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NAVAL STAFF MONOGRAPHS.

(FLEET ISSUE.)

VOLUME I.

Monograph 1.—Coronel.

Monograph 2.—German Cruiser Squadron
in the Pacific.

Monograph 3.—Falklands.

Monograph 4.—“Goeben” and “Breslau.”

NOVEMBER 1920.

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NAVAL STAFF,
TRAINING AND STAFF DUTIES DIVISION,
November 1920.

CORONEL OPERATIONS.

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This was an important area, as it was traversed by the great trade routes from the Plate and the Cape, and operations on the S.E. coast of America re-acted quickly on it.

This force was normally distributed so as to keep a close watch on the Canary and Cape Verde Islands—the former in particular, owing to the presence of German ships and the doubtful neutrality of the local Spanish authorities.

It thus tended to work in two groups, one looking north to Gibraltar as a base, the other looking south to Sierra Leone.

To this force fell the task of searching the African coast, while frequent calls were also made upon it to escort important convoys of Imperial troops from the Cape. Ships were also liable to be deflected from it to the Cameroons ("Cumberland") and the S.E. coast of America ("Canopus" and "Cornwall").

2. *Force E.*, formed of the 11th Cruiser Squadron, consisted on August 6th of five "Juno" Class—the "Juno," "Isis," "Venus," "Doris," "Minerva"—under Rear-Admiral R. S. Phipps Hornby.

It cruised to the west of Ireland, covering the Atlantic approach from the west, and was based on Berehaven and Queenstown.

It was not directly affected by operations on the S.E. coast.

3. *Force F.*, which was intended to guard the southern approach to the Irish Channel, does not seem to have materialised.

4. *Force G.*, formed of the 12th Cruiser Squadron, consisted of four unprotected cruisers—the "Charybdis," "Eclipse," "Diana," "Talbot"—under Rear-Admiral Rosslyn Wemyss. It cruised in the soundings and western approach to the Channel.

It co-operated with a French force of five armoured and two protected cruisers, and its principal function was to guard the cross-Channel communications against mine layers and surprise. It did not enter into the Coronel operations.

5. *Force H.* is intimately connected with Coronel, for Rear-Admiral Cradock was its original Commander.

It was formed of the 4th Cruiser Squadron, originally the North American and West Indies Squadron, and

consisted of four "County" and one "Town" Class—"Suffolk" (flag) "Berwick," "Essex," "Lancaster," and "Bristol." It operated in the Atlantic, west of 40° W.

Its sphere of operations naturally divided itself into two areas—the West Indies and approaches thereto and the northern area with the approaches to New York and Halifax.

Its bases were, in the north—Halifax, with anchorages at Sydney (Cape Breton) and St. John's (N.F.), Bermuda; and in the West Indies, Jamaica and Martinique (French).

It will be observed that the important focal area of trade routes off Pernambuco lay in the S.E. corner of Area D. (Rear-Admiral Stoddart), and interposed between Area H. and the S.E. coast of America.

This force suffered considerably from the great area it had to cover, for the two theatres of operations in the West Indies and off the northern U.S.A. ports were widely separated.

Its main concern in the north was the group of German liners in North American ports, owing to the possibility of their sailing and acting on our trade routes. This patrol and the convoy of the Canadian Overseas Divisions formed the principal branches of its work. The West Indies was left largely to the French cruisers, the "Condé" and "Descartes," which were constantly engaged in local patrol and convoy work, supported by one or more armoured cruisers as they could be spared.

This area was greatly affected by the presence and movements of the "Karlsruhe" in the early months of the war, and, after Coronel, by the prospect of the German Asiatic Squadron passing through the Panama Canal, whose opening on August 16th had added to the strategical importance and possibilities of the area.

6. *Force I.*, formed of the 9th Cruiser Squadron (3rd Fleet) under Rear-Admiral John M. De Robeck, consisted of six old unprotected cruisers, the "Amphitrite," "Europa," "Argonaut," "Highflyer," "Vindictive," "Challenger." This force operated in what may be called the Finisterre area, bounded on the south by the parallel of 30° N., on the north by a line W.S.W. true from Scilly, on the west by the meridian 40° W., on the east by a line from Scillies to Ushant and the coasts of Europe and Africa. It included the Portuguese possessions of the Azores and Madeira, and as it

comprised the great south-western approach to the Channel was an area of first-rate importance. The British bases were Plymouth and Gibraltar, but both Madeira and the Azores were used for coaling. The force was usually engaged in watching the Tagus and Portuguese coast with one ship based on Madeira and as far as the total number of ships permitted, one was kept at the Azores. It was very liable to calls for convoy and escort, as all the trade routes from the south and east with their extensive troop movements passed through it. Thus the "Challenger" took a convoy to the Cameroons and remained there, and the "Minerva,"* taking a convoy to the Mediterranean, had been retained on that station.

7. The Cape station included the waters of Africa not detailed in the above. The force there consisted only of two cruisers, the "Hyacinth" and "Astræa," who were fully employed in convoying the Imperial garrison home and in the operations connected with the suppression of the rebellion and the preparations for the expedition against German S.W. Africa.

The Cameroons expedition involved the services of the "Cumberland" (from Force D.), "Challenger" (from Force I.), and the gunboat "Dwarf."

8. *The S.E. Coast.*—The S.E. coast of America area comprised the Atlantic south of 10° S., and on the outbreak of war there was only one ship on it, the "Glasgow" (Captain John Luce). The menace to the South American route led very quickly to the formation of a South Atlantic force comprising the "Monmouth" and "Otranto," which were detached from Force D., and the "Empress of Britain" and "Victorian," which sailed from Liverpool on August 23rd, 1914.†

The only British territory in this area is the Falkland Islands, which were unfortified.

A secret coaling base was established at Abrolhos Rocks outside Brazilian territorial waters, and another at English Bank anchorage in the Rio de la Plata.

The Abrolhos Rocks consist of a cluster of islets, reefs, and banks situated about 30' off the Brazilian coast in latitude 18° S. They are arid and inhabited

* Originally in Force E.

† The "Empress of Britain" and "Victorian" were retained in Force D. The "Macedonia" and "Orama" took their place, arriving Abrolhos, October 10th.

only by lighthouse keepers watching a lonely light. Anchorage can be obtained outside territorial waters, but it is exposed to the swell and coaling was at times difficult.

English Bank anchorage is situated among the numerous shoals which block the approach to the River Plate and is about 20 miles from Monte Video. A light vessel marks the bank. The anchorage is exposed and coaling was liable to be delayed by gales.

CHAPTER II.

ATTITUDE OF NEUTRALS.

9. The attitude of the neutral countries bordering on this vast area differed considerably.

Portugal was entirely friendly and her possessions in Madeira and Cape de Verde Islands provided our squadrons with valuable bases. The attitude of her Government is expressed in a telegram sent from Lisbon on September 3rd to the Governor of Funchal, Madeira, on the occasion of the "Challenger" entering that port:—

"We are neutrals, but as Allies (of Britain) we are decided on giving every help to our Allies. Therefore, I repeat, that 'Challenger' may remain at Madeira as long as he likes."

This policy enabled us to use the Cape Verde Islands freely. St. Vincent became a regular base and the German ships there were segregated and watched by a Portuguese cruiser.

The only exception to this friendly attitude was in the Azores. Though no obstacles were put in our way with regard to coaling, or remaining in their waters, some of the officials seem to have been strongly pro-German and ready to give facilities to German men-of-war and auxiliaries, especially with regard to wireless communication.

10. The attitude of the Spaniards was very different. The Government at Madrid preserved a strictly correct attitude, but many local officials displayed a hostile bias. The desolate region of the Rio del Oro did not possess a force sufficient to enforce neutrality,

but the small Spanish garrison appears to have been distinctly disposed to assist the enemy and the "Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse" was never reported, though she used those waters as a base for nine days.

The authorities at Las Palmas, Canaries, were also pro-German, and the German fleet auxiliaries used those islands freely as a base.

The officials at Teneriffe were reported as being sympathetic to the Allies, but their sympathy does not seem to have been sufficiently pronounced to influence their actions.

LIBERIA.—The waters of Liberia do not appear to have been used by either belligerent, but there were strong German interests at Monrovia, and the Germans controlled the high power W/T station there.

BRAZIL.—The attitude of Brazil is summed up in one of Admiral Cradock's telegrams as "friendly, but very sensitive as to neutrality rights. Local German interests undoubtedly responsible." (Telegram 300, 18th September.)

A large portion of Southern Brazil was practically a German colony, and German interests were specially powerful there.

URUGUAY was friendly, but Monte Video could not be used freely as a base. The high power W/T station at Cerrito near Monte Video was permitted to communicate in cypher with the Falkland Islands and British ships.

ARGENTINA was strictly neutral and protested against any use of the Plate River, even outside the 3-mile limit. The question was raised by the "Glasgow," and on August 30th, after consulting with the Foreign Office, the Admiralty cabled:—

"You may coal in Plate River when necessary outside 3-mile limit from either shore, but, in order to avoid irritating Argentine Government, as much secrecy and discretion as possible must be used."

CHILE was strictly neutral and would not allow belligerents to use her ports as bases. A strong German element in Southern Chile caused a somewhat hostile bias in those regions.

THE UNITED STATES preserved a strictly neutral attitude in accordance with the recognised principles of

international law. The authorities maintained a close supervision on German ships in their ports, but were very disposed to resent naval activity on our part in the proximity of her coasts.

DENMARK.—The Island of St. Thomas, in the West Indies, was constantly under suspicion as a possible German base, but in spite of frequent investigations the suspicions regarding it were never confirmed.

CHAPTER III.

MOVEMENTS OF REAR-ADMIRAL CRADOCK IN AUGUST, 1914.

11. At the outbreak of war the 4th Cruiser Squadron, under Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock, consisted of four armoured cruisers of the "County" Class and one light cruiser—the "Suffolk," "Lancaster," "Essex," "Berwick," and "Bristol"—and to this Squadron, constituted as Force H., was allotted the important task of protecting maritime commerce in the West Indies and the western end of the great Trans-Atlantic trade route.

The Germans at the outbreak of war had only two light cruisers in the Atlantic—the "Dresden" and "Karlsruhe." The former had actually been under orders for home after being relieved by the "Karlsruhe," but the dangers of the homeward voyage evidently led to her remaining in southern waters.

Whether by intention or by chance, no area could have been more suitably chosen for the purpose of menacing our trade. The bays and anchorages of an extensive coastline, with few facilities for communications and where a cruiser could lie safely hidden for days, bordered on the important trade routes from South America and South Africa, and the presence of even two small cruisers in this area constituted a threat to our trade which almost immediately led to changes in the constitution of the trade defence squadrons and to a series of reactions which were felt by every squadron at home and abroad, and finally by the Grand Fleet itself.

12. Cradock's squadron was reinforced on August 14th by the "Good Hope," to which ship he transferred his

flag, and, later, by the old battleship, "Glory,"* which reached Halifax on August 17th, and the armed merchantman, "Carmania."

On August 12th, news had been received of the "Karlsruhe" off Curaçoa and of the "Dresden" off the Amazon, and Cradock accordingly moved down in the "Good Hope" to take charge of the southern portion of his area, leaving Captain Yelverton, of the "Suffolk," as Senior Officer on the American coast.

In West Indies waters were the "Berwick" and "Bristol," together with the French cruisers "Descartes" and "Condé," and on August 16th, the day on which Cradock started south, the strategical importance of the area was enhanced by the formal opening of the Panama Canal.

13. It had been the original intention of the Admiralty to include the Pernambuco area in the West Indies, but the needs of the North Atlantic route had led to its being placed in Admiral Stoddart's command. His force was inadequate to deal with so large an area, but the threat of the "Karlsruhe" led to instructions being given him to detach his fastest cruiser there, and on August 13th, when the "Monmouth" joined him at Las Palmas, he ordered her to the south.

14. *Cradock goes South to St. Lucia.*—Cradock meanwhile had started south on the 16th and, the "Karlsruhe" having been last heard of off La Guayra in Venezuela on August 13th, he ordered the "Berwick" and "Bristol" to meet him at St. Lucia, and asked for coal to be sent to Trinidad (W.I.), intending to carry out a search of the southern area of his command.

On the evening of August 20th news was received from the British Minister, Rio, of the "Dresden" having sunk the British S.S. "Hyades" on the 16th August, 180 miles east of Pernambuco. The Admiralty came to the conclusion that she was going to remain in this area, an opinion confirmed on August 21st by a report from our Vice-Consul at Pernambuco that she was using Rocas Reef—a coral reef with nothing but a lighthouse on it in 4° N., 34° W.—as a base, and on August 22nd Admiral Cradock was ordered to search for her and began his fateful journey to the south.

* The "Glory" was sent in pursuance of a policy of reinforcing our cruiser squadrons by old battleships. The "Canopus" was sent to St. Vincent and the "Albion" to Gibraltar.

15. *Movements of "Glasgow."*—Meanwhile the only ship on the S.E. coast of America was the "Glasgow" (Captain Luce), and, as the area was too vast to control effectually, he had decided to watch the northern portion and was working from a coaling base at Abrolhos Rocks between Rio and Pernambuco, where the "Monmouth" joined him—sent on by Stoddart on August 13th.

On August 23rd Captain Luce received orders to make the "Dresden" his chief objective, and went off accordingly to search for her 180 miles east of Pernambuco, where she had last been heard of on August 16th.

The "Glasgow" searched as far as Cape St. Roque, and on the 28th tried the supposed base at Rocas, but found nothing. There he was joined by the "Otranto" which had left St. Vincent (August 23rd), and the three ships—"Glasgow," "Monmouth," "Otranto"—went off together to their coaling base at Abrolhos Rocks.

16. *Cradock's Search of North Brazil and St. Paul's Rocks, August 27th.*—Cradock, on hearing of the "Dresden," began a sweep on August 27th, along the north coast of Brazil with the "Good Hope," "Berwick," and "Bristol." On August 29th a report was received of the "Cap Trafalgar," which had come out of the Plate River on August 22nd, making for St. Paul's Rocks. This desolate rock, situated nearly on the equator, affords no anchorage, but, as the "Dresden" had not been heard of for ten days, the Admiral decided to proceed there, 1,500 miles, in the "Good Hope," leaving the "Berwick" and "Bristol" to continue their search of the coast of Brazil.

Stoddart was at the Canaries at this time and, as St. Paul's Rocks was also within his area, on receiving the report of the "Cap Trafalgar" he despatched the "Cornwall" (Captain Walter M. Ellerton) to the southward with the same object.

Cradock reached St. Paul's Rocks on September 2nd. There was nothing there, and he returned to Fernando Noronha. Though this was Brazilian territory, there was a French cable there connected with Pernambuco, Dakar, and Brest. The Company had been British, the Manager was still British, and as he was ready to transmit messages in code, Cradock was able to get in touch with the Admiralty and Monte Video and to review the situation.

17. "*Dresden's*" *Movements*.—Meanwhile, the "*Dresden*" was on her way to the south. When war broke out she had just been relieved by the "*Karlsruhe*," and the closure of the North Sea led to her remaining in the Atlantic. She proceeded south and cruised for some time off Pernambuco. On August 9th and 10th she was coaling off Jericoacoara ($2^{\circ} 50' S.$, $40^{\circ} 35' W.$), a small port between Para and Pernambuco. Thence she proceeded to Fernando Noronha and then to Rocas Island; where she coaled on August 13th from the Hamburg-America S.S. "*Baden*." On the 16th, keeping off the usual track, she fell in with and sank the Houston liner, S.S. "*Hyades*," 180 miles east of Pernambuco. On August 19th or 20th, still in company with the "*Baden*," she made Trinidad, a small islet lying 500 miles from the Brazilian coast. This island ($20\frac{1}{2}^{\circ} S.$, $29^{\circ} W.$) is uninhabited and landing is difficult, but there is an anchorage off it, exposed to the Atlantic swell. There she found the gunboat "*Eber*" from German South-West Africa, waiting to arm the "*Cap Trafalgar*," and there, too, was a supply ship, the "*Santa Isabel*," which had sailed on August 9th from Buenos Ayres. After coaling, Captain von Lüdecke sailed on the 21st, and shaped course for the Plate. Altering course to the westward he struck the trade route, and on August 26th, when nearly abreast Rio Grande, captured and sank the British S.S. "*Holmwood*," outward bound for Bahia Blanca with coal, and shortly afterwards met the S.S. "*Katherine Park*" from Buenos Ayres to Rio and New York, which he released as her cargo was American-owned. Then, carrying on down the coast and keeping off the trade route, he made Gill Bay, an anchorage on the north side of the Gulf of St. George, 460 miles from Magellan Straits, on August 31st. Thence, with the "*Baden*" acting as her auxiliary still in company, she proceeded to Orange Bay, Hoste Island, in the proximity of Cape Horn, and remained in this secluded harbour from September 5th to 16th, when both ships left for the Pacific. Nothing of this was known at the time, and the latest news of her was that, on August 26th, she had sunk the British S.S. "*Holmwood*" in $31^{\circ} 30' S.$, $48^{\circ} 56' W.$, the report of which did not reach England till August 30th.

Meanwhile there had been no tidings of the German Asiatic Squadron under von Spee, consisting of the two

armoured cruisers "*Gneisenau*" and "*Scharnhorst*," and the two light cruisers, "*Emden*" and "*Nürnberg*." They were believed to have coaled at Ponape in the Carolines on August 8th, but no further news of them had been received.

18. Cradock arrived at Fernando Noronha on September 3rd and sent a telegram reporting the situation. The "*Cornwall*" was in wireless touch, proceeding south. Captain Luce had received reports of a number of German ships, presumed to be colliers, in the Magellan Straits, and proposed to proceed with the "*Monmouth*" and "*Otranto*" to the Straits, where, in the Rear-Admiral's opinion, a concentration of German forces "appeared possible."*

CHAPTER IV.

REINFORCEMENT OF SOUTH AMERICAN SQUADRON.

19. *Cradock appointed to South American Command, September 3rd*.—The Admiralty had come to the same conclusion and while Cradock's wire from Fernando Noronha was on its way, a message crossed it ordering him to remain and take charge of the S.E. coast of America station, placing under his orders the "*Good Hope*," "*Berwick*," "*Bristol*," "*Glasgow*," "*Monmouth*," "*Carmania*," "*Otranto*," and "*Victorian*."†

This transfer involved a number of changes. Rear-Admiral Phipps-Hornby, commanding the 11th Cruiser Squadron on the Irish station, was appointed to take over Rear-Admiral Cradock's North American command. The "*Canopus*" was transferred from Rear-Admiral Stoddart's command, where she had been acting as guardship off St. Vincent (Cape Verde), to Rear-Admiral Cradock to perform the same function at Abrolhos Rocks. The "*Albion*" from Admiral de Robeck's squadron was to take the place of the "*Canopus*," and Rear-Admiral Tottenham from the "*Albion*" was transferred to Rear-Admiral Phipps-Hornby's old command.

20. No mention had been made of the "*Cornwall*" in the telegram of September 3rd, and the Rear-Admiral,

* App. 1.

† App. 2.

in acknowledging it, inquired whether she was to be attached to him. He was informed in reply that the "Berwick" would remain in the West Indies, the "Cornwall" would be under his orders, and the "Victorian" was to remain with Admiral Stoddart in Force D.

The retention of the "Berwick" in the West Indies was the outcome of events in that area. A report had just come in of the British S.S. "Bowes Castle" having been sunk by the "Karlsruhe" on August 18th, about 200 miles east of Barbadoes, and renewed German activity was reported at the Danish island of St. Thomas. Under these circumstances, the "Essex" was despatched from the North American area to look into St. Thomas, the "Berwick" was retained in the West Indies area, and the "Cornwall," on returning from her examination of St. Paul's Rocks, (par. 1st) was ordered to proceed to Pernambuco to await Cradock's arrival.

21. *At Pernambuco, September 5th.*—The "Good Hope" left Fernando Noronha for Pernambuco on the evening of September 4th, and on his arrival the Admiral found ample evidence of the collapse of enemy trade in some 15 large ships belonging to the Hamburg-Amerika and Nord Deutsche Lloyd which had taken refuge there. From Pernambuco he sent a telegram asking for any information of the "Gneisenau" and "Scharnhorst" subsequent to the last report of them off the Caroline Islands on August 8th.* In reply he was told that there was no certain information subsequent to that date, and that Magellan Straits and its vicinity were regarded as "quite possible" destinations.† Without waiting at Pernambuco, the Admiral proceeded to Abrolhos Rocks, where he arrived on September 8th and was joined by the A.M.C. "Macedonia." Meanwhile the "Glasgow," "Monmouth," and "Otranto" had swept south from Abrolhos Rocks, arriving at Monte Video on September 8th, where Captain Luce proposed to remain till he got into wireless touch with the Rear-Admiral.

22. *Disposition of Forces, September 10th.*—Two days later—September 10th—the Rear-Admiral ordered the

* App. 3.

† App. 4.

following disposition of his forces, sending information of it to the "Glasgow" at Monte Video:—

"Good Hope" (at Abrolhos Rocks).	To search coast as far south as Plate River, especially San Sebastian and Sta. Catherina, where there were large German colonies.
"Cornwall" (at Pernambuco).	To proceed along the trade route to Rio de Janeiro and coal.
"Carmania" -	To search Trinidad Island and then proceed to Monte Video.
"Macedonia" -	To be guardship at Abrolhos.
"Bristol" (at Para)	To proceed along the trade route to Abrolhos.
"Glasgow" } "Monmouth" } "Otranto" }	(at Monte Video) { To proceed in company to Magellan Straits searching unfrequented bays and harbours in order to frustrate "Dresden's" proceeding to west coast.

These proposed movements were modified by two events—the disablement of the "Carmania" and a report of the "Dresden's" appearance at Sta. Catherina.

On September 14th the "Carmania," which had proceeded on her search, found the German armed merchant cruiser "Cap Trafalgar" coaling from two colliers off Trinidad Island. The German ship made off to the southward, but on recognising the "Carmania" as a merchant cruiser turned and closed at 18 knots. An action ensued, lasting from about 12.10 p.m. to 1.50 p.m., which resulted in the "Cap Trafalgar" being sunk, but the "Carmania" was so seriously disabled that she had to return to Gibraltar *via* Abrolhos Rocks. News of the action did not, however, reach the Rear-Admiral till September 20th at English Bank.

On the way to Magellan the "Glasgow" received, through Cerrito (Monte Video) wireless station, a report that the "Dresden" had recently coaled near Sta. Catherina. This report was false, but being out of touch with the Admiral, Captain Luce used his discretion to return at 19 knots with his force and met the Admiral just north of Santa Catherina on September 14th. A conference was held on board the Flagship and the Admiral decided to proceed with the "Glasgow's" detachment to Magellan Straits.

23. *Appreciation of Situation at the Admiralty, September 7th.*—The possibility of a concentration in the Magellan Straits by the German forces in the South Atlantic and Pacific had been foreseen at the Admiralty* and on September 7th a paper† had been prepared on the subject, which gave a list of the British forces on the south-east coast of America and of the Allied forces in the Pacific. The disposition of the latter was as follows :—

West coast of North America	-	-	-	“ Newcastle.”
				“ Idzumo.”
				“ Rainbow.”
Singapore and Java area	-			“ Minotaur.”
				“ Hampshire.”
				“ Yarmouth.”
				“ Ibuki ”
				“ Chikuma ”
				} Japanese.
				“ Dupleix ” (French).
Australian area for escorting New Guinea Expedition	-			“ Australia.”
				“ Melbourne.”
				“ Encounter.”
				“ Sydney.”
				“ Montcalm ” (French).

The memorandum pointed out that the earliest date on which the Rear-Admiral could receive reinforcements from the Australian station was October 15th. Reinforcements from England could arrive in about 20 days. In the event of the German forces intending to concentrate in South America, the following might be the possible situation :—

“ ‘ Scharnhorst,’ ‘ Gneisenau,’ and possibly ‘ Emden ’ could be off Punta Arenas in the Straits of Magellan September 10th. ‘ Nürnberg,’ and possibly ‘ Leipzig,’ could be off Punta Arenas,

* App. Nos. 1, 6.

† The paper in H.S. 26 (Historical Section, Vol. 26) is dated September 7th and is a copy of what was evidently an official Staff Memorandum.

September 22nd.” A note is added stating “ German force is much stronger than existing British disposition to meet it.”

The possible necessity of reinforcements was appreciated, for a further note was added to the memorandum :—

“ For consideration. If definite news is heard that German China Squadron has gone to South America, it is suggested that—

‘ Duke of Edinburgh,’

‘ Warrior,’

‘ Black Prince,’

‘ Weymouth,’

be sent to S.E. coast, being replaced in Canal and Red Sea by some French cruisers. They could proceed independently, and store ship (be) sent on after them either from England or Gibraltar.”

Consequent perhaps on this review of the situation, a telegram was sent on September 10th ordering the “ Defence,” then in the Mediterranean, to proceed at once to Gibraltar preparatory to proceeding to the South-East Coast, but engine-room defects rendered an immediate start impracticable.

The possibility of the German cruisers making for South America was confirmed by a telegram received on September 12th from the C.-in-C., China; “ No news of German cruisers, but as they are known to be well supplied with coal I consider it possible and even probable they will next be heard of on the South American coast and will attack our trade either off the Straits of Magellan or the mouth of the Rio de la Plata,” a view which was further borne out by telegrams from our consuls in Chile reporting movements of German merchant vessels on the west coast.

24. *Comparison of Forces.*—It was now becoming more and more evident that Rear-Admiral Cradock’s squadron might have to meet and oppose a very considerable German concentration, and the comparative strength of the forces available was a matter of concern.

The gun power of the forces more or less immediately available was :—

—	9·2-in.	6-in.	4-in.
“ Good Hope ” - - - - -	2	16	—
“ Glasgow ” - - - - -	—	2	10
“ Monmouth ” - - - - -	—	14	—
“ Cornwall ” - - - - -	—	14	—
“ Bristol ” - - - - -	—	2	10
“ Otranto ” - - - - -	—	—	—
	2 9·2”	48 6”	20 4”

—	8·2-in.	5·9-in.	4·1-in.
“ Scharnhorst ” - - - - -	8	6	—
“ Gneisenau ” - - - - -	8	6	—
“ Dresden ” - - - - -	—	—	10
“ Nürnberg ” - - - - -	—	—	10
“ Leipzig ” - - - - -	—	—	10
	16 8·2”	12 5·9”	30 4”

The British squadron was greatly superior in 6-in. guns, but this superiority was more than counterbalanced by the 16 8·2-in. guns, and by the fact that the main-deck guns of the “ Good Hope,” “ Monmouth,” and “ Cornwall ” could not be fought in a heavy sea. Further, a less evident but no less potent element of superiority lay in the fact that the “ Scharnhorst ” and “ Gneisenau ” had been commissioned for some time on a foreign station where conditions were particularly favourable for gunnery practice, and where they had actually attained a high degree of efficiency. The “ Good Hope,” on the other hand, which was the only ship carrying heavy guns, was a third fleet ship which had been commissioned for mobilisation, then paid off and commissioned with a fresh crew consisting largely of Royal Naval Reserve men, coastguards, and men of the Royal Fleet Reserve.

25. *Admiralty Instructions of September 15th—Reinforcements.*—Opinion at the Admiralty was now hardening, and the Rear-Admiral received at Sta. Catherina

on September 15th a telegram indicating the strong “probability of the ‘Scharnhorst’ and ‘Gneisenau’ arriving at Magellan Straits.” He was instructed to leave a sufficient force to deal with the “Dresden” and “Karlsruhe,” and to concentrate a squadron strong enough to meet the “Scharnhorst” and “Gneisenau,” making Falkland Islands his coaling base. The telegram informed him that the “Defence” was joining him from Mediterranean,* and that the “Canopus” was on her way to Abrolhos, and continued: “Until ‘Defence’ joins keep at least ‘Canopus’ and one ‘County’ Class with your Flagship. As soon as you have superior force search the Magellan Straits with squadron, being ready to return and cover the River Plate, or, according to information, search north as far as Valparaiso, break up the German trade and destroy the German cruisers. Anchorages in vicinity of Golfo Nuevo and Egg Harbour† should be searched. Colliers are being ordered to Falkland Islands, consider whether colliers from Abrolhos should be ordered south.”‡

This telegram was received by the Rear-Admiral on September 15th at Santa Catherina, some 250 miles south of Rio. The “Good Hope,” “Monmouth,” “Glasgow,” and “Otranto” had met there on September 14th, after a combined search, and were now proceeding to Monte Video to coal, intending afterwards to search the region of Magellan Straits and Beagle Channel. Two cruisers only were left to the northward—the “Bristol” to patrol between Monte Video and Santa Catherina, and the “Cornwall” between Rio and San Roque, an area too wide for them adequately to cover.

CHAPTER V.

THE THREAT OF A GERMAN CONCENTRATION.

26. *News of Von Spee, Telegram of September 16th.*—On September 16th the Admiralty received the first authentic news of the “Scharnhorst” and “Gneisenau” since August 8th. They had appeared off Samoa on the

* She had not actually started.

† Egg Harbour is close to Gill Bay which the “Dresden” left on September 1st.

‡ App. 6.

14th, and left it steering N.W. The situation was regarded as changed, and in passing the information the Admiralty instructed the Rear-Admiral that "Cruisers need not now be concentrated," and "the German trade on the west coast of America was to be attacked at once."*

The sailing of the "Defence" from the Mediterranean was cancelled by the Admiralty the same day,† but there is no notification of the Rear-Admiral having been informed, and as late as October 12th he evidently still expected her.

Rear-Admiral Cradock received this telegram on his arrival at Monte Video on September 17th, where he had intended to coal and proceed to the southward, but was prevented by heavy gales on the 17th and 18th.

The Admiralty instructions did not involve any immediate alteration in the Rear-Admiral's previous dispositions of September 10th, and in the exercise of his discretion he continued to keep the vessels with him together, and from September 18th onwards, the "Good Hope," "Monmouth," "Glasgow" and "Otranto" acted together as a unit distinct from the other ships in the command. The only ship which joined him subsequently was the "Canopus," which at this time had only just arrived at Pernambuco.

It was the Rear-Admiral's intention to sweep down towards the Magellan Straits and thence to send the "Glasgow" and "Monmouth" and later the "Carmania" on to the west coast to attack German trade and pick up orders at Coronel. The "Canopus," after coaling at Abrolhos Rocks, where the work was hampered by a heavy swell, was to proceed to the Rio de la Plata to guard the trade and colliers and await events.‡

27. *Down the East Coast to Magellan, September 22nd to 28th.*—On September 22nd§ the Rear-Admiral left English Bank, Rio de la Plata, and proceeded to the south with his squadron spread for search, the "Good Hope" skirting the coast examining the bays and endeavouring to obtain news of the "Dresden."

The Gulf of St. Mathias in Argentina was searched on September 24th, and Port Madryn visited, but nothing was seen or heard of the enemy. An accidental meeting

* App. 7.

† App. 8.

‡ App. 9.

§ De Vertueil says 21st.

at sea, however, on September 25th, with the Pacific Steam Navigation Company's liner "Ortega" gave him valuable information. This ship had been chased by the "Dresden" and "Baden" in the Pacific on September 18th off Cambridge Island, about 100 miles north of the western entrance to Magellan Straits, and though she had only 14 and the "Dresden" 21 knots speed, her master had managed to elude the enemy. He had taken his ship into the uncharted and neutral waters of Nelson Strait, where the "Dresden" was not prepared to follow, and by feeling his way with boats managed to get out into Smyth Channel.* On September 26th further news was received *viâ* Monte Video that a three-funnelled warship had been sighted off Punta Galera, near Valdivia, some 800 miles up the Chilian coast, and a private cable brought news of the German S.S. "Seydlitz" coaling at Valparaiso.

It was now clear that the "Dresden" had proceeded to the west coast, and in the early morning of September 28th the Rear-Admiral concentrated his force off Cape Virgins, and proceeded to Punta Arenas within the Magellan Straits.

It may be as well to summarise here the instructions he had received to govern his movements.

Telegram OUT 71, September 14th. (Appendix No. 6.)

- (a) Concentrate a squadron strong enough to meet "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" (cancelled by (h)).
- (b) Make Falkland Islands your base.
- (c) Until "Defence" joins keep at least "Canopus" and one "County" class with your Flagship.
- (d) As soon as you have superior force search Magellan Straits.
- (e) Being ready to return and cover River Plate.
- (f) According to information search north as far as Valparaiso.
- (g) Break up enemy trade and destroy German cruisers.

* The captain of the "Dresden" can hardly be said to have been deterred by risks of navigation, for he showed himself later a daring and skilful navigator in equally difficult waters. Nelson Strait is not described as specially dangerous in the South America Pilot, and it seems probable that the captain of the "Dresden" was disinclined to violate Chilian neutrality.

Telegram OUT, September 16th. (Appendix No. 7.)

- (h) Cruisers need not now be concentrated.
- (i) German trade on the west coast of America to be attacked at once.

From this last order of September 16th, the Rear-Admiral might assume that his principal objective was the attack of German trade on the west coast of America.

28. *Magellan Straits and the Falkland Islands, September 28th to October 22nd.*—On his way through the Straits numerous signals were intercepted between German men-of-war and merchantmen, and on arriving at Punta Arenas, on September 28th, the Rear-Admiral learnt from the Consul that the enemy had been using Orange Bay, a small harbour lying amongst the snows and glaciers of Hoste Island. He decided to proceed there immediately, and, sailing after midnight without lights, threaded the difficult and frowning passage of Cockburn Channel in thick weather with snow falling; rounding Cape Horn the next night and passing inside Barneveldt Rocks the squadron entered the broad reaches of Nassau Bay. The ships spread in different directions, and, at a given signal, closed towards the entrance of Orange Bay. But it was empty.

It was necessary to coal before proceeding further, and the "Otranto" returned to Punta Arenas, while the rest of the squadron proceeded to the Falkland Islands, where the "Glasgow" and "Monmouth" coaled preparatory to their cruise to the westward.* They sailed on October 3rd to pick up the "Otranto" and proceed to the west coast, leaving the "Good Hope" on watch in the Falklands Island area. News had been received at the Admiralty, on September 30th, of the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" having visited Papeete on September 22nd, where they sank the gunboat "Zelee," and shelled the town, but the Rear-Admiral did not receive the telegram sent him on the 30th to this effect.†

There was news of a ship which had been attending on the "Leipzig" having put into Callao on October 1st, and on the same day there had arrived at Guayaquil the master and part of the crew of the "Elsinore," captured off Cape Corrientes in Mexico on September 11th—two incidents which clearly pointed to the "Leipzig" operating in the southward, in possible

* App. 11.

† App. 14.

expectation of Admiral von Spee's arrival. How much of this information reached the Rear-Admiral is uncertain, as he was not acknowledging wireless signals, and constant interference by atmospherics rendered their receipt uncertain.

On October 1st the Rear-Admiral visited New Island in the West Falklands and on the 2nd went on to Port Edgar in the south-east of West Falklands. There the "Good Hope" stayed three days and coaled on the 5th.

From an investigation of German wireless intercepted by the "Otranto" at Punta Arenas at this time he had inferred that there might be hostile ships at Hermite Island, just west of Cape Horn, and leaving Port Edgar on October 5th proceeded there at high speed, ordering the "Glasgow's" squadron, then on its way up the west coast, to turn and meet him at the island west about, but again he found nothing. The Admiral remained behind, and on October 7th searched Orange Bay again, and this time found evidence of the "Dresden," the first trace of her since she had sunk the "Holmwood" on August 26th. A German sailor had left on a beacon the name of the "Dresden" written in pencil with the dates September 9th, 10th, and 11th,* and it was evident that she had gone before them to the west coast.

29. *Definite News of Von Spee, October 5th.*—As the Rear-Admiral was leaving Orange Bay for the Falkland Islands on October 7th he received an important telegram sent by the Admiralty on the 5th October, which had missed him when he left for Orange Bay on that date.† This contained a message, intercepted by Suva (Fiji), in German mercantile code, passed *viâ* Melbourne, locating the "Scharnhorst" between the Marquesas and Easter Island on the 4th October, and reporting from Wellington the call sign of the "Scharnhorst" to the "Dresden" on the same date. The telegram went on to say: "From this intercepted signal it appears that 'Scharnhorst' and

* Cradock's letter of October 12th.

† Communications in southern waters were slow and uncertain. There was a wireless station at Port Stanley in the Falkland Islands and the Uruguayan Government permitted the transmission of cipher messages to the Governor from their station at Cerrito, near Monte Video, but the whole area was subject to frequent continuous atmospherics, which interfered with messages for days at a time. From Punta Arenas the Chilean Government would not permit official messages to pass in cipher.

'Gneisenau' are working across to South America. You must be prepared to have to meet them, in company possibly with 'Dresden' scouting for them. 'Canopus' should accompany 'Glasgow,' 'Monmouth,' and 'Otranto,' the ships to search and protect trade in combination. Arrange about coal and consider whether a collier should accompany squadron. If you propose 'Good Hope' to go, leave 'Monmouth' on east coast and arrange for a Senior Officer for east coast."*

The Admiral thereupon proceeded to Port Stanley, Falkland Islands, arriving there on October 8th, ordered the "Canopus" to join him from Abrolhos Rocks, and directed the "Glasgow," "Monmouth," and "Otranto" not to go north of Valparaiso till the German cruisers were located.†

The situation then on October 8th was:—

"Good Hope"	-	At Falkland Islands.
"Canopus"	-	At Abrolhos Rocks; ordered to Falkland Islands.
"Glasgow"	-	} On west coast, based on Port Lagunas in Chile for coal.
"Monmouth"	-	
"Otranto"	-	

30. *Rear-Admiral's View of Situation, October 8th.*—On October 8th the Rear-Admiral sent a telegram with his view of the situation, which differed from that of the Admiralty telegram received on October 7th. Indications showed the possibility of the "Dresden," "Leipzig" and "Nürnberg" joining the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau," and the Rear-Admiral therefore asked for the "Cornwall" and evidently still expected the "Defence"; he intended, he said, to concentrate at the Falklands, which may have referred merely to the coming of the "Canopus" or his use of the Falklands as a base.

In another telegram of the same date, he broached another question, suggesting that, in the event of an enemy concentration on the west coast, it was necessary to have a second British force on the east coast capable of bringing the enemy to action in order to meet the contingency of Von Spee's evading his own squadron and proceeding into the Atlantic, where he might destroy the British coaling bases at Falkland Islands, English Bank, and Abrolhos Rocks, and possibly reach the West Indies.‡

* App. 12.

† App. 14.

‡ App. 15.

From the Falkland Islands on October 12th the Rear-Admiral wrote his last letter of proceedings, and sent it home. He concluded by saying that he had not discussed matters of importance, as it might fall into wrong hands, and it therefore contains no reference to the supposed movements of the enemy.

31. *Situation on October 12th, and despatch of "Kent."*—At Whitehall it was a time of pressure. The Naval Division was just completing its retreat from Antwerp, the Canadian convoy was coming up the Channel, and submarine activity was engaging attention. The "Karlsruhe" was still menacing the South Atlantic trade routes and exercising a large degree of influence on the disposition of forces in the Atlantic, and the arrival of the German Asiatic squadron in Atlantic waters would have enormously complicated the situation and possibly have led to the dislocation of the whole system.

It was considered therefore of the first importance that the German squadron should not pass Cape Horn unreported, and that a force should be concentrated at the Falkland Islands strong enough to give it battle.

The "Kent" (Captain J. D. Allen), which had just completed her steam trials, after commissioning for the North American station, had been given orders on October 8th to proceed to the south-east coast, calling at St. Vincent on the way, and sailed from Portsmouth on October 12th.

Admiral Cradock does not appear to have been informed of this intended reinforcement to his squadron, and in any case the pressure in the Atlantic led to the "Kent's" being intercepted at St. Vincent and returning north on October 20th with a South African convoy; after handing it over to the "Vindictive," she was sent on a further errand to search the African coast in consequence of reports received on October 24th and 25th of the "Karlsruhe" being at the Bisagos Islands, Portuguese Guinea, and so, like the "Defence," never actually joined Cradock's command.

32. *Admiralty View of Cradock's Suggestion.*—Persistent atmospheric baffled communication, and the two telegrams sent by Rear-Admiral Cradock on October 8th did not reach Whitehall till October 11th and 12th. It was then proposed that the cruise along the west coast should be postponed, and on October 14th approval was

given for Cradock to concentrate at the Falklands with the "Canopus," "Monmouth," "Good Hope," and "Otranto," and for the "Glasgow" to go round to the west coast to attack and protect trade as far as Valparaiso, but the actual instructions sent on October 14th did not completely embody these intentions. Arrangements were also made in accordance with Rear-Admiral Cradock's proposals for a new squadron to be formed on the east coast by sending the "Defence" to join the "Carnarvon." It was estimated that the "Canopus" could arrive at the Falklands on October 15th,* the Germans might appear there on the 18th, and that the "Carnarvon" and "Defence" would reach Monte Video by the 26th and 29th October respectively.

CHAPTER VI.

FORMATION OF THE SECOND SOUTH AMERICAN SQUADRON.

33. *Admiral Stoddart and Force D.*—On October 1st Force D was distributed as follows:

"Carnarvon" (flag)	-	At Sierra Leone for engine overhaul.
"Albion"	-	} Near Cape Verde Islands.
"Empress of Britain"	-	
"Highflyer"	-	Near Canary Islands.
"Marmora."		
"Victorian."		

That is to say, these ships were strung out along the African coast, leaving the Pernambuco area entirely unprotected. The Canary Islands could not be neglected as there were five German ships at Las Palmas and Teneriffe laden with coal and stores and showing signs of activity; but on October 12th when it became clear that the "Karlsruhe" was operating off Fernando Noronha, Admiral Stoddart decided to take the "Carnarvon," "Albion," "Marmora," "Empress of Britain," and a collier to sweep down to the south-west portion of his area. He proposed, when he had searched the neighbourhood of St. Paul's Rocks, Fernando Noronha and

* On account of bad weather she did not arrive at the Falklands till October 18th, and then required two or three days overhaul.

Rocas Reef, to proceed to the southern limit of his station and remain between St. Paul's Rocks and 10° S. while coal lasted.

34. *Formation of Second East Coast Squadron.*—By this time the Admiralty knew the German Asiatic Squadron was on its way to Easter Island, and had decided to adopt the suggestion which Admiral Cradock had made to establish a second squadron on the east coast of South America.

In order to meet the situation on the Cape station the "Albion" was removed from Force D and ordered to Ascension on October 12th, preparatory to reinforcing the South African squadron and two days later, on October 14th, Admiral Stoddart was instructed to proceed in the "Carnarvon" to Monte Video, calling at Pernambuco and Rio on the way. He was to take the "Cornwall," "Bristol," "Macedonia," and "Orama"* under his orders and be ready to concentrate them in the event of the German forces appearing on the east coast.†

A further addition to his squadron was sent him in the "Defence." This ship was due at Gibraltar on October 15th, on her way home with Admiral Troubridge's staff and was now ordered to proceed at highest possible speed to Monte Video, calling at St. Vincent, C.V., and Pernambuco. The Captain (Captain E. la T. Leatham) and Navigating Officer of the "Euryalus" were transferred to her, and she left Gibraltar at 10 p.m. on October 15th.

The "Defence" arrived at Pernambuco on October 26th, and sailed the next day for Abrolhos Rocks. The "Carnarvon" on her way south with Rear-Admiral Stoddart touched at Rio the same day (October 26th) and proceeded to the River Plate.

The second East Coast or River Plate squadron may, therefore, be considered to have been constituted by October 26th.

35. A telegram was sent on October 14th to Rear-Admiral Cradock, who was still at the Falkland Islands, informing him of these arrangements‡ which went on to say that his concentration of the "Good Hope," "Canopus," "Monmouth," "Glasgow," and "Otranto" "for

* Arrived English Bank, River Plate, October, 25th.

† App. 17.

‡ App. 16. This should be carefully compared with App. 14.

combined operations" was concurred in. It was apparently intended that the squadron, with the exception of the "Glasgow," should concentrate and presumably remain at the Falkland Islands, but the actual instructions sent on October 14th did not emphasise this and certainly did not debar him from going to the west coast.

CHAPTER VII.

CRADOCK ON THE WEST COAST.

36. *Reaction on Areas D and I.*—Before the "Carnarvon" left St. Vincent, on October 15th, Admiral Stoddart made arrangements for the disposition of his old squadron. The "Highflyer" and "Marmora" were ordered to leave the Canary Islands for the vicinity of St. Vincent, where they would join the "Empress of Britain." The watch on the Canaries was to be maintained by the "Victorian," due to return from coaling at Gibraltar. The whole force was left under the command of Captain Buller of the "Highflyer."

As the "Victorian" was unfortunately delayed in her coaling, and did not leave Gibraltar for the Canaries till October 19th, Area D was left with only the "Highflyer" and two merchant cruisers, and even this small force was soon broken up. The "Astrea," with two transports, homeward bound from the Cape, arrived at Sierra Leone on October 14th, and next day the Admiralty ordered the "Highflyer" to take them over and escort them till relieved by a cruiser from Force I. The only man-of-war therefore in the eastern portion of Area D became involved in convoy protection, leaving the armed merchant cruisers unsupported.

37. *The "Kent's" Movements.*—On October 3rd the "Kent" (Captain J. D. Allen) had been commissioned at Portsmouth after a long refit, and her sailing orders, dated October 8th, ordered her to proceed to the S.E. coast of America, calling at St. Vincent on the way. No mention was made in these sailing orders of Admiral Cradock's probable movements and he does not appear to have been informed of this reinforcement for his squadron.

The "Kent" sailed from Portsmouth on the 12th, and on the 15th her noon position was $37^{\circ} 37' N.$, $14^{\circ} 29' W.$, course for St. Vincent 15 knots. In view of the reduction in strength of Force D, the Admiralty on October 17th ordered her to remain in the vicinity of the Canaries and search for enemy coaling bases.

There was, however, a doubt as to whether the "Kent" would receive this signal and, in point of fact, she did not. The Admiralty, therefore, authorised Captain Buller ("Highflyer"), if the "Kent" had proceeded in accordance with her sailing orders to St. Vincent, to send her North with the convoy instead of the "Highflyer." This was done, and the "Kent" left St. Vincent with the convoy at 6 p.m. on the 20th October after completing with coal. None of these alterations in the "Kent's" original plans appear to have been transmitted either to Admiral Stoddart or to the Intelligence Centre, Pernambuco.

38. *The Canaries and the "Karlsruhe."*—Meanwhile Rear-Admiral de Robeck (Force I) had detached the "Vindictive" to the southern portion of his area to await the Cape convoy, but as there was considerable anxiety with regard to the Canary Islands, which were now completely uncovered, for the "Victorian" did not arrive off them till the 21st, the Admiralty ordered the "Vindictive" to visit the Islands.

Early on October 22nd another event occurred which roused apprehension with regard to the Canaries. The German ship "Crefeld," which had been acting as an auxiliary of the "Karlsruhe," entered Teneriffe, having on board the crews of 13 ships sunk to the north-eastward of Brazil. Admiral de Robeck thereupon suggested that he should send ships occasionally to visit the Canary Islands while Force D remained in its depleted state, and the Admiralty agreed to this.

39. On October 24th and 25th a series of reports reached the Admiralty indicating that the "Karlsruhe" was at the Bissagos Islands in Portuguese Guinea. The "Highflyer" and, on the 26th, the "Kent" (then off the Canaries) were accordingly ordered to search the African coast, Rear-Admiral De Robeck being directed to detach a cruiser and the "Calgarian" to the Canaries so as to leave Force D free to search for the "Karlsruhe" on the African coast.

The only vessel he had available was his own flagship the "Amphitrite," the "Calgarian" being in dockyard hands, and with this ship Admiral de Robeck proceeded to the Canaries, arriving off Las Palmas on the 28th.

The first effect, therefore, of the German move towards South America was to weaken Stoddart's old force and bring the Canaries into De Robeck's sphere of operations.

40. *Cradock goes to the West Coast.*—Meanwhile the "Glasgow" and "Monmouth" had proceeded up the west coast, and, on the evening of the 14th October, the Admiralty received a telegram from the former reporting her arrival at Coronel, and stating that she and the "Monmouth" would provision at Valparaiso the next day.

The Admiralty wired to the Consul-General at the latter port repeating the Rear-Admiral's orders not to go north of that port, but received a reply that the two ships had already left for an unknown destination—actually Port Lagunas, the newly established coaling base.

During the remainder of his stay at the Falkland Islands, Sir Christopher received no further orders. Telefunken wireless heard between September 25th and October 9th had led him to think that the "Karlsruhe" was in southern waters, but her location on October 8th in $0^{\circ} 20' S.$, $29^{\circ} 40' W.$, in the vicinity of St. Paul's Rocks, refuted this idea. The "Canopus" arrived on October 18th,* having been delayed by bad weather. On October 22nd the "Good Hope" sailed for the west coast, *viâ* Cape Horn, and was followed by the "Canopus" the next day, escorting two colliers *viâ* Magellan Straits. Coaling bases had been established at Port San Carlos in East Island, Falkland Islands, and on the west coast at Port Lagunas, Chile.

41. There are no indications in the Admiral's telegrams or official letters to show that he harboured any serious misgivings as to the fighting strength of his

* From "Canopus" log:—Arrived Port Stanley October 18th/10.15 p.m. Sailed October 23rd/9.30 a.m.

squadron. He had certain doubts, but this was not one of them. He was doubtful of his ability to force an action with the 12-knot "Canopus" attached to his squadron,* and this led to her being detached to convoy colliers. The problem of provisioning and storing his squadron was also becoming acute; the canteens were empty, and no mails had been received since July 10th, but no mention is made of his possible inferiority in gun power.

On the side of the Admiralty a note on the Staff Memorandum of September 7th had certainly implied such a doubt, and had suggested the despatch of the "Duke of Edinburgh," "Warrior," "Black Prince," and "Weymouth" to the S.E. coast if definite news were received of the German squadron making for South America (*see* para. 7), but the action taken had been limited to ordering the "Defence," on September 10th, from Malta to Gibraltar preparatory to proceeding to S.E. coast, an order which had been countermanded on September 16th.†

The Rear-Admiral had asked for the constitution of a squadron on the east coast, but apparently his primary object was to meet the enemy, and he decided to shed the "Canopus," on account of her slow speed, and relegate her to the work of convoying colliers.

This decision he embodied in a message sent when on his way round to the west coast on October 26th at 7 p.m., and passed *viâ* Port Stanley and Monte Video. "With reference to orders in Admiralty telegram received on October 7th (App. 20) to search for enemy and our great desire for early success, consider it impracticable on account of 'Canopus' slow speed to find and destroy enemy's squadron. Consequently have ordered 'Defence' to join me after calling at Monte Video for orders. 'Canopus' will be employed on necessary convoying of colliers. From experience of August 6th most respectfully submit not to oppose

App. 18. "I fear that strategically the speed of my squadron cannot exceed 12 knots owing to 'Canopus,' but shall trust circumstances will enable me to force an action."

† Apps. 5, 8. The "Kent," too, had been ordered out on October 8th, but had received counter orders on her way (*see* par. 28).

depredations of 'Karlsruhe,' may it continue until he meets vessel of superior speed."*

42. *Appreciation of October 28th.*—It was evident that the Admiral did not consider the attachment of the "Canopus" to his squadron a feasible arrangement. An appreciation of the situation was prepared at the Admiralty and is dated October 29th.† It stated that "the situation on the west coast seems safe. If the 'Gneisenau' and 'Scharnhorst' have gone north they will meet eventually 'Idzumo,' 'Newcastle,' and 'Hizen'‡ moving south, and will be forced south on 'Glasgow' and 'Monmouth,' who have good speed and can keep touch and draw them south on the 'Good Hope' and 'Canopus,' who should keep within supporting distance of each other."

