

Chirograph

LIMITS OF NAVAL STATIONS.

CIRCULAR LETTER.

No. 15.

M. 12159.

ADMIRALTY, S.W.,

14 April, 1913.

WITH reference to Circular Letter M. 01141 of the 26th November 1903, defining the boundaries of the Australia, China, Cape of Good Hope, and East Indies Stations, My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have decided to re-arrange the limits of the East Indies and China Stations so as to include Singapore, the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, &c. within the former command.

The new Australian Station allocated to the Royal Australian Navy is that arranged at the Imperial Conference of 1911.

A small alteration is made in the dividing line between the Cape and East Indies Stations which does not affect any territory.

The China Station extends to the North-Eastern limit of the East Indies Station and the Northern limit of the Australian Station. Its Eastern and South-Eastern limits are not defined.

A memorandum and a plan indicating the revised boundaries are attached for information and guidance.

The alterations are to take effect as from the 1st July next.

By Command of Their Lordships,

W. Graham Greene

*To all Commanders-in-Chief,
Captains, Commanders, and
Commanding Officers of
H.M. Ships and Vessels at
Home and Abroad.*

THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE STATION is bounded—

North.—In the Indian Ocean, by the Equator between the coast of Africa and the meridian of 70° east longitude and by the parallel of 13° south latitude between the meridians of 70° and 95° east longitude.

In the Atlantic, by the parallel of the Cunene river, about 17° 15' south latitude between the coast of Africa and the meridian of Greenwich, and by the parallel of 15° south latitude between the meridians of Greenwich and of 15° west longitude.

East.—By the meridian of 70° east longitude between the Equator and the parallel of 13° south latitude and by the meridian of 95° east longitude.

South.—By the Antarctic Circle.

West.—By the meridian of 15° west longitude.

THE EAST INDIES STATION is bounded—

On the North.—By the south shores of Asia (including the Persian Gulf) from an imaginary line drawn from the boundary landmark between the Italian and French Protectorates on Ras Dumeira on the African Coast to Sheikh Malu (Oyster Island), Ras Bab-el-Mandeb on the Arabian Coast as far as the mouth of the Golok River (the boundary between Siam and the Federated Malay States), in approximately 6° 16' north latitude, and thence by the parallel of 6° 16' north latitude to the meridian of 104° east longitude.


On the East.—By a line drawn south-eastward from 6° 16' north latitude on the meridian of 104° east longitude to 4° south latitude on the meridian of 110° east longitude, thence to 7° south latitude on the meridian of 120° east longitude and by the meridian of 120° east longitude to 13° south latitude.

On the South.—By the parallel of 13° south latitude between the meridians of 120° and 70° east longitude and by the Equator between the meridian of 70° east longitude and the African Coast.

On the West.—By the meridian of 70° east longitude between the parallel of 13° south latitude and the Equator and by the Coast of Africa from the Equator to the boundary landmark between the Italian and French Protectorates on Ras Dumeira on the African Coast.

THE CHINA STATION is bounded—

On the North.—By the Coast of Asia from the mouth of the Golok River in approximately 6° 16' north latitude, on the east side of the Malay Peninsula.



On the South and West.—From the mouth of the Golok River by the parallel of $6^{\circ} 16'$ north latitude to the meridian of 104° east longitude, thence by a line drawn south-eastwards to 4° south latitude on the meridian of 110° east longitude, thence to 7° south latitude on the meridian of 120° east longitude, thence south to 11° south latitude, thence to the boundary with Dutch New Guinea in about longitude 141° east, thence along the coast of British New Guinea to the boundary with German New Guinea in 8° south latitude, thence east to 155° east longitude.

On the East.—The boundary is left undefined.

The AUSTRALIAN STATION is bounded--

On the North, from 95° east longitude by the parallel of 13° south latitude to 120° east longitude, thence north to 11° south latitude, thence to the boundary with Dutch New Guinea on the south coast in about longitude 141° east, thence along the coast of British New Guinea to the boundary with German New Guinea in 8° south latitude, thence east to 155° east longitude.

On the East, by the meridian of 155° east longitude to 15° south latitude, thence to 28° south latitude on the meridian of 170° east longitude, thence south to 32° south latitude, thence west to the meridian of 160° east longitude, thence south.

On the South, by the Antarctic Circle.

On the West, by the meridian of 95° east longitude.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Attention is called to the penalties attaching to any infraction of the Official Secrets Act.

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C.B. 923.

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SUMMARY OF THE OPERATIONS

OF THE

GRAND FLEET.

AUGUST 1914 to NOVEMBER 1916.

(Short Title: Grand Fleet, 1914-1916.)

Monograph No. 13.

NAVAL STAFF,

TRAINING AND STAFF DUTIES DIVISION.

February 1921.

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NOTE ON SOURCES.

1. The following summary of the movements of the Grand Fleet during the period of Admiral Jellicoe's command, has been compiled principally from the "Grand Fleet Narrative."

2. **The Grand Fleet Narrative** is a continuous diary of proceedings forwarded to the Admiralty by the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet. This was sent at first daily, but after 23rd October 1915, weekly. The last date is 28th November 1916, when Admiral Jellicoe relinquished the command.

In the following summary the narrative will be quoted as G.F.N.

3. The composition of the Grand Fleet has been taken from "Positions and Movements of H.M. Ships," a daily return issued in the Admiralty. For some of the "flag changes" the Navy List is the authority.

4. Occasional reference has been made to (a) "The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916," a book written by Admiral Jellicoe and published by Cassell & Co. (b) "Germany's High Sea Fleet," by Admiral Scheer, published by Cassell & Co.

5. Notes on the reasons for movements of the Grand Fleet have been added, the source being Admiralty telegrams.

6. Reference has also been made to the volumes of telegrams and papers arranged for the Admiralty by the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. These are registered in the Admiralty Record Office with the general title of "H.S." and will be quoted as "H.S.," followed by the volume number.

Appendices have been added as follows:—

- A.—A chronological index of sweeps, exercises, and operations of the Grand Fleet.
- B.—A list of additions and losses in the Grand Fleet.
- C.—Changes in flag commands obtained, when possible, from the ships' logs.
- D.—Strength of the Grand Fleet at half-yearly intervals.

COMPOSITION OF GRAND FLEET ON OUTBREAK
OF WAR, ALL BASED ON SCAPA.

Fleet Flagship.—*Iron Duke* (Admiral Sir John Jellicoe),
Sappho, Oak.

1st B.S.—*Marlborough* (Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly,
K.C.B.), *St. Vincent* (Rear-Admiral H. Evan Thomas), *Colossus*,
Hercules, *Neptune*, *Vanguard*, *Collingwood*, *Superb*, *Bellona*
(attached light cruiser), *Cyclops* (repair ship).

2nd B.S.—*King George V.* (Vice-Admiral Sir George War-
render, Bart., K.C.B.), *Orion* (Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuth-
not, Bart.), *Ajax*, *Audacious*, *Centurion*, *Conqueror*, *Monarch*,
Thunderer, *Boadicea* (attached light cruiser), *Assistance* (repair
ship).

3rd B.S.—*King Edward VII.* (Vice-Admiral E. E. Bradford,
C.V.O.), *Hibernia* (Rear-Admiral M. E. Browning), *Common-
wealth*, *Zealandia*, *Dominion*, *Africa*, *Britannia*, *Hindustan*,
Blanche (attached light cruiser).

4th B.S.—*Dreadnought* (Vice-Admiral Sir Douglas Gamble,
K.C.V.O.), *Temeraire*, *Bellerophon*, *Blonde* (attached light
cruiser).

1st B.C.S.—*Lion* (Vice-Admiral, acting, Sir David Beatty,
K.C.B.), *Princess Royal*, *Queen Mary*, *New Zealand*.

2nd C.S.—*Shannon* (Rear-Admiral the Hon. S. Gough-
Calthorpe), *Achilles*, *Cochrane*, *Natal*.

3rd C.S.—*Antrim* (Rear-Admiral W. C. Pakenham, C.B.),
Argyll, *Devonshire*, *Roxburgh*.

1st L.C.S.—*Southampton* (Commodore W. E. Goodenough),
Birmingham, *Lowestoft*, *Nottingham*.

2nd Flotilla.—*Active* (Captain J. R. P. Hawksley), *Acorn*,
Alarm, *Brisk*, *Cameleon*, *Comet*, *Fury*, *Goldfinch*, *Hope*, *Larne*,
Lyra, *Martin*, *Minstrel*, *Nemesis*, *Nereide*, *Nymphe*, *Redpole*,
Rifleman, *Ruby*, *Sheldrake*, *Staunch*.

4th Flotilla.—*Swift* (Captain C. J. Wintour), *Acasta*,
Achates, *Ambuscade*, *Ardent*, *Christopher*, *Cockatrice*, *Contest*,
Fortune, *Garland*, *Hardy*, *Lynx*, *Midge*, *Owl*, *Paragon*, *Porpoise*,
Shark, *Sparrowhawk*, *Spitfire*, *Unity*, *Victor*.

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS OF THE GRAND
FLEET.

August 4th, 1914. Precautionary Sweep.¹—At 8.30 a.m. on
August 4th, the Grand Fleet left Scapa; *Iron Duke*, 1st, 2nd, 3rd,
and 4th B.S., *Southampton*, *Birmingham*, *Boadicea*, *Blonde*, and
4th Flotilla. *Bellona* and *Blanche* remained in harbour coaling.

Rear-Admiral 2nd C.S., with *Shannon*, *Natal*, *Roxburgh*,
Nottingham, *Falmouth*, *Liverpool*, and 2nd Flotilla left Rosyth
for a rendezvous in Lat. 58° 40' N., Long. 1° 30' E.

Vice-Admiral 1st B.C.S. and Rear-Admiral 3rd C.S. were
ordered to sweep the area between Lat. 60° and 61° N. east-
ward from Shetlands as far as 2° E., where they arrived at
4.0 p.m., and then changed direction to the south-eastward,
continuing the sweep in that direction until at 5 a.m., 5th, they
arrived on a line drawn S.W. from Haugesund, the eastern ship
being 20' from the coast.

Rear-Admiral 2nd C.S. with cruisers and flotilla swept
north-east on a broad front on his way to the rendezvous, and
at 9.0 p.m. changed direction to E.S.E., continuing the sweep
as far as Long. 2° 30' E.

The Battle Fleet cruised to the eastward until 3.0 a.m., 5th,
when it turned 16 points, having then reached 2° E. During
5th the Battle Fleet cruised to the north of 58° 30'; Admiralty
orders were received during the day to remain north of 57° 30'.
After cruising on the 6th between Lats. 59° and 60° N.,
Long. 1° E. and 1° W., the Fleet returned to Scapa at 6 a.m.,
7th. While this sweep was in progress the 3rd B.S., battle
cruisers, and other cruisers re-fuelled at Scapa, the 2nd Flotilla
at Rosyth, and the 4th Flotilla at Invergordon, and rejoined the
Fleet at sea.

Several German trawlers and drifters were sighted in the
areas searched, but none were found fitted with W/T though
some had carrier pigeons. The majority were sunk after the
crews had been taken off. Search for a supposed German base
on the Norwegian coast was carried out.

On the 6th the Grand Fleet Narrative states:—"Lack of
" defences at Scapa is causing anxiety—the defences which it
" has been possible to extemporise being inadequate to protect
" the Grand Fleet and secure it from attack by torpedo craft."

¹ Many of the earlier sweeps or driving movements were commenced
while one or more squadrons were already at sea in their cruising area, so
that the departure of the remainder of the fleet from the base cannot
always be counted upon as the beginning of the period of the fleet's stay at
sea. Similarly on the conclusion of such an operation it was usual to leave
certain squadrons at sea, generally those whose fuel consumption was least,
or whose period at sea had been shortest. Particularly noticeable in this
respect is the radius of action of the Dreadnought Fleet in the precautionary
sweep.

At 10 p.m., August 9th, an Admiralty telegram (evidently in view of reports of submarines) ordered the Commander-in-Chief to take all his heavy ships to the northward and then westward to a position north-west of the Orkneys at once.

In G.F.N., 10th/11th, it is stated that Loch Ewe is to be used for a coaling base as an alternative to Scapa, and Rear-Admiral Purefoy appointed in charge. (3rd B.S. sent to coal there 12th, 7.30 p.m.).

15th. Extended Sweep towards Heligoland.—At 7.30 p.m., 13th, *Iron Duke*, with 1st, 2nd, 4th, and 6th B.S., left Scapa, the remainder of the Battle Fleet being already at sea or coaling. At daylight, 15th, all ships were concentrating for a sweep towards Heligoland Bight in accordance with the Operations Orders H.F. 0022/3 of 13th August 1914. (These, together with full details of cruising order and sweeps, will be found in G.F.N.).

The object of the movement was "to examine the North Sea generally, and get in touch with the enemy if out" [C.-in-C.'s signal (visual) 0035 of 15th]. This sweep was carried out from 15th to 17th inclusive; on its conclusion the *Dreadnought* Battle Fleet shaped course between Fair Island and Orkneys for Loch Ewe, where it arrived early p.m. on 18th. The 3rd B.S. arrived at Scapa 1.0 p.m., 17th. 1st B.C.S. were detached to Scapa at daylight, 18th, 4th Flotilla to Scapa 6.0 a.m., 18th. 1st L.C.S. accompanied the Fleet to Loch Ewe—also *Bellona*, *Boadicea*, and *Blonde*; *Liverpool*, *Blanche*, and 2nd Flotilla proceeded to Scapa. *Drake*, *Endymion*, and *Gibraltar* returned to Scapa to coal, the two latter ships rejoining 10th C.S.

Distribution of forces at bases at noon, August 18th:—

Loch Ewe.	Scapa.
—	—
<i>Iron Duke</i> , 1st, 2nd, and 4th B.S.	3rd B.S., <i>Falmouth</i> and <i>Liverpool</i> .
1st L.C.S. (less <i>Falmouth</i> and <i>Liverpool</i>).	1st B.C.S.
<i>Bellona</i> , <i>Boadicea</i> , and <i>Assistance</i> .	

28th. Battle of Heligoland Bight.—The 1st B.C.S. and 1st L.C.S. left Scapa at 6.0 a.m., 27th, to take part in operations to the southward planned for the next day. Throughout the 24 hours, 8.0 a.m., 28th, to 8.0 a.m., 29th, the *Dreadnought* Fleet were at sea in company—noon position, 28th, Lat. 58° 19' N., Long. 0° 21' E. 1st B.C.S. and 1st L.C.S. returned to Scapa to coal 7.0 p.m., 29th. The *Dreadnought* Battle Fleet and attached cruisers arrived at 7.0 a.m. the next day. *31st Aug. WM.*

September 1st. Position of Grand Fleet.—

Scapa.—1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th B.S. with attached cruisers (3rd B.S. at sea); 1st B.C.S. (at sea); 1st L.C.S. 2nd and 4th Flotillas.

Cromarty.—2nd and 3rd C.S. (3rd C.S. at sea).

31st Aug. Sweep by 1st B.C.S., 3rd B.S., 3rd C.S., 10th C.S. towards Scottish coast in consequence of information having been recd. of possibility of enemy minelaying near Pentlands

The fleet proceeded to sea from Scapa at 8.30 p.m., 1st, after an alarm caused by the *Falmouth* reporting a submarine in the Flow at 6 p.m.

4th-5th September. Sweep towards Skagerrak.—A sweep was carried out up to the entrance of the Skagerrak from 4.0 a.m., 4th, till 5th by 2nd and 3rd C.S. 1st L.C.S. and 2nd Flotilla, supported by the *Dreadnought* Battle Fleet and 1st B.C.S. (H.F. 0022/9 of 2nd September, 1914, and Commander-in-Chief's signal 1340, 3rd September, 1914, both in G.F.N.). The operation had in view the interception of an enemy force supposed to consist of four cruisers and six submarines which, it was presumed would pass the Skaw about midnight, 3rd-4th September bound for the Orkneys. No results were achieved. On completion of the sweep the *Dreadnought* Battle Fleet proceeded to Loch Ewe, 3rd B.S. to Scapa, 1st B.C.S. and 1st L.C.S. Rosyth, 2nd and 3rd C.S. to Cromarty, 2nd and 4th Flotillas to Scapa.

13th. Destroyer Sweep to Heligoland Bight supported by the Grand Fleet.—At 6.0 a.m., 7th, the *Dreadnought* fleet left Loch Ewe, and proceeded into the North Sea. The other units of the Grand Fleet left their bases the same day. On the 9th the Battle Fleet with attached cruisers moved south.

The battle cruisers and L.C.S. were to the south-east supporting the 1st and 3rd Flotillas, which made a sweep of Heligoland Bight, advancing to within 12 miles of Heligoland at 3.30 a.m. on 10th. The orders for the operations are in H.F. 0022/11 of 5th September, 1914, G.F.N. 3rd and 4th September. The object was to raid the Heligoland Bight with 1st and 3rd Flotillas suitably supported, the Battle Fleet moving south in case the High Sea Fleet, or a portion of it, should put to sea. Our squadrons sighted no enemy vessels though a good deal of signalling was heard during the night of 9th.

G.F.N. states:—"It is quite possible that if another reconnaissance of this type proves abortive on the first day, a repetition 24 hours later might produce results, since the supposition that the fleet had withdrawn may induce the Germans to take the opportunity of sending out minelayers, vessels for interfering with trade, trawlers, &c. The only difficulty of carrying out this plan is that connected with the fuel supply of the flotillas and attached cruisers; this would have to be provided for by careful regulation of speed prior to the operations and adjustment of preliminary departure points. In the case of the attached cruisers it would be necessary to limit the number of merchant ships boarded, this being a very fruitful source of high coal expenditure."

During the return to bases tactical exercises were carried out.

The *Dreadnought* fleet arrived at Loch Ewe 5.0 p.m. 13th, 3rd B.S. and 1st B.C.S. at Scapa, 2nd and 4th Flotillas, Scapa, 2nd and 3rd C.S. at Cromarty.

22nd. Extended Sweep to Northward.—At 6 p.m. 21st the Commander-in-Chief, while at sea with the fleet, received from the Admiralty an intelligence report that a German force of cruisers, torpedo craft and submarines had passed Esbjerg on the 20th proceeding north.¹ He therefore ordered the whole fleet to spread at dawn on 22nd on a line east and west, the Battle Fleet covering a front of 104 miles, the battle cruisers and cruisers prolonging it to the eastward, so that the easternmost ship was in sight of the Norwegian coast. The whole fleet moved northward in this extended formation but encountered no enemy vessel. Passing to the westward of Sumburgh Head—Fair Island in the dark hours of 23rd, the fleet carried out target practice to the west of the Orkneys, and proceeded to Scapa 24th.

26th—1st. Sweep by B.C.S. and L.C.S. off Norwegian Coast. On 26th the B.C.S. and L.C.S. proceeded to eastward of Area No. 5, to sweep southward as far as the Naze—general direction of sweep to be southward by day and northward by night. On 28th the Commander-in-Chief ordered *Invincible* and *Inflexible*, then cruising to N.W. of the Faroes, to join the B.C.S. At this time the German steamer *Prinz Friedrich Wilhelm* was reported to be leaving Bergen. The squadrons returned during the night 30th/1st.

October 1st. Position of Grand Fleet.—

Scapa.—*Dreadnought* fleet and attached cruisers. 3rd B.S. and *Blanche* (at sea). 1st B.C.S. *Invincible*, 1st L.C.S. 2nd and 4th Flotillas.

Cromarty.—2nd C.S. (at sea), 3rd C.S. (at sea), *Drake*.

2nd October. Occupation of Cruiser Areas: "Covering" Operation.—On September 30th, Operations Order, No. 14 (not in G.F.N.) was issued to the fleet, giving details of an operation which was to commence on October 2nd and continue for a week. The object was to "cover" the passage of the Canadian contingent across the Atlantic by the occupation of the cruiser areas in the North Sea between Peterhead and the Norwegian coast by the 2nd, and most of the 10th C.S., the four battle squadrons acting in support. On October 2nd at 5 p.m., the *Dreadnought* fleet left Scapa, and proceeded to take up the positions ordered in the Operations Order for 8 a.m., 3rd. The 1st B.C.S. watched the area between the Orkneys and Shetlands westward of Fair Island; the *Invincible* and *Inflexible* working with minelayers, *Sappho* and merchant cruisers watched the area from north of the Shetlands to the Faroes.

¹ Admiralty telegram 756 to Commander-in-Chief, H.F. 4.35 p.m. 21/9/14.

The Commander-in-Chief had issued an order closing the Pentland Firth between October 3rd–8th to men-of-war passing eastwards. He had also detached the *Princess Royal* to meet the convoy in mid-Atlantic.

On completion of the operation, the fleet returned to Scapa early on 12th.

Rear-Admiral Wemyss left Gaspé on October 3rd with the first Canadian convoy of 31 ships escorted by *Charybdis*, *Diana*, *Eclipse*, and *Talbot*. The convoy was joined on the 7th by the *Glory*, and a transport with the Newfoundland contingent.

At 7 a.m. 10th, the *Princess Royal* and *Majestic* met and proceeded with the convoy.

The transports commenced to arrive at Devonport at 8 p.m. 14th, the first two being the *Montreal* and *Alaunia*, the batches consisting of twelve, twelve, and eight successively. Immediately prior to the departure from Gaspé Bay, the Admiralty had occasion to reassure the Canadian Government through the Colonial Office that every reasonable precaution had been taken to ensure the safety of the convoy and that the cancelling of their sailing on account of inadequate escort would rest, therefore, on the Canadian Government.¹

The Admiralty ordered the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, on 1st September, to be prepared to despatch either the *Princess Royal* or *Queen Mary* to a rendezvous in Lat. 49° 30' N., Long 30' W., in order to meet and escort the convoy as far as Fastnet.

13th-15th. Sweep by B.C.S. through the Long Forties to Dogger Bank and up Norwegian Coast.—At 5.30 p.m. 12th, the 1st B.C.S., 1st L.C.S., and two divisions of the 2nd Flotilla left Scapa to carry out a sweep of the North Sea south of areas Nos. 4 and 5 (on the 13th) and of the Norwegian Coast from Ryvingen northwards (on 14th)—operations detailed in H.F. 0022/17 of 12th October 1914, in G.F.N. The object on the 13th, if weather was favourable, was to search a few of the trawlers under neutral colours which were suspected of acting as submarine tenders or scouts.

Reports had been received of two German cruisers off Ekersund on 6th and of four German cruisers and a submarine 4 miles off Skudenaes on 7th.

When the *Antrim* was attacked by a submarine at 3.5 p.m. 9th in Lat. 50° N., Long. 4° 40' E., a suspected tender of the large trawler type had been in the vicinity.

The *Dreadnought* Fleet did not act in support during this sweep.

The operation ended without success. At 4 p.m. 16th the 1st B.C.S. was ordered to Loch Na Keal, where it arrived 6 p.m. 17th.

¹ H.S. 3, "Escort of Canadian Convoy," p. 132d.

21st. Sweep by B.S.C. towards Skagerrak.—On the Admiralty receiving information that several German cruisers, destroyers and submarines had left Danzig on 17th for the North Sea, the 1st B.C.S. left Loch Na Keal, where it had been resting, at 6 a.m. 21st. The squadron, passing into the North Sea through Fair Island Channel at daylight on 22nd, was joined by 1st L.C.S. p.m. 21st, and by the 4th Flotilla a.m. 22nd. The force was to sweep across the North Sea covering the area between Orkneys, Moray Firth and Skagerrak at 16 knots or greater speed, and arrive off Skagerrak at daylight 23rd, then turn and sweep back to the westward. The weather became so bad that the destroyers had to be sent back on 22nd. No enemy men-of-war were seen.

22nd. Grand Fleet based on Lough Swilly.—On 21st at 3 p.m. *Liverpool* arrived and moored in Lough Swilly as a mark for the fleet to anchor on. 1st and 4th B.S. left Scapa at 6 a.m. 16th and arrived at Lough Swilly a.m. 22nd, while the 2nd B.S. was at Loch Na Keal, resting.

27th. Loss of Audacious.—The 2nd B.S. left Scapa at 5 p.m. 13th and arrived at Loch Na Keal at noon 18th with one division of 2nd Destroyer Flotilla.

At 5 p.m. 26th the squadron sailed for a rendezvous in Lat. $55^{\circ} 45' N.$, Long. $8^{\circ} 30' W.$ for daylight 27th to meet *Liverpool* which left Lough Swilly at 5 p.m., escorting the tugs *Plover* and *Flying Condor*, each with a battle practice target rigged for firing. On departure of the 2nd B.S. from Loch Na Keal the division of destroyers remained there for local defence at one hour's notice.

At 9 a.m. 27th prior to the firing exercises, the *Audacious* struck a mine which flooded the port engine room and some store rooms, port side, and partly flooded the centre engine room. *Audacious* was the third ship in the line and was altering course when she struck; estimated position Lat. $55^{\circ} 34' N.$, Long. $8^{\circ} 13\frac{1}{2}' W.$ The 2nd B.S. left the vicinity, and the Vice-Admiral (Sir George Warrender) asked for assistance. At the time it was not known whether the ship was mined or torpedoed, but *Monarch* reported about 11 a.m. that she had sighted a submarine. The Commander-in-Chief had ordered the 2nd B.S. to keep clear and sent all available destroyers, tugs, trawlers, &c., from Lough Swilly to the assistance of *Audacious*, also *Cambria*, the collier *Thornhill* with towing hawsers, and the hospital ship *Soudan*. *Liverpool* was also standing by, but moving at high speed and taking the precautions usual in the presence of submarines.

At first *Audacious* was considered unable to steam, but soon it was discovered that she could steam slowly; the White Star *Olympic* on passage to America came up and took her in tow, but the tow parted. The collier *Thornhill* then attempted to take *Audacious* in tow, but this was also unsuccessful owing

to the heavy sea and the fact that *Audacious* was quite unmanageable.

At 1.8 p.m. 27th the Commander-in-Chief received a report of the blowing up of the ss. *Manchester Commerce* by a mine in approximately the same position as that of *Audacious* on the previous afternoon. This report disposed of the idea of submarine attack, and consequent thereon *Exmouth* was sent to sea at 5 p.m. to endeavour to bring *Audacious* in. All men not actually required on board were taken off by *Olympic*, *Cambria*, destroyers and trawlers, and at 7.15 p.m. it was reported that everyone had been removed as the ship was settling. At 9 p.m. the ship blew up with great violence. A petty officer in *Liverpool* was killed by falling debris when the explosion occurred; this was the only casualty.

The approximate position of *Audacious* at 9 p.m. was N. $30^{\circ} W.$, 14 miles from Fanad Head, about 18 miles from where she struck the mine.

Had the information which the Commander-in-Chief received at 1.8 p.m. been received a few hours earlier, warning could have been given to the Vice-Admiral Commanding 2nd B.S.

During this month the insecurity of Scapa and Loch Ewe against submarines becomes very apparent, and G.F.N. from day to day indicates the difficulty in which the Commander-in-Chief found himself with no secure anchorage for the Grand Fleet. The shifting of bases, various operations, and the loss of the *Audacious* on 27th made the month one full of anxiety.

November 1st. Position of the Grand Fleet.—

Lough Swilly.—*Iron Duke* 1st and 4th B.S., 2nd B.S. (arrived 1st, after coaling at Lamlash); *Russell* class of 3rd B.S.; *Liverpool*, *Active*, and 2nd Flotilla.

Scapa.—3rd B.S. (7th and 8th Divisions of Grand Fleet); 1st L.C.S.; half of 4th Flotilla.

Cromarty.—1st and 2nd B.C.S.; half of 4th Flotilla; 2nd C.S. (at sea).

At base in Shetlands:—

(Swarbacks Minn) 3rd C.S.

Refitting.—6th C.S. (*Drake* at Liverpool, *Leviathan* at Haulbowline and *King Alfred* at Portsmouth).

3rd. Gorleston Raid.—At noon 3rd, while the Battle Fleet were still at Lough Swilly, the 1st and 2nd B.C.S. left Cromarty for Heligoland in order to intercept the enemy force after the Gorleston raid. At 3.30 p.m. the same day they were ordered to return, and reached Cromarty at 8.45 p.m.

3rd-19th. 3rd B.S. and 3rd C.S. based on Portland and later Rosyth.—At 2.30 p.m., 2nd, the 3rd B.S., then at sea spread to intercept trade between Shetlands-Sydero, was ordered to

proceed to Portland with all despatch to join the Channel Fleet. This order was cancelled 10 a.m., 3rd. At 3.50 p.m. on the same day this cancellation was annulled and the squadron arrived at Portland on the 6th. The squadron returned to Scapa on 18th, and proceeded to Rosyth on 19th with 3rd C.S.

Battle Cruisers ; departure of Invincible and Inflexible.—

After dark on 5th the *Invincible* and *Inflexible* left Cromarty for Devonport, preparatory to being sent abroad.¹ At dawn, 6th, *Tiger* arrived at Scapa from Berehaven.

6th-9th. Sweep by 1st B.C.S.—The *Lion*, *Princess Royal*, and *Queen Mary* left Cromarty after dark on 6th to rendezvous the next morning with *Nottingham* and two light cruisers of 1st L.C.S., accompanied by one half of the 4th Flotilla from Scapa. A sweep through various positions (detailed in G.F.N., 1st B.C.S., 6th-7th) in the North Sea was carried out, and ships returned to bases at daylight on 9th.

11th. Princess Royal detached.—On 11th the *Princess Royal* was detached from the 1st B.C.S. for special service, and left Cromarty after dark for Halifax.²

17th-20th. Disposition for intercepting Enemy Ships.—On 17th the Commander-in-Chief receiving reports of possible enemy movements, made dispositions for the purpose of intercepting any ships sent out to the Atlantic. The 2nd B.S. watched an area to the westward of the Orkneys, and the 1st B.C.S., 2nd C.S. and 1st L.C.S. cruised to northward of Lat. 59° 20' N. in the North Sea. No news was received of enemy movements though *Arethusa* and *Undaunted* from Harwich had scouted as far as 12 miles from Heligoland.

22nd-26th. Combined Sweep to Heligoland.—At 8 p.m. 21st the Admiralty ordered the Commander-in-chief to make a sweep of the North Sea, 23rd--24th, and the Grand Fleet left its bases accordingly at dusk on 22nd to carry out operation No. 17, Commodore (T) with *Aurora*, *Undaunted* and eight destroyers of the 3rd Flotilla co-operating. A projected seaplane attack on the airship sheds at Cuxhaven was abandoned owing to the receipt of information that there were enemy forces scouting to N.W. of Heligoland. At 10.40 a.m. 24th Commodore (T) reported having reconnoitred Heligoland, and at 11 a.m. R.A. 2nd B. C. S. reported that he was returning to the northward with Commodore (T), having only sighted destroyers. At 12.35 p.m. 24th, an aeroplane dropped bombs ahead and astern of *Liverpool* in Lat. 54° 32' N., Long. 6° 57' E.. On 26th, 1st, 2nd and 4th B.S. and 3rd C.S. to Rosyth, and 1st B.C.S. to Cromarty.

¹ From Devonport they sailed for the South Atlantic and engaged Admiral von Spee's squadron off the Falkland Islands. See Naval Staff Monograph No. 3, O.U. 6038.

² *Princess Royal* proceeded to the North American station in case Admiral von Spee or other powerful hostile forces should appear in those waters. She returned to the Grand Fleet in January 1915.

December 1st. Position of Grand Fleet.—

Scapa.—1st, 2nd, and 4th B.S.; 1st L.C.S., 2nd C.S., 6th C.S., 2nd Flotilla.

Cromarty.—1st B.C.S. 1st C.S., 4th Flotilla.

Rosyth.—3rd B.S., 3rd C.S.

6th. Projected sweep abandoned.—The Commander-in-Chief projected a sweep of the North Sea by 1st B.C.S. and 1st L.C.S. supported by 1st B.S. and 6th C.S., but abandoned the plan on receiving Admiralty information that the recent bad weather had caused many mines to break adrift in areas south of Lat. 56° N.

7th. Formation of 1st C.S.—On 7th the 1st C.S. was formed of *Leviathan*, *Duke of Edinburgh*, *Warrior* and *Black Prince*. Rear Admiral Moore transferred his flag from *New Zealand* to *Leviathan* in command of the squadron.

9th-12th. 1st B.S. Cruise Sydero-Westray.—At 3.30 p.m. 9th the 1st B.S. left Scapa to cruise N.E. of the line Sydero-Westray. Severe weather was experienced and *Bellona* was sent back on 10th. The squadron returned to Scapa early on 12th.

New battleships.—The *Emperor of India* and *Benbow* arrived at Scapa 7.30 a.m. 10th, and joined the 4th B.S.

15th-18th. Movements of Grand Fleet during Scarborough Raid.—At 5.30 a.m. 15th the 2nd B.S. and 1st L.C.S. left Scapa for operations in the North Sea. About the same time the 1st B.C.S. and part of 4th Flotilla from Cromarty and the 3rd C.S. from Rosyth left their bases for a rendezvous with V.A. 2nd B.S. for 7 a.m. 16th in Lat. 54° 10' N. (Lat. of Flamborough), Long. 3° E. The 1st and 4th B.S. were ready for sea at one hour's notice from 5 a.m. 15th. The movements of the force under V.A. 2nd B.S. consisting of 2nd B.S., 1st B.C.S., 3rd C.S., 1st L.C.S., and seven destroyers of 4th flotilla with light cruisers and destroyers under Commodore (T) operating to the southward during the raid on the Yorkshire coast have already been dealt with in detail elsewhere.¹ At 12.6 p.m. 16th the 2nd B.S., sighted enemy forces about five miles distant, but the weather, which continued thick with rain squalls, prevented them from being brought to action.

At 12.15 p.m., 16th, the 1st and 4th B.S., 2nd Flotilla, attached light cruisers and cruisers left Scapa for a rendezvous in Lat. 57° N., Long. 2° 33' E., for 9 a.m. 17th. The 3rd B.S. which had left Rosyth at 10 a.m., 16th, failed to get into touch with the enemy raiders; the Commander-in-Chief ordered the squadron to concentrate with the remainder of the Grand Fleet the following morning, the 17th. The rendezvous was about midway between Aberdeen and the Jutland Bank. The Grand Fleet, together with the forces under Commodore (T), moved S. 21° E. 10½-14 knots, expecting to meet the High Seas Fleet

¹ See Naval Staff Monograph No. 8. C.B. 1552. "Scarborough Raid."

which had been reported as being at sea presumably covering the retirement of the raiders. At 1.14 p.m., 17th, Commodore (T) proceeded to Harwich. On 18th and 19th the squadrons returned to their bases of departure.

21st. Change of Battle Cruiser Base.—The 1st B.C.S. and 1st L.C.S. arrived at Cromarty early on 19th after the Scarborough raid. At 11 p.m., 20th, they proceeded to Rosyth, where they arrived early on 22nd. From this date onwards throughout the war Rosyth remained the battle cruiser base.

24th–27th. Southerly Sweep by Grand Fleet.—The 2nd and 4th B.S. left Scapa at 6.30 p.m., 23rd, to carry out target practice to the westward the following forenoon. After the practice they proceeded towards a 9 a.m. rendezvous on 25th in Lat. $56^{\circ} 45'$, Long. $1^{\circ} 30' E.$, with the remainder of the Grand Fleet, which had left its bases during the 24th. Beyond a report of smoke on the horizon by R.A. 1st C.S., and reports of submarines by other ships, nothing was seen of the enemy. At 10 a.m., 26th, the Grand Fleet turned from the southerly sweep to the northward on account of bad weather; the squadrons, after parting company, reached their bases during the 27th.

Indomitable joins 1st B.C.S.—During these operations the *Indomitable* joined the Commander-in-Chief's flag, and returned with the 3rd B.S. to Rosyth to join 1st B.C.S.

Formation of 2nd L.C.S.—Rear-Admiral Trevelyan Napier hoisted his flag in *Falmouth* at Scapa in command of 2nd L.C.S. on 28th December. The squadron consisted of *Falmouth*, *Gloucester*, *Liverpool*, *Yarmouth*, and *Dartmouth*. *Gloucester* was attached to 2nd B.S. temporarily in the absence of *Boadicea*; *Liverpool* was at Barrow with boiler defects, and *Yarmouth* and *Dartmouth* had not yet joined the Grand Fleet.

1st January 1915. Position of Grand Fleet.—

Scapa.—1st, 2nd, and 4th B.S., 2nd L.C.S., 6th C.S., 2nd Flotilla.

Cromarty.—1st C.S., 2nd C.S. (at sea), 4th Flotilla.

Rosyth.—3rd B.S., 1st B.C.S., 1st L.C.S., 3rd C.S.

(For composition of the squadrons see Appendix D.)

3rd. Fleet at Short Notice for Steam.¹—In consequence of information received from the Admiralty that enemy vessels were at sea (G.F.N. notes 3rd–4th January; Naval Centre, Cromarty, Signal No. 79) the fleet went to short notice on 3rd;

¹ The Battle Fleet was kept at 4 hours' notice generally, an emergency squadron being kept at 3 hours. Short notice implied steam ready at 2 hours or 1 hour and occasionally less, according to the importance of the circumstances necessitating greater readiness for sea.

the 1st B.C.S. and 1st L.C.S. leaving Rosyth at 4.30 p.m., 3rd. The enemy forces were four or five German cruisers and three Zeppelins in the North Sea 150 miles from Killingholme. At 6.10 p.m. the Commander-in-Chief received information that the enemy forces had turned back (G.F.N., 3rd–4th January); later, the fleet reverted to usual notice. The 1st B.C.S. returned on 4th and 1st L.C.S. on 6th without having sighted any enemy vessels.

15th. Fleet at Short Notice.—On 15th, at 2.15 p.m., the Admiralty ordered the Fleet to be ready to go to sea at short notice during the night, but cancelled the order at 5.30 p.m.

There was reason to believe that two battle cruisers had left the Jade about daylight on 15th.

15th. Formation of 2nd B.C.S. and consequent changes.—On 15th the 2nd B.C.S. was formed of *New Zealand*, *Invincible*, and *Indomitable*, under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir Archibald G. Moore, K.C.B., with his flag in *New Zealand*. The 1st C.S. was re-formed to consist of *Defence*, *Warrior*, *Duke of Edinburgh* and *Black Prince*, under command of Rear-Admiral Sir Robert K. Arbuthnot, Bart.; *Leviathan* to join the 6th C.S. Rear-Admiral Leveson hoisted his flag as R.A. 2nd B.S. in *Orion* on 17th.

19th. Reconnaissance of Heligoland Bight.—On 17th at 10 p.m. the 1st and the 2nd B.C.S. and 1st L.C.S. left Rosyth, and at 6.30 a.m. 19th, were in Lat. $55^{\circ} N.$, Long. $5^{\circ} 30' E.$, with the 1st L.C.S. 20 miles to the south-eastward, acting in support of Commodore (T), and a destroyer force reconnoitring in the Heligoland Bight. Nothing was sighted except an airship and an aeroplane by *Southampton*. The Commander-in-Chief ordered the forces to return to their bases.

24th. Dogger Bank Action.¹—At 9 p.m. 23rd the Fleet left Scapa for a rendezvous fixed as Lat. $57^{\circ} N.$, Long. $2^{\circ} 28' E.$, for 9.30 a.m., 24th. The 6th C.S. took up station 15 miles ahead of the fleet, the 2nd C.S. followed out of harbour and closing at early dawn 24th was disposed 15 miles on starboard beam of the 6th C.S.

On 23rd the 1st and 2nd B.C.S. and 1st L.C.S. left Rosyth. They were directed to proceed to a rendezvous in Lat. $55^{\circ} 13' N.$ Long. $3^{\circ} 12' E.$ for 7 a.m. 24th, where they were to be joined by Commodore (T) and all available destroyers. The 3rd B.S. and 3rd C.S. left Rosyth in company, after the battle cruisers. The 7th C.S., consisting of *Minotaur*, *Hampshire* and *Cumberland* on their way to Scapa, were ordered to join the Fleet at sea. The

¹ Details of the action are narrated in Naval Staff Monograph No. 12, C.B. 1573, "Dogger Bank."

2nd Flotilla left Scapa at 6.45 p.m. 23rd for the Battle Fleet rendezvous. All departure movements of squadrons were ordered by the Admiralty. The Battle Fleet proceeded south from their rendezvous at about 18 knots, the *Iron Duke's* noon position 24th being Lat. 56° 29' N., Long. 3° 22' E., at 4 p.m. 24th her position was Lat. 55° 15' N., Long. 4° 7½' E. At 4.30 p.m. the Battle Fleet having sighted the Battle Cruisers, turned to the northward, reduced to 15 knots, and took up night cruising order. The position of *Iron Duke* at midnight was Lat. 55° 57' N., Long. 2° 42' E. At 7.45 a.m. 25th the Battle Fleet altered course 16 points to S.E.; the 1st, 2nd, and 6th C.S. spread 15 miles ahead with two light cruisers ahead of them. At 7 a.m. 26th the *Iron Duke* and *Centurion* reached Cromarty, the remainder of the Battle Fleet arriving at Scapa at the same time.

29th. 1st B.C.S. and 1st L.C.S. co-operating with Commodores (S) and (T) from Harwich.¹—The *Princess Royal* (flag), *Queen Mary*, and 1st L.C.S. left Rosyth, p.m., 28th, for combined operations with forces from Harwich. The weather being unsuitable on account of fog the operations were postponed and the force returned to Rosyth at 6 a.m., 30th.

February 1st. Position of Grand Fleet.—

Scapa.—1st, 2nd, and 4th B.S., 2nd L.C.S., 1st C.S., 2nd Flotilla.

Cromarty.—2nd C.S. (at sea), 7th C.S., 4th Flotilla.

Rosyth.—3rd B.S., 1st B.C.S., 1st L.C.S., 3rd C.S.

Grand Fleet Movements.—During February there were no movements on the part of the Battle Fleet. The usual minor search and sweep operations were carried out by individual cruiser and light cruiser squadrons. Units of the Grand Fleet flotillas were employed throughout the whole month combating the increasing submarine activity round the coast of the British Isles, and had the Fleet needed to proceed to sea in an emergency it would have done so with a scanty screen. However, little movement was expected from the enemy in the immediate future on account of the flag changes occurring in the High Sea Fleet, principal among which was the appointment of Admiral von Pohl to succeed Admiral von Inghenol in the supreme command.²

Flag Changes.—Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee succeeded Vice-Admiral Sir Douglas Gamble in command of 4th B.S. on 7th.

¹ Commodore Roger Keyes and Commodore Reginald Tyrwhitt respectively.

² See "The Grand Fleet," page 201.

11th. Re-organisation of Battle Cruiser and Light Cruiser Squadrons.—The following new composition of squadrons was ordered on 11th:—

<i>Battle Cruisers.</i>		
<i>Lion</i> (Flag).		
1st Squadron.	2nd Squadron.	3rd Squadron.
<i>Princess Royal.</i>	<i>Australia.</i>	<i>Indomitable.</i>
<i>Queen Mary.</i>	<i>New Zealand.</i>	* <i>Inflexible.</i>
<i>Tiger.</i>	* <i>Indefatigable.</i>	* <i>Invincible.</i>
	* To join later.	
<i>Light Cruisers.</i>		
1st Squadron.	2nd Squadron.	3rd Squadron.
<i>Galatea.</i>	<i>Southampton.</i>	<i>Falmouth.</i>
<i>Cordelia.</i>	<i>Nottingham.</i>	<i>Yarmouth.</i>
<i>Caroline.</i>	<i>Birmingham.</i>	<i>Gloucester.</i>
<i>Inconstant.</i>	<i>Lowestoft.</i>	<i>Liverpool.</i>

With a view to giving opportunities for recreation to the Fleet, it was decided to send a squadron at a time to Invergordon. This routine was commenced by the 2nd B.S. sailing for Cromarty from Scapa at 10.30 p.m., 23rd.

17th. Change of 1st Flotilla Base.—On 17th *Fearless* and two divisions of the 1st Flotilla left Harwich for Rosyth where they were henceforward based; *Woolwich* and the remainder of Flotilla followed later.

