

Von Spee, on leaving Mas-a-fuera on the 15th, left the captured sailing vessels and the *Titania* and *Sacramento* with the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, as their lack of speed would hamper him in his future movements. The *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* was to clear them of coal, release the *Helicon*, sink the *Titania* and *Valentine*, and send the crew of the latter on board the *Sacramento* to Valparaiso.¹ With the aid of the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* he meant to hide his movement south and he gave her orders to remain off Valparaiso, making and answering signals and showing searchlights so as to give the impression that the whole squadron was still in the neighbourhood; after the first week in December she was free to come also into the Atlantic. Thus, when the concentration of the squadron took place there were, besides the five cruisers, only the *Baden*, *Amasis* and *Santa Isabel*. The whole squadron continued southward for San Quintin Bay in 46.49 S., 74.21 W., and arrived there on November 21.

At this anchorage, one of the best harbours on the coast,² they found waiting the *Seydlitz* and *Ramses*, supply vessels which had been sent from the Valparaiso base on October 20 and 12 respectively. The *Seydlitz* had 4,150 tons of coal, the *Ramses* 2,000, besides provisions and stores. At the same time as the squadron came in the *Memphis*, which had left Punta Arenas on the night of November 19 with 2,400 tons of coal; and on the 23rd arrived the *Luxor* from Coronel with 3,600 tons more. These smaller, slower vessels were not to accompany the squadron and all the coal and stores in them were transferred to the *Seydlitz*, *Baden* and *Santa Isabel*, which then carried between them 17,000 tons. The *Rhakotis*, with the crew of the *North Wales* on board, was to wait till the squadron was clear away and then go to Callao. The *Amasis* was to arrive at Punta Arenas on December 6 and fill up from the American steamer *Minnesotan*, which was waiting there with 7,300 tons of coal; she was then to go to the position 40° S., 50° W., and get in touch with the squadron by wireless. The *Memphis* and *Luxor* were to return to west coast ports.

With regard to the future programme of the squadron an interchange of telegrams with Berlin had taken place by means of the *Dresden's* visit to Valparaiso. The German Admiralty had already reached the conclusion that cruiser warfare in the Atlantic was only possible if the German ships acted in groups. The Staff were convinced that all their supply rendezvous were discovered or could not be maintained on account of the strong watch we kept on the trade routes; and the intention was for von Spee to make his way home, being joined by the *Karlsruhe* en route.³ The *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, on account of her large coal

¹ The deposition of the master of the *Valentine* is in papers titled F.O. 9.2.15, *Ships Chartered*.

² *South America Pilot*, Part II, p. 377.

³ It seems that attempts were made to order the *Emden*, then in the midst of her career of commerce destruction in the Indian Ocean, also to join von Spee, but communication with her could not be obtained. *Von Pohl's Diary*, November 11. Translated in *Monthly Intelligence Report*, July 1920.

consumption and little fighting value, was to be laid up in a neutral port. The Admiralty Staff had already informed the supply and intelligence officers who might be able to reach von Spee that the best thing he could do was to concentrate all forces and endeavour to break through the blockade to home, and during his personal visit to Valparaiso the Admiral received instructions to that effect.¹ It seems that he waited to be sure of coal supplies before definitely replying, on November 16, "Decided to break through for home."²

113. **Von Spee's Atlantic Coal Supply.**—The German Admiral had been informed that the coal supply was guaranteed. He therefore ordered the Buenos Aires and New York supply centres to have 10,000 tons of coal by December 5 at Puerto Santa Elena, an uninhabited anchorage in 44.31 S., 65.22 W., some 600' south of the River Plate, where was to be his next coaling rendezvous. He further ordered 20,000 tons by January 1, 5,000 of this to be on call at Pernambuco, and an additional 15,000 tons to be ready at New York by January 20.

He had, however, been misinformed. The coal supply was by no means guaranteed, and a letter fully explaining the situation was sent by the Buenos Aires Supply Officer to await the Admiral at Puerto Santa Elena. From October onwards colliers in Brazilian ports were not allowed to leave if there was the slightest suspicion that they were to supply German cruisers. The attitude of Argentine was no more accommodating, for vessels were not permitted to load more coal than their customary bunkers would hold. In December a further rule was made that the masters of colliers belonging to belligerent nations, before leaving, had to state all their ports of call, and both Argentine and Uruguay required a consular guarantee that the intended voyage was purely commercial. In Chile, where British objections to the departure of *Seydlitz* had been successfully overcome by the German representatives,³ the attitude of the Government became increasingly unfriendly after the departure of the *Luxor* and *Memphis* without clearance and the squadron had made so long a stay at Mas-a-fuera. Altogether the difficulties of the supply officers in South America were almost insuperable.

As regards the 20,000 tons ordered at New York great difficulty was anticipated owing to what the Germans considered to be the pro-British attitude of the authorities. In spite of this, however, even by the end of November it was hoped to get the colliers away when required, though that they could be German vessels, as specially requested by von Spee, was more

¹ Letter of October 10 from German Admiralty to von Spee, which was an amplification of a letter of September 29. *Kreuzerkrieg* I, 234-7.

² *Durchbruch des Kreuzergeschwaders in die Heimat ist beabsichtigt. Kreuzerkrieg* I, 238.

³ For our Minister's action see M. 15518/15.

than doubtful. This hope dwindled as December went on and the departure of a fully prepared supply ship from San Francisco had also to be delayed.

The most favourable centre for supply seemed to be the Canary Islands, where, at the end of October, there were 3,000 tons at Las Palmas, 4,000 at Palma and 6,000 at Tenerife. On November 6 this was increased by the arrival of the *Alwina*, one of two Dutch colliers chartered by the Berlin Admiralty for a voyage to Pernambuco. However, the secret of the *Alwina's* mission leaked out; it was considered too dangerous for her to continue the projected voyage and her cargo was disposed of locally.¹

Unaware of these difficulties and supposing all arrangements complete for coaling the squadron in the future, von Spee sailed on November 26 with his five cruisers and three supply ships for his adventurous voyage homeward round the Horn.