The appreciation implies that the situation would be met by the North Pacific squadron moving south, which would at once protect the Panama Canal and force Admiral von Spee down on the "Glasgow" and "Monmouth," who would be able to draw him on to the "Good Hope" and "Canopus." Events, however, took a different course.

The Rear-Admiral had despatched an order to the "Defence" on October 26th to join his flag, but this was countermanded by the Admiralty, and a telegram was sent to Cradock on October 28th to the effect that she was to remain on the east coast under Stoddart's orders in order to ensure a sufficient force on either side. He was also informed that the Japanese battleship "Hizen" was shortly expected on the North American coast, and would move southward with the "Idzumo" and "New-

* App. 20. This message implying that he had detached "Canopus" was the last he succeeded in passing to Port Stanley by wireless, and was also received by Admiral Stoddart. It has been suggested that the Rear-Admiral regarded his instructions as impracticable. This is the only communication where he uses the word, and it can only mean that with the "Canopus" in company it was impracticable to find the enemy. The telegrams did not state that it was impracticable to engage the enemy on account of inferior gun power, which actually became the point at issue.

† Copy only in H.S. C.I.D.

‡ "Hizen" arrived off Honolulu October 21st and was delayed to watch "Geier." She was formerly Russian "Retvisan." Full sea-going speeds in I.D. return, Aug. 1914, are as follows:—"Monmouth," 22·3 knots; "Glasgow," 23·9 knots; "Scharnhorst," 20·5 knots; "Gneisenau," 20·5 knots.

castle" towards Galapagos. The question of the "Canopus" and her detachment from the squadron was not mentioned.*

43. *Situation on October 26th.*—Puerto Lagunas (45° 17' S., 73° 46' W.) had originally been chosen as a coaling base on the west coast. It is like all the adjacent coast, desolate and uninhabited, and was no doubt selected for this reason. It proved, however, unsatisfactory for deep draught vessels as the survey was inadequate, and the "Otranto" grounded on an uncharted shoal.

Captain Luce, therefore, removed the coaling base to Rada Vallenar (45° 20' S., 74° 35' W.), an excellent roadstead about 20 miles to the south-west.

The situation, therefore, on October 26th was—

"Good Hope" approaching Vallenar (arrived October 27th).

"Glasgow"
"Monmouth" } at Vallenar.
"Otranto" }

"Canopus" at Punta Arenas.

"Defence" at Pernambuco, on way south.

"Carnarvon" at Rio de Janeiro, on way south (3450 miles to Cape Pillar).

"Scharnhorst"
"Gneisenau"
"Nürnberg"
"Dresden"
"Leipzig" } at Masa Fuera.

On October 28th the squadron was still at Vallenar. The "Glasgow" left the roads on that date with orders to reconnoitre the coast and go into Coronel to send and receive telegrams. The "Canopus" was ordered to come up the same day with her colliers. The "Otranto" left on the 29th October at 4 p.m. to reconnoitre Port Montt. In the course of the day Telefunken was heard strongly by the "Glasgow," and the Rear-Admiral decided to sail with the "Monmouth" on October 30th and proceed secretly to the northwards, keeping out of sight of land and coaling at Juan Fernandez.†

* App. 21. As the last telegrams received by the Admiral were from Coronel on October 31st, it is not certain whether this one reached him. Captain Luce is of opinion it did.

† App. 22.

As the Admiral left the harbour he passed the "Canopus" struggling along with her two colliers. She had developed defects in her high pressure piston rod gland and required 24 hours' overhaul, and the Admiral ordered her into Vallenar to carry this out.

As the enemy was evidently in the vicinity, Captain Luce was informed that the proposed visit to Coronel to send telegrams was subsidiary to the search for the enemy, and the "Glasgow" accordingly cruised to the west and north-west of Santa Martha Island off Coronel during the 30th and the night of the 30th-31st.

The "Otranto" returned on October 31st from her visit to Port Montt. She had found the place entirely pro-German, could gather no information, and had left at 6 a.m. on the 31st.

At 1 a.m. and during the day the call sign of the "Leipzig" could be distinguished close at hand. Admiral Cradock seems to have formed the opinion that von Spee was making to the northward, for he called up the "Canopus" and ordered her to proceed with her two colliers to St. Felix (in lat. $26^{\circ} 18' S.$, $80^{\circ} 11' W.$), a lonely islet some 500 miles to northward of Juan Fernandez, uninhabited and possessing an indifferent anchorage.

On October 31st the "Glasgow" went into Coronel to send and receive messages, and a rendezvous with her was arranged 50 miles west of Coronel in $36^{\circ} 50' S.$, $74^{\circ} 13' W.$, at noon on November 1st (4.30 p.m. G.M.T.). The junction took place at 1 p.m., and as the sea was too heavy for boat work, the telegrams were transferred to the "Good Hope" by floating them alongside in a barrel. They were the last the Rear-Admiral was to receive.

44. *German Movements.*—The "Dresden" anchored in Orange Bay from September 5th to 16th, where a sailor left the ship's name and dates inscribed on a beacon; she remained on the coast of Chile till the 29th September, when she proceeded to the island of Masa Fuera, a lonely island with a few sheep ranches on it, lying far out from the Chilian coast. There she coaled from the "Baden," and on October 3rd left in tow of the "Baden" for Easter Island, away to the westward, where she arrived on the 11th, to be joined by the "Scharnhorst," "Gneisenau," and "Nürnberg" on October 12th. The arrival of the "Leipzig" on the 14th concentrated the

whole force, and the squadron remained there revictualing for a few days.

On October 18th von Spee sailed fully replenished for Masa Fuera, arriving there on October 26th, when Cradock was approaching Vallenar. There, on October 27th, he was joined by the "Prinz Eitel Fredrich," driven from New Guinea waters by the Australian squadron. He had heard on October 6th from the "Dresden" that the "Good Hope," "Monmouth," and "Glasgow," with an auxiliary cruiser were at Punta Arenas on September 27th and had left again after a short stay. He probably received further wireless intelligence, and no doubt heard that British cruisers had visited Valparaiso, for on October 27th he sailed, and on October 30th and 31st was cruising some 50 miles west of Valparaiso. The Germans were more fortunate than ourselves in obtaining information from the Chilian coast, probably by wireless from German vessels, and on receipt of definite information on October 31st of the "Glasgow's" visit to Coronel, von Spee had proceeded south in line abreast at 14 knots in the hope of cutting her off, but she left in time to escape him.

45. *Enemy in Sight, November 1st.*—The Rear-Admiral was possibly engaged in reading some of the telegrams brought by the "Glasgow," when at 1.50 p.m. (November 1st) German wireless sounded clear and distinct to the northward, and orders were given to spread 15 miles apart on a line N.E. by E. course N.W. by N. (mag.), 10 knots. The order from the west end of the line was "Good Hope," "Monmouth," "Otranto," and "Glasgow." There was good visibility. At 4.20 p.m. the line was still incomplete when the "Glasgow" sighted smoke to the eastward on her starboard bow and altered course N. $80^{\circ} E.$ towards it. Her position at 4.25 p.m. was $36^{\circ} 23' S.$, $73^{\circ} 40' W.$ At 4.40 p.m. she was able to report the "Scharnhorst," "Gneisenau," and a light cruiser in sight, and a few minutes later was able to determine their course and reported "enemy's protected cruisers in sight steering between S.E. and South." The "Glasgow" turned at full speed to close the "Good Hope," and the "Monmouth" and "Otranto" followed. The "Canopus," which had left Vallenar Roads at 9 a.m. on October 31st, was 300 miles to the southward, toiling slowly along with her two colliers in a heavy sea on her

long voyage to St. Felix. During the afternoon the "Nürnberg" had chased a vessel inshore, and the "Dresden" had been thrown out to keep touch with her. Thus, at 4.40 p.m. (November 1st) when the two forces came into contact von Spee's squadron was somewhat scattered.

APPENDIX.

TELEGRAMS.

CORONEL CAMPAIGN.

ADMIRALTY TELEGRAMS.

- | No. | From R.A., 4th C.S. | Date sent, |
|--------|---|---|
| 1. In | To Admiralty. | September 3rd, 5.0 p.m.
Received,
1.24 a.m. on the 4th. |
| 285. | "Good Hope" arrived Fernando Noronha, after visiting St. Paul's Rocks, will arrive Pernambuco September 5th for orders. (Reports Result of Sweep.)
"Cornwall" is in wireless touch, proceeding South.
"Glasgow" reports proceeding with "Monmouth" and "Otranto" to Magellan Straits, where number of German ships reported, presumably colliers, and where concentration of German cruisers from China, Pacific Ocean and Atlantic Ocean appears possible. | |
| 2. Out | From Admiralty. | Date sent,
September 3rd, 5.0 p.m. |
| | To R.A., 4th C.S. | |
| 200. | You are to remain and take charge of the S.E. Coast of America Station. Ships under your orders: "Good Hope," "Berwick," "Bristol," "Glasgow," "Monmouth," "Carmania," "Otranto," "Victorian." Communicate with "Glasgow." | |
| 3. In | From R.A., "Good Hope," at Pernambuco. | Date sent,
September 5th, 6.25 p.m. |
| | To Admiralty. | Received,
12.20 a.m. on the 6th. |
| 290. | "Gneisenau" and "Scharnhorst" reported Caroline Islands, North of Tahiti (sic), 8th August. Is there any later information as to movements. Several German colliers said to be in vicinity of Magellan Straits. Reply to Pernambuco. | |

- | No. | From Admiralty. | Date sent, |
|--------|---|--|
| 4. Out | From Admiralty. | September 6th, 4.5. p.m. |
| | To R.A., "Good Hope," Pernambuco. | |
| 64. | No certain information of these ships since August 8th. C-in-C., China, reported they had colliers with 20,000 tons of coal with them. Rumours of German cruisers near Sumatra. China squadron searching. Magellan Straits and its vicinity quite possible. Falkland Islands anchorages might also be used by them. | |
| 5. Out | From Admiralty. | Date sent,
September 10th, 2.40 p.m. |
| | To S.N.O., Malta. | |
| | "Warrior" to proceed at once to Dardanelles. As soon as she is in touch with "Indefatigable," the "Defence" is to proceed to Gibraltar and fill up with coal preparatory to proceeding to S.E. Coast of America. | |
| 6. Out | From Admiralty. | Date sent,
September 14th, 5.50 p.m.,
via Rio. |
| 71. | There is a strong probability of the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" arriving in the Magellan Straits or on the West Coast of South America. The Germans have begun to carry on trade on the West Coast of South America. Leave sufficient force to deal with "Dresden" and "Karlsruhe." Concentrate as squadron strong enough to meet "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau," making Falkland Islands your coaling base. "Canopus" is now en route to Abrolhos. "Defence" is joining you from Mediterranean. Until "Defence" joins, keep at least "Canopus" and one "County" class with your Flagship. As soon as you have superior force, search the Magellan Straits with squadron, being ready to return and cover the River Plate, or according to information search North as far as Valparaiso. Break up the German trade and destroy the German cruisers. Anchorages in vicinity of Golfo Nuevo and Egg Harbour should be searched. Colliers are being ordered to Falkland Islands. Consider whether colliers from Abrolhos should be ordered South. | |
| 7. Out | From Admiralty. | Date sent,
September 16th, 12.20 p.m. |
| | To R.A., "Good Hope," Monte Video. | |
| 74. | Situation changed. "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" appeared off Samoa on September 14th to find it British, and left it steering N.W. "Emden" off Calcutta on September 14th. "Hampshire" and "Yarmouth" sent to search for her.
German trade on W. Coast of America is to be attacked at once. Cruisers need not now be concentrated. Two | |

- cruisers and an armed liner would appear sufficient for Magellan Straits and West Coast.
Report what you propose about "Canopus" and coaling bases.
8. *Out From Admiralty.* Date sent, September 16th, 11.15 a.m.
To A.S., Malta.
401. "Defence" will not now be required for S.E. Coast of America. Have defects thoroughly completed, and remain at Malta at 48 hours' notice.
9. *In From R.A., "Good Hope,"* Monte Video. Date sent, September 18th, 5.10 p.m.
To Admiralty. Received, 11.18 p.m. on the 18th.
300. When finished coaling am proceeding with "Good Hope," "Glasgow," "Monmouth," and "Otranto" to sweep South, region of Magellan Straits and search. "Glasgow" and "Monmouth" will continue to West Coast of America, to be followed by "Carmania," to destroy trade. "Canopus" will be ordered, after coaling Abrolhos Rocks, to proceed to Rio de la Plata to guard trade and colliers and remain pending events. Have ordered first two colliers arriving Abrolhos Rocks to proceed to Rio de la Plata, and propose to send first to Coronel for orders of "Glasgow." Heavy continuous gale here interferes with scheme of operations. Abrolhos Rocks very severe cold (*sic*)* coaling base exposed and considerable swell. Ships and colliers suffer accordingly, but no alternative. Brazil friendly, but very sensitive as to neutrality rights. Local German interest undoubtedly responsible.
* Read "gales."
10. *Out From Admiralty.* Date sent, September 30th, 10.0 p.m.
To R.A., 4th C.S.
81. Governor of Papeete reports that "Gneisenau" and "Scharnhorst" arrived at Papeete September 22nd with two colliers. They sank gunboat "Zelee" and destroyed half the town by shell fire. They left the same morning, steaming N.E.
(*Not received by Rear-Admiral at time, see No 14.*)
11. *In From R.A., 4th C.S.* Date sent, October 2nd, 6.20 a.m.
To Admiralty. Received, 1.30 p.m. on the 2nd.
508. September 30th. Search of Orange Bay fruitless owing to enemy's movements north. I consider it advisable now to coal "Monmouth" and "Glasgow" before going North, and have sent them to Falkland. "Otranto" proceeding Punta Arenas till October 3rd, then rejoining "Glasgow" and "Monmouth." "Good Hope" remaining in vicinity of Falkland for the present.

- No.
12. *Out From Admiralty.* Date sent, October 5th, 8.20 p.m.
To I.O., Monte Video, via Port Stanley to Good Hope. Received, October 7th.
Following from Navy Office, Melbourne, begins: 5.0 Suva message at 8.15 p.m., 4th October, "Scharnhorst" on the way between Marquesas Island and Easter Island
It appears that "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" are working across to S. America. You must be prepared to have to meet them in company possibly with a "Dresden" scouting for them. "Canopus" should accompany "Glasgow," "Monmouth," and "Otranto," the ships to search and protect trade in combination. Arrange about coal and consider whether a collier should accompany squadron. If you propose "Good Hope" to go, leave "Monmouth" on east coast and arrange for a Senior Officer for east coast. Inform R.A. "Good Hope" at Falkland Islands and "Canopus." Report when passed to "Good Hope."
13. *Out From Admiralty.* Date sent, October 7th, 7.45 p.m.
To Intelligence Officer, Monte Video. Wellington, N.Z., gives position "Scharnhorst" Long. 130° W.
14. *In From R.A., "Good Hope,"* Received, 6.15 p.m. October 8th. on the 12th October.
To Admiralty. via Monte Video.
312. Admiralty telegrams 75 to 92 received *except* 79 — 81* — 87. Intelligence received re "Gneisenau" and "Scharnhorst." "Good Hope" re-visited Orange Bay October 7th, found evidence of presence of "Dresden" there September 11th. Indications show possibility of "Dresden," "Leipzig," "Nurnberg" joining "Gneisenau" and "Scharnhorst." Have ordered "Canopus" to Falkland Islands, where I intend to concentrate and avoid division of forces. Have ordered "Glasgow," "Monmouth" and "Otranto" not to go north of Valparaiso until German cruisers are again located. "Karlsruhe" apparently operating in S. American water; suggest therefore "Essex" be now detached and relieved† by (*sic*) "Cornwall," and remain as S.N.O.; "Cornwall" then proceeding South. With reference to your 74, does "Defence" join my command? Do regulations of Panama Canal Company permit passage of belligerent ships at present time? . . .
* *Note.*—Telegrams 79 and 87 were not important, for 81 see No. 10.
† Read "relieve Cornwall."
15. *In From R.A., "Good Hope,"* Received, 5.35 p.m. October 8th. on the 11th October,
To Admiralty. via Monte Video.
313. Without alarming, respectfully suggest that in event of the enemy's heavy cruisers and others concentrating West

No

Coast of South America, it is necessary to have a British force on each coast strong enough to bring them to action. For otherwise should the concentrated British force sent from S.E. Coast be evaded in the Pacific, which is not impossible, (? and) thereby (? get) behind the enemy, the latter could destroy Falkland, English Bank and Abrolhos coaling bases in turn, with little to stop them, and with British ships unable to follow up owing to want of coal. Enemy might possibly reach West Indies.

16. *Out* From Admiralty. Date sent,
October 14th, 12.30 p.m.
To R.A., "Good Hope."
100. Your 312 and 313. Your concentration of "Good Hope," "Canopus," "Monmouth," "Glasgow" and "Otranto" for combined operations concurred in. Stoddart in "Carnarvon" has been ordered to Monte Video as S.N.O. North of Monte Video. "Defence" ordered to join "Carnarvon." He will also have "Cornwall," "Bristol," "Macedonia" and "Orama" under his orders. "Essex" remains in West Indies. Supply ships, "Crown of Galicia," with colliers, will be sent to Monte Video to be moved on as you order.
17. From Admiralty. Date sent,
October 14th, 1.15 p.m.
To R.A., "Carnarvon."
101. Proceed down trade route to Monte Video, calling at Pernambuco and Rio on the way. "Defence" is following you down from Gibraltar. While you are there "Cornwall," "Bristol," "Macedonia" and "Orama" will be under your orders. Keep sufficient force ready to concentrate in case German squadron from Pacific escape past Cradock, who has "Good Hope," "Canopus," "Monmouth," "Bristol" (*sic*)* and "Otranto" . . . (Here follows information *re* colliers and supply ships.) Communicate whenever you can with Cradock. He is now in vicinity of Falkland Islands.
* Misscript for Glasgow.
18. *In* From R.A., 4th C.S., Date sent,
via Monte Video. October 18th, 11.55 a.m.
To Admiralty. Received,
6.4 p.m. on the 18th.
316. "Karlsruhe" not reported since September 22nd. Consider it possible, in conjunction with Telefunken wireless heard by "Good Hope" south of Cape Horn between September 25th and October 9th, that she has been driven west and is to join other five.
I fear that strategically the speed of my squadron cannot exceed 12 knots, owing to "Canopus," but shall trust circumstances will enable me to force an action.

- No.
19. *In* From R.A., 4th C.S., Date sent,
via Punta Arenas. October 24th, 11.50 a.m.
To Admiralty. Received,
6.25 p.m. on the 24th.
319. "Good Hope" left October 22nd *via* Cape Horn. "Canopus" followed October 23rd *via* Magellan Straits (with 3 colliers) for West Coast of S. America. Until further notice address telegrams to Consular Intelligence Officer, Monte Video, who has been instructed as to disposal.
Squadron's secret coaling bases are Port San Carlos, East Island and Port Laguna, Chile.
20. *In* From R.A., 4th C.S., *via* Date sent,
Port Stanley and October 27th, 11.30 a.m.
Monte Video. Received,
To Admiralty. 7.25 p.m. on the 27th.
325. October 26th, 7 p.m., at Sea. With reference to orders in Admiralty telegram received on October 7th to search for enemy and our great desire for early success, consider it impracticable on account of "Canopus" slow speed, to find and destroy enemy's squadron. Consequently have ordered "Defence" to join me after calling at Monte Video for orders.
"Canopus" will be employed on necessary convoying of colliers. From experience of August 6th,* most respectfully submit not to oppose deprivations of "Karlsruhe." May it continue until he meets vessel of superior speed.
* On August 6th, "Karlsruhe" had outpaced "Suffolk" and "Bristol" in West Indies.
21. *Out* From Admiralty. Date sent,
October 28th, 6.45 p.m.
To R.A., "Good Hope."
109. Your 325. "Defence" is to remain on East Coast under orders of Stoddart. This will leave sufficient force on each side in case the hostile cruisers appear there on the trade routes. There is no ship available for the Cape Horn vicinity. Japanese battleship "Hizen" shortly expected on North American Coast. She will join with Japanese "Idzumo" and "Newcastle" and move south towards Galapagos.
22. *In* From R.A., "Good Hope." Date sent,
October 31st, 7.45 p.m.
To Admiralty. Received, 4.33 a.m. on
November 1st.
326. Your telegram 105 received. German mails seized. "Good Hope," "Monmouth," and "Otranto" at Vallenar, coaling. "Glasgow" patrolling vicinity of Coronel to intercept German shipping. Rejoining flag later on. After coaling, intend to proceed secretly northwards with squadron, keeping out of sight of land and coaling at Juan Fernandez, where friendly French interests. Continue sending telegrams to Monte Video till further notice.

- No. 23. *In* From "Good Hope,"
via Coronel.
To Admiralty. Date sent,
October 31st, 9.0 p.m.
Received, 6.43 a.m. on
November 1st.
328. October 29th, noon, Vallenar.
Telegrams for me should be sent to British Consul
Coronel, up to November 4th; then to British Consul-
General, Valparaiso, until further notice.
24. *In* From R.A., "Good Hope." Date sent,
October 31st, 9.0 p.m.
To Admiralty. Received, 7.40 a.m. on
November 1st.
329. October 29th, noon, Vallenar.
Mails should be forwarded to Valparaiso for Rear-Admiral
Cradock, "Good Hope" "Glasgow," "Monmouth,"
"Canopus," and "Otranto" until further notice
25. *Out* From Admiralty. Date sent,
November 3rd, 6.20 p.m.
To R.A., "Carnarvon" and
"Defence."
Proceed with all possible despatch to join Admiral
Cradock on West Coast of America.
Cancelled, 11.45 a.m. on the 4th.
26. *Out* From Admiralty. Date sent,
November 3rd, 6.55 p.m.
To R.A., "Good Hope,"
via Monte Video.
110. "Defence" has been ordered to join your flag with all
despatch. "Glasgow" should find or keep touch with
the enemy. You should keep touch with "Glasgow," con-
centrating the rest of your squadron, including "Canopus."
It is important that you should effect your junction with
"Defence" at earliest possible moment subject to keeping
touch with "Glasgow" and enemy.

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY.

MOVEMENTS OF REAR-ADMIRAL CRADOCK'S SQUADRON.

- 1914.
- Sept. 3 - Cradock appointed to south-east coast.
" 8-28 - Down the south-east coast.
" 8 - Good Hope at Abrolhos Rocks.
" 14 - At Sta. Catherina.
" 17 - At Monte Video.
" 22 - Leaves Monte Video.
" 25 - Meets S.S. "Ortega" at sea.
" 28 - Off Cape Virgins, arrives Punta Arenas, Magellan
Straits.
" 29 - Visits Orange Bay.
Sept. 29-Oct. 22 - "Good Hope" in Falklands area.

- 1914.
- Oct. 5 - Visits Orange Bay.
" 7 - "Glasgow," "Monmouth," "Otranto" on way up
west coast.
" 8 - "Good Hope" at Port Stanley.
" 14 - "Glasgow" calls at Coronel.
" 15 - (Defence leaves Gibraltar for Monte Video.)
" 18 - "Canopus" arrives Port Stanley.
" 22 - "Good Hope" leaves Port Stanley for west coast
via Cape Horn.
" 23 - "Canopus" leaves Port Stanley for west coast via
Magellan.
" 26 - "Defence" arrives Pernambuco (3,450 miles to
western entrance Magellan, about 3,900 to
Vallenar). Ordered by Cradock to join him.
Admiralty countermand order Oct. 28th.
" 27 - "Good Hope" arrives Vallenar, joins "Glasgow,"
"Monmouth" and "Otranto."
" 28 - "Glasgow" leaves Vallenar for Coronel.
" 30 - "Good Hope" and "Monmouth" leave Vallenar
to join "Glasgow."
" 30 - "Canopus" arrives Vallenar.
" 31 - "Glasgow" visits Coronel.
Nov. 1 - Battle of Coronel.

GEOGRAPHICAL INDEX.*

(CORONEL OPERATIONS.)

Abbreviations :—Numbers in brackets, as (8), refer to paragraphs
in text. S.A.P. = South America Pilot; I. = Part I., 6th
edition, 1911; II. = Part II., 11th edition, 1916; III. = Part
III., 1st edition, 1915. Pacific Is. = Pacific Islands Sailing
Directions; III. = Vol. III, 4th edition, 1909.

ABROLHOS ROCKS, BRAZIL :

Group of five small rocks some 30 miles from the coast of
Brazil, about 650 miles south of Pernambuco, largest Santa
Barbara, 131 feet high, three quarters of a mile in length, lying
east and west with lighthouse.

Lat. 17° 85' S., Long. 38° 42' W.

Anchorage in 8 to 9 fathoms.

Coaling rendezvous at outbreak of war (8).

S.A.P., I. 256, Chart 3157.

* The information is taken from South America Pilot, Part I.
(1911), Part II. (1916), Part III. (1915), and from Pacific Islands,
Vol. II. (Central Groups), Vol. III. Eastern Groups, issued by the
Hydrographic Department. Charts required are South Atlantic
West No. 2202B (Orinoco to Cape Horn) and Cape Horn to Cape
Corrientes, No. 786.

BARNEVELDT ROCKS :

Group of small islets 28 miles north and east of Cape Horn. Cradock's course on night of September 28th to 29th 1914 inside Barneveldt Rocks (28).

S.A.P., II. 57, Chart 1373.

BEAGLE CHANNEL :

Channel to south of Terra del Fuego, between it and two islands, Hoste Island and Navarin Island on south. Cradock's intention to search (25).

S.A.P., II. 42, Chart 1373.

BISSAGOS ISLANDS :

Africa; Portuguese Guinea. "Karlsruhe" suspected there October 24th (39).

CAMBRIDGE ISLAND (CHILI) :

Island on West Coast South America, 85 miles north of western entrance to Magellan Straits. "Ortega" chased, September 18th (27), Chart 786.

CAPE SAN ROQUE (BRAZIL) :

North-eastern point of Brazil. Lat. $5^{\circ} 29' S.$, Long. $35^{\circ} 15' W.$ Sandy point, 180 feet high. "Glasgow" sweeps up to (15).

CAPE VIRGINS (ARGENTINE) :

Eastern entrance Magellan Straits. Rear-Admiral Cradock arrives there September 28th (27).

CAPE CORRIENTES.

Columbia, North-West Coast of South America.

CERRITO.

Wireless station near Monte Video (10).

COCKBURN CHANNEL.

Channel 40 miles long between the western arm of Terra del Fuego on South and Clarence Island on north, forming a short cut out of Magellan Straits to southward.

Rear-Admiral Cradock proceeds from Punta Arenas through it on way to Orange Bay, September 28th (28).

S.A.P., II. 235, Chart 554.

EASTER ISLAND, CHILI (OR RAPA NUI) :

Small island 29 miles in circumference in East Pacific. Lat. $27^{\circ} 8' S.$, Long. $109^{\circ} 25' W.$ Anchorage. 220 inhabitants (1906).

German concentration there October 14th (44).

Pacific Is., III. 104, Chart Easter Is. 1386.

ENGLISH BANK.

Bank, 20 miles long by 5 miles broad on north side of entrance to River Plate coaling rendezvous for South East Coast Squadron (8).

S.A.P., I. 377, Chart 493.

EGG HARBOUR :

East Coast South America, Argentine. A sheltered anchorage in Gulf of St. George, north side, some 10 miles west of Cape Dos Bahias, exposed to south-east.

Cradock ordered to search, September 14th (25).

S.A.P., I. 502, Chart 2202B.

FERNANDO NORONHA (BRAZIL) :

Small island in Atlantic, 200 miles from Brazilian Coast, $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles long by $1\frac{3}{4}$ miles broad. Penal settlement for Pernambuco. Lat. $3^{\circ} 50' S.$, Long. $32^{\circ} 25' W.$

Suspected use of by German ships (15).

S.A.P., I. 159, Chart 2202B, Plan 388.

FLORIANOPOLIS :

Brazil, Santa Caterina Province, "Good Hope" at, September 15th (App. 12).

GILL BAY :

In Gulf of St. George, Argentine. A small bay on north side, close to Egg Harbour, about one mile deep and three quarters of a mile wide, with anchorage in 8 fathoms.

"Dresden" anchored there, August 31st (17).

S.A.P., I. 502, Chart 1284.

GOLFO NUEVO :

South America, Argentine, gulf south of Gulf of St. Matias, formed by Valdez Peninsula.

Cradock ordered to search, September 14th (25).

S.A.P., I. 489, Chart 2202B.

GULF OF ST. MATHIAS (MATIAS) :

South America, East Coast, Argentine, reached by "Good Hope," September 24th (27).

HERMITE ISLAND :

Island some 10 miles to west and north of Cape Horn, about 13 miles long by $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles broad. The largest island of the Hermite Group.

Searched by Cradock, October 5th (28).

S.A.P., II. 57, Chart 1373.

HOSTE ISLAND :

Large irregularly-shaped island, south of Terra del Fuego. South-eastern extremity is False Cape Horn. Orange Bay is an inlet on the east coast, about 15 miles to northward of False Cape Horn.

Cradock proceeds there, September 28th (28).

Chart 2202B, 1373.

JERICOACOARA (BRAZIL) :

North coast of Brazil, an anchorage some 350 miles west of Cape San Roque.

"Dresden" coals there, August 9th, 10th (17).

S.A.P., I. 139, Chart 528.

MAS AFUERA (CHILI) :

A small island in Pacific, about 9 miles long and 6 miles broad, about 450 miles from coast of Chili and 84 miles west of Juan Fernandez, with an anchorage on north-west side.

Lat. $33^{\circ} 46' S.$, Long. $80^{\circ} 46' W.$

German Squadron there, October 26th, 27th (43).

S.A.P., III. 274, Chart 786, Plan on 1383.

MARQUESAS IS. (FRENCH) :

Group of islands, East Pacific.

German Squadron there, September 26th, 1914, to October 2nd, 1914 (29).

Pacific Is., III. 153, Chart (Marquesas Islands) 1640.

NELSON STRAIT :

West Coast South America. Lat. $51^{\circ} 40' S.$, Long. $75^{\circ} W.$
Entrance about 70 miles north of Cape Pillar (the Cape at western entrance (south side) of Magellan Straits). Runs east-north-east about 40 miles between Cambridge Island on north and Queen Adelaide Archipelago on south.

Captain Kinneir in "Ortega" escaped from "Dresden" through Nelson Strait, September 18th (27).

S.A.P., II. 361, Chart 786, 23.

ORANGE BAY :

In Hoste Island, Terra del Fuego, lies on east side of Hardy Peninsula, which is a long arm running out more or less north and south at south-east end of Hoste Island, terminating in False Cape Horn (some 35 miles to westward of Cape Horn). Orange Bay is a small bay about 2 miles wide by 2 miles deep, open to eastward, about 12 miles north of False Cape Horn.

"Dresden" visited September 5th to 16th (17).

Searched by Cradock, September 29th, October 5th (28).

S.A.P., II. 63, Chart 1373.

PAPIETE (FRENCH) :

Capital of Tahiti, Society Islands, principal harbour of. German cruisers bombarded September 22nd, 1914 (28). Pacific Is., III. 60, Chart 1382.

PONAPE :

Caroline Islands, Pacific. "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" there August 8th (17).

PORT MADRYN :

South America, East Coast Argentine. Lat. $42^{\circ} 46'$, Long. $64^{\circ} 59' W.$ on west side of Golfo. Good anchorage.

Visited by Cradock in September in search for "Dresden" (27).

S.A.P. I. 491, Chart 2202B.

PORT MONTT :

South America, West Coast, Chili, north end of Reloncavi Sound in Corcovado Gulf. Lat. $41^{\circ} 28' S.$, Long. $72^{\circ} 57' W.$ Population (1911), 5,408.

"Otranto" reconnoitred, October 29th (43).

S.A.P., III. 131, Chart 1289.

PORT SAN CARLOS :

A harbour on North West-Coast of East Falkland at eastern side of north entrance to Falkland Sound. Lat. $51^{\circ} 30' S.$, Long. $59^{\circ} W.$, one of the finest harbours in Falklands, with entrance one mile wide and two arms about four miles long; depth 15 to 6 fathoms. Coaling base established, October 1914 (40).

S.A.P., I. 557, Chart 1354B.

PORT LAGUNAS :

South America, Chili, Chonos Archipelago. Lat. $45^{\circ} 17' S.$, Long. $73^{\circ} 46' W.$ Lonely anchorage at south-east end of Melchor Island.

Coaling anchorage established, October 1914 (40).

S.A.P., III. 39, Chart 1325.

PUNTA ARENAS (CHILI) :

In Magellan Straits. Population (1912), 10,500. Good and well sheltered anchorage from prevalent westerly and south-westerly winds. Telegraph to Gallegos and thence to Buenos Aires by Wireless (ciphers not permitted).

S.A.P., II. 122, Chart 554.

ROCAS REEF :

Atlantic, off Coast of Brazil, 125 miles north-east of Cape San Roque, reef with anchorage and lighthouse, about 80 miles west of Fernando Noronha.

Lat. $3^{\circ} 52' S.$, Long. $33^{\circ} 49' W.$

Suspected use of by German ships (15), (17).

S.A.P., I. 161, Chart Plan 1949.

ST. PAUL'S ROCKS (PENEDO DE S. PEDRO) :

Group of rocks in Atlantic off Coast of Brazil some 520 miles north-east of Cape San Roque.

Lat. $0^{\circ} 55' N.$, Long. $29^{\circ} 23' W.$, about quarter of a mile in extent, nearly steep-to.

S.A.P., I. 158, Chart 2202B, Plan 1397.

SAINT FELIX (CHILI) :

Small Island, about 500 miles from Coast of Chili. Lat. $26^{\circ} 19' S.$, Long. $80^{\circ} 10' W.$

"Canopus" ordered to go there with colliers, October 31st (43).

S.A.P., III. 275, Chart 786, Plan 1383.

SMYTH CHANNEL :

An inshore Patagonian Channel at western end Magellan Straits, running 43 miles in a north-north-easterly and northerly direction and communicating with Nelson Strait.

"Ortega" escapes from "Dresden" through Smyth Channel, September 18th (27).

S.A.P., II. 244, 247, Chart 23.

TRINIDADA :

An islet in Atlantic some 600 miles off Brazilian Coast (to eastward of C. San Thome). Lat. $20^{\circ} 30' S.$, Long. $29^{\circ} 22' W.$ about 3 miles by $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles in size, anchorage at south-west end.

"Dresden" coals there, August 20th (17).

S.A.P., I. 162, Chart 2202B.

VALLENAR ROADS (RADA VALLENAR) :

In Chonos Archipelago, Chili. East side of Islas ValLENAR on north side of western end of Darwin Strait, excellent roadstead sheltered, 12 fathoms. Lat. $45^{\circ} 24' S.$, $74^{\circ} 18' W.$

Coaling anchorage established there, October 1914, on Port Lagunas being found unsuitable (43)

S.A.P., III. 36, Chart 1325, Plan on 1296.

THE GERMAN CRUISER SQUADRON IN THE PACIFIC, 1914.

MONOGRAPH No. 2.

NAVAL STAFF.

(TRAINING AND STAFF DUTIES DIVISION.)

July, 1919.

NOTE ON SOURCES.

The Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence are carrying out the task of collecting and arranging the papers relating to the war, and the documents at present in their custody are the principal source for the following monograph.

CHINA.

Telegrams and undocketed papers from China Station are in H.S. 11 (Historical Section, Vol. 11).

Docketed papers are in H.S. 34; all papers relating to the Siege of Tsingtau are bound up separately in H.S. 35.

AUSTRALIA.

Telegrams and undocketed papers from July 30th to September 30th, 1914, are bound up in H.S. 7; from September 30th to December 15th in H.S. 16.

Docketed papers are in H.S. 45.

NORTH-WEST COAST OF AMERICA.

Telegrams and undocketed papers relating to N.W. Coast are bound up in volume H.S. 24.

Docketed papers have not yet been bound up, but are in a box file marked North Pacific, 1914.

GERMAN ASIATIC SQUADRON.

The German sources consist of a Diary from the "Gneisenau"; a list of noon positions and other information as to supply ships in a Pocket-book kept by Obersteuermann's Maat (~~Assistant Navigator~~ ^{Chief Quartermaster}) Zeus of the "Dresden"; a Note-book kept by Paul Siebert (Torpedo Machinist) in the "Leipzig," and a chart of

"Leipzig's" movements by F. Tantow (Steuermann). Three letters intercepted from the "Cormoran," a letter from the "Scharnhorst" (in "Kieler Neueste Nachrichten," January 10th, 1915), a report of the cruise of "Prinz Eitel Friedrich" in "Weser Zeitung," April 10th, 1915. There are also two books containing a considerable amount of information, "Das Kreuzer Geschwader," Admiral Dick, 1917, and "Maximilian, Graf von Spee," Admiral Kirchhoff, 1915.

"Das Kreuzer Geschwader" (the Cruiser Squadron), by Admiral C. Dick, Berlin, 1917, 233 pages. The author states in the preface that numerous letters and diaries have been placed at his disposal as well as further information that has come to hand. The book contains a large amount of information, and appears to be generally reliable and accurate, but in its account of the "Leipzig's" movements it omits her stops at Balenas Bay on 27th August 1914, Galapagos Islands, Lobos Afuera and Puerto de San Nicolas (Peru). It contains at the end a list of the officers in each ship, with photographs and biographies of the principal officers, and forms the basis of the account of Graf von Spee's Squadron in I.D. 1173, July 1918.

"Maximilian, Graf von Spee, Der Sieger von Coronel," by Vice-Admiral Germann Kirchhoff, Berlin, 1915. This is a somewhat discursive memorial of Graf von Spee containing eight letters of von Spee to his wife—Marshall Islands, August 18th, 1914; Majuro, August 29th, 1914; Nukuhiva, October 1st, 1914, October 13th, 1914; Mas Afuera, October 27th, 1914, November 10th, 1914, November 25th, 1914, November 26th, 1914; also one letter from Lieut. Heinrich von Spee ("Gneisenau"), November 25th, 1914, and letters from Lieut. Otto von Spee ("Nurnberg"), November 10th, 1914, November 24th, 1914, November 26th, 1914. These letters give a certain amount of information.

"Gneisenau" officer's diary. This is a small black-covered pocket diary, 4½ inches by 3 inches, for the quarter October 1st to December 31st, written up in pencil (in ink November 19th to November 23rd), damaged by water, not easily decipherable, ending on December 6th. There is a full translation of this diary in N.I.D. 13117 of June 6th, 1917, and the original diary is attached to the paper. There is an abbreviated and inferior translation evidently of the same diary in Vice-Admiral, Mediterranean, January 29th, 1915,

M. 17613. The translations are evidently of the same diary, for both diarists buy three pairs of boots on October 3rd, and both keep the 6.30-8 watch on October 4th (this has by chance been missed out from the N.I.D. version, though it is in the original). The matter and arrangement of both versions are practically identical. The diary contains useful information as to coaling and dates.

"Dresden" note-book, kept by Obersteuermann's Maat J. Zeus, of "Dresden," mentioned in Graf von Spee's Squadron, I.D. 1173, 1918, footnotes pages 6, 40. This is apparently the original of the article in "Naval Review," August, 1915, "Extracts from the Log of the 'Dresden,'" but the latter contains certain mistakes, either of mistranslation or misscripts; in list of coaling places it states 8th-14th September, Orange Bay, but in the chart attached and in I.D. 1173 the dates are 5th-16th September, Orange Bay. The original is in I.D. Library, and was evidently written up after the battle of the Falkland Islands.

"Leipzig" note-book, by Paul Siebert (Torpedo Machinist), gives the writer's ports of call from April 23rd, 1914, to January 19th, 1915, and date and hour of arrival and departure. Translation in I.D. 1173, "Graf von Spee's Squadron," page 42. This was apparently written up when Siebert was a prisoner of war.

"Leipzig" chart of movements, by F. Tantow, Steuermann, interned Brorton Camp, Stafford (Navigating Warrant Officer). This is on a chart of the world, carefully adorned with paintings and scroll work and list of officers of the "Leipzig." Positions agree with notebook and they are probably related.

"Cormoran's" letters: (a) Translation, letter, Erich Hollander, of "Cormoran," June 26th, 1916, in N.I.D. 20789, November 14th, 1916, gives a number of details. (b) Translation, letter, W. Silz, Chief Gunner's Mate to Leading Torpedoman E. Pulz in S 19 at Wilhelmshaven, dated Guam, August 17th, 1916. Writer joined the "Cormoran" at Yap, September 29th, 1914. His account is full, and, so far as he was in a position to know, seems to be accurate.

"Prinz Eitel Friedrich," report of cruise up to November 1914, in "Weser Zeitung," April 10th, 1915, translation in N.I.D. 6721, April 18th, 1915, purporting

to be based on interviews with her Captain and First Lieutenant, presumably after her internment at Newport News, March 11th, 1915.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE.*

1. The German "East Asiatic Squadron" exercised an influence in the first months of the war only second to that of the High Sea Fleet. Over a vast area its activity was the controlling influence in our dispositions, for on our foreign stations we had few ships capable of engaging the two armoured cruisers with any prospect of success. The Battle of Coronel gave convincing proof of their efficiency, and the eddies of that distant conflict finally affected our main concentration in home waters.

The following monograph deals with the operations against the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" in the Pacific. As the area of operations covers half the globe, only a general treatment of the subject is attempted, and particular aspects of it such as the Australian convoy, the expeditions against the German possessions and the operations of the "Emden" are only mentioned in so far as they affected the operations against the enemy armoured cruisers.

Each chapter deals with a definite phase of the operations. An appendix has been added containing the principal telegrams sent to or from the Admiralty relating to the operations under review, and the actual text of these should be consulted and compared with the narrative.

2. *China Station.*—The China Station was commanded by Vice-Admiral Sir T. H. M. Jerram, K.C.B.

The limits of the station were:—

On the West, a line joining the following points:—

(a) 6° N., 120° E.

(b) 6° N., 104° E.

* Authority for armament, &c. of warships is Quarterly Return, July 1914.

(c) 4° S., 110° E.

(d) 8° S., 120° E.

(e) 11° S., 120° E.

On the South, a line joining the following points:—

(a) 11° S., 120° E.

(b) 9° S., 141° E.

thence the North Coast of New Guinea to the German boundary in 8° S., thence along the parallel of 8° S. to 155° E., thence down the meridian of 155° E. to 30° S., thence along the parallel of 30° S. to 170° W.

On the East, by the meridian of 170° W.

The Station therefore included Borneo, the Celebes, the non-British waters of New Guinea and all the South Sea Islands as far East as Samoa. To the westward was the East Indian Station, to the southward the Australian.

The only defended port within the pre-war limits of the station was Hong-Kong, but Singapore, though nominally on the East Indian Station, was largely used.

The forces on the China Station were:—

Class.	Name.	Captain.	Full Sea-going Speed.	Armament.
Battleship -	"Triumph." (This ship was maintained in peace on a nucleus crew basis.)	M. S. Fitzmaurice.	17.7	4—10" 14—7.5"
Armoured Cruisers	"Minotaur" (Flag)	E. B. Kiddle -	21.0	4—9.2" 10—7.5"
	"Hampshire" -	H. W. Grant -	21.5	4—7.5" 6—6"
Light Cruisers	"Newcastle" -	F. A. Powlett	23.9	2—6" 10—4"
	"Yarmouth" -	H. L. Cochrane	23.8	8—6"
Sloops -	"Cadmus" -	H. D. Marriott (Commander).*	—	6—4"
	"Clio" -	C. MacKenzie, D.S.O.	—	6—4"

* Appointed August 10th *vice* Fitzmaurice.

Class.	Name.	Captain.	Speed.	Armament.
Destroyers -	"Colne."			
	"Chelmer."			
	"Ribble."			
	"Jed."			
	"Kennet."			
	"Welland."			
	"Usk."			
Submarines -	"Fame."			
	C. 36.			
	C. 37.			
Submarine Depot Ship.	C. 38.			
	"Rosario."			

In addition there were three gunboats, ten river gunboats, one yacht, and one surveying ship. These were all paid off before the actual outbreak of hostilities and their crews used to complete the "Triumph's" complement. It had originally been intended to pay off the "Cadmus" and "Clio" as well, and the Admiralty's order to keep them in commission occasioned a deficiency in the "Triumph's" complement.

3. *Australian Station.*—The Australian Navy in peace time was entirely under the control of the Commonwealth Government, the executive authority being the Naval Board of Administration seated at Melbourne. It had been arranged that in case of war the control and disposition of the Australian Navy should rest entirely with the British Admiralty, the Naval Board at Melbourne bearing to the Admiralty the relationship of a Commander-in-Chief on shore and the Australian sea-going fleet being regarded as a squadron of the Royal Navy.

The sea-going fleet was under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir George E. Patey, K.C.V.O.

The limits of the station were:—

On the North, a line joining—

- (a) 13° S., 95° E.
- (b) 13° S., 120° E.
- (c) 11° S., 120° E.

thence to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea round to the East as far as the boundary of German New Guinea, thence along the parallel of 8° S. to 155° E.

On the East, the meridian of 155° E. with an extension to include Norfolk Island.

On the South, the Antarctic Circle.

On the West, the meridian of 95° E.

The adjoining stations were the Cape and East Indian to the West and N.W. and the Chinese to the North and East.

A separate division operated in New Zealand waters.

The dockyard port was situated at Sydney; Adelaide, Brisbane, Freemantle, Hobart, Melbourne, Newcastle and Thursday Island were also defended ports.

The Australian Squadron consisted of the following vessels:—

Class.	Name.	Captain.	Full Sea-going Speed.	Armament.
Battle Cruiser	"Australia" (Flag)	S. H. Radcliffe.	23½	8—12"
	"Sydney" - -	J. C. T. Glosop.	23·2	8—6"
Light Cruisers	"Melbourne" -	M. L'E. Silver	23·2	8—6"
	"Encounter" -	C. La P. Lewin	19	11—6"
	"Pioneer" - -	T. W. Biddlecombe. R.A.N.	16	8—4"

Destroyers.—"Yarra," "Parramatta," "Warrego," under C. L. Cumberlege, Cdr. D.

Submarines.—A.E. 1 and A.E. 2, with depot ship "Protector."

Also one sloop and two surveying vessels of no fighting value, which were soon paid off.

4. *The New Zealand Division.*—Consisted of two cruisers belonging to the Royal Navy and the "Philomel," which had been lent as a training ship to the New Zealand Government but came under our control in time of war.

Captain H. J. T. Marshall, R.N., was S.N.O., and there were defended ports at Auckland, Wellington, Otago and Port Lyttleton.

The Division consisted of:—

Name.	Captain.	Speed.	Armament.
"Psyche" (S.N.O.) -	H. J. T. Marshall -	17	8—4"
"Pyramus" - - -	Viscount Kelburn -	17	8—4"
"Philomel" - - -	P. H. Hall Thompson	15	8—4·7"

5. *North-West Coast of America.*—The only ships of the Royal Navy on the whole West Coast of North and South America were the two sloops "Algerine" and "Shearwater," of no fighting value. The Senior Officer was Commander Trousdale, of H.M.S. "Shearwater." Both these vessels were paid off as soon as possible.

The Canadian Government manned and maintained the old British cruiser "Rainbow," and she was placed at the disposal of the Admiralty.

Name.	Captain	Speed.	Armament.
"Rainbow" - - -	W. Hose (Comdr. R.N. Retired.)	16	2—6" 6—4·7"

Two small submarines, which had been building at Seattle for the Chilian Government, were also purchased, named C.C. 1 and C.C. 2, and used for local defence.

The Port of Esquimalt was defended by the Canadian Government, but the matter had not been considered as of urgent importance, and of the two 9·2" guns available one was defective.

6. *Allied Men-of-War.*—Particulars of the various Allied ships mentioned in the following pages are:—

French.

Name.	Speed.	Armament.
"Montcalm" (Armoured Cruiser) -	18	2—7·6" 8—6·5"
"Dupleix" (Light Cruiser) - -	18	8—6·5" 4—3·9"
"D'Iberville" (Gunboat, built 1893) -	21 (trials)	1—4" 3—9 pdr.

Russian.

Name.	Speed.	Armament.
"Askold" (light cruiser) - - -	20	12—6"
"Zhemtchug" (light cruiser) - - -	22	8—4·7"

Japanese.

Class.	Name.	Speed.	Armament.
Battleships - - -	"Satsuma" - - -	17	4—12" 12—10"
	"Kashima" - - -	17	4—12" 4—10" 12—6"
	"Katori" - - -	17	4—12" 4—10" 12—6"
	"Hizen" (old Russian "Retvizan").	17	4—12" 12—6"
	"Tsukuba" - - -	17	4—12" 12—6"
Battle Cruisers - - -	"Ikoma" - - -	17	4—12" 12—6"
	"Ibuki" - - -	18	4—12" 8—8"
	"Kurama" - - -	18	4—12" 8—8"
	"Idzumo" - - -	20	4—8" 14—6"
Armoured Cruisers - - -	"Nisshin" - - -	18	4—8" 14—6"
	"Iwate" - - -	20	4—8" 14—6"
	"Asama" - - -	18	4—8" 14—6"
	"Tokiwa" - - -	18	4—8" 14—6"
	"Chikama" - - -	25	8—6"
"Yahagi" - - -			
"Hirado" - - -			
Light Cruisers - - -			

7. *The German East Asiatic Squadron.*—The German ships which affected our operations were:—

Class.	Name.	Speed.	Armament.
Armoured Cruisers	“Scharnhorst” (Flag)	20·5	8-8·2" 6-6"
	“Gneisenau” - -	20·5	8-8·2" 6-6"
Light Cruisers	“Emden” - -	21·8	10-4·1"
	“Nurnberg” - -	21·9	10-4·1"
	“Leipzig” - -	20·0	10-4·1"
Gunboat	“Geier” - -	15·0	8-4·1"

all under the command of Vice-Admiral Graf von Spee with Tsing-Tao (Kiao Chow) as a fortified base. Besides the above there were the gunboats “Luchs,” “Tiger” and “Cormoran,” which were paid off on the outbreak of war, and whose crews and armaments were used to commission the armed merchant cruisers “Prinz Eitel Friedrich” and “Cormoran II.” (See Chapter IV.)

8. *The Theatre of War.*—The operations described in the following pages extended over more than half the area of the Globe, and it is only possible here to give a brief description of the German possessions in the Pacific at the outbreak of war. These possessions relatively to Australia fall into two strategical groups, an outer and an inner.

The outer group, some 2,000 miles from Australia, comprises the Mariana (or Ladrone Islands), the Caroline Islands, the Pelew (or Palau), the Marshall Islands and the Samoa Islands stretching in a wide arc round Australian waters. What may be called the inner group consist of the Bismarck Archipelago, including the large islands of New Britain (New Pommern) and New Ireland (New Mecklenburg). The north-eastern portion of New Guinea was also a German protectorate.

9. In the outer group the Mariana Islands consist of a chain of some dozen volcanic islands in the Western Pacific between Japan and New Guinea, some 1,350 miles from the former and 1,200 from the latter lying in a north and south direction over some 550 miles of ocean and possessing few anchorages of any value. The principal island, Guam, belongs to the United States, and was an important centre of communication, with a cable to the United States, one to Japan, one to Shanghai,

one to the Philippines and one to Celebes in the Dutch East Indies. The Caroline and Pelew Islands may be considered together. The Germans divided them for administrative purposes into the Western Carolines and Pelew Islands with the seat of Government at Yap, and the Eastern Carolines with the seat of Government at Ponapé.

