

sails. October 20 was spent by *E.11* in the attempt to charge her batteries, but she was apparently located and reported by a seaplane,¹ and she was hunted by destroyers whenever she rose during the night.² On 21st she was again driven under by a destroyer, and on 22nd, being unable further to prolong her absence from her base, she decided to return to Harwich.

16. Netting of the Fehmarn Belt, October 23-27.—Measures were now taken by the Commander-in-Chief, Baltic, to prevent the British submarines from leaving the Baltic. It was decided to close the Fehmarn Belt with herring nets, for no other nets were available, and up to date the Germans had no experience of the use of nets against submarines. The work was entrusted to the Coast Defence Division and was carried out between October 23 and 27 by fishing boats, under the direction of Korvetten-Kapitän von Rosenberg. Seines³ 30 metres long and 15 to 16 metres deep were laid in lines of 1,200 metres between Marienleuchte and Hyllekrog in the Fehmarn Belt. The force of the current drew them into the shape of a bow facing west, and two rows 30 metres apart were laid chequerwise across the openings of the first line, 36 kilometres being laid in all. It was hoped that the nets would foul the propeller of a submarine and compel it to come to the surface, where it could be despatched by the armed trawlers which watched the nets. Experience in the North Sea had shown that destroyers were unsuitable for hunting submarines by reason of their unhandiness, and better results were to be obtained by employing a deep formation of trawlers in line abreast,⁴ to search a suspected locality. On the evening of October 19 the 8th T.B. Flotilla arrived at Kiel from the North Sea. Nine boats were sent to the Sound to reinforce the Chief of the 2nd Flotilla, and two to assist the *Undine* in Aarö Sound. The 17th Half-Flotilla and the four training boats were sent back to Kiel.

17. Destroyers withdrawn from Kiel Bay, October 21. Patrol by Submarines.—German submarines had been regularly stationed in the Heligoland Bight for some days on account of the constant presence of British submarines, and on the afternoon of October 19 one of them succeeded in sinking *E.3*, which was patrolling off the entrance to the Western Ems. Anti-submarine warfare was still in its infancy, and experiments were being made with various methods in order to discover the most effectual measure with which to combat these craft. The isolated success obtained against *E.3* gave rise to the hope that at last an effective counter had been discovered, and Prince

¹ The German seaplanes were not provided with bombs at this date.

² There is no mention of these incidents in G.O.H. This description is based on Report of *E.11* and Commander (S)'s covering letter. M. (no number); *titled* For. Off., October 21, 1914.

³ "Hochseestellnetze."

⁴ "In mehreren Reihen hintereinander."

Henry decided to withdraw all the destroyers from Kiel Bay and to leave its protection entirely to submarines. Six weeks earlier the British Admiralty had adopted somewhat similar measures to protect the northern Scottish bases.

Five boats were available, namely, *U.A*, *U.1*, *U.3*, *U.4* and *U.32*.¹ The procedure they were ordered to adopt was to spend the night on the bottom or in charging their batteries, and by day to cruise submerged in their respective areas, coming up at intervals to scout through their periscopes for enemy submarines. On October 21 every surface war vessel was withdrawn from Kiel Bay. Reconnaissance by aircraft and airships remained uninterrupted. The patrols east of the Fehmarn Belt were warned not to come west of the line Marienleuchte-Hyllekrog, and those in the Little Belt and Aarö Sound were ordered to keep north of the meridian of 54° 55' N. On October 25 the Naval Staff received the information, from a reliable source, that *E.1* and *E.9* had entered Libau at midday on October 21, and on 27th the patrolling submarines were withdrawn from Kiel Bay.

CHAPTER III.

GERMAN ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND THE WORK OF THE BRITISH BOATS, 1914.

18. Lights Extinguished in Sound, October 19-20, 1914.—The passage of the Sound by British submarines greatly increased the anxieties of the Germans for the security of their valuable exercise and training grounds in Kiel Bay and the Western Baltic, and for the safety of the Swedish iron ore trade in the Gulf of Bothnia, which was indispensable for the conduct of the war. Effective anti-submarine measures had not yet been developed in the Baltic, and there was a shortage of the only craft available to meet the menace, namely, torpedo boats, trawlers, and aircraft, since practically everything had been taken for the North Sea.

Directly the entry of the British submarines was reported a request was once more made by Germany to Denmark and Sweden to close their territorial waters to these craft as far as could be done. Sweden was asked to extinguish the lights and remove navigation marks in the Sound, and this was carried into effect by her on the night of October 19-20, the only lights remaining inextinguished being Helsingborg and Malmö Lights

¹ A new boat, completed since outbreak of war; one 22-pdr., four torpedo tubes (19·7 in.).

and those in the Trelleborg Channel. Even now, however, the Germans felt far from safe, for they considered that there must probably be in England pilots acquainted with those waters, who could take submarines through without recourse to lights or navigation marks. Denmark increased the stringency of her watch in the Belts and Danish ports of the Sound, and was convinced to her own satisfaction that no submarine could enter the Baltic by any of the channels over which she had control.

19. Reorganisation of German Patrol in West Baltic, November, 1914.—On October 29 the 2nd and 8th T.B. Flotillas, which had been lent to the Baltic temporarily from the North Sea, were required again by the Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet, and in their place the 2nd Mineseeking Division, consisting of 14 torpedo boats,¹ was sent to the Baltic for patrol purposes. The 4th T.B. Flotilla had been constituted a week previously from the 19th Half-Flotilla, and S.120 to S.131, less S.125, whilst G.134 had been added to the 20th Half-Flotilla under the "detached Admiral." With the *Sleipner* and *Carmen* the Commander-in-Chief now had 19 T.B.D.s available for work in the Western Baltic.

By the end of October the barrage of fishing nets in the Fehmarn Belt had proved to be impracticable. On 29th an easterly gale drifted many of the nets into Kiel Bay, where they obstructed the shipping. Application was made by Prince Henry for permission to close the Fehmarn Belt by mines, a course which he held to be essential in order to ensure the security of Kiel Bay. But the application met with a refusal by the Higher Command, not only because the necessary mines were not available, but further because a type of minefield effective in stopping submarines remained still to be evolved.

At the beginning of November the patrol service in the Western Baltic was reorganised in accordance with the experience gained up to date, the command being given to the Chief of the Coast Defence Division. In the Aarö Sound and at the southern exit of the Great Belt the measures in force remained as before, with the addition that on November 3 the exit from the Aarö Sound was blocked by a boom. Prince Henry wished to close the Fyr renden by mining and netting Thorö Riff and the area between the Riff and the German minefield, but this was disallowed by the Higher Command on account of Danish neutrality. The patrol at the exit of the Sound was maintained as before by torpedo boats, but the outpost guarding the Fehmarn Belt was withdrawn from the Möen-Dornbusch line and placed in the narrowest part of the Gjedser Channel, near Gjedser. The Sound section was normally to be guarded by the 4th T.B. Flotilla and the Gjedser section by the 2nd Mineseeking

¹ D.6 (leader), T.28, T.30, T.39, T.46, T.47, T.49, T.50-57.

Division, both being under Korvetten-Kapitän Wieting, of the 4th Flotilla. The cruisers were ordered not to remain permanently at sea, but to make occasional visits to the Sound and to show themselves off the Danish and Swedish coasts for the benefit of enemy agents.

20. "E.1" and "E.9" leave for Lapvik, October 25.—On October 21 the Higher Command telegraphed to Admiral Behring that an advance of the Russian naval forces was not unlikely in connection with the entry of the British submarines into the Baltic. The detached admiral was to make preparations to counter any such advance with his submarines.

The Germans rightly surmised that E.1 and E.9 would shortly leave for the Gulf of Finland to join Admiral von Essen. Lieutenant-Commander Laurence received orders from the British Ambassador on October 24 to proceed to Lapvik; and on the following day, as E.11 had not arrived, E.1 and E.9 left Libau for the north, intending, on the way, to try for the German cruisers in Danzig. The latter had recently been reinforced in consequence of the expectation of Russian naval activity in the near future. On October 19 the armoured cruiser *Friedrich Carl*¹ was sent to Neufahrwasser from Kiel as flagship for Admiral Behring, the channel from Neufahrwasser to Danzig being dredged to a depth of 8.5 metres for her benefit. Two days later a further reinforcement arrived in the training cruisers *Hertha*, *Hansa*, *Victoria Louise*, *Vineta* and *Thetis*, under Rear-Admiral Jasper. The patrol line in the bay was from Hela to Pasewark Beacon.

Unfortunately for the chances of the British submarines, Admiral Behring's force left Danzig on October 24 and 25 for an operation off Windau and the Gulf of Riga, in the hope of enticing the Russian fleet to sea and drawing it on to the submarines which were waiting off the Gulf of Finland.

On October 26 E.1 dived into the entrance to Neufahrwasser, but it was too thick to see whether there were any German ships inside. She was sighted at 1.30 p.m., three miles north of Weichselmünde. Not until 28th was the weather suitable for her to enter Neufahrwasser, when she fired a torpedo at a destroyer at 500 yards, but missed. In consequence of the presence of the British submarines in the bay, the training cruisers were withdrawn to Swinemünde.

On October 29 E.1 decided to turn north for Lapvik, proceeding by the west coast of Gotland, the route which the German cruisers were reported to make use of when proceeding north or south in the Baltic. At 7.30 a.m. that day Admiral Behring had commenced his homeward movement, taking the course down the west coast of Gotland. E.1 and E.9 must

¹ Freg.-Kap. Loesch, 8,856 tons, 21 knots, four 8.2 in., ten 5.9 in., twelve 15-pdrs.

have passed the German forces during the night of 29th–30th, for at 6 a.m. on 30th Admiral Behring was off the south point of Gotland, while *E.1* met *E.9* an hour later off Bogskär Light-house in the approach to the Gulf of Bothnia. But neither force sighted the other, and Admiral Behring withdrew in safety to Danzig, while the British submarines went in to Lapvik, which was to be their base. Everything possible was done by the Russians for the comfort of the British crews. The old cruiser *Ruinda* was specially arranged as a parent ship exclusively for them, warm clothing was supplied, arrangements were made to heat the boats, and the men were victualled as nearly as possible in the manner to which they were accustomed.¹

21. **German Operations off Libau, November, 1914.**—In the belief that *E.1* and *E.9* would continue to use Libau as their base, the Germans determined to render the use of the port as precarious as possible. On October 28, whilst at sea engaged on the operations off the Gulf of Riga, Admiral Behring decided to institute a secret blockade of Libau with his submarines. The three submarines *U.23*, *U.25*, and *U.26* had been allotted to the Baltic during the autumn²; they were assembled and the blockade was instituted, *U.A* being sent to reinforce them on November 6. The blockade was not maintained without difficulty. The position of the minefield laid off Libau by the *Augsburg* in August, through which *E.1* had inadvertently passed, was not exactly fixed; and there were difficulties in W/T communication between the submarines and the detached Admiral. The installation at Danzig W/T Station could not be used, for technical reasons, for communication with submarines, and all the cruisers except the *Thetis* were being refitted in Danzig until November 9. The latter, after a short stay at Memel at the end of October owing to the German apprehensions that the Russians in their forthcoming offensive in East Prussia would seize the port for use as a submarine base, was employed as W/T repeating ship for the submarines.

Although the British submarines had been reported—wrongly—lying in Helsingfors on November 4, the Germans had no certain knowledge that Libau had been abandoned as their base. The entrances to the harbour were not completely sealed by the vessels which the Russians had sunk there, and the Germans now decided to complete the blocking of the harbour themselves by sinking further ships, and, if necessary, by laying more mines; to bombard the port effectually; and to

¹ M. 04129/14, Report of Naval Attaché.

² Prince Henry had asked for two modern submarines, but the request was refused. Three older boats were, however, sent, mainly in order to avoid the disturbance of the High Sea Fleet's plans which occurred through despatching submarines to the Baltic. *U.23*, *U.25* and *U.26* were chosen, as they were unsuitable for long distance work in the North Sea owing to defective design of their circulating water plant.

render it completely useless. Aircraft were to be employed to scout, and the operation was combined with an advance by the submarines into the Gulf of Finland in the hopes of causing damage to the Russian fleet.

The operation began on the night of November 9–10, but was abandoned on 10th owing to a westerly gale. On 17th the 20th Half-Flotilla, supported by the *Lübeck* and *Amazone*, carried out a bombardment of Libau and sank four blockships in the entrances. At 1.46 a.m. that day the *Friedrich Carl*, flagship of Admiral Behring, ran on a Russian minefield off Memel and sank, with the loss of eight men. The operations by *U.25* and *U.23* in the Gulf of Finland were without result.

22. **“E.1” and “E.9” in Western Baltic, November 15–22.**—*E.1* and *E.9* proceeded to Revel for repairs shortly after arriving at Lapvik, though this did not prevent them being reported by German merchantmen and fishermen off the coast of East Prussia on November 5 and night of 5th–6th. On November 13 they returned to Helsingfors and Lieutenant-Commander Laurence received orders from Admiral von Essen for their future operations.

“At the end of the refit of *E.1* and *E.9* you are to proceed with submarines for offensive actions against the German fleet in the Baltic, near Bornholm Island, and to the west of it.

“A list of the Russian minefields and probable German minefields is attached.¹

(Signed) ADMIRAL VON ESSEN,
Commander-in-Chief, Baltic Fleet.”

On November 14 it blew a gale, but on the following day, the weather having moderated, the submarines left Helsingfors. It was unfortunate that they were not ready for sea a few days earlier, for on November 11 and 12 the 2nd Squadron of the High Sea Fleet was carrying out exercises in the Eastern and Western Baltic, and returned to Kiel on the night of 13th–14th.²

¹ This is not forthcoming. On October 17 the Russian Government made the following announcement: “The Imperial Government announces that in view of the presence of German submarines at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, and the placing by the enemy of booms and torpedoes near the Russian coast, the Russian naval authorities are compelled in their turn to have recourse largely to similar steps. Consequently, navigation in the northern zone bounded by the Russian coast by parallel 58° 50' North latitude and by the meridian 21° East longitude is to be regarded as dangerous, as is the entrance to the Gulf of Riga and the coast waters of the Åland Archipelago. In order that persons not taking part in the hostilities may not run the risks of war, the entrances and exits of the Gulf of Finland and Riga are to be regarded as closed from the moment of the announcement.” The Gulf of Finland, however, had been closed to navigation early in September, and all Russian lights in the Baltic had been extinguished. (See Notices to Mariners, No. 1496, September 10, 1914.)

² I.D.H.S. 3,000, p. 6.

E.1 went first to the Cadet Channel, but finding no enemy ships¹ she turned north and made for the Stevns Klint-Falsterbo line, thence east to the north end of Bornholm-Sandhammer, still without sighting even an enemy patrol. At 5 p.m. on 20th she shaped course again for Lapvik.

E.9 was off Cape Arcona on November 17 and attacked a two-funnelled cruiser, doubtless one of the Training Division on patrol, firing two torpedoes at 500 yards, both of which missed, due perhaps to the motion of the boat in the choppy sea. The cruiser then turned towards *E.9*, who dived.² Lieutenant-Commander Horton patrolled off Dornbusch on 18th and 19th, and off Bornholm on 20th, without sight of the enemy, and on 22nd he followed *E.1* to Lapvik, being sighted off Bengskär by *U.23*,³ which, with *U.25*, was still engaged on the operations in the Gulf of Finland.

23. Cruise of "E.1" and "E.9," December 11-17.—On December 10 Admiral von Essen issued orders to the British submarines for a combined operation with the Russian fleet.⁴ *E.1* and *E.9* were to be to the westward of Bornholm at daylight on 13th and were to attack any enemy vessels that might be seen during the day. On December 14, if no attack had been made, they were to show themselves to the coast look-out stations, so that the enemy should know of their presence. They were ordered not to go north of the line Stevns Klint-Falsterbo, nor west of Gjedser Odde-Darsser Ort.

E.1 arrived at her position off Stevns Klint at 7 a.m. on 13th. No sign was seen of the German patrol on the Stevns Klint-Falsterbo line, and *E.1* then proceeded off Möens Klint, where a German light cruiser was reported to patrol. At 1.35 p.m., between Möens Klint and Dornbusch, an enemy destroyer was sighted making large alterations of course. *E.1* dived to attack and fired a torpedo at 600 yards, "more with a view to letting him know of the submarine's presence than with any hope of hitting," wrote Lieutenant-Commander Laurence. The torpedo missed, and although the destroyer remained in the vicinity for half an hour, steaming at high speed, no opportunity presented itself for a second shot. Whilst charging her battery during the night *E.1* fractured her port intermediate shaft, and as she was 400 miles from the nearest available Russian port and she had accomplished her purpose in letting the enemy

¹ It is not known what patrols were maintained by the Germans in the Cadet Channel. G.O.H., p. 215, states that the patrol guarding the Fehmarn Belt was situated in the narrowest part of the Gjedser Channel, near Gjedser, but the Cadet Channel is not mentioned.

² Lieut.-Commander Horton considered the cruiser had observed the tracks of the torpedoes, but no mention is made of the incident in G.O.H.

³ Or possibly the submarine sighted by *U.23* was *E.1*.

⁴ It is not known what operation the Russian Fleet intended to carry out.

know of her presence, Lieutenant-Commander Laurence decided to proceed to Lapvik. At 11.21 a.m. on 16th, three miles south-west of Benskölar Lighthouse, a German submarine attacked him, firing two torpedoes, both of which were avoided by the use of helm. The submarine was *U.25*, which was engaged on the watch at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, which the Germans had recently instituted. The normal position of the submarine on watch was Benskölar, where in September the Germans had destroyed the Russian signal station; but she was allowed to go east into the Gulf of Finland at her discretion. From the observations of our submarine commanders it appears that the German submarines were supported by a sailing vessel.

E.9 proceeded into Tromper and Prorer Bays, in the Island of Rügen, soon after 8 a.m. on 13th, where it was reported that two German armoured cruisers had been seen at anchor; but she sighted nothing, except a destroyer some distance off. Whilst charging her battery that evening the port propeller blade carried away, and this decided her to return to her base, working up the west of Gotland, where the Germans maintained a patrol.

E.9 arrived at Lapvik at 11 a.m. on December 17.¹ During the afternoon there were continuous wireless reports of German cruisers in the Gulf. These reports referred to Admiral Behring's force, which was making a reconnaissance of the Åland Islands to discover whether the Russians had a base there; and at 7.45 p.m. *E.9* received permission to proceed to sea for 48 hours. It was, however, too late, for Admiral Behring had just commenced his return homeward, and *E.9* returned to Lapvik on 19th without having sighted the enemy.

24. Trade in the Baltic.—Trade with Sweden in the Baltic was a highly important factor in the war to all the three belligerents principally concerned in those waters. For Germany, the iron ore trade with the ports in the Norrbotten, the northern portion of the Gulf of Bothnia, was vital to the maintenance of her supply of steel and the continuance of the war. Up to the winter of 1914 no attempt was made by our submarines to disturb this trade, but instead, Admiral von Essen employed the two boats exclusively upon operations against the enemy's naval forces.

At the end of November the Higher Command pointed out to the German Naval Staff that Russia was being supplied from Sweden with war material and rolling stock, transport taking

¹ The *Lübeck*, engaged on the operations described *infra*, sighted a submarine at 8.50 a.m. (G.M.T.), December 17, off Utö. Utö is 60 miles from Lapvik. The submarine may possibly have been *E.9*. The island possessed a safe harbour for small ships, and was now believed by the Germans to be an enemy submarine base. An operation was projected by Admiral Behring to destroy it on January 6-9, 1915, but was unsuccessful owing to bad weather.

place across the Gulf of Bothnia to the Finnish ports Björneborg and Raumo. The Germans were faced with the fact that the longer the war continued the greater would become the transit traffic of material and stores across Sweden to Russia as the usual trade routes of the latter became closed to her one by one. It was decided by the Higher Command that measures must be taken to put an end to the traffic.

The destruction of the traffic in the Gulf of Bothnia was no easy task for the Germans. If they could have seized the Åland Islands the difficulty would have been more than half overcome; but this course would have outraged Sweden, and was therefore not to be thought of. Most of the contraband traffic to Finnish ports was carried out by Swedish ships, and the necessity of refraining from any action likely to drive the Swedes into the enemy's arms had evoked orders that that country was to be very tenderly treated. A mining operation against the Finnish ports, which was the only measure that could be taken, might bring about a deplorable situation with Sweden; but it was finally decided to undertake it, and directly the minefields had been laid to issue a timely warning to Sweden.

The operation was undertaken by the auxiliary minelayer *Deutschland*. Leaving Kiel at 2.30 p.m. on December 3, she reached the Gulf of Bothnia, after encountering some bad weather, which for a while placed her in a position of some danger. Considerable difficulty was experienced in fixing her exact position in the Gulf, but between 3.50 a.m. and 6.45 a.m. on 6th she successfully laid a field of 120 mines off Björneborg and 80 mines off Raumo, returning to Kiel, as she believed, undiscovered.

The outcome was not long to await. Scarcely had the *Deutschland* quitted Björneborg than two Swedish steamers ran on the minefield and sank, with loss of several lives. All Swedish traffic with Finland was stopped at once, and feeling in Sweden ran very high.¹ The possibility of an unfortunate occurrence of this description had been foreseen by the Germans when the operation was planned, and it was decided that the risk should be taken. The early discovery in this manner of the minefield off Björneborg naturally rendered it useless, for the Russians promptly swept it up; and the discomfiture of the Germans was completed when it was learnt that the Swedes had watched the *Deutschland* laying the second minefield, off Raumo, and had reported the fact. By the middle of December traffic was resumed between Sweden and the Finnish ports, and the lesson was brought home to Germany that it was

¹ Although the Swedish Government and the upper classes were pro-German, they did not accurately represent the feelings of the mass of the people.

fruitless to lay mines directly off an enemy's port where they could be swept up unmolested.¹

Of scarcely less importance in German eyes than the Swedish contraband trade in the Gulf of Bothnia was the Russo-Finnish and Swedish timber trade with Great Britain. The German Government had information that Great Britain was so short of pit props that some of the coal mines might have to cease working, and it was consequently of the greatest moment to prevent or restrict this trade. The control of mercantile traffic in the Sound, through which the traffic in question passed, was under the Chief of the 4th T.B.D. Flotilla, whose task, owing to the annoyance which the supervision caused to the Swedes, became daily more difficult. During the last half of October a number of Swedish vessels loaded with timber were taken into Swinemünde, which caused great annoyance in Sweden. So strongly did the latter protest at the interference with their trade, that for fear of a breach the German Government were forced to issue to the naval authorities in the Baltic restrictive orders, which completely prevented any effective control of the Swedish timber trade.²

25. German Operations in the Middle Baltic, December, 1914—January, 1915.—Since September no forces had been detached from the High Sea Fleet for operations in the Baltic. On December 24, however, four ships of the 5th Squadron were placed at Prince Henry's disposal for a few days, and he decided to employ them on a cruise to Gotland, in order to deceive the Russians as to the strength of the naval forces in reserve in the Baltic. The cruise was carried out between December 26 and 30, Admiral Behring's light forces being placed under the command of the Chief of the 5th Squadron as a screen. Unfortunately, just at this time both the British submarines were undergoing repairs at Revel, and the 5th Squadron withdrew unmolested.

On January 22, 1915, however, the Germans were again active in the Eastern Baltic. On that day Admiral Behring left harbour with his force for a reconnaissance in the southern entrance of the Åland Sea. On the way, as conditions were suitable, he decided to bombard Libau with the *Prinz Adalbert*, a sister ship to the *Friedrich Carl*, which had been sent to Swinemünde on December 7 to replace the latter. In the early morning hours of January 24 the *Prinz Adalbert* went ashore off Steinort. She got off again two hours later, little damaged; but meanwhile, *E.9*, who had completed her repairs by January 15 and had just left for a cruise in the area west of Bornholm, was ordered to attack her.³ *E.9* arrived off Steinort

¹ G.O.H., p. 259.

² G.O.H., p. 216.

³ By inference. The reports of *E.1* and *E.9* are not clear on the point.

on the afternoon of 25th,¹ by which time, however, Admiral Behring's force was off Bornholm, returning to harbour. The force did not escape unscathed, however, for during the night of January 24-25 the *Augsburg* ran on a Russian minefield 20 miles east of Bornholm, but though seriously damaged she was towed to Swinemünde in safety. At 1.39 p.m. on 25th a similar fate met the *Gazelle* 9 miles N.N.W. of Arkona. It was thought on board that the ship had been torpedoed, and fire was opened at the periscopes of two imaginary submarines; and it was not until she was examined in dock at Swinemünde, whither the 20th Half-Flotilla towed her, that it was established that she had struck a mine.

26. Winter Work of the Submarines under Difficulties.—

E.9 meanwhile, finding no signs of the *Prinz Adalbert* off Steinort, continued her cruise westward. At 3.21 p.m. on January 29 she sighted a German destroyer steaming southward off Möens Klint and proceeded to attack her. There was a heavy swell, which rendered depth keeping very difficult, but a position was reached seven points on the enemy's bow and a torpedo was fired. Before the result could be seen *E.9* dived to avoid detection; but the detonation of the torpedo was heard at the correct interval, and when *E.9* rose to the surface four minutes later the destroyer had disappeared, though a boat supposed by Commander Horton to be a second one was seen approaching. It was generally assumed by the British and Russian Admiralties that the first destroyer had been sunk, but this was incorrect, for actually the torpedo had hit the bottom and exploded. The German destroyer, which was the leader of the 7th Half-Flotilla, failed to sight *E.9*.² However, the suspicion that an enemy submarine was in the vicinity had an unfortunate result for *E.9*'s further chances; for the exercises which the 3rd Squadron of the High Sea Fleet was on the point of carrying out in the Western Baltic were now cancelled.³

The conditions under which *E.9* was working were exceedingly trying. A very cold north wind was blowing, with a rising sea. The spray froze as it struck, and the bridge became a mass of ice. Considerable difficulty was experienced in keeping the conning-tower hatch free of ice, a man being continuously employed on this work. The bridge screen was immovable, the ice on it being 6 in. thick, and the telegraphs were frozen. In order to free the boat of ice, Commander Horton⁴ went to the bottom for the night.

¹ Commander Horton's report gives time 2.30; presumably p.m. is meant.

² I.D., H.S. 3000. The incident is not mentioned in G.O.H.

³ I.D., H.S. 3000. The exercises had been postponed once already, when it was believed that the accident to the *Gazelle* was caused by an enemy submarine. They were resumed on February 1 or 2.

⁴ Lieut.-Commanders Laurence and Horton were promoted to Commander December 31, 1914.

For the next three months no operations were carried out by the submarines, though on February 8 *E.1* left for a cruise, and after being delayed for 48 hours by a strong south-westerly wind, which covered the ship with ice, she put to sea and reached a position 50 miles east of Bornholm on 11th, where she broke down and returned to Revel for repairs.

Apart from the severe cold of the Baltic winter, which was particularly trying to submarine crews on account of the absence of exercise, various other conditions militated against success. The whole Baltic was so full of mines that the area of operations of the submarines was practically confined to the waters west of Bornholm, in which, however, there were seldom any German forces other than the patrols.¹ The Russians seem to have held an exaggerated belief in the German anti-submarine defences in the Western Baltic; the passage to Kiel Bay was considered to be impregnable for submarines, and the latter were forbidden to attempt it.² Every time the boats proceeded to sea they had to steam over 1,000 miles; this caused great wear to their machinery, and there were continual breakdowns. It was unfortunate that the dates and areas of the submarine cruises seldom coincided with those of the German forces, whilst several misses with torpedoes had been made by the submarines. "The enemy in these waters, except for the destroyer patrol in the shallow water of the southern end of the Sound, appears to be just as scarce as in the North Sea," wrote Commander Laurence.³ "Before the winter set in, an occasional light cruiser came to the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, but remained only an hour or two. The enemy's heavy ships, as far as we know, have not been in the Baltic since they knew of our presence in these waters. The only ships we have seen since our first day have been the *Gazelle* and an occasional destroyer." Nevertheless, Admiral von Essen was satisfied, and stated that the submarines had been of the greatest assistance to him in his operations.⁴

¹ A chart of the mined areas in the Baltic at a date somewhat subsequent to this (M. 010072/15) shows practically the entire southern and eastern shores of the Baltic east of Bornholm, the Gulf of Finland, and the approaches to the eastern entrance of the Gulf of Bothnia to be dangerous from mines. There was also a Russian minefield north of Rügen, extending as far as 55° N.

² The Russians seem to have become possessed of a plan of the defences of the Kiel approaches, possibly through an agent, and, from its description, no doubt quite apocryphal. The plan has not been seen. It was examined by the British submarine Commanders, who were perfectly willing to make the attempt to penetrate the defences had this been permitted.

³ M. 02282/15. Private letter to Commodore (S).

⁴ *Ibid.* The Russian operations in 1914 consisted principally of minelaying.

APPENDIX A.

WAR ORGANISATION OF GERMAN BALTIC FORCES.¹

August 2, 1914.

Commander-in-Chief, Admiral-of-the-Fleet Prince Henry of Prussia.

I.—BALTIC COAST DEFENCE DIVISION.

Light Cruisers.

Amazone (flag of Rear-Admiral Mischke), 1900, 10—4·1 in., 21·5 knots.
Augsburg, 1909, 12—4·1 in., 27 knots.
Magdeburg, 1911, 12—4·1 in., 27·6 knots.
Lübeck, 1904, 10—4·1 in., 23·5 knots.
Undine, 1902, 10—4·1 in., 21·5 knots.
Thetis, 1900, 10—4·1 in., 21·8 knots.
Gazelle, 1898, 10—4·1 in., 19·5 knots.

(All 2 torpedo tubes.)

Freya (schoolship), 1897, 2—8·2 in., 6—5·9 in., 3 T., 19 knots.
Panther (gunboat), 1901, 2—4·1 in., 14 knots.

T.B.D.s.

T.91, 93, 94, 97 (Sleipner), 102, 127, 1898—1900, 400 tons, 3—4 pdr.,
 3 double T., 26 knots.
 V.25, 26, 186, 1910—1914, 650 tons, 2—15 pdr., 4 double T., 32·5 knots.
Carmen, 1896, 226 tons, 3—4 pdr., 1 S.T., 2 T.

Submarines.

D.10 (flotilla leader), 1898, 349 tons, 5—4 pdr., 2 T.
 U.3, U.4, U.A², 1—4 pdr., 4 T (U.A., 3 T).

Mining Vessels.

Auxiliary minelayers *Prinz Waldemar*, *Prinz Sigismund*, *Prinz Adalbert*,
Deutschland (4—15 pdr., 2—4 pdr.).
 Auxiliary Mineseeking Division at Neufahrwasser and Swinemünde.

Auxiliaries.

12 outpost vessels.
 Blockships *London*, *Rhein*, *Elli*, *Viandra*.
 3 barrage breakers.
 1 hospital ship.

Supply Ships.

3 colliers.
Kaiserin Augusta (Gunnery Schoolship), 1892, 6,000 tons, 12—5·9 in.,
 8—15 pdr., 21 knots.
 Submarine School, Kiel: *Vulkan* (salvage vessel), T.27, U.1.

II.—KIEL HARBOUR DEFENCE FLOTILLA.

(Under Vice-Admiral Bachmann.)

Delphin (Gunnery Tender), 1906, 450 tons, 4—15 pdr., 12 knots.
 T.58, 60, 63, 65.³
 Auxiliary Mineseeking Division.
Primus (Auxiliary mining vessel).

¹ From G.O.H., Table 3.² U.3 and U.4 were old boats (1909); U.A was built for the Norwegian Navy, but taken over by Germany before delivery on outbreak of war.³ Probably T.B.D.s, 1st class.

APPENDIX B.

WAR ORGANISATION OF RUSSIAN BALTIC FLEET.¹

August 2, 1914.

(Commander-in-Chief, Admiral N. O. von Essen.)

Active Fleet.

Battleship Squadron :—

Tzesarevich (flag of Vice-Admiral Baron V. N. Ferzen), 4—12 in., 12—6 in.,
 16—11 pdr., 17·3 knots.
Imperator Pavel I, 4—12 in., 14—8 in., 12—4·7 in., 16·7 knots.
Andrei Pervozvanni,² 4—12 in., 14—8 in., 12—4·7 in., 16·7 knots.
Slava, 4—12 in., 12—6 in., 20—11 pdr., 16·5 knots.
Ryurik (Cruiser) (flag of Commander-in-Chief), 15,190 tons, 4—10 in.,
 8—8 in., 20—4·7 in., 21 knots.

Cruiser Squadron :—

Gromoboi (flag of Rear-Admiral N. N. Kolomeitsov), 13,220 tons, 4—8 in.,
 22—6 in., 19—11 pdr., 19·6 knots.
Bayan, 7,775 tons, 2—8 in., 8—6 in., 22—11 pdr., 19·3 knots.
Pallada, as *Bayan*.

Admiral Makarov, 7,775 tons, 2—8 in., 8—6 in., 20—11 pdr., 19·3 knots.

Novik (Destroyer), 1,200 tons, 4—4 in., 4 double T., 36·3 knots.

1st Destroyer Flotilla (Rear-Admiral I. A. Shtorre) :—

1st Division : 9 boats, 1904—7, 570 tons, 2—4 in., 3 T., 25 knots.

2nd Division : 9 boats, 1904—5, 500 tons, 2—4 in., 2—3 T., 25 knots.

3rd Division : 9 boats, 1905—6, 350 tons, 2—11 pdr., 2—3 T., 27—28 knots.

4th Division : 10 boats, 1905, 330 tons, 2—11 pdr., 2 T., 27 knots.

2nd Destroyer Flotilla (Rear-Admiral A. P. Kurosh) :—

5th Division : 9 boats, 1905—6, 350 tons, 2—11 pdr., 2 T., 27 knots.

6th Division³ : 9 boats, 1895—1901, 220 tons, 2—11 pdr., 2 T. (15 in.),
 27 knots.

7th Division,³ 8 T.B.s

Submarine Flotilla (Rear-Admiral Levitzki) :—

1st Division : 4 boats.

2nd Division : 4 boats.

Minelaying Division (Rear-Admiral V. A. Kanin) :—

Minelayers—

*Amur.**Ladoga.**Enisei.**Onega.**Volga.**Narova.**First Reserve.*

Cruiser Squadron (Commodore P. N. Lyeskov) :—

Rossiya, 12,195 tons, 4—8 in., 22—6 in., 15—11 pdr., 19·2 knots.

Oleg, 6,675 tons, 12—6 in., 8—11 pdr., 19·9 knots.

Bogatuir (fitted as minelayer), 6,650 tons, 12—6 in., 12—11 pdr., 19·9 knots.

Aurora, 6,730 tons, 10—6 in., 20—11 pdr., 18·3 knots.

Instructional Division.

(Second Reserve.)

Imp. Aleksandr II (pendant of Captain E. N. Odintzov) (Battleship,
 2nd class).

Petr Veliki (Battleship, 3rd class).

Some gunboats, T.B.s, etc.

¹ From "War Vessels and Aircraft," August, 1914, and G.O.H., Table 4.² Repairs at Kronstadt six weeks from August 1, 1914, after grounding off Hangö.³ Belong to 1st Reserve (leader of 6th Division excepted), and temporarily attached to Active Fleet.

HISTORICAL MONOGRAPHS ISSUED BY THE
NAVAL STAFF.

- (1) O.U.6031. Operations leading up to the Battle of Coronel.
- (2) O.U.6029. The German Cruiser Squadrons in the Pacific, 1914.
- (3) O.U.6038. Operations leading up to the Battle of the Falkland Islands, November, 1914.
- (4) O.U.6040. *Cancelled.*
- (5) O.U.6039. Naval Operations in the Cameroons, 1914.
- (6) C.B.1537. Naval Movements, August, 1914, associated with the Transport of the British Expeditionary Force.
- (7) C.B.1549. The Patrol Flotillas at the commencement of the War.
- (8) C.B.1552. Naval Operations connected with the Raid on the North-East Coast, December 16, 1914.
- (9) C.B.1555. A History of the White Sea Station, 1914-1919.
- (10) C.B.1558. Naval Operations on the East Coast of Africa, August, 1914, to July, 1915.
- (11) C.B.1571. The Battle of Heligoland Bight, August 28, 1914.
- (12) C.B.1573. The Action of Dogger Bank, January 24, 1915.
- (13) C.B. 923. Summary of the Operations of the Grand Fleet, August, 1914, to November, 1916.
- (14) C.B. 926. The First Australian Convoy, 1914.
- (15) C.B. 931. Naval Operations in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf, from the Outbreak of War to the Fall of Kut, April 29, 1916.
- (16) C.B. 930. The China Squadron, 1914 (including the *Emden* hunt).
- (17) C.B. 929. The East Indies Squadron, 1914.
- (18) C.B. 936A. The Dover Command, Vol. I.
- (19) C.B. 935. The Tenth Cruiser Squadron during the Command of Admiral de Chair, 1914-1916.
- (20) C.B. 939. The Cape of Good Hope Squadron, 1914.
- (21) C.B. 948A. The Mediterranean, 1914-1915.
- (25) C.B. 955. The Baltic, 1914.

In Preparation.

The Atlantic Ocean, 1914.

Home Waters, August, 1914.

Home Waters, September to December, 1914.

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HISTORICAL MONOGRAPHS ISSUED BY THE
NAVAL STAFF

- (1) O.U. 931. Operations leading up to the Battle of Coronel.
- (2) O.U. 932. The German Cruiser Squadrons in the Pacific, 1914.
- (3) D.M.F. 633. Operations leading up to the Battle of the Falkland Islands, November, 1914.
- (4) O.U. 934. Campaigns.
- (5) O.U. 935. Naval Operations in the East Indies, 1914.
- (6) C.B. 1587. Naval Movements, August, 1914, associated with the Transport of the British Expeditionary Force.
- (7) C.B. 1588. The Patrol Fleets at the commencement of the War.
- (8) C.B. 1589. Naval operations connected with the Raid on the North-East Coast, December 19, 1914.
- (9) C.B. 1588. A History of the White Sea Station, 1914-1915.
- (10) C.B. 1590. Naval Operations in the East Coast of Africa, August, 1914, to July, 1915.
- (11) C.B. 1591. The Battle of Heligoland, August 28, 1914.
- (12) C.B. 1592. The Action of Dogger Bank, January 24, 1915.
- (13) C.B. 1593. Summary of the Operations of the Grand Fleet, August, 1914, to November, 1915.
- (14) C.B. 1594. The First Australian Convoy, 1914.
- (15) C.B. 1595. Naval Operations in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf, from the Outbreak of War to the Fall of Kut, April 29, 1916.
- (16) C.B. 1596. The China Squadron, 1914 (including the Zeeleeuw).
- (17) C.B. 1597. The East Indies Squadron, 1914.
- (18) C.B. 1598. The Dover Command, Vol. I.
- (19) C.B. 1599. The Tenth Cruiser Squadron during the Campaign of Admiral Jellicoe, 1914-1915.
- (20) C.B. 1600. The Cape of Good Hope Squadron, 1914.
- (21) C.B. 1601. The Mediterranean, 1914-1915.
- (22) C.B. 1602. The Baltic, 1914.

In Preparation.

The Atlantic Ocean, 1914.

Home Waters, August, 1914.

Home Waters, September to December, 1914.

THE ATLANTIC OCEAN, 1914.

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THE ATLANTIC OCEAN

1914.

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Historical Monograph No. 22.

NAVAL STAFF,

TRAINING AND STAFF DUTIES DIVISION,

November 1922.

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THE ATLANTIC OCEAN, 1914.

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THE ATLANTIC OCEAN, 1914.

Introduction.

The war opened with an anticipation on our part that Germany would, by some means or other, despatch a large number of fast armed liners to prey on our shipping on the trade routes. The following narrative will show to what extent that anticipation was realised and will indicate the difficulties and results of the German operations against our Atlantic trade.

The potential force of the Grand Fleet, interposed between Germany and the open sea, deterred the enemy from any systematic attempt at increasing her armed forces in the Atlantic by detaching ships from home; the result being that she could employ in commerce destruction only such vessels as were in position when war broke out. On the other hand, we were able to supply from home a continuous succession of reinforcements, even to the extent of battle cruisers. Consequently by the end of the first six months Germany abandoned hope of any effective war on our commerce except in our home waters, and it was left to the two armed vessels remaining in the Atlantic to do what they could before they too should be forced to take refuge in neutral ports.

For fear of making this monograph too long, however, the battle of the Falklands has been chosen as a suitable termination; and the book, therefore, ends with 1914.

An appendix of important telegrams is given. An index of ships' names is added, which, it is hoped, will enable the reader to pick up any of the threads in this complex story which he may have dropped.

Note on Sources.

The telegrams dealing with events in the Atlantic during 1914 have been bound; but, so far, the written correspondence, with some exceptions, remains in its original docket.

The bound volumes used for this monograph are as below:—

H.S. 3. Escort of the first Canadian Convoy. A collection of telegrams and dockets bearing on this subject.

H.S. 21, 22, 23. This is a valuable collection made in the Trade Division of correspondence concerning the capture of British merchant vessels abroad. It contains many original letters from owners of ships and copies of all the depositions made by masters.

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- H.S. 25. Area D; Telegrams to October 12.
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 H.S. 42. North America and West Indies; telegrams 15 October to 12 December, 1914.
 H.S. 43. South-East Coast of America; telegrams 15 October to 12 December, 1914.
 H.S. 44. Areas D and I; telegrams 15 October to 12 December, 1914.

I.D.H.S. volumes contain the archives of the Intelligence Division. In volumes 508 and 509 will be found collections of contemporary documents dealing with the German commerce raiders. All the Admiralty papers that appeared to bear on the subjects treated have been scrutinised; the more important ones are referred to in the footnotes.

~~The volumes of the German official history so far issued do not include the operations in the Atlantic, which will presumably be treated in *Kreuzerkrieg*, Vol. II. It was thought better not to wait for the publication of this, as such a course might delay the issue of this monograph for a year or two.~~

Of the French official history only one volume is at present available. This is *La Guerre des Croiseurs*, Vol. I. From 4 August to 1 October, 1914; author, P. Chack, Capitaine de Frégate.

"Seaborne Trade," by C. E. Fayle, is taken as the authority for the disturbances to the shipping industry caused by the German operations.

The times given are local.

*The German official history of operations in the Atlantic had not been published when this monograph was written. A volume, *Kreuzerkrieg Band II*, has recently appeared & gives an account of the KARLSRUHE'S movements, by which what is written has been carefully checked. The information in our Intelligence Division proves to be so complete that few alterations & additions have been necessary.*

THE ATLANTIC OCEAN, 1914.

CHAPTER I.

THE SCHEME OF TRADE DEFENCE.

1. **Standing Orders.**—The life of the British nation is at once in jeopardy should even a temporary stop be put to the stream of vessels bringing to us food and raw materials; and in a long war export has a corresponding importance, since without exports we cannot purchase imports. North America is our chief source of supply, both for food and raw materials, and the South American trade is of particular importance to the food supply of the country. The traffic on the Atlantic routes comprises, in addition to the trade of West and South Africa, a large part of the Australian trade. Further, the valuable trade with the Mediterranean and the East traverses Atlantic waters between Gibraltar and home ports.¹ Thus it is that the protection of the Atlantic trade routes from enemy interference is one of the principal anxieties of the Admiralty. With Germany as a foe, the Grand Fleet stationed in the North Sea could be trusted, in 1914, to prevent the escape into the Atlantic of any large, organised force of war vessels; the passage of the Channel could be made too dangerous for the enemy by the presence of submarines and mines; but there was no guarantee that our Grand Fleet and its outlying patrols would not be evaded by individual ships. There was also the possibility that the enemy might have made arrangements for arming those of her liners that a sudden outbreak of war would find at sea or in overseas ports; these, acting either alone or in company with such of her cruisers as might be abroad, could attack our vital trade routes with serious results.

Naturally, various methods had been proposed for solving the problems of the effective protection of the Atlantic trade routes. The views finally adopted were embodied in a pamphlet called "War Standing Orders for Vessels Employed in the Protection of Trade."² In this it was laid down as a general principle to be followed that the surest way of affording protection to trade was to make a prompt attack on the enemy's fighting ships, the destruction of which was the primary object in a maritime war. Secondary to this came the capture of enemy merchant ships and the stoppage of contraband destined for

¹ *Seaborne Trade*, I, pp. 100-104, 121, 154-161, 242.

² M. 01035/14, based on O.D. 79/14.

the enemy's use; this last work was not to interfere with operations aimed at the destruction of his ships, since our squadrons in home waters were advantageously placed, should the enemy be Germany, for the capture of his trade. The orders went on to point out that, in carrying out the general ideas of the protection of trade in war, the patrolling of areas or routes, on the chance of meeting an enemy on them, was not one to be followed, nor was the dotting of single vessels along the routes a disposition likely to meet with success. From the enemy's point of view, the most profitable places at which to attack our commerce would be the focal points where several trade routes meet; and these, if in certain wireless touch with British stations, would be the best position in which our cruisers could work. The rights of neutrals were to be scrupulously respected, especially in regard to the use of their territorial waters; and even should an enemy war vessel abuse territorial waters by an unduly prolonged stay, force was only to be adopted when all other means for stopping this abuse had failed. These "War Standing Orders" were not ready for issue till July 1914, and war had actually broken out before our cruisers on the more distant stations received them.

2. Atlantic Cruiser Forces.—In the meantime the Admiralty War Staff drew up detailed orders for the various squadrons whose duty it would be to protect trade.¹ These orders divided the Atlantic into areas designated by letters, arranged as follows: Area H extended from the North American coast to the meridian of 40° W., which longitudinally bisects the North Atlantic and cuts the coast of Brazil a little west of Cape San Roque; it thus included half the total length of the North American trade routes. Area E covered the home end of the North American trade routes, east of 40° W.; its southern boundary was a line running W.S.W. from the Scillies, and it thus took in the home end of the trade route from the Gulf of Mexico. Area I lay due south of Area E, extending to latitude 30° N. just north of the Canaries; it covered the home ends of the trade routes from India and the Far East, from South America and from the Cape. Area D, south again of Area I, was an oblong between 30° N. and 10° S., and between 40° W. and 10° W.; it included Pernambuco and the Canaries and Cape Verde Islands, which are ports of call of South American trade.

To each of these areas a "cruiser force" was assigned, either from the Second or Third Fleets. The actual vessels composing these forces varied from time to time, according to the circumstances of the moment. One force, however, was already in place; this was the 4th Cruiser Squadron, which was to operate on North American waters. Before 1904 the North American and West Indies Station had always been served by a squadron of some strength; but in accordance

¹ See Appendix B.

with the Admiralty policy announced in Parliament on 6 December, 1904, the older vessels were withdrawn and laid up; a new Particular Service Squadron (4th Cruiser Squadron) of modern ships was constituted as a training squadron for cadets and boys and placed under the Commander-in-Chief, North America and West Indies. The new squadron was based on home ports and made three cruises a year to provide for the regular policing of the North America and West Indies Station; two other cruisers were stationed permanently in the area, one to oversee the Newfoundland fisheries and one based on the West Indies. In 1908 the latter was joined by a protected cruiser.