114. The Canary Islands and East Atlantic.—The German-owned coal in Canary Islands ports had long been carefully watched by our Consuls and its escape retarded by the cruiser patrols maintained by Admirals Stoddart and de Robeck. The German Supply Officer thought, nevertheless, he could get it away if the cruiser squadron made an unexpected attack on our patrol. So far, he seems to have been able to communicate with South America with some ease; but after the middle of November this became more difficult when, by Admiralty direction, the Tenerife-Monrovia cable was cut and he was deprived of a line of cable controlled by Germans.²

The watch on the steamers at the Canary Islands, carried out so continuously by our cruisers, was interrupted for a few days when Admiral de Robeck received a French report that the *Karlsruhe* was off the African coast. He was then (November 11) at Madeira in the *Amphitrite*, coaling preparatory to a return to the Tagus; the *Donegal*, fresh out from home, had just joined him. He called up the *Victorian* and *Calgarian*, which were on guard at the Canaries, and proceeded to sweep southward along the trade route, but found no confirmation of the report. At the conclusion of the sweep, which extended as far as 23.30 N., the Admiral intercepted an Admiralty signal to the *Highflyer* ordering her to join him at Sierra Leone by the 20th. He knew nothing of the arrangements implied by this telegram and had been carrying out the usual patrols; but now he decided to go to Madeira for news, leaving the Canaries patrol to the *Donegal* and *Calgarian*. The *Victorian* he sent by Admiralty orders to join the *Highflyer*. At Funchal, which he reached at 10 p.m. on November 14, he received orders, sent two days before, that

¹ I.D.H.S. 1414/73, 74, 82, 106, 110, 117, 126, 132. The other Dutch collier was named *Josephina*.

² H.S. 44, pp. 425, 438, 503, 660.

he was to turn over the command of Force I to his Senior Captain and hoist his flag in the *Warrior*, to take charge of a squadron composed of the *Warrior*, *Black Prince*, *Donegal*, *Highflyer*, *Cumberland* and *Challenger*, which was to concentrate at Sierra Leone and oppose von Spee should he come to West Africa. It was, in fact, a substitute for the squadron of British and French ships for which the Admiralty had failed to obtain our ally's concurrence. After turning over the command to Captain Grant-Dalton of the *Argonaut* at Madeira, the Admiral proceeded to Gibraltar and hoisted his flag in the *Warrior* on the 17th. In the meantime, the Valparaiso telegram of the 14th had been received, with its implication that von Spee was still on the Chilean coast, and the Admiralty now decided to give up the projected West African Squadron. Admiral de Robeck was told to re-hoist his flag in the *Amphitrite*, while the *Warrior*, *Black Prince* and *Donegal* were to join the Grand Fleet.¹

The *Victorian* left St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, on the 19th for Sierra Leone to join the *Highflyer*, which had with her the *Marmora* and *Empress of Britain*. On the way she sighted a vessel named *Liberia*, flying British colours but carrying Telefunken wireless gear in charge of a German-American operator. She was bound for Sierra Leone, but to make sure of her Captain Somerville put a prize crew on board and escorted her in.² Her speed was only 7½ knots and he thus did not join the *Highflyer* till the 23rd. He was senior to Captain Buller of the *Highflyer*, under whose orders he had been put; but all difficulties which might arise from this circumstance were averted by an order from the Admiralty, received on the 25th, that the *Victorian* was to rejoin Force I.³

This latest order was due to a request from Admiral de Robeck for one more cruiser when he learned that the *Vindictive*, which passed the Tagus on November 22, was to go direct to Ascension and was not to rejoin him. He also asked for a re-statement of the limits of his command, and was now told that it extended from 44° N. to 26° N. and as far westward as 40° W.; it thus included Cape Finisterre, the Azores and the Canaries. All the various danger points of this station, except the Tagus, where the *Europa* was still on guard, had been left unpatrolled during the concentrations of the past few days. Force D was at Sierra Leone; but little danger was apprehended from St. Vincent, where the German ships were segregated under the guard of a Portuguese cruiser. The Canaries were again patrolled by the *Argonaut* from November 18 to 24; the *Donegal* showed herself at the Islands on November 27 and 28, on her way home from Sierra Leone where she had coaled, and on December 1 Admiral de Robeck himself appeared with the *Amphitrite* and

¹ de Robeck, Letter of Proceedings. M. 03957, 03959, 04705/14.

² The *Liberia* was released by the Prize Court, but her wireless installation was confiscated. M. 086/15.

³ *Victorian*, Letter of Proceedings. M. 01006/15.

Argonaut. He called on the Civil Governor at Tenerife and found that the *Nepos* and *J. L. Mowinkel* at Santa Cruz were refused permission to coal or tranship any cargo. A few days later the Admiralty learned that the Norwegian owners of these ships knew nothing of their connection with the German supply system and that the masters of the vessels, as soon as they realised the character of their voyage, had altered course, put in to Tenerife and refused to sail. Their owners ordered the cargo to be discharged at Tenerife, and they were therefore quite useless to the German supply officers.¹

The German steamer *Macedonia* had been moved to Las Palmas and was moored inside the breakwater. She had been immobilised by the removal of her cylinder cover, and a search made by Spanish naval officers revealed nothing but coal in her holds.² The *Duala* and *Aruca*s were definitely interned on December 2.³ From the Canaries the Admiral proceeded to Madeira, to be followed by the *Victorian*, which visited Tenerife on December 3 on her way from Sierra Leone to Gibraltar, where she was to clean her boilers. The *Argonaut* went also to Gibraltar for small defects, but in her place the *Calgarian* joined the Admiral on the 4th.

At Madeira he found the newly-established wireless station in working order. This would improve communications. By the arrangements in force the Intelligence Officer at St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, did not pass information to Admiral de Robeck, who therefore did not know that two Portuguese cruisers would be meeting some Portuguese transports off Las Palmas on December 5. The searchlights of these were reported to him by the *Calgarian*, which was then at the Canaries, and the Admiral, thinking the occurrence suspicious, came from Madeira to search; the matter was cleared up by a telegram from the Admiralty to him and he returned to Madeira, leaving the Canaries to be watched by the *Calgarian*.⁴ The departure of the Portuguese cruisers on convoy duty left the Cape Verde Islands without any naval force and the Consul suggested that a British man-of-war should be within call in case Portugal decided to join the Allies.⁵ Accordingly the Admiralty ordered the *Highflyer* to proceed to and remain at St. Vincent, until relieved by the battleship *Vengeance*, which was refitting at Gibraltar. The latter's duty was to guard the colliers while continuing work on her defects and she was to keep steam for ordinary speeds at four hours' notice.⁶

115. Admiral Sturdee sails from Abrolhos.—Just as von Spee was leaving his last anchorage in the Pacific, Admiral Sturdee and the two battle cruisers anchored at Abrolhos. The transfer

¹ M. 20793/14.

² de Robeck: *Neutrality of Canary Islands*. M. 04461/14; I.D.H.S. 1414/130.

³ Tel. Madrid to F.O. H.S. 44, p. 798.

⁴ de Robeck, Letter of Proceedings. M. 04877/14.

⁵ M. 04858/14.