These islands, some 30 in number, running more or less east and west, are all of coral formation and mostly of the atoll type—that is to say, a circular reef surrounding a lagoon. These lagoons are often of many miles in extent and afford a variety of excellent harbours. The only produce of these islands is copra, and they do not produce sufficient food to maintain the population, who have to rely on imported supplies. The natives are of a Malay stock, and in 1906 there were only 150 Europeans in the Islands.

The island of Yap, at the western end some 1,700 miles from Hong Kong, is a post of considerable importance. It was connected by cable with Menado (Celebes), and thence with the Dutch East Indies and Europe; with Shanghai, and thence to Tsing-tau; and with Guam, and thence to the United States and the Philippines. It also possessed a high power W/T station, and was thus a vital link in the enemy's system of communications.

There were also W/T stations on Anguar, the southernmost of the Pelew Islands, and Nauru (or Pleasant Island), lying isolated nearly on the equator, but these had no cable communications.

The Marshall Islands are coral islands, some 600 miles to the eastward of the Carolines, possessing numerous sheltered anchorages and generally resembling the groups previously described. The seat of Government was at Jaluit, but there is no cable communication.

10. *Samoa.*—The Samoa or Navigator Islands, lying some 2,400 miles from Australia and some 1,650 miles to the south-east of the Marshall Islands, were divided for administrative purposes between Germany and the United States, the former possessing the western portion of the group, with the seat of Government at Apia, in Upolu Island.

These islands, unlike the Carolines and Marshalls, are volcanic in origin, and produce copra, cattle and rubber. The harbour of Apia is safe except during the hurricane months (January to March), but the swell

sometimes renders coaling difficult. There was a W/T station at Apia which maintained communication with the British station at Suva in Fiji, the German station at Nauru and the American installation at Honolulu.

11. *The Inner Group.*—The Bismarck Archipelago and Kaiser Wilhelmsland* (in New Guinea) formed a German protectorate, the Government being established at Herbertshohe in New Britain. This region is perhaps as wild and unexplored as any in the world; in 1906 there were only 150 Europeans resident there, and except in the vicinity of the few settlements and trading posts barbarism reigns supreme.

The islands are rugged, with an indented coast line, but the surveys are incomplete, and only a few harbours can be used by heavy-draught ships.

The most important of these is the large bight at the N.E. extremity of New Britain, generally referred to as Simpsonhafen or Rabaul in the following pages. On its shores are situated Herbertshohe, the capital; the village of Rabaul and Kabakaul, where the Germans had erected a wireless station just previous to the outbreak of war. The adjoining Gazelle peninsula, forming the northern portion of New Britain, is comparatively well developed, and there are extensive plantations of cocoanut and cotton. The principal German settlement in New Guinea was at Friedrich Wilhelmshaven, and there is a good harbour at Alexis Bay, a few miles to the northward.

12. *Time-keeping.*—It is necessary to note that time-keeping in the Pacific is complicated by the 180 degrees meridian. In going from East Longitude to West Longitude, that is to say, when steering East, say from Fiji to Samoa, a day is apparently gained, *i.e.*, there will be two days the same date, and going from Samoa to Fiji a day will be similarly lost.

To avoid the inconvenience of islands of the same group keeping different days of the week, an arbitrary "Date or Calendar Line" has been adopted by the Governments concerned in place of the 180° meridian, so as to divide the islands conveniently. This "date meridian" in 1914 ran from 60° S. 180° to 51° 30' S. 180° to 45° 30' S. 177° W. to 15° 30' S. 172° 30' W. to 5° S. 180° to 48° N. 180° to 52° 30' N. 170° E., then through Behring Straits to 70° N. 180°.

* Chart 2766.

The local time kept in the following places was* :—

Fast on Greenwich :

Straits Settlements	-	-	7 hours.
Hong Kong, Shanghai, &c.	-	-	8 "
Japan	-	-	9 "
Caroline Islands, New Guinea, New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania, Victoria	-	-	10 "
New Zealand	-	-	11½ "

Slow on Greenwich :

Samoa	-	-	11½ "
British Columbia	-	-	8 "

CHAPTER I.

OPERATIONS OF CHINA SQUADRON UP TO AUGUST 23RD, 1914.

1. *Disposition.*—Admiral Jerram received the "warning telegram" at Wei-hai-wei at 8 a.m. on July 30th, when his force was distributed as follows:—

"Minotaur"	-	-	-	} At Wei-hai-wei, coaling.
"Hampshire"	-	-	-	
"Yarmouth"	-	-	-	
"Thistle" and five destroyers	-	-	-	
"Newcastle"	-	-	-	At Nagasaki, coaling.
"Cadmus"	-	-	-	} At Shanghai.
"Bramble"	-	-	-	
"Triumph"	-	-	-	
"Clio"	-	-	-	At Hong Kong, refitting.
"Jed"	-	-	-	At Hong Kong.
"Chelmer"	-	-	-	At Hong Kong, refitting.
"Fame"	-	-	-	At Hong Kong.

* Admiralty List of Lights and Time Signals, 1914.

The news available as to foreign men-of-war on the station was that on July 30th—

“K. Elizabeth” (Austrian), “Emden,” four gunboats and one destroyer were at Tsing-tau.

“Marco Polo” (Italian) at Kobe (Japan).

“Scharnhorst” at or beyond Yap in Western Pacific.

“Nurnberg” } doubtful, but believed to be on West
“Leipzig” } Coast of America.

“Gneisenau” left Singapore that day.

This last item was soon recognised as an error, apparently arising from confusion with the gunboat “Geier” in coding the telegram, and the position of both the enemy’s large cruisers remained practically unknown.

The French flagship “Montcalm” was out of touch in the South Seas, and the uncertainty as to her position caused some anxiety. A telegram was sent from the Ministry of Marine in Paris to Suva ordering her to join the British at Hong Kong.

2. *Original Plan.*—In accordance with a plan which he had drawn up dated 12th January 1914, Admiral Jerram intended to make his base in the Saddle Islands, at the mouth of the River Yangtse, and to keep his squadron on a line from the mouth of the Yangtse to the south of Japan so as to cover the trade route and control the approach to Tsing-tau. It was his intention to leave Wei-hai-wei on July 30th for a rendezvous north of his proposed base, and he sent a telegram to this effect,* but the Admiralty had meanwhile ordered him to concentrate at Hong Kong. He was “reluctant to move” so far to the southward, leaving Tsing-tau uncovered, but assumed that their Lordships had good reasons for sending him there and proceeded accordingly. On August 4th he was able to report that the concentration of his squadron consisting of the “Minotaur,” “Hampshire,” “Yarmouth,” “Newcastle,” “Cadmus” and six destroyers would be complete by August 5th, and asked if he could use his discretion as to leaving Hong Kong before the declaration of war. This was approved, but war was actually declared before he was ready to leave.

The French cruiser “Dupleix” arrived on the morning of August 5th to co-operate, and the crew of the “Triumph” was completed with 100 soldiers from the

* App. Tel. No. 1.

2nd Battalion, Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry. The C.P.R. liners “Empress of Russia,” “Empress of Japan,” and “Empress of Asia,” with the P. & O. Liner “Himalaya,” were taken over also, to be armed and commissioned as merchant cruisers. These ships were specially intended to deal with similar enemy vessels whose potential menace in this as in other theatres of war exercised a considerable influence on subsequent strategy.

In Chinese waters there were the German liners “Yorck” and “Prinz Eitel Friedrich,” the former last heard of at Yokohama, the latter at Tsing-tau. At Cebu, in the Philippines, was the “Princess Alice,” and at Shanghai were two Austrian ships, the “China” and “Silesia.” In all subsequent dispositions the possibility of these and other vessels acting on the trade routes had to be considered.

3. *News of Enemy, August 6th.*—In the early morning of August 6th the C.-in-C. received a report from the Navy Office, Melbourne, stating that from wireless signals heard during the last four days the probable approximate position of “Scharnhorst” at noon on August 5th appeared to be 8° S. 162° E. near the Solomon Islands, steering S.E. Further intelligence came to hand that the “Emden,” escorting four colliers, had left Tsing-tau on August 3rd bound to the S.E., the Nord Deutsche Lloyd liner “Yorck” had left Yokohama at 7 p.m., August 4th, heavily laden with coal and provisions, and the “Leipzig” was reported to have left Mazatlan, Mexico, about August 6th.

Admiral Jerram was of opinion that von Spee was either searching in the South Seas for the “Montcalm,” or on his way to some rendezvous to coal from colliers which had left Newcastle, N.S.W. on August 1st or 2nd, or intended to proceed to the S. American trade routes, and that he would endeavour to concentrate his forces in the South Seas, but “in the present state of his knowledge he did not feel justified in leaving the China Seas to search for the enemy through the South Pacific,” particularly as the “Australia,” “Sydney” and “Encounter” were believed to be in that vicinity.

4. *Rendezvous at Saddle Islands and Destruction of Yap.*—Under these circumstances Admiral Jerram decided to form a base at the Saddle Islands from which he could control the trade routes and watch the approaches

to Tsing-tau. He also determined to endeavour to intercept the "Emden" should she be proceeding to the important cable and wireless centre of Yap, and informed the Admiralty of his intentions.*

At 6 a.m., therefore, on August 6th the Squadron, with the exception of the "Triumph,"† left Hong Kong. The "Yarmouth," "Dupleix" and five destroyers were detached to the Saddle Islands to await the arrival of the "Triumph" and keep a watch on the Tsing-tau approach. The Admiral with the "Minotaur," "Hampshire" and "Newcastle" meanwhile proceeded towards Yap in the Caroline Islands intending to destroy the W/T station and, if nothing was found there, to join the rest of the Squadron later at the Saddle Islands base.

In order to avoid disclosing his movements, the Admiral had forbidden the use of wireless by his force, so that on August 9th, when the "Australia" was heard calling in an endeavour to suggest concerted action, no reply was made.

5. The "Minotaur's" Squadron reached a position 60' N.W. of Yap at 3 p.m. on August 10th and the ships were spread five miles apart on a line E.N.E. On August 11th the German collier "Elspeth," with 1,800 tons of Government coal from Tsing-tau for Yap, was captured and subsequently sunk by the "Hampshire" as the swell prevented coaling.

The Admiral at this time became "fairly certain" from all indications that "neither the 'Emden' nor the 'Yorck' were actually bound for Yap, but more probably were going elsewhere in the South."

Unfortunately by 5 p.m., August 11th, the "Hampshire" was so short of coal that she had to be sent back to Hong Kong, while the "Minotaur" and "Newcastle" proceeded towards Yap, arriving there at daylight, August 12th. The W/T station was put out of action‡ and the oil stores set on fire by bombardment, but time did not permit of a landing being made and at 10 a.m., August 12th, the British ships left for the Saddle Islands base, the "Minotaur" being ordered to pass south and the "Newcastle" north of the Loo Choo Islands between

* App. Tel. 2.

† The "Triumph" carried out a steam trial on the forenoon of August 6th.

‡ The crew of the surveying ship "Planet" were entrenched with machine guns to resist a landing.

Japan and Formosa "to increase the chance of falling in" with any German armed merchant ships which might "have succeeded in coming south from Tsing-tau."

6. *Japan's expected Declaration of War.*—In the meantime, however, in view of negotiations which had been taking place, it was believed that Japan would declare war Germany on August 12th. The Admiralty sent a telegram* to this effect ordering the C.-in-C., China, to leave the northern portion of his station to our Allies and to concentrate his attention on destroying the German cruisers in concert with the Australian Squadron, detaching one light cruiser to join the "Rainbow" at Vancouver.

Admiral Jerram received this telegram on the night of August 12th on his way to the Saddle Islands from Yap, and ordered the "Newcastle" to proceed to Yokohama at once to complete with fuel and then to proceed to Vancouver, coaling again at Unalaska (Aleutian Islands) if necessary.†

The Admiralty were now anxious about the trade on the Pacific coast of America, and a further telegram ordered the "Hampshire" to be sent to Esquimalt immediately Japan declared war. In view of the changed situation, Admiral Jerram "anticipating the immediate declaration of war by Japan," instead of proceeding to the Saddle Islands altered course for Hong Kong, where he intended to concentrate his forces, and informed Admiral Patey of his intentions. The "Minotaur" reached Hong Kong on August 17th to find that Japan had not yet commenced hostilities.

7. *Saddle Islands Force.*—The "Triumph" had sailed from Hong Kong at 2 p.m., August 6th, and joined the "Yarmouth," "Dupleix" and destroyers the next day.

The same day, August 6th, the "Emden" left Tsing-tau at 7 p.m. with a large auxiliary, the "Markomania," to join von Spee, followed by the "Prinz Eitel Friedrich," an armed liner, with a convoy of some 12 supply ships, so that on August 8th, when the "Triumph" reached the Saddle Islands and started to coal, the "Emden" was probably little more than 100 miles off, passing between the Saddle Islands and Quelpart.

* App. Tel. 3.

† The Admiralty had ordered her to proceed *via* Honolulu. By the northern route some 1,500 miles was saved, for the great circle track between Yokohama and Vancouver almost touches Unalaska.

Captain Fitzmaurice had heard from the French W/T at Shanghai, of her being sighted south-east of Tsing-tau at 10 a.m., August 7th, and during August 8th enemy wireless messages could be heard; on the morning of August 9th, therefore, as soon as coaling was completed, the squadron put to sea to search for the enemy, but failed to find him.

The force returned to the Saddle Islands, August 11th, and on August 20th, in obedience to an order from Admiral Jerram, proceeded to the vicinity of Tsing-tau, where, on August 22nd, they delivered a severe blow at the supply system of the German Squadron by the capture of four German merchant vessels—the “Paklat,” with 250 refugees from Tsing-tau for Shanghai; the “Senegambia,” with 3,800 tons of coal and live cattle; the “C. Ferd Laisz,” with 4,000 tons of coal, and the “Frisia,” with coal, live cattle and mails for the German Squadron, the last three ships being bound (nominally) to Macassar for orders.

The intention of the Admiralty telegram of August 11th was that all our ships should be removed from the Tsing-tau area and the whole station north of Hong Kong left to the Japanese, leaving our forces free to join the Australian Squadron in a search for the German cruisers, but for political reasons it was decided to co-operate in the reduction of the German base, and the “Triumph” and one destroyer were detached to assist.

8. *C.-in-C. at Hong Kong, August 17th.*—On his arrival at Hong Kong on August 17th, Admiral Jerram found it necessary to remain there some days in order to deal with the questions which had arisen during his absence.

No news had been received of the German Squadron, though the Admiral was of opinion that they might be in the Marshall Islands in company with the “Emden,” and that their possible objectives were either the Dutch East Indies or more probably the Pacific Coast of America. Pending the intervention of Japan, he decided to confine his efforts to watching Tsing-tau and protecting the trade routes with all available ships while he personally remained at Hong Kong to exercise general control.*

On August 19th he learnt from Melbourne that wireless showed the “Scharnhorst” to have been increasing

* App. Tel. 4.

her distance from Australia since August 8th, “but till he “ could obtain definite news of the German Squadron and “ pending the declaration of war by Japan,” which would radically affect the situation, he considered it best to “keep a watch on Tsing-tau and to patrol the trade routes,” the ships being disposed as follows:—

“Triumph”	-	-	} Off Tsing-tau.	
“Dupleix”	-	-		
“Yarmouth”	-	-		
Five destroyers	-	-	} Patrol, Shanghai to Japan.	
“Clio”	-	-		
“Cadmus”	-	-		“” “” Foochow.
“Hampshire”	-	-		“” “” Foochow to Hong Kong.
“Minotaur”	-	-	} Patrolling in sections from Hong Kong to Singapore.	
“Empress of Japan”	-	-		
“Empress of Asia”	-	-		

9. *Japan declares War.*—On the 20th August it was known that Japan would declare war on the 23rd, and the orders for the “Hampshire” to proceed to Esquimalt were cancelled. The Russians at Vladivostock placed the “Askold” and “Zhemtchug” at the C.-in-C.’s disposal, and they left for Hong Kong on August 24th; while, in exchange for the “Triumph,” which remained at Tsingtau, the Japanese sent the cruisers “Ibuki” and “Chikuma” to join his force.

At noon on August 23rd Japan declared war on Germany.

It will be observed that the delay in her declaration had prevented the China Squadron carrying out an active search for the enemy’s cruisers as intended by the Admiralty. A message received from the R.A., Australia, on the 21st contained, however, a correct forecast of the German movements and confirmed Admiral Jerram’s opinion that they were probably bound for the Pacific Coast of America.*

* App. Tel. 5.

CHAPTER II.

AUSTRALASIA UP TO AUGUST 30TH,
INCLUDING THE SAMOA EXPEDITION.

10. On July 30th, 1914, in view of the critical international situation, the Australian Government placed their forces at the disposal of the British Admiralty, having previously arranged that in these circumstances the Commonwealth Naval Board should be regarded as bearing to the Admiralty the relationship of a Commander-in-Chief ashore. The New Zealand Division was also placed at our disposal.

The War Orders directed that the "Australia" should join the China Squadron if there were no enemy armoured ships in Australasian waters on the outbreak of hostilities, and in accordance with this arrangement the Admiralty ordered her to Albany, Western Australia, preparatory to proceeding to Hong Kong, where the China Squadron had been ordered to concentrate, Admiral Patey being directed to shift his flag to the "Encounter" or some other vessel.

The War Orders limited the duties of the remainder of the Australian Squadron to protecting the local trade routes, in the anticipation that the enemy force would not exceed two light cruisers operating in the neighbourhood of New Guinea, while the New Zealand Division was to be distributed among the South Sea Islands to protect commerce in those waters and supply intelligence to the China and Australian Squadrons.

11. On August 4th the distribution of the squadron and its intended movements in accordance with these orders were as follows:—

- "Australia" at Sydney. Due to leave for Albany, W.A., on way to Hong Kong.
- "Melbourne" left Sydney for Fremantle, W.A., August 4th, in accordance with War Orders.
- "Encounter" at Sydney.
- "Pioneer" at Sydney.
- "Parramatta" left Sydney August 4th for Thursday Island (Torres Straits).

"Sydney" }
"Warrego" } left Townsville (Queensland) August
"Yarra" } 3rd for Thursday Island.

A.E. 1 at Sydney; refitting after voyage from England; completed August 8th.

A.E. 2 at Sydney; refitting after voyage from England; completed August 10th.

At Auckland were the

"Psyche." S.N.O. proceeding to Suva, Fiji, on outbreak of war.

"Philomel." S.N.O. proceeding to New Hebrides on outbreak of war.

"Pyramus." S.N.O. proceeding to Tonga Islands on outbreak of war.

The intelligence with regard to the enemy on August 4th was vague and inaccurate. The Rear-Admiral summarised it as:—

"Scharnhorst." Position unknown.

"Gneisenau." Left Nagasaki June 23rd. Probably in company with "Scharnhorst."

"Nurnberg." Possibly on her way from Mazatlan, Mexico, to Tsing-tau.

"Leipzig." Off Vancouver.

There were, however, some other indications. On August 1st Yap W/T station had been heard trying hard to communicate with the "Scharnhorst"; on August 2nd the ss. "Tannenfels," with 6,000 tons of coal, had left Singapore without clearance papers; two German colliers also had hurriedly left Newcastle, N.S.W., under sealed orders, steering to the N.E., and on August 3rd W/T intercepted by North Australian stations seemed to indicate that the "Scharnhorst," "Gneisenau" and other German ships were near New Guinea, and that the "Scharnhorst" was communicating with Yap.

12. From these indications, Admiral Patey judged that the enemy was endeavouring to concentrate his forces somewhere in the neighbourhood of New Guinea or the Bismarck Archipelago, where there were at least two good harbours at his disposal, namely, Friedrich Wilhelmshafen in Astrolabe Bay on the East Coast of German New Guinea and Simpsonhafen with the town of Herbertshohe in the north-east corner of the adjacent island of New Britain, where a wireless station had just been completed at Kabakaul near Herbertshohe. Such a

concentration would constitute a direct threat to Australasian waters, and in view of the fact that such a contingency was not contemplated in the Standing War Orders, the Rear-Admiral suggested that all available Australian ships should concentrate off Port Moresby* in the Gulf of Papua to cover the north-eastern approaches to Australia and get in touch with the enemy.

The Admiralty approved of this plan, and on August 7th directed Admiral Patey to get in touch with the C.-in-C., China, and arrange concerted action against the German ships. This was not, however, Admiral Patey's immediate purpose.

His preliminary strategy was based on the idea of taking up a position from which to cover the approaches to Australia, reconnoitre the enemy's bases and search the Bismarck Archipelago. It was useless, in his opinion, and in that of Admiral Jerram, to proceed into the spaces of the Pacific in order to look for an unlocated enemy, and the strategy of the China and Australia squadrons was therefore devoted in the first instance to protecting the trade routes and destroying the enemy's means of communication and supply.

13. *Search of Bismarck Archipelago by R. A., Australia, August 4th-16th.*—The "Australia" left Sydney at 10 p.m. on August 4th, and the Admiral appointed the following rendezvous† in New Guinea waters:—

- No. 1—12° 10' S., 148° 10' E., 180' south and east of Port Moresby.
- No. 2—12° 0' S., 154° 0' E., 40' south (true) of Rossel Island.
- No. 3—5° 33' S., 152° 50' E., off the east coast of New Britain 140 miles from Herbertshohe.
- No. 4—4° 33' S., 152° 32' E., off the north-east of New Britain between New Britain and New Ireland.

His intention was to concentrate the "Australia," "Sydney," "Encounter," and three destroyers at rendezvous No. 1, and "if no certain news of the enemy was obtained, proceed to Simpsonhafen, in the north-east corner of New Britain, and destroy what might be found there."

* From Port Moresby *via* Rossel Island to Simpsonhafen in New Britain is about 930', to Friedrich Wilhelmshafen in New Guinea about 1,160 miles.

† Chart 2759A.

Early on August 6th he received intelligence that W/T indications placed the "Scharnhorst," "Gneisenau," and "Nurnberg" at noon on August 5th in 8° S., 162° E. (near the Solomon Islands), steering S.E. This information was erroneous, and in any case Admiral Patey did not consider it sufficiently definite to justify a change of plan. The original object of detaching the "Melbourne" to Fremantle had been to protect the trade routes on the west coast of Australia and to meet the contingency of German cruisers appearing in these waters. This was now considered less likely and the "Pioneer" was sent to take her place. The "Melbourne" was recalled to join the Rear-Admiral in New Guinea waters, but did not arrive in time to take part in the preliminary operations.

At 10 a.m., August 9th, the force was concentrated at R.V. 1, and proceeded through the other points, thus searching the Louisiade Archipelago. A base for fuelling was established at Rossel Lagoon,* a large atoll some 20 miles long by 5 wide on the east side of Rossel (or Yela) Island in the Louisiade Archipelago. At 6 p.m., August 11th, the force arrived at R.V. 3 off New Britain, some 100 miles from Simpsonhafen, and the Admiral sent the "Sydney" and destroyers into the harbour with orders to execute a torpedo attack on any ships there, but they found it empty.

Next day, August 12th, a search was made for the W/T station known to exist, but it could not be discovered, either at Rabaul or Herbertshohe, and appeared too far inland to send landing parties. By this time, the Fleet was becoming very short of coal and oil, so the "Encounter" and destroyers were sent direct to Rossel Lagoon, where the "Melbourne" had arrived, while the "Australia" and "Sydney" swept round the north of Bougainville Island on August 13th and on August 14th the former was sent to Rossel to replenish. The Admiral meanwhile had received an important message from the Governor of New Zealand on the night of the 12/13th, asking if it was safe for the expedition to Samoa to start, and as this was the first he had heard of any such expedition,† he proceeded with the "Australia" to Port

* Pacific Islands, I., 158, Chart 2124; Rossel to Port Moresby is roughly 500 miles, to Simpsonhafen 430', to Friedrich Wilhelmshafen 660'.

† See pars. 14 and 17, *infra*.

Moresby to coal and get into direct cable communication, arriving there on August 16th.

During this cruise Admiral Patey had endeavoured to get into wireless touch with the C.-in-C., China, to propose concerted action. Admiral Jerram was actually performing a simultaneous operation (August 12th destroyed Yap W/T. station; August 17th arrived Hong Kong), and on August 6th Admiral Patey learnt that he was sweeping towards Yap, but, in accordance with Admiral Jerram's orders as to W/T silence no answer was given to the "Australia's" calls till the evening of the 12th, when information was passed as to the destruction of Yap W/T station and the return of the "Minotaur" to Hong Kong.

Meanwhile the S.N.O., New Zealand, in view of the uncertainty as to the movements of the German Squadron, did not despatch his old cruisers to the South Seas, but kept them concentrated in home waters, and they arrived at Auckland on August 11th.

Under these circumstances the only Allied warship to the eastward was the "Montcalm," Flagship of R.A. Huguet, whose actual whereabouts were uncertain, though she had reported by W/T that she would arrive at Suva in Fiji on the 12th. This she did, and receiving orders to proceed to China sailed the same day for Noumea (New Caledonia).

14. *The Pacific Expeditions.*—At home, naval strategy in the Pacific had been under consideration; on August 4th, a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence had been formed under the presidency of Admiral Sir H. B. Jackson, to consider combined Naval and Military operations against enemy territory, and on August 5th it was decided to ask the Commonwealth and New Zealand Governments to send expeditions to Samoa, Nauru, Yap and German New Guinea, to seize the cables and W/T stations there.

Telegrams to this effect were sent next day, Samoa being allotted as New Zealand's sphere of operations, and her assent to this proposal was received on August 7th. Australia's answer was received on 10th, but no date of departure was fixed for either expedition.

On August 7th Admiral Sir Henry Jackson drew up for the Sub-Committee a paper with regard to these expeditions, of which the following is a summary:—

Samoa.—“Object: to seize and hold the island of Upolu to prevent it being used as a base of operations by armed German ships against our trade, or as a W/T centre in the Pacific.

One cruiser required as escort. Transports to be lightly armed to resist armed merchant ships. Departure to be governed by the naval situation in the Pacific. “There are no British interests in the locality for attack, and it is improbable that a strong German force will be in the vicinity.”

New Guinea, &c.—Objects: To seize or destroy wireless and telegraphic communication at Yap.

To seize Rabaul,* occupy Gazelle Peninsula, and establish a base for carrying out military operations in German New Guinea.

To seize or destroy the wireless station at Nauru.

The position at Port Moresby not being very convenient, the seizure of Rabaul or other base in German territory would be necessary first. Yap, from the Naval point of view, is the most important objective.

A force of two cruisers would be sufficient “provided the German armoured cruisers in China are accounted for.”

15. *New Zealand Force ready to sail August 11th.*—It will be seen from the above that on August 7th it was apparently not anticipated that the expeditions would be launched until the “Scharnhorst” and “Gneisenau” were located. No further intelligence, however, of their movements had been received, and on August 8th, the New Zealand Government reported that the force for Samoa would be ready to sail on the 11th; the Admiralty concurred with the proposal, subject to local Naval approval being obtained, and on August 9th informed the C.-in-C., China and R.A., Australia, of the proposed expedition, instructing them to “guard against interference by the enemy,” at the same time ordering Admiral Patey, whom they believed to be still at Port Moresby, to reconnoitre Rabaul. These messages were not received at the time, as both Admirals were out of

* Rabaul is in N.E. New Britain on the north shore of Simpson-haven. Herbertshohe, the capital, is on the other side of the bay.

wireless touch, and Patey was actually engaged on this very task of searching the Bismarek Archipelago on his own initiative.

16. The sailing of the Samoan expedition had however been made conditional on the approval of the local S.N.O., and Captain Marshall was reluctant to sanction its departure without more definite intelligence of the enemy or till a stronger escort was available. His proposals in this sense were approved, and the "Montcalm" was ordered to join the escort, but she missed these orders at Suva, and in compliance with her former instructions, proceeded towards Noumea on her way to China. She was recalled by wireless, and only arrived back at Suva on the 15th August.

17. *Patey hears of Samoa Expedition.*—Meanwhile Admiral Patey, as the result of his search in the Louisiade Archipelago, had formed the opinion "that the enemy had retired to the North or East" in order to complete with coal, and would then "probably proceed eastwards or south-eastwards to the American coast, perhaps calling at Samoa on the way." On the 13th he sent by wireless, through the Navy Board, a report of his proceedings at Rabaul,* which reached the Admiralty the same day, expressing his intention of examining Bougainville Island and proposing after fuelling at Port Moresby to proceed with the "Australia," "Melbourne" and "Sydney" to Nauru Island,† destroy the W/T station there and search for the enemy.

Before this reached the Admiralty, however, he received, on the night of the 12th–13th August, his first intimation of the New Zealand expedition in the form of a message from the Governor of New Zealand, asking if it was safe for it to proceed. "I replied that it was not at present without a strong escort," but after consideration "came to the conclusion that an expedition to take Samoa was a very desirable operation if covered by the "Fleet." He therefore abandoned the idea of Nauru and decided to escort the expedition with the "Australia" and "Melbourne," and sent a message to the S.N.O., New Zealand, which the latter apparently only received in the early morning of August 15th, arranging a rendezvous some 450 miles south of Suva, Fiji, for August 24th.

* App. 6.

† A small detached island of the Gilbert Group, in Lat. 0° 33' S., Long. 166° 55' E., Chart 780, Plan 979.

Meanwhile he proceeded to Port Moresby to coal, but on his arrival there on August 16th he heard to his surprise that the Samoa expedition had sailed.

18. What had happened was this: The Admiralty had already, on August 11th, informed the S.N.O., New Zealand, that he could start, and on August 13th despatched orders to Admiral Patey, then in New Guinea waters, to "support the expedition" and join it at Suva on August 20th. This message the Admiral did not receive, as the W/T stations in Australia were of low power, the operators indifferent, and it had been found difficult to keep touch when off Rabaul.* On August 15th, therefore, the expedition without further reference to the Rear-Admiral started from Wellington for Suva, where at 12 knots it hoped to arrive on August 20th.

19. It will be seen that the Admiralty and Admiral Patey both agreed that the "Australia" should be diverted from her task of searching for the enemy and employed convoying the Samoan expedition, and the difference between them at first was merely one of dates.

It was the intention of the Admiralty that the Samoa expedition should proceed to Suva from New Zealand and be joined there on August 20th by the "Australia" and "Montcalm," when the whole force would sail for Samoa. But Patey did not receive the Admiralty telegram of August 13th to this effect, and only arrived at Port Moresby where the "Australia" had to replenish, and which is nearly 2,000 miles, or 5 days, from Suva, on August 16th. On August 15th he had despatched a telegram to S.N.O., New Zealand, arranging a rendezvous in 24° S., 177° E., some 450 miles off Suva, for August 24th, which apparently arrived very early in the morning of August 15th, but did not prevent the expedition sailing at 6 a.m. that day. An additional difficulty had crept in by Patey's having arranged to take the "Melbourne" with him to Samoa, and finally the whole project was still further complicated by the Australian Navy Board suddenly proposing to retain the "Australia" for the escort of their New Guinea expedition.

* Thursday Island W/T station was the principal station used. Admiral Patey reported that it was possible to detect the turns of duty of one operator owing to the unsatisfactory way in which he passed signals.

20. *The New Guinea Expedition clashes with Samoa.*—

At the end of the telegram reporting Admiral Patey's operations, received at the Admiralty on the 13th August, the Navy Board had added that the New Guinea expedition would be ready to sail in a week's time. This was the first specific date mentioned by them, and it was evident that the Samoa and New Guinea expeditions would clash. Admiral Patey was of opinion that the New Guinea expedition should not sail without the support of the "Australia," but the Commonwealth were reluctant to defer their operations, and made an endeavour to get their expedition taken first.*

Their suggestion, however, to this effect sent to the Admiralty was only despatched on the 15th after the sailing of the Samoan force the same day had become an accomplished fact. The Admiralty, seeing that the "Australia" would be late, ordered the Samoa convoy to Noumea in New Caledonia to await the "Australia" there. They suggested that the New Guinea expedition might proceed inside the Barrier Reef under escort of the "Melbourne" and "Sydney" and meet the "Australia" and "Montcalm" there when the Samoan operations were finished.

21. *Patey hears both Expeditions have sailed, August 16th.*—It had been Admiral Patey's intention on arriving at Port Moresby to go on with the "Melbourne" to Suva via Noumea and pick up the Samoa convoy, leaving the "Encounter" and destroyers to protect the base, and sending the "Sydney" to Rabaul to destroy the W/T station, the position of which had been learnt at Port Moresby. But on the afternoon of August 16th, after hearing to his surprise that the expedition for Samoa had already sailed, he received a still more disturbing piece of information to the effect that the Australian New Guinea force had started for Port Moresby. "He did not think that the New Zealand expedition would have started before he was ready to meet it, nor did he contemplate that the Australian expedition to New Guinea would start till after the New Zealand expedition had safely landed. He now found himself with two expeditions to convoy, and therefore had to relinquish all other operations."

* App. 7.

22. Under these circumstances Admiral Patey deferred the "Sydney's" attack on Rabaul, and made the following arrangements to deal with the situation:—

- (i) "Australia" and "Melbourne" to proceed to Noumea to meet Samoa expedition as arranged.
- (ii) "Sydney" to proceed to pick up the transport "Berrima" with 1,500 men off Sandy Cape and escort her to Palm Island (both off the coast of Queensland), there to wait the return of "Australia" and "Melbourne" for further escort to New Guinea.
- (iii) Destroyers to go to Port Moresby and with "Encounter" to support the 500 troops sent there from Thursday Island.

23. *Occupation of Samoa.*—The expedition to Samoa passed off without further incident, and without interference from the enemy, and the intervention of Japan on August 23rd, which Admiral Patey heard of at Suva, eased the situation.

The "Australia" left Port Moresby at 6.30 p.m. on August 17th, the "Melbourne" leaving Rossel Lagoon at 4 p.m. on the same day. On August 20th the Samoa expedition and "Montcalm" arrived at Noumea, where they were joined by the "Australia" and "Melbourne" at 8.0 a.m. on August 21st.

The whole force left Noumea on August 23rd and arrived at Suva on August 26th, leaving the next day, and appearing before Apia, the capital of Samoa, on the morning of August 29th, Western Time (30th, Eastern Time). The town surrendered on summons, and having hoisted the British flag and installed a garrison the Admiral left with the "Australia," "Melbourne" and "Sydney" to pick up the Australian expedition to New Guinea.

The two empty transports and the "Psyche," "Pyramus" and "Philomel" went back to New Zealand to escort the convoy for Europe.

Meanwhile the Australian force for New Guinea waiting at Palm Island in the transport "Berrima" had practised landing and bush fighting, while the 500 men sent from Thursday Island to Port Moresby in the transport "Kanowna," who appear to have been levied locally in Queensland, proved unsatisfactory and were finally disbanded.

CHAPTER III.

N.W. COAST OF AMERICA TO AUGUST 23RD.

24. At the end of July the sloop "Shearwater" (S.N.O.) was at Ensenada in the north-west corner of Lower California, Mexico, and the "Algerine" at Mazatlan, a port at the entrance to the Gulf of California, where the Japanese "Idzumo," the German "Leipzig," and a United States Squadron were also lying. This force was watching the coast of Mexico in connection with the internal disorders in that country.

The "Shearwater" received the "warning telegram" through our Vice-Consul at San Diego at 5 p.m. on July 29th. She at once proceeded to the United States port of San Diego in California, and endeavoured to pass the news to the "Algerine," but this was a matter of difficulty, as the radio station had broken down and shore cables in Mexico were unreliable.

The "Algerine" actually received news of the war between Austria and Serbia from the "Leipzig" on August 1st, and the latter vessel sailed the next day (2nd). Captain Corbett decided to leave also, and obtained the use of a collier from the American Admiral Howard. From Admiral Howard he also received the "warning telegram" which the "Shearwater" had succeeded in passing and information that the "Leipzig" had gone to La Paz, a port in the south-east of Lower California, Mexico, to coal. The "Algerine" sailed for Esquimalt at 2 a.m. August 3rd. On the same day the "Shearwater" left San Diego and the "Rainbow" left Esquimalt to join the two sloops and escort them back, and meeting the "Algerine" on the 14th arrived with her at Esquimalt on the 15th. The "Shearwater" had arrived there on August 13th and the two sloops were ordered to be paid off so that the "Rainbow," with two small submarines, were the only ships on the West Coast.

25. The "Leipzig" had left Mazatlan August 2nd and the position of the "Nurnberg" was uncertain. The latter had left Honolulu July 27th for an unknown destination, and on August 4th our Consul-General at San Francisco reported both cruisers off the port. A similar report was made on the 13th, and on the 15th the

"Leipzig" was definitely identified close to San Francisco, where she went in to coal on August 17th, receiving 850 tons, and leaving at 12.30 a.m. on the 18th.

The Canadian authorities wished to send the "Rainbow" south, which the Admiralty at first approved, but on a further report of the two German cruisers being on the coast these orders were countermanded, and she was directed to await the arrival of the "Newcastle" from China. This latter ship left Yokohama on August 18th, and the next day (19th) the "Idzumo" arrived at San Francisco. On August 20th the "Rainbow" proceeded to Prince Rupert Bay to search for a three-funnelled cruiser reported in the vicinity. The entry of Japan into the war on August 23rd added the "Idzumo" with her 8-inch guns to the forces in this area, and the arrival of the "Newcastle" at Esquimalt on August 30th assured the situation for a time.

CHAPTER IV.

THE ACTUAL MOVEMENTS OF THE
GERMAN SHIPS.

26. In the preceding chapters no attempt has been made to describe the actual movements of the vessels under the command of Count von Spee, as they were, up to their appearance off Samoa on September 16th, almost unknown to the British Admirals, and only their potential activities influenced our dispositions. The operations described in the ensuing chapters, however, were profoundly influenced by positive intelligence regarding the enemy ships, and it will be convenient here to summarise the information available as to the history of the German East Asiatic Squadron.

Our knowledge of the movements of the squadron is substantially complete, the various authorities (*see* Note on Sources) being generally in agreement, but it is impossible to be so certain as to the German Admiral's view of the situation, and to what extent he acted under instructions from home or in accordance with a pre-arranged plan.

Admiral Dick's book, supplemented by Von Spee's letters to his wife,* enables certain inferences to be drawn on the subject (for instance, he states that the "Dresden" at St. Quintin Bay (West Coast Chili) received the "quite unexpected news" of the German Asiatic Squadron's approach to South America), but these must be regarded merely as inferences and not as exact information.

27. *Preliminary Concentration of Squadron in Mariana Islands.*—At the outbreak of war the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" were at Ponape, an atoll with an extensive lagoon in the Eastern Carolines, and the seat of the German Government. The "Nurnberg" had left Honolulu on July 27th, and apparently proceeded to join them there. The "Emden" (Fregatēn Kapitän von Müller) was at Tsing-tau with the North German Lloyd liner "Prinz Eitel Friedrich" (see paragraph 40), which had been summoned from Shanghai, and after being armed with the guns of the old gun vessels the "Luchs" and "Tiger" was placed under the command of Commander Thierichsen of the "Luchs." The "Emden" put to sea on August 2nd, and on August 4th, in the Korea Straits, captured the Russian Volunteer Fleet liner "Riasan" (see paragraph 40), taking her into Tsing-tau on the morning of the 6th, where she was armed and renamed "Cormoran II."

28. Count von Spee's first step was to concentrate his force and to ensure a supply of coal, as the only collier with him appears to have been the small "Titania," which was commissioned and armed with a small gun on the outbreak of hostilities. He, therefore, appointed a rendezvous, about 1,000 miles to the north-west, at Pagan (approximate Lat. 22° N., Long. 146° E), in the Mariana Islands, and leaving Ponape on August 6th for this anchorage described in the Sailing Directions as bad, with a rocky bottom and little or no shelter,† arrived with the "Scharnhorst," "Gneisenau," and "Nurnberg" on August 11th.

The "Emden" had meanwhile, after coaling, left Tsing-tau on August 7th‡ with her supply ship, the "Markomannia," followed on the same day by the "Prinz

* Maximilian Graf von Spee, von Hermann Kirchhoff, 1915. This gives 14 letters from von Spee to his wife; also his report of Coronel and eight letters of Lt. Heinrich von Spee ("Gneisenau") to his mother.

† Pacific Islands, Vol. I., 433.

‡ Dick, 40.

Eitel Friedrich," which is said to have escorted no less than 12 colliers, oil tankers, and supply ships.

The "Emden" and "Markomannia" arrived at Pagan on August 12th. News was received from Tsing-tau about the same date of the Japanese ultimatum, and a conference was held on board the Flagship, where the decision to sail for South American waters is said to have been arrived at.*

Yap wireless had been placed out of action on the 12th and the squadron sailed the same day for the Marshall Islands, some 1,400 miles to the south-eastward.

The "Prinz Eitel Friedrich" also seems to have joined at Pagan, but as it is 1,800 miles from Tsing-tau, it is doubtful whether all her supply ships could have kept company with her, and two which were picked up later by the "Cormoran II." may have been part of the original convoy.

While lying at Pagan the Captain of the "Emden" had suggested to von Spee that he should be permitted to proceed to the East Indies and attack commerce there,† and on August 14th she left the squadron on her famous cruise with her auxiliary the "Markomannia," which acted as her supply ship until captured by the "Yarmouth" off Sumatra on October 12th.

29. *In the Marshall Islands and Samoa.*—Von Spee with the rest of the squadron and nine supply ships shaped course towards the atoll of Eniwetok (or Brown Atoll),‡ a coral island in the north-west of the Marshall Group whose lagoon forms an extensive deep-water anchorage some 70 miles in circumference. The squadron arrived there on August 19th after a rough passage and proceeded to coal.

The day before he arrived there, Count von Spee wrote a letter to his wife, dated August 18th, in which he expressed his view that the inferior German Squadron could do nothing against the combined English, French, and Russian forces. The "Australia" alone was so superior an opponent§ that they must keep out of her way, and in the German Admiral's view the

* Dick, 33.

† Dick, 41, 55.

‡ Pacific Islands, Vol. II., 230, Charts 983, 984.

§ "ein so überlegener Gegner ist." Letter to Gräfin von Spee off the Marshall Islands, August 18th, 1914.

British torpedo craft made his position more difficult. He went on to say that he was entirely dependent on W/T for information, but, as nothing had been received from Yap since August 12th, it had probably fallen into the hands of the enemy. In the letter, von Spee did not mention the Japanese, but Dick states that on August 12th or 13th he had learnt from Tsing-tau of the Japanese ultimatum, though it was not received in Berlin till August 20th, and it is evident that the disablement of Yap W/T station greatly curtailed his sources of information.

No supplies were obtainable at Enivetok, and on August 22nd at 6 a.m. the squadron left Enivetok for Majuro Island, some 600 miles to the south-eastward at the opposite (S.E.) extreme of the Marshalls, the "Nurnberg" being sent to Honolulu for news and mails. While on his way to the south-eastward, Admiral von Spee received by wireless on August 25th news that Japan had declared war, possibly by means of a press message transmitted from Honolulu.*

On August 26th the squadron arrived at Majuro, a large atoll of the usual type with some 1,400 inhabitants, and anchored in the lagoon, where they coaled, being joined on August 27th by the "Cormoran II.," with two supply ships, which she had overtaken on the way.

The declaration of war with Japan confirmed von Spee in his intention to proceed to the eastward, and on the 29th von Spee, in another letter to his wife,† says that, as Japan has joined the enemy, it would be useless to remain in East Asiatic waters, and he proposes to leave them.

Their next destination was Christmas Island, about 1,800 miles to the eastward, an uninhabited atoll right in the middle of the Pacific, leased to Messrs. Lever, of Port Sunlight. On August 30th the squadron sailed from Majuro with five supply ships, leaving the two armed liners, the "Cormoran II." and "Prinz Eitel Friedrich," with two supply ships to begin an independent cruise to the southward the next day. Two other supply ships were empty, and were ordered to proceed *via* Jaluit to neutral ports, and on September 1st the squadron crossed the 180° meridian‡ and counted two days of that date.

* Dick states that on August 21st they were receiving wireless from Apia *via* Nauru. Dick 28.

† Max. Graf von Spee, 19.

‡ Dick, 61.

30. The "Nurnberg" had meanwhile arrived at Honolulu on September 1st, received 725 tons of coal, provisioned and sailed that night with papers for the squadron and 37 German volunteers who had smuggled themselves on board. She rejoined the squadron at sea with mails and news from Honolulu on September 6th, and was detached again to proceed to Fanning Island and destroy the British Pacific cable between Vancouver and Fiji, which had a station there. She appeared off Fanning Island on the 7th and landed a party, which blew up the engine-house and shore end of the cable and smashed the instruments and batteries,* then proceeded to Christmas Island, where the squadron had arrived on September 7th. There is a good anchorage on the western side,† and there the squadron coaled and the Admiral and some of the officers landed.

31. On the night of September 3rd, on the way from Majuro to Christmas Island, von Spee had heard of the capture of Samoa by the New Zealand expedition, and after coaling at Christmas Island on the 8th, determined to proceed thither with the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau." His plan was to approach under cover of darkness and attack any enemy ships which might be there by surprise at dawn. Wireless telegraphy seemed to indicate that ships were protecting the island, and it was hoped that by careful planning and rapid execution a successful attack might be made even on the "Australia" herself.‡ In accordance with this plan the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" sailed for Apia, some 1,300 miles off, on September 9th, leaving the "Nürnberg" and the supply ships at Christmas Island. The cruisers reached Samoa on September 14th, and at 3 a.m., with guns manned, dashed into the well-known harbour, to find nothing but a couple of sailing boats there. "The nest was empty; they stood before their own house and could not enter."

32. It had already been decided that any attempt at recapture was out of the question as the ships could not

* The cable to Suva was repaired by September 27th, and it was then expected that the Bamfield (Vancouver) line would be repaired in a few weeks.

† Pacific Islands, III., 192; Chart 3045, Plan 2867, Lat. 1° 57' N., Long. 157° 28' W.

‡ Dick, 74; Max. Graf von Spee, 20, letter from Spee, September 14th, 1914.

spare the men required, and they could not hold the island against counter attack. A bombardment would only damage German property, and so the Admiral, after making a feint of steering for the north-west, shaped course for Suvaroff Island, some 500 miles directly to the eastward, where a collier had been ordered to await him. In a letter of September 14th to his wife, the Admiral says that he did not expect to meet any enemy warships for some time, and it is clear that the move to South America had by this time been definitely decided on.

The news of his appearance was passed by wireless to Suva, Fiji, and thence by cable to New Zealand and London, and was the first definite information the Admiralty had received of von Spee's movements since August 28th.*

33. *Von Spee's visit to Tahiti.*—Suvaroff Island, under British protection, is an isolated group of small wooded islets in a atoll enclosing a lagoon,† the seat of a pearl fishery. It was reached by the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" on September 17th, but as the swell prevented coaling it was decided to proceed to Bora Bora in the Society Islands, some 700 miles to the eastward, where there was a well-sheltered anchorage and supplies could be obtained.‡

The Society Islands as well as the Marquesas belong to France, and their mountains and fertile valleys, afforded a welcome change from the coral atolls where they had hitherto dropped anchor. As the islands were French all preparations were made for landing, but when on September 21st the cruisers ran through a narrow entrance into a mountain-encircled bay, they were at first mistaken for French ships, and, though their real identity was subsequently detected, no resistance was offered. Some oxen, pigs, and vegetables were obtained, and after coaling the cruisers put to sea at 5 p.m.

* The German ships jammed Samoa's wireless all the 14th (Samoa Western Time, Greenwich date 15th), and it was not till 6 p.m. that they got through to Suva. The news probably reached New Zealand about 9 p.m. to 11 p.m. and got to the Colonial Office, London, from the Governor, New Zealand, at 1 a.m. (Samoa date 15th, Greenwich date 16th). It would arrive at the Admiralty early in the morning of the 16th.

† Pacific Islands, Vol. III., 185, Chart 783, Plan 1176.

‡ Pacific Islands, Vol. III., 100, Chart 767, 1060. Bora Bora is in Lat. 16° 31' S., 151° 45' W.

The Admiral had decided to proceed to Papiete, the capital of Tahiti,* 150 miles to the eastward, and demand provisions and cattle, and issued the necessary instructions for occupying the Government buildings and arsenals in case hostilities were offered. Its cloud-covered mountains were in sight at 2 a.m., September 22nd, and the ships were ready for action at 5 a.m. Half an hour later the battery on shore opened fire, and it was clear that preparations had been made to resist landing. Fire was opened on the fort and on the old French gunboat "Zelée," which was lying alongside a captured German ship, the "Wal-kure." The "Zelée" was set on fire and abandoned by her crew, but the French Governor had ignited the stocks of coal, some 2,000 tons belonging to the Phosphate Company, and explosions were taking place which seemed to indicate the blowing up of storehouses. A landing would have meant a serious diminution of the fighting power of the ships, and von Spee, deciding that it was useless to attempt it, left for Nukuhiva, in the Marquesas Islands, some 840 miles to the north-eastward. A small steamer was hastily despatched by the French to Samoa with the news, whence it was transmitted to Fiji by wireless, and thence by cable to New Zealand, reaching London on the 30th September.

34. *The Squadrons stay in the Marquesas Islands.*—The "Nürnberg," which had been left with the supply ships at Christmas Island, did not leave till September 15th, so that it was possibly von Spee's intention to remain in the Pacific, making Samoa his base, if his hopes of finding and sinking the "Australia" there had been fulfilled. On their way to the Marquesas the ships proceeded on a widely extended front, and, though they did not expect to meet any hostile ships west of Easter Island, the safety of the colliers expected there gave rise to some anxiety.

The Marquesas Islands consist of some eight islands, of which the principal are Hiva Oa (or Dominica) and Nukuhiva, the former with some 2,500 and the latter with 800 inhabitants in 1880. The Société Commerciale de l'Océanie, a German firm of long standing in the Pacific, owned considerable property in these islands, including the valley of the Bay of Taahuku, the principal anchorage

* Tahiti (or Otaheite) is a mountainous island about 33 miles long with a peninsula at its south-eastern end. Papiete is a harbour in the north-west formed by coral reef barriers, which surround the whole island like a natural breakwater. Pacific Islands, Vol. III., 54, Chart 1382.

in Hiva Oa (in Traitors Bay). This firm had shops at Taiohae, the port and mart of these islands, in Nukuhiva, and at Atuona by Taahuku Bay in Hiva Oa, which had been closed since the outbreak of war.*

The "Nürnberg" arrived on the 24th September, and after a look at the small uninhabited islands of Hatulu and Eiao, anchored in Anna Maria (or Taiohae) Bay, a deep bay about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles by $\frac{3}{4}$ mile wide on the south side of Nukuhiva.† There she landed a small force of men, arrested the gendarme officer who had taken refuge in the bush, and seized 10,000 francs. On the 25th September she shifted berth to Controleur Bay, a more spacious anchorage some 5 miles to the eastward, and began coaling.

The "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" arrived early in the morning of the 26th, and the former went to Anna Maria Bay to remove the contents of the German shop there under the guidance of a Danish former employé, and the Admiral landed and visited the Catholic Mission.

On September 27th the "Scharnhorst" returned to Controleur Bay, a deep bay surrounded by steep cliffs of massive red rock. There they obtained ample supplies of oxen and pigs, bananas, oranges, and lemons too; this remained the principal anchorage of the squadron, and during their stay the officers landed and wandered about enjoying the beauty of mountain, waterfall, river, and wood.

On September 30 the "Gneisenau" was sent to Hiva Oa, some 75 miles to the south-eastward, to seize Government property and remove German goods, and anchored in the Bay of Atuona (Taahuku) in Traitors Bay,‡ "whose perpendicular shores rose sheer up from the water." There they seized 12,000 francs and the contents of the German shop, and purchased a number of pigs, hens, and pigeons.