This addition to the West Indies Station inaugurated a gradual reversion to the older policy of a permanent squadron; and in 1913, when the unsettled state of Mexico called for special attention, the 4th Cruiser Squadron had dropped its particular training character and had acquired that of a regular foreign station squadron. In that character it made several visits to ports in the Gulf of Mexico and in 1914 it was there engaged when the political situation in Europe became threatening in view of Austria's ultimatum to Serbia.

For some years the French had maintained one old light cruiser, the *Descartes*, to show the flag in the North American and West Indian waters. When the Mexican troubles became serious they decided to send out a cruiser of rather more modern type. The ship selected was the *Condé*, and both these vessels were in Mexican waters in the middle of July.¹ Another light cruiser, the *Friant*, was guarding French interests in the Newfoundland fishery district.

3. War Orders of Force H.—The War Orders for the Officer Commanding Cruiser Force H defined his station as lying between the meridian of 40° W. and the American coast; they refrained from laying down the positions which his squadron should watch in a period of strained relations, but left this matter to his judgment, with the suggestion that he should divide his force into two squadrons—a northern one based on Halifax and a southern one based on Jamaica. The former, being generally of the greatest importance, should be his special personal care. The duty for which he would be held responsible was the protection of the trade on passage between the British Isles and the North American Atlantic ports and of the trade in the West Indies. These orders were despatched from the Admiralty on 11 July, 1914, and were to be followed by the "War Standing Orders for the Protection of Trade" as soon as these could be got ready.

¹ *Descartes*, 3,970 tons, 17½ knots, 4—6.5, and 10—3.9 in. guns, 1892.
Condé, 10,233 tons, 19½ knots, 2—7.6, 8—6.5, 6—3.9 in. guns, 1898.

4. War Orders for South-East Coast of America and West Coast of Africa.—Apart from the 4th Cruiser Squadron in the West Indies and the Cape of Good Hope Squadron, the only men-of-war we had in the Atlantic were the light cruiser *Glasgow* (Captain J. Luce) on the south-east coast of America and the gunboat *Dwarf* (Commander F. E. K. Strong) on the west coast of Africa. The War Orders sent to the *Glasgow* in March 1913¹ stated that her principal duty was the protection of British trade south of Abrolhos Rocks in 18° S. (off the coast of Brazil), particularly the wheat and meat traffic from the River Plate. On the outbreak of war she would be assisted by a cruiser of the *Diadem* class, which would be sent out with all despatch as soon as possible after mobilising. The orders for this vessel were that, in conjunction with a ship from the 4th Cruiser Squadron, she was to patrol the South American trade route between the Cape de Verde Islands and Abrolhos Rocks.² This arrangement was contained in the old orders of the 4th Cruiser Squadron and would no longer be operative after the new orders were received by Force H; in these the protection of that part of the South American trade route came under the Rear-Admiral Commanding Force D.

The *Dwarf*, on receipt of a pre-arranged telegram warning her of a probable outbreak of war, was to proceed to Rio if she was on the south-east coast of America; if she should happen to be on the West Coast of Africa she was to go to Sierra Leone and superintend the enforcement of the traffic regulations, acting as Senior Naval Officer, West Coast of Africa.³

5. War Orders of Forces D and I.—Cruiser Force D was to be one of the squadrons of the Second Fleet and could therefore be expected to be ready for sea within 24 hours of the issue of the order to mobilise. But since for Area I only a Third Fleet Squadron was available, the Rear-Admiral Commanding Force D was at the outset to endeavour to hold both his own station and that of Cruiser Force I as well. In his War Orders his duty at the commencement of the war was laid down as the protection of the trade route from the south and south-west, especially near home. Should the political situation at the time allow it, vessels of the Mediterranean squadron would safeguard the area between the Straits of Gibraltar and Cape St. Vincent, and his main station was to be on the trade route off Cape Finisterre. He was, however, to send two of his ships at once to the Cape Verde Islands. When relieved at Finisterre by Force I he was to proceed to his own station, where his primary coaling bases would be Sierra Leone and Ascension. The orders pointed out that our most important interests were on the trade route from South America, along which our food-carrying ships proceed,

¹ M. 0029.² M. 0071.³ M. 0477 of 1908.

and he was accordingly instructed to send one of his fastest ships to join and work with the *Glasgow* on the southern part of the trade route.

Cruiser Force I, as soon as the Naval Reserves were mobilised, was to receive its balance crews and assemble at Plymouth. From there it was to proceed to relieve Force D and then take up its main stations, defined as off Ushant and Finisterre. The coaling base of this squadron was to be Plymouth.

6. Forces E and G.—Cruiser Force E, for the home end of the North Atlantic routes, was also a Third Fleet Squadron. It was to be based on Queenstown and was to be joined by the Cunard liners *Mauretania*, *Lusitania* and *Aquitania* as soon as they could be got ready; a further reinforcement would be provided later. The main station of Force E was to be off the Fastnet, with some vessels guarding the northern entrance to the Irish Sea. Berehaven and Lough Swilly were to be its main coaling bases. Across the entrance to the English Channel was to be stationed another squadron, Cruiser Force G, also composed of Third Fleet ships. In the event of an alliance with France this would act in co-operation with a French squadron based on Brest or Cherbourg.

7. The Neutral Powers.—In a war with France as an ally and Germany as the enemy, the principal neutral nations in the East Atlantic would be Spain and Portugal. The attitude of Spain would probably be more correct than friendly, but from Portugal, as an old ally of Great Britain, might be hoped a favourable interpretation of neutrality. The negro republic of Liberia, on the Guinea coast, was chiefly of importance through its cable landing and wireless station at Monrovia. Both these belonged to a German company.

In the West Atlantic, the United States was the overshadowing power. It was in her Atlantic ports that the finest German merchant vessels were to be found; for that and many other reasons the interpretation she put on neutrality in the event of war was of urgent importance to us. The Central and South American republics were also recipients of German trade, and in their harbours German vessels might be expected to take refuge. Most of these republics could be reckoned on as friendly. The West Indies, apart from those large islands with small republics of their own, were mainly British and French. One Danish island, St. Thomas, claimed special attention as being the West Indian headquarters of the Hamburg-Amerika Line.

8. Intelligence Arrangements.—In the system of Naval Intelligence in force in July 1914, the Atlantic was divided between the Intelligence Officers in London, Jamaica, Gibraltar, St. Vincent, Pernambuco, Monte Video and Cape Town. An

Intelligence Officer, besides his duty of keeping the Admiralty and the British men-of-war in his area fully informed of matters likely to affect their operations, had to give such warning, information and advice to British merchant vessels as would enable them to avoid capture and molestation by the enemy. He was kept informed of the movements of foreign men-of-war and enemy or suspicious vessels in his area by Reporting Officers in the ports concerned. These Reporting Officers were all Consuls and were each provided with a code for the purpose. Besides these Reporting Officers, who were nearly all salaried officials, the remaining unsalaried Consuls were expected to report movements of foreign men-of-war, though not of enemy merchant vessels.¹

The area under the Intelligence Officer, Cape Town, extended along the coast of Africa to Monrovia; Pernambuco was the Intelligence centre for the whole of Brazil and as far as St. Paul Rocks on the trade route to the Cape Verde Islands. Jamaica was the centre for the West Indies and the coast of America between Charleston and Georgetown, British Guiana.

The meridian of 40° W. divided the Jamaica area from the area of the Intelligence Officer, St. Vincent, Cape Verde. Gibraltar was the centre for intelligence from the Azores, Madeira, the coasts of Morocco, Spain, Portugal and France as far north as Bordeaux. The Canary Islands were divided between the Intelligence centres of St. Vincent and Gibraltar. The whole of the North Atlantic trade routes and North American ports as far south as Charleston were looked after by London.²

9. Communications.—Our communications across and along the shores of the Atlantic seemed to be, in general, good. There were several British cables from Great Britain to Canada and thence to the United States. South America was in touch with London by a line through Madeira and the Cape Verde Islands to Pernambuco; this cable had branches *via* Ascension to the River Plate and *via* Bathurst to the British African coast. The French owned a cable from Brest to Boston and another to Dakar in Senegal, whence it crossed the Atlantic to Pernambuco.


Germany also had a fair service of cables. There were five main lines from Borkum. One ran to Brest; another to Vigo; two went to New York by way of the Azores; and the fifth, after landing at Tenerife, went on to Monrovia in Liberia. From Monrovia one branch proceeded to Togoland and the Cameroons while another longer line crossed the Atlantic to Pernambuco.³

Wireless communication with the different areas varied in completeness. By the Hague Convention, wireless stations in neutral territory could not be used for passing to warships any orders or intelligence, and we had to rely on such arrangements as

¹ I.D. 940, 941.

² I.D. 941.

³ See Map at p. 54.



(Intelligence Areas denoted by pecked lines).

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
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¹ I.D. 940, 941. ² I.D. 941. ³ See Map at p. 54.



had been completed. The wireless stations in Great Britain could not reach ships on the American coast ; but a long-distance station was in process of erection at Glacé Bay, Newfoundland, for the northern half of Area H. The stations at Bermuda and at Bowden in Jamaica were only of low power ; but these, with the low power stations on other West Indian islands, had to suffice for that part of the West Atlantic.

Gibraltar, by its North Front station, could reach nearly the whole of Area I,¹ but for communication with ships in Area D we should have to rely on Dakar, the French station in Senegal.

German wireless stations were few but powerful. In Togoland there was Kamina, a long-distance station capable of reaching Germany and probably the whole of the tropical belt of the Atlantic. The home stations of Nauen (near Berlin) and Hanover were in constant touch with Sayville and Tuckerton, two powerful stations in the United States, but these two stations were on neutral territory. In the interior of German South-West Africa was another high-power station, Windhoek, which had been endeavouring for some time to communicate direct with Nauen, but, so far as we know, without success. Kamina was, however, a wireless link between Germany and South-West Africa. Berlin, in July 1914, had no difficulty in keeping her overseas squadrons and colonies completely informed of the trend of affairs.

CHAPTER II.

JULY 27 TO AUGUST 4. MOVEMENTS BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.

10. **The Cape Squadron, "Glasgow" and "Dwarf."**—By 27 July, 1914, the European political situation due to the tension between Austria and Russia was so threatening that the Admiralty warned all Senior Naval Officers abroad that as war between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente Powers was by no means impossible they were to be prepared to shadow hostile men-of-war. Among the recipients of this telegram were the Commander-in-Chief, Cape, the Rear-Admiral Commanding the 4th Cruiser Squadron and the Commanding Officers of the *Glasgow* and *Dwarf*.

The Cape Squadron was then approaching Zanzibar in the course of a cruise on the East Coast of Africa. The principal danger on this station appeared to be the *Königsberg*, a German light cruiser based on Dar-es-Salaam, the capital of German East Africa. She was at sea, and though an attempt was made

¹ During the day, signals from North Front could not be read in the western Azores, and at Madeira they were not reliable. H.S. 43, p. 111.

to shadow her she easily outpaced the slow old cruisers of the squadron and disappeared. The Commander-in-Chief, Rear-Admiral H. G. King-Hall, decided to proceed in his flagship, the *Hyacinth*, to Cape Town, leaving the *Astraea* and *Pegasus* to deal with the situation on the east coast. At Cape Town there was the German gunboat *Eber* engaged in a six weeks' refit. The Admiral endeavoured to have her detained; but war had not been declared and she left on July 30. There was no ship to shadow her and she also was lost.¹

Captain Luce of the *Glasgow*, which was at Rio, decided to remain there as it was a good central position.² The *Dwarf* was at Las Palmas; she left on the 30th for Sierra Leone.

11. Admiral Cradock in the West Indies.—The precautionary telegram of July 27 found Admiral Cradock in the Gulf of Mexico at Vera Cruz, with all his squadron³ except the *Lancaster*, then in dockyard hands at Bermuda. As the telegram warned him to be prepared to shadow hostile vessels he inquired for their latest positions and was told by the Admiralty that the *Dresden* had arrived at Port-au-Prince, Hayti, on July 25, and the *Karlsruhe* had left there on the 26th.⁴

This news decided Admiral Cradock to send the *Berwick*, on the 29th, from Vera Cruz to Jamaica. The *Essex* he sent to Bermuda to coal and prepare to join the *Lancaster* in patrolling the North American trade routes, but he himself remained behind at Vera Cruz with the *Suffolk* and *Bristol* to wait for the "Warning Telegram," on receipt of which he intended to proceed with the *Suffolk*, *Bristol* and *Berwick* to shadow the *Dresden* and *Karlsruhe*, the latter of which had been located by this time at Havana. The *Berwick* left Vera Cruz in advance at 9.30 a.m., July 29, to look for the *Karlsruhe*.

That evening the "Warning Telegram" was issued by the Admiralty; it was almost immediately followed by instructions to act on the War Standing Orders, Articles II to IV inclusive.⁵ Admiral Cradock had already made his dispositions. The *Essex* and *Lancaster* were to have charge of the North American trade routes; the *Berwick* had been detached to shadow the *Karlsruhe*; the flagship *Suffolk* proceeded for Jamaica, leaving the *Bristol* behind at Vera Cruz as a wireless link till midnight July 30–31, when she was to leave for Jamaica to join him there.

¹ For a detailed account of the proceedings of the Cape Squadron, see Monograph 20.

² The *Glasgow's* operations are described in Monographs 1 and 3.

³ *Suffolk*, Capt. B. J. D. Yelverton; *Berwick*, Capt. L. Clinton Baker; *Lancaster*, Capt. W. H. D'Oyly; *Essex*, Capt. H. D. R. Watson, C.B., M.V.O.; all 9,800 tons, 23 knots, 14—6 in. guns, 1900; and *Bristol*, Capt. B. H. Fanshawe, 4,800 tons, 25 knots, 2—6 in., 10—4 in. guns, 1909.

⁴ *Dresden*, Captain von Lüdecke; 3,592 tons, 22½ knots, 10—4.1 in. guns, 1907. *Karlsruhe*, Captain Erich Köhler; 4,820 tons; 24½ knots, 12—4.1 in. guns, 1912.

⁵ See C.B. 930, Monograph 16, *China* and *Emden*, para. 2, for a summary of these articles.

By the orders he had, he was to send a fast ship to act with one to be supplied from England in patrolling the route from Abrolhos Rocks to the Cape Verde Islands. He had intended to detail the *Bristol*, his fastest ship, for this service; but on July 30 the Admiralty telegraphed to him that the new War Orders should soon reach him and that they limited the area of his operations to North America and the West Indies. Accordingly, he would not be required to detach any ship to the south-east coast of America.¹

The French Ministry of Marine had by this time decided, as it was still uncertain whether Great Britain would intervene in the war, to recall the *Condé* and *Descartes*. They now gave them orders to come home from Mexico, calling in at Bermuda,² and at the same time recalled the *Friant* from Newfoundland to Brest.

12. Attempt to Shadow the "Karlsruhe."—Some belated intelligence of movements of German ships came in; the Admiralty heard that the *Dresden* had left Port-au-Prince on the 28th and this was repeated to Admiral Cradock. He himself learned through his Intelligence Officer that the *Karlsruhe* had visited and left Havana and he signalled the news on to the *Berwick* at 9 p.m. That ship left Vera Cruz at 9.20 a.m. on the 29th for Havana, at 12 knots, which was gradually worked up by midnight to 16½, and during the following morning to 18 knots. Her designed speed was 22, but her boilers were dirty and she had only American coal; to get even 18 knots she had to send 32 upper-deck hands down below to trim coal. On hearing that the *Karlsruhe* had left Havana, Captain Clinton-Baker eased down, fuzed his lyddite shell, fitted his torpedoes with warheads and pistols, and got them ready in the tubes. The *Berwick* reached Havana at noon on July 31, coaled and prepared for war. The Admiralty, on learning that Admiral Cradock had sent her to Havana to shadow the *Karlsruhe*, telegraphed instructions that she was not to remain in that port, but to keep touch from the nearest point outside territorial waters.³ This telegram was sent off some six hours before it was known that the *Karlsruhe* had left Havana and does not seem to have had immediate effect on the *Berwick's* stay. She remained at Havana till 11.30 p.m., August 2, when, in accordance with orders from Admiral Cradock, she proceeded to sea in the hope of gaining intelligence of the *Karlsruhe*, having previously ascertained by cable from our Consul at St. Thomas that the *Dresden*, which had arrived there on August 1, had left that port.⁴ Captain Clinton-Baker had no indication of the

¹ Appendix, A 1. The War Orders, M. 0065, reached the *Suffolk* on August 27. Admiral Cradock was not then in her and it is doubtful whether he ever received them.

² H.S. 37, p. 30.

³ Appendix A 2.

⁴ Our Consul at St. Thomas apparently did not report the *Dresden's* departure on August 1 to the Admiralty, who, so late as August 3, were not aware that she had left. See note on H.S. 37, p. 78.

route of the *Karlsruhe*, but he proceeded for the Florida Strait, after having steered a false course till he was out of sight of Havana.¹

13. Intelligence Received up to August 4.—On August 1 Germany declared war on Russia, a step which made it practically certain that France and Great Britain would also be involved. In North American waters, besides the *Dresden* and *Karlsruhe*, there was a large number of North German Lloyd and Hamburg-Amerika liners at New York or neighbouring ports; at least 14 of them were on our list as fitted for conversion into cruisers or transports. There were four more at St. Thomas, but a statement that the ships there were being armed was contradicted by our Consul.

Reports of the presence of hostile ships in various parts of the station began to come in with confusing rapidity. On August 3 two cruisers were reported on high authority to be off Heart's Content in Newfoundland, the terminus of one of the Atlantic cables, where there was also a wireless station. On the strength of this, the Admiralty ordered the Senior Naval Officer, Bermuda, to send either the *Essex* or *Lancaster* to search for the enemy and protect the cable and wireless there. Frequent reports of cruisers off New York were being received; moreover the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* and *Vaterland*, convertible liners, were said to have left New York on August 3, armed and carrying 10,000 reservists. This news the Admiralty passed to Bermuda and to Admiral Cradock, with information that these ships were to be searched for and shadowed.²

By this time it had been discovered that the wireless stations at Sayville and Tuckerton were owned and controlled by emissaries of the German Government. Code messages signed "Government, Berlin," and believed to be addressed to the *Dresden* and *Karlsruhe*, had been intercepted.³ As it was clear that these stations would be able to render considerable assistance to German vessels attacking trade, the Admiralty urged the Foreign Office to endeavour to secure some reduction of their power.⁴

Further reports of cruisers off New York came in, and at 4.40 p.m., August 4, the Admiralty informed Admiral Cradock that their appreciation of the situation implied that the neighbourhood of that port was the danger point in his area; British trade had been advised not to sail until some of his cruisers could arrive there.⁵ He had already ordered the *Bristol* to New York, and at 6 p.m. on August 4 he left Jamaica and followed her for Nantucket in the *Suffolk*, ordering the *Essex*

¹ *Berwick*, "Journal of Events," M. 02094/14.

² A 8, 9, 10.

³ H.S. 37, p. 63.

⁴ Papers titled *Foreign Office*, 2 August, 1914.

⁵ A 11.

also to Sandy Hook.¹ In the evening of August 4 the French repeated their instructions for the *Condé* and *Descartes* to come home.² The effect of all these orders would be to leave nothing in the West Indies except the *Berwick* cruising in Florida Strait for news of the *Karlsruhe*.

Admiral Cradock was still without his new War Orders. The Admiralty had, however, telegraphed to him a summary which explained that he was to operate to the west of 40° W. longitude. It also outlined the general scheme of cruiser areas, so that he was aware of the names and titles of the Admirals in adjoining stations,³ though he knew nothing of their movements.

14. Movements of Force D (Admiral Stoddart).—For Area D the 5th Cruiser Squadron of the Second Fleet had been detailed. This squadron on July 27 had consisted of the *Carnarvon*, *Liverpool*, and *Falmouth*, under Rear-Admiral A. P. Stoddart, who flew his flag in the *Carnarvon*. The *Liverpool* was patrolling the east coast of Ireland, which was in an excited state in anticipation of an attempt to land arms and ammunition for the forces of the rebellion then in progress.⁴ On the 28th she was ordered to her manning port to complete her crew. She was then to join her own squadron, which was to assemble at Portland;⁵ but next day both she and the *Falmouth* were detached from the 5th Cruiser Squadron and transferred to the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron,⁶ and the 5th Cruiser Squadron was reconstituted of the *Carnarvon* (Flag), *Cornwall*, *Cumberland* and *Monmouth*.⁷ Of these the *Monmouth*, which had some short time before been detailed as flagship of Force I, was to have undergone a long refit; but this was now postponed, and instead she received only the necessary repairs. The *Cornwall* and *Cumberland* were training cruisers, and therefore ready for service after disembarking the cadets, unrigging the special school fittings, and taking on board the few hands necessary to complete the crew on a war footing. The *Carnarvon* was ready by July 30 and was at once ordered along the trade route towards Madeira to give warning of the state of affairs to the liners on their way home from South America and the Cape; if war had not broken out by the time she reached the parallel of Cape St. Vincent she was to go in to Gibraltar and coal. The *Cornwall*, *Cumberland* and *Monmouth*, when complete with full crews, were to follow her to Gibraltar as they became

¹ 4th Cruiser Squadron, Proceedings. M. 01453/14.

² A 13.

³ A 6.

⁴ Tel. from Vice-Admiral, Queenstown. H.S. 50, p. 57.

⁵ H.S. 50, pp. 79, 102.

⁶ H.S. 50, pp. 373, 374.

⁷ *Carnarvon*, Captain H. L. d'E. Skipworth; 1902, 10,850 tons, trial speed 23 knots, 4—7.5 in., 6—6 in. *Cornwall*, Captain W. M. Ellerton; *Cumberland*, Captain C. T. M. Fuller; and *Monmouth*, Captain F. Brandt; 1900, 9,800 tons, trial speed 23½ knots, 14—6 in.

ready.¹ The *Carnarvon* left in the forenoon of July 31, the *Cumberland* next morning and the *Cornwall* at 2.40 p.m., August 2. The *Monmouth* was not due for completion until August 6.

In the East Atlantic, as in the West, reports of enemy movements began to multiply. Here, it was at Las Palmas that they became most definite, and when the Admiralty on August 3 learned that two German cruisers had been seen off the Canaries they ordered Admiral Stoddart, who had just arrived at Gibraltar, to continue on the trade route to search for them.² He had succeeded in meeting all but one of the vessels he had been told to warn and, having coaled, he left Gibraltar at 5.40 a.m., August 4; the *Cumberland* came in to Gibraltar that morning, coaled, and proceeded in the evening to join the *Carnarvon* on her voyage south.

15. Preparation of Forces I and E.—The mobilisation of Naval Reserves on August 2 enabled the Third Fleet Cruiser Forces to be manned. The 9th Cruiser Squadron had been detailed to Area I and on August 1 Rear-Admiral J. M. de Robeck was appointed to command it. His force consisted of three cruisers and three light cruisers, all old vessels.³ The *Europa* was to be his flagship, but she was in dockyard hands and could not get to sea for some weeks. His most ready ship was the *Vindictive*, and, shifting his flag to her on August 3, he proceeded from Portsmouth to Plymouth, where he was to assemble all his available ships and leave for his station next day. The *Challenger* also was ready; but she was sent by the Admiralty to the Bristol Channel to prevent minelaying or attack on Cardiff. Admiral de Robeck sailed at 1.15 p.m., August 4, with the *Vindictive* and *Highflyer*; the other ships of his squadron were to follow as they became ready.

Area E, the home end of the North Atlantic trade routes, to which the *Challenger* had been detached, was to be occupied by the five *Juno's*: *Doris*, *Juno*, *Isis*, *Venus*, *Minerva*,⁴ to be reinforced as soon as possible by the Cunard liners *Mauretania*, *Lusitania*, *Aquitania*,⁵ armed as cruisers; Rear-Admiral Phipps Hornby was appointed to command the force with his flag in the *Doris*. None of these ships could be expected to be ready till August 4 at the earliest. The area they would have to guard was not only that part of the Atlantic nearest to Germany and easiest reached by any commerce-raiders the enemy might send out from Wilhelmshaven, but it was also that in which the food ships from America would be most thickly congregated.

¹ A 3, 4.

² A 5, 7.

³ *Europa*, Captain G. W. Vivian; *Argonaut*, Captain R. A. Nugent; *Amphitrite*, Captain H. Grant-Dalton; 1896, 11,000 tons, 21 knots, 16—6 in. *Highflyer*, Captain H. T. Buller, M.V.O., *Vindictive*; Captain C. R. Payne; 1896, 5,700 tons, 20 knots, 10—6 in., and *Challenger*, Captain C. P. Beatty-Pownall, 1900, 5,880 tons, 21 knots, 11—6 in. guns.

⁴ 1894, 5,600 tons, 20 knots, 11—6 in. guns.

⁵ *Mauretania* and *Lusitania*, 30,000 tons; *Aquitania*, 45,600 tons.

16. "Drake" and "Leviathan" on North American Route.—Thirty-nine of our most important merchant vessels had since 1913 been armed with a couple of 4.7 in. guns mounted aft. Their ammunition, however, in order to avoid delays in foreign ports, was at home; and only ships leaving England could embark it. As these would be on the trade routes they should afford it some protection against vessels no stronger than armed liners. But these defensively armed merchant vessels were mostly employed in the refrigerated meat trade to South America and Australasia,¹ and the North Atlantic routes were comparatively unprotected. In view of this, the Admiralty on July 31 ordered the *Drake* and *Leviathan*,² of the 6th Cruiser Squadron, to proceed along the New York route from the Fastnet. The Cunard liner *Carmania*, on her way towards Liverpool, would have proved a great prize, and Rear-Admiral W. L. Grant, C.B., whose flag was in the *Drake*, was ordered to escort her home with one of his cruisers, sending the other as far as 500 miles along the route, from which point she was to return to coal at Queenstown.³ The two cruisers left Portsmouth that afternoon on this service. It appears to have been the intention of the Chief of the Admiralty War Staff⁴ for the *Good Hope*, the only remaining ready ship of the 6th Cruiser Squadron, to operate off the Fastnet also; but the wording of the telegrams containing the orders for this left the matter in doubt, and the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, sent her to Scapa round the West of Ireland.⁵

17. Armed Merchant Cruisers.—Although Cruiser Force E was the only squadron to which the War Orders definitely assigned armed merchant cruisers, arrangements had been in progress for taking up a certain number of fast liners for conversion into cruisers, which would then be used to reinforce the squadrons on the trade routes. On August 1 the *Aquitania* and *Caronia* of the Cunard Line, and the P. and O. steamer *Macedonia* were taken up; and next day the P. and O. *Marmora*, the Union Castle liner *Armadale Castle*, the White Star *Oceanic* and the Cunarders *Lusitania* and *Mauretania* were engaged. Two days later, when war was inevitable, the *Carmania*, *Kinfauns Castle*, *Empress of Britain*, *Alsation*, *Otranto*, *Mantua*, and *Victorian* were added, making a total of 15 armed merchant cruisers. Of these, the *Oceanic*, *Alsation* and *Mantua* were assigned to the Northern Patrol between the Shetlands and Norway; the *Lusitania*, *Mauretania*, *Aquitania* and *Caronia* to Force E; *Carmania* to Force H; *Kinfauns Castle* and *Armadale Castle* to the Cape; *Otranto* and *Empress of Britain* to South-

¹ Technical History and Index, Vol. II, Part 13.

² 1899, 14,100 tons, 23 knots, 2—9.2 in., 16—6 in.

³ H.S. 50, p. 455.

⁴ Vice-Admiral Sir F. C. D. Sturdee, K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G.

⁵ H.S. 51, pp. 312, 336, 342, 350.

East America ; *Macedonia* and *Victorian* to Force D ; *Marmora* to Force I.¹

While these movements and arrangements were taking place the political situation rapidly became worse. We were compelled to send an ultimatum to Germany ; but there was little chance that its terms would be accepted, and at 3 p.m. on August 4 a general warning was despatched to all Senior Naval Officers that the War Telegram would be issued that night. This, the order to commence hostilities forthwith against Germany, was despatched at 11 p.m. G.M.T.

CHAPTER III.

AUGUST 4-6. TAKING UP POSITION.

18. **German Cruisers and Merchant Vessels.**—The outbreak of war at 11 p.m. G.M.T., August 4, found our Atlantic cruisers taking up their stations. The ships of Force H were hurrying from the West Indies to what was considered to be the danger point off New York. Force D was bound for the Canaries in the hopes of meeting cruisers supposed to be there. Of Force I only three vessels were at sea ; one of these had been diverted to the Bristol Channel and the remaining two had only just left England. Force G, which was to guard the Channel entrance, had sailed, but had not yet met the French squadron with which it was to carry out a combined patrol. As Force E for the home end of the Atlantic trade routes was not ready, the *Drake* and *Leviathan*, of the 6th Cruiser Squadron, had been patrolling these outwards and were now on their way home.

None of the German cruisers in the Atlantic had been definitely located, except the *Strassburg*, which had been seen off the Lizard by the *Carnarvon* at night on July 31, and was now safe in Germany. The *Dresden* was considered in the Admiralty to be off New York. The *Karlsruhe* and *Eber* had disappeared.

German merchant shipping all over the world was making for neutral ports, and those vessels already in harbour showed little intention of moving. This, it appeared later, was in strict accord with the handbook of procedure in case of war carried by German merchant vessels, or at any rate by those belonging to Hamburg shipowners.² This handbook, which had been issued in 1912 after the Agadir crisis, laid down that immediately on receiving reliable news of the outbreak of war against Germany, the master of a ship must endeavour to reach a neutral harbour. "As a war with such powers as Holland,

¹ Papers titled *Admiralty, 1 August, 1914, Armed Merchant Cruisers.*

² A translation of the covering circular is in I.D.H.S., Vol. 513, p. 596.

Belgium, Spain and Portugal need not be taken into consideration the harbours of these countries and their colonies come especially under the heading of neutral harbours."¹ In the Atlantic, the Canaries, Azores and Cape Verde Islands were regarded as especially suitable.² Care was to be taken to avoid the usual steamer routes, to reach port at night, and to approach it from the open sea. The funnel markings were to be painted over.

As a result of these instructions nearly all the German liners were in harbour. Those that had left American ports during the period of strained relations had in most cases put back again and many others were sheltering in island and continental harbours of Portugal and Spain. Of the vessels thought by our Intelligence Department to be fitted for conversion into cruisers or transports only nine were at sea and most of these were homeward bound, completing what might well be a normal voyage. The most suspicious was the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, which left New York on the night of August 3-4 and had been reported as armed. Certain others were outward bound from Germany, but most of these were soon located in home or neutral ports. From August 4-7 the Grand Fleet executed a sweep across to Norway in the hope of stopping any vessels that might be making for the trade routes ; none were sighted, and for the moment it appeared that the peril from armed liners was less than that from the German cruisers at sea.

Though as yet the enemy had made no demonstration in the North-West Atlantic, the numerous reports of the presence of cruisers off various ports in Canada and the States were not without their effect on shipowners. It was the Admiralty's policy that trade should proceed with as little interruption as possible, and therefore it was essential that shipping should have full confidence. To secure this, the Admiralty decided to send Admiral Cradock some temporary reinforcements ; and having ascertained that the *Good Hope* could reach Canada without coaling, ordered her, at 6.40 p.m. on August 5, to Halifax, under the impression that our trade south of Newfoundland from the St. Lawrence was being threatened by one German cruiser and some armed merchantmen.³ This order they followed by instructions to the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, to complete the old battleship *Glory* to her full complement of coal ; she also was to go to Halifax to convoy the trade from Canada to England.⁴ By this time the *Lancaster* had been completed at Bermuda and was able to leave there at 6 p.m. on August 5 in order to patrol Cabot Strait, the southern entrance of the Gulf of St. Lawrence.

¹ This reference to Belgium is interesting, as is also the instruction for ships in Australian waters to make for Sydney in certain circumstances. T.S.D.D.

² The circular captured was one issued by the German Australian line and refers only to ports on that route. It is probable that each line issued a corresponding one dealing with its own route.

³ A 17, 23.

⁴ A 24.

Of the numerous reports of the *Dresden's* presence at various places on both sides of the North Atlantic, those placing her on the American coast were at last accepted by the Admiralty, and they telegraphed at 6.50 a.m., on the 5th, to Admiral Cradock that the *Dresden* was off New York.¹ From this port the *Lusitania* sailed that evening, while the *Olympic*, the largest British ship afloat, was due to arrive on the 6th. The *Lusitania's* departure started a fresh crop of rumours. Long Island reported the sound of firing; the captain of a steamer on arrival at New York announced the receipt of a message from the *Lusitania* to the effect that two German cruisers had chased her and had been sunk by British warships; and finally our Intelligence Officer at Pernambuco stated, on the authority of the Western Telegraph Company, that the *Strassburg*, *Dresden* and *Karlsruhe* had attacked the *Lusitania*, but had been beaten off by the *Suffolk* and *Essex*.²

All these rumours soon proved to be unfounded and can have received little credence; but they served to deepen the Admiralty's anxiety. When Admiral Cradock reported that the disposition of his cruisers would be such that homeward bound merchant vessels should be able to leave New York on August 7, they ordered him to arrange to protect the southern entrance of the Gulf of St. Lawrence as well as the approach to New York.³

20. The "Karlsruhe" in the West Indies.⁴—Most of the rumours of German cruisers so far received had concerned the *Dresden*; the *Karlsruhe* hardly figured in them at all. This may be due to the fact that she was new to the station. The *Dresden*, then under the command of Captain Erich Köhler, relieved the *Bremen* on the East American Station in January 1914. The *Dresden* was not intended to remain on the station, as the proper relief of the *Bremen* was the *Karlsruhe*, but the last-named ship was not ready to leave Kiel till 14 June, 1914, when she came out to the West Indies under Captain Lüdecke. She was to take over from the *Dresden*, the two ships exchanging captains, and the *Dresden* was to return to Germany on July 25. They met at Port au Prince, Haiti; Captain Köhler changed over to the *Karlsruhe*, taking with him his Staff-Officer Aust; Captain Lüdecke moved to the *Dresden*. At 4 p.m. July 26 the *Karlsruhe* sailed westward for Havana; two days later the *Dresden* turned eastward for St. Thomas and home. While Captain Köhler was at Havana in the *Karlsruhe* he received

¹ A 16.

² H.S. 37, pp. 113, 125, 131, 163, 167, 176, 177b, 192, 198, 202.

³ A 26.

⁴ The chief authority for the *Karlsruhe's* movements is the diary of her Adjutant, Lieut.-Commander Aust, published under the title of "Die Kriegsfahrten S.M.S. Karlsruhe." A translation of this and other German documents about the *Karlsruhe* are in I.D.H.S., Vol. 509. Another book on the *Karlsruhe*, not in I.D.H.S., Vol. 509, is "S.M.S. Karlsruhe," by her First Officer (Studt), numbered Ca 599 in the Admiralty library.

word of the tension existing between the Triple Entente and the Central Powers. The situation seemed so grave that when he left at 10 a.m. on July 30, he decided to remain at sea near Havana, in communication with the shore wireless stations. Meanwhile he prepared for action and carried out battle practice. The spot he chose for this appears to be ~~Plana Cays, one of the Bahama group in 22° 37' N., 73° 30' W., about 420 miles east of Havana, well out of all steamer tracks.~~¹ Sayville wireless station sent out Press news twice a day, which kept him advised of the progress of events; he was also in frequent communication with the wireless stations in Florida and the nearer islands. On July 31 he received the telegram "War Imminent"; next day the order "Mobilisation." The declarations of war on Russia and France came on August 2 and 3. This deepened his conviction that war between Germany and England was inevitable; he ~~moved up towards Florida Strait so as to be nearer the main route of British commerce.~~²

Captain Clinton-Baker, in the *Berwick*, left Havana on a false course at 11 p.m., August 3, and then steered for the Florida Channel. The strength of the *Karlsruhe's* signals, which he was constantly intercepting, led him to suppose her near him and he kept wireless silence for fear he should frighten her away. On August 4, however, he received instructions from Admiral Cradock to jamb her signals. This he did; but he could not prevent Captain Köhler from receiving that afternoon orders to commence hostilities against England and to open his war orders. These gave him full powers to act as he thought requisite and denoted his station as the Middle Atlantic,³ that is, the tropical portion of that ocean, most of which was in the area for which Admiral Stoddart was responsible. The order to commence hostilities against Germany did not reach Captain Clinton-Baker till 11.10 p.m., some four hours after it had been in force. At 1.28 p.m., August 5, he observed three vessels steering northward in the bright moonlight; they proved to be the *Condé* and *Descartes*, escorting a French oil-tank steamer and proceeding for Bermuda and home. They were not in possession of the Allied Fleet Signal Book, but he managed to inform them in French that war had been declared and gave them such intelligence, all untrue, as he had received. Then, having been recalled to Jamaica by Admiral Cradock, he steered along the north coast of the Bahama group for Jamaica, heading unconsciously for the *Karlsruhe*. At 7.45 p.m., when off Cat Island in 24° 20' N., 75° 30' W. he heard her signalling with strength R.8 to a ship with the peace call sign of *S.S. Friedrich der Grosse*. Shortly afterwards he turned south between the islands for Jamaica.⁴

¹ Studt, *S.M.S. Karlsruhe*, p. 22.

² Aust.

³ Studt, p. 22.

⁴ *Berwick*, Letter of Proceedings. M. 02049/14.

290 The signal he had just heard was possibly one made by the *Karlsruhe* to the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*.¹ At 7 a.m., August 5, Captain Köhler stopped a steamer, but she proved to be the Italian *Mondibello*, from Messina for Galveston, and he allowed her to go on. He knew that the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was at sea and making for the Bahamas; he had also received instructions to fit her out as an auxiliary cruiser.² He signalled a rendezvous to her and got ready the two 3.4 in. guns and the 150 rounds of ammunition he carried for the purpose of arming auxiliary cruisers; in addition he provided a machine gun and small arms, and ordered the kit bags of the guns' crews to be packed. The motor pinnace and gig were also to be handed over. His call to the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* appears to have been unexpected by that ship and diverted her out of her course.³ She met the *Karlsruhe* at 7 a.m., August 6, and went alongside to transfer coal and provisions to the cruiser and to receive her guns and her new captain, Lieutenant-Commander Paul Thierfelder, late navigating officer of the *Karlsruhe*.

The work was in full swing when at 10.15 a.m. the look-out reported smoke to the southward. Very soon this was seen to come from a British cruiser which all decided must be the *Berwick*. The officers and men to be transferred hurried across to their new ship, the hawsers were cast off, and the two ships separated, the cruiser steering to the northward, the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* to N.N.E. with the *Karlsruhe's* two boats still fast astern.⁴

21. The "Suffolk" and "Bristol" encounter the "Karlsruhe."⁵—The ship which had caused this sudden disruption was, of course, the *Suffolk*, on her way from Jamaica to New York. The position to which the two German ships had drifted was 25° 12' N., 72.40 W. Signalling this to his squadron, Admiral Cradock ordered the *Bristol*, then in about 31° 30' N., 73° W., to intercept the *Karlsruhe*, while he followed up in the *Suffolk*. The *Kronprinz Wilhelm* he took for a simple collier and he made no attempt to chase her.⁶ Thirty miles to the westward of the *Bristol* were the *Condé* and *Descartes*; but they were not in communication with our ships and they continued their voyage to Bermuda in ignorance of the encounter.⁷ Until 5 p.m. the *Suffolk* kept touch with the *Karlsruhe*, which was then in

¹ On the outbreak of war, all the call signs of German men-of-war and merchant vessels were changed.

² I.D.H.S. 1338, Nos. 94, 102, 108, 126.

³ The authorities for the movements of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* are various letters and newspaper articles by members of her crew, collected in I.D.H.S. 508. The authority for the additional guns carried by the *Karlsruhe* is *Kreuzerkrieg*, I. 13.

⁴ I.D. 1034 and 1134.

⁵ A good plan of this encounter is in Corbett's *Naval Operations*, I. 51.

⁶ The Admiralty informed him she had two guns mounted when she left New York. *Suffolk* W/T Log, Deptford, No. 20501, August 4.

⁷ Chack: *La Guerre des Croiseurs*, I. pp. 97, 98.

27.33 N., 72.54 W., steering N. 3° W. at 22 knots. By sunset she was out of sight. Accordingly, when the Admiral learned that the *Bristol's* 8 p.m. position would be 28.33 N., 73.2 W., he ordered her to steer S.W. by W. for 40 miles and then join the *Berwick* at a rendezvous to the southward in 23° N., 72° 20' W. Just as Captain Fanshawe received this signal, that is at 8.15 p.m., he sighted the *Karlsruhe* under the moon 3½ points on the port bow, at a distance estimated in the moonlight at six miles. He at once altered course seven points to port so as to bring his starboard guns to bear and to cut off the enemy from proceeding northwards. The range diminished rapidly to 7,000 yards, whereupon he opened fire with all starboard guns, a sighting shot having brought him to think the range fairly accurate. This forced the *Karlsruhe* round to an easterly course. She replied to the *Bristol's* fire and edged round more to starboard till she was on the *Bristol's* bow. Having drawn somewhat ahead through her superior speed she made an attempt to get away northward; but seeing the *Bristol* conform, she abandoned the move in a few minutes and, turning back to S.E., gained steadily on her pursuer. Though the *Bristol's* trial speed was 26 knots, in this chase it dropped rapidly till finally it fell to 18 knots.¹ Admiral Cradock ordered her to show a searchlight and fire rockets. He was about 60 miles to the south-westward, steering (like the *Bristol*) south-easterly, with the *Karlsruhe* between them when last seen. By 10.30 p.m. the *Bristol* had lost sight of the enemy; and though she continued on a south-easterly course, that of the *Karlsruhe* when last seen, in the hopes of picking her up again, at sunrise nothing was in sight.

The news that the enemy was lost brought about a change in Admiral Cradock's plans. The orders under which the *Bristol* was acting before the *Karlsruhe* had been sighted were that she was to patrol eastward from Nantucket along the track of inward bound steamers, informing them that a British cruiser was off New York.² He now ordered her to continue steering south-eastward to St. Lucia and coal there. The *Berwick*, which, when off the eastern end of Cuba, heard that the *Karlsruhe* had been sighted and was hurrying to the rendezvous north-east of Mariguana Island, was now ordered to continue steering eastward and then return to Jamaica for coal. The *Suffolk* was to go to Bermuda and, after coaling there, to take charge of the northern trade routes³ where the *Essex* was already in position, while the *Lancaster* would patrol off Newfoundland.

22. German Cruisers Reported at Las Palmas.—On the other side of the Atlantic, our Intelligence agents had reported much enemy activity. The British Consul at Las Palmas, when asked

¹ *Bristol's* Letter of Proceedings, M. 02094/14. No reason is given here or in the Rear-Admiral's Letter (M. 01453/14) for the failure to maintain speed.

² *Bristol's* W/T Log, A.C., 4th Cruiser Squadron to *Bristol*, 2.50 a.m., August 6.

³ *Suffolk* W/T Log, 7 a.m., August 7.

to furnish particulars of the German cruisers off his port, replied that they were generally believed to be the *Berlin* and *Panther*, and this report, though viewed with some scepticism by the Admiralty, was repeated to Admiral Stoddart. From Bilbao came further intelligence that two German cruisers were off that port searching for our cables there; upon which the Admiralty, in the afternoon of August 5, instructed Admiral de Robeck to send a cruiser on at once and sweep with the rest of his squadron to try and cut them off. This order they addressed to R.A. *Amphitrite*, under the impression that that was his flagship; 51 hours later that ship reported she had been unable to pass it on to the Rear-Admiral, who was in the *Vindictive*, and it is probable it did not reach him in time for any useful action.¹ In any case he could hardly have obeyed it, since at 3 p.m., August 5, when the order was despatched, the only ships he had at sea were the *Vindictive* and *Highflyer*, and the latter he had sent back to Plymouth with a Dutch liner he had met, carrying gold for the London branch of the Deutsche Bank.²

23. Escort of French Morocco Troops.—These rumours of German cruisers at Las Palmas and on the coast of Spain had their effect also on the French, whose troops in Morocco were about to sail from Casablanca, some for Bordeaux and the rest for the Mediterranean, to be replaced in Morocco by territorial battalions. On August 5 they called on us to provide a cruiser at Casablanca, another off Bordeaux, and to protect the transport route between Casablanca and the Straits of Gibraltar; they offered us some French cruisers from the Mediterranean Squadron presumably for this purpose.³ The supposed presence of hostile cruisers off Bilbao, though not well confirmed, brought about a change of plan; the same afternoon the French abandoned the idea of bringing their troops to Bordeaux and decided to send them all by Gibraltar and the Mediterranean, asking us to concentrate in Moroccan waters the cruisers we intended to detail. So far no orders had been sent out, but now the Admiralty ordered the *Cornwall* (Captain Ellerton) to shape course for Casablanca and cover the passage of the French transports. Captain Ellerton went in to Gibraltar at 11 a.m., August 6; off Cadiz he had captured the German steamer *Syra* and sent her in with a prize crew. He proceeded later in the day to Casablanca. Finding there that the transports would not be ready for nearly a week, he reported this home and was ordered back to Gibraltar to complete with coal.⁴ By the time the transports were ready the escort duty was taken over by French cruisers specially sent

¹ A 20, 33. See also H.S. 36, pp. 71, 75, 78, 80, 82.

² This was the *Tubantia*. For Boarding Report see papers titled B 400/1915.

³ A 18. By the Convention signed the following day, it was arranged that France should have the supreme command in the Mediterranean, while Britain held it everywhere else. This request and offer may have been in anticipation of the Convention.