March 1st. Position of Grand Fleet.—

Scapa.—1st and 4th B.S., 3rd L.C.S., 1st C.S., 7th C.S., 2nd Flotilla.

Cromarty.—2nd B.S., 2nd C.S., 6th C.S., 4th Flotilla.

Rosyth.—3rd B.S., 1st, 2nd and 3rd B.S.C., 1st and 2nd L.C.S., 3rd C.S., 1st Flotilla.

Flag Changes.—On March 7th, Rear-Admiral Pakenham hoisted his flag in *Australia* in command of 2nd B.C.S., in succession to Vice-Admiral Patey.

On 10th Rear-Admiral Grant assumed command of 3rd C.S., in succession to Rear-Admiral Pakenham.

Grand Fleet Exercises. Sinking of U. 29.—During the month of March no offensive operations were carried out though the Fleet went to sea on two occasions for exercises.

1. The Fleet left their bases on 7th to carry out P. Z. exercises on 8th and 9th in order to exercise deployment and action tactics (Memorandum H.F. 0037/1, 6th March, 1915, in G.F.N.). On 10th the squadrons returned to their bases.

2. On 16th, the 1st, 2nd and 4th B.S., 1st, 2nd and 7th C.S., and 3rd L.C.S., left their bases for strategical exercises mainly designed to give practice to the cruiser squadrons and to exercise battle tactics. After the exercises on 17th and one during the forenoon of the 18th, the Fleet was re-formed with a view to returning to bases, the Commander-in-Chief considering that opportunities were too favourable for an enemy submarine attack in the area then occupied by the Fleet. The weather was very fine on the 18th, though the seas had been so heavy on the previous day that the destroyers from the 2nd Flotilla accompanying the Commander-in-Chief had been sent back to harbour.

At noon on 18th, the 4th B.S. was detached to Cromarty; at 12.18 p.m. *Marlborough* reported sighting a periscope, and a torpedo was fired at *Neptune*. Speed was at once increased to 17 knots and course altered.

At 1.40 p.m. the Vice-Admiral Commanding 4th B.S. reported that *Dreadnought* had rammed and sunk *U. 29*. At 2 p.m. the *Broke* and six destroyers joined the Commander-in-Chief, and squadrons proceeded to their bases where they arrived early on 19th.

10th. 6th C.S. disbanded.—On 10th, the 6th C.S. was dispersed. *Leviathan* was at Rosyth embarking Vice-Admiral Patey, Commander-in-Chief North America and West Indies Station. *Drake* was sent to Portsmouth for refit, and *Cumberland* proceeded shortly afterwards to Gibraltar.

29th. Admiralty orders Grand Fleet to Sea.—At 4 p.m., 29th, instructions were received from the Admiralty for the Fleet to proceed to sea, the Battle Fleet to be in a position Lat. $56^{\circ} 45' N.$ Long. $3^{\circ} 25' E.$ at 8 a.m. 30th, the Battle Cruiser Fleet in Lat. $55^{\circ} 46' N.$ Long. $3^{\circ} 24' E.$ at dawn 30th. At 11 p.m. 29th, when at sea, the squadrons were ordered to return to their bases, which they reached on 30th.

These movements were based on information received that the 1st and 2nd Scouting Groups with two flotillas had sailed during the forenoon 29th from the Jade. The Grand Fleet was disposed with a view to allowing the German squadron to raid the East Coast, the Grand Fleet being to the eastward to cut off their return. At 10.15 p.m. an Admiralty signal informed the Commander-in-Chief that the enemy squadrons were returning to harbour and ordered him to do the same.

April 1st. Position of Grand Fleet.—

Scapa.—1st and 2nd B.S., 2nd and 7th C.S., 4th Flotilla.
Cromarty.—4th B.S., 1st C.S., 2nd Flotilla.

Rosyth.—3rd B.S., 1st, 2nd and 3rd B.C.S., 1st, 2nd and 3rd L.C.S., 3rd C.S., 1st Flotilla.

4th. Projected Exercise Cruises deferred.—On 4th, the presence of an enemy submarine in the Forth (Oxear Channel) prevented the departure from Rosyth of (1) the Battle Cruiser

Fleet for an exercise cruise to the eastward of the Shetlands; (2) the 3rd B.S. and 3rd C.S. for firing practices to westward of the Orkneys. These squadrons left after dark on 5th; 3rd B.S. and 3rd C.S. returned early on 8th on account of bad weather. The B.C.F. returned during the night 8th—9th.

Flag Changes, 7th C.S.—At sunset 10th, Rear-Admiral Weymouth's flag was struck and Rear-Admiral Tottenham's hoisted at 8 a.m. 11th.

11th—14th. Grand Fleet Cruise in North Sea.—On 11th all ships were ordered to raise steam and proceeded to sea. The cruise was carried out in the northern areas of North Sea and squadrons returned to their bases 14th—15th.

There were indications of probable movements on the part of the High Sea Fleet to take place on the night of 12th or during 13th. The Grand Fleet proceeded to sea on 11th to exercise firing and to be prepared to rendezvous if necessary on the morning of 13th. An early departure from bases was looked upon as advantageous in order to avoid coincidence with that of the High Sea Fleet and thereby arousing suspicion. Moreover, the position of the Grand Fleet would be unknown. On 14th fog put off enemy movements, and at 5.5 p.m., 14th, the Admiralty ordered the Commander-in-Chief to return to harbour. A submarine sighting the Grand Fleet probably put off further movements though it was still considered likely that the enemy would attempt them.

17th. Fleet proceeds under Admiralty Orders.—On 17th all squadrons proceeded to sea for a rendezvous ordered by the Admiralty. Further movement south was cancelled by the Admiralty in the early afternoon of 18th, and squadrons were ordered to return to bases after carrying out firing and other exercises.

The squadrons arrived at their bases during the night 20th—21st and coaled.

On this date the enemy appeared to be about to carry out a plan which had been ready since 12th, involving the 1st Scouting Group, with 1st and 3rd Battle Squadrons, a flotilla being attached to each squadron. Though no precise information was available it was presumed to be a coast raid in the hope of intercepting our Battle Cruiser Fleet. A rendezvous on this occasion was ordered for the Battle Fleet and 3rd B.S. in Lat. $56^{\circ} 30' N.$, Long. $3^{\circ} 0' E.$, for the Battle Cruiser Fleet in Lat. $56^{\circ} 30' N.$, Long. $6^{\circ} 00' E.$, all for noon 18th. The High Sea Fleet were at sea during the forenoon of 17th as far as Long $5^{\circ} 00' E.$, exercising tactics, but returned to harbour during the afternoon.

21st. Fleet proceeds under Admiralty Orders.—After dark on 21st the Grand Fleet proceeded into the North Sea, in accordance with Admiralty orders. At 5.50 p.m., 22nd, the Admiralty ordered the squadrons to return to their bases, which they reached during afternoon of 23rd.

(G.F.N. notes, 23rd to 24th April, state S.S. *Brabant* reported sighting a large number, 70 to 80, German men-of-war of all classes, accompanied by two Zeppelins in Lat. $54^{\circ} 30' N.$,

Long. 3° 30' E., a.m. 22nd. Ship was boarded by submarine U. 22 in Lat. 53° 57' N., Long. 2° 53' E.)

At 3.45 p.m., 21st, the Admiralty informed the Commander-in-Chief of the presence of the usual indications that the High Sea Fleet would proceed to sea during the night, and ordered the Grand Fleet to short notice. At 5.20 p.m., 22nd, the Admiralty informed the Commander-in-Chief that the High Sea Fleet was returning to harbour and ordered the Grand Fleet to return to its bases. The rendezvous for the Battle Fleet and 3rd B.S. was in Lat. 57° 15' N., Long. 5° 00' E., for the Battle Cruiser Fleet in Lat. 56° 15' N., Long. 5° 00' E. On arrival at rendezvous the Commander-in-Chief was ordered to cruise in the vicinity and await further orders.

20th. Firth of Forth Booms completed.—These booms for the anti-submarine protection of the Forth were completed by April 20th.

May 1st. Position of Grand Fleet.—

Scapa.—1st, 2nd, and 4th B.S., 7th C.S., 2nd and 4th Flotillas.

Cromarty.—1st and 2nd C.S.

Rosyth.—3rd B.S., 1st, 2nd, 3rd B.C.S., 1st, 2nd, and 3rd L.C.S., 3rd C.S., 1st Flotilla.

2nd-4th. Examination Sweep by Light Cruisers and Destroyers.—During May the Grand Fleet flotillas were largely occupied in endeavouring to locate and destroy enemy submarines. On 2nd, *Phaeton*, *Royalist*, and two divisions of 4th Flotilla from Scapa; the 1st L.C.S., *Botha* and two divisions of 1st Flotilla from Rosyth, left their bases for the purpose of carrying out Operation Order No. 20 (in G.F.N., 3rd-4th May)¹.

The area for the Scapa force:—

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} 57^{\circ} 30' \text{ N.} \\ 0^{\circ} 30' \text{ W.} \end{array} \right\} \text{ to } \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 58^{\circ} 10' \text{ N.} \\ 1^{\circ} 30' \text{ E.} \end{array} \right\} \text{ to } \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 57^{\circ} 50' \text{ N.} \\ 5^{\circ} 0' \text{ E.} \end{array} \right\} \text{ to } \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 57^{\circ} 0' \text{ N.} \\ 1^{\circ} 0' \text{ E.} \end{array} \right\}$$

Area for Rosyth force:—

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} 57^{\circ} 0' \text{ N.} \\ 1^{\circ} 0' \text{ E.} \end{array} \right\} \text{ to } \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 57^{\circ} 30' \text{ N.} \\ 5^{\circ} 0' \text{ E.} \end{array} \right\} \text{ to } \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 56^{\circ} 5' \text{ N.} \\ 5^{\circ} 0' \text{ E.} \end{array} \right\} \text{ to } \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 56^{\circ} 5' \text{ N.} \\ 1^{\circ} 0' \text{ E.} \end{array} \right\}$$

¹ The order states: "There is reason to suspect that in recent concentrations of the Grand Fleet warning of our movements has been given by a screen of trawlers flying neutral flags, also possibly by neutral vessels bound to or from British ports, some of which have been suspected of liberating carrier pigeons on sighting the Fleet. The object of these operations is thoroughly to examine all vessels given in the area below, and in which the Fleet usually concentrates, for signs of W/T and submarine sound signalling appliances or carrier pigeons, and, if possible, to find out on what system, if any, the vessels are disposed in the North Sea, assuming that they are in the employ of the enemy."

On May 4th the forces returned to their bases without result.

9th. Submarine Attack on 3rd B.S.—At 6.15 p.m., 9th, the 3rd B.S. returning from a gunnery cruise with 3rd C.S., and unaccompanied by destroyers, was attacked by submarine in Lat. 56° 49' N., Long. 0° 39' E. The Commander-in-Chief ordered all available destroyers of the 1st Flotilla to sea to meet the squadrons, which returned to Rosyth on 10th.

11th. 1st B.S. at Cromarty.—The 1st B.S., 7th C.S., *Active*, and eight destroyers of the 2nd Flotilla left Scapa for a stay at Cromarty on 11th.

17th-19th. Grand Fleet at Sea.—In accordance with Admiralty instructions, the ships of the Grand Fleet left their bases p.m., 17th, the Battle Fleet for a rendezvous in Lat 57° 10' N., Long. 0° 0', for 7 a.m., 18th, the Battle Cruiser Fleet in Lat. 56° 40' N., Long. 1° 0' E., for 8 a.m., 18th. After concentrating at the rendezvous and proceeding to the S.E. at 16 knots, the Commander-in-Chief received instructions for the Fleet to return to its bases. Squadrons arrived at their bases 18th-19th.

At 3.55 p.m., 17th, the Admiralty ordered the Commander-in-Chief to prepare for sea at once. The movements were based on information that the 1st and 2nd Scouting Groups, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd B.S., and six destroyer flotillas had left Norderney Gat at 2.30 p.m., 17th, steering N.W. At 11 p.m. this information was found to have been incorrect, though there were indications of the High Sea Fleet proceeding to sea during the night. At 10.35 a.m., 18th, the Admiralty ordered the Commander-in-Chief to return, as the High Sea Fleet was then on its way to harbour.

Flag Changes.—Rear-Admiral Hood hoisted his flag in *Invincible* at 8 a.m., 27th, as Rear-Admiral Commanding 3rd B.C.S.

29th-31st. Grand Fleet at Sea.—On 29th the Grand Fleet left its bases under Admiralty orders. The *Warspite* joined *King George V.*'s division, and *Queen Elizabeth* joined *Benbow*'s. At 3.30 p.m., 30th, the Commander-in-Chief turned the fleet to the northward, and the ships returned to their bases 30th-31st.

At 5.4 p.m., 29th, the Admiralty ordered the Grand Fleet to prepare for sea, and at 1.50 p.m., 30th, issued orders for its return, as the High Seas Fleet was then returning to its base.

June 1st. Position of Grand Fleet.—

Scapa.—2nd and 4th B.S., 1st and 2nd C.S., half 2nd Flotilla, 4th Flotilla.

Cromarty.—1st B.S., 7th C.S., half 2nd Flotilla.

Rosyth.—3rd B.S., 1st, 2nd, and 3rd B.C.S., 1st, 2nd, and 3rd L.C.S., 3rd C.S., 1st Flotilla.

2nd. Formation of 4th L.C.S.—On June 2nd the 4th L.C.S. was formed under the command of Commodore Charles E.

le Mesurier, consisting of *Royalist* (at Scapa), *Comus* (arrived 3 a.m., 2nd, from the Tyne), *Phaeton* (at Birkenhead for repairs), *Calliope* (at Chatham completing).

11th-14th. Grand Fleet Exercises: Seaplane scouts from Campania.¹—On the 11th the Grand Fleet left its bases to carry out Operation Q (H.F. 0057/7 in G.F.N. 13th-14th June), comprising full-calibre firing and tactical exercises. The rendezvous for the Battle Fleet was in Lat. 62° N., Long. 3° 30' W., and for the Battle Cruiser Fleet in Lat. 62° N., Long. 0° 0'. The 3rd B.S., 3rd C.S., and half 1st Flotilla exercised independently in the North Sea. After the exercises the Fleet returned to its bases. The *Campania* accompanied the Grand Fleet to sea, and during the tactical exercises hoisted out four seaplanes, two of which made scouting flights for exercises.

18th-21st. 3rd C.S. Sweep: Roxburgh torpedoed.² At 7 p.m. 18th the 3rd C.S. with *Nottingham* and *Birmingham* and four destroyers of 1st Flotilla left Rosyth for a sweep through:

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} 55^{\circ} 45' \text{ N.} \\ 0^{\circ} 0' \end{array} \right\} \text{ to } \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 57^{\circ} 20' \text{ N.} \\ 6^{\circ} 30' \text{ E.} \end{array} \right\} \text{ 6 p.m. 19th to}$$

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 58^{\circ} 0' \text{ N.} \\ 5^{\circ} 40' \text{ E.} \end{array} \right\} \text{ to } \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 56^{\circ} 0' \text{ N.} \\ 0^{\circ} 0' \end{array} \right\}$$

thence to base by 6 a.m. 21st.

During the sweep the force was subjected to repeated submarine attacks, and at 2 p.m. 20th in Lat. 57° 9' N., Long. 1° 52' E., *Roxburgh* was hit by a torpedo and holed in both bows, but was able to maintain a speed of 14 knots and to reach Rosyth safely at 11 p.m. 20th, being screened in by the 1st Flotilla. The remainder of the force reached Rosyth about 8 p.m., 20th.

July 1st. Position of Grand Fleet.—

Scapa.—1st and 4th B.S., 4th L.C.S., 1st and 2nd C.S., half 2nd Flotilla, 4th Flotilla.

Cromarty.—2nd B.S., 7th C.S., half 2nd Flotilla.

Rosyth.—3rd B.S., 1st, 2nd and 3rd B.C.S., 1st, 2nd and 3rd L.C.S., 3rd C.S., 1st Flotilla.

(For composition of the squadrons see Appendix D).

5th. Campania employed as Seaplane Base.—At 9 p.m. 5th the *Campania* left Scapa for Pierowall (Westray Island) as a base for seaplanes searching for submarines in the Fair Island Channels.

¹ "On this occasion the seaplanes working from the *Campania* were utilised, so far as I am aware, for the first time in history in observing the movements of the squadrons, which were ordered to represent a large hostile fleet."—*Grand Fleet, 1914-1916*, page 222.

² See "S/M Attack on *Roxburgh* 20/6/15" and "Torpedo Attack on *Roxburgh*" in H.S., C.I.D.

7th-9th. Visit of H.M. the King.—His Majesty the King visited Scapa from 7th to 9th, and inspected ships and defences.

11th-13th. Grand Fleet Exercises.—At 8 p.m. 11th, the ships of the Grand Fleet (except 3rd B.S. and 3rd C.S.) left their bases under Admiralty instructions to carry out Operation T (H.F. 0037/19 in G.F.N., July 13th-14th). The operation consisted of deployments and two P Z exercises. The seaplanes from *Campania* were unable to rise owing to the slight swell. The Battle Cruiser Fleet cruised independently. All squadrons returned to their bases on 13th.

28th. Cruiser Sweep to Skagerrak.—On 28th the 2nd B.C.S., 1st and 2nd L.C.S. with *Comus* and *Royalist* of 4th L.C.S., escorted by destroyers from 1st and 4th Flotillas, left their bases to carry out Operation C, in conjunction with Commodore (T) from Harwich in *Arethusa*, with *Cleopatra*, *Aurora*, *Undaunted*, and 12 destroyers. The operation was a sweep into the Skagerrak to intercept trade and to search for German outpost trawlers. The forces engaged returned to their bases on 31st. One German trawler was sunk by the light cruiser force from Rosyth, and a Danish steamer sent into the Humber by Commodore (T). The Dutch fishing fleet was sighted in Lat. 56° 20' N., Long. 0° 29' E.

August 1st. Position of Grand Fleet.—

Scapa.—1st and 4th B.S., 2nd C.S., 7th C.S. half 2nd Flotilla.

Cromarty.—2nd B.S., 1st C.S., half 2nd Flotilla.

Rosyth.—3rd B.S., 1st, 2nd, and 3rd B.C.S., 1st, 2nd, and 3rd L.C.S., 3rd C.S., 1st Flotilla.

2nd. Full Calibre Firing in Moray Firth.—On 2nd *Iron Duke*, 2nd B.S., and 1st C.S. carried out full calibre firing in Moray Firth. This system continued till it was superseded by the use of the Pentland Firth.

3rd. Exchange of Battle Squadron Bases.—On 3rd the 4th B.S. from Scapa and 2nd B.S. from Cromarty exchanged bases.

8th. Moored Minefield in Moray Firth.—At 6.15 p.m., 6th, the 4th L.C.S. left Scapa to cruise between Lat. 60° N., Long. 2° E., and the Norwegian coast in an endeavour to intercept an enemy minelayer believed to be proceeding north. While returning they were ordered to steer for Horns Reef and later to sweep to the Skagerrak for the same purpose. The squadron arrived at Scapa a.m. 10th. On 8th trawler minesweepers discovered an extensive moored minefield to the northward of Banff in the Moray Firth. The 1st and 2nd L.C.S. left Rosyth on 9th but returned the next day.

16th-17th. Sweeps by 1st and 4th L.C.S. off Base Approaches.—On 16th the 1st and 4th L.C.S. left their bases to carry out sweeps, returning p.m. 17th, on wide zigzags, to cover approaches.

18th. 1st B.C.S. Exercise.—On 18th the 1st B.C.S. and 2nd L.C.S. left Rosyth for an exercise and firing cruise north of the Shetlands. On 21st these squadrons arrived at Scapa for torpedo exercises, and reached Rosyth on 23rd.

Formation of 11th Flotilla.—On the arrival of *Kempenfelt* at Scapa on 21st, the 11th Flotilla was formed consisting of M Class Destroyers.

On 23rd Captain (D) 4th Flotilla transferred to *Carysfort* (from 4th L.C.S.), at Scapa.

24th. 4th B.S. return to Scapa.—After considerable mine-sweeping activity in Moray Firth since 8th the 4th B.S. returned to Scapa from Cromarty on 24th.

Flag Changes.—Rear-Admiral Gaunt hoisted his flag in *Collingwood* as Rear-Admiral 1st B.S., in succession to Rear-Admiral Evan Thomas, on 24th.

September 1st. Position of Grand Fleet.—

Scapa.—1st, 2nd, and 4th B.S., 4th L.C.S., 1st, 2nd, and 3rd C.S., 2nd, 4th, and 11th Flotillas.
Cromarty.—

Rosyth.—3rd B.S., 1st, 2nd, and 3rd B.C.S., 1st, 2nd, and 3rd L.C.S., 7th C.S., 1st Flotilla.

1st. Cruiser Sweep.—The Admiralty informed the Commander-in-Chief on 1st that two German cruisers and 10 destroyers had been sighted 25 miles west of Horns Reef Light Vessel proceeding N.W. at 9 a.m., 31st. The *Black Prince*, the four light cruisers attached to the Battle Fleet, and six destroyers left Scapa at 10 a.m. 1st, to sweep to the eastward as far as 1° E. The force returned on 2nd without result.

2nd-5th. Grand Fleet Exercise.—On 2nd the ships of the Grand Fleet at Scapa proceeded to sea for Operation A (an exercise cruise) and returned on 5th.

10th-12th. Operations in North Sea.—At 7 a.m., 10th, the 1st and 3rd B.C.S., 1st and 2nd L.C.S. with destroyers left Rosyth for operations in the North Sea; the remainder of the Grand Fleet went to short notice. The *Orvieta* (minelayer) was at sea for operations at the same time. The squadrons returned to their base on 12th.

During the month the squadrons of the Grand Fleet at Scapa exercised separately to the westward of the Orkneys, leaving harbour early a.m., and returning p.m., the same day.

October 1st. Position of Grand Fleet.—

Scapa.—1st, 2nd, and 4th B.S., 4th L.C.S., 1st and 2nd C.S., 2nd, 4th and 11th Flotillas.

Cromarty.—7th C.S.

Rosyth.—3rd B.S., 1st, 2nd, 3rd B.C.S., 1st, 2nd, and 3rd L.C.S., 1st Flotilla.

(No ships of 3rd C.S. available for Grand Fleet service. *Roxburgh* and *Devonshire* on special service; *Antrim* and *Argyll* refitting in the Tyne and at Devonport respectively.)

1st. Sweep by 3rd L.C.S.—At 5.30 p.m. 1st the 3rd L.C.S. with three destroyers of 1st Flotilla left Rosyth for a sweep in the North Sea as far as Long. 4° 20' E., thence proceeding to Scapa for practices.

New Battleships.—The *Warspite*, which had grounded on her way to Rosyth in the middle of September, was in the Tyne for repairs till November 23rd. The *Canada*, commissioned on July 11th, arrived at Rosyth from the Tyne on October 1st with engine defects. The *Barham* arrived at Scapa from Liverpool on October 2nd.

10th. Sweep by 3rd L.C.S.—*Falmouth*, *Yarmouth*, and *Gloucester* left Scapa at 6.30 p.m., 10th, for Rosyth, sweeping en route to Lat. 56° 25' N., Long. 5° E. The squadron was joined at 6.30 a.m., 11th, by four destroyers of 1st Flotilla and arrived at Rosyth 7 a.m., 12th.

13th. Grand Fleet Exercises.—The squadrons at Scapa proceeded to sea p.m. 13th to carry out operation B (H.F. 0037/37, in G.F.N. 13th-14th October), comprising exercises in deployment and tactics. The Fleet steered to be in a position Lat. 60° 49' N., Long. 1° 28' E., by 6.30 a.m., 14th. Bad weather intervened and the exercise had to be curtailed. On 15th the Commander-in-Chief detached the 1st B.S., *Black Prince* and *Duke of Edinburgh* (1st C.S.) to Cromarty and returned to Scapa with the remainder of the Fleet.

19th. 1st B.C.S. in support of Commodore (T).—On 19th at 6 a.m. the 1st B.C.S. and eight destroyers of 1st Flotilla left Rosyth to act as support to Commodore (T) operating off the Danish coast. The force from Rosyth reached Scapa, a.m. 20th, course towards Cromarty having been altered on account of a report of two suspicious-looking vessels sighted off Noss Head (G.F.N. Notes, 19th-20th October). Later, these two vessels were presumed to have been two armed trawlers returning to Scapa after escorting an oiler to the southward. The 1st B.C.S. and destroyers returned to Rosyth on 22nd.

24th. Agincourt and Superb exchange squadrons.—The *Agincourt* from 4th B.S. and *Superb* from 1st B.S. exchanged squadrons on 24th.

Full calibre firing in Moray Firth.—During October the ships of the Grand Fleet exercised full calibre firing in the practice firing area, in the Moray Firth. Minesweeping was being carried on continuously in this area and adjacent vicinities.

November 1st. Position of Grand Fleet.—

Scapa.—2nd, 4th and 5th B.S. (*Queen Elizabeth* and *Barham*), 1st L.C.S., 1st and 7th C.S., 4th Flotilla, half 11th Flotilla, 1st, 2nd and 7th C.S.

Cromarty.—1st B.S., half 11th Flotilla.

Rosyth.—3rd B.S., 1st, 2nd and 3rd B.C.S., 2nd, 3rd and 4th L.C.S., 1st Flotilla.

2nd-5th. Battle Fleet Exercises. Formation of 5th B.S.—

On 2nd, the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th B.S., 1st, 2nd and 7th C.S., 1st L.C.S., and 4th and 11th Flotillas proceeded to sea to the westward for exercises, returning on the 5th. The 5th B.S. took part in exercises for the first time as a squadron.

5th-8th. Light Cruiser Sweep to Skagerrak.—During the night 5th-6th, the 1st L.C.S. and six destroyers from Scapa and the 2nd L.C.S. from Rosyth proceeded to sea for a sweep into the Skagerrak (Operation "F"). The 1st and 2nd B.C.S., *Fearless* and 12 destroyers sailed from Rosyth on 6th to act in support. The forces returned on 8th. No trawlers were met; though many ships were boarded none appeared suspicious.

8th. Minefield laid by Princess Margaret.—On 8th a minefield was laid by Princess Margaret, on a line running $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles E.N.E. from Lat. $54^{\circ} 10\frac{1}{2}'$ N., Long. $6^{\circ} 27'$ E.

15th. Battle Squadrons exchange Bases.—On 15th the 1st and 2nd B.S. at Cromarty and Scapa, respectively, changed bases.

18th. Search for supposed German Cruiser.—At 9 p.m. 18th the 2nd C.S. sailed to operate with 7th C.S. and 2nd L.C.S. in a search for a German cruiser and destroyers which the Admiralty had informed the Commander-in-Chief had passed through the Sound, going North. *A later telegram stated that the destroyers had been seen passing Laeso Island on the morning of 18th, returning South (G.F.N., 14th-21st November, 1915). The dispositions were made with a view to intercepting the cruiser in the event of her making an attempt to harass the trade route to Alexandrovsk. The forces returned without success.

December 1st. Position of Grand Fleet.—

Scapa.—1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th B.S., 4th L.C.S., 1st, 2nd 7th C.S., 4th and 11th Flotillas.

Cromarty.—

Rosyth.—3rd B.S., 1st, 2nd and 3rd B.C.S., 1st, 2nd and 3rd L.C.S. (B.C.F. at sea, 28th November to December 2nd, for exercises). 3rd C.S., 1st Flotilla.

November 28th-December 7th. Grand Fleet Exercises.—

On November 28th the Battle Cruiser Fleet proceeded to sea for exercises, arriving in Lat. 58° N., Long. 3° E. at daylight on November 29th. They returned to Rosyth on December 2nd. On December 1st the Grand Fleet ships at Scapa proceeded to the westward for exercise. An exercise with the object of drawing a force over a minefield and submarine area, battle formations and range keeping exercises were carried out. At 9.40 a.m., 3rd, the *Warspite* and *Barham* collided and each sustained considerable damage.¹ On the 4th, the 1st and 4th B.S., 2nd and 7th C.S., and 4th L.C.S. returned to Scapa, 2nd B.S. and 1st C.S. to Cromarty. On 5th, the 3rd B.S., 3rd C.S., and 1st Flotilla left Rosyth for exercises to the eastward of May Island, and returned to Rosyth, a.m., 7th.

8th. 2nd L.C.S. Sweep.—2nd L.C.S. left Rosyth, p.m., 8th, for a sweep as far as Lat. 57° N., Long. $4^{\circ} 10'$ E., returning to Rosyth, 10th.

10th. Formation of 12th Flotilla at Scapa.—On 10th the *Royalist* joined 12th Flotilla as flotilla leader (*vide* G.F.N., 14th-21st November 1915 and 5th-12th December 1915).

16th. Flag Changes. 2nd B.S.—Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas H. M. Jerram relieved Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender in the command of the 2nd B.S. at Cromarty and the squadron sailed for Scapa on 17th.

24th. Sweeps by 1st C.S. and 3rd L.C.S.—At 1 p.m., 24th the 1st C.S. left Scapa for a sweep through Lat. $57^{\circ} 30'$ N., Long. $6^{\circ} 30'$ E., and Lat. $59^{\circ} 30'$ N., Long. $1^{\circ} 00'$ W., returning p.m., 26th.

The 3rd L.C.S. left Rosyth 11 p.m., 24th, for a sweep as far as Lat. $57^{\circ} 30'$ N., Long. $2^{\circ} 30'$ E., returning before daylight, 26th.

1st January 1916. Position of Grand Fleet.—

Scapa.—1st, 2nd and 5th B.S., 4th L.C.S., 1st and 7th C.S., 4th, 11th and 12th Flotillas.

Cromarty.—4th B.S., 2nd C.S., eight destroyers of 11th Flotilla, two of 12th Flotilla.²

Rosyth. 3rd B.S., 1st, 2nd and 3rd B.C.S., 1st, 2nd and 3rd L.C.S., 3rd C.S. 1st Flotilla.

(For composition of squadrons *see* Appendix D.)

5th-8th. Battle Cruiser Force Exercises. The Battle Cruiser Fleet proceeded to sea from Rosyth p.m., 5th, for exercises in the North Sea to the northward of 60° N., returning on 8th.

6th. Loss of King Edward VII.—On 6th the *King Edward VII.* on passage from Scapa to Belfast to refit, struck a mine and sank. Owing to the severe weather conditions³ sweeping

¹ G.F.N., November 28th—December 5th, 1915.

² At this time only four destroyers of 12th Flotilla were as yet available for service.

³ Continuous bad weather throughout the month interfered with patrols, minesweeping, and exercises.

in the area was delayed for some days. On January 28th sweepers working from Loch Eriboll destroyed a moored mine in Lat. $58^{\circ} 43' N.$, Long. $4^{\circ} 14' W.$, about one mile from the position in which *King Edward VII.* sank.¹

10th. Battle Squadrons exchange Bases.—On 10th, 1st B.S. at Scapa and 4th B.S., at Cromarty, exchanged bases.

26th. Extensive Cruiser Sweep to Skagerrak.—An extensive sweep was carried out by 1st and 4th L.C.S., supported by 2nd B.C.S., into the Skagerrak as far as Long. $7^{\circ} E.$ between 26th and 29th to intercept an enemy armed auxiliary cruiser, possibly a minelayer, supposed to be proceeding westward from the Skagerrak at any time after 6 a.m., 27th. The forces returned to their bases on 29th without sighting any suspicious vessels.

27th. Modification and addition of Patrols.—From 27th the limits of the Pentland patrol destroyers' night area were modified, and additional patrols were established off the three Fleet bases. (G.F.N., 23rd-30th January, 30th January, 6th February 1916.)

29th.—The 1st B.C.S. sailed for Cromarty with 3rd L.C.S., to carry out full calibre firing in the Moray Firth. The squadrons returned on 1st February.

February 1st. Position of Grand Fleet.—

Scapa.—2nd, 4th, and 5th B.S., 4th L.C.S., 1st and 2nd C.S., half 4th Flotilla, 11th and 12th Flotillas.

Cromarty.—1st B.S., 7th C.S., half 4th Flotilla.

Rosyth.—3rd B.S., 1st, 2nd, and 3rd B.C.S. (1st B.C.S. arrived from Cromarty a.m., 2nd, with 3rd L.C.S.), 1st 2nd, and 3rd L.C.S., 3rd C.S., 1st Flotilla.

1st-3rd. 1st C.S. Sweep.—At 6 a.m. 1st three ships of the 1st C.S. with four destroyers left Scapa to carry out a sweep in the northern part of the North Sea and off Norwegian coast. The ships returned on 3rd.

4th-6th. Firing Exercises in Moray Firth.—Between 4th and 5th ships of the Grand Fleet carried out full calibre practices in the Moray Firth.

10th-12th. Concentration of Grand Fleet in North Sea.—At 11.30 p.m., 9th, the preparatory signal for the Fleet to leave bases was made, and steam ordered for 18 knots at one hour's

¹ Admiral Scheer in "Germany's High Sea Fleet," page 112, says, "We considered her most important success to be the sinking of the *King Edward*, the flagship of the 3rd English Battle Squadron, which, on January 3rd (*sic*), struck a mine laid by the *Moeve*, and, owing to the damage caused, sank between Cape Wrath and the west ingress of the Pentland Firth."

notice. At 4.50 a.m., 10th, the negative signal was made to all squadrons, when ships reverted to 18 knots at two hours' notice. At 4.30 p.m., 10th, steam was put back to 15 knots at four hours', and at 5.40 p.m. again ordered for 18 knots at two hours'. At 11.21 p.m., 10th, the fleet sweeper *Poppy* reported to *Lion* that enemy torpedo craft were attacking the 10th Sloop Flotilla in Lat. $54^{\circ} 31' N.$, Long. $3^{\circ} 30' E.$ During the night 10th-11th the Battle Cruiser force left Rosyth, and early on 11th the ships at Scapa and Cromarty proceeded to sea. The *Arabis* of 10th Sloop Flotilla was sunk by an enemy destroyer. The squadrons of the Grand Fleet returned to bases a.m., 12th. On returning to Harwich during the afternoon of 11th the *Arethusa*, Commodore (T), struck a mine and eventually sank.

A telegram from the Admiralty to the Commander-in-Chief at 11 p.m. 9th, informed him that there were strong reasons to expect that the High Sea Fleet would leave harbour the next day (10th) for operations to the southward or westward, and ordered him to move with the whole fleet to the southward concentrating as necessary without further orders. Commodore (T) was exercising off Harwich and the light cruisers were to watch off the Texel.

At 4 a.m., 10th, the Commander-in-Chief was ordered to remain in harbour at 2 hours' notice, since the High Sea Fleet were probably only carrying out exercises in the Bight.

At 5.15 p.m. the Commander-in-Chief was informed that the High Sea Fleet was remaining in a state of instant readiness, the 2nd Scouting Group and three destroyer flotillas being outside the rivers. Two hours later the Battle Cruiser Fleet and 1st Flotilla were ordered to leave Rosyth at slack water, and at 8.10 p.m. it appeared that a coast raid was probable if the fog cleared.

At 0.45 a.m., 11th, the Admiralty ordered the Grand Fleet to sea; the Commander-in-Chief was informed at 1.14 a.m., 11th, that the 1st Scouting Group had left the Jade at midnight.

At 8.15 a.m. further information was received that the enemy forces were returning to harbour, but the Grand Fleet was ordered to remain at sea. At 7.50 p.m., 11th, the Admiralty ordered a return to bases.

17th. Sweep towards Norway by 3rd C.S.—On 17th the 3rd C.S. with *Dundee* and *Duke of Clarence* sailed from Scapa for Utvoer Light, thence to sweep southward along the Norwegian coast. During the forenoon of 18th two submarines were sighted on the surface off the Holmenzora Lighthouse, the point made by all ships using the north lead to Bergen; the visibility was extreme. Course was at once altered to the southward, and approval given for 3rd C.S. to return to Rosyth, the two armed boarding steamers returning to Scapa.

26th. Combined Grand Fleet Exercises.—On 26th the Battle Fleet left Scapa, and after exercising deployments p.m., 26th, was joined by the Battle Cruiser Fleet at 8 a.m., 27th, in Lat. $60^{\circ} N.$, Long. $3^{\circ} E.$ Further deployments and fire control exercises were carried out on 27th, and the squadrons returned to their bases a.m. 28th.

29th. Alcantara—Greif Action.¹—On 28th the Commander-in-Chief acting on information received from the Admiralty

¹ See "Proceedings of H.M. Ships *Comus*, *Andes* and *Alcantara* on 29th February 1916," titled X 9473/16.

made various dispositions to intercept a German mercantile auxiliary, expected to be moving out from the Baltic. *Calliope*, *Comus*, and *Blanche*, each with an attached destroyer from Scapa and the *Inconstant* and *Cordelia*, with four destroyers from Rosyth, proceeded to patrol specified areas in the northern portion of the North Sea (G.F.N., 28th Feb.—5th March 1916). At 8.55 a.m., 29th, the *Andes* of the 10th C.S. reported the enemy in sight in Lat. 61° 58' N., Long. 1° 8' E. At 9.15 a.m. the *Alcantara*, which had come up and did not know the ship to be an enemy, ordered her to stop; at 9.40 a.m., while the *Alcantara* was lowering a boat for examination purposes, the enemy, distant about 2,500 yards, threw her Norwegian ensign and staff over the side, hoisted the German ensign at the main, and opened fire. An action ensued, with the result that the enemy abandoned their ship, the *Greif*, about 10.22 a.m. The *Comus* and her accompanying destroyer (*Munster*) arrived about this time, and, after sinking the raider by gunfire, proceeded with the *Andes* to pick up survivors. The *Alcantara* had to be abandoned, and sank at 11.2 a.m.

The Admiralty informed the Commander-in-Chief at 11.20 a.m., 28th, that a German merchant auxiliary was off the Skaw at 7 a.m. that morning, and was proceeding to the westward.

29th. Fleet at short notice.—At 8 p.m. 29th, the preparatory signal was made for leaving Scapa, and the Fleet raised steam for 18 knots at two hours' notice.

At 7.40 p.m. 29th, certain signs of activity caused the Admiralty to order the Fleet to short notice. The Fleet reverted to usual notice at 11.15 a.m., March 2nd.

March 1st. Position of Grand Fleet.—

Scapa.—1st, 4th, and 5th B.S., 4th L.C.S., 2nd and 7th C.S., 4th Flotilla, 12th Flotilla.

Cromarty.—2nd B.S., 1st C.S., 11th Flotilla.

Rosyth.—3rd B.S., 1st, 2nd, and 3rd B.C.S., 1st, 2nd, and L.C.S., 3rd C.S., 1st Flotilla.

6th. Grand Fleet proceeds to Sea: Southerly Sweep.—At 9.25 a.m., 6th, the Admiralty ordered the Grand Fleet to raise steam with all despatch. The Battle Fleet from Scapa and Cromarty, and the Battle Cruiser Fleet from Rosyth proceeded to sea about midday. The 2nd B.S., 1st C.S., and destroyers from Cromarty were ordered to join the Commander-in-Chief in Lat. 55° 30' N., Long. 0° 30' E., by 6 a.m., 7th. The Battle Cruiser Fleet was ordered to arrive in Lat. 54° 55' N., Long. 0° 45' E., by 6 a.m., 7th. At 8 p.m., 6th, the Battle Cruiser Force was ordered to return to Rosyth, and arrived at 3 a.m., 7th. The Battle Fleet, after turning northward from their southerly course during the night, arrived at Scapa between 6 and 9 a.m., 7th. The 5th L.C.S. left Harwich at 8.50 a.m.,

6th, and returned there at 4.30 p.m., 7th. Numerous telefunken signals were intercepted at Scapa on the night, 5th-6th.

The order to raise steam was despatched from the Admiralty at 7 a.m., 6th. An hour later the Commander-in-Chief was informed that the enemy in force had been in Lat. 53° 43' N., Long. 4° 59' E., at 5.30 a.m. G.M.T., steering in a south-westerly direction. The Grand Fleet was ordered to proceed to sea and concentrate in the Long Forties. At 10 a.m. the Fleet Flagship of the High Seas Fleet was in Lat. 53° 27' N., Long. 4° 41' E., steering north.

At 1.15 p.m. further information was forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief that the main fleet at 2 p.m. G.M.T. would be in Lat. 53° 57' N., Long. 4° 45' E.; the 1st and 2nd Scouting Groups joining them there with three flotillas. The Battle Fleet were to return to harbour at dark, while three flotillas advanced in the direction of the Firth of Forth as far as compatible with returning to the Ems by daylight the following morning. The 1st and 2nd Scouting Groups accompanied the flotillas for a time, but parted company in order to arrive off the Ems at 8 p.m. that evening. A Zeppelin scouted over the course of the flotillas.

At 4.58 p.m., 6th, the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, proposed a return to bases in view of the fact that the light cruisers from Rosyth would be unable to encounter the enemy flotillas before nightfall—a proposal which was approved by the Admiralty at 6.45 p.m.

On the morning of the 7th the Admiralty informed the Commander-in-Chief that a German steamer, carrying two guns and two seaplanes, had been 15 miles north-west of Lyst on 5th.

11th-13th. Light Cruiser Sweep towards Norwegian Coast.¹—

The 1st L.C.S., with a division of 1st Flotilla, sailed at 7.30 a.m., 11th, to make a sweep along the Norwegian coast, arriving in Lat. 58° 20' N., Long. 5° 20' E., at 6 a.m., 12th, and after sweeping to Lat. 57° N., Long. 7° E., to join the Battle Cruiser Force acting in support.

At 10.30 a.m., 11th, the preparatory signal was made for the Fleet to leave Scapa, but ships reverted to usual notice at 2.30 p.m. the same day, weather conditions being unsuitable for destroyers. The 2nd L.C.S. proceeded to support the 1st L.C.S.; the Battle Cruiser Force with destroyers returned to Rosyth at 10.30 p.m., 12th. The 1st and 2nd L.C.S. arrived at Rosyth 7.30 a.m., 13th.

On 13th, *Iron Duke*, 4th B.S., 2nd C.S., and 12 destroyers of 4th Flotilla, proceeded to Cromarty.

16th and 20th. Sweeps between Udsire-Naze.—On 16th the *Roxburgh* and two destroyers swept this area, and on 20th *Comus* with two destroyers completed a sweep of the same area. Both operations had no results.

¹ "The objective being the capture of any enemy merchant ships found outside territorial waters between Ekersund and the Naze. It had been ascertained that some of the German merchant ships engaged in trade with Norwegian ports, and especially Narvik, occasionally returned outside territorial waters in this locality. It was the only locality, besides the vicinity of Stadlandet, in which they did so venture, and in which, therefore, there was a chance of capturing them."—Jellicoe: *Grand Fleet*.

26th. Grand Fleet at Sea: Aerial Operations off Danish Coast.¹—The Battle Cruiser sailed from Rosyth at 6 a.m. 24th, to cover operations by Commodore (T) off the Danish Coast. At 6 a.m. 26th the Fleet at Scapa and Cromarty proceeded to sea. During the operations the *Medusa* destroyer was rammed and sank, and on night 25th-26th *Cleopatra*, after cutting a German destroyer in two, rammed and caused serious damage to *Undaunted*. The squadrons, after experiencing severe weather throughout the operations, returned to their bases on 27th.

29th-31st. Grand Fleet Exercises.—On 29th the Fleet from Scapa and Cromarty proceeded to sea for exercises in deployment and low visibility. The ships returned to their bases on 31st, unscreened by destroyers, whose speed had been reduced to 12 knots on account of the fresh south-west wind.

Full calibre firing in Pentland Firth.—On 10th full calibre firing was carried out in the Pentland Firth by the 2nd B.S., 1st C.S. and other ships of the Fleet. This system became customary henceforward, and no more practice firing was carried out in the Moray Firth during 1916.

April 1st. Position of Grand Fleet.—

Scapa.—1st, 2nd and 5th B.S., 4th L.C.S., 1st and 7th S., half 4th, 11th and 12th Flotillas.