On October 2nd at 5 p.m. the "Scharnhorst" and "Nürnberg" weighed from Controleur Bay with two supply ships. The remaining two were empty and were given orders to return to neutral harbours and try and get coal and stores for the squadron, if possible at Valparaiso.§

* Melbourne Navy Office to Admiralty, April 19th, 1915, M.04199/15.

† Pacific Islands, Vol. III., 171, Chart 1640. For a description of Tai-o-hae and Atuona, see "In the South Seas," R. L. Stevenson, Cap. VIII., XII.

‡ Pacific Islands, Vol. III., 163, Chart 1640.

§ Dick, 89.

The "Gneisenau" had weighed from Atuona Bay in Hiva Oa the same evening, regretfully leaving the "cloud-crowned mountains shining in the moonlight," and joined the squadron next morning on its way to Easter Island, which lay some 2,000 miles to the eastward. Their stay in the Marquesas Islands had lasted from September 26th to October 2nd, a pleasant oasis in a voyage where sterner work now lay ahead.

35. *Concentration at Easter Island.*—It is doubtful whether von Spee up to the arrival of the "Dresden" on the West Coast at St. Quentin Bay had any hope of her joining his squadron. During her stay at Orange Bay from September 5th to 16th her presence was probably known to the German Consuls, but between the "Nürnberg's" visit to Honolulu on September 1st and October 2nd, when the squadron got into wireless touch with the "Dresden" and "Leipzig," von Spee could not have had any communication with the mainland. He may have been able previously to communicate with the "Leipzig," for the "Nürnberg" was at Honolulu on September 1st in telegraphic communication with America, and it is noticeable that the "Leipzig" was in touch with a German railway company at Guaymas in Mexico on September 8th and commenced to move south after that date.

36. Shortly after leaving the Marquesas Islands on October 2nd the "Dresden's" and "Leipzig's" wireless was heard, and communication was established with the "Dresden,"* some 3,000 miles off, on the night of October 4th, and with the "Leipzig" on October 5th. Portions of this were intercepted at the wireless station at Suva in Fiji, and after being passed to Melbourne established Easter Island as the destination of the squadron, this important intelligence reaching the Admiralty on October 5th. The "Dresden" told von Spee of the "Good Hope," "Monmouth," "Glasgow," and "Otranto" having been at Punta Arenas on September 28th, the first authentic information received by him of the names of the ships comprising Cradock's squadron.†

* The "Dresden" and "Leipzig" seem to have only shaped course definitely for Easter Island after getting into wireless touch. Admiral von Pohl's diary (September 9th) states that endeavours were made to concentrate the "Leipzig" and "Dresden." The latter turned suddenly on September 29th, and made for Mas Afuera.

† "Hier werden also zum ersten Male genau die Schiffe genannt." Dick, 91.

On October 6th, Valparaiso wireless press news began to come in, opening up an important source of news, and on October 9th the Admiral received definite information that he would find at Easter Island an ample supply of the coal ordered from Honolulu, which greatly relieved his anxiety and enabled him "to breathe more freely."

Further information was received that, besides the English cruisers mentioned above, two others had appeared on the scene. This must have arisen either from reports of the "Good Hope" and "Glasgow" at Orange Bay, or possibly from the "Glasgow" and "Monmouth" disguising themselves as the "Bristol" and "Cornwall," according to Cradock's directions, when they passed through the Magellan Straits the second time.*

The sudden fall of temperature and possibly the landing at Hiva Oa had resulted in an outbreak of enteritis (Darmkatarrhs), which was specially severe in the "Gneisenau," where two men died, but the measures taken to counteract it were successful, and it had subsided before their arrival on the West Coast.

37. The squadron arrived at Easter Island on October 12th, where the "Leipzig" joined it on October 14th, with three supply steamers, the "Anubis," "Amasis" and "Karnak." There they stayed six days till October 18th, coaling and taking in provisions. Easter Island† is a small volcanic island about 29 miles in circumference, with some 200 inhabitants, hilly, treeless and green. There is no harbour, but anchorage can be obtained off it, and as it is used as a cattle ranch, fresh meat is plentiful, and the ships' larders were replenished with 50 cattle (at 60 marks) and 100 sheep (at 13 marks), which took some two days to catch and kill and get on board. The stay there was not marked by any exceptional incidents.

The "Nurnberg" was unlucky enough while coaling to damage two of her propeller blades, which were only repaired with difficulty. The island is remarkable, among other South Sea islands, for its buildings carved out of lava, and also for its colossal statues scattered finished and unfinished amongst the hills, and the Admiral landed

* Cradock's letter, October 12th, 1914, M. 03489/14; Dick says "two others had passed round Cape Horn": Dick, 92. An officer in the "Gneisenau" writes on October 7th: "In addition two British ships passed the Straits of Magellan on October 5th, also steering west"—Diary of an officer in "Gneisenau," N.I.D. 13177, June 6th, 1917.

† Pacific Islands, III., 104, Chart 1386.

with his son Otto, a lieutenant in the "Nurnberg," in pouring rain to look at them. He was more hopeful than before. "Things appear favourable enough," he says in a letter to his wife, "anyhow they are better than before." They had coaled under very difficult circumstances, and had obtained a number of cattle, and he had effected a junction with Ludecke ("Dresden") and Haun ("Leipzig"). He had also received news of the position of the English cruisers, which was of material importance to the settlement of his plans.†

On October 18th they were ready to sail, and proceeded for Mas Afuera, some 1,500 miles to the eastward. They had emptied three steamers at Easter Island, two of which were sent to Valparaiso and arrived there safely.

38. *The "Leipzig's" Movements.*‡—The "Leipzig" left Mazatlan, Mexico, on August 2nd, and proceeded to Magdalena Bay, on the West Coast of Lower California, where she coaled on August 5th from a British collier which had previously been chartered for her use. She left on August 6th, and is stated by Dick to have been off the Farallones Islands, west of San Francisco, on August 12th, when the German Consul-General, Freiherr von Schack, came on board, and she probably received the latest intelligence available.

Her immediate subsequent movements are obscure, but she was back in the neighbourhood and entered San Francisco on August 17th, leaving next day after coaling. She then appears to have proceeded to the southward, still keeping off the Mexican Coast, for on August 27th she was in Ballenas Bay, Lower California, where mails were brought to her by the Mexican steamship "Mazatlan."

39. She had not been able to make arrangements for coal to be sent to her from San Francisco, and her coal

* October 13th, 1914, arrived December 12th, 1914. Max. von Spee, 21.

† Dick, 97. Probably news of the arrival of the "Glasgow" at Coronel on October 14th. The "Good Hope" did not leave the Falklands till October 22nd. A W/T message was received by the "Gneisenau" from South America on October 19th stating that "Monmouth," "Good Hope," and "Glasgow" were leaving Callao for the South.

‡ One of the principal sources of the actual movements is Paul Siebert's diary in I.D. 1173 of July 1918, and this has been taken as a correct record. Dick omits several stopping places mentioned in this diary.

supplies were now dangerously low, forcing her to proceed up the Gulf of Mexico to Guaymas, half-way up the Gulf on the east side, the only place on the Mexican coast where she was certain of getting a supply. To penetrate so far up would have placed her in a difficult position in the event of the "Newcastle" and "Idzumo" entering the Gulf, but there was no other alternative.

She was off Concepcion Bay, Mexico, opposite Guaymas, from September 4th to 6th, and arrived at Guaymas on the 7th at 8 a.m., where she coaled. The railway there was owned by a German company, and it is probable she was able to get in touch with San Francisco, and may have received instructions from Berlin or von Spee through the "Nurnberg" at Honolulu on September 1st. She left Guaymas on September 8th for the southward, and off Cape Corrientes captured the British ss. "Elsinore," an oiler recently built, of 6,542 registered tons, on September 11th, which she sank after removing the crew. She then proceeded along the coast of S. America, and appears to have met at some point an auxiliary, the "Marie,"* with which she proceeded to the Galapagos Islands.† These are a group of islands of considerable size (the largest, Albemarle Island, is 72 miles long) lying on the equator some 600 miles from the coast of Ecuador, to which politically they belong. The islands are fertile, with a number of good anchorages, and Chatham Island has a population of 675 (1913) with a large sugar factory at Progreso.

The "Leipzig" proceeded to Tagus Bay,‡ a snug anchorage formed by an old crater lying on the west side of Albemarle Island, where she coaled on September 17th, leaving on the 19th. She then proceeded to Chatham Island, farther to the eastward in the same group, arriving on the 20th. There she left the crew of the "Elsinore," and sailed on the 22nd for the coast of Ecuador with another auxiliary, the Kosmos Line steamship "Amasis," which had joined in the Galapagos. On striking the coast route she captured and sank off the Gulf of Guayaquil the British steamship "Bankfields" with a cargo of sugar,

* Report of Master of "Elsinore" says she coaled at sea on September 14th, but it is possible that he confused it with the coaling at Galapagos on the same day.

† Pacific Islands, Vol. III., 456, Chart 786 1375.

‡ Siebert's diary.

and proceeded down the coast to Lobos de Afuera,* a small group of islands some 40 miles from the coast of Peru and 360 miles north of Callao. Arriving there on the 28th she coaled from the "Amasis" and left with her the same day, sending the "Marie" to Callao with the crew of the "Bankfields."

On October 4th,† she went into Port San Nicholas, a commodious and little frequented port 225 miles South of Callao and 600 miles from Lobos de Afuera, met the German ss. "Abessinia" and coaled from her, leaving on the 5th. That night she established wireless communication with von Spee and the next day met the Kosmos liners "Anubis" and "Karnak" off Iquique, and with the "Amasis," "Anubis," and "Karnak" in company shaped course for Easter Island, 2,100 miles away, where she joined von Spee on October 14th.

40. *The "Prince Eitel Friedrich" and the "Cormoran."*—The "Prinz Eitel Friedrich," a north German Lloyd liner of 8,800 tons and 15 knots speed, was armed at Tsing-tau at the beginning of August with the guns of the gunboats "Luchs" and "Tiger," comprising four 4" and six 15-pdr. guns. She was manned by the crews of these obsolete ships under Thierichsen, of the "Luchs," and as already described sailed with a convoy of supply ships on August 6th to join the Admiral at Pagan.

The Russian liner "Riasan" had been armed from the old cruiser "Cormoran" with probably four 4" guns and renamed "Cormoran II." She sailed from Tsing-tau on August 10th, passing the Japanese coast during the night, and thus avoiding the "Triumph's" detachment, which was watching off the Saddle Islands. After getting clear of Japan she proceeded to join the squadron at Majuro on August 27th, having on her way overtaken and escorted two supply ships, probably stragglers from the original convoy.

When the squadron left Majuro for Christmas Island on August 29th the two armed liners stayed a day longer and then left for the South, apparently intending to attack the Australian trade. Their subsequent movements are somewhat uncertain. News of the British concentration in the neighbourhood of New Britain seems

* Pacific Islands III., 398.

† According to Siebert, left Lobos de Afuera on September 28th, 7 p.m., and arrived Porte de San Nicolas, October 4th, 6 a.m., that is 600 miles in 131 hours or an average of 4.6 miles an hour.

to have reached them and they turned to the westward. One of them appears to have been at Kaweing, a land-locked harbour just southward of North Cape, on the north coast of New Ireland, on September 5th, and both vessels may then have proceeded towards the Pelew Islands in the hope of obtaining coal. On September 14th the "Cormoran," flying the Russian flag, is reported as having endeavoured to coal in a Dutch port in Celebes, but could not get supplies, and on the 19th was off Yap, whence she proceeded to New Guinea and had to hide in Alexis Bay,* a harbour with several creeks some 7 miles north of Friedrich Wilhelmshafen, during the landing of the Australian Expeditionary Force on September 24th.

The "Prinz Eitel Friedrich" is reported to have coaled at Malakal in the Pelew Islands, where there was a stock of 2,000 tons recently deposited by a German collier; this coaling took a week, and the "Prinz Eitel" is said to have then proceeded to join the "Cormoran" in Alexis Bay, New Guinea, on September 28th, where she learnt of the occupation of the German protectorate. Captain Thierichsen apparently decided to make for the Atlantic, leaving the "Cormoran," which was short of coal, behind, and he accordingly proceeded to the eastward, getting in touch with the squadron unexpectedly at Mas Afuera on October 27th.†

41. *The "Cormoran" alone.*—The "Cormoran" meanwhile returned to Yap, arriving there September 28th and embarking the crew of the surveying ship "Planet," who had been landed with machine guns on August 10th to defend the W/T station. With this reinforcement the "Cormoran" is said to have proceeded towards Friedrichs Wilhelmshafen, but for some reason or other on arriving in the vicinity she turned with the intention of returning to Yap. The petty officer, whose letter is the principal authority for the "Cormoran's" movements, says that they sighted the "Australia" and her squadron, but if his dates are correct and the German ship left Yap on September 29th for Friedrichs Wilhelmshafen, this is not possible. It is possible that she may have been off Rabaul (1,180 miles from Yap), as on October 1st and 2nd Admiral Patey was cruising to the northward of that port and may have been sighted there.

* Pacific Islands, I., 210, Chart 1084.

† Movements of "Prinz Eitel Friedrich" are uncertain. The "Komet" was at Anguar, September 14th and 26th, and her W/T log has no messages from the "Prinz Eitel Friedrich."

The "Cormoran" arrived off Yap about October 7th to find the Japanese battleship "Satsuma" (Second Southern Squadron) in possession, but by taking advantage of a timely rain squall she succeeded in escaping unobserved. She was now very short of coal, and her only chance was to conceal herself, which she did at a small atoll in the Carolines described as "Samutrek" (probably Lamotrek or Swede Island), a reef with several islets enclosing a lagoon. Here she remained short of coal, food and water, the crew living principally on coconuts until December 12th, when her commander, despairing of obtaining further supplies, used the little coal remaining to proceed to Guam (Mariana Islands), where the United States authorities interned her on December 15th.

42. *The squadron proceeds to the Chilean Coast.*—To return to the East Asiatic Squadron, which now consisted of the "Scharnhorst," "Gneisenau," "Nürnberg," "Leipzig" and "Dresden." From Easter Island they proceeded on the 18th October to Mas Afuera,* 1,550 miles to the eastward. They proceeded at moderate speed, carrying out exercises (Gefechtsdienst) on the way and celebrating the Emperor's birthday on the 22nd, drinking on board the "Gneisenau" to a victorious fatherland.

On the 26th October they arrived off Mas Afuera,† a small island some 9 miles long by 6 miles broad, which is little more than a mountain 1,840 metres high surrounded on every side by a constant surge of surf with its snow-covered top lost in the clouds and its sides rising sheer up from the sea. It affords anchorage, and there they coaled and were joined unexpectedly‡ by the "Prinz Eitel Friedrich."

In the afternoon of October 28th a conference was held on board the Flagship, and in the evening the squadron put to sea to escort the "Prinz Eitel," which was badly in want of coal, and two empty supply ships to Valparaiso.

The coaling situation was far from satisfactory, and the Admiral, writing to his wife on October 27th,

* It seems probable that the "Leipzig" also visited Juan Fernandez. Siebert gives Juan Fernandez arr. October 26th, 1 p.m., dep. 26th, 9 p.m.; Mas Afuera arr. 27th, 7 a.m., dep. 27th, 6 p.m., see I.D. 1173, 43. "Gneisenau's" diary gives arrival at Mas Afuera on 26th and states "Leipzig" searching for colliers.

† South Atlantic Pilot, Part III., 274.

‡ "Ganz unvermutet fand die Vereinigung . . . statt": Dick, 105.

mentions his "constant anxiety"* on this point arising from his lack of fixed bases. "If my supplies once fail me I am done for."

He was now fully aware of the presence of the English Squadron on the Chilian coast and evidently expected to meet them.†

43. On October 30th, in the afternoon, the giant heights of the Andes were in sight and the squadron cruised at slow speed 30 or 40 miles from land, the "Prinz Eitel Friedrich" being sent into Valparaiso the next day. On the night of October 31st/November 1st, she wirelessly about 3 a.m. that a small English cruiser had anchored in Coronel the night before, and the squadron proceeded at once at high speed to the South.

They were 190 miles from Coronel, and in spite of the freshening sea and southerly wind could reckon on being off there by 5 p.m. At noon the "Leipzig" was sent in to examine the coast and met a sailing ship and a Chilian steamer, which led to her being some 25 miles behind when the English squadron was sighted. The "Dresden" also was sent about 2 o'clock to examine a large Chilian steamer and fell to the rear out of sight. About 4 p.m. the wireless of several English ships was heard in close proximity and almost immediately afterwards smoke could be seen to the westward and the ships increased to full speed and prepared for action.‡

CHAPTER V.

CHINA STATION, AUGUST 23RD TO OCTOBER, 1914.

Continued from Chapter I.

44. *The Japanese Intervention.*—The entry of Japan into the war disposed of any anxiety as to the safety of Hong Kong and the trade routes in the China Seas.

* "ewige Sorge um Kohlen," Max. von Spee, 23.

† Letter to wife, October 27th, Max. von Spee, 23.

‡ For movements subsequent to the Battle of Coronel, see Operations leading up to the Battle of the Falkland Islands, Cap. IV.

The primary objective of the Japanese was the reduction of Tsing-tau, and to this end two forces were employed. The first consisting of three battleships, four light cruisers and a flotilla of destroyers was employed in escort duty and in the patrol of Japanese waters; the second composed of three old battleships, two coast defence ships, three armoured cruisers and a destroyer flotilla was employed in the actual attack on Tsing-tau. The rest of the Naval force available was devoted to the protection of the trade routes and allied co-operation against the enemy. The "Ibuki," a slow battle cruiser, and the light cruiser "Chikuma" were despatched to join Rear-Admiral Jerram at Singapore.

The Japanese also took over the protection of the Formosa Strait with a force named "The Third Squadron," consisting of the light cruiser "Tsushima" and a number of smaller craft.

Admiral Jerram was thus free to proceed to the south and bar the door between the China and East Indies Seas against any attempt of von Spee to break back into the Indian Ocean. This movement to the South developed into the defence of the trade routes and the pursuit of the "Emden" in East Indian waters, a contingency which Rear-Admiral Pearce, C.-in-C., East Indies, could not possibly have met with the Indian and Australian convoys and the "Königsberg" on his hands.

45. *Jerram's Appreciation of August 24th.*—The telegram sent by the Admiralty informing Admiral Jerram of Japan's declaration of war on August 23rd requested information as to the disposition of the China Squadron,* and definitely ordered him to proceed in search of the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau," as their destruction was of the first importance; he was further told to keep in touch with the "Australia," which was searching for them at Samoa; but this information was not strictly correct, as the reason for Admiral Patey proceeding to Samoa was not to seek out the enemy but to escort the expeditionary force.

* App., Tel. 8.

Admiral Jerram's reply on August 24th gave the disposition of his force as being:—

"Minotaur" at Hong Kong	} These ships had been	patrolling the trade	
coaling - - - - -			} routes in China
"Hampshire" due Hong Kong August 25th-			
"Triumph" and one destroyer co-operating with Japanese off Tsing-tau.			
"Dupleix," "Yarmouth," "Cadmus," "Clio" and four destroyers on passage from Tsing-tau to Hong Kong.			
"Empress of Japan" - - - - -	} Patrolling Hong Kong to Singapore trade route.		
"Empress of Asia" - - - - -			
"Himalaya" - - - - -			

He added that the Japanese were probably placing at his disposal the "Ibuki" and "Chikuma," while the Russians were sending the cruisers "Askold" and "Zhemtchug" to Hong Kong.*

46. Admiral Jerram's appreciation of the situation and his proposed movements are contained in the same telegram and were elaborated a few days later in a letter, dated 29th August. He stated that from the beginning of the war he had held the opinion that the "Scharnhorst," "Gneisenau," "Nurnberg," and possibly the "Geier," had concentrated either in the Mariana or Marshall Islands. From charts and mail bags found in the collier captured off Tsing-tau it appeared that their destination was somewhere on the southern coast of Sumatra and Java. Movements of German ships in Dutch and Philippine ports gave support to this theory, and there was thus a strong probability that the whole German squadron might appear on the trade routes between Australia, Singapore and Colombo. The C.-in-C., China, considered the protection of these routes as being a task of the first importance, and he therefore proposed to proceed with his force to Singapore and carry out a thorough search of the East Indian Archipelago. It may be noted that this was really beyond the limits of his station, but the East Indian Squadron was fully employed to the westward in escorting troops from India to Suez, "the only British forces on the "great trade routes between Australia, Singapore and

* App. 9, Tel. August 24th, "Askold" and "Zhemtchug" left Vladivostock for Hong Kong, August 24th; "Ibuki" and "Chikuma" left Sasebo for Hong Kong, August 26th.

"Colombo being the 'Fox' and 'Espiegle' near Colombo, and 'Pioneer' near Fremantle." The C.-in-C. decided against the alternative of proceeding in force to search the Mariana, Caroline and Marshall Islands on the grounds that by the time he could get there the Germans would probably have sailed as there was no motive to keep them there. If they had gone to America he would be too far behind to catch them, and if they had gone to the Dutch East Indies he would be leaving the trade routes entirely exposed to attack. As regards the Marshall Islands in particular he considered the Australian squadron better situated for the purpose of search, the distance being 3,500 miles from Hong Kong and only 1,500 miles from Fiji, where the Australian squadron would be coaling on September 2nd.

He concluded his telegram of the 24th by suggesting that the expedition to New Guinea should be delayed while the Australian Squadron searched the Marshall Islands, and that he would employ the "Askold" to examine the Mariana Islands.

47. *The Move to Singapore, August 25th.*—In accordance with the C.-in-C.'s intention to proceed to the Dutch East Indies, the "Minotaur" and "Hampshire" left Hong Kong on August 25th and arrived at Singapore August 30th. While on passage certain intelligence had been received which seemed to confirm the idea that the German ships were in the neighbourhood of Sumatra. On August 26th Cocos Id. W/T Station heard the "Gneisenau" signalling, and on the same day the "Geier" was reported "definitely" (but erroneously) S.E. of Madura Island, off Java. On August 29th the arrival at Sabang* of one of the "Königsberg's" auxiliaries with the crew of a British ship led to a report that the "Konigsberg" had accompanied her auxiliary "almost into port." This was not known to be false till September 1st, and meanwhile it seemed to point to a German concentration in the Dutch East Indies.

On August 28th news was received from Suva that on 8th and 9th August† the German ships were coaling at Ponape (Caroline Islands), and it was believed in Fiji they were still there. The Admiral thought it very improbable, however, that they would remain there longer than was necessary to coal, and was of opinion that they

* A small port on an island N.W. of Sumatra.

† They actually left Ponape on August 6th.

would then make their way either to the American coast or to the trade routes between Australia, Singapore and China. He added that the C.-in-C. of the Australian Fleet agreed "that the German ships were either proceeding East or possibly breaking back to the S.W."

At Singapore were the "d'Iberville" and three French destroyers. Admiral Jerram heard the rumour of the "Königsberg" being off Sabang on his arrival in the "Minotaur" at Singapore on the forenoon of August 30th, and at once sent the "Hampshire" to patrol off Aceh Head, the north point of Sumatra. On September 1st she went into Sabang and discovered the report was false. The "d'Iberville" and French destroyers were sent to Penang to patrol from there to Diamond Point on the Sumatra Coast. While waiting for the "Yarmouth" and "Dupleix" the "Minotaur" took a short trip to the eastward. The "Yarmouth" arrived at Singapore on September 2nd and the "Dupleix" on September 3rd, but the latter ship was suffering from engine defects and had to dock on arrival.

48. *Dispositions, September 2nd.*—On September 2nd the Admiral issued his orders, which were intended to provide for three objectives:—

- (a) To search for the German armoured cruisers.
- (b) To protect the trade routes from all attacks.
- (c) To prevent the sailing of enemy supply ships from Dutch and Philippine ports.

The Philippines and Manilla in particular were a constant source of anxiety, as there were several ships there known to be loaded with coal for German warships, and the attitude of the United States authorities on the subject was not satisfactory. There were 22 German ships in the American Islands, and 37 in the Dutch possessions.

The measures adopted were as follows:—

- "Hampshire" to search down West Coast of Sumatra.
- "Minotaur" and "Yarmouth" to search East Coast of Sumatra and Java.
- "Dupleix" (when ready) to Penang to take charge of patrol in Malacca Straits.
- "Cadmus," "Clio," and five destroyers, to Sandakan (N. Borneo) to intercept German supplies from Manilla. (Sandakan patrol.)

"Empress of Asia" and "Empress of Russia" to patrol east coast of Philippines. (Philippine patrol.)

"Himalaya" and "Empress of Japan" to patrol trade route between Singapore and Hong Kong. (Trade Route patrol.)

The "Ibuki" and "Chikuma" were due at Singapore from Hong Kong on September 5th, and they were ordered to leave on September 9th to search Karimata Strait (S.W. of Borneo) and join the Admiral.

The arrangement that the "Askold" should search the Mariana Islands had to be abandoned, as an escort was required for three British battalions from Hong Kong about September 16th, and the "Askold" and "Zhemtchug" were the only ships available. The former was ordered, while waiting, to proceed from Hong Kong down the east coast of Philippines and back through the Celebes and Sulu Seas.

The telegram giving a summary of these dispositions concludes with repeating that the enemy might possibly have gone east.*

49. *Search of Dutch East Indies, September 3rd-13th.*† —On September 3rd at noon the "Minotaur" and "Yarmouth" sailed to carry out the intended search of East Indies waters, proceeding together through Banka Strait (between Banka and Sumatra) and then parting company.

The "Minotaur" on September 5th arrived at Batavia, where the Admiral had an interview with our Consul General, but could gain no intelligence as to German movements. The Dutch appeared to be maintaining strict neutrality, and the "Minotaur" sailed at 6.0 p.m. the same evening along the north coast of Java for Madura Straits (between the Island of Madura and the north coast of Java).

The "Yarmouth," after parting company, proceeded through Sunda Straits and along the south coast of Java. She met the Flagship in the Madura Straits on September 9th, and was sent back to Singapore *via* Serutu Island,‡ a small uninhabited island with an anchorage, in Carimata Straits, 65 miles north-eastward of Billiton Island. At 6.0 a.m. on September 11th she met the "Ibuki" and "Chikuma," and returned with the "Chikuma"

* App. 10.

† Chart 2483.

‡ China Sea Pilot II., 213, Chart 2160.

to Singapore, where she arrived on September 12th, the "Ibuki" remaining for some days longer in the Java Seas.

The Flagship proceeded west from Madura Straits back along the north coast of Java, and joined the "Hampshire" on September 11th off Etna Bank, 50 miles north of Batavia.

50. The "Hampshire" searching simultaneously down the west coast of Sumatra left Sabang* on September 1st, visited Padang, half way down the coast, on September 7th, coaled at sea on the 8th, and then proceeded through Sunda Straits to meet the Flagship on the 11th. Having effected a junction, the "Minotaur" and "Hampshire" returned to Singapore, arriving on September 13th.

51. This search of the Dutch East Indies, which involved a considerable dispersion of force, had no result, and as there seemed no likelihood of an immediate appearance of the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" on the trade routes, the Admiral in a telegram of September 12th reporting his proceedings stated that he considered it probable that they had gone to South America and would attack our trade off the Straits of Magellan or off the River Plate. Great difficulty had been experienced during the cruise in maintaining wireless communication, as atmospherics were frequent, and the only wireless equipment at Singapore was a low power installation rigged up in a merchant ship. Admiral Jerram had now come to the conclusion that in view of the vast area he had to deal with, and the difficulty of co-ordinating the movements of ships of four different powers, it was essential to have his headquarters ashore. He proposed, therefore, to establish his headquarters at Hong Kong as soon as convenient, and to send the "Minotaur" and "Hampshire" to join the R.A., "Australia."†

52. *The Australian Convoy.*—But while Admiral Jerram was executing his search of the Dutch East Indies the Admiralty had sent him orders of a very different nature, which greatly limited his further movements, and transformed his work of search into that of convoy.

An Australian convoy of 22 ships was due to leave Fremantle for Colombo on October 3rd, and on Septem-

* China Sea Pilot I., 51, Chart 2760.

† App. 11, Tel. September 12th.

ber 8th he was instructed to assist in their convoy. The original escort was to consist of the "Melbourne" and "Sydney," but the Admiralty now sent instructions for the "Minotaur" and "Hampshire" to meet them near Cocos Keeling Islands and accompany them to Colombo.

These orders were modified on September 10th, due to the fact that the "Australia" had been added to the escort, and Admiral Jerram was now ordered to assist only in covering their passage to the northward within wireless touch, and it was considered that with the two Japanese cruisers he had a force sufficient to work in two divisions, each strong enough to engage the German squadron, if he thought fit.*

A few days later the instructions with regard to the Australian convoy were again modified, the "Hampshire" being ordered on September 13th to join the "Australia" at Fremantle by October 7th.

Admiral Jerram's proposal to establish his headquarters ashore at Hong Kong was approved of by the Admiralty on the same day, and the Admiral accordingly prepared to sail in the "Empress of Japan" for Hong Kong to establish his headquarters ashore.

53. *Co-operation with Australian Squadron.*—Admiral Patey had for some time emphasised the desirability of the China Squadron working in combination with him. On September 1st he had suggested "that the China Squadron might join up and carry out a combined sweep through Caroline Islands and Marshall Islands." On September 13th he suggested as very desirable that the China Fleet, with "Montcalm" and "Duplex," should assist in the search for the enemy's ships, and on the 15th September repeated the suggestion in the same words.

It was no doubt as a result of these suggestions and after communication with the C.-in-C., Australia, that the C.-in-C., China, decided on September 14th, with the Admiralty's subsequent approval, to send the "Minotaur," "Ibuki" and "Chikuma" to Rabaul, in the north-east corner of New Britain, to cover Australia and the islands in the event of von Spee breaking back.

* Jerram now had the "Minotaur," 4—9.2", 10—7.5"; "Newcastle," 2—6", 10—4"; "Chikuma," 9—6"; "Hampshire," 4—7.5", 6—6"; "Yarmouth," 8—6"; "Ibuki," 4—12", 8—8".

54. Intelligence with regard to the enemy was still very meagre. There was news of the "Nürnberg's" arriving at Honolulu on September 1st and leaving the same day after receiving 750 tons of coal, and it was reported that she had joined the "Leipzig" outside. On September 7th a large three-funnel cruiser was reported off Fanning Island, and shortly after the operator signalled that she was landing armed parties. Communication then ceased, and it was presumed that the "Nürnberg" had cut the cable. On September 14th a wireless signal from the "Luchs" (probably the "Prinz Eitel Friedrich") had been intercepted, ordering the German collier "Tannenfels" to a rendezvous in $0^{\circ} 140^{\circ}$ E., which was captured that very day in Basilan Straits (between the Philippines and Borneo) by the "Chelmer," one of the destroyers patrolling from Sandakan, headquarters of the North Borneo Company, to intercept German supply ships.

55. *Disturbance caused by News of Enemy.*—It will be seen that the main course of events on the China Station had been the destruction of the W/T at Yap, the move to the southward when Japan declared war, the search of Sumatra and Java waters, and the prospective escort of the Australian convoy. All the arrangements, however, made for covering the Australian convoy were upset by two events. On the night of the 15th–16th September Admiral Jerram learnt that the "Emden" was operating successfully in the Bay of Bengal, and next day (September 16th) heard that the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" had appeared off Samoa on the morning of September 14th (15th Eastern time). The effect of this definite location both of the German Asiatic Squadron and the "Emden" was widespread, and instantly affected the whole situation. To deal with the "Emden" the Admiral at once detached the "Hampshire," "Yarmouth" and "Chikuma" towards the Bay of Bengal, while the "Minotaur" was sent to the west coast of Sumatra and the "Ibuki" to the Cocos Islands.

In view of the dispositions previously arranged (*see* paragraph 63), the Australian expedition in New Britain now appeared to be exposed to attack, and the Admiralty ordered the "Australia," then on her way from Sydney to Fremantle, to return and cover it and search for the enemy. This seriously weakened the escort for the European convoy, and on September 16th the "Minotaur" was ordered to be sent with one Japanese cruiser (the

"Ibuki") to Fremantle by October 4th.* Subsequently the Admiralty decided that none of these convoys should be at sea with an escort unable to meet the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau," and on September 23rd the order of September 16th was modified, and the "Minotaur" and "Ibuki" were ordered to Wellington to escort the New Zealand Division.

In order to deal with the new situation which had arisen Admiral Jerram, instead of returning to Hong Kong, decided to remain at Singapore, and the headquarters of the China Squadron were established ashore with the Admiral's flag flying at Fort Canning.

After September 20th the C.-in-C., China, had no ships at his disposal to operate against the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau," and the forces under his orders were fully occupied in searching for the "Emden" and convoying transports. A watch was still kept on Manilla, and as far as possible the various Dutch East Indian Seas were kept under observation, as the "Geier" was still at large and the Germans were known to have armed two liners, the "Prinz Eitel Friedrich" and the "Cormoran" (*ex* Russian "Riasan"), of which nothing had been heard.

56. *The Japanese Squadrons.*—The squadrons organised by the Japanese for service against the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" exercised considerable influence on operations.

The first report of these squadrons is contained in a communication from our Minister at Tokio, dated September 9th, which mentions the objects of the First Squadron as the location and destruction of the German Squadron believed at the time to be in the Caroline Islands.

The Second Squadron was to watch for supply ships leaving Manilla, and it was later arranged with the Admiralty that it should proceed to Rabaul. Admiral Jerram gives the composition and objectives of the squadrons in a letter dated September 25th as:

1st Southern "Kurama" (battle cruiser).
Squadron.

"Tsukuba" (battle cruiser).

"Asama" (armoured cruiser).

2 T.B.D.'s.

* App. 12, Tel. September 16th.

To proceed through Mariana and Caroline Islands to Jaluit, Marshall Islands, which was reported to have been used by German ships, and where on September 17th it was reported that there were 25,000 tons of coal.

2nd Southern "Satsuma" (battleship).
Squadron.

"Yahagi" (light cruiser).

"Hirado" (light cruiser).

To proceed *via* east coast of Philippines through the Western Carolines to Labuan(*sic*), and then guard the trade routes through Mollucca and Banda Seas between Celebes and New Guinea.

The idea that the Second Squadron was proceeding to Labuan was, however, quite erroneous, and was due to an error on the part of the Japanese officer on Admiral Jerram's staff, who decoded a word meaning Rabaul as Labuan. In the belief that Labuan was meant the Admiral proposed to the Japanese authorities that the First Squadron should act in co-operation with the C.-in-C., Australia, and the Second in co-operation with himself, the general dividing line being the meridian of 140° E. The Japanese Admiralty agreed to this, reserving, however, full discretion to employ both their squadrons on the same side of the meridian if required.

It must be borne in mind that owing to Australian susceptibilities there was a certain delicacy with regard to the Japanese operating to the southward, and the original proposal had been that only British ships should be employed south of Singapore.

57. Between September 25th and October 1st, Admiral Jerram's discovery of the error which had been made in decoding Labuan for Rabaul led him to change his views. He says in his letter of October 1st: "It would mean that the Australian Squadron and the Japanese First and Second Squadrons were all to the eastward of the 140th meridian—an unnecessarily strong force—whilst to westward of this meridian there was no force capable of engaging 'Scharnhorst' and 'Gneisenau' if they made their next appearance there, as 'Minotaur' and 'Ibuki' are in South Australia, and the remaining weaker ships are widely dispersed in searching for the 'Emden' and escorting troops."

He therefore opened further negotiations with the Japanese Admiralty, the outcome of which was an agreement that:—

Japanese First Southern Squadron should operate North of the Equator and East of 140° E. (roughly, longitude of Yokohama).

Japanese Second Southern Squadron should operate North of 20° S. and West of 140° E.

Australian Squadron should operate South of Equator and West of 140° W. (roughly, longitude of Marquesas Islands).

58. The actual movements of the Japanese Squadrons were limited to the Carolines and Marshall Islands, and appear to have been:—

First Southern Squadron:—"Kurama," "Tsukuba," "Asama," 2 T.B.D.s.

September 14th	-	Left Yokusuka.	Searched Marianne and Caroline Islands.
" 19th	-	Arrived Jaluit, Marshall Islands, found no signs of Germans, and searched to the eastward.	
October 5th	-	At Kusaie (Ualan) (Eastern Carolines).	
" 7th	-	At Ponape (Eastern Carolines).	
" 11th	-	At Truk (Central Carolines).	
" 19th	-	Left Truk. "Asama" detached to Honolulu to look after "Geier."	
" 26th	-	Arrived Jaluit (Marshall Islands).	
November 4th	-	Returned to Truk.	

Second Southern Squadron:—"Satsuma," "Yahagi," "Hirado."

October 1st	-	Left Sasebo.
" 7th	-	At Yap* (Western Carolines).
" 8th	-	At Pelew Islands.

* German "Cormoran II." left Yap on October 1st.

October 10th - - "Hirado" detached to search Molucca passage and Banda Sea, thence to visit Timor, where German colliers were reported. "Yahagi" detached to Singapore. The "Satsuma" remained in Pelew Islands.

The Squadrons were reorganised after the Battle of Coronel.

59. *Admiral Jerram's Appreciation, October 2nd.*—On September 30th it was definitely known that the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" had bombarded the French possession of Tahiti, and Admiral Jerram, in his letter of October 10th, remarked that "the appearance of 'Scharnhorst' and 'Gneisenau' off Tahiti, on September 22nd, pointed to the probability of their intending to cross the Pacific to the American Coast."

He discussed at length the situation which had arisen in his telegram of October 2nd, and suggested:—

- (a) That the Japanese First Squadron should proceed to the coast of North America.
- (b) That the Japanese Second Squadron should work from Borneo.
- (c) That the Australian Squadron should remain near Australia.

This disposition he considered would meet the circumstances of the enemy either returning to the westward or proceeding to attack the coast of British Columbia or harass our trade there. If the enemy proceeded through Panama Canal, or Magellan Straits, he would have to be met by forces from elsewhere.*

This was practically the last suggestion made by the C.-in-C. on the subject of the German Asiatic Squadron, for with the appearance of the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" at Tahiti on September 22nd its influence on the China Command may be said to have ceased.

* App. 13, Tel. October 2nd.

CHAPTER VI.

(Continued from Chapter II., p. 77.)

AUSTRALIAN STATION FROM AUGUST 30TH to NOVEMBER 1914.

60. *Operations after Capture of Samoa.*—The objectives for Admiral Patey's force after the capture of Samoa on August 30th can be considered under two headings. One task was the convoying of the Australian forces destined for Europe, a duty first mentioned in Admiralty telegram of August 13th, while another and totally different series of operations was proposed in a telegram of August 19th, directing Rabaul to be seized and used as a base for the capture and occupation of Nauru, Angaur and Yap, and a subsequent attack on Kaiser Wilhelmsland.* The forces for these later operations were already at Palm Island (Queensland) and Port Moresby (British New Guinea), and the Commonwealth had pressed that they should not be delayed.

These operations consisted in the transport of considerable bodies of troops over waters where the enemy's movements were unknown, and though the difficulties of communication in these extensive areas were likely to hamper hostile operations, there still remained an element of risk to which attention was drawn by the Oversea Attack Sub-Committee in a Memo. of August 24th on the general disposition of force in the Indian Ocean and Pacific, especially with regard to troop movements. This concluded by saying, "If these waters were known to be clear of enemy cruisers, the situation would be very different, and I would point out that the duties that occupy and foreshadow the movements of our Eastern Squadrons are hardly those laid down in the Standing War Orders, where the destruction of the enemy warships is the first and principal duty. It is noteworthy that these have not been encountered or seriously looked for; and we seem to be asking too much for the limited force we have in those waters, and are looking ahead and planning our military expeditions without taking sufficient thought of our enemy's Naval forces it is high time

* App. 14, Tel. August 19th.

"we destroyed the German communications and armed vessels of all descriptions in these waters." This issue between the conflicting requirements of active search for the enemy and protection for important convoys which affected Naval strategy on every station was felt perhaps more strongly in Australian waters than in any other sea.

61. Samoa had been occupied on August 29th/30th, and in reporting this Admiral Patey stated that he was proceeding to Suva, in Fiji, with the "Australia," "Montcalm," and "Melbourne" to coal preparatory to escorting the New Guinea expedition.

The Admiralty approved of his proposed movements, but urged the importance of destroying the wireless station at Nauru.

The situation at this time (August 30th) was as follows:—

"Australia," "Melbourne," "Montcalm," on the way to Suva (arrived September 2nd), returning to escort New Guinea expedition.

"Sydney," "Encounter," "Berrima" (transport with 1,500 troops) at Palm Island, Queensland, waiting for the "Australia" to return and escort them to New Guinea.

Destroyers "Warrego," "Parramatta," "Yarra" and transport "Kanowna" (troops later disbanded) at Port Moresby for local defence.

Protector with Submarines A.E. 1 and A.E. 2 en route from Sydney to Palm Island.

Admiral Patey, after considering the various calls on his force, came to the conclusion that assistance from the China Squadron was desirable, and suggested to the C.-in-C., China, a combined sweep, using Rabaul as a base. This suggestion was not concurred in by Admiral Jerram, who replied on September 3rd, that while R.A., "Australia" remained to the eastward of Australia, he thought it was better for the China Squadron to remain to the westward of New Guinea; this being no doubt due to the opinion held both by the Admiralty and the C.-in-C., China, that the enemy's squadron was possibly in the East Indian Archipelago and still threatening the great trade routes.

62. *New Guinea and Nauru.*—On August 30th, Admiral Patey issued orders to the "Sydney" and the ships and fleet auxiliaries of the expeditionary force. The text of his message was as follows:—"Sydney with ships,

"destroyers and fleet auxiliaries under your orders to be at rendezvous 11° 27' S., 154° 35' E.,* by 7.0 a.m. on September 9th. A.E. 1 and A.E. 2 should accompany you if they have arrived and fuel was available. . . . All ships under your orders should be as complete with fuel as possible on September 9th."

The "Australia" and "Melbourne" sailed from Suva on September 4th, and in accordance with the Admiralty instructions the "Melbourne" was detached to Nauru to destroy the W/T station, the "Montcalm" proceeding to Noumea to communicate with France.

On September 7th the "Sydney" and her convoy left for the above rendezvous, where she joined the "Australia" off Rossel Island in the Louisiade Archipelago on the 9th, according to plan, the same day that the "Melbourne" destroyed the German W/T station at Nauru and removed the operators. Everything was now ready for the move to German New Guinea.

63. *Patey ordered to take Home Convoy.*—Meanwhile there had been no further news of the enemy save that the "Nürnberg" had appeared at Honolulu on September 1st, and on the 7th had cut the cable at Fanning Island, and the Australian authorities began to be alarmed with regard to the safety of their convoy for Europe. The Admiralty on September 3rd had ordered Admiral Patey to detach the "Melbourne" and "Sydney" for this purpose, so as to arrive at Sydney on September 22nd, but the Admiral did not receive this until September 9th, when the "Melbourne" was due at Nauru.

As time went by without further news of the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau," it was decided at home—possibly in view of the above Memo. of August 24th—that a stronger escort was necessary, and on September 10th the Admiralty suggested that the "Australia," "Sydney" and "Melbourne" should escort the convoy, leaving Sydney on September 27th, across the Indian Ocean. The "Encounter" and flotilla could remain with the New Guinea expedition, "occupying New Guinea and the islands as convenient," and the Admiralty also expressed their "desire" that Angaur should be seized without delay. Admiral Patey received this telegram on the afternoon of September 11th, while he was conducting the operations against the German settlements in the N.E. corner of New Britain.

* Five miles S.E. of Rossel Islands, some 660 miles from Palm Island.

64. *Landing at Herbertshohe.*—A landing had been effected at Herbertshohe (the headquarters of the German Protectorate) on September 11th, and after some hours of bush fighting the wireless station at Kabakaul was seized next day. On September 12th the "Melbourne" arrived from Nauru, and on the 13th Rabaul was occupied without resistance. The Admiral then had to consider the situation in the light of his approaching departure. The Australian Government was very anxious to proceed with the expedition against Friedrich Wilhelm harbour in New Guinea without delay, and this was also the Admiralty view. Submarine A.E. 1 was lost with all hands on September 13th while patrolling off Simpsonhafen.

65. But the German forces had not yet all been accounted for; the Governor had retired into the interior, and there was a possibility of the Germans raising native levies in the unoccupied islands. Admiral Patey therefore did not consider that the military situation justified the immediate removal of the troops, who still required naval support, which in its turn might be exposed to an attack from von Spee. He therefore again expressed a wish that the China Squadron should assist in the active search for the enemy's ships, reporting at the same time that he was sailing for Sydney on September 15th to escort the Indian Ocean convoy, leaving the "Encounter" in charge at Rabaul.

On September 14th he learnt from the Naval Board that his convoy would consist of 27 transports, which would assemble in King George's Sound October 5th, and be joined there by 15 transports from New Zealand.

The "Australia," "Sydney" and "Melbourne" accordingly left Simpsonhafen on September 15th, the day the "Montcalm" arrived from Noumea, though Admiral Patey was not altogether easy in his mind as to the situation in which he had left the New Britain expedition. An intercepted signal* had given a German collier (the "Tannenfels") a rendezvous in $0^{\circ} 140^{\circ} E.$, just north of New Guinea, and he considered everything pointed to their continued presence in the Marshall Islands, which meant the possibility of their appearance off New Britain.

On September 17th he suggested, therefore, that a ship from the China Squadron should support the "Encounter," and, in point of fact, before the appearance of the "Em-

* This signal was from the "Prinz Eitel Friedrich."

den" in East Indian waters on September 14th, Admiral Jerram had intended to send the "Minotaur," "Ibuki" and "Chikuma" to Rabaul for this very purpose.

66. *Germans appear at Samoa, September 14th.*—The news of von Spee's appearance off Samoa on September 14th cleared up the situation. It was while on passage to Sydney that Admiral Patey received the news, which completely refuted the theory that the enemy were in the East Indies, and new orders issued by the Admiralty on September 16th definitely ordered the "Australia" and "Montcalm" to cover the New Guinea Expeditionary Force from attack and then search for the two enemy cruisers. The "Melbourne" was to be employed at the Admiral's discretion, and the "Sydney" was to be used for the convoy to Aden, being at Fremantle joined by the "Minotaur" and a Japanese cruiser.‡ As the "Melbourne," however, required some repairs, she was sent on to take the home convoy instead of the "Sydney," which remained for the present with the "Australia."

Admiral Patey received these orders on his way to Sydney on September 17th and at once returned with the "Sydney" to Rabaul, arriving there on the 19th. There was now no expectation of reinforcements from China, as the "Hampshire," "Yarmouth" and "Chikuma" were busy hunting the "Emden," and the "Minotaur" and "Ibuki" had been detailed for the Australian home convoy.

On September 21st the "Sydney" was detached to proceed to Angaur and disable the W/T station there, and the next day (22nd) the whole remaining force sailed for Frederick Wilhelm harbour, the capital of German New Guinea in Astrolabe Bay.†

On September 22nd, therefore, the situation at noon was:—

"Australia" -	-	} $4^{\circ} 22' S., 152^{\circ} 27' E.$, just
"Encounter" -	-	{ off Simpsonhafen in New
"Montcalm" -	-	{ Britain on way to New
"Berrima" -	-	{ Guinea.
"Sydney" -	-	{ $3^{\circ} 00' S., 147^{\circ} 30' E.$, in Bis-
		{ marck Archipelago on way
		{ to Angaur.
"Melbourne" -	-	{ at Sydney (waiting to take
		{ Home Convoy).

* App. 15, Tel. September 16th. The "Ibuki" was selected, and was with the "Minotaur" and "Sydney" when the latter was detached to chase the "Emden" on November 9th.

† Pacific Islands I., 208, Chart 2759A, 1084.

"Warrego" -	-	} at Simpsonhafen in New Britain.
"Parramatta" -	-	
"Yarra" -	-	
A.E. 2 and Auxiliaries -	-	
"Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" -	-	} Near Tahiti.
"Cormoran" -	-	} Up a creek in Alexis Bay, New Guinea, some 10 miles north of Wilhelms- hafen.
"Prinz Eitel Fried- rich" -	-	
"Dresden" -	-	} In Pelew Islands or New Guinea Waters.
"Leipzig" -	-	} St. Quintin Bay, S.W. Chile.
"Nurnberg" and Auxiliaries -	-	} Marquesas Islands.

67. *Capture of Friedrich Wilhelm Harbour, September 24th.*—The Australian Squadron arrived off Friedrich Wilhelm harbour on September 24th. The place was occupied without resistance, and in the evening the Fleet sailed again for Rabaul,* arriving there on September 26th. The "Sydney" destroyed Angaur W/T station the same day (26th) and returned to Rabaul, arriving there on September 30th. On both her outward and homeward journeys she passed through the Tannenfels rendezvous (see paragraph 65) but saw nothing, though she heard strong German wireless, and it is possible that both the "Prinz Eitel Friedrich" and "Cormoran" may have narrowly escaped meeting her. The former appears to have left Malakal (Pelew Islands, north of Angaur) about September 24th for Alexis Bay (New Guinea), arriving there on the 28th, where she met the "Cormoran," which had concealed herself up a creek on September 24th after sighting one of Admiral Patey's cruisers employed on the New Guinea expedition.

68. *The Move Eastward in Search of the Enemy.*—Of the objectives given Admiral Patey in his orders of September 16th, the first had been completed, and the expeditionary force was safely landed at New Guinea. He had now to carry out his further orders to search for the enemy cruisers. In order to accomplish this task he considered it desirable to get into touch with the Japanese First Southern Squadron, which was working through the

* This is practically synonymous with Simpson harbour or hafen, which is the northern portion of Blanche Bay.

Carolines and due at Jaluit (Marshall Islands) on the 29th September, and endeavoured to establish communication with them while coaling and oiling his Fleet at Simpsonhafen. Failing to effect this he decided to make a cruise to the northward and sailed on October 1st.

Meanwhile the absence of a protected base was causing some anxiety at the Admiralty, as Rabaul was undefended and exposed to a sudden attack, and they accordingly ordered Admiral Patey to send to Thursday Island or inside the Barrier Reef any ships he was not taking with him in his search for the enemy. To this he demurred, as the shifting of his base to Thursday Island or the Barrier Reef would have reduced his radius of action by 2,000 miles. If it was the Admiralty intention that he should operate permanently in the South he suggested Noumea as a suitable base, but if Simpsonhafen was still to remain his working supply base he would arrange for the flotilla of three destroyers and a submarine to protect it. The question was soon solved by the appearance of the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" on September 22nd off the town of Papeete (Tahiti), capital of the French Society Islands. There being no cable communication, this was not known in Australia till September 30th, and Admiral Patey had sailed to the northward to carry out his sweep before receiving the intelligence. When the news reached the Rear-Admiral at 2.0 a.m. on October 2nd, there being no longer any object in his sweep, he returned to Rabaul to refuel and obtain further orders.

69. These he received on October 3rd, to the effect that he was to proceed to Suva (Fiji) to cover Samoa, Fiji and New Zealand, as it was probable the Germans would return and carry out similar attacks to that on Tahiti.*

These orders were probably very largely due to the feeling of alarm which existed in New Zealand and the Commonwealth at the unchecked activities of the "Scharnhorst," "Gneisenau" and "Emden." Public opinion had become inflamed on the subject, and a false report of a cruiser off Tutuila, Samoa, unfortunately received at this juncture helped to mislead popular opinion. The New Zealand Government refused to allow their troops to sail without the convoy of the "Ibuki" and "Minotaur," and the Prime Minister threatened to resign unless adequate protection was given.