⁴ A 21, 22, 27, 31.

from Bizerta. These were the *Bruix*, *Latouche-Tréville* and *Amiral Charner*, to which the *Cassard* and *Cosmao*, of the Morocco Division, gave occasional assistance. The first convoy left Casablanca on August 13 with the *Bruix* and *Amiral Charner*.¹

24. Admiral de Robeck and German Communications.—The presence of these French cruisers relieved Admiral de Robeck of any direct responsibility as regards the safety of the French transports. It was as well; for he had much other work on his hands. Proceeding southwards along the trade route, on August 6 he captured the North German Lloyd liner *Schlesien* and sent her to Plymouth with a prize crew from the *Vindictive*. He also stopped two Austrian vessels, one laden with grain consigned to Germany; he directed them to report themselves at Falmouth, and passed on. In the afternoon of August 7 he arrived off Vigo in the *Vindictive*. In port were known to be six German merchant vessels, three of them suspicious; these were the North German Lloyd *Goeben*, supposed to be fitted for conversion, the cable ship *Stephan*, suspected of designs on our cables, and another vessel called *Colonia*, whose wireless it was thought had been heard. On Admiral de Robeck's representations the wireless installations were removed from the *Stephan* and *Goeben*; the *Colonia* proved to be a harmless coaster without wireless. Next day he was joined by the *Amphitrite*; leaving her patrolling off Vigo, he passed on for Lisbon.²

The importance of denying the use of wireless to Germany can readily be seen when it is realised that this was her only certain means of communicating orders and intelligence. Curiously enough, the first act of war affecting the Atlantic had been performed, not by the Army or Navy, but by the General Post Office. Immediately on the declaration of war a cable ship had proceeded to cut all the five German cables running from Borkum down the Channel, and thenceforth Berlin had to rely on her long distance wireless stations for communicating with nations or ships overseas.³ On the other hand, by means of British cables and the wireless stations in British and Allied territory we could reach nearly all those parts of the world in which operations were likely to take place and we could dispense with the use of neutral wireless stations; consequently, our aim was to secure the denial of these to all belligerents alike and thereby isolate Germany from the rest of the world. In international law every state was fully entitled to regulate as it pleased the use of wireless telegraphy in its own territory and territorial waters; thus, action rested with the States themselves. The Republic of Cuba was the first to act; on August 4

¹ Chack: *La Guerre de Croiseurs*, I. 91.

² De Robeck, Letter of Proceedings, M. 7060/14.

³ Papers titled *Telegram*, 5 August, 1914. The arrangements for this operation and its effect are discussed in papers titled *Admiralty*, 14 March, 1913.

her Government stations refused to accept messages for transmission. Two days later the United States Government issued an executive order prohibiting all wireless stations in their jurisdiction from transmitting or receiving for delivery messages of an unneutral nature; naval officers were detailed to act as censors in the stations.¹ The Portuguese Government on August 5 sounded the German Minister in Lisbon on the subject of prohibiting the use of wireless; he strongly objected, and in view of his truculent attitude they asked our advice. We guaranteed to stand by Portugal should Germany consider the exercise of this right sufficient for a declaration of war, and accordingly, on August 7, an Order in Council was issued from Lisbon for the immediate dismantling of wireless apparatus in foreign merchant vessels in Portuguese waters at home and abroad.² Spain was not so prompt, though, as a rule, she agreed to dismantle the apparatus of any ship proved to have used it in her ports. As will be seen later, we had considerable trouble with the German ships in Spain and the Canary Islands.

CHAPTER IV.

AUGUST 6-16. TRADE RECOVERS CONFIDENCE.

25. Admiral Cradock proceeds to the Northern Trade Routes.

—In spite of the *Karlsruhe's* attempt to get past the *Bristol* on August 6, Admiral Cradock considered that her destination was undoubtedly the West Indies.³ In the evening of August 7 the *Berwick* intercepted a signal from the *Karlsruhe* with strength R.12, showing that she could not have gone north. Altogether Admiral Cradock had no hesitation in telegraphing at 2 a.m. August 8, to our Consul-General, New York, "Assure British ships they are safe to leave for England. Known position British and German warships are now such as to warrant this. Send ships to sea."⁴

In this telegram he seems to ignore the possibility that the *Dresden* was off New York. It appears from the *Suffolk's* wireless log that he had not received the Admiralty's definite statement that she was there, and their previous warning that the danger point was off New York was so garbled in transmission that it can have made little impression. As received by him, the first sentence read: "As far as situation already gone, the concentrating point of trade in your allotted area appears to be in neighbourhood of New

¹ A 32.

² H.S. 37/88, 216; H.S. 36/104, 125.

³ H.S. 37, p. 230, "Destination of *Karlsruhe* is undoubtedly West Indies."

⁴ *Suffolk* W/T Log, p. 23.

York,"¹ a statement which was an obvious truism. The code in force, apparently not a good one, does not seem to have been skilfully used; mistakes were undoubtedly made in transmission; and the miscomprehensions that arose from these causes were as frequent in Admiral Cradock's case as in that of any other officer.² The only report he had received of the *Dresden's* presence off New York was one coupling her with the *Karlsruhe*, which, of course, he now disbelieved, especially as he had heard in the West Indies a wireless note thought to be the *Dresden's*. Convinced that both the German cruisers were to the southward of him he proceeded for Bermuda.

At 4 a.m. on the 8th he picked up the German oil-tanker *Leda* and took her with him in to Bermuda next day.³ In view of the necessity of getting to New York he did not coal, but left after a stay of only one hour. In port were the *Condé* and *Descartes*, which had arrived on the 8th, knowing nothing of the encounter with the *Karlsruhe*. In view of the small number of cruisers at Admiral Cradock's disposal the Admiralty, on August 5, asked the Ministry of Marine to put the two ships temporarily under his orders, offering to replace them in the 2nd Light Squadron at home, to which they belonged, by British cruisers, if necessary.⁴ The request was readily granted and they were placed under Admiral Cradock, who ordered the *Condé* (Captain Grout) to patrol the Florida Strait and Providence Channel with Jamaica as her base, while the *Descartes* (Commander Lafrogne) reconnoitred the Caribbean Islands, operating from St. Lucia.⁵ These two ships with the *Berwick* and *Bristol* formed a respectable force for the West Indies, and should be enough to deal with the *Karlsruhe*.

26. The "Karlsruhe" Coals.—That ship, as Admiral Cradock had foreseen, did not go to New York. The *Bristol's* salvoes, though they came close ahead and astern, did not reach the *Karlsruhe*, and Captain Köhler, as soon as he had shaken off pursuit, once more steered north-easterly. But the high speed he had been obliged to use had reduced his coal supply so much that he decided to turn south again and replenish at St. Thomas, for which at 10 p.m., August 6, he steered at 16 knots. Even that was too costly and he reduced it still further to 12 knots, his economical speed. August 7 was an anxious day for him. British wireless signals were frequently heard. At 7 a.m. he was convinced from their increasing loudness that a British cruiser was on a converging course. By 10 a.m. they were so strong that everyone expected to see the ship come up over the

¹ *Suffolk* W/T Log, p. 4. Compare Appendix A 11.

² Bermuda complained that many groups in the *Suffolk's* signals were unintelligible. *Suffolk* W/T Log, pp. 28 and 41.

³ The *Leda* was subsequently released. See Fayle: *Seaborne Trade*, I, p. 107.

⁴ Chack: I, p. 95.

⁵ Cradock, Letter of Proceedings. M. 01453/14.

horizon. But the signals died away and the crew of the *Karlsruhe*, who had fully expected their end, breathed again.¹ Even after this relief there was bad news from the engine room, for the Engineer Officer announced that there was not coal enough to take the ship to St. Thomas, and Captain Köhler decided on San Juan, Porto Rico, the nearest port, in the hope that he might get some coal there. He arrived at daybreak on August 9, with only 12 tons left in the bunkers.² The *Bristol* was then about 100 miles to the eastward; but knowing nothing of this, she continued on her course for St. Lucia.

Porto Rico was a possession of the United States. Consequently, Captain Köhler was permitted only enough coal to take him to the nearest non-American neutral harbour, St. Thomas. Moreover, his stay was limited to 24 hours. In San Juan harbour was the *Odenwald*, of the Hamburg-Amerika Line; she had no coal but supplied a few reservists, and her crew helped the *Karlsruhe's* men to take in 500 tons obtained from an American owner in the port. On the other side of the island was lying the *Patagonia*, a 3,000-ton steamer of the Hamburg-Amerika Line. Her captain came over and offered his services. He was instructed by Captain Köhler to go to St. Thomas, coal from the German stock, and then join the *Karlsruhe* at a rendezvous off Barbadoes. The *Karlsruhe* left again soon after 7 p.m., at first steering as if for St. Thomas; but at the eastern point of the island Captain Köhler took the dangerous passage to the southward. He had no intention of going to St. Thomas, which, as a suspected harbour, he felt sure would be watched by our cruisers.³

27. **Admiral Cradock off New York.**—The news of the *Karlsruhe's* arrival at San Juan reached Admiral Cradock at 8.49 p.m., August 9; it had been reported by the French Vice-Consul there to the French Consul at Bermuda. The Admiral had remained at Bermuda only from 4 to 5 a.m. on the 9th and was now at sea again. This report showed him the necessity of organising a better intelligence service; he ordered the Senior Naval Officer, Bermuda, to constitute a Naval Intelligence centre there at once, and asked Captain Grout of the *Condé* to instruct the French Consuls in the West Indies to telegraph information as to the enemy direct to our Intelligence Officer at Jamaica.⁴ This was for the benefit of the squadron in the West Indies, which he had put under Captain Clinton-Baker in the *Berwick*.⁵

¹ Aust. The approaching cruiser was probably the *Suffolk*.

² Studt, pp. 44, 45.

³ Aust, Studt.

⁴ *Suffolk* W/T Log, pp. 42, 43.

⁵ The interchange of information between British and French Competent Authorities was not officially approved by the French Government till December, 1914. See papers titled *Foreign Office*, 25 August, 1914.

The Admiral himself was carrying out the spirit of his War Orders and proceeding to take personal charge of the North American trade routes. The *Lancaster* was patrolling near Cabot Strait in accordance with his orders and the *Essex* should have been off New York, but had been sent to Hearts Content by direct orders from the Admiralty. The *Mauretania* was on passage to New York and, hearing what appeared to be authentic reports of German cruisers lying in wait near the entrance to that port, the *Essex* diverted the *Mauretania* to Halifax and proceeded there herself to coal. Leaving again on the 7th, she was in course of searching another Canadian harbour for hostile vessels reported there, when she was ordered by the *Lancaster* to return to New York. These disturbances of his dispositions brought about by the numerous rumours then prevalent compelled the Admiral to order the *Essex* and *Lancaster* not to leave their patrolling grounds on the trade routes except for chasing enemy's ships whose position was authenticated.¹ He arranged a rendezvous off Nantucket with the *Essex*, and at 1.53 a.m., on the 10th, telegraphed through her to the Consul-General, New York, that as he would be with two British cruisers off Nantucket it was safe for merchant ships to proceed to sea from New York and Halifax.² He arrived off Sandy Hook at 10 a.m. on the 11th, to inspire confidence in shipping, and then proceeded eastward to meet the *Essex*. After communicating at 6 p.m. he sent her eastward along the westbound track and took the *Suffolk* in to Halifax to coal. His appearance off New York had the desired effect and shipping, which till then had lain inactive in North American ports, began to move again.

28. **The "Karlsruhe" at Curaçao.**—His opinion that the *Karlsruhe* would remain in the West Indies was soon confirmed. Her next appearance was at Curaçao. Arriving there in the early dawn of August 12, she was received with mixed feelings by the Dutch Governor, who had had no news from home for several days and was in some doubt whether Germany and Holland were not at war. However, Captain Köhler was able to overcome his objections and the *Karlsruhe* received 1,200 tons of coal. The amount appeared to the Admiralty as excessive and representations were made to the Dutch Government. Their reply was that it was not more than sufficient to enable her to reach the nearest port of her home country and we allowed the matter to drop.³ A small German steamer, the *Stadt Schleswig*, entered while the *Karlsruhe* was at Curaçao; Captain Köhler gave her orders to follow him with coal and appointed a rendezvous. Then at 8 p.m. he put to sea. Never again did the *Karlsruhe* come into any port.⁴ She proceeded slowly eastward along the coast of Venezuela hoping to fall in with some British vessels.

¹ *Suffolk* W/T Log, pp. 36, 44-46.

² *Suffolk* W/T Log, pp. 44, 48, 52.

³ Papers titled *Foreign Office*, 1 September 1914, and A 104.

⁴ Aust. Also Studt, p. 66.

The *Berwick* was the only ship anywhere near Curaçao. She had left Kingston, Jamaica, at 10 a.m. on August 12 and was off the east point of Jamaica at 6.30 p.m., when Captain Clinton-Baker received two pieces of intelligence. One was that the *Karlsruhe* had arrived at Curaçao; the other that the German merchant ship *Bavaria* was coaling and provisioning at Havana and likely to sail at any moment. As the *Karlsruhe* was 600 miles away and would in all probability be lost again before he could get to Curaçao he adhered to his original intention of visiting Cozumel Island, near Yucatan Channel, which Admiral Cradock had suggested might be a coaling station. There he thought he would have a chance of finding the *Dresden* coaling from the *Bavaria*. The *Karlsruhe's* appearance at Curaçao he looked upon as a trap to draw us south away from the Yucatan Channel and leave a clear field for the *Dresden* there.¹

29. Intelligence of the "Dresden."—The news of the *Karlsruhe's* arrival at Curaçao did not reach Admiral Cradock till the 13th. It had been preceded by authentic intelligence showing that the *Dresden* was also to the southward, and nowhere near the Yucatan Channel. After leaving St. Thomas on July 31, fully coaled and provisioned, the *Dresden* headed for home *viâ* the Azores; but three hours later she received through Porto Rico wireless station an order not to return home, but to carry on cruiser warfare in the Atlantic. Captain Lüdecke replied that he would operate off the coast of south-east America. His intention was to coal in the lee of Rocas Reef, and then proceed to the River Plate.² It is possible that his signal was not received by the German Admiralty, for we find them as late as August 4 informing him that there was plenty of coal near Las Palmas.³ On August 6 he was off the Amazon, and in 1.10 N., 45.5 W., stopped the *Drumcliffe*, a steamer bound for Trinidad from Buenos Aires in ballast. The master of this ship had his wife and child on board, and the *Dresden* released the vessel after destroying the wireless and exacting a written pledge from the master and crew that they would not engage in hostilities against Germany. About an hour later another steamer, the *Hostilius*, on passage to Barbados, came up in company with a third, the *Lynton Grange*. The *Lynton Grange* also was released as soon as the officers and men had signed a similar declaration to that exacted from the *Drumcliffe*. But in the case of the *Hostilius* the master, Mr. James Jones, did not belie the fighting name of his ship. He refused to sign the declaration and was supported by every member of his crew, though they were clearly informed by the German boarding officer that if they did not they would be taken to the *Dresden*

¹ *Berwick*, Letter of Proceedings. M. 02094/14.

² The main authority for the *Dresden's* movements is the German Official History, *Der Krieg zur See, Kreuzerriegel*, I.

³ I.D.H.S. 1338, Nos. 100, 126.

as prisoners and their ship sunk. Captain Lüdecke, however, did not carry out his threat, and to the surprise of every one on board signalled that the ship was to be released. The boarding officer made a note in her log: "Let go because her destruction did not seem worth while."¹ These incidents merit special notice as showing German procedure in the first cases of ships captured by those German cruisers which were on foreign stations at the outbreak of war.

The masters of the three ships, in two cases doubtless oppressed by the weight of the pledge they had signed, made no effort to make an immediate report of the occurrence to the Admiralty. They had all left port before August 4 and had no knowledge of the outbreak of war or instructions what to do. They proceeded quietly on their normal voyage and it was not till they arrived in port that this most urgent piece of intelligence became known. The *Drumcliffe* reached Trinidad on the 11th; the Customs Officer there, on learning the news, immediately reported it to the Admiralty, whom it reached at 3.55 a.m. on the 12th.² He gave the position correctly as 1.10 N., 45.5 W., but confusion was introduced by the Censor, Trinidad, who early on the 12th telegraphed that the position was 350 miles N.E. of Cayenne, adding: "the report of yesterday was wrong or referred to another cruiser."³ This position is 540 miles N.N.W. of the true one. Either the *Hostilius* or the *Lynton Grange* gave information at Barbados. The local reporting officer telegraphed this to the Admiralty, his telegram arriving at 5.21 a.m. on the 11th, in the form: "From Barbados. German one *Dresden* arrived (stop). Cruiser North 5.0 p.m. Lat. 10.2 N., Long. 45.1 W. 18 knots." This is presumably a copy of the entry made by one or other of the ships on Form "C.O.," the printed form supplied to British merchant ships for reporting intelligence.⁴ Two important items—the date and the name of the ship molested—are omitted. Nor is there any mention of the fact that the ship was captured and released. The words "arrived (stop)" have crept in; the latter appears to have been added by some member of the Staff, who seemed to think it meant that the *Dresden* had arrived at Barbados at 5 p.m. that day.⁵ The position given—10° 2' N., 45° 1' W.—is again wrong; presumably 10.2 is a mistake for 1.2.

The result of all this and other confusing intelligence was

¹ H.S. 23, pp. 271–273. The cargo of the *Hostilius* was neutral owned.

² A 38.

³ A 39.

⁴ A copy of Form "C.O." is in I.D. 972. Its columns read: Nationality, Number, Name, Description, Course of Vessel sighted, Date and Time, Position, Estimated speed of vessel sighted, Remarks.

⁵ See H.S. 37, pp. 292 and 304; also A 37.

that the Admiralty sent to Admiral Cradock the following telegram:—

154. German cruisers are reported to be in West Indies. They are being coaled at sea by German steamers who have embarked coal St. Thomas, W.I., for this purpose. They have been reported as follows: *Karlsruhe* at Curaçao 12.8.14, German cruiser off Guadeloupe, 12.8.14. German cruiser coaled in mouth of Para River, 8.8.14 and was off coast near Para, 10.8.14. French steamer seized near Curaçao on 7.8.14. They are apparently operating against West Indian trade. Believed some British ships have been captured.

(Sent 3.50 p.m., 14.8.14.)

It will be noticed that the encounter of the *Dresden* with the *Drumcliffe*, *Lynton Grange* and *Hostilius* is not mentioned. The statement that colliers were leaving St. Thomas appears to rest on a French report that a German merchant vessel named *Netherlands*, at anchor at St. Thomas, had coaled on August 6.¹ The German cruiser off Guadeloupe grew out of a report that a warship of unknown nationality had been seen off that port at night.² The authority for the "French steamer seized near Curaçao" has not been found, and in fact none had been molested on that date.

Admiral Cradock had already received these reports and also that of the *Drumcliffe*, though here again the position was wrongly given to him as Long. 40° 5' W., 300 miles to the eastward of the true spot.³ But this made no difference to his appreciation. Sorting the wheat from the chaff, he interpreted the intelligence he had received as indicating a movement of the *Dresden* to the south away from his station.

30. Movements of the West Indies Squadron.—The *Karlsruhe's* appearance at Curaçao baffled him; of her he said "present whereabouts or objective not apparent." In order to hamper her activities, however, he requested the Admiralty that, as she had now coaled twice in neutral ports since the outbreak of war, representations should be made to all American states and republics to prevent her from coaling again in any neutral port.⁴ Nothing could be done on this proposal, since each state limited its action to the prevention of unneutral acts in its own territory; moreover, to have induced the neutral states to accede to his proposal would have embarrassed our own ships in their operations in certain parts of the world.

Since we had four cruisers in the West Indies Squadron it might be expected that the *Karlsruhe* ran some risk. But their movements were in other directions. Captain Clinton-Baker in the *Berwick* continued his cruise to Yucatan Channel and

¹ H.S. 37, p. 222. The *Patagonia* left St. Thomas on August 12, after filling up with coal there, but no report of her departure can be traced in Admiralty records up to August 15.

² A 37.

³ *Suffolk* W/T Log, p. 56.

⁴ A 52.

Florida Strait, and returned to Jamaica on August 20, passing north of the Bahamas. The *Bristol* coaled at St. Lucia on the 10th, and after patrolling the entrance that night to prevent attempts at blocking or mining it, proceeded next evening by orders of Captain Clinton-Baker towards San Juan, Porto Rico. An oiler for the fleet was due there on the 16th and the *Bristol* was ordered to escort her to Jamaica. The *Condé*, after leaving Bermuda on the 11th, patrolled Providence and Florida channels, communicating with British ships. On the 16th she and the *Berwick* met in Yucatan channel and after a few more days in that neighbourhood the *Condé* proceeded to her base at Martinique to complete her crew and stores. The *Descartes* proceeded south from Bermuda and visiting each port in the Caribbean Islands arrived at St. Lucia to coal on the 17th. She also intended to call at Fort de France for stores. Thus none of the four cruisers in the West Indies Squadron came near either the *Karlsruhe* or the *Dresden*.¹

31. War with Austria. United States Regulations as to Neutrality.—On August 13 an order to commence hostilities against Austria was issued by the Admiralty. This made very little difference to the Atlantic squadrons, since we concluded an agreement with the Austrian Government whereby certain "days of grace" were allowed in which Austrian vessels were exempt from capture. They were thus able to take refuge in neutral ports. As far as the Atlantic was concerned, the only addition to the hostile forces brought about by the declaration of war on Austria was the presence of three liners considered convertible into cruisers—the *Martha Washington* at New York, the *Laura* and the *Alice* at Bahia.

German merchant shipping had to run to port for shelter and altogether 54 German and Austrian vessels were at anchor in the harbours on the Atlantic coast of America. The port of New York contained nine large German liners,² all of which our intelligence led us to believe were specially fitted for conversion. Activity in connection with these vessels was reported on August 6 by our Reporting Officer at New York; in particular the *Barbarossa* and *Vaterland* were taking enormous quantities of coal, while large numbers of reservists were held on the spot. However, instructions had been issued by the United States Government that without a special reference to Washington clearance was not to be allowed to vessels either loading abnormal quantities of coal, or painted a war colour, or whose passengers were men only. The unpacking of guns or other warlike preparations were to be considered conclusive evidence of warlike intentions, but the inclusion of reservists in the ordinary

¹ Letter of Proceedings. M. 02094/14.

² *Barbarossa*, *Friedrich der Grosse*, *George Washington*, *Grosse Kurfürst*, *Kaiser Wilhelm II*, *Pennsylvania*, *President Grant*, *President Lincoln*, and *Vaterland*.

passenger lists was held not to be sufficient ground for the detention of a vessel. Our Ambassador was even able to secure the issue of an order preventing the clearance of all outgoing foreign vessels without both a detailed manifest and a visit from an inspector, to see that no warlike preparations had been made.¹

32. Admiral Cradock Sails for the West Indies.—The *Good Hope* (Captain Yelverton) arrived at Halifax on August 14. She had been intended as only a temporary reinforcement, but Admiral Cradock now obtained permission to keep her, particularly as Captain Yelverton was high enough on the list to relieve him as Senior Officer in the north in case, as seemed probable, the Admiral's presence was required to the southward. The Admiralty were also of opinion that the West Indies was now in need of some reinforcement. The *Good Hope* was the only suitable ship to send, as none of the others had speed enough to cope with the *Karlsruhe*; and the Admiralty accepted Admiral Cradock's suggestion that she should go. The *Suffolk* and the *Good Hope* met on the 15th at a sea rendezvous; the Admiral, his staff, and Captain Francklin of the *Suffolk* shifted over to the *Good Hope*. Captain Yelverton came to the *Suffolk* and the Admiral, now in the *Good Hope*, sailed for Bermuda. His absence, he felt, would be brief, for he was convinced that the *Karlsruhe* had followed the *Dresden* off his station.² His operations in the north, together with the effect of the State Insurance scheme, had fully restored the confidence of the trading world; on August 15 the Admiralty were able to state "the passage across the Atlantic is quite safe. British trade is running as usual."³

33. South American Trade.—A similar feeling of security was showing itself on the South American trade routes. It was not to the interests of any of the South American States that there should be any interruption in the free passage of British shipping to and from their ports. All the German mercantile vessels in South American ports had come to a standstill and refused to complete their voyages, even to discharge their cargoes. Thus, unless British shipping moved freely, Brazil could not export her coffee and rubber, nor Argentine and Uruguay their wheat, maize and meat; nor, as seemed to them at the moment more serious, could they receive British coal, of which they annually imported some 6,000,000 tons. German trade with the South American republics in the years before the war was nearly as great as our own. But in August 1914 this came to a full stop, and unless British trade and British shipping were freely available South American prosperity was dangerously threatened.⁴ The coal

¹ H.S. 37, pp. 181, 183, 185.

² *Suffolk* W/T Log, p. 71.

³ A 53.

⁴ See Fayle: *Seaborne Trade* I, Chapter IX.

situation immediately became serious. As early as July 31 Brazil threatened to refuse all supply of coal to belligerents. Directly war between England and Germany broke out Brazil, Argentine, Uruguay and Chile prohibited the shipment by any vessel in their ports of more coal than would carry her to her next port of call in South America. It had been reported to these Governments that Great Britain had prohibited the export of coal, and in any case the colliers and ports of South Wales were all taken up with Admiralty requirements. Though the coal merchants of the Tyne were endeavouring to arrange export from there, they were still somewhat afraid of the passage through the North Sea; and until the coal actually arrived, the republics were not inclined to deplete their scanty stocks. This was hardly to be expected. On the 7th our Minister at Rio telegraphed that coal was at famine prices and that the financial position of the Government and private firms was grave in the extreme. It was in vain that we made official protest against these coal restrictions, which would put a more effectual stop to our food supplies than the activities of a score of German raiders. We even approached the United States Government to urge them to use their good offices on our behalf. They, however, refused to do anything in the matter, on the plea that the South Americans resented outside advice. A specific assurance from us that only the best steam coal was reserved for Admiralty use and that no restrictions would be placed on the free export of other kinds was required before any relaxation of the South American embargo could be obtained. By that time United States coal was arriving in British ships.¹

34. Neutrality Regulations in South America.—Their anxiety to maintain the free passage of shipping led the republics to make early declarations of neutrality, in each case based on the Hague Convention of 1907. Brazil, in addition, put forward a tentative proposal that the whole of the Atlantic south of Lisbon should be neutralised, and offered, if the British and French Governments agreed to the suggestion, to enforce it on Germany. In view of the practical difficulties in the way of the scheme we discouraged the suggestion and the matter was reluctantly abandoned by Brazil.² From our point of view the most urgent necessity of the moment was to prevent the egress from South American ports of the German liners we considered suitable for conversion into armed merchant cruisers. There were two of these. One, the *Blücher*, had broken off her voyage homeward and put in to Pernambuco; the other, the *Cap Trafalgar*, was at Buenos Aires. We drew the attention of the countries concerned to their duty of preventing such vessels from leaving if these could reasonably be considered as intended

¹ See F.O. telegrams in H.S. 26, first 130 pages. Also papers titled *Case 439* and *F.O. 2/9/14, Uruguay Neutrality*.

² F.O. telegrams, H.S. 26, pp. 147, 162, 184.

to be employed for warlike purposes; we also pointed out to them that the use of wireless telegraphy by merchant vessels in harbour lends itself to the abuse of neutrality. As a result of these representations the republics generally adopted the United States rules. Both the *Blücher* and *Cap Trafalgar* were frequently visited and searched, without any specially warlike preparations being noticed.¹

35. Movements of "Glasgow."—Captain Luce, in the *Glasgow*, the only cruiser in the South Atlantic on the outbreak of war, could, of course, operate on only a small part of his enormous station, and he remained at first near Rio. His war orders gave Abrolhos Rocks as the northern limit of his station and led him to expect a reinforcement from Admiral Cradock's squadron, for the Admiralty, when informing Admiral Cradock that he need not send a cruiser to the south-east coast of America, had omitted to tell Captain Luce of the change of plan, and even by August 10 he was unaware of it.² He had been moving about off Rio, giving to passing steamers the Admiralty's instructions as to precautions they should take, and incidentally inspiring confidence in trade. Hearing that two German vessels, the *Asuncion* and *Crefeld*, were preparing for sea at Santos and Rio respectively, Captain Luce showed himself in the neighbourhood, hoping to be reported and thus deter them from putting out.³ They both, however, left, the *Asuncion* on August 9 at 7 p.m., and the *Crefeld*, also from Santos, during the night of August 12/13. Two other German vessels, the *Santa Isabel* and *Pontos*, left the River Plate on the 6th and 8th respectively. A large Hamburg-America steamer, the *Baden*, got out of Pernambuco at 8 p.m. on August 11; she had only recently arrived from Barry, and was full of Cardiff coal.⁴ Another Hamburg Süd-Amerika vessel, the *Rio Negro*, fitted with wireless apparatus, left Para on the 9th filled with food and Cardiff coal.⁵ None of these vessels was likely to be intended as an armed raider; they were more probably carrying stores to the cruisers at sea.

The Admiralty, on August 13, informed Captain Luce what they thought to be the positions of *Karlsruhe* and *Dresden*, and that both appeared to be working to the southward towards his station; they also told him that the *Monmouth* was at St. Vincent, Cape Verde, on the way to join him.⁶ He was then cruising near Abrolhos Rocks, where, on the 14th, he captured a Hamburg Süd-Amerika liner, the *Santa Catherina*. She had left New York on July 27 for the South American ports, and, having no wireless, was unaware that war had been declared.

¹ For Brazilian action *re Blücher*, see papers titled *Foreign Office*, 16 September, 1914; for Argentine action *re Cap Trafalgar*, see *Foreign Office*, 3 October, 1914.

² See H.S. 26, p. 104.

³ *Glasgow*, Letter of Proceedings. M. 01745/14.

⁴ Log of Intelligence Division, Section E 2, Nos. 381, 437, 530, 600, 626.

⁵ H.S. 26, p. 119, and N.L. 20482/14.

⁶ Telegram 49 to *Glasgow*. H.S. 26, p. 128.

Removing her crew, he sent her with a small guard on board to anchor off Abrolhos Rocks, outside territorial waters; the German crew he sent by a British ship to Buenos Aires, and the mails to Rio. Her cargo was all consigned to merchants in Brazil, and he proposed to send her to Rio to discharge it, so long as this course did not prejudice his possession of the prize. To this the Brazilian Government agreed. The Admiralty, however, assuming that the suggestion was being carried out, did not definitely inform Captain Luce that his proposal was approved, with the result that the prize was left at Abrolhos Rocks with her cargo undischarged. In October her coal spontaneously ignited and she was sunk.¹

By August 14 the reports of German activity against shipping on our Atlantic trade routes were reassuring rather than otherwise. The expected armed liners had not made an appearance. The *Karlsruhe* had not yet stopped a British ship, and the three which had met the *Dresden* had suffered little from the encounter. Though the French ships in South American ports were sometimes held up by rumours of the near neighbourhood of German cruisers, we were able on the 15th to assure the Brazilian Government that British merchant vessels were prepared to take cargo outward and homeward across the Atlantic, which was practically secure for trade.²

36. Movements of Forces E and I.—At the home end of the Atlantic routes Force E was fully occupied in close proximity to the coast in covering the route of the transports of the British Expeditionary Force to France. The Admiralty had now decided not to employ the *Lusitania* and *Mauretania* as armed merchant cruisers. This needed some adjustment with the Cunard Company, from whom, on August 3, they had been definitely requisitioned. The *Lusitania* was at Liverpool; the *Mauretania* at Halifax had sent all her passengers overland to New York, and had commenced preparing for her new service; Captain V. H. G. Bernard had been appointed to command the *Lusitania*, and Captain C. C. Fowler the *Mauretania*. All these arrangements were now cancelled, and the Cunard Company were indemnified by the payment of one month's hire, £40,000, of one of the ships.³

Further down the trade route Admiral de Robeck with his force of three cruisers managed to keep watch off Lisbon and Vigo, and to show the flag in most of the ports on the Atlantic coast of Spain and Portugal. South of Gibraltar French cruisers were passing up and down the coast of Morocco. In addition to detailing the armoured cruisers *Bruix*, *Latouche-Tréville*, and *Amiral Charner* to escort their troops from Casablanca, the French ordered two old light cruisers, the *Cassard*

¹ H.S. 26, p. 248, and papers titled *Case 816*.

² H.S. 26, pp. 154, 157.

³ S. 0420/1914.

and *Cosmao*, to patrol the coast of Morocco, where the tribes were in a somewhat excited state. During the night of August 9 Lloyd's Signal Station at Cape Spartel, near Tangier, was attacked. The attack was repulsed, but the station was abandoned, and some anxiety was felt for the Eastern Telegraph Company's cable landing at Tangier. Immediately they heard of the incident, the French diverted to Tangier the *Amiral Charner*, then on passage outwards. The Admiralty considered that sufficient protection would be afforded either by a Gibraltar torpedo boat or one of the smaller cruisers, and eventually the *Cassard* was detailed for this duty. However, our representatives at Tangier, unwilling to offend the Spanish, who resented any advance by the French in Northern Morocco, suggested no protection was necessary, since the signal station was permanently closed, and the cable was almost impossible to find. The Admiralty concurred in this. Nevertheless, the *Cassard* went to Tangier, and on the 20th removed the German Chargé d'Affaires and staff, disembarking them at Palermo. The French also proposed to send troops to Tangier, but, as this would undoubtedly provoke difficulties with Spain, the troops were diverted to Casablanca. They passed the Straits of Gibraltar westward on the 22nd. The *Cassard* and *Cosmao* remained patrolling the coast of Morocco.¹

On August 11 the *Amphitrite* stopped the Austrian steamer *Daksa*. Finding that she was bound for the Elbe with grain "for orders," Captain Grant-Dalton decided that her cargo, though conditional contraband, became absolute through its destination; and putting a prize crew on board he sent her to Gibraltar.²

On August 13 Admiral de Robeck was joined by the *Argonaut* and *Sutlej*.³ This latter ship had not been apportioned to Force I in the War Plan, but seems to have been intended as a reinforcement for Force E. When, however, she was reported as ready at Devonport, on August 6, she was ordered to join Admiral de Robeck, though only temporarily. On August 16 the *Challenger* was at last relieved of her duty in home waters, and also proceeded to join Force I; off Finisterre she relieved the *Sutlej* to go into Gibraltar to coal. Beyond the suspicion attaching to the liners and other German ships in Spanish and Portuguese harbours there seemed to be no evidence of an attack on commerce in the waters of Area I.

37. **Movements of Force D.**—Nor had our merchant shipping on the African and European coasts as yet suffered from the enemy. On August 6 Admiral Stoddart was told that one of

¹ See H.S. 36 and A 35, 55.

² *Amphitrite*, Proceedings. M. 7060/14.

³ *Sutlej*, Captain C. Lynes, 1902, 2,000 tons, trial speed 21.7 knots; 2—9.2 in., 12—6 in.

12,000

his squadron must press on to St. Vincent, Cape Verde, leaving one cruiser to deal with the enemy off Las Palmas. He had so far only the *Carnarvon* and *Cumberland* under his direct orders. On the 8th, however, the Admiralty ordered the *Cornwall* to proceed from Gibraltar to join him, examining Madeira on the way.¹ His fourth ship, the *Monmouth*, was now ready to sail from home. By his War Orders he had to send one ship to South America to join the *Glasgow*; at his suggestion she was detailed for this service, and she therefore sailed direct for Pernambuco, via St. Vincent, Cape Verde, and did not join his squadron at all. She reached St. Vincent on the 13th, coaled, and proceeded for Pernambuco. Next day she met the German steamer *Hochfeld*, bound for Madeira from Monte Video, which she had left before the outbreak of war. The prize had only enough coal to take her to Madeira, and Admiral Stoddart ordered her to be released, as she was hampering the *Monmouth*.² The *Hochfeld* arrived duly at Madeira and remained there.

During the first few days of the war a succession of German and Austrian merchant vessels took refuge at the ports in the East Atlantic between Bilbao and the Cape Verde Islands, at Madeira, and at the harbours in the Azores and Canaries, till the total reached more than a hundred. One, the *Bethania*, left Tenerife on August 3 without a bill of health, for an unknown destination. This was suspicious. It was also noted that the German steamers *Ingo* and *Arucas* at Las Palmas were taking more coal from the German depôt than was necessary for their own requirements. The stock of German coal was, however, only 1,500 tons. The British and French Consuls protested to the Governor, who upheld the protests, and the steamers were made to discharge their coal again. The *Carnarvon* and *Cumberland* arrived in the islands on August 7. At Tenerife was the French liner *Formosa*, prevented from sailing by fear of the German cruisers supposed to be off the islands. Admiral Stoddart offered to escort her out of harbour, but she made no reply and he went on to Las Palmas, sending the *Cumberland* in to coal, while he himself waited outside. Though German wireless had been frequently heard, it ceased entirely after his arrival. The attitude of the Spanish authorities at Las Palmas was most friendly; amongst other things they had taken down the aerials of German ships in harbour, and had sealed their wireless rooms. No trace of German men-of-war could be found in the Canary Group, nor had they been seen at a base reported to be situated between two of the smaller islands. There had been no case of interference with any British ship. The Admiral determined to push on to St. Vincent. He sailed on August 8, leaving the patrol of the Canaries to Captain Fuller in the *Cumberland*, who

¹ A 28, 34. No particular intelligence concerning the Cape Verde Islands had come in, beyond the arrival of a few German merchant vessels.

² Stoddart, Letter of Proceedings. M. 02074/14.

was to take the *Cornwall* under his orders on her arrival.¹ The latter left Gibraltar on August 8; proceeding *viâ* Madeira and the Salvages, she joined the *Cumberland* on the 12th at a rendezvous south of Grand Canary. Between them the two ships made a close examination of all the harbours in the Canary Islands. From time to time they heard the Tenerife wireless station calling the *Blücher*, and on one occasion, by giving the *Blücher's* reply signal, the *Cornwall* received two messages addressed to the German ship, but they were in code. At night the two ships closed in, the one near Santa Cruz de Tenerife, the other near Las Palmas.

38. The "Re Vittorio."—At this period German reservists were making their way to Germany in large numbers, and many vessels from America to neutral ports contained these as passengers. Among such vessels was the *Re Vittorio*, an Italian mail steamer, which had left Buenos Aires before war was declared. She was reported to have 80 reservists on board, and on August 14 the Senior Naval Officer, Gibraltar, telegraphed to that effect to the *Cornwall* (Captain Ellerton), then cruising near Las Palmas. Next morning Captain Ellerton sighted the *Re Vittorio*, and sent a boarding party to examine her. They found 21 declared reservists, and proceeded to remove them to the *Cornwall*. Captain Ellerton, however, considering he had no accommodation for prisoners of war, sent them back. He put a prize crew of four officers and 15 men on board; and after obtaining permission from the *Cumberland*, his immediate senior officer, proceeded to escort the vessel to Gibraltar. Meanwhile, Admiral Stoddart in the *Carnarvon*, at the Cape Verde Islands, wishing to coal at Sierra Leone, ordered the *Cumberland* to come and relieve him south of the islands, and this order reached Captain Fuller in the *Cumberland* a few hours after he had sent the *Cornwall* off to coal at Gibraltar on arrival with the *Re Vittorio*. By Admiral Stoddart's orders he now recalled the *Cornwall* to watch off Las Palmas, while the *Cumberland* proceeded down the trade route. The *Re Vittorio* continued to Gibraltar in charge of the prize crew. On nearing port the officer in charge of the prize crew hoisted the British flag in place of the Italian, whereupon the master threatened to abandon the command of the ship. As a result of his protest, the Italian flag was hoisted at the stern, though the British flag hung at the fore. At Gibraltar 54 passengers were removed, the original 21, and 33 more discovered since to be reservists, and the *Re Vittorio* was released. The Italian Government protested both against the capture of the ship and the removal of the German passengers. The Foreign Office proposed to express regret, and to assure the Italian Government that unjustifiable interference with Italian shipping would be avoided in future; but

¹ Stoddart, Letter of Proceedings, M. 7056/14; H.S. 25, pp. 83, 136, 150.

before agreeing to this course, the Admiralty, on 19 September, 1914, called on Captain Ellerton for a full report, with reasons for his action. Owing to the course of events, this demand did not reach him till July 1915.¹ He pointed out that the *Re Vittorio* was undoubtedly performing unneutral service in that she had reservists on board, and had not landed them at St. Vincent after the declaration of war;² when he captured her he had no immediate prospect of being able to take her to a British port himself, and though the ship must pass the Straits of Gibraltar, there was a possibility that she might evade the patrol. In the circumstances he took the only course which would certainly prevent the reservists from joining the enemy's forces, and he submitted this justified his action. The Admiralty were not quite sure of this; but since by the time Captain Ellerton's reply came in Italy had joined the Entente, they felt it unnecessary to make a formal answer to her complaint, and the matter dropped.³

The *Cornwall* was not back in position off Las Palmas again till the forenoon of August 17. Since the Canaries were a long way from Sierra Leone, the coaling base, and Dakar was reported to have the plague, Admiral Stoddart asked the Admiralty, should it still be considered necessary to keep a cruiser at the Canaries, that she might coal at Gibraltar, which was not one of the coaling bases allotted to him in his War Orders. This message, timed 1400 on the 16th, was to be passed by the *Cumberland*; but, owing probably to interference, it could not get through till 11 p.m. on the 18th, when the *Cumberland* passed it *viâ* Dakar. The chief source of interference seemed to be the *Leviathan*.⁴

This ship, of the 6th Cruiser Squadron, had been sent down from Queenstown to examine the Azores for German cruisers and colliers. The *Dresden* had been reported near the islands, and though they lay in Area I, for which Admiral de Robeck was responsible, his few cruisers had been too busily occupied on the European coast to be able to investigate the rumour. The *Leviathan* went first to Flores and obtained no news there. She then went on to Horta, the principal port of the Azores, arriving on the 14th. There she induced the authorities to intern a German oil tanker and to remove the wireless apparatus from two Hamburg-America liners in port. Though there were no enemy cruisers in the Azores, the *Leviathan* proposed to remain

¹ The Admiralty letter was addressed to R.A., *Good Hope*, under whom Captain Ellerton was then serving. It never reached Admiral Cradock, and was returned to the Admiralty in March 1915.

² This refers to Article 43 of the Prize Manual: "A neutral ship should be detained if to the knowledge of the charterer, the master, or the owner, she is transporting a military detachment of the enemy."

³ Papers titled N. 553/15. Over 90 reservists were removed from the Italian *S.S. Caserta* from New York to Naples when she passed Gibraltar on August 23. See H.S. 36, pp. 431, 440.

⁴ This paragraph is based on *Cumberland* W/T Log, 23046.

10 days in the group and then coal at Gibraltar. She had evidently not received an order from the Admiralty sent *via* Gibraltar, North Front, on the 12th, ordering her to the Cape to escort homeward-bound troops. This order was repeated on the 15th to the Consul, Horta, and at 11 a.m. on the 16th she shaped course southward for St. Vincent, Cape Verde.¹

CHAPTER V.

AUGUST 16-26.—THE KAISER WILHELM DER GROSSE.

39. Appearance of the "Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse."—The situation as regards the attack and defence of trade on the Atlantic trade routes, after a fortnight of war, was so generally in favour of the defence that the confidence of shipowners and merchants in the efficacy of naval protection steadily increased. The chief cause of the paralysis which struck the shipping industry on the outbreak of war was financial rather than the fear of capture; and though trade was still stagnant, by the middle of August it was beginning to be resumed.² It was at this stage that the first German armed liner made her brief appearance in the Atlantic.

The *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, a 14,000-ton vessel of the North German Lloyd Line, dated from 1897, and had a speed of 22½ knots.³ Before the war she was known to be fitted for conversion into an armed auxiliary.⁴ She was lying in the Weser when the German Government issued the Warning Telegram, which apparently contained orders to fit her out as an armed merchant cruiser. She was painted black all over, and on August 3 received her guns and naval crew, with Captain Reymann in command.⁵ On August 4 she passed through the lock into the German Bight, where the telegram for war against England reached her. Her orders were to carry on war against commerce in the Atlantic; and to reach her station she had, of course, to get out of the North Sea. Our Northern Patrol was not then in position,⁶ but the Germans expected a

¹ H.S. 36, pp. 228, 256, 276, 281; *Leviathan*, Letter of Proceedings. M. 02184/14 and *Leviathan's Log*.

² See Fayle, *Seaborne Trade*, pp. 109, 171, etc.

³ The incidents summarised in this section are described in detail in papers titled *Misc. Office*, 24 August, 1914. The German versions are in *Kreuzerjagd im Ocean*, by Kap-Lt. Aye, translated in I.D. 1170, and the diary of J. Peters, translated in I.D. 1035; both of these are in I.D.H.S. 551.

⁴ Particulars and Movements of German and Austrian Mercantile Steam Vessels.

⁵ Presumably at Wilhelmshaven. Our Consul Bremerhaven reported that she left his port on August 2. H.S. 51, p. 442.

⁶ See Monograph 19, 10th Cruiser Squadron, C.B. 935.

more or less close blockade, and Captain Reymann thought he could escape only by hugging the Norwegian coast and making a wide detour to Iceland. By August 7 he was west of Iceland and made his first capture, a steam trawler, the *Tubal Cain*, which he sank, taking her crew on board. From there he apparently made straight for the route of trade homeward bound from the south. On August 12 the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* crossed the Azores-American route and soon sighted a ship. She turned out to be an Italian, the *Il Piemonte*, bound for New York; she was consequently a neutral vessel, and having no contraband had to be released.¹ Proceeding southward, the German raider was off the southernmost of the Canaries on August 15. Here she took in many wireless signals *en clair*; these were mostly from steamers ordering coal in Tenerife, and as they all gave their names it was possible, by consulting Lloyds Register, to discover a great many particulars about them. One of the messages came from the *Galician*; it was addressed to the British Consul, Tenerife, and signed "Captain Day"; he ordered coal to be ready next evening and asked: "Is the track clear?" From the distinctness of the wireless message, Captain Reymann judged the *Galician* was close, and, sending a reassuring answer, prepared to act as soon as she appeared.² He had not long to wait. At 2.45 p.m. August 15, in 27.30 N., 18.0 W., he overhauled her. The position is about 60 miles to the westward of the usual track, showing that Captain Day was carrying out the Admiralty's instructions to diverge. At first Captain Reymann ordered the *Galician* to stop and lower her aerial, so that she could not communicate by wireless; but before he had sent a boat, he sighted on the opposite side of him another steamer, and, going in chase of the new prey, he ordered the *Galician* to follow at full speed. The second steamer turned out to be the German collier *Duala*, disguised as an English ship, full of coal and supplies. This was a good find, for the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse's* long voyage had nearly exhausted her fuel and she was high out of the water. Ordering the *Duala* to a rendezvous on the African coast, Captain Reymann returned to the *Galician*. He intended to bring all her passengers and crew to his own ship, but, as there were women and children among them and the transfer would take many hours, he decided to wait till morning.

Forcing the *Galician* to follow him on a triangular course, Captain Reymann thought out what he should do with her. The difficulty of feeding 250 extra persons, should he transfer them to his own ship, and the consumption of valuable time in getting them across, weighed heavily with him. He had to coal within 24 hours and had appointed a rendezvous off the

¹ Peters gives August 11 as the date of this. On arrival at New York nine days later the *Il Piemonte* reported having been stopped on August 12 in 39 N. 35 W., about 180 miles West of Flores. H.S. 25, p. 353.