Cromarty.—4th B.S., 2nd C.S., half 4th Flotilla.

Rosyth.—3rd B.S., 1st, 2nd and 3rd B.C.S., 1st, 2nd and 3rd L.C.S., 3rd C.S., 1st Flotilla.

2nd. Formation of 13th Flotilla.—On 2nd the *Nerissa* arrived at Rosyth from the Clyde and the *Obdurate* on 3rd, forming the 13th Flotilla.

Zeppelin Raid on Firth of Forth.—At 6 p.m. 2nd, information was received that four Zeppelins were *en route*, possibly to attack a northern base. The 2nd L.C.S. left Rosyth to patrol the track from Rosyth to Heligoland on the meridian of 0° 30' E. and the fleet raised steam for 18 knots at 2½ hours notice. Between 9.45 p.m. and 1.10 a.m. various reports of aircraft over and near the Forth were received. Two Zeppelins manoeuvred over the Forth eastward of the middle line of islands, where many bombs were dropped. No damage was done to Leith docks. The 2nd L.C.S. returned to Rosyth 1 p.m. 3rd without having seen or heard the enemy aircraft.

3rd-4th. Sweep towards the Norwegian Coast.—On 3rd the *Devonshire* and two destroyers left Rosyth and proceeded towards Udsire, the destroyers returning at dark. Two other destroyers from Scapa joined *Devonshire* 5 a.m., 4th. The

¹ These operations involved an attack on the enemy's Zeppelin sheds at Tondern.

force, on arrival off Udsire at 8 a.m., swept down the Norwegian coast at 15 knots as far as Lat. 57° 45' N., Long. 60° 20' E., when it returned to bases. Many steamers were observed to the northward inside territorial waters.

6th-7th. The operation described above was carried out by *Roxburgh* without result.

12th. *Campania*, fitted with a flying-off deck and a kite balloon, returned to Scapa after completion of alterations at Liverpool.

16th. 4th B.S. and 2nd C.S. returned to Scapa from Cromarty.

20th-23rd. Extensive Sweep into Kattegat: Abandonment of Operation "L" and Concentration of Grand Fleet.—Submarines E 43, G 4 and G 5 sailed from Blyth on 19th to arrive in various positions between Lat. 56° 20' N., Long. 11° 6' E. and Lat. 56° 44' N., Long. 12° 0' E. before daylight on 22nd, to assist in Operation "L" (not in G.F.N.) On 20th at 2 p.m. the *Carysfort* and two destroyer divisions left Scapa to sweep into the Kattegat and intercept merchant shipping. The 2nd B.S., 2nd B.C.S., 2nd L.C.S., and 4th L.C.S. left their bases 20th-21st to take part in these operations.

At 6 p.m. 21st, Operation "L" was abandoned and orders issued for a concentration of the Grand Fleet in the North Sea as follows:—*Dreadnought* Battle Fleet, cruiser squadrons (except the 3rd), 4th L.C.S., 1st, 11th and 12th Flotillas in Lat. 57° 30' N., Long. 1° 20' E. at 9.30 a.m. 22nd, the Battle Cruiser force and all destroyers (except four) of the 1st and 13th Flotillas in Lat. 57° N., Long. 2° 20' E. at 9 a.m., 22nd. The squadrons not already at sea proceeded during the night 21st-22nd. The 3rd B.S. and 3rd C.S. were ordered to cruise in area "A." At 2.30 p.m. the 4th L.C.S. with three destroyers were ordered to proceed to the Skaw and start a westerly sweep the following morning, destroyers being used for boarding. At 3 p.m., 22nd, the weather became misty, and by 10 p.m. the fleet was in a thick fog which lasted until 6.15 a.m., 23rd. At 1 a.m., 23rd, the Commander-in-Chief ordered the Vice-Admiral commanding the Battle Cruiser Fleet and the 4th L.C.S. to abandon operations and return to bases. In the fog the *New Zealand* and *Australia* were in collision, also the destroyers *Garland*, *Ardent* and *Ambuscade*, while *Neptune* collided with a steamer which was towing another vessel.

The 1st B.S. and 7th C.S. proceeded to Cromarty and 4th L.C.S. to Scapa, and the remainder of the squadrons to their bases of departure, where they arrived on 23rd-24th.

An Admiralty telegram to the Commander-in-Chief at 5.25 p.m. 21st, ordered the ships of Grand Fleet not already at sea to have steam at two hours' notice; it was anticipated that the High Seas Fleet would be ready for sea at 8 p.m. that night. Further information reached the Commander-in-Chief at 8.12 p.m. that the entire

High Seas Fleet would proceed to the vicinity of Horns Reef at daylight 22nd.

At 8.55 a.m., 22nd, the High Seas Fleet was returning to harbour, the Battle Fleet having come north of Lat. 55° N., and the scouting groups to Lat. 56° N.

25th. German Raid on East Coast.—Commodore (T)'s force sailed from Harwich at 8 a.m. 24th. At 5 p.m., 24th, the preparatory signal for leaving Scapa was made. The 5th B.S. and 4th L.C.S. sailed from Scapa at 9.10 p.m., 24th, and proceeded in support of the Battle Cruiser Force, which left Rosyth at 10.50 p.m. The remaining ships at Scapa and the ships at Cromarty sailed between 10 and 11 p.m., 24th. The 3rd B.S. and 3rd C.S. with *Fearless* and two destroyers sailed from Rosyth at 4 a.m. 25th, for a position 20 miles 80° from Farn Island to watch the northern exit from the Tyne area. At 4.6 a.m., 25th, Commodore (T) reported that he was in touch with the 1st and 2nd scouting groups in Lat. 52° 24' N., Long. 1° 57' E., four enemy battle cruisers and six light cruisers being sighted to the northward, steering north-west.

At 4.20 a.m. the Admiralty informed the Commander-in-Chief that enemy ships were firing on Lowestoft, Commodore (T) being in touch. At 5 a.m. Gorleston reported enemy battle cruisers in sight, steering north. At 5.40 a.m. Aldeburgh W/T station reported that enemy battle cruisers were in sight, steering east at high speed. At 6.24 a.m. the Commander-in-Chief directed Rear-Admiral, 5th B.S. to follow the Battle Cruiser Force down M channel. The Admiralty ordered Commodore (T) at 8 a.m. to return to harbour, and at 11 a.m. the Grand Fleet was ordered to return. At 12.30 p.m., 25th, the Battle Cruiser Force reported their position at Lat. 53° 55' N., Long. 4° 20' E., steering N. 61° W., speed 20 knots. All ships returned to bases 25th-26th.

On the return of the Grand Fleet to harbour, 23rd-24th April, ships remained at two hours notice. At 4.6 p.m. 24th, the Commander-in-Chief was informed of the Dublin riots and the Tralee episode, and was warned that the German Fleet would assist by demonstrating off the east coast.

At 5.52 p.m., 24th, the Admiralty telegraphed that the 1st and 2nd scouting groups had been in Lat. 54° 12' N., Long. 6° 45' E., at 3 p.m. The Grand Fleet had re-fuelled, and was at two hours notice at 7 p.m. A quarter of an hour later the Commander-in-Chief was ordered to sea to intercept the enemy forces.

A return to bases was ordered by the Admiralty at 11.10 a.m. 25th.

27th. Fleet at Short Notice.—At 4.40 p.m. 27th, the preparatory signal was made for the Fleet to proceed to sea. At 8.30 p.m. the 1st and 2nd C.S., 5th B.S., 4th L.C.S., *Dublin*, and 4th B.S.'s destroyer screen were ordered to raise steam for 20 knots at half-an-hour's notice, the remaining ships at Scapa for 18 knots at one hour's notice. At 10.45 p.m. the 5th B.S. and Cruiser Squadrons reverted to 20 knots at one

hour and the Battle Squadrons to 18 knots at two hours' notice. At 11.30 a.m. 28th, all Squadrons reverted to 17 knots at three hours' notice.

Commodore (T)'s force sailed from Harwich at 4.30 a.m. and returned at 8 p.m. 28th.

At 4.17 p.m. steam was ordered at two hours' notice. The Commander-in-Chief was informed at 5.20 p.m. that some small German vessels has been out to the Dogger Bank the previous night (26th-27th) and had sunk one trawler and captured another. It was considered probable that enemy destroyer flotillas would sweep out to the north-west from the Ems during the night (27th-28th) to meet and bring in the prize and that the operation would be supported by the 1st Scouting Group and 3rd Battle Squadron. Further information at 8.30 p.m. considered the likelihood of big ships being assembled in case we should attack the destroyer flotillas.

29th. Base Changes.—The 3rd B.S. and 3rd C.S., screened by eight destroyers of 1st Flotilla, sailed from Rosyth for the Humber p.m. 29th, *en route* for Sheerness, where they were to act as a supporting force for the Harwich and Dover forces, using the Swin as a war anchorage. (Admiralty to C.-in-C. Telegram No. 81 of 26th April; C.-in-C. to Admiralty Telegram No. 676 of 27th April; Admiralty to C.-in-C. Telegram No. 113 of 28th April).

May 1st. Position of Grand Fleet.—

Scapa.—2nd, 4th and 5th B.S., 4th L.C.S. 1st and 2nd C.S., 4th and 11th Flotillas.

Cromarty.—1st B.S., 7th C.S., 12th Flotilla.

Rosyth.—1st, 2nd and 3rd B.C.S., 1st, 2nd and 3rd L.C.S., 1st and 13th Flotillas.

2nd-5th. Operation XX. : Bombing of Tondern Sheds.—

The squadrons from Cromarty arrived at Scapa at 5 p.m., 2nd, to take part in these operations. *Lurcher*, with three submarines from Harwich, left at 3.30 p.m., 2nd, for the vicinity of Terschelling. *Trident*, with three submarines from Blyth, left at 8 p.m., 2nd, for positions off the Horns Reef Light Vessel. The *Abdiel* (minelaying destroyer) left Scapa at 9 p.m., 2nd, with orders to lay 80 mines between 12.30 a.m. and 2.30 a.m., 4th, from a point 8 miles 180° from the Vyl Light Vessel, with approximately 10 mines to the mile, but at irregular intervals, adjusted to a depth of 15 feet L.W.O.S. Orders were given by the Admiralty to *Princess Margaret* to lay mines at the seaward end of the channel leading out of the Heligoland Bight near the Borkum Riff. The 1st L.C.S., *Vindex* and *Engadine* (with the seaplanes for the bombing of the Zeppelin sheds), and 16 destroyers of 1st Flotilla left Rosyth at 2.45 a.m., 3rd. The ships at Scapa and remainder of Battle Cruiser Force left harbour between 3 and 4.30 a.m., 3rd. On arrival of 1st L.C.S., in a position to northward of Horns Reef at dawn on 4th, only one seaplane was able to proceed, the others being damaged by the sea. This machine succeeded in dropping

bombs on the objective. The Battle Cruiser Force cruised in support of 1st L.C.S., keeping in visual touch with the Battle Fleet Cruiser Screen. At 10 a.m., 4th, the Battle Cruiser Force in Lat. $55^{\circ} 32' N.$, Long. $6^{\circ} 10' E.$ sighted a Zeppelin (L. 7), bearing east-south-east. She was reported to be in difficulties, and the 1st L.C.S. attacked her. *Galatea* and *Phaeton* brought her down in a position 9 miles 160° from Horns Reef Light Vessel, and submarine E 31 completed her destruction at 11.30 a.m.

At 2 p.m., 4th, the Battle Fleet and Battle Cruiser Fleet met in Lat. $56^{\circ} 12' N.$, Long. $5^{\circ} 54' E.$, and proceeded to their bases, where they arrived a.m., 5th. On account of a submarine reported in the Moray Firth, no ships proceeded to Cromarty. The 1st B.S. and 7th C.S. proceeded to Cromarty, a.m., 7th.

9th. 4th L.C.S. Sweep of Norwegian Coast.—The 4th L.C.S. left Scapa at 8 a.m., 9th, for a sweep Udsire-Naze, and after intercepting one Norwegian steamer, which was sent to Kirkwall, proceeded to Rosyth.

The 2nd L.C.S. left Rosyth for Scapa on 9th, making a wide sweep of centre portion of North Sea *en route*.

16th-17th. Base Changes.—On 16th the 1st B.S. and 7th C.S. proceeded to Scapa, and on 17th the 2nd B.S. to Cromarty.

18th. Enemy Submarine Activity in North Sea.—On 18th the Commander-in-Chief received information of enemy submarine activity. Orders were issued to patrols as to increased vigilance, and extra precautions taken to guard the entrances to bases. (G.F.N. 14th-21st May, 1916). At 0.30 a.m., 19th, two E.C. mines exploded in nets which were laid between points 5 and 10 miles respectively on a bearing 360° from Muckle Flugga (Orkney Islands). An enemy submarine passed close to this position shortly after the explosion. At 1.45 a.m., 20th, a report was received from the hydrophone station at Cromarty that a submarine was approaching the Whistle Buoy. The vicinity was searched the next day with chain sweeps by the local sweepers, but no mines were found.

21st.—British Summer Time, one hour in advance of G.M.T. was adopted as from 2 a.m. 21st. All times subsequent to this, unless otherwise stated, are B.S.T.

23rd. 3rd B.C.S. at Scapa. The 3rd B.C.S. arrived at Scapa from Rosyth on 23rd (5th B.S. at Rosyth 22nd).

24th. 4th L.C.S. Sweep towards Norwegian Coast.—At 5 a.m. 24th, the 4th L.C.S. and five destroyers left Rosyth for a sweep Naze-Udsire. The sweep was without result; the destroyers returned to Rosyth, and 4th L.C.S. arrived at Scapa, 3 a.m., 26th.

1st C.S. arrived at Cromarty from Scapa 10 a.m., 25th.

26th. Sweep by 1st L.C.S.—The 1st L.C.S. and six destroyers sailed from Rosyth at 10.45 p.m., 26th, for a reconnaissance sweep to the southward of Mine Area I. The force was directed to arrive off the southern end of L Channel by about 1 p.m., 27th, sweep as far as the meridian of Long. $6^{\circ} E.$ and return by M Channel to Rosyth, where it arrived at 9 a.m., 28th, with nothing to report.

27th. Full Calibre Firing in Pentland Firth.—Full calibre firing was carried out in the Pentland Firth on Saturday 27th, by the 1st B.S., *Royal Oak*, *Vanguard*, 7th C.S. (except *Donegal*), *Canterbury*, *Calliope* and *Active*.

30th.—7th Cruiser Squadron was amalgamated with 2nd Cruiser Squadron.

31st. Fleet Action off the Jutland Coast.—At 5.40 p.m., 30th, the preparatory signal was made for leaving harbour, and the Grand Fleet sailed from Scapa, Cromarty, and Rosyth between 9 and 10.40 p.m. The engagement with the High Sea Fleet off the Jutland Bank and the subsequent movements of the Grand Fleet until its return to harbour, also the movements of squadrons and ships ordered to search for crippled vessels, are contained in the despatches of the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, on the proceedings of the Fleet off the Jutland coast on 31st May and 1st June.

The Commander-in-Chief had, on the 28th May (Admiralty telegram No. 955), formulated a scheme for a sweep of the Kattegat on June 2nd by two light cruisers and 14 destroyers supported by the whole of the Grand Fleet at sea. It was hoped that the enemy might be drawn out by this means. The operation, however, was eclipsed by the proceedings which commenced with the information from the Admiralty at noon on 30th that there were indications of movements on the part of the High Sea Fleet.

June 2nd. Position of Grand Fleet (on return from Action off Jutland Coast).—

Scapa.—1st, 2nd, and 4th B.S., *Barham* and *Malaya* (of 5th B.S.), 4th L.C.S., 3rd B.C.S., 2nd C.S., and *Duke of Edinburgh*, 4th, 12th, and 14th Flotillas.

Cromarty.—11th Flotilla.

Rosyth.—*Warspite* and *Valiant* (of 5th B.S.), 1st and 2nd B.C.S., 1st, 2nd, and 3rd L.C.S., 1st and 13th Flotillas.

5th. Re-organisation of Battle Cruiser and Cruiser Squadrons.—At 8 a.m., 5th, the following re-organisation took place:—

Battle Cruiser Fleet.

Lion, Fleet Flagship.

1st B.C.S.

2nd B.C.S.

Princess Royal.
New Zealand.
Tiger.

Australia.
Indomitable.
Inflexible.

Until the repairs to the battle cruisers were completed, the *New Zealand* remained in the 2nd B.C.S.

The light cruiser squadrons remained unaltered.

Cruiser Squadrons.

2nd C.S.	3rd C.S.
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Minotaur.

Duke of Edinburgh.

Cochrane.

Shannon.

Achilles.

Donegal (temporarily attached).

Antrim.

Roxburgh.

Devonshire.

5th. Loss of H.M.S. Hampshire.—At 5.30 p.m., 5th, the *Hampshire* left Scapa with Lord Kitchener and a military mission for Archangel. Between 7.30 and 7.45 p.m. she struck a mine in a position about 1½ miles off the shore between Brough of Birsay and Marwick Head on the west side of mainland, Orkney.

The escorting destroyers had been ordered back by the captain of the *Hampshire* on account of the rising wind and sea. Twelve survivors reached the shore in Carley floats, but no officers of the ship or members of the mission were saved.

14th. 1st L.C.S. Sweep towards Norwegian Coast.—The 1st L.C.S. and six destroyers of the 13th Flotilla sailed from Rosyth at 6 a.m., 14th, and swept the line Naze-Udsire without result, returning to Rosyth a.m., 16th.

14th-15th. Visit of His Majesty the King.—His Majesty the King visited Scapa on 14th-15th and inspected the fleet.

21st. Squadron Change of Bases.—The 2nd B.S. (Cromarty since 9th) and 4th B.S. (Scapa) exchanged bases.

25th. Light Cruiser Sweep towards Norway.—The *Comus* and *Constance* sailed from Scapa at 10 a.m., 25th, for a sweep off the Norwegian coast and returned 4 a.m., 27th.

29th. 3rd L.C.S. Sweep towards Norway.—The *Birkenhead*, *Yarmouth*, and *Gloucester*, with six destroyers sailed from Rosyth a.m., 29th, for a sweep, and returned a.m., July 1st.

July 1st. Position of Grand Fleet —

Scapa.—1st and 2nd B.S., 2nd and 3rd C.S., 4th L.C.S., 11th and 12th Flotilla.

Cromarty.—4th B.S., 4th and 14th Flotillas, *Malaya* and *Revenge*.

Rosyth.—5th B.S., 1st and 2nd B.C.S., 1st, 2nd, and 3rd L.C.S., 1st and 13th Flotillas.

Tyne.—*Marlborough*, *Lion*, and *Falmouth*.

Devonport.—*Barham*.

Portsmouth.—*Princess Royal*.

(For composition of squadrons see Appendix D.)

10th. Dispositions to intercept new Commerce Raider Moewe.—During the afternoon of the 8th the Admiralty telegraphed that fairly reliable information had been received that a new *Moewe* would leave Kiel for the North Sea at 5 p.m. on Sunday, 9th, accompanied by four or five torpedo boats. Ships of 1st, 3rd, and 4th L.C.S. were ordered to take up certain positions for patrol purposes from 2 a.m., 11th. Nothing was sighted, and the vessels returned to their bases; 1st and 3rd L.C.S. to Rosyth, 3.30 p.m., 12th; 4th L.C.S., 6 p.m., 13th. *Donegal* and *Shannon*, which had been ordered out on 10th to patrol the meridian of Greenwich between Lats. 63° and 65° N., returned to Scapa 14th.

12th. Sweep by Ships of 2nd L.C.S.—At 8 p.m., 12th, *Southampton*, *Birmingham*, and six destroyers of 1st Flotilla sailed from Rosyth and swept as far as Lat. 59° 45' N., Long. 3° 15' E., returning to Rosyth 3 a.m., 15th.

15th. Fleet ordered to prepare for Sea.—At 4 p.m. the Admiralty ordered the Fleet to prepare for sea. Battleships raised steam for 18 knots, 5th B.S. and 4th L.C.S., 20 knots by 8.30 p.m. The Battle Fleet reverted to 2½ hours notice at 9.15 p.m. The 4th B.S. arrived at Scapa from Cromarty at 10 p.m., 15th.

At 4.25 p.m., 15th, the Commander-in-Chief was informed that that the High Sea Fleet would probably go to sea by the Horns Heef. At 6.10 p.m. the sailing of the Grand Fleet was deferred, the enemy expecting an immediate operation on our part, and making suitable defensive preparations.

17th-20th. Sweep towards Norwegian Coast by 3rd L.C.S.—The *Birkenhead*, *Gloucester*, and six destroyers sailed at 8 p.m., 17th, for a sweep off the Norwegian coast and returned at 4 p.m., 20th.

Fleet Exercises.—Between noon and 1.30 p.m., 17th, the 1st, 2nd, 4th, and 5th B.S., 2nd and 3rd C.S., 4th L.C.S., *Campania*, 4th, 11th, 12th, and 14th Flotillas left Scapa and proceeded to the north and east of the Shetlands for exercises. On completion, the 1st B.S. (except *Royal Sovereign* and *Revenge*) and 12th Flotilla proceeded to Cromarty, the remainder of the Fleet to Scapa on 20th.

21st. Sweep by 1st L.C.S.—*Inconstant* and *Cordelia*, with four destroyers, sailed 3 a.m., 21st, to sweep down the probable course of enemy raider of *Moewe* class between Norwegian coast and No. 1 Mine Area. The force returned 2 a.m., 23rd.

24th. Sweep by 2nd L.C.S. down Norwegian Coast.—At 3 a.m., 24th, *Nottingham* and *Dublin*, with four destroyers of 13th Flotilla proceeded for a sweep down Norwegian coast, returning to Rosyth, 3 a.m., 26th, without result.

26th-28th. 2nd L.C.S. Sweep ; temporary exchange of base with 4th L.C.S.—The 2nd L.C.S. (except *Birmingham*) with four destroyers of 13th Flotilla left Rosyth 4 p.m., 26th, and after a wide sweep into the northern area of North Sea on the look-out for enemy raiders and Zeppelins, arrived at Scapa, 6 a.m., 28th. The 4th L.C.S. (except *Royalist*) sailed from Scapa at 1 p.m., 27th, and proceeded direct to Rosyth, arriving a.m. 28th.

30th. Active (4th Flotilla Leader) based on the Humber.—On 30th the *Active* arrived in the Humber where 4th Flotilla were now based until November 19th, when they were withdrawn to the Channel for submarine hunting.

31st. Fleet ordered to prepare for Sea.—At 10 minutes after midnight 30th-31st the Fleet was ordered to short notice and reverted to usual notice again at 12.35 p.m., 31st.

Admiralty telegram 116 at 11.40 p.m., 30th, reported signs of activity. At 10.55 a.m., 31st, normal conditions were resumed. During the night the 2nd Flotilla from Belgian ports had proceeded to Germany, light cruisers and destroyers having been sent out to cover their return. The 1st B.S. and some ships of 3rd Squadron also left and returned to Jade.

August 1st. Position of Grand Fleet.—

Scapa.—2nd, 4th, and 5th B.S., 2nd L.C.S., 3rd C.S., 11th and 14th Flotillas.

Cromarty.—1st B.S., 2nd C.S., 12th Flotilla.

Rosyth.—1st and 2nd B.C.S., 1st, 3rd, and 4th L.C.S., 1st and 13th Flotillas.

1st. Submarine Patrol.—The Admiralty informed the Commander-in-Chief that submarines had been ordered to patrol the following positions and to remain on patrol for seven days:—

- (1) Between Lats. $53^{\circ} 00' N.$ and $53^{\circ} 15' N.$ to the east of Long. $4^{\circ} 0' E.$
- (2) Between Lats. $53^{\circ} 15' N.$ and $53^{\circ} 30' N.$ between Longs. $4^{\circ} 00'$ and $4^{\circ} 40' E.$
- (3) Between Lats. $53^{\circ} 30' N.$ and $53^{\circ} 45' N.$ between Longs. $4^{\circ} 00'$ and $4^{\circ} 40' E.$
- (4) Between Lats. $53^{\circ} 45' N.$ and $54^{\circ} 00' N.$ between Longs. $5^{\circ} 00'$ and $5^{\circ} 45' E.$
- (5) Between Lats. $54^{\circ} 00' N.$ and $54^{\circ} 45' N.$ between Longs. $4^{\circ} 00'$ and $5^{\circ} 00' E.$

Sweep towards Norway.—On 1st, *Phaeton*, *Cordelia*, and four destroyers left for a sweep off Norwegian coast. They returned to Rosyth on 3rd without anything to report.

4th-6th. B.C.F. : temporary base changes.—The 4th L.C.S. from Rosyth and 2nd L.C.S. from Scapa, exchanged bases on 4th. The 1st and 2nd B.C.S., 3rd L.C.S., and half of 13th Flotilla left Rosyth for Scapa on 5th.

9th. Withdrawal of 3rd C.S.—On 9th *Antrim* and *Roxburgh* proceeded to Devonport. On 2nd the *Devonshire* proceeded to Scapa from Liverpool, and on 27th she left Scapa for Devonport to pay off.

8th-10th. Sweep towards Norway by 1st L.C.S.—*Galatea*, *Phaeton*, and four destroyers sailed from Rosyth at 9 a.m. 8th, with orders to proceed to a position in Lat. $60^{\circ} 0' N.$, Long. $2^{\circ} 0' E.$, and sweep to Lat. $57^{\circ} 30' N.$, Long. $5^{\circ} 0' E.$, thence to return to Rosyth, where they arrived on morning of 10th. The object of the sweep was to intercept enemy raiders.

12th-14th. Merchant Vessels convoyed by 4th L.C.S.¹—The 4th L.C.S. and four destroyers left Scapa on 12th, proceeding towards Udsire to meet and convoy 10 merchant vessels towards Rattray Head.

16th. B.C.F. Firing Exercises and return to Rosyth.—On 16th the 1st and 2nd B.C.S. and 3rd L.C.S. carried out full calibre firing practice in Pentland Firth and returned to Rosyth.

18th-20th. Operations in the North Sea.²—The Grand Fleet carried out the operations reported in Home Fleets Letter, No. 8896/H.F. 0022 of 24th August 1916.

At 10.40 a.m., 18th, the Grand Fleet was ordered to raise steam, the High Sea Fleet, with the exception of its 2nd B.S., being due to sail at 8 p.m.

The Grand Fleet left harbour at 5 p.m., 18th, for a rendezvous in Lat. $56^{\circ} 30' N.$, Long. $0^{\circ} 20' E.$, by 6 a.m. 19th, thence steering 175° at 17 knots. The Battle Cruiser Fleet sailed to be in Lat. $56^{\circ} 0' N.$, Long. $0^{\circ} 20' E.$ by 6 a.m., 19th, thence steering 175° at 17 knots.

At 2.45 p.m., 19th, the German Commander-in-Chief was in Lat. $54^{\circ} 14' N.$, Long. $2^{\circ} 2' E.$, and at 4.52 p.m. in Lat. $54^{\circ} 16' N.$, Long. $2^{\circ} 51' E.$, steering for base through Lat. $54^{\circ} 12' N.$, Long. $6^{\circ} 55' E.$, by a newly-swept route, speed 15 knots.

At 8.47 p.m., 19th, the Admiralty ordered the Grand Fleet to return to harbour.

24th. Warspite-Valiant Collision at Scapa.—While *Warspite* was returning to her anchor berth and *Valiant* proceeding to the Flow to carry out night firing before midnight 24th, the two vessels collided, and each sustained considerable damage, necessitating dockyard repairs at Rosyth and Cromarty respectively.

28th. Formation of 10th Submarine Flotilla in the Tees.—G 8, G 11 and G 12 arrived in the Tees on 28th to join the Flotilla. *Termagant* arrived Barrow on 31st from the Tees. G 7 arrived in the Tees from the Tyne on September 1st.

¹ This is first occasion of merchant vessels convoyed by a constituted force of Grand Fleet.

² No further mention in G.F.N. 13th-21st August 1916 is made either of the torpedoing of *Nottingham* and *Falmouth* or the possible meeting with the High Seas Fleet. According to the Commander-in-Chief in "*Grand Fleet, 1914-1916*," p. 442, the latter "appeared to be so certain that I arranged the distribution of gunfire of the Battle Fleet."

September 1st. Position of the Grand Fleet.—

Scapa.—1st, 4th, and 5th B.S., 4th L.C.S., 2nd C.S., 12th and 14th Flotillas.

Cromarty.—2nd B.S.

Rosyth.—1st and 2nd B.C.S., 1st, 2nd, and 3rd L.C.S., 1st and 13th Flotillas.

2nd. 1st and 4th L.C.S. Change of Bases.—On 2nd the 1st L.C.S. from Rosyth and 4th L.C.S. from Scapa exchanged bases, returning again on 11th.

4th-6th. Sweep by 2nd B.C.S. and 2nd L.C.S.—The 2nd B.C.S. and 2nd L.C.S., screened by 11 destroyers, sailed from Rosyth p.m., 4th, to sweep through positions in Lat. $57^{\circ} 30' N.$, Long. $5^{\circ} 0' E.$, and in Lat. $56^{\circ} 30' N.$, Long. $5^{\circ} 20' E.$, and thence returned to Rosyth, arriving at daylight on 6th.

20th-22nd. Sweep by Yarmouth and Chatham.—The *Yarmouth* and *Chatham*, with four destroyers of 13th Flotilla, sailed from Rosyth 4 p.m., 20th, and proceeded eastwards, sweeping through position (a) Lat. $57^{\circ} 40' N.$, Long. $5^{\circ} 20' E.$, and position (b) Lat. $56^{\circ} 45' N.$, Long. $5^{\circ} 45' E.$, and thence to base, where they arrived at 10 a.m., 22nd.

Grand Fleet Exercises.—1st, 2nd, 4th, and 5th B.S., 2nd C.S., 4th L.C.S., 11th, 12th, and 14th Flotillas proceeded to sea for exercises p.m., 20th, between the Orkneys and Shetlands. 4th and 5th B.S., and 14th Flotilla returned to Cromarty, the remainder to Scapa, 22nd.

23rd. Arrival of 2nd Floating Dock at Cromarty.—A floating dock left Tyne on 21st, screened by six destroyers and eight trawlers, and arrived at Cromarty on 23rd. The first floating dock had arrived at Cromarty on September 6th, 1914, from Portsmouth.

25th. Fleet at Short Notice.—At 8 p.m., 25th, the preparatory signal for leaving harbour was made; cruisers and destroyers with steam at half hour's notice, battleships at one hour. At 8.40 a.m., 26th, ships reverted to usual notice for steam.

Admiralty Telegram No. 713 despatched at 7.55 p.m., 25th, reported that the 1st Battle Squadron and 1st Scouting Group would be off Terschelling at 4 a.m., 26th, probably for the purpose of covering the return of Zeppelins. At 8 a.m., 26th, the Commander-in-Chief was informed that the enemy forces had returned to harbour.

26th. Sweep by Southampton and Dublin.—*Southampton* and *Dublin* with four destroyers sailed from Rosyth, 3.30 p.m., 26th, and proceeded by M Channel as far as $1^{\circ} E.$, and thence through (a) Lat. $54^{\circ} 20' N.$, Long. $1^{\circ} 00' E.$, at 6 a.m., 27th; (b) Lat. $54^{\circ} 20'$, Long. $3^{\circ} 30' E.$, and returned to base by Queen's Channel, arriving, a.m., 28th.

30th. B.C.F. leave Rosyth for Scapa.—On 30th, 1st and 2nd B.C.S., 2nd L.C.S., and 13 destroyers of 13th Flotilla left Rosyth for Scapa, arriving, a.m., 1st.

October 1st. Position of Grand Fleet.—

Scapa.—1st and 2nd B.S., 4th L.C.S., 1st and 2nd B.C.S., 2nd L.C.S., 2nd C.S., 11th and 12th Flotillas.

Cromarty.—4th and 5th B.S., 14th Flotilla.

Rosyth.—1st and 3rd L.C.S., 1st and 13th Flotillas.

1st. Sweep by 4th Flotilla.—*Active* and eight destroyers of 4th Flotilla sailed at 6 a.m., 1st, by G Channel to search the area between Lats. 54° and $55^{\circ} N.$ as far as Long. $4^{\circ} 0' E.$, and returned to the Humber, a.m., 2nd.

2nd. Exercise Cruise by 1st B.S.—The 1st B.S., *Minotaur*, *Duke of Edinburgh* and 12th Flotilla sailed from Scapa at 5 p.m., 2nd, for exercises in the northern part of North Sea, returning to the base at daylight on 4th.

7th. Exercises with Airships.—*Caroline* and *Cambrian* sailed at 7 a.m., 7th, for exercises with Longside airships off Peterhead. The exercises could not be completed owing to bad weather. The two light cruisers arrived at Scapa, 7 p.m., 7th.

Battle Cruiser Force. Firing and return to Rosyth.—The Battle Cruiser Force carried out full calibre firing practice on 7th in the Pentland Firth, proceeding to Rosyth, where it arrived, a.m., 9th.

8th. Exercise Cruise by 2nd B.S.—2nd B.S., *Minotaur*, *Duke of Edinburgh*, with destroyers of 11th and 15th Flotillas, sailed, p.m., 8th, for an exercise cruise to the eastward, and returned, a.m., 10th.

12th. Battle Squadron change of Bases.—1st B.S., *Orion*, *Minotaur*, and 12th Flotilla proceeded to Cromarty, and 4th B.S., *Barham*, *Malaya*, and 14th Flotilla proceeded to Scapa on 12th.

16th-19th. Sweeps by Light Cruisers.—*Southampton*, *Birmingham*, and four destroyers sailed at 1 p.m. 15th, for a sweep in North Sea, but were recalled on account of the weather. *Birkenhead*, *Chester*, and four destroyers sailed at 1 p.m. 17th, for a sweep in North Sea to intercept enemy raiders and vessels carrying cargoes of enemy origin or destination. The force arrived in Lat. $58^{\circ} 30' N.$, Long. $4^{\circ} 0' E.$, at daylight 18th, swept to Lat. $57^{\circ} 0' N.$, Long. $5^{\circ} 30' E.$, and thence returned to Rosyth 8 a.m., 19th.

18th. Fleet at Short Notice.—At 8.30 p.m. 18th, the Admiralty ordered the Fleet to short notice, the Harwich force

leaving harbour at 1.30 a.m. 19th. At 8 p.m. 19th, the Fleet reverted to usual notice.

The Admiralty ordered the Fleet to short notice and a sweep of base approaches at 7.45 p.m. 18th. At 8.5 p.m. the High Sea Fleet showed signs of activity.

At 0.35 a.m., 19th, the Admiralty informed the Commander-in-Chief that the High Sea Fleet had sailed at midnight.

During 19th the High Sea Fleet were at sea; at 8.20 a.m. G.M.T. in Lat. $54^{\circ} 18' N.$, Long. $4^{\circ} 55' E.$, steering W.N.W., and at 9 a.m. course had been altered to S.E. $\frac{1}{2}$ S.

The Grand Fleet was ordered to revert to usual notice at 7.20 p.m., 19th.

19th. Sweep to intercept raiders.—On 19th, *Minotaur*, *Achilles*, and four destroyers from Cromarty, and *Weymouth*, *Melbourne*, with two destroyers from Scapa proceeded to the northern area of North Sea, with a view to intercepting enemy raiders attempting to break through to the Atlantic. The force returned to bases a.m., 21st.

22nd. Exercise Cruise by 4th and 5th B.S.—4th and 5th B.S., with 14th and 15th Flotillas, sailed from Scapa p.m., 22nd, for exercises to eastward of the Shetland Islands, and returned a.m., 24th.

23rd. Fleet at Short Notice.—At 4.30 p.m., 23rd, the preparatory signal was made to leave harbour, and ships raised steam accordingly. At 6.40 p.m., 23rd, the Admiralty telegraphed the warning message to prepare for a naval raid south. At 9.35 a.m., 24th, the fleet reverted to usual notice.

At 1.28 p.m., 23rd (Admiralty telegram No. 989), the Commander-in-Chief was informed that there was a likelihood of the 1st B.S., the 1st and 2nd Scouting Groups, with destroyer flotillas, leaving harbour that afternoon, and warned him to have the Grand Fleet ready at short notice from midnight.

28th. Sweep by 2nd L.C.S.—*Birkenhead* and *Yarmouth*, with four destroyers sailed p.m., 28th, and proceeded down Queen's Channel to Lat. $54^{\circ} 10' N.$, Long. $3^{\circ} 30' E.$, and returned by M Channel at a speed of advance of 18 knots to reconnoitre south of Mine Area I. The force returned to Rosyth a.m., 30th.

31st October—3rd November. Exercise Cruise by Battle Cruiser Force.—The Battle Cruiser Force and 13th Flotilla sailed p.m., 31st, for exercises, and to be in a position for intercepting enemy vessels in the North Sea. The force returned to harbour a.m., 3rd November.

November 1st. Position of Grand Fleet.—

Scapa :—2nd, 4th and 5th B.S., 5th L.C.S., 11th 14th and 15th Flotillas.

Cromarty :—1st B.S., 12th Flotilla.

Rosyth :—1st and 2nd B.C.S., 1st 2nd and 3rd L.C.S., 13th Flotilla. (Battle Cruiser Force at sea 31st October to 3rd November.)

Swarbacks Minn :—2nd C.S.

2nd. Exercise Cruise by 2nd B.S.—The 2nd B.S., 11th Flotilla, *Calliope*, *Comus* and *Cambrian* sailed from Scapa, p.m. 2nd, for exercises and to be in a position for intercepting enemy vessels between Lats. $61^{\circ} 15' N.$ and $62^{\circ} 15' N.$, and Long 1° and $8^{\circ} E.$ The forces returned a.m., 4th.

3rd. Destroyer Sweep to intercept Enemy Submarines off Norwegian Coast.—*Botha* and four destroyers of 14th Flotilla left Scapa a.m., 3rd, for a sweep up the Norwegian Coast along the probable track of enemy submarines. *Faulknor* and six destroyers of 12th Flotilla left Cromarty at the same time for a similar sweep. The 1st L.C.S. from Rosyth acted in support. The forces returned to their bases a.m. 4th.

5th. Submarine Attack on German Battleships.—Submarine *J.1* reported having attacked four *Kaiser* class ships in Lat. $6^{\circ} N.$, Long. $6^{\circ} 53' E.$ at 1.20 p.m., 5th. Four torpedoes were fired, two of which took effect on two ships.

10th. Operation to intercept German S.S. Brandenburg.—*Caroline* with destroyers *Orestes* and *Partridge* sailed from Scapa p.m. 10th, for Lerwick, preparatory to operations off Stadlandet to intercept the steamship *Brandenburg*.

13th. Battle Squadrons : Change of Bases.—The 1st B.S. and 12th Flotilla arrived at Scapa, 2nd B.S., *Calliope*, *Comus*, and *Royalist* arrived at Cromarty, p.m., 13th.

21st. Light Cruiser Sweep.—*Dublin*, *Melbourne*, and four destroyers sailed from Rosyth, p.m., 21st, with orders to sweep down M Channel and up Queen's Channel, thence to Rosyth. The force returned a.m., 23rd.

22nd—26th. Grand Fleet Exercises.—The 1st, 2nd, and 4th B.S., 4th L.C.S., 11th, 12th, 14th and 15th Flotillas proceeded to the eastward of the Shetlands, p.m., 22nd. At the conclusion of the a.m. exercise on 23rd, the *Iron Duke* proceeded to Rosyth to enable the Commander-in-Chief to confer with the First Lord of the Admiralty. The remainder of the forces returned to their bases 26th.

28th. Flag Changes.—Admiral Sir David Beatty succeeded Admiral Sir John Jellicoe in the supreme command of the Grand Fleet on the latter's appointment as First Sea Lord. Consequent thereon Rear-Admiral Sir William Pakenham was appointed to the command of the Battle Cruiser Fleet.

APPENDIX A.

MONTHLY INDEX TO PRINCIPAL SWEEPS, OPERATIONS,
AND EXERCISES.

1914.

August.

- 4th - Precautionary sweep of Grand Fleet.
- 15th-18th - Extended sweep.
- 28th - Heligoland Bight action.

September.

- 3rd-5th - Sweep to Skagerrak by 2nd and 3rd C.S., 1st L.C.S., and 2nd Flotilla.
- 7th-13th - General sweep of North Sea.
- 21st - Battle Fleet sweep north from Lat. 55° 45' N., Long. 3° 30' E.
- 26th - Sweep off Norwegian coast by B.C.S. and L.C.S.

October.

- 2nd-12th - Occupation of Cruiser Areas by Battle Fleet.
- 13th-15th - Sweep by 1st B.C.S. and 1st L.C.S.
- 16th - 1st and 4th B.S. sweep towards Rockall Bank on passage to Lough Swilly.
- 21st - Sweep by 1st B.C.S. and 1st L.C.S. towards Skagerrak.

November.

- 1st - 2nd B.S. joined 1st and 4th B.S. at Lough Swilly.
- 3rd - Gorleston Raid.
- 7th - 1st B.S. reached Scapa; 8th, the 2nd B.S.; 9th, the 4th B.S.
- 18th - 2nd B.S. left Scapa to watch area to westward.
- 21st-26th - General sweep of North Sea.

December.

- 9th-12th - 1st B.S. cruise N.E. of line Sydero-Westray.
- 15th - 2nd B.S. and 1st L.C.S. proceeded for operations in North Sea.
- 16th - Scarborough Raid.
- 24th-27th - Southerly sweep by Grand Fleet.

1915.

January.

- 19th - Reconnaissance of Heligoland Bight by 1st and 2nd B.C.S. and 1st L.C.S.
- 24th - Dogger Bank Action.

February.

- 1st-3rd - 3rd C.S. cruise in middle area of North Sea.
- 16th-20th - 2nd L.C.S. sweep to southward in North Sea.

March.

- 7th-10th - Grand Fleet exercises.
- 16th-18th - Grand Fleet exercises; sinking of U 29.
- 29th - Fleet proceeded to sea under Admiralty orders.

April.

- 11th-14th - Grand Fleet cruise in middle area of North Sea.
- 17th-21st - Fleet proceeded under Admiralty orders.
- 21st-23rd - Fleet proceeded under Admiralty orders.

May.

- 2nd-4th - Examination sweeps by L.C.S. and destroyers.
- 17th-19th - Sweep of middle area of North Sea.
- 29th-31st - Sweep towards Dogger Bank.

June.

- 11th-14th - Operation "Q"; full calibre firing and tactical exercises.
- 18th-21st - 3rd C.S. sweep towards Skagerrak.

July.

- 11th-13th - Grand Fleet exercises.
- 28th - Cruiser sweep to Skagerrak.

August.

- 6th-10th - 4th L.C.S. sweep off Norwegian coast.
- 16th - 1st and 4th L.C.S. sweep to cover approaches to bases.
- 18th - 1st B.C.S. exercise cruise.

September.

- 1st - Cruiser sweep to eastward of Scapa.
- 2nd-5th - Grand Fleet exercise cruise.
- 10th - Mining operations in North Sea.

October.

- 13th - Grand Fleet exercise cruise.
- 19th - 1st B.C.S. acting in support of Commodore (T).

November.

- 2nd - Grand Fleet exercise cruise.
- 5th-8th - Light Cruiser sweep to Skagerrak with Lion, 1st and B.C.S. in support.

December.

- 1st - Grand Fleet exercises.
- 2th - 2nd L.C.S. sweep to eastward of Little Fisher Bank.
- 24th - Sweeps by 1st C.S. and 3rd L.C.S.

1916.

January.

- 5th-8th - B.C.F. exercises.
- 26th-29th - Sweep in to Skagerrak by 1st and 4th L.C.S. supported by 2nd B.C.S.

February.

- 1st-3rd - 1st C.S. with four destroyers sweep in northern area of North Sea.
- 10th-12th - Concentration of Grand Fleet in North Sea.
- 17th - Sweep toward Norway by 3rd C.S.
- 26th-28th - Combined Grand Fleet Exercises.
- 29th - *Alcantara-Greif* Action.