* App. 16, Tel. October 2nd.

70. *Australian Squadron sails for Fiji, October 4th.*—Admiral Patey, however, considered that the enemy's appearance off Tahiti was a clear indication that they were bound to South America, and on October 3rd began making the fuel arrangements which would be necessary should he be ordered to follow them. Admiral Jerram was of the same opinion, which was confirmed by a message from the "Scharnhorst" to the "Dresden," intercepted on October 4th, which read "'Scharnhorst' on the way between Marquesas Islands and Easter Island. Present position 130° W." Admiral Patey sailed for Suva from Rabaul at 11 p.m. on October 3rd with the "Australia," "Sydney," "Encounter," and "Montcalm," and arrived there on October 12th, having carried out a short cruise to the north-eastward on the way.

On arrival he found that his colliers had been delayed by bad weather, and he would not be able to leave Suva till October 17th. He then proposed to cruise in the vicinity of Fiji, suggesting that it might be desirable to search the Marquesas Islands in case the Germans had left colliers there, but as this would entail an absence from Suva of 21 days, he did not like to undertake it without Admiralty approval.

Following up his previous suggestion he now proposed that in the event of the "Australia" being required to follow the German Squadron to South America he should proceed to meet the "Newcastle" and "Idzumo" by way of the Marquesas and Galapagos Islands. In the event of both "Australia" and "Sydney" going, two colliers and an oil ship would be required to accompany them, another collier being sent straight to Valparaiso.

The Admiralty replied on October 14th that it had been decided not to send the Australian Squadron to South America, and that he should confine his operations to the vicinity of Fiji. The "Sydney" was to proceed to Sydney and join the Home Convoy. This meant that he must confine his movements to the vicinity of Fiji, and in accordance with these orders Admiral Patey carried out three short cruises.

October 17th to 23rd, to Savaii, Wallis and Horne Islands.

October 26th to 31st, to south-westward of Suva.

November 3rd to 6th, in neighbourhood of Fiji.

As he was still firmly of opinion that the German Squadron was on its way to South America, Admiral

Patey suggested on October 27th that if it did not go to the Galapagos Islands it would probably coal at Juan Fernandez, and on that very day it was actually fuelling at Masafuera only 80 miles from the position suggested.

It will be seen then that when the Battle of Coronel was being fought the "Australia," largely on account of political considerations, was lying tied to Suva in order to cover Samoa and New Zealand from attack though the German Squadron both at Samoa and Tahiti had shown the inability of a flying squadron of this sort to carry out any serious attack against a force on shore.

71. After the news of Coronel had arrived, the Admiralty (*see* Cap. VII.) decided to effect a concentration on the west coast of North America, and orders were sent on November 5th ordering Admiral Patey to hold himself in readiness to proceed to North America *via* Fanning Island, where the cable had fortunately been repaired by November 1st.

Admiral Patey had constantly borne in mind the possibility of having to proceed to America, and had kept the whole of his resources in hand for this purpose. When therefore at 5.30 a.m. November 8th he received orders to proceed at once to Fanning Island* *en route* to Honolulu, he had no further arrangements to make, and sailed that afternoon at 12.30 p.m. with a fast collier in company.

CHAPTER VII.

OPERATIONS ON N.W. COAST OF AMERICA.

72. *Operations previous to Coronel.*—With the arrival at Esquimalt on August 30th of the "Newcastle," the forces on the North American Coast consisted of:—

"Newcastle."

"Rainbow."

"Idzumo."

These ships were employed in searching for the "Leipzig" only, fear of the "Nürnberg's" operating off the coast being removed by her appearance at Honolulu on September 1st and at Fanning Island, where she cut the cable on September 7th.

* App. 18, Tel. November 7th.

Captain Powlett sailed in the "Newcastle" on September 3rd, and met the "Idzumo" off Sta. Cruz Island (34° N., 120° W.) on September 8th. The Captain of the Japanese ship considered that his orders did not permit of his going south, so the "Newcastle" proceeded independently to search the Gulf of California, examining the various anchorages on the way south. Between September 9th and 17th she visited Guadalupe Islands, a group of islands some 150 miles from the coast of Lower California, Santa Rosalia, San Bartolome Bay, Asuncion Bay, Ballenas Bay, Magdalena Bay, all on the West Coast of Lower California, and La Paz round the corner in the Gulf.* At the latter place it was learnt that the "Leipzig" had undoubtedly been using the Gulf of California as a base, but had probably by this time left for the South. Captain Powlett then decided to return to Esquimalt for repairs, and arrived there on September 25th. The "Idzumo" had arrived there on September 14th, and was cruising off the coast. On the "Newcastle's" arrival the Japanese ship proceeded south to patrol between San Diego, a port on the West Coast close to the Mexican boundary, and San Francisco.

73. While the "Newcastle" refitted, the "Rainbow" cruised off Vancouver, and Captain Powlett occupied himself in organising the defences of Esquimalt, as he was of opinion that "strong squadrons to the South might drive the enemy's main force to the North." The defences were not in a satisfactory condition as one of the two 9·2-inch guns available was defective, and a 6-inch gun was dismantled. The minefield plant had been sold for old iron, but was repurchased and rendered efficient; motor launches were fitted with dropping gear, and the 4-inch guns from the sloops mounted ashore to defend the northern channels.

By this time further information had been received as to the enemy. On September 30th it was known that the armoured cruisers had bombarded Tahiti on the 22nd September. On October 1st the crew of a ship captured by the "Leipzig" reached Callao, and next day it was known that she had been at the Galapagos Islands on September 17th, while activity on the part of the German

* Chart 2324, Cape San Lucas to San Diego; Chart 2530, San Diego to Cape Mendocino; Chart 2531, Cape Mendocino to Vancouver Island. Sailing Directions, West Coast of Central America and United States Pilot, 1916.

ships in Peruvian ports seemed to show that she was working South.

The "Newcastle" sailed accordingly on September 30th and met the "Idzumo" on October 5th at San Bartolome Bay, half way down the West Coast of Lower California, about 350 miles south of San Diego, where the Captains agreed upon the following disposition:

The "Newcastle" was to search the Gulf of California, which was considered to be the most probable area for ports of enemy supply on the coast; the "Idzumo" was to patrol the San Francisco trade routes, and the "Rainbow" was to cruise between Esquimalt and San Francisco.

74. *News of Cradock's Force and Japanese Reinforcement.*—Meanwhile Captain Powlett had received information from the Admiralty as to the steps being taken to meet the German concentration on the South American coast. A sufficiently strong force was being sent through the Straits of Magellan to sweep up the Chilian Coast, while the Japanese battleship "Hizen" was on her way to join his force on the coast of North America,* and on October 13th further information was received that she would arrive at Honolulu on October 22nd, and at Ensenada, Mexico, a port on the East Coast of Lower California, in Todos Santos Bay, some 60 miles south of San Diego, on November 2nd. On October 16th the "Newcastle" and "Rainbow" patrolled between Guadalupe Island and the mainland in an endeavour to intercept the supply ship "Sacramento," which had left San Francisco with 8,000 tons of coal and 2,000 tons of provisions on October 15th, but failed to find her.† On October 18th all three ships met at Santa Cruz, a port on the West Coast of the United States, some 80 miles south of San Francisco, and it was decided to proceed to Esquimalt to clean boilers and "await the 'Hizen,' in 'view of the probable arrival of the 'Scharnhorst' and 'Gneisenau' on the coast."

On October 22nd the squadron arrived at Esquimalt, and after further consultation the following movements were decided on:—Until November 1st all ships were to patrol in the immediate vicinity of Vancouver Island, and

* App. 19, Tel. October 5th.

† She arrived at Mas Afuera on November 9, where she transferred her coal to von Spee's squadron; she arrived at Valparaiso empty on November 20th, and was finally interned in January 1915.

after completing with coal on October 31st and November 1st, were to proceed South and establish a line of communication. The "Newcastle" was to be furthest South to get into touch with Admiral Cradock if required, the "Rainbow" off the north end of Lower California, and the "Idzumo" to the north of the "Rainbow"; the "Hizen," due at Ensenada on November 2nd, was to convoy colliers.

75. "*Geier*" arrives Honolulu, October 15th, "*Hizen*" delayed.—These arrangements were not fulfilled so far as the "Hizen" was concerned.

The German gunboat "*Geier*" had arrived at Honolulu on October 15th in need of repair, and this apparently insignificant event dislocated the Admiralty's plans, for the Japanese Admiralty considered her presence there a threat to their trade routes, and ordered the "Hizen," which arrived off Honolulu on October 21st, to wait off that port for ten days, whether the "*Geier*" was still there or not. The British Admiralty replied that they hoped the concentration of the "Hizen" with the ships on the North American Coast would take place as soon as possible, and the Japanese accordingly on October 24th ordered the "*Asama*," from the First Southern Squadron in the Carolines, to relieve the "Hizen" at Honolulu with all speed. On October 29th, however, they again modified their plans, and in view of the obscurity attending the movements of the enemy's squadron they considered it unsafe to leave the "*Asama*" off Honolulu alone, and proposed to keep both the "Hizen" and "*Asama*" there till the "*Geier*" was accounted for, adding later that the "*Asama*" was expected to join the "Hizen" on 30th or 31st October. The Admiralty accepted the Japanese view and meanwhile pressed the United States Government to intern the "*Geier*," informing the Japanese Naval Attaché that they hoped, after the "*Geier*" had been disposed of, that both ships would patrol the Pacific Coast of America.

76. *Reports of German Squadron and Coronel*.—This delay in the arrival of the "Hizen" dislocated the plans Captain Powlett had made for a voyage to the South, and he now decided to remain in the neighbourhood of Esquimalt till the situation was clearer. The "Hizen" was still off Honolulu, where she had been joined by the "*Asama*" on October 31st, with whom the "Idzumo" was in wireless touch.

During the first days of November a series of reports from the Chilian coast showed that the German Squadron was undoubtedly in that area, and this information induced Captain Powlett to suggest that he should proceed with the "Newcastle" and "Rainbow" towards the Gulf of California, leaving Esquimalt on November 4th, and calling at Mazatlan, a port on the west coast of Mexico at the entrance to the Gulf of California on November 12th.

This message reached the Admiralty shortly after the first news of Coronel, and they at once vetoed the proposed movement. The departure of the ships had already been postponed 24 hours at the instance of the Captain of the "Idzumo," who had wired to his Government for reinforcements on hearing the news of Coronel. The message sent to stop the "Newcastle" had also warned Captain Powlett that he might be required to close the "Australia" at Honolulu, but owing to mutilation during transmission this was read as an order, and the "Newcastle" sailed for this purpose on November 5th. At the same time the "Idzumo" was stationed to patrol 500 miles west of San Francisco to maintain constant wireless touch with the "*Asama*" and "Hizen" at Honolulu.

77. *Admiralty Dispositions*.—The Admiralty were meanwhile negotiating with the Japanese authorities with regard to the situation, and their first proposal made on November 5th was that the "Newcastle" and "Idzumo" should go South to San Clemente, an island in St. Catalina Gulf, 55 miles west of San Diego on the Californian Coast, to meet the "Hizen" from Honolulu, while the "*Asama*" could remain at Honolulu till the "*Geier*" was settled and the "Australia" should proceed to Fanning Island for orders, being replaced at Fiji by a Japanese Squadron to cover New Zealand.

The Japanese Admiralty in their reply apparently misread this suggestion and said "we are reluctant to allow the 'Hizen' and 'Asama' to leave Honolulu at once and abandon the watch on the 'Geier.'" They suggested instead that the concentration should take place at Honolulu instead of San Clemente, and proposed to send their First Southern Squadron from the Carolines towards Honolulu to cover it. The Admiralty thereupon on November 7th ordered the "Australia" to proceed from Suva to Honolulu *viâ* Fanning Island and again approached

the Japanese suggesting that, as the "Australia" would reach Honolulu before the Germans could do so, the "Hizen" should be detached to California at once; further that if the "Geier" should be interned before the arrival of the "Australia" all ships should unite off the coast of California and sweep south. They also again asked that the Japanese First Southern Squadron should proceed to Fiji* to take the "Australia's" place.

The Japanese agreed to this scheme, and stated that the "Hizen" would be detached from Honolulu at once; in point of fact the "Geier" was interned on November 8th, and both the "Hizen" and "Asama" left Honolulu for the Californian Coast on November 10th.

78. *Concentration of New N.W. Coast Squadron.*—The "Newcastle" had in error sailed for Honolulu on November 5th, but was at once recalled and ordered to remain at Esquimalt till further orders. In view of this enforced inaction, Captain Powlett suggested that he should patrol to the southward to intercept enemy supplies of which he had definite knowledge, but on November 9th he received orders in accordance with the Admiralty plans, which instructed him to meet the "Hizen" off San Diego and arrange a rendezvous with the "Australia," now on its way from Suva in Fiji. There was some further discussion as to the place of rendezvous, and Magdalena Bay, a large and well sheltered anchorage on west coast of Lower California, about 150 miles north of Cape San Lucas, was finally fixed on. Subsequent orders on November 18th, however, ordered the "Newcastle" to arrange a rendezvous further south with the "Australia," as there was evidence that von Spee was still off the Chilian coast in the middle of the month.

79. Meanwhile the "Australia" had left Suva, Fiji, November 8th, with orders to proceed to Honolulu *via* Fanning Island, where she arrived on November 14th, and received Admiralty orders dated November 12th directing her to Magdalena Bay.

Admiral Patey was ordered to bring the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" to action as soon as possible, following them to the West Indies if they went through the Panama Canal; if they went northwards to British Columbia he was to follow and bring them to action; if

* App. 20, November 7th.

they went to the South Atlantic he was to go south and block their return at Magellan Straits or Cape Horn. Australia and New Zealand would be covered by a strong Japanese squadron at Fiji.*

The organisation of the two Japanese squadrons at this time was as follows:—

1st Southern detached squadron based on Suva (Fiji) and due there about beginning of December to cover New Zealand and Samoa.

Battleship	-	-	-	"Kurama."
Battle cruiser	-	-	-	"Tsukuba."
Battle cruiser	-	-	-	"Ikoma."
Light cruiser	-	-	-	"Chikuma."
Light cruiser	-	-	-	"Yahagi."
2 destroyers.				

2nd Southern detached squadron based on Truk, in the Caroline Islands:—

Battleship	-	-	-	"Satsuma."
Armoured cruiser	-	-	-	"Iwate."
Armoured cruiser	-	-	-	"Nisshin."
Light cruiser	-	-	-	"Hirado."

80. *"Australia" in touch with "Newcastle," November 20th.*—From Fanning Island Admiral Patey directed his course towards Magdalena Bay in such a way as to take full advantage of the equatorial current, and at noon on November 20th was in a position $9^{\circ} 36' N.$, $129^{\circ} 51' W.$, about half-way between Fanning Island and Mexico. The "Newcastle's" wireless had been heard faintly since the 18th, and on the night of the 20th–21st November, Admiral Patey received the Admiralty orders to arrange a rendezvous further south in order to gain time. The "Newcastle" suggested Acapulco on the Mexican coast as suitable, but the Vice-Admiral selected Chamela Bay, a bight sheltered to the westward by a string of islands 55 miles north of Manzanilla as being less frequented, and the estimated date of arrival was reported to the Admiralty as November 26th.

The "Hizen," "Asama," "Idzumo" and "Newcastle" effected their concentration at Magdalena Bay on November 20th, where the squadron coaled, the "Rainbow" being stationed between San Francisco and San Diego to act as a wireless link with Esquimalt. On November

* App. 21, Tel. November 12th.

23rd, in accordance with Admiral Patey's arrangements, the three Japanese ships left Magdalena Bay for Chamela Bay, while the "Newcastle" took up a position 40 miles to the northward to ensure wireless communications with Esquimalt.

The question of communications with home was one of some difficulty, as the chaotic state of Mexico rendered all intercourse by land wire uncertain, but the problem was solved by stationing a West Indies ship (first the "Berwick," then the "Lancaster") off Colon in touch with Jamaica. Before reaching Chamela Bay, however, on November 25th the Vice-Admiral received further orders informing him that the German Squadron was certainly at Mas Afuera on November 15th and possibly still off the south coast of Chili on November 21st. He was therefore to proceed to Galapagos Islands with his squadron, searching Cocos Island on the way, a well watered but uninhabited island with a good anchorage,* half way between Galapagos and the mainland. The arrival of the "Australia" at Chamela Bay on November 26th completed the concentration of the squadron.

81. *Cruise of the concentrated Squadron.*—After the concentration had been effected, the "Newcastle" was sent at 2.0 a.m. November 27th to Manzanilla with orders for the colliers which had been sent from Panama, and from there she was to search Cocos Island and rejoin the squadron. At 8 p.m. the Admiral with the rest of the squadron sailed and proceeded for Chatham Island in the Galapagos Group, a cluster of islands belonging to Ecuador possessing numerous good anchorages and producing plenty of meat and vegetables, where the "Leipzig" had anchored in September.

82. The question of coal supply for the squadron necessitated elaborate arrangements, but does not seem to have hampered its movements. The "Australia" had brought a collier with her, three others had been brought south with the ships from Esquimalt; there was also available 9,000 tons in two colliers which had been ordered by Admiral Cradock through the Panama Canal from Jamaica, and the Admiralty ordered a further supply to be sent every week through the Canal. A 3,000-ton oil-ship had been ordered from China, and another collier

* App. 22, Tel. November 24th.

from Suva, which had arrived at Fanning Island on November 17th, was on its way.

On December 1st the "Newcastle" examined Cocos Island but found it deserted and rejoined the squadron next day.

On December 3rd the squadron arrived at Chatham Island in the Galapagos, and next day orders were received that the fast ships should search the coast of South America from Guayaquil in Ecuador to Perlas Islands in the Gulf of Panama while the slower vessels guarded the colliers.

If nothing was found the whole force was to proceed to the southward down the coast.

On December 5th a search of the Galapagos Islands was carried out and the Admiralty orders were in course of execution when, on December 10th, Vice-Admiral Patey learnt of the Falkland Islands action.

APPENDIX.

TELEGRAMS.

- No.
1. *From C.-in-C., China.* July 30th. Sent, 5.55 p.m.
To Admiralty. Received, 1.10 p.m.
110. "Minotaur," "Hampshire," four T.B.D.s leaving Wei-hai-wei 4 p.m. G.M.T. to-day, Thursday. "Newcastle" joins at sea to-morrow. One destroyer remains here till 4 a.m. G.M.T. to-morrow, Friday, bringing war telegram if received before then. "Yarmouth" should arrive Shanghai 11 p.m. G.M.T. to-night and will remain until outbreak of war. I am sailing for rendezvous north of my proposed base in Saddle Islands, and if hostilities commence I hope to prevent "Scharnhorst," "Gneisenau" from the south and "Marco Polo" (Italian) from Japan reaching Tsing-tau. "K. Elizabeth," "Emden" and small craft are there now
2. *From C.-in-C., China.* August 6th. Received, 11.45 a.m.
To Admiralty.
119. I am endeavouring with "Minotaur," "Hampshire," "Newcastle" to cut off "Emden" and four colliers bound south-east from Kiao Chow, and I may possibly proceed as far as Yap; shall then go to base in process of formation Saddle Islands where remainder of squadron is assembling. Coal probably for German Admiral, who with three ships may either be proceeding

- No. to South America or chasing "Montcalm" or returning to Kiao Chau. Fitzmaurice commands "Triumph," whose crew has been almost completed by 100 2nd Battalion Duke of Cornwall Light Infantry.
3. *From Admiralty.* August 11th. Sent, 8.30 p.m.
To C.-in-C., China.
128. Practically certain Japan declares war against Germany on 12th August. Communicate by wireless with Japanese C.-in-C. and concert measures. Send forthwith one light cruiser to close "Rainbow" at Vancouver coaling at Honolulu. You may now leave whole protection of British trade north of Hong Kong to Japanese, *concentrating your attention in concert with Australian Squadron on destroying German cruisers.*
4. *From C.-in-C., China.* August 17th. Received, 2.5 a.m.
To Admiralty.
121. Probably "Scharnhorst," "Gneisenau," "Emden," "Nurnberg" are now together, but their position is still unknown, though Marshall Islands seems likely. They have more than 20,000 tons of coal afloat. I am watching Tsing-tau and arranging to protect trade routes between Japan, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Singapore with all available ships, including "Minotaur" and "Dupleix," and also armed mercantile cruisers as they become available. Until situation is clearer or it becomes desirable to work as a squadron I shall personally remain at Hong Kong, whence I can make arrangements with Russians and Japanese and exercise general control.
- Possible objective of German Squadron may be Dutch East Indies, but more likely Pacific Coast of America; in the latter case, owing to absence of facilities for obtaining information, our earliest certain knowledge will be their arrival, and I suggest for consideration whether it may be possible to spare any cruisers from home waters to meet this danger. Is it still probable Japan will declare war against Germany? Result of my recent cruise, one German collier with 1,800 tons of coal captured and sunk. Wireless station at Yap destroyed. Expect "Newcastle" to leave Yokohama to-morrow, Tuesday, for Vancouver Island *via* Honolulu in compliance with Admiralty order. "Hampshire" is ready to follow from Hong Kong if Japan declares war.
5. *From C.-in-C., China.* August 21st. Received, 12.21 p.m.
To Admiralty.
129. With reference to my telegram 121 of 17th following telegram received to-day from R.A., Commanding Australian Squadron, strengthening my opinion regarding intentions of German Squadron. Begins: There appears to be no doubt that Germans are collecting large supplies of coal and concentrating somewhere N.E. of New Britain. I believe that main body will make across Pacific Ocean either east or south-east, possibly visit Samoa or Tahiti. Probably auxiliary cruisers will be left to work from base in Pacific on China, Pacific and Australian trade. Expect to arrive Samoa 29th August and may be able to form better opinion. Ends.

- No. *From Navy Board, Melbourne.* August 13th.
6. *To Admiralty.* Received, 10 a.m.
- R.A. in "Australia," with "Melbourne," "Sydney," "Encounter" and three destroyers near Rabaul 11th August. Destroyers searching Tillili Bay, Simpsonhafen and Matupi harbour: no vessel seen. . . . Wireless station could not be located. Telegraph and telephone communications were destroyed, R.A. proceeding to examine Bougainville Island, thence to Port Moresby to complete with coal and oil. When completed, if no news of enemy has been received, "Australia," "Melbourne" and "Sydney" could proceed to Nauru to destroy wireless station and might find enemy in that direction, leaving "Encounter" and destroyers to maintain wireless communication with Port Moresby. With reference to Yap, R.A. suggests China Fleet may do this as Australian Squadron cannot attack Nauru and Yap without returning to coal. . . . Expeditionary force for German New Guinea now being fitted up at Sydney: should leave in about a week.
7. *From Naval Board, Melbourne.* August 15th.
To Admiralty. Sent, 1.50 p.m.
Received, 9.10 a.m.
- In reply to your telegram of August 13th for Rear-Admiral, referring to convoying of Samoa and New Guinea Expeditions, Rear-Admiral reports as follows:—(Begins) Do not consider it advisable for Australian expedition to start for New Guinea without escort of "Australia" so long as "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" are not accounted for or definitely located. In view of this, "Melbourne," "Sydney" should accompany "Australia" to Samoa and afterwards all return to carry out New Guinea expedition. Will leave Port Moresby for Samoa *via* Noumea on August 17th. "Australia" will proceed alone if above not approved. (Ends.) With reference to above message, Rear-Admiral Commanding emphasises necessity of "Australia" convoying the Australian expedition to New Guinea, German ships not having been located. As Australian expedition ready to leave for Thursday Island immediately and Australian Fleet is at Port Moresby, Government ask your consideration practicability "Australia" convoying Australian expedition first, then proceeding with Samoa expedition. Very short time necessary to carry out New Guinea expedition, while other course will involve delay of fully a month. The Government's proposal on the other hand will, while securing New Guinea, only delay Samoa enterprise a few days.
8. *From Admiralty.* August 23rd.
To C.-in-C., China. Sent, 8.30 p.m.
155. Japan declared war with Germany at noon to-day 23rd. How is China Squadron disposed? The destruction of "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" is of the first importance. Proceed on this service as soon as possible with "Minotaur," "Hampshire," "Dupleix," keeping in communication with R.A. "Australia," who, together with "Montcalm," is engaged on

No.

the same service. They are at present searching for them at Samoa. What arrangements have you for use of Russian cruisers?

9. From C.-in-C., China, at Hong Kong. August 24th.
Sent, 6.35 p.m.
Received, 4.35 p.m.
To Admiralty.
131. "Minotaur" is now coaling at Hong Kong. "Hampshire" arrives Hong Kong to-morrow. "Dupleix," "Yarmouth," "Cadmus" and four destroyers are on passage to Hong Kong from North. "Clio" following a little later. "Triumph" and one destroyer remain North escorting troops from Taku and co-operate with Japan. Armed mercantile cruisers "Himalaya," "Empress of Japan," "Empress of Asia" are patrolling trade routes Hong Kong to Singapore. "Empress of Russia" fitting out Hong Kong will be ready 28th August. Japanese authorities are probably placing "Ibuki" and "Chikuma" at my disposal. I have asked them to be sent to Hong Kong. "Askold" and "Zhemchug" also believed on passage from Vladivostock to Hong Kong at my disposal. From charts and mail bags found on board prize captured shortly after leaving Tsing-tau it is believed German Squadron probably consists of "Scharnhorst," "Gneisenau," "Nurnberg," "Emden," "Luchs" may be now or shortly on southern side of Sumatra, perhaps near Padang, and that their auxiliaries are also using Dutch Islands in Java Sea as their base. This view receives support from other sources. *As East Indies Squadron is to the westward I am sailing for Singapore* with "Minotaur" and "Hampshire" as soon as possible to-morrow, followed by "Dupleix" and "Yarmouth" when ready, and shall also ask Japanese ships to follow and assist in search. I shall ask "Askold" to examine Mariana Islands and employ "Zhemchug" in the neighbourhood of Hong Kong. *I consider that Marshall Islands should be examined by Australian Squadron* after they coal at Fiji Islands about 2nd September and before escorting expedition to Rabaul unless I have previously located German squadron. I am not doing this myself as the possibility of Germans being on trade routes is of first importance and there is ample Naval force North of Australia. "Cadmus," "Clio" and five destroyers will be employed by me in South as considered expedient.
10. From C.-in-C., China. September 3rd.
Sent, 12.40 p.m.
Received, 6.55 a.m.
To Admiralty.
137. I am proceeding to search Sumatra and Java Head and adjoining seas with "Minotaur," "Hampshire" and "Yarmouth" followed shortly by "Ibuki" and "Chikuma." "Dupleix" is making good defects at Singapore and will then join "D'Iberville" and French destroyers to patrol western approach to Malacca Strait. "Cadmus," "Clio" and five destroyers based on Sandakan will work to north and east of Borneo. Armed mercantile cruisers "Himalaya" and "Empress of Japan" patrol between Hong Kong and Singapore. "Empress of Asia" and "Empress of Russia" from north end

No.

- of Philippines down east coast with a view to intercept German supplies from Manilla. Your telegram 121 of 17th August and 129 of 21st August nothing heard of "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" since 9th August when they were coaling at Ponape. It seems possible therefore that they have gone east though reported movements of large quantities of coal moving towards German ship (*sic*) moving towards Java Sea make me very uncertain of it.
11. From C.-in-C., China. September 12th.
Sent, 6.5 a.m.
Received, 1.20 a.m.
To Admiralty.
139. Searching of Sumatra, Java and adjoining seas has now been completed but has yielded no results. British trade is proceeding normally. There is absolutely no news of "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" since August 9th; as reported in my 137 they are well supplied with coal and *I consider it is possible or even probable they will be next heard of on our American coast and that they will attack our trade either off Straits of Magellan or off mouth of River Plate.*
Summary: C.-in-C. considers that in order to control cruisers over an immense area and to deal with delicate international questions he must make his headquarters ashore to avoid getting out of touch. I consider the only solution *is to establish my headquarters at Hong Kong and send "Minotaur" and "Hampshire" to join Rear-Admiral C.-in-C., "Australia."* Both ships arrive at Singapore on morning of September 13th and will be ready to leave again September 16th.
12. From Admiralty. September 16th.
Sent, 12.40 p.m.
To C.-in-C., China, and R.A., Australia.
176. Situation changed by appearance of "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" at Samoa on September 14th and "Emden" in Bay of Bengal. "Australia" and "Montcalm" to cover "Encounter" and Expeditionary Force from attack, and then search for the two cruisers. "Melbourne" to be used at R.A.'s discretion. "Sydney" to return for convoy of Australian troops to Aden. "Hampshire" and "Yarmouth" to sink "Emden." "Minotaur" to arrive at Fremantle by October 4th for Australian convoy. One Japanese cruiser to accompany "Minotaur."
13. From C.-in-C., China. October 2nd.
Sent, 4.10 p.m.
Received, 1.27 p.m.
To Admiralty.
185. The unimportant results which "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" must have anticipated from their visit to Tahiti seem to point to fact that they went there on their way across Pacific Ocean to the American Coast. Possibly it was a blind to draw our ships off, but that could have been attempted at less expense of coal and time. Their objectives may be to harass coast of British Columbia or attack our trade along the Pacific Coast or to pass through Panama Canal or Straits of Magellan. To counter the first two objectives, I think

No.

Japanese First Southern Squadron should cross Pacific Ocean as soon as it is known definitely that "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" have done so. That "Australia" and "Montcalm" should remain near east coast of Australia; that Japanese Second Squadron now coming south should use Borneo East Coast harbours as bases, and that "Minotaur" and "Ibuki" should continue their present services,† which incidentally take them to New Zealand in case any attack should be made there in the near future. If the visit to Tahiti was a blind, squadrons would still be well placed. These movements would, however, involve such important considerations, political and otherwise, that they should be arranged by the Governments concerned rather than by me to the Japanese and Australian authorities (*sic*). The two last objectives can only be met by force from elsewhere. The great efforts now being made to get colliers out of Manilla past our ships waiting for them seems to point to the possibility of "Nurnberg" and armed merchant cruisers approaching Philippine Islands.

14. *From Admiralty.* August 19th.
Sent, 12.50 a.m.
To Naval Board.
Following operations should be undertaken by Australian expedition and squadron from Port Moresby when Rear-Admiral considers the Naval situation will admit. Seize and occupy Rabaul at base. Detach three expeditions to seize and occupy Nauru, Yap and Angaur in order to break enemy's lines of intelligence in Pacific. The seizure and occupation of Kaiser Wilhelm Island to be considered later. Give orders for total destruction of wireless stations if any chance of enemy recapturing them.
15. *From Admiralty.* September 16th.
Sent, 12.40 p.m.
To R.A., "Australia."
18. Situation changed by appearance of "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" at Samoa on September 14th, and "Emden" in Bay of Bengal. "Australia" and "Montcalm" to cover "Encounter" and Expeditionary Force from attack and then search for the two cruisers. "Melbourne" to be used at R.A.'s discretion. "Sydney" to return for convoy of Australian troops to Aden. "Hampshire" and "Yarmouth" to sink "Emden." "Minotaur" to arrive at Fremantle by October 4th for Australian convoy. One Japanese cruiser to accompany "Minotaur."
16. *From Admiralty.* October 2nd.
Sent, 3.57 p.m.
To V.A., "Australia."
It is very probable that "Gneisenau" and "Scharnhorst" may repeat attacks similar to the one at Papeete, therefore they may be expected to return towards Samoa, Fiji, or even New Zealand. Making Suva your base search for these cruisers

* *I.e.*, Australian and New Zealand Home Convoy.

A. 17

No.

in these waters and leave Simpsonhafen as soon as possible to search. A cruiser with a collier was reported off Tutuila on the evening of September 29th.

17. *From V.A., "Australia."* October 13th.
Sent, 5.20 p.m.
To Admiralty. Received, 10.25 a.m.
132. Should it become known definitely that the German Squadron has gone to South America and if Admiralty decide to send Australian Fleet after them, following suggestions are offered. Route proposed Marquesas Islands and Galapagos Islands. If only "Australia" and "Sydney" go, one collier would be sufficient to coal those two ships at Galapagos and rendezvous should be arranged with "Newcastle" and "Idzumo." If "Montcalm" accompanies us another collier and an oil ship must be taken. In either case a second collier and oil ship must go as far as Marquesas. These are available this week. Further supplies of coal and oil should be ordered at Callao and Valparaiso, and in addition a large collier sent direct to Valparaiso from New Zealand, leaving latter place about the same date as we leave Samoa. Consider "Encounter" should be left behind.
18. *From Admiralty.* November 7th.
Sent, 11.45 a.m.
To Naval Board.
Please direct "Australia" to proceed at once to Honolulu with collier. She is to call at Fanning Island for telegraphic communication.
19. *From Admiralty.* October 5th.
Sent, 8.11 p.m.
To Naval Board, Ottawa.
80. Wireless signals indicate that "Scharnhorst" is somewhere between Marquesas and Easter Island. It seems probable that other ships will be with her also that they are proceeding probably to the South American Coast. A sufficiently strong force is being sent through the Straits of Magellan to sweep up the Chilean Coast. Japanese battleship "Hizen" is coming over to join "Newcastle" and "Idzumo," who should remain cruising off the North American and Mexican Coast. Inform "Newcastle" and "Idzumo."
20. *From Admiralty.* November 7th.
To Japanese Admiralty via J.N.A.
The battle cruiser "Australia" has been ordered to proceed to Honolulu calling at Fanning Island to receive telegraphic communications *en route*. She will arrive at Honolulu about the 20th. The British Admiralty will be glad if the Japanese Naval General Staff will allow the "Hizen" to proceed at once to join the "Idzumo" and "Newcastle" off San Diego. The "Asama" would remain at Honolulu to watch the "Geier" and will be quite safe until the "Australia" arrives as the Germans cannot possibly reach Honolulu first. If the "Geier" is interned before the "Australia" arrives, the "Asama" should leave to join the "Idzumo," "Hizen" and "Newcastle"

No.

without waiting for the "Australia," who would probably receive the news when she calls at Fanning Island, and could go direct to the rendezvous off San Diego or else meet at a new rendezvous, Magdalena Bay, for instance. There would then be a powerful squadron, viz., "Hizen," "Idzumo," "Asama," "Australia," "Newcastle." This squadron would then move south to meet the enemy. The British Admiralty would prefer that the First South Detached Japanese Squadron should go to Fiji. It is not considered likely that the German ships will go towards Honolulu, but they might come across the Southern Pacific and attack the Australian and New Zealand trade.

21. From Admiralty. November 12th.
Sent, 7 p.m.

To V.A. "Australia."

46. On arrival at Fanning Island you should coal and proceed to Magdalena Bay to join "Asama," "Idzumo," "Hizen" and "Newcastle." The Japanese ships and "Newcastle" will arrive at a rendezvous Guadalupe Island off San Diego on 17th November, coaling there, and proceeding to Magdalena Bay to join you and bring their colliers with them. The "Scharnhorst," "Gneisenau" and three light cruisers left Valparaiso on November 4th. Since that date no intelligence has been received of their movements. If they have proceeded northwards they will either pass through the Panama Canal or else proceed northwards possibly with object of attacking British Columbia. You will not be in time to stop them should they go through the Canal and if they do so you must follow them and bring them to action in the West Indies. Should they go northwards you must endeavour to find and bring them to action If they are heard of in the South Atlantic you will be informed and must then go south to block their return at Magellan Straits or Cape Horn. A powerful Japanese squadron will be at Fiji to intercept them if they return across the Pacific.

22. From Admiralty. November 24th.
Sent, 5.15 p.m.

To Ottawa Navy Board.

Pass to "Newcastle" for "Australia": Begins. 52. According to last definite intelligence Germans were at Mas Afuera on November 15th. Later intelligence not so definite points to their presence on S. Coast of Chili on November 21st. Having concentrated at Chamela Bay, squadron should proceed south with colliers to Galapagos Islands at once and wait further orders. It will be advisable to detach a fast ship *en route* to Cocos Island to search for supply ships. Following are arrangements for wireless communication. Jamaica to a cruiser in the Caribbean Sea, and thence to Japanese cruiser from your squadron in Gulf of Panama, which passes messages to you, using if necessary a collier as a link You should avoid disclosing presence of your large ships on the coast.

OPERATIONS LEADING UP TO THE BATTLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

MONOGRAPH No. 3.

NAVAL STAFF.

TRAINING AND STAFF DUTIES DIVISION.

July 1919.

NOTE ON SOURCES.¹

1. The Historical Section (Naval) of the Committee of Imperial Defence are carrying out the task of collecting and arranging the papers relating to the war, and the documents in their custody are the principal source for the following monograph.

2. The system adopted by the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence is to bind up Docketed Papers in one series; undocketed papers and telegrams together in another series. The process of binding Docketed Papers is not yet complete for the period dealt with, and where this has not been done the documents are in box files (June 1919). An undocketed paper is a paper that is not in a docket or cover, and presumably has not passed through one of the departmental registries. These may include Staff Memos., Minutes from the First Lord, and Sailing Orders.

3. SOUTH-EAST COAST OF AMERICA, &c.

Telegrams and undocketed papers from October 15th to December 12th are in volume H.S. 43.²

¹ See also Note on Sources, Monograph No. 2, German Cruiser Squadron.

² H.S. = Historical Section.

Docketed papers have not yet been bound up but are contained in three box files marked South-east Coast America I., South-east Coast America II., and Falkland Islands Action.

The most important papers in each box are :—

South-east Coast I.

- H.M.S. "Glasgow," Report of Coronel Action, November 8th, M. 04711/14.
- H.M.S. "Canopus," Letter of Proceedings from November 1st—November 15th, M. 04712/14.
- Letter of Proceedings, Rear-Admiral, H.M.S. "Carnarvon," November 7th, M. 04178/14.
- Letter of Proceedings, Rear-Admiral, H.M.S. "Defence," November 18th, M. 0134/15.
- Letter of Proceedings, H.M.S. "Canopus," December 7th, M. 0518/15.
- Draft Orders for Admiral Sturdee, Admiralty, November 9th, M. 0080/14.

South-east Coast II.

- Letter of Proceedings, C.-in-C., South Atlantic and Pacific, November 17th, M. 04283/14.
- Letter of Proceedings, C.-in-C., South Atlantic and Pacific, November 26th, M. 05084/14.
- Letter of Proceedings, C.-in-C., South Atlantic and Pacific, December 7th, M. 0517/15.

Falkland Islands Action.

- Letter of Proceedings, C.-in-C., South Atlantic and Pacific, dated December 20th, M. 0410/15.

4. OTHER AREAS.

- Telegrams, &c., from Area H (West Indies) are in Volume H.S. 42.
- Telegrams for the Mid-Atlantic Areas (D and I) are in Volume H.S. 44.
- These have been consulted in preparing the following monograph.

CHAPTER I.

REAR-ADMIRAL STODDART ON EAST COAST
OF SOUTH AMERICA, OCTOBER 15TH TO
NOVEMBER 4TH.

1. *Formation of East Coast Squadron.*—In accordance with Rear-Admiral Cradock's proposal of October 9th,¹ a second squadron had been constituted on the East Coast of South America under Rear-Admiral Stoddart to provide a force able to meet von Spee in the event of his evading Cradock.

Rear-Admiral Stoddart in the "Carnarvon" had left St. Vincent, C.V., on October 15th, in accordance with an Admiralty telegram which ordered him to proceed to Monte Video, calling at Pernambuco and Rio de Janeiro on the way.

He was ordered to be ready to concentrate a sufficient force should the German Asiatic Squadron appear, and also to maintain communication with Admiral Cradock then near the Falklands.²

The ships placed under his orders were :—

- Armoured Cruiser "Defence" (Captain E. la T. Leatham), left Gibraltar October 15th.
- Armoured Cruiser "Cornwall" (Captain W. M. Ellerton).
- Light Cruiser "Bristol" (Captain B. S. Fanshawe).
- Armed Merchant Cruiser "Macedonia" (Captain B. S. Evans).
- Armed Merchant Cruiser "Orama" (Captain J. R. Segrave).

2. The "Cornwall," "Bristol," and "Macedonia" already on the station had been cruising to protect trade against the depredations of the "Karlsruhe" with their coaling base at Abrolhos Rocks.³ The "Orama" was proceeding to the River Plate to keep a watch on German shipping, where she arrived on October 25th; and the Armed Merchant Cruiser "Edinburgh Castle" (Captain W. R. Napier), ultimately destined for the North American

¹ See Coronel Operations, Cap. VI.

² Appendix No. 1.

³ Off coast of Brazil, Latitude 18° S.

Station, was ordered to call at Abrolhos Rocks with stores and ammunition on her way out.

3. The "Carnarvon" arrived at Pernambuco on October 21st, where the Admiral was informed by the Intelligence Officer that the "Karlsruhe" had been taking in stores at anchor at 10 a.m. the day before in a position 5° 0' S., 30° 30' W., some 15 miles from Macao, a small port on the Rio de Assu in the north of Brazil, about 100 miles to the westward of C. San Roque, and 300 miles from Pernambuco.

The Admiral then under orders to proceed south to Monte Video was not prepared to return 300 miles to the north, but sent directions to the "Kent," whom he apparently believed to be at the time some 900 miles north of Pernambuco on her way out to the south-east coast.

As a matter of fact, the "Kent" on reaching St. Vincent had been sent north again with a convoy from the Cape and had left St. Vincent with it at 6 p.m. on October 26th, so that at the time of receiving Stoddart's signal she must have been some 200 miles north of St. Vincent, and 1,800 miles from Pernambuco.

The "Edinburgh Castle," however, was then on her way to Pernambuco from Abrolhos, and received orders to search for the "Karlsruhe," leaving Pernambuco on October 23rd for this purpose, to be joined later by the "Bristol" from Abrolhos. In accordance with the Admiralty orders to proceed to Monte Video the "Carnarvon" left Pernambuco for Abrolhos at 4 p.m. on October 21, arriving there on the 24th, where she found the "Cornwall" and "Macedonia"; the latter was ordered to complete with coal and join the "Bristol" and "Edinburgh Castle" in their search for the "Karlsruhe," while the "Cornwall" remained as guard ship at the base. The "Carnarvon" having coaled sailed from Abrolhos at 11 a.m. on the 25th for Rio de Janeiro,¹ arriving there at 8 p.m. on October 26th, the same day that the "Defence" arrived at Pernambuco and sailed for Abrolhos on her way south.

5. *Disturbing influence of "Karlsruhe."*—Meanwhile nothing had been heard of the "Scharnhorst's" squadron, though the War Staff had calculated that they might arrive in South Atlantic waters on October 18th.² On

¹ Pernambuco to Abrolhos 630; Abrolhos to Rio 440, Rio to Monte Video 1,020 miles.

² See *Colonel Operations*, par. 32.

the other hand, the arrival of the German steamer "Crefeld" at Teneriffe on October 22nd with the crews of 13 vessels sunk by the "Karlsruhe" showed that the latter was still operating successfully on the South American trade routes, and the Admiralty on October 24th, therefore, sent a telegram to Rio to await the arrival of Admiral Stoddart. This ordered him not to proceed further south for the present until there was more definite news of the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau," and indicated that they were more concerned for the moment about the "Karlsruhe." He was to station his ships to guard and patrol the focal points in the vicinity of C. San Roque and the Abrolhos Rocks; the "Edinburgh Castle" was added to his squadron and the "Defence" was to be considered as replacing the "Kent."¹

It will be seen that these orders tended to modify the purpose for which the squadron had been recently formed, namely, to ensure obtaining contact with von Spee should he elude Cradock on the west coast and reach the Atlantic, for it was now proposed to disperse them in operations against a single light cruiser.

6. *Cradock asks for the "Defence."*—Admiral Stoddart received this message at Rio de Janeiro on his arrival on October 26th and replied on October 27th that he was disposing his ships accordingly; the "Bristol," "Macedonia," and "Edinburgh Castle" in the north of Brazil, the "Cornwall" in the San Roque—Fernando Noronha area, the "Carnarvon" and "Defence" to patrol between Abrolhos Rocks and Rio de Janeiro, covering Abrolhos Rocks, and the "Orama" to watch the River Plate. This disposition was speedily disturbed by the receipt of a message from Admiral Cradock on October 27th, who had been informed on September 14th that the "Defence" was on her way out to him, instructing Stoddart to send the "Defence" to Monte Video to coal and draw charts, preparatory to proceeding to the west coast to act under the orders of Good Hope. Stoddart informed the Admiralty of this and asked for two fast cruisers to replace "Defence," as he considered his force inadequate to carry out the latest Admiralty orders.² He left Rio late on the night of the 27th October and returned to Abrolhos on the 29th,

¹ Appendix No. 2.

² Appendix No. 3.

where he met the "Defence" and sent her on to Monte Video in accordance with Admiral Cradock's instructions.

7. The Admiralty replied by ordering him to retain the "Defence" under his flag,¹ but as no wireless communication was permitted from the Brazilian coast, and Admiral Stoddart, now at sea, did not receive the telegram sent on the 28th, the "Defence" continued on her way south. The Rear-Admiral remained in the vicinity of Abrolhos, disposing his ships to protect the trade routes as previously detailed; and the "Cornwall" was sent into Rio de Janeiro to maintain communication and sailed from the Abrolhos area at 3 p.m. on the 30th October.

8. A new Board of Admiralty came into office on October 30th, when Lord Fisher became First Sea Lord, and the policy of concentration assumed a more definite form; the decision with regard to the "Defence" was reversed on November 3rd and she was ordered to join Cradock on the west coast with all possible despatch. A telegram was sent informing Cradock, and giving him definite orders to concentrate his whole squadron, including the "Canopus,"² using the "Glasgow" to find and keep touch with the enemy. The "Defence," then at Monte Video, acknowledged the receipt of her orders that night and proposed to sail at noon November 4th. Before she could sail, however, news was received which put a very different complexion on affairs.

CHAPTER II.

THE NEWS OF CORONEL AND MOVEMENTS IMMEDIATELY RESULTING.

9. *The News of Coronel.*—During November 2nd and 3rd, several telegrams reached the Admiralty from our Consul General at Valparaiso, reporting that the German squadron had appeared off the port, and finally that the "Scharnhorst," "Gneisenau," and "Nurnberg" had entered the port. This was the first time these vessels had been sighted since they had bombarded Papeete (Tahiti) on September 22nd, and it was presumably this

¹ Appendix No. 4.

² Appendices Nos. 5, 6.

definite intelligence of their arrival that prompted the orders sent to Admiral Cradock on November 3rd to concentrate his squadron.

At 1.29 a.m. on November 4th a further telegram¹ was received from Consul-General Maclean, reporting the battle and leaving little doubt that our squadron had suffered a serious reverse, and, at 5.30 p.m. on the 4th, the Admiralty knew that the German ships had left that morning for an unknown destination.

10. *Concentration at Monte Video.*—The report of the Battle of Coronel left the situation of the remaining ships of Admiral Cradock's squadron uncertain, and this uncertainty was increased by the fact that unless they called at a consular port, communication with them was only possible via the Falkland Islands W/T station. The atmospheric conditions in the neighbourhood of the Magellan Straits were most unfavourable for wireless communication, and were a constant source of trouble when operating in these waters.

The first step taken was to order a concentration; the "Defence" was told to remain in the vicinity of Monte Video, and to concentrate there with the "Carnarvon" and "Cornwall" off the River Plate,² and on receipt of these orders she left Monte Video at 2 p.m., November 4th, to patrol and wait for the Rear-Admiral outside. The Intelligence Officer sent a message, presumably on the Captain's behalf, asking if she could proceed to the Falkland Islands, as this appeared the most probable point of attack,³ but the Admiralty withheld their approval.

Admiral Stoddart was ordered to concentrate all armoured ships at once off Monte Video, including the remnants of Cradock's squadron. He was told that the "Kent,"⁴ then at Sierra Leone, had been ordered to join him, and that reinforcements, whose strength and nature were not specified, would reach him shortly from England,⁵ as it was considered probable that the enemy would next appear on the South American trade routes.

Instructions were sent at the same time to the "Canopus," "Glasgow," and "Otranto" through the various Consuls, to join the "Defence" near Monte Video, and

¹ Appendix No. 7.

² Appendix No. 8.

³ Appendix No. 9.

⁴ Left Sierra Leone 3.0 a.m., November 5th.

⁵ Appendix No. 10.

avoid being brought to action by superior forces; the "Canopus" was further instructed, if attacked, to fight to the last as it was imperative to damage the enemy.¹ None of these orders reached any of Cradock's squadron at the time as they were out of wireless touch, and did not call at any ports.

11. *Escape of the "Canopus" and "Glasgow."*—On the evening of November 1st, while the battle of Coronel was being fought, the "Canopus" was 250 miles to the south-west escorting two colliers to the Island of St. Felix,² in accordance with Admiral Cradock's orders.

When the first news of the enemy being sighted was received the "Canopus" ordered the colliers to Juan Fernandez (750 miles south of St. Felix), and proceeded at full speed to join the Admiral, but by 8.45 p.m. signals received from the "Glasgow" made it evident that it was too late to retrieve the situation.

The "Canopus" then steered to the westward to intercept the colliers and order them to the Falkland Islands, which she was successful in doing at 3.30 a.m., November 2nd, but a subsequent endeavour to join the "Glasgow" failed, the latter ship reporting that she was on her way to Magellan Straits with all despatch in order to avoid being cut off. On hearing this Captain Heathcoat S. Grant of the "Canopus" decided to make for Magellan Straits by the Patagonian Channels and steered for the entrance of Messier Channel in the south of the Gulf of Penas (47° 40' S., 74° 40' W.), some 550 miles off, entering it at 11 p.m. on November 3rd and passing to the southward by English Narrows, Concepcion Channel, and Smythe Channel, inside the islands of the Archipelago³—a remarkable feat of navigation for a deep-draught vessel. At 11 p.m., on November 5th, the "Canopus" passed Punta Arenas steering west, and at 6.30 a.m., November 6th, joined the "Glasgow" at anchor in Spiteful Anchorage, a roadstead in Lomas Bay on the southern side of the eastern entrance to Magellan Straits.⁴ The two ships then proceeded in company to the Falklands.

The "Otranto," after the action, proceeded south of Cape Horn, rounding it on November 5th, and thence

¹ Appendices No. 11, 12.

² A small island 26° 19' S., 80° 10' W., some 500 miles from the coast of Chile.

³ See Chart 786, Cape Horn to Cape Corrientes.

⁴ Chart 554.

direct to English Bank on the River Plate, where she arrived November 10th.

12. *Admiral Stoddart's Movements.*—To return to Rear-Admiral Stoddart's squadron. The "Cornwall" arrived from Rio (*see par. 7*) at Abrolhos at 6 p.m., November 5th, to coal, and Rear-Admiral Stoddart having by then received the Admiralty orders to concentrate at Monte Video, gave her orders to proceed there after coaling. He himself left for Monte Video in the "Carnarvon," calling at Rio on the 7th on the way south to inform the Admiralty that he was concentrating "Carnarvon," "Defence," "Cornwall," and "Orama" in the River Plate, the "Edinburgh Castle" being left at Abrolhos Rocks as guardship, while the "Bristol" and "Macedonia" continued to search for the "Karlsruhe."²

The exposed position of the Falkland Islands seems to have impressed the Admiralty, and they warned the Governor of a possible German attack, and ordered the "Glasgow," "Canopus," and "Otranto" not to call there, but to proceed if possible direct to the River Plate.³ They received these orders on gaining W/T touch with the Falkland Islands at 2 a.m. on November 6th.