² The above particulars are from *Kreuzerjagd im Ocean*, I.D. 1170.

African coast for his colliers.¹ Ultimately he decided to release the ship, and at 5 a.m., August 16, when in 25.35 N., 17.20 W., made a signal to that effect, and the *Galician* proceeded with much relief on her voyage to Tenerife.

Two hours later another steamer came up to the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*. This was the *Kaipara*, carrying nearly 4,000 tons of meat from New Zealand. As she had no passengers, Captain Reymann signalled to the boarding officer: "Transfer crew to *Kaiser*, sink the ship and lose no time." The last part was added because the wireless of British cruisers had been heard, among them the *Carnarvon*. The *Kaipara* was sunk by explosive charges combined with 53 shells, and Captain Reymann, about midday, shaped course for his coaling base on the African coast. But he was in an area where shipping is thick and it was not long before he came across another vessel. In reply to his signals, one of which was that she was to throw overboard her wireless apparatus with which she had been calling for help, he learned that she was the *Arlanza*, a Royal Mail liner, homeward bound from South America. Having left Buenos Aires before the outbreak of war she had had no special instructions and was directly on the track for Las Palmas. "How many passengers have you on board?" asked the German. "Fifteen hundred," came the reply. "You are released," said Captain Reymann, and made off at high speed.² Before he could get clear, however, another steamer was sighted. It was now half-past four, and as she proved to be a cargo steamer, the *Nyanga* of the Elder Line, with African produce, he made short work of her, and after transferring her crew to his own ship continued his voyage to meet the *Duala*.

40. **Action taken on the "Arlanza's" Report.**—The first report of the presence of the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* on the trade route was made by the *Arlanza*, which arrived at Las Palmas at 7 a.m. on the 17th. Her master informed the British Consul, who proceeded to warn through the Tenerife Wireless Station all the British ships he knew to be near.³ Leaving again at noon, the *Arlanza* met the *Cornwall* just outside, to whom her master repeated the information. The position of the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, as given by the *Arlanza*, was 24.40 N., 17.14 W., at 1 p.m. August 16. As the *Cumberland* was near there,⁴ Captain Ellerton telegraphed it to her and proceeded himself to the southward of the Canaries. Bad atmospheric prevented him from communicating either with Gibraltar⁵ or the *Carnarvon*, which was then at St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, and

¹ *Kreuzerjagd*.

² These signals are not recorded by the *Arlanza*, but may be a free paraphrase by Kap.-Lt. Aye.

³ See *Cornwall's* W/T Log.

⁴ *Cumberland's* noon position, August 17, was 25.41 N. 18.19 W.

⁵ H.S. 25, p. 402.

the *Cumberland*, when she received the news at 1.35 p.m., was about 130 miles south of Ferro, steaming south-westward along the trade route towards St. Vincent in accordance with her orders. Before, however, Captain Fuller had arranged any measures for dealing with the raider, he received new orders which took him right away from the area in which she was operating.

41. **"Cumberland" ordered to Fernando Po.**—One of the first steps taken at home after the outbreak of war was the appointment of a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence to consider suitable objectives for overseas attack. One of these was the important wireless station at Kamina in Togoland; and another, in close geographical connection with it, was the German Cameroons colony, with its important harbour of Duala. The ubiquitous *Dresden* was reported on August 9 to be expected at Duala, where 32 German merchant vessels had taken refuge; the wireless station at Fernando Po, a Spanish island not far from Duala, was stated to be under German control; by the 13th German cruisers had been reported near Duala; and the Admiralty considered a ship should be sent to gain intelligence, as the expedition for the seizure of the port was nearly ready to start. At 8.35 p.m. on the 13th they telegraphed to Admiral Stoddart at St. Vincent that he was to send one cruiser to Fernando Po to gain intelligence, leaving one ship near St. Vincent to guard trade. The order did not reach him and it was repeated at 12.20 a.m. on the 15th, being sent *viâ* Pembroke and Dakar. Even then he appears not to have received it till 1 a.m. on the 17th. After ascertaining the amount of coal on board the *Cumberland*, he ordered her at 10.50 p.m. to proceed as fast as fuel allowed to Sierra Leone and on to Fernando Po. At 1 a.m. on the 18th she shaped course for Sierra Leone and took no further part in any operations against the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*.¹

42. **Ships passing through Area D.**—Besides the *Cornwall* and *Cumberland* there were several men-of-war approaching the scene of the raid by the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*. One of these was the *Kinfauns Castle* (Captain D. B. Crampton), now an armed merchant cruiser, with orders to proceed in the first instance to St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, and probably from there to the Cape Station.² She had left Southampton at 4 p.m. August 15, and on the 18th intercepted a message to the *Amphitrite* to the effect that the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* had captured the *Galician*. The *Kinfauns Castle* was then some 300 miles north of Madeira; she was a slower ship than the German, but in case they should meet, Captain Crampton had

¹ *Cumberland* W/T Log and A 43.

² H.S. 25, p. 223.

his ship's funnels painted red to look like a Union Castle liner, in the hope of attracting the enemy within range.¹ She was not the only ship that was coming out from England along the trade route. The liners which had been armed as merchant cruisers were becoming ready. The *Armada Castle* on her way out to the Cape was two days ahead of the *Kinfauns Castle*; she passed west of the Canaries about noon on the 19th, followed half a day later by the *Otranto* on the way to the south-east coast of America. Both these ships made St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, their first port of call. But nearer than either of these was the *Macedonia*, which passed west of the Canaries between the 17th and 18th. Her log shows that she continued straight on to a rendezvous off St. Vincent, where, at noon on the 20th, she met Admiral Stoddart.² He sent her to patrol 200 miles northward from St. Vincent while he remained to the southward of the group.

43. "Highflyer" detached from Area I to Area D.—The Admiralty took action by sending the *Highflyer* to join Admiral Stoddart. She was on the way to Madeira from Gibraltar. He ordered her to operate on the trade route near the Canaries, relieving the *Cornwall* to come down to St. Vincent and take the *Carnarvon's* place while she went in to Sierra Leone to coal.³ The *Highflyer's* place in Force I was taken by the *Minerva* from Force E.⁴ At this time the first divisions of our Expeditionary Force were crossing from Southampton to Havre, and the part played by Force E in the protection of the transports was to occupy a line from Queenstown to the Scillies. It was from this line that the *Minerva* came and she left for her new station on the 20th, before the transport of the Expeditionary Force was complete.

44. Battleship Supports at Focal Points of Trade.—Another step taken by the Admiralty at this period was their decision to distribute the *Canopus* class battleship of the 7th Battle Squadron at focal points on the trade routes. The *Glory* had already gone to North America and was now ordered to cruise off New York. The *Ocean* was ordered to Queenstown to act with Force E; the *Albion* to Gibraltar for Force I; the *Canopus* to St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, for Admiral Stoddart.⁵ The function of these battleships was to form supports for the cruiser forces in case of raids by hostile battle cruisers,⁶ though this was

¹ Letter of Proceedings. M. 01947/14.

² See plan at p. 48.

³ Letter of Proceedings. M. 02074/14.

⁴ A 56, 58, 59, 62. She was the only ship of that squadron that could proceed at once without coaling. H.S. 36, p. 333.

⁵ A 63, 64. *Ocean* (Captain Hayes-Sadler), *Albion* (Rear-Admiral H. L. Tottenham, Captain A. W. Heneage, M.V.O.), *Canopus* (Captain Heathcoat S. Grant), all 12,950 tons; 4—12 in., 12—6 in.; 18 knots; dating from 1900.

⁶ A 81.

not definitely laid down in the orders to the ships themselves; these orders spoke only of "generally protecting trade" and "generally supporting cruisers in protecting trade."¹

They were also to carry a large number of extra ratings to distribute among the cruisers for prize crews. In some cases it had been the practice for the Atlantic cruisers to escort into port any prize or suspicious ship they had met. The Admiralty now issued general instructions that since for cruisers the main object was to destroy the enemy's armed ships, they were not to be diverted from that object by prizes. Prize crews must be put on board, and if that were not possible and the cargo were mostly enemy, the crew should be removed and the ship sunk; if the cargo were neutral the captain would have to decide what to do.²

45. "Dresden" makes Two Captures.—It will be noticed that the focal points at which the battleships were stationed were all large ports. There was another place from which thickly populated and important trade routes radiate in many directions. This was Cape San Roque, at the north-eastern corner of Brazil. Here diverge the routes from the Plate ports to the Canaries and Cape Verde Islands on the one hand, and to the Gulf ports and New York on the other. The South American republics carry on a large trade with the United States and most of this trade was carried in British ships. North-east of Cape San Roque the track of coffee to Europe joined the main route of foodstuffs from the Plate. Hence the area for some hundred miles round Pernambuco afforded one of the richest of the distant fields open to an enemy raider. It was here that the *Dresden* made her reappearance.

Since August 12, when the arrival of the three ships stopped by the *Dresden* had revealed her position, though incorrectly, six days before that date, a good deal of intelligence which might relate to her had been received. The French Intelligence Division at Dakar stated on the 12th that probably two or three German warships were between the Canaries and Togoland. The *Dresden* herself was reported near Para on the 14th; and the French Consul at Rio stated she had coaled near Bahia on the 16th. On the strength of this, though the vessel in question was variously reported as the *Dresden* or *Bremen*, which latter had gone home before the war, he asked for a British cruiser to escort out of Pernambuco harbour a French liner containing hundreds of French reservists, a request which could not at the time be granted. Next, our Minister at Rio stated that the *Dresden* was off Maranhão on the 17th, interfering with the telegraph cables. It was not till August 20 that she was definitely located. On that day there came in to Rio the *Prussia*, a Hamburg-America liner which had left Pernambuco on

¹ See A 65.

² A 57, 60.

August 4, ostensibly for Santos. On board the *Prussia* when she arrived at Rio were the master and crew of the Houston steamer *Hyades*, which the *Dresden* had sunk on August 15 in 6° S., 32° 46' W., about half way between Pernambuco and Fernando Noronha. Shortly after the arrival of the *Prussia* there came into Rio the British steamer *Siamese Prince*, which reported that she had been stopped by the *Dresden* on the 16th in 10° S. 32° W., but allowed to proceed.

After releasing the *Drumcliffe*, *Hostilius*, and *Lynton Grange* on August 6 the *Dresden* had continued her course for Rocas Reef. The weather had become bad and it was doubtful whether her coal would last. Captain Lüdecke thought it advisable to call to him one of the steamers he knew to be in the ports near and he signalled to the *Corrientes*, then lying at Maranham. In calling to her he gave his own ship's name as *Sierra Salvada*, and the master of the *Corrientes* suspected the call to be a trap. But he had served on board the *Dresden* and knew many of her officers, and by referring to them Captain Lüdecke was able to calm his suspicions. The *Corrientes* left Maranham at 6 a.m. on August 8 and met the *Dresden* that afternoon.¹

By the advice of the master of the *Corrientes* the *Dresden* coaled on August 9 and 10 at Jericoacoara, an unfrequented harbour on the north coast of Brazil in 3° S., 40° W. She took in 570 tons.² Leaving at noon August 10, the two ships passed north of Rocas Reef on the 12th and went on towards Fernando Noronha, hoping to find some British vessels on the trade route. Captain Lüdecke was now in touch with the *Baden*, which, arriving at Pernambuco on August 7, with 12,000 tons of coal, had reported her presence to the *Dresden* through the Olinda Wireless Station, and had been ordered to the position 3° S. 35° W. near Rocas Island. Captain Lüdecke thereupon sent the *Corrientes* to Pernambuco, where she arrived on August 14. During the 13th the *Dresden* tried to coal from the *Baden* under such a lee as the reef afforded;³ and some damage was done to the cruiser by the bumping in the swell. Meanwhile, two more German auxiliaries had joined: the *Prussia*, which had left Bahia on the 10th, and the *Persia* from Ceara. The lighthouse keeper on Rocas Reef became curious to know what was the reason of this assembly of ships near his station and was told the *Dresden* was a Swede, the *Fylgia*, repairing her damaged engines. The little squadron remained only till the 14th. Captain Lüdecke sent the *Persia* off to Parahyba with his sick, and at 9 p.m. started off southward with the *Baden* and *Prussia*. During his stay near Rocas Reef and Fernando Noronha he had seen no shipping, a fact which he interpreted as showing that we were diverting our steamers to another route. This he

¹ Her departure does not seem to have been reported. The *Sierra Salvada* was really at sea; she came in to Rio on August 14.

² Notebook of J. Zeus, one of the *Dresden's* crew. I.D.H.S. 115.

³ 254 tons were taken in, according to Zeus.

considered might be *viâ* Trinidad, a small island in 20° S., 30° W., for which he now steered direct. While on the way the *Dresden* fell in with the *Hyades*, and captured her. The *Hyades* was bound for Rotterdam with a cargo largely German owned; nevertheless Captain Lüdecke, thinking it had little chance of reaching any destination other than a British port, sank the ship and transferred her crew to the *Prussia*. In sinking the ship he expended 42 rounds. Next day, August 16, he overtook the *Siamese Prince* bound for the River Plate. Her cargo was neutral and he released her. He then sent off the *Prussia*¹ to discharge her prisoners at the nearest port, presumably Pernambuco; but hearing British warship wireless² the *Prussia* diverged and arrived at Rio almost simultaneously with the *Siamese Prince*.³

The *Hyades* was the first vessel known to have been sunk by German cruisers in the Atlantic; for though the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* had destroyed two ships off the African coast, the fact was not yet known, as their crews were still in the raider. At first there was some feeling of alarm at the ports of South America, and the arrival of ships at sea was eagerly awaited. As one by one these came safely into port the uneasiness subsided and the incident "had no appreciable effect upon the confidence of traders or shipowners. The contrast between the comparative immunity enjoyed by shipping and the heavy percentage of losses which had been anticipated was so marked that isolated captures could well be disregarded, especially in view of the assistance given by the State Insurance Scheme."⁴ As a measure of precaution, however, since no men-of-war would be available for the protection of shipping in the neighbourhood till the end of the month, the Consul at Pernambuco advised British vessels not to proceed north of his port till then.⁵

46. Movements of the South-east Coast of America Squadron.—The position, 180 miles north-east of Pernambuco, in which the *Hyades* had been sunk, was within the area for which Admiral Stoddart was responsible. His small force, however, had been so tied to the Canary and Cape Verde Islands by the Admiralty's orders⁶ that he had been unable to send any ship to the south-western corner of his station. Nor did he now detail one to go there. The *Monmouth* had passed down the trade route, leaving St. Vincent, Cape Verde, on the 14th. She arrived at Pernambuco on the 20th, when the news of the loss of the *Hyades* came in; but she was not part of Force D, and as her

¹ She had only 200 tons of coal aboard.

² Possibly H.M.S. *Monmouth*, which was at Pernambuco on August 20. T.S.D.D.

³ Deposition of Master of *Hyades*. M. 16613/14.

⁴ Fayle: *Seaborne Trade* I, p. 192.

⁵ H.S. 36, p. 247.

⁶ A 28, 43.

station was to the southward she left next day to join the *Glasgow*, according to her orders. Captain Luce, as soon as the *Monmouth*, had joined him, asked if he could act to the northward of his station; the Admiralty replied, "If you have certain information *Dresden* is your objective. Station limits are only a general guide."¹

47. Admiral Cradock ordered to search the Brazilian Coast.—

The Admiralty did not disturb Admiral Stoddart, whose force was on the lookout for the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*; but, instead, they ordered Admiral Cradock to search the northern coast of Brazil for bases of the German cruisers, continuing his voyage as far as Pernambuco.² He arrived at St. Lucia on August 23 with the *Good Hope* and *Bristol*, and coaled. Outside the port, which was without defences, were nine British steamers awaiting orders. Considering them unnecessarily exposed, should the *Karlsruhe* choose to attack them, he advised them to go to Martinique, which, though French, was a defended anchorage. Over 60 merchant ships had visited St. Lucia since the outbreak of war. It was an important coaling station and the Admiral suggested it should have two 6 in. or 4.7 in. guns "if hostilities are likely to last."³ Nothing, however, was done and the Admiralty appeared to acquiesce in the suggestion that British ships should seek shelter in the French port. The Admiral landed a 12 pdr. and a Maxim from the *Berwick*, which had joined him, and, stationing the *Descartes* as guard ship off the port, he proceeded for Trinidad.

The *Bristol* and *Berwick* he sent on in advance to show themselves off St. Vincent and Grenada. The *Good Hope* went south-westward to the coast of Venezuela and then worked eastward to Trinidad; the western half of the coast of Venezuela had been visited by the *Condé*, which the Admiral now directed to patrol off St. Thomas. The three British ships arrived separately at Trinidad on August 26, and left next day to commence a search of the north coast of Brazil.⁴ The order on which he was operating contained the words, "coaling if necessary at Pernambuco." These appear to have been decoded by him as "coal outside Pernambuco"; to do this in the August weather seemed so difficult to him that in the course of reporting his proposed movements he asked for further instructions. His telegram did not make clear on what point he was requesting instructions, and the reply he received merely ordered him to hunt the *Dresden* and her colliers.⁵

48. The "Brandenburg's" Escape.—Just before reaching Trinidad he heard through the *Bristol* that a large German merchant vessel had sailed from Philadelphia with 9,000 tons

¹ A 75.

² A 73.

³ A 83.

⁴ Letter of Proceedings, M. 02094/24.

⁵ A 76, 77.

of coal, nominally for Norway, but, of course, suspected to be for the German cruisers at sea.¹ This added another report to the numerous and persistent rumours of sailings of German ships with supplies for cruisers in the Gulf of Mexico. He accordingly telegraphed to our Consuls at New York and Galveston to give publicity to a false statement that three British men-of-war were rushing to the Gulf of Mexico to protect the oil and cotton traffic and that two German supply ships had been captured. This message ultimately reached our Minister at Rio, who pointed out that to publish rumours officially would discredit genuine news. The Admiralty agreed with this view and informed Admiral Cradock that he should communicate only with Ministers and not Consuls, except in matters of extreme urgency.²

The vessel which had caused this correspondence was the *Brandenburg*, 7,500 tons, of the North German Lloyd Line, which had put in to Philadelphia in the early days of the war. Her speed was only 12½ knots, and she was not on our list of ships convertible into armed merchant cruisers.³ On August 19 she took in a large quantity of provisions and began to coal. This information was duly reported to the Admiralty by our Consul at Philadelphia, who also warned the local United States authorities. When he heard next day that she had taken 5,000 tons of coal he asked that she might be refused clearance. However, she gave Bergen as her destination and the United States authorities did not detain her. She sailed at 5 p.m. August 21, the Consul's report of this being received in the Admiralty at 4.54 a.m. on the 22nd, but it was not till 1.30 p.m. on the 23rd that the Admiralty, which was the Intelligence Office for that area, sent out the information to the *Suffolk*, adding that the German ship was probably taking coal to enemy cruisers in American waters.⁴ Captain Yelverton had learned from the New York papers that the *Brandenburg* seemed about to sail, and on the 21st, at 7.25 p.m., sent a warning to the *Essex* that the liner might be leaving Philadelphia that day with coal for German cruisers. The *Essex* was then, by Admiral Cradock's orders, showing herself off the Chesapeake; she went, indeed, so close that she received a salute from a United States battleship at anchor in the roadstead.⁵ At 8 p.m. she proceeded northward at 12 knots, reaching the southern shore of the Delaware estuary at noon, August 22, by which time the

¹ *Bristol* W/T Log 18259, August 25. This was a telegram despatched from Admiralty to I.O. Jamaica, 1.10 a.m., 24.8.14.

² H.S. 37, pp. 535, 571.

³ This list can be found in "Disposition of German, Italian and Austrian Ships," a daily return issued by the Intelligence Division. It first appears on p. 7 of the issue of 8 August, 1914.

⁴ H.S. 37, pp. 441, 450, 455, 473.

⁵ *Essex* Deck Log.

Brandenburg had been gone some 18 hours.¹ Captain Yelverton received the Admiralty's telegram through the *Glory* two days after the *Brandenburg* had sailed.²

49. **Movements in Area D, August 20-26.**—In spite of the passage of the armed merchant cruisers between the Canaries and Cape Verde Islands, they obtained no intelligence of the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*. The *Armada* left St. Vincent southward on the 22nd, the *Otranto* on the 23rd, the *Kinfauns Castle* on the 24th. Two days before reaching St. Vincent, the *Kinfauns Castle* captured a German barque, the *Werner Vinnen*, with 4,325 tons of Welsh coal; she had left England before the outbreak of war. Captain Crampton put a prize crew of two lieutenants, one midshipman and 29 ratings on board and sent her to Sierra Leone.³ The Admiral himself, in the *Carnarvon*, remained near St. Vincent, patrolling till the 23rd, when he started for Sierra Leone to coal. At 2 p.m. he came across a German steamer, the *Professor Woermann*. This ship, one of the Woermann Line, left Hamburg on July 25 on her ordinary voyage to the Cameroons. She reached Tenerife on August 1 and, instead of continuing for Conakry, the next regular port of call, she proceeded to Las Palmas, where the English and French passengers were advised to land. Taking in 600 tons of coal and the German reservists from ships in port, she sailed at 10 p.m. August 2, having spread a rumour that she was making for Madeira. Our cruisers had been on the lookout for her ever since their arrival at the Canaries.⁴ She was, however, captured in 15.35½ N., 24.35 W., near Brava Island, and had apparently been waiting some time there on a rendezvous. The *Carnarvon* did not put a prize crew on board but gave the German captain written instructions to accompany the *Carnarvon* to Sierra Leone, informing him that his ship would be sunk without further notice should any attempt to escape be made.⁵ The two arrived on August 26 at Sierra Leone, where the *Professor Woermann* was condemned in the Prize Court. The Admiral had not waited for relief by the *Cornwall* before leaving St. Vincent; she did not arrive till the 26th. The *Macedonia*, however, since meeting the Admiral, had been patrolling the trade route northwards for some 200 miles. Neither the cruisers of Force D nor the other ships passing through the station learned any more of the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*; it was reserved for a newcomer to run her to earth. On August 24 our Consul at Las Palmas was informed by a passenger in a Cadiz


¹ The *Brandenburg* seems to have made no attempt to get in touch with German cruisers; she arrived at Trondhjem early in September and made no further effort to continue her voyage, the purpose of which is not at present known.

² *Suffolk* W/T Log.

³ Letter of Proceedings, M. 01947/14.

⁴ *Cumberland* W/T Log.

⁵ A 79. Papers titled X 3356/14, and Colonial Office, 2 January, 1915.

DISPOSITION 20th August, 1914.

schooner that the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* had arrived at Rio de Oro, in Spanish West Africa, with the *Duala*, at daybreak, August 17. She had coaled from the *Duala* and had remained 48 hours at anchor, ignoring the Spanish authorities. The *Highflyer* had just reached Las Palmas when the news came in, and on receipt of the intelligence proceeded at 5.30 a.m., August 25, at 8½ knots, to investigate the Rio de Oro, on the chance that something might still be there. The news was now a week old, but the Admiralty, thinking that the *Cornwall*, if she had received it within 24 hours of the arrival of the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, ought to have been in time to catch her, asked Captain Ellerton when he "received intelligence of the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* and what steps he took." He received this inquiry at St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands. The new intelligence had not reached him, and as the Admiralty's telegram did not specify what intelligence they meant, he assumed it to be that received on the arrival of the *Arlanza* and replied accordingly.¹

The next piece of intelligence concerning the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* was furnished by the German Consul at Tenerife, who announced on the 26th, without further particulars, that the raider had sunk the *Kaipara* and *Nyanga*.² This news showed that Captain Lüdecke of the *Dresden* was not the only German officer who was sinking prizes, and it increased the Admiralty's desire to get rid of the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*. They ordered Admiral de Robeck to detach from his force the armed merchant cruiser *Marmora*,³ from Madeira, to work with the *Highflyer*.⁴

50. **Area I, August 16-26.**—Admiral de Robeck was maintaining watch off Lisbon to prevent the escape of the German liners. The Portuguese prohibited the departure of vessels at night and stationed three cruisers and three torpedo boats in the harbour; but two vessels, one Dutch and one Italian, escaped, and thenceforward a Customs official was posted in each merchant ship every night. Besides watching Vigo and the Tagus, he had endeavoured to station a cruiser off Madeira. The *Highflyer*, which he had sent there on the 16th, had been absorbed into Force D; and the same fate had attended the *Marmora*, which, joining him on the Portuguese coast on the 21st, he had at once ordered down the trade route. The *Challenger* joined his squadron on the 17th and was stationed off Finisterre to relieve the *Sutlej* for coaling. The *Vindictive*, after a week in dockyard hands at Plymouth, rejoined him on the 22nd and was added to the Tagus division. The *Minerva*⁵ left Queenstown on the 20th; he sent her in to Bilbao to find out the proceedings of a

¹ H.S. 25, pp. 287, 392, 395, 402.
² A 82.
³ Captain J. U. Farie. R.N.; 8—4.7 in. guns.
⁴ A 84.
⁵ Captain P. H. Warleigh, R.N.

German ship, the *Frankenwald*, which had been reported as interfering with our cables landed there.¹ Captain Warleigh found that her wireless had been dismantled by the Spanish authorities in answer to French representations; he now urged that she should be sent to sea or searched for submarine cable gear. None was found in her and the *Frankenwald* remained in port. The *Minerva* then returned to her station off Finisterre, relieving the *Challenger* to proceed to Madeira. At Funchal the *Challenger* found four German steamers all with their wireless apparatus dismantled by the Portuguese authorities, who were very friendly; permission was obtained for any British man-of-war to remain more than 24 hours, to take more coal than was necessary to reach Gibraltar and even to return in a few days to coal again.² The *Albion* arrived off the Tagus on the 25th and continued on to Gibraltar to coal. Thus, on August 26 Admiral de Robeck had off the Tagus the *Amphitrite* (flag) and *Vindictive*; at Finisterre, the *Minerva*; off Cape St. Vincent, the *Sutlej*; at Gibraltar, the *Albion* and *Argonaut* coaling; near Madeira the *Challenger* and *Marmora*.³ It was, therefore, no serious strain on him to send the *Marmora* to work with the *Highflyer*. At the same time the Admiralty ordered the *Macedonia* to work with the *Cornwall*, both pairs of ships to hunt down the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*.⁴ This is the first definite order for merchant cruisers to work with cruisers and not alone; a principle that later became a rule.⁵ But even before this order was dispatched the immediate cause which had given rise to it had been removed.

51. Action between "Highflyer" and "Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse."—The *Highflyer* (Captain Buller) reached the Rio de Oro in the afternoon of the 26th and was rewarded by finding four German steamers. One, the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* herself, was coaling off the entrance from two steamers, one on each side of her, while a third was standing off stopped. Captain Buller reports⁶: "I closed and signalled 'I call on you to surrender.' She replied: 'German warships do not surrender. I request you to observe Spanish neutrality.' I then signalled to her that if that was her plea I considered she had been violating neutrality by using the Rio de Oro as a base, and that I should fire on her unless she surrendered, requesting her to warn her colliers to leave her. After giving her another opportunity to surrender, she replied she had nothing more to say. Having given her an hour and a-half to surrender or proceed to sea, at 3.10 p.m. I fired a shot well to her right and she immediately opened fire on me. I had by this time manœuvred my ship to the northward

¹ A 72.

² H.S. 36, p. 488.

³ De Robeck. Letter of Proceedings. M. 7060/14.

⁴ A 84, 85.

⁵ See section 75.

⁶ *Highflyer's* Report. M. 01831/14.

and there was a clear range of five miles on the line of fire between her and the shore. Fire was returned and continued until she ceased firing at 4.25 p.m. It was observed that boats were being lowered and the crew taken on shore. I signalled: "Am unwilling to cause unnecessary loss of life," and "If you will haul down your ensigns I will send boats and medical assistance." Boats were lowered from *Highflyer*, but before they reached the vessel she sank at 5.10 p.m. in shallow water. Our boats then approached the shore, flying the Red Cross flag; and as they did so the survivors who had landed took up an aggressive position behind the sand dunes along the coast and the boats were therefore recalled. During the engagement the three steamers of the enemy had escaped to the southward. Their names were not ascertained; it is, however, believed that two of them were the *Magdeburg* and *Arucas*, that left Las Palmas on the night of the 23rd with oil, coal and stores on board and reported to be joining the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*." August 26

52. Proceedings of "Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse at Rio de Oro."—After sinking the *Nyanga* the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* had continued her voyage to the rendezvous, arriving off the coast of Rio de Oro that night. Next morning the *Duala* came up, and reported that there was another collier waiting at a rendezvous 60 miles off. The *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* steamed out to find this vessel, but hearing British cruisers in the neighbourhood returned again to the *Duala* to begin coaling from her. A Spanish officer boarded the ship and was told that she was from Bremen for Cape Verde, put in to repair her engines which had broken down.¹ He saw no signs that she was armed, and observing the ribbon of the Norddeutscher Lloyd on the seamen's caps, had no suspicion that she was anything but an ordinary merchantman. By August 20 she had obtained enough from the *Duala* to increase her supply of coal to 1,300 tons; but since at half speed she consumed 250 tons a day, this was not much help to her. The *Duala* then sailed for Las Palmas, which she reached on the 22nd.

Four days later the *Magdeburg* joined the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* with 1,400 tons of coal and provisions. Her papers, when examined by the Spanish officials, showed that she had cleared from Las Palmas for Cape Town with provisions. On the 25th two more colliers arrived; these were the *Bethania* and *Arucas*. There was now enough coal to take the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* to South America, which is stated to have been her destination;² but when the *Highflyer* came up Captain Reymann was still coaling his ship. Seeing an action to be inevitable he transferred the crews of the captured British ships to the *Arucas* before casting her off. The *Magdeburg* and *Bethania* disappeared, but the *Arucas* proceeded to Las Palmas;

¹ The Spanish version of the incidents in the Rio de Oro is in M. 04118/14.

² Peters.

arriving on the 28th she was at once interned by the Spanish authorities. Captain Reymann, nine other officers, and 72 of the crew of the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, having reached the shore in safety, walked to the Spanish fort, where the Governor took charge of them. There were insufficient resources in the Spanish colony to keep the refugees from the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* at the Rio de Oro, and they were consequently sent by a Spanish steamer to Las Palmas, where they were interned on board three of the German steamers sheltering there.¹

Thus ended the brief career of the only armed liner sent out from Germany to destroy British commerce. The value of the vessels and cargoes she had destroyed was under £400,000—"a poor return for the loss of so fine a ship—and the indirect effect of her operations was trifling."² One of these effects was that at Casablanca, where at this period there were always half a dozen French transports at anchor, one of the escorting French cruisers had always to be present, and the *Friant* was ordered to join the Morocco Division.³

53. Spanish Protest against Violation of Neutrality.—Immediately on arrival at the Spanish port Captain Reymann handed in a written protest against the *Highflyer's* action. It was in this protest that the Spanish first were officially informed that the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* was an armed merchantman. The protest became the basis of a Spanish complaint that we had violated her neutrality in that the *Highflyer* had taken matters into her own hands instead of leaving the authorities on the spot to deal with them. The Admiralty's reply was that Captain Buller did not know that the place in question was inhabited and that "as there was no prospect of the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* being interned in accordance with International Law, H.M.S. *Highflyer* was in duty bound to take the only effective steps in her power." This, coupled with an expression of sincere regret that operations of war had taken place in Spanish waters, satisfied the Spanish Government and no more was heard from them of the matter.⁴

CHAPTER VI.

AUGUST 26 TO SEPTEMBER 3—RE-DISTRIBUTION OF THE ATLANTIC SQUADRONS.

54. The Monrovia Cables.—The episode of the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* again drew attention to the Canary Islands and the question of German communications. Tenerife was still connected to Monrovia and thence to Pernambuco by a German-owned cable, which could be fed at Monrovia by a German wireless station. Though the direct cable from Germany to

Tenerife had been cut on the outbreak of war, it had still been possible for Germany to pass messages *viâ* the Berlin wireless to Kamina in Togoland, and thence by the Monrovia wireless and cable station to the Canaries and Pernambuco. The question of cutting these cables at Monrovia had been considered before the war by a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, which had finally recommended no interference with the Monrovia-Pernambuco cable, since it was thought that Brazil would resent such action, and might retaliate by restrictive measures on the working of our own cables. Soon after the outbreak of war the Postmaster-General, nevertheless, proposed to transfer the German cables from Monrovia to Sierra Leone, a proceeding which would take only three days, and would not interfere with their use by Brazil except for the time of transfer. The *Colonia*, a cable ship of the Eastern Telegraph Company, was at Sierra Leone. Accordingly, on August 14, the Admiralty asked the Postmaster-General to carry out the proposed transfer, and instructed the *Dwarf* to cover the operation. She, however, reported that there was not enough cable on the spot for the transfer, which must consequently be delayed till a sufficient length could be obtained. Moreover, the expedition for the seizure of Togoland and its wireless station at Kamina was nearly ready; with this station in our hands the chain of German communications would be broken, and the cables could be worked by ourselves. It was therefore decided at the Admiralty, on August 16, not to cut the cable, every effort being concentrated instead on the capture of Kamina—a step which would have the advantage of not annoying Brazil. The Postmaster-General was informed of the change of plan, and the *Dwarf* was used to escort the transports for Lome instead of the cable ship. Meanwhile, the Foreign Office was asked to urge the Liberian Government to check the exchange of messages dealing with matters not private or commercial.

This was the situation when the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* made her raid off the west coast of Africa. The French at once asked the Liberian Government to close the Monrovia wireless station, but this was refused as an unneutral action. The French then asked for a military censorship.¹ The effectiveness of a Liberian censorship was a doubtful quantity, and the Admiralty urged the Foreign Office to make a combined Franco-British effort directed towards the substitution of Allied operators for the Germans at the cable and wireless stations. The President of Liberia issued a proclamation of neutrality on August 10, and four days later our Consul-General at Monrovia reported that the German cable was not being worked. Nevertheless, it was clear that use was being made of it, since the German Minister at Rio continually issued war news received by him from the German Ambassador at Madrid, the only line of

¹ M. 04118/14.

² Fayle: *Seaborne Trade* I, 82.

³ Chack: p. 195.

⁴ M. 04118, 04824/14.

¹ Telegram 12, Treaty, Paris to Foreign Office.

communication being by the Spanish cable from Cadiz to Tenerife and thence by the Monrovia cable to Pernambuco. Presumably the German Ambassador at Madrid was in touch with his own Government by some clandestine channel. The capture and destruction of the Kamina high-power station during the night of August 24-25 deprived Monrovia of most of its dangers,¹ and finally, on September 3, the Liberian Government closed both the French and German wireless stations. A joint meeting of representatives of all the British Government departments concerned, held on August 31, had in the meantime decided that there was no reason for cutting the cable, and it was left intact.²

55. Movements of German Colliers.—The activity of the Germans at the various ports abroad did not, of course, escape notice. The Canaries in particular attracted special attention. The *Walhalla*, for example, on arrival at Las Palmas from Cardiff on August 1, had commenced disembarking her cargo, but speedily reloaded it, and, taking in provisions, left early on August 2. We know now what was her object. She returned to Las Palmas on August 26, having given her coal to the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* near San Miguel, Azores, and taken from that ship 40 old, unsuitable members of the crew.³ The *Duala* also had cleared from Las Palmas on August 2, ostensibly for New York.⁴ The *Bethania* left Tenerife on August 3, and was now known to have been with the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* at Rio de Oro.⁵ She was still at large.

The *Slawentzitz*, a collier from Barry with 5,000 tons of Welsh coal, put in to Las Palmas late on August 10, and left again next night with all lights out.⁶ Finally, the *Arucas* and *Magdeburg* disappeared from Las Palmas on the 22nd. The *Arucas* returned to Las Palmas five days later with the crews of the ships captured by the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, and from them it was learned that the *Magdeburg* also had attended that ship. She did not come back to Las Palmas, where there were still twelve German steamers in port.

In North American ports there were similar movements of coal. It was discovered that the Hamburg-Amerika Line had been chartering neutral steamers to sail from Atlantic ports with large cargoes of coal and provisions. They generally carried a German supercargo, and cleared for distant ports. The following were known: *Thor*, Norwegian, left Newport News August 4; *Heine*, Norwegian, left Philadelphia August 7;

¹ See Monograph 5, O.U. 6039, and Corbett: *Naval Operations I*, for a description of the land operations in Togoland.


² This section is based on papers titled *Telegram, 5th August, 1914*, and *Post Office, 20th August, 1914*.

³ H.S. 25, pp. 47, 53, 403, 433.

⁴ M. 04118/14.

⁵ H.S. 25, pp. 62, 440.

⁶ Papers titled *Case 585*.



Nepos, Norwegian, left Philadelphia August 23; *Berwind*, United States ship, left New York August 6; *Lorenzo*, also United States, left New York August 6. The *Johann Ludwig Mowinckel*, Norwegian, left Philadelphia September 2, and the *Pathfinder*, another suspected American ship, was at Cay Barien, Cuba.¹ Besides these, the *Graecia*, of the Hamburg-Amerika Line, left New York on August 27 with over 4,000 tons of coal cleared for Cadiz, and three days later the Hamburg-Amerika *Macedonia* cleared from New Orleans for Cadiz with coal and provisions. A report came in from Baltimore that Newport News, the big American coaling port, was undoubtedly being used as a supply base for the Germans.² Further south a small German steamer, the *Präsident*, was moving about in the West Indies, and German activity at St. Thomas was again reported. The *Präsident* was assumed to be serving the *Karlsruhe*.³

The *Graecia*, in leaving New York, ran some chance of capture. Captain Yelverton, in the *Suffolk*, at the time was proceeding from Halifax for the Delaware River, not knowing whether the *Brandenburg*, of whose approaching departure he had read in the "New York Herald," had sailed or not. He had also received information that a steamer named *Ruby* was about to leave Philadelphia with gold supposed to be taken from one of the German liners. He met the *Essex* at 9 p.m., August 26, in 41.32 N., 65.25 W.; the *Essex* then went on to Halifax and the *Suffolk* to Delaware Bay. Our Consul's report that the *Graecia* was about to sail was not received in the Admiralty till 5.22 a.m. on the 28th; it had been repeated to Halifax, Jamaica, and Bermuda by the Consul. His further report that the *Graecia* had passed out of Ambrose Channel at 10.30 p.m., August 27, was received in the Admiralty at 5.36 p.m. on the 28th, but the *Suffolk* did not get the news till 1.50 a.m. on the 29th, 27 hours after the German vessel had sailed.⁴

The vessel watching off New York during the night of August 27-28 was the *Glory*, which had left Halifax on the 23rd for that patrol. Had she known of the *Graecia's* departure in time, there seems to have been some possibility of her capturing the German ship, as can be seen in the accompanying plan.⁵ Captain Yelverton ordered the *Glory* to leave New York at 6 a.m., August 28, and proceed to Halifax, showing herself off Boston in daylight;⁶ he himself came north from the Delaware River at sunset on the 28th, and patrolled off New York till

¹ A 91, 92. This organisation had been reported to the Admiralty on August 8 by Cayzer, Irvine & Co., of Glasgow.

² H.S. 37, pp. 534, 547.


³ H.S. 37, p. 554.

⁴ *Suffolk* W/T Log, pp. 102, 107, 110, 111, 122. H.S. 37, pp. 534, 540.

⁵ See next page. In the plan the *Glory's* track is from her log. The *Graecia's* track is assumed; she was capable of 11½ knots.

⁶ *Suffolk* W/T Log, August 27, 11.25 p.m.

September 2, when he proceeded for Halifax. There was therefore no chance of stopping the *Johann Ludwig Mowinkel*. The *Essex* remained at Halifax, repairing some small defects, from August 27 to September 2. She then left for the New York patrol.



56. **Movements of Force I, August 26 to September 3.**—Some of the supply ships from the American coast were bound for the East Atlantic. The *Graecia*, for instance, had been ordered to the rendezvous near San Miguel, possibly to take the place lately occupied by the *Walhabla*; the *Macedonia's* station was near Ferrol.¹ This, of course, we did not know at the time; the *Graecia* had given Cadiz as her destination, and this information was telegraphed by the Admiralty to the Atlantic Admirals.² The officer apparently most concerned was Admiral de Robeck, Commanding Force I. The watch on the Tagus, where so many German ships were sheltering, absorbed two of his cruisers, of which one, his flagship, was always close in, while the other cruised to westward. Another cruiser took the Finisterre district; a fourth the neighbourhood of Cape St. Vincent. He had now enough ships to enable him to spare one or two for Madeira. Generally there was at least one of his ships coaling at Gibraltar. It had been his practice to shift his flag whenever his flagship had to coal, so that he might always be present off

¹ I.D.H.S. 1414, No. 25; and papers titled *Cap K*, 25.1915.

² H.S. 25, p. 461.

the Tagus; but on the 28th he proceeded from there for Madeira in the *Argonaut*, which had just coaled at Gibraltar, feeling satisfied that the Portuguese measures for dealing with the German ships were good enough to make it safe for him to leave the guard of that district to Captain Lynes in the *Sutlej*. This was the first time he had left the neighbourhood of Lisbon.

A new duty now devolved on the cruisers of Force I—that of escorting troopships. The War Office had decided to bring home the British garrisons in the Mediterranean and replace them by territorial battalions. A Union-Castle liner, the *Edinburgh Castle*, was on her way home from the Cape; by Admiralty orders Admiral de Robeck ordered her to Gibraltar to embark the 1,000 troops there. When, on August 31, she left Gibraltar, the Admiral, in accordance with further Admiralty instructions, detailed the *Sutlej* to escort her as far as Finisterre, whence the *Minerva*, his most northerly cruiser, would escort her homeward until relieved by a cruiser from home waters. A few hours after taking over the *Edinburgh Castle*, the *Minerva*, Captain P. H. Warleigh, met coming towards them a steamer which hoisted Austrian colours and did not stop when ordered to do so. Her movements and course caused Captain Warleigh to consider her suspicious, and he brought her to by firing two rounds of blank.

On examination she was found to be the *Bathori*, of the Austrian Lloyd Line, bound for Vigo in ballast from Havre. She carried a French pass countersigned by the British and American Consuls-General at Havre, the latter representing the Austrian Government; but her position 35 miles due west of Vigo was so far from the track to her destination that suspicion was roused that she was not complying with the terms of her pass. The Admiralty had been informed that she was sailing with a French pass, but her port of destination was then given as Rotterdam, and all ships that would meet her on such a voyage were ordered to allow her to pass¹; her change of destination to Vigo was not reported to the Admiralty by the British Consul-General at Havre, and consequently the *Minerva* had received no instructions about her. The Admiralty issued an Interim Order on August 29, instructing all ships to respect French, Russian and Belgian passes if properly authenticated, but this order had not yet reached the *Minerva*. Captain Warleigh had therefore no option but to treat her as suspicious. She had only sufficient coal to take her to Vigo, where a prize crew would probably be interned; he had the *Edinburgh Castle* under his charge; he therefore felt compelled to remove the *Bathori's* crew and papers, and sink her by gunfire, which was accordingly done. As the whole incident was due to misunder-

¹ A 80.

standing, H.M. Government expressed its regret to the French Government, agreed to consider the question of compensation to Austria on the resumption of friendly relations, and repatriated the crew *via* Flushing on 20 March, 1915.¹

The *Minerva*, having disposed of the *Bathori*, continued her course northward, and was ordered by the Admiralty to carry on as far as 100 miles from Ushant, or until French cruisers were met. She sighted none, and arranged with the *Charybdis*, of Force G, to be relieved by her near Ushant at midnight, September 2-3, going on herself to Plymouth to coal.

57. The French Patrol their own Coast.—That part of Area I between Ushant and Finisterre which his War Orders had indicated to Admiral de Robeck as his main station had practically been unvisited except by ships on passage to and from home; the menace of the German liners had kept his cruisers off the coast of Portugal, and his tendency had been to stretch southward to Madeira rather than northward to Ushant.

In actual fact the Ushant area was now more important than ever. The unfavourable results of the first collisions with the German army had brought about a wholesale retreat of the French, and it seemed not improbable that the French Channel ports might have to be relinquished to the enemy. Havre, as a base for our army in the field, was considered insecure, and the important decision was made to abandon it and use instead St. Nazaire, at the mouth of the Loire, for landing troops and stores. The change of route brought new responsibilities to the Atlantic cruisers. The voyage from Southampton to Havre took only a few hours and was well protected; the Dover-Calais entrance to the Channel was patrolled by a flotilla of destroyers and submarines; the western entrance by an Anglo-French cruiser squadron; in the Channel itself were the pre-Dreadnought battle squadrons based on Portland.² Transports on the new route, however, as soon as they passed Ushant would be without cruiser protection other than could be afforded by Admiral de Robeck. It was obvious that he could do little unless he denuded the rest of his station of cruisers, and accordingly the Admiralty, on August 31, asked the French to take over the Ushant-Finisterre part of Admiral de Robeck's station, using some of the cruisers of their 2nd Light Squadron for the purpose. The French readily agreed, and sent a division of three or four ships (*Gloire*, senior officer) to cruise between Ushant and Finisterre, and thus relieved Admiral de Robeck of the charge of that area.³

¹ Papers titled *Case 1029*.

² The arrangements for protecting the Southampton-Havre routes are fully described in Monograph 6 (C.B. 1537), "Passage of the Expeditionary Force."

³ A 94, 97; H.S. 36, pp. 542, 557, 561.

58. Movements of Force D, August 27 to September 3.—After sinking the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* the *Highflyer* returned to the Canary Islands. Her damages were insignificant, and though the Admiralty gave permission for her to proceed at once to Gibraltar to dock and replenish, Admiral Stoddart kept her till he could come up from Sierra Leone in the *Carnarvon* to relieve her. The *Cornwall* and *Macedonia* kept watch on the trade routes south of St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands. There, on August 30, the *Cornwall* removed 69 German reservists from the Dutch steamer *Hollandia*, and lodged them in the *Macedonia*, which, being a big P. and O. liner, had ample accommodation. Next day the *Empress of Britain* arrived at St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, on the way to South America to join the *Glasgow*. She proved to be a greedy consumer of water; the capacity of her evaporator was insufficient, and she required 1,200 tons a month in addition. The south-east coast of America was thus an unsuitable station for her, and the Admiralty therefore ordered the *Macedonia* to join Captain Luce, the *Empress of Britain* to remain with Admiral Stoddart in her place.¹ This order, sent on September 1, was some time in taking effect. It was not till September 4 that Admiral Stoddart ordered the German prisoners in the *Macedonia* to be transferred to the *Empress of Britain*,² and it was not till the morning of September 8 that the *Macedonia* arrived at Pernambuco.