March.

- 6th-7th - Southerly sweep by combined forces of Grand Fleet.
- 11th-13th - 1st L.C.S. sweep along Norwegian coast.
- 16th & 20th - Udsire-Naze sweep by *Roxburgh* and *Comus*, respectively, with two destroyers.
- 26th - Aerial operations off Danish coast: Grand Fleet at Sea.
- 29th-31st - Grand Fleet exercise.

April.

- 2nd - Zeppelin Raid on Firth of Forth.
- 3rd-4th - Sweep towards Norwegian coast by *Devonshire* and two destroyers.
- 6th-7th - Sweep towards Norwegian coast by *Roxburgh* and two destroyers.

April.

- 20th-23rd - Extensive sweep into Kattegat followed by concentration of Grand Fleet in the North Sea.
25th - German raid on East Coast.

May.

- 2nd-5th - Operation XX.: bombing of Tondern sheds.
9th - Sweep of Norwegian coast by 4th L.C.S.
24th - Sweep Naze-Udsire by 4th L.C.S. and five destroyers.
31st - Fleet action off the Jutland coast.

June.

- 14th - Sweep of Norwegian coast by 1st L.C.S.
25th - Sweep of Norwegian coast by *Comus* and *Constance*.
29th - Sweep of Norwegian coast by 3rd L.C.S.

July.

- 10th - Dispositions ordered to intercept new commerce raider *Moewe*.
12th - Sweep by ships of 2nd L.C.S.
17th-20th - Norwegian coast sweep by 3rd L.C.S. Grand Fleet exercises.
21st - Sweep off Norwegian coast by 1st L.C.S.
24th-26th - Sweep down Norwegian coast by 2nd L.C.S.

August.

- 1st - Sweep towards Norway by *Phaeton*, *Cordelia*, and four destroyers.
8th-10th - Sweep to intercept enemy raiders by 1st L.C.S.
12th-14th - Convoy by 4th L.C.S. of merchant vessels from Udsire to Rattray Head.
18th-20th - Operations by Grand Fleet in southern area of the North Sea.

September.

- 4th-6th - Sweep by 2nd B.C.S. and 2nd L.C.S.
20th-22nd - Sweep by *Yarmouth* and *Chatham* Grand Fleet exercises.
26th - Sweep by *Southampton* and *Dublin*.

October.

- 2nd-4th - 1st B.S. exercise cruise.
8th-10th - 2nd B.S. exercise cruise.
Sweep by *Birkenhead*, *Chester* and four destroyers.
19th-21st - Sweep by *Minotaur*, *Achilles*, *Weymouth* and *Melbourne* with six destroyers to intercept raiders.
22nd-24th - Exercise cruise of 4th and 5th B.S.
28th-2nd - L.C.S. sweep.
31st - B.C.F. and 13th Flotilla exercises.

November.

- 2nd - 2nd B.S. exercise cruise.
3rd - Destroyer sweep to intercept enemy submarines off the Norwegian coast.
21st - Sweep by *Dublin* and *Melbourne* with four destroyers.
22nd-26th - Grand Fleet exercises.

APPENDIX B.

ADDITIONS AND LOSSES TO GRAND FLEET.

(N.C. signifies New Construction.)

1914.

August.

- 26th - *Agincourt* (N.C.) joined Fleet off Noss Head and entered Scapa in company. Joined 4th B.S. September 7th.
30th - *Inflexible* from Mediterranean joined 1st B.C.S. at Scapa.

September.

- 3rd - *Princess Royal* detached on convoy service.
6th - Floating dock from Portsmouth northabout arrived at Cromarty.
14th - *Erin* (N.C.) joined Grand Fleet at Loch Ewe.
22nd - *Cressy*, *Aboukir* and *Hogue*, sunk in Lat. 52° 18' N., Long. 3° 41' E.

October.

- 18th - *Princess Royal* rejoined 1st B.C.S. at Loch Na Keal.
27th - *Audacious* sunk.

November.

- 2nd - 3rd B.S. ordered to Portland to join Channel Fleet.
3rd - 10 a.m. order cancelled. 3.50 p.m. Squadron ordered to proceed to Portland.
5th - *Invincible* and *Inflexible* left Cromarty for Devonport on special service.
6th - *Tiger* (N.C.) arrived at Scapa.
11th - *Princess Royal* detached to Halifax, N.S. on special service.

December.

- 7th - Formation of 1st C.S.
10th - *Emperor of India* (N.C.) and *Benbow* (N.C.), arrived at Scapa and joined 4th B.S.
20th - *Indomitable* from Mediterranean joined 1st B.C.S.
28th - Formation of 2nd L.C.S.

1915.

January.

- 1st - *Yarmouth* arrived Scapa and joined 2nd L.C.S.
2nd - *Princess Royal* arrived Scapa.
15th - 2nd B.C.S. reconstituted.
24th - *Lion* badly damaged in Dogger Bank action.

February.

- 1st - *Caroline* (N.C.) arrived Rosyth and joined 1st B.C.S.
7th - *Inconstant* (N.C.) arrived Rosyth and joined 1st B.C.S.
11th - Re-organisation of battle cruiser and light cruiser squadrons.
17th - *Australia* arrived at Rosyth and joined 2nd B.C.S.
24th - *Cordelia* (N.C.) arrived at Rosyth and joined 1st L.C.S.

March.

- 4th - *Indefatigable* and *Invincible* arrived Rosyth and joined 2nd and 3rd B.C.S. respectively.
10th - 6th C.S. (*Leviathan*, *Drake*, *Cumberland*) disbanded.

April.

- 7th - *Lion* returned to Rosyth and hoisted flag (8th).
- 13th - *Warspite* (N.C.) arrived at Scapa from Devonport.

May.

- 5th - *Campania* with seaplanes arrived at Scapa.
- 26th - *Queen Elizabeth* arrived at Scapa from the Dardanelles.

June.

- 2nd - *Comus* (N.C.) arrived at Scapa from the Tyne and joined 4th L.C.S.
- 19th - *Inflexible* arrived at Scapa from Gibraltar.
- 30th - *Carysfort* (N.C.) arrived at Scapa and joined 4th L.C.S.

July.

- 9th - *Calliope* (N.C.) arrived at Scapa from Devonport and joined 4th L.C.S.

August.

- 11th - *Canada* (N.C.) commissioned at Newcastle to join 4th B.S.
- 21st - *Kempenfelt* (N.C.) flotilla leader arrived at Scapa. Formation of 11th Flotilla.

September.

- 18th - *Warspite* on passage to Rosyth touched shoal off Dunbar; proceeded to Tyne on 22nd.
- 20th - *Birkenhead* (N.C.) arrived at Scapa from Liverpool.

October.

- 2nd - *Barham* (N.C.) arrived at Scapa from Liverpool.
- 15th - *Canada* arrived at Scapa from Rosyth.
- 22nd - Amalgamation of 2nd and 11th Flotillas at Scapa completed.
- 28th - *Argyll* wrecked on Bell Rock, proceeding from Devonport to Rosyth northabout.

November.

- 2nd - Formation of 5th B.S. at Scapa.
- 23rd - *Warspite* rejoined 5th B.S. at Scapa from the Tyne and Rosyth.

December.

- 3rd - *Warspite-Barham* collision.
- 8th - *Barham* proceeded to Cromarty.
- 11th - *Warspite* arrived at Devonport.
- 23rd - *Barham* rejoined Fleet at Scapa: *Warspite* the following day.
- 30th - Explosion and foundering of *Natal* at Cromarty.

1916.

January.

- 6th - *King Edward VII.* sunk by mine.
- 7th - *Albemarle* from 3rd B.S. at Rosyth left for Archangel.
- 19th - *Champion* (N.C.) joined 2nd L.C.S. at Rosyth; *Lowestoft* detached to Mediterranean; *Gloucester* paid off in Tyne.
- 31st - *Constance* (N.C.) arrived at Scapa from Liverpool, and joined 4th L.C.S.

February.

- 11th - *Arethusa* sunk by mine.
- 18th - *Malaya* (N.C.) arrived at Scapa from Tyne.

March.

- 2nd - *Valiant* (N.C.) arrived at Scapa from Devonport.
- 5th - *Zealandia* returned to Rosyth from the Mediterranean.
- 27th - *Revenge* (N.C.) arrived at Scapa.

April.

- 2nd - *Hibernia* returned to Rosyth from Mediterranean.
- Formation of 13th Flotilla at Rosyth.
- 12th - *Campania* returned to Scapa from Liverpool.
- 18th - *Royal Sovereign* commissioned at Portsmouth.
- 19th - *Royalist* transferred to 4th L.C.S. from 12th Flotilla.
- 29th - 3rd B.S. and 3rd C.S. left Rosyth for the Humber and Sheerness.
- " *Champion* became flotilla leader of 13th Flotilla.
- " *Carysfort* left Scapa for Harwich to join 5th L.C.S.

May.

- 11th - *Royal Oak* (N.C.) arrived at Scapa from Devonport.
- 12th - *Gloucester* arrived Rosyth from special service.
- 25th - *Royal Sovereign* (N.C.) arrived at Scapa from Portsmouth.
- 27th - Formation of 14th Flotilla at Scapa.
- 30th - 7th C.S. amalgamated with 2nd C.S.
- 31st - *Queen Mary, Indefatigable, Invincible, Defence, Warrior, Black Prince, Tipperary* (flotilla leader), and *Sparrowhawk, Ardent, Fortune, Turbulent, Nestor, Nomad* and *Shark* (destroyers), sunk in action. *Marlborough* damaged by torpedo.

June.

- 5th - *Hampshire* sunk by mine.

July.

- 8th - *Lion* returned to Rosyth from Tyne, *Barham* to Scapa from Devonport and the Clyde.
- 30th - *Active* and 4th Flotilla based on Humber.

August.

- 5th - *Marlborough* returned to Cromarty from the Tyne.
- 9th - *Antrim* and *Roxburgh* proceeded to Devonport.
- 18th - *Cambrian* (N.C.) arrived at Scapa from Pembroke and joined 4th L.C.S.
- 24th - *Warspite* and *Valiant* in collision at Scapa.
- 27th - *Devonshire* sailed from Scapa for Devonport to pay off.

September.

- 21st - *Repulse* (N.C.) arrived at Scapa from Clyde for exercises before joining Battle Cruiser Force at Rosyth.

October.

- 19th - Formation of 15th Flotilla; *Grenville* (N.C.) from Birkenhead and the Clyde arrived at Scapa.
- 21st - *Melbourne* arrived at Rosyth from Scapa to join B.C. Force.
- 26th - *Weymouth* arrived at Rosyth from Scapa to join 2nd L.C.S.

November.

- 10th - *Repulse* arrived at Rosyth to join B.C. Force.
- 14th - *Courageous* (N.C.) arrived at Rosyth from Tyne.
- 16th - *Sydney* arrived at Rosyth from Scapa to join 2nd L.C.S.
- 19th - 4th Flotilla withdrawn from Commander-in-Chief's command to the channel for submarine hunting.

APPENDIX C.

FLAG CHANGES IN THE GRAND FLEET.

1914.

- December.**
 2nd - Rear-Admiral Moore transferred his flag from *New Zealand* to *Leviathan* in command of 1st C.S.
 18th - Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, 1st B.S. and Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, 6th B.S., exchanged commands.
 28th - Rear-Admiral Trevelyan Napier hoisted his flag in *Falmouth* in command of 2nd L.C.S.

1915.

- January.**
 17th - Rear-Admiral Sir Archibald Moore transferred his flag to *New Zealand* in command of 2nd B.C.S.
 Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot hoisted his flag in *Defence*, 1st C.S.
 17th - Rear-Admiral Leveson hoisted his flag as R.A., 2nd B.S. in *Orion*.

- February.**
 7th - Vice Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee succeeded Vice-Admiral Sir Douglas Gamble in command of 4th B.S.
 8th - Rear-Admiral Sir Archibald G. Moore, lately of 2nd B.C.S., appointed R.A., 9th C.S. (*King Alfred*).
 15th - Commodore Alexander-Sinclair hoisted his broad pendant in *Galatea* at Scapa in command of 1st L.C.S.

- March.**
 1st - Commodore O. de B. Brock hoisted his broad pendant in *Tiger* (temporarily).
 5th - Rear-Admiral O. de B. Brock hoisted his flag in *Princess Royal* in command of 1st B.C.S.
 7th - Rear-Admiral Pakenham hoisted his flag in *Australia*, 2nd B.C.S. in succession to Vice-Admiral Pater.
 13th - Rear-Admiral Grant assumed command of 3rd C.S.

- April.**
 11th - Rear-Admiral Tottenham succeeded Rear-Admiral Waymouth in command of 7th C.S.
 15th - Captain C. E. Le Mesurier appointed Commodore 4th L.C.S.

- May.**
 27th - Rear-Admiral Hood hoisted his flag in *Invincible* as R.A.C. 3rd B.C.S.

- July.**
 27th - Rear-Admiral Sydney R. Fremantle appointed R.A. 3rd B.S. and Rear-Admiral Browning appointed R.A.C., 3rd C.S.

- August.**
 24th - Rear-Admiral Gaunt hoisted his flag in *Collingwood* as R.A. 1st B.S. in succession to Rear-Admiral Evan Thomas.

- October.**
 25th - Rear-Admiral Herbert L. Heath hoisted his flag in *Minotaur* in command of 7th C.S.

- December.**
 16th - Vice-Admiral Sir Martyn Jerram relieved Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender in command of 2nd B.S.

1916.

- March.**
 13th - Rear-Admiral Cecil F. Dampier relieved Rear-Admiral Sydney R. Fremantle as R.A. 3rd B.S.

- May.**
 31st - Rear-Admiral Sir Robert K. Arbuthnot commanding 1st C.S. and Rear-Admiral Hon. Horace Hood, commanding 3rd B.C.S., killed in action.

- July.**
 19th - Vice-Admiral Sir John M. de Robeck relieved Vice-Admiral Sir Edward E. Bradford in command of 3rd B.S. (Flag flown in *Dreadnought*).
 [From April 18th-June 22nd, 1916, *Dreadnought* was at Rosyth refitting. She reached Scapa again on June 23rd, but left again on July 8th for Sheerness, where she became the flagship of 3rd B.S. *Dreadnought*, rejoined Grand Fleet again in May 1918.]

- November.**
 28th - Admiral Sir John Jellicoe appointed First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir David Beatty to Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, and Vice-Admiral Sir William Pakenham to command Battle Cruiser Fleet.

APPENDIX D.

COMPOSITION OF GRAND FLEET.

January 1st, 1915.

Iron Duke (Flag), *Sappho*, *Oak*.

1st B.S.—*Marlborough* (Flag), *Collingwood*, *Colossus*, *Hercules*, *Neptune*, *St. Vincent* (Flag 2), *Superb*, *Vanguard*, *Bellona* (*Bellona* left Leith p.m., 29th Dec.).

2nd B.S.*—*King George V.*, *Ajax*, *Centurion* (Flag, temp.), *Conqueror*, *Monarch* (Devonport, 5 p.m., January 1st), *Orion* (Flag 2), *Thunderer*, *Boadicea*. (Refitting Scotstoun, complete January 3rd.)

3rd B.S.—*King Edward VII.* (Flag), *Africa*, *Britannia*, *Commonwealth*, *Dominion*, *Hibernia* (Flag 2), *Hindustan*, *Zealandia*, *Blanche*.

4th B.S.—*Benbow* (Flag), *Dreadnought*, *Bellerophon* (docked at Cromarty, 1st January), *Temeraire*, *Agincourt*, *Erin*, *Emperor of India* (Flag 2), *Blonde*. *Sapphire* (detailed as flotilla leader in Mediterranean).

1st B.C.S.—*Lion* (Flag), *Princess Royal*, *Queen Mary*, *New Zealand*, *Tiger*, *Indomitable*.

1st C.S.—*Leviathan* (Flag), *Warrior*, *Black Prince* (docked at Cromarty, 18th December, complete 1st January), *Duke of Edinburgh*.

2nd C.S.—*Shannon* (Flag), *Achilles*, *Cochrane*, *Natal*.

3rd C.S.—*Antrim* (Flag), *Argyll*, *Devonshire*, *Rozburgh*.

6th C.S.—*Drake* (Flag); *Donegal*; *Hampshire* (arrived Gibraltar, 10th December, ordered to England, ready 6th January); *Cumberland* arrived Devonport (a.m., 27th December, docking).

1st L.C.S.—*Southampton* (Flag), *Birmingham*, *Nottingham*, *Lowestoft*.

* *Audacious*, was still shown in "Positions and Movements," although sunk on October 27th, 1914.

2nd L.C.S.—*Falmouth* (Flag), *Gloucester*, *Yarmouth* (p.m. left Devonport), *Liverpool* (defects 20th December, arrived Barrow; complete 20th February 1915), *Dartmouth* (27th December, left Trinidad to search coast to eastward: p.m. 31st, arrived Georgetown).

2nd Flotilla.—*Galatea*, *Active* (Captain D., 30th December, left for Devonport, defects), *Broke* (2nd in Command: Leith, defects: Complete, 31st December). *Blake* (Depôt Ship), *Acorn*, *Alarm*, *Brisk*, *Cameleon*, *Comet*, *Fury*, *Goldfinch*, *Hope*, *Larne*, *Lyra*, *Martin*, *Minstrel*, *Nemesis*, *Nereide*, *Nymph*, *Redpole*, *Rifleman*, *Ruby*, *Sheldrake*, *Staunch*.

4th Flotilla.—*Caroline* (Captain D. temporary), *Swift* (to arrive Birkenhead 4th January), *Faulknor* (2nd in Command): *Hecla* (Depôt Ship), *Acasta*, *Achates*, *Ambuscade*, *Ardent*, *Christopher*, *Cockatrice*, *Contest*, *Fortune*, *Garland*, *Hardy*, *Lynx*, *Midge*, *Owl*, *Paragon*, *Porpoise*, *Shark*, *Sparrowhawk*, *Spitfire*, *Unity*, *Victor*.

July 1st, 1915.

BATTLE FLEET.

Iron Duke (Flag), *Carysfort*, *Sappho*, *Oak*.

1st B.S.—*Marlborough* (Flag), *Collingwood*, *Colossus*, *Hercules*, *Neptune*, *St. Vincent* (Flag 2), *Superb*, *Vanguard*, *Bellona*.

2nd B.S.—*King George V.* (Flag), *Ajax*, *Centurion*, *Conqueror*, *Monarch*, *Orion* (Flag 2), *Thunderer*, *Warspite*, *Boadicea* (arrived Glasgow 21st June, refit. Complete 5th July.)

3rd B.S.—*King Edward VII.* (Flag), *Africa*, *Britannia*, *Commonwealth* (Flag 2, temporary), *Dominion*, *Hibernia*, *Hindustan*, *Zealandia*, *Albemarle*, *Russell*, *Diamond* (docked at Leith. Completed, 13th July).

4th B.S.—*Benbow* (Flag), *Dreadnought*, *Bellerophon* (arrived Devonport, 20th June: refit; complete 2nd July), *Temeraire*, *Agincourt*, *Erin* (arrived Portsmouth 27th June, refit), *Emperor of India* (Flag 2), *Queen Elizabeth*, *Blonde*.

BATTLE CRUISER FLEET.—*Lion* (Flag).

1st B.C.S.—*Princess Royal*, *Tiger* (Flag), *Queen Mary*.

2nd B.C.S.—*Australia* (Flag), *New Zealand*, *Indefatigable*.

3rd B.C.S.—*Indomitable*, *Invincible* (Flag), *Inflexible*.

1st L.C.S.—*Galatea* (Broad Pendant), *Caroline*, *Cordelia*, *Inconstant*.

2nd L.C.S.—*Southampton* (Broad Pendant), *Birmingham*, *Lowestoft* (arrived Chatham, 19th June. Refit. Date of completion uncertain). *Nottingham*.

3rd L.C.S.—*Falmouth* (Flag), *Gloucester*, *Liverpool* (Barrow, refit. Date of completion, 20th September), *Yarmouth*.

4th L.C.S.—*Calliope* (Broad Pendant, arrived Devonport 29th June), *Royalist*, *Comus*, *Phaeton* (arrived Barrow, 5th June. Refit machinery at Vickers' Works. Complete 2nd July).

1st C.S.—*Defence* (Flag), *Warrior*, *Black Prince*, *Duke of Edinburgh*.

2nd C.S.—*Shannon* (Flag), *Achilles*, *Cochrane*, *Natal*.

3rd C.S.—*Antrim* (Flag), *Argyll*, *Devonshire*, *Roxburgh* (arrived Tyne, 27th June, repairs at Palmers', Hebburn, date uncertain).

7th C.S.—*Minotaur* (Flag), *Hampshire* (left Liverpool 29th), *Donegal*, *Lancaster*.

1st Flotilla.—*Woolwich* (Depôt Ship), *Fearless* (Captain D.), *Botha* (2nd in Command), *Acheron*, *Archer*, *Ariel*, *Attack*, *Badger*, *Beaver*, *Defender*, *Druid*, *Ferret*, *Forester*, *Goshawk*, *Hind*, *Hornet*, *Hydra*, *Jackal*, *Lapwing*, *Lizard*, *Phoenix*, *Sandfly*, *Tigress*.

2nd Flotilla.—*Blake* (Depôt Ship), *Active* (Captain D.), *Broke* (2nd in Command), *Acorn*, *Alarm*, *Brisk*, *Cameleon*, *Comet*, *Fury*, *Hope*, *Larne*, *Lyra*, *Martin*, *Minstrel*, *Moon*, *Nemesis*, *Nereide*, *Nymph*, *Redpole*, *Rifleman*, *Ruby*, *Sheldrake*, *Staunch*.

4th Flotilla.—*Hecla* (Depôt Ship), *Swift* (Captain D., arrived in Clyde, 16th June. Complete 1st July), *Faulknor* (2nd in Command), *Acasta*, *Achates*, *Ambuscade*, *Ardent*, *Christopher*, *Cockatrice*, *Contest*, *Fortune*, *Garland*, *Hardy*, *Lynx*, *Midge*, *Owl*, *Paragon*, *Porpoise*, *Shark*, *Sparrowhawk*, *Spitfire*, *Unity*, *Victor*.

January 1st, 1916.

BATTLE FLEET.

Iron Duke (Flag), *Sappho*, *Oak*.

1st B.S.—*Marlborough* (Flag), *Collingwood*, *Colossus* (Flag 2), *Hercules*, *Neptune*, *St. Vincent*, *Agincourt*, *Vanguard*, *Bellona*.

2nd B.S.—*King George V.* (Flag), *Ajax*, *Centurion*, *Conqueror* (at Invergordon, docked 23rd December for repairs. Complete 3rd January), *Monarch*, *Orion* (Flag 2), *Thunderer*, *Erin*, *Boadicea*.

3rd B.S.—*King Edward VII.* (Flag), *Africa* (Belfast for refit. Complete 3rd January), *Britannia*, *Commonwealth*, *Dominion*, *Hindustan*, *Albemarle*, *Diamond*.

4th B.S.—*Benbow* (Flag), *Dreadnought*, *Bellerophon*, *Temeraire*, *Superb*, *Emperor of India* (Flag 2), *Canada*, *Blonde*, *Blanche*.

5th B.S.—*Barham* (Flag), *Queen Elizabeth*, *Warspite*.

BATTLE CRUISER FLEET.

Lion (Flag).

1st B.C.S.—*Princess Royal* (Flag), *Tiger*, *Queen Mary*.

2nd B.C.S.—*Australia* (Flag), *New Zealand*, *Indefatigable*.

3rd B.C.S.—*Invincible* (Flag), *Indomitable*, *Inflexible*. (Tyne for refit. Undocked 31st December.)

1st L.C.S.—*Galatea* (Broad Pendant), *Phaeton*, *Cordelia*, *Inconstant*.

2nd L.C.S.—*Southampton* (Broad Pendant), *Birmingham*, *Lowestoft*, *Nottingham*, *Champion* (temporarily attached).

3rd L.C.S.—*Falmouth* (Flag), *Gloucester* (Tyne for refit. Date, completion uncertain. Paid off 7th January), *Yarmouth*, *Birkenhead*.

1st C.S.—*Defence* (Flag), *Warrior*, *Black Prince*, *Duke of Edinburgh*.

2nd C.S.—*Shannon* (Flag), *Achilles*, *Cochrane*.

3rd C.S.—*Antrim* (Flag), *Devonshire* (Liverpool for refit. To complete January 8th), *Roxburgh*.

7th C.S.—*Minotaur* (Flag), *Hampshire*, *Donegal*.

4th L.C.S.—*Calliope* (Broad Pendant), *Caroline*, *Comus*.

1st Flotilla (Rosyth).—*Woolwich* (Depôt Ship) *Fearless* (Captain D.), *Botha* (2nd in command), *Acheron*, *Archer*, *Ariel*, *Attack*, *Badger*, *Beaver*, *Defender*, *Druid*, *Ferret*, *Forester*, *Goshawk*, *Hind*, *Hornet*, *Hydra*, *Jackal*, *Lapwing*, *Lizard*, *Phoenix*, *Sandfly*, *Tigress*.

2nd Flotilla (Cromarty).—*Broke* (2nd in Command), *Nemesis*, *Nymph*.

11th Flotilla (Cromarty).—*Blake* (Depôt Ship), *Castor* (Captain D.), *Kempfenfelt*, *Mandate*, *Manners*, *Marmion*, *Marne*, *Martial*, *Michael*, *Milbrook*, *Minion*, *Mons*, *Moon*, *Morning Star*, *Mounsey*, *Musketeer*, *Mystic*, *Ossory*.

12th Flotilla (Scapa).—*Diligence* (Depôt Ship), *Royalist* (Captain D.), *Marksman*, *Maenad*, *Marvel*, *Mindful*, *Mischief*, *Nessus*.

4th Flotilla (Scapa).—*Hecla* (Depôt Ship), *Carysfort* (Captain D.) *Faulknor*, *Acasta*, *Achates*, *Ambuscade*, *Ardent*, *Christopher*, *Cockatrice*, *Contest*, *Fortune*, *Garland*, *Hardy*, *Midge*, *Owl*, *Paragon*, *Porpoise*, *Shark*, *Sparrowhawk*, *Spitfire*, *Unity*, *Victor*.

July 1st, 1916.

BATTLE FLEET.

Iron Duke (Comander-in-Chief's Flag at Invergordon for refit. To complete July 3rd). *Sappho*, *Abdiel*, *Oak*, *Active* (temporarily attached).

1st B.S.—*Marlborough* (Tyne for repairs. To complete middle of August), *Royal Oak* (Flag), *Emperor of India* (Flag 2), *Canada*, *Revenge*, *Royal Sovereign*, *Benbow*, *Agincourt*, *Bellona*.

2nd B.S.—*King George V.* (Flag), *Ajax*, *Centurion*, *Conqueror*, *Monarch*, *Orion* (Flag 2), *Thunderer*, *Erin*, *Boadicea*.

3rd B.S.—*Britannia* (Flag), *Africa*, *Commonwealth*, *Dominion*, *Hindustan*, *Hibernia* (Flag 2), *Zealandia*, *Dreadnought*, *Diamond*.

4th B.S.—*Hercules* (Flag), *Colossus* (Flag 2), *Collingwood*, *Bellerophon*, *Neptune*, *St. Vincent*, *Vanguard*, *Temeraire*, *Superb*, *Blonde*, *Blanche*.

5th B.S.—*Barham* (Devonport for repairs. To complete 3rd July) *Queen Elizabeth* (Flag), *Warspite* (Rosyth for repairs. To complete 8th July), *Malaya*.

BATTLE CRUISER FLEET.

Lion (Tyne for repairs. Date of completion uncertain).

1st B.C.S.—*Princess Royal* (Flag. At Portsmouth for repairs. To complete about 15th July).

Tiger (Flag of V.A. at Rosyth. To complete about 2nd July), *New Zealand*.

2nd B.C.S.—*Australia* (Flag), *Inflexible*, *Indomitable*.

1st L.C.S.—*Galatea* (Broad Pendant), *Phaeton*, *Cordelia*, *Inconstant*.

2nd L.C.S.—*Southampton* (Flag), *Birmingham*, *Nottingham*, *Dublin*.

3rd L.C.S.—*Falmouth* (Flag. Tyne for refit. To complete 3rd July), *Chatham* (Chatham), *Yarmouth*, *Birkenhead*, *Gloucester* (temporarily attached), *Chester* (Humber for refit. To complete August 30th).

2nd C.S.—*Minotaur* (Flag. Liverpool for refit), *Shannon*, *Achilles*, *Chorane*, *Duke of Edinburgh*.

3rd C.S.—*Antrim* (Flag), *Devonshire*, *Rozburgh*.

4th L.C.S.—*Calliope* (Broad Pendant), *Caroline*, *Comus*, *Constance*, *Royalist*.

1st Flotilla (Rosyth).—*Woolwich* (Depôt Ship), *Fearless*, *Acheron*, *Archer*, *Ariel*, *Attack*, *Badger*, *Goshawk*, *Hydra*, *Jackal*, *Lapwing*, *Lizard*, *Phoenix*.

4th Flotilla (Scapa).—*Hecla* (Depôt Ship), *Botha*, *Broke*, *Acasta*, *Achates*, *Ambuscade*, *Christopher*, *Cockatrice*, *Contest*, *Garland*, *Hardy*, *Midge*, *Owl*, *Paragon*, *Porpoise*, *Spitfire*, *Unity*, *Victor*.

11th Flotilla (Cromarty).—*Blake* (Depôt Ship), *Castor* (Commodore F.), *Kempfenfelt*, *Magic*, *Mandate*, *Manners*, *Marmion*, *Marne*, *Martial*, *Michael*, *Milbrook*, *Minion*, *Mons*, *Moon*, *Morning Star*, *Mounsey*, *Musketeer*, *Mystic*, *Ossory*.

12th Flotilla (Scapa).—*Diligence* (Depôt Ship), *Faulknor*, *Marksman*, *Maenad*, *Mameluke*, *Marvel*, *Mary Rose*, *Menace*, *Mindful*, *Mischief*, *Munster*, *Napier*, *Narwhal*, *Nessus*, *Noble*, *Nonsuch*, *Obedient*, *Onslaught*, *Opal*.

13th Flotilla (Rosyth).—*Woolwich* (Depôt ship), *Champion*, *Gabriel*, *Moresby*, *Narborough*, *Negro*, *Nepean*, *Nereus*, *Nerissa*, *Nicator*, *Obdurate*, *Onslow*, *Paladin*, *Pelican*, *Penn*, *Petard*, *Pigeon*.

14th Flotilla (Scapa).—*Greenwich* (Depôt Ship), *Nonpareil*, *Observer*, *Ophelia*, *Opportune*, *Orestes*, *Partridge*, *Patriot*, *Peyton*, *Relentless*.

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Attention is drawn to the Penalties attaching to any infraction of the Official Secrets Act.

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THE FIRST AUSTRALASIAN CONVOY. 1914.

Monograph No. 14.

NAVAL STAFF,
TRAINING AND STAFF DUTIES DIVISION,
January, 1921.

THE FIRST AUSTRALASIAN CONVOY. 1914.

INTRODUCTION.

The arrangements for the escort of the Australasian convoy and its voyage from Sydney to Suez were contemporary with a long period of anxiety in Eastern waters and occupied a considerable part of the Admiralty's attention during the first few months of the war. The convoy has, therefore, seemed a suitable subject for a monograph, though it is realised that a detailed story of it will bring about a certain amount of repetition of matter which must also appear in monographs treating of the stations through which it passed.

This may not be thought a great disadvantage, since here, events are viewed as they affected the convoy, while in the other monographs the convoy is considered only in the effect it had upon station arrangements. Thus two different view-points are presented from which to assess the effect of intelligence or the complications bound to arise from conflicting demands upon Naval force.

Sources.—The telegrams, reports and other documents concerning the Australasian Convoy have been collected and bound by the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence; these volumes are titled H.S. 1 and H.S. 2, and consist together of over 650 leaves. The arrangements made by the Transport Department are to be found in the volumes T.3340/15 and T.11209/14 dealing with the Australian and New Zealand Expeditionary Forces separately.

References.—An appendix of telegrams has been added, and reference to this is in footnotes beginning with the letter A. Telegrams quoted verbatim in the text are not given in the Appendix.

No references are given for movements of H.M. Ships or for Intelligence Reports; the former are taken from the logs and the Intelligence Reports are to be found in a summarised form in a Return called "Disposition of German, Austrian, and Italian Ships," issued by the Intelligence Division throughout the war. In several places references will be found to a monograph called "China and *Emden*." This is in preparation and will be issued early in 1921.

The Convoy Naval Orders, as in force when the convoy started, are given in Appendix B.

This monograph is an expansion of material compiled by the writer while serving on the staff of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence, for the use of Sir Julian Corbett in the production of his "Naval Operations."

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THE FIRST AUSTRALASIAN CONVOY. AUGUST to NOVEMBER, 1914.

CHAPTER I.

THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

The threat of war between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente roused great enthusiasm in all British Dominions and Colonies, nowhere more than in Australia and New Zealand. On 31 July, 1914, a resolution was passed in the New Zealand Parliament which stated that New Zealand was prepared to send her utmost quota of help in support of the Empire; and on August 3 the Commonwealth of Australia offered to despatch an Expeditionary Force of 20,000 men of any desired composition to any destination indicated by the Home Government.¹

War with Germany was declared on August 4 and on the 5th a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence (with Admiral Sir Henry B. Jackson in the Chair) was appointed by the Prime Minister to consider combined operations against the German Colonies; their first decision was to invite the Governments of Australia and New Zealand to undertake the seizure of the German wireless and cable stations in the Pacific. Australia was accordingly asked to take New Guinea, Yap and Nauru, while New Zealand was to seize Samoa, in addition to sending to Europe the Expeditionary Forces they had offered. The seizure of these German possessions is described in C.B. 917, Naval Staff Monographs (Fleet issue), Vol. I., No. 2; they will be mentioned here only in so far as they affect the transport home of the forces intended for the main theatre of war. Australia's contingent was one division and one light horse brigade, ready in four to six weeks, while New Zealand would have 8,270 men and 3,838 horses ready to embark in four weeks' time. As the ships in which the troops would be transported were chiefly those employed in the frozen meat trade it was decided that they should also bring a full cargo of mutton and other home goods for private shippers.²

To the Admiralty the provision of escort for so large a body of troops was a serious question, particularly in view of the fact that the small expeditions in the Pacific would require for some weeks all the Naval force on the station. The matter was not immediately urgent since the contingents for home were not ready; and by careful adjustment both services could be

¹ H.S. 1, pp. 8c., 20.

² C.I.D. Paper 114-C; H.S. 1, pp. 25, 25, 32.

managed. As soon as the *Encounter*, *Sydney* and *Melbourne* had completed their duty of supporting the Australian Expedition to New Guinea they could return to take up the escort of the convoy for Europe, and on August 13th it was considered by the Admiralty that they would be available in good time.¹

The preparation of the New Zealand force proceeded more rapidly than had been anticipated, and on August 14 the Governor announced that it could start on the 27th if the necessity was urgent.² Ten ships had been chartered,³ nine of which plied normally in the cold storage trade.

The Australian Contingent also was making rapid progress and the Governor-General of the Commonwealth, influenced probably by the fact that no enemy had been active in Australian waters, on the 18th telegraphed:—

In about a week it is proposed to start horses in slow ships, other ships following as soon as they are ready. Is it considered necessary to have a convoy? (Recd. at C.O. 9.10 a.m. 18.8.14.)

This proposition was almost identical with that made about the same time by the Canadian Government, who also wished to send their troop-ships one by one as soon as ready; it received the same reply to the effect that the transports must leave in one convoy, the date of its departure to depend on Naval opportunity. There were German war vessels in the waters through which the Australian transports would pass, and until these were hunted away the convoy could not leave unescorted.⁴ The *Königsberg* and some liners possibly armed were known to be in the western part of the Indian Ocean. In Australasian waters the chief danger was from the German Pacific Squadron commanded by Admiral Von Spee. His most powerful units, the two armoured cruisers *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, had not been located since the outbreak of war, but were thought to be together in the Marshall Islands. They had over 20,000 tons of coal afloat, which gave them a very large radius of action. Intelligence had been received that the light cruiser *Emden* had left Tsingtau with four colliers on August 4 and she had not since been reported. Another light cruiser, the *Leipzig*, had coaled at San Francisco on August 17, while the third light cruiser, *Nürnberg*, was thought to be accompanying the German Admiral. The gunboats of the German squadron were all at Tsingtau or up rivers in China and did not enter into the question, but close to Australian waters was the gunboat *Geier*, which had last been heard of in the Makassar Straits on August 5.⁵

¹ A.1.

² A.2.

³ *Maunganui, Tahiti, Arawa, Athenic, Waimana, Star of India, Hawke's Bay, Ruapehu, Orari, Limerick.* HS 1, pp. 49, 51.

⁴ A.3. H.S. 1, p. 82e.

⁵ Disposition of German, Austrian, and Italian Ships, 18th August 1914.

Australia had increased to 25, so that from Fremantle to Aden the convoy would consist of 35 ships. There had been a change in dates. The idea in Australia appears to have been to send a convoy from Fremantle on October 9 instead of October 4, to be followed by another on October 12, and a third on November 12. The Admiralty felt unable to provide three separate escorts but guaranteed a strong one on October 7, to be followed by another in six weeks' time, and the Australian and New Zealand authorities were instructed to make arrangements accordingly.¹ The escort was to be strengthened still more by the presence of the *Australia* as well as a cover to be afforded by the China Squadron.² This, which was now based on Singapore, had searched Sumatra, Java, and adjoining seas but found no trace of the German ships, nothing being known of the Pacific Squadron since August 9, when they coaled at Ponape (7° N., 158° E.). Herbertshöhe in New Pommern had been occupied by the Australian Expedition without opposition, and after a short fight inland at the wireless station the officer commanding the German forces had surrendered unconditionally. After the occupation of Rabaul, which was expected immediately, Admiral Patey would be free to use the greater part of his force in escort work. His proposal to leave Simpsonhaven for Sydney on the 14th, to pick up the transports, was approved by the Admiralty, who ordered the *Hampshire* only to Fremantle, leaving the movements of the *Minotaur* in abeyance.³

The New Zealand Contingent, which was now to leave on September 25, was to be escorted from Wellington as far as longitude 145 E. by the *Psyche* and *Philomel*, to be relieved there by the *Pyramus*, and taken on by her to Fremantle without calling at Port Adelaide; in this arrangement the Admiralty did not interfere, as they had left all details to Admiral Patey. The Australian Government also abandoned Port Adelaide as the point of concentration, and chose King George Sound, Albany, for the assembling of their transports, now numbering 27 ships.⁴ During the absence of the Australian cruisers, the *Minotaur*, *Ibuki*, and *Chikuma* were to form a squadron under the command of Captain Kiddle of the *Minotaur* and act from New Britain, while the waters south of Singapore were to be patrolled by the *D'Iberville*, three French destroyers, and the *Askold*.⁵

Thus all seemed satisfactorily arranged. The contingent sent by the New Zealand Government was to be brought by its own cruisers as far as Fremantle, while the Australian transports, after assembling at King George Sound, would be escorted by the Australian squadron, reinforced by the *Hampshire*, and joined somewhere on the route by the 10 New

¹ H.S. 1, p. 138.

² A.11.

³ A.13, 14.

⁴ A.15; H.S. 1, p. 161; A.17

⁵ A.16.

Zealand transports. The powerful ships of the China Squadron would act as a screen to the east and north of the transport route while lighter forces patrolled the passages between Sumatra and Australia. But no sooner were all the arrangements complete than a serious disturbance took place.

CHAPTER II.

CRUISERS ON THE CONVOY ROUTE.

Two telegrams caused the disturbance. One reported a German message overheard ordering a collier to the neighbourhood of New Guinea, and the other stated that the *Emden* had suddenly appeared in the Bay of Bengal.

The New Zealand Government were already feeling considerable uneasiness at the fact that the escort for their expedition would consist of only P. Class ships as far as Albany,¹ and their anxiety was deepened when, in addition, it was learned that the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* had appeared off Samoa on September 14, and had left it in a N.W. direction. This news caused a great alteration of the arrangements; the *Australia*, *Melbourne*, and *Sydney* had left Simpsonhaven for Sydney, but the *Australia* was retained in the Pacific, and the China Squadron was redistributed in accordance with the following telegram:—

Situation changed by appearance of *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* at Samoa on 14th, and *Emden* in Bay of Bengal.

Australia and *Montcalm* to cover *Encounter* and Expeditionary Force from attack, and then search for the two cruisers.

Melbourne to be used at R.A.'s discretion; *Sydney* to return for convoy of Australian troops to Aden.

Hampshire and *Yarmouth* to sink *Emden*.

Minotaur to arrive at Fremantle by October 4 for Australian convoy; one Japanese cruiser to accompany *Minotaur*.

(176 to China, 18 to R.A., *Australia*, 27 to Navy Board, Melbourne. Sent 12.40 p.m., 16.9.14.)

The Japanese cruiser chosen was the *Ibuki*, carrying four 12-inch and eight 8-inch guns, an easy match for the German armoured ships. On receipt of the telegram Admiral Patey turned back for Simpsonhaven with the *Australia* and *Sydney*, choosing the latter, as the *Melbourne* required slight repairs which she could easily carry out at Sydney before being required for escort work. But these arrangements, since they promised no increase in escort to the New Zealand forces between Wellington and Albany, did little to calm the anxiety

¹ A.18.

of the New Zealand Cabinet, several Ministers threatening to resign on the subject. The Australian Cabinet also considered that the Admirals in the Pacific had failed to cope with the German Squadron, and in their eyes it was a grave menace to the convoy, which now numbered 41 ships.¹ The Admiralty's interpretation of Admiral von Spee's appearance at Apia was that he did not even know that Samoa had been taken, and would know nothing of the arrangements of the New Zealand sailings; they considered it incredible for him to steam 2,000 miles south into waters where he could get no coal, other than what he brought with him, and they assured the New Zealand Government that there was really no need for escort of any kind if due precautions were taken. To withdraw the Australian Squadron for escort duty would mean the abandonment of the New Guinea Expedition, which they felt would be the goal of the German Admiral, and they were not prepared to agree to such a course. In response to these representations the New Zealand Government did not press its objections, and on the 21st consented that the expedition should leave Wellington on the appointed date.²

But the trouble was not over, for the German cruisers were thought to have come from Samoa towards Fiji, and a meeting of the New Zealand Cabinet, held on September 22, expressed dissent with the Admiralty views as to the safety of the route, the Leader of the Upper House threatening to resign. The Admiralty again refused to withdraw the *Australia* from New Britain, and suggested that, as no further escort was available, the departure of the contingent had better be postponed; they pointed out, however, that the Australian Contingent would leave on the day already arranged. Perhaps this last remark had a settling effect on the New Zealand Cabinet, for at a meeting which discussed this reply they finally decided to let their men sail on the 25th.³

Meanwhile, the Admiralty ordered the *Minotaur* and *Ihuki* round the south coast of Australia to meet the convoy.⁴ Thus all seemed to have been satisfactorily settled, and the *Pyramus* left for Melbourne while two transports proceeded from Auckland with the *Philomel* to join up with the rest of the New Zealand convoy at Wellington. But at the last moment there was a serious hitch.

¹ A.18, 19, 20, 49.

² A.21, 22.

³ A.23, 24, 28

⁴ A.25.

CHAPTER III.

THE ATTITUDE OF THE DOMINION GOVERNMENTS.

