption been that the ceiling at the target would be so low as to prohibit dive bombing, at least six and possibly all the torpedo bombers would have carried torpedoes."

22. Battle of Cape Esperance, 11th-12th October, 1942 (Plan 8)

Early in October, 1942, the American strength in surface ships in the South Pacific had increased sufficiently to allow a striking force of cruisers and destroyers to be formed for the purpose of countering the enemy's night activities off Guadalcanal. This force, known as Task ^{GROUP} Force 64.2,¹ was placed under the command of Rear-Admiral N. Scott, U.S.N.

On 7th October, Task ^{GROUP} Force 64.2 sailed from Espiritu Santo for the Guadalcanal area. The intention was to remain well to the southward of the island by day beyond the range of enemy bombers, and to close the Western Approaches by night, in order to intercept enemy reinforcements.

These dispositions coincided with the opening moves of the third great Japanese effort. The recapture of Henderson Field was still considered by the enemy an essential preliminary to landing the main occupation force, but to build up his forces ashore sufficiently by his methods of infiltration was a slow business, so he decided to bring in transports at night, run them aground, if necessary, on the unloading beaches, and trust to getting the personnel and as much material as possible ashore before the ships were destroyed by air attack in daylight. The first operation of this nature, planned for the night of the 11th/12th October, was defeated by Rear-Admiral Scott in the night action known as the Battle of Cape Esperance. The Japanese plan was as follows:—

A transport and two destroyers (the *Natsugumo* and *Akatsuki*) were to land their reinforcements and supplies at Tassafaronga. Cover was to be provided by a force under Rear-Admiral Goto, consisting of the heavy cruisers *Aoba* (flag), *Furutaka* and *Kinugasa* (the 6th cruiser division) and the destroyers *Fubuki* and *Murakumo*. The landing operations were expected to be completed by about midnight, 11th/12th, when Admiral Goto's force was to bombard Henderson's Field, while the transport force made its withdrawal.

Task ^{GROUP} Force 64.2 had arrived in its cruising area on 9th October. For two days there was no special news of the enemy; on the 10th two aircraft from each of the cruisers conducted a search of the area used by the Japanese landing reinforcements, after which they proceeded to Tulagi for the night with instructions to rejoin their parent ships next afternoon. At 1347, 11th October, however, a shore-based reconnaissance aircraft reported an enemy force of cruisers and destroyers 210 miles to the north-westward of Guadalcanal

¹ Task ^{GROUP} Force 64.2, 8-in. cruisers *San Francisco* (flag), *Boise*, *Salt Lake City*; A/A cruiser *Helena*; destroyers *Farenholt*, *Laffey*, *Duncan*, *Buchanan*, *McCalla*. *Boise* was a 6-in. cruiser.

approaching the island at high speed. A further report at 1810 placed it 100 miles nearer.

Rear-Admiral Scott calculated that the enemy would reach the landing area about 2300, 11th October, and accordingly at 1600 steered to the northward at 29 knots from position lat. 11° 30' S., long. 161° 45' E., to establish a patrol to the westward of Guadalcanal and Savo Island. During this passage the aircraft which had spent the night at Tulagi returned to the cruisers; they were not taken on board, however, but with an additional aircraft from each cruiser were sent back to Tulagi, in order to clear the cruisers' decks of aircraft in preparation for the night action which seemed imminent.

At 2200 the remaining cruiser aircraft were catapulted to search for the Japanese force. The plane from the *Salt Lake City* crashed on catapulting and burst into flames; this was taken for a signal from the beach by the approaching Japanese, who answered with a searchlight.

Shortly after 2300 and again at 2330 the *San Francisco* aircraft reported a transport and two destroyers off the north beach at Guadalcanal, but Rear-Admiral Scott was after larger game, and they were last seen at 0230 retiring to the north-westward unmolested.

At 2333 the squadron had reached a position about four miles due west of the northern point of Savo Island, and course was altered to port from 050° to 230°. Ships were in column in the order *San Francisco*, *Boise*, *Salt Lake City*, *Helena*, with three destroyers (*Farenholt*, *Duncan*, *Laffey*) ahead and two (*Buchanan*, *McCalla*) astern of the cruisers.¹ It was a dark night, with no moon and a clear atmosphere; there was a 7 knot wind from the south-east, and a calm sea, with an easterly swell.

There had been several vague radar contacts from 2100 onwards but at 2325—just before the alteration to the south-westward—the *Helena* obtained a definite contact on S.G. radar of ships bearing 315°, 27,700 yards off, and tracking commenced. The *San Francisco* was unfortunately not fitted with S.G. radar, and Rear-Admiral Scott therefore had to wait for other ships' reports. This caused him considerable inconvenience and uncertainty during the approach and action which followed.² Additional anxiety was caused by his ignorance of the position of his destroyers, which became separated from the cruisers during the 180° turn at 2333. Actually, when contact occurred, they were overtaking the cruisers to starboard, and thus between them and the enemy.

Meanwhile the enemy was approaching at 26 knots, the cruisers in line ahead in the order *Aoba*, *Furutaka*, *Kinugasa*, with a destroyer on either beam of the flagship—the *Murakumo* to starboard and the *Fubuki* to port.

At 2342 the Americans estimated the Japanese to be bearing 285°, 12,000 yards, steering 140° at 26 knots; three minutes later they sighted ships to starboard and at 2346 opened fire at a range of 4,000–5,000 yards. The Japanese were caught unawares; at first they thought they were being fired on by their own supply group. They immediately altered course 16 points to starboard, except the *Kinugasa* which, owing to congestion and the heavy

¹ The two rear cruisers and the destroyers astern of them were specially charged with guarding the disengaged side after action was joined. This did not preclude them from opening fire on the engaged side.

² There was considerable confusion at the commencement of the action. At 2344, the *Boise* reported five ships bearing 065°. This was intended as the relative bearing, but was interpreted as the true bearing (295°). Uncertainty was increased by the fact that at the moment of contact the U.S. destroyers were passing between the cruisers and the enemy, in order to regain station ahead after the 180° turn at 2333.

shell fire, turned to port. This independent manoeuvre stood her in good stead; as a result, she only received minor damage and was enabled later to inflict serious injuries on the Americans. But the remaining ships as they turned received the fire of the whole American squadron; the *Fubuki* was set on fire almost immediately and sank, followed a few minutes later by the *Furutaka*, while the *Aoba* was hit about 40 times and suffered very severe damage and many casualties, including Rear-Admiral Goto, who was mortally wounded early in the action. Only the *Murakumo*, which chanced to be screened by the smoke from the *Aoba*, escaped unhurt.¹

For eight minutes the Americans were unscathed; then at 2354, the *Boise* received a hit. A quarter of an hour later she came under a heavy fire from an 8-in. cruiser and a destroyer²; she received seven hits in three minutes and was forced to discontinue the action. The *Salt Lake City*, too, was hit and the destroyer *Duncan* which had closed in to fire torpedoes, was caught between the two forces and fired on by both. She was set on fire and subsequently sank, most of her crew being saved. The action continued on a north-westerly course till 0025, 12th October, when all firing ceased. "By this time the enemy had been crushed. Except for several ships burning (two of these were an 8-in. cruiser and a destroyer, that ultimately blew up) radar screens showed no targets. . . . Our force had received indeterminate damage, the formation was disorganised after a half hour of heavy action, and the destroyers were still out of position, so that there was danger of our ships engaging each other."³

In these circumstances, Rear-Admiral Scott decided to withdraw, and at 0027 set course to the south-westward. By 0305 all the American ships (except the *Duncan*) had rejoined the flag. The *Boise*, *Salt Lake City* and *Farenholt* had suffered damage and the *Duncan* had been lost. Against this the 8-in. cruiser *Furutaka* and destroyer *Fubuki* had been sunk, and the *Aoba* (severely) and *Kinugasa* (lightly) damaged.⁴

¹ The foregoing account of the Japanese contact is based on the interrogation of Captain K. Kijima, I.J.N., who was Chief of Staff to Admiral Goto at the time. Captain Kijima seems to have been held responsible for the Japanese defeat, judging from his reply to the last question he was asked—"I do not know. I failed in this task and was relieved as soon as we arrived at Rabaul."

² Presumably the *Kinugasa* and the *Murakumo*.

³ Rear-Admiral Scott's Report.

⁴ As is usually the case in night actions, duplication of reports and confusion caused the enemy losses to appear higher than was actually the case. It was considered possible that these amounted to 4—8-in. cruisers, 1 or 2 light cruisers, 1 auxiliary and 7 destroyers.

The number of enemy ships present was long in doubt, but it was believed that there had been two groups,—the first consisting of three 8-in. cruisers and three destroyers, the second (some distance astern) of two cruisers and six destroyers, with possibly some auxiliaries between the groups.

The result of the action was as shewn below:—

CLASS	JAPANESE				U.S.A.	
	ESTIMATED		ACTUAL		SUNK	DAMAGED
	SUNK	DAMAGED	SUNK	DAMAGED		
Heavy cruisers	2	1	1	2	—	2
Light cruisers	1	—	—	—	—	—
Destroyers ...	5	(?) 2-3	1	—	1	1
Auxiliaries ...	1	—	—	—	—	—

Aircraft from Guadalcanal followed up the victory after daylight, and sank the destroyers *Murakamo* and *Natsugumo*, which had proceeded to the scene of the action to rescue survivors.

After this successful action, Rear-Admiral Scott returned to Espiritu Santo, covered by shore-based aircraft of the South Pacific Air Force.

The next day (13th October) the American Marines in Guadalcanal were reinforced by the 164th Infantry Regiment, U.S. Army, which was landed without interference by the enemy.

23. Preparations and Assault, 13th-24th October, 1942 (Plans 2A, 8)

Undeterred by their defeat at the Battle of Cape Esperance, the Japanese continued to press on their preparations for their third great assault on Guadalcanal. They still enjoyed local command of the sea by night, and two nights after the engagement (13th/14th October), a force of two battleships (the *Haruna* and *Kongo*), a light cruiser and eight destroyers bombarded Henderson Field for an hour and twenty minutes, destroying a large number of aircraft. The bombardment was repeated with less effect by cruisers and destroyers on the two succeeding nights. Numerous air attacks increased the damage, but cost the enemy heavily in aircraft.¹

On 15th October, before dawn, the enemy succeeded in landing about 10,000 troops and much equipment from six transports to the west of Kokumbona (see Plan 8); aircraft from Henderson's Field sank three or four of these transports and damaged an escorting 8-in. cruiser after daylight.

To the south-east submarines² and carrier-borne aircraft operated as far as lat. 13° S. against the American lines of communication; the auxiliary *Meredith* was sunk on the 15th October, and the cruiser *Chester* was torpedoed and seriously damaged on 20th October. Far to the north-west, Japanese troops and aircraft were being steadily moved from the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies and other places towards the Solomons, and the concentrations in the Rabaul and Shortland Islands areas were increasing daily.

To meet this threatening situation, the Americans concentrated submarines in the Bismarck area, and increased the number of heavy land-based bombers and patrol aircraft in the South Pacific. All available aircraft were flown into Guadalcanal from Espiritu Santo after the bombardments, but even so only 23 fighters, 16 dive bombers and 1 torpedo plane could be mustered on 26th October, and these were handicapped by a critical shortage of fuel. For over a week, while the tempo of Japanese attacks was increasing, the only fuel available for the defending fighters was flown in by Marine C-47s (Transports), assisted by such aircraft as were available from the Army Air Force 13th Troop Carrier Squadron. "Although constantly harassed in the air by fighters, and on the ground by enemy mortar fire, each plane was able to fly in enough fuel to maintain 12 fighters in the air for one hour. The importance of this unusual mission can be measured by the fact that on the 24th, 24 Grumman fighters were able to shoot down 20 Zeros and 1 bomber in one short flight."³

¹ Between 1st and 27th October, approximately 200 (out of 600) aircraft were shot down by aircraft and A/A fire from Guadalcanal.

² In addition to the submarines operating to the south-east of the Solomons, six submarines (known as Force A) were deployed in the Indispensable Strait (see Plan 3), and a further six (Force B) was ordered to reinforce those in the former area. Both Forces A and B were ordered to the north of the Santa Cruz Islands after the battle on the 26th October, in order to intercept the damaged U.S. ships.

³ The "Campaigns of the Pacific," p. 119.

Aircraft of the South-West Pacific area collaborated and intensified their attacks on Rabaul and the airfields in the Bismarcks, doing considerable damage.¹ The main Naval Forces were held in readiness to intercept the enemy expeditionary force as it approached Guadalcanal (*see postea*, Sec. 24).

On the evening of the 23rd October, after a heavy artillery bombardment of the American lines, the Japanese land forces which had been built up to some 26,000 Army troops and 3,000 special naval assault troops attacked with tanks and massed infantry along the Matanikau River, with Henderson's Field as their objective. Hard fighting took place throughout the 24th and 25th. For the opening stages the airfield was out of action, owing to damage and heavy rains, and on the 25th the enemy troops were supported by cruiser and destroyer gunfire as well as by bombers; but despite all their efforts they failed to achieve a break-through. At this juncture Vice-Admiral Nagumo, the senior officer of the Naval Forces covering the main Occupation Force, whose landing, originally planned for the 21st, had successively been postponed to the 23rd, 24th, 25th, informed the Japanese Island Commander that the supporting fleet would be forced to retire owing to lack of fuel if the attack was not carried out immediately. By noon (25th) the weather had improved, and American aircraft could again be operated; they broke up many bomber attacks and sank the light cruiser *Yura* (east of Indispensable Strait) in the course of the afternoon. That night (25th) came the crisis of the battle; the enemy actually broke through the American lines,² but after desperate fighting were driven back with heavy losses. The great attack had failed; the all-important airfield remained in American hands, and the main Japanese occupation forces, which had left Buin during the night of the 24th–25th October once again turned back. The attempt, however, had very nearly succeeded, and if the Japanese had moved in their main occupation forces while Henderson's Field was unserviceable, without waiting for its capture, it would have been difficult for the Americans to have held out.

On the following day (26th October), the enemy's discomfiture was completed at the Battle of Santa Cruz. This, like the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, was fought out by carrier-borne aircraft, and again the Japanese air forces were practically annihilated, though on this occasion the Americans suffered heavier losses in both air and surface craft than on 24th August.

24. Battle of Santa Cruz, 26th October, 1942 (*Plans 2A, 9*)

The Japanese covering forces on this occasion were organised in three groups,³ as follows:—

THE ADVANCE FORCE, under Vice-Admiral Kondo, Commander-in-Chief, 2nd Fleet, with his flag in the cruiser *Atago*, consisting of the battleships *Kongo* (flag, Vice-Admiral Kurita) and *Haruna*, the light carrier *Junyo*, four heavy cruisers, one light cruiser and 13 destroyers;

¹ On the nights of 23rd–25th October these aircraft reported hitting about 10 ships, including one cruiser and one destroyer.

² This prompted the Japanese Commander to report the airfield as captured, with the result that 14 fighters and a few bombers from the Carriers arrived over the field next morning (as planned), where they circled awaiting a signal to land. Eight U.S. fighters took off and shot them all down before the mistake could be rectified.

³ For Organisation and composition of Japanese Covering Forces, *see* App. D (3).

THE CARRIER STRIKING FORCE, consisting of the large carriers *Shokaku* (flag, Vice-Admiral Nagumo) and *Zuikaku*, the light carrier *Zuiho*, the heavy cruiser *Kumano* and 7 destroyers, and;


THE BATTLESHIP STRIKING FORCE, consisting of the battleships *Hiei* (flag, Rear-Admiral Abe) and *Kirishima*, three heavy cruisers, a light cruiser and 7 destroyers.

The whole force was under the command of Vice-Admiral Nagumo, Commander-in-Chief, 3rd Fleet, flying his flag in the *Shokaku*. During the land attacks on the American positions between the 23rd and 25th it had cruised in the area 200 to 400 miles north east of Malaita, the Battleship Striking Force about 60 miles to the southward of the Carrier Striking Force, and the Advance Force about 100 miles to the westward. A supply group, consisting of 4 oil tankers and 3 transports, escorted by a destroyer, was also at sea, standing by to proceed to Guadalcanal when ordered to do so.

Meanwhile, as the Japanese preparations advanced, the following naval dispositions had been taken up by the Americans. The fast battleship *Washington*, with three cruisers and ten destroyers (Task Force 64), under Rear-Admiral W. A. Lee, Jr., cruised to the westward of Guadalcanal, ready to attack the enemy forces supporting landings. Beyond the New Hebrides, some 800 miles to the eastward, Task Force 61 consisting of the carrier *Hornet* with the remaining cruisers and destroyers, under Rear-Admiral Murray, awaited news of the departure of the enemy main occupation forces from the Shortlands area. The *Enterprise* (Flag, Rear-Admiral Kinkaid) was at Pearl Harbour, repairing damage suffered at the Battle of the Eastern Solomons; by great exertions, she was able to join the *Hornet* in lat. 13° 45' S., long. 171° 30' E. on 24th October—the day after the Japanese launched their land assault on Henderson's Field. With her came the battleship *South Dakota*, and Rear-Admiral Kinkaid, who was the senior officer present, assumed command of the whole force.¹

On receipt of the news that the Japanese offensive had begun, Task Force 61 shaped course to the north-westward to close the Guadalcanal area, passing north of the Santa Cruz Islands.² During the 25th October air reports were received of strong enemy forces, including battleships and carriers some 360 miles to the north-westward; Rear-Admiral Kinkaid steered for the contact at 27 knots, and flew off an attack group of 18 bombers, and 11 fighters, which, however, failed to reach the enemy, who had altered course to the northward.

¹ On the junction of the *Enterprise* the following organisation was adopted:—



² Task Force 61 was operating in accordance with the following directive:—

"Proceed around the Santa Cruz Islands to the north, thence proceed south-westerly and east of San Cristobal to area in Coral Sea and be in position to intercept enemy forces approaching the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area. There are many enemy submarines concentrated south-west of San Cristobal."

During the night (25th-26th October), Task Force 61 continued to steer towards the enemy at 20 knots.¹ At 0410² 26th October, a shore-based aircraft reported a large carrier and six other vessels about 200 miles from Task Force 61's position. This report did not reach Rear-Admiral Kinkaid till 0612, when the *Enterprise* was flying off fighter patrols and a search group of 16 aircraft. At 0730 the first report of the search group was received:—two battleships, one heavy cruiser and six destroyers, steering north, had been sighted at 0717 at a distance of 170 miles 275° from the *Enterprise*. Half an hour later, at 0750 a second report placed two carriers and escort steering 330°, 75 miles north of the squadron first sighted. At the same moment a Japanese aircraft was reporting Task Force 61.³ Two of the American search planes attacked one of the carriers (*Zuiho*) and obtained 2 hits; two others thought they hit the stern of a cruiser.

At 0800, 26th October, Task Force 61 was in position lat. 8° 45' S., long. 166° 38' E. (about 100 miles north of the Santa Cruz Islands), steering 270° at 23 knots. Between 0830 and 0910 both carriers flew off striking forces, totalling 50 bombers and torpedo bombers, and 23 fighters.⁴

At 0930 the *Enterprise* group, when some 60 miles out, was surprised by fighters of an enemy striking force on its way to attack Task Force 61, which shot down 3 torpedo-bombers and 2 fighters, and damaged 1 torpedo bomber and 2 fighters so seriously that they returned to the *Enterprise* and landed in the water. The remainder went on and, failing to find the enemy carriers, dive-bombed a *Kongo* class battleship at 1040, unfortunately without success. The torpedo planes attacked an *Atago* class cruiser, but claimed no hits. About 16 enemy aircraft were shot down.

The *Hornet* group found the carrier group and attacked at 1050. The dive-bombers secured four 1,000 lb. bomb hits on a large carrier (*Shokaku*)⁵ and two hits on the 8-in. cruiser *Chikuma*, leaving both heavily on fire, while the torpedo planes unsuccessfully attacked an 8-in. cruiser (*Nachi* class) with

¹ The forces engaged in the Battle of Santa Cruz were as follows:—

ALLIED (see Apps. A and D (2))
2 carriers, *Enterprise* and *Hornet*.

1 fast battleship, *South Dakota*.

3 heavy cruisers, *Portland*, *Northampton*, *Pensacola*.

3 light cruisers, *San Juan*, *Juneau*, *San Diego*.

14 destroyers.

JAPANESE (see Apps. B and D (3)).

4 carriers, *Shokaku*, *Zuikaku*, *Zuiho* and *Junyo*.

4 battleships, *Hiyei*, *Kirishima*, *Kongo*, *Haruna*.

8 heavy cruisers, *Atago*, *Takao*, *Mayo*, *Myoko*, *Kumano*, *Tone*, *Chikuma*, *Suzuya*.

2 light cruisers, *Isuzu*, *Nagara*.

27 destroyers.

Several submarines.

² Zone minus 12 Time.

³ This was not known at the time, but subsequently transpired from captured documents. Two of the American search planes when about 85 miles from the *Enterprise* had encountered an enemy aircraft flying in the opposite direction; they did not attack it, and apparently did not report the contact.

⁴ *Enterprise*—3 bombers (1,000 lb. bombs), 8 torpedo bombers (torpedoes), 8 fighters.
Hornet—First wave—15 bombers (1,000 lb. bombs), 6 torpedo bombers (torpedoes), 8 fighters. Second wave—9 bombers (1,000 lb. bombs), 9 torpedo bombers (4-500 lb. bombs each), 7 fighters.

⁵ The *Shokaku* suffered serious injury to her flight deck, and had her speed reduced to 21 knots. That evening Vice-Admiral Nagumo shifted his flag to a destroyer.

torpedoes and a light cruiser (*Tone* class) with 500 lb. bombs. Two destroyers—the *Terutsuki* and *Akikazi*—were severely damaged in the course of these attacks.

Meanwhile the enemy striking force had attacked the *Hornet*. Soon after 0920 two large groups were picked up by radar, bearing 280° 60 miles distant¹. The *Hornet* was then in position Lat. 8° 38' S., Long. 166° 43' E., closely screened by her cruisers and destroyers, the *Enterprise* group being 8 or 10 miles to the north-east. There were 15 American fighters overhead. These encountered the enemy shortly before 1000, and shot down a number of them. About 15 dive-bombers got past, however, and at 1012 concentrated their attack on the *Hornet*. At the same time 12 or more aircraft carried out a well co-ordinated torpedo attack from various directions. Flying low over the water, they got in unopposed by American fighters, but suffered heavily from A/A fire.² Within three minutes the *Hornet* was hit by a bomber,³ which dived into her and exploded, by three 500-lb. bombs, and by two torpedoes. The latter especially caused very serious damage. Two boiler rooms and the forward engine room were flooded; all propulsion, power and communications failed; large fires broke out, and the ship listed 7° or 8° to starboard. Two minutes later an unarmed torpedo plane crashed into the ship and blew up, starting another large fire. By 1017—five minutes after the first bombs had fallen—the attack was over. A/A fire had accounted for eight or more torpedo planes and about 12 out of the 15 dive bombers which got through the fighter umbrella.

The *Hornet* was by this time dead in the water. A circular screen was formed round her by the cruisers and some of the destroyers, while others went alongside and despite a heavy roll, did excellent work in assisting to fight the fires. By 1100 these were all under control, and the *Northampton* commenced to take her in tow.

Just at this time, another enemy striking force was opening an attack on the *Enterprise*. When the attack on the *Hornet* started, Rear-Admiral Kinkaid had turned to the northward to take advantage of a rain squall.⁴ Between 1031 and 1048, the *Enterprise* recovered her search group, which reported having shot down 7 enemy fighters and 1 torpedo bomber.⁵ At 1107, the destroyer *Porter*, while rescuing survivors of a friendly aircraft which had crashed, was torpedoed by a submarine,⁶ and about five minutes later, the force was heavily attacked from the air.

It appears that the enemy had been unaware of the presence of the second carrier until 1027, when it was revealed by radio voice transmission. He lost no time in taking action, and during the next two hours launched three heavy attacks on her.

¹ They were reported at about the same time by the *Hornet's* out-going striking force.

² The *Pensacola* estimated that 20 aircraft took part in this torpedo attack, and that over half were shot down before releasing torpedoes.

³ This bomber was armed with two 100 lb. and one 500 lb. bombs. Both the 100 lb. bombs burst, but the 500 lb. one failed to detonate. See App. B, damage to the *Hornet*.

⁴ This caused visual touch between the two groups to be lost at 1045. It was not regained that day.

⁵ ? of the force which had attacked the *Hornet*?

⁶ She suffered such injury that the Admiral subsequently ordered her to be abandoned and sunk by gunfire.

The first attack was carried out by about 24 dive bombers between 1115 and 1119. Owing to broken clouds, and confusion on the radar screen due to the large number of aircraft, friendly and hostile, the enemy were not seen till well in their dives. About 10 of them were shot down, but the *Enterprise* suffered damage from a near miss and two direct hits, which put the forward lift out of action, and caused heavy damage.

Half an hour later, at 1145, 15 torpedo planes accompanied by fighters, commenced a drawn out attack. This was immediately followed by 12 dive bombers, most of which attacked the screening ships. There were no torpedo hits or bomb hits during the main attack, but some minutes later a solitary bomber slipped through the clouds, and obtained a direct hit on the *South Dakota*, which put two guns of number 2 turret out of action. The destroyer *Smith* was also damaged by a torpedo plane which crashed on her.¹ The *Enterprise* was saved from torpedo hits by clever ship handling and well directed A/A fire; about 12 torpedo planes and 5 or more dive-bombers were shot down.

Just after this attack (at 1155), a submarine fired four torpedoes at the *Portland*; one passed ahead, the others probably hit, but failed to explode. Ten minutes later the *San Juan* sighted a periscope; torpedoes were fired at her, but she succeeded in combing their tracks.

From 1221 to 1233, 20 dive-bombers attacked the *Enterprise* in shallow glides. They got no hits, though a near miss caused damage, and about 9 of them were shot down. They were followed by 15 dive-bombers and 9 fighters, which inflicted considerable damage on the *San Juan* with five near misses and a direct hit; 10 of them were shot down. This was the last attack on Task Force 16; over 80 aircraft had taken part in three attacks; at least 60 had been destroyed,² and the damage sustained by the American ships had been remarkably light. As soon as the last attack was over, the *Enterprise* was able to resume landing on aircraft, which by this time were running very short of fuel. Many ran out and had to land in the water.

While these attacks on Task Force 16 were taking place, Task Force 17—except for a harmless attack by a lone aircraft at 1109—had not been molested. Soon after noon the *Northampton* had the *Hornet* in tow; later there was a delay owing to the tow parting, but by 1420 they were moving at about three knots, and there were good hopes of saving the ship.³ But it was not to be.

At 1620 Task Force 17 was attacked by 9 torpedo planes and 6 dive-bombers.⁴ The *Northampton* cast off the tow as the torpedo planes came in, and just avoided all torpedoes. Three or four of the aircraft were shot down but one torpedo hit the *Hornet*, flooding the remaining engine room. The list to starboard gradually increased to about 20°, and the order was then given to

¹ Although ablaze, the *Smith* maintained her position on the screen. By steering his ship under the stern of the *South Dakota* her captain made use of the spray from the high speed wake to help bring the fire under control.

² The American fighters shot down about 18 of the enemy, of which 10 were torpedo bombers. On only one occasion did they get into position to attack dive-bombers before they were in their dives. A/A fire was effective against the dive-bombers, many of them being set on fire in their dives, while others turned away at high altitudes.

³ The engine room department was making progress in regaining power at this time. As a precaution, however, all hands not required for handling and fighting the ship were removed by destroyers.

⁴ An appeal to the *Enterprise* for fighter protection could not be complied with owing to congestion, caused by the large number of aircraft from both carriers on board, and aggravated by one elevator being out of action.

abandon ship, but before this could be done, 9 twin-engined bombers—unseen in the broken clouds—carried out a high level attack from 8,000 ft.; one bomb struck the *Hornet*, the remainder falling close astern of her and the *San Juan* at 1655. An hour later (1805) just as the last survivors were being picked up, 4 dive-bombers, 2 of which were shot down, attacked the stricken carrier; one bomb exploded in the hangar just before the island.

Meanwhile Japanese air reconnaissance had sighted Rear-Admiral Lee's Task Force 64 (*Washington*) to the southward of Guadalcanal. Estimating that this force would move east to cover the damaged carrier, the Japanese Commander¹ ordered a night attack by cruisers and destroyers, supported by a strong force of battleships, on the American forces in the Santa Cruz area. Rear-Admiral Murray realised that attack was imminent, and at 1905 ordered the destroyers *Mustin* and *Anderson* to destroy the *Hornet*, withdrawing with the remainder of Task Force 17 to the south-eastward. Badly damaged though she was the *Hornet* resisted the efforts of the destroyers to sink her for two and a half hours. During this time they hit her with nine torpedoes and 369 rounds of 5-in.² She was still afloat, burning fiercely and sinking, when at 2140 they ceased fire and followed after Task Force 17 at high speed. The two destroyers were shadowed by flare dropping enemy aircraft until 0100, 27th October; unknown to them they were being pursued by a force of cruisers and destroyers, probably less than 40 miles off, which, however, gave up the chase about midnight, 26th-27th October.