⁶ Tel. 921 to Senior Naval Officer, Gibraltar, 4.12.14.

of the *Defence's* Poulsen gear to the *Invincible* took only a few hours and she sailed at 1.50 p.m. for St. Helena. The battle cruisers coaled as rapidly as the conditions of Abrolhos would allow and the squadron was ready to leave early on the 28th. The Commander-in-Chief gave the master of the collier *Priestfield* charge as Senior Officer at Abrolhos, with instructions to inform the *Otranto* and *Macedonia*, which he had ordered to come from Sierra Leone, that they were to proceed to the Falklands, keeping 300 miles from the coast. Eight fuel ships under the escort of the *Orama* were to follow the squadron, keeping well to eastward of the Admiral and in wireless touch with him. The *Bristol* he sent to Rio to carry mails and obtain intelligence, and on the 28th at 10 a.m. he started with the rest of the squadron for the Falklands, having ordered the *Bristol* to rejoin him on passage. The area in which the *Karlsruhe* had lately been so active was thus entirely deprived of cruiser patrols.

116. Rumours of the "Karlsruhe."—No definite intelligence of the *Karlsruhe* was received after the arrival of the crew of the *Vandyck*, though she had made another capture. Shortly after the *Vandyck* was sunk the *Karlsruhe* stopped the British *Royal Sceptre*, from Brazil for North America, but her master succeeded in persuading Captain Köhler that his cargo was neutral and his ship was released, though, in point of fact, he was carrying a valuable cargo of coffee for Canada. The *Royal Sceptre* called at St. Lucia on November 4, but the incident appears to have been unknown to the Admiralty at the time.¹

Apart from rumours that Jacmel in Haiti and various places in Honduras and Venezuela were being used by the *Karlsruhe* as bases for intelligence and supplies, no intelligence which could locate her was received till the 19th, when a vessel reported having seen a four-funnelled cruiser off the Bahamas a week before. Captain Clinton-Baker, Senior Naval Officer in the West Indies, thereupon proposed to make a sweep north of the Bahamas with the *Berwick*, *Lancaster* and *Condé*, but this did not suit the Admiralty's plan of watching the Canal for von Spee and they ordered either the *Lancaster* or *Berwick* to remain near Jamaica as a wireless link with the *Australia* and the Japanese squadron in the Eastern Pacific which were approaching the Panama Canal. The *Berwick* went to Mosquito Gulf, Costa Rica, using the *Lancaster* as link with Jamaica; even by November 24 she was not in touch with any of the ships in the Pacific.²

On that date our New York Consul-General learned that the *Karlsruhe* intended to decoy and attack the *Lusitania* due at New York in a few days. The *Princess Royal* had reached Halifax on the 20th and the Admiralty directed her to shadow the *Lusitania* in to New York, keeping out of sight.³ The Cunarder arrived safely; the *Karlsruhe* had not appeared and some idea

¹ See H.S. 22/219.

² H.S. 43, pp. 290, 439, 451, 463, 533.

³ H.S. 43, pp. 518, 519.

that she had sunk was started by the discovery at Grenada of some wreckage and a boat bearing her name. This needed investigation. The *Descartes*, so long the guard ship at St. Lucia, could not go as she had a serious collision on the 24th and would be unfit for sea for some months; but the *Edinburgh Castle*, which arrived at St. Lucia on the 28th in the course of her round voyage, was ordered to make a report. She found no bodies and no evidence that the *Karlsruhe* had sunk, since the supposed wreckage could all be reasonably considered as articles dropped overboard in the process of transshipping stores at sea.¹

117. **Movements of the "Kronprinz Wilhelm."**—Though nothing was seen of the *Karlsruhe*, the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, of which the latest news was that she had been near Trinidad on September 19,² again revealed her activities by sending one of her supply ships into port. On November 22 the *Sierra Cordoba* arrived at Monte Video and was soon found to have on board the crews of vessels captured by the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*.

The *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, after dismissing the crew of the *Indian Prince* on September 19, apparently remained near Trinidad till the end of the month and then proceeded towards the River Plate to intercept meat ships. There, on October 7, about 260° E.N.E. of Lobos Island in the estuary and directly on the line between Trinidad and the mouth of the river, she met a large steamer, *La Correntina*, of the Houlder Line, armed with two 4.7 in. guns aft. This was the very situation for which our merchant vessels had been defensively armed, and the circumstances should have been in our favour since the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* had only two 3 in. guns. The German observed *La Correntina* very carefully and did not close till after she had got well ahead; she then came rushing up at full speed, closing ultimately to 50 yards when she found that the liner was calling by wireless for help. The disposition of the ships seemed ideal for the defensively armed vessel to open fire; but, unfortunately, although her guns were on board the ammunition for them was at Liverpool.

La Correntina had been armed in 1913. She left Liverpool on July 26, just before the outbreak of war, and in accordance with the peace regulations carried no ammunition. As soon as war broke out, arrangements were made for another vessel of the same line to carry it out to her, but owing to the financial dislocation of the meat trade dates became disarranged and finally the ammunition was left behind under the impression that *La Correntina* would be back before the other vessel could meet her. She was therefore unable to offer any resistance and was easily taken by the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*.³

¹ H.S. 42, pp. 590, 595, 596, 638.

² See Section 78.

³ H.S. 23/302.

The cargo of meat she carried proved very welcome to the captors, who were running short of food and water and other provisions. Putting a prize crew on board, Captain Thierfelder of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* made *La Correntina* accompany him as he cruised about eastward, on fine days transshipping from her enough meat to last till the middle of March, 1915, besides coal, water and other necessaries. Finally, on October 14, the prize was sunk.

A week later the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was joined by the *Sierra Cordoba*, one of the vessels which had been at Buenos Aires since August. She left there on October 16 and, joining the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* on the 20th, proceeded eastward into calmer sea where she gave up the coal and stores with which she was laden; they included clothes, vegetables, soap and cigars. By October 22 the sea was calm enough to allow the two vessels to be alongside each other, and the crew and passengers from *La Correntina* were sent across from the cruiser to the collier. Leaving her at this rendezvous the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* steamed off westward.

Coal was the raider's most serious need at the moment, as the supply from the capture and the *Sierra Cordoba* would not last long. It was, therefore, a piece of luck that the next vessel she met should be a collier. This was the French sailing ship *Union*, bound for the Plate with 3,100 tons of Cardiff coal, met on October 28 in 34° S., 52° W. She was towed back to the *Sierra Cordoba* and the crew sent across. Another supply ship was expected, but as she did not arrive it was considered she must have been caught by us.¹ Finally, on November 15, the *Sierra Cordoba* was sent to Monte Video to land the prisoners, leaving the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* still coaling from the *Union*. The *Sierra Cordoba* arrived on November 22 and the news of the loss of *La Correntina* reached Admiral Sturdee before he left Abrolhos.

