Tac Talks: Evaluating effects-based operations in the Australian Defence Force

Effects Based Operations (EBO) and parallel warfare concepts have proven to be a highly effective approach to securing control of the air and denying an enemy force freedom to manoeuvre in a battle-space. The most distinct demonstration of an EBO was in the air campaign waged by the United States during the opening stages of the First Gulf War (1990-1991), an effort code-named ‘Instant Thunder’. By their very nature however, EBOs are offensive as a concept and their execution as a strategy in warfare is almost entirely the preserve of the first-strike combatant as opposed to the action of a responding force. Nevertheless, the acquisition of key assets, particularly in the last decade, means limited EBOs are now possible. Specifically, the ADF now possesses the ability to conduct wide-spread airborne surveillance, self-escort jam and strike capabilities in addition to new sea combatants able to project sea power over considerable distances. In spite of this potential however, I will be expanding on the role of EBOs and parallel warfare concepts have in wider ADF doctrine and arguing that their applicability is highly limited. This is chiefly since the concept runs counter to the long-standing defence strategy of Australia. Nevertheless, while the ADF would be unlikely to mount such activities unilaterally, it is important for us to maintain awareness of the role they play in wider coalition kinetic activities, particularly those led by the United States.

The fundamental concept of Effects Based Operations (EBO) is not new. Although not formally codified until the mid-1980s, the notion of EBO has permeated military planning and the execution of complex operations throughout history. The concept of EBO and, more broadly, parallel warfare, is based on the notion of achieving specific effects in combat as opposed to the absolute destruction of assets and facilities contained on a target list. At its core, the process is best described through explanation of a simple electrical circuit, which, poignantly, is where the theory gains its name. In this sense, a sequential electrical flow sees electricity pass through a series of lightbulbs, lighting them individually and one at a time. Conversely, parallel electrical flow sees electricity pass through each light bulb simultaneously, lighting them almost at the same time.^[1] Although this analogy seems simple and possibly distant from the complexities of military planning, it has important applicability in understanding and executing EBOs.

Captain Moore (white overalls) with members of his bridge team closed up during operations in the Persian Gulf.

The concept was most effectively applied during the First Gulf War (1990-1991) by the United States military. Particularly in campaigns prior to this conflict, military force was applied to progressively destroy, or ‘roll back’, an enemy’s defences before finally attacking the targets of critical value.^[2] Ground based radar sites, surface-to-air missile assets and airfields would be struck before critical utility, transport and leadership nodes would be attacked. This approach represents sequential warfare and is based on target destruction.

In contrast, parallel warfare involves a broad-based, near simultaneous attack against all vital enemy systems. Leadership, essential utilities, transport links and enemy combat capability are all targeted equally, causing the more rapid and desirable imposition of control on an enemy force.^[3] The core aim of parallel warfare is to not merely to destroy individual targets but rather to attack and eventually collapse an entire enemy system through targeted and concentrated application of force, built around serving the pre-defined strategic objectives of commanders and government.^[4] Ultimately, EBOs and parallel warfare are intricate concepts best summarised through a definition. Although multiple descriptions of what constitutes an EBO exist, for the purposes of this article and for ease of understanding, the definition used by the US Joint Forces Command is utilised; that is:

EBO is a process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or effect…on the enemy through the synergistic and accumulative application of military and non-military capabilities at all levels of conflict^[5]

Importantly, EBOs can be such an effective tool for achieving control in warfare as they exploit the three key dimensions of time, space and levels of war. Once again, it is the military campaign waged during the First Gulf War which serves as the best exemplar of this concept. In this sense, time was crucial to success, with the US military successfully and impressively striking over 150 separate Iraqi targets, predominantly through use of air power, within the first 24 hours of the conflict.^[6] The US-led coalition also applied military force across the entirety of Iraqi territory, taking advantage of the speed and reach of airpower and the long range afforded by of sea launched cruise missiles.^[7] Finally, the levels of war played an important role in the conflict with the Iraqi system itself coming under sustained and broad-based attack on the strategic, operational and tactical level; meaning all centres of gravity were targeted.^[8]

Such a concerted attack against a demonstrably inferior enemy force led to a decisive victory for the U.S coalition during this conflict. Nevertheless, victory necessitated the deployment of a staggering array of aircraft, ships, fielded forces and all associated support and logistical elements. In all, the US military alone contributed some 1800 combat aircraft to the campaign which ultimately conducted more than 65,000 sorties.^[9] In addition, the US Navy deployed upwards of 120 surface combatants, transport and supply ships to the to take part in the conflict; while over 700,000 grounded troops deployed to the Gulf region.^[10]

Oil fields on fire in Kuwait during Operation DAMASK.

This bewildering array of assets and personnel allowed the US coalition to execute a parallel warfare campaign which defeated Iraqi forces with relative ease and with comparatively limited combat losses. Still, it was not merely the considerable number of assets used by the coalition in Desert Storm but also the tailored mission profile, high level of accuracy and increased interconnectedness of each platform that guaranteed allied success.