To sum up the day's operations, two enemy carriers (*Shokaku* and *Zuiho*) one heavy cruiser (*Chikuma*) and two destroyers (*Terutsuki*, *Akikaze*) had been severely damaged.

Against this, the Americans had suffered more serious losses: the *Hornet* and one destroyer (*Porter*) being sunk, and the *Enterprise*,³ *South Dakota*,³ *San Juan* and *Smith* damaged. The loss of personnel amounted to 29 officers and 254 ratings. In the air, as at the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, the enemy had suffered crippling losses, 100 carrier-borne aircraft having been shot down by fighters and A/A fire; the Americans lost 74.⁴ Of these only about 20 were shot down, with a loss of 23 officers and 10 ratings, the

¹ C.-in-C., Combined Fleet (Vice-Admiral Naguma).

² See App. E (3).

³ Both these ships were repaired in time for them to take part in the Battle of Guadalcanal three weeks later.

⁴ Losses in the Battle of Santa Cruz:—

CLASS	JAPANESE				AMERICAN	
	ESTIMATED		ACTUAL		SUNK	DAMAGED
	SUNK	DAMAGED	SUNK	DAMAGED		
Carriers ...	—	2	—	2	1	1
Battleships...	—	1	—	—	—	1
Heavy cruisers	—	3	—	1	—	—
Light cruisers	—	1	—	—	—	1
Destroyers ...	—	—	—	2	1	1
Aircraft ...	123 destroyed		100 destroyed		74 destroyed	

remainder being lost in the carriers, or owing to the inability of the *Enterprise*, herself damaged, to cope with the large number of her own and the *Hornet's* aircraft wishing to land on, after the latter had been put out of action.

That night (26th/27th October) Task Forces 16 and 17 retired independently to a position about 185 miles south-east of Espiritu Santo, where they rejoined each other and fuelled the next day. Japanese aircraft searched for them in the Santa Cruz area during the 27th, while their surface forces withdrew to their usual position north-east of Guadalcanal. But the fate of the island had already been decided by the failure of their land forces to capture Henderson's Field, and late that day with battered ships and denuded of carrier aircraft they set course for their northern bases.

CHAPTER V

FOURTH JAPANESE OFFENSIVE

25. Events following the Battle of Santa Cruz (Plan 10)

After their repulse at the Battle of Santa Cruz, the Japanese began assembling ships and troops for yet another attempt on Guadalcanal. On shore in the island unsuccessful assaults on the American lines had cost the enemy dear during the last days of October, and, before they had time to make good these losses by reinforcements, the Americans launched a counter-attack. Beginning at 0030, 30th October, the *Atlanta* and four destroyers bombarded the Japanese positions behind Point Cruz for eight hours. At dawn the marines, heavily supported from the air, struck across the Matanikau River, and by the 3rd November had advanced beyond Point Cruz, killing many of the enemy and capturing much equipment. During the night of 2nd-3rd November, however, Japanese cruisers and destroyers managed to land about 1,500 troops with artillery east of Koli Point and the American offensive to the westward was checked to meet this new threat. The force east of Koli was effectively bombarded by the *San Francisco*, *Helena* and *Sterett* on 4th November, and after several days fighting, most of it was surrounded at Tetere, and had been annihilated by 11th November.

Meanwhile the Americans had not been slow to take advantage of the retirement forced on the Japanese surface forces by the Battle of Santa Cruz. Appreciating that the retention of Guadalcanal depended on getting enough troops on shore to sustain an offensive, they landed additional troops at Lunga early in November. A force was also landed to the east at Aola Bay (see Plan 3) to begin a supporting airfield¹; and arrangements were made for a further 6,000 men with ammunition and supplies to arrive about the middle of the month in two convoys under Rear-Admiral Turner. The airfields in the Lunga area were being developed rapidly; and aircraft operating from them attacked an enemy force of one light cruiser and 10 destroyers on 7th November. One bomb and two torpedo hits were claimed on the cruiser, besides damage to two destroyers; in addition 16 enemy aircraft were shot down.

During the first fortnight of November, too, a decision which had been taken just before the Battle of Santa Cruz to operate 24 submarines—known as Task Force 42—in the South Pacific Command, bore good fruit. Attacking the enemy's supply line to the Solomons they inflicted the following damage:—one destroyer ~~sunk, one probably sunk, one~~ damaged; one torpedo hit on an armoured cruiser and two on a *Natori*² class light cruiser; one minesweeper and four transports or oilers had been sunk, and at least three others damaged, and a *Chiyoda*³ class seaplane tender,⁴ had received two torpedo hits.

¹ This was changed later, as a better site was found at Koli Point.

² *Natori*.—5,170 tons, 33 knots: 8 5.5-in., 2 .15-in. HA; 8 21-in. torpedo tubes.

³ *Chiyoda*.—9,000 tons, 20 knots: 16 seaplanes; 4 5-in. HA guns.

⁴ No confirmation of these successes has been seen in Japanese post-war casualty lists.

But almost nightly Japanese troops and supplies were reaching Guadalcanal in destroyers or small boats, and though the motor torpedo boat squadron based at Tulagi,¹ aircraft and ships' gunfire took their toll, considerable reinforcement was effected. And the enemy concentration in the Rabaul-Buin area was increasing daily.

26. Naval Situation, 10th November, 1942

On 10th November, a coast watcher reported at least 60 ships, including four battleships, six cruisers and 33 destroyers in this area, and the enemy was estimated to have available besides two carriers and six light cruisers. A grand scale attack on Guadalcanal was evidently imminent, and, despite their previous successes, the situation appeared to the Americans critical. Their land forces may have been superior to the Japanese, but the enemy had been constantly bringing in small reinforcements and a large assault force was known to be ready in the north. The Japanese naval and air forces, however, were numerically far stronger.

Their carrier situation was uncertain but it seemed probable that three—the *Hayataka*,² *Hitaka*,² and *Zuiho*³—were present, and possible that the *Zuikaku* would be sufficiently repaired to take part.⁴

The only available U.S. carrier was the partly repaired *Enterprise*⁵ which would not be fully ready for action till 21st November. She was at Noumea, and with the Battleships *Washington* and *South Dakota*, cruisers *Northampton* and *San Diego* and eight destroyers formed Task Force 16 under Rear-Admiral Kinkaid. The remainder of the American surface forces were operating under the command of Rear-Admiral Turner, who with his flag in the transport *McCawley* was on passage from Noumea to Guadalcanal, where he was due on 12th November, with the reinforcements for the garrison embarked in four transports escorted by the cruisers *Portland* and *Juneau* and four destroyers (Task Force 67). A smaller convoy (Task Group 62.4) consisting of three transports escorted by the cruisers *Atlanta* (Flag, Rear-Admiral Scott) and four destroyers were due at Guadalcanal next day, 11th November, from Espiritu Santo. Covering these movements was Task Group 67.4 under Rear-Admiral Callaghan consisting of the cruisers *San Francisco*, *Pensacola* and *Helena* and six destroyers.

27. Japanese Attack on Guadalcanal, 11th November, 1942 (Plan 10)

The Japanese plan on this occasion was to immobilise Henderson's airfield by air attack and bombardment by battleships and then to run in a large troop convoy under powerful escort. Though it was true that considerable reinforce-

¹ The destroyer *Mochizuki* was torpedoed by an M.T.B. on 8th November, but was not seriously damaged.

² *Hayataka*, *Hitaka*, ex-liners.—27,700 tons, 28 knots: 54–58 aircraft.

³ *Zuiho*, ex-tanker.—12,000 tons, 25 knots: 42 aircraft.

⁴ Actually, no carrier-borne aircraft were available (see Sec. 27 postea).

⁵ The *Saratoga* was just leaving Pearl Harbour on completion of repairs after being torpedoed 31st August, and extensive improvements to her A/A armament. Immediately after the Battle of Santa Cruz the Americans had requested that a British carrier should be sent to the South Pacific, but this could not be done so long as the result of the Allied landings in North Africa (8th November, 1942) was in doubt. The *Victorious* left European waters 16th December, and arrived at Pearl Harbour early in March, 1943.

ments had been landed from destroyers during the past fortnight, this method did not lend itself to landing tanks and heavy guns, and in order to cope with this difficulty a convoy of 12 heavy transports was assembled in the Buin-Faisi area during the first part of November and loaded with 10,000 replacement troops of the Hiroshima Division, 3,500 Naval attack troops, heavy field artillery and other supplies. At the same time major surface units were concentrated at Truk and Rabaul. Owing to the damage inflicted on the aircraft carriers and the heavy loss of aircraft and pilots in the Battle of Santa Cruz three weeks before, no fleet air support was available and the Japanese were forced to rely on the protection of a limited number of shore based fighters, operating over an increasing distance as the convoy approached its destination.

On 11th November enemy land-based aircraft began a heavy attack on the airfield. That same day Rear-Admiral Scott's transports commenced landing 6,000 men with much equipment, ammunition and supplies. These were attacked by the enemy bombers, but only one (the *Zeilin*)¹ was ^{damaged} hit. About 13 aircraft were shot down by fighters, and several more by A/A fire.

It was clear that the Japanese had started another large scale attack on Guadalcanal, and Rear-Admiral Turner determined not only to land the remainder of the reinforcements due the next day, but also to protect Henderson's Field—the key to the whole position—by engaging the bombarding forces with his escort forces. This bold decision to accept heavy risks for an adequate object was amply justified in the event.

At sunset, 11th November, the transports withdrew from the unloading area to Indispensable Strait and joined the second convoy which was approaching. The surface units under Rear-Admiral Callaghan swept east and west of Savo Island during the evening but nothing was seen of the enemy and the convoys then proceeded to the anchorage. At dawn, 12th November unloading was recommenced. This was interrupted by a heavy air attack by 21 torpedo bombers escorted by 12 fighters at 1405; able manoeuvring, good gunfire and fighter protection from Guadalcanal enabled all the store ships to escape unscathed.¹ It is believed that all but one of the torpedo bombers and several of the fighters were destroyed.

Early that morning (12th) air reconnaissance located Japanese forces approaching Guadalcanal from the north. One group consisted of the battleships *Hiyei* and *Kirishima*, screened by a light cruiser (*Nagara*) and 15 destroyers; a second more distant group consisted of transports. Numerous reports during the day left little doubt that the enemy intended to attack the transports, or bombard Henderson's Field during the night, with a force likely to consist of the two battleships, four to six cruisers and ten or more destroyers. At 1815, 12th November, Rear-Admiral Turner left Lunga Roads, and proceeded to Espiritu Santo with the transports and three escorting destroyers, leaving Rear-Admirals Callaghan and Scott with five cruisers and eight destroyers² (Task Group 67.4) to deal with the approaching enemy force.

At this time Task Force 16 under the command of Rear-Admiral Kinkaid,

¹ The *San Francisco* was damaged by a torpedo plane which crashed into her on fire, and the *Buchanan* was hit by a 5-in. projectile fired by one of the American ships.

² Task Group 67.4, *San Francisco* (Flag, Rear-Admiral Callaghan), *Portland*, *Atlanta* (Flag, Rear-Admiral Scott), *Helena*, *Juneau*, eight destroyers.

the *Enterprise*, two battleships, two cruisers and eight destroyers¹, was steaming north from Noumea with orders to be in a flying off position south of Guadalcanal on the morning of 13th November.

From this setting developed the decisive actions known as the Battle of Guadalcanal, which settled the issue of the whole campaign. This battle consisted of two entirely separate night actions—on the nights of 12th/13th and 14th/15th November—between strong surface forces on each side, with a series of air operations over the whole period. The net result was so severe a defeat of the Japanese that they gave up hope of recapturing the island and from then on confined their efforts merely to delaying the final expulsion of their forces.

28. Battle of Guadalcanal, 12th-15th November, 1942

NIGHT ACTION, 12TH/13TH NOVEMBER (Plan 10)

After escorting Rear-Admiral Turner's transports to the south-eastward, Rear-Admiral Callaghan's Force re-entered Lengo Channel at midnight, 12th-13th November. Ships were in line ahead in the order *Cushing* (Commander, 10th Destroyer Division), *Laffey*, *Sierrett*, *O'Bannon*, the light cruiser *Atlanta* (Flag, Rear-Admiral Scott), heavy cruisers *San Francisco* (Flag, Rear-Admiral Callaghan), *Portland*, light cruisers *Helena*, *Juneau*, destroyers *Aaron Ward* (Commander, 12th Destroyer Squadron), *Barton*, *Monssen* and *Fletcher*. The night was dark and overcast.

First contact with the enemy was obtained at 0124, 13th November, when the *Helena's* S.G. radar picked up three groups of ships bearing 310°-312°, range 27,000-32,000 yards. There were indications that the enemy consisted of heavy ships screened ahead on either flank by light forces. The American column was at the time near Lunga Point, steering 280°; Rear-Admiral Callaghan altered course to 310° and shortly afterwards to 000°. The enemy was closing rapidly on a south-easterly course.² Besides these three groups, there seemed to have been a further formation of three or more ships to the north-east range 10,000 to 15,000 yards when the action started.³ Unfortunately Rear-Admiral Callaghan's flagship was not equipped with S.G. radar, and much of the advantage to be expected from the superiority of the American radar equipment was therefore wasted. Before Rear-Admiral Callaghan could get a clear picture of the situation the head of his column became mixed with the enemy and confusion arose before the firing began, the van destroyers and some of the American ships hauling round to the north-westward, while others maintained the northerly course. At 0148 he ordered odd numbered ships to open fire to starboard, even numbered to port; simultaneously enemy ships close aboard on both hands switched on searchlights, and one of the fiercest actions of the war commenced.

¹ Task Force 16, *Enterprise* (Flag, Rear-Admiral Kinkaid), *Washington* (Flag, Rear-Admiral W. A. Lee), *South Dakota*, *Northampton*, *San Diego*, eight destroyers, had left Noumea at noon, 11th November, when it became clear that the enemy was committed to a full scale attack, but this was too late for it to arrive in time to interfere with the threatened bombardment, 12th-13th November.

² Course 134°, later 120°, speed 20-23 knots. By the time fire was opened, the number of radar echoes was 16.

³ It does not appear that any such group of Japanese warships was in fact present in this position.

The three approaching enemy columns seemed to be 2,000 to 3,000 yards apart, with the two flank columns advanced, and for some time it was thought that on the first contact the screen of the northern column had just passed ahead of the American van destroyers; Rear-Admiral Callaghan therefore found himself between the flank columns, and directly in the path of the main body which contained the battleships.¹

Actually, the Japanese Force consisted of the two battleships *Hiyei* (Flag, Vice-Admiral Abe) and *Kirishima*, in single line ahead, about 8 cables apart, screened by the light cruiser *Nagara* about a mile and a half ahead, and three destroyers in line ahead, about 7½ cables apart, on each flank, the rear destroyer being about a mile abeam of the battleships. Two destroyers—the *Yudachi* and ~~*Murasame*~~^{*Murasame*}—were stationed 3 miles on the ~~port~~^{starboard} bow of the flagship (i.e. the Guadalcanal side) and three others about the same distance on the ~~port~~^{starboard} quarter. It is not absolutely clear with what part of the screen first contact occurred, but it is probable that it was with the *Nagara*, which had hauled over to port, and the northern column of destroyers. Be that as it may, the *Yudachi* and ~~*Murasame*~~^{*Murasame*} came into action with the American cruisers almost at the same moment, and the southern column of the screen joined in a few seconds later. The American fire seemed very effective. Within five minutes one ship in the northern column appeared to blow up and others were believed to be damaged before they could retire on the main body. In the southern column the *Portland* and *Atlanta* each claimed a destroyer and the *Helena* heavily hit a target which looked like an armoured cruiser and was thought to be sinking.

Most of the American ships received hits during this brief engagement; the *Atlanta*, however, which was hit by one or two torpedoes, was the only one seriously damaged, possibly because the enemy were firing bombarding ammunition from their main armament. But the formation was no longer an organised force. Considerable confusion existed, and it was difficult to distinguish friend from foe. At 0155 Rear-Admiral Callaghan, in the belief that some of his ships were firing on the *Atlanta*,² ordered "cease fire".

Within a minute or so the second phase of the action began with the arrival of the battleships. The *Hiyei*, which at 0140 seems to have altered course to about S.S.E. for 5 minutes, passed close to port of the *Cushing* on a north-easterly course, and through the van destroyer column astern of the *Laffey* (the original second ship in the line). She was being hit repeatedly by gunfire, probably from the *San Francisco* and *Portland*. The *Laffey* increased to full speed to avoid being rammed by the battleship and then fired torpedoes, but the range was too short; just afterwards she was herself hit by a torpedo—probably fired by the *Yudachi*, which was then passing to the eastward of the American ships on a southerly course—and within a few minutes blew up with heavy loss of life. The *Hiyei* reversed her course; she was then apparently struck by three torpedoes from the *Cushing* and withdrew slowly to the westward. At about the same time the *O'Bannon* claimed three torpedo hits on her; there was a tremendous explosion "and the battleship was enveloped

¹ It must be remembered that these were still the comparatively early days of radar, and the radar contacts were liable alike to duplication and misinterpretation.

² There is reason to believe that the *Atlanta* was in fact engaged by the *San Francisco*. She reports being hit by three or four salvos and received 19 8 in. hits at a range of about 3,500 yards. The *San Francisco* fired two salvos at "an enemy small cruiser or large destroyer," range 3,300 yards just forward of the starboard beam at the time. Reported movements and relative positions are so incomplete that no conclusions can be reached from them.

from bow to stern in a great sheet of flame." During this second phase of the action (from 0155 to 0200) the *Aaron Ward* (leading the rear destroyers) reported seeing a large enemy ship roll over and sink 1,500 yards to starboard; the *Helena* nearly rammed a large capsized vessel, and observed an enemy ship larger than the *San Francisco* burning from bow to stern and apparently sinking; and the *Monssen* (two ships astern of the *Aaron Ward*) claimed two torpedo hits on the *Hiyei*, then some 4,000 yards to starboard.¹ The *Barton* was sunk by two torpedoes, the *Cushing* heavily hit by gunfire and brought to a standstill, and the *Portland* was hit by a torpedo aft, which damaged her steering gear, so that she could only steam in circles. While doing so she continued to fire with good effect on a battleship.² The *Juneau* had by this time been put out of action by a torpedo hit in her forward engine room.

In the third phase of the action which lasted from 0200 to 0230, the *San Francisco* continued to engage the *Hiyei* as she drew to the westward and seriously damaged her upper works; most of her own secondary battery was knocked out by 14-in. shell, but one gun in local control detonated the depth charges of a destroyer, which probably sank as a result. The *San Francisco* herself came under a cross fire, and was severely damaged, sustaining 15 hits of major calibre and many of smaller calibre. She lost about 85 killed, including Rear-Admiral Callaghan and most of his staff, and her Commanding Officer, Captain Young, during this engagement. Her situation was somewhat relieved by the *Helena*, which heavily hit one of the larger ships engaging her, and also set two destroyers on fire. By this time the enemy ships were probably firing at each other. Between 0205 and 0220 the *Sterrett* thought she got two torpedo hits on the stern of the damaged *Hiyei* part of whose crew were seen abandoning ship, and at about 0230 she torpedoed a *Fubuki*³ (probably the *Akatsuki*) class destroyer, which blew up. The explosion illuminated the *Sterrett*, which at once came under a heavy fire and was damaged. The *Monssen*,⁴ meanwhile, had been abandoned at about 0220, after being wrecked by about 40 hits; and the *Cushing*, already dead in the water, having fired her torpedoes, came under a heavy fire, and was abandoned. The *Aaron Ward* had passed through the entire enemy formation at some time after 0205, receiving three 14-in. hits, two 8-in. hits and five smaller. She engaged a cruiser and damaged two destroyers, then lost power and remained stopped until after daylight, when she was towed to Tulagi. The *Fletcher* torpedoed what she took to be a heavy cruiser during this period.

¹ The damage inflicted on the enemy appeared higher than it actually was owing to duplication of reports and the confusion. This particularly applied to the *Hiyei*, who was thought to have been hit by no less than 10 torpedoes (*Cushing* 3, *O'Bannon* 3, *Sterrett* 2, *Monssen* 2). Actually, according to Lieut.-Commander Yunoki, I.J.N., who was in charge of the main battery fire director in the *Hiyei*, she received no torpedo hits during the night action, all the damage being inflicted by shell hits, of which she received about 85. In the air attacks which were made on her next day, she received further damage from dive bombers, and was struck by a number of air torpedoes, only 3 of which however exploded. She was eventually scuttled by her crew. The estimated losses arrived at by analysis and subsequent intelligence reports, together with the actual losses confirmed by the Japanese after the war are given in the note at the end of this section.

² Apparently the *Hiyei*. The part played by the *Kirishima* in this action is very obscure. According to the rough plan provided by the Japanese after the war, she continued to the northward after the *Hiyei*'s turn to the westward at about 0152, and manoeuvred to the east of Savo, while the flagship passed to the south and west of the island. Practically no damage was suffered by the *Kirishima* which received only one hit by a 6-in. shell and it is not known what American ships she engaged.

³ *Fubuki*.—1,700 tons, 34 knots: six 5-in. guns; six 21-in. torpedo tubes.

⁴ She continued to burn throughout the night, and blew up about noon, 13th November.

When firing finally ceased the enemy retired to the north-west. Nine ships were left burning on the scene of the action; three of these were the *Atlanta*, *Cushing* and *Monssen*.

The remnant of the American Force capable of steaming withdrew towards Espiritu Santo at 18 knots. This consisted of the *Helena*, *O'Bannon* and *Fletcher*, which were not seriously damaged, and the badly damaged *San Francisco*, *Juneau* and *Sterrett*. The *Portland* and *Aaron Ward* remained immobilised in the Battle area; the *Laffey* and *Barton* had been sunk.¹

Thus ended one of the most fiercely contested actions recorded in history. The American losses were admittedly large, but the enemy, too, had suffered severely; above all his bombardment of Henderson Field was prevented with results which became impressively apparent in the next forty-eight hours.

In summing up the battle the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, wrote:—"This action, in which a brave and gallant leader . . . took in brave men against superior forces, was a turning point in the Solomons Islands campaign. Had the powerful enemy fleet succeeded in its mission of bombarding our airfield on Guadalcanal, the task of preventing a major enemy attack and landing of large-scale reinforcements would have been much more difficult if not impossible. The calculated decision of Admiral Turner to send in the cruiser force, the resolution with which Rear-Admirals Callaghan and Scott led the ships in, the well-directed fire and courage of our personnel, merit the highest praise".

OPERATIONS, 13TH/14TH NOVEMBER (Plans 2A, 10)

Dawn broke on the scene of the battle at about 0530, 13th November. The *Portland*, still not under control, found herself within range of the damaged *Yudachi*,² which she promptly sank at 12,500 yards range. She could also see a cruiser on the northern horizon and a *Kongo* battleship steaming slowly in circles north-east of Savo Island. The latter fired four 2-gun salvos at the *Aaron Ward* at 25,000 yards range; then she was attacked by American aircraft and ceased fire on the destroyer. The *Portland* eventually succeeded in reaching Tulagi with the help of a tug, but the *Atlanta*, which had lost 40 per cent of her personnel, including Rear-Admiral Scott, after being towed to the vicinity of Lunga Point, sank at 2015 that evening.

During the forenoon of 13th November an enemy carrier³ with a battleship and other warships, was reported about 250 miles to the northward of

¹ Result of night action, 12th-13th November:—

CLASS	JAPANESE				U.S.A.	
	ESTIMATED		ACTUAL		SUNK	DAMAGED
	SUNK	DAMAGED	SUNK	DAMAGED		
Battleships...	—	2*	—	1*	—	—
Heavy cruisers	1	1	—	—	—	3
Light cruisers	1	1	—	—	2	4
Destroyers...	4	—	2	4	4	3

* One—*Hiyei*—sunk on the next night.

² Combat Narrative "Solomons Islands Campaign," VI, p. 32.

³ No Japanese carriers were in fact present at these operations though frequently reported from the air. It is possible that some of the troop transports were ingeniously camouflaged with the deliberate intention of simulating the appearance of carriers from the air.

Guadalcanal apparently as cover for their damaged ships, or possibly to attack those of the Americans. Anxiety on this account was felt for the ships on passage to Espiritu Santo, but no interference was encountered from these forces. The *Juneau*, however, fell a victim to submarine attack. She was struck by a torpedo at 1101, 13th November, when in lat. 10° 32' S., long. 161° 02' E., and the whole ship disintegrated, nearly all of her crew being lost.¹

Air attacks on the damaged Japanese battleship off Savo Island, which proved to be the *Hiyei*, were carried out intermittently throughout the day. Seven torpedo² and two 1,000 lb bomb hits were claimed, but when last seen she was still afloat, with a cruiser and five destroyers standing by. She was scuttled during the night. Air reconnaissance reported another damaged battleship (*Fuso* class), between Florida and Santa Isabel Island, which was hit and further damaged by B.17's from Espiritu Santo³; a destroyer beached on Olevuga Island (north of Florida Island) was also sighted. In the course of the day, an unidentified ship blew up and sank south-west of Florida Island.

Large enemy troop convoys which had closed Guadalcanal on 12th November ready for a landing next day returned to Buin after the defeat inflicted on their surface forces by Rear-Admiral Callaghan. They put to sea again during the night of 13th/14th November for another attempt.

Meanwhile, Task Force 16 from Noumea had reached the position to which it had been ordered, some 300 miles south of Guadalcanal⁴ in the morning of 13th November. As one of the *Enterprise's* lifts, damaged at the Battle of Santa Cruz, had not yet been repaired, it was decided to reduce the number of aircraft on board, and nine torpedo bombers, with six fighters, were flown off to Guadalcanal. These fell in with the damaged *Hiyei* en route, which they attacked and hit; they proved of great value in subsequent operations, working from Henderson's Field.

Early that forenoon the *Pensacola* (Flag, Rear-Admiral Tisdale) joined Task Force 16, and at 1110 orders were received from Vice-Admiral Halsey, who had relieved Vice-Admiral Ghormley as Commander, South Pacific, to proceed to the support of the ships damaged in the action of the previous night, but to remain south of lat. 11° 40' S., unless conditions required otherwise. Rear-Admiral Kinkaid increased speed to 23 knots and steered to the northward. Further orders from the Commander, South Pacific, received at 1653, 13th November, directed him to organise a battleship striking force to intercept enemy bombarding forces, expected off Lunga Point during the night; this force, however, was not to proceed on this duty without express orders from the Commander, South Pacific. The battleships *Washington* (flag) *South Dakota* and four destroyers⁵ were at once detailed under Rear-Admiral Lee,

¹ The Senior Officer present altered course away from the area, reporting the position by signal through an escorting aircraft for which he had asked. This signal did not get through and in consequence many of the 60 odd who survived the explosion perished on rafts. Three men in a rubber boat reach Santa Catalina on the 18th, and seven more were rescued from rafts on the 19th November.

² The torpedoes were all set for 10 ft. depth. Only three actually exploded (see note Sec. 28 (i) (ante)).

³ No such damage has been admitted by subsequent Japanese reports.

⁴ Lat. 14° S., long. 161° 30' E.

⁵ *Washington* (flag), *South Dakota*, destroyers *Preston*, *Gwin*, *Benham*, *Walke*. This force was designated Task Force 64.

and at 1929¹ orders were received for them to attack that night, but it was then too late for them to reach the Lunga area in time, and an enemy force consisting of the heavy cruisers *Chokai*, *Kinugasa*, *Suzuya* and *Maya* and the light cruisers *Izuzu* and *Tenryu*, with four destroyers, bombarded Henderson's Field from 0120 to 0240, 14th November, unopposed except by six M.T.B.s from Tulagi. These brought off three attacks and claimed one torpedo hit. The bombardment destroyed 3 aircraft and damaged 17 fighters—most of them slightly—on the airfield. The Japanese cruisers then withdrew to the southward of New Georgia Island. There they were sighted by a reconnaissance flown from the *Enterprise* which had been closing Guadalcanal during the night and at dawn was in a position about 200 miles to the southward. She immediately ordered 17 bombers and 10 fighters—already launched—to attack them, and then go on to Guadalcanal. This striking force reached its objective shortly after 0800, just as a Marine air group from Henderson Field was finishing a dive bombing and torpedo attack on the same targets; as a result the *Kinugasa* was sunk and the *Chokai*, *Izuzu*, and destroyer *Michishio* were heavily damaged.