The Admiral himself, in the *Carnarvon*, left Sierra Leone on August 29. He, like other authorities, thought it desirable to cut the cables at Monrovia, and proposed to escort the cable ship *Transmitter*, then at Sierra Leone, for the purpose. As explained above, the Admiralty did not then approve the project.³ He searched the African coast as far as the River de Oro. There he found the wreck of the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* almost submerged, the part above water being gutted and burnt out. At noon on September 3 he met the *Highflyer* and his reinforcements, the *Canopus* and the armed merchant cruiser *Victorian*, at a rendezvous off Grand Canary. The *Canopus* had been at the Canaries since September 1. The supernumerary ratings brought by her were distributed among the ships present, and the *Highflyer* went off to Gibraltar to dock.

The *Victorian*⁴ had commissioned at Liverpool on August 21. Her officers, except Captain Somerville in command and one lieutenant from the emergency list, were all from the Royal Naval Reserve, her former master acting as first lieutenant. She sailed on August 23. Three days later, when south of the Fastnet, she captured the German barque *Excelsior* from New Orleans, which had been 40 days at sea. Next morning Captain Somerville turned his prize over to the *Isis* of Force E, and continued his course southward. He reached the Canaries on

¹ A 96.

² Stoddart, Letter of Proceedings. M. 02075/14.

³ H.S. 25, pp. 434, 438. ⁴ Captain H. B. T. Somerville, R.N. 8—4.7 in. guns.

September 1. At Palma, the westernmost island, he saw no German ships, but at Santa Cruz de Tenerife there were six.¹ At Las Palmas, which he visited after meeting the *Highflyer* on September 2, he found 14 German steamers and two Austrian.² There was also a Spanish cruiser in port.³

59. **The "Cap Trafalgar" leaves the River Plate, August 23.**—One of the German liners on our list of vessels which Germany could probably convert into cruisers was the Hamburg-Süd-Amerika vessel, *Cap Trafalgar*, an almost new ship of 18,710 tons and 17½ knots. She arrived at Buenos Aires shortly before the outbreak of war, and immediately became suspect. Reports were received that she had guns on board, and was even distributing them by night to the *Santa Isabel*, *Pontos*, *Gotha*, and *Sierra Cordoba*, German ships lying close to her in the port. The *Pontos* left on August 6, with San Francisco as her ostensible destination; she put in to Monte Video two days later, and left again at 5 p.m. The *Santa Isabel* sailed from Buenos Aires on the 8th. The Argentine Government made a search of the *Cap Trafalgar*, and could find no evidence that she carried anything of a warlike nature. Her bunker capacity was 4,000 tons, and she still had 2,100 tons on board. British colliers had been discharging coal to the German Coal Company at Buenos Aires, but this was soon stopped by the British Consul-General. The *Cap Trafalgar* discharged all her cargo, and sailed on August 17 at 5 p.m., the general impression being that she carried guns, had embarked 3,500 tons of coal, and taken on board large baulks of timber for the support of gun positions either in herself or other vessels. She re-appeared, however, at Monte Video, and was again thoroughly searched by two British-born officials of the Uruguay Government. They found no guns, baulks of timber, or warlike preparations; she had no cargo, and only the original 2,100 tons of coal.⁴ She asked for more coal, giving out that her destination was Europe *viâ* Las Palmas. By this time the coal situation in South America had eased considerably. The South American Governments were sufficiently reassured by the arrangements for supply to permit all merchant vessels to load such bunker coal as they required. Accordingly, the *Cap Trafalgar* received 1,600 tons, and sailed from Monte Video on August 23.⁵ The Admiralty had been kept fully informed of her movements and the suspicions about her, but her departure does not seem to have been reported by the

¹ *Cap Ortegá, Prinz Regent, Kurt Woermann, Irma Woermann, Usumbara, Telde.*

² German: *Ingo, Lulu Bohlen, Thekla Bohlen, Illyria, Assuan, Emmi Arp, Elizabeth Brock, Elhab, Teneriffa, Irma Fried, Menes, Walhalla, Arucas, Duala.* Austrian: *Onda, Columba.*

³ *Victorian*: Report of Proceedings. M. 01006/15.

⁴ Papers titled *F.O.*, 3/10/14, *Cap Trafalgar*.

⁵ We now know that the German Admiralty on August 8 ordered her to proceed to one of their cruiser equipment stations to meet the *Eber*, which sailed from Lüderitzbucht on August 5 for the same station. I.D.H.S. 1338, Nos. 94, 171.

Intelligence Officer to the Admiralty. The Minister, however, informed the Foreign Office.¹

60. **Movements of the South-East Coast Division.**—In spite of all this German activity in the River Plate, the Senior Naval Officer on the south-east coast of America, Captain Luce in the *Glasgow*, had been unable to give any attention to that district. During the first week of the war he had been near Abrolhos Rocks, waiting to meet the cruiser from the North American Squadron, which the Admiralty had not told him was not coming. After the *Monmouth* joined him he had taken her to Abrolhos to coal on the 23rd. The two then proceeded northward in company in the hope of meeting the *Dresden*. In fact, on the same day as the *Cap Trafalgar* was leaving the River Plate, the Admiralty instructed Captain Luce that, if he had certain information, the *Dresden* was to be his objective.² He knew for certain that the *Dresden* had sunk the *Hyades* in the Pernambuco district, and thus when he left Abrolhos it was to the northward and not towards the River Plate that he sailed. The *Glasgow* and *Monmouth* searched the Brazilian coast from Cape San Roque to Macau during daylight of August 27, and Rocas Reef early on the 28th. The *Otranto* joined them there, and the three ships, widely spread, then proceeded southward to Abrolhos to coal again.

61. **Reinforcement of the Atlantic Squadrons.**—The principal shipping companies whose vessels passed through the waters in which the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* had operated had of necessity been perturbed by the incident. The vessels and cargoes belonging to these companies were of great value; some of those from South America were worth half a million, and the meat they carried was of prime importance. So, too, was the grain brought by many tramp steamers on the route. It was realised in the Admiralty that Force D must be reinforced if it was to keep all possible enemy bases in that area under continual supervision, and also watch the trade routes. The nights were lengthening, and cruisers from Germany would have an increasingly better chance of evading our patrols in the North Sea. Moreover, the *Karlsruhe* and *Dresden* might appear on the East Atlantic routes, either driven there by the relatively stronger squadrons in the West Atlantic or attracted by the large coal supplies available in the Canaries. On September 3, therefore, the Admiralty decided to fit out four more armed merchant cruisers—the *Teutonic*, *Orama*, *Edinburgh Castle*, and *Calgarian*. Their armament was to be eight 6 in. guns.³

62. **Search for "Cap Trafalgar."**—Besides the *Karlsruhe* and *Dresden*, and any other cruisers which might have got away

¹ See his telegram in H.S. 26, p. 227, where the news is tacked on to a repetition of an earlier message, and seems to have escaped notice.

² A 75. ³ M. 01750/14; H.S. 25, pp. 466 to 468.

from Germany, there were the possible armed merchant cruisers to be dealt with. Of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* the information was vague. Some of her crew had arrived at Las Palmas in the *Walhalla*. In that ship were also six British seamen, but our Consul had been refused permission to interview them,¹ so that it was not definitely known whether or not the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was armed. At any rate, no captures were known to have been made by her. The other German merchant vessels not in port were more likely to be supply ships than mercantile cruisers, except the *Cap Trafalgar*. On August 29 a telephone message was received at the Admiralty from Lloyds, which was understood to mean that she had left Rio unarmed the previous day for Africa. This was at once telegraphed to the Commander-in-Chief, Cape, Admirals Stoddart and de Robeck, and Captain Luce.² To most of them it appears to be the first news of her on which they could act. Admiral Stoddart ordered the *Cornwall* down the trade route; she was then patrolling south of the Cape Verde Islands, and at 8 a.m. on August 30 she set her course for St. Paul Rocks, distant S. by W. 850 miles.

Admiral Cradock, though not informed by the Admiralty of this last report, seems to have known something of the *Cap Trafalgar's* movements. He left Trinidad on August 27, and was now sweeping along the north coast of Brazil with his three ships, *Good Hope*, *Berwick* and *Bristol*, widely spread in line abreast. The *Carmania* was following from Bermuda with 4,000 tons of coal. On the 29th he received information that there was reason to believe that the *Cap Trafalgar* was making for St. Paul Rocks, and decided to go there himself in the *Good Hope*, leaving the *Berwick* and *Bristol* to continue the search of the coast.³ The *Good Hope* reached St. Paul Rocks at 9.30 a.m., September 2. Nothing was there except innumerable sea birds flying over the rock, which rises some 50 ft. above the water; and the Admiral altered course for Fernando Noronha. As the search of the Brazilian coast also proved fruitless, he ordered the *Bristol* back to Para to coal, and the *Berwick* to return to Trinidad, while he himself intended to call at Pernambuco for orders before returning to Trinidad, where he meant to concentrate his squadron.⁴

63. Movements of "Dresden," August 15-30.—The main object of Admiral Cradock's sweep along the Brazilian coast, and even of his visit to St. Paul Rocks, had been to find the *Dresden*, which he, as well as all the principal authorities, had assumed to be operating off the north-east corner of Brazil.

¹ H.S. 25, p. 448.

² H.S. 26, p. 263. The report was a mistake; the *Cap Trafalgar* never went near Rio.

³ According to Surgeon Verteuil on board *Good Hope* "it was the Governor of Demerara who informed the Admiral that they picked up something by wireless about St. Paul Rocks, and he came to the conclusion that it was the rendezvous of the colliers coaling the *Dresden*." (Verteuil's Diary, M. 03598/15.)

⁴ H.S. 37, p. 579.

The Intelligence Officer, Pernambuco, suspected Rocas Island as her base; but Captain Luce had found nothing there, and was now steaming south to coal at Abrolhos.

Before he could arrive, news was received that German cruisers were at work to the southward of him. On August 30 there came into Rio the steamer *Katherine Park*, bringing the crew of the British collier *Holmwood*, sunk by the *Dresden* not far from the estuary of the River Plate.

On releasing the *Siamese Prince*, the *Dresden*, on August 16, steered at first a false course for Rio, to which port she dismissed the *Prussia* with the crew of the *Hyades*. At dusk, however, Captain Lüdecke resumed his course for Trinidad. During the night of the 18th-19th, when close to the island, he came in touch with a German vessel, the *Steiermark*, which had come from Lüderitzbucht, in South-West Africa, in company with the *Eber*. Captain Lüdecke knew from signals which had been passing that the *Eber* was waiting close to the island, and he ordered the *Steiermark*, which during the night had lost the *Eber*, to follow him. Next morning at the island he met the steamers *Santa Lucia* and *Eleonore Woermann*, which had been called up by the *Eber*. Anchoring under an obelisk on the west side of the island, the *Dresden* took provisions from the *Santa Lucia* and coal from the *Baden*. In the afternoon there arrived the *Santa Isabel* from the River Plate; she had 3,100 tons of coal, 1,800 tons of drinking water, provisions and live stock, and had fitted up a wireless set she had taken over at Buenos Aires from the *Sevilla*, another German steamer there. Captain Lüdecke appropriated her for the *Dresden's* use. The *Eber* appeared on the 20th; the two captains conferred and agreed that if the *Cap Trafalgar*, which they expected, failed to appear, the armament of the *Eber*, a vessel useless for commerce destruction, should be mounted in the *Eleonore Woermann*. The *Dresden* transferred to the *Eber* 42 shells in exchange for a like number of her old ones, and the *Eber* went off with the *Eleonore Woermann* and *Santa Lucia* for the rendezvous, to wait for the *Cap Trafalgar*. On September 22 the *Dresden* started for the River Plate in company with the *Baden* and *Santa Isabel*. The latter proved unable to keep up 12 knots, and was sent to a rendezvous to the southward. The *Dresden* had thus only the *Baden* with her when, on August 26, she came across the British collier *Holmwood* in 31.30 S., 49.6 W., off the southern boundary of Brazil. This ship she sank, after transferring her crew to the *Baden*. A few hours later another British steamer, the *Katherine Park*, came in sight. She was on her way to New York from the Plate with a cargo owned in the United States, and Captain Lüdecke decided to release her. Transferring the crew of the *Holmwood* to her, he allowed her to continue her voyage to Rio, where she arrived on August 30.¹

¹ This paragraph is based on the German official history, *Kreuzerkrieg I*, Chapter VI.

The *Holmwood* carried 6,000 tons of coal for the British-owned Buenos Aires and Pacific Railway Company. Her loss, following so soon after that of the *Hyades*, for a short time shook the confidence of shipping circles to the extent of delaying departures from the River Plate, and added difficulty to the coal situation, already serious. It was still thought by the local authorities that both the *Dresden* and *Bremen* were in South American waters, and the only British cruiser they knew to be on the station was the *Glasgow*. Our representative at Buenos Aires, in reporting the occurrence added: "It would help trade if a few more of the 25 British cruisers in the Atlantic could be spared for protection of the southern routes, and if there were some sign that the promised convoy was being afforded to colliers."¹

64. Formation of a South-East Coast Squadron.—This telegram seems to have convinced the Admiralty that a redistribution of the Atlantic squadrons was necessary. They replied promptly that they had detailed five cruisers and four armed merchant cruisers to South American waters, each cruiser able to engage the German light cruisers successfully; and that it was under consideration to send further reinforcements when the movements of troops on foreign stations were completed.²

Admiral Cradock was chosen to command the new squadron. On arrival at Fernando Noronha at 4 p.m., September 3, he sent ashore some telegrams, one to the Admiralty announcing his arrival, and another to the British Consul at Pernambuco. The latter immediately sent on a code message received from the Admiralty. This latter, when decoded, read:—

200. You are to remain and take charge of S.E. Coast of America Station. Ships under your orders: *Good Hope*, *Berwick*, *Bristol*, *Glasgow*, *Monmouth*, *Carmania*, *Otranto*, *Victorian*. Communicate with *Glasgow*.³

Next day the composition of the squadron was slightly modified. The *Victorian*, like the *Empress of Britain*, needed a copious water supply, and was left with Admiral Stoddart. The *Cornwall*, however, which on her way south had been in wireless touch with Admiral Cradock, and was now on passage to Sierra Leone for coal, the Admiralty transferred to the South-East Coast Squadron; and the *Canopus* they ordered to Abrolhos to guard Admiral Cradock's colliers and supply ships. On the other hand, it was found necessary to send the *Berwick* back to the West Indies.

¹ Tel. 29, Buenos Aires to F.O., recd. 5 a.m., 3.9.14.

² Letter M. to F.O., 3.9.14. Copy in H.S. 26, p. 285.

³ Or rather, this is how the draft reads. See H.S. 37, p. 585. In view of its urgency and importance the Admiralty sent it to the British Consul, Pernambuco, with instructions to repeat it to Ceara, Maranhã, and Para, to await the Admiral's arrival. It was also sent to the Governor, British Guiana, for *Good Hope*.

65. Reappearance of "Karlsruhe."—In fact, although the South American trade route had managed to secure so much attention that the West Indies division had been drawn to it, the former area of that division was not free from danger. On September 2, the night before the Admiralty had given Admiral Cradock charge of his new station, they received information that the *Karlsruhe* had sunk a British vessel, the *Bowes Castle*, 186 miles east of Barbados, on August 18. This was the first location of the *Karlsruhe* since she left Curaçao. The *Bowes Castle*, which carried nitrates and ore from Chili for New York, had been some time overdue, but this was the first definite news of her fate; it was brought by her crew, who had been transferred to the *Stadt Schleswig*, from which ship they had been landed at Maranhã.¹

Since leaving Curaçao, on August 12,² the *Karlsruhe* had steamed eastward. At early dawn of August 18 she was joined by the *Patagonia*, and the two proceeded southward for the coaling rendezvous, a quiet bay in the delta of the Amazon. That afternoon the *Bowes Castle* was sighted and sunk, her crew being transferred to the *Patagonia*. The *Karlsruhe*, with the *Patagonia* in company, reached the Amazon rendezvous, and coaled there on August 21 from her; the coaling was slow, and she did not leave again till the 24th. Next day the *Stadt Schleswig* appeared with 800 tons of coal from Curaçao. The three ships went in to the Sao Joao Islands (Long. 45° W.), and the *Karlsruhe* took from the *Stadt Schleswig* all the coal she could stow, the remainder being transhipped to the *Patagonia*. The crew of the *Bowes Castle* were then ordered to embark in the empty *Stadt Schleswig*, which Captain Köhler sent to Maranhã, where she arrived on September 2.³

She had run some chance of being caught by the *Bristol*. That ship in the course of her search of the Brazilian coast left Para on September 1, and, proceeding eastward, examined the Sao Joao Islands, and put in to Maranhã about noon September 3. The Vice Consul came off to the ship and from him it was learned that the *Karlsruhe* had coaled at Maraca Island in the mouth of the Amazon on August 21, and at the Sao Joao Islands from August 25 to 28 from the *Patagonia* and *Stadt Schleswig*. This news the *Bristol* signalled to Admiral Cradock on September 4 and received from him orders to coal at Para and then come on to Abrolhos Rocks. It was not, however, till September 11 that this important intelligence was

¹ A 100. The position given is wrong; it should be 9.54 N., 53.7 W., or 450 miles S. 62 E. (true) of Barbados. H.S. 22/202/19. *K*

² See Section 28.

³ Deposition of first officer of *Bowes Castle*, M. 17306/14; Aust.; there are also some unreliable statements made by officers of the *Bowes Castle* seven months after the event in M. 02119/15.

received in the Admiralty, and even then it conveyed the impression that the *Karlsruhe* had been coaling N.E. of Fernando Noronha on August 25 to 28.¹

The Admiralty still assumed that the *Karlsruhe*, and possibly the *Dresden*, were being supplied from St. Thomas; they accordingly ordered Captain Yelverton, Senior Naval Officer, North America, to send the nearest of his cruisers to St. Thomas. The ship he sent was to operate in the West Indies against the *Karlsruhe* and her colliers.²

The North American division would not be reduced in numbers by this move, since the cruiser *Niobe*, which the Canadian Government had placed at our disposal on the outbreak of war, was at last manned and ready; she left Halifax on September 3 to take up patrol. The *Suffolk* was short of fuel, but the *Essex* had just coaled at Halifax; accordingly Captain Yelverton sent her to the West Indies in response to the Admiralty orders. This left the care of the whole North American Atlantic coast to four ships, the *Suffolk*, *Niobe*, *Glory* and *Lancaster*, although so many vessels in American ports were strongly suspected as part of the German supply system. Indeed, one of these, the Norwegian *Johan Ludwig Mowinkel*, known to be chartered by the Hamburg-Amerika Line, left Philadelphia at 3 p.m. on September 3 with coal; the Admiralty received news of her intending departure from the British Consul 24 hours before she sailed, but did not repeat it to Captain Yelverton.

66. Admiral Phipps Hornby to command Force H.—The Admiralty did not intend the North America and West Indies station to remain long without an Admiral in command, and the appointment of Admiral Cradock gave rise to a general redistribution. Admiral Hornby, from Cruiser Force E on the Irish coast, was ordered to go over to America in the armed Cunarder *Caronia*, and take command of the North America and West Indies station; his place in Force E was taken by Admiral Tottenham, formerly in the *Albion*, who was now ordered to come home in the *Sutlej*, the *Albion* going on to St. Vincent to take the place of the *Canopus*, and the *Ocean* from Queenstown coming down to Gibraltar.³

Up to this time Cruiser Force E had been guarding the home ends of the trade routes north and south of Ireland. The general idea was to maintain constant patrols at the Fastnet and near Tory Island. As a rule the cruisers remained near home, but occasionally they pushed out as far as 200 miles towards America and back. The squadron, originally the *Doris*,

¹ *Bristol W/T Log* 18259. H.S. 37, p. 686. Disposition of German, Italian and Austrian ships, 11 September, 1914, p. 18.

² A 105.

³ A 106, 108.

Isis, *Juno*, *Venus*, *Minerva*, was reinforced by the Cunarders *Aquitania* on August 8 and *Caronia* on August 10. The *Challenger* of Force I on the outbreak of war was sent to patrol the Bristol Channel and later the North Channel between Ireland and Scotland; she was relieved by one of the Force E cruisers on August 13, and proceeded to join Admiral de Robeck. From August 9 onwards the Bristol Channel was patrolled by the *Pelorus*, a P-class cruiser belonging to the Channel Fleet. The Admiralty had intended to add the *Lusitania* and *Mauretania* to Force E, but, as has been explained, this engagement was cancelled. The *Aquitania* had the bad luck to be seriously damaged on August 22 by colliding with another steamer. After a report on the injury suffered by the *Aquitania* the Admiralty, on August 28, decided to terminate that arrangement also. The place of the Cunarders was taken to some extent by the *Tara* and *Scotia*, fast Irish mail boats, which were requisitioned and armed. The *Scotia* joined up in the Bristol Channel on August 19, the *Tara* some time later. The *Ocean* guarded the trade focus at the Fastnet. The operations of the squadron took place in the close proximity of home, and will not be described here. Admiral Hornby sailed from Berehaven in the *Caronia* on September 5.

CHAPTER VII.

SEPTEMBER 3-20.—BREAKING UP THE GERMAN SUPPLY SYSTEM.

67. The German Supply System for her Commerce Raiders.¹—It is now possible to form some sort of idea as to the method by which Germany hoped to maintain her cruisers at sea. At various ports she had what we may call Communications Officers, whose duty it was to arrange for the supply of coal and other necessities; they were separate from, but in close touch with the Intelligence Officers. This Communications Service was mobilised on July 30. It is known to have had centres at Las Palmas, New York, Pernambuco, and Buenos Aires; most probably there were others. A number of rendezvous had been selected and portioned out to the suitable Communications Officers, who had to maintain colliers on these rendezvous. The cruisers were supplied with a Cruiser Handbook, in which these rendezvous were given; they therefore knew where they might find coal, and were freed from the necessity of making signals to the shore. Apparently the colliers waiting at the

¹ Based upon I.D.H.S. 1338. None of this was known at the time.

rendezvous were not to remain stopped, but were to steam up and down a certain fixed line. This may have been to avert suspicion in the minds of passing steamers, who would naturally report any vessel observed to be stopped in mid-ocean. The most successful of the Communications Officers seems to have been the one in the Canaries, who by August 3 had 2,000 tons of coal in the *Walhalla* near San Miguel; next day he had 15,000 tons afloat, and this, with the supply from New York, gave 5,000 tons at each of three rendezvous and 2,000 tons at each of six others. The *Professor Woermann*, captured by the *Carnarvon* on August 23,¹ was undoubtedly one of these colliers. The New York centre utilised Norwegian steamers as well as German.

Communications between all these centres and Berlin seems to have been carried on without much difficulty. Up to August 13 Nauen continued to signal to the cable ship *Stephan* at Vigo and the *Frankenwald* at Bilbao, in spite of the steps taken by the Spanish authorities;² the messages they took in were to be passed to the German Embassy at Madrid, whence by the Spanish Cadiz-Tenerife cable they were to be sent to Las Palmas, Pernambuco and Buenos Aires. At least one message was made from Nauen to Kamina to be passed to Pernambuco *via* Monrovia, but that route broke down with the capture of Kamina on August 25.

Besides the rendezvous at which colliers could be expected, there were others where liners were to be fitted out as armed merchant cruisers. A list of these was also in the Cruiser Handbook. One of these equipment stations was near the Bahamas, and it was there that the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* had been fitted out. Another was at or near the island of Trinidad, some 600 miles east of Rio; and a third, destined never to be used, was somewhere on the Argentine coast. These three are the only stations definitely mentioned as such in the documents we have, but there were possibly many others.³

68. **The North America Division, September 3-20.**—One of the means by which the Admiralty had hoped to meet the attacks of hostile commerce destroyers was the defensive arming of ordinary trading vessels. In addition to those fitted with two 4.7 in. guns before the outbreak of war, 10 more were chosen on August 8 to be armed with four 6 in. guns. Most of these 10 ships were employed on the North Atlantic trade route, and some of them called at United States ports. The South American States, after some protest, accepted the principle that in war time defensive armament did not change a trading

¹ See Section 49.

² On August 11 the Captain of the Port of Vigo reported to our Vice-Consul that all the wireless gear of the German ships in port was landed, and the engines deprived of essential parts. Log of Section E.2 of the Intelligence Division, No. 565.

³ In *Kreuzerkrieg* I, pp. 19 and 20, the qualifications of such stations are discussed. At none of them were any guns stored.

vessel into a warship; but the United States Government "pressed the argument that it would be impossible for them, on the one hand, to detain German vessels capable of being equipped as armed auxiliary cruisers and, on the other, to give rights of free ingress and egress to their ports to British merchant vessels armed for self-defence." The Admiralty did not accept this reasoning. To them it seemed easy to distinguish between the offensive and defensive nature of the armament; if the vessel carrying arms was engaged in ordinary commerce and embarked passengers in the usual way, she was clearly a peaceful trader. But in view of the action of the United States Government in taking steps to detain the convertible German liners, and to prevent their using American ports for arming, the Cabinet on September 3 decided to give way under protest, and the Admiralty issued instructions for the disarming of all defensively armed vessels which might use United States ports.¹ Some apprehension was felt that the South American States might again raise objections to the visits of trading vessels carrying guns; but luckily the question did not arise, and Admiral Cradock on his new station was not troubled with the matter.

On his departure southward from Pernambuco, Admiral Cradock, as he would be out of wireless touch, gave Captain Yelverton authority to act independently on the northern trade routes.² His chief duties were to patrol the St. Lawrence estuary and to keep watch off New York. The *Lancaster* was in the north, the idea being for the *Niobe* to work with her. The *Essex* was patrolling off New York, when on the 5th she was sent down to the West Indies, her place to be taken by the *Glory*, which left Halifax southward that same morning. Off Nantucket the *Glory* came across two ships reported previously as suspicious; one was the *Ruby*, with bullion on board, and the other the Spanish liner *Montserrat*, in which were found a number of German reservists. The *Ruby's* gold proved to be Spanish property, and she was allowed to proceed, but the *Glory* took the *Montserrat* to Halifax with her. Thus from September 7 to 11 there was nothing off New York, and the *Magdeburg*, the German collier which operated from Las Palmas, and had been with the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, was able to make a safe entry into New York at noon, September 8. That same day the *Glory* turned the *Montserrat* over to the Prize Marshal at Halifax, and started again for the New York patrol, followed on the morning of the 9th by the *Suffolk*. The watch was re-instituted by these two from the 11th, and it seemed more necessary than ever. While on passage southward Captain Yelverton received information that all the North German Lloyd and Hamburg-Amerika

¹ M. 01787/14 reprinted in C.B. 1515/13. Also H.S. 37, pp. 580, 598, 614 and papers titled *Case 441, Vol. 3*.

² *Suffolk* W/T Log, 20501, 5 September, 1914.

vessels at New York had been ordered to be ready for sea at three hours' notice.¹ This information had been duly reported by the Consul-General, New York, to his Intelligence Officer in London, through whom it reached Captain Yelverton some 15 hours later, with the addition that a careful watch must be maintained.

To the officers on the spot it seemed a cumbrous system that information, for instance, that a ship was leaving New York could reach the cruisers watching off that port only through the Intelligence Department in London, and Captain Yelverton, after the *Brandenburg* incident, telegraphed to the British Consul-General, New York, asking him to instruct all the Consuls on the Atlantic coast to report to Bermuda and Halifax the sailing of German and Austrian warships and merchant vessels immediately they were known.² To this arrangement the Foreign Office raised objections, and Captain Yelverton had to be told to cancel his telegram, although the Consul-General, New York, pointed out that if he reported suspicious movements to London only, there would be loss of time, which might have serious results. Nevertheless, the original arrangements had to stand. The situation, unsatisfactory as it was at the moment, was about to be improved by the establishment of a new Intelligence Centre on the North Atlantic coast.³

Just then there seemed to be a marked increase of activity among the German liners in New York. They were reported each to have 5,000 to 7,000 tons of coal aboard, but the Consul-General, who was watching the situation, announced that he would have 24 hours' notice of the departure of any of them, and that a dash to sea was impossible,⁴ probably on account of the precautions taken by the United States authorities. On September 13 the Admiralty ordered the cruiser patrolling off the St. Lawrence to be transferred to the New York patrol; two ships were to be permanently stationed there to prevent the German liners escaping.⁵ The only cruiser engaged on the St. Lawrence patrol was the *Lancaster*, since the *Niobe*, which had been intended to take watch and watch with her, had now gone to Bermuda, escorting a transport with Canadian militia to relieve the British troops of the garrison there. The original garrison was to be escorted back to Halifax, and then join a large contingent raised in Canada for service in Europe. The *Niobe* was thus not available for patrol work till much later, and the St. Lawrence had to be left without a guard. The *Lancaster* reached New York on September 15, relieving the *Glory* to return to Halifax; and for the next few days the *Suffolk* and *Lancaster* remained stopped off New York within a few miles of Ambrose light vessel. On the 18th three of the large German liners

¹ From Ambassador, Washington, to Senior Naval Officer, Halifax. *Suffolk* W/T Log, September 10, 1.25 a.m.

² *Suffolk*, W/T Log, August 25.

³ H.S. 37, pp. 623, 650, 688.

⁴ H.S. 37, pp. 676, 706, 716, 717, 724, 745.

⁵ A 113.

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moved out into the harbour, and were expected to leave, but there was a United States destroyer present, and they made no attempt to escape.¹ The very close watch we were keeping was utilised by the anti-British party in the States to stir up public feeling, and when it was discovered that the *Suffolk* on a previous occasion had made a wireless signal to our agent in New York for a supply of beef and newspapers to be sent out to her off Ambrose light vessel, an agitation was started which resulted in a protest from the United States Government and the closing of the Marconi station which had delivered the message.²

On September 19 the United States Government issued a set of regulations for dealing with merchant vessels suspected of carrying supplies to belligerent warships. According to one paragraph a belligerent warship or supply ship could not receive supplies twice from United States ports in the course of any three consecutive months; another paragraph disclaimed any liability on the part of the United States to prevent the dispatch of supplies to another neutral port, even if that port were notoriously a base of supplies to a belligerent.³

Admiral Hornby in the *Caronia* reached Halifax on September 14. He had been delayed some little time by a Dutch steamer, the *Noordam*, which had been reported as bringing reservists from the United States. When challenged she endeavoured to escape, and was brought to only after a three hours' chase, and two shots had been fired. Admiral Hornby then escorted her eastward till he met one of the cruisers of Force E, to whom he turned her over, having lost nearly two days by the incident.⁴ At Halifax he found that the Nova Scotian Government proposed to reduce the garrison of that naval base to a peace footing. His objection to this course was upheld by the Admiralty, and the reduction was not carried out.⁵ The *Caronia* took in 3,300 tons of coal and 2,900 of water at Halifax. Admiral Hornby transferred his flag to the *Glory* on the 19th, and in the afternoon the *Caronia* proceeded for the New York patrol to assist in keeping guard in case the liners should break out.

69. Five German Supply Ships captured by West Indies Division, September 7-13.—In addition to the liners, whose chief potential danger was that they might convert themselves into cruisers, there were vessels of the supply ship type whose movements were attracting the attention of our whole cruiser system. From North America, particularly Philadelphia, Norwegian

¹ H.S. 37, pp. 774, 779.

² H.S. 37, pp. 819, 826, 844.

³ Full text is in papers titled *F.O.*, 14 October, 1912. *U.S.A. Regulations*, M. 02660/14.

⁴ *Caronia's Deck Log*, September 7 and 8.

⁵ M. 02028/14.

colliers had been sailing, or were preparing to sail, for no other purpose than to supply German cruisers. One, the *Unita*, left on September 9 for Cadiz with a cargo of flour, provisions, and coal. Another which had left much earlier, the *Heina*, arrived at La Guayra on September 5, being 30 days out from Philadelphia.¹ She sailed four days later for St. Thomas, by which time it had been discovered that her coal was for the Hamburg-Amerika depôt there. St. Thomas was a suspected port and we were maintaining a more or less continuous watch off the island. The *Condé* had been there since September 1, and she it was who captured the *Heina* about noon, September 13. The *Essex*, on her way to Jamaica, had similar good fortune. At daylight on September 7, when in 30.20 N., 73.50 W., she sighted a suspicious ship, and gave chase. After half an hour the vessel stopped, and when boarded was found to be the German *Bethania*, one of the Las Palmas supply ships which had been ordered by the German Consul, Tenerife, to join the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* with 6,000 tons of coal. She had been present when the *Highflyer* came up; she managed to take on board 400 of the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse's* crew, and then escape. At first Captain Watson transferred the *Bethania's* crew to the *Essex*, and put a prize crew on board, but after a few hours sent the *Bethania's* crew back again, and took her in tow, with orders to go at her best speed. He cast her off again on September 10, just before reaching Kingston, Jamaica. The *Essex*, after coaling at Jamaica, proceeded on the 12th for St. Thomas. It seemed still necessary to maintain the patrol of the island, since not only had it been a source of supply to the Germans, but also the vessels there were using their wireless. Diplomatic representations to Denmark failed to secure the prevention of this.² The *Essex*, therefore, took over the patrol from the *Condé* on September 14, and the French cruiser and her prize, the *Heina*, proceeded for Martinique.

Another important capture was made at this time by the West Indies Division. Captain Clinton-Baker, now senior officer of the division, in the *Berwick*, left Trinidad on September 5, and coaled at St. Lucia, where the *Descartes* was acting as guard ship and conducting the examination service. While in the harbour Captain Clinton-Baker received information that firing had been heard to the eastward of Tobago. Accordingly the *Berwick* and *Descartes* proceeded to investigate the firing. They found nothing, and the *Descartes* returned to her guard at St. Lucia.³ The *Berwick*, however, steamed eastward towards a position in 10° 30' N., 57° W., near which a suspicious ship had been seen on two occasions, and found there at 3.30 p.m., September 9, the *Thor*, a Norwegian vessel, previously reported

¹ H.S. 37, p. 663, 678, 685.

² H.S. 37, p. 692, 746, M. 01990/14.

³ H.S. 37, pp. 641, 643, 687.

by the Consul-General, New York, as chartered by the Hamburg-Amerika Line to supply German cruisers. The boarding officer found this to be perfectly correct. The vessel was 36 days out from Newport News, and had a cargo of 1,980 tons of coal and 30 tons of provisions; her log showed that she had steamed a long way out of her course, and had been stopped on two occasions for a considerable time, one of the positions being 23.20 N., 72.30 W. There was a German supercargo on board, through whom the master received orders from a German vessel, the *Spreewald*. The evidence was enough for Captain Clinton-Baker; as the master agreed to navigate the ship into port, a prize crew was sent over, and the *Thor* was ordered to St. Lucia, the *Berwick* keeping touch during the night. Captain Clinton-Baker, seeing that he had hit upon a rendezvous for supply ships, turned back so as to reach the spot again about dawn; nothing was then in sight, but he remained in hopes that something more might come. At noon a steamer was sighted, but she was British, and was allowed to proceed; at 2.20 p.m. another came up. This proved to be another vessel, the *Lorenzo*, also on the New York Consul-General's list of supply ships. The boarding officer found a similar state of affairs to that in the *Thor*. She had a cargo of 3,977 tons of coal and 150 tons of provisions, and her log showed she had stopped at two rendezvous for considerable times. Her orders had been received from the *Präsident*; the *Neckar* had been in company, and the *Spreewald*, *Thor*, *Neckar*, and *Lorenzo* were expecting the *Dresden* at the rendezvous.

While the examination was in progress another ship was seen. She proved to be the *Spreewald*, apparently the commodore of the supply squadron in that district. She was captured without delay, but unfortunately not before she had been able to warn the *Neckar* by wireless. Captain Clinton-Baker "therefore judged it expedient to escort these two valuable prizes into port, considering that the *Neckar* would undoubtedly leave the vicinity."¹ He brought them in to St. Lucia on September 12, and left again for a cruise towards Tobago. This *Neckar* was a North German Lloyd steamer fitted for conversion into a cruiser; she had left Havana at 3 a.m., August 5, after coaling and watering, and though reported to have been seen off Cuba, had not since arrived at any port. The *Neckar* seems to have received the warning; she put in to Baltimore on September 20, and remained there.

70. Movements on the South American Coast, September 5-13.—On the South American coast, also, there were German movements. The *Eber*, which had disappeared since leaving Cape Town on July 30, turned up again at Bahia on September 5, flying the merchant flag. The German Consul gave the captain of

¹ Papers titled *Treasury*, 28 October, 1914, *Captures by Essex and Berwick*.

the port his written word of honour that she had been dismantled at Lüderitzbucht (German South-West Africa), and had no armament on board; and on the strength of this she was not treated as a warship. On the previous day a Hamburg-Amerika ship, the *Santa Lucia*, which had sailed from Bahia on August 10 with large quantities of stores and supplies, returned there with her funnel painted black, and under the false name of *Lucia*, New York. Our Minister made representations to the Brazilian Government about both these ships, and was able to secure the internment of the *Eber*.¹

Pernambuco was also the scene of a supply ship episode. Admiral Cradock visited the port in the *Good Hope* on September 5, leaving in the evening for Abrolhos. Next morning there came in the *Patagonia*, having discharged her coal to the *Karlsruhe*. Little seems to have been known about her at the time, and the fact that she had left St. Thomas on August 12 was not reported to the Admiralty.² Still, there were sufficient doubtful circumstances about her to enable our Minister to express to the Brazilian Government his suspicions that she intended to supply German cruisers at sea. Possibly as the result of these representations, the Brazilian Government on September 9 issued a decree that no merchant vessel was to leave a Brazilian port without declaring her destination, and giving an assurance that her purpose in leaving was purely commercial; if on her return to a Brazilian port it could be proved she had not proceeded direct to her declared destination, she would be considered part of the naval forces of her nation, and treated accordingly.³

Besides this regulation, which might prevent her return but not her escape, there was a British naval force on the spot. On the 8th the *Macedonia* called at Pernambuco on the way to join the South-East Coast Squadron; the *Bristol* passed outside, but in sight of land, at noon on the 10th; and on the 11th the *Cornwall*, also on passage south, put in. The *Patagonia* had moved to another position in the harbour, and the Brazilian Government stationed a destroyer in the outer roadstead to prevent her leaving. Throughout the night of the 11th and the forenoon of the 12th the *Cornwall*, in conjunction with the *Carmania*, also on passage to join Admiral Cradock, patrolled just outside. At this point the captain of the *Patagonia* gave his word not to sail; whereupon the *Cornwall* and *Carmania* continued their voyage southward, and the Brazilian destroyer returned to harbour. Nevertheless, at dawn of September 13 the *Patagonia* disappeared. The Brazilian Government,

¹ H.S. 26, p. 338.

² It appears first in the "Disposition of German, Austrian and Italian Ships" of September 18.

³ H.S. 26, p. 362.

incensed at this flouting of their authority, addressed a strong letter to the German Minister, and removed the captain of the port.¹

Further south, at Rio, the *Prussia*, which had brought the crew of the *Hyades*, and therefore was undoubtedly connected with German cruisers, sailed on September 5 with the *Eberburg*,² a Hansa liner which had been in harbour since the early days of the war. The *Glasgow* was no longer within touch of Rio. Having intercepted a message from the *Good Hope* on August 30 to the effect that the *Holmwood* had been sunk by the *Dresden* in Latitude 31° S., Captain Luce decided to proceed southward as soon as he had coaled.³ He left Abrolhos for the River Plate with the *Monmouth* on September 2, followed two days later by the *Otranto*. Even if he had been off Rio he could not have been informed of the departure of the *Prussia* and *Eberburg*, since Brazilian coast wireless stations from that date refused to handle code messages.⁴

The result of these German movements on the coast of Brazil was that on September 17 the Brazilian Government issued a new regulation. By this, belligerent merchant vessels which had taken refuge in Brazilian ports, and vessels which gave *force majeure* as a reason for discontinuing their normal voyage, were to be prevented from leaving except by special permission of the captain of the port; after 48 hours in port their aerials were to be removed by the captain of the port, who was also to take any other measures to prevent them from using wireless telegraphy.⁵

Captain Luce's appearance at the River Plate on September 8, with the *Glasgow* and *Monmouth*, did much to restore confidence; and shipping, in response to an improvement in the financial situation, began to move again.⁶

The *Bristol*, after passing Pernambuco, met a Dutch vessel, the *Kelbergen*, on September 11, in the latitude of Bahia. She was on passage from Norfolk, Virginia, to Rio with coal, but as her Bill of Lading was made out to "order" Captain Fanshawe decided to take her to Abrolhos for further examination. The Admiralty sent the collier for adjudication to Rio, where her innocence was established and she was released.⁷

71. Supply Ship captured in Azores, September 8.—A capture was also made at this period in the East Atlantic. German warship wireless was heard on August 29 about 400 miles north of the Azores. The news of this did not reach Admiral de Robeck

¹ H.S. 26, pp. 334a, 377, 386, 400; M. 17749/14, and papers titled *F.O.* 14 September, 1914 (M. 01943/14, etc.).

² H.S. 26, p. 496.

³ H.S. 26, pp. 305, 319, 326.

⁴ H.S. 26, pp. 305, 319, 326.

⁵ *Faille: Seaborne Trade I, 176.*

⁶ *Glasgow Telegraph Log No. 20110.*

⁷ H.S. 26, pp. 409, 451.

⁸ Papers titled *F.O.*, 4 December, 1914.

till September 1, as he was about to return in the *Argonaut* from Madeira to the Tagus. He left two ships behind at Funchal, the *Challenger* and *Vindictive*; and as the *Challenger* was reserved for convoy duty, he ordered the *Vindictive* (Captain C. R. Payne) to search the Azores. She reached Santa Maria, the easternmost island of the group, on September 3, and proceeded to visit all the islands in turn. On September 8, while searching northward of Fayal, she sighted a steamer which immediately altered course and made for the shore. Captain Payne steered at full speed so as to cut her off, and found her to be the German collier *Slawentzitz*, apparently all ready for discharging coal. She appeared to have no wireless installation. The position was then 39.17 N., 28.50 W., north of Fayal. Having ascertained that the German captain consented to steam his ship to Gibraltar with his own crew, Captain Payne put an armed guard on board, with orders to hand her over to the Senior Naval Officer, Gibraltar. He then steamed off in the direction in which the *Slawentzitz* was first heading, but, finding nothing, returned to complete his search of the islands, remaining till September 19.¹

72. The First Atlantic Convoys, September 4-15.—The *Challenger*, having been in Area I since August 17, had at first patrolled the trade routes near Vigo. She had then come to Madeira, and was now to proceed to Las Palmas to meet the *Europa* from England with a transport called the *Appam*, in which were the General and Staff for the Cameroons Expedition.² The Portuguese were most friendly, and gave permission for the *Challenger* to stay at Madeira as long as she liked, and to take as much coal as she wanted.³ The *Europa* was due at Las Palmas early on September 7, and accordingly the *Challenger* left Madeira on September 4. The two met off Las Palmas at daylight, September 7; the *Challenger* proceeded with the *Appam* to Sierra Leone and Duala, where she remained.

The *Appam* was the first transport to leave home for a foreign station, but the movement to replace the British garrisons abroad by territorial battalions was about to commence. Most of the Gibraltar garrison had gone home in the *Edinburgh Castle*, escorted by the *Minerva*; the Malta garrison, in the *Ultonia* and *Gloucester Castle*, left Gibraltar on the 10th, escorted by the *Sutlej*, which had been waiting for them there.

Five transports containing the Territorial battalions to relieve these left Southampton on September 4, and were picked up by the *Amphitrite* from Devonport. In the latitude of Vigo the Admiral in the *Argonaut* met them at 3 p.m., September 7. As the *Argonaut* had some defects, he transferred his flag to

¹ *Vindictive*, Proceedings, M. 02671/14.
³ H.S. 36, pp. 578, 580.

² A 102.

the *Amphitrite*, sent the *Argonaut* to Devonport, and took charge of the convoy, which he conducted to Gibraltar.¹

A still larger convoy from home was the East Lancashire Division, which in 14 transports left Southampton for Egypt and India on September 10. The *Minerva* was retained at Devonport till this convoy was ready, and was joined by the *Ocean* from Queenstown, which was to take the *Albion's* place off Cape St. Vincent. These two joined the convoy at a rendezvous and brought them to Gibraltar. Admiral de Robeck, in the *Amphitrite*, met them on the 15th and accompanied them till they turned eastward for Gibraltar. From there the Admiralty wished them escorted as far as Malta; Admiral de Robeck selected the *Minerva* for this service and she proceeded with them. Her absence from the Atlantic on this duty was intended by the Admiralty to be temporary; but owing to the development of the situation in the Mediterranean, she was absorbed into the squadron there, and never returned to Force I. Admiral de Robeck ordered the *Ocean* to Madeira and the Azores, but this the Admiralty countermanded. The Atlantic was not the only part of the sea where convoys were passing. Large movements of troops from India were in progress, and the demands for escort were so great that the *Ocean* had to be taken for work in the East Indies.²

73. Passage of the Cape Convoy, September 11-19.—Admiral de Robeck had been told the *Europa* was to join him when relieved by the *Challenger*, and he sent her orders to return to Madeira; but the Admiralty informed Admiral Stoddart that she might be used to relieve the *Hyacinth*, which, with the *Leviathan*, was escorting homewards six transports containing the Cape garrison. This convoy was due at St. Vincent, Cape Verde, on the 10th.³ He therefore overrode Admiral de Robeck's orders, and sent her southward to join the *Leviathan*. She met the convoy on the 11th in 22.6 N., 20° W., about half way between the Canaries and Cape Verde Islands, and there relieved the *Hyacinth* to return to the Cape. But from the 8th onward the *Leviathan* developed defects in her port engine to such an extent that Admiral Stoddart was obliged to relieve her to go to Gibraltar for repairs.⁴ The only ship he had available was his flagship, the *Carnarvon*, in which accordingly he took charge of the convoy at 10 a.m., September 13, in 29.35 N., 9.17 W., requesting the Admiralty to arrange for his relief as soon as he reached the limit of his station. The Admiralty ordered Admiral de Robeck to arrange this. He had the *Vindictive* at Madeira, the *Argonaut* at Devonport, and his

¹ De Robeck: Proceedings, M. 02480/14.

² A 110, 120, 121. See C.B. 929, *The East Indies Squadron*, for details.

³ A 102.