118. **Sweep from Abrolhos to the Falklands, November 28–December 7.**—The latest position of the raider as given to him was 300 miles east of Santos; he therefore swept through the suspected area with his squadron spread on a course of S. 6° E., and, finding nothing, continued on that course, intending to maintain it as far as Latitude 27° S.; but he was diverted by a message from Rio reporting the German squadron to have been 400 miles off Monte Video on November 26. This rumour reached our Legation through private sources and was not at all improbable; to bring the Plate trade to a standstill would have been a natural object for the German Admiral, and in the interval since he was last seen he could have made the voyage. Admiral Sturdee accordingly steered for the reported position till the *Bristol* rejoined on December 1 and informed him that the rumour was

¹ Possibly this was the *Navarra*, from whose crew it was learned she was intended for the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*.

unconfirmed; he then directed his course for the Falklands with his squadron spread as before. By December 4, when he was passing close to the spot where *La Correntina* had been captured, he had received no evidence that the enemy was north of him.

A hint of von Spee's intentions was given by the captain of the *Helicon*, which came into Antofagasta on November 27. From conversations he had overheard he concluded that the German Admiral intended to make for the Atlantic round the Horn.¹ On the other hand, there were the rumours to which the operations of the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* gave rise. By the time Admiral Sturdee reached the Falkland Islands the information which he had received brought him to the conclusion that the enemy were still off Valparaiso on December 4 and, as his orders were to proceed to the Chilean coast as soon as possible, he refrained from detaching any ships to scout in the neighbouring waters, but took the whole fleet in to Port Stanley in the forenoon of December 7 to commence coaling at once.²

119. New York and the West Indies.—The further possibility that von Spee would come through the Panama Canal received some support on November 29 when our Consul at Iquique reported two cruisers and an auxiliary off his port steering northerly.³ In view of this the *Princess Royal* was ordered to Jamaica by the Admiralty, who now adopted Admiral Hornby's view of using her against von Spee instead of keeping her to stave off attacks on the New York Patrol.⁴ The number of ships available for patrol duties was reduced by the discovery, on December 1, that the *Caronia*, which then arrived at Halifax from New York, had serious boiler defects and would require six weeks' dockyard repair, and Admiral Hornby asked for another ship to replace her.

As has already been made clear, the chief problem for the New York patrol was one of communications; for although the arrangements for collecting news as to the movements of German ships in the harbour were excellent, the transmission of intelligence to the watching cruisers was not so efficient. The wireless station at Cape Sable could not transmit so far as New York (420 miles), nor could Halifax reach New York by day.⁵ A merchant ship was therefore chartered to act as wireless link with Cape Sable. Efforts were also made to arrange for another merchant ship in New York harbour to slip out and telegraph to our cruisers as soon as any movement was discerned; but this scheme had to be abandoned for fear of conflict with the United States authorities, who sealed the wireless apparatus of the *Winchester*, the ship engaged.⁶

¹ H.S. 43, p. 804.

² M. 0517/15.

³ This false rumour was specially spread by the Germans. *Kreuzerkrieg*.

⁴ A 174, 175.

⁵ H.S. 42, pp. 305, 310, 313, 314.

⁶ Papers titled *Foreign Office, 7th November, 1914. German Liners*.

The *Princess Royal* (Captain Osmond de B. Brock, R.N.) reached Jamaica on December 6 and Captain Brock took over the duties of Senior Naval Officer, West Indies. The *Karlsruhe* had not yet revealed her presence and the only enemy movement reported was that of the *Präsident*, which left Havana on December 2 nominally for Norfolk, Virginia. She reappeared 10 days later at San Juan, Porto Rico. On November 10 our Panama Consul stated that, as regards the probability of von Spee's arrival there was a report that 10,000 tons of coal had been bought in New York to wait at a Venezuelan port.¹ On the other hand, the Colombian wireless station at Carthagena, which for some time had been suspected to be at the disposal of the Germans, was definitely closed on December 8 in response to repeated diplomatic protests.² This should make it more difficult for von Spee to get into touch with any ship coming out from Germany. There was a rumour afloat that the battle cruiser *Von der Tann* had evaded our patrols and was now in the Atlantic,³ and the Admiralty on the 9th, in their anxiety to be sure of touch with the *Australia*, ordered either the *Berwick* or *Lancaster* through the Canal as a wireless link between her and the West Indies squadron.⁴ But an hour or two after the despatch of this telegram all anxiety about the German Cruiser Squadron came to an end.

120. Von Spee's Last Voyage.⁵—When von Spee left San Quintin Bay on November 26 the most definite intelligence of British movements furnished him was that on November 7 the *Defence*, *Cornwall*, *Carnarvon*, *Bristol*, *Glasgow* and *Canopus* were probably concentrated at the Falklands. He had also heard a rumour that all except the *Canopus* had gone to South Africa to help in quelling the rebellion there; but this he disbelieved. The departure of our two battle cruisers from home had been so successfully kept secret that the Admiralty staff in Berlin did not learn it till the two ships revealed themselves at Abrolhos; and though the Buenos Aires supply centre was informed on November 24 that the *Invincible*, *Defence* and *Carnarvon* were at Abrolhos, no attempt was made to inform the German Admiral by wireless, with the result that he remained in ignorance of this essential piece of intelligence till too late. Instead of having to meet British battle cruisers, it would seem he was expecting rather to be supported by a battle cruiser sweep out from Germany and the reply from Berlin that this was impossible did not reach him. The hazards of such a voyage as he contemplated, great enough even with a perfect supply and intelligence system, were rendered all the greater by the inefficiency of that at his disposal.

Soon after leaving San Quintin Bay for Puerto Santa Elena, which he intended to be his next port of call, the squadron

¹ H.S. 42, p. 312.

² M. 10058/15.

³ H.S. 42, p. 703.

⁴ A 178.

⁵ Based on *Kreuzerkrieg*.

encountered a full Cape Horn gale and a strong south-westerly sea. The light cruisers with their deckloads of coal lurched so badly that they had to jettison part of the precious cargo, till the *Dresden*, a turbine-driven vessel, reported she could not reach Puerto Santa Elena without coaling again. To economise fuel, the squadron, instead of passing 100 miles south of Cape Horn, came within 30 miles of it, and there sighted a British sailing vessel. She was brought in by the *Leipzig* and proved to be the *Drummuir* with a cargo of coal. It was too valuable to be sunk, and the whole squadron accompanied the prize to Picton Island, east of the Horn, where three days were consumed in transferring the *Drummuir's* coal to the *Baden* and *Santa Isabel*, while the cruisers filled up from the *Seydlitz*.¹ Before sailing at noon on the 6th the Admiral called all his captains to the flagship, and announced his next move.

The rumour that our squadron had gone over to South Africa had been repeated from various sources, with the added detail that the coal stocks at the Falklands were blazing, and it had suggested a new operation. The Admiral now explained to his assembled officers that on the way to Santa Elena he would attack the Falkland Islands, destroy the wireless station, and, above all, take the Governor prisoner as a reprisal for the alleged ill-treatment by us of the Governor of Samoa. The actual operation was to be carried out by the *Gneisenau* and *Nürnberg*, who were instructed to avoid action with such an overwhelming opponent as the *Canopus*. The rumour was again partly confirmed the night after the cruiser squadron left Picton Island by a telegram from Punta Arenas, passed on by the *Amasis*, that the departure of the British squadron to South Africa was very probable. It was therefore with the fixed determination of raiding the Falklands that the German Admiral set his course towards them as soon as he passed Staten Island and entered the Atlantic Ocean.