The enemy was apparently determined to push reinforcements through to Guadalcanal on 14th November regardless of cost, and half an hour after the attack on the *Chokai's* cruiser force, shore based aircraft reported a convoy of 12 ships, escorted by 3 light cruisers and 8 destroyers steaming down New Georgia Sound direct for Guadalcanal.

On receipt of this report, the *Enterprise* sent another Striking Force of 8 bombers and 12 fighters to Guadalcanal to attack the convoy; then, with only 18 fighters left on board for her own protection, she withdrew to the southward, taking no further part in the operations.

Attacks on the transports started about 1300 by a group of 40 Marine aircraft, followed an hour later by the *Enterprise* group. The results of these attacks were not immediately known, but it was certain that many transports and warships had suffered severe damage. By 1900, 14th November, of 12 ships reported in the convoy "one or more were sunk, six were seriously damaged, and with others were milling around about 60 miles north-west of Savo Island". These were attacked again before dark by aircraft from Guadalcanal and B.17's from Espiritu Santo, when several were sunk and three were left heavily on fire.²

¹ Time of origin, 1652, 13th November.

² The total damage inflicted by aircraft operating from Guadalcanal (including the *Enterprise* group) on 14th November, was:—

CLASS	SUNK		DAMAGED	
	NO.	NAMES	NO.	NAMES
Heavy cruisers...	1	<i>Kinugasa</i>	2	<i>Chokai</i> , <i>Maya</i>
Light cruisers ...	—	—	1	<i>Izuzu</i>
Destroyers ...	—	—	2	<i>Yukikazi</i> , <i>Michishio</i>
Transports ...	8	<i>Arizona Maru</i> , <i>Sado Maru</i> , <i>Kumagawa Maru</i> , <i>Nagara Maru</i> , <i>Canberra Maru</i> , <i>Brisbane Maru</i> , <i>Niwa Maru</i> , <i>Sawa Nogawa Maru</i>	4	<i>Kinugawa Maru</i> , <i>Yamaura Maru</i> , <i>Yamatsuki Maru</i> , <i>Hirokawa Maru</i>

NIGHT ACTION, 14TH-15TH NOVEMBER (Plan 11)

Meanwhile Rear-Admiral Lee's battleship force had arrived some 50 miles to the S. by W. of Guadalcanal towards the close of the forenoon of 14th November. From the reports received throughout the day it seemed almost certain that the enemy would renew their bombarding operations that night, probably using capital ships. In the hope of surprising them Rear-Admiral Lee remained in this vicinity till late in the afternoon,¹ when he shaped course to the northward, passing between Russell Island and Savo Island in the early evening.

The American appreciation was correct. At about the same time a Japanese bombarding force under Vice-Admiral Kondo was approaching Indispensable Strait from the northward. The enemy force on this occasion consisted of the battleship *Kirishima*, the heavy cruisers, *Atago* (Flag) and *Takao*, screened by the light cruiser *Nagara* and 6 destroyers, and the light cruiser *Sendai* with 3 destroyers as a "sweeping" (scouting) group.

Task Force 64 reached a position some 20 miles to the north-westward of Savo at 2110, and then shaped course to the eastward. Nothing was seen of the enemy and when north of Savo Island, a south-easterly course was steered till 2253, 14th November, when course was altered to 270°, the Force then being due north of Lunga Point. The Force was in column formation, the four destroyers led by the *Walke* 2 miles ahead of the *Washington*. The distance between the battleships was 1,700 yards; the speed 17 knots. The moon was in the first quarter and visibility was good.

At 2307 the *South Dakota* sighted three ships bearing 330°, dimly illuminated by the setting moon. The leading ship was identified as a battleship or heavy cruiser, the other two light cruisers. They were to the eastward of Savo in almost the same water as the American ships had traversed on their run to the south-east. At 2317,² the *Washington* opened fire on the leading ship, at radar range 18,000 yards, and immediately afterwards the *South Dakota* engaged the next astern. Both targets were hit and set afire by the first or second salvos; after seven or eight salvos, within seven minutes of opening fire, both targets were believed to be sunk. The rear ship of the enemy column might have retired, or might have been a ship which appeared some five minutes later on the *South Dakota's* starboard quarter, and was engaged by her at a range of 10,000-11,000 yards. After a few salvos, the enemy was seen to break in two and sink at 2333.

Soon after first contact, Rear-Admiral Lee had ordered an alteration of course to 300°; the column was at this time heading midway between Cape Esperance and Savo Island. At 2326 the leading American destroyers opened fire on a group of enemy destroyers, possibly accompanied by a cruiser, which had stood south close to the coast of Savo Island.³ The battleships joined in and at least two of the enemy were damaged, but not before firing torpedoes

¹ Actually Task Force 64 was sighted by a Japanese aircraft and reported as possibly one battleship, one cruiser and four destroyers.

² The *South Dakota* had heard Japanese voice transmissions on 2070-2080 kc/s intermittently since about 2030 that evening. When firing commenced these became very excited and very numerous, 13 different stations being heard at one time. This pointed to the desirability of having a Japanese interpreter on the staff whenever possible.

³ "The gunfire of our destroyers forced the enemy to fire his torpedoes prematurely and at our destroyer formation instead of our battleships"—Rear-Admiral Lee's report. This group was the scouting group (the *Sendai* and destroyers *Uranami*, *Shikinami* and *Ayanami*).

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Meanwhile Rear-Admiral Lee's battleship force had arrived some 50 miles to the S. by W. of Guadalcanal towards the close of the forenoon of 14th November. From the reports received throughout the day, it seemed almost certain that the enemy would renew their bombarding operations that night, probably using capital ships. In the hope of surprising them Rear-Admiral Lee remained in this vicinity till late in the afternoon,¹ when he shaped course to the northward, passing between Russell Island and Savo Island in the early evening.

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Task Force 64 reached a position some 20 miles to the north westward of Savo at 2110, and then shaped course to the eastward. Nothing was seen of the enemy, and when north of Savo Island, a south-easterly course was steered till 2253, 14th November, when course was altered to 270°, the force then being due north of Lunga Point. The force was in column formation, the four destroyers led by the *Walke* 2 miles ahead of the *Washington*. The distance between the battleships was 1,700 yards; the speed 17 knots. The moon was in the first quarter and visibility was good.

Unknown to the Americans, they had been sighted on their south-easterly course at 2210 by the Japanese scouting group. Two destroyers, the *Uranami* and *Ayanami*, were detached to pass west of Savo and reconnoitre the channel south of the Island, while the *Sendai* and the remaining destroyer followed the enemy, reporting them as 2 cruisers and 2 destroyers. On receipt of this report, Admiral Kondo decided to send Rear-Admiral Kimura in the *Nagara* with 4 destroyers to pass south of Savo at high speed astern of the *Uranami* and *Ayanami*, while he himself with the bombarding group and 2 destroyers would pass north and east of the island.

At 2307 the *South Dakota* sighted three ships bearing 330°, dimly illuminated by the setting moon. The leading ship was identified as a battleship, the other two light cruisers. They were to the eastward of the Savo in almost the same water as the American ships had traversed on their run to the south-east. At 2317,² the *Washington* opened fire on the leading ship, at radar range 18,000 yards, and immediately afterwards the *South Dakota* engaged the next astern. Both targets were apparently hit and set afire by the first or second salvos; after seven or eight salvos, within seven minutes of opening fire, both targets were believed to be sunk. The rear ship of the enemy column might have retired, or might have been a ship which appeared some five minutes later on the *South Dakota's* starboard quarter, and was engaged by her at a range of 10,000-11,000 yards. After a few salvos the enemy was seen to break in two and sink at 2333.

¹ Actually Task Force 64 was sighted by a Japanese aircraft and reported as possibly one battleship, one cruiser and four destroyers.

² The *South Dakota* had heard Japanese voice transmissions on 2070-2080 kc/s intermittently since about 2030 that evening. When firing commenced these became very excited and very numerous, 13 different stations being heard at one time. This pointed to the desirability of having a Japanese interpreter on the Staff whenever possible.

That, at least, is how it appeared to the Americans at the time. Actually, the ships engaged were the *Sendai* and the destroyer *Shikinami*, which promptly made smoke and withdrew at high speed to the northward, without suffering damage.

Soon after first contact, Rear-Admiral Lee had ordered an alteration of course to 300°; the column was at this time heading midway between Cape Esperance and Savo Island. At 2326 the leading American destroyers opened fire on a group of enemy destroyers, possibly accompanied by a cruiser (the *Uranami* and *Ayanami* followed by Rear-Admiral Kimura's force), which had stood south close to the coast of Savo Island.¹ The battleships joined in and it was thought at least two of the enemy were damaged,² but not before firing torpedoes, which at 2334 sank the *Walke* with heavy loss of life. The *Preston* was sunk by gunfire; the *Benham* was also torpedoed, but remained afloat, and the *Gwin* was severely damaged.³ At this time the *Washington* and *South Dakota* came under fire from an unidentified enemy force to starboard; neither ship was hit, most of the enemy's shot going over. The *South Dakota*, however, was having electrical trouble which deprived her of all power for three minutes and put her S.G. radar out of action from 2333 to 2346. At 2335 Rear-Admiral Lee altered course to port to 282° to pass to the southward of his damaged destroyers; the *South Dakota*, however, in trying to conform, had to alter sharply to starboard to avoid the *Benham*, thereby becoming silhouetted by the blazing *Preston* and *Walke*. This contretemps caused her to lose touch with the *Washington* and she finally settled down on a westerly course about a couple of miles to the northward of the flagship's track. Between 2340 and 2345 she fired at targets close to Savo Island, by that time fine on the starboard quarter.⁴ Some ten minutes later she had a narrow escape. At 2355 Rear-Admiral Kimura's force (*Nagara* and destroyers) then making to the westward, sighted her first before the port beam, at a range of just over a mile. The Japanese immediately attacked with torpedoes, firing no less than 34—all of which missed.

On receipt of Rear-Admiral Kimura's report of the *South Dakota*, Vice-Admiral Kondo, who had been manoeuvring the bombardment force to the north and west of Savo Island and was then about ten miles west of it, altered course to the south-eastward to attack the battleship.

The *Washington*, meanwhile, which had resumed her 300° course after clearing the damaged destroyers, had been following on her radar screen Vice-Admiral Kondo's force closing on her starboard bow. Rear-Admiral Lee did not know the exact position of the *South Dakota* because of a blind arc astern in the *Washington's* S.G. radar, nor was he aware of the breakdown of the *South Dakota's* radar and her consequent ignorance of the enemy approaching from the north-west. At 0000, 15th November, the *South Dakota* was illuminated by a searchlight from just before the starboard beam, and came under a heavy fire from the *Kirishima* and the two 8-in. cruisers, at about 6,000 yards range. The *Washington* immediately opened fire on the leading enemy ship, the *Kirishima*, and the *South Dakota* shortly afterwards engaged the second ship—the illuminating ship—which was thought to have been sunk.⁵ The first and

¹ "The gunfire of our destroyers forced the enemy to fire his torpedoes prematurely and at our destroyers formation instead of our battleships"—Rear-Admiral Lee's report.

² Actually, only the destroyer *Ayanami* was hit, which subsequently sank.

³ At 2348 Rear-Admiral Lee, realizing that his surviving destroyers were no longer capable of offensive action, ordered them to withdraw.

⁴ One salvo from No. 3 turret set fire to the *South Dakota's* aircraft on her stern; the next salvo fortunately blew two out of the three aircraft over the side and extinguished most of the fires.

⁵ This was not the case.

third ships were hit and heavily smoking, and a fourth ship was believed to be damaged when the action came to an end at about 0010, 15th November.¹ During this short engagement the *South Dakota* received many hits, including 14-in., 8-in., 6-in., and smaller. About 30 men were killed and 60 wounded; five oil fuel compartments were holed and much damage done to radars, directors, guns and equipment. For the time being she had become more of a liability than an asset, and her Commanding Officer "wisely decided to retire—to the great relief of the Task Force Commander",² and set course to the south-westward at 0010, 15th November.

In far worse shape was the *Kirishima* after the *Washington* had finished with her. Struck by about nine 16-in., and forty 5-in., projectiles, she became totally unmanageable, and shortly afterwards was scuttled by order of her Captain, most of the crew being taken off by destroyers. The *Atago* and *Takao* were also hit, but sustained only slight damage.

The *Washington* continued to the north westward and northward, seeking enemy transports or other suitable targets, until at 0033 she altered course sharply to starboard to avoid a smoke screen laid by some Japanese destroyers. Appreciating that by this time the transports had been sufficiently delayed to prevent their reaching Guadalcanal before daylight, Rear-Admiral Lee decided

¹ The *South Dakota* states this took place at 2348, 14th November, the *Washington* at 0000, 15th. The discrepancy cannot be reconciled, but the plot of the action on the Chart tends to confirm the *Washington's* estimate.

² Rear-Admiral Lee's report.

which at 2334 sank the *Preston and Walke* with heavy loss of life. The *Benham* was also torpedoed, but was able to retire. At this time the *Washington* and *South Dakota* came under fire from an unidentified enemy force to starboard; neither ship was hit, most of the enemy's shot going over. The *South Dakota*, however, was having electrical trouble which deprived her of all power for three minutes and put her S.G. radar out of action from 2333 to 2346. At 2340 speed was increased to 26 knots. During the next five minutes the *South Dakota* engaged targets close to Savo Island. By that time the formation was drawing to the westward of the island and targets were fine on the starboard quarter.¹

The *Washington*, meanwhile, had been following on her radar screen a group of eight enemy ships closing on her starboard bow. These were the *Kirishima* and heavy cruisers, which after the engagement at 2315 had steered to the westward, passing north of Savo where they were joined by the screening group, which had been manoeuvring in this area. When about 10 miles west of Savo course was reversed and they were thus once again closing the American battleships. Rear-Admiral Lee did not know the exact position of the *South Dakota* because of a blind arc astern in the *Washington's* S.G. radar, nor was he aware of the breakdown of the *South Dakota's* radar and her consequent ignorance of the enemy approaching from the north-west. At 0000, 15th November, the *South Dakota* was illuminated by searchlight from just before the starboard beam and came under a heavy fire from three or four ships at about 6,000 yards range. The *Washington* immediately opened fire on the leading enemy ship, a battleship, subsequently identified as the *Kirishima* and the *South Dakota* shortly afterwards engaged the second ship—the illuminating ship—which broke in two and sank. The first and third ships were hit and heavily smoking, and the fourth ship was believed to be damaged when the action came to an end at about 0010, 15th November.² During this short engagement the *South Dakota* received many hits, including 14-in., 8-in., 6-in. and smaller. About 30 men were killed and 60 wounded; five oil fuel compartments were holed, and much damage done to radars, directors, guns and equipment. For the time being, she had become more of a liability than an asset, and her Commanding Officer "wisely decided to retire—to the great relief of the Task Force Commander",³—and set course to the south-westward at 0010, 15th November.

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² The *South Dakota* states this took place at 2348, 14th November, the *Washington* at 0000 15 November. The discrepancy cannot be reconciled, but the plot of the action on the chart tends to confirm the *Washington's* estimate.

³ Rear-Admiral Lee's Report.

the time had come to withdraw, and shaped course to the south-westward.¹ Several torpedo attacks—mostly from the port quarter—were made on her during retirement, and “four or five torpedoes came uncomfortably close and were avoided only by bold and skilful ship-handling.”² After clearing Russell Island radar contact was established with the damaged *Benham*³ and *Gwin*, who were directed to proceed independently to Espiritu Santo while the *Washington* herself rejoined the *South Dakota*.⁴

The enemy completely foiled in their attempt, were retiring to the northward. All they had managed to do during the night was to beach three transports and a store ship on the Japanese-held coast off Cape Esperance. These were attacked and damaged by aircraft early next morning, and finally destroyed by the destroyer *Meade*, which had arrived at Tulagi the day before escorting a Fleet Auxiliary, and now found herself the only warship in the area. She also rescued 266 survivors from the *Walke* and *Preston* and one man who had been blown overboard from the *Benham*.

Thus ended the Battle of Guadalcanal, and with it the Japanese hopes of recapturing the island. They had made their great effort, with the strongest force available;⁵ beyond landing negligible reinforcements, with no supplies, they had achieved nothing, and had suffered such losses in surface ships that for the first time since 9th August the Americans achieved superiority in this respect.

In the words of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, “In four days the fate of Guadalcanal and the fate of our campaign in the South Pacific for months to come were decided. There were many courageous decisions, from lowest to highest commands, and heroic actions without number. First place among them however, belongs to the decision of the Commander, Task Force 67, well knowing the odds and possible destruction of his forces, to send his cruisers and destroyers against the Japanese battleship bombarding force, and the resolute manner in which our ships were led into the resulting battle”.

¹ A course was chosen well to the westward of the tracks of the damaged American ships, to avoid leading enemy destroyers towards them.

² Rear-Admiral Lee's report.

³ The *Benham* began to break up while en route for Espiritu Santo that afternoon. After taking her crew on board, the *Gwin* sank her by gunfire.

⁴ Result of night action, 14th–15th November:—

CLASS	JAPANESE				AMERICAN	
	ESTIMATED		ACTUAL		SUNK	DAMAGED
	SUNK	DAMAGED	SUNK	DAMAGED		
Battleships...	1	1	1	—	—	1
Heavy cruisers	1	1	—	2	—	—
Light cruisers	1	1	—	—	—	—
Destroyers...	2	3	1	—	3	1

⁵ In a captured Japanese combat report, covering the widespread sea and air operations of the last three weeks of October there appears this statement:—“Consequently, it must be said that the success or failure in recapturing Guadalcanal Island, and the results of the vital naval battle related to it, is the fork in the road which leads to victory for them or for us. The Imperial army and navy must forget the countless hardships they bear together, for this is the time when we must dash forward to attain our goal.”

CHAPTER VI

JAPANESE ON DEFENSIVE

29. Events following Battle of Guadalcanal (Plan 12)

After the Battle of Guadalcanal there was a lull of about a fortnight. Thoroughly defeated the Japanese naval forces temporarily abandoned their advanced base in the Shortland Islands, and fell back to the Rabaul area while the American Naval Forces withdrew to Espiritu Santo and Noumea to reorganise and make good damage, a striking force of cruisers and destroyers (Task Force 67) under Rear-Admiral Kinkaid being held in readiness at Espiritu Santo.

During this period the enemy pressed on their efforts to strengthen their position in the mid-Solomons, and commenced a new airfield at Munda, New Georgia (about 200 miles from Guadalcanal¹); two escorted cargo ships were damaged in this area by American aircraft on 28th November. On shore at Guadalcanal, the American Marines had taken the offensive and by the end of November had driven the main Japanese forces well to the westward of Point Cruz. At the same time they had dispersed the enemy detachments to the east of the Tenaru River (see Plan 12). For these operations they had been supported by Naval bombardment. At this stage, American Army Units arrived to take over from the Marines,² and during the change over, active shore operations were suspended. To the enemy however, the situation must have appeared very serious, and on 24th November a marked increase of shipping³ in the Buin-Fasi area indicated to the Americans that an attempt at reinforcement was in preparation.

Actually, the Battle of Guadalcanal had convinced the Japanese of the impossibility of ejecting the Americans from Guadalcanal, and all plans for the recapture of the island had been abandoned. They were, however, determined to make its complete occupation as costly as possible, and in pursuance of this policy it was decided to land stores and small reinforcements at the end of November. Destroyer Squadron II,⁴ consisting of 8 destroyers under the command of Rear-Admiral Tanaka, was detailed for this duty.

The attempt took place on the night of 30th November—1st December and was frustrated in the night action known as the Battle of Lunga Point, at a heavy cost in American cruiser strength as the result of torpedo attack.

¹ The construction of the airfield was so cleverly concealed by the use of natural camouflage of cocoanut trees that its existence, though suspected, was not definitely verified till early December, when it was nearly complete.

² This had been intended from the first, as soon as circumstances would permit.

³ By 27th November about 25–30 ships were reported in this area, as compared with about a dozen a week earlier.

⁴ Destroyer Squadron II, 30th Division, *Nag'nami* (Flag), *Mak'nami*, *Takanami*; 15th Division, *Oyashio*, *Kuwashio Kagevo*; 24th Division, *Kawakaze*, *Suzukaze*.

30. Battle of Lunga Point (or Tassafaronga) 30th Nov.-1st Dec. 1942 (Plan 12)

On the evening of the 29th November, Rear-Admiral Wright who had succeeded Rear-Admiral Kinkaid in Command of Task Force 67¹ only the day before, received orders to proceed to sea as soon as possible, in order to intercept an enemy force of eight destroyers and six transports expected to be off Tassafaronga (Guadalcanal) at 2300, 30th November. Task Force 67 sailed that night at high speed² and reached Lengo Channel by 2145, 30th November.

Rear-Admiral Wright's intention was to engage by radar at a range of about 12,000 yards, after his destroyers had delivered an unseen torpedo attack, also by radar. For this purpose the destroyers were stationed two miles on the "engaged" bow; after launching their torpedoes they were to clear the range quickly, and engage with gunfire when the cruisers opened fire.³

Task Force 67 cleared Lengo Channel at ²²²⁵2245, 30th November, and shaped course 320°, 20 knots in the order *Minneapolis* (Flag), *New Orleans*, *Pensacola*, *Honolulu* (Flag, Rear-Admiral Tisdale), *Northampton*, the destroyers *Fletcher*, *Perkins*, *Maury* and *Drayton* being stationed 300° 2 miles from the flagship, and the *Lamson* and *Lardner*, which had joined too late to receive the plan of attack, astern of the *Northampton*.

Meanwhile the Japanese destroyers had left Buin during the previous night (29th); passing through Bougainville Strait, they steered well to the eastward and made their final approach from the northward, passing between Santa Isabel and Florida Islands. As Rear-Admiral Wright cleared Lengo Channel they were to the westward of Savo, just turning on to a south-easterly course for Tassafaronga. Their formation was divisions in line ahead disposed astern, Rear-Admiral Tanaka in the *Naganami* leading; the *Takanami* was stationed on his port bow as a lookout. A signal from Rabaul had reported the presence of American cruisers in the Guadalcanal area, but no details were known.

This Flotilla had been specially trained in night torpedo attack. In order to guard against divulging the number and position of his force Rear-Admiral Tanaka had ordered gunfire to be withheld unless absolutely necessary for defence. It must be admitted that in the action which ensued his tactics were amply justified.

It was a dark night, with overcast sky and surface visibility of about 2 miles. At 2238 the American cruisers formed line of bearing 140° on course 280°. At 2306 the *Minneapolis* obtained an S.G. radar contact of ships off Cape Esperance bearing 284°, 23,000 yards, and three minutes later the Squadron turned together to 320°, bringing the cruisers into line ahead. There seemed to be seven or eight ships in the enemy group, steering a south-easterly course at 15 knots. At the same time, another group of six vessels, about 4 miles

¹ Task Force 67, cruisers *Minneapolis* (Flag, Rear-Admiral Wright), *New Orleans*, *Pensacola*, *Honolulu* (Flag, Rear-Admiral Tisdale), *Northampton*; destroyers *Perkins*, *Drayton*, *Fletcher*, *Maury*. The destroyers *Lamson* and *Lardner* joined the Force while on passage.

² Task Force 67 averaged 28.2 knots for the passage.

³ Arrangements had been made for aircraft from Guadalcanal to illuminate the enemy with flares after action was joined. The aircraft, however, did not arrive in time, and the flares dropped by them actually illuminated damaged American ships rather than the enemy. Both sides made use of star shell.

to the south-eastward of those picked up by radar, was reported by aircraft to be approaching Tassafaronga close inshore but this report did not reach Rear-Admiral Wright.⁴

At 2314 course was altered to port to 300°; at the same time, the commander of the destroyers in the van asked permission to fire torpedoes, but was ordered to wait till the range had closed.⁵ Five minutes later (2319) the torpedo attack was carried out; the *Fletcher* fired 10, and the *Perkins* (her next astern), eight torpedoes at ranges of 7,300⁶ and 5,000 yards respectively. The *Drayton*, the third in the line, owing to an erratic radar plot fired two torpedoes only and the *Maury*, which was not fitted with S.G. radar and could not identify targets, fired none. Almost simultaneously the *Minneapolis* opened fire (2320) and the action became general. The results of the destroyer attack were unknown; some minutes afterwards a target⁷ 4,000 yards on the port beam disappeared in a violent explosion and a number of "terrific explosions occurred along the beach," towards which the American ships were firing by that time. The destroyers retired at high speed to the westward of Savo Island, exchanging gunfire with the enemy until out of range and took no further part in the action.⁸

The Japanese were taken by surprise. None of their ships was equipped with radar and they had no indication of the approach of the enemy. They had just reduced speed to 12 knots, prior to turning inshore to land their supplies, when two torpedoes were sighted passing ahead; almost simultaneously they came under fire. Their reaction was rapid. Speed was increased to 24 knots, their course reversed by divisions (leaders together, the rest in succession) and all ships fired torpedoes as fast as they were able.⁹ In accordance with previous orders, gunfire was withheld, except by the look-out ship *Takanami*,—the nearest ship to the Americans—which opened fire and paid the penalty of her disobedience by being promptly sunk.

The cruisers meanwhile were engaging with gunfire, at first it seemed with satisfactory results. The *Minneapolis* opened fire at 2320⁷ on the right hand (rear) enemy ship, bearing 260° at a range of 9,200 yards; she saw her "disintegrate", and then thought she sank a destroyer coming in to attack from the westward; the *New Orleans* and the *Northampton* engaged the leading

⁴ Rear-Admiral Wright had received no definite intelligence of the enemy since the original signal ordering the operation (*see ante*), except a coast watcher's report of the departure of 12 destroyers from Buin on the night of 29th November, and a signal from the Commander, South Pacific, that the enemy force might consist of destroyers only. Aircraft searches on 30th November, including special ones from Guadalcanal, had failed to locate any approaching enemy ships despite good weather and 100 per cent. coverage of search sectors. This may have been due to the evasive course steered by Admiral Tanaka.

⁵ By radio-telephony. It was subsequently thought that this may have been intercepted by the enemy, and thus have given away the presence of Task Force 67, but this was not the case.

⁶ The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet (Admiral Nimitz) subsequently considered these ranges excessive, and remarked that torpedo firing ranges at night of more than 4,000–5,000 yards were not acceptable.

⁷ Probably the *Takanami* which was sunk by gunfire about this time.

⁸ While on a north-westerly course rounding Savo Island, the *Drayton* detected three vessels to the westward, and fired four torpedoes at them, with unknown results.

⁹ This manoeuvre had been practised for the previous 18 months.

⁷ "At 2320, after receipt of report that our destroyers in the van had fired torpedoes, and when range from *Minneapolis* to right-hand target was 10,000 yards, I ordered commence firing with guns."—Rear-Admiral Wright's Report.

ship of the formation—a destroyer bearing 220°, range 8,700 yards, which was thought to blow up—while the *Pensacola* hit a “three-funnelled cruiser”, which “capsized”.¹ Then things began to go awry.

The *Minneapolis* had just fired a salvo at a large cruiser or destroyer being engaged by the *New Orleans*, when at 2327 she was hit on the port side by two torpedoes; one exploded in No. 2 boiler room, causing extensive damage and flooding, and the other blew off the bow and started large petrol fires forward. One minute later, a torpedo struck the *New Orleans*, port side forward, detonating her fore magazines, and causing very serious damage. The entire bow, including No. 1 turret, disappeared, and the whole crew of No. 2 turret was killed. The *Minneapolis*, though apparently sinking, continued firing for five minutes after being hit; then, at 2333, all power failed, and she came to a standstill. With his flagship immobilised and communications failing Rear-Admiral Wright directed Rear-Admiral Tisdale in the *Honolulu* to take over the conduct of the battle.

Deprived at a stroke of its two leading ships, the American formation was thrown into some confusion. The third in the line, the *Pensacola*, hauled out to port to clear the *New Orleans*, while the *Honolulu* and *Northampton* altered sharply to starboard, steadying independently on northerly courses. The *Pensacola* continued to the westward roughly parallel to the coast engaging two enemy targets—both retiring at high speed—with unknown results. At 2339 her last target had just disappeared when a torpedo struck her port side abreast the main-mast. Many compartments, including the after engine room, were flooded; a 13° list developed, and fires were started which were not fully under control 12 hours later.