The Admiralty received an account of the Battle of Coronel the same day from the "Glasgow," dated November 4th, in Magellan Straits and passed via the Falkland Islands, and this was followed on the 8th by telegrams,⁴ stating that the "Canopus" and "Glasgow" would have to coal at the Falkland Islands, where they expected to arrive that day; that the "Glasgow" would probably require docking to repair damage received in action, and the "Canopus" was suffering from engine defects which would necessitate a five days' overhaul. The "Otranto" was proceeding to Monte Video direct.

Under these circumstances the "Canopus" was ordered on November 9th to remain at the Falklands for coast defence purposes and to organise resistance to a German raid.⁵ Continuous atmospheric prevented all communication between Cerrito W/T Station at Monte Video

¹ Apparently via Monte Video and the "Defence."

² The "Karlsruhe" had been destroyed by an internal explosion on November 4th, but this was not known at the Admiralty with certainty till the end of the year.

³ Appendices No. 13, 14.

⁴ Appendix No. 15.

⁵ Appendix No. 16.

and the Falklands at this time¹ and the "Canopus" did not get the message, but coaled and proceeded on the night of November 8th for Monte Video. On the 10th she received it through the "Defence," and, returning to Port Stanley, moored in William Harbour at 4.30 p.m., November 12th, and proceeded to take defensive measures against a raid on the island.

CHAPTER III.

THE ADMIRALTY DISPOSITIONS.

13. *General Situation, November 4th.*—It will be as well to summarise here the situation which the Admiralty had to face at this time and the various demands on the available strength of the Navy.

In Home Waters the Grand Fleet had been driven by the submarine menace to remove its bases to Lough Swilly and the West Coast of Scotland.

On November 3rd hostile battle cruisers had appeared off Yarmouth and laid mines off the East Coast, while the imminent danger to the Channel Ports should the first battle of Ypres turn against us, rendered naval activity on the part of the enemy probable.

In the Atlantic the "Karlsruhe" (though actually destroyed) was unlocated and the armed liner "Kronprinz Wilhelm," which had left New York on the outbreak of war, was also known to be at large, probably in the Pernambuco area, having sunk the S.S. "Indian Prince" in 18° S., 27° W., on September 9th, but she had not been heard of since September 25th. On the West Coast of Africa the Cameroons expedition was still in progress.

In South Africa the situation was disquieting. After the expedition to German South-west Africa had been launched, the outbreak of rebellion within the Union had involved a troublesome campaign, revealing marked hostile sympathies among considerable sections of the population, and there could be little doubt that in view of the weakness of our Cape Squadron the appearance of the German armoured cruisers off South Africa might have a most unfortunate effect.

¹ Appendix No. 17.

"The Konigsberg" was blockaded in the Rufigi River in East Africa but had not yet been immobilised, and our attempts to invade German territory had been unsuccessful.

Further, the large and important convoy of Australian troops was proceeding to Colombo through waters frequented by the "Emden" and requiring a strong escort, while as a final complication hostilities had commenced with Turkey and formidable forces were threatening the Suez Canal.

14. *Admiral Sturdee's Appointment.*—It had become increasingly evident that a strong force was required to cope effectively with the situation on the South-east Coast, and, at the risk of depleting the Grand Fleet, a telegram was sent to the C.-in-C., Home Fleets, ordering the "Invincible" and "Inflexible" to be sent to Berehaven as they were urgently required for foreign service. Their destination was changed later to Devonport, so as to permit of their taking out stores and provisions to the South-east Coast, where the question of supply was becoming acute.¹

On this same day, November 4th, the appointment of Admiral Sturdee as C.-in-C., South Atlantic and South Pacific, was drafted, the limits of his station to be:—On the North, Latitude 50° North, on the East, western limit of Cape station, and on the West, eastern limit of Australia station.

The C.-in-C., Home Fleet, was also informed that to replace the battle cruisers, the "Minotaur," "Warrior," "Duke of Edinburgh," and "Black Prince" would be sent to join the Grand Fleet as soon as possible. The former was escorting the convoy of Australian troops to Colombo, and the other three were in the Red Sea also employed on convoy work.

15. *Orders to Cruiser Forces D and I.*—The general distribution of forces in areas D and I on November 4th was as follows:—

Force I:—

"Amphitrite" (Rear-Admiral de Robeck).	} Off Canary Islands.
"Victorian" - - -	
"Calgarian" - - -	
"Europa" - - -	Tagus.

Appendix No. 18.

Force D :—

- “Highflyer” (Senior Sweeping African coast
Officer). from Bissagos Is. in
Portuguese Guinea to
Dakar for “Karlsruhe.”
- “Kent” (*see par. 10*) - Sierra Leone.
“Marmora” - - Sierra Leone.
“Empress of Britain” St. Vincent, Cape de Verde.

Passage :—

- “Donegal” - - Left Plymouth November
3rd for Madeira.
- “Argonaut” - - Left Plymouth November
3rd for Azores.

16. To remedy the weakening of Force D, caused by the despatch of the “Kent” to South America, the Canaries were included in the area covered by Force I, and the “Highflyer” was ordered to collect the three armed liners “Marmora,” “Empress of Britain,” and “Victorian,” and cruise with them between St. Vincent and Sierra Leone.

The alteration in the limits of the two stations was not a matter of great importance, for since the departure of Admiral Stoddart for South America on October 15th, Force I had generally kept a ship stationed off the Canaries.

17. *Orders to Cruiser Force H (North America and West Indies).*—The disposition of Force H on November 4th was :—

- | | | |
|--|---|---|
| “Glory” (Rear-Admiral
Phipps Hornby). | } | Halifax. |
| “Niobe” (long refit) - | | |
| “Suffolk” - - - | } | Off New York. |
| “Caronia” - - - | | |
| “Berwick” - - - | | |
| “Conde” (French) - | } | Martinique, Fort de
France. |
| “Essex” - - - | | |
| | | Relieving French ship
“Descartes” as guard-
ship at St. Lucia. |
| “Lancaster” - - - | | On passage; due to
arrive Bermuda Novem-
ber 7th for five days’
refit. |

St. Lucia unfortified and helpless was a source of anxiety, as it was constantly in use as a coaling station both by men-of-war and merchant ships.

18. As the distance from Valparaiso to Panama is 2,700 miles and that from Plymouth to Colon 4,524, it was possible for von Spee to arrive in the Caribbean Sea through the Canal before reinforcements from home could reach that station. On the other hand, the West Indies was not an acute danger point, for von Spee could not conduct landing operations, and the real danger was that the enemy might reach the Atlantic and attack the vital trade routes. Persistent rumours were current at this time that the Germans intended to send cruisers into the Atlantic from their home ports, and it was even reported that the “Von der Tann” was at large.

19. To deal with this situation the Admiralty ordered Admiral Hornby to arrange for two of his fastest cruisers to watch the Panama Canal and keep touch with the enemy should they pass through, as it was most important that the German ships should not be lost until superior forces were available to deal with them. The watch on the numerous German liners in New York was to be maintained, but other interests were to be disregarded.

This view of the situation did not satisfy Admiral Hornby, as he doubted whether the county class cruisers were faster than the “Gneisenau,”¹ and on November 11th he pointed out that the cruisers in the West Indies were in a precarious position, and, having received no further information, arranged next day to concentrate his whole force, except the “Suffolk” and “Caronia,” in the West Indies.

20. The Admiralty had, however, already taken steps to secure the position on the American Coast. The “Princess Royal” was ordered from the Grand Fleet to the North American Coast,² and on November 13th the Admiralty ordered Admiral Hornby to concentrate the “Glory,” “Lancaster,” and “Berwick”—a combination

¹ The speed of “Gneisenau” and “Scharnhorst” was estimated to be 20½ knots; if “Suffolk” was left off New York there would be, at most, three county class left, none of whom had any guns larger than 6-inch.

² Appendix No. 20.

very similar to that of Cradock's squadron—at Jamaica, while the "Princess Royal," "Suffolk," "Essex," and "Caronia" were to maintain the watch on New York.

It should be noted that the reason given to the C.-in-C., Home Fleets, for the despatch of the "Princess Royal" was not the menace of the German Pacific squadron—though no doubt this may have been taken into account—but the possibility of cruisers from Germany attacking the Atlantic trade routes. On November 12th the Admiralty informed the various senior officers in the Atlantic of Admiral Sturdee's appointment, and instructed them to act under his orders should he be operating within the limits of their command.

21. *Proposed West Coast of Africa Squadron.*—Meanwhile our forces in the vicinity of Cape Verde and the Cameroons were far from strong, and in order to meet the possibility of the German cruisers appearing in that area, the Admiralty proposed to form another armoured cruiser squadron off the West Coast of Africa. For this purpose the "Black Prince" and "Warrior" were ordered on November 6th to proceed from Egypt to Gibraltar, and the French were asked to supply three armoured cruisers from the French Adriatic Squadron and a flag officer to command the squadron.

The British Admiralty had kept their intention to despatch the battle cruisers a strict secret, and the French authorities, not being fully cognisant of the situation, replied on November 9th that they thought it unlikely the German ships would appear on the coast of Africa, and suggested the East Coast of South America, or possibly the West Indies as a more likely destination.

The British Admiralty then explained their intended operations. The "Minotaur," "Dartmouth," and "Weymouth" were being sent from the Indian Ocean to S.W. Africa to join the battleship "Albion." Two battle cruisers, the "Invincible" and the "Inflexible," were proceeding to the East Coast of S. America, to join Stoddart's four armoured cruisers, "Cornwall," "Carnarvon," "Defence," and "Kent." The "Glory" and the armoured cruisers "Lancaster" and "Berwick" were watching the West Indies.

As to the West Coast of America, the Japanese ships, "Hizen," "Idzumo," and "Asama" were joining the "Newcastle," and were to be reinforced by the battle cruiser

"Australia." A strong Japanese squadron (First Squadron) was proceeding to Fiji.¹ The only area remaining unprotected was the West Coast of Africa, and it was for this purpose the French ships were required.

In spite of this clear exposition of policy the French refused to send any ships, and on November 12th Admiral de Robeck was accordingly ordered to hoist his flag in the "Warrior" and take command of a squadron consisting of the "Black Prince," "Donegal," and "High-flyer," based on Sierra Leone.

CHAPTER IV.

ENEMY MOVEMENTS AFTER CORONEL.²

22. *To Mas Afuera, November 6th-15th.*—It may possibly have been the intention of Admiral von Spee, previous to the battle of Coronel, to go on to St. Quintin Sound, in the Gulf of Penas, for the German s.s. "Seydlitz" left Valparaiso on October 31st with 6,000 tons of coal for that anchorage, but the battle altered the situation, and the next day the "Scharnhorst," "Gneisenau," and "Nürnberg" proceeded to Valparaiso, steaming into the bay at 11 a.m. on the 3rd. There they found 32 German ships, "a heart-rejoicing sight, but alas! all bound by England's power at sea."

As three ships only were permitted to enter the port at a time, the "Leipzig" and "Dresden" were sent off to escort the supply ships to Mas Afuera.

The "Sacramento," formerly a German ship, "Alexandria," subsequently registered under the American flag, had left San Francisco about October 16th³ with 8,000 tons of coal, and was due at Valparaiso on November 7th. The "Dresden" now made a cast of some 300 miles to the northward,⁴ evidently with the intention of getting in touch with her, which she succeeded in doing on the 6th

¹ See German Cruiser Squadron, Cap. VII.

² For enemy movements prior to the Battle of Coronel see German Cruiser Squadron, Cap. IV.

³ Von Spee, on the way from Marquesas to Easter Island, was in touch with Valparaiso on October 6th, and orders for the "Sacramento" may have been passed then.

⁴ "Dresden's" noon position from "Dresden's" notebook, see track in Naval Review, August 1915, 414.

or 7th. She was brought to Mas Afuera, and the captain professed later that he was taken at sea by the German cruiser and his cargo forcibly seized,¹ but the whole business appears to have been definitely prearranged.

23. Two other prizes were captured on November 2nd and 3rd, the Norwegian s.v. "Helicon," a full-rigged ship with 2,650 tons² of Cardiff coal, and a French four-masted barque "Valentine" with 3,600 tons of coal.

The "Titania," a small supply ship which had accompanied the fleet from Ponape, met the "Helicon" and boarded her. The "Helicon" at first refused to alter course for her, but the "Titania" fired three shots with a small boat's gun and succeeded in compelling her. The "Dresden" and "Baden" came up soon after and the latter took her in tow. The next day, November 3rd, the "Leipzig" fell in with the French s.v. "Valentine" and brought her to Mas Afuera in tow of the supply ship "Amasis," arriving there on November 5th. This is a small island belonging to Chile about 84 miles west of Juan Fernandez which had already been used as an anchorage by the squadron on October 26th and 27th on its way to the Chilean coast. It possesses no harbour and can boast of only a few inhabitants, but anchorage is obtainable off the coast.³

The armoured cruisers and "Nurnberg" had sailed from Valparaiso at 11 p.m.⁴ on November 4th, and proceeding apparently at about 9½ knots, arrived at Mas Afuera on November 6th, covering the 465 miles in two days.

There they found the "Leipzig," "Amasis," and "Valentine," with the "Prinz Eitel" cruising in the vicinity, and on November 7th the "Titania" and "Baden" arrived with the "Helicon" in tow, and the "Dresden" brought the "Sacramento" in the next day. The squadron was once again united at its island anchorage and spent a busy week coaling and transferring

¹ Dick says "beschlagnahmte," i.e., "distrained" or "impressed." Dick, 151.

² Master of the "Helicon's" deposition said 2,000 tons forcibly discharged, leaving about 650 tons. The "Gneisenau's" diary says 3,500 tons.

³ South America Pilot III., 274, Plan 1383. Alvarez says, "Valentine," "Helicon," and "Sacramento" were in the North-east Bay.

⁴ "Gneisenau's" diary, but Dick says that the last boat left the shore at 9.30 on the 5th and the squadron weighed anchor shortly before eleven. Dick, 141.

the coal from the two captures to the holds of the "Baden" and "Amasis."

24. *Plans for the Future.*—Here too the Admiral had time to consider his future plans. A further campaign on the American Coast offered few prospects of success in view of the superior Japanese force, which he had been told at Valparaiso was on its way across, and of the difficulty of getting supplies.

The British Minister and the Consul-General Maclean at Valparaiso were fully aware of the importance of the supply question, and the movement of every ship and of every ton of coal up and down the coast was watched by them with a jealous eye and immediately reported to the Foreign Office.¹ Even had the Chilians been slow to enforce strict neutrality, the activity of the British Minister would have spurred them to action; but they were apparently quite alive to their responsibilities, and though Von Spee was at the outset able to get supplies, there could be little doubt that he would encounter serious obstacles in remaining permanently on the station and establishing a system of continuous supply. The idea of a return to Asiatic waters had been rejected² on account of the presence of the "Australia" and the overwhelming strength of the Japanese. There remained only three courses—to wage a cruiser warfare in the Atlantic, to assist in the defence of German colonies, or to attempt to break through to Germany. The lack of bases made cruiser warfare difficult.³ Co-operation in the military defence of the colonies offered no profitable military objective, for direct support by means of landing operations would weaken the squadron's fighting power, and in the absence of fortified harbours would render them vulnerable to attack. On the other hand a break-through offered "relatively good prospects of success";⁴ engines and boilers were in good order and the squadrons at home might be able to render assistance in breaking through the blockade.

¹ The "Luxor," which could hold 9,000 tons of coal, had only been allowed to take in 2,900 tons at Coronel on 9/9/14; the German Minister had then asked permission to establish a base at Arica or Valparaiso to coal the German ships detained in Chilean waters; this had been refused.

² "Von der Hand gewiesen werden musste," Dick, 149.

³ Dick, 149.

⁴ "Verhältnismässig gute Aussichten," Dick, 149.

The principal difficulty was coal, and this could be met by the information received and arrangements made at Valparaiso. Under these circumstances the Admiral, according to Admiral Dick,¹ decided to base his measures for the future on an attempt to break through, and with this in view, to keep his squadron united as long as possible, but for the present only the Chief of the Staff, Captain Fielitz, was cognisant of his intention and plan.

25. The "Dresden" had coaled by November 10th,² and on that date left Mas Afuera for Valparaiso, where she arrived with the "Leipzig" on November 13th. This was the first civilised spot the squadron had seen since August, and the Admiral possibly wanted to give the "Dresden" and "Leipzig" a chance to visit it in their turn. Whatever may have been the object, it was a mistake, for like the visit to Samoa on September 14th, and the bombardment of Papeete on September 22nd, it served no real purpose of military utility and gave the Admiralty invaluable information of the fact that Von Spee's squadron was still on the Chilian coast.

26. By November 15th coaling had been finished and the squadron proceeded to sea that night. The "Dresden" and "Leipzig" had already left Valparaiso on the 14th at 1 a.m. and were on their way to the southward to meet them.

The crew of the French ship "Valentine" had been transferred to the "Sacramento," and the ship had been towed to sea and sunk; the Norwegian s.v. "Helicon" had been released.³ The "Titania," which had done yeoman service and had come all the way from Ponape in the Caroline Islands, and had struggled hard to keep up with them, could go no further; she had captured the "Helicon" with a boat's gun, to the amusement and admiration of the squadron, but for her too "the fateful hour had struck." Her speed and seaworthiness were not sufficient for the journey round the Horn, and she was regretfully sunk.⁴

¹ Dick, 149.

² "Dresden's" notebook. "Leipzig" left Mas Afuera November 8th and may have been on watch to seaward.

³ Apparently left for Antofagasta, on November 18th.

⁴ Dick, 152; "Dresden's" notebook gives November 12 sunk "Titania," but "Dresden's" position on this date was more than half-way to Valparaiso, which seems an unlikely place to sink her.

It had been decided to leave the armed liner "Prinz Eitel Friedrich" in the Pacific in order to confuse the enemy and she remained behind when the squadron sailed and reached Newport News many months later after a voyage round the Horn.

27. *Leave Masafuera November 15th.*—The night of the 15th the squadron, consisting of the "Scharnhorst," "Gneisenau," "Leipzig," "Baden," "St. Isabel," "Sacramento," and "Amasis," steered at slow speed to the south-east for San Quintin Bay, the men-of-war spread in a look-out formation.¹

On the 17th² the "Dresden" and "Leipzig," which had left Valparaiso on the 14th, at 1 a.m., met the squadron at sea. The supply ship "Rhakotis," of the Kosmos Line, was apparently with them; she had left Valparaiso, cleared professedly for Panama, on November 12th, and seems to have met the "Dresden" at sea about the 14th.

The squadron stopped, and the Admiral received a report from the two light cruisers; the "Dresden" had captured the British Admiralty collier "North Wales" the day before³ 360 miles S.W. $\frac{1}{2}$ W. from Valparaiso in Lat. $37^{\circ} 30' S.$, Long. $77^{\circ} W.$, on her way from Juan Fernandez to the Falkland Islands. No coal appears to have been received from her, but her coal bags, the lack of which had delayed coaling at Easter Island, were taken out of her, and she was sunk. Her crew were removed to the "Dresden" and thence to the "Rhakotis."⁴

28. *Arrive San Quintin Bay, November 21st.*—The whole squadron was now united, and on the forenoon⁵ of November 21st made the Chilian coast in rain and fog, and anchored in San Quintin Sound.⁶ This bay, already visited by the "Dresden" on September 21st, is one of the

¹ Dick, 153.

² Dick says the 18th, but "Dresden's" position indicates the 17th, as she turned to the south-east on that date; "Gneisenau's" diary says 17th; "Dresden's" noon position on 17th was $39^{\circ} 20' S.$, $79^{\circ} 50' W.$

³ Dick says she had given up her coal to the "Monmouth" and "Good Hope." "Good Hope" apparently coaled from her at the Falklands on October 9th.

⁴ Statement, master "North Wales" at Callao, December 14th, 1914; "Rhakotis" arrived Callao with 200 tons of coal on December 13th, 1914.

⁵ "Leipzig's" diary, 10 a.m.

⁶ S.A.P., II., 376, calls it Bahia San Quintin, Chart 24, San Quintin Sound. In most reports it is called St. Quentin.

arms of the Golfo San Estevan, which in its turn lies in the north-east corner of the larger Gulf of Penas. It extends for some 13 miles east and west between the Esmeralda Peninsula on the north and Forelius Peninsula on the south, one of the finest harbours on the coast, easy of access, with depths of 9 to 15 fathoms, and good holding ground, 810 miles from Cape Horn and 400 miles north of the western entrance of Magellan Straits. Surrounded by high hills with snowy summits and sides covered with forests of firs, and pines, alternating with stretches of moorland, a sombre silence broods over it, and no trace of human existence can be seen. In the south the great glacier of Ofqui stretches its arms into the sea,¹ a magnificent spectacle in the sunshine and a welcome change from the glare of tropical climes. Here they found two Kosmos steamers, the "Seydlitz" and "Memphis," with 6,000 and 2,400 tons of coal waiting for them; the former had left Valparaiso suddenly on the night of October 31st, and the latter had slipped out of Punta Arenas without a clearance on the night of November 19th. The "Luxor," another Kosmos steamer, with 3,000 tons of coal on board, had left Coronel without a clearance on November 18th and arrived five days later on November 23rd.

29. *German Supply System.*—A few words may here be said on the supply system of the squadron. At Pagan, in the Mariana Islands, the squadron had been joined by some 10 supply ships brought by the "Prinz Eitel Friedrich" from the China Sea, and three or four more appear to have joined at Majuro, in the Marshall Islands. The "Ahlers," "Yorck,"² and "Göttingen," all from China waters, were with the squadron in the Marquesas Islands, and the two latter accompanied it to Easter Island. Here it came within reach of supplies from the West Coast, where it was greatly assisted by the vessels of the Kosmos Line, fourteen of which were lying war-bound in various ports, and three of which, the "Amasis," "Karnak," and "Anubis," the "Leipzig" brought with her when she arrived on October 14th.

When the "Nurnberg" went to Honolulu on September 1st, it was probably one of her missions to arrange for

¹ S.A.P., II., 376; letter, Leutnant Graf Otto von Spee, November 26th, 1914.

² "Yorck" from Yokohama, August 14th.

a sufficient supply of coal on the West Coast, and the "Leipzig" may have received instructions from her to that effect.

The "Amasis" had joined the "Leipzig" at Galapagos about September 18th and probably returned to give instructions to the other two. On October 6th, the day the "Leipzig" got into wireless touch with the squadron, she was joined by them off Iquique, and proceeded to Easter Island. The "Dresden" also brought with her two fine ships, the "Baden" (from the East Coast) and "St. Isabel" (from Punta Arenas). When the "Dresden" shaped course suddenly for Mas Afuera on September 29th¹ the "St. Isabel" appears to have been ordered to Valparaiso, for she arrived there on October 1st and remained a whole month, probably collecting supplies, provisions, and intelligence, and sending news out by wireless.

The "Baden" (7,646 tons with W/T) accompanied the "Dresden" to Easter Island, towing her part of the way, and arrived with her on October 12th. It is doubtful whether she contributed much to the coaling there and was probably held in reserve to accumulate coal for the voyage round the Horn. The squadron shipped considerable quantities at Easter Island, the "Gneisenau" taking in 2,200 tons and 250 tons on deck.²

They coaled again at Mas Afuera on October 26th and 27th, and either the same colliers had gone on ahead or some others had joined them, for the "Leipzig" was stated to be looking for the colliers.³

They were now in constant communication with the mainland, and the Admiral was probably able to make all necessary arrangements, though these were always liable to be upset by the action of the Chilian Authorities and the watchfulness of our Minister and Consular Authorities, who were particularly active on the South-West Coast.

During his visit to Valparaiso on November 3rd, after the Battle of Coronel, von Spee saw the German Minister, Herr von Eckert and Consul-General Dr. Gumprecht on November 3rd, and probably arranged details for the supply of coal at San Quintin and in the Atlantic. The "Sacramento," a large vessel carrying 8,000 tons,

¹ It is permissible to assume that she may have received news from the s.s. "Seydlitz," which was at Valparaiso at the time.

² "Gneisenau's" diary, October 18th.

³ "Gneisenau's" diary, October 26th.

originally the German ship "Alexandria,"¹ subsequently registered under the American flag, which had left San Francisco about October 16th, was due at Valparaiso on November 7th and was clearly acting as a supply ship.

The squadron's second visit to Mas Afuera may have been actuated by the capture of two sailing vessels, the French s.v. "Valentine" and the Norwegian s.v. "Helicon," laden with coal on November 2nd and 3rd, for they had to be towed to some spot where the transfer of the coal could be effected, and Mas Afuera was the nearest convenient anchorage for the purpose. The "St. Isabel" had left Valparaiso on October 31st possibly for the purpose of looking for them. At Mas Afuera the squadron had the "Sacramento" (8,000 tons), "Amasis" and the two prizes "Valentine" (3,000 tons) and "Helicon" (2,650 tons), altogether totalling something like 13,000 to 14,000 tons of coal, a considerable portion of which was transferred to the "Baden."

Meanwhile ample arrangements had been made for coaling at San Quintin. The "Amasis" came down with them from Mas Afuera. The "Seydlitz" had left Valparaiso on October 31st with 6,000 tons of coal and proceeded thither; the "Memphis" had left Punta Arenas without a clearance with some 2,400 tons on November 3rd, but a hitch² of some sort seems to have taken place, for the "Luxor" lying in Coronel with 3,000 tons was told on November 14th, 1914, to leave at all hazards, and slipping out without a clearance on November 18th, 1914, arrived at San Quintin on November 23rd. The "Rhakotis" left Valparaiso on November 12th, 1914, with 700 tons and met the "Dresden" and fleet at sea on November 17th, 1914, and accompanied them to San Quintin, where she assisted to coal and water the squadron.

¹ "Leipzig's" diary.

² The "Anubis" had arrived at Callao on October 29th, 1914, tried to get coal and could not do so. The "Abyssinia" was at Junin on October 31st, 1914, and was expected to sail within three days with 1,200 tons, but did not sail. The U.S.S. "Minnesotan" had arrived at Punta Arenas on November 11th, 1914, with 7,200 tons consigned to a small German-Chilian shopkeeper, who refused to take the cargo. The Chilian Authorities refused to allow the ship to leave; the coal was evidently intended for von Spee's squadron, and may have belonged to his Atlantic arrangements, or its impending loss may have given rise to the sailing of the "Luxor." App. No. 23.

At San Quintin, therefore, the squadron had a train of seven ships—the "Memphis," "Luxor," "Rhakotis," "Amasis," "Seydlitz," "Baden," and "St. Isabel," but only the first four were used for coaling; the last three were retained for the voyage round the Horn.

31. Further arrangements had been made for the East Coast. The Italian s.s. "Amista," 4,195 tons, chartered by German Government agents and cleared for Monte Video from Newport News on October 17th, 1914,¹ may have been intended for this purpose. The "Mera," a Kosmos steamer of 4,797 tons, which was at Monte Video loading coal and water on December 1st, 1914, and left at night on December 3rd, 1914, cleared for Hamburg, was evidently intended for the Atlantic supply, for she never reached Hamburg, but put back to Monte Video on December 22nd, 1914. The East Coast arrangements were, however, rendered abortive by the annihilation of the squadron at the Falkland Islands. It will be seen that the system resolved itself into three sections, the West Pacific, where the squadron was supplied by ships from China waters and Manilla, most of whom left it at Majuro; the Trans-Pacific, where it drew its supply from some of the larger ships, including the "Yorck" and "Gottingen," which accompanied it to Marquesas and Easter Island; and the East Pacific, where it came into touch with the Minister at Valparaiso and the Kosmos Line. The only ship that apparently came right across from China to the Chilian Coast was the small "Titania," which seems to have been used as a supply ship rather than a collier. Generally speaking, the squadron had to coal at least every 14 days, and in round numbers some 7,000 tons was required for the two armoured cruisers and the three light cruisers on each occasion.

32. *At St. Quintin.*—The squadron started coaling again on its arrival; the "Gneisenau" took in some 800 tons from the "Amasis" and completed from the "Luxor," which arrived from Coronel on November 23rd. The "Luxor," "Memphis," "Amasis," and "Rhakotis" were emptied and preparations made for the voyage round Cape Horn. The "Seydlitz," "Baden," and "St. Isabel" were to accompany them round the Cape with

¹ Tel., Washington, October 19th, 1914. This seems, however, too early for von Spee to make his East Coast arrangements, and she was probably intended for the use of the "Karlsruhe" and "Kronprinz Wilhelm."

some 17,000 tons of coal, which would suffice to take them well up the East Coast irrespective of any captures they might possibly make.

In spite of these circumstances, the Admiral does not seem to have been over hopeful, and writing to his wife from San Quintin¹ said: "How our further activities will develop lies in God's hand, and though I naturally have my plans, yet the possible contingencies are so many that I must be prepared for everything. What would be most unpleasant is the cutting off of the coal supply (versagen der Kohlenzufuhr), and this is very doubtful."

At Valparaiso, in conversation with an old acquaintance who had formerly been a surgeon in the navy, he had stated that he had a presentiment that he would one day meet the same fate as he had just meted out to Rear-Admiral Cradock. "You must not forget," he said, "that I am quite homeless. I cannot reach Germany, we possess no other secure harbour, I must plough the seas of the world (durch die Weltmeere hindurchschlagen), doing as much mischief as I can, till my ammunition is exhausted, or till a foe far superior in power succeeds in catching me."²

CHAPTER V.

PROGRESS OF BRITISH CONCENTRATIONS.

33. *Enemy Intelligence till November 14th.*—After the departure of the three German ships from Valparaiso on November 4th ten days elapsed without any further definite intelligence as to the enemy's movements, though a series of reports more or less circumstantial came in from our Consuls along the coast.

On November 7th at 8.5 a.m. the Admiralty received from the Navy Board, Melbourne (who possessed a

¹ Letter, November 25th, 1914, arrived January 1915, Graf von Spee, 66.

² Graf von Spee, 73; Vice-Admiral Kirchhoff takes the view that von Spee's objective was to do as much damage to trade and shipping as possible, keeping his force together so as to be prepared to meet stronger forces, see Graf von Spee, 77. Dick is of opinion that it was his definite intention to try and reach home. Kirchhoff's book is based chiefly on family letters.

captured German mercantile code), a message intercepted by the Intelligence Officer at Monte Video. It was much mutilated, but showed that a German warship was endeavouring to communicate with the "s.s. Sacramento," and ordering her to a rendezvous at Mas Afuera to the westward of Juan Fernandez. On November 9th the Consul-General reported that quantities of provisions and engine-room stores were being accumulated at Valparaiso for the Leipzig and another German cruiser expected there, while there were several reports of German merchant vessels preparing to sail, particularly the Rhakotis, which actually left Valparaiso on the night of the 12th. On November 13th definite news was received that the Dresden and Leipzig had arrived at Valparaiso and would not be allowed to coal. They sailed again at 1.0 a.m. on the 14th, and it was reported that the German squadron was waiting for them outside.

This date (November 14th) is an important one in the history of the Falklands campaign as the Admiralty now knew that a fortnight after Coronel, von Spee was still off the Chilian coast and was not on his way towards Panama or the South Atlantic, a piece of news which considerably eased the situation and gave their counter-measures time to mature.

34. *Sturdee's Orders and Departure.*—On November 8th the "Invincible" and "Inflexible" arrived at Devonport. The "Invincible" was docked and next day the Admiral Superintendent reported that the earliest date for completion was midnight on November 13th. The Admiralty refused to accept this date, and the C.-in-C. was informed that he would be held responsible for their despatch in an efficient state on the 11th,¹ a decision which proved of momentous consequence in the ultimate result.

On November 9th the orders for Vice-Admiral Sturdee were issued. He was to proceed *via* St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, to South American waters, and to bear in mind that should the German squadron go towards the Panama Canal, he might be ordered to the West Indies. The orders continued:—

"Your main and most important duty is to search for the German armoured cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and bring them to action; all other con-

¹ Appendix No. 26.

siderations are to be subordinated to this end. It is not intended that you should confine your operations to the limits of your station should the movements of the enemy render it necessary for you to pass beyond them."

Abrolhos Rocks was indicated as a suitable place to join Admiral Stoddart, but this was left to Admiral Sturdee's discretion. The "Bristol" and "Macedonia" were to be withdrawn from the search for the "Karlsruhe" and employed in the operations against von Spee's squadron.¹

By dint of strenuous exertion the "Invincible" and "Inflexible" were ready on November 11th, the date appointed for their departure, and sailed with Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee from Plymouth, arriving at St. Vincent, C.V., on the 17th and leaving at 6 p.m. next day for Abrolhos, while von Spee, unaware of the thunderbolt launched against him, was making his way at 10 knots from Mas Afuera to San Quintin Sound.

35. *Movements on South-east Coast of America.*—In pursuance of the order to concentrate at Monte Video, the "Carnarvon" arrived in the River Plate at 10 p.m. on November 10th, joining the "Defence," "Otranto," and "Orama," which were already there, and transferring his flag to the "Defence" on arrival. The "Cornwall's" arrival completed the concentration of the squadron and wireless communication was established with the "Glasgow" the next day. Here Rear-Admiral Stoddart received from the Intelligence Officer at Monte Video an Admiralty telegram giving a summary of the situation as known at home and ordering him to remain off the Plate long enough to give the "Glasgow" a chance of joining him from the Falklands, then to retire, keeping the squadron concentrated, and take up a position to cover the colliers at Abrolhos, on whose safety the mobility of Sturdee's squadron might depend.² In his turn he asked for information as to the movements of the "Kent" and the reinforcements promised on November 4th, receiving in reply on November 11th details of the Admiralty dispositions.³

¹ M. 0080/14. Orders for C.-in-C., South Atlantic.

² Appendix No. 27.

³ Appendix No. 28.

The "Glasgow" joined him on November 11th and Admiral Stoddart sailed on November 12th with the whole squadron for the Abrolhos Rocks, which the Admiralty had ordered him to cover, detaching the "Orama" to search Trinidad Island on the way. To ensure communications, arrangements were made before sailing for all information from Monte Video, Rio de Janeiro, and Pernambuco to be forwarded to the Consular Reporting Officer at Bahia, 300 miles north of Abrolhos Rocks,¹ whence a steamer could carry it to the Admiral.

The Government of Uruguay, incited by the German Minister, protested against the "Defence's" having stayed for more than 24 hours off Monte Video, but the protest was recognised as being merely a matter of form and the dispute was settled amicably by the diplomatic authorities.

The "Orama" had no sooner left the Plate on November 11th than she sighted an enemy ship which, after a short chase to the south-east, was abandoned by the crew and set on fire. This was the s.s. "Navarra," which had sailed from Pernambuco on September 24, had been in the neighbourhood of Magellan Straits, and may possibly at this time have been awaiting von Spee's arrival. The "Orama," after rescuing the crew, proceeded to Abrolhos.

Admiral Stoddart reached the Abrolhos Rocks with his squadron on November 17th and met the "Kent" there, bringing his squadron of armoured cruisers up to four. On her way north the "Otranto" called at Rio on November 14th, followed two days later by the "Glasgow"; the Brazilian authorities were asked to help in rendering her seaworthy and gave every assistance; she was docked in the Government floating dock on the 17th and left on the 22nd, all payment for this valuable service being refused.

The Rear-Admiral reported the disposition of his squadron on November 20th. The "Defence," "Carnarvon," "Cornwall," "Kent," and "Bristol" were cruising in the vicinity of the Abrolhos Rocks, while the "Glasgow" was at Rio de Janeiro, and the armed merchant cruisers "Orama" and "Otranto" were searching Trinidad Island (South Atlantic) for traces of enemy activity.

36. On November 16th the Admiralty learnt that the "Canopus" had been at the Falkland Islands since

¹ Rio de Janeiro, the previous port of landwire communication, was 410 miles from Abrolhos.

November 12th and was energetically organising and improvising defences to meet the expected German raid.¹ This message took 48 hours to reach England, and as it was very desirable to improve the communications with the South Atlantic, the "Vindictive" then refitting at Devonport was ordered to proceed to Ascension Island to act as a wireless link with the "Defence" on the South-east Coast. Both these vessels were fitted with the Poulsen apparatus, and the "Vindictive" reported that at night she had a reliable range of over 2,200 miles, but her completion was delayed and she did not reach St. Vincent (C. Verde) till December 1st.

37. *Dispositions in other Areas.*—From the visit of the "Dresden" and "Leipzig" to Valparaiso on November 13th in conjunction with the fact that the "Minnesotan," a large U.S.S. collier with 7,200 tons of coal on board consigned to a small shopkeeper, was still at Punta Arenas on the 15th November, it might be inferred that von Spee was still in the Pacific, and the Admiralty decided to abandon their idea of forming a West African cruiser squadron. Admiral de Robeck, who had hoisted his flag in the "Warrior" at Gibraltar on November 17th, was accordingly ordered on November 18th to resume his command of the Ninth Cruiser Squadron, sending the "Warrior," "Black Prince," and "Donegal" to join the Grand Fleet. Area I was at the same time reconstituted with boundaries on the north, 44° N., on the south, 26° N., and on the west, 40° W.

Though the idea of a West African squadron was abandoned, the Admiralty decided to strengthen the Cape squadron with the "Defence," and Rear-Admiral Stoddart was ordered to send her to St. Helena as soon as Sturdee arrived, preparatory to joining the "Minotaur," "Weymouth," and "Dartmouth" in South African waters.²

38. The proposed concentration in the West Indies (*see par. 19*) never took place, as the "Suffolk" broke down, necessitating the "Glory" remaining off New York. This left the "Lancaster" and "Berwick" the only British ships in the West Indian region. The danger of the enemy passing through the Panama Canal was, however, consider-

¹ Appendix No. 29.

² Appendix 30. South Africa force therefore consisted of "Albion," "Hyacinth," "Astrea," and proceeding thither "Minotaur," "Defence," "Weymouth," "Dartmouth."

ably reduced by November 20th, as our concentration in the North Pacific was approaching completion, and Admiral Patey was now in wireless touch with the "Newcastle." Communication with the Pacific was not, however, satisfactory. The "Newcastle" off Lower California was in touch with both Esquimalt and the "Australia" at this time, but as this link would fail if the squadron moved south, and as the W/T station at Bowden, Jamaica, had a range of only 200 miles, one of the armoured cruisers in the West Indies was ordered to act as a link with the Pacific and the "Berwick" remained westward of Jamaica for this purpose.

The situation in the West Indies remained unchanged till November 30th, when information was received from our Consul at Iquique, Chile, that on November 28th four war vessels, one of them large, had been seen far out at sea off that port steering north. This was said to be reliable, and as it indicated that the Germans were heading for the Canal some 2,000 miles to the northward the Admiralty ordered the "Princess Royal" to proceed to Jamaica at once. On her arrival there, on the 6th December, she was ordered to take over the duties of S.N.O., West Indies, and concentrate all cruisers by the 15th December, keeping on as a wireless link with the Pacific.

These arrangements were rendered unnecessary by the news of the action off the Falkland Islands which reached the Admiralty on the 9th December, and they at once ordered the "Princess Royal" to return to Scapa Flow with all convenient despatch.

CHAPTER VI.

MOVEMENTS PRIOR TO THE BATTLE.

39. *Sturdee on his way South, November 11th–November 26th.*—While Rear-Admiral Stoddart was waiting with his squadron off Abrolhos Rocks, Sturdee was covering the 2,300 miles stretch from St. Vincent (Cape de Verde), and arrived at Abrolhos Rocks on November 26th at 8 a.m., the same day that von Spee left San Quintin for his journey round the Horn. There he found a telegram, sent on November 24th, awaiting

him,¹ which informed him that Von Spee's squadron was at Mas Afuera on the 15th November² and that later and less reliable information pointed to its presence in the Gulf of Penas, Chile, on the 21st. As the intelligence available seemed to point to the enemy being still in the Pacific, Admiral Sturdee was instructed to proceed south with the colliers and whole squadron (except the "Defence"), using the Falkland Islands as his main coaling base; after coaling he was to proceed to the Chilian coast, being careful to prevent the battle cruisers being seen in the Magellan Straits.

In accordance with Admiralty instructions Rear-Admiral Stoddart transferred his flag from the "Defence" to the "Carnarvon," and the "Defence," after handing her Poulsen wireless gear to the "Invincible," left for St. Helena to reinforce the Cape squadron on November 26th at 1.40 p.m.

Reinforced by Rear-Admiral's Stoddart's ships, Sturdee's squadron now consisted of the "Invincible," "Inflexible," "Carnarvon," "Cornwall," "Kent," "Glasgow," "Bristol," and "Orama." The "Otranto" was boiler cleaning at Sierra Leone, where she arrived on November 23rd; the "Macedonia" had just finished the same task, and, arriving at Pernambuco on November 28th, sailed the same day to join the squadron.

40. Three days before, on the 23rd November, further news had arrived of the armed merchant ship "Kronprinz Wilhelm," to the effect that she had sunk the British liner "La Correntina" on October 7th in lat. 34° 20' S., 49° 40' W., 300 miles eastward of the Plate, and on October 28th in 34° S., 52° W., 150 miles north of the Plate and 60 miles from the coast of Uruguay, she had captured the French s.v. "Union" and taken 2,400 tons of coal from her; these were the first reports of her since September 25th, when news had been received of her having sunk s.s. "Indian Prince" on September 9th in 18° S., 27° W., 700 miles ^{east} west of Abrolhos, and indicated that she might still be working in the South Atlantic. There seemed to be a chance of meeting her on the way south, and after completing with coal the whole squadron sailed from Abrolhos at 10 a.m. on November 28th to sweep down the trade route on the way to the Falklands, with

¹ Appendix 34.

² From crew of French s.v. "Valentine," arrived Valparaiso November 21st.

50,000 tons of coal following under convoy of the "Orama."

41. *Intelligence of the Enemy Squadron in November.*—The telegram of November 24th which Vice-Admiral Sturdee received at Abrolhos on his arrival on November 26th informed him that Von Spee's squadron was at Mas Afuera on November 15th, and that there were indications of his presence in the Gulf of Penas, Chili, on November 21st.

A considerable amount of further information had come in since the news of the "Dresden" and "Leipzig's" visit to Valparaiso on November 13th.

On November 19th the Consul at Coronel reported that the German s.s. "Luxor" had left without a clearance with 3,000 tons of coal¹; this reached the Admiralty at 6 p.m. and seemed to indicate an intention on Von Spee's part to remain in the Pacific.

Information had also arrived on the 19th of the "Memphis" having sailed from Punta Arenas on November 18th. On November 21st the Consul-General at Valparaiso obtained definite information from the crew of the captured French sailing ship "Valentine," which arrived in the s.s. "Sacramento" at Valparaiso on that date, that the squadron had been at Mas Afuera on November 15th.² This reached the Admiralty just after midnight November 21st to 22nd, when Sturdee was at sea between C. de Verde and Abrolhos Rocks; three hours later a telegram arrived from the Consul-General giving the name of the ships at Mas Afuera and stating that further information gave the position of the "Gneisenau" and "Scharnhorst" as near Tresmontes, south-west Chili.³ This information was substantially correct for San Quintin Sound, where they actually were on that date, is only some 20 miles from Tresmontes Gulf.⁴

On November 23rd this was confirmed by special intelligence, which pointed definitely to San Quintin.

42. This information was sent to Vice-Admiral Sturdee on November 24th, and was received by him on his arrival at Abrolhos Rocks on November 26th. Nothing definite

¹ Appendix No. 23.

² Appendix No. 24.

³ Appendix No. 25.

⁴ Chart 27.

was heard of the subsequent movements of the enemy. The Norwegian s.s. "Helicon" arrived at Antofogasta on November 27th, after being released by the Germans at Mas Afuera on November 15th, with news of their departure thence on November 15th, and that German sailors in conversation had stated they were proceeding to the Atlantic,¹ but this merely corroborated previous intelligence. Persistent rumours were current in Buenos Aires and Monte Video anticipating the arrival of the German squadron off the Plate. The German s.s. "Eleonore Woermann" left Buenos Aires on December 1st at 7 p.m. possibly to meet the squadron at a rendezvous;² the German s.s. "Patagonia" was filling up with extra coal at Monte Video, and reports pointed generally to an early appearance of Von Spee in the Atlantic. The only report to the contrary was a circumstantial story from Iquique on the west coast on November 28th, of four warships sighted off the port on the afternoon of November 27th steering north, which led to the "Princess Royal" being ordered to proceed to the West Indies. On December 4th, too, the "Prinz Eitel Friedrich" was sighted off Valparaiso with an auxiliary, and news arrived at Monte Video from Punta Arenas on December 7th of a German transport sighted on the night of December 6th in Fox Bay,³ an anchorage on the east side of Dawson Island, some 48 miles to the south and eastward of Punta Arenas, and 150 miles from the eastern entrance to the Straits.

These later reports were received by Vice-Admiral Sturdee from the Intelligence Officer, Monte Video, through Port Stanley W/T Station on his way down.

43. *The British Force at the Falkland Islands, December 7th.*—The squadron arrived at Port Stanley at 10.30 a.m., December 7th, having carried out gunnery exercises en route, the distance of 2,200 miles from Abrolhos having been covered in 9 days at a mean speed of 10 knots.

The Vice-Admiral considered that the latest reports (presumably that of the "Prinz Eitel Friedrich") seemed to indicate that the enemy were probably still off Valparaiso

¹ Appendix No. 79.

² Buenos Aires to Falkland Islands, Stanley Harbour, is 990 miles, which would be 110 hours, or 4½ days, at 9 knots, but the rendezvous may have been arranged on the American coast.

³ Chart 554, lat. 53° 53' S., 70° 26' W.

on December 4th. "Therefore, in order to reach the Chilian coast at the earliest possible date, all ships were ordered in to coal together, to remain only 48 hours."

The "Macedonia" was ordered to patrol off the harbour during the night and the remaining ships kept steam at two hours' notice with the exception of the "Inflexible" (guardship at half-an-hour's notice) and the "Bristol," whose engines required repairs.¹

It had been originally arranged that the "Carnarvon," "Bristol," and "Glasgow" should coal first and the battle cruisers afterwards, but of the three colliers at the Falkland Islands one was found to be full of deteriorated coal and this delayed the "Bristol" in her fuelling.

Thus at 7:50 a.m. December 8th, when the shore station established by the "Canopus" signalled that the enemy was in sight the only ships complete with coal were the "Invincible," "Carnarvon," and "Glasgow"; the "Inflexible" and "Bristol" were still coaling; the "Kent," "Cornwall," and "Macedonia" had not yet commenced, the "Kent" being about to take over the duty of guardship.

44. *Enemy Movements to December 8th.*—By November 26th Von Spee's squadron had finished coaling and was ready to leave San Quintin. A number of iron crosses had arrived on the 23rd² and a distribution took place in the forenoon of the 25th³ or 26th. The squadron left in the afternoon for Cape Horn, 815 miles to the southward, and the next day ran into a gale with force of wind 12 and a very heavy sea which broke up its formation and reduced its speed to 5 knots. The sea broke right over the smaller cruisers, and the "Leipzig" with 3 feet of water on her upper deck owing to the deck cargo of coal getting into the scuppers, was for a time in imminent danger of capsizing.⁴

The "Scharnhorst" stood by her and they succeeded in getting the coal overboard. The weather moderated on the 28th, but on the 29th they encountered a tremendous sea on the beam which rendered it impossible to remain

¹ Ships were allowed to place one engine at six hours' notice for repairs.

² Presumably by the "Luxor" from Coronel.

³ Otto von Spee in a letter of November 26th 1914 says they received them "yesterday," Von Spee, 70. Dick says 26th.

⁴ Leipzig's diary, I.D. 1173, 44.

on deck without life-lines and lashings. On the 30th the wind and sea seem to have gone down and they passed the Horn at midnight on December 1st.¹

45. On December 2nd, 70 miles East by North of the Horn, the "Leipzig" was carrying out some gunnery practices when she met the British three-masted barque "Drummuir" with a cargo of 2,800 tons of coal, a capture apparently fortunate but involving fateful consequences. The "Drummuir" was taken in tow and the squadron altered course to the north-westward for Picton Island, the nearest anchorage, some 80 miles off. This is a small island about 10 miles long by 3 miles broad lying on the east side of Navarin Island at the eastern entrance of Beagle Channel. The squadron arrived in the evening and after anchoring on the east side of the island about a mile from the shore, the "Baden" and "St. Isabel" set to work to transfer the coal to their holds. There were sea lions and seals on the rocks, and the officers took the opportunity of going shooting. On December 6th an important conference was held apparently on board the "Seydlitz," where the Admiral announced his intention of attacking the Falkland Islands, destroying the dockyard and wireless, and taking the Governor prisoner.²

The "Gneisenau" and "Nürnberg" were to carry out this operation while the "Scharnhorst" stood off in support. The transfer of coal was completed and the squadron sailed on the afternoon of the 6th. The "Baden" towed the "Drummuir" off shore and the "Leipzig" sank her with an explosive charge. They had lost three whole days, and Sturdee's squadron hurrying to the south was now only some 200 miles off the Falkland Islands. As the "Leipzig's" charge exploded and the "Drummuir" sank beneath the waves her master might have had the satisfaction of feeling that she had done all that could be asked of her, for with her perished Von Spee's hopes of evasion and his expectations of success.

¹ "Leipzig's" diary says Dec. 2-3, but this is evidently wrong, for the "Drummuir" was captured on December 2nd by the "Leipzig," 70 miles from the Horn. "Gneisenau's" diary and Dick say December 1st, which would mean an average speed of 6.4 knots to the Horn, which agrees with speeds in "Gneisenau's" diary; even at 6 knots they would have reached the Horn by 8 a.m. on December 2nd.

² Dick, 157. Steward Bloch of the "Seydlitz" states that the Admiral and all captains had midday dinner on board on the 6th.

The squadron had not escaped observation. It had been seen by some Indian shepherds who had gone off with the news, but their report did not reach the Falkland Islands via Punta Arenas and Monte Video till December 10th, two days after the battle.

46. Von Spee evidently considered at the time that the destruction of the wireless station was an operation of importance, and no doubt a real advantage would have accrued to him by the destruction of any colliers in Port Stanley.

According to information from prisoners, he had no indication by wireless of the presence of Sturdee's battle cruisers, and the only ships he expected to meet were the "Canopus," "Carnarvon," "Kent," "Cornwall," "Glasgow," "Bristol," "Newcastle," and possibly "Defence." He knew too that the "Canopus" could not lie in a line going more than 13 knots, and that the other cruisers, except the "Defence" and "Carnarvon," could not muster any gun larger than six-inch. From Picton Island to Port Stanley is 400 miles, and on December 8th at dawn the squadron, going an average speed of 10½ knots, sighted the Falkland Islands at 5 a.m. The "Gneisenau" and "Nürnberg" were despatched on their mission. According to the approved plan, in the absence of hostile ships, they were to enter harbour Port William behind a minesweeping flotilla of boats; the "Gneisenau" was then to endeavour to get the Governor on board, while the "Nürnberg," with the minesweeping boats, was to press on into the inner harbour of Port Stanley to destroy the dockyard and the wireless station. In the case of enemy ships being present, they were to fall back on the squadron lying off below the horizon. The night had been short and bright, the weather was unusually clear, the sea calm, the sun shining.¹

47. The principal port of the Falklands is Stanley Harbour (or Port William) in the north-east corner of East Falklands. Port William is a bay running east and west, open to the east, some 4 miles long with an outer entrance 2 miles wide, narrowing to about three-quarters of a mile; the anchorage, in 7 fathoms, is at the western end. On the southern shore of the western portion is a narrow entrance only 300 yards wide into Stanley Harbour, a long narrow tongue of water running east and west some

¹ Dick, 166.

3 miles long by half a mile wide with a depth of 3 to 5 fathoms.

The harbour is surrounded by low sand dunes with Mount Low 840 feet high on its northern side and Sapper Hill, 450 feet, on the southern side.