The fact that we had taken no obvious steps to seek out and destroy the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, though due entirely to the necessity of first eliminating their means of communication and supply, was having various effects upon the minds of the Australian and New Zealand peoples. Of these, the chief were distrust of the Admiralty's assurances as to the safety of the transports; annoyance at the Admiralty's handling of the Australian Fleet, coupled with regret that they had not retained a larger measure of local control; and dissatisfaction at what was considered to be the failure of Admiral Jerram, Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Fleet, to prevent even the most insignificant of the German ships from slipping through his line or cutting important cables. In New Zealand there was, further, a feeling that the Admiralty should have sent out the battle cruiser *New Zealand*, named after and paid for by the Dominion, to be available for escorting her own expeditions instead of forcing them to rely for protection on Australian warships which were wanted for the Commonwealth contingents, and whose absence at Samoa for New Zealand purposes had held up the Australian seizure of New Guinea for over a month. The "singularly little damage" done by the German squadron which the Governor-General of Australia remarked on in his despatch of 17 September, 1914, seems to have been considered locally as a lucky accident rather than the result of the Admiralty's naval strategy; and when Admiral von Spee steamed off westward from Samoa local anxiety for the safety of the convoys, should they start, became acute. To the Australian Cabinet and the Governor-General "it was obvious" that the only great coup open to German cruisers in the Pacific was to attack and destroy the Australasian transports, "either before or after they reached their rendezvous, or while they assembled in King George Sound," and they refused to accept the Admiralty's statement that such an attempt was incredible. In Australia there was a strong feeling that the New Zealand troopships, should they sail as arranged, would be in serious danger of immediate attack, and the Governor-General was himself convinced that should any unprotected transports be sunk by the enemy it would be no longer possible to maintain a good understanding between the Admiralty and the Commonwealth, who would certainly demand that the

Australian Navy should be returned to them. He felt impelled to secure delay, and telegraphed to the Governor of New Zealand: "Personal and Secret. I think your transports run "serious risk and that until you consult Admiralty their "sailing should be delayed,"—a message whose receipt, at 7 p.m. on September 24, so deepened the uneasiness of the New Zealand authorities that they countermanded the departure of their contingent and recalled the *Philomel* and her two transports to Auckland. The *Pyramus* was, however, allowed to continue her voyage to Melbourne as it was considered the use of wireless would only attract the attention of the enemy, whom they presumed to be already in the Tasman Sea.¹

The report of this postponement made it clear to the Admiralty that some concession must be made to local feeling, imperfectly understood though it was until the arrival some five weeks later of the Governor-General's despatches quoted above; and they agreed to fresh arrangements, which were telegraphed to the Governors as follows:—

"Admiralty adhere to the opinion that despatch of transports from Australia and New Zealand ports to point of concentration at Fremantle is an operation free from undue risk.

"In view, however, of anxiety felt by your Ministers the Lords Commissioners propose to send *Ibuki* and *Minotaur* to Wellington to fetch New Zealand Convoy and escort it westward along Australian coast, picking up Australian transports on the way and bringing the whole to their destination. Delay of about three weeks will be caused by this. Exact dates will be telegraphed later."

(Sent from Colonial Office, 2.30 p.m., 24.9.14.)

while to New Zealand was added:—

"Governor-General, Australia, has been informed that their contingents must wait until both yours and theirs can come together."

The *Minotaur* and *Ibuki* were to arrive at Fremantle September 29, and could reach Wellington by October 14.²

The arrangements in this telegram were much appreciated in New Zealand. The troops disembarked from the transports and continued their training ashore. Three Australian troopships had started from Brisbane for Albany, but they were ordered to concentrate at Melbourne, H.M.A.S. *Melbourne* leaving Sydney on September 26 to cover them; and the departure of the others was delayed till further Admiralty instructions.³

¹ A. 29, 30, 49, 50.

² H.S. 1, p. 231; A.31.

³ Convoy Naval Orders, No. 35, 26.9.14, H.S. 2, p. 326; A.32.

The transports were ordered to assemble and remain at various ports as follows:—

Sydney.	Melbourne.	Hobart.	Adelaide.
<i>Clan Macquodale.</i>	<i>Hymettus.</i>	<i>Geelong.</i>	<i>Medic.</i>
<i>Argyllshire.</i>	<i>Orvieto.</i>	<i>Katuna.</i>	<i>Ascanius.</i>
<i>Euripides.</i>	<i>Pera.</i>		<i>Saldanha.</i>
<i>Star of Victoria.</i>	<i>Omrah.</i>		<i>Port Lincoln.</i>
<i>Afric.</i>	<i>Shropshire.</i>		
<i>Suffolk.</i>	<i>Karoo.</i>		
<i>Miltiades.</i>	<i>Star of England.</i>		
	<i>Wiltshire.</i>		
	<i>Hororata.</i>		
	<i>Marare.</i>		
	<i>Rangatira.</i>		
	<i>Benalla.</i>		
	<i>Anglo-Egyptian.</i>		
	<i>Armada.</i>		
	<i>Southern.</i>		

The *Pyramus* arrived safely at Melbourne on September 29, and whatever danger had been anticipated had not manifested itself. That it was imaginary was proved next day by a report from Samoa that the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* had, on the 22nd, bombarded Papiéte (17° 30' S., 149° 30' W.), halfway between Australia and the South American coast, and over 2,000 miles E.N.E. of Auckland.¹

This intelligence "cleared the Naval situation in New Zealand and Australian waters and rendered the military "convoy practically safe from attack by the *Scharnhorst* and "Gneisenau," and confirmed the Admiralty view that the transports could proceed forthwith to the point of concentration.² There seemed to be some difference of opinion among the authorities on the spot, for the Navy Board, Melbourne, reported that the New Zealand troopships would proceed independently to Port Phillip, the *Melbourne* and *New Zealand* cruisers forming a screen between Auckland and Green Cape, N.S.W.; while the S.N.O., New Zealand, stated that the convoy was delayed until the arrival of the *Minotaur* and *Ibuki* at Wellington. To the Admiralty it seemed quite safe now for the expedition to embark, and, under escort of P Class cruisers, to join the Australian Contingent at Port Adelaide; the *Minotaur* could meet them on the way, and also it was desirable that the contingent should leave with the minimum delay in order to fit in with the escort arrangements made for them beyond Suez.³ It was considered essential for them to form one convoy across the Indian Ocean, and in order to secure this the Admiralty

¹ H.S. 45, p. 366.

³ A. 33, 34, 35.

² H.S. 2, p. 17.

telegraphed through the Colonial Office to the Government of New Zealand :—

“ Admiralty are clearly of opinion that, in view of latest news as to German cruisers, arrangements for concentration of transports in Australia can safely be made without further delay.

“ This involves despatch of New Zealand Contingent without escort of *Minotaur* and *Ibuki* until in Australian waters. Are your Ministers prepared to accept Admiralty opinion and to despatch contingent forthwith.”¹

At the same time the Australian Government was informed that their contingent must await the arrival of the New Zealand transports before crossing the Indian Ocean. But this did not satisfy the New Zealand Cabinet, which announced that they would consider as a breach of faith any alteration in the arrangements whereby the transports were to be escorted from Wellington by the *Minotaur* and *Ibuki*. In point of fact, the action of the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* in bombarding Papiété had had opposite results on the minds of the Admiralty and the New Zealand Cabinet. At Whitehall, and in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, China, it merely confirmed the already formed view that Admiral von Spee's objective was South America rather than Australia, and had the effect of relieving their anxiety as to the safety of the transports; but in the Colony it and the activity of the *Emden* were regarded as signs of failure on the part of the Navy to cope with the situation; and the Admiralty's assurance that coaling difficulties were alone sufficient to prevent any incursion into the Tasman Sea was discredited when it was learned that there were colliers with the German cruisers. It was thought that the sea north of Auckland was too dangerous for even a cable ship to start, and the Prime Minister threatened to resign if “adequate” escort were not provided for the transports.² The Admiralty's comment on the telegram from New Zealand was :—

“ . . . In regard to the escort, the Naval situation on the Pacific became sufficiently favourable, when the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* were located, to render the transport of the troops from New Zealand to Australia free from risk. . . . Had the advice of the Admiralty, as then conveyed to the New Zealand Government by the Secretary of State, been promptly acted upon, the necessity for an escort would have disappeared. The unwillingness of the New Zealand Government to act promptly and despatch the expedition now increases the possibility, though not the probability, of attack, which their Lordships consider as unlikely at the present time as when Mr. Harcourt's telegram of September 24 to the Government of New Zealand was despatched.

“ The matter thus rests with the New Zealand Government. . . . If (they) so decide, the escorting arrangements which provide for the escort of the New Zealand troops by *Minotaur* and *Ibuki* (all the way from Wellington) will hold good, with the consequent delay to both naval and military forces in their active operations against the enemy. (To Colonial Office.” H.S. 2, p. 30.)

¹ H.S. 2, p. 29.

² A. 36, 50.

The telegram which went from the Colonial Office to the Governor of New Zealand, however, did not speak quite so plainly; it merely said :—

“ Admiralty have agreed in deference to views of Prime Minister that transports should await arrival of escort *Minotaur* and *Ibuki* in accordance with existing arrangements stated in my telegram of September 24.”

As remarked by the First Sea Lord, “this in no way conveys our views.”¹

The New Zealand Government's fear of an attack in the Tasman Sea by the German armoured cruisers was, as before, proved groundless, for while the Prime Minister was making his threat to resign office Suva wireless station was intercepting a German wireless message which, as interpreted, read “*Scharnhorst* on the way between Marquesas Island and Easter Island.” Wellington W/T station also took in this message with further groups reading “Present position 130° W.,” a thousand miles further from New Zealand than Papiété. There could be no more doubt that Admiral von Spee was retiring from the Western Pacific and there could be little wonder at this, for he knew the battle cruiser *Australia* was off New Guinea and that a powerful Japanese Squadron was holding the waters near Australia. In answer to an inquiry from the New Zealand Government the Admiralty replied that the date of departure of the expedition would depend on the arrival at Wellington of the *Minotaur* and *Ibuki* about October 12th, unless they cared to let the transports sail without this escort as soon as the troops could be re-embarked.² Apparently, this latter risk was not accepted; for the arrangements made on the spot were for the *Minotaur* and *Melbourne* to leave Albany on October 28 with 26 Australian and 10 New Zealand transports, to be joined at sea by the *Ibuki* with 2 transports which she would bring from Fremantle.³

There was to have been another Japanese ship in the escort, the *Nisshin*, a heavy cruiser which in the later stages of the Russo-Japanese War had acted with the battle squadron. She had been put at Admiral Jerram's disposal and had as early as September 21 been told off for the convoy. The various delays had given Admiral Jerram a chance to employ her for the Sandakan Patrol,⁴ where, unfortunately, she had grounded; she came on to Singapore, but on arrival was found to be too seriously damaged for repairs to be completed in time. The Japanese Admiralty offered to send one of the two light cruisers *Yahagi* or *Hivado* instead, but neither could reach the convoy till it arrived at the Cocos Islands.

¹ H.S. 2, p. 37e.

³ A. 37.

² H.S. 2, p. 40.

⁴ See Monograph “China and *Emden*.”

The arrangements reached at this stage turned out to be really the final ones. In accordance with them H.M.A.S. *Melbourne* left Melbourne for Sydney on October 11 to cover the movement of the Australian transports down the coast, and the *Philomel* brought two transports from Auckland to Wellington to join the other eight ships there and wait for the arrival of the *Minotaur* and *Ibuki*, for the New Zealand Government had decided not to let their men go without the presence of the two armoured cruisers. The impossibility of securing the *Nisshin* or any other of the ships of the China Squadron for the Australasian Convoy, since they were all either occupied with other escort duties or in chase of the *Emden*, suggested the idea of employing the *Pioneer*, another "P" Class cruiser which ever since the outbreak of war had been patrolling in the vicinity of Fremantle. She had insufficient coal capacity to steam all the way to Colombo, and the only chance of utilising her would be to tow her during the daylight hours; but this project was dropped, and instead it was decided that she should go as far as the Cocos Islands and then join the force in the Pacific, the *Sydney* being detached from Admiral Patey's command and ordered to go with the convoy under the Captain of the *Minotaur*.¹ She had to coal at Sydney and was not expected at Albany till the 25th.

Although so anxious for a powerful escort to accompany the New Zealand Volunteers, the Minister of Defence in that Colony had sent off 7 officers and 140 men of the Imperial Reserve in the *Corinthia*, an ordinary passenger liner, without escort on the 10th. He had been asked to distribute these reservists over his 10 ships, but had not done so owing to ill-feeling between the men themselves, and he was now asked for an assurance that no more reservists or troops should proceed without escort.²

CHAPTER IV.

THE CONVOY'S VOYAGE.

The *Minotaur* and *Ibuki* arrived at Wellington at 4.30 p.m. on October 13, and at 6 a.m. on October 16 the New Zealand troops left Wellington for Hobart, their departure being witnessed by the Governor, Ministers, and a large and enthusiastic crowd. The *Minotaur* led the convoy, which was in two divisions, each of five ships, the *Psyche* taking one line

¹ A.38.

² War Office to Minister of Defence, New Zealand, 14.10.1914, see H.S. 2, p. 71.

and the *Philomel* the other; in rear came the Japanese battle cruiser *Ibuki*. They arrived on the 21st at Hobart where they found the *Pyramus*, which had come down from Melbourne. Meanwhile the Australian transports had been making their way along the coast and were collecting at King George's Sound, Albany. They had no direct escort, but H.M.A.S. *Melbourne*, coming from Sydney on the 17th, patrolled off Green Cape during the 19th and 20th, and Admiral Patey, with the *Australia* and *Montcalm*, occupied the waters in the neighbourhood of Fiji.

On October 22, at 2.45 p.m., the New Zealand convoy proceeded from Hobart, escorted as before by the *Minotaur*, *Ibuki*, and *Philomel*; but the *Psyche* had been relieved by the *Pyramus*, since she was in need of an extensive refit. The idea was for the two New Zealand cruisers to go on to Suez with the convoy and then remain in the narrow waters of the Red Sea, where their services could be better utilised than in the immense stretches of the Pacific, for which their limited radius of action rendered them unsuitable. As they could not steam all the way between Australia and Colombo without coaling they were to leave the convoy at the Cocos Islands, coal at Singapore, and bring from there any French transports which had arrived from Saigon, so that these could come on from Colombo under the protection of British cruisers.¹ On October 22 H.M.A.S. *Melbourne* left Melbourne for Albany, not directly escorting transports, but speaking to them as she overtook them. No news of the departure of the convoy was allowed to be published, since it was important to keep secret the probable date of its arrival in the Indian Ocean, where most danger was to be feared, chiefly from the *Emden*, which was thought to be getting intelligence by wireless almost every night from the steamer *Roon*, at anchor at Chilachap Harbour, south of Java.²

Meanwhile events were taking place which nearly had the effect of diverting the whole of the Australasian Contingents for home to an unexpected sphere of action. The outbreak of war had been greeted in the Union of South Africa with the same expressions of loyalty which had marked the attitude of the other great Dominions of the British Empire. The British garrison had been embarked for service in France, and a large volunteer force had been raised for the seizure of the neighbouring German Colony of South-West Africa; but General Beyers, in supreme command of this, showed himself disloyal, and Colonel Maritz, who was in charge of the force operating on the North-West Frontier, became an active rebel in the pay

¹ A.39, 40, 41.

² It is extremely doubtful whether these communications ever took place. The installation of the *Roon* had been dismantled, and what was heard was probably code signals between Dutch men-of-war. (From The Hague to Foreign Office, 67 Treaty, 1.11.14, M. 18577/14.)

of Germany. Further, General Christian de Wet endeavoured to raise commandoes among the disaffected Dutch in the outlying districts, urging them to rebel against the constituted authority and set up again the Dutch Republics, which had been abolished by the outcome of the Boer War. The whole situation was so threatening that it seemed desirable to bring the Australasian troops to Durban in preference to sending them through Egypt, and at a Cabinet meeting held on October 25 it was decided to bring the Australasian Convoy home by the Cape instead of the Suez Canal. It appeared that many of the transports could reach Durban without coaling, and these could go with the *Minotaur* direct; a second convoy of fast ships with less coal capacity could be escorted *viâ* Mauritius by the *Melbourne*, which would also need to coal somewhere between Albany and Durban; while the remainder could come on with the *Ibuki* or H.M.A.S. *Sydney*, which had that morning left Sydney for King George Sound. The Japanese were known to be anxious for the return of the *Ibuki*, and the *Sydney* alone should have been sufficient escort, as the *Emden* was thought to be north of Australia and danger was apprehended only from the *Königsberg*.¹ The New Zealand convoy, with the *Minotaur*, *Ibuki*, *Philomel*, and *Pyramus*, arrived safely on October 28 at King George Sound, where they found assembled the whole of the Australian Convoy, except the transports from Fremantle, which the *Ibuki* left next day to fetch, and final arrangements were made for the escorting of the Australasian force to the Cape, the *Philomel* and *Pyramus* to go on to Suez as they were required for work in the Red Sea.²

On October 28, however, General Botha, who had taken over the supreme command of the Union Forces, inflicted a severe defeat on Beyers, and the other chief rebel, Maritz, retired across the German frontier. The consequent improvement in the political situation made it questionable whether the effect of the passage of the Australasian Convoy round the Cape would sufficiently compensate for the resulting delay in their arrival at the scene of action, and at a Cabinet meeting held on the 30th it was decided that the convoy should proceed as originally arranged till it reached Colombo, by which time the condition of affairs in South Africa should have become clear, but arrangements for coaling at the Cape were still carried on in case the convoy would ultimately have to go there. In accordance with this decision orders were sent for the convoy³ to leave Albany for

¹ H.S. 2, p. 143.

² For details of the arrangements, see A. 43.

³ The Australian transports were:—*Afric*, *Anglo-Egyptian*, *Argyllshire*, *Armada*, *Benalla*, *Clan MacCorquodale*, *Euripides*, *Geelong*, *Hororata*, *Hymettus*, *Karoo*, *Katuna*, *Marere*, *Miltiades*, *Omrah*, *Orvieto*, *Pera*, *Port Lincoln*, *Rangatera*, *Saldanha*, *Shropshire*, *Southern*, *Star of England*, *Star of Victoria*, *Suffolk*, *Wiltshire*—26 ships. Two more, the *Ascanius* and *Medic*, were at Fremantle.

Colombo as soon as possible under the escort of the *Minotaur*, *Melbourne*, *Ibuki*, and *Sydney*, which last was due at King George Sound next day. The *Yahagi* would not now join the escort as she was engaged in hunting the *Emden*.¹

At 5.30 a.m. on Sunday November 1 the *Minotaur* weighed anchor in King George Sound, and proceeded out of harbour followed by all the transports in divisions. By 9.15 a.m. the whole convoy and its escort was out of harbour, and the Fleet went to prayers. The sky was clear, the sea calm, and at 10 knots the 36 transports in three lines steamed along the remainder of the Australian coast with the *Minotaur* leading them and the *Melbourne* and *Sydney* on either beam. Cape Leeuwin was rounded at 2 next morning, and course was set to pass eastward of the Cocos Islands, then distant 1,600 miles. On November 3 at 3.30 p.m. the *Ibuki* and *Pioneer* came up with the two transports *Ascanius* and *Medic* from Fremantle, and thus completed the convoy. The Japanese cruiser took station on the starboard hand, and the *Melbourne* moved to bring up the rear.²

The only enemy ships near enough to attack the convoy were the *Königsberg* and *Emden*. The former had not been definitely located, but on October 23 had been considered probably south of Mozambique, while the *Emden* had added to her attacks on trade in the Bay of Bengal a daring raid at Penang on October 28, in the course of which she had sunk the Russian light cruiser *Zhemchug* at anchor and the French destroyer *Mousquet* in the entrance to the harbour. But the *Emden's* captain would hardly be bold enough to attack a convoy guarded by a battle cruiser, an armoured cruiser, and three light cruisers, of which only one, the *Pioneer*, carried lighter guns than herself. It was as well that the *Pioneer* was not regarded as part of the escort, since she was only three hours with the convoy before breaking down, and at 6.30 was sent back to Fremantle with condenser defects, her projected voyage to join the Australian admiral in the Pacific having to be abandoned. Without further incident the voyage proceeded till the morning of November 8.

A week before, when the convoy left King George Sound, the last definite news of the German Pacific Squadron with Admiral von Spee was already a month old, being nothing more than an intercepted wireless message to the effect that he was on his way to Easter Island. Although the Australasian Governments had never lost their fear that the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* would return to attack the convoy the Admiralty regarded this as improbable, holding rather the view that von Spee's most likely objective was the trade on the south coasts of America, and to meet him they had ordered Admiral Cradock

¹ A. 44.

² Log of *Minotaur*.

with a mixed squadron first to the Falkland Islands, and then round the Horn to the coasts of Chile. Their appreciation was correct; off Coronel in Chile the two admirals met, and a battle was fought on November 1 with the result that we lost two armoured cruisers with all hands, including Admiral Cradock himself, and the fragments of our squadron were forced to run for the Falkland Islands. This battle, though a disaster, justified the Admiralty's opinion that the convoy ran no risk from von Spee. The powerful escort which the pressure of Australasian opinion had compelled the Admiralty to attach to the convoy as protection against the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* was no longer necessary, and, indeed, the armoured ships were urgently required elsewhere. Provision was made from other sources to strengthen all the points the victorious German admiral would probably attack, except the Union Expedition against German South-West Africa, and to protect this last the *Minotaur* was selected. On November 6 at 3.35 p.m. a telegram was sent to her *viâ* the Cocos Islands to turn the convoy over to the senior officer present and proceed at once to join the *Albion* off South-West Africa, in view of a possible raid by the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*.¹ The telegram took some time to reach her, and it was not till 7.0 a.m. on the 8th, in latitude $14\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ S. $99\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ E., that she parted from the convoy, having turned it over to Captain M. Silver of the *Melbourne*.²

The escort was now reduced to the Australian light cruisers *Melbourne* and *Sydney* and the Japanese battle cruiser *Ibuki*. The only possible enemy that could attack them was the *Emden*, for the *Königsberg* had been located up the Rufiji River in German East Africa, where she was being kept under observation by the *Chatham*,³ and the *Nürnberg* and *Dresden* were with Admiral von Spee on the coast of Chile. As regards the *Emden*, her exact whereabouts was unknown, but Captain Kiddle of the *Minotaur*, in turning over the convoy, had warned Captain Silver that the intelligence received from the C-in-C, China, led him to expect her to make an attempt on the cable and W/T station at the Cocos Islands.⁴ It was not, therefore, unexpected that at 6.30 a.m. on November 9 a W/T message was intercepted from Cocos to *Minotaur*: "Strange cruiser off entrance," followed by wireless signal of distress and Telefunken jamming. Luckily the convoy with its powerful escort was only 55 miles to the northward of Cocos, and Captain Silver, to whom the safety of the transports was the chief concern, decided that his best course was to get in touch with the enemy cruiser. He therefore directed the *Sydney* to proceed to Cocos, working up full speed, and stationed the *Melbourne* and *Ibuki* on the south-west side of the convoy, that being the quarter from which

¹ A. 45.

² Log of *Minotaur*.

³ Captain Silver had not been told this. (See H.S. 2, p. 343d.)

⁴ H.S. 2, p. 343d.

attack was most likely. The *Sydney* steamed off at 7.0 a.m. Two and a half hours later she signalled that the enemy was in sight. It was, as expected, the *Emden*, and a brisk engagement ensued. The captain of the *Ibuki*, as soon as he heard the *Sydney* had sighted the enemy, was anxious to participate in the action, but his assistance proved unnecessary, for at 11.15 a.m. the *Sydney* signalled that the German cruiser had been grounded to avoid sinking; she surrendered at 4.35 p.m., after having lost nearly all her men. The *Sydney's* damages and casualties were very slight.¹

Admiral Jerram's dispositions had been affected by the approaching passage of the convoy through what was now his station. Fearing that the *Emden* might possibly attack the transports, he ordered the *Hampshire* and *Empress of Russia* from the Colombo focal area, which they were patrolling, to proceed at high speed to cover the convoy into Colombo, and as soon as he heard that the *Emden* was attacking the Cocos station ordered the *Empress of Asia* to go also. These orders arrived too late for any of the ships named to get anywhere near the spot in time.²

With both *Königsberg* and *Emden* gone from the list of possible attackers, there was no longer any necessity for fast ships with the convoy, and the Admiralty telegraphed to the Naval Board, Melbourne:—

"100. As the Pacific and Indian Oceans are now clear of enemy ships Admiralty desire to utilise *Melbourne* and *Sydney* for service in the Atlantic where fast cruisers are urgently required. Ships "have accordingly been ordered to Malta." (Sent 10.11.14, 9.10 p.m.)

The *Melbourne*, on receipt of this order, turned the convoy over to the captain of the *Ibuki*, and at 8.0 a.m. on November 12 in 3° S., 88° E., increased speed to 15 knots for Colombo, leaving the convoy behind. That afternoon she passed the *Empress of Russia* and *Hampshire* coming S.E. From the first she heard that the *Königsberg* was accounted for; while the *Hampshire* stated that she would join the convoy, which was then in an anomalous position, being a large Australasian army under the sole protection of a cruiser of Japan, which, in pre-war days, Australians considered as their chief probable enemy. But this situation was of short duration, for the *Hampshire* and *Empress of Russia* soon joined them, while the *Empress of Asia* went on to the Cocos Islands. Some idea of the difficulty of protecting such a convoy from determined attack by a fast cruiser may be judged from the fact that, even at her speed of $19\frac{1}{2}$ knots in the opposite direction, the *Empress of Asia* took 40 minutes to pass the 37 transports, then under the protection of the *Ibuki* only.³ The whole convoy arrived on November 15

¹ For an account of the action see Monograph "China and *Emden*."

² See Monograph "China and *Emden*," also A. 46.

³ Log of *Empress of Asia*, 12 November 1914.

at Colombo, where they were joined by the *Sydney*. They left two days later for Aden escorted by the *Ibuki* and *Hampshire*.¹

At the time of the enlistment of the Australasian forces it had been assumed that they would serve, after training, in France with the rest of the British forces on the Continent. We have seen how at one time they were very nearly diverted to the Cape by the rebellion; but by now General Botha had completely stamped out that menace and there was no need for their presence there. On the line of their advance a fresh danger had arisen, for the attitude of Turkey since the outbreak of the war had been so unsatisfactory that on November 5² we had been compelled to declare war on her, a step which put Egypt in some fear of attack. Accordingly it was decided that the Australasian troops should not go direct to England, and on November 20 the Colonial Office telegraphed to the Australasian Governors:—

“Disembarkation of Australian and New Zealand Contingents in Egypt has been found advisable to assist in its defence, and to complete their training there. They will go direct to the front with other British troops in Europe when this is completed.”

Having reached Aden on November 25, the convoy went on under the escort of the *Hampshire* alone next morning. The main body arrived at Suez on December 1, the *Orvioto* and *Maunganui*, in which were the Headquarter Staffs, having gone on ahead so as to arrive the previous day. In spite of all the fears of the Australasian Governments, no active enemy ship had been within 5,000 miles of it, excepting the *Emden*, of which nothing remained but a tangle of iron and the few survivors who had been transferred to the *Orvioto* by the *Sydney* at Colombo.

¹ A. 47, 48.

² A state of war had been in existence since October 31, though we had delayed making an official declaration in the hope that the Turkish authorities would comply with our demands.

APPENDIX A.

A

TELEGRAMS.

- A.1. From Admiralty. August 13th.
To Naval Board, Melbourne. Sent 7.40 p.m.
For R.A. *Australia* . . . Use *Encounter, Melbourne, Sydney* for New Guinea Expedition and if possible destruction of wireless at Nauru. They will be required latter for convoy of Australian troops to Aden . . .
- A.2. From Government New Zealand. August 14th.
To Colonial Office. Received 2.28 p.m.
My Government can despatch Expeditionary Force about August 27th if there is urgent necessity . . .
- A.3. From Colonial Office. August 24th.
To Governor General, Australia. Sent 6 p.m.
Lords Commissioners of Admiralty consider it most inadvisable that any portion of Expeditionary Force should start at once. There are German warships on route of transports which have not yet been definitely located and until they are destroyed or hunted off route transports should not leave without convoy. Such convoy is not at present practicable as greater part of Australian and New Zealand Squadrons are engaged in offensive operations in Pacific. When force does start it should go preferably in one convoy and probably by Suez route.
- A.4. From I.O., Singapore. August 27th.
To Admiralty. Received 3.30 a.m.
Last night *Geier* reported definitely S.E. of Madura Island (Java Sea). *Gneisenau* heard from wireless station at Cocos and N. and W. coasts of Australia.
- A.5. From I.O., Singapore. August 29th.
To Admiralty. Received 7 p.m.
German Ship *Goldenfels* arrived Sabang night of 28th August . . . escorted almost into port by *Königsberg*.
- A.6. From Admiralty. August 30th.
To R.A., *Australia*. Sent 7.46 p.m.
. . . German cruisers may be in Eastern Archipelago. .
- A.7. From War Office. September 1st.
To Minister of Defence, New Zealand.
Expeditionary Force should assemble at Wellington by 20th September, by which date an escort is expected to be ready to convoy the transports to Port Adelaide where the Australian Contingent will join them. From Port Adelaide all ships will proceed *via* Fremantle, Colombo, and Red Sea . . .
- A.8. From Admiralty. September 1st.
To R.A., *Australia*. Sent 9.6 p.m.
Australian troops for Aden will require escort of *Sydney* and *Melbourne* on September 22nd at Sidney and (they) should be detached in time to be ready for this duty. *Melbourne* should deal with Nauru en route to Sydney if possible. Further details can be arranged after seizure of Simpsonhafen by remainder of your force.

- A.9. From Admiralty. September 8th.
To C.-in-C., China. Sent 12.5 a.m.
166. If the two German armoured cruisers are not accounted for by the end of month you must escort with *Minotaur* and *Hampshire* to Colombo the Australian Contingent which leaves Fremantle on 3rd October for Colombo. You should arrange to meet the 22 transports on their line of advance near Cocos, *Sydney* and *Melbourne* will convoy all the way from Fremantle to Colombo.
- A.10. From S.N.O., New Zealand. September 10th.
To Admiralty. Received 9.26 a.m.
148. Essential repairs will delay *Psyche* until 24th September. *Philomel* and *Pyramus* will be ready 20th September. Should Australian Expedition be delayed, could date of departure from New Zealand be altered instead of expedition waiting at Port Adelaide.
- A.11. From Admiralty. September 10th.
To R.A., Australia. Sent 8.50 p.m.
- Troops do not leave Sydney till September 27th. You should escort them across Indian Ocean with *Australia*, *Sydney*, and *Melbourne*. China Squadron will also cover them as far as Colombo. A contingent from New Zealand will join at Port Adelaide.
- A.12. From Admiralty. September 10th.
To S.N.O., New Zealand. Sent 10.35 p.m.
105. Australian troops leave Sydney on September 27th for Port Adelaide. New Zealand Contingent should join them at Port Adelaide escorted by New Zealand cruisers. Australian ships escort them to Aden. Arrange direct with R.A., Australia, as to movements so as to conform to his wishes.
- A.13. From R.A., Australia. September 13th.
To Admiralty. Received 9.38 a.m.
73. Propose to leave Simpsonhafen with *Australia*, *Melbourne*, and *Sydney*, 14th or 15th September, for Sydney preparatory to escorting troops across Indian Ocean.
- A.14. From Admiralty. September 13th.
To C.-in-C., China. Sent 1.36 p.m.
171. *Minotaur's* subsequent movements can be decided later. *Hampshire* is to join *Australia* at Fremantle by October 7th to convoy troops and remain for present under orders of R.A.
- A.15. From Gov., New Zealand. September 13th.
To Colonial Office.
- Expedition will leave New Zealand, September 25th, proceeding direct to Fremantle, arriving there October 7th. S.N.O. with *Psyche* and *Philomel* will escort expedition to longitude 145° E., having sent *Pyramus* on to coal at Melbourne, and *Pyramus* will escort expedition from longitude mentioned to Fremantle. Please telegraph whether Admiralty concur as soon as possible.
- A.16. From C.-in-C., China. September 14th.
To Admiralty. Received 6.45 a.m.
141. Your 171 . . . I propose that *Minotaur*, *Ibuki*, *Chikuma*, under orders of captain of *Minotaur*, should proceed to New Britain and act from there. This will cover *Australia* during absence of Australian cruisers and would be best position from which to meet any attempt of German cruisers to remain in Pacific

Islands or to return in the direction of New Guinea and Australia. Arrangements will be made with French men-of-war and Russian Senior Officer for patrolling waters south of Singapore.

Reply.—172. Your 141. Action approved.

- A.17. From Navy Office, Melbourne. September 14th.
To Admiralty. Received 7.21 a.m.
39. Arrangements have been made for Australian Expeditionary Force in 27 transports to assemble at King George Sound by 5th October.
- A.18. From Governor, New Zealand. September 15th.
To Colonial Office. Received 10.35 a.m.
- The Cabinet has expressed considerable uneasiness with regard to the fact that the escort for the expedition between New Zealand and the point of junction with Australian Squadron will consist of "P" Class ships.
- A.19. From Governor, New Zealand. September 17th.
To Colonial Office. Received 7.48 p.m.
- . . . Feeling runs high, so much so that certain Ministers threaten to resign, as Admiralty do not appear to appreciate position of Government if they allow transports to go to sea protected only by "P" Class cruisers when German warships have only short distance to go to reach Tasman Sea.
- A.20. From Gov.-Gen., Australia. September 17th.
To Colonial Office. Received 7.48 p.m.
- . . . Disturbing element is failure of Admiral, China Station, with co-operation of other flags to cope with German cruiser squadron, which would become grave menace to the 41 Australian and New Zealand transports.
- A.21. From Colonial Office. September 19th.
To Governor, New Zealand. Sent 5.40 p.m.
- Admiralty sends following: Begins: H.M.A.S. *Australia* is covering Commonwealth Expedition attacking New Britain. Fighting still going on. She cannot, therefore, reach New Zealand in time to convoy contingent. That *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* should steam 2,000 miles south into waters where no possible coal for them is incredible. They did not even know Samoa had fallen and can have no knowledge of date of New Zealand sailings or even that any are in contemplation. There is strong probability that Germans have turned N.W. to Marshall Islands where coaling base reported Jaluit on good authority. In these circumstances route is regarded by Admiralty as perfectly safe, and we advise proceed. No need for escort of any kind if they keep well off the track and steam without lights. Otherwise departure must await return of next convoy involving at least six weeks' delay. Ends.
- A.22. From Gov., New Zealand. September 21st.
To Colonial Office.
- Unless you advise me situation is inadvisable Expedition will leave as notified.
- A.23. From Gov., New Zealand. September 22nd.
To Colonial Office. Received 7.1 a.m.
- The Cabinet met this morning and consider that since German cruisers are reported this morning in vicinity of Fiji and Samoa, they cannot agree with Admiralty views as expressed in your cypher telegram of September 19th. Bell, the Leader of the Upper House,

threatens to resign. . . . If Australian cruisers could meet the expedition in Tasman Sea it might help. . . .

- A.24. *From Colonial Office.* September 22nd.
To Gov., New Zealand. Sent 4.35 p.m.

There is no Naval Force available to provide immediate escort, and though the Admiralty adhere to their view in my telegram of 19th, it seems, in the circumstances, that the best practicable course for your Ministers is to postpone departure of your contingent until convoy can be provided. This will be done as quickly as possible, but it may involve a delay of six weeks. Departure of the Australian Contingent on the day already arranged cannot, of course, be delayed.

HARCOURT.

- A.25. *From Admiralty.* September 23rd.
To C.-in-C., China. Sent 9.40 p.m.

194. Until *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* are located, it is not considered advisable to transport the New Zealand and Australian troops under a convoy that cannot meet them.

Minotaur and *Ibuki* are, therefore, required to proceed forthwith at good speed past Fremantle round the south of Australia to Wellington.

Making coaling arrangements and report estimated date of reaching Fremantle, Melbourne, and Wellington.

- A.26. *From Auckland.* September 24th.
To Admiralty. Recd. 12.4 a.m.

Philomel and two transports sailed under sealed orders 9 a.m.

- A.27. *From S.N.O., New Zealand,* September 24th.
To Admiralty. Recd. 3 a.m.

152. I leave with convoy September 25th. Convoy should arrive at Fremantle by October 7th. Presume escort will wait if convoy delayed by weather.

- A.28. *From Gov., New Zealand.* September 24th.
To Colonial Office. Recd. 9.33 a.m.

. . . . Cabinet met September 23rd and after I had clearly explained situation agreed that expedition should leave early September 25th, as originally arranged

- A.29. *From Gov., New Zealand.* September 24th.
To Colonial Office. Recd. 10.42 a.m.

(Extremely urgent. Clear the line.)
Private and Very Secret.

Urgent telegram from Governor-General of Australia was received by me at 7 p.m. to day telling me that we should run grave risk if expedition sails to-morrow. I have, therefore, issued orders countermanding sailing pending instructions from you.

LIVERPOOL.

- A.30. *From S.N.O., New Zealand.* September 24th.
To Admiralty. Recd. 12.35 p.m.

153. Departure of New Zealand Expedition has been delayed on account of telegram received by Governor New Zealand from Governor-General of Australia, who considers Tasman Sea may not be safe. *Pyramus* is on way to Melbourne, and it is considered safer for her to continue than to stop her by using wireless telegraphy.

- A.31. *From C.-in-C., China.* September 25th.
To Admiralty. Recd. 5.16 a.m.

Minotaur and *Ibuki* will arrive at Fremantle 29th September; Melbourne or Hobart according to whichever is arranged 8th October; Wellington 14th October Japanese ships have poor radius of action and appear to be extravagant with coal, and consequently can seldom exceed 10 knots for long voyages.

- A.32. *From Gov. New Zealand.* September 25th.
To Colonial Office. Recd. 12.45 p.m.

Arrangements conveyed in your telegram of September 24th are much appreciated by my Ministers. Disembarkation takes place as soon as possible and training will continue. Owing to gale expedition could not in any case have sailed to-day.

LIVERPOOL.

- A.33. *From Navy Office, Melbourne.* October 2nd.
To Admiralty. Received 6.4 a.m.

67. *Melbourne* and New Zealand cruisers should form a screen between north of New Zealand and Green Cape. New Zealand transports to proceed to Port Phillip independently.

- A.34. *From S.N.O., New Zealand.* October 4th.
To Admiralty. Received 4.36 a.m.

158. New Zealand transports were delayed by Admiralty directions conveyed to Governor of New Zealand by Colonial Secretary, 24th September, until arrival of *Minotaur* and *Ibuki* at Wellington

- A.35. *From Admiralty.* October 4th.
To S.N.O., New Zealand. Sent 12.40 p.m.

Admiralty consider expeditions could embark and proceed at once with "P" Class cruiser escort and join Australian expedition at Port Adelaide, and other convenient port and meet *Minotaur*, the latter not proceeding to Wellington.

Desirable expedition leaves as soon as possible to fit in with escort arrangements made for them after Suez.

- A.36. *From Gov., New Zealand.* October 4th.
To Colonial Office. Received 5.30 p.m.

. . . . Cabinet consider that, as far as escort is concerned, any alteration of your telegram of September 24th would be breach of faith After news of attack on Papiete is published Dominion would not sanction expedition leaving without proper escort. Further than that cable ship *Belfast* recalled to Auckland yesterday owing to sea north of Auckland not being considered safe. Under the circumstances (Prime Minister) would tender his resignation if transports are not given adequate escort.

- A.37. *From Navy Office, Melbourne.* October 9th
To Admiralty. Received 11.25 a.m.

80. Present arrangements for conveying are that *Minotaur*, *Melbourne*, *Nisshin*, leave Albany 27th October or 28th October with 26 Australian and 10 New Zealand transports, *Ibuki* coals at Fremantle, and with 2 Australian transports from Fremantle joins convoy at sea.

- A.38. *From Admiralty.* October 14th.
To V.A.C., Australia. Sent 8.50 p.m.

34. . . . *Pioneer* to proceed with the convoy until relieved by Japanese cruiser near Cocos, when she can return to Thursday Island,

coaling at Port Darwin if necessary, and then work with the Australian Expedition. *Sydney* is to proceed to Sydney to coal and join the convoy under *Minotaur*.

- A.39. From Admiralty. October 21st.
To S.N.O., New Zealand. Sent 6.55 p.m.
20. . . . *Philomel* and *Pyramus* are to proceed with convoy as far as Suez, where they will remain for the present. . . .

- A.40. From C.-in-C., China. October 23rd.
To Admiralty. Received 6.29 a.m.

218. *Minotaur* requests permission for *Philomel* and *Pyramus* to leave convoy in vicinity of Cocos Island to proceed to coal at Singapore and rejoin convoy at Colombo.

This is necessary owing to small coaling capacity and reduced steam quality, which makes it impossible for them to proceed direct from Fremantle to Colombo.

- A.41. From Admiralty. October 23rd.
To C.-in-C., China. Sent 8.15 p.m.

Your 218. Approved. Inform *Minotaur* and Navy Board, Melbourne. *Philomel* and *Pyramus* can then escort *Monmouthshire* with rifles and details and any French transports ready at the time to Suez. . . .

- A.42. From Admiralty. October 26th.
To Navy Board, Melbourne. Sent 12.50 p.m.

74. Secret and Urgent. It has been decided to bring the New Zealand and Australian convoy to England by the Cape of Good Hope route. Report detailed arrangements proposed as soon as possible. Do not let any vessels sail till orders are given that they may proceed. . . .

- A.43. From Navy Board, Melbourne. October 29th.
To Admiralty. Received 3.35 p.m.

134. After consultation with Captain Senior Officer *Minotaur* (group corrupt) as follows, begins: *Minotaur* with Australian 1st Division and New Zealand transport proceed at 10½ knots direct to Table Bay. *Melbourne* with Australian 3rd Division proceeds at 12 knots calling at Mauritius for coal for herself only, *Sydney* with Australian 2nd Division to proceed at speed of 11½ knots calling at Mauritius for coal for herself only, *Ibuki* bringing two transports from Fremantle turning over to *Sydney* rendezvous, then returning to Fremantle herself pending further instructions from Japanese Admiralty; her small radius of action renders it impossible for her to escort even to Mauritius without materially delaying convoy. Requirements are as follows: at Mauritius 2,000 tons Welsh coal, 500 tons oil fuel; at Table Bay for Cruiser 4,000 tons Welsh coal, 1,200 tons oil fuel, and for transports, 25,000 tons of coal, 20,000 tons of water. Proposed dates of departure from Albany and Fremantle 1st November, date of arrival Mauritius, *Melbourne*, 13th November; *Sydney*, 14th November; date of arrival at Table Bay *Minotaur*, 21st November (ends). Senior Officer, *Minotaur*, comments as follows:—*Melbourne* and *Sydney* cannot be relied on to reach Port Natal. By sending faster division via Mauritius and not employing *Ibuki* roughly five days can be saved, and in view of large number of horses this appears important. In that case services of *Weymouth* or *Dartmouth* will not be required. Propose that whole convoy and escort sail daylight 1st November *Minotaur* (ends).

- A.44. From Admiralty. October 30th.
To Navy Board, Melbourne. Sent 7.50 p.m.

82. Cancel my 74. Convoy is to proceed to Colombo as previously arranged, and can leave Australia at once under escort of *Minotaur*, *Ibuki*, *Melbourne*, and *Sydney*. *Yahagi* will not join escort. "P" Class cruisers can start if ready but are not to delay sailing of expedition.

- A.45. From Admiralty. November 6th.
To *Minotaur* (via Cocos Islands). Sent 3.35 p.m.

Minotaur is to proceed to Simon's Bay at once, coaling at Mauritius if necessary. Place convoy in charge of Senior Officer present. After coaling at Simon's Bay you will join *Albion* off South-West Africa in view of probable raid by *Gneisenau* and *Scharnhorst*. Husband your oil fuel as there is none at the Cape.

- A.46. From C.-in-C., China. November 9th.
To Admiralty. Received 5.1 p.m.

260. As the Australian convoy will be passing within the limit of 100 miles from Cocos or Keeling Islands to-day *Emden* may detect their presence and possibly attack. I have, therefore, ordered *Hampshire* and *Empress of Russia* to proceed at high speed to cover them into Colombo, *Askold* and *Empress of Asia* take over trade route Minikoi to Colombo.