Meanwhile the *Honolulu* followed by the *Northampton* had gradually hauled round to the westward. The *Honolulu*² had already engaged two destroyers; one (possibly the other) was believed to have been sunk, but after her alteration to clear the damaged cruisers she was unable to pick up fresh targets. The *Northampton* claimed another destroyer during this phase of the action (2337); then, at 2348, she was herself struck by two torpedoes³ port side amidships, which wrecked many compartments, started fires, and brought the ship to a standstill with a 10° list. This brought the action to a close. Five fires were burning in the enemy target area; the remainder of their ships had disappeared. They had in fact—except for the *Takanami*—got clear away, and were by then to the northward of Cape Esperance, reforming after their encounter. Rear-Admiral Tisdale in the *Honolulu* searched the area to the west and north of Savo Island, but nothing more was seen of them. He then returned to the scene of action, and directed salvage and rescue operations. The *Northampton* was listing 35° by 0245, 1st December, and the order was given to abandon ship; 20 minutes later (0304), just after her Captain had

¹ As is usually the case in night actions, duplication of reports and confusion caused the enemy losses to appear higher than was actually the case. Possibly some ships engaged “phantoms,” i.e., their own shadows thrown by gunflashes, etc. (see App. F). It is rare, however, that the estimated losses arrived at by analysis and subsequent intelligence reports so greatly exceed the reality as was the case in this action (see table in note at end of Sec.). Apart from the loss of the *Takanami*, the only damage suffered by the enemy was a shot through the funnel of Admiral Tanaka's flagship, the *Naganami*.

² The *Honolulu*, 3,000 yards astern of the *Minneapolis*, was late picking up a target with her S.G. radar, and did not open fire till about the time the two leading cruisers were torpedoed (2327). In the ensuing six minutes she engaged the two destroyers.

³ Fired, it is thought, either by submarines, or by retiring enemy ships which could not be picked up by radar against the land.

left, she turned over on her beam ends and sank. The three other damaged cruisers “by able seamanship and damage controls”¹ managed to reach Tulagi, where temporary repairs were effected.

Once again the Japanese torpedo efficiency—both tactical and technical—had been demonstrated. Though taken by surprise in the first instance, in under half an hour by their mastery of this weapon they put four 8-in. cruisers completely out of action (one of which subsequently sank). On the other hand, the superiority of the American radar equipment and gunnery appeared to receive fresh confirmation. Though the actual damage inflicted was uncertain,² the Americans had no doubt that they hit such targets as offered early and hard, while the Japanese gunfire made little or no impression.

Rear-Admiral Tanaka, on the other hand, in discussing the operation, was of a different opinion. “The enemy” he wrote “had discovered our plans and movements, had put planes in the air beforehand for purposes of illumination, had got into formation for an artillery engagement, and cleverly gained the advantage of prior neutralization fire. But his fire was inaccurate, shells improperly set for deflection were especially numerous, and it is conjectured that either his marksmanship is not remarkable or else the illumination from his star shells was not sufficiently effective”.

Summing up, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, remarked that “the operation for this engagement was simple and well conceived. Except for the failure of the illumination planes to arrive on schedule, the T.B.S. communications³ before the torpedo attack, and the long range at which the torpedo attack was delivered, the conduct of the battle was correct. Rear-Admiral Wright led his force into action resolutely and intelligently, and opened fire at a range that should have permitted avoiding surprise torpedo attack. When his flagship was immobilised, he transferred direction of the force to Rear-Admiral Tisdale, who continued the battle and sought the enemy with determination. The fortunes of war and the restricted waters in which we were forced to bring the enemy into action caused our ships to suffer greater loss than their leadership and action merited, and prevented them from inflicting heavier damage on the enemy.”

31. Operations in Guadalcanal Area, December, 1942-January, 1943

The Battle of Lunga was the last occasion on which considerable American Naval Forces were engaged with enemy ships in the fight for Guadalcanal.

On shore, the relief of the U.S. Marines by the Army proceeded smoothly during December; Major-General Vandegrift of the Marine Corps turned over

¹ Report of Admiral C.W. Nimitz, U.S.N., Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

² Result of the Battle of Lunga Point:—

CLASS	JAPANESE				U.S.A.	
	ESTIMATED		ACTUAL		SUNK	DAMAGED
	SUNK	DAMAGED	SUNK	DAMAGED		
Heavy cruisers	—	—	—	—	1	3
Destroyers ...	4	2	1	1	—	—

³ Radio Telephone.

his command to Major-General Patch on the 9th and by the end of the month, out of approximately 58,000 American troops stationed in the Guadalcanal—Tulagi area, 31,600 were Army forces.

During all this time the enemy continued to run in small reinforcements and supplies in high speed craft at night. This traffic became known as the "Tokyo Express", and was constantly attacked by aircraft and the motor torpedo boats based on Tulagi, casualties being suffered by both sides. In the course of these operations, the toll on the Japanese Naval forces was heavy; 8 destroyers were damaged by air attack, (4 of them severely); two suffered major damage from collision; one, the *Terutzuki* was torpedoed and sunk by M.T.Bs. (12th Dec.) and on the 18th the light cruiser *Tenryu* was sunk by a submarine.¹ But the ultimate outcome of the campaign was no longer in doubt, and in January the American Naval Forces were able to carry the offensive into enemy waters and attack their positions in the central Solomons.

The final stage of the relief of the Marines involved a particularly large troop movement which was planned to take place in the early days of January, 1943. Six transports and one cargo vessel carrying part of the 25th Division were to leave Noumea on New Year's Day, arriving at Guadalcanal on 4th January. As soon as their troops were landed they were to embark the 7th Marines and leave the following day for Melbourne.

It was clearly desirable that the attention of the enemy should be occupied elsewhere during such an operation, and a suitable—and at the same time, useful—diversion was not far to seek.

The discovery on the 3rd December of the new enemy airfield at Munda (See Sec. 29 ante) led to regular attacks on it throughout the month by aircraft from Guadalcanal. None of these, however, had succeeded in putting it out of action for more than a day or so,² and it was decided to try the effect of a Naval bombardment. By synchronising this bombardment with the landing of the 25th Division an excellent diversion would be provided for the latter.

Recently arrived reinforcements in the South Pacific enabled strong Naval forces to be provided for the operation. Task Force 67, consisting of seven cruisers and five destroyers³ commanded by Rear-Admiral W. L. Ainsworth U.S.N., was to escort the transports and carry out the bombardment, while cover was provided by a Task Force of three battleships and four destroyers under Rear-Admiral Lee.

Task Force 67 sailed from Espiritu Santo on 2nd January, 1943. The transports from Noumea were met at 0800 on the 3rd, and escorted till dark, when they steered for Guadalcanal, while Task Force 67 patrolled to the westward of San Cristobal during the night. The next day (4th) the Task Force proceeded to a position 25 miles south-west of the Russell Islands, and at 2000 that evening Rear-Admiral Ainsworth with the Bombardment Group shaped course for Munda at 26 knots leaving the remainder of the Task Force under Rear-Admiral Tisdale to patrol to the southward of Guadalcanal during the night.

¹ See App. E, (7).

² A fighter strip had been completed and the Japanese were operating Zeros from it by Christmas. By 31st December it was being used by bombers. It therefore constituted a serious threat to the American position.

³ Task Force 67, cruisers *Nashville* (Flag, Rear-Admiral Ainsworth), *St. Louis*, *Helena*, *Honolulu* (Flag, Rear-Admiral Tisdale), *Columbia*, *Louisville*, H.M.N.Z.S. *Achilles* and the destroyers *Fletcher*, *O'Bannon*, *Nicholas*, *Lamson*, *Drayton*.

32. Bombardments of Munda and Kolombangara Island (Plans 3, 13)

The Force detailed for the bombardment consisted of the three 6-in. cruisers *Nashville*, (Flag, Rear-Admiral Ainsworth), *St. Louis* and *Helena* and the destroyers *Fletcher* and *O'Bannon*. The passage through Blanche Channel (between New Georgia and Rendova Island) was accomplished without incident. A submarine—the *Grayback*—had been stationed off Rendova to assist navigation; this, in conjunction with the use of radar, enabled the operation to be carried out exactly as planned. A total of 2,773 rounds of 6-in., and 1,376 rounds of 5-in., was fired, approximately 80% of which fell in the target area, according to reports from the spotting Catalina; several fires were started and there were numerous explosions.¹ The bombarding ships rejoined the remainder of Task Force 67 to the westward of Guadalcanal next morning (5th January.) Shortly afterwards the force was surprised by Japanese dive bombers² but escaped unhurt, except the *Achilles*,³ which received a direct hit on No. 3 turret. The explosion, however, was noticeably slight and was accompanied by a quantity of white smoke; this combined with the limited area of damage suggested that detonation was incomplete. The American account of the incident remarks "the *Achilles* took the damage in her stride and never lost position".

After the attack Task Force 67 retired at high speed to the south-east; during the night 5th/6th January it patrolled off the western end of Guadalcanal without incident, and the landing operations having been by then successfully carried out, returned to Espiritu Santo on 8th January.

Three weeks later, on 24th January, a similar operation was carried out against enemy troops and installations at the Vila and Stanmore Plantations, in the south of Kolombangara Island (north of New Georgia, see plans 3 and 8). The restricted waters of Kula Gulf would not afford much manoeuvring room, and the plan was therefore to get in unobserved and to withhold fire until headed out; but on this occasion the difficulties of an unseen approach were enhanced by the fact that there was a full moon; it was also anticipated—wrongly as it turned out—that so soon after Munda the enemy would be on the *qui vive*.

The bombardment was carried out by the cruisers *Nashville* and *Helena*, and destroyers *Nicholas*, *De Haven*, *Radford*, *O'Bannon*, the cruisers *Honolulu* and *St. Louis*, with three destroyers operating to seaward in support. The Force was picked up south of Guadalcanal by enemy reconnaissance planes at 1030,

¹ The damage was, however, so quickly remedied that enemy aircraft were operating from the field in less than 18 hours. Commenting on the operation, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, remarked: "As a diversion, as training, and as a deterrent against air attack on Guadalcanal during troop replacement, the operation was of value. The damage to airfields, or other land positions, is so transient that ships should not ordinarily be risked to bombard airfields or other positions, except in close support of ground operations."

² The Force was exercising guns' crews against friendly fighters at the time. Radar failed to distinguish the approaching enemy from these, and when the attack developed some of the guns' crews mistook it for part of the practice.

³ Throughout the earlier stages of the campaign for Guadalcanal, H.M.N.Z.S. *Achilles* (as well as the *Leander*) were employed on convoy escort duty continuously. The *Achilles* which had completed a refit on 17th November, 1942, had escorted the *Aquitania* (carrying New Zealand troops for the Middle East) to a position south of Australia, and then joined Task Force 67 on 30th December.

A serious defect which occurred in November put the *Leander* out of action till March 1943.

23rd January, and shadowed all day while making to the westward,¹ but, just after sunset, the whole sky became overcast, and at 2000, when course was altered to the northward, it was too dark for the turn to be detected. At 0014, 24th January, however, two large Japanese aircraft—tentatively identified as Mitsubishi twin-engined bombers—sighted the force to the northward of New Georgia and remained over it, frequently challenging, for about half an hour; eventually, receiving no reply, they apparently decided it was friendly, and flew off. The last stages of the approach were accomplished without incident, and though no particularly good navigational landmarks existed, radar enabled the cruisers to open fire at 0200, 24th January, exactly as planned. About 95 per cent. of the rounds fired fell in the target area. Very large fires and explosions resulted, and there is no doubt that great damage was inflicted. As soon as the bombardment was over, the two spotting aircraft each dropped two 500-lb. bombs, which considerably added to the flames.

During the withdrawal the Force was shadowed by an enemy aircraft, which illuminated its route with flares and float lights for some time, and was eventually shot down or disabled by the *Helena*. Later, several groups of enemy aircraft which made half-hearted attempts to close, were detected on radar screens; twice they came within range, and were driven off by gunfire, one at least being shot down. Skilful use of heavy black squalls which blew up at about 0330, enabled the force to avoid a serious attack, and at dawn the enemy withdrew.

Some six hours after the bombardment, at 0800, 24th January, the same area at Kolombangara was heavily attacked by aircraft from the *Saratoga*.² Twenty-five bombers and 17 torpedo bombers, escorted by 24 fighters, dropped 85 500-lb. bombs and 47 100-lb. bombs in the target area, while the fighters "strafed" housing areas and A/A positions. There was no enemy fighter opposition, and all the aircraft returned to Guadalcanal safely, "there being no personnel or material casualties resulting from the sporadic and inaccurate A/A gunfire."

33. Japanese evacuate Guadalcanal

The successful landing of the American reinforcements on 4th/5th January completed the preparations for a major offensive on shore. This was launched early in the New Year and continued vigorously throughout January, constantly confining the Japanese to an ever dwindling portion of the island. Four destroyers³ based on Guadalcanal from 16th January onwards assisted the army by bombarding enemy positions as required, and on 1st February covered a landing at Nugu⁴ Point, on the west coast of the island. The landing was unopposed, but one of the destroyers—the *De Haven*—was sunk by air attack to the southward of Savo Island that evening.

¹ It is thought probable that the Japanese staff appreciated Munda as the destination of the Force.

Task Force 11 (*Saratoga*, *San Juan*, six destroyers) had left Noumea on 21st January, and proceeded to the south-westward of Guadalcanal, where the *Saratoga's* striking force was flown off to Henderson's Field on 23rd January. After the attack on Kolombangara on 24th January, it returned to Guadalcanal for servicing, and rejoined the *Saratoga* off Rennel Island that afternoon.

² Task Group 67.5 *Nicholas*, *De Haven*, *O'Bannon*, *Radford*.

⁴ Not to be confused with Nugu Island in Sealark Channel.

Two enemy submarines were ^{attacked} destroyed during this period; one off Coughlan Harbour by the *Nicholas* and *Radford* on 28th January and another on 30th January by the New Zealand trawlers¹ *Kiwi* and *Moa*, a mile to the westward of Cape Esperance, after a most spirited action. That night the *Moa* was again in action, and with the *Tui* engaged four Japanese landing barges laden with troops, sinking two and damaging one.

The last week of January, 1943, saw an intensification of the enemy air activity in the Solomons area. There were also indications of a movement of strong Japanese naval forces towards the Southern Solomons, and Vice-Admiral Halsey ordered his main forces to take up dispositions suitable for interception. At the same time, Rear-Admiral R. C. Giffen with a strong force of cruisers, destroyers, and two auxiliary carriers—Task Force 18²—was to cover an American troop convoy bound for Guadalcanal.

During recent months naval forces in the South Pacific had greatly increased, and at this time Vice-Admiral Halsey had at his disposal (exclusive of Task Force 18), three carriers, seven battleships, four cruisers, two A/A cruisers and many destroyers. These were organised in five Task Forces. Four of these Task Forces³—Nos. 16, 11, 64 and 67—were ordered to concentrate in the area bounded by Lats. 14° to 17° 20' S. Longs. 157° to 162° E. where they would be well placed alike for the interception of the enemy in the event of yet another large scale attempt on Guadalcanal developing, or as cover for Rear-Admiral Giffen's convoy. The remaining Task Force, consisting of the four old battleships *New Mexico*, (flag, Vice-Admiral H. F. Leary), *Colorado*, *Maryland*, *Mississippi*, and two destroyers was held in reserve at Nandi, Fiji Islands.

Task Force 18 left Efate on 27th January, and had reached a position to the south of Guadalcanal on the evening of the 29th January, when it was attacked by Japanese torpedo planes. Two attacks were carried out, about 12 aircraft being employed in each. The first took place in late twilight,⁴ and was preceded by an aircraft dropping dim white marker floats, and red and green parachute lights; no hits were scored, but shortly afterwards another attack developed, and at 1945 the *Chicago*, which was illuminated by an aircraft which she had just shot down in flames, was hit by two torpedoes. She was subsequently taken in tow by the Fleet tug *Navajo*, but was again attacked next day, 30th January, by about 13 torpedo planes. Ten of these were shot down by fighters from the *Enterprise*, which had made contact from the south; but three of their torpedoes hit the *Chicago*, and she sank 10 minutes later.

¹ The 25th Minesweeping Flotilla under Commander A. D. Holden, R.N.Z.N.R. consisting of H.M.N.Z. ships *Matai*, *Kiwi*, *Moa* and *Tui* had been based on Tulagi since 15th December.

² Task Force 18.—8-in. cruisers *Wichita* (Flag, Rear-Admiral Giffen), *Louisville*, *Chicago*; 6-in. cruisers *Montpelier* (Flag, Rear-Admiral A. S. Merrill), *Columbia*, *Cleveland*; auxiliary carriers *Suwannee*, *Chenango*; 8 destroyers.

³ Task Force 16.—Carrier *Saratoga* (Flag, Rear-Admiral De W. C. Ramsey), A/A cruiser *San Juan*, 4 destroyers.

Task Force 11.—Carrier *Enterprise* (Flag, Rear-Admiral F. C. Sherman), A/A cruiser *San Diego*, 5 destroyers.

Task Force 64.—Battleships *Washington* (Flag, Rear-Admiral W. A. Lee), *North Carolina*, *Indiana*, 4 destroyers.

Task Force 67.—6 in. cruisers *Nashville* (Flag, Rear-Admiral W. L. Ainsworth), *Helena*, *Honolulu*, *St. Louis*, 4 destroyers.

⁴ Sunset, 1849.

The American Forces remained at sea during the first few days of February, but no contact occurred with enemy surface craft. The Japanese heavy forces, which included battleships and carriers, kept well to the northward, apparently as distant cover, while a strong force of destroyers evacuated the remnant of the Japanese troops from Guadalcanal under cover of darkness.

34. Conclusion

To sum up the campaign, the key to the whole position—as was recognised by both sides—was the possession of Henderson's Airfield. By their original occupation of Tulagi, in April, 1942, the Japanese had allowed their sea and land forces to outstrip their air support, their nearest air base being at Rabaul—some 675 miles distant. Their carrier losses at the Battle of the Coral Sea, May, 1942, and Midway Island, June, 1942, accentuated this weakness, and the construction of an airfield on Guadalcanal was put in hand in July, 1942. The Americans, however, struck too quickly, and captured the well nigh completed airfield at the outset of their operations in August. After the cruiser losses suffered by the Allies at the Battle of Savo (8th/9th August) the enemy had enjoyed complete local command of the sea; but before he could gather his forces for a large scale effort at re-capture, the establishment of American aircraft at Henderson's Field wrested from him command of the sea by day. The enemy was thus faced with the alternative of operating by day within range of American shore-based aircraft or confining his operations to the hours of darkness. The great superiority in radar equipment enjoyed by the American surface forces rendered his operations by night almost as hazardous as by day; and the net result was a steady drain on his naval and air strength, with no corresponding drain on that of the Americans. This eventually compelled him to acknowledge defeat.

The importance of the victory can hardly be over-estimated. Both strategically and tactically the enemy had been out-manoeuvred and out-fought; with the Southern Solomons firmly in American hands, the vital line of communications between America and Australia was safeguarded, and the first stepping stone secured on the 3,000 mile route leading through the Bismarck Archipelago and Mandated Islands to China and Japan.

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APPENDICES

- A Allied warships mentioned in narrative, with Commanding Officers
- B Japanese warships mentioned in narrative
- C Operation "Watchtower": organisation of Allied surface forces
- C (1) Operation "Watchtower": United States and (estimated) Japanese Military Forces
- C (2) Operation "Watchtower": U.S. Marine Corps Landing Craft
- D Organisation of Allied Surface Forces: Battle of Eastern Solomons
- D (1) Organisation of Japanese Surface Forces: Battle of Eastern Solomons
- D (2) Organisation of Allied Surface Forces: Battle of Santa Cruz
- D (3) Organisation of Japanese Surface Forces: Battle of Santa Cruz
- E Naval losses and damage (Allied and Japanese)
- E (1) Shell hits sustained by H.M.A.S. *Canberra*: Battle of Savo
- E (2) Casualties to personnel, H.M.A.S. *Canberra*: Battle of Savo
- E (3) Damage received by U.S.S. *Hornet*, 26th October, 1942
- F "Phantom" Contacts
- G Chronology

APPENDIX A

ALLIED WARSHIPS MENTIONED IN NARRATIVE WITH COMMANDING OFFICERS

Note :—Ships are given in alphabetical order according to type

I. UNITED STATES

SHIP	DATE OF COMPLETION	STANDARD TONNAGE	SPEED	MAIN ARMAMENT	COMMANDING OFFICER
(a) BATTLESHIPS					
U.S.S. <i>North Carolina</i> ...	1941	35,000	27	9 16-in., 20 5-in., HA/LA ; 16 1.1-in., 12 0.79-in. A/A ; 40 20 mm. Oerlikons	Capt. G. H. Fort Capt. G. B. Davis
U.S.S. <i>Washington</i> ...					
U.S.S. <i>South Dakota</i> ...	1942	35,000	27.5	9 16-in., 16 (<i>Indiana</i> 20) 5-in. HA/LA ; 12 1.1-in., 12 0.5-in. A/A	Capt. T. L. Gatch
U.S.S. <i>Indiana</i> ...					
U.S.S. <i>Colorado</i> ...	1923	32,500	18	8 16-in., 12 5-in., 8 5-in. HA/LA ; (?) 19 0.5-in. A/A	
U.S.S. <i>Maryland</i> ...	1921	31,500			
U.S.S. <i>Mississippi</i> ...	1917	33,000	20	12 14-in., 12 5-in., 8 5-in. HA/LA ; (?) 12 0.5-in. A/A	
U.S.S. <i>New Mexico</i> ...	1918	33,400			
(b) AIRCRAFT CARRIERS					
U.S.S. <i>Enterprise</i> ...	1941	20,000	32.5	94 aircraft ; 8 5-in. HA/LA	Capt. A. C. Davis. (2) Capt. O. B. Hardison
U.S.S. <i>Hornet</i> ...					
U.S.S. <i>Saratoga</i> ...	1927	33,000	33	76 aircraft ; 16 5-in. HA/LA	Capt. De W. C. Ramsey
U.S.S. <i>Wasp</i> ...	1940	14,700	30	72 aircraft ; 8 5-in. HA/LA	Capt. F. P. Sherman
U.S.S. <i>Chenango</i> ...	1942 ¹	—	18	32 aircraft ; 2 5-in., 8 1.57-in., 32 0.79 in. A/A	Capt. B. H. Wyatt Capt. F. W. McMahon
U.S.S. <i>Suwannee</i> ...					
(c) CRUISERS					
U.S.S. <i>Astoria</i> ² ...	1934	9,950	32.7	9 8-in., ³ 8 5-in. HA/LA ; 16 1.1-in. A/A ²	Capt. W. G. Greenman Capt. H. D. Bode. (2) Capt. R. O. Davis Capt. C. T. Joy Capt. C. E. Rosendahl Capt. W. S. DeLaney. (2) Capt. G. H. Roper Capt. W. A. Kitts Capt. F. L. Lowe Capt. L. T. DuBose Capt. S. N. Moore Capt. E. G. Small Capt. C. H. McMorris. (2) Capt. C. Young Capt. F. L. Riefkohl Capt. F. S. Low Capt. E. W. Burrough Capt. W. A. Heard Capt. L. Wood Capt. E. G. Moran Capt. G. C. Hoover. (2) Capt. C. P. Cecil Capt. R. W. Hayler Capt. H. A. Spanagel Capt. C. Campbell
U.S.S. <i>Chester</i> ...	1930	9,200			
U.S.S. <i>Chicago</i> ...	1931	9,300			
U.S.S. <i>Louisville</i> ...	1931	9,050			
U.S.S. <i>Minneapolis</i> ...	1934	9,950			
U.S.S. <i>New Orleans</i> ...	1934	9,950			
U.S.S. <i>Northampton</i> ...	1930	9,050			
U.S.S. <i>Pensacola</i> ³ ...	1930	9,100			
U.S.S. <i>Portland</i> ...	1933	9,800			
U.S.S. <i>Quincy</i> ² ...	1936	9,375			
U.S.S. <i>Salt Lake City</i> ³ ...	1929	9,100			
U.S.S. <i>San Francisco</i> ...	1934	9,950			
U.S.S. <i>Vincennes</i> ² ...	1937	9,400	32.5	12 6-in., 12 5-in. HA/LA ; 16 1.1-in. A/A	Capt. E. W. Burrough Capt. W. A. Heard Capt. L. Wood
U.S.S. <i>Wichita</i> ...	1939	10,000			
U.S.S. <i>Cleveland</i> ...	1942	10,600	32.5	12 6-in., 12 5-in. HA/LA ; 16 1.1-in. A/A	Capt. E. W. Burrough Capt. W. A. Heard Capt. L. Wood
U.S.S. <i>Columbia</i> ...					
U.S.S. <i>Montpelier</i> ...					
U.S.S. <i>Boise</i> ...	1939	9,700	32.5	15 6-in., 8 5-in. HA/LA ; 16 1.1-in. A/A	Capt. E. G. Moran Capt. G. C. Hoover. (2) Capt. C. P. Cecil Capt. R. W. Hayler Capt. H. A. Spanagel Capt. C. Campbell
U.S.S. <i>Helena</i> ...	1939	9,700			
U.S.S. <i>Honolulu</i> ...	1938	9,745	32.5	15 6-in., 8 5-in. HA/LA ; 16 1.1-in. A/A	Capt. E. G. Moran Capt. G. C. Hoover. (2) Capt. C. P. Cecil Capt. R. W. Hayler Capt. H. A. Spanagel Capt. C. Campbell
U.S.S. <i>Nashville</i> ...	1938	10,000			
U.S.S. <i>Phoenix</i> ...	1939	9,700			
U.S.S. <i>St. Louis</i> ...	1939	9,700			

¹ Merchant ships converted.

² *Astoria, Quincy, Vincennes*, 10 0.5-in. A/A.

³ *Pensacola* and *Salt Lake City*, 10 8-in.

APPENDICES

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A—I. UNITED STATES (contd.)

SHIP	DATE OF COM- PLETION	STANDARD TONNAGE	SPEED	MAIN ARMAMENT	COMMANDING OFFICER
<i>(d) A/A CRUISERS</i>					
U.S.S. <i>Atlanta</i>	1941	6,000	38	16 5-in. HA/LA; 16 1.1-in., 8 0.79-in. A/A	Capt. S. P. Jenkins
U.S.S. <i>Juneau</i>	1942				Capt. L. K. Swenson
U.S.S. <i>San Diego</i>	1942				Capt. B. F. Perry
U.S.S. <i>San Juan</i>	1942				Capt. J. E. Maher
<i>(e) DESTROYERS</i>					
U.S.S. <i>De Haven</i>	1942	2,000		5 5-in. HA/LA, 4 1.1-in. A/A, 10 21-in. torpedo tubes	Com. C. E. Tolman
U.S.S. <i>Fletcher</i>					Lt.-Com. F. L. Johnson
U.S.S. <i>Nicholas</i>					Lt.-Com. A. J. Hill
U.S.S. <i>O'Bannon</i>					Com. E. R. Wilkinson
U.S.S. <i>Radford</i>					Lt.-Com. W. K. Romoser
U.S.S. <i>Aaron Ward</i>	1942	1,630	35	4 5-in. HA/LA, 4 1.57-in. Bofors, 5 21-in. torpedo tubes	Lt.-Com. O. F. Gregor
U.S.S. <i>Barton</i>					Lt.-Com. J. M. Worthington
					(2) Lt.-Com. D. H. Fox
U.S.S. <i>Buchanan</i>					Com. R. E. Wilson
U.S.S. <i>Duncan</i>					Lt.-Com. E. W. Taylor
U.S.S. <i>Farenholt</i>					Lt.-Com. E. T. Seaward
U.S.S. <i>Laffey</i>					Lt.-Com. W. E. Hank
U.S.S. <i>Lardner</i>					Lt.-Com. W. M. Sweetser
U.S.S. <i>McCalla</i>					Lt.-Com. W. G. Cooper
U.S.S. <i>Meade</i>					Com. R. S. Lamb
U.S.S. <i>Grayson</i>	1941	1,630	35	4 5-in. HA/LA, 9 0.79-in A/A, 10 21-in. torpedo tubes	Lt.-Com. F. J. Bell
U.S.S. <i>Gwin</i>					Lt.-Com. J. L. Higgins.
U.S.S. <i>Monssen</i>					(2) Lt.-Com. J. B. Fellows
					Com. R. N. Smoot

82

APPENDICES

83

U.S.S. <i>Anderson</i>	1940	1,570	35	4 5-in. HA/LA, 6 0.79-in. A/A, 8 21-in. torpedo tubes	Lt.-Com. R. A. Guthrie
U.S.S. <i>Hughes</i>					Lt.-Com. D. J. Ramsey
U.S.S. <i>Morris</i>					Lt.-Com. R. B. Boyer
U.S.S. <i>Mustin</i>					Com. W. F. Petersen
U.S.S. <i>O'Brien</i>					Lt.-Com. G. R. Hartwig
U.S.S. <i>Russell</i>					Com. T. E. Fraser
U.S.S. <i>Walke</i>					
U.S.S. <i>Benham</i>	1939	1,500	37	4 5-in. HA/LA, 6 0.79-in. A/A, 8 21-in. torpedo tubes	Lt.-Com. J. B. Taylor
U.S.S. <i>Ellet</i>					Lt.-Com. F. H. Gardner
U.S.S. <i>Mauzy</i>					Lt.-Com. G. L. Sims
U.S.S. <i>Stack</i>					Lt.-Com. A. J. Greenacre
U.S.S. <i>Sterrett</i>					Com. J. G. Coward
U.S.S. <i>Wilson</i>	Lt.-Com. W. H. Price				
U.S.S. <i>Bagley</i>	1938	1,500	35+	4 5-in. HA/LA, 3 0.5-in. A/A, 16 21-in. torpedo tubes	Lt.-Com. G. A. Sinclair
U.S.S. <i>Blue</i>					Com. H. N. Williams
U.S.S. <i>Helm</i>					Lt.-Com. C. E. Carroll
U.S.S. <i>Henley</i>					Com. R. H. Smith
U.S.S. <i>Jarvis</i>					Lt.-Com. W. G. Graham
U.S.S. <i>Mugford</i>					Lt.-Com. E. W. Young
U.S.S. <i>Patterson</i>					Com. F. R. Walker
U.S.S. <i>Ralph Talbot</i>	Lt. Com. J. W. Callahan				
U.S.S. <i>Balch</i>	1937	1,850	35+	8 5-in. LA, 8 1.1-in., 5 0.75-mm. A/A, 8 21-in. torpedo tubes	Lt.-Com. H. H. Tiemroth
U.S.S. <i>Phelps</i>					Lt.-Com. E. L. Bull
U.S.S. <i>Porter</i>					Lt.-Com. D. G. Roberts
U.S.S. <i>Selfridge</i>					Lt.-Com. C. D. Reynolds

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A—I. UNITED STATES (contd.)