⁴ *Leviathan*: Proceedings, M. 02184/14.

flagship, the *Amphitrite*. At the moment he was investigating a report received from the French, who had intercepted a message implying that the German cruiser *Stettin* was off Cadiz; he had thus left his usual station at the Tagus for Cadiz, and was obliged to reply that he had no cruiser available to relieve the *Carnarvon*. The Admiralty, who had at first intended the convoy to be escorted as far as Finisterre by two British cruisers, now ordered the *Carnarvon* to return as soon as the latitude of Lisbon was reached,¹ and asked the French cruisers guarding the Bay of Biscay to look after the convoy for the remainder of the voyage. The *Stettin* rumour was investigated at the same time by the French Commodore in the *Cassard*, but no sign of German cruisers was found, nor were there indications of abnormal activity.² The French sent the *Dupetit Thouars* from L'Orient to join the convoy; she and the *Gueydon* met it at dawn on the 18th, by which time it was almost in the latitude of Ushant. These cruisers returned as soon as the English Channel was reached. The *Europa* arrived at Portsmouth at 8 a.m. on the 19th, and the convoy went on to Southampton.³

Admiral Stoddart's temporary absence from his station happened to occur at a period of special anxiety. On September 6 a wireless message from Las Palmas addressed to the *Karlsruhe* had been intercepted; it was worded so as to appear to refer to some commercial transaction, but was more probably in code. A censorship was in force; but this was an abuse of it, and the Foreign Office made representations to the Spanish Government.⁴ On the 8th the *Nepos*, one of the suspected Norwegian colliers, arrived at Tenerife from Philadelphia.⁵ The Admiralty ordered Admiral Stoddart to have her searched as soon as she left Spanish waters. The *Empress of Britain* was patrolling the trade route south of the Canaries at the time; he ordered her to keep watch south of Tenerife, and stationed the *Victorian*, which had joined his flag on the 3rd, to the northward of the port. The Consul at Las Palmas thought the *Nepos* unlikely to sail, and on the 11th the Admiralty gave Admiral Stoddart discretion about continuing to watch her.⁶ He left the *Victorian* to patrol the Canaries, and sent the *Empress of Britain* slowly down the trade route towards St. Vincent, where the *Albion* was now patrolling. The *Marmora* had to coal at Sierra Leone, and was thus away from patrol between the 12th and 20th.

Another factor in the situation was that the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, of which nothing had been heard since the arrival of

¹ A 115, 117. ² H.S. 36, pp. 734, 738, 750, 783. ³ *Europa* Deck Log.

⁴ H.S. 25, pp. 528, 559, and papers titled *F.O.*, 31 October, 1914, *W/T in Canary Islands*.

⁵ It subsequently transpired that she had been to the Rio de Oro; finding that the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, whom she was to coal, had been sunk, she came in Las Palmas for further orders (M. 01006/15, para. 10).

⁶ H.S. 25, pp. 563, 569, 576, 588.

the *Walhalla* at Las Palmas, had boarded and released a Russian sailing vessel, the *Pittan*, on August 27, about half way between the Cape Verde Islands and Flores in the Azores. This came to light on September 10, the news being brought by a British steamer which had spoken the Russian.¹ Admiral Stoddart was at the time at Tenerife arranging for the watch on the *Nepos*, and investigating a rumour that two German steamers there were using their wireless. He came to the conclusion that this was not possible, though they could doubtless take in messages.²

74. "Cap Trafalgar" Sunk by "Carmania," September 14.³—On September 14 the New South-East Coast of America Squadron was in two distinct halves. The *Good Hope*, *Glasgow*, *Monmouth*, and *Otranto* met that day at Santa Catherina after a widespread sweep of the coast. Admiral Cradock intended to take them with him and search the Magellan Straits. The *Bristol*, *Macedonia*, and *Cornwall* were together at Abrolhos Rocks. To them he allotted the coast patrol; the *Bristol* between Monte Video and Santa Catherina; the *Macedonia* between Santa Catherina and Abrolhos; the *Cornwall*, Rio to Cape San Roque.⁴ The *Carmania* (Captain Noel Grant, R.N.) was to take the southernmost section from Monte Video southward to Port Desire, but before starting her patrol the Admiral ordered her to inspect the island of Trinidad or Trinidadá, which lies about 500 miles east of Abrolhos Rocks. She sighted the island soon after dawn, September 14; by 11 a.m. she could make out three steamers, one a large liner, the others apparently colliers. Before she had raised their hulls they were making off in different directions. The liner, however, after a little while turned towards the *Carmania*. At 8,500 yards Captain Noel Grant fired a shot across the bows of the liner, which at once replied. The firing thereupon became general and the liner closed to machine-gun range. Both ships were soon on fire; in the *Carmania* the cabin under the forebridge was so fiercely ablaze that the ship had to be coned from aft; but an hour and a half from the firing of the first shot the enemy capsized to starboard, and went down bows first with colours flying. She had been making wireless signals, and since to the northward smoke was visible in which an imaginative signalman thought he saw a cruiser's funnels, Captain Grant went off full speed to the southward, altering course at dusk for Abrolhos Rocks, calling up the ships there for assistance. There were 304 holes in the ship made by 79 projectiles. All communications inside the ship and all the navigational instruments had been destroyed by the fire, and

¹ H.S. 25, pp. 577, 735.

² Stoddart: Proceedings, M. 02075/14.

³ The description of the action is based on Captain Grant's Report (M. 02473/14) and entries in *Carmania's* Deck Log.

⁴ H.S. 26, p. 394.

the navigation and conning of the ship were difficult and uncertain. The *Bristol* got away at midnight, and picked up the *Carmania* at 5 p.m.; the *Cornwall* joined at 9.30 p.m., whereupon the *Bristol* parted company to search Trinidad Island. There was nothing there when she reached it at 9 a.m. on the 17th. The *Cornwall* brought the *Carmania* to Abrolhos. On the 17th the damaged vessel started for Gibraltar under escort of the *Macedonia*, putting in to Pernambuco for an hour or so on September 20 to report the action. This she had been unable to do by wireless, owing to the Brazilian regulations. The *Cornwall* remained at Abrolhos to guard the colliers there till the *Canopus* arrived on the 22nd to take over that special duty. The *Macedonia* was to escort the *Carmania* as far as St. Vincent, Cape Verde, and then return to the south-east coast; from St. Vincent to Gibraltar the damaged liner was escorted by the *Marmora*, told off by Admiral Stoddart.

At first there was some doubt what vessel it had been which the *Carmania* had sunk. Captain Noel Grant thought it either the *Cap Trafalgar*, *Cap Finisterre*, or *Berlin*; Admiral Stoddart suggested the *Blücher*.¹ Although the *Blücher* had remained steadily at anchor in Pernambuco harbour, there were frequent reports that she had left; sometimes it was stated she was armed. The latest information Admiral Stoddart had about her was an Admiralty telegram dated September 16, saying she was acting as wireless agent to the *Dresden*.² All doubt on the matter was cleared up on the 24th, when a German steamer, the *Eleonore Woermann*, arrived at Buenos Aires with 292 survivors of the *Cap Trafalgar*.

It is now clear that the *Cap Trafalgar*, after leaving the River Plate, proceeded to the "fitting-out" station indicated to her, and there met the *Eber*, which had come over from Lüderitzbucht, accompanied by a collier, the *Steiermark*, to transfer her own armament to the liner. The arming appears to have taken place on September 1. The *Cap Trafalgar* received from the *Eber* two 10.5 cm. (4 in.) guns and six 3.7 cm. (1.4 in.) machine guns; and, as she carried none herself, these formed her sole armament.³ The German liner then cruised for a fortnight to capture British merchantmen. In this she had no success. The frequently heard wireless of the British cruisers passing along the trade routes compelled her to keep away from the places where she was most likely to find vessels; and her career was brought to an end before she had made a single capture. After the ship had sunk, the *Eleonore Woermann* picked up the survivors; 15 had been killed, among them Commander Wirth, who was the Commanding Officer.⁴

¹ H.S. 26, p. 434, 468. The *Cap Finisterre* was at Hamburg.

² H.S. 25, p. 652. ³ *Kreuzerkrieg* I, p. 177. The *Carmania* had eight 4.7 in.

⁴ The chief authority for the career of the *Cap Trafalgar* is a letter from a surgeon of the *Eber*, printed in the *Weser Zeitung*; a translation of this and other letters is in I.D.H.S. 509.

Presumably one of the colliers seen by Captain Grant as he approached the island of Trinidad was the *Eleonore Woermann*. This ship was last reported at Lagos on July 29; she may have gone to Duala and been sent over from there. The other collier was either the *Pontos* or the *Berwind*, one of the ships reported as chartered by the Hamburg-Amerika Line. The *Berwind*, owned in the United States, left New York on August 6 with stores for Buenos Aires; she arrived at Rio on September 18, empty. From a West African on board the *Eleonore Woermann* it was learned that both the *Pontos* and *Berwind* had been in attendance on the *Cap Trafalgar* at Trinidad.¹

The destruction of the *Cap Trafalgar*, combined with the capture and detention of so many of their colliers, seem to have discouraged the German Admiralty. On September 20 a long telegram was sent out from Norddeich, one of the long-distance wireless stations in Germany, addressed to the *Prinz Heinrich*, one of the liners at Lisbon which they presumably thought was still acting as a receiving station. Part of it was found to consist of a statement that all the coaling rendezvous were compromised, except, perhaps, the position in which the *Eber* had met the *Cap Trafalgar*.² This same information was sent out by Nauen, and was presumably taken in by the German cruisers at sea, with the result that they now knew they had to avoid the rendezvous, and could no longer obtain fuel except by their own efforts. Thus our cruisers, though their operations had in the main been confined to watching ports, and not hunting for the enemy, had in the course of moving from place to place succeeded in breaking up the system which Germany had elaborated for the supply of her commerce destroyers in war time.

CHAPTER VIII.

OPERATIONS BETWEEN SEPTEMBER 20 AND OCTOBER 3.

75. The Functions of Armed Merchant Cruisers.—The action between the *Carmania* and *Cap Trafalgar* has special interest in that it is the first engagement between two armed merchant cruisers. Strangely enough, it had taken place against the wishes of the Admiralty. The day before it was fought they issued a general telegram to the following effect:—

"The original purpose of our armed merchant cruisers was to capture or sink the armed merchant cruisers of the enemy.

There does not now appear to be as many armed merchant cruisers as was anticipated.

Each of our armed merchant cruisers should, as far as possible, work in conjunction with a cruiser.

¹ M. 20882/14. After this episode the *Berwind* reverted to ordinary commerce (papers titled *F.O.*, 20 October, 1914, *Berwind* and *Indrani*).

² H.S. 36, p. 865, and I.D.H.S. 1338, Nos. 171, 203, 204.

So far the Admirals of the Atlantic squadrons had disposed their armed merchant cruisers independently, as if they were cruisers. For instance, Admiral Stoddart, who had three of them in his squadron, had them at the moment disposed—*Empress of Britain* on the trade route north of St. Vincent, Cape Verde; *Marmorata* proceeding to Sierra Leone for fuel; *Victorian* patrolling the Canary Islands. His two cruisers were nowhere near; the *Highflyer* was at Gibraltar refitting after her action with the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, and the *Carnarvon* had just taken charge of the Cape convoy.

Of the enemy's merchant cruisers two had been sunk and only one remained of those known to be armed. This was the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, of which there was a rumour that she had recently visited the Rio de Oro.¹ Accordingly, as the *Highflyer* was ready for sea by September 16, Admiral Stoddart who had gone to Madeira after leaving the convoy, arranged with her a combined search of the African coast. The *Highflyer* was to meet him off Cape Juby in the morning of the 19th; on her way south she was to search the coast and look in at Agadir. The two ships would then continue to search in company.

76. Co-operation with the French on the Coast of Morocco.—His departure from Madeira just prevented him from receiving an order to co-operate with the French on the African coast. For some time past, in order to make trouble in Morocco, the Germans had been spreading a report that England had declared war on France. The result was so much unrest among the tribesmen that immediate steps were necessary to counteract the insidious propaganda. To the French Government it seemed that the most effective means would be a joint naval demonstration along the disturbed coast. They therefore proposed on August 31 that a British cruiser should act with a French cruiser for about a week on the south coast of Morocco. At first the Admiralty refused to send a cruiser and suggested on September 14 that the same result could be secured more economically if British and French military officers were seen together in Morocco.² But this idea was not considered sufficient by the French, who, on the 15th, asked through the Foreign Office for a British cruiser to support the *Cosmao*, then operating south of Agadir. Upon this the Admiralty promised one of the armed liners,³ and on September 16 instructed Admiral Stoddart to give orders accordingly. The telegram, however, just missed him at Madeira, and though it was repeated on the 18th and

¹ H.S. 25, pp. 622, 629, 635, 652.

² H.S. 36, pp. 549, 747.

³ Papers titled *F.O.*, 15 September, 1914, M. 01979/14. The disposition of the French Morocco Division on the evening of September 18 was: *Cassard* (Captain Simon, senior officer) at Casablanca; *Latouche-Tréville* at Gibraltar; *Amiral Charner* at Mehediyah; *Bruix* at Lagos, ready to escort the French transports to Duala; *Cosmao* at Agadir; *Friant* at Rochefort, with orders to join the Morocco Division (H.S. 36, p. 850).

20th, it still failed to reach him. His search was quite blank, and on the 20th the *Carnarvon* and *Highflyer* parted company, the Admiral proceeding by way of St. Vincent and Sierra Leone for fuel, and the *Highflyer* to join the *Victorian* in watching the Canaries.

Meanwhile the French Government, unable to understand why our promise had not been fulfilled, represented on September 22 that the *Highflyer's* one-hour visit to Agadir could have no effect in impressing the tribesmen with the solidarity of the Anglo-French Alliance. Next day the original order reached Admiral Stoddart a week after it was despatched;¹ he immediately ordered the *Victorian* away from the Canaries. She had on the 18th taken in 1,400 tons of coal and 1,500 of water at Tenerife by permission of the Spanish authorities, and, having since been generally lying stopped or at slow speed, was able to undertake a long voyage. On September 26, near Agadir, she met the *Cassard*, which had relieved the *Cosmao*, and in company they proceeded down the coast as far as Cape Juby, the French cruiser occasionally bombarding the villages as they passed. The effect seems to have been all the French desired and the tribal unrest died down.

The passage of French troops to and from Morocco had been in progress since August 13. The last transport left Casablanca on September 28 escorted by the *Amiral Charner*, and her voyage brought the escort service to an end; 29,000 troops had been transported from Morocco and 12,000 Territorials taken there.²

It was intended for the *Victorian* to make a second parade with the *Cassard* back to Agadir; but more German supply ships had been arriving at the Canaries and the *Victorian* had to be recalled to resume watch. She was back at Tenerife on September 29.³

77. German Movements in the Canary Islands.—Although the Admiralty had no exact information as to the German system, it was clear that the Canary Islands formed one of the German bases for supplies and intelligence. Moreover, there was a rumour, traced to the German Vice-Consul at Las Palmas, that the German Asiatic Squadron under Admiral von Spee was approaching the islands with a view to interrupting trade. According to the Admiralty's intelligence, the German Admiral had been off Samoa on September 14 with the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*; the *Nürnberg* and *Leipzig* were both in the Pacific; the *Dresden* seemed to have gone south. Only the *Karlsruhe* was thought to be in the North Atlantic and nothing had been heard of her since August 28. Accordingly the Admiralty

¹ H.S. 25, p. 724.

² Chack I, 244, 245.

³ *Victorian*: Proceedings, M. 01006/15.

considered the Las Palmas report improbable and on September 24 told Admiral Stoddart so.¹ Apart from this, another of the Norwegian steamers chartered by the Hamburg-Amerika Line, the *Johann Ludwig Mowinckel*, arrived at Santa Cruz de Tenerife on the 26th for orders; the *Highflyer*, which was patrolling the group, happened to be at Palma Island at the time and missed her. Also the German steamer *Telde*, which had been at Santa Cruz since the early days of the war, began to take in coal from the German depôt and from a British contractor who communicated with the Admiralty.² The *Victorian*, before leaving for Agadir, had been able to board and send back a Spanish ketch named *Express* which was believed to have German naval officers aboard and to be intended for communication with German warships.³

Besides this movement of supply ships there were signs that unneutral messages were being sent by wireless. Between September 21 and 28 the *Victorian* intercepted 13 messages in code sent by the Austrian Consul at Las Palmas *via* Tenerife W/T Station to Madrid. The Norddeich station in Germany was signalling to Madrid in cypher and there were indications that the German Government was in touch through Madrid with Tenerife, the messages being no doubt connected with German ships. Wireless telegraphy in Spain was a monopoly of the Spanish Government, which, on our protest against the German use of it, offered to put its military wireless station at Madrid at our disposal for official communications in the same way as Germany. The Italian Ambassador was communicating through it with Rome. Spain was in charge of the interests in enemy countries of most of the belligerents and the Spanish Government seemed to think the Germans were using wireless only for messages between Berlin and Madrid on this subject; they had indeed refused to forward messages from the German Ambassador, Madrid, to Tenerife. Though we were convinced that this was not the true explanation of the numerous cypher messages passing and that the use of the Spanish stations went a long way towards nullifying our efforts to cut Germany's communications, we had to content ourselves with suggesting that Spain should institute a censorship on the lines of that enforced by the United States at Sayville.⁴

78. South America. Movements of Supply Ships and News of the "Kronprinz Wilhelm."—On September 24 the *Patagonia* arrived at Bahia Blanca saying she could not get to Buenos Aires on account of English cruisers. The same day the *Navarra*, a Hamburg-Amerika liner fitted with wireless, put in

¹ H.S. 25, pp. 667, 717-720, 726.

² H.S. 25, pp. 737, 771, and 774.

³ H.S. 25, pp. 706, 723, 733. Log of *Victorian*.

⁴ See F.O. telegrams between pp. 888 and 1,111 of H.S. 36.

to Pernambuco, being 18 days out from Pensacola. She left next day with Buenos Aires as her declared destination. The *Patagonia* at Bahia Blanca went in to dry dock; she was leaking from damage received evidently while lying alongside some other vessel either at sea or in an unsheltered roadstead.¹

Two other supply ships, the *Prussia* and *Eberburg*, reappeared, the *Prussia* at Santos on September 24 and the *Eberburg* at Rio on September 25. The latter must have had a narrow escape from the *Cornwall*, which left Rio at 8 o'clock that morning to have another look at Abrolhos for a week until relieved on the 22nd by the *Canopus* in the duty of protecting the colliers and prizes at Abrolhos. The *Prussia* and *Eberburg* had each on board half the crew of a British ship, the *Indian Prince*, sunk by the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* in 7° S., 27° 17' W. on September 9. In accordance with the latest Brazilian rules they were both detained and were lost to Germany as supply ships.

The *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, after spending four days in taking over 2,500 tons of coal from the *Walhalla* near the Azores, steamed out into mid-ocean and then steered almost due south at low speed to economise fuel.² The Russian barque *Pittan*, whom she boarded on August 27, was released, as she had started before the outbreak of war and knew nothing about it. On September 2 the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* crossed the line. Next morning she met a German steamer, the *Asuncion*, and the day was spent taking in provisions.

The *Asuncion* had been in attendance on the *Karlsruhe*, which, though near and in wireless touch, did not come up.³ The position appears to be somewhere near Rocas Reef. Continuing south from there, the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was in 7° S., 31° 30' W., about 200 miles east of Pernambuco, at 10 p.m. on September 4, when she heard wireless signals very close and soon afterwards sighted a steamer. This ship she speedily forced to stop and found to be the *Indian Prince*, two days out from Bahia. In accordance with the Admiralty instructions her master was keeping well away from the trade route, and it was by an unfortunate accident that he met the German vessel. He was forced to steer S.S.E., his captor following close astern. Next morning he was boarded, but the south-easterly course continued till the 8th, where in 18° S., 27° 30' W., 200 miles north east of Trinidad, the work of transferring passengers, coal and stores to the cruiser commenced. At 9 a.m. on the 9th the *Indian Prince* was sunk.⁴

¹ M. 6776/14.

² The chief sources for the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* are letters by Schneller and Mahlstedt. These and other papers are in I.D.H.S. 508.

³ Aust. The *Karlsruhe* took in the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*'s signals but did not reply owing to the proximity of British cruisers.

⁴ Master's Deposition and Letter. M. 18129/14, 21674/14.

At this time the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* had no other vessel with her, but on September 11 or 12 she was joined by the *Ebernborg* with supplies and South American newspapers, which contained information of large meat contracts between England and the Argentine; this news suggested the neighbourhood of the Plate River as a good area for commerce destruction. Next day the *Pontos* met them; and a few days later arrived the *Prussia*. These last two were auxiliaries for the *Cap Trafalgar*. It was while she was coaling from these that the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* learned by wireless that the *Cap Trafalgar* was engaging the *Carmania* scarcely 150 miles away.

As soon as the *Ebernborg* was cleared Captain Thierfelder sent half the crew of the *Indian Prince* over to her, and on the 17th despatched her to Brazil. The remainder of the captured crew left, also for Brazil, in the *Prussia* on the 19th. The coaling of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* at sea must have been a lengthy process, occupying possibly the whole time from the arrival of the first to the departure of the last of the colliers, that is from the 11th to the 19th. During this time the cruiser was probably stopped at the rendezvous 150 miles from Trinidad, very near to the position given by the master of the *Indian Prince* as that in which his ship was sunk.¹ The nearest approach to this spot was that of the *Bristol*, which on September 17 visited Trinidad and Martin Vaz islands; but she turned back at that point and proceeded to Monte Video.

79. **Movements of Force I September 20 to October 3.**—All the three supply ships had come from South American ports. Those from the United States seemed generally to go to rendezvous in the North Atlantic. Only one of the suspected Norwegian colliers, the *Unita* from Philadelphia, was now at sea; and she arrived at Cadiz on September 25. The Consul reported that she had a German naval officer on board and had been cruising about to supply German warships.² There was no cruiser of Force I near Cadiz. In fact, that force was reduced to a low ebb. The *Minerva* was in the Mediterranean and on that date was definitely detached from Admiral de Robeck's command. He was, as usual, off the Tagus, his flag being in the *Argonaut*. The *Amphitrite* had taken home a convoy and was at Devonport putting right defects. The *Vindictive*, after visiting Madeira, was approaching Gibraltar also with defects. In the circumstances, there was no ship of Force I to station off Cadiz to prevent the *Unita* putting out again, and the Senior Officer, Gibraltar, was compelled to send the *Proserpine*, a light cruiser which had been despatched from home to Gibraltar, to assist in the Straits Patrol.³ At other ports besides Cadiz movements were expected.

¹ The track given in I.D. 1165, *Commerce Raiders*, is certainly wrong at this period.

² H.S. 36, p. 923.

³ H.S. 36, pp. 719, 723, 929.

The French received information that the *Frankenwald* at Bilbao was about to escape for home, but our Consul there stated that she was too carefully watched to be likely to leave. However, in view of the anti-German attitude of Portugal, the Admiralty thought it best to warn Admiral de Robeck that the ships in Portuguese ports might try to escape into Spain.¹ The weakness of the squadron was to be redressed by the addition of the *Donegal*, *Calgarian*, and *Diana*; the *Donegal*, cruiser, was to be newly commissioned; the *Calgarian*, armed merchant cruiser, left Liverpool on September 25; the *Diana* was engaged on convoy work and could join when this was finished.²

At this period the *Edinburgh Castle*,³ which had commissioned at Tilbury on September 12 and had been armed with eight 6 in. guns, passed through the station, escorting a transport conveying Territorial troops for the garrison at Gibraltar. The *Edinburgh Castle* was making a round voyage to Gibraltar, St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, Abrolhos, Bermuda, Halifax, and Devonport with 400 boys whom she was to distribute among the men-of-war she should meet, receiving in exchange seamen for gunnery and torpedo courses at home. She was, however, to take her part in the protection of trade and would come under the orders of the Flag Officers through whose stations she passed.⁴ On September 23 she was off the Tagus and spoke the *Argonaut* there. She was off St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, on October 3, and discharged a proportion of her boys to the *Albion* and *Empress of Britain* which were present. She left next day for Sierra Leone.

No man-of-war had visited Lisbon since the revolution in Portugal, but in view of the very friendly attitude of the Portuguese Government, Admiral de Robeck was now instructed to send a ship there if circumstances permitted. He went in himself in the *Argonaut* on September 28, and had a most enthusiastic reception. Coming out again in the evening he turned over the Tagus patrol to the *Calgarian*, which had just joined him there, and proceeded for fuel to Gibraltar, now by Admiralty order his principal coaling base, and to repair the *Argonaut's* thrust collars, which would be a week's job. No sooner had he arrived than a message was received from our Minister at Lisbon stating that six of the German merchant steamers in the port were raising steam. The *Argonaut* could not leave; but the *Vindictive* was ready and she proceeded with despatch, at 2.30 p.m., October 2, to join the *Calgarian* outside the Tagus.⁵

¹ H.S. 36, pp. 877, 878, 951, 917.

² H.S. 36, p. 920.

³ Captain W. R. Napier, R.N.

⁴ Sailing Orders in papers titled *Admiralty*, 1 August, 1914; *Armed Merchant Cruisers*. Copy in H.S. 25, p. 625.

⁵ De Robeck. Letter of Proceedings, M. 02671/14.

80. The "Karlsruhe" reported by "Ascaro," September 28. **Movements of Force D.**—Nothing had been heard of the *Karlsruhe* for more than a month, and the latest news of her was that she had sunk the *Bowes Castle* on August 18, 186 miles east of Barbados. She had consequently attracted the Admiralty's attention less than the *Dresden*, although that ship was in fact making her way rapidly out of the Atlantic and was taking captures on the trade routes only as it were by accident. On September 28 the Italian steamer *Ascaro* came in to St. Vincent and reported that she had been boarded by the *Karlsruhe* on September 22 in 0.50 S., 31.30 W., between Fernando Noronha and St. Paul Rocks. The *Karlsruhe* had a deck cargo of coal and was accompanied by two steamers, one a small German passenger ship, the other a collier, possibly British. While the *Ascaro* was being boarded two other ships were sighted to the westward; whereupon the *Karlsruhe* recalled her boats and gave chase to these, leaving the *Ascaro* free to proceed.¹

The news might be taken to imply that the *Karlsruhe* had left the West Indies and was now operating on the South American trade route, within Admiral Stoddart's area. At the moment his cruisers were nowhere near the spot. The *Carnarvon* was at Sierra Leone with the *Macedonia*, and the *Empress of Britain* was on her way from there to St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, where the *Albion* was patrolling; the *Victorian* was still with the French Commodore; the *Marmora* had just reached Gibraltar with the *Carmania*; the *Highflyer* was at the Canaries, but had to go that day to Madeira for coal. The *Orama*, on her way south to join Admiral Cradock, had taken in 731 tons of coal at St. Vincent and had left at noon, September 27. She did not go down the trade route, however, but proceeded nearly to Sierra Leone, meeting the *Macedonia* at noon on the 30th in 8.30 N., 17° W. The two then steamed in company towards Pernambuco, but the detour to Sierra Leone took them wide of the place where the *Ascaro* had met the *Karlsruhe*. At the South American end of the trade route our ships were likewise a long distance from the spot. Admiral Cradock, with the *Good Hope*, *Glasgow*, *Monmouth* and *Otranto*, had gone down to the Patagonian islands. The *Canopus* was at Abrolhos Rocks guarding the supply squadron; the *Cornwall* was examining Trinidad and the *Bristol* was on the way from Monte Video to Abrolhos.

The news seems to have had little effect. Admiral Stoddart made no change in his dispositions. The *Albion* and *Empress of Britain* remained at St. Vincent and when the *Carnarvon* left Sierra Leone she joined them; the *Highflyer*, *Victorian* and *Marmora* watched the ports in the Canary Islands, chiefly to prevent the escape of the *Telde*.²

¹ H.S. 25, pp. 753, 767.

² H.S. 25, pp. 775, 782.

Should the *Karlsruhe* choose the trade route between Fernando Noronha and St. Paul Rocks for a field of operations, it seemed likely that she would have it to herself for some time.

81. **North America. Establishment of a new Intelligence Centre.**—The main pre-occupation of the North America Division was to prevent the escape of the liners in New York. Shortly after the *Caronia*'s arrival on patrol there was another report that three of the big liners were ready to sail with guns in their holds and that there was no United States man-of-war to prevent them from leaving. As before, our Ambassador made representations to the United States Government, who ordered a search for guns to be made. The Consul-General at New York, however, thought the reports much exaggerated; and apprehensions that the vessels were on the point of leaving died down, though there was no relaxation in the stringency of our watch off the port.¹

By October 1 the new Intelligence Centre was established at St. John's, Newfoundland, to serve the area north of the latitude of Charleston and east of 40° W. To Admiral Hornby the situation of the new centre seemed unfortunate; at first he suggested New York for it, but this was debarred by fear of complications with the United States. Up till then, Halifax had been acting as Intelligence Centre for his squadron and he had made good arrangements for transmission of news from there; he therefore urged that Halifax should continue to act as centre, with St. John's as a subsidiary service. A few days later he quoted examples of the delays which had occurred through using St. John's; but all arrangements were complete and no change was made.² He proposed, however, that the wireless stations at Bermuda and Jamaica should be given a day range of 500 miles, and this was accepted.³ The necessity for learning the enemy's movements with the least possible delay was at the beginning of October even more urgent than ever. The Canadian contingent for service in Europe was on the point of leaving the St. Lawrence; and it was only to be expected that attempts would be made to interfere with its transport.

¹ H.S. 37, pp. 870, 878, 883, 889, 898.

² H.S. 37 pp. 909-923.

³ Papers titled *Qa* 173/1915. The new stations took six months to erect.

CHAPTER IX.

OCTOBER 3-14.

PASSAGE OF THE CANADIAN CONVOY.¹

82. **The Canadian Expeditionary Force.**—As soon as war appeared to be threatening the Canadian Government began to consider the most effective means of rendering every possible aid; they were confident that a considerable force of men would be available for service abroad. By the terms of the Canada Militia Act, the active militia could be placed on active service outside Canada only for the defence of Canada itself; but on August 2 the Canadian Government suggested that they should raise regiments as Imperial troops, undertaking all financial responsibility for maintenance and equipment. This offer was gratefully accepted and they were asked to send an Expeditionary Force of one division to England as soon as possible. Not content with this, the Canadian Government on August 8 offered, in addition to a full division of 22,000 men, various cavalry, artillery and infantry units, which also were gratefully accepted. A fortnight later it was announced that the contingent would be ready to embark early in September.²

From the first of the volunteers was formed a regiment called the Princess Patricia's Light Infantry; 80 per cent. of this were ex-regular soldiers, most of whom had seen service, and the Canadian Minister of Militia and Defence³ telegraphed "There is nowhere a better regiment." In view of the adverse situation in France and Belgium he was anxious to put it at the disposal of the War Office; and on August 26, the day after the retreat from Mons, reported that it was leaving Montreal at dawn on August 29.⁴ He had consulted with Captain Yelverton in the *Suffolk*, who considered he could spare the *Lancaster* to escort the transport as far as 40° W. on this occasion, though he could not arrange escorts for single transports in future. He pointed out to Colonel Hughes that opportunity should be taken to send as many transports as possible when a cruiser was available.⁵ The Admiralty, however, could not agree to provide escort across the Atlantic for a single regiment, nor would they consent to allow troops to cross unescorted; the departure of Princess Patricia's Regiment, had, therefore, to be delayed. The Canadian Government made another attempt to get this regiment away in advance of the rest of the contingent when the question of escorting home the 2nd Battalion of the Lincolnshire Regiment from Bermuda arose. This was

¹ Telegrams and papers concerning the convoy are bound in volume H.S. 3; the arrangements made by the Transport Department are in T. 8126/1914.

² H.S. 3, pp. 8, 18, 22, 25, 26, 27, 31. ³ Colonel Sam Hughes.

⁴ H.S. 3, p. 32. ⁵ *Suffolk* W/T Log 20501, August 7, 1215, 1510.

to be relieved by the Royal Canadian Regiment, escorted from Halifax by the *Niobe*, and the Dominion Government proposed that if the *Niobe* escorted the British troops home from Bermuda she should be joined at a suitable rendezvous by Princess Patricia's Light Infantry in the transport *Royal George*. This again the Admiralty would not permit, and the *Niobe* escorted the Lincolnshire Regiment back to Halifax, there to await the assembling of the whole Canadian Expeditionary Force and to make the journey across with it.

The horses, 7,000 head, were to be embarked in slower ships, and the Dominion Government wished to send these on in advance without escort; but the War Office informed the Minister of Defence that none of the vessels of the Expeditionary Force was to leave unconvoyed.¹

83. **First Arrangements for Escort.**—On September 10, the Canadian Government proposed that the port of embarkation should be Quebec, where the whole force was encamped, and asked whether an escort would be available between September 22 and 27. This the Admiralty considered possible if 10 days' notice were given, but they decided to give no definite orders till the Dominion Government could announce the exact date and port of sailing. In order to be ready, however, when the information came they settled that the escort should be provided by the 12th Cruiser Squadron, that is, the *Charybdis*, *Talbot*, *Eclipse* and *Diana*, under Rear-Admiral Wemyss, who, with the French 2nd Light Squadron had been maintaining the Western Channel Patrol. During his absence on escort duty his place was to be taken by four battleships from the Channel Fleet under Vice-Admiral the Hon. Sir A. E. Bethell, K.C.B. K.C.M.G. On September 10, therefore, Admiral Wemyss was ordered, as soon as he was relieved by Admiral Bethell, to get his squadron coaled and proceed to Canada to bring back the convoy, which would consist of about 14 transports. He turned over the Western Patrol to Admiral Bethell on the 11th and went in to Plymouth. There, on the 12th, he received his sailing orders. He was to proceed to Halifax with three cruisers, the *Diana*, which needed some small repairs, to follow as soon as ready; he was to spread his squadron when crossing the Atlantic and he was warned that German liners detained in New York were ready for sea and might sail at any moment.² He sailed with the *Charybdis*, *Talbot* and *Eclipse* that afternoon, the *Diana* following two days later.

After he had sailed it was learned from Canada that the Expeditionary Force would not be ready to embark at Quebec till September 27. The Admiralty had suggested that the horse boats should sail separately, escorted by the *Niobe*; but only four out of the 10 were expected to be ready before the 27th, and the

¹ H.S. 3, pp. 39, 40e, 41, 43, 49, 50, 55, 57.

² A 109, 111.

idea of a separate escort for them was abandoned. The *Niobe*, after bringing the Lincolnshire Regiment to Halifax, was to remain in Canadian waters.

84. The Escort increased.—On September 16 the Minister of Militia asked the strength of the escort, an inquiry which determined the Admiralty to increase it. They ordered Admiral Hornby to shift his flag from the *Glory* to the *Lancaster* and put the *Glory* and *Niobe* under Admiral Wemyss; and at the same time detached a battleship from Admiral Bethell to meet the convoy at a rendezvous in 49.30 N., 30 W. They were thus able to reply that the escort would be four cruisers besides the *Glory* and *Niobe*, reinforced midway by a second battleship, while the Grand Fleet covered the escort from attack by any large force of the enemy. An additional factor of safety was provided in that the route chosen was that used in winter by shipping between the St. Lawrence and England; at the period when the convoy would cross the Atlantic, Canadian traffic would be using the Belle Isle route, far to the northward, and there was therefore little chance of the convoy being sighted by ordinary merchant ships till it was nearing home.¹

The second half of its passage was expected to be that in which it was more likely to suffer attack; the possibility that a battle cruiser might evade the Grand Fleet had to be recognised. Accordingly, on September 21 the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets, was ordered to send either the *Queen Mary* or *Princess Royal* to be at the rendezvous in 49.30 N., 30 W., on October 2, and accompany the convoy as far as the Fastnet.

The removal of the *Glory* and *Niobe* from his command for escort duties left Admiral Hornby very weak. He pointed out that a cruiser in the St. Lawrence and two off New York were all he could maintain, so that Philadelphia, whence so many suspicious vessels came, had to go unwatched. The Admiralty met his wishes by giving him back the *Niobe*, as the escort would be sufficient without her, and, moreover, she would most probably develop defects on the long voyage.²

Admiral Wemyss with his three cruisers reached Halifax on September 22; the *Diana* went to Sydney, Cape Breton Island, arriving on the 23rd. They had all been delayed by headwinds, which had reduced their speed across the Atlantic to 10 knots. All details as to rendezvous and date of sailing had been left to Admiral Wemyss, and he accordingly went up to Quebec by train to make arrangements with the Minister of Militia. In spite of the slow speed at which he had made the passage, he found he was in plenty of time for the convoy, since the Canadian Government had now decided to send the whole force at Quebec, numbering 31,200 of all ranks and 7,500 horses.

¹ H.S. 3, pp. 85, 87c and g, 91; A 119. ² H.S. 37, p. 839 and A 127.

These they hoped to embark in the course of the week.¹ They would occupy 31 transports and would not be ready till October 1. The delay enabled another contingent, that from Newfoundland, to join up; it had at first been reported as not ready till October 7, but the Newfoundland Government was urged to hurry on the preparations so that the transport containing the troops could join the large convoy.

85. The Convoy Orders.—The convoy when complete would thus consist of 32 ships carrying 32,178 troops, 6,767 horses and 23 motor lorries.² Admiral Wemyss divided them into three columns, and put a cruiser at the head of each, with one astern of the middle line. His flagship was to lead the southern column. The columns were to be 15 cables apart, the ships separated by four cables. In the event of an enemy being sighted all the transports were to turn 8 or 16 points together; the three leading cruisers would engage the enemy and the rear cruiser would take charge of the convoy, the transports endeavouring to preserve their fleet formation in all circumstances.³

Admiral Wemyss arranged with the Minister of Militia that the transports, as soon as they had embarked their troops at Quebec, should proceed down the St. Lawrence and assemble at Gaspé Bay, where each on arrival would be anchored at its proper place in one or other of the columns. Owing to the liners⁴ at New York and Boston, he thought it essential that the place of assembly and time of departure should be kept secret and arranged for censors to be stationed at Gaspé and outlying villages; by this means no information regarding the movements of the transports reached the public and the general impression seems to have been that each vessel had sailed straight for England from Quebec. Admiral Wemyss left Halifax September 26 with the *Charybdis*, *Eclipse* and *Talbot*, bringing with them the transport *Canada* in which the 2nd Lincolnshire had come from Bermuda. At sea he was joined by the *Diana*, which had coaled at Sydney, Cape Breton Island. The squadron was in Gaspé Bay by the 28th and coaled. The Admiral instituted a patrol of the entrance to the harbour. One of his cruisers took the duty at night, and in the daylight hours it was performed by a Canadian Government vessel which had been placed at his disposal. It had been hoped that the transports would arrive from Quebec with some regularity; but owing to some hitch in the orders they came in batches, three on September 29, none on September 30, 13 on October 1, 12 during daylight of October 2, and two during that night.

¹ H.S. 3, p. 102c.

² These appear to be the numbers actually carried by the convoy. See H.S. 3, p. 274. Some of the horses came on later in unescorted ships.

³ These orders, pp. 256-275 in H.S. 3, though dated September 23, do not mention the *Glory*.

⁴ Admiral Wemyss speaks of them as "armed German merchantmen." See his letter, H.S. 3, p. 249.

This rendered the task of berthing them, each in its special billet, more troublesome than had been anticipated; but by the forenoon of October 3 all was ready for the start.

It was found that the ships were not particularly well fitted out for transports, nor had the room on board been fully utilised, owing to the lack of experience on the part of the Dominion officials. The Assistant Director of Transports (Colonel Sam Hughes being Director of Transports as well as Minister of Militia and Defence) had been till the outbreak of war a merchant in Quebec, with no special knowledge of shipping. Admiral Wemyss, in remarking on the rapidity with which everything in connection with the troops and convoy had been conjured up as it were from nothing by totally inexperienced persons, observes, "I am inclined to think that this very want of knowledge, perhaps, gave them courage to embark on the undertaking with a lighter heart than they might otherwise have done."¹

86. The Canadian Government doubt the Adequacy of the Escort.—The Minister of Militia visited Gaspé on October 2, and finding only four cruisers in port telegraphed to his Prime Minister, "Escort is altogether inadequate: its strength should be increased." This report, with an inquiry from the Governor-General² whether the Admiralty were thoroughly assured as to the adequacy of the escort, reached the Colonial Office early on October 3. The Admiralty had already explained that two battleships would join the convoy on passage and that the Grand Fleet was covering it from attack by any large force of the enemy. They replied to the Colonial Office at once: "My Lords are satisfied that every reasonable precaution has been taken and the escort is considered safe. They do not, therefore, intend to increase the number of ships accompanying the expedition across the Atlantic, being satisfied as to the adequacy of the arrangements made to protect it. The cancelling of their sailing on the grounds of inadequate escort will rest, therefore, with the Canadian Government."³ It will be noticed that in this reply no mention is made of the *Princess Royal*, the most important vessel of the escort. Possibly desiring to keep secret the detachment of so powerful a unit from the Grand Fleet, the Admiralty had informed no one, not even Admiral Wemyss, that a battle cruiser would guard the convoy from half way across. Moreover, in addition to the vessels definitely charged with escort duty, Admiral Hornby in the *Lancaster* had arranged to leave Halifax on October 3 and cover the convoy to the southward as far as the limit of his station; two other cruisers were keeping close watch off New York against the German liners.

Besides these liners which the Admiralty had specially mentioned to Admiral Wemyss,⁴ the only German vessels known to be in the Atlantic were the *Karlsruhe*, *Dresden* and *Kronprinz Wilhelm*.

¹ H.S. 3, p. 252.

² H.S. 3, p. 132f.

³ The Duke of Connaught.

⁴ A 111.

The *Karlsruhe* was last reported as near Fernando Noronha on September 22, the *Dresden* had not been definitely seen since August 26, when she was off the southern part of Brazil, though there were several reports showing that a German cruiser was operating near Cape Horn; the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was known to have been near Trinidad Island on September 9. This intelligence was all fairly old; in fact, the Intelligence Department confessed on October 5 "There are no recent reports of the German cruisers in the Atlantic which allow a conclusion as to their present likely positions."¹ Whether or not any of these ships were aware of the preparations of the convoy it is hard to judge; but the German agents ashore must have known a good deal. Although every effort was made in England to keep secret all the material facts about the departure of the Expeditionary Force, the Canadian Government were not so careful. The Minister of Militia on October 3 telegraphed to the War Office *en clair* all the details regarding the personnel, etc., in each transport, and in reply to a remonstrance from home stated that the strength of the contingent and the names of the transports had already been published.²

87. Passage of the Convoy, October 3-14.—Strangely enough, Admiral Wemyss, either in his telegrams or his two reports on the escort of the Canadian Expeditionary Force,³ does not mention Colonel Hughes' visit to Gaspé or his opinion that the escort was insufficient. Whatever doubts the Canadian Government may have had, these seem to have been dispersed without difficulty, for at 2.30 p.m. on October 3 the convoy commenced to move out of Gaspé Bay and was soon in its three columns. The southern or X line was headed by the *Charybdis*, the middle or Y column by the *Diana*, and the northern or Z column by the *Eclipse*, while the *Talbot* cruised in rear.⁴ Proceeding through Cabot Strait the convoy was joined off St. Pierre Island by the *Glory*, which had left Halifax on the 3rd to join them. She took station seven miles on the starboard beam of the southern line. Admiral Hornby, in the *Lancaster*, left Halifax at the same time as the *Glory*; he proceeded first up to Cape Race and then steered so as to cut the convoy's track at dawn on the 6th. From that time he kept about 30 miles south of it till the 8th, when, as 40° W. had been reached, he was to turn back. He first steered so as to sight the convoy; and passing along the whole length of the southern line shaped course for Halifax.

¹ H.S. 37, p. 948.

² H.S. 3, pp. 134, 135, 137, 139, 140.

³ M. 02692 and 02693, both in H.S. 3.

⁴ X Line: *Charybdis*, *Scotian*, *Arcadian*, *Zealand*, *Corinthian*, *Virginian*, *Andania*, *Saxonia*, *Grampian*, *Lakonia*, *Montreal*, *Royal George*.

Y Line: *Diana*, *Caribbean*, *Athenia*, *Royal Edward*, *Franconia*, *Canada*, *Monmouth*, *Manitou*, *Tyroliia*, *Tunisian*, *Laurentic*.

Z Line: *Eclipse*, *Megantic*, *Ruthenia*, *Bermudian*, *Alaunia*, *Ivernia*, *Scandinavian*, *Sicilian*, *Montezuma*, *Lapland*, *Cassandra*. *Florizel*, with Newfoundland contingent, joined Z line off Cape Race.

The *Princess Royal* left Scapa early on October 3 and was at the rendezvous in 49.30 N., 30 W., by 10 p.m. October 7. The *Majestic*, which was the battleship detached from Admiral Bethell's force, had been waiting for orders at Devonport since September 23. She sailed on October 1 and reached the rendezvous at 8 p.m. on the 6th.

Neither Admiral Wemyss nor any of the naval authorities in Canada reported the sailing of the convoy, and by October 6 the Admiralty were uncertain whether or not Colonel Hughes' opinion as to the inadequacy of the escort had held it up. When the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets, on October 5, asked if it had sailed, they telegraphed to Admiral Wemyss through Cape Race Wireless Station: "Report what is the position of the convoy. Have you assembled and started."¹ It was not till the afternoon of the 6th that they received the reply, timed 0600, "Convoy assembled and left Gaspé Bay October 3. Present position 45.30 N., 52° W. Speed 9 knots."² Colonel Hughes had informed the War Office that the transports and escort had sailed from the rendezvous; but his telegram, dated 4 October, did not reach the Admiralty till two days later.³ Thus the convoy had been three days at sea before the Admiralty were aware that it had sailed.

The *Princess Royal* and *Majestic* had to wait at the rendezvous for 2½ days. Their movements had been timed on the assumption that the convoy would leave on October 1 at 10 knots, as signalled by Admiral Wemyss,⁴ whereas it left on the 3rd and could maintain only 9 knots. Admiral Wemyss was in wireless touch with them by the 7th, and at 6 a.m. on the 10th joined them at the rendezvous. As he was now about to approach Home waters, attack was in future more likely from the north. He, therefore, stationed the *Princess Royal* seven miles on the port beam of the northern column and the *Majestic* seven miles ahead of the centre.

88. The Question of the Disembarkation Port.—Southampton had at the outbreak of war been almost entirely closed to commercial traffic and was used by the War Office as their port for all military embarkations and for the disembarkation of the garrisons from abroad. But by the end of September German submarines began to be reported in the Channel and, in order to avert the possibility of accident to the convoy, the question of disembarking it at some port on the west coast was considered. A conference between the principal Admiralty and War Office officials was held; they considered that the general conditions of Liverpool would hamper transport work, while the depth of water at Heysham, Holyhead and Fishguard, and the quay space at Pembroke, were insufficient for the large

¹ Sent 11.35 p.m., 5.10.14.

² H.S. 3, pp. 147, 148, 152, 153.

³ H.S. 3, pp. 149, 150.