48. About 8 a.m. the "Gneisenau" approaching the harbour could see two wireless masts and heavy columns of smoke, which were at first taken to be due to the firing of stocks of coal. The gunnery officer of the "Gneisenau," Kapitan Leutnant Busch, is said to have caught a glimpse of tripod masts through a gap in the sand hills, but his report was not believed. The "Kent" was seen leaving the harbour and as the "Gneisenau" increased speed to stop her, the "Canopus" opened fire over the sand hills, controlled by an observation post ashore. The shots fell short, but were evidently 12-inch; and the "Gneisenau" turned away and then resumed her course.

At 9.0 a.m. the flagship was some 15 miles south of the entrance and the clouds of smoke led Von Spee to send orders to the supply ship to keep away and rendezvous in lat. 54° S., long. 57° W., 130 miles to the southward. Shortly afterwards the captain of the "Gneisenau" reported the presence of six ships, including the "Cornwall" and "Canopus." It is not known definitely whether he had seen the tripod masts of the battle cruisers. The "Scharnhorst" soon afterwards signalled "Gneisenau, 'Nürnberg' do not accept battle," and directly afterwards made the general signal "Steam in all boilers. Steer east."


About 10 o'clock six men-of-war could be made out at the entrance of the harbour, which were supposed to be a light cruiser of the "Glasgow" type, three large cruisers (two "Cornwalls" and a "Defence"), and two battleships, "Canopus" and "Formidable."¹

At 10.20 a.m. the German squadron was on an easterly course going 20 knots, and by that time two more men-of-war could be seen leaving the harbour vomiting thick clouds of dense smoke which effectually concealed them from view. These soon cleared away, revealing the masts and funnels of two battle cruisers, and Von Spee knew that his hour had come.

¹ Dick, 167; also I.D. 1173, 28.



cruisers in place of "Defence," as I do not consider force at my disposal sufficient to ensure capture of "Karlsruhe"



Australia
Newcastle
Hizen
Idzumo
Asama

FORCE D
Highflyer
Marmora
Victorian
Empress of Britain

S. E. COAST
Invincible
Inflexible
Carnarvon
Cornwall
Kent
Glasgow
Bristol
Macedonia
Orama
Canopus

CAPE STATION
Minotaur
Hyacinth
Dartmouth
Weymouth
Astraea
Albion

German Ships which rounded CAPE HORN
Scharnhorst
Gneisenau
Leipzig
Dresden
Nurnberg
St. Isabel
Baden
Seydlitz

MOVEMENTS PRIOR TO THE FALKLANDS BATTLE
Compiled in Training and Staff Duties Division.
Track of Invincible (noon positions, from log) —○—
" " Australia (" ") -○-
" " Von Spee's Squadron (from Dresden's noon positions) —●—

Transverse I.
Sandwich Group
Candlenas I.
Sandwich I.
Morungue I.
Bristol I.
South Thule

- No. as well as carrying out orders in Admiralty telegram 109 and leave "Orama" in Rio de la Plata, where I consider it necessary to keep ship.
4. *From Admiralty.* October 28th.
To R.A., Carnarvon, Rio. Sent, 4 p.m.
Your 45. Concur in your disposition. Cradock has been informed that "Defence" is not to leave your command.
5. *From Admiralty.* November 3rd.
Sent, 6.55 p.m.
To Admiral Cradock, c/o Consul, Coronel.
110. "Defence" has been ordered to join your flag with all despatch. "Glasgow" should find and keep touch with the enemy. You should keep touch with "Glasgow," concentrating the rest of your squadron, including "Canopus." It is important you should effect your junction with "Defence" at earliest possible moment, subject to keeping touch with "Glasgow" and enemy. Enemy supposes you at Corcovados Bay.
6. *From Admiralty.* November 3rd.
Sent, 6.20 p.m.
To "Defence," Monte Video, and R.A., Carnarvon, Rio.
"Defence" to proceed with all possible despatch to join Admiral Cradock on West Coast of America.
7. *From Maclean, Valparaiso.* November 4th.
Received, 1.29 a.m.
To Admiralty.
Chilian Admiral just informed me that German Admiral states that his ships met "Good Hope," "Monmouth," "Glasgow," and "Otranto" at sunset on Sunday (November 1st) north of Coronel in thick and wicked weather. Fight ensued. After about an hour's action "Monmouth" turned over and sank. "Good Hope," "Glasgow," and "Otranto" drew off into the darkness. "Good Hope" on fire. An explosion was heard; it is believed she sank. German ships included "Scharnhorst," "Gneisenau," and "Nurnberg."
8. *From Admiralty.* November 4th.
Sent, 11.45 a.m.
To "Defence," Monte Video.
Urgent. "Defence" is to remain in vicinity of Monte Video till "Carnarvon" and "Cornwall" join her.
9. *From Intelligence Officer, Monte Video.* November 4th.
Sent, 3.15 p.m.
To Admiralty. Received, 8.30 p.m.
Urgent. If news from Valparaiso is true it is to be presumed that the next point of attack will be the Falkland Islands. Please ask Admiralty if H.M.S.

- No. "Defence" should proceed there at once. German squadron has left Valparaiso.
10. *From Admiralty.* November 4th.
Sent, 1.35 p.m.
To British Minister, Rio de Janeiro.
114. Following for Carnarvon (begins). In view of reported sinking of "Good Hope" and "Monmouth" by "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" off Coronel, November 1st, armoured ships on S.E. Coast should concentrate at once. "Carnarvon," "Cornwall" should join "Defence" off Monte Video. "Canopus," "Glasgow," "Otranto" have been ordered, if possible, to join you there. "Kent," from Sierra Leone, has also been ordered to join your flag, via Abrolhos. Endeavour to get into communication with them. Enemy will most likely come on to the Rio trade route. Reinforcements will meet you shortly* from England.
11. *From Admiralty.* November 4th.
Sent, 2.30 p.m.
To "Glasgow," "Otranto," via Consuls, Monte Video, Punta Arenas, Coronel, Valparaiso.
You should make the best of your way to join "Defence" near Monte Video. Keep wide of track to avoid being brought to action by superior force.
12. *From Admiralty.* November 4th.
Sent, 3.30 p.m.
To "Canopus," via Consuls, Monte Video, Punta Arenas, Coronel, Valparaiso.
In view of the reported sinking of "Good Hope" and "Monmouth" by "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" on November 1st, you should make the best of your way to join "Defence" near Monte Video. Keep wide of track to avoid being brought to action by superior force. If attacked, however, Admiralty is confident ship will in all circumstances be fought to the last as imperative to damage enemy, whatever may be the consequences.
13. *From Admiralty.*
To "Glasgow," "Canopus," "Otranto," via Monte Video.
"Glasgow," "Canopus," "Otranto" are to proceed, if possible, direct to River Plate to join "Carnarvon" and "Defence." Avoid Falkland Islands unless you are absolutely unable to go direct to River Plate.
14. *From Admiralty.*
To Governor, Falkland Islands. (Sent via Colonial Office.)
German cruiser raid may take place. All Admiralty colliers should be concealed in unfrequented harbours. Be ready to destroy supplies useful to enemy and hide codes effectively on enemy ships being sighted.

* MS draft has "reach you shortly."

- No. 15. *From* Monte Video, viâ Falkland Islands. November 6th. Received, 3.42 p.m.
To Admiralty.
- From* "Glasgow," Magellan Straits, November 4th.
"Good Hope," "Monmouth," "Glasgow" fought action at sunset, November 1st . . . with "Scharnhorst," "Gneisenau," "Leipsig," "Dresden" lasting one hour. . . . "Good Hope" exploded. . . . "Monmouth" hauled off at dusk, but . . . unable to steam away. . . . Regret to report very little possibility of her escaping. . . . "Glasgow" was not extensively damaged . . . has three holes on water line. Impossible to estimate damage done to enemy, but it did not appear severe. They fired large amount of ammunition. "Canopus" was 200 miles distant from scene of action, and "Otranto" was not in the action. Have informed "Canopus," and all three ships are now proceeding independently Falkland Islands.
- No. 16. *From* Admiralty. November 9th. Sent, 3.10 a.m.
To I.O., Monte Video.
- Following orders to "Canopus" and "Glasgow":—
"Canopus" to remain in Stanley Harbour. Moor the ship so that your guns command the entrance. Extemporise mines outside the entrance. Be prepared for bombardment from outside the harbour; send down your topmasts. Stimulate the Governor to organise all local forces and make determined defence. Arrange observation stations on shore to enable you to direct fire on ships outside. Land guns or use boats' torpedoes to sink a blocking ship before she reaches the narrows. No objection to your grounding ship to obtain a good berth. Send "Glasgow" on to River Plate should she be able to get sufficient start of enemy to avoid capture; if not, moor her inside "Canopus." Repair your defects and await orders.
- No. 17. *From* I.O., Monte Video. November 13th. Sent, 10.40 a.m. Received, 4.28 p.m.
To Admiralty.
- There has been no communication with Falkland Islands since November 8th owing to atmospheric disturbances, so I asked "Defence" to try and get in wireless touch with "Canopus." Message was apparently received after she had left Falklands, and she asked whether she would return.
- No. 18. *From* Admiralty.
To C.-in-C., Grand Fleet.
- No. 171. Order "Invincible"* and "Inflexible" to fill up with coal at once and proceed to Berehaven with despatch. They are urgently needed for foreign service. Admiral

* "New Zealand" erased.

- No. and Flag Captain "Invincible" to transfer to "New Zealand." Captain of "New Zealand" to "Invincible." "Tiger" ordered to join you with all despatch. Give her necessary orders.
- No. 19. *To* R.A., "Glory." November 8th. Sent, noon.
- No. 78. There is a possibility of "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" coming through the Panama Canal. Arrange for two of your fastest cruisers to watch canal and keep touch with enemy without engaging superior force, very important that German ships should not be lost touch of until superior forces are available to deal with them. Canal should be watched from the 12th instant. New York should not be uncovered, but other interests must be left unguarded.
- No. 20. *To* C.-in-C., Grand Fleet. November 10th. Sent, 10.40 a.m.
- No. 219. In view of your reports of large ships passing north of the Faroes and serious possibility, confirmed by personal reports from trustworthy Danish agents of German intention to send out cruisers into the Atlantic, we consider it imperative to send a battle cruiser, preferably the "Princess Royal," to New York, as "Suffolk" and "Caronia" are quite insufficient. Give orders accordingly.
- No. 21. Your 81 and 82. November 13th. Sent, 1.15 p.m.
- No. 88. "Princess Royal" sailed yesterday for Halifax to coal and then join ships off New York. Transfer your flag to "Suffolk" and remain off New York with "Suffolk," "Caronia," "Princess Royal," and "Essex" when available. Send "Glory" to Jamaica and order "Lancaster" and "Berwick" to join her there and remain concentrated. Foreign Office are being asked to arrange for trustworthy intelligence being sent should German squadron enter canal.
- (Note.—There were Consular Reporting Officers at Panama and Colon.)
- No. 22. *To* all Admirals in Atlantic. November 12th. Sent, 1 a.m.
- Vice-Admiral Sturdee is sailing from England in "Invincible" with "Inflexible" as C.-in-C., South Atlantic and South Pacific station, limits of which will be on north Lat. 50° N., on east western limit of Caps station, on west limit of Australian station. If movements of enemy make it necessary for him to pass within your station, you will for this purpose come under his orders.

- No. 23. *From* Consul, Coronel. November 19th.
To Admiralty. Received, 6.12 p.m.
German s.s. "Luxor," which arrived here September 6th to load 10,000 tons of coal for Valparaiso, was stopped loading by Chilian Government on 9th after receiving 3,000 tons, sailed midnight last night without permission of Chilian authorities. Destination unknown.
24. *From* Consul-General, Valparaiso. November 21st.
Sent, 5.25 p.m.
Received, 12.8 am., November 22nd.
Reported 5 German warships, 2 transports, 3 steamers, 2 sailing ships were at Mas Afuera November 15th.
25. *From* Consul-General, Valparaiso. November 22nd.
To Admiralty. Received, 3.44 a.m.
Names of German ships at Mas Afuera on 15th, "Scharnhorst," "Gneisenau," "Leipzig," "Dresden," "Nurnberg," and "Prince Eitel Friedrich," also German merchant vessels "Amasis," "Sta. Isabel," "Baden," and "Titania." Coal has been deposited at Masa Fuera . . . Further information from generally reliable source is that "Gneisenau" and "Scharnhorst" are at present near Tresmontes, S.W. Chile.
23. *From* Admiralty. November 10th.
To C.-in-C., Devonport. Sent, 12.5 a.m.
"Invincible" and "Inflexible" are to sail Wednesday 11th. They are needed for war service and dockyard arrangements must be made to conform. If necessary dockyard men should be sent away in the ship and return as opportunity may offer. You are held responsible for the speedy despatch of these ships in a thoroughly efficient condition.
27. *From* Admiralty. November 9th.
Sent, 6.30 p.m.
To R.A., "Carnarvon," Monte Video.
119. "Canopus" and "Glasgow" expect to arrive Port Stanley on 8th. Both ships must coal there. "Canopus" cannot steam properly and has been ordered to remain in Port Stanley and defend herself and the town. German ships may arrive Port Stanley on 10th, and "Glasgow" has been ordered to remain unless she can get sufficient start of German ships to ensure her escape.
Keep your ships concentrated off River Plate and remain long enough to enable "Glasgow" to rejoin you should she start. Should you not get news of "Glasgow" after waiting a reasonable time retire keeping your force still concentrated in advance of German squadron and cover the coaling base at Abrolhos Rocks. Coal there if you have time before Germans arrive. The colliers must be protected and you must engage the German squadron if necessary to protect colliers. Do not lose sight of the possibility of the Germans not calling at Falklands and going north direct.

- No. 28. *From* Admiralty. November 11th.
Sent, 11.10 a.m.
To R.A., "Defence," Monte Video.
121. "Inflexible" and "Invincible" with Admiral Sturdee are leaving Devonport to-morrow for Abrolhos via St. Vincent. "Kent" left Sierra Leone on 5th. "Warrior" and "Black Prince" with possibly three French cruisers leave Gibraltar for West Coast of Africa about 14th.
29. *From* "Canopus," via Monte Video. November 16th.
To Admiralty. Received, 5.34 p.m.
3. "Canopus" arrived Falkland Islands 12th November; is moored head and stern to cover entrance of harbour and obtain fire to S.E. over land. Engine-room repairs are now in hand. Possible landing places are now protected. Naval ratings, guns, 12-pdr. 12 cwt., are now being landed. Look-out and signal stations have been established. All battery positions and stations are now in telephonic communication. Entrance to Port William harbour will be mined shortly. Landing force marine detachment 70 men and local volunteer force of 150 men all under command of captain, R.M. Every assistance has been rendered by the Governor, Falkland Islands, and local administration.
1800 14th.
30. *From* Admiralty. November 22nd
Sent, 3.40 p.m.
To "Glasgow," Rio de Janeiro.
128. Pass to "Defence." On arrival of battle cruisers transfer your flag to "Carnarvon" and instruct Admiral Sturdee to send "Defence" at 15 knots to St. Helena at once. Poulsen wireless gear should be transferred to one of Sturdee's ships provided it does not entail 12 hours' delay, and operator should be exchanged also. A collier has been sent to St. Helena, "Defence" will join "Minotaur," "Weymouth," and "Dartmouth" on Cape Station, further telegraphic orders will be sent to St. Helena. Inform Sturdee that "Warrior," "Black Prince," and French cruisers will not go to West Africa, and that force on African coast will consist of "Albion," "Hyacinth," "Astrea," "Cumberland," "Challenger," "Defence," "Minotaur," "Weymouth," and "Dartmouth."
31. *From* Admiralty. November 22nd.
Sent, 12.35 p.m.
To "Glasgow," Rio de Janeiro.
Consul-General, Valparaiso, reports that "Gneisenau," "Scharnhorst," "Dresden," "Leipzig," "Nurnberg," "Prinz Eitel Friedrich," and four German merchant vessels were at Mas Afuera near Juan Fernandez on November 15th.

- No. 32. From Admiralty. November 23rd.
Sent, 5.10 p.m.
To I.O., Montevideo.
Ascertain from "Canopus" how many colliers and how much coal is at Falkland Islands.
33. From I.O., Monte Video. November 25th.
To Admiralty. Received, 3.59 p.m.
11. "Canopus" reports three colliers with total 14,500 tons of coal at Falkland Islands.
34. From Admiralty. November 24th.
To Minister, Rio, and I.O., Monte Video and Pernambuco.
For Admiral Sturdee arriving at Abrolhos Rocks in "Invincible" on 25th to join squadron (begins). Scharnhorst's squadron was at Mas Afuera, Juan Fernandez, on 15th instant; later evidence which is less reliable points to their presence in Gulf of Penas, Chile, on 21st. Proceed south with colliers and whole squadron except "Defence." Use Falkland Islands as main base for colliers. After coaling proceed to Chilian coast, avoiding letting your large ships be seen in Magellan Straits. Search the straits, inlets, and channels, taking colliers with you as necessary. "Australia" with Japanese squadron will arrive Galapagos Islands about December 21st, and will move south should Germans remain in south. A powerful Japanese squadron is collecting at Suva, Fiji, and will probably proceed to Marquesas Islands.
35. From Bahia. November 28th.
To Admiralty. Sent, 9.35 a.m.
Received, 3.37 p.m.
"Invincible" and "Inflexible" arrived Abrolhos. Admiralty telegram of November 24th received. Proceeding south, November 28th, with all ships and colliers
36. From V.A., "Invincible." November 30th.
To Admiralty. Received, 9.35 a.m.
Via H.M.S. "Bristol" and Rio de Janeiro.
16. Left Abrolhos at 10 a.m. Saturday, November 28th, with "Invincible," "Inflexible," "Carnarvon," "Cornwall," "Kent," and "Glasgow" for Falkland Islands, due December 7th. "Bristol" also calls Rio de Janeiro. Cruisers spreading will sweep trade route. "Orama" follows convoying colliers with 50,000 tons of coal. "Macedonia," "Otranto," ordered to Falkland Islands, latter searching Trinidad and Martinmas Islands. Total supply of coal now at Falkland Islands, 8,000 tons. Request 18,000 tons reserve be kept at St. Vincent in case squadron follows enemy north.

- No. 37. From Bird, Consul, Antofagasta. November 28th.
To Admiralty. Received, 4.0 a.m.
"Helicon" reports—was captured by Germans, November 2nd, taken to Mas Afuera, where 2,000 tons of coal were forcibly discharged to "Scharnhorst," "Gneisenau," "Dresden," "Baden," "Nurnberg." Other German ships there were "Prinz Eitel," "Leipzig," "Amasis." They all left 15th in an easterly direction. German sailors in conversation said they expected to go to the Atlantic round Cape Horn. Master declares "Sacramento" supplied 8,000 tons of coal and 2,000 tons of provisions.
38. From Admiralty. December 2nd.
To I.O., Monte Video. Sent, 2.25 p.m.
25. Inform V.A. "Invincible," through "Canopus," Falklands, also by any other means that German s.s. "Eleonore Woermann" with coal and supplies left Buenos Aires 7 p.m. yesterday; also German s.s. "Patagonia" is filling up with extra coal at Monte Video. Keep V.A. "Invincible" informed as far as possible of movements of these two ships as well as Admiralty.

**OPERATIONS
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN,
AUGUST 4th—10th, 1914.**

MONOGRAPH No. 4.

NAVAL STAFF.

(TRAINING AND STAFF DUTIES DIVISION.)
September 1919.

NOTE ON SOURCES AND INTRODUCTION.

Referred to in Footnotes as (A), (B), etc.

1. The following official documents in the keeping of the historical section of the Committee of Imperial Defence have been used in compiling this monograph:—

- (A) M. 01548. Diary of events from C.-in-C., Mediterranean, dated August 20th, 1914.

This contains a report from "Indomitable" concerning events of August 4th; a report from "Dublin" of events on night August 6th-7th; Captain of "Weymouth's" report to C.-in-C. concerning occurrences at entrance to Dardanelles.

This diary is the principal authority, but it was compiled some days after the events related and requires to be supplemented by the following:—

- (B) M. 01653. Copy of orders issued to Rear-Admiral Troubridge on August 2nd, 1914.
- (C) M. 01811. Report of proceedings by R.A., 1st Cruiser Squadron, dated August 26th, 1914.

- (D) M. 01601. Report of proceedings in Mediterranean from C.-in-C., furnished in reply to Admiralty questions and dated August 26th.
- (E) M. 01989. Explanation of movements on August 6th-7th, by Rear-Admiral Troubridge, dated August 26th.

Telegrams and undocketed papers have been bound up into a volume, H.S. 19.

2. The fair deck-logs of the following ships have been examined; they are at present (June 1919) in the custody of the H.S., C.I.D.:—"Inflexible," "Indomitable," "Defence," "Dublin."

The signal and W/T logs of the "Inflexible," "Indomitable," "Gloucester," and "Defence" have also been consulted when compiling the Appendices.

3. The sources with regard to the French movements quoted in the official history are two in number, namely:—

Commandant Vedel: "Nos Marins à la Guerre," Paris, 1916.

René La Bruyère: "Deux Années de Guerre Navale," Paris, 1916.

These have been consulted in compiling the present study, but it is difficult to assess their value. They are not official and are written in a somewhat journalistic style, and are often grotesquely inaccurate with regard to English movements, but they appear to be in substantial agreement as to the French dispositions.

4. On the German side there is a book by Emil Ludwig, "Die Fahrten der Goeben und der Breslau," Berlin, 1916, which seems fairly accurate. Von Pohl's Diary (translation) in Monthly Intelligence Report, April 1920, should be consulted.

5. Admiralty telegrams and the text of important signals are contained in Appendices. The telegrams are distinguished by numbers and the signals by letters. References are given in footnotes.

6. The time used throughout, unless otherwise mentioned, is Central European time: that is to say, one hour fast on Greenwich time.

The code times of signals (expressed in 24-hour time) are all in Greenwich time; but times of receipt, &c., and in the text of messages, are in local time.

The "Dublin" apparently used G.M.T. for all times in her signals.

The moon was full on August 6th, 1914.

CHAPTER I.

FORCES AND PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS.

COMPOSITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF FORCES.*

1. *British*.—The British squadron in the Mediterranean, under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir Archibald Berkeley Milne, consisted of the Second Battle Cruiser Squadron, with four attached light cruisers; the First Cruiser Squadron, under Rear-Admiral E. C. Troubridge; and the Fifth Destroyer Flotilla, commanded by Captain C. P. R. Coode.

On July 27th the composition and disposition of these squadrons was as follows, the fact that the ship was at Malta being indicated by (M.); at Alexandria by (A.); at Durazzo by (D.) :—

Second Battle Cruiser Squadron.

Captain.

Battle Cruisers :—

"Inflexible" (flag) (A.) - R. F. Phillimore (Chief of Staff), A. N. Loxley (Flag Captain).
 "Indomitable" (M.) - F. W. Kennedy.
 "Indefatigable" (A.) - C. F. Sowerby.

Light Cruisers :—

"Chatham" (A.) - S. R. Drury-Lowe.
 "Dublin" (A.) - John D. Kelly.
 "Gloucester" (A.) - William A. H. Kelly.
 "Weymouth" (A.) - W. D. Church.

Torpedo Gunboat :—

"Hussar" (A.) - Admiral's yacht.

* Position and movements of H.M. ships, January 1st to August 31st, 1914, Daily Return.

First Cruiser Squadron.

Captain.

Armoured Cruisers :—

"Defence" (flag) (D.) - Fawcett Wray.
 "Black Prince" (A.) - F. D. Gilpin-Brown.
 "Duke of Edinburgh" (M.) - H. Blackett.
 "Warrior" (A.) - G. H. Borrett.

Fifth Destroyer Flotilla.

Depôt Ship :—

"Blenheim" (A. to M.) - Captain C. P. R. Coode.*

First Division :

"Wolverine" (A.) "Renard" (A.)
 "Scorpion" (A.) "Scourge" (A.)

Second Division :

"Foxhound" (M.) "Raccoon" (D.)
 "Mosquito" (A.) "Basilisk" (A.)

Third Division :

"Beagle" (A.) "Harpy" (A.)
 "Bulldog" (A.) "Grasshopper" (A.)

Fourth Division :

"Savage" (A.) "Pincher" (A.)
 "Grampus" (M.) "Rattlesnake" (A.)

These destroyers all burnt coal.

2. The main body of the Fleet was, therefore, at Alexandria and due to leave for Malta on July 28th in accordance with the published programme of the cruise. H.M.S. "Defence" was at Durazzo, with one destroyer (the "Raccoon"), forming part of the International Squadron on the Albanian coast. The "Duke of Edinburgh" had just completed her refit at Malta, where the "Indomitable" was about to take her place in the dockyard, the latter ship's refit being already overdue.

3. *French*.—Of the four Dreadnought battleships of the "Courbet" class, only the "Courbet" was in the Mediterranean at the outbreak of war, flying the flag of the C-in-C., Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère. Two of the remaining ships had recently been in the Baltic and

* In "Wolverine" when war broke out.

were still in the Atlantic, while the fourth ship was building at Brest.

The First Squadron consisted of six "Lord Nelson" type battleships of the "Danton" class. The Second Squadron included five pre-Dreadnought vessels, with four older battleships in a Reserve Squadron. There were six armoured cruisers organised in two divisions and at least 24 sea-going destroyers. The whole of this force was concentrated at Toulon by the end of July.

4. *German.*—The German forces in the Mediterranean at this time consisted of the battle cruiser "Goeben," flagship of Rear-Admiral von Souchon, believed to be at Pola,* and the light cruiser "Breslau," known to be at Durazzo as guardship. The light cruiser "Strassburg" had been reported at Horta in the Azores, but returned to Germany without exercising any direct influence on the Mediterranean, passing Rear-Admiral Stoddart in the "Carnarvon" on his way down Channel on July 31st.

There were no other German naval forces in or near the area, but in the various Mediterranean ports were several merchant ships capable of acting as auxiliaries. It was even reported that two liners at Genoa were arming, and, as will be seen, the Deutsch Ost-Afrika liner "General" played a considerable part in subsequent events.

5. *Austrian.*—Though in the period covered by this monograph, Austria and Great Britain were nominally at peace, the position was so delicate that the Austrian Fleet had to be considered as potentially hostile and therefore exerted a considerable influence on events. It consisted of three Dreadnought battleships and three of "Lord Nelson" type, with a few light cruisers and destroyers. All their forces were concentrated in the Adriatic, and, besides the dockyard port of Pola, the harbour of Cattaro in the southern portion of that sea was fortified.

6. *Italian.*—The attitude of the third member of the Triple Alliance was for a time doubtful, and the possibility of Italy joining her nominal Allies had to be faced. The Italian Fleet, if united with the German and Austrian forces, would have formed a concentration

* The "Goeben" had refitted at Pola in July. She had apparently left, and was at or near Trieste by the end of the month (A.).

very superior in strength to the French squadrons, for it consisted of three Dreadnoughts based on Taranto, with four more modern battleships at Gaeta, near Naples.

7. *The First Warning—Concentration at Malta.*—On July 27th the C.-in-C. at Alexandria received a telegram from the Admiralty, stating that war "was not impossible," and ordering him to return to Malta with the Fleet. The Fleet sailed next day (28th) as had been previously intended, and late that night the Admiral received the official "warning telegram," which ordered all preparations to be made for war, short of actual mobilisation of the reserves. The ships at Durazzo ("Defence" and "Raccoon") were at once recalled to Malta, where the main fleet arrived on July 29th.

By the afternoon of August 1st the whole fleet, including those ships which had been refitting, was ready for sea and completed with all stores. It should, however, be noted that, during the first days of the war, there was a considerable shortage of colliers, no Admiralty cargoes being due, and it was some time before the process of intercepting coal bound to the East and loading ships in ballast from the Malta stocks relieved the situation.

CHAPTER II.

ORDERS AND OPERATIONS TO MIDNIGHT, AUGUST 3RD-4TH.

8. *The First Admiralty Orders.*—On the evening of July 30th Sir Berkeley Milne received a telegram from the Admiralty which gave him definite instructions as to the policy he was to pursue.

His first task was to assist the French in the transportation of their African army to Europe by bringing to action the "Goeben" or other German ships which might endeavour to interfere with the operation, and he was informed that he would be notified when he might consult with the French Admiral. It was hoped that Italy would remain neutral and that Greece and Spain would be friendly and, possibly, Allies.

The Admiral was further ordered not to engage superior forces, except in combination with the French,

and that, as the Mediterranean would probably be reinforced, the British forces were to be husbanded at the outset.

In the C.-in-C.'s reply, sent on July 31st, the "Goeben" is not mentioned, but the superior strength of the Italian and Austrian Fleets is emphasised, and the C.-in-C. pointed out that in order to protect the French transports the British force must remain concentrated, which entailed leaving the trade routes in the Eastern Mediterranean open to attack, for isolated cruisers or light cruisers detached to protect them would be exposed to the risk of loss. The only immediate movement proposed was the despatch of a light cruiser to watch the Straits of Messina, though this last proposal was not carried out immediately.

9. *The French Arrangements.*—As the first objective assigned to the British fleet was the protection of the French transports, it may be as well to describe the arrangements which the French authorities had made to cover their passage.

The force to be conveyed to France from Algeria was the 19th Army Corps, comprising about 40,000 men, with their due proportion of artillery, transport and horses.

It had been arranged that the troops should embark at three ports, Philippeville, Algiers and Oran, and, to cover these routes, the French fleet was divided into three groups. The First Squadron (six "Lord Nelson" type), three armoured cruisers and 12 destroyers, were to proceed to Philippeville; the second group, consisting of the "Courbet" (fleet flagship), with the Second Battle Squadron (five pre-Dreadnought type), three armoured cruisers and 12 destroyers was destined for Algiers; while the Reserve Squadron (four old battleships) was to cover the route from Oran.

It had been originally intended that the whole fleet should sail from Toulon on August 1st, but, in point of fact, they did not start till August 3rd. This delay is accounted for variously. La Bruyère states that it was owing to the desire to avoid any appearance of provoking war; Commandant Vedel says—with greater likelihood—that it was due to the uncertain attitude of Italy.

It is just possible that the fleet was not ready to sail on the pre-arranged date.

All this was unknown to the British Admiral, and his orders had not authorised him to communicate with the French.

10. *Further Admiralty Orders.*—The original orders to the British C.-in-C. were on August 2nd supplemented by further more definite instructions. These directed that two battle cruisers should shadow the "Goeben," the approach to the Adriatic being watched by cruisers and destroyers, and that, though it was believed Italy would remain neutral, no reliance should be placed on her attitude. The C.-in-C. was ordered to remain near Malta.

11. *Intelligence of the Enemy.*—On August 1st it was reported that the "Goeben" and "Breslau" were coaling at Brindisi, and, later, that the "Breslau" had left before the "Goeben"—it was believed for the coast of Albania.

Actually, it appears that they met at Brindisi the Deutsch Ost-Afrika liner "General," fuelled and provisioned for the voyage to East Africa. This ship was ordered to Messina to act as an auxiliary, and thither both the warships proceeded; but these movements were not known to the British Admiral.

12. *Disposition of Force—August 2nd.*—Sir Berkeley Milne had been ordered to cover the transport of the French troops, to watch the mouth of the Adriatic and to shadow the "Goeben" with two battle cruisers, and, in order to comply with these directions, on the afternoon of August 2nd he decided to dispose his force as follows:—

The "Inflexible," in accordance with the Admiralty instructions, to remain at Malta, with the "Dublin" and "Weymouth"; Rear-Admiral Troubridge, with the "Indomitable," "Indefatigable," "Defence," "Warrior," "Duke of Edinburgh," "Gloucester," and the first and second divisions of destroyers, to watch the approaches to the Adriatic. This force sailed at 9 p.m., August 2nd.

Four destroyers were stationed to watch the Malta Channel, being spread on a line between C. Correnti in Sicily and Valetta; and the "Chatham" was sent to examine the Straits of Messina and then join the Rear-Admiral.

The "Black Prince," in pursuance of Admiralty orders, had been sent to Marseilles to embark Lord Kitchener and his staff and take them to Egypt, but the course of events at home resulted in the cancellation of these orders and the "Black Prince" was recalled. She arrived at Malta at 7.30 a.m. on August 3rd, coaled, and proceeded to the mouth of the Adriatic to join the Rear-Admiral, with whom a junction was effected at 10.40 a.m., August 4th.

13. *The Rear-Admiral's Orders.*—The orders to the Rear-Admiral were to the effect that, in accordance with instructions from the Admiralty, the Naval forces in the Mediterranean were to be husbanded in the early stages of the war and superior forces were not to be engaged.

The line to be watched by him was from Cape S. Maria di Leuca, the South-eastern point of Italy, to Fano Island, North of Corfu. The destroyers were to patrol by night and the cruisers by day, the coal of the destroyers being carefully economised.*

Before sailing the Rear-Admiral stated to the C.-in-C. that, in his opinion, the First Cruiser Squadron was an inferior force to the "Goeben" in the open sea and with full visibility; but was informed that the question did not arise as the two battle cruisers would be with him.†

14. *"Goeben" at Messina.*—Sir Berkeley Milne, in reporting these dispositions to the Admiralty, inquired whether the watch on the Adriatic should be maintained in the event of the German ships leaving that sea, or whether all ships should be concentrated in order to cover the French transports.

About midnight on August 2nd the C.-in-C. received information that the "Goeben" and "Breslau" had arrived at Messina at 1 p.m., August 2nd, and early in the morning of August 3rd he received from the Admiralty the reply to his inquiry as to what he should do if the German vessels left the Adriatic.

He was informed that the watch on the Adriatic should be maintained, but that the "Goeben" was his objective, and that she was to be followed and shadowed wherever she went; the outbreak of war was probable and imminent. On hearing that the "Goeben" was at Messina, Rear-Admiral Troubridge had asked the C.-in-C.

* (B.)

† (E.)

whether he should continue watching the Adriatic, and received a reply, about 4.30 a.m., August 3rd, to do so, but that the "Goeben" was the primary consideration. The "Chatham" was ordered at the same time to proceed through the Straits in order to ascertain if the enemy had gone North.

15. *Forces ordered West.*—The "Chatham" reported, at about 7 a.m., August 3rd, that there was no sign of the enemy in Messina or the Straits. The enemy was, therefore, unlocated, but it appeared possible that they had gone North as the "Chatham" had been watching the Southern approach during the night.

In view of his orders to protect the French transports, the C.-in-C. thereupon decided to send the Rear-Admiral's force to the westward, south of Sicily, detaching the "Gloucester" and destroyers to watch the Adriatic,* and at 9.40 a.m. Admiral Troubridge, with the 1st C.S., "Indomitable" and "Indefatigable," then on his way to the Adriatic, altered course to the south-westward in accordance with these instructions. The Admiralty had given permission to enter into communication with the French Senior Officer for combined action at 7 p.m., August 2nd, but all attempts to establish communication with the French W/T station at Bizerta proved ineffectual, and the Admiral at this time had no definite information as to the arrangements and dispositions of our Allies. The Admiralty having ordered him to consider the protection of the Algerian transports as his first task, it was important to gain intelligence on the subject, and in the afternoon of August 3rd the "Dublin" was despatched to Bizerta with a letter for the French Admiral.

16. Sir Berkeley Milne apparently reconsidered his decision to leave the Adriatic patrol to the "Gloucester" and destroyers during the forenoon of August 3rd, for at 1.30 p.m. he ordered the Rear-Admiral to return with the First Cruiser Squadron to his original station,* leaving the "Indomitable" and "Indefatigable" to proceed to the Westward to search for the "Goeben," and await further orders. At 3.18 p.m., August 3rd, therefore, being then off Cape Passaro, the Rear-Admiral turned back to the Adriatic with the First Cruiser

* App. B. 2

Squadron, the battle cruisers continuing their course towards Malta.

Further orders for the battle cruisers were sent by the C.-in-C. and received at 5.35 p.m., August 3rd, ordering them to join the "Chatham" (then searching the North coast of Sicily) and to cruise between Cape Bon and Cape Spartivento and as far to the Eastward as 40° N., 13° E.; they were to shadow the enemy if sighted and avoid being surprised; steam was to be raised for full speed.

In this way the Admiral endeavoured to carry out the orders sent him, namely, to cover the French transports as his first task and to avoid being brought to action by superior force (July 30th), to watch the approaches to the Adriatic (August 2nd), and to shadow the "Goeben" (August 3rd).

At 6.30 p.m., August 3rd, the C.-in-C., in the "Inflexible," left Malta and took up a position 16 miles from Malta on the line C. Correnti—Valetta. The "Weymouth" was stationed six miles off C. Correnti, and destroyers were disposed in the space between.* Later, in order to maintain visual communication with Castille signal station, the flagship closed Malta.

17. *Battle Cruisers ordered to Gibraltar.*—Meanwhile the unprotected state of our trade routes had apparently led the Admiralty to believe that the "Goeben" and "Breslau" were making for the Atlantic, for at 8.30 p.m., August 3rd, a telegram was received by the C.-in-C., ordering him to send the two battle cruisers at high speed to Gibraltar, ready to prevent the "Goeben" leaving the Mediterranean.†

The "Indomitable" received this order from the C.-in-C. at 9 p.m., and the two ships increased speed to 21 knots. The "Chatham" was ordered to rejoin the flagship off Malta.

18. *Enemy's Movements.*—Meanwhile the "Goeben" and "Breslau" had left Messina for the North-westward at 1 a.m. on August 3rd. Admiral Souchon, while awaiting orders from Berlin, had decided to make a dash at Bona and Philippeville in order to hamper the transport of the 19th Army Corps. He was off C. Spartivento, in Sardinia, about 9 p.m. and altered course for his objectives. At about midnight of August

* App. B. 4.

† App. A. 1, B. 3.

3
ppendix A.)



GOEBEN AND BRESLAU OPERATIONS


SITUATION 8.30 P. M. AUGUST 3rd 1914.

INDOMITABLE AND INDEFATIGABLE ordered to GIBRALTAR. (*Telegram 7, Appendix A.*)

Positions are Approximate.

REFERENCE.

Ind:.....	INDOMITABLE.	Glo:.....	GLouceSTER.
Indefat:.....	INDEFATIGABLE.	Dub:.....	DUBLIN.
Infl:.....	INFLEXIBLE.	Wey:.....	WEYMOUTH.
Chat:.....	CHATHAM.	1 st C.S.....	1 st CRUISER SQUADRON.



3rd he is said to have received orders from Berlin, but as the "Breslau" had already been detached to bombard Bona, he decided to carry out his immediate enterprise.*

19. *Situation*—8.30 p.m., August 3rd.—Thus the general situation at this time may be summarised as follows:—

"Goeben" and "Breslau."—Off S.W. point of Sicily on way to bombard Bona and Philippeville.

Rear-Admiral and First Cruiser Squadron.—Proceeding to join "Gloucester" at Adriatic entrance.

"Inflexible" (flag), "Weymouth."—In Malta Channel.

"Indomitable" and "Inflexible."—Between Malta and Pantellaria, steering to pass Cape Bon.

"Dublin."—Between Malta and Pantellaria on way to Bizerta (arrived 8 a.m.).

"Chatham."—On the way from Messina, rounding West point of Sicily, steering for Malta, 20 knots.

"Gloucester" and eight Destroyers.—Watching entrance to Adriatic.

CHAPTER III.

THE FIRST CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY.

20. *Bombardment of Bona and Philippeville.*—About 6 a.m. on August 4th the "Goeben" appeared off Philippeville and the "Breslau" off Bona, and both these ports were bombarded; but, beyond causing a few casualties, little material damage was done. On receipt of the news that the enemy were at Messina, the French had decided, pending the arrival of their fleet, to use only Algiers and Oran as ports of embarkation, and there was therefore no concentration of troops or transports at Philippeville.

* See I.D., M.I.R., No. 12, April 15th, 1920, p. 45. Von Pohl implies that it was the intention of the Admiralty Staff that the "Goeben" should proceed to Pola, and that Souchon acted on his own initiative.

The "Goeben" left, steering N.W., and Admiral Souchon seems to have intended to make a feint to the Westward and then, after meeting the "Breslau" at a rendezvous to the Northward, to run back to the Eastward, a collier having been sent to C. Matapan in the Morea (Greece) to meet him. But he was not to get clear away.

21. An unofficial report of the bombardment was received through the Eastern Telegraph Company by the C.-in-C. at 8.50 a.m. on the 4th, but the official report from the French Admiral did not reach him till 3.30 p.m. The "Indomitable" deciphered the Eastern Telegraph Company's signal as "German ships bombarded 'Dover,'" though it was suspected that Bona might be meant; and the signal sent by the C.-in-C. to the Rear-Admiral, curiously enough, introduced another error, as it reported that Oran, 400 miles West of Bona, had been bombarded.


22. "Goeben" sighted and shadowed (see Appendix C.).—After hearing of the bombardment, the "Indomitable" and "Indefatigable" continued their course towards Gibraltar, when at 10.32 a.m., August 4th, by a stroke of good luck they sighted the "Goeben" and "Breslau" on the starboard bow in $37^{\circ} 45' N.$, $8^{\circ} 0' E.$ (50' North of Bona), steering to the Eastward at about 20 knots.

The British ships, with guns loaded and manned and the crews at action stations, passed between the German vessels at a distance of 8,000 yards. The turrets remained fore and aft with hands itching on the training levers and eyes expectantly watching the enemy for signs of hostile intent; but nothing moved, and the battle cruisers, turning in a wide circle, proceeded to shadow the "Goeben," maintaining a distance of from 11,000 to 7,000 yards. The day was misty to the Eastward, with varying visibility, and the "Breslau" was occasionally lost sight of. At 1 p.m. the British cruisers were in $37^{\circ} 46' N.$, $8^{\circ} 45' E.$, steering N. $85^{\circ} E.$, 17 knots, with the "Goeben" 10,000 yards ahead and the "Breslau" out of sight.

The "Dublin" on her way from Bizerta had been ordered up to support the "Indomitable" at full speed and she came in sight about 2.30 p.m. on the starboard bow, taking station later on the starboard beam of the "Goeben."

S

GOEBEN.




GOEBEN AND BRESLAU OPERATIONS

SITUATION 10.40 A. M. AUGUST 4th 1914.

INDOMITABLE AND INDEFATIGABLE *on way to GIBRALTAR sight* GOEBEN.

Positions are Approximate.



23. *Effect of News at Home.*—The original signal sent by the "Indomitable" to the C.-in-C. stated that the enemy was steering East, but this portion of the message was apparently not received in the "Inflexible" and the telegram sent to the Admiralty contained no indication of their course*; it was apparently assumed at home that Admiral von Souchon intended to attack the French transports, and the First Lord of the Admiralty after despatching a telegram ordering the "Goeben" to be "held," requested authority from the Cabinet to engage her should she molest the French transports.†

This was approved, subject to warning being given; but the message sent in accordance with this decision did not reach the C.-in-C. till 5 p.m.

24. *Intelligence with regard to French.*—Sir Berkeley Milne was meanwhile waiting off Malta with his flagship in order to keep in touch with the Admiralty, and, while lying in this position, received through the "Dublin" his first communication from the French. The transmission of this was, apparently, delayed by wireless congestion due to the reports of the enemy, and it was not till the afternoon that he knew the whole French fleet had left for the Algerian coast; but the message contained no definite information as to the precise composition and distribution of their forces.‡ Actually the French had left Toulon at 4 a.m., proceeding at slow speed, and were abreast of the Balearic Islands when they heard of the bombardment of Bona, having averaged only about 8 knots. This delay and slow speed was probably due to the uncertain attitude of Italy at the time.

The message from Bizerta added that it was believed the "Goeben" would coal from a collier waiting at Palma (Majorca). This item of intelligence had previously been reported by the "Dublin" as coming from Paris, and was possibly true, as the German Admiral, before receiving definite orders to proceed to Turkey may have made arrangements to ensure his coal supply to the westwards.

25. *The Chase of the "Goeben," August 4th* (see Appendix C).—At about 4 p.m. the "Goeben" and "Breslau" increased speed and began to draw away from the British battle cruisers, who had hitherto had

* App. A. 2.

† App. A. 3, 4.

‡ App. B. 8.

no difficulty in shadowing the "Goeben"; the "Dublin" was still able to keep touch, but by 4.35 p.m. the enemy was out of sight of the battle cruisers.

It is difficult to arrive at an accurate estimate of the enemy's speed, which seems to have been exaggerated in most of the reports. The "Indomitable" was overdue for refit; her engine room complement, based on a peace establishment, was far too small, and 90 seamen had to be taken from their action stations to trim coal; the "Indefatigable" had to make similar arrangements, and in spite of all these efforts it seems doubtful if either ship steamed much more than 23 knots. The "Dublin" logs a steady 25 knots throughout the chase, but this does not agree with her own reports as to the position of the enemy. It seems probable that the "Goeben," by dint of great exertion, steamed between 25 and 26 knots and the "Breslau" perhaps a knot more. After August 4th their speeds were estimated locally as 27 and 28 knots respectively.

The "Dublin" kept touch with the enemy for some time after the battle cruisers had lost her; by 7.30 p.m. their smoke only was visible, and at 8.52 p.m., August 4th, having lost sight of the enemy, she turned back to join the "Indomitable." She had requested permission to engage the "Breslau" at 3.56 p.m., but this had been refused.

26. *The C.-in-C.'s Orders.*—Captain Kennedy of the "Indomitable" had intended, after losing sight of the "Goeben," to patrol out of sight of the Sicilian coast during the dark hours in order to prevent the enemy breaking back and then to move to the eastward so as to be off the Northern entrance to the Straits of Messina at 4 a.m. This plan was frustrated by the receipt of an important signal at 6.50 p.m. from the C.-in-C. :—

" 'Dublin' endeavour to keep touch with 'Goeben.' 'Indomitable' and 'Indefatigable' slow speed, steer West (1740)."

These orders were soon supplemented by another signal, which stated that the enemy might proceed to Majorca, where their collier was, and the "Indomitable" and "Indefatigable" were to shape course accordingly. The C.-in-C. informed the Admiralty at the same time of the situation.*

* App. A. 9.

27. *Italian Neutrality — War Declared.*— Though, according to his signal to the Admiralty, the principal reason which induced Admiral Milne to make the "steer West" signal seems to have been the German collier reported at Palma, he may have been influenced also by a message received from the Admiralty with regard to Italian neutrality.* This informed him that the Italian Government had definitely declared neutrality and that none of H.M. ships was to approach within 6 miles of the Italian coast; and this order was transmitted to all ships about 7.15 p.m., August 4th.†

At 7.2 p.m., August 4th, he received a message stating that war would probably be declared at midnight, G.M.T., and cancelling the authorisation to engage the "Goeben" should she attack the French transports; he replied that he intended to concentrate his three battle cruisers to the West of Sicily with the "Chatham" and "Weymouth"; one vessel of the Rear-Admiral's force would watch the Southern approach to Messina Straits; the "Dublin" was still endeavouring to keep touch with the enemy.

28. The disposition ordered by the C.-in-C. on the night of August 4th-5th was evidently governed largely by the idea that the "Goeben" and "Breslau" would turn back to the westward.

"My first consideration," the Admiral stated in his report dated August 20th, "was the protection of the French transports from the German ships. A position had to be taken up from which the 'Goeben' could be cut off if she came Westward."

The "Chatham" was ordered at 6.30 p.m. to patrol between Ras el Mirh on the Tunisian coast and Pantellaria, a beat of 40 miles, and the "Weymouth" between Pantellaria and Graham Shoal "in case the 'Goeben' and 'Breslau' might break back to the South."

At 9.5 p.m., August 4th, the Admiral made a general signal in which he summarised the situation and detailed his future movements. The flagship would join the "Indomitable" and "Indefatigable" to the Westward, picking up the "Chatham" and "Weymouth" on the way; the First Cruiser Squadron and "Gloucester" were to remain at the entrance to the Adriatic but were not

* App. A. 6.

† App. B. 10.

to get involved in a serious engagement with a superior force; the "Gloucester" or another vessel was to be sent to watch the Southern entrance to the Straits of Messina.* At 1 a.m., August 5th, the "Indomitable," "Indefatigable" and "Dublin" were ordered to steer first for Cape Bon and then for Pantellaria; the Admiral, after receiving news of the declaration of war, left Malta to join them, and at 10.30 a.m., August 5th, concentrated the "Inflexible," "Indomitable," "Indefatigable," "Weymouth," "Chatham," "Dublin" and the destroyers "Pincher," "Savage" and "Rattlesnake" off Pantellaria.

CHAPTER IV.

THE SECOND CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY.

29. *The C.-in-C.'s Movements—August 5th.*—After effecting his concentration off Pantellaria about 11 a.m. on August 5th, Sir Berkeley Milne proceeded towards Bizerta, the "Dublin" being sent back to Malta to coal, and then join the Rear-Admiral off the Adriatic. Arriving off Bizerta about 5.30 p.m. the "Indomitable" was sent in to complete with coal and gain intelligence as to the French dispositions, and the Admiral proceeded to the Northward with "Inflexible," "Indefatigable," "Chatham," "Weymouth" and two destroyers, the "Savage" and "Rattlesnake,"† intending to patrol between Africa and Sardinia along the meridian of 10° E. to cover the French transport lines.

30. *French Movements and Intelligence.*—It has been already stated that on the morning of August 4th, when he learnt of the bombardment of Bona and Philippeville, Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère, with the whole French fleet, was in the latitude of the Balearic Islands. The First and Second Squadrons were at once ordered to proceed at full speed to C. Matifou, near Algiers, and remain there from 3 p.m., August 4th, till daylight, August 5th, to intercept the Germans should they be coming West. As nothing was seen of the enemy, the "Courbet" with two other battleships proceeded on August 5th to search the Balearic Islands.

* App. B. 12.

† The destroyer "Pincher" had been detached to escort a captured German merchant ship.

31. The British C.-in-C. knew nothing of all this, except the meagre news which the "Dublin" had passed on August 4th to the effect that the whole French fleet had left for the Algerian coast. The next intelligence he received was from the "Indomitable" at 12.35 a.m., August 6th, giving details of the French local defences and informing him that the French were not keeping any watch between C. Corso and Italy. This last information was perhaps the result of a definite inquiry on this point, as the Admiral thought it possible the "Goeben" might go to the North.

At 5.35 a.m., August 6th, he sent a request for definite information as to the position of the French fleet and date of departure of the transports and from a series of signals in reply he learnt that the first transports had left, that the French fleet was all actively employed off the Algerian coast, and that it would probably not be released from this work till August 10th.* It was not till 2.15 p.m., August 6th, that Admiral Milne was definitely aware that the French forces were to the Westward, disposed so as to protect and cover the transport of their troops from Algiers, and even then he had no detailed knowledge of the French plans.

32. *The "Goeben" at Messina.*—The "Goeben" and "Breslau" had arrived at Messina in the early morning of August 5th and proceeded to coal from the liner "General," which she had requisitioned on its way out to German East Africa. Sir Rennell Rodd, our Ambassador at Rome, had news of her arrival, but, owing probably to pressure on the wires, the news did not reach London till 5 p.m., and our Consul at Messina evidently did not inform Malta direct. The Germans, however, had been using wireless freely, and at 4.32 p.m., August 5th, Captain Howard Kelly, in the "Gloucester," now off the Straits, signalled that the strength of the German wireless signals indicated that the "Goeben" was at Messina, and at 4.53 a.m., August 6th, the Admiral Superintendent, Malta, sent definite information of their location there, received from home.

Meanwhile, the British C.-in-C. had been patrolling along the meridian of 10° E.

33. *The Rear-Admiral's Movements—August 3rd to 5th.*—The arrival of the "Goeben" at Messina on

* App. B. 18, 19, 20, 21.