SHIP	DATE OF COMPLETION	STANDARD TONNAGE	SPEED	MAIN ARMAMENT	COMMANDING OFFICER
<i>(e) DESTROYERS (contd.)</i>					
U.S.S. Conyngham ...	1937	1,480	36	4 5-in. HA/LA, 8 0.79-in. A/A, 12 21-in. torpedo tubes	Lt.-Com. H. C. Daniel Lt.-Com. C. Noble. (2) Lt.-Com. E. N. Parker Lt.-Com. J. E. Cooper Com. P. H. Fitz-Gerald Lt.-Com. R. W. Simpson Lt.-Com. W. C. Ford Com. M. C. Stormes Lt.-Com. W. G. Jones Lt.-Com. H. Wood, Jr.
U.S.S. Cushing ...					
U.S.S. Drayton ...					
U.S.S. Lamson ...					
U.S.S. Mahan ...					
U.S.S. Perkins ...					
U.S.S. Preston ...					
U.S.S. Shaw ...					
U.S.S. Smith ...					
U.S.S. Dale ...					
U.S.S. Farragut ...					
U.S.S. Hull ...					
U.S.S. MacDonough ...					
U.S.S. Worden ...					
<i>(f) MINESWEEPING DESTROYERS</i>					
U.S.S. Hopkins ...	1921	1,190	35	4 4-in., 6 or 8 0.5-in. A/A	Lt.-Com. B. Coe Lt.-Com. W. S. Heald Lt.-Com. J. B. Cochran Lt.-Com. B. M. Agnew Lt.-Com. P. L. Wirtz
U.S.S. Hovey ...	1919				
U.S.S. Southard ...	1919				
U.S.S. Trever ...	1922				
U.S.S. Zane ...	1921				

APPENDICES

(g) SUBMARINES

U.S.S. Argonaut ...	1928	2,710	14.6	2 6-in., 2 0.5-in. A/A, 4 torpedo tubes	Lt.-Com. E. S. Stephen
U.S.S. Grayback ...	1941	1,475	17	1 3-in. HA/LA, 1 0.5-in. A/A, 10 torpedo tubes	
U.S.S. Narwhal ...	1930	2,730	14	2 6-in., 1 0.5-in. A/A, 6 torpedo tubes	

II. BRITISH EMPIRE

SHIP	DATE OF COMPLETION	STANDARD TONNAGE	SPEED	MAIN ARMAMENT	COMMANDING OFFICER
<i>CRUISERS</i>					
H.M.A.S. Australia ...	1928	10,000	31.5	8 8-in., 8 4-in. HA	Capt. H. B. Farncombe, M.V.O., R.A.N.
H.M.A.S. Canberra ...	1928	9,850	31.5	8 8-in., 4 4-in. HA	Capt. F. E. Getting, R.A.N.
H.M.A.S. Hobart ...	1936	7,105	32.5	8 6-in., 8 4-in. HA	Capt. H. A. Showers, R.A.N.
H.M.N.Z.S. Achilles ...	1933	7,030	31.6	8 6-in., 4 4-in. HA	Capt. C. A. L. Mansergh, D.S.C., R.N.
H.M.N.Z.S. Leander ...	1933	7,270	31	8 6-in., 4 4-in. HA	Capt. R. H. Bevan, R.N.
<i>TRAWLERS, A/S, M/S</i>					
H.M.N.Z.S. Mata ¹ ...	—	1,050	—	1 4-in.	Com. A. D. Holden, O.B.E., R.D., R.N.Z.N.R.
H.M.N.Z.S. Kiwi ...	1941	600	12.5	1 4-in., 6 .303-in., 1 Oerlikon	Lt.-Com. G. Bridson, D.S.C., R.N.Z.N.V.R. Lt.-Com. P. Phipps, D.S.C., R.N.Z.N.V.R. Lt.-Com. J. G. Hilliard, D.S.C., R.N.Z.N.V.R.
H.M.N.Z.S. Moa ...					
H.M.N.Z.S. Tui ...					

¹ S.O. 25th M/S Flotilla ; formerly N.Z. Government lighthouse tender.

85

APPENDICES

APPENDIX B

JAPANESE WARSHIPS MENTIONED IN NARRATIVE

Note :—Ships are given in alphabetical order according to type.

SHIP	DATE OF COM- PLETION	STANDARD TONNAGE	SPEED	MAIN ARMAMENT
(a) BATTLESHIPS				
<i>Haruna</i>	1913/15 Re-con- ditioned 1934/39	29,300	26	8 14-in., 14 5.9-in., 8 5.1-in. HA
<i>Hiyei</i>				
<i>Kirishima</i>				
<i>Kongo</i>				
(b) AIRCRAFT CARRIERS				
<i>Hayataka</i> ¹	1942	20,000	26	54 aircraft, 16 5.1-in. HA ; 40(?) 0.79-in. A/A
<i>Hitaka</i> ¹				
<i>Junyo</i> ²	1939	16,500	21	42 aircraft ; 6 5.1-in. HA
<i>Ryujo</i>	1933	7,100	25	30 aircraft ; 12 5-in. HA/LA
<i>Shokaku</i>	1941	23,500+	28	72(?) aircraft ; 16 5.1-in. HA
<i>Zuikaku</i>				
<i>Zuiho</i>	1939	12,000	19	36 aircraft
<i>Chitose</i>	1938	9,000	20	16 seaplanes ; 6 5.1-in. HA, 4 3-in. HA
<i>Chiyoda</i>				
(c) CRUISERS				
<i>Atago</i>	1932	9,850	33	10 7.87-in., 4 4.7-in. HA ; 8 0.78-in. A/A ; 8 24-in. torpedo tubes
<i>Chokai</i>				
<i>Maya</i>				
<i>Takao</i>				
<i>Ashigara</i>	1929	10,000	35.5	10 7.87-in., 8 5.1-in. HA ; 12 21-in. torpedo tubes
<i>Myoko</i>				
<i>Nachi</i>				
<i>Aoba</i>	1926/27	7,100	33	6 7.87-in., 4 4.7-in. HA ; 8 24-in. torpedo tubes
<i>Furutaka</i>				
<i>Kako</i>				
<i>Kinugasa</i>				
<i>Chikuma</i>	1938/39	8,500	33	7 7.87-in., 8 5.1-in. HA ; 8 3-in. HA ; 12 24-in. torpedo tubes
<i>Tone</i>				

¹ Originally designed for N.Y.K. Line : converted before launching.

² Ex N.Y.K. Line : converted after launching.

APPENDICES

SHIP	DATE OF COM- PLETION	STANDARD TONNAGE	SPEED	MAIN ARMAMENT
(c) CRUISERS (contd.)				
<i>Kumano</i>	1935/37	8,500	33	10 7.87-in., 8 5.1-in. HA ; 12 24-in. torpedo tubes ; 4 3-in. HA
<i>Mogami</i>				
<i>Suzuya</i>				
(d) LIGHT CRUISERS				
<i>Noshiro</i>	1942	6,000	32	6 6.1-in., 2 4.7-in. HA/LA ; 14 1.57 or 0.98-in. A/A ; 4 24-in. torpedo tubes
<i>Oyodo</i>				
<i>Nagara</i>	1922/25	5,170	33	7 5.5-in., 3 3-in. HA ; 8 21-in. torpedo tubes
<i>Natori</i>				
<i>Izuzu</i>				
<i>Yura</i>	1924/25	5,195	33	7 5.5-in., 3 3-in. HA ; 8 21-in. torpedo tubes
<i>Jintsu</i>				
<i>Sendai</i>	1919	3,230	33	4 5.5-in., 1 3.15-in. HA ; 6 18-in. torpedo tubes
<i>Tatsuta</i>				
<i>Tenryu</i>				
(e) DESTROYERS				
<i>Akazuki</i>	1928/31	1,700	34	6 5-in. HA/LA ; 9 21-in. torpedo tubes
<i>Amagiri</i>				
<i>Ayanami</i>				
<i>Fubuki</i>				
<i>Hasuyuki</i>				
<i>Ikazuchi</i>				
<i>Inazuma</i>				
<i>Isonami</i>				
<i>Murakumo</i>				
<i>Shikinami</i>				
<i>Shirakumo</i>	1937/42	1,500	35.8	6 5-in. HA/LA ; 8(?) 24-in. torpedo tubes
<i>Shirayuki</i>				
<i>Uranami</i>				
<i>Yugiri</i>				
<i>Akizuki</i>				
<i>Amatsukazi</i>				
<i>Arashi</i>				
<i>Asagumo</i>				
<i>Hagikazi</i>				
<i>Hamakaze</i>				
<i>Hatsukazi</i>				
<i>Hatsuzuki</i>				
<i>Hayashio</i>				
<i>Isokazi</i>				
<i>Kagero</i>				
<i>Kuroshio</i>				

APPENDICES

APPENDIX B (contd.)

SHIP	DATE OF COM- PLETION	STANDARD TONNAGE	SPEED	MAIN ARMAMENT
(e) DESTROYERS (contd.)				
<i>Maikaze</i> ...	1937/42	1,500	35.8	6 5-in. HA/LA ; 8(?) 24-in. torpedo tubes
<i>Makanami</i> ...				
<i>Mahigumo</i> ...				
<i>Michishio</i> ...				
<i>Minegumo</i> ...				
<i>Naganami</i> ...				
<i>Natsugumo</i> ...				
<i>Natsushio</i> ...				
<i>Nowaki</i> ...				
<i>Oyashio</i> ...				
<i>Shuranuhi</i> ...				
<i>Takanami</i> ...				
<i>Terutzuki</i> ...				
<i>Urakazi</i> ...				
<i>Yamagumo</i> ...				
<i>Yukikazi</i> ...				
<i>Harusame</i> ...	1936/37	1,368	34	5 5-in. HA/LA ; 8 21-in. torpedo tubes
<i>Kawakazi</i> ...				
<i>Murasame</i> ...				
<i>Samidare</i> ...				
<i>Shiratsuya</i> ...				
<i>Shigure</i> ...				
<i>Suzukazi</i> ...				
<i>Umikaze</i> ...				
<i>Yudachi</i> ...				
<i>Ariaki</i> ...	1935	1,368	34	5 5-in. HA/LA ; 6 21-in. torpedo tubes
<i>Yugure</i> ...				
<i>Kamakaze</i> ...	1925/27	1,270	34	4 4.7-in., 6 21-in. torpedo tubes
<i>Mochizuki</i> ...				
<i>Mutzuki</i> ...				
<i>Uzuki</i> ...				
<i>Yunagi</i> ...				
<i>Akikazi</i> ...	1920/21	1,215	34	4 4.7-in., 6 21-in. torpedo tubes
<i>Hakaze</i> ...				
<i>Tachikazi</i> ...				

APPENDIX C
OPERATION "WATCHTOWER" (Landings at Guadalcanal)
ORGANISATION OF ALLIED SURFACE FORCES

Vice-Admiral R. L. Ghormley, U.S.N.,
Commander, South Pacific,
Flag at Noumea.

Vice-Admiral F. J. Fletcher, U.S.N.
(Flag in *Saratoga*),
Task Force 61
(Expeditionary Force).

Rear-Admiral J. S. McCain,
Task Force 68.

SHORE BASED
Aircraft, S. Pacific Force, and aircraft
temporarily attached.

AIR SUPPORT FORCE
Rear-Admiral Noyes
(Flag in *Wasp*)

CARRIER (1)
Saratoga
Flag, Vice-Admiral
Fletcher

8-in. CRUISERS (2)
Minneapolis
New Orleans

DESTROYERS (5)
Phelps
Farragut
Worden
Macdonough
Dale

BATTLESHIP (1)
N. Carolina

8-in. CRUISER (1)
Portland

6-in. CRUISER (1)
Atlanta

DESTROYERS (5)
Balch
Maury
Gwin
Bonham
Grayson

CARRIER (1)
Wasp
Flag, Rear-Admiral
Noyes

8-in. CRUISERS (2)
San Francisco
Salt Lake City

DESTROYERS (5)
Sterrett
Aaron Ward
Stack
Laffey
Farenholt

AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
Rear-Admiral Turner
(Flag in *McCanley*)

Guadalcanal Transport Group "X-Ray"
(Capt. Reifsneider in
Hunter Liggett)

TRANSPORTS (9)
Fuller
American Legion
McCannley
(Flag, Rear-Admiral
Turner)
Barnett
Geo. F. Elliott
Hunter Liggett
Crescent City
President Hayes
President Adams
STORESHIPS (4)
Bellatrix
Libra
Fomalhaut
Betegeuse
Alhena
ALCHIBRA

Tulagi Transport Group "Yoke"
(Capt. Ashe in
Neville)

TRANSPORTS (4)
Neville
Zellin
Heywood
President Jackson

PAST TRANSPORTS (4)
Colhoun
Gregory
Little
McKean

Fire Support Groups
(a) GUADALCANAL
8-in. CRUISERS (3)
Vincennes
Quincy
As'oria
DESTROYERS (4)
Dewey
Ellet
Wilson
HULL
(b) TULAGI
5.5-in. CRUISER (1)
San Juan
(Flag, Rear-Admiral
Scott)
DESTROYERS (2)
Monsen
Buchanan

Fire Support Groups
Minesweeper Group
DESTROYERS (5)
Hopkins
Traver
Zettie
Southard
Hovey

Screening Group
8-in. CRUISERS (3)
Australia
(Flag, Rear-Admiral
Crutchley, V.C.)
Canberra
Chicago
6-in. CRUISER (1)
Hobart
DESTROYERS (9)
Sulfridge
Henley
Helm
Bluc
Mugford
Patterson
Ralph Talbot
Jervis
Bagley

APPENDIX C (1)

OPERATION "WATCHTOWER" (Landings at Guadalcanal)

UNITED STATES and (Estimated) JAPANESE MILITARY FORCES

ESTIMATED ENEMY		U.S. FORCES ASSIGNED		REMARKS
Guadalcanal				
06	1 Regt. Infantry	2,050	1st Reg., 1st Div., U.S.M.C.	1. These Japanese forces were estimated to have a rifle strength of about 2,120 besides tommy guns and hand grenades. Other special weapons were estimated as follows:— Light machine-guns, 99 Heavy machine-guns, 18 3-in. A/A guns, 12 37-mm. anti-tank, 6 70-mm., 6 Aircraft—6 Zero fighters on floats; Kawanisi flying-boats 2. U.S. forces were to land at Beach Red (<i>see</i> Plan 4) and then proceed for a hill bearing about 260° true behind Kukum, which overlooked the Japanese defences
	1 Engineer Btn.	520	5th Regt., 1st Div., U.S.M.C. (less one btn.)	
	1 A.A. Btn.	625	11th Regt., 1st Div. (less one btn.)	
	2 Construction Units	720	1st Btn. Engineers, U.S.M.C.	
	Naval Forces	100	1st Btn. Pioneers, U.S.M.C.	
	Advance Aviation Ground Forces	85	1st Btn. Special Weapons, U.S.M.C.	
	Labour Units	900	1st Btn. Tanks	
		5,000	Headquarter Units	
			11,400	
Tulagi Area				
	Tulagi Island About 500		1st Raider Btn. 800 2nd Btn. 5th Regt. 800	U.S. forces were to land at Beach Blue, and to attack across the island to the northward and then to attack the town to the southward
			1,600	
	Gavutu About 500		1st Parachute Btn. 500	U.S. forces were to carry out a frontal attack landing about Lever's Wharf
	Tanambogo About 500		1st Parachute Btn. after capture of Gavutu and reinforcements as necessary from Tulagi and Ngela, up to about 1,200	U.S. forces were to advance across the causeway after Gavutu had fallen, also making use of rubber boats
91	Florida Island (Ngela) Haleta up to 100 Halavo up to 250	 250 650	Landings were to take place 30 minutes prior to the attacks on Tulagi and Gavutu to cover the main landings and prevent the escape of Japanese
	Makambo Probably not more than 25		Survivors of No. 1 Parachute Btn., probably 400	These two islands were not to be attacked till the second day (8th August)
	Mbangi Very lightly held		As convenient	

APPENDICES

APPENDICES

APPENDIX C (2)
OPERATION "WATCHTOWER"
U.S. MARINE CORPS LANDING CRAFT

Landing craft used were of four types :—

HIGGINS TROOP BOATS, 36 feet long, 12 knots, not armoured carry 39 full equipped men.

CHRIS CRAFT RAMP BOATS, armoured, 12 knots; have a ramp in front capable of being lowered to enable quick disembarkation of men and stores.

TANK LIGHTERS, similar to ramp boats, but larger; about 10 knots. Used for vehicles, artillery stores, tractors and men.

AMPHIBIOUS TRACTORS (known as "Alligators").

Lightly armoured, tank-like machines without overhead cover, sufficiently buoyant to float when loaded with men and stores. The tracks propel them through water at about 8 knots and on land at 15 miles per hour. They were hardly beyond the experimental stage and suffered from numerous mechanical faults on shore, but proved extremely useful for transport of men and stores along the beaches.

2. All landing craft were capable of being driven at speed on to a beach.
3. Landing craft were carried in the transports in accordance with personnel, equipment and stores to be handled. No "mother ship" was used.
4. The transports lay to out of range of shore batteries and the amphibious tractors were launched first on account of their slow speed. The other boats were then lowered, and remained astern till ordered alongside to be loaded by ship gear.
5. When loaded the boats proceeded to a rendezvous area closer inshore, whence they made a dash from a departure line marked by destroyers, overtaking the amphibious tractors on the way.

APPENDIX D.
ORGANISATION OF ALLIED SURFACE FORCES :
BATTLE OF EASTERN SOLOMONS

Task Force 61

Vice-Admiral F. J. Fletcher, U.S.N.
 (Flag in U.S.S. *Saratoga*)

Task Force 11

Carrier :
 U.S.S. *Saratoga*
 (Flag, Vice-Admiral Fletcher)

Cruisers :
 U.S.S. *Minneapolis*
 (Flag, Rear-Admiral Wright)
 U.S.S. *New Orleans*
 H.M.A.S. *Australia*
 (Flag, Rear-Admiral Crutchley, V.C.)

Light Cruiser :
 H.M.A.S. *Hobart*

Destroyers :
 U.S.S. *Phelps*
 (Capt. Brewer, S.O. 1st Dest. Squad.)
 U.S.S. *Farragut*
 (Com. McInerney, S.O. 2nd Dest. Div.)
 U.S.S. *Worden*
 U.S.S. *MacDonough*
 U.S.S. *Dale*

Task Force 16

Carrier :
 U.S.S. *Enterprise*
 (Flag, Rear-Admiral Kinkaid)

Battleship :
 U.S.S. *North Carolina*

Cruiser :
 U.S.S. *Portland*
 (Flag, Rear-Admiral Tisdale)

A/A Cruiser :
 U.S.S. *Atlanta*

Destroyers :
 U.S.S. *Balch*
 (Capt. Sauer, S.O. 6th Squad.)
 U.S.S. *Mauray*
 U.S.S. *Benham*
 U.S.S. *Ellet*
 U.S.S. *Grayson*
 (Com. Holcomb, S.O. 22nd Div.)
 U.S.S. *Monssen*

Task Force 18¹

Carrier :
 U.S.S. *Wasp*
 (Flag, Rear-Admiral Noyes)

Cruisers :
 U.S.S. *Salt Lake City*
 U.S.S. *San Francisco*


A/A Cruiser :
 U.S.S. *San Juan*
 (Flag, Rear-Admiral Scott)

Destroyers :
 U.S.S. *FARRAGUT*
 (Capt. Tobin, S.O. 12th Squad.)
 ARRON WARD
 BUCHANAN
 LANG
 (Capt. Warlick, S.O. 15th Div.)
 STACK
 STERETT
 SELFRIDGE
 (Capt. Flynn, S.O. 4th Squad.)

¹ Task Force 18 was not present at the battle, having been detached the evening before to fuel.

Note : Task Force 17 Carrier *Hornet* (Flag, Rear-Admiral Murray), cruisers *Northampton*, *Pensacola*, *San Diego*, and destroyers joined T.F. 61 on 29th August (5 days after the battle).


APPENDIX D (1)
ORGANISATION OF JAPANESE SURFACE FORCES :
BATTLE OF EASTERN SOLOMONS



94

APPENDICES

APPENDIX D (2)
ORGANISATION OF ALLIED SURFACE FORCES :
BATTLE OF SANTA CRUZ




95

APPENDICES

APPENDIX D (3)

ORGANISATION OF JAPANESE SURFACE FORCES :

BATTLE OF SANTA CRUZ



96

APPENDICES

APPENDIX E

NAVAL LOSSES AND DAMAGE (ALLIED AND JAPANESE) :

Note :—Total losses are shown in *ITALIC CAPITALS*. Japanese losses and damage have been taken from table in "The Campaigns of the Pacific War" (U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey) compiled from Japanese sources available after the War.

ALLIED		JAPANESE	
SHIP	REMARKS	SHIP	REMARKS
BATTLESHIPS		2 sunk	
U.S.S. <i>North Carolina</i>	Torpedoed by submarine, 15th September 1942	<i>HIYEI</i>	Sunk, gun, torpedo, air; Guadalcanal, 12th-14th November 1942
U.S.S. <i>South Dakota</i>	Damaged, air attack, Santa Cruz, 26th October 1942 Damaged, gunfire, Guadalcanal, 14th-15th November 1942	<i>KIRISHIMA</i>	Sunk: damaged by gunfire and scuttled, Guadalcanal, 15th November 1942
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS		1 sunk : 3 damaged	
U.S.S. <i>Enterprise</i>	Damaged, air attack Eastern Solomons, 24th August 1942. Damaged, air attack, Santa Cruz, 26th October 1942	<i>RYUJO</i>	Sunk, air attack, E. Solomons, 24th August 1942
U.S.S. <i>Saratoga</i>	Torpedoed by submarine, 31st August 1942	<i>Chitose</i>	(Seaplane Carrier) damaged, air attack, E. Solomons, 24th August 1942
U.S.S. <i>WASP</i>	Torpedoed and sunk by submarine, 15th September 1942	<i>Zuiho</i>	Damaged, air attack, Santa Cruz, 26th October 1942
U.S.S. <i>HORNET</i>	Sunk, air attack, Santa Cruz, 26th October 1942	<i>Shokaku</i>	Damaged, air attack, Santa Cruz, 26th October 1942
CRUISERS		5 sunk : 8 damaged	
H.M.A.S. <i>CANBERRA</i> (8-in.) ...	Sunk, gunfire, Savo, 9th August 1942	<i>Aoba</i> (7.87-in.)	Damaged, gunfire, Savo, 9th August 1942. Damaged, gunfire, C. Esperance, 11th-12th October 1942
U.S.S. <i>VINCENNES</i> (8-in.) ...	Sunk, gunfire, Savo, 9th August 1942	<i>Chokai</i> (7.87-in.) ...	Damaged, gunfire, Savo, 9th August 1942
U.S.S. <i>QUINCY</i> (8-in.) ...	Sunk, gunfire, Savo, 9th August 1942	<i>KAKO</i> (7.87-in.) ...	Sunk, off Kavieng, submarine, 9th August 1942
U.S.S. <i>ASTORIA</i> (8-in.) ...	Sunk, gunfire, Savo, 9th August 1942	<i>Jintsu</i> (5.5-in.)	Damaged, air attack, E. Solomons, 25th August 1942
U.S.S. <i>CHICAGO</i> (8-in.) ...	Damaged, gunfire, Savo, 9th August 1942. Sunk, air torpedoes, Rennell Island, 30th January 1943		

97

APPENDICES

APPENDIX E (contd.)