In this sense, a significant range of different aircraft types were used with focused mission profiles designed to meet specific ends. In addition, precision munitions, including GPS and laser guided bombs as well as complex land attack cruise missiles were employed to devastating effect.^[11] Also, while suffering from a multitude of technical difficulties and limitations, tactical datalinks, GPS and satellite communications played a significant role in ensuring coalition assets exercised a degree of interoperability and collective situational awareness.^[12] These systems developed in complexity throughout the conflict and greatly enhanced the ease with which command and control could be exercised. Indeed, the overall success of the US coalition during the First Gulf War relied on the commitment of multiple, interconnect platforms, in all spheres, which struck appropriate targets with high levels of speed and precision. The combined effect was a clear demonstration of the impact EBOs and parallel warfare can have on an opposing force.

Australian Clearance Diving Team 3 members watch after disposing of unexploded ordnance during Operation DAMASK.

In understanding the applicability of an effects-based approach to military planning in the Australian context, it is important to consider the capabilities the ADF now possesses in reference to power projection. Particularly over the course of the last two decades, the overall capacity of the ADF and its ability to conduct mobile, flexible and precise operations has greatly increased. In the air domain, the RAAF now possesses significant strike, command and control and electronic warfare capabilities.

The combination of F/A-18F Super Hornets and E-7A Wedgetail early warning and control platforms has strengthened Australia’s capacity to control the air. The addition of F/A-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft has further increased potency in increasingly complicated battle spaces.^[13] The ADFs air power assets can now also be sustained indefinitely with highly capable air mobility platforms and air-to-air refuelling assets operating with full capability. Combined, the RAAF is developing into a balanced force, capable of conducting complex operations globally. Indeed, Australia’s most recent contribution to multi-national operations over Iraq (OP OKRA) saw the deployment of a self-supporting combat element of strike aircraft, control assets and airborne tankers; thereby minimising reliance on coalition assets.^[14]

As well, in terms of sea power, Australia has begun to significantly develop the capacity of the RAN and its ability to project power. With the introduction to service of Canberra Class amphibious platforms and Hobart Class destroyers, Australia once again possesses the ability to reach far beyond the littoral in both humanitarian and defensive or offensive operations. Projecting both soft and hard power with these assets can now be achieved with a level of confidence never enjoyed by Australia.^[15] Moreover, with considerable expenditure flagged for a complex fleet of new submarines and anti-submarine frigates, the RAN continues to grow as a force able to conduct sustained, though limited, sea-control operations.

Further, as has been seen since 2017, the RAN has deployed sizeable, self-sustaining task groups to the Asia Pacific region to enhance defence engagement and interoperability with regional partners.^[16] These activities are further strengthened through peace and stabilisation missions, such as OP APEC ASSIST. Ultimately, with defence expenditure expected to increase to over 2% of gross domestic product in 2020-21, we will retain and grow our small, but technically complex military capability into the future.^[17] The combined capacity, of air and sea power assets, now operated by the ADF means that the three key dimensions in EBOs of time, space and levels of war can now be exploited with a high degree of efficacy.

The growing capability of the ADF to project power in our region clearly points to a capacity, at least in theory, to undertake effects based operations and parallel warfare campaigns. Although it is self-evident that the ADF would be unable to mount an EBO rivalling the activities of the United States, Australia’s military capability is now both complex and mature in its development. Through air power deployments to the Gulf region and naval deployments throughout the Asia Pacific, the ADF, while small, is now largely self-sustaining with a growing ability to conduct activities independent of allied partners, in particular the United States. It is therefore feasible to suggest that Australia could support an effects based approach to warfare in the future, albeit in a limited capacity.

Although the theoretical capabilities of the ADF suggest an ability to conduct EBOs and parallel warfare, it is important to consider Australian defence policy, wider ADF doctrine and its link to the role of this country’s military forces. Indeed, Australia’s overarching defence strategy and national goals are clearly outlined and are focused around three core objectives. Specifically, policy is intended to deter and defeat threats to Australia, contribute to the security of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific and, finally, is intended to contribute to global responses to any threats to the rules-based order.^[18] By its very nature, Australia’s defence policy is almost exclusively built around the concept of defensive activities as opposed to offensive operations. Defence policy is further founded upon the mixed notion of ‘self-reliance and alliance dependency’ as a means of guaranteeing the security of national interests.^[19]

In an attempt to bring peace and stability to the region, Australia led a peacekeeping force to broker a peace agreement between the PNG Government and the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA), with a view to hold free and fair elections in the long term. This force was known as the South Pacific Peacekeeping Force (SPPKF), which deployed between 4-21 October 1994.