August 5th shifted the centre of gravity of the operations to the Eastward and increased the responsibilities of the Rear-Admiral of the First Cruiser Squadron.

After leaving the battle cruisers off Cape Passaro on August 3rd, Rear-Admiral Troubridge had maintained an uneventful watch on the Adriatic. Owing to the doubtful attitude of Italy and the necessity of respecting her neutrality, the patrol had been shifted from the line Cape S. Maria di Leuca-Fano Island, originally ordered, to the latitude of Cephalonia.* The principal anxiety had been the question of fuel for the destroyers, and on the afternoon of August 4th the C.-in-C. had ordered them all back to Malta, giving as his reason the impossibility of supplying them with coal; but, six hours later, this was countermanded when the news of the ultimatum was known and colliers were becoming available at Malta.† The destroyers, however, consisting of the First and Second Divisions, Fifth Flotilla, under Captain Coode, in the "Wolverine" were still very short of fuel and remained in Vasiliko Bay, Santa Maura Island.

34. The orders given by the C.-in-C. to the Rear-Admiral, previous to the commencement of hostilities, on the evening of August 4th, directed him to continue watching the Adriatic, to avoid a serious engagement with superior forces, and to detach a vessel to watch the Straits of Messina. The "Gloucester" had been selected for this latter purpose and, after parting company with the Rear-Admiral at 10 p.m., August 4th, was in position to the South of Messina by 8 a.m., August 5th. At 12.30 p.m., August 5th, the Rear-Admiral received a report that the Austrian fleet was at sea cruising off Pola, but hostilities had not yet commenced with that Power, and the "Goeben" at this time was not definitely located.

In the afternoon of August 5th, Admiral Troubridge concluded from wireless indications that the "Goeben" was in his neighbourhood, and he informed the C.-in-C. that he intended to keep within 30 miles of Santa Maura Island in the hope of drawing her into narrow waters should she be encountered. This intention was in accordance with his previously expressed opinion that

* App. B. 6.

† App. A. 10, B. 7, 8, 11.

the First Cruiser Squadron was no match for the "Goeben" under normal tactical conditions.*

Later in the same afternoon (5th), on hearing from the "Gloucester" that the enemy were probably at Messina, the Rear-Admiral stood across towards Cape Colonne in the hope of intercepting, and fighting a night action with the enemy should they attempt to proceed into the Adriatic.†

In reply to his previous signal, the C.-in-C. told him to use destroyers for night work, and added that the "Dublin" with two more destroyers would join him shortly.‡

The Rear-Admiral also learnt about the same time that a collier was being sent to Santa Maura, leaving Malta 8 p.m., August 5th. This collier was delayed, though urgently needed, the destroyers being by this time so short of coal that they were tied to the Ionian Islands; being unable to use them off the coast of Italy, the Rear-Admiral turned back at 9.50 p.m., August 5th, and returned to the patrol position off Cephalonia.

36. Meanwhile the C.-in-C., with the "Inflexible," "Indefatigable," "Chatham," "Weymouth," "Rattlesnake" and "Savage" patrolled to the west of Sicily along the meridian of 10° E. throughout the night of August 5th-6th, and at 7.30 a.m., August 6th, altered course so as to sweep towards Cape San Vito, the North-west point of Sicily, at 10 knots.

He knew now that the German ships were at Messina and had to consider their possible movements. In the state of opinion then prevailing, they had three obvious courses before them: to proceed to join the Austrians in the Adriatic, to return to the Algerian coast, or to proceed North and interfere with the French transports near their ports of debarkation. No one seems to have contemplated their proceeding to Constantinople, though it was realised at home that relations with Turkey were severely strained on account of the requisitioning of her two Dreadnoughts (renamed the "Erin" and "Agincourt"). It was known that she was mobilising, that the German Military Mission was taking charge of her army, and that the Dardanelles were being mined; but none of this information appears to have been communicated to Admiral Milne, except the fact of mine-

* (B.)

† App. B. 15.

‡ App. B. 16.

laying which, by itself, merely indicated an intention to bar the passage to all belligerent vessels.

37. During the day of August 6th the Admiral received a certain amount of information as to the French dispositions (*see* para. 31), and at 4.30 p.m. informed the French Admiral that he would turn to the Westward at 6 p.m., August 6th, and, if nothing had been sighted by 7 a.m., August 7th, he would assume that the enemy had gone to the Northward. He also asked for a definite answer as to whether his ships were required on the transport line or not.* The answer to this was not received till 1.15 a.m., August 7th, by which time the situation had altered, and was to the effect that the French could place four cruisers at the disposal of the British Admiral, while their main force was covering the transport of troops.

At 5.40 p.m., August 6th, Admiral Milne decided that, as no news had been received of the "Goeben" and "Breslau" leaving Messina, he would not turn to the Westward at 6 p.m., but would close the Northern entrance of the Strait "and risk the chance of 'Goeben' having already proceeded Northward."†

In accordance with this new decision, the "Chatham" was sent off at 20 knots to patrol off Milazzo Point at the N.E. coast of Sicily, the "Weymouth" was stationed 15 miles ahead of the battle cruisers, and a rendezvous was appointed for 1.30 a.m. in 38° 30' N. 14° 30' E. (near the Lipari Islands).

The "Indomitable" at Bizerta had been delayed over her coaling by the fact that the fuel provided for her consisted of briquettes, but she finally obtained a satisfactory supply of coal by commandeering the cargo of a British steamer, consigned on German account, and under somewhat suspicious circumstances, to Jeddah (Arabia). She left to join the Admiral at 8 p.m., August 6th, but before that time intelligence was received which completely altered the situation.

38. "Goeben's" *Escape*.—The "Goeben" on her first arrival at Messina on August 2nd had been refused coal by the Italian authorities, but had requisitioned whatever was available from German ships. After wiring to Rome, permission had been granted to obtain it from the German firm of Stinnes and from 7 p.m. to 11 p.m. coal had been

supplied by that firm, and the "Goeben" is stated to have had 2,000 tons on board when she stopped coaling and prepared for sea on the night of August 2-3.*

On her return at 4 a.m. on August 5th, after her escape from the "Indomitable" and "Indefatigable," it was absolutely necessary for her to coal, and the Italian authorities had objected to her coaling again, but the Admiral is stated to have argued that this was merely a resumption of his previous coaling. An English collier, the "Wilster" (*sic*), lay in harbour with coal consigned to Stinnes, but the Italian authorities on the protest of the British Consul forbade its direct transference to the German ships of war and the coal had to be taken to Stinnes' wharf and thence in lighters that night to the "Goeben" and "Breslau."

As the Admiral was sitting at table about 5 p.m. on the evening of August 5th, an Italian officer was announced, who requested to be informed how long the German ships intended to remain, as they could only stay 24 hours in a neutral harbour. Admiral Souchon replied he would remain 24 hours, counting it, of course, from the time at which this announcement was made. His plans were made that night. He apparently believed that the French and British were concentrating to the North and South, and that the British fleet was off the Straits of Otranto. He was not sanguine as to his chances of escape, but issued orders for the "Goeben" to leave at 5 p.m., August 6th, at 17 knots; the "Breslau" following, 5 miles astern. His auxiliary, the "General," was to sail two hours later and, keeping along the Sicilian coast, make for Santorini, an island in the South of the Grecian Archipelago.

It was the Admiral's intention to steer a false course till nightfall, so as to give the impression of making for the Adriatic, and then alter course for Cape Matapan.

Von Souchon's decision to proceed to the Ægean was apparently made on his own initiative. The Kaiser had sent him a telegram to say that "His Majesty is convinced that the ship will successfully fight her way through," and as the Austrian Admiral had been asked to go to meet him, Pola was apparently the destination assumed by the Admiralty Staff at Berlin.

* Emil Ludwig, 25, 28. Ludwig must not be regarded as an absolutely trustworthy source.

* App. B. 22.

† (A.)

39. At 6.10 p.m., August 6th, the "Gloucester," then off Taormina, in Sicily, reported that the "Goeben" was leaving the Straits of Messina for the Eastward, and, later, that she was followed by the "Breslau." Captain Howard Kelly proceeded to follow and keep touch. He considered it his first duty as a look-out cruiser to report the movements of the enemy's capital ship and, therefore, did not attempt to bring the "Breslau" to action, though she was at one time within range.

The enemy proceeded along the coast of Italy in the direction of the Adriatic until about 9.50 p.m., when the "Breslau" altered course to E.S.E., followed by the "Goeben" at 10.45 p.m.,* and at 11.50 p.m. the enemy's course was reported as being S. 54° E., steaming straight for Cape Matapan at 22 knots.


40. *The "Dublin's" Attempt to Attack.*—Meanwhile, at 2 p.m., August 6th, the "Dublin," with the destroyers "Beagle" and "Bulldog" had left Malta to join the Rear-Admiral. She received the "Gloucester's" message announcing the escape of the "Goeben," and about 8 p.m. the C.-in-C. ordered her to sink the "Goeben" during the night, if possible.

At 9 p.m. the "Dublin" reported that should the "Goeben" continue on her course towards the Adriatic and not exceed a speed of 18 knots, she would be in her vicinity about half-an-hour after daylight. Some slight confusion was caused by a signal from the Rear-Admiral ordering the "Dublin" to proceed towards Zante, but this was annulled by the C.-in-C.'s signal at 8 p.m., and she was ordered to shadow the "Goeben" at daylight, if nothing could be done during the dark hours.

The "Goeben's" alteration of course to the South-eastward placed the "Dublin" with her destroyers in a much more favourable position, and Captain John Kelly reported that he expected to meet the enemy about 1 a.m.† The exact details of what followed are difficult to reconstruct, owing to the difficulty of being certain

* According to Ludwig the "Goeben" started to jam the "Gloucester's" wireless on altering course, and succeeded in doing so for two hours. This is incorrect. The "Gloucester" made the signal at 2146, that is, 10.46 p.m., local time, and it was received at 11.08 local (*i.e.*, Central European) time. See App. C. 3.

† App. B. 28.




GOEBEN AND BRESLAU OPERATIONS

SITUATION 6.20 P. M. AUGUST 6th 1914.

GOEBEN AND BRESLAU leave MESSINA.

Positions are Approximate.



of the exact positions of ships which had been proceeding at full speed for some time.

At 1 a.m., August 7th, the "Dublin" sighted a vessel on her port bow, apparently the "Breslau," and turned to attack her, but had not sufficient speed. Captain Kelly reported sighting the track of a torpedo during this movement. The "Dublin" endeavoured to chase but was outdistanced, and, reckoning that he must now be well ahead of the "Goeben," Captain Kelly altered course to the Northwards, so as to bring the enemy between him and the moon, and then turned back to a North-westerly course. About 3.30 a.m. smoke was sighted to the Southward a considerable distance off, but it was impossible to distinguish whether it was from the "Goeben" or "Gloucester," and at 3.45 a.m. Captain Kelly altered course for Fano Island in accordance with the Rear-Admiral's orders.

41. *The Rear-Admiral's Movements—August 6th and 7th.*—The Rear-Admiral was patrolling off Cephalonia when, at 6.25 p.m. on August 6th, he heard that the "Goeben" had left Messina and was steering towards the Adriatic. He at once altered course to the Northward, intending to arrive off Fano Island about daylight so that he could engage the enemy in narrow waters, and despatched an order to the destroyers to be under weigh in Vasilico Bay, Santa Maura, by midnight.* This signal was passed in the transposed alphabet code, which was believed to be known to the Germans, and so, when the news of the "Breslau's" parting company to the South-eastward was received, the Rear-Admiral's first idea was that the enemy had intercepted the signal and that the "Breslau" had been detached to attack the destroyers.

When the "Goeben's" alteration of course to the Southward was reported at 11 p.m., the Rear-Admiral at first considered it a feint, as he was convinced they were going to the Adriatic and "could not conceive of any mission they could have in the Eastern Mediterranean."† At midnight, however, he realised that the original North-easterly course had been the false one, and altered to the Southward in the hope of cutting her off. Speed was increased to 21 knots by signal, but from the logged positions it does not appear that this was attained, and the Rear-Admiral in his subsequent

* App. B. 23.

† (E.)

report stated that the speed of his force as a squadron could only be considered as 18 knots.*

At 3.5 a.m. he made a signal to his squadron, stating that he was endeavouring to cross the enemy's bows by 6 a.m. and intended to engage them, if possible; but, if unable to cut them off, he might retire behind Zante to avoid a long range action. It appears from the positions afterwards reported that, going 18 knots, he might have intercepted them between 5 a.m. and 6 a.m., but this would have entailed an alteration of course of some 5 points to the Westward at 3 a.m.

At 3.47 a.m., "finding that he could not come across her till 6 a.m., two hours after daylight, and as he had already decided that that was a condition under which it was not in his power to bring her to action," he altered course to the Eastward, picked up the destroyers, and at 9.30 a.m. anchored in the Southern bay of Zante and coaled them from his ships.

42. *The C.-in-C.'s Movements after Escape of "Goeben."*—Meanwhile, the C.-in-C., off the North-western coast of Sicily, had hardly decided to proceed along the coast of Sicily to the Northern entrance to Messina Straits when he received news that the "Goeben" had escaped to the Southward. He may have considered that Rear-Admiral Troubridge was strong enough to bar the Adriatic, and that there was a possibility of the "Goeben" breaking back to the Westward, for he returned at moderate speed to Malta, picking up the "Indomitable" from Bizerta on the way, and detached the "Chatham" at 1.30 a.m., August 7th, to patrol off Milazzo Point, in the North-east of Sicily, as it was believed that German merchant ships in Naples might attempt to leave the port armed. The remainder of the force arrived at Malta noon, August 7th, and the "Inflexible" and "Indefatigable" coaled, the former receiving 900 tons and the latter 1,450 tons.

43. *The "Gloucester" and "Goeben."*—The "Gloucester" meanwhile maintained touch with the enemy all through the night of August 6th, and on the forenoon of August 7th, in accordance with orders received from the C.-in-C., gradually dropped astern to avoid risk of capture. The "Breslau" also dropped

* According to "Gloucester's" previously reported positions the "Goeben" was then going 21 knots.

astern of the "Goeben" and at 1.30 p.m. the "Gloucester" engaged her at 11,500 yards, the "Breslau" returning the fire without result, and, finally, the "Goeben" turned to support her. This caused the "Gloucester" to break off the action, but she still kept the enemy in sight till, at 5 p.m. on August 7th, they passed through the Cervi Channel. As Captain William Kelly had received orders not to chase beyond Cape Matapan, he then altered course to join the Rear-Admiral.

44. At 12.30 a.m., August 8th, the C.-in-C. left Malta with the "Inflexible," "Indefatigable," "Indomitable" and "Weymouth," to follow the enemy to the Ægean. Steaming at an average speed of about 15 knots at 2.30 p.m. he had reached a position a little over half way to Cape Matapan, when he received a signal sent from the Admiralty by mistake to commence hostilities against Austria. This had been sent at noon, G.M.T., and, though it was cancelled an hour and three-quarters later at 1.45 p.m., it had a large influence on operations in the Mediterranean, for the C.-in-C. decided not to follow the "Goeben" into the Ægean, and at 2.30 p.m. (local) altered course to N. 17° E., at the same time ordering the First Cruiser Squadron, "Gloucester," "Wolverine" and First and Second Destroyer Divisions to rejoin him, giving them his position and course,* evidently with the intention of concentrating his force in view of impending hostilities. The cancellation of the hostilities signal was followed by another signal, despatched by the Admiralty at 1610 G.M.T., stating the situation with Austria was critical and, apparently in view of this, the C.-in-C. continued his concentrating movement.†

45. The junction, however, was not to take place. The "Gloucester" signalled that the Second Division Destroyers had only from 24 to 40 tons of coal and could not leave without coaling, and in view of this the C.-in-C. at 4.22 p.m. (local) cancelled his previous

* Position at 1330 G.M.T., 36° 16' N., 18° 42' E., N. 16°, E., 16° knots.

† From "Inflexible's" log, courses (standard compass):—August 8th, 2.30 p.m. to 9 p.m., N. 18½° E. (dev. 1½° W.), 61·6'; 9 p.m. to midnight, S. 16° W. (dev. 1 E.), 16·6'; August 9th, midnight to 6 a.m., N. 59½° E. (dev. ½° W.), 67·5'; 6 a.m. to 10.35 a.m., N. 11° W. (dev. 1 W.), 34·3'; 10.35 a.m. to 12.30, S. 13° E. (dev. 1 E.); noon position, August 9th, Lat. 37° 49' N., Long. 19° 49' E.

signal,* and ordered the First Cruiser Squadron, "Gloucester" and destroyers to stay where they were and the "Dublin" to watch the mouth of the Adriatic. At 4.41 p.m. (local) a signal was sent to the R.A., telling him to proceed with the First Cruiser Squadron off Cape Dukato (the Southern point of Santa Maura Islands) and await further orders. The C.-in-C. was meanwhile coming up, and at 8.14 p.m. (local) further orders were sent to the First Cruiser Squadron to proceed to Malta without delay with destroyers, towing as requisite, and that the C.-in-C. would try and get North of him on Sunday, 9th. The Rear-Admiral began to arrange for assembling and taking the destroyers in tow at Zante at 0300 (G.M.T.), August 9th, but it was ultimately arranged that the First Cruiser Squadron should give them sufficient coal to take them down; some of them had already received about 25 tons in this way on the 7th. They required from 40 to 50 tons to reach Malta and came alongside the various ships of the First Cruiser Squadron at Zante and finished coaling by 9.30 a.m. (local) on the 9th.† Their collier had apparently been expected at noon, August 8th, off Zaverda Bay (on the mainland, abreast of Santa Maura Island), but had gone to Port Vathi, Ithaca.‡

46. On the completion of the coaling being reported to the C.-in-C., he ordered them, at 9.30 a.m., G.M.T., on the 9th, to proceed under easy steam to Port Vathi, and the First Cruiser Squadron to remain within 10 miles West of Vardiani Light (South-east corner of Cephalonia) and await orders. The Rear-Admiral was then, with the First Cruiser Squadron and T.B.D.'s in company, in lat. 37° 39' N., long. 20° 55' E., off Cape Marathia, the Southern point of Zante, on a course S. 34° E., 10 knots. Just about this time, at 11.15 a.m., August 9th, the "Weymouth" found the missing collier, the "Vesuvio," at Port Vathi, Ithaca, where she had been lying since 2 p.m. the day before, and the C.-in-C. ordered the

* App. B. 37, 38.

† "Scorpion," "Wolverine," "Basilisk," "Raccoon," "Renard," "Beagle," "Scourge," "Mosquito," "Foxhound." "Defence's" W/T Log, August 9th.

‡ There are three small ports of this name in this area: Port Vathi in Prevesa Gulf, in the Gulf of Arta; Port Vathi on the East coast of Ithaca, in the Gulf of Molo; also Port Vathi Vali on the West side of Zaverda Bay, on the mainland inside Santa Maura. See *Medit. Pilot*, Vol. III.

destroyers to proceed there at once and fill up. The C.-in-C. by this time had reached a position about 45 miles to the Westward of the North point of Zante, steering S. 12° E. (mag.) with the "Inflexible," "Indomitable" and "Indefatigable." At 12.30 p.m. (local) he altered course to S. 48° E. and signalled his position* to the Admiralty. This news was evidently unexpected, for a reply was sent him at 12.50 p.m. G.M.T., "Not at war with Austria; continue chase of Goeben." Leaving Admiral Troubridge to watch the Adriatic, he proceeded with the three battle cruisers and "Weymouth" towards Cape Matapan. Steaming at about 12 knots he passed Cape Matapan at 1.23 a.m., August 10th, and at 5.18 a.m. sighted Belo Pulo Light, 235 miles from the Dardanelles, about half-an-hour before the "Goeben," 120 miles to the Eastward, got under way from Denusa. It was too late to overtake her.

47. *German Movements.*—Soon after the "Gloucester" had abandoned the pursuit off Cape Matapan at 4 p.m. on August 7th, Admiral Souchon received a message informing him that entry to the Dardanelles was not possible for the present. He signalled to the "General" to proceed to Smyrna, instead of Santorin, to act as a wireless link with Constantinople, and, having met the collier waiting for him off Cape Matapan, cruised slowly during the 8th, detaching the "Breslau" in the evening to take the collier to Denusa, a small, sparsely inhabited island 10 miles West of Naxos, without a cable, wireless, military, or police, where he had decided to coal. There he coaled from 5 p.m. on the 9th till 5 a.m. on the 10th.† The "General" meanwhile had arrived at Smyrna on the 9th, informing the authorities that she had come to take in coal. On receipt of a signal from the "Admiralstab," possibly passed by her, the Admiral determined to make for the Dardanelles, 185 miles off, and immediately he had finished coaling put to sea at 5.45 a.m. on the 10th and shaped course for Mytelene and the Dardanelles. All that day he heard the wireless of Admiral Milne's ships, searching in the area South of the Gulf of Athens, and, proceeding at about 15 knots,

* "Inflexible's" log, 12.30 p.m. (*i.e.*, local): "Altered course S. 48° E., increased to 108 revs." The C.-in-C. sent his position at this time to the Admiralty, 11.30 G.M.T., Lat. 37° 45' N., Long. 19° 51' E., course, S. 48° E., 10 knots.

† Ludwig, 67.

he arrived off Cape Helles at 5 p.m. He approached the entrance and signalled for a pilot. A pilot boat appeared and replied "Follow me." It was seventeen minutes past five when he passed into the Dardanelles.*

48. After entering the Ægean on the night of the 9th-10th August, Admiral Milne cruised in the area South of the Gulf of Athens on the 10th, using the "Weymouth" to search outlying harbours. The battle cruisers were disposed at first on the line Zea-Thermia-Serpho, three islands running South-east from the Gulf of Athens. The "Inflexible" off Cape Dimitri, the South point of Thermia Island, the "Indomitable" off Cape Tamelos (Zea), the "Indefatigable" off Cyclops Head (Serpho), while the "Weymouth" was despatched to examine Milo, then proceed through Siphano Channel (between Serpho and Siphano) to Syra. These orders were issued at 9 a.m. (local time) on the 10th, and the Flagship remained in this vicinity during the day.† At 11.30 a.m., it was thought that the "Goeben" was "somewhere near," and the "Weymouth" was ordered to close with dispatch. At 5.20 p.m. she was told to look into San Gengio (about 15 miles South of C. Colonna), then go to Syra, then go slowly through the Mykoni Channel (between Mykoni and Tinos) and wait off the Northern entrance till further orders.

During the night of the 10th-11th the C.-in-C. moved to the Eastward and at 4 a.m. on August 11th was off C. Korax, the North point of Paros, and took up a position between Mykoni and Nykaria, an island lying about 10 miles West of Samos. The "Weymouth" was sent West to Khios to examine the Gulf of Smyrna, and the "Chatham," which was approaching on its way from Malta, was ordered to go through the Straits of Samos.

At noon, August 11th, the Flagship was in 37° 51' N., 25° 42' E., 20 miles North of the Mykoni-Nikaria gap, about 40 miles North of Denusa on the direct line to the Dardanelles, when news arrived that the "Goeben" and "Breslau" had entered the Dardanelles at 8.30 p.m. the evening before. Admiral Milne proceeded thither and in the course of the afternoon received orders to blockade the exit.

* According to Von Pohl, a signal was sent on the 10th from Nauen (and acknowledged) "Proceed Constantinople immediately," but the exact time of receipt is not mentioned.—M.I.R., April.

† Noon position, August 10th, 36° 59' N., 23° 53' E.; at 3.17 p.m., local, 36° 43' N., 23° 24' E. "Inflexible's" log.

OPERATIONS AGAINST "GOEBEN" AND
"BRESLAU."

APPENDIX A.

COPIES OF ADMIRALTY TELEGRAMS.

- | | | |
|------|---|---------------------------------------|
| No | | |
| 1. | <i>From</i> Admiralty. | August 3rd, 1914.
Sent, 6.30 p.m. |
| | <i>To</i> C.-in-C., Mediterranean. | Received, 8.30 p.m. |
| 208. | The two battle cruisers must proceed to Straits of Gibraltar at high speed, ready to prevent "Goeben" leaving Mediterranean. | |
| 2. | <i>From</i> C.-in-C., Mediterranean. | August 4th, 1914. |
| | <i>To</i> Admiralty. | Received, 10.58 a.m. |
| | "Indomitable" and "Indefatigable" sighted "Goeben" and "Breslau" off Bona, 10 a.m. They are shadowed. "Dublin" ordered to assist. (10.18.) | |
| 3. | <i>Most Urgent.</i> | |
| | <i>From</i> Admiralty. | |
| | <i>To</i> Foreign Office. | |
| | German battle cruiser "Goeben" and fast light cruiser "Breslau" have been found West of Sicily and are being shadowed by British battle cruisers "Indomitable" and "Indefatigable." It would be a great misfortune to lose these vessels, as is possible in the dark hours. They are evidently going to interfere with the French transports, who are crossing to-day. The following telegram has already been sent: "Good—hold her—war imminent." We wish to add this:—
"If 'Goeben' attacks French transports you should at once engage her." An immediate decision is required. | |
| 4. | <i>From</i> Admiralty. | August 4th, 1914.
Sent, 11.20 a.m. |
| | <i>To</i> C.-in-C., Mediterranean; "Indomitable" and "Indefatigable." | |
| 213. | Your message 1,000. Very good—hold her—war imminent. | |
| 5. | <i>From</i> Admiralty. | August 4th, 1914.
Sent, 12.10 p.m. |
| | <i>To</i> A.S., Malta. | Received, 5.2 p.m.
by C.-in-C. |
| 239. | Transmit following to C.-in-C., Mediterranean. | |
| 214. | If "Goeben" attacks French transports, you should at once engage her. You should give her fair warning of this beforehand. | |

- No. 6. *From Admiralty.* August 4th, 1914.
Sent, 12.55 p.m.
To C.-in-C., Mediterranean.
215. The Italian Government have declared neutrality. You are to respect this neutrality rigidly and should not allow any of (*see B 10*) H.M. ships to come within 6 miles of the Italian coast.
7. *From C.-in-C., Mediterranean.* August 4th, 1914.
To Admiralty. Received, 2.50 p.m.
396. I p.m. "Goeben" and "Breslau" steering East, 15 knots, followed by "Indomitable," "Indefatigable" at 5 miles. Weather hazy. "Breslau" disappearing Northwards. (1329.)
8. *From C.-in-C., Mediterranean.* August 4th, 1914.
Sent, 2.49 p.m.
To Admiralty. Received, 3.10 p.m.
397. In view of impossibility of coaling eight destroyers watching Adriatic, have ordered them to Malta. First Cruiser Squadron and "Gloucester" remain to watch. (1336.)
9. *From C.-in-C., Mediterranean.* August 4th, 1914.
To Admiralty. Received, 7.58 p.m.
398. "Indomitable" and "Indefatigable" lost sight of "Goeben" and "Breslau" in 38° N., 10° 16' E., at 5 p.m., steering Eastward, outclassed in speed. "Dublin" may, possibly, keep in touch. "Indomitable" and "Indefatigable" steering slow speed to the Westward in case of "Goeben" and "Breslau" returning towards Palma (Majorca), where they have colliers. Urgent. (1814.)
10. *From C.-in-C., Mediterranean.* August 4th, 1914.
To Admiralty.
393. In view of impossibility of ensuring coal supply, I am retaining Third Division of destroyers at Malta. First and Second Divisions will watch Adriatic as previously arranged.
11. *From C.-in-C., Mediterranean.* August 4th, 1914.
Sent, 9.46 p.m.
To Admiralty. Received —
399. In view of Admiralty telegram 216.
"Inflexible," "Chatham," "Savage,"
"Indomitable," "Weymouth," "Rattlesnake,"
"Indefatigable," "Pincher,"
will concentrate Westward of Sicily.
"Dublin" is still trying to shadow "Goeben," North of Sicily. One vessel of First Cruiser Squadron or "Gloucester" will watch South of Straits of Messina; others, with eight destroyers, mouth of Adriatic. Colliers have been engaged, Malta, for destroyers. Five destroyers remain, Malta, protecting merchant vessels and trying to capture German merchant ships in vicinity.

- No. 12. *From Admiralty.* August 5th, 1914.
Sent, 12.30 p.m.
To C.-in-C., Mediterranean.
222. Austria has not declared war against France or England. Continue watching Adriatic for double purpose of preventing Austrians emerging unobserved and preventing Germans entering.
13. *From Admiralty.* August 6th, 1914.
Sent, 7.45 p.m.
To C.-in-C., Mediterranean.
232. If "Goeben" goes South from Messina, you should follow through the Straits, irrespective of territorial waters.
14. *From C.-in-C., Mediterranean.* August 7th, 1914.
To Admiralty.
404. 5 a.m., August 7th. "Goeben" and "Breslau," 37° 43' N., 19° E., evidently going to Eastern Mediterranean.
First Cruiser Squadron abandoned chase 4 a.m., "Gloucester" followed, but has been ordered to drop astern to avoid capture. "Inflexible," "Indomitable" and "Indefatigable," "Weymouth" will complete with coal at Malta, then commence searching Eastern Mediterranean. "Chatham" will watch North of Straits of Messina for German armed mercantile cruisers. First Cruiser Squadron, "Dublin," 10 destroyers will coal in Ionian Islands.
15. *From C.-in-C., Mediterranean.* August 7th, 1914.
Sent, 2.30 p.m.
To Admiralty.
405. Careful plotting shows speed of "Goeben" 27 knots. "Breslau," 28 knots. Maximum speed available British Battle Cruisers, 24 knots. Cruisers, 21½ knots. Light Cruisers, 25 knots.
"Goeben," "Breslau" avoided action last night and proceeded towards Crete. After coaling at Malta, "Inflexible," "Indomitable," "Indefatigable," one light cruiser will search for "Goeben" again. Watch on Adriatic being maintained as ordered.
16. *From Admiralty.* August 8th, 1914.
To All Ships. 12 noon.
371. Commence hostilities at once against Austria.
(Cancelled at 1.45 p.m.)
17. *From Admiralty.* August 8th.
To All Ships. (1345.)
372. Negative my telegram hostilities against Austria. Acknowledge. Urgent. (1345.)
18. *From Admiralty.* August 8th.
To All Ships. (1610.)
373. With reference to the cancellation of telegram notifying war with Austria, situation is critical. (1610.)

- No. 19. *From C.-in-C. Mediterranean.* August 8th.
To Admiralty. Received, 6.15 p.m.
409. In view of Admiralty telegram 371, I am not following "Goeben" into Aegean Sea.
- No. 20. *From Admiralty.* August 9th.
To C.-in-C., Mediterranean. 12.50 p.m.
- Not at war with Austria. Continue chase of "Goeben," which passed Cape Matapan on 7th, steering North-east.

APPENDIX B.

OPERATIONS SIGNALS EXTRACTED FROM THE LOGS OF VARIOUS SHIPS.

NOTE.—Times of receipt and despatch and all times in text, unless otherwise stated, are ship time. Times of origin (Code times) are always G.M.T.

All Signals were transmitted by W/T, unless marked "Visual."

1. *From C.-in-C.*
To R.A., First Cruiser Squadron.
Send "Gloucester" with destroyers to watch Adriatic, using Ionian Islands as a base. "Defence," "Duke of Edinburgh," "Warrior," "Indomitable," "Indefatigable" to pass South of Sicily and to Westward. Further orders will be sent later, but "Chatham" to go Westward from North end of Straits. (0731.)
2. *From C.-in-C.* August 3rd.
To R.A., First Cruiser Squadron. 2.33 p.m.
First Cruiser Squadron to support destroyers South of Adriatic. "Black Prince" will join, leaving Malta 1900. Battle cruisers shape course to pass within 20 miles N.E. from Valetta and report time of arrival in that position at 14 knots. They will continue course to Westward to search for "Goeben." Further orders will be sent. (1234.)
3. *From C.-in-C.* August 3rd.
To "Indomitable," "Indefatigable," "Chatham." 9 p.m.
"Indomitable" and "Indefatigable" proceed at 22 knots to Gibraltar ready to prevent "Goeben" leaving Mediterranean. "Chatham" rejoin Flag 36° 23' N., 14° 41' E., by 6 a.m., Tuesday, at 20 knots. (1933.)
4. *From C.-in-C.* August 4th.
To A.S., Malta.
Flagship's position, N. 38° E. from Saint Elmo. Send "Hussar" and one destroyer 8' apart between Flag and Saint Elmo. Two destroyers 8 and 16 miles N. 38° E. from Flag. "Weymouth" will be 6 miles S. 38° W. from C. Correnti. Destroyers go out at 15 knots. Outer destroyers bring Flagship's and "Weymouth's" mails and correspondence. (0555.)

- No. 5. *From "Dublin" (at Bizerta).* August 4th.
To C.-in-C. a.m.
Received news from Paris, German collier anchored Palma, Majorca, supposed idea coal two German cruisers. (0930.)
6. *From R.A., First Cruiser Squadron.* August 4th.
To C.-in-C. a.m.
Urgent. In view of your Memo. about Italy, I am making my support position about Latitude of Cephalonia. Submit patrol should move South of Latitude S. Maria di Leuca. I shall do my best to coal destroyers. (1120.)
Approved by C.-in-C.
7. *From C.-in-C.* August 4th.
To R.A., First Cruiser Squadron. p.m.
War imminent. Send destroyers, Malta, as fast as coal permits, keeping well clear of Italian coast. Retain "Gloucester" and watch Adriatic. (1250.)
8. *From Admiral Bizerta (French).* August 4th.
To C.-in-C. via "Dublin." p.m.
"Dublin" arrived. Thanks for sending her and letter. Bizerta W/T Station at your disposal for communication with our main fleet. This morning "Goeben" bombarded Bona and "Breslau" Philippeville. They then steered to N.W. and believe their collier is at Palma, Majorca. French Fleet, consisting all our forces, just left for Algerian coast. (1145.)
9. *From C.-in-C.* August 4th.
To "Indomitable," "Indefatigable," "Dublin." Received, 5.50 p.m.
"Dublin" endeavour to keep touch with "Goeben." "Indomitable" and "Indefatigable" slow speed, steer West. (1740.)
10. *From C.-in-C.* August 4th.
To "General." p.m.
Italian Government has declared neutrality, which is to be rigidly respected. No ship is to approach within 6' of Italian coast. (1805.)
11. *From C.-in-C.* August 4th.
To R.A., First Cruiser Squadron. p.m.
Urgent. Recall destroyers immediately and send them to Sta. Maura, await collier. War will be declared at 1 a.m. (1859.)

- No. 12. *From C.-in-C.* August 4th.
To "General." 9.5 p.m.
- Ultimatum to Germany expires at midnight, G.M.T. Hostilities will commence after that time on receipt of telegram. Flagship will join battle cruisers to the Westward, picking up "Chatham" and "Weymouth" on her way. First Cruiser Squadron and "Gloucester" will remain watching entrance to Adriatic and are not to get seriously engaged with superior force. First and Second Divisions of Destroyers are to return immediately to Greek coast.
- Fourth Division, except "Grampus," will accompany C.-in-C. "Gloucester" or other vessel is to be sent to watch Southern entrance to Straits of Messina. "Goeben" and "Breslau" were 40 miles West of Maritimo at 5 p.m., steering to the Eastward, having been followed at high speed from Bona by "Indomitable" and "Indefatigable."
- At present there is no declaration of war against Austria. (1941.)
- No. 13. *From R.A., First Cruiser Squadron.* August 5th.
To C.-in-C. 2.19 p.m.
- In case "Goeben" is in these waters, I am keeping within 30 miles of Santa Maura. If we encounter her, I shall attempt to draw her into narrow waters, where we can engage her at our range. (1230.)
- No. 14. *From "Gloucester"* August 5th.
To R.A., and C.-in-C. 4.32 p.m.
- Urgent. From strength signals, "Goeben" should be in Straits of Messina. (1522.)
- No. 15. *From R.A., First Cruiser Squadron.* August 5th.
To C.-in-C. 5.40 p.m.
- I am proceeding to endeavour to intercept "Goeben" and instructing destroyers to do the same if they have sufficient coal. (1740.)
- No. 16. *From C.-in-C.* August 5th.
To R.A., First Cruiser Squadron. 7.19 p.m.
- Your 1230. In case she should come out use destroyers for night work. "Dublin" arrives at Malta, Thursday morning, coals, and will leave immediately to join you with two destroyers. Give directions to "Dublin" to-morrow where to join up. (1519.)
- No. 17. *From A.S., Malta.* August 6th.
To R.A., First Cruiser Squadron and C.-in-C. 4.53 a.m.
- "Goeben" and "Breslau" at Messina. (0335.)

- No. 18. *From C.-in-C.* August 6th.
To "Indomitable." 5.35 a.m.
- Request French Admiral to inform British Admiral, through you, exact position of French Fleet to-day, and when first transports with troops leave Algeria. (0435.)
- No. 19. *From "Indomitable."* August 6th.
To C.-in-C. 10 a.m.
- French Admiral reports first transports left Algerian coast and French Fleet will not probably be free until August 10th, as second shipment is necessary. (0852.)
- No. 20. *From French Fleet.* August 6th.
To British Fleet. 1.13 p.m.
- Four Ironclads, three Armoured Cruisers, French Fleet, quitted Philippeville 8 a.m. for Ajaccio, where they arrive Friday afternoon (7th).
- No. 21. *From "Indomitable."* August 6th.
To C.-in-C. 2.15 p.m.
- Your 0435 of 6th. Last position of French Fleet known here:—
- | | | |
|-----------------------|-----|--|
| Wednesday 5th, 3 p.m. | - - | "Courbet" at Algiers. |
| 6 p.m. | - - | Second Squadron left Algiers conveying seven transports. |
| Thursday 6th, 8 a.m. | - - | Squadron of eight cruisers left C. de Fer for Philippeville. French information from Rome, Wednesday night, "Goeben" and "Breslau" at Messina. |
- 16 Austrian ships at Pola. (12227.)
- No. 22. *From C.-in-C.* August 6th.
To "Indomitable." 4.33 p.m.
- Inform French Admiral I have swept Eastward to Cape San Vito* turning to Westward at 6 p.m. If German ships have sailed and are not sighted by 7 a.m., Friday, assume they have gone to the Northward, either through Bonifacio or round C. Corso. I am ready to come with two battle cruisers and one light cruiser to assist on transport line, if you wish. Please reply quickly.
- No. 23. *From R.A., First Cruiser Squadron.* August 6th.
To "Wolverine" via "Black Prince." 6.56 p.m.
- "Goeben" left Messina 6 p.m., steering E., probably "Breslau" also. Be under way concealed in Vasilico Bay by midnight with steam for full speed. (1740.)

* North-west point of Sicily.

- No. 24. *From* R.A., First Cruiser Squadron. August 6th.
To "Dublin." 8.20 p.m.
If you can be at Zante Channel by 4 a.m., proceed there with destroyers at full speed. (1845.)
25. *From* R.A., First Cruiser Squadron. August 6th.
To "Dublin." 10.12 p.m.
If you cannot attempt anything on "Goeben" during dark hours, shadow him at daylight, reporting position and course. I shall be off Fano Island at 4 a.m. (2055.)
26. *From* R.A., First Cruiser Squadron. August 6th.
To First Cruiser Squadron (Visual). 10.53 p.m.
It would appear that "Goeben" and, possibly, "Breslau" are making for the Adriatic. Unless further information is received, propose to arrive off Fano Island at daylight. I do not propose to engage him in the middle of the Straits, my instructions being against it. If "Goeben" wishes to fight, I shall endeavour to make use of short (? shoal) waters of Fano Island to choose my own range. (2125.)
27. *From* R.A., First Cruiser Squadron. August 6th.
To "Wolverine" *via* "Black Prince." 11.5 p.m.
"Gloucester" reports at 8.30 p.m. "Goeben" and "Breslau" in 37° 50' N., 16° 17' E., Co. N. 63° E., 18 knots. "Breslau" parted company, destination unknown. As your base is probably known, it is likely she will be in your vicinity at daylight. My original intention was to combine with you at daylight, but I am going North instead. Owing to transposed alphabet having been used to code my message (1740), it is probable that the enemy understand it. Do your best. (2120.)
28. *From* "Dublin." August 7th.
To R.A., First Cruiser Squadron. 12.30 a.m.
Expect to meet both enemy cruisers about 1 a.m. (2320.)
29. *From* "Dublin." August 7th.
To R.A., First Cruiser Squadron. 2.16 a.m.
My position 2 a.m., 37° 48' N., 18° 19' E. "Goeben" right ahead, S. 55° E., 27 knots. (0100.)
30. *From* R.A., First Cruiser Squadron. August 7th.
To "Dublin," "Gloucester." 2.54 a.m.
First Cruiser Squadron, 2.30 a.m., 38° 25' N., 20° E., C.S., 20 knots. Am endeavouring to cross "Goeben's" bows at 6 a.m. (0140.)

- No. 31. *From* R.A., First Cruiser Squadron. August 7th.
To First Cruiser Squadron (Visual). 3.10 a.m.
I am endeavouring to cross the bows of "Goeben" by 6 a.m. and intend to engage her, if possible. Be prepared to form on a line of bearing, turning into line ahead as required. If we have not cut him off, I may retire behind Zante to avoid a long range action. (0205.)
32. *From* R.A., First Cruiser Squadron. August 7th.
To "Dublin" and "Gloucester." 4.5 a.m.
Am obliged to give up the chase. (0255.)
33. *From* "Dublin." August 7th.
To R.A., First Cruiser Squadron. 4.28 a.m.
Position, 0400, 38° 03' N., 18° 33' E., N. 27° E., 24 knots. Chased "Breslau" S. 55° E. for 1½ hours, then turned to attack "Goeben," but failed to find her. (0310.)
34. *From* R.A., First Cruiser Squadron. August 7th.
To C.-in-C. 4.49 a.m.
Being only able to meet "Goeben" outside the range of our guns and inside his, I have abandoned the chase with my squadron. Request instructions for light cruisers. "Goeben" evidently going to Eastern Mediterranean. I had hoped to have met her before daylight. (0305.)
35. *From* C.-in-C. August 8th.
To R.A., First Cruiser Squadron, Received, 3 p.m.
"Gloucester" and "Wolverine."
"Gloucester," First and Second Division Destroyers, "Beagle," "Bulldog," rejoin C.-in-C., passing South of Cephalonia. Leave collier, Ithaca. My position (1330), G.M.T., 36° 16' N., 18° 42' E., N. 16° E., 16 knots. (1354.)
36. *From* C.-in-C. August 8th.
To R.A., Cruiser Squadron. 2.58 p.m.
Urgent. First Cruiser Squadron and "Gloucester" rejoin C.-in-C. My position (1330), (G.M.T.), 36° 16' N., 18° 42' E., N. 16° E., 16 knots.
37. *From* "Gloucester." August 8th.
To C.-in-C. Received, 4.16 p.m.
Urgent. Second Division Destroyers in company with me have from 24-40 tons of coal. They cannot leave here without coaling. (1458.)
38. *From* C.-in-C. August 8th.
To R.A., First Cruiser Squadron, Received, 4.45 p.m.
"Gloucester."
Cancel previous orders to R.A., "Gloucester" and destroyers. Stop where you are "Dublin" watch mouth of Adriatic. (1522.)

- No. 39. *From C.-in-C.* August 8th.
To R.A. Received, 4.52 p.m.
First Cruiser Squadron proceed off Cape Dukato* and await further orders. Look out for collier "Vesuvio." (1541.)
40. *From "Gloucester."* August 8th.
To C.-in-C., R.A. Received, 5.4 p.m.
"Gloucester" and Second Division Destroyers returning to Zaverda Bay.†
41. *From C.-in-C.* August 8th.
To R.A. Received, 8.20 p.m.
First Cruiser Squadron proceed Malta without delay with destroyer towing as requisite. Continue giving me your positions and I will get North of you to-morrow, Sunday. (1914.)
42. *From R.A.* August 8th.
To C.-in-C. Received, 10 p.m.
I am trying to order destroyers to assemble at 0300, G.M.T. (9th) at Zante, where I will take in tow. (2031.)
43. *From R.A.,* August 9th.
To C.-in-C. Received, 8.19 a.m.
At 8 a.m. all destroyers will have 70 tons of coal, except "Beagle." Cruisers, all over 1,200 tons. (0645.)
44. *From C.-in-C.* August 9th.
To R.A. Received, 11.8 a.m.
Your 0836.‡ Send destroyers under easy steam to anchor at Port Vathi or near neighbourhood. Tell Captain (D) keep a good look-out for colliers and coal immediately any arrive, constantly altering his base. After searching for collier, "Weymouth" is to remain near destroyers for the present. First Cruiser Squadron remain within 10 miles West of Vardiani Island,§ Cephalonia, till further orders. (0929.)
45. *From "Weymouth."* August 9th.
To C.-in-C. Received, 11.24 a.m.
Collier "Vesuvio" anchored in Port Vathi. (1015.)
46. *From C.-in-C.* August 9th.
To R.A. Received, 11.45 a.m.
Send destroyer at once to Port Vathi, Ithaca, to coal. (1033.)
At 12.50, G.M.T., the C.-in-C. was ordered to continue to *Ægean*.

* South point, Cephalonia.

† Mainland, inside Santa Maura Island.

‡ Reporting all destroyers complete with sufficient coal, return, Malta, at 15 knots.

§ S.E. point, Cephalonia.

APPENDIX C.

SUMMARY OF SIGNALS REPORTING TOUCH WITH AND POSITION OF
"GOEBEN" AND "BRESLAU" ON AUGUST 4TH AND
AUGUST 6TH-7TH.

1. Signals from "Indomitable," August 4th.

Time of acknowledgment.	From "Indomitable."* August 4th.
10.46 a.m.	<i>To C.-in-C., "Inflexible."</i> Enemy in sight, 37° 44' N., 7° 56' E., consisting of "Goeben" and "Breslau" (steering E.)† (0940.)
11.44 a.m.	"Goeben," 37° 36' N., 8° 06' E.; Course, N., 20 knots. (1015.)
11.54 a.m.	"Goeben," 37° 42' N., 8° 16' E.; Course, N., 22 knots. (1034.)
12.16 p.m.	"Goeben," 37° 40' N., 8° 12' E.; Course, E., Bearing, E., 10,000 yards; hazy. (1110.)
!	"Breslau" disappeared to N. at 11.30 a.m.‡ Am keeping "Indefatigable" with me. (1120.)
1.15 p.m.	My position, 1 p.m., 38° 0' N., 8° 30' E.; Co., E. by N., 15 knots. "Goeben," 10,000 yards ahead. "Breslau" out of sight. (1215.)
2.15 p.m.	My position, 1 p.m., 37° 46' N., 8° 45' E.; Co., N. 85° E., 17 knots. (1400.)
2.45 p.m.	"Breslau" has rejoined "Goeben." (1335.)

2. Signals from "Dublin," August 4th.

Time of acknowledgment.	From "Dublin."§ August 4th.
2.54 p.m.	<i>To "Indomitable" and C.-in-C.</i> My position, 37° 57' N., 9° 21' E. "Goeben" and "Breslau" steering East. (1343.)
3.34 p.m.	Enemy, 38° N., 9° 40' E., 26 knots.
5.26 p.m.	Cruisers have separated. "Goeben" to the N.W. (<i>sic</i>) apparently. "Breslau" to the S.E. (1620). Repeated at 6.08 p.m.
5.56 p.m.	I am about 15' on starboard bow of "Indomitable." "Breslau," E.S.E., about 15' on port bow of "Dublin." (1645.)
5.58 p.m.	My position at 4.15 p.m. was 38° 01' N., 10° 23' E. "Goeben," about 15' from me and is now apparently steering E.N.E. (1650.)
6.08 p.m.	Cruisers have separated. "Goeben" to the N. apparently. "Breslau" to the S.E. (1620). Repetition of signal at 5.26 p.m.
6.17 p.m.	My position, 38° 07', 10° 45' E. "Goeben," N. 47° E., steering E. by S. "Breslau," N. 88° E., steering E. by S. (1719.)

* "Indomitable's" W/T log.

† "Inflexible's" log omits "steering East."

‡ Logged by "Inflexible" as 1118.

§ From "Inflexible's" W/T log.

Time of acknowledgment.	
7.25 p.m.	Position of "Goeben," 38° 21' N., 11° 17' E., at 6 p.m., steering N. 85° E. Speed between 24 and 27 knots. (1800.)
7.37 p.m.	"Goeben" out of sight. Can only see smoke. Still daylight. (1820.)
10.24 p.m.	Have lost touch with "Goeben." Am rejoining "Indomitable." (2055.)

3. Signals from "Gloucester," August 6th.

From "Gloucester."* August 6th.
To C.-in-C. and R.A.,

	First Cruiser Squadron.
6.13 p.m.	Position, 37° 56' N., 15° 30' E. "Goeben" steering East.† (1710.)
7.8 p.m.	"Breslau" one mile astern of "Goeben" (?)
7.4 p.m.	"Goeben" will round C. Spartivento at 1820, G.M.T. (1740.)
7.42 p.m.	Enemy is steaming at 26 knots. (1828.)
7.51 p.m.	Enemy, 18 knots, S. 85° E., 37° 51' N., 16° 0' E. (1830.)
8.19 p.m.	Present course of enemy is N. 50° E. (1906.)
8.33 p.m.	"Goeben" and "Breslau," 37° 56' N., 16° 17' E.; Course, N. 63° E.; 18 knots. (1930.)
9.08 p.m.	"Breslau" parted company from "Goeben," "Goeben" continuing course. (2006.)
10.19 p.m.	Position of "Goeben," 9.50 p.m., 38° 15' N., 16° 37' E., N. 65° E., 26 knots. (2100.) Position of "Breslau," 9.50 p.m., 38° 15' N., 16° 34' E., E.S.E., 20 knots. (2109.)
11.08 p.m.	"Goeben" is altering course to the Southward. (2146.)
11.36 p.m.	Position, "Goeben," (2300), 38° 29' N., 17° 06' E., S. 73° E., 22 knots. (2211.)
?	Have lost touch with "Breslau," 11.15 p.m., who has gone E.S.E., 24 knots. I am following "Goeben." (2221.)
11.58 p.m.	Position of "Goeben," 38° 20' N., 17° 21' E., S. 54° E., 22 knots. (2250.)
	August 7th.
12.37 a.m.	Position of "Goeben," midnight, 38° 20' N., 17° 31' E., S. 54° E., 22 knots. (2304.)
2.7 a.m.	Position of "Goeben," 2 a.m., 38° 04' N., 18° 08' E., S. 54° E., 17 knots. (0104.)
3 a.m.	"Dublin" seems to be chasing "Breslau," who is rejoining "Goeben." (?)

* W/T logs, "Inflexible" and "Defence."

† "Steering East," not logged in "Defence."

Time of acknowledgment.	
3.22 a.m.	Position of "Goeben," 3 a.m. 37° 55' N., 18° 28' E., S. 55° E., 17 knots. (0216.)
4.56 a.m.	My position, course and speed, at 5 a.m., 37° 42' N., 19° 0' E., S. 55° E., 16 knots. (0356.)
8.53 a.m.	8 a.m., position, "Goeben," 37° 17' N., 20° 0' E., Co. S. 55° E., 18 knots. "Gloucester," 15 miles astern. (?)
12.15 p.m.	Noon position of "Goeben" is 36° 36' N., 21° 35' E. "Breslau," 36° 42' N., 21° 23' E., Co. S. 55° E., 20 knots. "Gloucester," 20' astern of "Goeben" and 10 miles astern of "Breslau." (1200.)
4.45 p.m.	(1600). Enemy ships in Cervi Channel, steering E., 15 knots. I am off C. Matapan and returning, N. 55° W., 15 knots. (1542.)