ALLIED			JAPANESE		
SHIP		REMARKS	SHIP		REMARKS
CRUISERS (contd.)					
U.S.S. <i>Salt Lake City</i> (8-in.)	...	Damaged, gunfire, C. Esperance, 11th-12th October 1942	<i>Myoko</i> (7.87 in.)	...	Slightly damaged, air attack, 14th September 1942
U.S.S. <i>Boise</i> (6-in.)	...	Damaged, gunfire, C. Esperance, 11th-12th October 1942	<i>YURA</i> (5.5-in.)	...	Damaged, air attack, Shortlands, 25th September 1942. Sunk, air attack, E. of Indispensable Strait, 25th October 1942
U.S.S. <i>Chester</i> (8-in.)	...	Torpedoed by submarine 20th October 1942	<i>TENRYU</i> (5.5-in.)	...	Damaged, air attack, Rabaul, 2nd October 1942. Sunk, Solomons, submarine 18th December 1942
U.S.S. <i>San Juan</i> (A/A)	...	Damaged, air attack, Santa Cruz, 26th October 1942	<i>FURUTAKA</i> (7.87-in.)	...	Sunk, gunfire, C. Esperance, 11th-12th October 1942
U.S.S. <i>ATLANTA</i> (A/A)	...	Sunk, gunfire and torpedoes, Guadalcanal, 12th-13th November 1942	<i>Chikuma</i> (7.87-in.)	...	Damaged, air attack, Santa Cruz, 26th October 1942
U.S.S. <i>JUNEAU</i> (A/A)	...	Damaged, gunfire, Guadalcanal, 12th-13th November 1942. Sunk by S/M, 13th November 1942	<i>Izuzu</i> (7.87-in.)	...	Damaged, air attack, Guadalcanal, 14th November 1942
U.S.S. <i>San Francisco</i> (8-in.)	...	Damaged, gunfire, Guadalcanal, 12th-13th November 1942	<i>Chokai</i> (7.87-in.)	...	Damaged, air attack, Guadalcanal, 14th November 1942
U.S.S. <i>Portland</i> (8-in.)	...	Damaged, gunfire, Guadalcanal, 12th-13th November 1942	<i>Maya</i> (7.87-in.)	...	Damaged, air attack, Guadalcanal, 14th November 1942
U.S.S. <i>Helena</i> (6-in.)	...	Damaged, gunfire, Guadalcanal, 12th-13th November 1942	<i>KINUGASA</i> (7.87-in.)	...	Sunk, air attack, Guadalcanal, 14th November 1942
U.S.S. <i>NORTHAMPTON</i> (8-in.)	...	Sunk, torpedo, Lunga, 30th November 1942	<i>Noshiro</i> (6.1-in.)	...	Damaged, air attack, Guadalcanal, 14th January 1943
U.S.S. <i>Minneapolis</i> (8-in.)	...	Damaged, torpedo, Lunga, 30th November 1942	<i>Oyodo</i> (6.1-in.)	...	Damaged, air attack, Guadalcanal, 14th January 1943
U.S.S. <i>New Orleans</i> (8-in.)	...	Damaged, torpedo, Lunga, 30th November 1942			
U.S.S. <i>Pensacola</i> (8-in.)	...	Damaged, torpedo, Lunga, 30th November 1942			
H.M.N.Z.S. <i>Achilles</i> (6-in.)	...	Damaged, air attack, 5th January 1943			
DESTROYERS			13 sunk : 39 damaged		
U.S.S. <i>Mugford</i>	...	Damaged, air attack, 7th August 1942	<i>Akikaze</i>	...	Damaged, air attack, off Guadalcanal, 19th August 1942. Damaged, air attack, Santa Cruz, 24th October 1942
U.S.S. <i>JARVIS</i>	...	Damaged, air torpedo, 8th August 1942; lost at sea			
U.S.S. <i>Patterson</i>	...	Damaged, gunfire, Savo, 9th August 1942	<i>Hagikaze</i>	...	Damaged, air attack, Solomons, 19th August 1942
U.S.S. <i>Ralph Talbot</i>	...	Damaged, gunfire, Savo, 9th August 1942	<i>Kawahaze</i>	...	Damaged, air attack, Solomons, 22nd August 1942
U.S.S. <i>BLUE</i>	...	Torpedoed and sunk by M.T.B., 21st August 1942	<i>MUTSUKI</i>	...	Sunk, air attack, E. Solomons, 25th August 1942
U.S.S. <i>LITTLE</i>	...	Sunk, gunfire, Lengo Channel, 4th-5th September 1942	<i>ASAGIRI</i>	...	Sunk, air attack, Solomons, 28th August 1942
U.S.S. <i>GREGORY</i>	...	Sunk, gunfire, Lengo Channel, 4th-5th September 1942	<i>Shivakumo</i>	...	Damaged, air attack, Solomons, 28th August 1942
U.S.S. <i>O'BRIEN</i>	...	Torpedoed by submarine, 15th September 1942; lost at sea	<i>Yugiri</i>	...	Damaged, air attack, Solomons, 28th August 1942
U.S.S. <i>Farenholt</i>	...	Damaged, gunfire, C. Esperance, 11th-12th October 1942	<i>Minegumo</i>	...	Damaged, air attack, Solomons, 5th October 1942
U.S.S. <i>DUNCAN</i>	...	Sunk, gunfire, C. Esperance, 11th-12th October 1942	<i>Murasame</i>	...	Damaged, night action, Guadalcanal, 13th November 1942. Damaged, air attack, Solomons, 5th October 1942
U.S.S. <i>PORTER</i>	...	Torpedoed by submarine, 26th October 1942; sunk	<i>Hasuyuki</i>	...	Damaged, slightly, night action, 11th October 1942
U.S.S. <i>Smith</i>	...	Damaged, air attack, Santa Cruz, 26th October 1942	<i>NATSUGUMO</i>	...	Sunk, air attack, near Savo, 11th October 1942
U.S.S. <i>CUSHING</i>	...	Sunk, gunfire, Guadalcanal, 12th-13th November 1942	<i>FUBUKI</i>	...	Sunk, gunfire, C. Esperance, 12th October 1942
U.S.S. <i>MONSSEN</i>	...	Sunk, gunfire, Guadalcanal, 12th-13th November 1942	<i>MURAKUMO</i>	...	Sunk, air attack, near Savo, 12th October 1942
U.S.S. <i>BARTON</i>	...	Sunk, gunfire, Guadalcanal, 12th-13th November 1942	<i>Samidare</i>	...	Damaged slightly, air attack, Solomons, 14th October 1942
U.S.S. <i>LAFFEY</i>	...	Sunk, gunfire, Guadalcanal, 12th-13th November 1942	<i>AYANAMI</i>	...	Damaged slightly, air attack, Solomons, 19th October 1942. Sunk, gunfire, Guadalcanal, 15th November 1942
U.S.S. <i>Aaron Ward</i>	...	Damaged, gunfire, Guadalcanal, 12th-13th November 1942	<i>TERUTZUKI</i>	...	Damaged slightly, air attack, Santa Cruz, 27th October 1942. Sunk, torpedoes, Guadalcanal, 12th December 1942
U.S.S. <i>Sterrett</i>	...	Damaged, gunfire, Guadalcanal, 12th-13th November 1942	<i>Amagiri</i>	...	Damaged, air attack, Rabaul, 5th November 1942
U.S.S. <i>O'Bannon</i>	...	Damaged, gunfire, Guadalcanal, 12th-13th November 1942	<i>Naganami</i>	...	Damaged, air attack, Solomons, 7th November 1942. Damaged slightly, gunfire, Lunga Point, 30th November 1942
U.S.S. <i>Fletcher</i>	...	Damaged, gunfire, Guadalcanal, 12th-13th November 1942	<i>TAKANAMI</i>	...	Damaged, air attack, Solomons, 7th November 1942. Sunk, gunfire Lunga Point, 30th November 1942
U.S.S. <i>PRESTON</i>	...	Torpedoed and sunk, Guadalcanal, 14th-15th November 1942			
U.S.S. <i>WALKE</i>	...	Torpedoed and sunk, Guadalcanal, 14th-15th November 1942			
U.S.S. <i>BENHAM</i>	...	Torpedoed and sunk, Guadalcanal, 14th-15th November 1942			

APPENDIX E (contd.)

ALLIED			JAPANESE		
SHIP		REMARKS	SHIP		REMARKS
DESTROYERS (contd.)					
U.S.S. DE HAVEN	Sunk, air attack, 1st February 1942	<i>Mochizuki</i>	Damaged slightly, torpedo, Tassafaronga, 8th November 1942
			<i>AKATZUKI</i>	Sunk, night action, Guadalcanal, 13th November 1942
			<i>YUDACHI</i>	Sunk, night action, Guadalcanal, 13th November 1942
			<i>Ikazuchi</i>	Damaged, night action, Guadalcanal, 13th November 1942
			<i>Amatsukazi</i>	Damaged, night action, Guadalcanal, 13th November 1942
			<i>Hatsukaze</i>	Damaged, night action, Guadalcanal, 13th November 1942. Damaged, torpedo, Solomons, 10th January 1943
			<i>Yakikazi</i>	Damaged, air attack, Solomons, 10th January 1943
			<i>Michishio</i>	Damaged, air attack, Shortlands, 10th January 1943
			<i>Umikaze</i>	Damaged, air attack, Buna, 18th November 1942
			<i>HAYASHIO</i>	Sunk, air attack, Solomons, 24th November 1942
			<i>MAKIGUMO</i>	Damaged, air attack, off Buna, 29th November 1942. Sunk, mine off Guadalcanal, 1st February 1943
			<i>Shiratsuyu</i>	Damaged, air attack, off Buna, 29th November 1942
			<i>Isonami</i>	Damaged, air attack, Buna, 1st December 1942. Damaged, air attack, Guadalcanal, 8th December 1942
			<i>Makinami</i>	Damaged slightly, air attack, Guadalcanal, 3rd December 1942. Damaged, air attack, off New Georgia, 1st February 1943
			<i>Arashi</i>	Damaged slightly, air attack, Shortlands, 7th December 1942. Damaged, air attack off New Georgia, 15th January 1943
			<i>Nowaki</i>	Damaged, air attack, Solomons, 7th December 1942
			<i>Kagero</i>	Damaged, air attack, Shortlands, 16th December 1942
			<i>Mizuki</i>	Damaged by collision, 25th December 1942
			<i>Uzuki</i>	Damaged by collision, 25th December 1942
			<i>Ariaki</i>	Damaged, air attack, Solomons, 26th December 1942
			<i>Tachikaze</i>	Damaged, air attack, Rabaul, 26th December 1942
			<i>Suzukaze</i>	Damaged, air attack, Solomons, 1st January 1943. Damaged, air attack, Solomons, 2nd January 1943
			<i>Natsushio</i>	Damaged, torpedoed by M.T.B., Guadalcanal, 10th January 1943
			<i>Yamagumo</i>	Damaged, air attack, Kavieng, 14th January 1943
			<i>Urakazi</i>	Damaged, air attack, New Georgia, 15th January 1943
			<i>Akaizuki</i>	Damaged, torpedo (submarine), Solomons 19th January 1943
			<i>HAKAZE</i>	Sunk, torpedo (submarine), Kavieng, 23rd January 1943
			<i>Kawakaze</i>	Damaged slightly, air attack, Kolombangara, 4th February 1943
			<i>Kuroshio</i>	Damaged slightly, air attack, Guadalcanal, 4th February 1943
			<i>Maikaze</i>	Damaged, air attack, Shortlands, 4th February 1943
			<i>Shuranuhi</i>	Damaged, air attack, Kolombangara, 4th February 1943
			<i>Isokaze</i>	Damaged, air attack, off Guadalcanal, 7th February 1943
			<i>Hamakazi</i>	Damaged, air attack, off Gizo, 7th February 1943

APPENDICES

APPENDICES

APPENDIX E (1)

SHELL HITS SUSTAINED BY H.M.A.S. "CANBERRA"

BATTLE OF SAVO

- (1) "A" barrette, port side upper deck; training out of action.
- (2) One hit in torpedomen's mess deck.
- (3) Two hits in foretop mess deck ("B" turret undamaged).
- (4) One hit in stokers' mess deck.
- (5) One hit in plotting office; one hit in port foremost corner of bridge, wounding captain, killing gunnery officer and causing many casualties.
- (6) One hit foremost end of main galley; penetrated to sick bay dispensary.
- (7) One hit in Sto. P.O.'s mess deck, penetrating into "A" fan flat.
- (8) "B" boiler room.
- (9) One hit, 1st motor boat and starboard pom-pom magazine.
- (10) At least four hits on 4-in. gun deck.
- (11) At least two hits in torpedo space.
- (12) Aircraft and aircraft catapult both hit.
- (13) One hit in regulating office flat, penetrating to forward engine room.
- (14) One hit in after director.
- (15) One hit through gunnery office, bursting starboard side of gun room flat.
- (16) One hit through left cabinet bursting between the guns of X-turret.
- (17) One hit penetrating through cypher office (immediately forward of C.O.'s quarters) to shell handing room.
- (18) One hit in Warrant Officers' flat.

Note: It was thought at the time of the action that the *Canberra* was hit by a torpedo between the boiler rooms. After very careful examination of the survivors, the Board of Enquiry, subsequently held at Sydney, came to the conclusion that this was improbable. No oil fuel whatever was seen round the ship after the action, nor had any survivor experienced the shock of an underwater explosion. It was assumed that the list which gradually increased from 5° to 30° in about five hours was caused by shell going right through the ship and penetrating the starboard side under water.

APPENDIX E (2)

CASUALTIES TO PERSONNEL—H.M.A.S. "CANBERRA"

BATTLE OF SAVO

	OFFICERS	RATINGS
Missing, presumed killed	9 ¹	65
Died of wounds	1 ²	9
Wounded	6	49
Survivors	44	636 ³
Total	60	759

¹ Including Lieutenant (jg) J. Vance, U.S.N., Liaison Officer.

² Captain F. E. Getting, R.A.N.

³ Including three U.S.N. signal ratings.

APPENDIX E (3)

DAMAGE RECEIVED BY U.S.S. "HORNET"

26th October, 1942

TIME	CAUSE OF DAMAGE	REMARKS
1012	Two near misses	—
1013	Dive-bomber dived into ship and exploded with two 100 lb. bombs	Set fire to signal bridge, which was rendered uninhabitable; pierced flight deck and started large fire
1015	Two torpedoes	Both torpedoes hit starboard side amidships. Forward engine room and two boiler rooms flooded; all power and communications lost; ship listed 7°-8° to starboard
	500 lb. bomb hit	At about frame 155; exploded on No. 4 deck
	500 lb. bomb hit	At about frame 153; exploded on contact
	500 lb. bomb hit	At about frame 80; exploded on No. 3 or 4 deck
1017	Unarmed torpedo plane dived into ship	Exploded just out board of No. 1 elevator shaft, causing bad fire
1620	One torpedo	Flooded remaining engine room. Ship listed to starboard 14½°, increasing gradually to 18°-20°
1655	One bomb hit	Struck after starboard corner of flight deck; exploded in sea
1802	One bomb hit	Exploded in hangar, just forward of island superstructure
1905-2140	Nine torpedoes; 369 rounds 5-in.	Fired by the U.S.S. destroyers <i>Mustin</i> and <i>Anderson</i> . The torpedoes were all fired at the port or high side, so their early effect was to counter flood. Fire was ceased at 2140, leaving the <i>Hornet</i> burning fiercely and sinking

Note: Commenting on this occasion, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, expresses satisfaction that the carriers were able to prevent fire from getting into the petrol systems, and remarked: "Except for the *Lexington* and *Saratoga*, our carriers have proven especially vulnerable to torpedo hits. Although carriers are not supposed to withstand the same amount of punishment as our modern battleships, they should still be as tough as possible."

APPENDIX F

"PHANTOM" CONTACTS

As experience in night fighting increased, it was found that ships were liable to open fire on "phantoms," *i.e.*, their own shadows, thrown by gun flashes from other ships or illuminants, on to low cloud banks. Rear-Admiral Ainsworth, U.S.N., remarked as follows on this phenomenon in his report on the bombardment of Munda: "This matter of firing at one's own shadow is much more real than can at first seem possible. With everyone on their toes and all look-outs alerted, we are all prone to see things which do not exist, and these black shadows reflected on cloud masses near the horizon certainly appear to be enemy ships. The *St. Louis*, going across the range, was a ball of fire on the *Nashville's* port quarter, and the *Nashville* opened fire on a phantom torpedo boat on her starboard bow. The *Fletcher* likewise almost fired a half salvo of torpedoes at her own silhouette. . . . It may well be probable that several of our reports of enemy ships sunk in night engagements may be in error from this cause. Here, again, it behoves us to put our faith in S.G.¹ and, if time permits, check the phantom before opening fire."

Captured documents show that the Japanese experienced similar troubles. For example, one of their destroyer squadrons reported chasing American destroyers and torpedo boats out of the area during the battleship bombardment of Guadalcanal on the night of 13th-14th October; in point of fact, no U.S. surface forces were present on this occasion.

¹ Radar.

APPENDIX G
CHRONOLOGY

DATE	EVENT	REMARKS	FORCES ENGAGED		NAVAL AND AIR LOSSES	
			ALLIED	JAPANESE	ALLIED	JAPANESE
7th Aug.	U.S. Landing at Tulagi and Guadalcanal	Japanese surprised. First objectives captured	Expeditionary Force (Vice-Adl. F. J. Fletcher, U.S.N.): (1) AMPHIBIOUS FORCE (Rear-Adl. R. K. Turner, U.S.N.): 6 8-in. cruisers 2 light cruisers 15 destroyers 5 minesweepers 22 transports, etc., (carrying about 15,000 marines under Maj.-Gen. Vandergrift)			
7th-8th Aug.	Japanese air attacks on transports. U.S. marines occupy airfield (Henderson's Field) at Guadalcanal		(2) AIR SUPPORT FORCE (Rear-Adl. Noyes, U.S.N.): 3 carriers (<i>Wasp</i> , <i>Saratoga</i> , <i>Enterprise</i>) 1 battleship (<i>North Carolina</i>) 5 8-in. cruisers 1 light cruiser 15 destroyers			Sunk : 1 transport Damaged : 3 destroyers

APPENDIX G (contd.)

DATE	EVENT	REMARKS	FORCES ENGAGED		NAVAL AND AIR LOSSES	
			ALLIED	JAPANESE	ALLIED	JAPANESE
9th Aug.	Battle of Savo	0145/9. Night surprise attack by Japanese surface craft	5 8-in. cruisers 6 destroyers	5 7.87-in. cruisers 2 5.5-in. cruisers 1 destroyer	Sunk : 4 8-in. cruisers— H.M.A.S. <i>Canberra</i> U.S.S. <i>Vincennes</i> U.S.S. <i>Quincy</i> U.S.S. <i>Astoria</i> Damaged : 1 8-in. cruiser— U.S.S. <i>Chicago</i> 2 destroyers	Damaged : 2 7.87-in. cruisers— <i>Chokai</i> <i>Aoba</i>
106 20th Aug.	First Japanese attempt at recapture starts	<i>PLAN :</i> Neutralise Henderson's Field by carrier-borne air attack; run in heavily escorted convoy	—	—	—	—
23rd-25th Aug.	Battle of Eastern Solomons	Long-range carrier-borne aircraft action. Enemy lose almost entire air striking force; convoy retires	Task Force 61 (Vice-Adl. Fletcher): 2 carriers (<i>Saratoga</i> , <i>Enterprise</i>) 1 battleship (<i>North Carolina</i>) 4 8-in. cruisers 2 light cruisers 11 destroyers, plus 101 land-based aircraft	3 Carriers— (<i>Zuikaku</i> , <i>Shokaku</i> , <i>Ryujo</i>) 1 Seaplane carrier 2 battleships (<i>Hiyei</i> , <i>Kirishima</i>) 4 7.87-in. cruisers 2 light cruisers 21 destroyers 160 land based aircraft	Damaged : <i>Enterprise</i> Air : 11 pilots lost	Sunk : <i>Ryujo</i> <i>Chitose</i> Air : 90 aircraft destroyed

APPENDICES

31st Aug. to 15th Sept.	Japanese submarine offensive against Allied lines of communication	Small scale reinforcements to Guadalcanal by both sides. American carrier forces covering convoy route suffer serious losses	Carrier Task Forces	—	31st Aug. <i>Saratoga</i> torpedoed, to Pearl Harbour 15th Sept. <i>Wasp</i> torpedoed, sunk; 1 destroyer torpedoed, lost on passage. <i>North Carolina</i> torpedoed; to Pearl Harbour
107 15th-18th Sept.	Second Japanese attempt at recapture	<i>PLAN :</i> To capture Henderson's Field by land forces built up by infiltration. Escorted convoy ready at sea. Land attack defeated by U.S. marines. Convoy withdrew	—	—	—
18th Sept.	American troops in Guadalcanal strongly reinforced	All available troops in S.W. Pacific, with stores, landed during 17th-18th Sept.	—	—	—
5th Oct.	U.S.S. <i>Hornet</i> aircraft attack shipping in Buin-Faisi area	Torpedo attack on Japanese advance base in Shortland Islands, where shipping was assembling for third attempt on Guadalcanal	Task Force 17 (<i>Hornet</i>) and escort	—	—

APPENDICES

APPENDIX G (contd.)

DATE	EVENT	REMARKS	FORCES ENGAGED		NAVAL AND AIR LOSSES	
			ALLIED	JAPANESE	ALLIED	JAPANESE
11th-12th Oct.	Battle of Cape Esperance	Newly formed U.S. Striking Force intercepted convoy attempting to land reinforcements by running transports ashore in Japanese held part of Guadalcanal	Task Force 64.2 (Rear-Adl. N. Scott): 2 8-in cruisers— <i>San Francisco</i> (flag) <i>Salt Lake City</i> 2 light cruisers— <i>Helena, Boise</i> 5 destroyers	3 7.87-in. cruisers— <i>Aoba, Furutaka, Kinugasa</i> 2 destroyers	Sunk : 1 destroyer Damaged : <i>Salt Lake City</i> <i>Boise</i> 1 destroyer	Sunk : <i>Furutaka</i> 1 destroyer Damaged : <i>Aoba, Kinugasa</i>
14th Oct.	Japanese battleships bombarded Henderson's Field	Bombardment combined with heavy rain, put airfield out of action temporarily. Strong Japanese reinforcements landed	—	—	—	—
23rd Oct.	Third Japanese attempt at recapture	PLAN : Land offensive to capture Henderson's Field. This was nearly successful, but just failed. Escorted convoy ready at sea	—	—	—	—
26th Oct.	Battle of Santa Cruz	Long-range carrier-borne aircraft action. Americans suffered heavier losses in ships, but again crippled enemy air striking forces, and Japanese convoy withdrew	Task Force 61 (Rear-Adl. Kinkaid): 2 carriers— <i>Hornet, Enterprise</i> 1 battleship— <i>South Dakota</i> 3 8-in. cruisers 3 light cruisers 14 destroyers	4 carriers— <i>Shokaku, Zuikaku, Zuiho, Junyo</i> 4 battleships— <i>Hiyei, Kirishima, Kongo, Haruna</i> 8 7.87-in. cruisers 27 destroyers	Sunk : <i>Hornet</i> 1 destroyer Damaged : <i>Enterprise</i> <i>South Dakota</i> Light cruiser— <i>San Juan</i> 1 destroyer Air : 74 carrier planes lost	Damaged : <i>Shokaku, Zuiho, Chikuma</i> 2 destroyers Air : 100 aircraft destroyed
12th Nov.	Fourth Japanese attempt at recapture	PLAN : To neutralise Henderson's Field by battleship bombardment, and then bring in heavily escorted convoy	—	—	—	—
11th-12th Nov.	The Americans landed strong reinforcements					
12th-15th Nov.	Battle of Guadalcanal	Three phases: (1) Night 12th-13th. Attack by U.S.A. cruiser force on bombarding force, which included battleships	Task Force 67.4 (Rear-Adl. Callaghan): 2 8-in cruisers— <i>San Francisco, Portland</i> 3 light cruisers— <i>Atlanta, Helena, Juneau</i> 8 destroyers	2 battleships— <i>Hiyei, Kirishima</i> 1 light cruiser— <i>Nagava</i> 11 destroyers	Sunk : <i>Atlanta, Juneau</i> 4 destroyers Badly damaged : <i>San Francisco</i> <i>Portland</i> 2 destroyers Damaged : <i>Helena</i> 1 destroyer	Sunk : 2 destroyers Badly damaged : <i>Hiyei</i> Damaged : 4 destroyers

APPENDIX G (contd.)

DATE	EVENT	REMARKS	FORCES ENGAGED		NAVAL AND AIR LOSSES	
			ALLIED	JAPANESE	ALLIED	JAPANESE
110		(2) Air attacks on Japanese convoy and cruisers inflicted serious losses on 14th Nov.	Shore-based and <i>Enterprise</i> aircraft		—	Sunk : <i>Hiyei, Kinugasa</i> 6 transports
		(3) Night 14th-15th. Night action between 2 U.S.A. battleships and strong enemy forces Net result : Enemy so heavily defeated that he gave up hope of recapturing Guadalcanal, and confined himself to actions to delay his final expulsion	Task Force 64 (Rear-Adl. Lee) : 2 battleships— <i>Washington, South Dakota</i> 4 destroyers	1 battleship— <i>Kirishima</i> 2 7.87-in. cruisers— <i>Atago, Takao</i> 2 light cruisers— <i>Nagara, Sendai</i> 9 destroyers	Sunk : 3 destroyers Damaged : <i>South Dakota</i>	Sunk : <i>Kirishima</i> 1 destroyer Damaged : <i>Atago, Takao</i>
30th Nov.	Battle of Lunga Point	On 30th Nov. the Japanese recommenced running in reinforcements in destroyers. About 8 of these were driven off by an American Cruiser Force, which, however, suffered heavy losses from torpedo fire	Task Force 67 (Rear-Adl. Wright): 5 8-in. cruisers— <i>Minneapolis</i> (Flag), <i>New Orleans, Pensacola, Honolulu, Northampton</i> 6 destroyers	8 destroyers	Sunk : <i>Northampton</i> Seriously damaged : <i>Minneapolis, New Orleans, Pensacola</i>	Sunk : 1 destroyer Slightly damaged : 1 destroyer
December 1942	American army replace marines in Guadalcanal	Japanese supplied their troops by high-speed ships at night. The U.S.A. army took over from the marines, and prepared for a major offensive to clear the island	—	—	—	—
111	January 1943	American land offensive in Guadalcanal	Japanese gradually confined to smaller portion of island	—	—	—
5th Jan.	Bombardment of Munda	—	Part of Task Force 67 3 6-in. cruisers— <i>Nashville, St. Louis, Helena</i> 2 destroyers	—	—	—
24th Jan.	Bombardment of Kolombangara	—	<i>Nashville, Helena</i> 3 destroyers	—	—	—
7th Feb.	Japanese evacuate Guadalcanal	About 20 destroyers under distant cover of battleships and carriers, evacuated remnant of army	—	—	—	—

APPENDICES

APPENDICES

INDEX

NOTE : Names of ships and individuals which occur in the narrative are included in this index : Names of ships and individuals which appear in Appendices only are **not** included.

Numbers refer to Sections

- Aaron Ward*, U.S. destroyer, damaged, 28(i).
- Achilles*, H.M.N.Z.S. ; 31 (note) ; damaged by air attack, 32 (and note).
- Ainsworth, Rear-Admiral W.L., U.S.N. ; Flag in *Nashville*, Commander, Task Force 67 ; 31 ; 32 ; 33.
- Air attacks ; at Battle of Eastern Solomons, 14, at Battle of Santa Cruz, 24 ;
ALLIED ATTACKS on Rabaul 20, 21, 23, on Shortland Islands, 21, on *Hiyei*, cruisers and transports, 28, on Kolombangara, 32 ;
JAPANESE ATTACKS on Squadron X, 4, 5, on Henderson's Field, 14, 20, 27, on U.S. line of communications, 20, 23, on convoy, 11 Nov., 27, on *De Haven*, 31, on *Achilles*, 32, on *Chicago*, 33 ;
DIVE BOMBING, American, 11, 14, 21, 24, 25, 28, 32 ; Japanese, 14, 24, 32.
HIGH LEVEL BOMBING, Japanese, 14, 23, 24, 27.
TORPEDO, American, 14, 24, 28 ; Japanese, 14, 24.
FIGHTERS, American, 14, 23, 24, 32 ; Japanese, 14, 24.
- Aircraft, ALLIED ; at landings, 7th Aug., 2, 4, failure of patrols, 5 (note) ; 12 ; 13 ; at Battle of Eastern Solomons, 14 ; 15 ; raid on Shortlands, 21 ; at Battle of C. Esperance, 22 ; enemy bombardment inflicts heavy losses, 23 ; at Battle of Santa Cruz, 24 ; heavily damage enemy at Battle of Guadalcanal, 28 (ii) ; failure to illuminate at Battle of Lunga, 30 (note) ; attack Kolombangara 32 ; 34.
JAPANESE, 4 ; attack Squadron X, 4, 5, locate Savo patrol, 6 ; 7 ; 8 ; 9 ; 11 ; at Battle of Eastern Solomons, 14, at Battle of Santa Cruz, 24 ; heavy losses, 14, 23, 24.
- Airfields,
ALLIED ; in S. Pacific, 12, developed by U.S.A., 25 ;
JAPANESE, in Solomons Area, 1 ; at Kukum, Guadalcanal, 2, captured by Americans 4 (and note), completed and used by Americans (Henderson's Field), 11, attacked by Japanese, 14, 20, 23, 28, importance, 34 ; at Munda, 29, bombarded by Americans, 32.
- Air Losses and damage ; American and Japanese, at Battle of Eastern Solomons, 14, and Battle of Santa Cruz, 24 ; App. G.
- Air Reconnaissance ; ALLIED, 5 (note), 14, 22, 24 ; JAPANESE, 6, 14, 20, 24, 32.
- Air Support Force ; Operation " Watchtower," composition and function, 2 ; aircraft support landings, 4 ; decision to withdraw, 5 ; Apps. A and C.
- Akatsuki*, Japanese destroyer, 22 ; sunk, 28 (i).
- Akikaze*, Japanese destroyer, 11 (note) ; damaged, 24.
- Alchiba*, U.S. transport, 20 (note).
- Amphibious Force, Operation " Watchtower " ; composition and functions, 2 ; passage to Solomons, 3 ; at landings, 4, 5 ; decision to withdraw, 7 ; withdrawal, 10 ; Apps. A and C.
- Anderson*, U.S. destroyer, sinks *Hornet*, 24.
- Anti-aircraft Fire ; AMERICAN, 14, 23 (note), 24, 25, 27. JAPANESE, 32.
- Aoba*, Japanese cruiser, 6 ; damaged at Battle of Savo, 9 ; Flag, Rear-Admiral Goto and damage, Battle of C. Esperance, 22.
- Aola Bay, Guadalcanal, U.S. landing, 25.
- Aquitania*, S.S., escorted by *Achilles*, 32 (note).
- Argonaut*, U.S. Submarine, Raid on Makin, 12 (note).
- Arizona Maru*, Japanese transport, sunk, 28 (ii) (note).
- Asagiri*, Japanese destroyer, sunk, 15.
- Assault landings, Operation " Watchtower," 4 ; Landing craft, App. C (2).
- Astoria*, U.S. Cruiser, 2 ; 3 ; 5 ; at Guadalcanal landing, 4, 7 ; Sunk, Battle of Savo, 8.