During December 7, the *Gneisenau* and *Nürnberg* completed their preparations for mine-sweeping and landing; and early next morning they were detached for their mission, the rest of the squadron following at a lower speed. By 8.30 a.m. on December 8 the wireless mast could be seen by the watchers in the *Gneisenau*. A pall of smoke hung over the harbour and, thinking this to be from the coal and oil stores on fire, the advancing German cruisers found in it confirmation of the absence of British forces. But from 9 a.m. onwards the funnels of warships could be seen, and the captain of the *Gneisenau* signalled to his chief that the *Canopus*, two of the *Kent* class and two *Glasgows* were in the harbour. When two ships thought to be the *Kent* and *Macedonia* were seen slowly steaming out the *Gneisenau* proposed to attack them; but just then four shell from an unseen ship which they guessed to be the *Canopus* fell into the sea

¹ Statements by officers of *Drummuir* are in M. 17105/15.

a mile or so short
some 10 miles off, and the German Admiral recalled his two advanced cruisers. Even then he did not expect to have to encounter a more powerful ship than the *Defence*, and it was not till 10 o'clock that the tripod masts were sighted and von Spee knew that he must fight against overwhelming odds.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE POSITION AT THE END OF 1914.

121. **The Destruction of the German Cruiser Squadron. Escape of the "Dresden" and "Seydlitz."**—The course of approach of the German cruisers, parallel to the land, enabled the look-out established by the *Canopus* to give early warning to our squadron coaling within the harbour; the *Gneisenau* was in sight for two hours before she turned away to rejoin her flagship. In the interval our ships had all weighed and when they reached the mouth of the harbour the five German cruisers could be clearly seen. They had made no attempt to scatter—in fact, it was not till well after 1 o'clock that von Spee detached the light cruisers from his flag. In such circumstances the result of the battle could hardly be in doubt. The *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* were sunk by the battle cruisers; the *Leipzig* and *Nürnberg* by our lighter forces; the *Dresden*, which proved to have the highest speed, escaped southward. Unfortunately, the *Bristol*, our fastest ship, had both engines opened up when the enemy was first sighted and, being unable to get away till 11, was ordered to deal with the supply ships, which at the time were thought to be transports. She found and sank the *Baden* and *Santa Isabel*, but the *Seydlitz* could not be seen.

The *Seydlitz*, which at first was following the German squadron with the temporary rating of hospital ship, was ordered by von Spee at noon to proceed to a rendezvous in 54° S., 57° N. At 3.17 p.m. she learned that the *Baden* and *Santa Isabel* were being chased, and at 3.43, by which time she was out of sight of the action, she was ordered by von Spee back to the "former anchorage." By an intercepted British signal she learned at 6.20: "*Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau* sunk, *Leipzig* on fire." Steering steadily southward, the *Seydlitz* repeatedly called up the *Dresden* and also the *Nürnberg*, of whose destruction she was unaware. Uncertain what anchorage von Spee had meant by his last signal, since in the circumstances Picton Island was an unlikely rendezvous, her captain decided to act on his general orders, which instructed vessels driven away from the squadron to seek a neutral harbour if no longer able to reckon on its protection. He therefore went in to San José Bay¹ and

¹ Possibly the San José in 42° 30' S., 62° 30' S., not far north of Puerto Santa Elena.

spent the night of December 14 in signalling on his highest power to the *Dresden* and the *Rhodopis*, a Kosmos steamer in Corral which served as a wireless station. Two days later he intercepted a signal to the *Eleonore Woermann*, *Mera* and *Patagonia*, ordering them to some harbour whose name was unfortunately jambed; he thereupon decided to anchor at Port San Antonio, 80 miles further north, where he landed the crew of the *Drummuir* who were still on board. He remained in the port until interned in January by the Argentine authorities.¹

The *Dresden*, with whom he had failed to get in touch, was in hiding. She appeared at Punta Arenas on December 12 and disappeared again; the hunt for her was the sole occupation of several ships for three months and she was not encountered till March 1915.

The *Eleonore Woermann*, *Mera* and *Patagonia* were three of the supply ships which the Buenos Aires Supply Centre had despatched to Puerto Santa Elena for the use of the Cruiser Squadron. The *Eleonore Woermann*, which on September 14 had brought to Buenos Aires the survivors of the *Cap Trafalgar*, remained in port under deep suspicion, particularly in mid-October, when, as a result of diplomatic pressure, she was made to discharge 800 tons of coal she was carrying in excess of her bunkers. She managed to get out at night on December 1, cleared ostensibly for South-West Africa with a full cargo of provisions,² and made for the rendezvous line near Puerto Santa Elena. The *Mera* of the Kosmos Line had been at Monte Video throughout the war; she left on December 3 with a small amount of coal and much provisions, cleared for Hamburg. She also went to the rendezvous line. The *Patagonia*, which had arrived at Monte Video from Bahia Blanca on November 22, proceeded at 2 a.m. December 3, ostensibly for Chile, and soon found her way to the same rendezvous. Boiler trouble developed and she had to put into the harbour, where on December 5 she and the *Eleonore Woermann* were seen by a passing steamer, which next day reported their presence to the British Consul at Port Madryn. Meanwhile an Argentine warship found her and ordered her either to leave Argentine waters or proceed to a regular port. The *Patagonia* put to sea again but went in to a lonely harbour, where on December 14 she was discovered by an Argentine cruiser, and brought back in custody to Santa Elena Bay. She and her guard were seen there on December 17 by the *Carnarvon*. She was eventually taken to Bahia Blanca and interned.³ On December 9, the day of the battle, however, she was still within call of the rendezvous, where, by the addition of the Dutch *Josephina*, which had arrived with 1,500 tons, there was a total coal supply of 7,000 tons.⁴

¹ Seydlitz. Report in *Kreuzerkrieg* I, 316-318. Also papers titled F.O., 18.1.15, *Suspected Infringement of Chilean Neutrality by Seydlitz*.

² Papers titled Case 439. ³ M. 0330/15, M. 15604/15, I.D.H.S. 1479/682.

⁴ *Kreuzerkrieg* I. 240.