⁴ H.S. 3, pp. 99, 105, 111.

vessels in the convoy. It was undesirable to use Avonmouth, as it was now one of the principal ports for the importation of food stuffs. In view of these conditions, the Conference decided that the Canadian convoy should disembark at Devonport Dockyard; and the Divisional Naval Transport Officer, Southampton, was ordered to supply the Commander-in-Chief, Devonport, with such appliances for disembarkation as might be required. However, two military members of the Southampton Embarkation Staff who visited Plymouth to make arrangements reported so adversely on the conditions at Plymouth that the War Office, on October 6, pressed for a reconsideration of the question, as a result of which the Admiralty agreed to the use of Southampton and informed Admiral Wemyss.¹

He accordingly arranged that as soon as the longitude of the Fastnet was reached the eight fastest transports should proceed to Southampton at 16 knots without escort; 15 more, at 12 knots, should be escorted by the *Charybdis*, *Diana* and *Eclipse*; and the nine slowest at 9½ knots with the *Diana* and *Majestic*. This programme had to be modified, since certain camp equipment, without which the troops could not be dealt with on shore, was stowed in the *Montreal*, 12 knots, and *Alaunia*, 14 knots. It was essential that these two should be unloaded first. The most convenient method for disembarkation was for 12 of the fastest infantry ships to arrive on the first day, nine infantry and three horse ships to arrive 20 hours later, and seven horse ships and one slow infantry ship 24 hours after that. If this could be managed the disembarkation would take only three days. Accordingly, Admiral Wemyss was ordered on the 11th to send on the *Montreal* and *Alaunia* at once with one of his cruisers. At the longitude of the Fastnet (9° 40' W.) the convoy was split up into three batches. The *Glory* was to proceed to Queenstown to coal; the *Princess Royal* to be detached to Plymouth or Queenstown as convenient. The first batch of fast ships² was to go on with one cruiser, the second batch,³ with two cruisers, to proceed at 10 knots, and the third,⁴ of slow ships, at 8 knots. No escort for the third batch is specifically mentioned in the order,⁵ but the *Majestic* was still available. She and the cruisers were not to go further than the Eddystone, where pilots were to be taken on board the transports; the men-of-war were to go in to Plymouth to coal, while the transports went on to Southampton. For their passage between the Eddystone and the Needles they were to be escorted by the local

¹ T. 8126/1914, H.S. 3, pp. 170, 172.

² *Royal George*, *Bermudian*, *Megantic*, *Franconia*, *Royal Edward*, *Laurentic*, *Virginian*, *Tunisian*, *Lapland*, *Canada*—lowest speed 15 knots.

³ *Scandinavian*, *Arcadian*, *Zealand*, *Cassandra*, *Ivornia*, *Scotian*, *Manitou*, *Andania*, *Caribbean*, *Grampian*, *Saxonia*, *Florizel*—lowest speed 13 knots.

⁴ *Montezuma*, *Ruthenia*, *Monmouth*, *Corinthian*, *Sicilian*, *Athenia*, *Tyrolia*, *Lahonia*—lowest speed 12 knots.

⁵ Telegrams 42 and 43 to R.A. *Charybdis*. H.S. 3, pp. 181–186.

defence flotillas of Devonport and Portland.¹ They were to enter by the Needles channel on the nights of the 13th, 14th and 15th.²

89. **The Convoy Diverted on account of Submarines.**—The *Montreal* and *Alaunia*, escorted by the *Diana*, parted company with the rest of the convoy 570 miles west of Scilly at 6.30 p.m. October 11. As the rest of the convoy approached the longitude of the Fastnet the escorting cruisers heard what appeared to be strong German wireless calls and Admiral Wemyss decided not to break up the convoy and to keep the *Princess Royal* and *Glory*.³ At the longitude of the Fastnet, he passed the *Sutlej* and *Isis* of Force E. These with the *Venus* had come down from their usual stations and were now forming a sort of outer Channel guard along the transport route. But at this moment occurred an event which upset all the plans. On the 12th the French had sighted a submarine off Cape Gris Nez and had established a patrol from Cherbourg to the Owers Light Vessel east of Portsmouth; in spite of this a submarine was sighted and attacked by one of the torpedo boats of Portsmouth Extended Defence at 4.30 p.m. on the 13th, just off Culver Cliff at the east end of the Isle of Wight.⁴

The presence of this submarine so near Southampton made that port dangerous for the disembarkation, and the Admiralty immediately ordered the convoy to take shelter in Plymouth Sound till the road to the Needles could be cleared. The same orders were sent to the *Diana*. Her two transports arrived at Devonport at dawn October 14. At the same time Admiral Wemyss, who had reached Scilly, broke up the convoy and sent the first batch to Plymouth, following with the other batches. All arrived safely during October 14. Meanwhile, at the suggestion of the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, orders had been given for the transports not to wait, but for them to carry on disembarking at Plymouth till the submarine in the Channel could be disposed of, and Disembarkation Officers were sent from Southampton to assist. The submarine situation did not improve and the disembarkation at Plymouth, having once started, continued till the whole convoy had landed at Devonport.

The submarines sighted on the 12th and 13th in the approaches to Southampton had, in fact, been dispatched from Germany with the special mission of attacking the convoy. The German Admiralty on October 8 learned from their New York agents that 24 transports, escorted by eight warships, had left Quebec on October 2, a report which, so far, was very nearly accurate. Boulogne was assumed to be the destination of the

¹ H.S. 3, pp. 188, 192, 200, 203.

² H.S. 67, p. 934.

³ 26 from S.O. Force G., timed 13.10.14, 0800. See H.S. 3, p. 204.

⁴ H.S. 67, p. 999, and H.S. 68, p. 176.

force, the date of arrival to be between October 10 and 12, and as the troops were thought to be sufficiently trained to take the field at once, the military authorities wished to have this convoy attacked. Accordingly U.8 and U.20 were despatched on October 10 to operate off Boulogne against it. It was U.8 that was seen off Cape Gris Nez and U.20 was met off Culver Cliffs; but neither submarine seems to have come so far west as Plymouth, and thus the convoy escaped a very real danger.¹

The Canadian Expeditionary Force were the first Dominion troops to arrive in England; the enthusiasm and driving power of the Canadian Government had succeeded in landing 30,000 fine soldiers in England ten weeks from outbreak of war.

CHAPTER X.

OCTOBER 3-14. MOVEMENTS DURING THE PASSAGE OF THE CANADIAN CONVOY.

90. **North America, October 3-14.**—The German cruisers in the Atlantic made no sign of any attempt to interfere with the Canadian convoy. By October 6 the *Dresden* was considered to be on the west coast of America, and throughout the whole passage no intelligence of the *Karlsruhe* or *Kronprinz Wilhelm* came to light. Nor was any special activity noticed among the various convertible liners at ports within reach of the convoy route. The Hamburg-Amerika Company at New York engaged two pilots, but they cancelled the order on the day the convoy sailed. Two Norwegian colliers left Philadelphia on October 3 and were naturally assumed to be part of the German supply organisation. Apart from these the principal event of the period was a complaint from the United States authorities that our cruisers watching New York were too close in; their presence so near harbour and their stopping neutral vessels close to New York to take off reservists was causing adverse comment. The Admiralty instructed Admiral Hornby to prevent a repetition of such incidents, to which he replied that his ships had never been inside territorial waters since he had taken over the command, and that he had now given stringent orders for them not to approach within three miles of the pecked line joining Ambrose Lightship to the shore on Chart 2491.²

The watch on New York had been maintained by the *Suffolk* and *Caronia* from October 3-7; and by the *Caronia* and *Niobe* from October 7-13. On October 13 the *Suffolk* came back from Halifax and that same evening stopped and

¹ G.O.H. Nordsee II, pp. 153 *et seq.*

² H.S. 37, pp. 925, 940, 953, 955, 964, 969.

put a prize crew on board an oil tanker, the *Brindilla*, about six miles from Ambrose Light. This vessel was one of four German ships owned by the Standard Oil Company which had been transferred to the American flag under new names; Admiral Hornby proposed to send them in if met, since they were registered as belonging to the Deutsch-Amerika Petroleum Company of Hamburg.¹ The *Caronia*, which had been watching off New York since September 20, was due for coaling and she took the prize with her to Halifax. The *Lancaster*, with Admiral Hornby on board, was in port; he had arrived on October 12. As soon as the *Caronia* was again ready for sea on October 18, he transferred his flag to her.

91. Reservists no longer to be taken from Ships. Introduction of Green Clearance Labels.—Up till this time one of the duties of our cruisers had been the removal of German and Austrian reservists from vessels met at sea; and many other ships, besides those already mentioned, had had reservists taken from them. This procedure was causing a good deal of ill-feeling amongst certain neutrals whose good opinion it was essential for political reasons to preserve. A concession was made to Italy and on September 21 the Senior Officers in the Mediterranean and East Atlantic were instructed that parties of less than 50 enemy reservists in an Italian ship were to be allowed to proceed in the ship. A fortnight later the practice of removing reservists was entirely abandoned and on October 7 the Admiralty issued an order that they were no longer to be arrested in neutral ships. By a curious coincidence, on that very date the German Government came to the conclusion that it was no longer advisable to send home reservists from America, as British and French cruisers always removed them from neutral ships; in future, the return to Germany of conscripts was left to the individual judgment of the man himself.²

As regards the stoppage of contraband, the cruisers were relieved of some part of their duty of search by a system of green clearance labels issued by the Customs to innocent vessels. These vessels were handed on by signal through the different commands. The system came into force on October 5, when an order to that effect was sent to Cruiser Forces E, I and D in the East Atlantic.³

92. The West Indies. September 14 to October 14.—Since the capture of the *Spreewald* and the supply ships on September 11 the movements of the West Indian Division produced no noteworthy results. The *Essex* relieved the *Condé* of the guard at St. Thomas from September 14–17 and then coaled at St. Lucia. The *Berwick*, *Essex* and *Condé* began an independent

¹ H.S. 37, p. 1015. She was released later. For effect of her capture, and the question of her transfer see Fayle: *Seaborne Trade* I, 293, 294.

² I.D.H.S., 1476, No. 149.

³ A 128.

search of the islands round to the Bahamas; in the course of this the boilers of the *Essex* developed defects on the 25th and she had to spend from September 27 to October 12 in dockyard hands at Bermuda. The other two cruisers continued their cruise and arrived at Kingston, Jamaica, on September 27. They left again on the 30th for a week's cruise in the Western Caribbean, the *Berwick* examining St. Andrew Island (13° N., 82° W.) and Cartagena on the mainland, both of which were suspected as scenes of German activity.¹ Nothing suspicious was observed at either place. After coaling at Jamaica on October 7, the *Berwick* returned to St. Lucia *via* St. Christopher. The *Descartes*, which had been acting as guard ship at St. Lucia, was run into by a steamer on September 25 and somewhat damaged.² She had to go to Martinique for repairs, leaving only the *Berwick* and *Condé* fit for service. The latter proceeded also to Martinique.

St. Thomas, as before, continued to be a subject of suspicion. The *Präsident*, the small steamer which seemed to be acting as a German messenger in the West Indies, appeared at Havana on September 15, her departure from St. Thomas not having been reported by the Consul, an unsalaried official. Our Naval Attaché from Washington³ had been sent to report on the state of affairs at St. Thomas; he learned that two German vessels in harbour had been using wireless, but the Danish Governor, who was much under German influence, at first refused to stop this on the ground that we owned and operated a British cable station on the island. However, on September 20 the wireless rooms of the German ships were sealed with the seal of the colony and the ships were thenceforward kept under observation daily.⁴ As a result of his report on the island a salaried Consul was appointed.⁵ The arrival of the *Präsident* at Havana drew attention to Cuba, and when it was discovered that she had visited the island on two previous occasions since the outbreak of war, returning after widely different intervals, we pointed out to the Cuban Government that she had probably been supplying German cruisers and urged that she should not again be allowed to leave unless it was certain she was engaged in nothing more than ordinary trading.⁶

93. Movements of Force I, October 3–14.⁷—When the Canadian convoy started from Gaspé, the only ships of Force I actually at sea were the *Calgarian* and *Vindictive*, keeping watch off the Tagus. The *Amphitrite* was ready to leave Devonport

¹ H.S. 37, pp. 841, 843.

² Papers titled *Colonial Office*, 27 September, 1914: *Damage to Descartes*.

³ Captain Guy F. Gaunt, R.N.

⁴ H.S. 37, p. 994.

⁵ Papers titled *F.O.*, 16 September, 1914, and *F.O.*, 20 October, 1914: *Proceedings at St. Thomas*. H.S. 37, p. 998.

⁶ H.S. 37, pp. 974, 993.

⁷ De Robeck: Letter of Proceedings. M. 02930/14.

by the afternoon of October 3 and was ordered by Admiral de Robeck to relieve the *Vindictive*, on her way south visiting Coruna, Villagarcia and Vigo, where German ships and agents were reported to be showing activity. The Admiral himself got away from Gibraltar on the 5th, in the *Argonaut*, and proceeded as usual to the Tagus. There he was joined on the 7th by the *Amphitrite*. She had found at Coruna a large Telefunken wireless station in process of erection under German auspices, while at Villagarcia and Vigo were German ships with their aeriels still in place. Her arrival off the Tagus brought the number of ships there up to four—the whole available strength of Force I. Its presence appeared to have put a stop to the activity of the German ships at Lisbon, and the Admiral redistributed his force. He sent the *Vindictive* to Madeira; left the *Amphitrite* at the Tagus; and with the *Argonaut* and *Calgarian* started for the Azores, the flagship shaping course for Fayal and the armed merchant cruiser for Flores. His move resulted in another capture. At 12.45 p.m. on October 10, in 38.31 N., 25.44 W., about 35 miles north of San Miguel, the *Argonaut* boarded a ship flying Norwegian colours and calling herself the *Bjorgoin* of Bergen. Her general appearance agreed with the name she carried, but on investigation she turned out to be the *Graecia*, of the Hamburg-Amerika Line. Her remaining papers showed that after leaving New York she had come straight over to the Azores and had been hovering in the vicinity of those islands from September 7 to the date of her capture. Her wireless operator's log showed that on September 6, 7 and 8 she had been calling up German warships but had received no reply. She was made a prize and sent with a prize crew to Gibraltar, where she arrived on the 15th. The *Argonaut* and *Calgarian* remained cruising in the Azores; on the 13th the *Calgarian* had to go to Gibraltar for coal and to repair defects. The Tagus guard was kept by the *Amphitrite*. It had been Admiral de Robeck's intention to relieve her by the *Europa*, but that ship, though her completion was long overdue, had had unsatisfactory steam trials and could not leave Devonport. The old cruisers of the *Europa* class were notorious for breakdowns, and the Admiralty, wishing to give Admiral de Robeck a good ship, on October 8 ordered the *Donegal*, then preparing to commission in England, to join Force I when ready;¹ but when, after various delays, she actually sailed, the situation had changed and she went to the south-east coast of America instead.

Admiral de Robeck's visit to the Azores and capture of the *Graecia* brought to light the fact that the Portuguese authorities gave free use of their wireless stations to ships at sea; accordingly German colliers kept about 50 miles off the islands, maintaining touch by wireless. Several officials were strongly pro-German. To sever German communications with New York, the Admiral

¹ H.S. 36, p. 1049.

suggested that the Fayal-New York cable should be cut;¹ and to improve on our own, recommended the erection of a high-power station in the Azores to form a connecting link between England and ships in the south-west Atlantic.

94. **Convoys in the East Atlantic.**—During the Admiral's visit to the Azores an important convoy left home; this was the 1st Wessex Division for India, in nine transports, accompanied by three empty vessels.² This was the first of the long series of transport moves necessitated by the substitution of Territorial battalions for the Indian Army, most of which was now on its way home or to France. The provision of escorts from the small number of cruisers available for the various convoys moving in all parts of the world was a matter for nice adjustment, and forms an important part of the history of all foreign stations during 1914.

With the departure of the 1st Wessex Division was inaugurated a new system. The dates of arrival and departure from intermediate ports of the various convoys at sea were fixed so that an escort which had taken an outward convoy could bring back a homeward-bound one; and the sections of the whole voyage were arranged so that the escort could be provided from the stations through which the convoy passed. It was at first hoped to manage fortnightly sailings from home and from India; but this necessitated a higher speed than some of the transports could obtain, and a programme based on sailings at 16-day intervals was drawn up and issued on October 1. The outward Atlantic escort was to drop its convoy at Gibraltar and return with the homeward-bound convoy which should be ready there.³ So far, escorts in the section between Gibraltar and home had been provided by Admiral de Robeck, but with the new programme two cruisers, the *Bacchante* and *Euryalus*, were specially attached to the Western Channel Patrol for this particular duty. These cruisers had been operating in the southern part of the North Sea with the rest of their class; but after the torpedoing of the *Cressy*, *Hogue* and *Aboukir*, on September 22, the *Bacchante* and *Euryalus* were kept in harbour at Sheerness till October 7, when they proceeded to Portsmouth to pick up the convoy they were to take to Gibraltar. This left punctually on October 9, and after an uneventful voyage reached Gibraltar on the 14th; from there it proceeded unescorted as far as Malta.⁴

The Senior Officer, Gibraltar, however, suggested that it was impossible for both the cruisers to accompany all the convoys. He proposed to send one of them back to England with a convoy leaving Gibraltar on the 16th; she could then

¹ H.S. 36, p. 1089.

² *Alnwick Castle, Assam, Braemar Castle, Cawdor Castle, Dunluce Castle, Galeka, Kenilworth Castle, Nevasa, Ultonia.* The empty vessels were *Ingoma, Kelvingrove, Thongwa.*

³ See H.S. 36, pp. 979-981.

⁴ For its further progress see Monographs 22: *Mediterranean*, and 17: *East Indies.*

bring the next batch of outward-bound transports due to leave Southampton on October 25. The second cruiser he suggested should wait at Gibraltar till October 19; she would then take home another convoy and leave England again on November 10. Thenceforward the two cruisers could work alternate convoys, resting nine days at Gibraltar and 13 days in England. His proposals were not countermanded and, in fact, that was what was done, in spite of the Admiralty's evident intention for the convoys to have an escort of two cruisers between Gibraltar and home.¹

The Wessex Division, on its way south, passed a small homeward-bound convoy. The *Leviathan* had been in dock-yard hands at Gibraltar since September 17, and as it was now decided she should join the Grand Fleet, the opportunity of her passage was taken to bring home the remainder of the Army of Occupation of Egypt in four transports.² They left Gibraltar on October 11 for Southampton, but on October 14, when they were still 200 miles south of Ushant, they were diverted to Liverpool, as Southampton was considered dangerous on account of the submarine. The *Leviathan* accompanied them as far as St. George's Channel; there she parted company and proceeded in to Queenstown for repair. The four transports reached Liverpool safely on October 16.³

95. **The French Patrol in the Bay of Biscay.**—The passage of these and future convoys made a patrol of the Ushant-Finisterre section of Admiral de Robeck's original station more necessary than ever. This was in charge of the French, who, possibly not knowing of the impending programme of convoys, suggested on October 7 that the division of the 2nd Light Squadron watching between Finisterre and the Loire should go back to the Western Channel Patrol. Admiral Wemyss was away with the Canadian convoy and the suggestion was natural. The Admiralty, however, asked that three cruisers should maintain a patrol between Ushant and Finisterre and thus serve the double purpose of protecting the transport route and covering the Loire. The *Guichen* of the French squadron had been cruising off Bilbao; she was now recalled to take her place in the squadron.⁴ She had been waiting off Bilbao to intercept two German ships expected to put in there under neutral flags.⁵ These had not appeared.

96. **Area D, October 3-14.**—The *Unita* at Cadiz was not of much use to the Germans. Though she had 4,000 tons of coal on board, the master of the ship refused to obey the German

¹ H.S. 36, pp. 1083, 1094. It is not known why both cruisers could not accompany all convoys according to the Admiralty programme.

² *Californian, Corsican, Deseado, Indian*; see A 127.

³ H.S. 3, pp. 210, 224, 228; H.S. 68, p. 339; M. 7072/14; T. 9527/15, 7463/15.

⁴ A 129.

⁵ H.S. 36, p. 1041.

supercargo and the German Admiralty were forced to send instructions for the coal in her to be sold. All the colliers from New York for the East Atlantic zone had now been dispatched; but as they believed the rendezvous to be compromised the German Admiralty ordered all those ready laden at Las Palmas to wait further orders, the *Telde* included.²

This information was not at the time known to the cruisers of Force D, who were continuing their patrol of the Canaries and expecting at any moment that the *Telde* would depart. On this station, as elsewhere, the communications had proved not quick enough, and Admiral Stoddart was ordered to supply the Consul at St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, with apparatus for a temporary wireless station. The Portuguese Government had no objection to this, nor to the construction of a permanent station on the island, though this they wished to take over after the war. The temporary set was fitted up by the *Carnarvon* when she went in to St. Vincent on October 9.³ She had left Sierra Leone on the 3rd and had met the *Edinburgh Castle* on the way across. Force D was now entirely occupied in watching the Atlantic islands. At the Cape Verde group were the *Carnarvon*, *Albion* and *Empress of Britain*; while at the Canaries were the *Highflyer*, *Marmora* and *Victorian*. The last went off to coal at Gibraltar on October 9. On her return it was Admiral Stoddart's intention for the *Marmora* to come south to work with the *Carnarvon*, so that his squadron would then be in pairs.⁴

Before this scheme was in working order, Admiral Stoddart had come to the conclusion that the southern part of his station needed some attention. The patrol of the coast of Brazil itself was under the charge of the *Cornwall*, *Bristol* and *Macedonia*, based on Abrolhos Rocks. The *Cornwall* and *Bristol* left the Rocks on October 2 and proceeded northward to sweep the coast, the *Bristol* inshore and the *Cornwall* about 100 miles to seaward of her. The *Bristol* visited Bahia on October 3 and Pernambuco on the 5th. There she picked up the *Macedonia* and *Orama* to aid in the sweep. The two armed merchant cruisers took the middle position, the *Macedonia* making for Fernando Noronha, the *Orama* for Rocas. At Rocas the *Orama* turned back to coal at Abrolhos; at Fernando Noronha the *Macedonia* turned west to conform to the movements of the two cruisers, continuing as far as 40° W. at about 100 miles off shore. The *Bristol* inshore went as far as the Sao Joao Islands, off which a foreign ship had been seen cruising on October 5.⁵ Turning there, she followed the coastline at some 30 miles distance and, calling at Pernambuco on the 11th, was back at Abrolhos on October 14.

The *Cornwall* passed through the spot where the *Ascaro* had sighted the *Karlsruhe* and, visiting Pernambuco on the 10th,

¹ I.D.H.S. 1414, Nos. 26, 28, 47, 51. ² I.D.H.S. 1414, Nos. 30, 35.

³ H.S. 25, pp. 704, 742, 773. M. 02118/14, 03718/14.

⁴ H.S. 25, p. 806.

⁵ *Bristol* W/T Log 18259.

returned on the 13th to Abrolhos, where she remained till the end of the month. The sweep seemed to have produced no visible result and no enemy vessels were sighted.

Admiral Cradock was far away with the *Good Hope*, *Glasgow*, *Monmouth* and *Otranto*. The Falkland Islands was now his base and he ordered the *Canopus* there from Abrolhos. On October 8 he asked further that the *Essex* might relieve the *Cornwall* to join him also. This telegram reached the Admiralty on October 12, by which time they had ordered the *Kent*,¹ newly commissioned, to the south-east coast of America, and they, therefore, left the *Essex* in the West Indies. The German Cruiser Squadron under Admiral von Spee was known to be coming eastward towards South America and could reach the River Plate by about October 18. Admiral Cradock therefore announced that he would concentrate his squadron and suggested that there should be enough force on the south-east coast of America to bring the enemy to action should he evade the *Good Hope* squadron in the Pacific. It may have been merely a coincidence that Admiral Stoddart now proposed to take the *Carnarvon*, *Albion*, *Marmorata* and *Empress of Britain*, with a collier, and sweep towards St. Paul Rocks, Fernando Noronha, Rocas Island, and thence to the southern limit of his station, so long as coal lasted.² This proposal of his reached the Admiralty on October 12, while they were deciding what to do in face of the situation which would arise if Admiral von Spee, with his modern 8 in. gun cruisers *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, more powerful ships than any in our cruiser forces, should arrive in the Atlantic. The Cape Squadron was particularly weak; it had only the *Hyacinth* and *Astraea*, old vessels with nothing better than 6 in. guns, and the *Astraea* was nearing Sierra Leone with two transports,³ containing the remainder of the Cape garrison on passage from home. As a first step they ordered the *Albion* from St. Vincent to Ascension preparatory to sending her out to the Cape.⁴ She left on October 14.

97. Formation of a Second South American Squadron.—The Admiralty's decision was to adopt Admiral Cradock's suggestion of a second squadron to oppose Admiral von Spee should he evade the *Good Hope* squadron in the Pacific and come round into the Atlantic.

On a previous occasion, early in September, when nothing had been heard of the German Cruiser Squadron for a month and it was thought it would shortly appear to the east of Cape Horn, the *Defence*, a modern cruiser with four 9·2 in. and ten 7·5 in. guns, was ordered from the Dardanelles to the south-east

¹ 1900, 9,800 tons, fourteen 6 in., Captain John D. Allen, R.N.

² A 133. Admiral Stoddart's letter of proceedings (M. 03718/14), covering the period between September 15 and October 21, consist of only three pages with wide margins and do not even mention this proposal.

³ *Dover Castle*, *Garth Castle*.

⁴ A 132.

coast of America to join Admiral Cradock, but a few days later the German squadron was sighted off Samoa and the departure of the *Defence* was countermanded.¹ She remained at the Dardanelles as flagship till October 6, when she was ordered home. Now, once again, she was ordered to Monte Video. Her captain was required at home for an important inquiry; at Gibraltar he exchanged with Captain Leatham of the *Euryalus*, who left Gibraltar with the *Defence* on October 15, to join the new squadron.² The Admiralty gave the command of this new squadron to Admiral Stoddart, sending him orders as follows:—

101. Proceed down the trade route to Montevideo, calling at Pernambuco and Rio on the way. *Defence* is following you down from Gibraltar. While you are there, *Cornwall*, *Bristol*, *Macedonia* and *Orama* will be under your orders.

Keep sufficient force ready to concentrate in case German squadron from Pacific escape past Cradock, who has *Good Hope*, *Canopus*, *Monmouth*, *Bristol*³ and *Otranto*.

Empress of Britain and *Marmorata* to return when you think fit, to operate in the vicinity of Cape Verde, under *Highflyer*.

There is coal at Abrolhos Rocks.

Communicate when you can with Cradock, through Montevideo. He is now in the vicinity of the Falkland Islands.

(Sent 1.15 p.m., 14/10/14, via Dakar Radio. Repeated to St. Vincent by cable.)

CHAPTER XI.

OCTOBER 14 TO NOVEMBER 4. THE "KARLSRUHE'S" ACTIVITIES REVEALED.

98. The Canary Islands, October 14-22.—The order that he was to sail for Monte Video reached Admiral Stoddart in the afternoon of October 14 as he was patrolling in the *Carnarvon* off St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands. Next morning he went in, coaled and made arrangements for the conduct of the station during his absence. Captain Buller, in the *Highflyer*, was the senior Captain and Admiral Stoddart ordered him to come from the Canaries to St. Vincent with the *Marmorata*. The Admiral had been given the option of taking the *Empress of Britain* and *Marmorata* with him, possibly to sweep for the *Karlsruhe* in accordance with his latest proposal;⁴ but they were expecting the arrival of a storeship, now somewhat overdue, and he decided

¹ C.B. 917, p. 37, Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8.

² A 134.

³ Evidently a slip of the pen for *Glasgow*. For original see H.S. 25, p. 837.

⁴ A 133.

to leave them behind, the *Empress of Britain* to be in charge at St. Vincent till the *Highflyer* and *Marmora* arrived. The *Victorian*, on leaving Gibraltar, was to look after the Canaries.¹ These arrangements completed, he left St. Vincent at 9 p.m. on the 15th to take charge of the south-east coast of America.

Just as he was leaving he received an order to escort the *Astraea's* convoy across his station. As he had only the three armed liners and the *Highflyer* at his disposal he replied that he had no cruiser to send. As it happened, this order, though it did not reach him till the 15th, had been sent six days before; and as no reply had come from him the Admiralty had sent instructions direct to the *Highflyer* that she was to take over the convoy at St. Vincent and escort it homeward until relieved by one of the cruisers of Force I. After coaling at Madeira the *Highflyer* came south to St. Vincent, arriving there on the 22nd; the *Marmora* left the Canaries on the 19th and joined the *Highflyer* on the 23rd. Thus three out of the four vessels of Force D were stationed in the Cape Verde Islands, although it had been clear for some time that the Canaries group was one of the centres of German activity and the anchorage of many German and strongly suspected neutral ships.

On leaving the Canaries, Captain Buller gave the Admiralty a resumé of the situation there. He reported that the *Telde* had embarked 1,400 tons of coal and the *Nepos* and *Mowinkel*, though their machinery had been disabled by the Spanish authorities, were loaded with naval stores; there was a rumour abroad that the *Cap Ortegale*, of 13½ knots and fitted with wireless, was about to escape from Santa Cruz de Tenerife; and circumstances indicated that the Canary Islands had been used again and again as a base for enemy ships.²

The number of these was increased by the *Macedonia*, a Hamburg-Amerika liner which had left New Orleans on August 30 and had not since been heard of. She came in to Santa Cruz de la Palma on October 17. At that time the *Highflyer* was examining the Salvages on her way to Madeira and the *Marmora* was patrolling the southern approach to Tenerife; the German vessel, therefore, ran little risk of capture. A previous arrival, the *Walhalla*, at Las Palmas, was now reported by the French to be about to receive a supply of coal from Bilbao, and she moved from Las Palmas to Tenerife, presumably to get into a more advantageous position.³

The *Kent* was passing the islands on her way to the south-east coast of America and the Admiralty signalled to her *via* Gibraltar North Front Wireless Station that she was to remain

¹ H.S. 44, pp. 11, 18, 21.

² Sent 7.30 p.m., 18th, received 12.11 p.m. 19th, *via* Horsea. See H.S. 44, p. 91.

³ H.S. 44, pp. 39, 129, 132, 144.

in the vicinity of the Canaries for the time, putting herself under the orders of Captain Buller in the *Highflyer*, who was now Senior Officer on the station, and searching for coaling bases in the islands.¹ The order does not seem to have reached the *Kent*, for she continued to St. Vincent, arriving on the 19th, by which time her orders were again changed.

The *Astraea*, with the two transports *Dover Castle* and *Garth Castle*, containing the remainder of the Cape Garrison, left Sierra Leone on the 17th, and next day the Admiralty gave Captain Buller the option of using either the *Kent* or *Highflyer* to escort the transports across Area D. He ordered the *Kent* to take this duty and she started northward with them on the 19th. Admiral de Robeck, who had been instructed to relieve the *Kent* with one of his cruisers, selected the *Vindictive*, as she was in need of some dockyard repair. She was then at Madeira, testing the range of a new Poulsen wireless installation with which she had been fitted before leaving home.² The Admiralty ordered Admiral de Robeck to send her to search the islands while waiting for the *Highflyer* and her convoy.³ This order, like most of those for the East Atlantic ships, failed to arrive in time and the *Vindictive* remained off Funchal till noon on the 22nd, when she proceeded direct for the rendezvous north of Palma Island at which she was to relieve the *Highflyer* of the Cape convoy. The relief took place on October 23, in latitude 30° N., and the *Kent* returned to the Canaries. The convoy arrived at Southampton on October 30, the *Vindictive* by Admiralty orders having parted company at the position halfway between Ushant and the Eddystone;⁴ she went in to Devonport and remained there refitting for three weeks.

The *Victorian* could not get away from Gibraltar till early on October 19, having been delayed several days by strikes of Spanish workmen in the dockyard. During her two days' voyage we had no cruiser at the Canaries at all. On arrival at the islands she went to Palma to interview our Consul on the subject of the *Macedonia*. From him it was learned that signal lights had been seen off the south end of Palma Island and rumours were current that the *Karlsruhe* was in the neighbourhood. The *Kent*, with her convoy, was passing near and the *Victorian* proceeded to the south-west of Hierro Island to warn her.⁵

99. Reports of the "Karlsruhe." October 16 to 22.—The latest authentic reports of the *Karlsruhe* had been furnished by a Spanish vessel which came in to Las Palmas on October 16. A week before she had been stopped by that cruiser in 0° 20' S., 29° 40' W., about 60 miles south of St. Paul Rocks. The

¹ A 139.

² A 140, 141.

³ A 142.

⁴ *Vindictive*, Letter of Proceedings. M. 03207/14.

⁵ *Victorian*, Letter of Proceedings. M. 01006/15.

Carnarvon had left St. Vincent and Admiral Stoddart did not learn this intelligence. He steamed straight down the trade route well to the westward of this position; and, as British merchant vessels were keeping wide of the route, he sighted only neutral steamers. On arrival at Pernambuco on October 21 he was informed by our Intelligence Officer that the *Karlsruhe* was seen at 10 a.m., October 20, at Lavandeira Reef (5° S., 36° 8' W.), taking in stores from another vessel. Unable to investigate the report himself, as he had to proceed to the southward, he ordered the *Bristol* and *Edinburgh Castle* to examine the place, the liner then to continue her round voyage.¹ Various neutral steamers arriving at Las Palmas reported on October 20 that she was operating near the Equator and had sunk 12 merchant vessels,² whose names they did not know. Vague though the information was, it was not unlikely to be true since seven steamers on the South American route were overdue; and all doubt was cleared up on October 22.

While the *Victorian* was off Hierro Island trying to inform the *Kent* that the *Karlsruhe* might be near, there came into Tenerife a German ship, the *Crefeld*, which the *Glasgow* had tried to keep in port but which had sailed from Santos on August 12. Since then the vessel had not been reported. On arrival at Tenerife she was found to have on board 419 people, the crews and passengers of 13 ships³ captured and believed to have been sunk by the *Karlsruhe* in the area between St. Paul Rocks and Rocas Reef.

100. "Karlsruhe's" Movements, August 26 to October 1.⁴

On dismissing the *Stadt Schleswig*, Captain Köhler of the *Karlsruhe* decided to attack trade at the north-east shoulder of Brazil. He coaled again on August 30 at a secluded spot and continued his voyage to the eastward. Next morning he picked up the *Asuncion* and *Crefeld* and was proceeding in single line ahead with them and the *Patagonia*, when at 4 p.m., in 3.35 S., 34.35 W., about 50 miles W.N.W. of Rocas Reef, another steamer was sighted. This was at first thought to be the *Rio Negro*, with which the *Karlsruhe* was in wireless touch; but seeing that the newcomer was a stranger, Captain Köhler sent the *Asuncion* and *Crefeld* to wait for him at the reef, keeping

¹ A 146; H.S. 44, p. 37; H.S. 43, pp. 91, 115, 117. ² H.S. 44, p. 125.

³ *Strathroy*, Norfolk (Va.) for Rio; *Maple Branch*, Liverpool for Punta Arenas; *Highland Hope*, U.K. for Buenos Ayres; *Cornish City*, Cardiff for Rio; *Rio Iguassu*, St. Vincent, C.V., for Rio; *Pruth*, Monte Video for St. Vincent, C.V.; *Indrani*, Norfolk (Va.) for Rio. These seven vessels constituted the overdue list.

Farn, Barry for Monte Video; *Cervantes*, Rio for Liverpool; *Condor*, Philadelphia for Valparaiso; *Lynrowan*, Buenos Aires for Liverpool; *Niceto de Larrinaga*, Buenos Aires for Liverpool; *Maria* (Dutch), Punta Arenas for Dublin.

The number of British vessels passing through the area in which the *Karlsruhe* was reported to be acting was about 16 daily (H.S. 22, p. 173).

⁴ Based mainly on Aust.

the *Patagonia* with him, while he examined the stranger. She proved to be the British collier *Strathroy*, with 5,600 tons of coal from Norfolk, Virginia, for Brazil,¹ more than was carried by the four tenders of the cruiser. Ordering her to follow, Captain Köhler continued his course to Rocas Reef, and was there by 8 a.m., September 1. There the European crew of the *Strathroy* were transferred to the *Asuncion*, the original Chinese crew remaining in the ship, and Captain Köhler sent his mails to the *Patagonia* for delivery at Pernambuco. This completed the operations at Rocas Reef. The *Patagonia* conducted the *Strathroy* to a secluded harbour on the coast of Brazil² and then passed on for Pernambuco, arriving on September 6. The *Karlsruhe* steamed northward with the *Crefeld* in company for a point which Captain Köhler thought suitable for the interception of steamers. The *Asuncion* and *Rio Negro* seem to have remained behind near Rocas Reef.

It will be remembered that the *Glasgow* and *Monmouth* searched the Brazilian coast as far as Macau on August 27 and were joined by the *Otranto* at Rocas Reef on August 28.³ Had Captain Luce's sweep taken place a few days later he would have come upon the German squadron, consisting of the *Karlsruhe*, *Patagonia*, *Rio Negro*, *Crefeld* and *Strathroy*, anchored in the swell off Rocas Reef.

Captain Köhler had not long to wait. In the early morning of September 3 the *Maple Branch* from Liverpool came upon them in 2° S., 32.10 W. She was stopped, and her crew, mostly Chinamen, were transferred to the *Crefeld*. On board, besides general cargo for South America, was a number of prize animals intended for exhibition in the Argentine; these provided the Germans with a supply of fresh meat of the finest quality. At nightfall the *Maple Branch* was sunk.⁴

About this time wireless signals from the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* were heard, but the *Karlsruhe* did not communicate as she had been intercepting signals from 11 different British warships, and did not want to reveal her own position.⁵ The *Kronprinz Wilhelm* joined the *Asuncion*, took provisions from her and went on southward.⁶ The *Asuncion* rejoined the *Karlsruhe* in the afternoon of September 5 and next day transferred the crew of the *Strathroy* to the *Crefeld*; the *Karlsruhe* then made off at full speed for the quiet spot where the *Strathroy* was waiting with her load of coal. Just at this time the *Macedonia* was passing about 30 miles to westward. The coaling lasted for two days,

¹ Deposition of Chief Engineer of *Strathroy*. M. 20570/14.

² This has not been identified, in spite of descriptions given by the Chinese crew.

³ See Section 60.

⁴ Deposition of master of *Maple Branch*. M. 19408/14.

⁵ Two of these were the *Good Hope* and *Cornwall*, who, during September 2 and 3, passed 60 miles to eastward.

⁶ See Section 78.

Sept 4.
No II 270.

specially anxious ones for the cruiser. "These coaling days were always the most dangerous for us, if not, indeed, the only dangerous ones," says Aust. We do not know where the coaling place was, but if it was near Macau there was some chance of their being sighted by the *Bristol*, then on passage from Para to Pernambuco. She was about 35 miles north of Macau at noon, September 9, and continued towards Cape San Roque, keeping some 30 miles off and out of sight of the shore, which in this neighbourhood is dangerous and edged with shoals. Thus she missed what seems to have been a good chance of catching the *Karlsruhe* coaling.

By September 10 the *Karlsruhe* was back in position, but somewhat to the northward of her former station, with the *Crefeld* to the west of her, the *Rio Negro* to the east, serving as scouts to warn her of the approach of enemy or prey. Her engines were stopped to economise coal, but she always kept steam up ready for full speed if necessary. Nothing was seen till the early hours of September 14, when the lights of a steamer were sighted. Keeping touch, the *Karlsruhe* at dawn found this to be the *Highland Hope*, bound to the Argentine for meat. In this position, 1.3 S., 31.45 W., she was stopped and captured.¹ While the prize was in process of being dealt with, a Spanish liner on the way to Monte Video passed, and seeing a cruiser and three merchant vessels stopped in mid-ocean, inquired what they were. The *Karlsruhe* replied by wireless, "Convoy British ships." The question and answer were taken in by the *Canopus*, then on passage to Pernambuco escorting an oiler. Her suspicions raised, she inquired and obtained the position of the Spanish vessel, and found it to be 18 miles on the starboard beam; however, she did not close the Spaniard, but continued her cruise for Pernambuco, having, in fact, had the *Karlsruhe*, *Highland Hope*, *Rio Negro* and *Crefeld* 20 miles on her starboard beam a few hours before.² The incident seems to have been a narrow escape for the *Karlsruhe*, and has particular interest in that the *Canopus*, of all ships, might have ended the German cruiser's career, which Admiral Cradock considered would undoubtedly continue till she should meet a ship with more than her own 26 knots.³

¹ Deposition of master of *Highland Hope*. M. 18852/14.

² The W/T Log of *Canopus*, No. 31331, has the following on September 14:—9.50 a.m. Message in unknown cypher. (This we now know to be the *Karlsruhe* calling the *Rio Negro* to the position 1° S., 31° 40' W.)

1.19 p.m. *Reina Victoria Eugenia* to all ships: "What are those four ships abeam?"

1.30 p.m. To *Reina Victoria Eugenia*: "Convoy British ships."


2.53 p.m. *R. V. Eugenia* to M X E (fictitious call sign given by *Canopus*). Lat. 1° 23' S., 31° 48' W.

Extract from Deck Log of *Canopus*: "September 14, noon position, 0.53 S., 31.21 W. Course 8.30 a.m. to 1 p.m. S., 38 W., variation 19° W. Average speed 8 knots. Course 1 p.m. to noon September 15, S. 35 W., unchanged. Average speed 8 knots."

³ Compare Cradock's telegram 325 in A 154.

The encounter with the Spanish liner, however, and her conversation with the British man-of-war, which had been overheard in the *Karlsruhe*, decided Captain Köhler to move

KARLSRUHE'S escape of 14th September.



away for a time and try his luck on the North American route, which was north-westward from Cape San Roque. On the 15th he sighted two Norwegian sailing vessels and on the 17th another British collier on passage to South America with Virginian coal. This was the *Indrani*, and was speedily captured in 3° S., 35.40 W. As she had 7,000 tons of coal on board¹ and was fitted with wireless, which the master had neglected to destroy, she was looked upon as a valuable addition to the squadron and was not destroyed. Her British officers were transferred to the *Crefeld*, but her original Chinese crew were left on board to work the ship and cargo under German control; and she was renamed *Hoffnung*. The *Karlsruhe* went off in company with the *Asuncion*, which had come up to rejoin, and coaled once more.

Captain Köhler now decided to return to the European track. Revisiting the rendezvous where the *Indrani* and *Crefeld* were waiting, he took along with him the *Rio Negro* and *Crefeld* to act as scouts, and by September 21 was once again in the neighbourhood of the spot where he had captured the *Highland Hope*. Here, during that day, he sank two steamers. The first of these was a Dutch ship, the *Maria*, which had been

¹ Deposition of master of *Indrani*. M. 18797/14.

boarded by the *Canopus* two days before ; she was sunk because carrying wheat from Portland, Oregon, to Ireland. The legality of Captain Köhler's action is questionable ; in the minds of those in the *Karlsruhe* there was no suggestion other than that the wheat was for the civil population,¹ but the Supreme Prize Court of Berlin justified what was done on the assertion that Dublin was a military base.²

The second prize of that day was another British collier, the *Cornish City*, with 5,500 tons of coal from Barry for Rio. Her coal was of poor quality and Captain Köhler decided to get rid of her, as she was an old, worn-out vessel with no wireless, and he could not spare another crew for her. Moreover, the *Indrani* alone would keep him supplied for some time. Accordingly she was blown up that afternoon in the position 1.55 S., 32.5 W.³

Meanwhile, strong signals had been heard from a vessel thought to be the *Amazon*, of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company. The *Karlsruhe* chased northward and at 10 p.m. sighted lights, but decided not to hold up the vessel till daylight as she probably had passengers on board. Keeping the lights in view, at daybreak she sighted the steamer ; but to the general disappointment it was not the *Amazon*, but the Italian *Ascaro*, which had to be released and whose report at St. Vincent six days later was the first definite information as to the *Karlsruhe's* whereabouts. But in the afternoon the failure to catch the *Amazon* was compensated for by the capture of still another collier, the *Rio Iguassu*, with 4,800 tons from Newcastle for Rio.⁴ As her coal, like that of the *Cornish City*, was poor and the ship was old, she shared the same fate. Captain Köhler had at first intended to take in some coal from her but abandoned the attempt on account of the swell. She was blown up by two charges, one in the shaft tunnel and one forward in the collision bulkhead ; and was the first steamer the men of the *Karlsruhe* had seen sunk by daylight.

By this time the cruiser was in need of some overhauling and repair on account of the continuous steaming and the damage caused by the frequent coalings. She did not venture to go into harbour for this, but moved off to westward ~~out of the track of all shipping and spent from September 23 to 27 in this necessary work.~~ She then proceeded to her coaling base, meeting on the way the *Asuncion*, which had sunk the *Strathroy* after removing all her remaining coal. On October 1, with her bunkers full and with coal a yard deep on the upper deck, except round the guns, the *Karlsruhe* started for another raid.

¹ Aust. says "This cargo would provide the entire City of London with bread for a fortnight."

² See Fayle : *Seaborne Trade* I, 256.

³ Deposition of master of *Cornish City*. M. 18852/14.

⁴ Deposition of master of *Rio Iguassu*. M. 19624/14.

101. "Karlsruhe's" Movements, October 1-13.¹—On October 2 the *Asuncion* rejoined with a series of important telegrams. From these Captain Köhler learned that the *Cap Trafalgar* had been sunk ; that von Spee was on the way to South America, and the *Good Hope*, *Monmouth* and *Glasgow* were proceeding southward, and that there was so serious a shortage of coal throughout Brazil that some railways had stopped running and the electric light supply was much reduced.

For two days no vessels came in sight ; but on October 6 the *Crefeld*, which was scouting to eastward of the cruiser, reported a steamer. After two hours' chase this was captured in 0.46 S., 30.50 W., and proved to be the *Farn*, from Barry for Monte Video with 5,810 tons of Welsh coal and coke.² As the *Strathroy* had been scuttled, Captain Köhler had now a spare crew ; these he put on board the *Farn* under a Reserve Officer, Lieutenant-Commander Lubinus, and he then sent her off to join the *Asuncion* and take from her the *Strathroy's* Chinese crew. The *Karlsruhe* remained with the *Crefeld* and *Rio Negro*. As evening drew on the wireless calls of a British man-of-war were heard ; the signals increased so much in strength that Captain Köhler decided to move off to the eastward.

