Tac Talks: What are the shortcomings of the Intelligence Cycle and how might they be mitigated?
Introduction
The danger with a doctrine is that it is apt to ossify into dogma.
- JFC Fuller
Australian Army Lieutenant Sebastian Ellis, 2nd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, prepares to conduct intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance tasks during Exercise Warfighter held in Townsville, Qld, in 2021. Photographer: CPL Brandon Grey.
The intelligence cycle is a popular model used to explain the process of creating intelligence.
The Central Intelligence Agency model consists of planning, collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination. The cycle’s simplicity has allowed it to endure but it has also been interpreted as to its greatest weakness. The cycle is vague enough to be used as a descriptive model of information analysis but it falls short in its relevance to many of the other, more valued disciplines of intelligence. It presents a simplistic and linear normative model, which is at odds with the realities of intelligence production.
In practice, the intelligence process occurs in a far more complex and haphazard manner, especially in the more time-sensitive areas of intelligence where adaptability and resilience are tactical necessities.
If there were more inter-agency integration and information sharing, the intelligence cycle would probably be a more accurate model. Such integration remains unlikely, however considering the continuing trends of competition and over-compartmentalisation in intelligence communities.
The intelligence cycle
When viewed as a descriptive model the intelligence cycle does not reflect popular definitions of intelligence, nor encompass all of the activities of the agencies who are involved in it. Two separate camps; those who view it as the creation of secretive information and those who also involves all of the other activities usually conducted by intelligence agencies generally define intelligence. CIA doctrine states that “reduced to its simplest terms, intelligence is knowledge and foreknowledge of the world around us.” Thomas Troy defines it simply as “knowledge of the enemy”. The framework of the intelligence cycle fits neatly into these definitions. Where these definitions fall short, however, is in encompassing intelligence agencies’ attempts to influence the world around them. Counter-Intelligence, covert action, cyber warfare and information operations are a few examples of some of the more valued skill-sets of intelligence organisations. It is these skill sets, rather than analysis, which have historically defined organisations within an intelligence community.
The Central Intelligence Agency, for example, is regarded as the expert in the discipline of covert action with its Special Activities Division. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is considered the agency for counter-intelligence operations, whereas the National Security Agency is considered the centre for excellence in cyber warfare and communications exploitation. This shortfall could be mitigated by re-labelling the cycle the ‘information cycle’ but this would separate the model from intelligence. Perhaps inserting an ‘exploitation and influence’ component after or before ‘dissemination’ could allow the cycle to encompass all of the definitions and disciplines of intelligence organisations.
Members of 462 Squadron conduct training during the Cyberspace Incident Analyst Course at DSTO Edinburgh, SA, in 2020. Photographer: CPL Brenton Kwaterski.
When used as a normative model the cycle presents an unrealistic linear process that is at odds with the realities of intelligence production. The intelligence cycle does not outline where it is supposed to begin. The decision-maker cannot direct collection onto a target without being cued by the intelligence product. Conversely, the intelligence analyst cannot disseminate a product to contextualise the decision-maker without being directed. This is not a problem if, in a stable and relatively bi-polar strategic environment like that experienced during the Cold War, the threat does not change. In today’s strategic environment of rapid change and shifting crisis areas with diverse, transient threats, however, the cycle does not present a resilient normative model. Even if the area of interest does not change, a rapidly escalating crisis can reveal new realities, which can be overlooked by preconceived ideas, entrenched through years of myopic intelligence focus. Events that may appear of minor significance may become viral, leading to dramatic strategic change in a short period. This was well illustrated by the 2011 Arab Spring, when a single act of self-immolation in Tunisia caused widespread democratic uprisings, tearing down formerly unshakable dictatorships in months. There is no way to alter the intelligence cycle to mitigate these challenges. Systems analysis-oriented approaches are reportedly superseding linear models like the intelligence cycle in many organisations.
A more inclusive model?
A P-8A Poseidon aircraft at Melbourne Avalon Airport before flying to Defence Establishment Fairbairn for its official welcoming ceremony. Photographer: FSGT Kev Berriman and CPL Oliver Carter.
In practice, the intelligence process occurs in a far more complex and haphazard manner than that depicted by the intelligence cycle. The decision-maker is often triggered to direct the collectors by the relatively politicised information received from the twenty-four-hour news cycle. The collectors are cued on to their targets not by the decision-maker but by the analysts, who, having assumedly built context on a particular target, seek out information gaps. The analyst is rarely ‘need to know the sources, methods and capability of the collectors and can sometimes misdirect them. The collector, in turn, naturally tries to use their initiative to meet the needs of the analyst but they often misunderstand the wider strategic context and misdirect their assets.