- A.47. From C.-in-C., China. November 13th.
To Admiralty. Received 7.16 a.m.

275. With reference to escort of Australian convoy from Colombo, I submit it is undesirable *Ibuki* (Jap.) should be their sole protection, not so much from the point of view of safety as of Australian sentiment.

Suggest *Hampshire* and *Yarmouth* should carry out this service if *Melbourne* and *Sydney* cannot be spared.

Moreover, Japanese have asked that *Ibuki* may be released at Colombo, as they are anxious for her to join their 2nd Southern Squadron without delay. Request early reply.

- A.48. From Admiralty. November 13th.
To C.-in-C., China. Sent 5.55 p.m.

289. Your 275. *Hampshire* is to take Australian convoy on from Colombo. Question of release of *Ibuki* is being considered. *Yarmouth* is to proceed to Gibraltar.

- A.49. From Gov.-Gen., Australia.
To Colonial Office.

Despatch dated September 17th. Extract:—
. . . . Our inability to locate the ships of the German Pacific Squadron may lead to trouble, and is causing uneasiness, especially as our best ships are now detailed for escort work, and will, therefore, be withdrawn from these shores, while the Admiral of the China Squadron has retired in ill-health to Hong Kong, from which station he proposes to direct operations.

The situation which arose after the R.A. ships were handed over to the Admiralty resulted in practically releasing the Australian Fleet from any one centre of control. The Admiralty ordered Admiral Patey to leave his two cruisers to protect the trade routes and proceed to sea. The Admiral wished to take his cruisers with him, hoping to come up with the two heavy German cruisers while

destroying wireless stations. The New Zealand Naval Officer wired through the Navy Board to Admiral Patey asking when he would be ready to convoy New Zealand troops to Samoa. The Navy Board, considering H.M.A. Fleet was now under the orders of the Admiralty, transmitted this cable to Admiral Patey without informing the Minister for Defence. Admiral Patey replied to the New Zealand Officer that he would be ready on such and such a date, and proceeded with all his ships to an agreed rendezvous, leaving the Australian Expedition for New Guinea, which was within a day or two of being ready to start, hung up for a month. It might have been advisable to have cleared the Seas first by the combined action of the China Squadron and the Australian ships, but the Pacific waters are so vast that success would have been problematic, and to the Australasian peoples the idea of annexing German Territory and of driving a foreign power out of the neighbouring Islands was far more attractive. Moreover, a purely Naval movement would have left the New Zealand troops unoccupied and caused dissatisfaction in that Dominion. The annexation of Samoa and German New Guinea has given great satisfaction, and the moral results of the achievement are worth the risk taken by leaving the German cruisers unaccounted for. It was, moreover, reasonable to expect that the China Squadron, reinforced by our Allies and armed merchantmen, would have located some, at least, of the enemy. The Admiral on the China Station, has, however, failed to cope with any German cruiser. One of the lightest of the hostile squadron is now making prizes off the Hoogly after slipping through his line in the East Indies; another has cut our cable at Fanning Island. Otherwise, singularly little damage has been done. We learnt recently that the two cruisers we have to fear have been seen in the neighbourhood of Samoa. There is cause for anxiety as to the convoy of 30,000 men of the Australasian Expedition, which begins to embark on different dates, commencing the 24th, in 41 transports at half a dozen ports, and has its rendezvous at King George's Sound on October 5th. I referred to these circumstances in my cable of this date. Communications are now passing with the Admiralty, and fresh dispositions of convoying ships are being made.

I give this *précis* of Naval events, both for your information, and because later on a question is likely to be raised as to the degree of local control that it is expedient to give in order that the general directions of the Admiralty may be carried out satisfactorily in time of war.¹

A.50. From Gov.-Gen., Australia.
To Colonial Office.

Despatch dated September 29th. Extract:—

On reaching Melbourne September 24th I went to the Navy Office and found increased concern in official circles, especially with regard to the unprotected New Zealand transports, and also as to the safety of our own contingent, which had begun to embark. The return of the *Australia* for escort service had been countermanded, and this left our seas open to the German cruisers, which, it was calculated, could, with a 12 to 15-knot speed, reach these coasts from Samoa in ample time to play havoc with our 42 Australasian transports. A far easier feat than that accomplished for less serious ends in the Bay of Bengal by the *Emden*.

Mr. Fisher was as alive as I was to the military disadvantages of postponement, and to the prospect of discontent following upon a second dislocation of Australian plans owing to New Zealand being

¹ H.S. 2, pp. 292 *e* to *e*.

without her own warships to protect her own transports. Nevertheless, the risk involved under the circumstances to transports sailing without convoy seemed to him excessive, and he expressed that view to the Minister for Defence. I had come to a similar conclusion. It was obvious that the only great coup open to German cruisers in the Pacific was to attack and destroy the Australasian transports either before or after they reached their rendezvous, or while assembled in King George's Sound. Nor can it be assumed that the enemy is without sufficient knowledge of our movements. There are patriots among the many Germans here, whose able Consul-General seemed so dangerous an alien that before I left I asked for his closer surveillance.

The Navy Office had already cabled warning to the S.N.O. in New Zealand on September 22nd:—

"Remember that the armoured German cruisers are at large and unlocated." On returning from my visit to the Navy Office I received your cable of that 23rd. On the day also the C-in-C., China Station, cabled that cruisers were proceeding *via* Fremantle to Wellington to escort New Zealand transports. Under these circumstances, and knowing Mr. Fisher's mind, I cabled you, as requested, my personal opinion in favour of postponement, and regarded the embarkation as definitely delayed.

The first half of the New Zealand transports were timed to sail on the 24th. It seemed to me, therefore, that some risk might be saved, or avoidable confusion through the recall of transports at sea obviated, through the detention of a few hours of their ships while Lord Liverpool referred the matter home. I, therefore, wired to the Governor of New Zealand as follows: "Personal and Secret. I think your transports run serious risk, and that until you consult Admiralty their sailing should be delayed. Am cabling this opinion to Colonial Office without informing my Government."

I quite recognise that the cable was irregular. To be explained by circumstances and the urgency of the moment, and to be defended on the grounds of expediency alone.

I felt that a loss of unescorted transports would entail not only the loss of life—a matter for Naval and Military Authorities—but a loss of confidence in the Admiralty, which would raise the question of the advisability of handing over the Australian Fleet to Admiralty control. It would also accentuate the feeling that the *New Zealand* should be in New Zealand waters, so that the Australian Expedition should not be dependent on the movements of New Zealand troops. I feel convinced that were unprotected transports sunk by the enemy a good understanding between the Admiralty and my Government could not be maintained. The ex-Minister for Defence told me confidentially on quitting Office that experience proved to him that there must be local control of all detail of movements in war time, subject to an agreed general Naval policy as laid down by the Admiralty.¹ . . .

¹ H.S. 2, pp. 292 *f* to *i*.

B.

APPENDIX B.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE.

CONVOY NAVAL ORDERS.¹

Orviato at Melbourne,
October 19, 1914.

The following extracts from Convoy Naval Orders are promulgated for general information and guidance. Masters of transports will take the necessary steps to ensure these instructions being communicated to Officers of the Watch, wireless operators, and others whom they may concern.

(Signed) A. GORDON SMITH,
Captain-in-Charge of Convoy.

C.N.O. 3.

LIST OF TRANSPORTS.

The following is a list of the transports forming the convoy :—

No.	Name.	Ton- nage.	Speed.	Embarks at	Troops detailed.
A.1	<i>Hymettus</i> -	4,605	11½	Sydney, Melbourne, and Adelaide.	A.S.C. horses.
A.2	<i>Geelong</i> -	7,951	12	Melbourne and Hobart.	Mixed.
A.3	<i>Orviato</i> -	12,130	15	Melbourne - -	G.O.C. and mixed.
A.4	<i>Pera</i> -	7,635	11	Sydney - - -	Artillery horses.
A.5	<i>Omrah</i> -	8,130	15	Brisbane - -	Infantry and A.S.C.
A.6	<i>Clan MacCorquodale.</i>	5,058	12½	Sydney - - -	Horses.
A.7	<i>Medic</i> -	12,032	13	Adelaide and Fre- mantle.	Two companies of Infantry, Artillery, A.S.C., and A.M.C.
A.8	<i>Argyllshire</i> -	10,392	14	Sydney - - -	Artillery.
A.9	<i>Shropshire</i> -	11,911	14	Melbourne - -	"
A.10	<i>Karoo</i> -	6,127	12	Sydney and Mel- bourne.	Signallers and A.M.C.
A.11	<i>Ascanius</i> -	10,048	13	Adelaide and Fre- mantle.	Infantry.
A.12	<i>Sudanha</i> -	4,594	11	Adelaide - -	Horses.
A.13	<i>Katuna</i> -	4,641	11	Sydney and Hobart	"
A.14	<i>Euripides</i> -	14,947	15	Sydney - - -	Infantry.
A.15	<i>Star of Eng- land.</i>	9,150	13½	Brisbane - -	Light Horse.
A.16	<i>Star of Vic- toria.</i>	9,152	13½	Sydney - - -	"
A.17	<i>Port Lincoln</i> -	7,243	12	Adelaide - -	"
A.18	<i>Wiltshire</i> -	10,390	14	Melbourne - -	Light " Horse and A.M.C.
A.19	<i>Afric</i> -	11,999	13	Sydney - - -	Infantry, A.S.C., and Engineers.
A.20	<i>Hororata</i> -	9,491	14	Melbourne - -	Infantry.
A.21	<i>Marere</i> -	6,443	12½	" - - -	Horses.
A.22	<i>Rangatira</i> -	10,118	14	Brisbane - -	Artillery, Infantry, and A.M.C.
A.23	<i>Suffolk</i> -	7,573	12	Sydney - - -	Infantry.

¹ H.S. 2, p. 297.

No.	Name.	Ton- nage.	Speed.	Embarks at	Troops detailed.
A.24	<i>Benalla</i> - -	11,118	14	Melbourne - -	Infantry and A.S.C.
A.25	<i>Anglo-Egyptian</i>	7,379	12	Brisbane and Mel- bourne.	Horses.
A.26	<i>Armadales</i> -	6,153	11	Melbourne - -	Line of Communica- tion Unit.
A.27	<i>Southern</i> - -	4,769	10½	Sydney and Mel- bourne.	Horses.
A.28	<i>Miltiades</i> -	7,814	13	" "	Imperial Reservists.

C.N.O. 9.

ORGANIZATION OF CONVOY.

The Convoy will be organized as follows :—

Dis- tinguish- ing Signal.	Trans- port No.	Fleet No.	Name.	Ton- nage.	Speed.	Remarks.
<i>1st Division.</i>						
A V B	A. 3	1	<i>Orviato</i> - - -	12,130	15	Flag of G.O.C.
A V C	A.27	2	<i>Southern</i> - - -	4,769	10½	
A V D	A. 4	3	<i>Pera</i> - - -	7,635	11	
A V E	A.26	4	<i>Armadales</i> - - -	6,153	11	
A V F	A.12	5	<i>Saldanha</i> - - -	4,594	11	
A V G	A.13	6	<i>Katuna</i> - - -	4,641	11	
A V H	A. 1	7	<i>Hymettus</i> - - -	4,606	11½	
A V I	A.23	8	<i>Suffolk</i> - - -	7,573	12	
A V J	A.25	9	<i>Anglo-Egyptian</i> -	7,379	12	
<i>2nd Division.</i>						
A W B	A.18	10	<i>Wiltshire</i> - - -	10,390	14	Division Leader.
A W C	A. 7	11	<i>Medic</i> - - -	12,032	13	
A W D	A.11	12	<i>Ascanius</i> - - -	10,048	13	
A W E	A.15	13	<i>Star of England</i>	9,150	13½	
A W F	A. 2	14	<i>Geelong</i> - - -	7,951	12	
A W G	A.17	15	<i>Port Lincoln</i> - -	7,243	12	
A W H	A.10	16	<i>Karoo</i> - - -	6,127	12	
A W I	A.21	17	<i>Marere</i> - - -	6,443	12½	
A W J	A. 6	18	<i>Clan MacCorquodale</i> -	5,058	12½	
<i>3rd Division.</i>						
A X B	A.14	19	<i>Euripides</i> - - -	14,947	15	Division Leader.
A X C	A. 8	20	<i>Argyllshire</i> - - -	10,392	14	
A X D	A. 9	21	<i>Shropshire</i> - - -	11,911	14	
A X E	A.19	22	<i>Afric</i> - - -	11,999	13	
A X F	A.24	23	<i>Benalla</i> - - -	11,118	14	
A X G	A.22	24	<i>Rangatira</i> - - -	10,118	14	
A X H	A.16	25	<i>Star of Victoria</i>	9,152	13½	
A X I	A.20	26	<i>Hororata</i> - - -	9,491	14	
A X J	A. 5	27	<i>Omrah</i> - - -	8,130	15	
A X K	A.28	28	<i>Miltiades</i> - - -	7,814	13	

C.N.O. 10.

GENERAL PROCEDURE OF CONVOY.

1. The Convoy will proceed at sea in three divisions. The first division in the centre, the second division to the port, and the third division to starboard of the first division.
2. The ships of the Convoy have been organised in divisions which include as far as possible ships of equal speeds, the first division including the slowest, and the third division the fastest vessels.
3. Leaders of divisions will be abeam of the *Orvieta* and 1 mile distant, unless otherwise ordered.
4. Ships in each division will proceed in sequence of fleet numbers, ships being 4 cables (800 yards) apart, unless otherwise ordered.
5. When proceeding in or out of harbour, the Convoy may be formed in single line. In this case, the first division will lead and the Convoy will proceed in sequence of fleet numbers. (See also C.N.O., No. 13.)
6. The magnetic course and speed which the *Orvieta* intends to steer will be indicated by signal.
7. Leaders of divisions should make such signals as may be necessary to their own divisions.
8. Ships should in all cases follow in the wake of the next ship ahead, except to avoid collision or running into danger. (For exception to this rule, see C.N.O. No. 12.)
9. Each vessel is responsible for her own navigation, and should any ship-master consider that the course ordered passes unnecessarily close to any danger, he will at once inform his Divisional Leader.
10. When the signal to weigh is made, ships will keep their heads pointing in the direction in which they were heading before the anchor broke the ground, and remain stationary until a further signal is made.

C.N.O. 11.

CONVOY PROCEDURE—STATION KEEPING.

1. The position of ships in the Convoy (800 yards from the next ahead) should be maintained by means of sextant angles. For this purpose, a table of heights from mastheads to waterline, for all ships, is being prepared.
2. At night, ships are to hoist a signal lamp at the masthead for the same purpose.
3. Care should be taken that ships do not get outside their correct distance. This is important at night, as, if the line becomes drawn out, the rear ships of each division may be out of signal distance at daybreak.
4. Alterations of speed should be made as rarely as possible, and should, as a rule, not exceed 1 knot on either side of the speed of the Convoy.

C.N.O. 12.

CONVOY PROCEDURE—ALTERING COURSE.

1. For alteration of course, signals A B C to A S T will be used (*vide* International Signal Book).
2. If the Convoy, or a division, is in single line, the leader may alter course with or without signal; in either case, it is the duty of each ship, as far as the exigencies of safe navigation and the rule of the road permit, to keep in the wake of her next ahead.

3. If in divisions, the Leaders of Divisions only will alter course on the signal to alter course being hauled down; other ships follow in the wake of their next ahead. After this has been done, in order again to bring the second and third divisions abeam of the first division, the inner division will decrease speed to 6 knots until again in station, and the outer division will increase speed to regain the original bearing, necessary signals being made by Leaders of Divisions.

4. Alterations of course—all ships turning together—will be made by using the special "Turn together" flag over the course signal. This signal will be shown underneath Y, V, W, or X, indicating whether the signal is to apply to the whole Convoy or to the first, second, or third division only. All ships should put their helm over to turn to the new course on the signal being hauled down.

The signal having been executed, will probably be shortly followed by another "Turn together" to the original course. Until this takes place, the ships of the Convoy continue on the course signalled without alteration of speed, preserving their original compass bearings and distances from their leaders.

C.N.O. 13.

CONVOY PROCEDURE—FORM SINGLE LINE.

1. The signal to "Form single line" will be F Flag hoisted singly. When this is hauled down the leader of the second division will reduce speed to 6 knots and turn inwards so as to form astern of the first division. The leader of the third division will also reduce speed to 6 knots and turn inwards to form astern of the second division when in a position to do so.
2. When the signal G Flag is hoisted singly, ships are to assume the cruising order in three divisions, according to the organization given in C.N.O. No. 9, the leading ship of the second division increasing speed to place herself 1 mile on the port beam of the *Orvieta*, the ships of the second division following in her wake.
3. The third division will proceed in a similar manner on the starboard beam of the first division.

C.N.O. 14.

CONVOY PROCEDURE—MAN OVERBOARD.

1. If a man falls overboard from any ship in the Convoy, that ship should at once haul out of the line and go full speed astern until way is off the vessel.
2. Z Flag should be hoisted at the dip, or, if at night, a rocket should be fired, and Z should be flashed continuously. A rocket and apparatus should always be in readiness for this purpose on the bridge.
3. Boats should be lowered from the ships nearest to the man, provided the state of the sea admits.
4. The ship next astern should be in a good position to pick up the man if warned in time by the above signals.
5. The Convoy will be stopped by signal as soon as possible, but ships astern should not wait for this.
6. Any ship going astern with her engines at night is always to make a succession of S s (... .. &c.) on her siren.
7. It is desirable that buoys, with a calcium light attached, should always be in readiness on both sides of the ship, and a sentry stationed at each, with clear orders as to what he should do in the event of a man falling overboard.

C.N.O. 15.

CONVOY PROCEDURE—SPEED CONES.

1. Speed cones are used to indicate to other ships, particularly those astern, when an increase or decrease of speed of engines is made.

2. The following is the procedure for their use:—

Cone hoisted point up indicates "Engines are moving ahead."

Cone hoisted point down indicates "Engines are moving astern."

Cone hoisted close up indicates "I am proceeding as fast as possible with the steam at present available."

Cone hoisted just clear of bridge rail indicates "I am proceeding dead slow."

When proceeding at the speed ordered, cone should be three-quarters way up.

Any intermediate position indicates an intermediate speed.

When engines are stopped, cone should be out of sight.

3. The use of this cone is important, as it gives timely warning to ships astern of alterations of speed, and its position, particularly when going in or out of harbour, should be changed whenever any material alteration of speed is ordered.

4. The cone should be hoisted at the fore yardarm, or, if no yard is fitted, where it can best be seen by the ship astern.

5. No speed signals will be used at night.

C.N.O. 16.

SIGNALLING PROCEDURE.

1. The distinguishing signal of a ship is used when the signal accompanying it addresses that particular ship only.

2. The convoy as a whole will be addressed by Y Flag, the first division by V Flag, the second division by W Flag, and the third division by X Flag.

3. Signals should be obeyed immediately they are *hauled down*, and not before.

4. The code pendant is always to be kept ready on the signal halliards during daylight.

It should be hoisted at the dip as soon as a signal is seen. When the signal is fully understood it should be hoisted close up.

5. Leaders of Divisions are to repeat all signals; but all ships must use their discretion and repeat signals if it is seen that rear ships have not seen or cannot make out the flags shown by the leaders. When the Convoy is formed in single line all ships should repeat signals.

6. If necessary, a blast on the siren is to be used to call attention to a signal that is flying. This should not be required if officers on watch keep a good look-out.

7. A three-flag signal with code pendant superior refers to signals in the British Signal Manual.

8. All ships in the Convoy are to keep complete records of all signals made or received, whether by visual or wireless. This record, or "Signal Log," should show the time each signal was made or received, source of origin, and to whom addressed.

9. The Officer Commanding Troops in each Transport, if men are available, and if requested to do so by the Master of the Ship, will detail Army Signallers to assist the Officer of the Watch in signal work.

C.N.O. 27.

FLOATING MATERIAL NOT TO BE THROWN OVERBOARD AT SEA.

While at sea care should be taken that no floating material is thrown overboard from ships in the Convoy. Wooden cases and casks should be broken up and burnt, and empty tins should be perforated before being thrown overboard so as to ensure their sinking.

C.N.O. 39.

TABLE OF MASTHEAD HEIGHTS OF TRANSPORTS.¹

* * * * *

C.N.O. 40.

NEW ZEALAND TRANSPORTS.

The transports of the New Zealand Imperial Force, 10 ships in all, are organized as follows:—

No.	Ship.	Speed.	Tonnage.	Master or Naval Transport Officer.
<i>1st Division.</i>				
3	<i>Maunganui</i> - - -	16	7,527	Com. Ward, R.N.
6	<i>Orari</i> - - -	13	7,207	Lt. Jenkins, R.N.R.
8	<i>Star of India</i> - - -	11	6,800	Lt. Varian, R.N.R.
7	<i>Limerick</i> - - -	13	6,827	Lt. Williams, R.N.R.
4	<i>Tahiti</i> - - -	17	7,585	Lt.-Com. Denniston, R.N.
<i>2nd Division.</i>				
10	<i>Arawa</i> - - -	12	9,372	Com. Newton, R.N.
11	<i>Athenic</i> - - -	12	12,234	Lt. Porter, R.N.R.
9	<i>Hawke's Bay</i> - - -	12	6,800	Lt. Tonge, R.N.R.
5	<i>Ruapehu</i> - - -	13	7,885	Lt. Cooper, R.N.R.
12	<i>Waimana</i> - - -	14	10,389	Lt. Glenny, R.N.

C.N.O. 41.

MASTHEAD TO STERN LIGHT—NEW ZEALAND TRANSPORTS.¹

* * * * *

C.N.O. 46.

"ORVIETO" TO BE "GUIDE OF THE FLEET."

With reference to C.N.O. No. 10, regarding the general procedure of the Convoy, the *Orvieto* will be considered the "Guide of the Fleet." That is to say, *Orvieto* will maintain a steady course and speed, with which other ships are to conform.

¹ For details, see H.S. 2, p. 297.

C.N.O. 47.

USE OF WIRELESS TELEGRAPHY.

1. Wireless telegraphy will be used by the *Orviato* for the transmission of messages and orders from the General Officer Commanding Australian Troops and the Senior Naval Officer of the Escort to ships of the Convoy.

2. The only ships of the Australian Convoy besides the *Orviato* which are authorised to use wireless for making or acknowledging signals are *Wiltshire* and *Euripides*.

3. Other ships of the Convoy are never to use their W/T apparatus for transmitting, but are to be prepared to receive signals by wireless as follows:—

- (a) If an enemy is sighted.
- (b) In fog or heavy rain.
- (c) In the event of "Man Overboard" from any ship of the Convoy.
- (d) When General Signals are being made by the *Orviato*.

4. Long General Signals by day, and all General Signals by night, will be made to the Convoy from the *Orviato* by W/T, if possible at the hours of 6 and 10 a.m. and 1 and 5 p.m.

5. In the daytime, 10 minutes before commencing a message, the *Orviato* will hoist Z M X, upon which all W/T operators should prepare to receive.

All ships repeat this signal, hoisting it at the dip. When the W/T message has been received, and is understood, Z M X should be hoisted close up. The message will be repeated until all ships have thus signified "Message is understood."

6. At night the procedure will be similar.

Z M X will be made by the *Orviato* in Morse on the flashing lamp, and repeated at intervals during the preliminary 10 minutes.

If the matter to be signalled is urgent, a red Very's light will be fired to call attention, in which case the W/T message may be proceeded with without delay, and will usually be made *en clair*.

Ships are to answer on the flashing lamp, both before and after the W/T message has been received.

7. Orders transmitted by W/T are to be carried out when received, with the exception of signals which require to be obeyed by all ships simultaneously.

These signals, such as "anchor instantly," or "reduce speed," are to be carried out—

By night when the *Orviato* fires a white Very's light.

By day when the *Orviato* fires a gun.

The day executive signal is only likely to be required in case of fog or heavy rain.

C.N.O. 49.

NAVIGATION LIGHTS AND DARKENED SHIP.

1. All ships are to carry side lights, stern lights, and a light at the after-masthead, for use in keeping station at night.

2. Only Leaders of Divisions, and no other ships, are to carry steaming lights on the fore and main masts.

3. In order to reduce the power of Navigation Lights as much as possible, oil illuminants should be used for this purpose.

4. Vessels should be prepared to darken ship at any time by lowering deadlights on all ships' side ports; and arrangements should be made so that all lights on the upper deck can be promptly turned out upon receipt of orders from the bridge.

C.N.O. 50.

STATIONING OF NEW ZEALAND CONVOY.

The New Zealand Convoy of 10 ships will follow astern of the Australian Convoy.

C.N.O. 51.

PROCEDURE ON SIGHTING ENEMY.

By Day :—

1. On an enemy being sighted, if necessary, the Convoy will be ordered to alter course not more than 4 points from the enemy, and, if the attack is from ahead, to reduce speed to 6 knots.

2. Should no order reach *Orviato* from *Minotaur*, *Orviato* will use his discretion in accordance with this general principle.

3. Course is to be resumed as soon as clear of any chance of gunfire.

4. W/T watch is at once to be kept; boats cleared away; lifebelts to be prepared, and all floating gear to be unlashd; watertight doors and scuttles to be closed; and men to be brought on deck and ordered to remove boots. (Some of these steps are extreme precautions to deal with a dangerous situation.)

By Night :—

5. Darken ship, switch off Navigation Lights, except shaded stern lights and carry out all precautions enumerated in para. 4 above, and be prepared to reduce speed or stop if ordered.

6. Ships are to be very careful to keep station and avoid collisions.

7. Any ship attacked will fire two rockets in rapid succession every five minutes, and endeavour to reach the nearest cruiser, avoiding passing through the lines.

C.N.O. 52.

TIME TO BE KEPT

During passage, ships are to keep ship apparent time; in harbour they will keep standard time of the place.

C.N.O. 54.

ANCHORING AND WEIGHING.

Weighing :—

1. The signal Z Q will be made, upon which all ships are to shorten in to twice the depth of water they are in.

2. Z S, the signal to weigh, will follow. Ships must endeavour to keep their heads pointing in the direction in which they were lying at the time the signal was made.

3. As a rule, each division will be ordered to weigh, and proceed out of harbour, separately, under its own Divisional Leader.

4. Should it be necessary to proceed out of harbour in reverse order, *i.e.*, rear ships first, the signals K V, U W C, S T K, will be made. If possible, in this case, a cruiser will lead each division and make the necessary signals.

Anchoring.

5. Before approaching a port the intended arrangements for anchoring will be communicated.

C.N.O. 55.

PROCEDURE IN FOG OR HEAVY RAIN.

1. All ships at once look out for W/T signals.
2. Ships put over fog buoys, and maintain speed very accurately, using only very small increases or decreases of revolutions.
3. Syrens are to be sounded by all ships in succession from van to rear of divisions.
4. Ships close all watertight doors and scuttles.
5. Should it be thought advisable to reduce speed, the procedure laid down in C.N.O. No. 47 will be followed.
6. *By night*, in addition, all ships are to switch on Navigation Lights, electric if possible, including steaming lights.

NOTE.—A fog buoy consists of an ordinary slung cask, and is towed 150 fathoms astern by a grass line.

C.N.O. 56.

TOWING.

Should it become necessary to tow a disabled transport, a cruiser will be detailed and will supply towing hawsers, the transport shackling them to her cables and veering in such a manner as to equalize the strain.

CORRESPONDENCE *re* RESPONSIBILITY FOR
CONVOY NAVAL ORDERS.

Telegram :

From Naval Board, Melbourne.

23.10.14.

To Admiralty.

112. Following telegram received from *Minotaur*, begins :—

Commonwealth Naval Board of Administration. Convoy Naval Orders in printed form just received appear as having been promulgated by Captain Gordon Smith in the character of Captain in Charge of Convoy.

I regret I must protest against orders for the defence and conduct of the Convoy, and referring also to New Zealand transports, being thus signed.

If issued under any signature, they should bear mine as Capt. in Charge both of Convoy and Escort.

I suggest Capt. Gordon Smith is Principal Transport Officer of the Australian Convoy as Commander Ward is of the New Zealand Convoy (*message ends*). *Minotaur*.

Following telegram sent in reply (*begins*) :—Capt. Gordon Smith will be under your orders as Senior Officer of Escort.

His appointment in charge of Convoy is by Order in Council of Commonwealth Government.

Australian Convoy will be under orders of several officers in charge of escort before arrival at destination.

Masters of Transports are new to this Service, and it was necessary that orders should be issued for their guidance.

Orders are internal orders for Australian Convoy only, and do not refer to escorting ships.

Object of orders is to facilitate your work.

It is desirable that these Orders should change as little as possible during voyage to destination.

Orders issued have approval of Commonwealth Naval Board of Administration.

Capt. Gordon Smith proceeded to Hobart for the sole purpose of discussing these Orders to avoid any possible misunderstanding.

C.-in-C., China, and Admiralty have been informed.

From Naval Board of Administration, Melbourne.

26.10.14.

To Admiralty.

121. My 112, following telegram received from *Minotaur* (*begins*) :—

I entirely concur in all Convoy Orders issued under authority of Commonwealth Board of Administration, and I appreciate Capt. Gordon Smith's visit to Hobart, when all appeared satisfactorily settled in consultation.

If the duties of Captains in Charge of Convoy are synonymous with those of Principal Transport Officers I quite understand the position, but it seemed to me that the title was open to misconstruction (*ends*).

C.-in-C., China, C.-in-C., East Indies, have been informed.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Attention is called to the penalties attaching to any infraction of the Official Secrets Act.

Copy No. No. 42.

C.B. 930.

005472

**THE
CHINA SQUADRON,
1914**

(including the EMDEN HUNT).

(Short Title: "CHINA AND EMDEN.")

Monograph No. 16.

**NAVAL STAFF,
TRAINING AND STAFF DUTIES DIVISION,
August, 1921.**

THE CHINA SQUADRON, 1914,

(including the "Emden" Hunt).

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THE CHINA SQUADRON, 1914

(including the EMDEN HUNT).

(Short Title : "CHINA and EMDEN.")

INTRODUCTION.

This monograph describes the operations of the China Squadron until the end of 1914 when it was dispersed and its ships sent to Home Waters or other stations. The depredations of the *Emden* and the hunt for her took place outside the original China Station; but, as will be seen from the narrative, the vessels engaged in the hunt were all those of the China Squadron, and, therefore, the operations against the *Emden* are treated here.

The operations of the East Indies Squadron are dealt with in monograph 17.

A description of the Pacific and its stations and squadrons has already been given in C.B. 917, Naval Staff Monographs (Fleet Issue), Vol. I, in the section dealing with the German Cruiser Squadron,¹ where also is a summary of the earlier movements. For the sake of continuity here, these will be recapitulated in the opening chapters, even at the risk of some repetition.

Appendices are attached as follows:—

C.—Important telegrams.

D.—China Station War Orders.

E.—Action between *Emden* and *Sydney*.

Note on Sources.

The chief sources for the information given in this monograph are (a) the general letters of the Commander-in-Chief, China, now bound with some miscellaneous papers in the volume "titled" H.S. 34, and (b) telegrams to and from the China Station, bound in the volumes "titled" H.S. 11 and H.S. 17. These volumes have been prepared by the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and are at present in the custody of that section.

The "title" of a paper or collection of papers registered in the Admiralty Record Office is merely a symbol indicating its place on a shelf. All volumes prepared by the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence are titled as H.S. Papers which, for some reason or other, have not yet been sent to the Record Office will in this monograph be referred to by the number given to them by the branch registry concerned

¹ This will be quoted as Monograph : *German Cruiser Squadron*.

papers dealing with operations are usually registered by "M" (Military) Branch of the Admiralty Secretariat.

The War Archives of the Intelligence Division of the Admiralty have been arranged and bound by the Historical Section of that division. These will be referred to as I.D.H.S., followed by the number of the volume.

Other sources, when quoted, will be mentioned in the footnotes. As yet no important books have been published on the subjects treated in this monograph.

No footnote references are given for the movements of H.M. Ships; these have been taken from their logs unless otherwise stated.

Intelligence of the movements of foreign ships, where not substantiated by a footnote, has been taken from the "Daily Return of Enemy, British, and Allied Ships Abroad" compiled at the time by the Intelligence Division.

The *Emden's* career has to be pieced together from various diaries, letters and other papers captured, and from statements of prisoners. The chief documents are:—

- (a) Diary of Petty Officer Plotz. (M. 04529/14.) H.S. 1020
- (b) Diary of Lieutenant Fikentscher. (M. 04554/16.) summary H.S. 1027
- (c) Signal Log of S.M.S. *Emden*, October 16 to November 8, 1914. (N.I.D. 11716; M. 09840/15.) p. 42
- (d) *Emden's* Chronometer Journal (captured in *Exford*). (M. 0955/15.)
- (e) *Markomannia's* Track Chart (copy in M. 0309/15).
- (f) Several books by von Mücke, one of the *Emden's* officers.

THE CHINA SQUADRON, 1914

(including the EMDEN HUNT).¹

CHAPTER I.

THE SQUADRON, THE STATION AND THE WAR PLANS.

1. **The China Squadron.**—In July 1914, the China Station was in the charge of Vice-Admiral Sir T. H. M. Jerram, K.C.B., who had under his command the battleship *Triumph*; the cruisers *Minotaur* and *Hampshire*; the light cruisers *Yarmouth* and *Newcastle*; the destroyers *Colne*, *Chelmer*, *Ribble*, *Jed*, *Kennet*, *Welland*, *Usk*, *Fame*, with their depôt ship *Rosario*; the sloops *Cadmus*, *Clio*; the first class gunboats *Bramble*, *Britomart*, *Thistle*; and the river gunboats *Kinsha*, *Teal*, *Moorhen*, *Widgeon*, *Woodcock*, *Woodlark*, *Sandpiper*, *Nightingale*, *Robin*, *Snipe*. In addition, he had as Admiral's yacht the *Alacrity*. At Hong Kong were four torpedo boats and the three submarines *C. 36*, *C. 37*, and *C. 38*, while the surveying vessel *Merlin* was working at Labuan. The Commander-in-Chief flew his flag in the *Minotaur* since the *Triumph* was not in full commission, but was at Hong Kong in the hands of a nucleus crew, the intention should war become imminent being to lay up the small craft and use their crews to bring her up to full strength.

2. **War Standing Orders and War Orders.**—This was in accordance with the War Standing Orders for the guidance of Commanders-in-Chief and Senior Officers in command abroad, which had been drawn up by the Admiralty and issued in 1913.²

In a paragraph headed "General Policy" they pointed out that "the surest way of striking an effective blow at the enemy, and at the same time of affording protection to trade and to outlying places would be by a prompt attack on the enemy's fighting ships, which and not the enemy's bases, must always be the true objective in a maritime war. This principle may also be applied by the enemy, and hence the paramount necessity for an immediate concentration of the force under your orders in the first instance." A specially worded "Warning telegram"³ was laid down, which put in force Articles II. to IV. of these orders. The gist of these was that the recipient was to inform other intended recipients within reach; to get into touch with officers commanding neighbouring

¹ For General Map, see p. 110. ² M. 0494/1913. ³ C. 4 in Appendix C.

stations with a view to co-operation; to maintain touch with the enemy, avoiding all palpably hostile demonstration; to watch the enemy's mercantile marine; to prepare nucleus crew ships for full commission when authorised; to pay off such small craft as could not be employed for war service, utilising their personnel and armament for other vessels; to prepare for embodying Naval Reserve men, but not to enrol them till the receipt of the telegram "Naval Reserves mobilised"; to make preparation for commissioning armed merchant cruisers; and to arrange for an immediate coal supply.

Further articles in these War Standing Orders gave instructions to be followed on the receipt of the order to commence hostilities. As soon as this arrived, the recipient was to arrange for British merchant ships to be warned by H.M. ships and signal stations; to respect the neutrality of friendly Powers and to maintain cordial relations with them; to disregard limits of stations if desirable during operations; to utilise Naval Reserve men; and to communicate freely with Allied officers. Other matters of minor importance were touched upon, and the orders included altogether 40 separate paragraphs.

3. In addition to the War Standing Orders, which were only for general guidance, each station had its own *War Orders* drawn up by the Commander-in-Chief concerned, who submitted them to the Admiralty for approval, and revised them at half-yearly intervals. The China War Orders were framed on the supposition that the German squadron would at the outbreak of war commence a vigorous offensive against British trade off the Yangtse. To meet this menace the C.-in-C. intended to concentrate at Hong Kong and then move up in force to a base in the Saddle Islands off the mouth of the Yangtse, where he would be in a good central position, until the situation became clearer.¹ He had also drawn up an agreement with Rear-Admiral A. Huguot, commanding the French Division in the Pacific; by it the French commander guaranteed to send his effective cruisers *Montcalm* (flag) and *Dupleix* to join the British squadron, while the *D'Iberville*, an ancient cruiser, and three destroyers would proceed from Saigon to the Malacca Straits, there to assist the East Indies Squadron in the guard of that exit from the China Seas.² The possibility that Holland might join Germany was also allowed for, but should this not take place the War Orders contemplated the addition to Admiral Jerram's force of the battle cruiser *Australia* from the Australian Squadron, but only after she had brought to action any annoured ships in Australian waters.

With Japan our alliance would hold good until July 1921, but its terms did not involve that power in a war between Great Britain and Germany alone; and in framing these War

¹ See Appendix D.

² M. 01587/14.

Orders nothing beyond her benevolent neutrality could be counted upon.

4. The China Station.—The limits of the China Station, as fixed on April 1913, included Borneo, Celebes, Timor, New Guinea, and as far south as 30° below the equator, the eastern boundary being left undefined. The station thus contained all the German possessions in the Pacific;¹ of these Tsing tau, a fortress in the German territory of Kiao chau; Angaur, an island in 7° N., 134° E.; and Yap, an island some 1,700 miles from Hong Kong in 9° 30' N., 138° E., were the westernmost. Yap was of special interest, since from it radiated cables to Shanghai, to Celebes and the neighbouring United States island of Guam; these cables were partly owned by Holland, and it had been decided not to cut them;² but Yap had also a powerful wireless station newly erected, which would be easier to deal with.

To the south of the China Station was the Australian Squadron, under Rear-Admiral Patey, consisting of the battle cruiser *Australia*, the light cruisers *Melbourne*, *Sydney*, *Encounter*, other small craft, and three submarines; three "P" class light cruisers formed the New Zealand Division; while to the west of the Malay Peninsula was the East Indies Squadron, consisting of the battleship *Swiftsure*, the cruisers *Dartmouth* and *Fox*, and some sloops, under Rear-Admiral R. H. Peirse.

There was only one British defended port on the China Station proper; this was Hong Kong, a second class naval base protected on a scale sufficient to deter attack by a powerful armoured squadron and to repel a raid by not more than 2,000 men supported by such a squadron. Though not on the China Station as laid down in the Orders of April 14, 1913, yet destined to be largely used by Admiral Jerram, Singapore, in the East Indies Command, was fortified on the same scale as Hong Kong; and these two ports later became the headquarters of the China Fleet.

Organisation of Naval Intelligence.³—In the system of collecting and passing items of intelligence, the world was divided into intelligence areas, corresponding approximately, but by no means exactly, to the limits of the naval Stations. In each intelligence area was one naval intelligence officer who received reports from the reporting officers in his areas; these were usually the consuls for foreign ports and the principal officials in British ports. In 1914 the naval intelligence officer, in addition to his duty of collecting and transmitting intelligence, had also the control of merchant shipping in war time; this control was then much less exact than it later became, and at the time was almost wholly confined to the offering of suggestions to masters as regards their route and procedure and

¹ For details, see Monograph: *German Cruiser Squadron*.

² M. 0475/13.

³ I.D. 941; I.D. 972.

the precautions they should take to lessen the chances of capture. These suggestions took the form of telegraphic instructions to the reporting officers under him.

Naval intelligence officers, and port officers with their permission, had the power to close any particular trade route which they deemed unsafe; and until this route was reopened, merchant shipping would proceed along it at their own risk. Each naval intelligence officer was under the command of the Admiral commanding his station.

The intelligence areas mentioned in the present monograph are:—

Hong Kong, which included Siberia, China, the Philippines, New Guinea, New Zealand, and all the Pacific Islands.

Singapore, which extended northward to Moulmein, and included the whole of Dutch East Indies.

Fremantle and Sydney, in which were Australia and the southern shores of New Guinea

Colombo, in whose sphere was the Indian Ocean, west of Moulmein and north of the Chagos Archipelago, both inclusive.

5. Enemy Forces.—Opposing the British force in the Pacific the Germans had their East Asiatic Squadron, generally called the "Cruiser Squadron" and commanded by Vice-Admiral Graf von Spee. It consisted of the armoured cruisers *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*; the light cruisers *Emden*, *Nürnberg*, and *Leipzig*; the five gunboats *Iltis*, *Jaguar*, *Tiger*, *Luchs*, *Cormoran*; the river gunboats *Tsingtau*, *Vaterland*, *Otter*; and the destroyers *Taku* and *S. 90*. The only fortified German base on the station was Tsingtau in the province of Shangtung, China.

Austria had one old light cruiser, the *Kaiserin Elizabeth*. Italy, the third member of the Triple Alliance, was represented by the light cruiser *Marco Polo* and the gunboat *Sebastiano Caboto*.

6. Attack on Trade expected.—In view of the anticipated attack on trade on the outbreak of war, the Admiralty were in process of making arrangements to reinforce the China Squadron by two Empress liners (Canadian Pacific Railway Company) which were to be recalled to Hong Kong, manned by any excess ratings from the gunboats after the *Triumph* had been completed, and armed with the 16—4·7-inch guns kept in readiness at the British naval base.

The ideas of the Staff on the subject of attack on our China trade are reflected in the following appreciations¹ made in July 1914:—

China trade may expect attack from:—

(a) The German cruisers on the station.

(b) Mercantile cruisers armed either on the high seas or at Tsingtau.

¹ H.S. 34, p. 214.

As regards (a), whatever the German force may do, it will require the whole British force to deal with it, and no vessels can be spared for direct commerce protection. As regards (b) there are always some German vessels either at Tsingtau or in the vicinity suitable for conversion into armed vessels, and no doubt all German ships which can do so will seek the safety of Tsingtau where they can be rapidly armed.

It is, therefore, not improbable, especially in view of recent intelligence, that attacks might be made on British shipping within a week at the most.

The urgency of arming and manning mercantile cruisers is at once evident when the relative force of cruisers to our possible antagonists is examined.

Thus :—

		GERMAN.		
		Tons.		Guns.
<i>Scharnhorst</i>	- - -	11,420	}	8—8·2-inch.
<i>Gneisenau</i>	- - -			6—5·9-inch.
<i>Nürnberg</i>	- - -	3,400		10—4·1-inch.
<i>Leipzig</i>	- - -	3,200		"
<i>Emden</i>	- - -	3,592		"

5

16—8·2-inch ; 12—5·9-inch ; 30—4·1-inch.

		BRITISH.	
<i>Triumph</i>	- - -	Partly manned.	
<i>Minotaur</i>	- - -	4—9·2-inch ; 10—7·5-inch.	
<i>Hampshire</i>	- - -	4—7·5-inch ; 6—6-inch.	
<i>Newcastle</i>	- - -	2—6-inch ; 10—4-inch.	
<i>Yarmouth</i>	- - -	8—6-inch.	

4

4—9·2 ; 14—7·5-inch ; 16—6-inch ; 10—4-inch (without *Triumph*).

Added to which the Austrians have :—

Kaiserin Elizabeth—3,936 tons, 8—5·9-inch,

and the Italians :—

Marco Polo—6—6-inch ; 4—4·7-inch. Neither, however, is a modern ship.

It will be seen that our cruisers will have more than enough to do in following and bringing to action the hostile vessels.

Our trade will largely be at the mercy of any merchant vessels armed by either or each of these Powers.

In view of these considerations the Admiralty decided that the two armed merchant cruisers for the China Station should be manned at Hong Kong from any excess ratings after the *Triumph* was completed, instead of at Sydney from the Australian Reserve as had been the case in the arrangement then in force ; and a letter to that effect was on its way to China when the situation in Europe began to grow threatening.¹

CHAPTER II.

