Tac Talks: Joint Fires - are they really Joint?
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Amongst the most enduring tasks of any warship from its inception as a tool of war many years ago, has always been its ability to project firepower inland. Before troops go ashore and before air superiority can be achieved, a warship can move into a hostile area and quite literally define the littoral, by the reach of its guns alone.
Certainly, the ability to provide naval gunfire support (NGS) has played a part in every major campaign fought by the Five Eyes Nations since World War I. For the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), the last time it fired live ammunition at an enemy, in a Naval Gunfire Support capacity, was on the Al Fawr peninsula in 2003. Tellingly this was not just an NGS engagement but a combined Joint Fires Operation the type of which the RAN had not conducted for a significant period.
The RAN has made the best use of its experiences in 2003 to improve and develop this capability, but this paper aims to present an opinion, exploring whether we are at an adequate standard to integrate into a large scale Joint Fires mission amongst other Five Eyes allies.
This paper, designed as an opinion piece, argues that to integrate into a large scale Joint Fires tasking, a truly operational capability in this sphere must be achieved. For the capability to be considered fully operational, it must be well-considered and highly coordinated effort within the overall campaign plan from the initial planning stages and not as an additional task at the end.
History has demonstrated the enduring need to have this capability, but as an organisation, we are more content to allocate resources to the more visible but in many ways more defensive disciplines of Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW). It is not my intention to understate the importance of either of these disciplines but they are primarily defensive in allowing the Amphibious Force to move into its Amphibious Area of Operations (AOA) and commence projecting the force ashore. As a developing amphibious force, the ability to project fire ashore in support of that Amphibious Operation is critical. Without the guarantee of allied carrier or host nation support where we can base our strike aircraft, Naval Fires from surface units are the primary option and this can only be used as a deterrent if we possess both the capability and the means.
With defence budgets worldwide subject to ever-increasing levels of scrutiny, Governments are quite rightly demanding greater efficiency and adaptability from their militaries. That strike missions likely carried out by very expensive missile systems such as the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM), Harpoon or the equally expensive option of basing an aircraft carrier close to the coast will become a luxury and the more extensive use of guided munitions fired from large calibre guns, both shore-based artillery and naval guns will become more widespread. Options for precision-guided munition fired from weapons platforms that already exist in the RAN inventory such as BAE’s Multi-Service Standard Guided Projectile (MSSGP)[1] are available and could provide the capability enhancement that the RAN needs to meet future conflicts.
HMAS Parramatta (IV), as the Joint Fires warfare champion, has completed many NGS serials on the Lancelin and Beecroft gunlines since November 16 conducting her Unit Readiness Workup (UR WUP), Exercise OCEAN EXPLORER 2017 (OE17) and Warfare Assessment Week. Throughout these Exercises, the focus has serials have been focused on procedural correctness as opposed to the achievement of realistic preparation for Joint Fires tasking. In this modern age of both joint and combined operations, NGS is somewhat of a misnomer, as all live-fire missions in the future will be conducted as a Joint Fires mission utilising shore and even air spotters from at the very least other services and very likely other nations to provide this effect.
Within the construct of the recent OE17, a Joint Fires serial was included in the programme but due to various constraints, the ability to properly plan and the subsequent realism from which the Ops Teams could draw proper conclusions was limited. As it was a live-fire exercise containing elements from all three services it is considered regrettable that more resource in terms of time and attention was not paid to this phase of the exercise.
As in any sphere of warfare, the adage of ‘train as you mean to fight’ is key, and in this case the lack of integration between all elements of the Joint Fires missions had a somewhat negative effect on the training benefit gleaned. The Supporting Arms Coordination Cell, the firing Surface Combatants and the firing Air Unit never actually met face to face for the coordinated planning effort. A Joint Fires planning group was conducted but unfortunately, all key participants were unable to attend, and the procedure, although contained within ATP4, had not been practised by any of the team in the ship and had to be self-taught overnight. When operating in a well-worked up Joint Fires Organisation then this is achievable but when still dealing with a very much embryonic capability, this takes away from the training value.
All operators involved were competent and well trained in their areas but without a dedicated Joint Fires planning team, there was a limit to the realism and training value that could be expected. In this instance, both firing units were positioned on the gunline before the first light and remained in position, in full view of the shore for some hours before any fire mission was conducted. Whilst the reasons for these issues are understood and, in the event, fully necessary, it is however indicative of the relative importance of the Joint Fires space compared to the other spheres of warfare being validated.
This paper concludes that as a growing amphibious power, it is time that the importance of a realistic and sustainable Joint Fires capability is recognised. To have any real capability it needs to be ranked alongside the other warfare disciplines such as ASW and AAW and be resourced in terms of equipment and manpower as such. If this is not made the case I believe Australia will be left behind in terms of its ability to participate in offensive Amphibious Operations.
Sources/References
- http://www.baesystems.com/en/feature/precision-guided-munitions.
- Naval Gunfire Support of Amphibious Operations, Major General Donald M Weller, USMC (Ret’d).
- http://defense-update.com/20130627_5-inch-guided-projectile-test-fired.