122. **The Effect on the South American Trade Route.**—The destruction of von Spee's squadron removed the most visible menace to South American trade and relieved the anxiety with which the shipping had been awaiting events. On the west coast, especially in Chile, shipping had been at a standstill from the arrival of the *Scharnhorst* at Valparaiso, on November 4, till the 26th. It was then officially released on condition that neutral waters should be fully utilised and every precaution taken to avoid capture. Even so, one of the first steamers to move, the *Charcas*, belonging to Lamport and Holt, and on passage from Corral to Panama, was captured and sunk on December 3 by the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* some 50 miles south of Valparaiso. The capture was made known on December 6 when the crew of the *Charcas* were landed at Papudo, a short distance north of Valparaiso.

At the River Plate, shipping had been hardly at all disturbed, "in fact, the volume of traffic both ways was practically as great during November as it was in October, before Admiral Cradock's defeat."¹ Even in December the rumours that the German squadron was off Monte Video and that the *Von der Tann* was on the way out were disregarded by all but one or two vessels. But the situation was an anxious one for the Argentine Government. They had to dispose of the next harvest; and their negotiations with neighbouring states for mutual action to protect their interests was viewed with concern by the local German representatives, who felt that difficulties would ensue if their squadron appeared off the mouth of the River Plate.² The defeat of von Spee was therefore received in South America with feelings of great relief, openly expressed in the public newspapers.

It would appear, however, from what is known of Admiral von Spee's ideas, that he had no intention of making systematic war on Atlantic trade. Like all German sea officers he would rather achieve military success than devote his forces to commerce destruction. At Mas-a-fuera he had refused a request from the captain of the *Leipzig* to be allowed to raid the sailing-ship routes, and it is, therefore, unlikely that in the Atlantic he would have reduced his fighting strength by detaching any of his five cruisers from his flag.³ But, whatever may have been his plans, Admiral Sturdee's victory prevented their fruition, and the influence von Spee's entry into the Atlantic had been exerting on all parts of that ocean came to an end.

123. **Recall of the Heavy Cruisers from the Atlantic.**⁴—The battle of the Falkland Islands reduced the enemy vessels with which we thought we had still to reckon to the light cruisers

¹ Fayle: *Seaborne Trade* I, 345.

² I.D.H.S. 1479/458.

³ *Kreuzerkrieg* I, p. 244.

⁴ This is treated in greater detail in the next volume, where full references are given.

Karlsruhe and *Dresden*, and the armed liners *Kronprinz Wilhelm* and *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*. Heavy ships were no longer necessary in the Atlantic and the Admiralty ordered Admiral Sturdee to come home with the battle cruisers, turning over to Admiral Stoddart the command of all the remaining vessels on the south-east coast of America. The *Invincible* left the Falklands on December 16 for home; but the *Inflexible*, which was searching for the *Dresden* on the west coast, had to be recalled and did not proceed from the Falklands for home till the 24th. The *Defence* and *Minotaur* sailed from South-West Africa on December 11 and were home soon after the New Year. The *Dartmouth*, of the Cape Squadron, was ordered across to Abrolhos to join Admiral Stoddart.

The return of the *Princess Royal*, which had been called home within a few hours of the receipt of the news of the Falklands victory,¹ was delayed on account of a report received on December 12 that the *Karlsruhe* was off the Bahamas. Freed from the necessity of taking into consideration the possible movements of the German Cruiser Squadron, the Admiralty took vigorous action. The *Berwick*, *Condé* and *Edinburgh Castle* started from Jamaica to sweep the spot, and the Admiralty instructed the *Princess Royal* to co-operate with them. At the same time they diverted the *Dartmouth* to Pernambuco and later to Demerara; the *Newcastle* they ordered through the Canal to join Admiral Hornby; and the *Melbourne*, which on December 9 had been instructed to go from Gibraltar to visit the Azores, was now ordered to proceed as fast as possible to Bermuda.

Next day, however, the *Dresden's* departure from Punta Arenas became known and the *Newcastle* and *Australia* were both ordered south to assist the Japanese in searching for the *Dresden*, *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* and their colliers. On the 16th the *Princess Royal* was definitely ordered to Scapa Flow with all convenient despatch.

124. Intelligence of the Enemy and Disposition of Forces, 31st December, 1914.²—Thus, at the end of the year, by which time the adjustments to the new conditions had taken place, we had—

Off South America.—The *Carnarvon* (flag of Admiral Stoddart) and *Cornwall* searching the eastern exit of the Straits of Magellan; *Kent*, *Bristol*, *Glasgow* and *Orama* on the coast of Chile; *Canopus* guarding Abrolhos; *Otranto* guarding Port Stanley. The *Macedonia* was on the way home with German prisoners; the *Australia* was passing through the Straits of Magellan on the way home, and the *Newcastle* returning north again from Valparaiso. There were also two Japanese cruisers watching the coast of Ecuador.

¹ A 179.

² Taken from *Daily Return of Enemy, British and Allied Ships Abroad*.

The *Dresden*, after leaving Punta Arenas on December 13, was not again located, though it was locally believed she was in hiding among the archipelago south of the Magellan Straits. The *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* was reported, but vaguely, from various Chilean ports, and the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* had last been seen 300 miles from Santos.

There were 35 German merchant vessels taking refuge in Chilean ports, among them at Valparaiso the *Yorck*, specially suspicious because convertible into a cruiser. In Argentine ports there were 11 German and seven Austrian steamers. Brazil, however, was sheltering more than any other South American State; she was the unwilling host of 46 German and four Austrian merchant ships.

On the Cape Station.—Here were the two old battleships *Albion* and *Goliath*, the light cruisers *Hyacinth* and *Astraea*, and the armed merchant cruiser *Armada Castle*. Off East Africa were the *Fox*, *Chatham*, *Weymouth* and *Kinfauns Castle* keeping watch over the blockaded *Königsberg*. On this station there were only 10 German steamers; four in German East African ports and six in Portuguese harbours.

In the East Atlantic.—Admiral de Robeck had still the *Amphitrite*, *Argonaut* and *Europa*, *Victorian* and *Calgarian*. The *Carmania*, after repair at Gibraltar, took the Tagus guard, in which assistance was provided by another old battleship, the *Prince George*, which arrived on the 29th with orders to lie off the Tagus while carrying on her own refit. The *Vindictive* was at Ascension as wireless link with the South American Squadron, and the *Vengeance* was guarding the colliers at St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands. The *Highflyer*, *Marmora* and *Empress of Britain* patrolled between those islands and Sierra Leone. There were four French cruisers on the Morocco patrol; and operating against the Cameroons were the *Challenger*, *Dwarf* and *Pothau*.

Though no German cruisers were thought to be in the East Atlantic, there were 120 enemy merchant vessels in the various ports—three at the Azores, 26 at the Canaries, four at Madeira, eight at the Cape Verde Islands; in Spanish Atlantic ports there were 37 and at the Tagus and other Portuguese harbours 38. The remaining four were in ports on the coast of West Africa.