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.

7. **War Threatening.**—The precautionary telegram of July 27, which conveyed a warning that war between the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente was by no means impossible,² reached Admiral Jerram at 9.0 a.m. on Tuesday, July 28, at Wei-hai-wei, whither he had just returned from a cruise to Japan and Vladivostock. The Squadron, consisting of the *Minotaur*, *Hampshire*, *Yarmouth*, and six destroyers, was coaling there ; the remaining light cruiser *Newcastle* was at Nagasaki coaling, preparatory to rejoining the Admiral at Wei-hai-wei. The message, though not the "warning" telegram, conveyed news serious enough for him to take immediate action. He established night patrols at Wei-hai-wei to guard the Fleet from surprise attacks, telegraphed for the *Newcastle* to join him at once, ordered the gunboat *Thistle* from Wei-hai-wei to Hong Kong, directed the other two gunboats to stand by to leave Shanghai for Hong Kong, and sent the *Yarmouth* to Shanghai to complete with oil fuel, and to act as a wireless link if he had to leave Wei-hai-wei. He also ordered the Commodore at Hong Kong to prepare the *Triumph* for service, and gave him supplementary instructions as to Fleet auxiliaries in the event of war.³

That night the Admiralty ordered him to prepare to take up four merchant ships to be armed instead of the two previously decided on, and next day, the 29th, sent out the "warning" telegram at 10.20 p.m. This reached the Admiral at 8.0 a.m., local time, on the 30th (midnight 29/30 G.M.T.).⁴

He thereupon prepared his ships for war by landing unnecessary gear ; ordered all the river gunboats, except the *Teal* and *Widgeon* in the Upper Yangtse, to be laid up and their crews to be sent to Hong Kong ; directed the *Cadmus*,

¹ H.S. 34, pp. 214, 216.

² Appendix C 2.

³ China General Letter, No. 20 in H.S. 34. These letters will, in future, be quoted as C.L.

⁴ C.L. 20.

Bramble, *Thistle*, *Alacrity*, and *Merlin* to pay off at Hong Kong; and established through the Commissioner at Wei-hai-wei a censorship which, however, was abolished a few days later by the Colonial Office.¹

He had made special inquiries as to the positions of foreign men-of-war, and was now in possession of the following information:—

At Tsingtau - - *Kaiserin Elizabeth*, *Emden*, *Iltis*,
Tiger, *Luchs*, *Cormoran*, *S. 90*.
At Shanghai - - *Jaguar*.
At Kobe - - *Marco Polo*.
At or near Yap - *Scharnhorst*.
In Eastern Pacific - *Nürnberg*, *Leipzig*, somewhere near
the coast of Mexico.
At Singapore - - *Gneisenau*.¹

This last item was, however, quite a misapprehension, due to a coding error. The ship at Singapore was really the German gunboat *Geier*, which was on a visit there from July 26 to August 3.² She left there on July 30, and was not again heard of with any certainty for some weeks.

8. **Proposed Base off the Yangtse.**—In accordance with his war plans, Admiral Jerram's intention was to establish a base for supplies, &c., at the Saddle Islands off the Yangtse, and to keep the squadron to the northward on a line from the mouth of the Yangtse to the south of Japan in readiness to commence hostilities if ordered, thus being in a favourable position between the ships at Tsingtau and those elsewhere.¹ With this in view, he telegraphed to the Admiralty his arrangements as follows:—

"110. *Minotaur*, *Hampshire*, 4 *T.B.D.*'s leaving Wei-hai-wei, 4 p.m. G.M.T. to-day, Thursday (30 July). *Newcastle* joins at sea to-morrow. One destroyer remains Wei-hai-wei until 4 a.m. G.M.T. to-morrow (Friday), bringing war telegram if received before then. *Yarmouth* should arrive Shanghai 11 p.m., G.M.T., to-night, and will remain until outbreak of war.

"I am sailing for rendezvous north of my proposed base in Saddle Islands, and if hostilities commence I hope to prevent *Gneisenau*, *Scharnhorst*, from the south and *Marco Polo* from Japan reaching Tsingtau.

"*Kaiserin Elizabeth*, *Emden*, and small craft are at Tsingtau now."

(Received at Admiralty 1.10 p.m., 30.7.14.)

Two hours before the receipt of this, however, the Admiralty had sent him orders as below:—

"95. You should concentrate at Hong Kong and take following action as regards *Triumph*, *Alacrity*, *Bramble*, *Britomart*, *Thistle*, and seven river gunboats to lay up at Hong Kong,³ crews turning

¹ C.L. 20.

² C. 1.

³ This step had been approved by the Foreign Office, which, however, urged that the river services should be re-established as soon as possible. (See H.S. 11, page 24.)

over to *Triumph*, balance of seamen, marines, and stoker ratings being made good with natives. This leaves *Clio* and *Cadmus* for action against German sloops. Report your arrangements with the French."

(Sent 11.20 a.m., 30 7.14.)

9. **Concentration at Hong Kong.**—He received this order just before leaving Wei-hai-wei, and remarks: "As regards this order to concentrate at Hong Kong, I must confess that I was reluctant to do so, as it placed me almost 900 miles from what I conceived to be my correct strategical position. I assumed, however, that Their Lordships had good reason for sending me there, and proceeded accordingly, at a speed of 10 knots, in order to economise coal. At the same time I sent my telegram, No. 111, reporting my action, having in my mind that possibly I might receive directions to carry out my original intention."¹

Telegram 111 read:—

"111. In compliance with order contained in your 95, I am paying off *Cadmus* and *Clio*, and I am proceeding up to Hong Kong instead of as stated in my telegram 110 unless I hear to the contrary through *Yarmouth* at Shanghai.

"Commodore, Hong Kong, hopes to have *Triumph* commissioned and ready 10 days' time, but she will be many ratings short without crews of *Cadmus* and *Clio*, and I consider it extremely doubtful whether natives will serve.

"*Montcalm* (French) is in South Sea. *Dupleix* (French) on passage to Nagasaki from Hakodate.²

"I have not yet received instructions to co-operate, but if you authorise me doing so propose to ask for them to join with me and carry out arrangements already sanctioned by Admiralty."

(Received at Admiralty, 9.54 p.m., 30.7.14.)

The Admiralty, however, gave him no directions to carry out his original intention, merely replying—

"97. Your 111 noted. Delay any definite action as to co-operation."

Accordingly he proceeded with the *Minotaur*, *Hampshire*, and four destroyers on July 31 at 3.25 a.m. from Wei-hai-wei, leaving the *Usk* behind as wireless link till the *Yarmouth* could arrive at Shanghai. The *Newcastle* from Nagasaki joined him outside, and the squadron rounded Shantung Promontory on the way to Hong Kong. Next morning the *Cadmus*, *Bramble*, and

¹ C.L. 20.

	Date.	Trial Speed.	Tons.	Guns.
<i>Montcalm</i> - - - -	1887	21	9,177	2 7·6-inch. 8 6·5-inch.
<i>Dupleix</i> - - - -	1897	21	7,432	8 6·5-inch. 4 3·9-inch.

Thistle left Shanghai, and on August 2 the *Yarmouth* also left there, having embarked the crews of the Yangtse gunboats. Through her and through the *Newcastle*, which he had sent to Amoy, the Commander-in-Chief had been receiving telegrams and news, among the former being the following authorisation:—

“102. You can enter into communication with the French Senior Officer on your Station for combined action in case Great Britain should decide to become an ally of France against Germany.

“Situation very critical. Be prepared to meet surprise attacks”

It seemed urgent that he should get to Hong Kong quickly, and at 2 a.m. on August 2 he increased speed to 15 knots with the *Minotaur* and *Hampshire*, leaving the destroyers to continue at 10 knots, which was all the speed their coal endurance allowed them. The gunboats from Shanghai were being followed closely by the *Newcastle* and *Yarmouth*.¹ The Admiral reached Hong Kong at 3 p.m. on the 4th, and by the 5th the concentration of the whole China Squadron was complete. The *Usk* from Wei-hai-wei had also arrived.

10. **Proposed Reduction of Hong Kong Garrison.**—It was at this period that the War Office announced to the Admiralty a few hours before the declaration of war that it had been decided to reduce the garrison of Hong Kong by transferring to Calcutta one of the Indian Army battalions, two sections (four guns) mountain battery, and a proportionate number of men and mules of the Supply and Transport Mule Corps; they asked that arrangements for the conveyance of the troops should be made with a view to their departure from Hong Kong as speedily as possible. This move seemed to the Admiralty most undesirable at that moment, and they replied that—

“ . . . they must deprecate most strongly any reduction in the garrison of Hong Kong at the present juncture, and they would be glad to hear that the Army Council had abandoned their intention.

“It it were decided to move from Hong Kong the troops mentioned in your letter, it would be essential to convoy them, and under present circumstances none of H.M. Ships can be spared for the purpose.”

(Letter to War Office M/T 5428, August 6, 1914.)

Two days later the Army Council announced that they would not carry out the reduction of the garrison at Hong Kong.²

11. **“Dupleix” and “Montcalm.”**—The Commodore at Hong Kong had taken up as merchant cruisers the *Empress of Asia*, which should be ready by August 13, the *Empress of Japan* and *Himalaya*, due on August 13, and the *Empress of Russia*, due on the 21st.³ But a more speedy reinforcement of the squadron was provided by the *Dupleix*, Captain Daveluy,

¹ C.L. 20.

² H.S. 11, p. 134.

³ C. 14.

which reached Hong Kong at 8 a.m. on August 5.¹ By that time Admiral Jerram had received the instructions—

“You had better enter into the closest co-operation with French Officers on your station”

(Admiralty to all Senior Officers at home and abroad, 6 25 p.m., 4.8.14.)

Accordingly he took the *Dupleix* into his squadron under his immediate orders. He had been unable to get into communication with the French Admiral in the *Montcalm*. Captain Daveluy knew that she was due at Samoa on August 7 from Tahiti, and was then to go on to Fiji, but beyond that had no definite information of her position. He was very anxious about her since she was alone in the South Pacific Ocean, and might be unaware of the state of hostilities.² Her position was unknown even to the French Government, who had on the 5th asked us to communicate the following:—

“Marine à Consul France, Suva, Fiji.

Prière passer par radio à *Montcalm* telegramme suivant:—

Guerre déclarée entre France et Allemagne seule. Soutenez Amiral Anglais à Hong Kong. Capturez tout ennemi rencontré.”

11A. **Opening of Hostilities.**—Admiral Jerram had asked whether he might leave Hong Kong before the declaration of war if strategy appeared to demand it, and though he received the following reply, “Use your own discretion about leaving Hong Kong,” our ultimatum to Germany expired, and we were in a state of war before he had completed his preparations. The order to commence hostilities forthwith reached him on the morning of August 5.³

CHAPTER III.

THE BOMBARDMENT OF YAP.

12. **Intelligence.**—Of the German naval force in the Pacific nothing was known except that it was probably not yet concentrated. Yap Wireless Station had been heard on August 1 trying hard to communicate with the *Scharnhorst*. Berlin had endeavoured to get a message through Port Moresby (New Guinea) to the surveying ship *Planet*; the collier *Tannenfels* had left Singapore with 6,000 tons of coal but no clearance papers on the 2nd; two German colliers had left Newcastle, N.S.W., about the same time under sealed orders; wireless messages intercepted by Northern Australian stations seemed to indicate that the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, and other German

¹ Log of *Hampshire*.

² C.L. 21.

³ C. 15.

ships were near New Guinea; further German signals between the *Scharnhorst* and Yap were heard by Australian stations that night; and finally on the 6th the Navy Office, Melbourne, informed the Admiral that from wireless indications the probably approximate position of the *Scharnhorst* at noon on August 5 was 8° S., 162° E., and that she possibly had the *Gneisenau* and *Nürnberg* with her.¹

This intelligence brought Admiral Jerram to the conclusions expressed as below:—

"I regarded this information as sufficiently reliable to work upon, and it seemed probable that the German Admiral was either—

"(a) Chasing, or searching for, *Montcalm*

"(b) Proceeding to some rendezvous to coal from colliers which had left Newcastle, N.S.W., on 1st and 2nd August

"(c) Proceeding to the South American trade routes.

"Considering this information in conjunction with the facts that:—

"(a) *Emden*, escorting four colliers, left Tsingtau on August 3²

"(b) N.D.L. *Yorck* left Yokohama at 7 p.m., August 4, heavily laden with coal and provisions

"(c) *Leipzig* was reported in the press to have left Mazatlan (Mexico) about August 6

"I regarded it as likely that the German Admiral intended to concentrate his forces in the South Seas, but in the present state of my knowledge I did not feel justified in leaving the China Seas to search for him through the Southern Pacific Ocean, and, moreover, the *Australia*, *Sydney*, *Encounter*, and three destroyers were comparatively close to him.

"I thought it worth while, however, to try to cut off *Emden*, *Yorck*, and the four colliers. The route they would take was, of course, quite doubtful, but it seemed likely they might be bound for, or call at, Yap, the principal place in the Caroline Islands, which is about 1,560 miles from Hong Kong, and I found that by steaming at 15 knots I could reach Yap before *Emden* and the colliers, but that *Yorck* would probably get there before me.

"*Minotaur*, *Hampshire*, and *Newcastle* were the only ships whose coal endurance gave sufficient margin for the purpose, and I decided to take them first to Yap in the hope of my surmise proving correct, and then to go North to join the remainder of the Squadron engaged in watching Tsingtau, with a view to preventing the egress of colliers or of merchant cruisers believed to be fitting out there."³

His intentions he reported to the Admiralty in:—

"119. I am endeavouring with *Minotaur*, *Hampshire*, and *Newcastle* to cut off *Emden* and four colliers bound South-East from Kiao-Chau, and I may possibly proceed as far as Yap; shall then go to base in process of formation, Saddle Island, where remainder of Squadron is assembling.

¹ C. 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13.

² Plotz and Fikentscher give only one collier with *Emden*. M. 04529/14, 04554/16.

³ C.L. 21.

"Coal probably for German Admiral, who, with three ships, may either be proceeding to South America or chasing *Montcalm*, or returning to Kiao-Chau. Fitzmaurice commands *Triumph*, whose crew has been almost completed by 100 2nd Batt. Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry."

(Received 11.45 a.m., 6.8.14.)

12.—**Manning the Triumph.**—Great efforts had been made to complete the *Triumph*; the crews of the *Alacrity*, *Bramble*, *Britomart*, *Thistle*, *Merlin*, and river gunboats were transferred to her, but they proved insufficient; and when Admiral Jerram reported that natives were found unwilling to take the risk of joining a warship the Admiralty ordered one of the sloops of the East Indies Station to Colombo ready to proceed to Singapore if her crew should be wanted for the *Triumph*. Even when the Naval Reserves were mobilised the numbers were still insufficient.¹

The solution of the difficulty of manning the ship is stated in Admiral Jerram's letter, No. 21:—

"I have great pleasure in reporting that, by permission of His Excellency Major-General F. H. Kelly, C.B., commanding the troops in South China, the complement of *Triumph*, which would otherwise have been very short, was augmented by 2 Officers, 100 rank and file, and 6 Signallers from the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, and I believe that the whole garrison of Hong Kong would willingly have volunteered. It is highly gratifying to observe such spirit."

The Admiral appointed Captain M. S. Fitzmaurice from the *Cadmus* in command of the *Triumph*, and she was to leave in a day or two to join the Tsingtau watching force at their base in the Saddle Islands. The communications for this flying base presented great difficulties, but the Admiral had made an arrangement with the wireless station at Shanghai, where he had also chartered s.s. *Victoria* as a fleet messenger, and had provided for the telegraph ship *Patrol* to splice a brace into the British cable between Shanghai and Hong Kong. A third source of communication was the yacht *Mekong* at Nagasaki (fitted with powerful wireless apparatus) which the Duc de Montpensier, her owner, had offered to the Admiral.²

13. **Bombardment of Yap.**—Having thus made all arrangements for carrying out his original plan of watching Tsingtau, the Admiral proceeded at 6 a.m. on August 6 from Hong Kong with the *Minotaur* (flag), *Hampshire*, *Newcastle*, *Yarmouth*, *Dupleix*, and destroyers. Outside the port he sent the *Yarmouth*, *Dupleix*, and destroyers off to the Saddle Islands, there to await the arrival of Captain Fitzmaurice, who was to be Senior Officer of the watching force, while with the *Minotaur*, *Hampshire*, and *Newcastle* he himself proceeded for Yap. To conceal his movements he forbade his ships to use wireless after 10 p.m. on August 6, though he still continued to take in signals from the shore stations and the *Triumph*.²

¹ C. 5, 8.

² C.L. 21.

By 3 p.m. on the 10th he had reached a position 60 miles north-west of Yap, and there he stationed his three ships 5 miles apart on a line bearing E.N.E. Dense rain squalls obscured the view, but next morning a ship hove in sight; this proved to be a German collier named *Elsbeth*, bringing 1,800 tons of coal from Tsingtau to Yap. As a prize crew could not be spared, her crew were removed, her seacocks opened, and she was sunk by gunfire from the *Hampshire*. A bag of mails addressed to the *Scharnhorst* was recovered in a sodden state.¹ She was not one of the colliers the Admiral had hoped to meet, and as it seemed fairly certain from call signs and fragments of messages intercepted that neither the *Emden* nor *Yorck* was coming to Yap but rather to some rendezvous further south, he proceeded to carry out the destruction of the wireless station on the island, ordering the *Hampshire*, whose coal was running short, back to Hong Kong.²

The *Minotaur* and *Newcastle* sighted Yap at daylight on the 12th and proceeding round its N.E. corner arrived at 8 a.m. off the harbour. No shipping was to be seen; but the wireless station, surrounded by dense palm groves, stood conspicuously on an isolated hill about 2 miles from the settlement.

In the intervals of jamming by the station he made the following message three times in German:—

“From the British man-of-war. Precisely at 9 a.m. heavy guns will open fire at the wireless telegraphy installation. Everyone should withdraw from the neighbourhood of the W/T station. Acknowledge receipt of this communication.”

No answer was received, but people could be seen leaving the buildings, and as an additional warning the *Minotaur* at 9.20 a.m. fired a shot well over the station. After waiting a further 10 minutes she opened slow firing of 7.5-inch lyddite at 4,500 yards. The second shot set fire to the buildings, and with 14 rounds the whole station was destroyed, the mast brought down, and the oil in the power house set alight. The destruction of the station³ robbed the German Admiral of a direct means of communication with Germany, for Yap was connected by cable with Shanghai through Tsingtau.

At 10 a.m. the *Minotaur* and *Newcastle* proceeded south-west till the island was out of sight, and then turned northward for the Saddle Islands, the flagship intending to pass south of the Liu Kiu group, while the *Newcastle* was to take the northern passage in order to increase the chance of falling in with any armed liners which might have got out from Tsingtau.²

14. Yangtse Gunboats.—In the Yangtse River where both Germany and ourselves had gunboats, both sides had agreed to

¹ Log of *Hampshire*.

² C.L. 21.

³ It was privately owned by a German firm, but had been used to pass coded messages. C.L. 21.

dismantle their vessels. Sir J. Jordan, our Minister in Peking, reported:—

“On July 30 officers and crew of H.M. Ships *Kinsha*, *Woodcock*, and *Snipe* left Hankow for Shanghai after depositing guns and papers with His Majesty's Consul-General.

“His Majesty's Consul at Ichang reported on July 31 that the following ships were in harbour:—

United States Ships *Helena* and *Monocacy*, *Palos* (nationality unknown), and Japanese ship *Toba*.

“German ship *Luchs* (? *Lachs*) arrived at Kiao-Chau on July 30, and His Majesty's Consul at Nanking reports that *Vaterland*, which has entirely dismantled wireless telegraphy installation and whose crew has been sent by rail to Kiao-Chau, left for Shanghai on August 8 in tow of the *Otter*, which has also deposited war materials in German hulk at Nanking.

“There would, therefore, appear to be no danger of fighting between German and British vessels in the Yangtse, but pending definite information as to attitude of Japanese Government and resumption of direct telegraphic communication with the Admiral I do not propose to raise question of neutrality of the river with German Charge d'Affaires.”¹

Contrary to anticipation, no German armed ships had so far molested British shipping, and the Admiral declared the trade route from Singapore to Shanghai to be clear, and that from Shanghai to Japan to be safe also if a certain track were followed.² The extreme south of the station was to a certain extent guarded by the *D'Iberville* and the three French destroyers; these had arrived at Singapore from Saigon on August 10, and had left again three days later to patrol the Java Sea.

CHAPTER IV.

THE ATTITUDE OF JAPAN.

15. Japan and Germany.—During the Admiral's cruise political events of great importance to his station had been taking place. On August 10 the Russian Admiral placed the *Askold* and *Zhemchug*,³ 4 torpedo boats and 4 armed volunteer

¹ Telegram 147, Peking to Foreign Office, H.S. 11, p. 114.

² Telegram 151, Peking to F.O., 10.8.14. H.S. 11, p. 155.

	Tons.	Trial Speed.	Date.	Guns.
<i>Askold</i> - - - -	5,905	23.4	1901	12—6-in.
<i>Zhemchug</i> - - - -	3,130	24.1	1904	8—4.7-in.

ships at his disposal; the Australian navy had also been transferred to Admiralty control, and he had been instructed to co-operate with it.¹ But of more importance than either of these was the increasing desire of Japan to take up arms against Germany whose unfriendly attitude at the conclusion of the Chino-Japanese war she had keenly resented and whose unwarrantable seizure of Kiao-Chau had long called for revenge. At first our Foreign Office had informed Japan that we should not call on her for assistance, and had repeated this on the 10th of August, owing to Australian apprehension that Japan would seize the opportunity to extend her empire further southward; even so late as the 9th we endeavoured to limit her action to the protection of our commerce against the German armed liners, but the Japanese were determined if they took action at all "to wipe out Germany from their part of the world for ever". On the 11th our Ambassador in Tokio telegraphed that Japan was determined to declare war on Germany, and would at once commence operations to seize Tsingtau with, or without our co-operation,² and on the strength of this the Admiralty telegraphed to Admiral Jerram:—

"128. Practically certain Japan declares war against Germany on 12th August. Communicate by wireless with Japanese C.-in-C. and concert measures.

"Send forthwith one light cruiser to close *Rainbow* at Vancouver coaling at Honolulu.

"You may now leave whole protection of British trade north of Hong Kong to Japanese, concentrating your attention in concert with Australian Squadron in destroying German cruisers. (11.8.14. Sent 8.30 p.m.)

This telegram, received at night on the 12th, completely altered Admiral Jerram's movements. It was no longer within his orders for him to concentrate his forces in the Saddle Islands, and anticipating an immediate declaration of war by Japan, he altered course in the *Minotaur* for Hong Kong, detaching the *Newcastle* to proceed to Vancouver *via* Yokohama.³ She thus left his command and was absorbed into the force which operated in the Eastern Pacific. He was further instructed from home:—

"129. Our trade on the Pacific coast is being threatened. Directly Japan declares war *Hampshire* in addition to light cruiser is to be sent to Esquimalt. Arrange for coal on passage." (Sent 12.20 p.m., 12.8.14.)

The *Hampshire* was then well on her way to Hong Kong to coal.

16. Watching Tsingtau.—The rest of his squadron was now in place for the watch on Tsingtau. The *Triumph*, being ready earlier than was anticipated, had left Hong Kong shortly after

¹ C. 20, 21. ² C. 18, 22, 23; H.S. 11, pp. 161, 162. ³ C.L. 22.

2 p.m. on the 6th, and that same evening had overtaken the *Yarmouth* and *Dupleix*, whereupon Captain Fitzmaurice directed the *Yarmouth* to lead the squadron and fly the Vice-Admiral's flag so as to give passing steamers the impression that the *Minotaur* was present. In the evening of the 8th the *Dupleix*, which was in touch with the French wireless station at Shanghai, heard from there that the *Emden* with two small ships had been seen at 10 a.m. on the 7th about 120 miles south-east of Kiao-Chau steering southward. At the same time German W/T was heard about 60 to 80 miles away, and the squadron raised steam for full speed; but the strength of the signals died away and nothing hostile was sighted.¹

As the proposed base was found untenable in the south-west monsoon prevailing, the flotilla assembled at a proposed new base on the north-west side of South Saddle Islands, and here the *Triumph* and *Dupleix* coaled on arrival at daylight on the 11th, while the *Yarmouth* and three destroyers patrolled between the Yangtse and the southern corner of Korea. Captain Fitzmaurice, however, realising that with his small force he could not from there control the passage of vessels to and from Tsingtau, determined to close the hostile base and had given orders to that effect when he received Admiralty telegram 128 regarding Japanese action. In view of this news he despatched the *Yarmouth* at 20 knots to communicate the telegram to Admiral Jerram, and at noon on the 13th sent the *Dupleix* south to form a W/T link with the *Yarmouth*. With his reduced squadron, consisting of the *Triumph* with the gunboats and destroyers, he cruised for the protection of British trade and to prevent enemy merchant ships from leaving Shanghai.² Our enemies were now two in number, for on the 13th we declared war on Austria;³ but as Austrian naval force in the Pacific was limited to the old light cruiser *Kaiserin Elizabeth*, still at Tsingtau, it did not affect the strategical situation. On the other hand, the anticipated entry of Japan into the conflict caused Admiral Jerram to inform the Japanese C.-in-C. through the *Yarmouth* and *Triumph* that in the event of a declaration of war on Germany by Japan all our ships and the *Dupleix* would be withdrawn to Hong Kong for the purpose of operating to the southward.⁴

17. British Expeditions to seize Pacific Islands.—This was the more necessary since expeditions were on foot from Australia and New Zealand to seize Samoa and German New Guinea, and Admiral Jerram had been instructed to cover them. The Australian Admiral's force had been strengthened by the

¹ H.S. 34, p. 42. The vessels seen were possibly *Emden*, *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* and the collier *Markomania*, which left Tsingtau, 7 p.m., August 6. (Fikentscher, M. 04554/16.)

² H.S. 34, pp. 43, 44.

³ C. 27.

⁴ C.L. 22.

Montcalm which, on arrival at Suva on the 12th, was directed to co-operate with him during the passage of the expeditions, and subsequently to join Admiral Jerram.¹

18. **The Japanese Ultimatum.**—On August 15 the Japanese sent an ultimatum to Germany demanding the unconditional surrender of Kiao-chau to Japan in order that it might be eventually restored to China; a week's grace was given, but the ultimatum would expire on August 23. This delay till the 23rd was unexpected on our part, but the Japanese stated that they would at once place cruisers on the trade routes to shepherd British and Japanese merchant ships and to round up enemy vessels.² It was not quite certain that Germany would refuse to agree with Japan's demands as she had already been approached by China with a view to returning Kiao-chau to her. This we learned by an intercepted telegram. Our Ambassador at Peking reported:—

“ . . . Following is text of two telegrams sent last night in English by the German Charge d'Affaires to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs . . . :—

‘ Radowitz, Wilhelmstrasse 76, Berlin.

‘ Engagement with *Miss Butterfly* very probable—Maltzan.’

“ Second message begins:—

Baron Stumm Hohenzollernstrasse 8, Berlin.

‘ Tell Montgelas landlord sounded me regarding return of lease on account of present difficulties. Regards, Maltzan.’”

She had also proposed to neutralise East Asiatic waters if Great Britain did the same, as we learned by a telegram from Bethmann Hollweg to German Embassy, Newport, intercepted by Poldhu, on the 14th at 6.5 p.m.³

In spite of these suggestions, until August 23 the watch on Tsingtau would have to be maintained by Captain Fitzmaurice's Squadron. The Admiral, in response to his request, had now been given authority to use his discretion as to the declaration of the blockade of Kiao-Chau in combination with the Japanese; and he had strengthened the watching squadron on August 15 by the *Empress of Asia*, the first of the merchant cruisers armed at Hong Kong; she had left there on the 9th, her crew having been completed by 1 officer and 20 men of the Royal Garrison Artillery and 25 men from the 40th Pathans. Further reinforcement was provided in the *Dupleix*, which came up with the *Empress of Asia*; the *Yarmouth* also having communicated with Admiral Jerram, was sent back by him from the latitude of Hong Kong to rejoin the *Triumph* on the 17th.⁴ Germany appeared still to have hopes of keeping Japan from joining

¹ C. 18a, 24. ² Tel. 85 Tokyo to F.O. H.S. 11, pp. 250, 251.

³ H.S. 11, pp. 202, 241. ⁴ C. 25, 19; H.S. 34, p. 44.

the belligerents, for Poldhu wireless station reported on August 17:—

“ Following intercepted at 2.30 p.m. from Hanover to-day. Begins:—

“ No. 24. Berlin. 25 words. German Embassy, Newport. 125. Wiederholung für Tokio.

“ Ostasiatisches Geschwader angewiesen feindliche Akte gegen England zu unterlassen falls Japan neutral bleibt. Bitte Japanische Regierung benachrichtigen. Zimmermann.”¹

A few minutes later, however, a further message cancelling this was intercepted, and next day Hanover sent out:—

“ German Embassy, Newport.

Please forward following message to Governor, Tsingtau:—Attack by Japan at latest on August 23rd. Emperor commands to defend Tsingtau to the last. Send out women and children. Inform cruiser squadron. Marine Office. Zimmermann.”²

On August 20 the whole squadron under Captain Fitzmaurice, in accordance with orders from Admiral Jerram, proceeded for the vicinity of Tsingtau. Here they captured four German steamers coming from the German base (*Senegambia*, *C. Ferd Laeisz*, *Paklat*, and *Frisia*), and a suspicious American ship, the *Hannametal*. From the *Senegambia* it was learned that the ships were bound for the Dutch East Indies with coal and provisions, and that the Germans had armed and despatched from Tsingtau a fast Russian mail boat captured early in the war.³

19. **Kennet and S. 90.**—In the evening of August 22 Captain Fitzmaurice withdrew his squadron from Tsingtau so as not to come in the way of the Japanese should they take action during the night. Just as the ships were moving away the destroyer *Kennet* observed the German destroyer *S. 90* making for Tsingtau from the east and gave chase, in the course of which she suffered some damage and casualties from the guns of the German destroyer. Although the *Kennet* fired 136 rounds and one torpedo she does not appear to have damaged the *S. 90* at all.⁴ The whole British squadron withdrew to Wei-hai-wei while the *Dupleix* proceeded south for Hong Kong to join the Admiral.

He had communicated no statement of his movements to the Admiralty, who, though they had been sending and receiving messages, knew nothing of his operations beyond his telegram

¹ Translation:—“ Repetition for Tokio. East Asiatic Squadron informed abstain from hostile acts against England in case Japan remains neutral. Please inform Japanese Government. Zimmermann.” H.S. 11, p. 286.

² H.S. 11, pp. 289, 299.

³ C.L. 33, Enclosure.

⁴ C.L. 23, Enclosure 4.

of August 6, in which he said he would try to cut off the *Emden*. On the 13th they had asked the Commodore, Hong Kong, if he knew the position and movements of the Commander-in-Chief, but learned in reply that Hong Kong was not in touch with him. Next day, however, our naval agent at Shanghai reported that he had been told to inform the Admiralty that the Commander-in-Chief's address was Hong Kong, and from that place came the following:—

"198. Am in wireless touch with Commander-in-Chief, China, and expect him to arrive at Hong Kong with *Hampshire* on 17th of August from direction of Yap Island. (Received at Admiralty 8.11 a.m., 14.8.14.)"

20. **Patrol of Trade Routes.**—Admiral Jerram reached Hong Kong on August 17, and found that the *Hampshire* had got in the day before. Transferring his flag to the *Alacrity* next day, he sent the *Minotaur* to patrol for a week between Hong Kong and Cape Padaran (Cochin China) while the *Hampshire*, after docking, visited Swatow, where four German ships had been reported in shelter, and patrolled the routes from Hong Kong to the northward as far as the parallel of 26°.

As soon as he had destroyed Yap W/T station, Admiral Jerram had opened communication with the Australian Admiral, whom he had acquainted with his arrangements, but he had been cut off from news other than Admiralty telegrams.¹ The intelligence he received on his return was still not very definite as to the position of the enemy. The *Princess Alice* (a convertible liner) and two colliers at Manila were thought to be about to leave there for New Guinea, which strengthened the Admiral's opinion that the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, and *Nurnberg* had met. He reported this appreciation and the result of his cruise as below:—

"121. Probably *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Emden*, *Nurnberg*, are now together, but their position is still unknown, though Marshall Islands seems likely.

"They have more than 20,000 tons of coal afloat.

"I am watching Tsingtau and arranging to protect trade routes between Japan, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Singapore, with all available ships, including *Minotaur* and *Dupleix*, and also armed mercantile cruisers as they become available.

"Until situation is clearer, or it becomes desirable to work as a squadron, I shall personally remain at Hong Kong, whence I can make arrangements which may be authorised with Russians and Japanese and exercise general control.

"Possible objective of German squadron may be Dutch East Indies, but more likely Pacific Coast of America. In latter case, owing to absence of facilities for obtaining information, our earliest certain knowledge will be their arrival, and I suggest for consideration whether it may be possible to spare any cruisers from home waters to meet this danger.

¹ C.L. 22.

"Is it still probable Japan will declare war against Germany? Result of my recent cruise, one German collier with 1,800 tons of coal captured and sunk; wireless station at Yap destroyed.

"Expect *Newcastle* to leave Yokohama to-morrow, Tuesday, for Vancouver Island via Honolulu in compliance with Admiralty order. *Hampshire* ready to follow from Hong Kong if Japan declares war." (Received 2.5 a.m., 17.8.14.)

This was the first report the Admiralty had received from him since August 6. Just before it arrived they had sent him:—

"140. Report proposed movements. Has Wireless Station Yap been destroyed? China Squadron should promptly deal with it and Angaur. Due to uncertainty of position of *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, *Australia* and *Montcalm* are being used to cover Samoan and New Guinea Expeditions." (Sent 6 p.m., 16.8.14.)

To this he replied:—

"122. Wireless Station at Yap Island already destroyed. Angaur not being connected by cable is of minor consideration, and as I cannot spare ship for necessary voyage of 3,000 miles I propose leaving it for the present.

"Owing to Admiralty Letter M. 0475, of 29th March 1913,¹ cable from Shanghai to Yap Island has not been cut, but telegraph ship is now arranging to leave for Shanghai ready to cut it if desired.

"If *Sealark* and *Fantome* are not appropriated for any war service, may they be ordered to Hong Kong to pay off so that officers and men could be utilised as requisite?"

The three suggestions above were answered by the Admiralty:—

144. "Your 122. Concur about Angaur. Cable Shanghai to Yap not to be cut. *Sealark* and *Fantome* on Australian Station not available." (Sent 3.35 p.m., 17.8.14.)

The *Sealark* and *Fantome* were two surveying vessels, the former was then on her way to Suva where she was to assist in local defence, while the *Fantome* had left Fremantle for Sydney on August 14.²

21. **Co-operation with the Japanese.**—The chief matter to decide was the extent of our co-operation with the Japanese. Political considerations, mainly the fears of Australia, the United States and China that Japan might embark on a campaign of aggression, compelled us to lend our presence so that the attack on Tsingtau might appear to be undertaken by Great Britain and Japan in co-operation. To this end Admiral Jerram, after correspondence with the Admiralty, agreed that after the Japanese declaration of war he would not withdraw the whole British force in the North, but would leave the *Triumph* and a destroyer to escort a contingent of British troops from Tientsin to Kiao-Chau, and to assist in the landing operations. In exchange for them the Japanese placed the *Ibuki* and the light

¹ See paragraph 4.

² H.S. 11, p. 277.

cruiser *Chikuma* at Admiral Jerram's disposal.¹ Both these were modern ships, the *Ibuki* being what may be called a second-class battle-cruiser, and formed a valuable addition to Admiral Jerram's force. Meanwhile, he arranged a series of patrols of the whole trade route as follows:—

<i>Clio</i> - - - - -	Shanghai to Japan.
<i>Cadmus</i> - - - - -	Shanghai to Foochow.
<i>Hampshire</i> - - - - -	Foochow to Hong Kong.
<i>Empress of Japan</i> - - -	} Hong Kong to Singapore. ²
<i>Empress of Asia</i> - - -	
<i>Minotaur</i> , to be relieved by	
the <i>Himalaya</i> - - -	

22. **Japan at War.**—The period of suspense regarding Japan's action came to an end on August 23, when she formally declared war on Germany and assumed responsibility for the protection of trade north of Hong Kong.

CHAPTER V.

THE CHINA SQUADRON CONCENTRATES IN THE SOUTH.

23. **The Dutch East Indies.**—Admiral Jerram was now free to consider the situation afresh. It was hardly probable that any German Squadron would face the Japanese Navy in the North-West Pacific, and the safety of our trade there was secured. But as regards the South, he says, "I was aware that the whole of the Australian and New Zealand Squadrons and *Montcalm* were well to the eastward of Australia engaged in escorting expeditions first to Samoa and then to New Britain which would keep them occupied until the middle of September; that the best ships of the East Indies Squadron were engaged in escorting troops from India westwards; and that the only British force on the great trade routes between

—	Tons.	Trial Speed.	Date.	Guns.
<i>Ibuki</i> - - - - -	14,600	20·9	1910	4—12-in. 8—8-in.
<i>Chikuma</i> - - - - -	4,950	—	1912	14—4·7-in. 8—6-in.

² C.L. 22.

"Colombo, Singapore, and Australia were *Fox* and *Espiègle* near Colombo, and *Pioneer* near Fremantle."¹

"I have mentioned the possibility of the Germans going to the Dutch East Indies, and bearing in mind the disastrous results to our trade if they did so, the conclusion was irresistible that a strong force was needed to work from Singapore.

"I decided against the alternative of proceeding in force to search the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall Islands on the ground that:—

"(a) By the time I could get there the Germans would probably have sailed, as I failed to see any object in their remaining there. If they had gone to America I should be too far astern to catch them, and if they had gone to the Dutch East Indies I should be leaving the trade routes entirely exposed to attack.

"(b) As regards the Marshall Islands, particularly, the Australian Squadron is better situated for the purpose, the distance being 3,500 miles from Hong Kong, and only 1,500 miles from Fiji, where the Australian Squadron will be coaling on September 2."²

The Australian Admiral's opinion was that the Germans were collecting supplies and concentrating somewhere north-east of New Britain, and his belief, as telegraphed to Admiral Jerram, was that the main body would go Eastward visiting Samoa and Tahiti, while auxiliary cruisers, acting from a base in the Pacific, would attack our China, Pacific and Australian trade.³ This last menace could also be countered by the China Squadron's proposed move to Singapore.

24. **Admiralty wish von Spee to be hunted.**—But the Admiralty had other views as to the effective use of Admiral Jerram's force. In an important memorandum, dated August 20, 1914, we find:—

" . . . The Commander-in-Chief in China should detail *Triumph* to co-operate with the Japanese Fleet in the attack on

—	Class.	Tons.	Date.	Trial Speed.	Guns.
<i>Fox</i> - - - - -	Light cruiser.	4,360	1895	19·9	2—6-in., 8—4·7-in.
<i>Espiègle</i> - - - - -	Sloop	1,070	1902	13·5	6—4-in.
<i>Pioneer</i> - - - - -	Light cruiser.	2,200	1900	19·7	8—4-in.

² C.L. 22.

³ C. 29.

Tsingtau, and should proceed himself immediately with *Minotaur*, *Hampshire* and *Yarmouth* to Rabaul As soon as the minor enterprises against Yap, &c., have been executed, the C.-in-C. should devote himself in conjunction or combination with the *Australia* and *Montcalm* to searching for *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, assuming we do not know by then that they have left Australian and China waters

"With the destruction of the German base in the Pacific, and the hunting down of the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, the three heavy ships in China together with the *Australia* will become available for service in home waters for the climax of the Naval war."¹

The idea that the Australian Squadron from the South and the China Squadron from the North should search in conjunction for the German armoured cruisers was telegraphed to Admiral Jerram in :—

"155. Japan declared war with Germany at noon to-day.

"How is China Squadron disposed? The destruction of *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* is of the first importance. Proceed on this service as soon as possible with *Minotaur*, *Hampshire* and *Dupleix* keeping in communication with R.A., Australia, who, together with *Montcalm* is engaged on the same service. They are at present searching for them at Samoa"

(Sent 8.30 p.m., August 23, 1914.)

The Admiralty had not yet made any provision for meeting the German squadron should it be driven eastward, nor for guarding the rear should it elude pursuit in the vast spaces of the Pacific and double back on to the rich trade routes behind. The protection of these seemed to Admiral Jerram, as we have seen, the most vital necessity of the moment, and he replied :—

"131. . . . From charts and mailbags found on board prize captured shortly after she had left Tsingtau it is believed German Squadron, probably consisting of *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Nürnberg*, *Emden*, *Luchs*, may be now or shortly on southern side of Sumatra, perhaps near Padang, and that their auxiliaries are also using Dutch Islands in Java Seas as their base. This view receives support from other sources.

"As East Indies Squadron is to the westward I am sailing for Singapore with *Minotaur* and *Hampshire* as soon as possible, either to-morrow evening or morning of 26th, followed by *Dupleix* and *Yarmouth* when ready; and shall also ask *Ibuki* and *Chikuma* to follow and assist in search. . . .

"I consider that Marshall Islands should be examined by Australian Squadron after they coal at Fiji Islands about September 2 and before escorting expedition to Rabaul unless I have previously located German squadron. . . . I am not doing this myself as the possibility of Germans being on trade routes is of first importance and there is ample naval force north of Australia. . . ."

(Received 4.35 p.m., 24.8.14.)

The order for the *Hampshire* to go to Esquimalt had been countermanded as the Japanese were keeping their cruiser *Idzumo* on the Pacific Coast of North America.² All the North China Division except the *Triumph* and one destroyer were now

¹ H.S. 7, pp. 315-318,

² H.S. 11, p. 333.

on the way to Hong Kong and the armed merchant cruisers *Himalaya* and *Empress of Japan* were acting with the *Empress of Asia* on the patrol of the routes between Singapore and Hong Kong. The *Empress of Russia* would be ready by the 28th and was to join them in this work. The Admiral had asked the Russian Commander-in-Chief that the *Askold* might examine the Mariana Islands on her way south from Vladivostock and intended to use *Zhemchug*, when she arrived, on patrol south of Hong Kong.¹

25. Move to Singapore.—The movements proposed by Admiral Jerram were not interfered with by the Admiralty,² and in the evening of August 25 he proceeded from Hong Kong for Singapore with the *Minotaur* and *Hampshire*, to be followed as soon as possible by the *Yarmouth*, *Dupleix*, *Cadmus*, *Clio*, and destroyers then on passage from the north to Hong Kong. With them, increased by the *Ibuki* and *Chikuma*, due at Hong Kong on the 31st, he intended to make a thorough search of the East Indian Archipelago.¹ The French destroyers had returned on the 24th to Singapore; they had seen nothing of any German ships.

The enemy's supposed presence in that district received confirmation in a report on August 27 from our intelligence officer at Singapore that the *Gneisenau* had been heard by Cocos Island, and the *Geier* was south-east of Madura in the Java Sea. At the Admiralty this was considered to indicate that the *Gneisenau* was to the south of Java, with the *Geier* as W/T link to the Dutch East Indies, the Australian trade to Colombo and the wireless at Cocos being the probable objective, though this view was modified by a later telegram from Melbourne to the effect that the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* had disappeared to the north-eastward, which suggested the Australian expedition to New Guinea as possibly the objective of Admiral von Spee.³

Still further evidence of a presumed concentration in the East Indies was afforded by the arrival at Sabang, Sumatra, of a German steamer called the *Goldenfels*, which spread a rumour that she had been accompanied almost into port by the *Königsberg*, a German light cruiser last heard of in the Gulf of Aden.⁴

Admiral Jerram arrived with the *Minotaur* and *Hampshire* on August 30 at Singapore, whither the *Yarmouth*, *Dupleix*, *Clio*, *Cadmus*, and destroyers were on their way to join him. He sent the *Hampshire* to join the *d'Iberville* and French destroyers in the patrol of the western end of the Straits of Malacca in case the *Königsberg* should be lurking there, and proceeded in the *Minotaur* for a short cruise to the eastward pending the arrival of the rest of his force, when about the

¹ C.L. 22.