The ship he heard was the *Cornwall*, which in the course of a sweep with the *Bristol* and *Macedonia*³ was steering direct for the spot where the *Farn* had been captured. Just short of it she turned at noon on the 7th to westward for the sweep of the north coast of Brazil. By that time Captain Köhler's move to eastward had brought him luck. In the afternoon of October 6 the *Rio Negro* reported a steamer, the *Niceto de Larrinaga*, British, from Buenos Aires for London. She was sunk that night in 0.35 S., 29.48 W.⁴ Next morning the *Lynrowan*, which had left Buenos Aires at the same time as the *Niceto de Larrinaga*, was captured in 0.25 S., 29.54 W.⁵ After transferring her crew to the *Crefeld*, Captain Köhler ~~decided to use her hull as a target for gunnery practice. As a result of this she sank at 3 p.m.~~ Fortunately for him the sound of the firing did not reach the *Cornwall*, which at noon, October 7, was in 1.40 S., 31.4 W.⁶ A third steamer was taken next morning, the *Cervantes*, from Rio for Liverpool, and at midnight another, the *Pruth*, from Monte Video with nitrate. Both were sunk.⁷

This fine haul of vessels at 40 miles distance from the usual track was due to the mischance that, while the vessels were obeying Admiralty instructions to keep wide of the route, the

¹ Based upon Aust.

² Deposition of master of *Farn*. H.S. 22/210/4.

³ See Section 96.

⁴ Deposition of master of *Niceto de Larrinaga*. M. 18797/14.

⁵ Deposition of master of *Lynrowan*. M. 18915/14.

⁶ Corbett's *Naval Operations*, Map 12, wrongly shows *Cornwall's* noon latitude as 0° 40' S.

⁷ Depositions of masters of *Pruth* and *Cervantes*. M. 18926/14, 19119/14.

Karlsruhe, which had been waiting more or less on the route itself, had been frightened away from it by the wireless of the cruisers sweeping for her. It would have been advantageous to stay in so good a spot but coal was getting low. At noon, October 9, she met and released the Spanish mail steamer *Cadiz* and Captain Köhler realised that he must soon move, as his position would undoubtedly be reported on the ship's arrival at Las Palmas. He waited another day, in which he held up and released a Norwegian steamer. Then, steering across the trade route, he arrived next day at the rendezvous where the *Asuncion* and *Farn* were awaiting him, and there he found that they were in conversation with another British steamer, the *Condor*, bound from New York for Chile. The master had taken a widely circuitous route which had brought him to this unfrequented spot, 2° S., 34° W.,¹ that is, 165 miles clear of the track he would follow in peace time and 125 miles from the Brazil-St. Vincent route. The *Condor* was captured and proved a valuable prize. She had in her cargo lubricating oil which the *Karlsruhe* could use for fuel; provisions, which were welcome; and dynamite cartridges, of which the cruiser had run out. Unloading this prize occupied the whole of October 12 and 13.

The *Crefeld* was now full of unwilling passengers, the crews of the captured ships, and the feeding of them was a serious drain on the stock of provisions. Already Captain Köhler had decided to send her to Tenerife to land her prisoners; he now detached her for the voyage, with orders not to arrive before October 22. She parted company at 4 p.m., October 13, while the men of the cruiser were still engaged in clearing the *Condor*.²

By the *Crefeld* Captain Köhler sent a letter in which he reported that he was not in touch with the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* and did not know where she was; he was in communication with Pernambuco through the *Holger*, a vessel of the Roland line, which had been at that port since the beginning of the war; and that he knew the rendezvous line between Rocas Reef and Trinidad (possibly Trinidad T.S.D.D.) to be compromised.³ The *Holger* seems to have signalled to him the movements of merchant ships and war vessels.⁴ In addition to the intelligence given him by the *Holger*, the newspapers in the captured vessels supplied much useful information. The frequent calls of our cruisers at South American ports were all recorded and enabled

¹ Deposition of the master of *Condor*. M. 18798/14.

² This section and the previous one are taken almost entirely from Aust.: *Die Kriegsfahrten S.M.S. Karlsruhe*. This little book, based evidently on a contemporary diary, is corroborated by the statements of the crews of the captured ships given in M. 02377/14, 03281/14, 18626/14, 18715/14, 18809/14, 03383/14, 03403/14.

³ I.D.H.S. 1414/66.

⁴ I.D.H.S. 1499, p. 2. It was possibly to take in these messages which were not likely to be made on high power that the *Asuncion* went off from time to time. T.S.D.D.

him to place many of our ships. For instance, the *Lynrowan's* papers told him that the *Good Hope*, *Monmouth* and *Glasgow* had been at Monte Video.

Punctually on the date fixed by Captain Köhler the *Crefeld* steamed in to Tenerife, and soon the report that she had on board 400 men from 13 sunken ships began to spread. It reached the Admiralty at 5.58 p.m. on October 22, and was followed next morning by a list of the names of the ships.¹ The effect of the news on shipping was slight; in fact, it disturbed trade less than the sinking of the *Hyades* and *Holmwood* by the *Dresden*, and the effect of the *Karlsruhe's* operations was hardly appreciable even on the trade of the route which she attacked.²

The Consul's endeavours to inform the *Victorian* by wireless of the *Crefeld's* arrival were to a certain extent frustrated by the Spanish operators at the Marconi station, who withheld his message from despatch until 4 a.m., October 23. On receipt of it the *Victorian* went full speed to Santa Cruz de Tenerife, arriving at midday. The Spanish refused to intern the *Crefeld*; she thus made the fourth vessel to be blockaded at Tenerife alone, and Captain Somerville of the *Victorian* suggested that torpedo boats were required to make the blockade effective. He interviewed all the masters of the captured ships and telegraphed to the Admiralty a précis of the information obtained from them.³

According to these masters the *Karlsruhe* had over 12,000 tons of coal, mostly Welsh, oil fuel and a large quantity of provisions taken from captured ships; she operated in line abreast with her scouts at 80 miles distant on each beam; and she obtained exact information from the United States and Brazil of the dates of departure and destination of steamers.⁴

102. **Searching the Brazilian Coast for the "Karlsruhe."**—No special steps were taken by the Admiralty to send any ships to the area in which the *Karlsruhe* had been operating. What was done was rather to look for her bases. Admiral Stoddart's information that she had been coaling in 5° S., 36° 8' W. (Lavandiera Reef) on October 20 was later than that brought by the *Crefeld*, and he ordered the *Kent* to look in there on her way south and to inform the *Defence*,⁵ which had left St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, in the forenoon of the 21st for Pernambuco. The *Defence*, however, did not visit Lavandiera Reef; keeping well out of the trade route she examined Rocas Reef in the early morning of October 25 and, visiting Pernambuco for a few hours on the 26th, proceeded for Abrolhos.

¹ A 145.

² Fayle: *Seaborne Trade* I, 266, where the reasons for this are discussed; also pp. 333-4.

³ *Victorian*, Letter of Proceedings. M. 01006/15.

⁴ Telegram from *Victorian* received October 26, 1.14 a.m. H.S. 44, p. 234.

⁵ H.S. 44, p. 185.

Admiral Stoddart, as can be seen by his instructions to the *Kent*, thought she was to join him in accordance with her sailing orders. When ordering her to remain with the *Highflyer* the Admiralty had not informed him of the change, but they now explained to him that the *Defence* was not additional to, but instead of, the *Kent* in his squadron. They instructed him not to proceed further south till there was more definite news of von Spee's squadron; a cruiser working with an armed liner was to operate within 300 miles of Cape San Roque, while another ship was to guard the supplies and colliers at Abrolhos; the *Edinburgh Castle* was not to continue her round voyage as he had ordered, but to remain on the station for the time. Besides giving him these definite instructions, they pointed out that there were two focal points to be guarded and patrolled by him, one near Cape San Roque, the other between Rio and Abrolhos.¹

On October 26 a still later report of the *Karlsruhe* was brought by a Swedish ship, the *Annie Johnson*, which came into Pernambuco with the news that she had been stopped by the *Karlsruhe* at night on October 23, 100 miles north of Fernando Noronha. The *Edinburgh Castle*, which had looked in at Pernambuco on the 23rd and examined Lavandeira Reef on the 24th, was then cruising round about Fernando Noronha and Rocas Reef. The *Bristol*, with Captain Fanshawe, Senior Officer of the Cape San Roque division, was on her way up from Abrolhos, keeping 100 miles to seaward while the *Macedonia* followed close in shore. Calling the *Edinburgh Castle* to him, Captain Fanshawe met her at midnight in 5.20 S., 33.20 W., whereupon he sent her to patrol along the trade route 100 miles north of Fernando Noronha, while he himself proceeded for Lavandeira *viâ* Rocas Reef.

Off Rocas, at noon on the 27th, he was joined by the *Macedonia* and he sent her to patrol the meridian of 34° W., between 2.30 S., and 4.30 S. None of the three vessels saw or heard anything of the *Karlsruhe* or her colliers, except some faint Telefunken, unreadable through atmospherics.²

103. **Searching the Coast of Africa for the "Karlsruhe."**—The Admiralty, on the other hand, were investigating a totally different area. They had come to the conclusion that when a hostile cruiser made her presence known by sending the crews of captured vessels in to port she was unlikely to remain on the same route,³ and when a report came in from Dakar on the 24th that the *Karlsruhe* was at anchor near the Bissagos or Bijouga Islands (11° N., 16° W.), they gave it sufficient credence to order the *Highflyer* there from St. Vincent.⁴ She accordingly proceeded on the 25th, leaving the *Empress of Britain* alone off St. Vincent. The *Marmora* was on her way to Sierra Leone,

¹ A 146, 147.
³ A 137.

² *Bristol W/T Log*, 18259. October 27.
⁴ A 148, 150.

escorting the store ship. Admiral de Robeck had already suggested that he should send a vessel to assist in the patrol of the Canaries when ships were short there, and the Admiralty now asked him to send a cruiser and the *Calgarian* to relieve the *Kent* and *Victorian* at the Canaries, so that they could go down the inshore trade route towards Cape Verde to look out for the *Karlsruhe*.¹ He was now in the *Amphitrite*. He had left the Azores in the *Argonaut* on October 14, and after coaling at Madeira on the 17th met the *Amphitrite* at the Tagus and transferred his flag to her on the 20th. The *Argonaut* he sent to Devonport with orders to look in at Vigo on the way. The *Europa* joined him at last next day, and leaving her to guard the Tagus he proceeded to Gibraltar. Soon after leaving Gibraltar again he received the Admiralty's telegram requiring him to send a cruiser to the Canaries. His flagship was the only vessel available,² and as the *Calgarian* was not out of dockyard hands he suggested that the *Bacchante*, then waiting at Gibraltar for a convoy, should join him at the Canaries. This the Admiralty would not allow³ and the *Amphitrite* proceeded alone.

Meanwhile the *Highflyer* had received explicit information that the *Karlsruhe* was cruising near Bissagos Islands; on this, the *Kent* was instructed to proceed towards Cape Verde as soon as Admiral de Robeck's cruiser approached the Canaries. As Captain Buller (*Highflyer*) asked that if the *Kent* could be spared she should be sent to join him, and a definite report was received from the French Admiralty that the *Karlsruhe* had been seen at anchor on the 23rd in the suspected spot,⁴ the Admiralty sent the *Kent* orders direct to join the *Highflyer*, using all despatch.⁵ The French also instructed their cruiser *Pothuau*, then en route for the Cameroons, to search the district as she passed.⁶

Without waiting for the *Amphitrite*, the *Kent* shaped course at 2 a.m. on the 26th for the Bissagos Islands; and, coaling at Dakar on the 28th, joined the *Highflyer* at the suspected spot on the 30th. They remained patrolling the African coast till November 4, when they both went in to Sierra Leone, the *Kent* to coal and the *Highflyer* to refit. Neither found any trace of the *Karlsruhe* or any supply ship.

104. **Admiral de Robeck at the Canary Islands.**—The *Amphitrite* reached Las Palmas at 9 a.m. October 28, and from the Consul and from Captain Somerville of the *Victorian* Admiral de Robeck learned full details of the unsatisfactory state of affairs. He immediately addressed a letter to the Civil Governor of the Canaries, suggesting that, since the Spanish Government had stopped the departure of German merchant ships from ports of

¹ A 144, 151. The *Kent*'s convoy had been taken over on the 23rd by the *Vindictive*.

² De Robeck, Letter of Proceedings. M. 03850/14.

³ A 151.

⁴ H.S. 44, pp. 198, 212, 225, 227.

⁵ A 152.

⁶ H.S. 44, p. 236.

Spain by disabling their engines, the *Aruacas*, *Macedonia* and *Walhalla* should be similarly treated. As regards the use of wireless, he urged the Governor to take immediate action for the strict and impartial enforcement of neutrality, which appeared at the time to be infringed in that, while the British Consul at Las Palmas was forbidden to transmit wireless messages in cypher, the German and Austrian Consuls in the Islands were reporting the movements of ships by cypher messages to their Embassies at Madrid. Some of these messages were intercepted by the *Victorian*; they had been sent from Las Palmas to Tenerife (a distance of 56 miles) from a high-power station with a range of 1,500 to 2,000 miles, on the 600 metre wave-length; then from Tenerife, also a high-power station, on the 2,500 metre wave-length; and from Cadiz, another high-power station, on a third wave-length; thus offering three chances of interception to a listening ship.¹ As Admiral de Robeck pointed out to the Governor, these reports were without doubt read by all German vessels within 1,000 miles.² In the middle of his correspondence with the Governor came an order from Madrid permitting cypher messages to be sent by all nations alike; he at once protested that such a privilege was of no use to us, but had the effect of converting the Canary Islands into a base for the distribution of German intelligence. Besides addressing the Governor he urged the Admiralty to take up the matter.³

Not content with writing to the Governor of the province, he sent the *Victorian* to Palma Island to demand the internment of the *Macedonia* by the local officials. The request was immediately complied with as a provisional measure; sanction for the steps taken was received from Madrid, and at 10 a.m. on October 31 the Consul was able to inform the *Victorian* that the vessel was absolutely and officially interned by order of the supreme authority. The reason for her internment is not given. Some five months later it was discovered that she had been waiting for four weeks at her rendezvous west of Hierro Island. While there she came across a German sailing ship, the *Pamir*, whose master, an old friend of the *Macedonia's* captain, did not know of the outbreak of war. The two arranged that the *Pamir* should go in to Santa Cruz de la Palma, her master coming out in his boat once a week to keep the *Macedonia* posted with news. At the end of four weeks at the rendezvous the *Macedonia*

¹ Letter from *Victorian*, M. 04500/14, in papers titled *F.O.*, 31.10.14. Between October 10 and November 11, 25 messages were intercepted. They were addressed in Spanish to the German Embassy, Madrid, and signed *Mittelstrasse*, who was the Austrian Consul. In each case the first groups read "for German cruisers," and they contain information concerning the movements of warships or merchant vessels.

² Although he did not mention it to the Governor, there was no need to use wireless, since the cable to Cadiz was available.

³ This paragraph is based on papers titled *Foreign Office*, 31 October, 1914, *W/T in Canary Islands*; and de Robeck: Letter of Proceedings. M. 03850/14.

decided to go into Palma Island, and found on arrival that there was an order for her to that effect.¹ Although these facts were not then known, some inkling of them was gathered from a letter of one of the *Pamir's* crew intercepted by us about this time,² and even without this evidence the Spanish Government considered the *Macedonia* sufficiently dangerous to intern.

At Las Palmas, however, we were unable to secure the internment of the *Duala* and *Aruacas*, which were definitely known to have coaled the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*; some half-promises were received and the two ships were ordered into harbour; they were "not to be allowed to leave," but were not officially interned.³ The situation seemed so unsatisfactory that Admiral de Robeck decided to remain in the Canaries, although his own station was occupied only by the *Europa* off the Tagus, since the *Argonaut* and *Vindictive* were in dockyard hands at Devonport.

It will be remembered that one of the duties of the Atlantic cruisers had been the sending in of neutral steamers carrying reservists. This had been stopped on October 7;⁴ but on October 27 the Admiralty reinstated the practice.⁵ The reservists had by that time found that they were no longer arrested, and in the Italian *Principe di Udine* the *Victorian* discovered 50 of them. She sent the vessel into Gibraltar to be dealt with there.⁶

After the end of October the number of cruisers at sea began to increase. The *Argonaut* left Devonport on November 3; the *Donegal* got finally away the same day with orders from Admiral de Robeck to call at Madeira and then join him at the Canaries;⁷ and the *Calgarian* left Gibraltar November 1 for the same purpose.

105. Another Outward Convoy.—The convoy on account of which the *Bacchante* had been prevented from coming to the Canaries during the refitting of the *Calgarian* was the Home Counties Division of Territorial troops for India. According to the programme it should have left England on October 25.⁸

The *Euryalus* was not to bring out the convoy, since she was taken by Admiral Wemyss for the flagship of the Western Channel Patrol; it was to be taken by the *Diana* only. As far as Finisterre the French armoured cruisers would help to cover it, and the *Bacchante* on the 27th was ordered to join it off Finisterre and come on to Gibraltar with it.⁹ Accordingly, the

¹ Papers titled Cap. K 25/1915, *Proceedings of Macedonia*.

² Admiralty to I.O., Gibraltar, 20.10.14.

³ *Victorian*, Letter of Proceedings. M. 01006/14.

⁴ See Section 91. ⁵ H.S. 44, p. 254.

⁶ *Victorian*, Letter of Proceedings, M. 01006/15. They were released, as they had been shipped before the last order; see H.S. 44, p. 517.

⁷ H.S. 44, p. 363. ⁸ See paragraph 94. ⁹ A 153.

Bacchante, which had been lying at Gibraltar since October 14, proceeded at 8 p.m. on the 27th and was off Finisterre by the 29th. There she endeavoured to get into touch with the *Diana* by wireless. All attempts failed, and, concluding that by this time the convoy must have passed, the *Bacchante* proposed to go back to Gibraltar. It was not till then that the Admiralty informed her that the *Diana* and convoy were only now about to sail and that she must remain off Finisterre to pick them up.¹ Even so, it was not till the morning of the 30th that the *Diana* met the convoy off the Eddystone; and since, on account of French reports of submarines, the route of the convoy was put 30 miles west of the usual track, the *Bacchante* had to wait off Cape Finisterre till November 1 before she could join it. She arrived at Gibraltar with it on the 4th, the *Diana* having parted company at Cape Tarifa, where she took charge of three transports from China,² which had been brought from Gibraltar so far by the *Proserpine*.

106. **More Captures by the "Karlsruhe."**—By the end of October the *Highflyer* and *Kent* had found no confirmation of the rumour that the *Karlsruhe* had been on the coast of Africa, and Captain Buller proposed to return to St. Vincent with the *Highflyer* and *Marmora*, the *Kent* to work with the *Empress of Britain* on the coast from Sierra Leone; this arrangement would agree with the Admiralty's latest order that the cruisers were each to have an armed merchant cruiser attached to them, and the *Empress of Britain's* boilers required three weeks' cleaning.³

A few days later it was further made clear that the German cruiser had certainly been nowhere near Bissagos at the time reported. On November 2 the *Asuncion* steamed in to Para, bringing the passengers and crews of three more British steamers—the *Glanton*, *Hurstdale* and *Vandyck*. These three ships had been captured by the *Karlsruhe* on October 18, 23 and 26 respectively, the first two in the neighbourhood of 1° 20' S., 31° 30' W., and the *Vandyck*, which was a liner on passage from the River Plate for New York, in 1.14 S., 40.42 W., an entirely new area for the *Karlsruhe's* operations,⁴ which had so far been confined to Area D, whose western limit was the meridian of 40° W. The *Glanton* and *Hurstdale* had been seen to sink, but the *Vandyck* was still afloat when the *Asuncion* parted company. She was a fast ship of 10,000 tons, fitted with wireless, which had not been damaged, and to the Consul-General, Buenos Aires, it seemed probable that the German would arm her and use as cruiser. Another British liner of similar qualifications, *La Correntina*, was nearly a month overdue, and she too, he thought, might have been captured and armed.⁵

¹ H.S. 44, pp. 307, 309.

² *Arcadia, Nile, Carnarvonshire.*

³ A 157; H.S. 44, pp. 334, 341, 355, 369.

⁴ H.S. 43, pp. 241, 243, 245.

⁵ H.S. 43, p. 258.

It was now three weeks since the *Karlsruhe* had been reported and she had then last been seen taking stores from the *Condor*. This occupied the cruiser till 10 p.m. on October 13, by which time the *Condor's* oil had been brought on board.¹ Leaving the *Rio Negro* to make certain that the *Condor* sank, the *Karlsruhe* went off with the *Farn* to coal. She was joined on the 17th by the *Rio Negro* and *Asuncion*, the latter, as usual, with news. Next day, Captain Köhler was back at his station on the trade route north of Fernando Noronha and almost immediately captured the *Glanton*. Although this ship was carrying Cardiff coal to Monte Video, he had quite enough fuel, and not being able to spare a crew for her, decided to sink her. Just as she was going down, another steamer was sighted; it proved to be the *Zaanland* of Amsterdam, and had to be released. An Italian ship later in the evening was also let go. As the *Karlsruhe* was exactly on the trade route, he had little chance of catching British vessels; indeed, the *Glanton's* presence there was accidental, for her master was at the time crossing the trade route from west to east.² For three days during which the *Karlsruhe* and her consorts remained drifting no vessel was seen, though one ship had passed whose presence would have been unwelcome. This was the *Carnarvon* on her way to Pernambuco from St. Vincent; at 3 a.m. she was in 1.20 S., 31.40 W., practically the position in which the *Glanton* had been captured. She saw nothing of the *Karlsruhe* squadron, nor did they see her. In fact they sighted no ship till at 10 p.m. on the 22nd the Swedish S.S. *Atlant* was hailed and let go.

On the 23rd the *Hurstdale*, whose master was keeping only 20 miles from the track, was brought to and sunk; while she was still half-submerged and sinking, the *Annie Johnson* passed to carry the news to Pernambuco. By this time Captain Köhler was aware that his methods and the field of his operations must have been revealed by the British seamen in the *Crefeld*. On October 25, therefore, he collected his auxiliaries, the *Rio Negro*, *Asuncion*, *Farn* and *Indrani*, gave them detailed orders for the next few weeks and, accompanied by the *Farn* as collier, proceeded away to the north-west.

When leaving the West Indies he had been considering plans for attacking the British and French West Indian possessions, in particular Martinique and Barbados. At the time his coal supply was too uncertain for him to risk the attempt; but now that he had the *Farn* and *Indrani*, that difficulty was no longer present, and it was for a surprise attack on Barbados that he had temporarily abandoned the ordinary methods of commerce destruction. He did not expect to find any steamers on his present course and it was, therefore, a welcome surprise to him when his lookouts reported the *Vandyck*, which

¹ From here to the end of this section is based upon Aust.

² H.S. 22, p. 216.

proved to be the " choicest morsel that had fallen into our laps . . . She had been warned of our presence by the *Bristol*. Her master had exercised the greatest caution, had darkened the lights at night, and had not used his wireless for six days. He was all the more surprised, therefore, when the Prize Officer solemnly informed him that we had really expected him yesterday."¹ The 210 passengers and the crew of the *Vandyck*, and the crews of the *Glanton* and *Hurstdale*, were transferred to the *Asuncion*, which was to carry them to land. Captain Fritsch of the *Asuncion* wanted to stay, and assured Captain Köhler that he would much rather share the fortunes of the *Karlsruhe*. Luckily for him Captain Köhler did not give way and the *Asuncion* departed for Para with orders not to arrive before November 1.

Although, of course, the crews of the captured steamers knew nothing of Captain Köhler's plans for attacking the West Indies, the position in which the *Vandyck* had been sunk was in Area H, and Admiral Hornby, who until then had been occupied mainly with watching New York, now inquired what was the extreme southern limit of his station. It is not clear that any answer was sent.²

107. North America and West Indies, October 15 to November 4.—The possibility of an attack in the West Indies had presented itself to Admiral Hornby, who reviewed with some concern the accumulation of coal at St. Lucia, an entirely undefended island. By October 23 there were 10,000 tons ashore and 5,000 more on the way; on his representation that he could not keep a cruiser permanently there as guard ship the Admiralty diverted to Jamaica a collier then on its way and arranged to send no more coal to St. Lucia unless the Admiral requisitioned it.³ The *Descartes* had resumed the duty of guardship at St. Lucia on October 13. The other cruisers of the West Indies Division, the *Berwick*, *Essex* and *Condé*, made cruises to examine the various German rendezvous, but failed to catch any more supply ships.

In the north Admiral Hornby maintained the watch on New York with the *Lancaster*, *Suffolk*, *Niobe* and *Caronia*, till the *Niobe's* condensers gave out and she had to go to Halifax for four weeks' repairs. From time to time circumstantial reports that the German liners were ready to sail were received,⁴ but nothing particular occurred. The *Glory* rejoined from Queens-town on November 2 and Admiral Hornby re-hoisted his flag in her at Halifax.

The neutral ships chartered by the Hamburg-Amerika Line to supply German cruisers continued to give trouble. On October 21 the Admiralty gave the Intelligence Officers at

¹ Aust.

³ H.S. 42, pp. 94, 108.

² See H.S. 42, p. 236.

⁴ H.S. 42, pp. 122, 146, 163.

Kingston and St. John's an outline of the system so far as known to them. In this, they stated that the headquarters of the system appeared to be Philadelphia and that the agents were Grandfield and Co., the New York and Porto Rico S.S. Company, and Ganz; any colliers or supply ships chartered by any of these firms were to be detained. It was Grandfield who had chartered the *Heina*, *Nepos*, *Mowinckel*, and *Unita*; and five other Norwegian colliers were thought to be operating. It had been reported that vessels chartered as supply ships for the Caribbean were instructed, if they did not find the German cruisers at the rendezvous given them, to go to St. Thomas and turn their cargoes over to the German Consul.¹ Our Ambassador at Washington handed in a formal protest asking that steps should be taken to prevent United States ports being made a base for hostilities; but the reply he received was only to the effect that United States Consuls would make inquiries. As regards St. Thomas, the Danish Governor published an emphatic denial that the island was a base for German supplies. This was confirmed by the new British Consul, who reported that the wireless telegraphy rooms of the German ships were sealed and the general feeling in the place was anti-German. A new suspicious ship was the *Uller*, Norwegian, chartered by the Hamburg-Amerika Line, which, arriving at Savannah from New York on October 19, began loading cotton for Gothenburg, a port which had never yet taken any of that article. As her agent was Ganz, and she left a week later with 80 tons of ice, besides meat and tinned goods, she was looked upon as suspicious.² Another suspected vessel was the *Evelyn*, American, which left Philadelphia on October 21 for Norfolk, Virginia, to load coal; she had taken in at Philadelphia 11 railway car loads of provisions. She returned to Baltimore on November 6 and there seemed nothing to confirm our suspicions about her.³

On November 2 an agent reported that the German cruiser squadron from the Pacific, under Admiral von Spee, intended to strike before long in the North Atlantic,⁴ and as it was known he was making for South America there can have been nothing improbable in the notion. But unless he came through the Panama Canal he would have to deal first with Admirals Cradock and Stoddart.

108. Movements on the South American Coast in the latter half of October.—Admiral Cradock left the Falkland Islands on October 22 to join the *Glasgow*, *Monmouth* and *Otranto*, which were then off the coast of Chile. He had seen definite traces of the *Dresden* at Orange Bay, near Cape Horn, where on a beacon had been found written the words "S.M.S. *Dresden*," and the dates September 9, 10, 11. This was the first indication of her presence since she had sunk the *Holmwood* on August 26.

¹ H.S. 42, pp. 70, 201, 224.

³ H.S. 42, pp. 17, 62, 78, 84, 273.

² H.S. 42, pp. 16, 60, 103, 130.

⁴ H.S. 42, p. 216.

After dispatching the *Katherine Park* with the *Holmwood's* crew, the *Dresden* attempted to coal by means of boats from the *Santa Isabel*; but a storm came on, and as the cruiser had been damaged by previous coalings so much that her seaworthiness was doubtful, Captain Lüdecke felt obliged to leave his excellent cruising ground off the River Plate and seek shelter for coaling and repairs. After trying two or three anchorages, all of which proved impracticable in the north-westerly gale, he finally reached Gill Bay in 45° S., about 800 miles from the River Plate, where he coaled on August 31 and September 1. The place was unsuitable for the repairs to the hull and the opening up of the machinery necessary before the *Dresden* could carry on her work, and Captain Lüdecke decided to seek a more secluded spot in the lonely archipelago which ends in Cape Horn. Leaving Gill Bay on September 2 he followed the trade route southward. The *Santa Isabel* he sent in advance to Punta Arenas to report his presence in South American waters and to procure warm clothing and materials for repairing the engines. The steamer reached Punta Arenas on September 4 and communicated with the supply centres of Buenos Aires and Valparaiso. She was also able to get a message through to Berlin on September 7, and received on the 9th a reply recommending the *Dresden* to operate with the *Leipzig*, which had just reported herself at Guaymas in the Gulf of California. A similar message was sent from Berlin to the *Leipzig*; she immediately left for the southward to meet the *Dresden*; and Captain Lüdecke disappeared for a time from the Atlantic.¹

Admiral Cradock coaled his squadron on the coast of Chile, intending to proceed northward, and on November 1 a message was received from him that telegrams for him should be sent to Coronel, a port 240 miles south of Valparaiso, up to November 4, after that to Valparaiso. He was evidently likely to meet enemy forces, since on November 1 an armed merchant cruiser, the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, considered to be with von Spee, put in to Valparaiso for a couple of hours; and on the 2nd the agent of the Pacific Line, Valparaiso, reported to his Liverpool headquarters that three German cruisers and five transports were off his port on November 1. On the 3rd there came in further intelligence from Valparaiso; first, that the *Nürnberg* and two other German cruisers had been examining ships about 150 miles south of Valparaiso; next, that active preparations were proceeding in that port for coaling and provisioning German warships and that, on November 1, two large German warships and three smaller ones had been 200 miles south of Valparaiso steaming towards Coronel. Finally, at 5.6 p.m. on November 3 a telegram came from the Consul-General at Valparaiso announcing that three German warships were approaching Valparaiso Bay.²

¹ This paragraph is from *Kreuzerkrieg* I, pp. 379, 380.

² H.S. 43, pp. 227, 239, 255, 262. A 158. The Consul-General, Valparaiso, some two hours later, gave the names of the three ships as *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Nürnberg*, but the exact time of the receipt of this intelligence is not known.

These reports definitely located the German squadron. The arrangement in force was that Admiral Stoddart on the east coast of South America should have the *Defence* to enable him to bring von Spee to action should he come round the Horn unreported. But now that the more likely event was that the first collision would be with Admiral Cradock, the Admiralty decided to add the *Defence* to the *Good Hope* squadron, and at 6.20 p.m. they ordered her to join Admiral Cradock on the west coast of America with all possible dispatch.¹ At the same time he was told to use the *Glasgow* to keep touch with the enemy, concentrating the rest of his squadron, including the *Canopus*, and effecting a junction with the *Defence* at the earliest possible moment, though without losing touch with the *Glasgow*. The *Defence* had just arrived at Monte Video with the *Orama* and was coaling when she received the order. She replied that she would sail at noon November 4; but as the distance from Monte Video to Valparaiso is nearly 3,000 miles it would be some time before she could be expected to join Admiral Cradock.

Even before she was ready to sail it was learned she would be too late; at 1.29 a.m. on November 4 came a telegram from Valparaiso announcing that an action had taken place outside Coronel on November 1 leaving the German Admiral victorious. The *Monmouth* had sunk; the *Good Hope* was believed to have blown up and gone down too; only the *Glasgow* and *Otranto* had escaped in the darkness.²

CHAPTER XII.

NOVEMBER 4 TO DECEMBER 9. THE END OF THE GERMAN CRUISER SQUADRON.

109. Arrangements to Counter the German Cruiser Squadron.³

—The news of the defeat and dispersal of Admiral Cradock's squadron off Coronel reached England while the nerves of the nation were still tingling from the effects of the bombardment of Gorleston by German battle cruisers the day before. The Admiralty immediately decided to concentrate at Monte Video the whole force in South American waters so as to bar the way of the victorious German Admiral in his passage to the South American trade routes, which appeared to be his most profitable and therefore most probable objective. Orders to this effect were sent out at once, and the *Kent* at Sierra Leone was instructed

¹ A 159. Lord Fisher had been First Sea Lord since October 30; the order is initialled by him and the First Lord.

² A 160.

³ This period has been treated in detail in Monograph 3, O.U. 6038, *Operations leading up to the Battle of the Falkland Islands*. Only the main points will be recapitulated here, but new matter will receive fuller treatment.

to join Admiral Stoddart.¹ The concentration when effected would give Admiral Stoddart a more powerful force than had been allotted to Admiral Cradock, since it included the *Defence* in place of the *Good Hope*; but, not content with this, the Admiralty decided to make the destruction of von Spee absolutely certain, and ordered the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets, to detach the battle cruisers *Invincible* and *Inflexible* from the Grand Fleet at once for this purpose.² A new command, the South Atlantic and South Pacific Station, was constituted out of the area between the Australian and Cape stations as far north as 5° N.,³ thus including the whole of South America except the Caribbean coast. Vice-Admiral Sturdee, who, as Chief of the War Staff, had a complete knowledge of all the circumstances which had brought about the present situation, was given command of the new station, his flag to be flown in the *Invincible*.

Besides making an attack on the South American trade routes, von Spee might endeavour to interfere with the operations for the capture of German South-West Africa then in progress and to stimulate a rebellion which had just broken out. The only ship of any force in the Cape squadron was the *Albion*. But orders were sent to the *Minotaur*, sister ship to the *Defence*, to leave the convoy of Australian troops she was escorting and proceed to South Africa, where she and two light cruisers from East Africa were to concentrate on the *Albion*.

To protect West Africa endeavours were made to form an Anglo-French squadron of armoured cruisers from the Mediterranean with a French Admiral in command; but the objection of the French Commander-in-Chief to parting with any of his ships could not be overcome, and the squadron was not formed in that manner.

Although the Admiralty expected von Spee to make his next appearance in the South Atlantic, they did not lose sight of the possibility that he might operate in the Pacific or come through the Panama Canal into the West Indies area. By arrangements with the Japanese any probable movement of the German Cruiser Squadron back to Australian waters was countered; and the battle cruiser *Australia* of the Australian Navy was ordered from Suva in Fiji to Honolulu ready to proceed to the North American coast. A combined squadron consisting of the *Newcastle* and three Japanese vessels was already on the Pacific side of North America; it was ordered to a rendezvous near the Canal, and on November 12 Admiral Patey, in the *Australia*, was instructed to join this squadron. It was understood that he might not be in time to stop von Spee should he have decided to go through the Canal, and if he had done so the

¹ A 162, 163, 165.

² A 164, 168.

³ The 50° N. in O.U. 6038, para. 14, is a misprint.

Australia was to follow him and bring him to action in the Caribbean Sea.¹

In the meantime, before the *Australia's* arrival, steps had to be taken to deal with the menace to the West Indies. On the 8th the Admiralty ordered Admiral Hornby to send two cruisers to watch the Canal from the 12th onwards, ignoring all other interests except the guard over the liners at New York. They felt that if the German Cruiser Squadron came anywhere near, these liners would certainly attempt to break out. To add to the general anxiety, there were reports from trustworthy agents that Germany intended to send a battle cruiser out from home.² They met this new danger by dispatching the *Princess Royal* to operate off New York.

110. The Concentration at Monte Video and Move to Abrolhos; destruction of the "Navarra."—By November 11 all the cruisers on the south-east coast of America were concentrated off Monte Video except the *Bristol* and *Macedonia* operating off Cape San Roque in search of the *Karlsruhe*. The *Canopus*, with serious engine defects, was useless with the squadron and was ordered by the Admiralty to organise defences at the Falkland Islands in case von Spee should arrive with the intention of destroying the wireless station and capturing the coal there.

Admiral Stoddart sent the *Otranto* to Rio for mails, water and other necessaries, to join him as soon as possible at Abrolhos. The *Orama* also was sent on in advance to meet and send back two colliers and an oiler which were on their way to Monte Video. The rest of the squadron sailed immediately the *Glasgow*, which had just joined, finished coaling.

Shortly after leaving the squadron the *Orama* sighted a steamer and altered course towards her. The steamer immediately made the wireless signal, "*Navarra* being chased by English cruiser," and smoke was seen to be coming from her fore-castle. The *Orama*, Captain Segrave, rapidly approached, and finding that the ship was really on fire and that her crew had taken to the boats, he hailed them alongside and took them into his ship; he did not board the burning vessel, whose name *Navarra* could be read on her stern, since his information was that she was carrying ammunition, but he sunk her by gunfire.

From the prisoners it was discovered that she had embarked ammunition in Germany on July 5 for the German Cruiser Squadron and arrived at New York on July 21; going on to

¹ Telegram 46 to Vice-Admiral Commanding, *Australia*, sent 7 p.m., 12.11.1914.

² On November 6 the Captain of the *Von der Tann* sent in an official memorandum proposing the use of the battle cruisers for commerce destruction in the Atlantic. The speed with which this came to our knowledge is given by the German historian as an example of the efficiency of our intelligence system. *Kreuzerkrieg I*, 258 fn.

Galveston she loaded provisions, later taking in 6,000 tons of coal at Pensacola. From Pensacola she went to a rendezvous in 25° N., 55 W., arriving there on September 16, and proceeded at once to Pernambuco *viâ* Fernando Noronha, which she seems to have passed on September 23-24. After a short visit to Pernambuco on the 25th she steered straight for 29° S., 31½ W.; whence on September 30 she changed course for Punta Arenas. At that port she embarked a considerable quantity of provisions on October 9, intending, according to her captain, to go to the west coast of America. But, frightened by the proximity of our cruisers, he had kept out to sea, hoping eventually to approach the River Plate. A track chart found on the captain suggests that he steamed up and down what may be rendezvous lines from 40° S., 35° W. to 30° S., 30.30 W.; and from the latter position to 40° S., 40° W. between October 21 and November 1. He seems to have been making for the River Plate when captured, and his chief officer stated that they expected to meet the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* there.¹

The *Glasgow* finished coaling at dawn on the 12th and proceeded for Rio to effect repairs to the damage she had received in the action. The *Defence*, *Carnarvon*, and *Cornwall* weighed at the same time, and, spread within signalling range, kept to seaward of her. At Rio the *Glasgow* was permitted to dock and make a five-days' repair; the Brazilian Government acted with great generosity, allowing her every facility, and at the conclusion of her stay refused to make any charge for docking. Her repairs were most effectually carried out, and in fact she left Rio in better condition than she was in at the outbreak of war.²

Admiral Stoddart arrived at Abrolhos on the 17th and found the *Edinburgh Castle* guarding the supply ships; the *Kent* also had just arrived. On the way up he ordered the *Otranto*, after communicating with the squadron off Cape Frio, to go with the *Orama* and investigate Trinidad Island, both to return to Abrolhos; but this order was soon modified, as the *Otranto* had steamed 16,000 miles continuously, and when the two merchant cruisers reached Trinidad on the 19th he sent the *Otranto* on to Sierra Leone for a rest. The *Orama* returned to Abrolhos and rejoined the squadron waiting for Admiral Sturdee.

111. **Admiral Sturdee's Movements November 11-26.**—There was some delay in getting the battle cruisers away; after their arrival at Devonport from Cromarty it was found they would have to remain at least four days before being ready to leave, but the Admiralty felt the urgency to be so pressing that they

¹ Report of destruction of *Navarra* titled *Qa. 49/1914*. The track chart gives a position for September 31 and is probably not very reliable.

² M. 04863/14.

ordered the Commander-in-Chief, Devonport, to send the dockyard men, if they could not finish their work in time, away in the ships to be returned as opportunity offered.¹

Admiral Sturdee's orders, dated November 9,² were that he was to proceed to St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, and thence to South American waters; unless on the voyage he was instructed to go to the West Indies, should information be received that the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* were coming north up the west American coast with the possible intention of passing through the Panama Canal. His main duty was to search for the German armoured cruisers and bring them to action. If he went to South America, Abrolhos Rocks would be the best place to meet Admiral Stoddart; and on the way he was to withdraw the *Bristol* and *Macedonia* from the search for the *Karlsruhe* and employ them in operations against the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*. The *Vindictive*, at the conclusion of her refit, would leave Devonport for Ascension to act as a wireless linking ship with home.

The two battle cruisers left Devonport at 4.45 a.m. on November 11, still with some civilian workmen and officials on board; on the 17th they arrived and coaled at St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands. There Admiral Sturdee learned that the German Admiral appeared to be still off the coast of Chile. Frequent intelligence reports came in from Consul-General Maclean of Valparaiso, who not only cabled every piece of likely information but also hired small Chilean steamers to visit the harbours near in quest of news of the cruisers or their supply ships. Nothing definite was discovered; but he telegraphed a likely rumour that 10 German ships were off Valparaiso at dawn on the 13th; eight of them went off N.W., while the remaining two, the *Leipzig* and *Dresden*, came into port. These left next morning without having obtained any coal. Apart from this, the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* had come to Valparaiso on November 4, when she received 1,500 tons of coal.

Besides these reports placing Admiral von Spee off the coast of Chile there was a crop of rumours that the enemy had gone or intended to go north. It was even stated by a secret agent at Tacoma, who got his information from the German Consulate at that port, that the German fleet was coming north with *Victoria*, *British Columbia*, as objective.³

On the 15th further information from Valparaiso reached Admiral Sturdee to the effect that the German squadron had been seen off Valparaiso Bay at dawn on the 14th, and with this last item of intelligence he left St. Vincent on the 18th for Abrolhos to join the South-East Coast Squadron.

While waiting for the arrival of Admiral Sturdee the collection of intelligence was Admiral Stoddart's chief concern. He made

¹ Telegram to C.-in-C., Devonport, 12.5 a.m., November 10.

² M. 0080.

³ Telegram from Esquimalt received 8.8 p.m., 6.11.14.

arrangements with our Brazilian Minister by wireless that Bahia should be his chief intelligence centre, receiving news from Rio, Pernambuco and Monte Video. He sent at intervals a ship to Bahia to collect the reports and pass them on to him by wireless.¹ Of von Spee and the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau* and *Nürnberg* nothing later than November 4 was definitely known, and it seemed probable that Admiral Sturdee and his battle cruisers, which should pass Rocas Reef on the 23rd, would arrive in time to combine with Admiral Stoddart's squadron before the Germans had struck a blow. As soon as the junction was effected, the *Defence* was to leave to join the Cape Squadron, turning her Poulsen wireless installation over to the *Invincible*, which by its means could keep touch with the *Vindictive*, similarly fitted, when she reached Ascension.²

The meeting of the two Admirals and the concentration of the South Atlantic and Pacific Squadron took place on the 26th, when the two battle cruisers arrived at Abrolhos and Admiral Sturdee took command of all the ships present. They included the *Bristol*, which, after a search of the north coast of Brazil for the *Karlsruhe's* bases, had come to Abrolhos, looking in at Ceara, Pernambuco and Bahia on the way. The *Macedonia* had participated in the first part of this search, but on the 15th started for Sierra Leone to clean her boilers. New orders had arrived for Admiral Sturdee; it was now certain that the *Scharnhorst* squadron was at Mas-a-fuera, near Juan Fernandez, on the 15th, and an intercepted wireless message pointed to their presence in the Gulf of Penas, Chile, on the 21st. He was, therefore, to take the whole squadron south and proceed to the Chilean coast after coaling at the Falkland Islands.

112. **Movements of von Spee, November 1-18.**³—The information that the whole German squadron was at Mas-a-fuera on November 15 was obtained from the crew of a captured ship brought into Valparaiso on the 20th by the *Sacramento*, a collier that had been serving the German Cruiser Squadron. The news could not be doubted and it showed that the German Admiral had not followed up his victory by an immediate attack on the South American trade routes as had been anticipated.

From the reports of his ships after the battle he learned during the night of November 1 that the *Monmouth* was undoubtedly sunk, but the fate of the *Good Hope* was not so certain. She was seen in flames, and a violent explosion was observed in the darkness from her direction, but by none of the German ships had she been seen to sink. He therefore decided to go into Valparaiso, his centre of supply and intelligence, with the threefold object of inspiring confidence in German power, of obtaining information and supplies, and of securing

¹ M. 0134/15.

² Telegram 128 to Admiral Stoddart, 3 a.m., 22.11.14.

³ Based on *Kreuzerkrieg*, except where other references are given.

the internment of the *Good Hope* should she have taken refuge in a Chilean harbour. As only three ships of any one belligerent were allowed to enter a Chilean port together he detached the *Dresden* to take the important collier *Sacramento* to Mas-a-fuera, and the *Leipzig* to bring his other colliers from the rendezvous 150 miles west of Valparaiso also to Mas-a-fuera, where he intended to coal his whole squadron before undertaking further operations. During the morning before the battle a Norwegian sailing vessel, the *Helicon*, with a British-owned cargo of 2,600 tons of Cardiff coal, was captured by one of his attendant auxiliaries, the *Titania*, and eventually towed to Mas-a-fuera by the *Baden*.¹ The *Leipzig*, whose compasses had taken on a new deviation through the firing and the diminution of her ammunition, had some difficulty in making the rendezvous, but at length found the supply ships *Baden*, *Santa Isabel* and *Amasis* on the 3rd. Shortly afterwards she captured a French sailing vessel, the *Valentine*, also with coal to the amount of 3,500 tons. She was towed to Mas-a-fuera by the *Amasis*,² the two sailing ships providing an unexpected, but none the less welcome, addition to the squadron's fuel supply.

Going in to Valparaiso with the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau* and *Nürnberg*, Admiral von Spee telegraphed to Berlin a short report on the action and embarked 127 volunteers from the German merchant vessels in harbour. His report reached the German Admiralty on the 6th.³ He left at 11 a.m., November 4, for Mas-a-fuera, arriving two days later. The *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* went in to Valparaiso on the 4th for coal and provisions; on the way she made an attempt to capture a Pacific liner, but was foiled by the liner keeping in territorial waters, which were being patrolled by Chilean destroyers. After leaving Valparaiso she also joined the squadron at Mas-a-fuera. The absence of the *Dresden* and *Leipzig* when the Admiral went in to Valparaiso had started a rumour that they had been sunk in the battle; partly to refute this and more especially to get further intelligence and orders, he sent them in with a second report on the 13th. At midnight November 13-14 the *Leipzig* and *Dresden*, at high speed and with all lights out, left for a rendezvous in 42.30 S., 79.45 W. On the way there they met one of Admiral Cradock's colliers, the *North Wales*, which had been recalled from Juan Fernandez to the Falkland Islands and in accordance with the general instructions was keeping well wide of all steamer tracks. She had only 700 tons of coal left, and the *Dresden* therefore sank her, after transferring her crew to the *Rhakotis*, a Kosmos liner which had come up out of Valparaiso on the 12th and had been overtaken by them. The concentration took place at the appointed spot on the 18th.

¹ Statement of master of *Helicon*, M. 16612/15. ² *Glasgow W/T Log* 46988.

³ As late as 6.20 p.m. on the 6th, the German Admiralty were asking the Chilean Legation whether the report of a victory was true or not. I.D.H.S. 1414, No. 92.