On the North American and West Indies Station.—Watching New York and cruising for the protection of North Atlantic trade were the *Glory*, *Suffolk*, *Niobe*, *Essex* and *Caronia*. In the West Indies we had the *Berwick*, *Condé*, *Lancaster*, *Melbourne* and *Dartmouth*, with the *Sydney* on the way across from the Azores. The *Descartes* was still under repair at Martinique, and the *Edinburgh Castle* had proceeded for home to complete her voyage.

Here there were 91 German and Austrian merchant ships to keep in port; 76 of them, including nine potential cruisers at New York, were in United States ports. There were no late reports of the *Karlsruhe* which would serve to locate her; from Para, which was the port to which she had sent the crew of her latest capture, came the rumour that she intended to attack trade in the North Atlantic; various places were mentioned as her probable rendezvous and searchlights had been seen near San Domingo. But we now know that all these rumours of her position were false.

125. **The End of the "Karlsruhe."**—When towards the end of October the German Admiralty realised that von Spee intended to come into the Atlantic with the Cruiser Squadron, they endeavoured to order the *Karlsruhe* to join him. Whether or not he received this order, Captain Köhler's decision, taken about that time, to attack Barbados shows that he had no immediate intention of going south to meet von Spee. But he was destined to see neither von Spee, nor Barbados, nor home again. Just after sunset on November 4, when he was still about 300 miles short of his objective, a terrific explosion cut the *Karlsruhe* in half. The fore part, with Captain Köhler and most of the crew, went down at once; the after part floated for 20 minutes, just long enough for the survivors to get on board the *Indrani* and *Rio Negro* which were in company. As Captain Köhler was gone, the senior officer saved, Lieutenant-Commander Studt, after a short consultation, decided that he would try to reach Germany in the *Rio Negro*; he knew how many of our cruisers the *Karlsruhe* had kept employed, and in order to prevent us from knowing that she was no longer in existence he ruled out a suggestion that he should make for a neutral port. Accordingly, after clearing the *Indrani*, he sank her and started for home. No effort was made to inform the *Farn* of the new conditions; she wandered about for two months and eventually put in to San Juan, Porto Rico. For safety's sake the *Rio Negro* made a wide detour to northward, where in the icy latitudes the survivors of the *Karlsruhe*, in their scanty clothing, suffered a great deal from the cold. Although the vessel was fitted with wireless they made no signals and even so late as November 27 the German Admiralty sent out from Nauen a signal to Captain Köhler conveying the Kaiser's permission for him to return home. This was taken in by the *Rio Negro* and must have been read with strange feelings by the officers and men, for they had loved and admired their dead commander. Two days later the *Rio Negro*, hardly believing she could have run the blockade of the North Sea successfully, put in to Aalesund in Norway.¹ She reached Germany about a week later.²

¹ At the time when she passed the North Sea was entirely destitute of patrols. See Monograph 19, *The Tenth Cruiser Squadron* (C.B. 935), p. 26.

² This paragraph is based on Aust, and I.D.H.S. 1338 and 1414.

126. **Remarks on the "Karlsruhe's" Career.**—The official German version of the *Karlsruhe's* operations has not yet been issued; but, even without that, the published diaries of the surviving officers have enabled us to reconstruct most of her proceedings. The chief obscurity that remains is the exact location of the harbours in which she coaled.¹ Between August 4 and October 27—a period of 84 days—she captured a total of 17 ships; one of these was a Dutch vessel and another, the last of the series, she released. For more than six weeks she remained in mid-ocean lying in wait for steamers, in an area at most 100 miles square, across the South American trade route, leaving it only when she had to coal; and though she had several narrow escapes from our cruisers on passage to join the South-East Coast Squadron, the operations set in motion by the reports of her captures were mostly confined to searches of the coast for her bases, rather than sweeps designed on the principle that "where the carcass is, there will the eagles be gathered together." Admiral Stoddart, in whose area her depredations occurred, had his attention constantly attracted to the northern end of his station. The *Karlsruhe* therefore escaped such danger as might have threatened by an organised sweep of her cruising ground, and it was not fear of an encounter but lack of prey which led Captain Köhler to decide to leave it.

A comparison naturally suggests itself between the proceedings and achievements of Captain Köhler of the *Karlsruhe* and Captain von Müller of the *Emden*.² Owing to the fame of the latter it may be thought that the destruction of shipping by Captain Köhler was on a smaller scale. But this is not the case. Indeed, Captain Köhler sank as many ships as his rival in the Indian Ocean, and the value of hulls and cargoes destroyed by him has been estimated at well over £1,000,000.³ The fact appears to be that, operating in the open sea where wide divergence from the normal track was possible, he gave vessels opportunity for evading him; by endeavouring to conceal his presence he robbed his captures of the element of surprise; and when his prison ships came in to port the news they brought was merely a confirmation of opinions already formed by the shipping community and gave little indication of his position at the time. Hence his operations attracted comparatively little attention, either from the Admiralty or the trading public, and had scarcely any effect in interrupting the passage of shipping on the routes he attacked. On the contrary, what made the effect of the *Emden's* captures so great was that the released prisoners had to report her as being very recently in a position so near Calcutta or Colombo that the risks to ships going in or out were very serious. There is nothing in the *Karlsruhe's* career

¹ Most probably one was Lavandeira Reef, in 5° S., 36° W., which her officers recommended as soon as they got home. See I.D.H.S. 1476/362.

² For the history of the *Emden's* career see Monograph 16.

³ Fayle: *Seaborne Trade* I, 331.

to compare with the *Emden's* raids at Madras and Penang, though Captain Köhler's intended attack on Barbados harbour would undoubtedly have created a great sensation, especially if it had been carried out on November 5. Faith in the navy would certainly have been shaken by the publication on three successive days of the news of a bombardment of a British coast town, the defeat of a British squadron off Chile, and the destruction of shipping in a British West Indian harbour. Luckily for us the *Karlsruhe's* spontaneous explosion saved us from that; and the next naval news of importance to be published was that of the destruction of the *Emden* and the victory at the Falkland Islands.

Thus by the end of 1914 the Atlantic was cleared of the German cruisers which had been in it at the outbreak of war. Moreover, the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, which had entered it from the north, was lying on her side on the sandy shore of Spanish West Africa; and the Cruiser Squadron which had endeavoured to reach it from the south had, with its commander, Admiral Graf von Spee, come to an heroic end. The only German armed vessels afloat outside the confines of Heligoland Bight and the Black Sea were the *Dresden* and the armed liners *Kronprinz Wilhelm* and *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*.¹

¹ The operations against these vessels after the battle of the Falkland Islands will form the subject of Volume II of the history of the Atlantic Ocean.

APPENDIX A.

TELEGRAMS DEALING WITH THE ATLANTIC SQUADRONS.