INDEX

- Atago*, Japanese cruiser, 24 ; flag, Vice-Admiral Kondo at Battle of Guadalcanal 14/15 Nov., 28 (iii).
- Atlanta*, U.S. A/A cruiser, 12, 14 ; bombards at Guadalcanal, 25 ; Flag, Rear-Admiral Scott, 26 ; damaged at Battle of Guadalcanal and sinks, 28.
- Australia*, H.M.A.S. ; Flag, Rear-Admiral Crutchley, V.C., 2 ; leads Squadron X, 3 ; 5 ; Movements, 8th-9th Aug., 7, 10 ; 12 ; 14 ; proceeds to Australia, 16 (note).
- Ayanami*, Japanese destroyer, 28 (iii).
- Bagley*, U.S. destroyer, 5 ; in Battle of Savo, 8 (and note).
- Barnett*, U.S. transport, 10.
- Barton*, U.S. destroyer, sunk, Battle of Guadalcanal, 28 (i).
- Benham*, U.S. destroyer ; damaged, Battle of Guadalcanal, and sinks, 28 (iii).
- Blue*, U.S. destroyer ; radar patrol off Savo, 5 (and note) ; rescues survivors from *Canberra*, 8 ; evaded by Japanese, 9.
- Boise*, U.S. Cruiser, 20 (note) ; damaged, Battle of C. Esperance, 22.
- Bombardment, naval,
 ALLIED ; at assault landings, Operation " Watchtower," 4, 5 ; 25 ; 31 ; 32.
 JAPANESE, 14, 23, 28.
- Buchanan*, U.S. destroyer, at Tulagi landing, 4, 10 ; at Battle of Cape Esperance, 22.
- Buin*, (Shortland Islands) Japanese advanced base, 21, 29.
- Callaghan, Rear-Admiral, D.J., U.S.N. ; Flag in *San Francisco*, 26, 27 ; in command, night action, 12th/13th Nov., Battle of Guadalcanal, and killed, 28 (i).
- Callahan, Lt.-Com., J.W., U.S.N., C.O., *Ralph Talbot*, night action off Savo, 8.
- Canberra*, H.M.A.S., 2 ; 3 ; 5 ; reported on fire, 7 ; sunk, Battle of Savo, 8 ; damage, App. E (1) ; casualties, App. E (2).
- Canberra Maru*, Japanese transport, sunk, 28 (ii).
- Cape Esperance, (north point, Guadalcanal) ; Battle of, 22 ; Japanese transports beached, 28 ; Japanese submarine destroyed, 31.
- Carroll, Lt.-Com., C.E., U.S.N., C.O. *Helm*, Battle of Savo, 8.
- Casualties, Allied and Japanese Warships, App. E.
- Chester*, U.S. cruiser, sunk by submarine, 23.
- Chicago*, U.S. cruiser, 2 ; 3 ; carries out fighter direction, operation " Watchtower," 4 ; in charge of southern patrol, 5, 7 ; torpedoed, Battle of Savo, 8 ; 10 ; sunk by air torpedo attack, 33.
- Chikuma*, Japanese cruiser, 14 (note) ; damaged, Battle of Santa Cruz, 24 (and note).
- Chitose*, Japanese seaplane carrier, damaged, Battle of Eastern Solomons, 14 (and note).
- Chiyoda*, Japanese seaplane carrier, 25 (and note).
- Chokai*, Japanese cruiser, Flag, C. in C., 8th Fleet, leaves Rabaul, 6 ; at Battle of Savo, and damaged, 8, 9 ; bombards Henderson's Field and damaged by aircraft, 28 (ii).
- Cimarron*, U.S. Tanker, 10.
- Colorado*, U.S. battleship, 33.
- Communications, Operation " Watchtower," Allied failure, 7, 9.
- Coral Sea, effect of Battle of, 1.
- Crescent City*, U.S. Transport, 20 (note).
- Crutchley, Rear-Admiral, V.A.C., V.C., D.S.C. ; Flag in *Australia* ; at Operation " Watchtower," commander screening group and 2nd-in-Command, Amphibious Force, 2, 3, responsible for defence of convoys, 4, 5, remarks on enemy air attack, 5, assumes night disposition 8th Aug., 5, witnesses Battle of Savo, 7, remarks on night action and necessity for training, 9 ; 12 ; joins Vice-Admiral Fletcher's force, 13, and present at Battle of Eastern Solomons, 14 ; proceeds to Australia, 16 (note).
- Curtiss*, U.S.S. Seaplane carrier, 3 (note).
- Cushing*, U.S. destroyer, sunk, Battle of Guadalcanal, 28 (i).

INDEX

- Defence of convoy anchorages, Operation " Watchtower," 4, and weakness against surprise, 9.
- De Haven*, U.S. destroyer ; at bombardment of Kolombangara, 32 ; sunk by air attack off Savo, 33.
- Dewey*, U.S. destroyer, at Guadalcanal landing, 4 ; 10.
- Dive-bombing, *see* Air Attacks.
- Drayton*, U.S. destroyer, at Battle of Lunga Point, 30 (and note).
- Duncan*, U.S. destroyer, at Battle of C. Esperance, 22.
- Eastern Solomons, Battle of, 14.
- Efate, New Hebrides, Allied advanced base, 12.
- Ellet*, U.S. destroyer, at Guadalcanal landing, 4 ; 10.
- Enemy reports, Operation " Watchtower " ; delayed, 5 ; lack of, at Battle of Savo, 7, 8, 9 ; at Battle of Eastern Solomons, 13, 14 ; 17 ; 20 ; Battle of C. Esperance, 22 ; at Battle of Santa Cruz, 24 ; 26 ; 27 ; 28.
- Enterprise*, U.S. Aircraft Carrier, 2, 12 ; Flag, Rear-Admiral Kinkaid, and damaged at Battle of Eastern Solomons 14, and Battle of Santa Cruz, 24 ; 26 ; 27 ; Operations during Battle of Guadalcanal, 28 ; 33.
- Espiritu Santo, New Hebrides, Allied advanced base, 12, 17, 20, 24, 29.
- Expeditionary Force, Operation " Watchtower," composition, 2 ; Apps. A, C.
- Faisi, Shortland Islands, Japanese advanced base, 20, 21, 29.
- Favensholt*, U.S. destroyer, at Battle of C. Esperance, 22.
- Fatigue, of personnel in prolonged operations, 8, 9.
- Fighters, *see* Air attacks.
- Flares, Japanese use of in night action, 7, 8, 9, 23, 24.
- Fletcher, Vice-Admiral F. J., U.S.N. ; Flag in *Saratoga*, Commander, Expeditionary Force, Operation " Watchtower," plan, 2, 4 ; decision to withdraw Support Force, 5 ; in command of Carrier Forces, 12, 13 ; at Battle of Eastern Solomons, 14 ; Movements after the battle, 15, 16.
- Fletcher*, U.S. destroyer ; damaged at Battle of Guadalcanal, 28 (i) ; leads torpedo attack at Battle of Lunga Point, 30 ; at bombardment of Munda, 32.
- Florida Island, Solomons, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7.
- Forces,
 ALLIED NAVAL ; Operation " Watchtower," 2, App. C ; in South Pacific Command, Aug., 1942, 12, Feb., 1943, 33 ; at Battles of Eastern Solomons, 14, C. Esperance, 22, Santa Cruz, 24, Guadalcanal, 28, Lunga Point, 30. App. A.
 JAPANESE NAVAL, at Battles of Savo, 6, 8, Eastern Solomons, 14, C. Esperance, 22, Santa Cruz, 24, Guadalcanal, 28, Lunga Point, 30. App. B.
- Fubuki*, Japanese destroyer, sunk, Battle of C. Esperance, 22 ; 28 (i) note.
- Fuller*, U.S. transport, 10.
- Furutaka*, Japanese cruiser, 6 ; at Battle of Savo, 8, 9 ; sunk at Battle of C. Esperance, 22.
- Gavutu Island, 1, 2 (note) ; landing at, 4 ; captured by Americans, 5.
- George F. Elliott*, U.S. transport, bombed, set on fire and lost, 5.
- Getting, Captain F.E., R.A.N., C.O. *Canberra*, mortally wounded at Battle of Savo, 8 (and note).
- Ghormley, Vice-Admiral R. L., U.S.N. ; Commander, South Pacific Area, in general command of Solomons operations, headquarters at Noumea, 2 (and note) ; plan of operation " Watchtower," 2 ; approves withdrawal of Air Defence Force, 5 ; 12 ; policy, 27th Aug., 15 ; 20 ; superseded by Vice-Admiral Halsey U.S.N., 28 (ii).
- Giffen, Rear-Admiral R. C., U.S.N., Flag in *Wichita*, commander, Task Force 18, 33 (and note).

INDEX

- Good, Rear-Admiral H. H., U.S.N., Flag in *Northampton*, at Battle of Santa Cruz, 24 (note).
- Goto, Rear-Admiral I. J. N., Flag in *Aoba*, killed at Battle of C. Esperance, 22.
- Greenman, Capt. W. N., U.S.N., C.O. *Astoria*, attempts salvage after Battle of Savo, 8.
- Guadalcanal; decision to re-capture, 1; plan of operations, 2; landings and operations 4, 5; 7; situation, 10th Aug., 10, and (note); first Japanese offensive, 11, 14; reinforcements landed by both sides, 15, 17; second Japanese offensive repulsed, and strong U.S. reinforcements, 20; third Japanese offensive, 23, 24; U.S. Marines counter-attack, 25; fourth Japanese offensive, 26; U.S. reinforcement, 27; naval battle of Guadalcanal, 28; U.S. Marines take offensive, 29, and relieved by U.S. Army Units, 29; Operations, Dec., 1942, 31, and Jan., 1943, 33; evacuated by Japanese, 33.
- Gwin*, U.S.S. destroyer, at Battle of Guadalcanal, 28.
- Hagikaze*, Japanese destroyer, 11 (note).
- Halavo, (Florida Island), captured, 4.
- Haleta, (Florida Island), preliminary landing, 4.
- Halsey, Vice-Admiral W. F., U.S.N., succeeds Vice-Admiral Ghormley as Commander, S. Pacific, 28 (ii); 33.
- Haruna*, Japanese battleship, 12 (note); 14; bombards Henderson's Field, 23; at Battle of Santa Cruz, 24.
- Hayataka*, Japanese aircraft carrier, 26.
- Helena*, U.S. A/A cruiser; at Battle of C. Esperance, 22; bombards Koli Point, 25, 26; damaged at Battle of Guadalcanal, 28 (i); bombards Munda and Kolombangara, 32.
- Helm*, U.S. destroyer, 5; with Vincennes group, Battle of Savo, 8 (and note).
- Henderson's Field, Guadalcanal, 11; 13; bombed and bombarded, 14, 23, 28; land assaults, 20, 23; out of action, but retained by U.S., 23; importance of, 1, 11, 34.
- Heneberger, Lt.-Com. H. B., U.S.N., Senior surviving officer, *Quincy*, report of Battle of Savo, 8.
- Henley*, U.S. destroyer, reinforces minesweepers bombarding Gavutu, 4.
- Hirokawa Maru*, Japanese transport, damaged, 28 (ii).
- Hitaka*, Japanese aircraft carrier, 26.
- Hiyei*, Japanese battleship, 12 (note); 14; at Battle of Santa Cruz, 24; 27; damaged at Battle of Guadalcanal, 28 (i), and scuttled, 28 (ii).
- Hobart*, H.M.A.S., 2; 3; 4; 5; 10; 12; 14; 16 (note).
- Holden, Com. A. D., R.N.Z.N.R., S.O., 25th M/S Flotilla, 33 (note).
- Honolulu*, U.S. cruiser, Flag, Rear-Admiral Tisdale at Battle of Lunga Point, 30.
- Hopkins*, U.S. destroyer, tows damaged *Astoria*, 8.
- Hornet*, U.S. aircraft carrier, Flag, Rear-Admiral Murray; leaves Pearl Harbour, 12; joins Vice-Admiral Fletcher, 16; attacked by submarine, 17, 18; air raid on Shortlands bases, 21; sunk, Battle of Santa Cruz, 24; damage, 24, App. E (3).
- Hull*, U.S. destroyer, at Guadalcanal landing, 4; 10.
- I-class submarines, Japanese, ordered to Guadalcanal, 6; 14; 16; 17; 18; 19; 23 (note); 24; 33.
- Identification, of Japanese ships by *Quincy*, 8, 9; by *Bagley*, 9 (note); by *Patterson*, 8, 9 (note).
- Indiana*, U.S. battleship, 33.
- Isokaze*, Japanese destroyer, 14 (note).
- Izuzu*, Japanese cruiser, 24 (note); bombed and damaged, Battle of Guadalcanal, 28 (ii).
- Japanese, Air attacks, 4, 5, 14, 23, 24, 27, 31, 32, 33; Airfields, 1, 29, 32, 34; air losses, 14, 24, 27; bases, plan 2, 2A; counter measures to operation "Watchtower," 6;

INDEX

- efficiency, 9 (and note), 30; evacuation of Guadalcanal, 33; importance attached to Guadalcanal, 28 (note); naval Commanders-in-Chief, 15 (note); naval losses and damage, 9, 14, 21, 22, 24, 25, 28, 33; naval forces employed, 6, 8, 11, 14, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30; reinforcements, 11, 15, 21, 22, 23, 25, 28, 30; strategy, 1; submarine activities, 6, 16, 17, 18, 19, 23 (note), 24, 33; tactics, (night) 9, 30; torpedo efficiency, 30.
- Jarvis*, U.S. destroyer, torpedoed by aircraft, 5 (and note); lost at sea, 8 (note).
- Jintsu*, Japanese cruiser, flag Rear-Admiral Tanaka, Occupation Force, Battle of Eastern Solomons, 11, 14 (and note).
- Juneau*, U.S. A/A cruiser, 21 (note); at Battle of Santa Cruz, 24; 26; damaged, Battle of Guadalcanal, and subsequently sunk by submarine, 28.
- Junyo*, Japanese aircraft carrier, at Battle of Santa Cruz, 24 (and note).
- Kagero*, Japanese destroyer, 14 (note); 29 (note).
- Kako*, Japanese cruiser, 6; at Battle of Savo, 8; 9; sunk by U.S. submarine, 10.
- Kawakaze*, Japanese destroyer, 11 (note); 14 (note); 29 (note).
- Kijima, Capt., K., I.J.N., Chief of Staff to Rear-Admiral Goto, Battle of C. Esperance, 22 (note).
- King, Fleet-Admiral E., Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy; requests diversion by Eastern Fleet, 3 (note); approves Rear-Admiral Turner's decision to withdraw, 7 (note).
- Kinkaid, Rear-Admiral T. C., U.S.N.; Flag in *Enterprise*, 2; commands Task Force 16 at Battle of Eastern Solomons, 13, 14; in Command of U.S. Forces at Battle of Santa Cruz, 24; 26; 27; Commands Carrier Force, Battle of Guadalcanal, 28 (ii); 29.
- Kinryo Maru*, Japanese transport, sunk, 14.
- Kinugasa*, Japanese cruiser, 6; at Battle of Savo, 8; 9; at Battle of C. Esperance, 22; bombed and sunk, 28 (ii).
- Kinugawa Maru*, Japanese transport, damaged, 28 (ii) (note).
- Kirishima*, Japanese battleship, 12 (note); 14; 24 (and note); 27; at Battle of Guadalcanal, 28 (i) and sunk, 28 (iii).
- Kiwi*, H.M.N.Z. Trawler, sinks Japanese submarine, 33 (and note).
- Koli Point, Guadalcanal, Japanese reinforcements landed, 3rd, Nov., 25.
- Kolombangara Island, Central Solomons, Japanese installations bombarded, 32.
- Kondo, Vice-Admiral N., I.J.N., C.-in-C., 2nd Fleet, Flag in *Atago*, 24.
- Kongo*, Japanese battleship, 12 (note); 14; bombards Henderson's Field, 23; 24.
- Koro Island, Fiji, rehearsals, operation "Watchtower," 3.
- Kukum, Guadalcanal, bombarded, 4; airfield (Henderson's) captured, 4; 5; 11; U.S. reinforcements landed, 20, and bombarded by Japanese, 20.
- Kumagawa Maru*, Japanese transport, sunk, 28 (ii) (note).
- Kumano*, Japanese cruiser, 14 (note); 24 (and note).
- Kurashio*, Japanese destroyer, 29 (note).
- Kurita, Vice-Admiral, I.J.N., Flag in *Kongo*, Battle of Santa Cruz, 24.
- Laffey*, U.S. destroyer, at Battle of C. Esperance, 22; sunk at Battle of Guadalcanal, 28 (i).
- Lamson*, U.S. destroyer, at Battle of Lunga Point, 30.
- Landing craft, U.S. Marine Corps, App. C (2).
- Lardner*, U.S. destroyer, at Battle of Lunga Point, 30.
- Leander*, H.M.N.Z.S., 20 (note); 32 (note).
- Leary, Vice-Admiral H. F., U.S.N., Flag in *New Mexico*, 33.
- Lee, Rear-Admiral W. A., Jr., U.S.N.; Commander, Task Force 64, Flag in Washington 24; in command night action 14th-15th Nov., Battle of Guadalcanal, 28 (iii); Commander, Task Force 64, 33.
- Lengo Channel, 1; swept for mines, 4; patrol, 5; Amphibious Force leaves by, 10.

- Losses, see Naval losses etc.
- Lunga Point, Guadalcanal, 1 ; Allied landings, 2, 4 ; 25 ; 27 ; 28 ; Battle of Lunga Point, 30.
- MacArthur, General D., U.S.A., C-in-C., S.W. Pacific, 2 (and note).
- Macdonough, U.S. destroyer, sights submarine attacking *Saratoga*, 16 ; bombards at Guadalcanal, 20.
- Macfarland, U.S. destroyer, 3 (note).
- Mackinac, U.S. seaplane carrier, 3.
- Makanami, Japanese destroyer, 29 (note).
- Makin, Gilbert Islands, raided by U.S. Marines, 11 (and note).
- Maramasike Sound, (Malaita,) U.S. air patrols established, 3 ; 14.
- Maryland, U.S. battleship, 33.
- Matai, H.M.N.Z.S., S.O., 25th M/S Flotilla, 33 (note).
- Matanikau River, Guadalcanal, attacked by Japanese, 23, by U.S. Marines, 25.
- Maurry, U.S. destroyer, at Battle of Lunga Point, 30.
- Mayo, Japanese cruiser, 24 ; bombed and damaged, 28 (ii).
- McCain, Rear-Admiral J. S., U.S.N., in command of shore based aircraft, 2 ; 5.
- McCalla, U.S. destroyer, at Battle of C. Esperance, 22.
- McCawley, U.S. transport ; Flag, Rear-Admiral Turner, Commander of Amphibious Force, Operation " Watchtower," 2, 5, 6, 7, 10 ; reinforcements to Guadalcanal, 26.
- Meade, U.S. destroyer, destroys enemy transports, 28 (iii).
- Meredith, U.S. auxiliary, sunk by aircraft, 23.
- Merrill, Rear Admiral A. S., U.S.N., Flag in *Montpelier*, 33 (note).
- Michishio, Japanese destroyer, damage, air attack, 28 (ii).
- Midway Island, effect of battle (June), 1.
- Mikawa, Vice-Admiral Gunichi, I.J.N., C-in-C. 8th Fleet, 6 ; at Battle of Savo, 9.
- Minesweepers, Operation " Watchtower," 2, 3, at landings, 4 ; New Zealand, at Guadalcanal, 33 (note).
- Minneapolis, U.S. Cruiser, 12 ; 14 ; tows torpedoed *Saratoga*, 7 ; 20 ; Flag, Rear-Admiral Wright and torpedoed, Battle of Lunga Point, 30.
- Mississippi, U.S. battleship, 33.
- Moa, H.M.N.Z. Trawler, sinks Japanese submarine and landing barges, 33 (and note).
- Mochizaka, Japanese destroyer, 25 (note).
- Monssen, U.S. destroyer, at Tulagi landing, 4 ; 10 ; bombards at Guadalcanal, 20 ; sunk, Battle of Guadalcanal, 28 (i).
- Montpelier, U.S. cruiser, Flag, Rear-Admiral Merrill, 33.
- Moore, Capt., S. N., U.S.N., C.O., *Quincy*, killed, Battle of Savo, 8.
- Motor torpedo boats, U.S., based on Tulagi, 25 (and note) ; attack Japanese bombarding force, 28, and Japanese reinforcements, 31.
- Mugford, U.S. destroyer, damaged by bomb, 4 ; rescues survivors after Battle of Savo, 8 ; 10.
- Munda, New Georgia, Japanese construct airfield, 29, 31 ; bombarded by U.S. Forces, 32.
- Murakumo, Japanese destroyer, at Battle of C. Esperance, 22.
- Murasame, Japanese destroyer, at Battle of Guadalcanal, 28 (i).
- Murray, Rear-Admiral G. D., U.S.N. ; Flag in *Hornet*, joins Vice-Admiral Fletcher, 16 ; movements, 31st Aug.-15th Sept., 17 ; directs air raid on Shortlands bases, 21 ; orders destruction of damaged *Hornet*, 24.
- Mustin, U.S. destroyer, sights torpedo attack on *North Carolina*, 19 ; sinks *Hornet*, 24.
- Mutzuki, Japanese destroyer, sunk, 14.
- Myoko, Japanese cruiser, 24 (note).


- Nachi*, Japanese cruiser, reported bombed, 21.
- Naganami*, Japanese destroyer, 29 (note), Flag, Rear-Admiral Tanaka, Battle of Lunga Point, 30.
- Nagara*, Japanese cruiser, 14 (note) ; 24 (note) ; 27 ; at Battle of Guadalcanal, 28 (i), (iii).
- Nagara Maru*, Japanese transport, sunk, 28 (ii) (note).
- Nagumo, Vice-Admiral C., I.J.N., C-in-C. 3rd Fleet, and in command of all Naval Forces, Battle of Santa Cruz, 23, 24, (and note).
- Nashville*, U.S. cruiser, bombards Munda and Kolombangara, 32.
- Natsugumo*, Japanese destroyer, 22.
- Narwhal*, U.S. submarine, raid on Makin, 12 (note).
- Navajo*, U.S. tug, tows damaged *Chicago*, 33.
- Naval Forces, Allied in South Pacific, August, 1942, 12, February, 1943, 33 ; estimated Japanese, 17th August, 12.
- Naval Losses and damage.
- ALLIED :—At Battles of Savo, 8, Eastern Solomons, 14, C. Esperance, 22, Santa Cruz, 24, Guadalcanal, 28, Lunga Point, 30 ; 32 ; by submarine attack, 16, 18, 19, 23, 24 ; Apps. E, E (1), E (2), E (3).
- JAPANESE :—At Battles of Savo, 8, Eastern Solomons, 14, C. Esperance, 22, Santa Cruz, 24, Guadalcanal, 28, Lunga Point, 30 ; by submarine attack, 10, 25 ; by air attack on Shortland area, 21, and Rabaul, 23 (note) ; App. E.
- Ndeni, (Santa Cruz Islands) to be occupied, 2 ; patrol aircraft arrive, 3 ; occupation postponed, 5.
- New Mexico*, U.S. battleship, Flag, Vice-Admiral Leary, 33.
- New Orleans*, U.S. cruiser, 12 ; 14 ; torpedoed, Battle of Lunga Point, 21.
- Nicholas*, U.S. destroyer, sinks submarine, 33 ; at bombardment of Kolombangara, 32.
- Night action ; Battle of Savo, 7, 8, 9, effect of, 10 ; Battles of C. Esperance, 22, Guadalcanal, 28 (i) (iii), Lunga Point, 30 ; difficulty of assessing damage to enemy, 1 (note), 22 (note), 28 (i) (notes), 28 (iii) (notes), 30 (note) ; difficulty of identification of forces, 9 (note), 22 (note), 28 (i).
- Night dispositions, Allied, Operation " Watchtower," 4, 5, 8.
- Nimitz, Admiral C. W., U.S.N., Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet ; Headquarters Pearl Harbour, 2 (note) ; defines prime objectives, 13 ; remarks on Battles of Guadalcanal, 28 (i) (iii) and Lunga Point, 30, on bombardment damage to airfields, 32.
- Northampton*, U.S. cruiser, 16 ; 21 (note) ; tows damaged *Hornet*, Battle of Santa Cruz, 24 ; 26 ; torpedoed and sunk, Battle of Lunga, 30.
- North Carolina*, U.S. battleship, 12 ; attacked by aircraft, Battle of Eastern Solomons, 14, by submarine, 17 ; torpedoed, 19.
- Noumea, (New Caledonia), Headquarters, Commander, South Pacific, 2 ; 17 ; 19 ; 21 ; 27 ; 29.
- Noyes, Rear-Admiral L., U.S.N. ; Flag in *Wasp*, Commander of Air Support Force, Operation " Watchtower," 2 ; 13 ; joins Rear Admiral Murray, 11th Sept., 17.
- Nugu Island, Sealark Channel, 33 (note) ; Nugu Point, west coast, Guadalcanal, U.S. landing, 33.
- O'Bannon*, U.S. destroyer, damaged, Battle of Guadalcanal, 28 (i) ; operations off Guadalcanal, 31 ; at bombardments of Munda and Kolombangara, 32.
- O'Brien*, U.S. destroyer, torpedoed by submarines and lost, 19.
- Object of Operation " Watchtower," 1, 2.
- Operation " Watchtower," code name, Allied landings in Southern Solomons, 7th August, 1942, 1.
- Oyashio*, Japanese destroyer, 29 (note).
- Patch, Major-Gen., U.S. Army, assumes command ashore, Guadalcanal, 31.
- Patterson*, U.S. destroyer, 5 ; with *Chicago* group in Battle of Savo, and rescues *Canberra's* survivors, 8 ; 9 (note).

- Pearl Harbour, Hawaiian Islands, 1 ; 12 ; 16 ; *Saratoga* proceeds to, 17 ; *Enterprise* repaired and departs, 24.
- Pensacola*, U.S. cruiser, 16 ; 21 (note) ; at Battle of Santa Cruz, 24 (and note) ; 26 ; torpedoed at Battle of Lunga Point, 30.
- Perkins*, U.S. destroyer, at Battle of Lunga Point, 30.
- Phantom contacts, 28 (note), 30 (note) ; App. F.
- Phoenix*, U.S. Cruiser, 12 ; proceeds to Australia, 16 (note).
- Plan of operations, Operation " Watchtower," 2.
- Porter*, U.S. destroyer, torpedoed by submarine and sunk, 24.
- Portland*, U.S. cruiser, 12 ; 14 ; 26 ; damaged, Battle of Guadalcanal, 28.
- President Adams*, U.S. transport, 20 (note).
- President Hayes*, U.S. transport, 20 (note).
- President Jackson*, U.S. transport, 20 (note).
- Preston*, U.S. destroyer, sunk, Battle of Guadalcanal, 28 (iii).
- Price, Lt.-Com. W. H., U.S.N., C.O. *Wilson*, Battle of Savo, 8.
- Quincy*, U.S. Cruiser, 2 ; 3 ; at Guadalcanal landings, 4, 7 ; 5 ; sunk, Battle of Savo, 8.
- Rabaul, (New Britain), Japanese base, 1 ; 2 ; 6 ; 7 ; raided by Australian bombers, 20, 23, 29 ; 34.
- Radar ; American superior to Japanese, 34 ; confused at Battle of Eastern Solomons, 14 ; *San Francisco* (flag) lacks equipment at Battles of C. Esperance, 22, and Guadalcanal, 28 (i) ; breakdown in *South Dakota*, 28 (iii) ; at Battle of Lunga Point, 30, and bombardments of Munda and Kolombangara, 32 ; radar patrol, Battle of Savo, 4, 5, failure, 8, 9.
- Radford*, U.S. destroyer, sinks submarine, 33 ; at bombardment of Kolombangara, 32.
- Radio-telephony, danger of interception by enemy, 30 (note).
- Ralph Talbot*, U.S. destroyer, radar patrol off Savo, 5 ; sights aircraft, 8 ; engaged and damaged by Japanese cruiser, 8.
- Ramsey, Rear-Admiral De W. C., U.S.N., Flag in *Saratoga*, Commander Task Force 16, 33.
- Reconnaissance, see Air reconnaissance.
- Reinforcement, of Guadalcanal,
AMERICAN—20, 22, 25, 26, 27, 31 ;
JAPANESE—23, 25, 28.
- Riefkohl, Capt. F. L., U.S.N., C.O. *Vincennes*, 5, and Senior officer, northern patrol, Battle of Savo, 8 (and notes).
- Ryujo*, Japanese carrier, 11 ; sunk at Battle of Eastern Solomons, 14 (and note).
- Sado Maru*, Japanese transport, sunk, 28 (ii).
- St. Louis*, U.S. cruiser, bombards Munda, 32.
- Salt Lake City*, U.S. cruiser, 12 ; 13 ; at Battle of C. Esperance, 22.
- San Diego*, U.S. A/A cruiser, 16 ; 21 (note) ; at Battle of Santa Cruz, 24 ; 26.
- San Francisco*, U.S. cruiser, 12 ; 13 ; Flag, Rear-Admiral Scott at Battle of C. Esperance, 22 ; lacking in radar equipment, 22, 28 (i) ; bombards Koli Point, 25 ; damaged by air attack, 27 (note) ; Flag, Rear-Admiral Callaghan, and seriously damaged, Battle of Guadalcanal, 28 (i).
- San Juan*, U.S. A/A cruiser, Flag Rear-Admiral Scott, operation " Watchtower," leads Squadron Y, 3, and at Tulagi landing 4 ; night patrol, 5, 7 ; 10 ; 12 ; 13 ; damaged at Battle of Santa Cruz, 24 ; 32 (note).
- Santa Cruz Islands, decision to occupy, 2 ; patrol aircraft arrive, 3 ; occupation postponed, 5 ; Battle of, 24.