² H.S. 11, p. 378.

³ H.S. 11, p. 405; C. 30, 31.

⁴ C. 32.

3rd of September he intended to start a systematic search of the Java Archipelago.¹

Knowing the susceptibilities of the Australians as regards Japan he had inquired of the Governor-General whether there was any objection to the use of the Japanese ships in waters adjacent to Australia; no objection was raised by the Australian Government;² but in view of the feeling which undoubtedly existed, the Admiralty telegraphed to him:—

“156. . . . H.M. Government would prefer, if possible, British men-of-war being used south of latitude of Singapore, but in case of necessity you have complete freedom of action.”

26. Proposed Sweep of Pacific Islands.—While Admiral Jerram was thus concentrating his attention on the Dutch East Indies as the probable base of the German Squadron, Admiral Patey on the other hand again suggested that the China Squadron might co-operate with him in a combined sweep of the Caroline and Marshall Islands;³ but Admiral Jerram considered that while the Australian Squadron was to the north-eastward of Australia he himself should remain to the west of New Guinea; and the question of the combined sweep of the Pacific Islands remained in abeyance. Admiral Patey's own squadron was insufficient for the purpose, since he had been warned that his three cruisers would soon be required to escort as far as Aden a large contingent of Australian troops being raised in the Commonwealth for service in Europe.⁴

27. Convoys and the Philippines.—Admiral Jerram's sole contribution to a search of the Pacific Islands, namely, his order to the *Askold* to visit the Mariana Group on her way south from Vladivostock, he had to cancel owing to the necessity of escorting three transports⁵ bringing to Calcutta the British regiments from Tientsin, Hong Kong, and Singapore. In view of Japan's complete command of the sea north of Hong Kong he considered no direct protection necessary from Tientsin to that port, but from there he ordered them to be escorted as far as Singapore by the *Askold* and *Zhemchug*, which had arrived at Hong Kong and were at his disposal. From Singapore the *Yarmouth* was to take them to Calcutta. They were to leave Hong Kong on September 16, and in the meantime the *Askold* cruised down the east coast of the Philippines, returning through the Celebes and Sulu Seas with a view to intercepting German colliers which were known to have been leaving Manila.⁶

The Philippines, as a suspected base for German supply ships, attracted the greater part of the weaker vessels under Admiral Jerram's command. The armed merchant cruisers *Empress of Asia* and *Empress of Russia* had arrived at Singapore on September 1, and these he sent to patrol the east coast

¹ C.L. 22.

² H.S. 34, p. 241.

³ C. 33.

⁴ H.S. 45, p. 93.

⁵ *Arcadia*, *Nile*, and *Carnarvonshire*.

⁶ C.L. 23.

of the group, while to provide a watch over the channels between the Philippines and Borneo he ordered the *Cadmus*, *Clio*, and five destroyers from Hong Kong to Sandakan, which was to be their base while they carried out a patrol north and east of Borneo.¹

28. Examination of the Dutch East Indies.—Having thus provided for German activity at Manila, he started his examination of the Dutch East Indies. No new intelligence of importance had been received. The Admiral, in reporting his dispositions on his departure from Singapore, added:—

“137. . . . Nothing heard of *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* since 9th of August, when they were coaling at Ponape (Caroline Islands).

“It seems possible, therefore, they may have gone East, though reported movements of large quantities of coal moving towards Java Sea make me very uncertain of it. . . .”

(Sent 12.40 p.m. Received 5.55 a.m., 3.9.14.)

The *Minotaur* and *Yarmouth* left Singapore at noon on September 3 for a search of the coasts of Java. In company they passed through Banka Strait, on the south side of which they separated, the *Minotaur* proceeding to Batavia, which she reached on the 5th, while the *Yarmouth* passed through Sunda Strait and visited all the harbours south of Java. The two met again on the 9th in Madura Strait, the entrance to Surabaya, where they once more separated, the flagship proceeding back along the coast of Java while the *Yarmouth* took the more easterly passage *via* Seruta Island (1° 43' S., 108° 40' E.), where, at 6 a.m. on the 11th, she met the *Ibuki* and *Chikuma*, which had arrived at Singapore on September 5 and had left four days later to search the Java Sea. Off Etna Shoal, 50 miles north of Batavia, the flagship was joined by the *Hampshire*, which, on the report of the possible presence of the *Königsberg*, had been sent on August 30 from Singapore to keep watch off Acheh Head, the north point of Sumatra. She had gone into Sabang on September 1, and having found that there was no truth in the rumour that the *Königsberg* had come that way,¹ was ordered by Admiral Jerram to search the west coast of Sumatra. From September 2 to 10 she worked her way round from bay to bay, visiting Padang on the 7th, and after coaling off Etna joined company with the flagship and returned with her through Banka Strait to Singapore.

The ports of the Philippines and the Dutch Islands were full of German steamers, there being 22 in the American group and 37 in Sumatra, Java, and other Dutch possessions; almost every steamer met at sea was owned by the British who had no difficulty in getting cargoes. Our Consul-General at Batavia confirmed the fact that German steamers had been moving in an inexplicable manner, but stated that the Dutch authorities

¹ C.L. 23.

seemed anxious to observe the strictest neutrality.¹ As he reported that no armed German ship had been near Java since the war began and there seemed no indications of the presence of any, Admiral Jerram became convinced that he had better return to Singapore, especially as he was experiencing great difficulty in maintaining wireless communications.² He arrived there on September 13.

29. Escort Questions.—In his absence a new duty had devolved upon his squadron. The Australian contingent of troops for European service would soon be ready and the question of their escort across the Indian Ocean began to press. From the Australian Squadron the *Sydney* and *Melbourne* would be available, but these alone were felt by the Admiralty to be insufficient between Australia and Colombo, and on September 8 they had telegraphed to Admiral Jerram :—

“166. If the two German armoured cruisers are not accounted for by end of month you must escort with *Minotaur* and *Hampshire* to Colombo the Australian contingent which leaves Fremantle on 3rd October for Colombo.

“You should arrange to meet the 22 transports on their lines of advance near Cocos.

“*Sydney* and *Melbourne* will convoy all the way from Fremantle to Colombo.” (Sent 12.5 a.m., 8.9.14.)

Two days later, however, the arrangements were changed and the *Australia* was directed to accompany the transports across the Indian Ocean, the part to be played by Admiral Jerram being explained to him in the following telegram :—

“R.-A., Australia, has been directed to proceed to Sydney and escort Australian troops for England across Indian Ocean. They are to leave Fremantle for Colombo on October 7 with *Australia*, *Melbourne*, and *Sydney*.

“You are to assist by covering their passage to the Northward within wireless touch unless German armoured cruisers are previously accounted for.

“*Encounter* with flotilla and troops from Rabaul will seize wireless at Angaur and occupy New Guinea. You have also *Dupleix* and Japanese cruisers so that your force is sufficient to work in two divisions if you think fit, each strong enough to engage *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*.

“Acknowledge and report any further proposals.”

(Sent 8.15 p.m., 10.9.14.)

The *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* were still unlocated ; in fact, the only reported activity on the part of Admiral von Spee's Squadron was the temporary interruption of our cable at Fanning Island by the *Nürnberg*, which, after coaling at Honolulu on September 1, had approached that isolated station on the 7th under the French flag and raided the cable office. In contrast to this one act of war we had bombarded Yap Wireless Station, occupied Samoa on August 31, destroyed Nauru Wireless

¹ See para. 74.

² C.L. 23.

Station on September 9, and captured Herbertshohe on the 11th,¹ while the Japanese were maintaining a strict blockade of Tsingtau and preparing for a military assault on it. A powerful Japanese Squadron was about to leave Japan for a few weeks' cruise to the Mariana and Caroline Islands, so that there was little likelihood of the Germans remaining near there.² But with the absence of the *Australia* on convoy duty there was a possibility that Admiral von Spee might return to attack the expedition at Simpsonhafen, and Admiral Jerram arranged with the Admiralty that the *Minotaur*, *Ibuki*, and *Chikuma* should proceed under the orders of the Captain of the *Minotaur* to New Britain and act from there ; this would cover Australia during the absence of the Australian cruisers, and would place the ships in the best position from which to meet any attempt of the German cruisers to remain in the Pacific Islands or to return in the direction of New Guinea or Australia.³

That they would take either of these courses was not Admiral Jerram's opinion. He telegraphed :—

“There is absolutely no news of the *Gneisenau* and *Scharnhorst* since August 9. They are well supplied with coal, and I consider it possible, or even probable, that they will be next heard of on our American coast, and that they will attack our trade either off Straits of Magellan or off mouth of River Plate.”

(139 from C.-in-C., China ; received 1.20 a.m., 12th September 1914.)

30. Projected Return to Hong Kong.—Though his flagship was to go to New Britain, the Admiral did not propose to go himself as it would be impossible for him to control from there the complications of the work developing upon him. Under him were British, French, Russian and Japanese ships ;⁴ the *Triumph* at Tsingtau, the Sandakan division which was now in place, the escort of the British regiments from China, the Australian convoy in which the *Hampshire* had been ordered to join, the French squadron guarding the Malacca Straits, and the patrol of the trade routes by the armed merchant cruisers all called for his supervision. As Singapore had for wireless only an installation improvised in a merchant ship, he proposed to establish his headquarters ashore at Hong Kong, where he would be in a central position well served with the machinery of communications.⁵

¹ See C. B. 917.—Monograph : *German Cruiser Squadron*.

² C. 34.

³ C. 37, 38.

⁴ Some idea of the miscomprehensions which arise in an international squadron can be gathered from the remarks made to a British Officer acting as liaison in a Japanese ship ; he was told there was no objection to his praying in the wardroom, and was asked : “What is the chief recreation of British Naval Officers besides drinking ?” (Col. Luard, R.M.L.I., who was assisting the Intelligence Officer, Colombo, at the time)

⁵ C.L. 24 ; C. 35.

His proposal was approved by the Admiralty on September 13, but before a move could be made the whole situation was changed by the receipt of intelligence that a new enemy had appeared in a new area.

CHAPTER VI.

THE EMDEN APPEARS.

31. **Early Movements of Emden.**—One of the objects of Admiral Jerram's visit to Yap had been to intercept the light cruiser *Emden*, then known to be making her way southward from Tsingtau. He had not seen her and nothing more had been heard of her; indeed, it was thought at one time that she had returned to Tsingtau; but the Japanese had ascertained that she was not there. The most natural assumption was that she had joined von Spee, and this, in fact, was what she had done. From captured documents and German publications it has been possible to piece together an account of her movements and we now know that, in the first week of August, she proceeded from Tsingtau towards Vladivostock, captured a Russian volunteer liner named *Riasan*, and took her back to Tsingtau where the prize was armed and renamed *Cormoran II*. The *Emden* then, on August 6, started from Tsingtau with one collier, the *Markomannia*, and proceeded straight to the Ladrone Islands where Admiral von Spee was preparing for war.

Here, according to some accounts, her Captain, von Müller, suggested that he should not remain with the Squadron but should be detached to act against British commerce single-handed.¹ At any rate, on August 14 he left the Squadron and proceeded south-westward, coaled from the *Markomannia* at Angaur, and on August 25 coaled again off the island of Timor. From there the two ships passed along the northern shores of Flores and Sumbawa Islands; on the way the *Emden* stopped, but released, the S.S. *Tromp*; however, the vessel was Dutch, and no hint of the incident reached our intelligence agents. Passing on, the *Emden* slipped southward through the passage between Bali and Lombok, and by August 29 was in the Indian Ocean.²

Admiral Jerram's expectation that a search of the Dutch East Indies would yield some result was very nearly realised, for as on September 4 the *Emden* was coaling at Langeni, or Telok Delam, on the east side of Simalur Island, the *Hampshire* in the course of her search of the West Coast of Sumatra (see § 28) must have passed close to her. In fact, she had searched that very anchorage on the previous day.

¹ Dick: *Das Kreuzergeschwader*, p. 51.

² M 0955/15.

Equally unconscious of what had so nearly been a meeting, the ships proceeded in opposite directions, the *Hampshire* to rejoin the Admiral at Singapore, and the *Emden* into the Bay of Bengal. She was the first warship of any nation to enter that peaceful spot since the outbreak of war.

32. **Shipping Precautions.**—On the 4th of August the Admiralty had issued a general telegram to all Commanders-in-Chief and Intelligence Officers to the effect:—

“Advise all British shipping with which you may be in touch to abandon regular tracks, complete voyages without bunkering if possible, reduce brilliancy of lights”

This was in accordance with the Admiralty policy that trade should be as little hindered as possible by war operations; a policy directly opposed to that of Germany, whose merchant ships had been instructed to run for the nearest neutral port and stay there till the end of the war. At first, British ships in the East showed some reluctance to move for fear of possible armed merchant cruisers; but they soon recovered confidence. On August 9 the Intelligence Officer, Singapore, stopped the route to ports North of Java in view of information he had received, but the Admiralty immediately wired to him:—

“Most important trade should not be stopped unless absolutely necessary.”

Again, on August 31, they telegraphed:—

“Constant complaints received from shipowners, vessels being detained, especially in Far Eastern and Australian waters. A Government scheme for war insurance has been designed to keep ships running in spite of some losses.

“Essential trade of empire should continue uninterrupted. If vessels sail after dark, make good offing and avoid regular tracks, danger of capture small.

“Most essential impress this on all concerned. No ships should ever be detained unless definite news of presence of enemy cruisers in immediate vicinity.”

The losses anticipated from enemy action did not occur, and by the middle of September the Oriental trade route seemed so safe that in the Bay of Bengal, the only large portion of the sea whose shores are entirely British, shipping was proceeding as in peace time, and even the elementary precautions of avoiding regular tracks and obscuring lights were neglected. It should be remembered in this connection that to avoid the regular track means a more expensive, because longer voyage; and to obscure lights increases the danger of being in the wrong in case of collision, both results being particularly repugnant to owners and masters. Not only had these almost forgotten the danger they ran through the war, but the Ceylon and Indian papers continued to give exact details of the cargoes, dates of arrival and sailing, and destinations of the merchant ships in the East¹, and these papers were, of course, on board the ships themselves.

¹ Report from I.O. Colombo, N.I.D. 3116/14.

33. **Captures on the Colombo-Calcutta Route.**—The first vessel to run into the *Emden's* arms was the *Indus*, which had left Calcutta, September 7, for Bombay to take up duty as a Government transport. At 9.10 a.m., September 10, in Lat. 11° N., Long. 83° 45' E., she sighted a warship which she naturally assumed to be British; but the cruiser was the *Emden*, who, after boarding the *Indus* and disabling her W/T, transferred her crew to the *Markomannia*, and sank the prize by 10 shots.¹

While this was in progress there came up another vessel, a Greek collier named *Pontoporos*, with 6,000 tons of Bengal coal aboard. This was a valuable reserve for a raider existing like the *Emden* from hand to mouth, and the Greek ship was not sunk but added to the squadron, consisting now of the *Emden* and two colliers. The three then proceeded slowly along the trade route towards Calcutta.

Next day another vessel came up to them. She was the *Lovat* from Calcutta, also chartered as a Government transport. Her master, seeing the cruiser and the two ships, thought this must be the convoy he was to join; but he was soon undeceived, and two hours later his ship went to the bottom while her crew was transferred to the *Markomannia*, six Indian firemen being sent to the *Pontoporos* to trim coal. The *Emden* continued her course northward.

Throughout the daytime of September 12 she saw nothing, but at 11 p.m. a steamer with lights approached and was stopped. She was the *Kabinga* from Calcutta, not a transport this time, but with general cargo. At first Captain von Müller intended to sink her, but learning that the captain had his wife and child on board, he allowed them to remain aboard till daylight, and then when at 7 a.m. another ship, the *Killin*, came up to him, he decided to use the *Kabinga* to accommodate his rapidly increasing prisoners.

A few hours later a big ship was observed approaching. This was the *Diplomat* from Calcutta with 7,000 tons of general cargo. Sighting the *Emden* the master assumed her to be the British cruiser with three German prizes of which he had heard; he was right as to the cruiser and prizes, but soon found himself wrong as to the nationality, and the *Diplomat* went down to the bottom before sunset, carrying with her 30,000 chests of tea. The loss of this ship cost the Government 82,000*l.* insurance money. She was accompanied to her end by the *Killin*, although that ship had 5,000 tons of Bengal coal aboard. Probably Captain von Müller felt he had enough of this in the *Pontoporos*, and did not want to spare another prize crew.

Just before they sank, another vessel overtook the squadron, this time from the south. She was the Italian S.S. *Loredano*, bound for Calcutta, a neutral. Captain von Müller stopped her,

¹ For details of the cargoes of the ships captured by *Emden*, see Fayle: *Seaborne Trade*.

endeavoured to get her to relieve him of his prisoners, but this the Italian skipper, Captain Giacobolo, refused to do on the grounds that he had not enough provisions. So she had to be released in spite of the presumption that she would soon give the alarm. She had no wireless, which gave Captain von Müller a short breathing space; but he was now in 18° N. and 86° E., not far from Calcutta, whence news of his raid should soon start a hunt for him. Before he left the district, however, he took two more prizes. The first of these, the *Trabboch*, a large coasting steamer bound for Calcutta, he captured 33 miles south-east from False Point; her crew he transferred to the *Kabinga*, which he sent off to Calcutta with all the prisoners. Shortly after she had left the *Clan Matheson* arrived and was captured and sunk. Captain von Müller waited some time longer and coaled from the *Pontoporos*; then feeling probably that Calcutta had been warned he made off for Rangoon.¹

The Italian master of the *Loredano* had done well. Meeting the *City of Rangoon*, a vessel with cargo worth 600,000*l.*, he warned her to turn back; and it was this vessel that gave the alarm.² Thus, at 10.26 p.m. on September 14 the Admiralty received from Captain Caulfeild, R.M.A., Intelligence Officer, Colombo:—

“German *Emden* with four prizes sighted by Italian steamer, position 18° N., 86° 16' E. Time not reported. Estimated 8 a.m., 13th September . . .”

This he followed next morning by a further telegram giving the time of the encounter as 5 p.m., September 13, and when the *Kabinga* came in he was able to add from the reports of her crew:—

“ . . . *Emden* position 16 miles south-east of False point, Bay of Bengal, 11.30 p.m., 14th.” (Received 5.14 p.m., 15th September.)

The news had come from the Port Officer, Calcutta, who on receipt of it immediately closed his port and informed his chief at Colombo. There the Intelligence Officer gave instructions for all vessels in the Bay of Bengal trade to be detained in port and for the Colombo-Singapore route to be closed³; these orders had the effect of depriving the *Emden* of any further bait.

34. **Inauguration of the Hunting Squadron.**—The raid had taken place in waters belonging to the East Indies Station, but Admiral Peirse's Squadron was fully employed with convoy work, a large body of Indian troops being due to start in a few days. There was now no ship at the Colombo focal point, which, in the early days of the war, had been patrolled by the *Fox* and *Espiègle*; for the *Fox* was on escort duty and the *Espiègle* had left Colombo on September 13 for the Persian

¹ Fikentscher's Diary mentions another Italian, the *Dandolo*, as met on September 13.

² M. 10041/14.

³ Fayle: *Seaborne Trade*, Vol. I., p. 206.

Gulf. In fact, there was no man-of-war in the Bay of Bengal at all.¹ The chase of the *Emden*, therefore, devolved on Admiral Jerram, and as soon as he heard the intelligence (which did not reach him till the night of September 15-16) he took prompt action. The only ships he had available were those which had just returned from their cruise to the Java Sea and these he ordered off to make a combined search of the Bay of Bengal. The *Hampshire*, being coaled and ready, got away first at 4.30 a.m. on the 16th, the *Chikuma* left the same afternoon, and the *Yarmouth*, which had been in dock, at noon on the 17th. These he placed under the orders of Captain H. W. Grant of the *Hampshire*, to whom he gave instructions to search for the *Emden*.²

35. **Captain Grant's Scheme of Operations.**—Captain Grant's original intention had been to proceed with the *Hampshire* and *Chikuma* direct to Dondra Head, the southern point of Ceylon, and thence work up the trade routes towards Madras and Calcutta, while the *Yarmouth* examined the Nicobar and Andaman Islands on the way towards Rangoon; but on September 18 the *Yarmouth* developed machinery defects and had to put into Penang, and he, therefore, decided to go up the Eastern Islands himself, while the *Chikuma* proceeded alone for the west shore of the bay.³ The northern entrance to the Straits of Malacca was still guarded by the *d'Iberville* and French destroyers, to which was now added the *Dupleix*, which was to take charge of them as soon as she was ready. She had followed Admiral Jerram down to Singapore, and on September 7 had gone on to Penang where she was carrying out machinery repairs.

35a. **Von Spee located.**—It will be remembered that the last arrangement had been for the *Minotaur*, *Ibuki* and *Chikuma* to go to Rabaul and cover Australia during the absence of the main part of Admiral Patey's Squadron with the Australian convoy which was about to start. The *Chikuma* had now been taken to hunt for the *Emden*, while from the Pacific had come some intelligence which was to alter considerably the remainder of the arrangements. On the morning of September 14 the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* made their first appearance since the outbreak of war, at the spot which Admiral Patey had considered them most likely to visit. This was Apia in the Samoan Group,⁴ now in possession of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force. Finding there the British Flag flying, the two German cruisers steamed off in a north-westerly direction without firing a shot. At last the main strength of the German


¹ See plan.

² C.L. 24. The Admiralty had sent orders for *Hampshire* and *Yarmouth* to go in search of *Emden*, but he seems to have taken action before receiving them. See C. 41, 45.

³ Captain Grant's Report of Proceedings M. 0309/15.

⁴ See para. 23.





SEPT. 15. EMDEN REPORTED IN BAY OF BENGAL.

Positions of H.M. Ships from their logs, of Allied Ships estimated.

East Asiatic squadron was located, and the Admiralty, who received the news from the Colonial Office at 2 a.m. on September 16, reconsidered their plans for dealing with the various operations within striking distance of the German Admiral.

36. New Dispositions.—The Samoa force was presumably safe, for it was in possession of the islands and the Germans had no men to spare for landing parties, but the fleet base at Simpsonhafen was protected only by the light cruiser *Encounter* and the smaller craft of the Australian Navy, since Admiral Patey with the *Australia*, *Melbourne* and *Sydney* was already on his way to Australia where he was to pick up the transports of the Australian contingent. He was expecting the *Minotaur*, *Ibuki* and *Chikuma* to leave Singapore for Rabaul on September 18, in accordance with the last arrangement made between Admiral Jerram and himself; but Singapore was 3,000 miles away, and in the meantime the base at Simpsonhafen must be protected. Accordingly the Admiralty now sent to the two Admirals the following orders:—

“Situation changed by appearance of *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* at Samoa on the 14th of September and *Emden* in Bay of Bengal.

“*Australia* and *Montcalm* to cover *Encounter* and expeditious force from attack, and then search for the two cruisers.

“*Melbourne* to be used at R.A.’s discretion; *Sydney* to return for convoy of Australian troops to Aden.

“*Hampshire* and *Yarmouth* to sink *Emden*.

“*Minotaur* to arrive at Fremantle by October 4 for Australian convoy.

“One Japanese cruiser to accompany *Minotaur*.” (176 to China; 18 to R.A.C., Australia; sent 12.40 p.m., 16.9.14.)

Admiral Jerram, therefore, countermanded the despatch of the *Minotaur* and *Ibuki* to Rabaul, and, instead, on September 18 sent the *Minotaur* to the west coast of Sumatra and the *Ibuki* to the Cocos to look out in those districts for the *Emden*, and to be ready to proceed to Fremantle when necessary.¹

37. Capture of German Collier.—The appearance of the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* off Samoa threw little light on the problem of their immediate destination. Admiral Patey had suggested that South America was their objective, with Tahiti as their next port of call, but against this there had been intercepted a German message which appeared to be an order for a ship called *Tannenfels* to make a rendezvous on the north side of New Guinea. This *Tannenfels* was a German vessel with 6,000 tons of coal, which had left Batavia on the 1st of September.² She at first was sighted making apparently for Sunda Strait, but this was probably a false course, for on September 14 she was captured in Basilan Strait, south-west of Mindanao, by the *Chelmer*, one of the destroyers operating from

¹ C.L. 24.

² C. 49.

Sandakan. Her capture was made the subject of a protest by the United States on the ground that it was within their territorial waters; but as the position of the *Tannenfels* when captured was more than 3 miles from the nearest land and could be reached without passing through an entrance less than 6 miles in width, the protest was apparently not allowed by us.¹ The Sandakan squadron made another capture next day in the Sulu Archipelago of the *Rio Passig*, a United States collier, which had left Manila on the 5th for the German squadron, but after visiting Yap, Angaur, and Ceram, had been unable to find them and still had her 4,000 tons of coal on board.²

These captures reduced by two more the supply ships upon which Admiral von Spee might be dependent. Any use of the northern chain of Pacific Islands would soon be denied to him, since a Japanese squadron,³ three powerful, but slow, cruisers and two destroyers, had left Yokosuka on September 14 to search the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall Groups.⁴

38. **Manila.**—Besides this squadron the Japanese were preparing to send another to watch ships leaving Manila, where the *Empress of Asia* and *Empress of Russia* were still maintaining their patrol. The German colliers *Elmshorn* and *Bochum*, on September 14, were reported by our Consul at Manila as ready to leave, and three more German ships were stated by the French Consul to be coaling on the 15th. From one of the *Bochum's* stokers, an Englishman, our Intelligence Officer at Hong Kong heard that either the *Scharnhorst* or *Gneisenau* had met the *Emden* and *Geier* about the 24th August off the north coast of Borneo.⁵ Later evidence shows that this report was quite untrue, and, in any case, it could hardly affect operations since the two big cruisers were now known to be near Samoa and the *Emden* had made her appearance in the Bay of Bengal.

39. **Emden off Rangoon.**—After leaving the approach to Calcutta the *Emden* was next sighted at 6.30 p.m. on September 18 off Rangoon, and next morning the Norwegian ship *Dovre* arrived at that port with the crew of the *Clan Matheson*, who had been turned over to her by the *Emden*. Captain von Müller remained a couple of days in the neighbourhood, but finding no prey, as shipping was not on the move, he made off across the bay again. If the *Emden* had remained long off Rangoon she might have been caught by Captain Grant, who, in the *Hampshire*, was working his way north; but it is possible she knew he was coming, since the Indian authorities were sending messages "en clair"—a practice which seemed to

¹ M. 03341/14.

² C. 48.

³ *Kurama*, cruiser, 4—12-inch, 8—8-inch, 18·1 knots; *Tsukuba*, cruiser, 4—12-inch, 12—6-inch, 17·3 knots; *Asama*, cruiser, 4—8-inch, 14—6-inch, 18·4 knots; *Yamakaze*, *Umikaze*, destroyers.

⁴ C.L. 24; the telegram C. 47 mentioned only one destroyer.

⁵ C. 36, 39, 42.

Captain Grant so dangerous that he went in to Port Blair, Andaman Islands, at noon on the 19th, to request the stoppage of it. From there he continued his way northward towards Rangoon. About 4 a.m. on the 20th he passed through the position where it was subsequently discovered the *Emden* had been at noon on September 19. Captain Grant did not go in to Rangoon, but turned westward round the head of the Bay of Bengal. The *Yarmouth* completed her repairs and left Penang at 5.15 a.m. on the 20th, to proceed also in the direction of Rangoon, which she visited on the 22nd. The *Chikuma* steamed along the parallel of 6° N. towards Colombo,¹ and it was her turn this time to miss the *Emden*.

40. **Raid on Madras.**—Captain von Müller, finding that he was drawing blank at Rangoon, decided on a new operation. The fact was that traffic to and from the ports in the head of the Bay of Bengal had been stopped as soon as the *Emden's* presence was known, and no movement of British ships was in progress. The German captain may have realised this, for his next move was of a new kind. Standing right across the Bay of Bengal he arrived off Madras on September 22. At 9.30 p.m., approaching close to the shore, he switched on his searchlights and illuminated the harbour and town; simultaneously he opened fire on the Burmah Oil Company's tanks that lay close to the town between his ship and the harbour. Before he had fired 30 rounds, two of the tanks were ablaze, the flames vividly lighting up the whole foreshore so much that the *Emden* had no difficulty in picking her target. They also lit up the ships and enabled the shore batteries to reply, but they had feeble guns and did no harm.² The *Emden* was firing for about half an hour. A few shots fell in the town and in bungalows near the oil tanks, and one shell burst aboard the S.S. *Chupra* in the harbour, causing altogether 26 casualties. The raider then switched off her searchlights, ceased firing and disappeared. The whole incident, its unexpectedness, the glare of the burning tanks and the ineffectiveness of the defence made a deep impression on the native mind and seriously disturbed the course of trade.³

The nearest ship to the scene of this episode was the *Chikuma*. Captain Grant, as soon as he heard that the *Emden* was at Rangoon, had endeavoured to order the Japanese cruiser there, but she did not get the message till she was near enough to Colombo to make it necessary for her to coal there before proceeding to Rangoon. She arrived at Colombo on the 21st,

¹ Capt. Grant's Report, M. 0309/15.

² The defence consisted of 6 R.M.L. 6·3-inch Howitzers, 6 Maxims, 6 B.L. 15-prs.; there were also 2 Q.F. 4·7-inch guns as a moveable armament, intended to be hauled by 10 pairs of bullocks (Scheme for the Defence of Madras, 1913, General Staff, India).

³ See Fayle: *Seaborne Trade*.

whereupon Captain Grant, who intended to coal at Madras, asked the *Chikuma* to go there with a collier; and in pursuance of this order, the Japanese cruiser proceeded with the collier at 9 a.m. on September 22.¹ She was thus making for the same point as the *Emden*. From Colombo to Madras is 590 miles, and as the speed of the collier was only 7 knots, she would be 340 miles from the blazing oil tanks when the *Emden* disappeared from Madras. The news of the bombardment reached the Intelligence Officer, Colombo, at 11 p.m., and was immediately sent by wireless to the *Chikuma*, who, on receipt of it, sent the collier back to Colombo and hurried northward at her best speed.² There was still a chance of a meeting since the *Emden* proceeded southward with her collier in company, and spent several hours off Pondichery next morning in order to coal from her.³ The two disappeared again at 2 p.m., September 23. The *Hampshire* was bearing down on her from the north, but at the moment when the *Emden* disappeared was still about 300 miles from Pondichery. Captain Grant does not seem to have received the Pondichery intelligence; in his Report of Proceedings he does not mention it, and after stating that the *Emden* was reported off Madras, says:—

“ . . . *Chikuma* turned south to look out in the vicinity of Trincomali, which I thought *Emden* might possibly attack as she was apparently moving out of the bay.”

The third member of the hunting group, the *Yarmouth*, only left Rangoon that day to take up patrol off Acheh Head.


41. **Effect of Madras Raid.**—The effect of the *Emden's* raid on Madras was perhaps as great as that of any of her exploits. Captain von Müller had cleverly managed to give an impression of omniscience by telling the masters of some of his captures when they had left Colombo and what their cargoes were. But this information he had quite simply received from the Ceylon papers seized in the first ship he found. Again, at a time when attention was attracted to the eastern side of the bay, and only a few hours after the trade route to Calcutta had been declared “reasonably safe” again,⁴ he had made a startling reappearance at one of the principal commercial harbours on that very trade route; and, disappearing amid flames and rolling smoke, left a deep impression, not only on the natives but on the British merchants as well. In the minds of the latter, who naturally could not rightly appreciate the difficulties of the situation, it was obvious that the advice given by the authorities could not be relied on; and mistrust of the directions of the Admiralty


¹ C. 54. Captain Grant in his Report of Proceedings says that after completing with coal she waited for further orders which were really unnecessary in view of the fact that she was carrying out the original programme of sweeping the East Coast of India.

² Colonel Luard, R.M.L.I.

³ *Markov annia's* Track Chart. M. 0309/15.

⁴ C. 49, 56.





**OPERATIONS AGAINST EMDEN.
SEPT. 13-24.**

*The tracks of Allied Ships are estimated;
those of British Ships are from their logs.*

*The figure within a circle represents the noon position on that day.
The positions of the EMDEN are shown as reported.*

and Intelligence Officers began to spread. The Indian Press from September 23 onwards was full of letters pointing scorn at the ineptitude of the naval authorities. A favourite *nom-de-plume* for the writers of these letters was "Reasonably Safe."

In the circumstances it might have been expected that Admiral Jerram would send more than three cruisers to deal with the *Emden*, and yet the general situation scarcely permitted such a course. Admiral Patey had repeatedly urged that the China Squadron should join his in a combined search of the Pacific Islands for von Spee; this, so far, had not been arranged. The *Minotaur* and *Ibuki* were to escort the Australasian Convoy; the *Triumph* was at Tsingtau; the French and Russian ships at Admiral Jerram's disposal were mostly broken down; and the American neutrality at Manila compelled the Admiral to keep his weaker forces off that port. In fact, just after the bombardment of Madras, when he may have been considering the question of utilising in the Bay of Bengal some of the vessels engaged in the Philippines patrol, the Admiralty warned him that 15 German ships were now full of coal at Manila, and asked him whether he could not take steps to watch these vessels. He had two *Empress* liners relieving each other on patrol outside the Eastern Channel, with two sloops and a destroyer flotilla watching the Southern Channel, and the Admiralty's telegram pointed to the necessity of still retaining them there.¹ Besides all these considerations there was, in addition, the movement of troops homeward, which here, as in the other stations, raised another demand upon naval force.

CHAPTER VII.

ESCORTS FOR TROOP TRANSPORTS.

42. **The Arcadia Convoy.**—Both the British cruisers searching for the *Emden* had before her appearance been intended for convoy duty, the *Hampshire* with the Australian contingent, and the *Yarmouth* with the British regiments from China. These last were now on their way, but had started several days later than the naval arrangements had anticipated. The transport *Arcadia* had left Chingwangtao on September 16 with the 2nd Gloucester Regiment, and also brought the 100 men of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, who, at the outbreak of war, had volunteered for service in the *Triumph*;² the remainder of that regiment were in another transport, the *Nile*. With them also were the *Carnarvonshire* in which the Singapore garrison were to embark, and the *Cordillère*, a French ship bringing

¹ C. 57.

² The *Triumph* was still assisting in the blockade of Tsingtau.

rifles and ammunition from Japan which the French Government had asked us to escort. North of Hong Kong no escort had been considered necessary owing to the Japanese command of the sea; but between it and Singapore the presence of armed ships was indispensable. The transports had accordingly left Hong Kong on September 21 escorted by the *Askold* and *Empress of Asia*. The intention had been that the *Zhemchug* should have taken the place of the *Empress of Asia*, which was wanted for the Manila patrol, but the Russian cruiser's engines were in bad condition, and she was to come on later with some French transports from Saigon. The destination of the British regiments was Calcutta, but the *Cordillère* was to wait at Singapore for the arrival of the French troopships with the *Zhemchug*, and would then be taken with them by the *Dupleix* to Colombo, and possibly Aden. A few days after the *Arcadia* convoy had started, the War Office wished to change the destination of the Duke of Cornwall's Regiment from Calcutta to Bombay; but to provide a separate escort for one regiment in the circumstances was impossible, and it was decided on September 22 that the British troops should all go to Bombay to join one of the Indian convoys, for it was ultimately arranged by the War Office that they should come back to England.¹ They arrived at Singapore on the 26th, their passage having afforded some protection to the trade route, which for some time had not been patrolled, since the activity of the German colliers at Manila had caused Admiral Jerram to order the *Himalaya* from there to assist the *Empress of Russia* in place of the *Empress of Asia*.

43. **German Colliers at Manila.**—The *Empress of Japan*, which at first had shared the patrol of the Hong Kong-Singapore trade route with the *Himalaya*, had been at Singapore since September 13. When the *Minotaur* departed for the West Coast of Sumatra, Admiral Jerram had shifted his flag to the *Empress of Japan* on the 17th, but feeling that she was being wasted in harbour he obtained the Admiralty's permission to hoist his flag on shore, and on the 23rd had sent her *via* Banka and Makassar Straits to Sandakan, from which place she was to escort the prizes *Tannenfels* and *Rio Passig* to Hong Kong for adjudication by the Prize Court.² The presence of the squadrons on each side of Manila appeared to have stopped the departure of the coal for the enemy cruisers, no German vessels having left Manila between the 4th and 25th of September. On the 26th, however, the *Elmshorn*, collier, which for some time had been reported as ready, sailed during the night of the 26th-27th of September, but sighting the *Himalaya* outside put back again.³ The Sandakan squadron was to be strengthened by the Japanese cruiser *Nisshin*, which had been put at Admiral Jerram's disposal. He had at first ordered

¹ C. 45, 46, 50, 51, 60.² C. L. 24.³ C.L. 25.

her from Hong Kong on the 25th to Singapore as the Admiralty wished her to join the Australian Convoy in addition to the *Minotaur* and *Ibuki*,¹ but when the departure of that convoy was delayed he sent her in the meantime to Sandakan, where, with the two sloops and five destroyers she was to carry out a search of the Banda and Flores Seas in which possibly the *Geier* or the armed auxiliaries *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* and *Ryasan* might be lurking. The anxiety of the Germans in Manila to get supply ships out lent some colour to the idea of the presence of some armed enemies in those waters.²

44. **Minotaur and Ibuki leave the Station.**—The delay in the departure of the Australian Convoy which permitted the *Nisshin's* participation in this search was due to apprehensions on the part of the New Zealand Government that the appearance of the German cruisers at Samoa implied that they were coming south to attack the New Zealand transports. These were to have left Wellington on the 25th escorted by "P" class cruisers as far as Albany where they would join up with the rest of the Australian transports, but in spite of the Admiralty's assurance that the route was safe the New Zealand Government refused to let them sail without a stronger escort.³

The Admiralty, therefore, on September 23rd ordered Admiral Jerram to send the *Minotaur* and *Ibuki* forthwith at good speed round the south of Australia to Wellington. There had been difficulty in communicating with them for some time owing to bad atmospheric conditions in that region of electric storms⁴; but he got the order through, and the *Minotaur*, at 11.30 p.m. on the 23rd, started for Fremantle, working up gradually to 15 knots. She sighted the *Ibuki* on the 27th and together they proceeded for Wellington,⁵ which they were to reach on October 14th, when the convoy would commence its long voyage to Europe, unless circumstances permitted an earlier start. The two most powerful ships under Admiral Jerram's command were thus detached for a voyage along the south of Australia, which seemed an unlikely place to meet an enemy vessel, or was at any rate away from the sphere of the *Emden's* activity.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE FIRST MINIKOI RAID.

45. **The Oriental Trade Route.**—So far the *Emden* had been operating only on the Calcutta branch of the great Oriental Trade Route. The main trunk of this route runs from Singapore to Aden, and for the protection of it the East Indies Squadron had been stationed in the Indian Ocean. Plans for the defence

¹ C. 52.² C.L. 52.³ See Monograph: *The First Australian Convoy* for details.⁴ C. 53, 55.⁵ Log of *Minotaur*.

of trade in his command had been drawn up by Admiral Peirse, C.-in-C., East Indies, and embodied in his War Orders, which he had submitted to the Admiralty and which had been approved by them.¹

In these it was assumed that our alliance with Japan would become immediately operative on the declaration of war, and that, therefore, we and the Japanese together would have ample force to keep the German Cruiser Squadron from moving, or to deal with it wherever it should go. The chief danger anticipated was from merchant vessels which the enemy might manage to arm. As the ports of the Indian Ocean were nearly all British, it was not from there that such raiders would be likely to come, but rather from the Dutch East Indies and the harbours of South China, from which intelligence was difficult to obtain. Should they appear on the trade routes Admiral Peirse considered that "the points at which they will probably strike" are those where the trade routes are restricted and where, in consequence, the vessels are closer together and more easily "found than in the open sea." Such points are not difficult to settle. A glance at the map will show a fringe of islands extending from Australia to Rangoon which constrain trade to pass through two Straits; Sumatra bars the way from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean, and trade from America and the Far East must pass either South or North of it, that is, either through Sunda Strait or between Aceh Head and the Nikobars. Coming further West all the routes converge on Dondra Head, the South point of Ceylon. Nothing can pass between Ceylon and the mainland since the Strait is not navigable. In the Gulf of Aden the routes coalesce into a stream which must pass the Straits of Bab el Mandeb. Thus four of the points considered by Admiral Peirse as affording the best chance of prey to a raider were Sunda Strait, the Straits of Malacca, Dondra Head and the Gulf of Aden. But there was a fifth, which though in mid-ocean has the curious property of being a focal point of trade.

46. **Minikoi.**—Four hundred miles from Colombo the route to Aden is crossed by a barrier reef of coral which runs north and south on the meridian of 75° E. for a thousand miles. There is a gap 120 miles wide in the barrier just where the line from Colombo to Aden cuts it, and in the middle of the gap is a little coral island called Minikoi; and thus within sight of Minikoi in Lat. 8° N. passes practically all our trade to and from the Far East, Calcutta, and the East Indian Archipelago, and much of that with Australia.² Any enemy vessel that could maintain itself near Minikoi would be certain of meeting ships; on either side of the island there is only 60 miles of clear water and the reef effectually prevents any wider diversion.

¹ See Monograph: *East Indies*.

² A detailed description of the Oriental Trade Route is given in Fayle: *Seaborne Trade*, Vol. I., Chapter VII.

In his War Orders, therefore, Admiral Peirse had included Minikoi with the four other danger points and he had assigned the vessels under his command to one or other of these five stations. When war broke out, however, his plans were so altered by the necessities of the moment and the unexpected transfer of the Indian Armies to Egypt and France that, like the Bay of Bengal, Minikoi since the first week of the war had not seen a man-of-war.

47. **Movements of the Hunting Squadron.**—Captain Grant's attention was fixed on the Bay of Bengal. He had the *Yarmouth* on patrol off Aceh Head; the *Chikuma* seems to have gone north from Trincomali and then carried out a patrol off the east coast of Ceylon; the *Hampshire* herself continued southward from Madras and put into Colombo to coal on September 26. The *Emden* had disappeared. Captain Grant had now to settle his next move. Admiral Jerram had left him a free hand, furnishing him with all available information to assist him, but refraining, as far as possible, from hampering him with too much advice.¹ He had, however, asked him, if possible, to assist with the convoy work. Not only had the Admiral to consider the *Arcadia* convoy, which was to leave Singapore on September 28 for Colombo with the *Askold* and *Empress of Asia*, but also there was the *El Kantara*, a French ship, bringing eight batteries of field guns and ammunition urgently required by the French Government.² This ship was being escorted to Colombo by the *Dupleix*, which had left Penang on September 26 with orders to add the *El Kantara* to the *Arcadia* convoy; the *Dupleix* was still in need of repair which she would effect at Colombo and could steam only 10 knots. Still another French transport, the *Admiral Oly*, which had come up from Saigon to Hong Kong should leave there under the escort of the *Zhemchug* on September 27. The Admiral had thus felt compelled to call on Captain Grant for any assistance possible. Captain Grant, therefore, having no idea where the *Emden* was likely to turn up again, decided to follow the Colombo-Singapore trade route, and possibly carry out simultaneously the services of hunting for the raider and supporting the convoys.³ He was halfway across to Aceh Head when the *Emden* again revealed herself.

48. **Arrival of the Gryfevale.**—With Captain Grant's concurrence the Intelligence Officer, Colombo, declared the route from his port to Singapore reasonably safe as from 8 a.m., September 28,⁴ and ships began to move again; but exactly 24 hours later, there came into Colombo a steamer, the *Gryfevale*, on passage from Bombay to Calcutta. She brought news of the *Emden*—

¹ C.L. 25.

² C. 58, 66.

³ Captain Grant's Report, M. 0309/15.

⁴ C. 59.