With predominantly defensive and humanitarian activities being the core focus of Australia’s defence policy, it is evident that EBOs and parallel warfare concepts have only limited relevance in the planning and execution of ADF operations. The applicability of these concepts is further undermined by the fact that, by their very nature, EBOs are, largely, offensive military activities. As has been outlined, while the core focus of EBOs and parallel warfare is not merely based on indiscriminate target destruction, significant effort is given to targeting enemy centres of gravity and key enabling nodes to cause overall collapse.^[20] This approach to warfare is inherently offensive and ultimately runs counter to Australia’s standing military policy and strategic goals.

Nevertheless, Australia’s complex and interconnected military assets possess the ability to provide meaningful contributions to multilateral operations, in particular those led by the United States. As has been seen, the ADF has maintained a significant presence in many campaigns led by other states, particularly since the end of the Second World War. The proficiency and expertise of Australian service personnel, along with the technical complexity of ADF assets means that niche elements of Australia’s military can seamlessly integrate into broader multilateral defensive or offensive activities. Ultimately, with Australia’s “self-reliance and alliance dependency” framework, centred around a small, but capable military, underpinned by the ANZUS Alliance, the country is unlikely to ever have the need to unilaterally plan and execute an effects based campaign. This position, combined with the fact that EBOs and parallel warfare concepts are incompatible with Australian defence policy, it becomes evident that the ADF would not be well served by exclusively adopting an effects based approach to warfare or planning. Rather, these concepts must underpin and support ADF activities in the context of integrated operations.

To summarise this contribution, EBOs and parallel warfare concepts have, in the past, has proven to be a very effective approach to securing control of the air and denying enemy combatants’ freedom of manoeuvre. The air campaign undertaken by the United States during the First Gulf War was outlined as a clear demonstration of an EBO. Explanation of the key enabling assets now operated by the ADF were used to demonstrate that, although limited in scope, Australia now possesses the ability to conduct EBOs and parallel warfare operations.

Wide-spread airborne surveillance platforms, self-escort jam and strike capabilities and new sea combatants allow for the conduct of these activities. In spite of this however, I’ve explained that the applicability of EBOs and parallel warfare concepts in wider ADF doctrine and operations is highly limited due chiefly to the fact that the concept runs counter to the long-standing defence strategy of Australia. By their very nature, EBOs are offensive as a concept and their execution as a strategy in warfare is almost entirely the preserve of the first-strike combatant as opposed to the action of a responding force. Ultimately, for a middle-tier military such as the ADF, an EBO approach to warfare, while likely achievable for a limited period, is simply impractical and would place inordinate strain on the entirety of defence for limited tangible outcome. Focus must be maintained on developing technical maturity and professional mastery of warfare, at all levels, to seamlessly integrate into wider coalition activities as required.

Endnotes

1. ↑David Deptula (2001), Defining Rapid Decisive Operations: Parallel Warfare. In D Deptula Effects-Based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare. (Arlington, Aerospace Education Foundation) pp. 3-7.
2. ↑ibid
3. ↑Richard Shultz, et al. (1992), The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War. (Maxwell Air Force Base, Air University Press) pp. 64-82.
4. ↑Steven Carey, et al. (2006), Five Propositions Regarding Effects-Based Operations. (Maxwell Air Force Base, Air & Space Power Journal 20 (1)). pp. 63-74.
5. ↑United States Department of Defense (2001), A Concept Framework for Joint Experimentation: Effects Based Operations. (Washington, USJFCOM).
6. ↑David Deptula (2001), Defining Rapid Decisive Operations: Parallel Warfare. In D Deptula Effects-Based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare. (Arlington, Aerospace Education Foundation) pp. 3-7.
7. ↑ibid
8. ↑ibid
9. ↑United States General Accounting Office (1997), Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air Campaign. (Washington, GAO).
10. ↑Joseph Englehardt (1991), Desert Storm and Desert Shield: A Chronology and Troop List for the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf Crisis. (Washington, Strategic Studies Institute US Army War College).
11. ↑United States General Accounting Office (1997), Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air Campaign. (Washington, GAO).
12. ↑Carl Jones (1993), Interoperability: A Desert Storm Case Study. (Washington, Institute for National Strategic Studies).
13. ↑Andrew Davies (2015), ADF Capability Snapshot - RAAF. (Canberra, Australian Strategic Policy Institute).
14. ↑ibid
15. ↑Tim Barrett (2016), A 5th Generation Royal Australian Navy. (Canberra, Australian Strategic Policy Institute).
16. ↑Department of Defence (2018), Indo-Pacific Endeavour 18 Continues to Build Regional Security and Stability. (Canberra, Minister for Defence).
17. ↑Department of Defence (2018), A Safer Australia - Budget 2018-2019 Overview. (Canberra, Minister for Defence).
18. ↑Australian Government (2016), 2016 Defence White Paper. (Canberra, Department of Defence).
19. ↑Reid Hutchins (2015), What was the ‘Defence of Australia’ Strategic Policy? (Canberra, The Regionalist Institute for Regional Security).
20. ↑Paul Davis (2001), Effects-Based Operations: A Grand Challenge for the Analytical Community. (Washington, RAND Corporation).