- Saratoga*, U.S. aircraft carrier ; Flag Vice-Admiral Fletcher, Operation " Watchtower," 2 ; 12 ; 13 ; at Battle of Eastern Solomons, 14 ; torpedoed by submarine, 16, and proceeds to Pearl Harbour, 17 ; 26 (note) ; air attack on Kolombangara, 32 ; 33.
- Savo Island, off Guadalcanal, 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 4 ; Battle of, 7, 8, 9 ; 22 ; 27 ; 28 ; 30 ; 31 ; 34.
- Scott, Rear-Admiral N., U.S.N. ; Flag in *San Juan*, 2 ; leads Squadron Y, 3 ; at assault landings, 4 ; 7 ; 12 ; 13 ; Flag in *San Francisco*, commands U.S. Forces at Battle of C. Esperance, 22 ; Flag in *Allanta*, 26 ; lands reinforcements, 27 ; killed at Battle of Guadalcanal, 28.
- Screening Group, Operation " Watchtower," commanded by Rear-Admiral Crutchley, V.C. composition and functions, 2.
- Selfridge*, U.S. destroyer, Senior Officer, Destroyer Squadron 4, makes landfall, 6th August, 3 ; at Battle of Savo and sinks *Canberra*, 8.
- Sendai*, Japanese light cruiser, 9 (note) ; at Battle of Guadalcanal, 28 (iii).
- Sherman, Rear-Admiral F. C., U.S.N., Flag in *Enterprise*, commander Task Force II, 33.
- Shikinami*, Japanese destroyer, 28 (iii).
- Shirakumo*, Japanese destroyer, damaged, air attack, 15.
- Shokaku*, Japanese aircraft carrier, 11 ; 14 (and note) ; damaged at Battle of Santa Cruz, 24 (and note).
- Sinclair, Lt.-Com. G. A., U.S.N., C.O. *Bagley* at Battle of Savo, 8.
- Smith*, U.S. destroyer, damaged at Battle of Santa Cruz, uses battleship's wash to fight fires, 24 (and note).
- Solomon Islands, strategic importance, 1.
- Somerville, Admiral Sir James, F., K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, stages diversion, 3.
- South Dakota*, U.S. battleship ; damaged at Battle of Santa Cruz, 24 ; 26 ; damaged at Battle of Guadalcanal, 28 (iii).
- South Pacific, general situation, July 1942, 1 ; Area, 2 (note).
- South-West Pacific area, 2 (note).
- Stevett*, U.S. destroyer, bombards Koli Point, 24 ; damaged at Battle of Guadalcanal, 28 (i).
- Strategy, 1.
- Submarines :
AMERICAN, special patrols arranged, Operation " Watchtower," 2 ; torpedo *Kako*, 10 ; concentrated in Bismarck area, 23 ; inflict losses on enemy, 25.
JAPANESE, reported off Tulagi, 4 ; ordered to Guadalcanal, 6 ; 14 ; 15 ; torpedo *Saratoga*, 16 ; attack *Hornet*, 17 ; sink *Wasp*, 18 ; torpedo *North Carolina* and *O'Brien*, 19 ; torpedo *Chester*, 23 ; sink *Porter*, Battle of Santa Cruz, 24 ; 21 ; two sunk, 33.
- Surprise, Allied patrols, 8th/9th Aug., 8, 9 ; Japanese, operation " Watchtower," 4 ; at Battles of C. Esperance, 22, Lunga Point, 30.
- Suzukaze*, Japanese destroyer, 29 (note).
- Suzuya*, Japanese destroyer, 14 (note) ; bombards Henderson's Field, 28 (ii).
- Tactics, Japanese night, 9 ; 22 ; 30.
- Takanami*, Japanese destroyer, 29 ; sunk, Battle of Lunga Point, 30.
- Takao*, Japanese cruiser, 24 ; at Battle of Guadalcanal, 28 (iii).
- Tanaka, Rear-Admiral, I.J.N., Commands Occupation Force, Battle of Eastern Solomons, 11, 13 ; 29 ; commands at Battle of Lunga Point, and remarks on action 30.
- Tanambogo, (off Florida Is.) 2, 4 ; captured 5.
- Tassafaronga, Guadalcanal, attempted Japanese landing, 30.
- Tenryu*, Japanese light cruiser, 6 at Battle of Savo, 9 ; bombards Henderson's Field, 28 (ii) ; sunk by submarine, 31.
- Teruzuki*, Japanese destroyer, damaged 24 ; sunk by M.T.Bs., 31.
- Tisdale, Rear-Admiral M. S., U.S.N., Flag in *Portland*, Battle of Santa Cruz, 24 (note) ; Flag in *Pensacola*, 28 ; Flag in *Honolulu*, second in command at Battle of Lunga Point, 30.


INDEX

- Tone*, Japanese cruiser, 14 (note) ; 24 (note).
- Torpedo attacks, by Aircraft *see* Air attacks ; by submarines, *see* Submarines ; by surface craft, 8 ; 9 ; 28 ; 30.
- Tui*, H.M.N.Z. trawler, sinks Japanese landing barges, 33 (and note).
- Turner, Rear-Admiral R. K., U.S.N., Flag in *McCawley*, Commander of Amphibious Force, Operation " Watchtower," 2, 3 ; in Air attack, 8th Aug., 5 ; decision to withdraw surface forces, 7 ; cancels withdrawal 10 ; leaves Guadalcanal and arrives Noumea, 10 ; 17 ; lands reinforcements, Guadalcanal 20 ; 25 ; 26 ; lands further reinforcements 11th Nov., 27 ; decision to protect Henderson's Field with cruiser forces, 27 ; commended by C-in-C. Pacific, 28 (i), (iii).
- Uranami*, Japanese destroyer, 28 (iii).
- Vandegrift, Major-Gen. W., U.S. Marine Corps. ; commanding landing forces, operation " Watchtower " ; planning handicapped by time factor, 1 (note) ; 3 ; at conference 7th Aug., 7 ; report on situation, 10th Aug., 10 (note) ; turns over shore command, Guadalcanal, to Maj-Gen. Patch, U.S. Army, 31.
- Vincennes*, U.S. cruiser, 2 ; 3 ; at Guadalcanal landing, 4 ; 5 ; 7 ; sunk, Battle of Savo, 8, 9.
- Visibility, on passage to Solomons, 6th Aug., 3 ; at Battle of Savo, 8.
- Walke*, U.S. destroyer, sunk, Battle of Guadalcanal, 28 (iii).
- Walker, Com., F. R., U.S.N., C.O., *Patterson*, Battle of Savo, 8.
- Walsh, Com., J. A., R.A.N., senior surviving officer, *Canberra*, 8.
- Washington*, U.S. battleship, Flag, Rear-Admiral Lee, 24 ; 26 ; at Battle of Guadalcanal, 28 (iii).
- Wasp*, U.S. aircraft carrier, Flag, Rear-Admiral Noyes, 13 ; 13 ; 14 ; sunk by submarine, 18.
- Weather ; on passage to Solomons, 3 ; at Battles of Savo, 8, Eastern Solomons, 14, C. Esperance, 22, Guadalcanal, 28, Lunga Point, 30 ; during reinforcement of Guadalcanal, 18th Sept., 20 ; carrier borne raid on Shortlands and importance, 21 ; during Japanese land attack, 23rd Oct., 23.
- Wright, Rear-Admiral C. H., U.S.N., Flag *Minneapolis*, 20 (note) ; commands at Battle of Lunga Point, 30.
- " X-ray " Convoy, Operation " Watchtower," 2 ; passage to Guadalcanal, 3 ; at assault landings, 4 ; attacked by aircraft, 4, 5 ; disembarkation of stores, 4, 5, 7, 10 ; leaves Guadalcanal, 10.
- Yamatsuki Maru*, Japanese transport, damaged, 28 (ii).
- Yamaura Maru*, Japanese transport, damaged, 28 (ii).
- " Yoke " Convoy, Operation " Watchtower," 2 ; passage to Tulagi, 3 ; at assault landings, 4 ; engages aircraft, 5 ; disembarkation of stores delayed, 4, 5, 7, 10 ; leaves Tulagi, 10
- ~~YUBARI, Japanese cruiser, 6 at Battle of Savo, 9.~~
- Yudachi*, Japanese destroyer, at Battle of Guadalcanal, 28 (i) ; sunk, 28 (ii).
- Yugiri*, Japanese destroyer, damaged, 15.
- Yukikazi*, Japanese destroyer, bombed and damaged, 28 (ii) (note).
- Yura*, Japanese light cruiser, bombed and sunk, 23.
- Zane*, U.S. destroyer, 20.
- Zetlin*, U.S. auxiliary, bombed, 27.
- Zone times, 3 (note) ; 13 (note) ; 16 (note) ; 17 (note) ; 18 (note) ; 19 (note) ; 24 (note).
- Zuiho*, Japanese aircraft carrier, damaged, 24 (and note) ; 26 (note) ; 27 (note).
- Zuikaku*, Japanese aircraft carrier, 11 ; 14 (and note) ; 24 (and note).



SOUTH PACIFIC AREA
Naval Operations
1st - 13th August, 1942
KEY

- Japanese Forces..... **Blue**
- Allied Forces..... **Red**
- Airfields..... **A**
- Seaplane Anchorages..... **SP**




SOUTH PACIFIC AREA

Naval Operations
GUADALCANAL CAMPAIGN
August, 1942 - February, 1943

KEY

Japanese Forces.....Blue
Allied Forces.....Red
Airfields.....[A]
Seaplane Anchorages.....[SP]

MAKIN **SP**
Raided by
Americans, 17th Aug.






Battle of Savo, 9th Aug., 1942
- C. Espinosa, 11th-12th Oct.
- Guadalcanal, 12th-13th Nov.
- Guadalcanal, 14th-15th Nov.
- Lunga Point, 30th Nov-1st Dec


SOUTH PACIFIC AREA
Naval Operations
GUADALCANAL CAMPAIGN
 August, 1942 - February, 1943

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
Japanese Forces..... **Blue**
 Allied Forces..... **Red**
 Airfields..... **A**
 Seaplane Anchorages..... **SP**

SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA (GEN. MACARTHUR).
SOUTH PACIFIC AREA (ADM. NIMITZ).







Assault Landings
at
Tulagi & Guadalcanal
7th August, 1942.




Assault Landings
at
Tulagi & Guadalcanal
7th August, 1942.





Based on Admiralty Chart 2658



TULAGI ISLAND and Approaches to GAVUTU HARBOUR

Scale of Feet
0 1000 5000

Longitude 160° 10' East from Greenwich

GUADALCANAL AREA

Battle of Savo.
9th August, 1942

THIS PLAN SHOWS THE GENERAL COURSE OF THE ACTION. IT IS BASED ON ALL THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE (AUGUST, 1948), BUT MUCH OF THIS IS CONTRADICTIONARY & IMPOSSIBLE TO RECONCILE.

KEY

ALLIES SHOWN IN RED ; JAPANESE IN BLUE
 APPROXIMATE POSITION OF JAPANESE FORCES AT 0100 :
 " " " " " " " " " " 0215 :
 AREAS OCCUPIED BY AMERICANS (red hatched) ; BY JAPANESE (blue hatched)




GUADALCANAL AREA

Battle of Savo. 9th August, 1942

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KEY

ALLIES SHOWN IN RED	JAPANESE IN BLUE	:
APPROXIMATE POSITION OF AMERICAN FORCES AT 0100	" " " " " " " " 0215	⇄
AREAS OCCUPIED BY AMERICANS	BY JAPANESE	▨



165°

170°E

BATTLE OF THE EASTERN SOLOMONS

23RD-25TH AUGUST, 1942

POSITIONS ARE APPROXIMATE ONLY. ALL TIMES ARE ZONE - 11.

UNITED STATES SHOWN IN RED : JAPANESE SHOWN IN BLUE..

AIRFIELDS..... [A] : SEAPLANE BASES..... [B]

Movements of T.F. 61, (*Saratoga*, *Enterprise*, etc.,
 " " " 18, (*Wasp*),

Movements of Japanese Forces based on information supplied by I.J.N. Staff College.
 Main Body, (*Zuikaku*, *Shokaku*, etc.,
 Advanced Force
 Detached Force, (*Ryujo*, *Tone*, 2 destr.).....

Enemy Reports received by U.S. Forces, (see Legend)..... ○

Air attacks on Japanese ships ○ on U.S. ships ○

Air Striking Forces, (Reconnaissance not shown) ↗ ↘


Japanese Submarines..... ⚓

Legend

AP = Transport : BB = Battleship : CA = Heavy Cruiser ..
 CL = Light Cruiser : CV = Carrier : DD = Destroyer....

- A 1010/23. 4 AP, 2 CA, 3 DD, Co. 190°, Speed 17.
- B 1300/23. PBV reports transport group alters co., to N.W.
- C 0905/24. 1 CV (*Ryujo*), 2 CA, 1 DD, Co. 180°.
- D 1221/24. 3 CL, 2 DD, 3 AP, Co. 180°, Speed 14.
- E 1410/24. 1 CV (*Ryujo*), 2 CA, 3 DD, Co. 270°, Speed 20.
- F 1430/24. 2 CV (*Shokaku*, *Zuikaku*), 4 CA, 6 CL, 8 DD, Co. 120°, Speed 25.
- G 1440/24. 3 CA, 3-5 DD, other ships, Co. 180°, Speed 20.
- H 1550/24. *Ryujo*, 1 CA or CL, 3 DD attacked by *Saratoga's* Striking Force
- J 1735/24. *Saratoga's* A/c attack 4 CA, 6 CL, 6-8 DD, Co. 150°
- K 1735/24. 2 A/c from *Saratoga* hit BB
- L 1 CV, 3 CA, 2 DD.
- M 1810/24. B17's hit small CV.
- N 1815/24. B17's report *Ryujo* dead in water.
- O 2050/24. Unidentified vessels in rain.
- P 2105/24. 1 CV, 6 other vessels, Co. 190°, Speed 25.
- Q 2130/24. 5 vessels, Co. 140°, Speed 20, more to north.
- R 0125/25. CV group, 7 vessels, Co. 160°, Speed 15.

- S 0530/25. Unidentified vessels
- T 0755/25. A/c from Guadalcanal attack 4 AP, 1 CA, CL & DD.
- U 0850/25. 4 CA, 2 CL, Co. 020°, Speed 18. 2 CA, Co. 340°
- V 0935/25. 1 CL, Co. 000°, Speed 15.
- W 0945/25. B17's from Espiritu Santo hit CL or DD
- X 1045/25. 7 DD, 2 CL, 1 AP, Co. 010, Sp. 15.
- Y 1105/25. 1 BB, 5 CA, 1 DD, Co. 338, Sp. 25.
- Z 1024/26. Carriers



0/25
 125
 2400/25
 ①

0/24

0745/23

1645/24 *Enterprise* bombad
 0630/24

0200/24

0730/25


00/23

03/27

0920/25, Sunk.

1145/25, sink by destroyers
 1130/24, Fuelling

0750/21 TASK FORCE 61



165°

170°E

5°S

10°S

15°S

155°E 160° 165° 170°E

BATTLE OF THE EASTERN SOLOMONS

23RD-25TH AUGUST, 1942

POSITIONS ARE APPROXIMATE ONLY. ALL TIMES ARE ZONE -11.

UNITED STATES SHOWN IN RED; JAPANESE SHOWN IN BLUE.
 AIRFIELDS..... [A]: SEAPLANE BASES..... [S.P.]
 Movements of T.F.61, (Saratoga, Enterprise, etc.),
 " " " 18, (Wasp),

Movements of Japanese Forces based on information supplied by I.J.N. Staff College.
 Main Body, (Zuikaku, Shokaku, etc.).....
 Advanced Force.....
 Detached Force, (Ryujo, Tone, 2 destr.).....


Enemy Reports received by U.S. Forces, (see Legend).....
 Air attacks on Japanese ships ○ on U.S. ships.....
 Air Striking Forces, (Reconnaissance not shown) - - - - -
 Japanese Submarines,.....

Legend

AP= Transport; BB= Battleship; CA= Heavy Cruiser...
 CL= Light Cruiser; CV= Carrier; DD= Destroyer....

- A 1010/23. 4 AP, 2 CA, 3 DD, Co. 190°, Speed 17.
- B 1300/23. PBY reports transport group alters co. to N.W.
- C 0905/24. 1 CV (Ryujo), 2 CA, 1 DD, Co. 180°.
- D 1221/24. 3 CL, 2 DD, 3 AP, Co. 180°, Speed 14.
- E 1410/24. 1 CV (Ryujo), 2 CA, 3 DD, Co. 270°, Speed 20.
- F 1430/24. 2 CV (Shokaku, Zuikaku), 4 CA, 6 CL, 8 DD, Co. 120°, Speed 25.
- G 1440/24. 3 CA, 3-5 DD, other ships, Co. 180°, Speed 20.
- H 1550/24. Ryujo, 1 CA or CL, 3 DD attacked by Saratoga's Striking Force
- J 1735/24. Saratoga's A/c attack 4 CA, 6 CL, 6-8 DD, Co. 150°
- K 1735/24. 2 A/c from Saratoga hit BB
- L 1735/24. 1 CV, 3 CA, 2 DD.
- M 1810/24. B17s hit small CV.
- N 1815/24. B17s report Ryujo dead in water.
- O 2050/24. Unidentified vessels in rain.
- P 2105/24. 1 CV, 6 other vessels, Co. 190°, Speed 25.
- Q 2130/24. 5 vessels, Co. 140°, Speed 20, more to north.
- R 0125/25. CV group, 7 vessels, Co. 160°, Speed 15.

- S 0550/25. Unidentified vessels
- T 0755/25. A/c from Guadalcanal attack 4 AP, 1 CA, CL & DD.
- U 0850/25. 4 CA, 2 CL, Co. 020°, Speed 18. 2 CA, Co. 340°
- V 0935/25. 1 CL, Co. 000°, Speed 15.
- W 0945/25. B17s from Espiritu Santo hit CL or DD
- X 1045/25. 7 DD, 2 CL, 1 AP, Co. 010, Sp. 15.
- Y 1105/25. 1 BB, 5 CA, 1 DD, Co. 338, Sp. 25.
- Z 1024/26. Carriers



PLAN 7

BATTLE OF EASTERN SOLOMONS

The times shown in blue against the Japanese track should be amended as follows:—

Main Body

For	Read
0530/23	0800/23
1130/23	1400/23
1555/23	1825/23
0330/24	0600/24
0830/24	1100/24
1130/24	1400/24
1730/24	2000/24
0400/25	0630/25


Advanced Force


1930/24	Stet
0830/25	1100/25

Detached Force

1130/24	1400/24
1530/24	1550/24
0830/25	1100/25

In position 8° 15' S. 163° 15' E. (alteration of advanced force to northward) insert "2400/24".





BATTLE OF THE EASTERN SOLOMONS

23RD - 25TH AUGUST, 1942

POSITIONS ARE APPROXIMATE ONLY. ALL TIMES ARE ZONE - 11.

UNITED STATES SHOWN IN RED; JAPANESE SHOWN IN BLUE...
 AIRFIELDS [A] : SEAPLANE BASES..... [S, P]
 Movements of T.F. 61, (*Saratoga, Enterprise, etc.*, [red line]
 " " " 18, (*Wasp*), [blue line]

Movements of Japanese Forces based on information supplied by I. J. N. Staff College.
 Main Body, (*Zuikaku, Shokaku, etc.*, [blue line]
 Advanced Force [blue line]
 Detached Force, (*Ryujo, Tone, 2 destr.*, [blue line]

Enemy Reports received by U.S. Forces, (see Legend)..... [circle]
 Air attacks on Japanese ships [red circle] on U.S. ships..... [blue circle]
 Air Striking Forces, (Reconnaissance not shown) [red arrow]
 Japanese Submarines, [blue triangle]

Legend

AP = Transport : BB = Battleship : CA = Heavy Cruiser...
 CL = Light Cruiser : CV = Carrier : DD = Destroyer....

- A 1010/23. 4 AP, 2 CA, 3 DD, Co. 190°, Speed 17.
- B 1300/23. PBY reports transport group alters co., to N.W.
- C 0905/24. 1 CV (*Ryujo*), 2 CA, 1 DD, Co. 180°.
- D 1221/24. 3 CL, 2 DD, 3 AP, Co. 180°, Speed 14.
- E 1410/24. 1 CV (*Ryujo*), 2 CA, 3 DD, Co. 270°, Speed 20.
- F 1430/24. 2 CV (*Shokaku, Zuikaku*), 4 CA, 6 CL, 8 DD, Co. 120°, Speed 25.
- G 1440/24. 3 CA, 3-5 DD, other ships, Co. 180°, Speed 20.
- H 1550/24. *Ryujo*, 1 CA or CL, 3 DD attacked by *Saratoga's* Striking Force
- J 1735/24. *Saratoga's* A/c attack 4 CA, 6 CL, 6-8 DD, Co. 150°
- K 1735/24. 2 A/c from *Saratoga* hit BB
- L 1810/24. 1 CV, 3 CA, 2 DD.
- M 1810/24. B17's hit small CV.
- N 1815/24. B17's report *Ryujo* dead in water.
- O 2050/24. Unidentified vessels in rain.
- P 2105/24. 1 CV, 6 other vessels, Co. 190°, Speed 25.
- Q 2130/24. 5 vessels, Co. 140°, Speed 20, more to north.
- R 0125/25. CV group, 7 vessels, Co. 160°, Speed 15.

- SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS
- Ndeni I.
- Utupua I.
- VANIKORO ISLANDS

- S 0550/25. Unidentified vessels
- T 0755/25. A/c from Guadalcanal attack 4 AP, 1 CA, CL & DD.
- U 0850/25. 4 CA, 2 CL, Co. 020°, Speed 18. 2 CA, Co. 340°
- V 0935/25. 1 CL, Co. 000°, Speed 15.
- W 0945/25. B17's from Espiritu Santo hit CL or DD
- X 1045/25. 7 DD, 2 CL, 1 AP, Co. 010°, Sp. 15.
- Y 1105/25. 1 BB, 5 CA, 1 DD, Co. 338, Sp. 25.
- Z 1024/26. Carriers

GUADALCANAL AREA
Naval Operations, October, 1942.
 (INCLUDING BATTLE OF C. ESPÉRANCE.)


All movements and positions are approximate. Times: Zone-11
 Area occupied by Americans... ■
 " " " Japanese... ■
 American movements... ⋯ Red
 Japanese movements... ⋯ Blue




Embarked
 night 13-14 Oct.
 13 Destroyers
 Oct. and by
 5 Oct.

GUADALCANAL AREA
Naval Operations, October, 1942.
(INCLUDING BATTLE OF C. ESPERANCE.)

All movements and positions are approximate. Times: Zone-11
Area occupied by Americans...
" " " Japanese...
American movements... Red
Japanese movements... Blue



Airfield bombed by Battleships, night 13-14 Oct, by Cruisers and Destroyers, nights 14-15, 15-16 Oct, and by day, 25 Oct.



From Adm'lty Chart 1469.

170°E

CRUZ

1942

ONLY. ALL TIMES ARE ZONE-12

D: JAPANESE SHOWN IN BLUE.
SEAPLANE BASES.....SP.....
ces based on information

lege.....

Shokaku,

2030/26
Shokaku, Haruna,

e, (Hiyei,

hips.....○ on U.S. Ships.....○

ewn.....

.....
mated by U.S

58

BATTLE OF SANTA CRUZ

24th-27th OCTOBER, 1942

POSITIONS ARE APPROXIMATE ONLY. ALL TIMES ARE ZONE-12

UNITED STATES SHOWN IN RED; JAPANESE SHOWN IN BLUE.

AIRFIELDS..... [A] SEAPLANE BASES..... [SP]

Movements of Task Force 61..... [Red line]

Movements of Japanese Forces based on information supplied by I.J.N. Staff College..... [Blue line]

Carrier Striking Force, (Shokaku, Zuihaku, Zuicho)..... [Blue line]

Advanced Force, (Kongo, Haruna, 4 cruisers, Junyo)..... [Blue line]

Battleship Striking Force, (Hiyei, Kirishima, etc)..... [Blue line]

Air Attacks on Japanese Ships..... [Red circle] on U.S. Ships..... [Blue circle]

Air Striking Forces not shown..... [Dotted line]


Legend

Enemy positions as estimated by U.S.

A. 0410/26, Carrier repd. by shore-based %c Report not received by Ad. Kinkaid till 0612.

B. 0717/26, Enterprise %c report Battleship S.F.

C. 0750/26, Enterprise %c report 2 Carriers & escort, ca 330°



2030/26 Shokaku
 Flag shifted to destroyer.
 CARRIER 8.F. 1500/24.
 Shokaku
 Zuihaku
 Zuicho
 1 Cruiser
 7 Destroyers

ADVANCED FORCE
 Kongo
 Haruna
 5 Cruisers
 13 Dest.

BATTLESHIP SF
 Hiyei
 Kirishima
 4 Cruisers
 7 Dest.

Junyo
 2200/25

Advanced Force, 25/26
 0500/26
 0600/26
 0800/26

STEWART 196

1900/25
 Shokaku bombed.
 Zuihaku bombed 0900/26
 Zuicho bombed 0900/26
 0500/26

1500/27
 1000/27
 0200/27
 1500/27

Enterprise bombed 0830/26
 Hornet bombed 0930/26
 Enterprise bombed 1100/26
 Enterprise bombed 1115/26
 Enterprise bombed 1230/26
 Enterprise bombed 0130/27
 0500/26
 0800/27
 2100/26

1500/26
 1745/25
 2000/25
 02100/26

TASK FORCE 61.
 Enterprise
 Hornet
 South Dakota
 6 cruisers
 14 Destroyers

SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS
 Ndani I
 Utupua I.
 VANIKORO IS.

TORRES IS.
 Vanua Lava I.
 BANKS ISLANDS
 Gaua I.

Espiritu Santo
 NEW HEBRIDES IS.
 NAUPORA I.



Tulagi

Aaron War
0630, 13 NOV.

1.
2.

Destroyers
Convoy boats
off Air
Attack,
12 NOV.

Atlanta
San Francisco
Portland
Albatross
Tuesu

0129, 13 NOV. - First
Radar contact.

U.S. Reinforcements
landed, 11 and 12 NOV.
Lunga Pt.

KUKUM



HENDERSON'S
AIRFIELD

160°E


5'

GUADALCANAL AREA
Naval Operations. 1st-13th Nov., '42.
 (INCLUDING BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL,
 CRUISER ACTION.)



All movements and positions
 are approximate. Times: Zone-11

Area occupied by Americans... **Red**
 " " " Japanese... **Blue**
 American movements..... **Red**
 Japanese movements **Blue**


Hiyei
 Firing on *Aaron Ward*, 0630, 13 Nov.
 Damaged by *A/C* during 13 Nov.,
 and scuttled.



From Adm'lty Chart 1469.




GUADALCANAL AREA-BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL



ANAL AREA

of Lunga Point.
over-1st December, 1942.

Positions and positions
 approximate: Times: Zone-11
 occupied by Americans...
 " Japanese...
 Movements..... Red
 Movements..... Blue



Van Destroyers
 0018, 1 DEC.
 0007, 1 DEC.

Rear Destroyers
 2320
 2320, Open Fire.
 Minneapolis
 New Orleans
 Pensacola
 Honolulu
 Northampton

2306, First Ra
 *Takanami sunk
 Radar (?) 3 to 6 ships 2320 (not present)
 20 torpedoes fired, 2319





GOGELA CHANNEL
 Walker Rks.
 Jones Rf
 Knowles Patchas
 Nugu I.


Task Force 67
 Sealark Reef
 Tanapari I.
 Low Sand Cay
 Hutchinson Shoal.

FARONDA
 Pt Cruz
 KOKUMBONA
 KUKUM
 TAIVU
 Taivu Pt


GUADALCANAL AREA

Battle of Lunga Point.
30th November - 1st December, 1942.

All movements and positions are approximate. Times: Zone-11
Area occupied by Americans... 
" " " Japanese... 
American movements... 
Japanese movements 




From Adm'lty Chart 1469.




**Bombardments of Munda,
5th January, 1943,
and Vila-Stanmore Area,
24th January, 1943.**

Prepared from Admiralty Charts, 2392, 2601, 3208.



Compendium of the
and the
of the
of the



RESTRICTED