The analyst is supposed to be disconnected from the decision-maker to protect their objectivity but this is never completely the case. Most intelligence organisations, particularly military ones, have a ‘top down’ decision-making hierarchy, where every product must be referred upwards before it is released. The further up the chain the product has to go, the greater the risk of political bias. When the product reaches the decision-maker, a high-ranking intelligence official routinely exposed to political influence often briefs it. At the strategic level, the intelligence process usually lags behind the decision-maker, who has often already developed courses of action to possible scenarios and, as Johnson notes, will probably “hope that this product will confirm in some way to the wisdom of the path […] already chosen.”
The intelligence cycle is not typically reflected at all at the tactical level. In the military sphere, in particular, analysis and collection typically occur in parallel, displayed instantaneously in a common operating picture streamed through tactical data links from multiple organic sensors straight to the decision-maker.
Integration and information sharing between agencies would probably make the intelligence cycle more accurate. Historically, however, agency integration has been successful only at the tactical level, where organisations have dedicated key experts to ‘teams of teams’ dedicated to achieving a particular end state. These experts direct the resources of their agencies under the command of a separate organisation aligned to a particular goal. General Stanley McChrystal noted that this technique aimed to deliver “extremely transparent information sharing and decentralized decision-making authority” to “fuse generalized awareness with shared expertise.” One recent example of successful integration was the CIA led, joint NSA, NGA, JSOC, ODNI, DOD team that supported Operation Neptune Spear in 2011. As this example demonstrates, however, agency integration is dependent upon the existence of a common desired end state, which transcends agency rivalry.
Strategic level integration remains unlikely due to the continued trends of competition and over-compartmentalisation in intelligence communities. Competition is a natural product when organisations are forced to work together to achieve the same broad aims with access to a shared pool of limited resources. Some sharing of processes and products is inevitable in this environment but competition often motivates each agency to put its perspective on a particular issue. This can result in duplications of effort, or, in the case of the intelligence, which justified the 2003 invasion of Iraq, increasingly misleading speculative analysis.
Commander ISAF General Stanley McChrystal talks with Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and Chief of the Defence Force Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston during a visit to the Special Operations Task Group at Camp Russell, Oruzgan Province, Afghanistan in 2009. Photographer: CPL Rachael Ingram.
In addition to the traditional security classifications, which limit the distribution of intelligence products, the ‘need to know’ principle is applied to its dissemination. Each organisation’s perception of who ‘needs to know’ is heavily influenced by their own organisational culture and personal beliefs. Good teams within a compartment will have a strong belief that what they are doing is very important but that belief in itself will often reinforce the need to keep their valuable insights to themselves. Over-compartmentalisation can be deadly. When multiple agencies are operating in the same battlespace, a shared context is critical, otherwise, their sources and methods may be inadvertently targeted. When agencies do not de-conflict in their threat notifications there can be circular reporting, which can reduce the situational awareness of the customer and obscure the emergence of real threats.
The intelligence cycle is a reasonable descriptive model for education on how the intelligence process should work. It should not be appropriated, however as a normative model, nor as an all-encompassing guide to the intelligence discipline. Some of the shortfalls of the intelligence cycle could be mitigated by additions to the cycle or expectation management in the way in which it should be interpreted. Perhaps if intelligence organisations collaborated further the intelligence cycle would be a more accurate depiction of reality. Continued trends of over-compartmentalisation and competition, however, make this unlikely to occur above the tactical level.
Bibliography
- Bamford, James (2005), A Pretext for War: 9/11 Iraq and the Abuse of America’s Intelligence Agencies, Random House, New York.
- Callanan, James (2010), Covert Action in the Cold War: US Policy, Intelligence and CIA Operations, Tauris and Co, London.
- Johnson, Lock (2007), Strategic Intelligence: Understanding the Hidden Side of Government, Praeger Security International, London.
- McChrystal, Stanley (2015), Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World, Penguin, New York.
- Murphy, Christopher (2005), Competitive Intelligence: Gathering, Analysing and putting it to work, Gower Publishing, London.
- Nouelhen, Lin (2012), The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, Counter-Revolution and the making of a new era, Yale University Press, London.
- Panzeri, Peter (2012), Killing Bin Laden: Operation Neptune Spear 2011, Osprey, London.
- Pythian, Mark (2013), Understanding the Intelligence Cycle, Routledge, London.
- Warner, Michael (2012), ‘Wanted: a Definition of Intelligence - Understanding Our Craft’, 2012, pp-15-22.