1. Adty. to R.A., 4th C.S. 30.7.14.
Sent 1240.
121 New war orders should reach you shortly by mail. These do not provide any reinforcement for squadron and limit the area of your operations to North America and West Atlantic so that you will not be required to detach any ships to south-east coast of America.
2. Adty. to R.A.C., 4th C.S. 30.7.14.
Sent 4.30 p.m.
122 *Berwick* must not remain in Havana but keep touch from nearest point outside territorial waters.
3. Adty. to Admiral, Devonport. 30.7. 4.
Sent 8.50 p.m.
Carnarvon is to sail at once to Gibraltar to coal there and await orders. *Cornwall*, *Cumberland*, *Monmouth*, are to complete with men, coal and stores and proceed Gibraltar and wait orders.
4. Adty. to C.-in-C., Devonport. 31.7.14.
Sent 10.50 a.m.
Carnarvon is to proceed along the route towards Madeira and is to get into wireless communication with *Asturias*, *Drina*, *Alcantara* now returning from South America and *Kinfauns Castle* from the Cape. In the event of hostilities to prevent any interference with these vessels. If peace still continues on arriving on the parallel of Cape St. Vincent *Carnarvon* to proceed to Gibraltar and complete with coal.
5. Adty. to *Carnarvon*. 3.8.14.
1 Proceed on trade route to St. Vincent and complete with coal immediately on arrival.
6. Adty. to R.A.C., 4th C.S. 3.8.14.
Sent 10.40 a.m.
128 New orders provide for you to operate only to west of 40° W. longitude for protection of trade in North America and West Indies. Primary bases Halifax and Jamaica. Your command is called in new order Cruiser Force H and another Cruiser Force E with bases Berehaven and Lough Swilly under R.A. Hornby in *Doris* will operate on North American trade route to east of 40° W. longitude.
Another Cruiser Force D with primary bases Sierra Leone and Ascension under R.A. Stoddart in *Carnarvon* will operate between latitudes 30° N. and 10° S. and longitude 40° W. and 10° W.
Another Cruiser Force I with primary base Plymouth under R.-A. de Robeck in *Europa* will operate off Ushant and Finisterre with northern limit line W.S.W. true from Scilly Isles and southern limit latitude 30° N.
7. Adty. to *Carnarvon*. 3.8.14.
Sent 3.35 p.m.
2 Two German cruisers reported off Las Palmas on August 2. Continue on trade route to search for them.

8. Adty. to S.N.O., Bermuda. 3.8.14.
Sent 7 p.m.
From reliable information. Two German cruisers are reported in the neighbourhood of Heart's Content, Newfoundland. One ship is to at once proceed to search for them and to protect cable and wireless station. Inform *Essex* and *Lancaster*.
9. Adty. to *Lancaster*, Bermuda. 4.8.14.
R.A.C., 4th C.S. Sent 10.58 p.m.
German cruisers reported off New York to escort two German liners *Kronprinz Wilhelm* and *Vaterland* painted grey probably armed with 10000 reservists on board. They are to be searched for and shadowed. Inform *Essex*.
10. Adty. to *Lancaster* and *Essex* via Bermuda. 4.8.14.
Sent 3.30 p.m.
Report present position. Trade immediately threatened in the vicinity of New York. Despatch is necessary.
11. Adty. to R.A.C., 4th C.S. 4.8.14.
Sent 4.40 p.m.
131 On appreciation of situation it appears that the danger point to trade in your allotted area appears to be in the neighbourhood of New York. British trade is being advised not to sail until some of your cruisers arrive.
12. Adty. to all Ships. 4.8.14.
Sent 6.45 p.m.
Advise all British shipping with which you may be in touch to abandon regular tracks, complete voyages without bunkering if possible, reduce brilliancy of lights. On arrival in United Kingdom call early for orders. Pass to all ships.
13. Ambassador, Paris, to Foreign Office. 4.8.14.
Recd. 9 p.m.
French Government ask whether as a favour the following message could be sent to French Consular Agent at Bermuda. Begins. War declared between France and Germany only. Inform Commanders of *Condé* and *Descartes* and instruct them to return to Brest, capturing any German vessels they may meet. Ends.
14. Adty. to Intelligence Officer, Jamaica. 5.8.14.
Sent 1.45 a.m.
Have *Suffolk* and *Bristol* sailed? Inform Admiral that the trade from New York and the St. Lawrence is seriously threatened.
15. R.A.C., 5th C.S., to Adty. 5.8.14.
Recd. 3.38 a.m.
Submitted that *Monmouth* be ordered to proceed down trade route St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, to coal and then proceed Brazil and take orders from *Glasgow*.
16. Adty. to S.N.O., Bermuda. 5.8.14.
Sent 6.50 a.m.
German cruiser *Dresden* is off New York.
17. Adty. to *Good Hope*. 5.8.14.
Sent 9 a.m.
How much coal have you on board? Can you proceed to Halifax at 13 knots without coaling?
Reply:—1,850 tons. Can proceed Halifax at 13 knots without coaling.

18. Ministry of Marine, Paris, to French Embassy. 5.8.14.
10.45 a.m.
Prière dire Attaché Naval demander immédiatement à l'Amirauté envoyer si possible un croiseur à Casablanca, un croiseur devant entrée Gironde, et assurer sécurité transport troupes entre Casablanca et détroit Gibraltar. Quelques croiseurs français Méditerranée pourraient être mis à la disposition du Commandant Supérieur anglais sur sa demande.
19. Adty. to *Carnarvon*, *Cumberland*. 5.8.14.
Sent 2.29 p.m.
German cruisers off Las Palmas are believed to be *Beylin* and *Panther*.
20. Adty. to C.-in-C., Devonport, and R.A., *Amphitrite*. 5.8.14.
Sent 3.21 p.m.
Two German cruisers reported off Bilbao trying to cut our cables. Send a cruiser on at once and sweep with squadron to try and cut them off.
21. Ministry of Marine, Paris, to French Embassy. 5.8.14.
4.30 p.m.
La présence des croiseurs allemands que vous nous avez signalés sur les côtes Ouest du Maroc et de l'Espagne nous a conduits à faire passer désormais les transports des troupes du Maroc par Gibraltar et la Méditerranée. L'Amirauté peut-elle faire concentrer dans les eaux marocaines les croiseurs qu'elle a affectés à la protection de ces transports. Prévenez quand cet ordre de concentration sera donné et quand il sera exécuté.
22. Adty. to *Cornwall*. 5.8.14.
Sent 5.26 p.m.
Shape course for Casablanca and cover passage of French transports from Casablanca. Inform *Carnarvon*.
23. Adty. to *Good Hope* and *Drake*. 5.8.14.
Sent 6.40 p.m.
Our trade south of Newfoundland from the St. Lawrence is being threatened by one German cruiser and some armed merchantmen. *Good Hope* is to proceed forthwith at 13 knots or faster if coal will permit to cover trade, completing with coal at Halifax.
24. Adty. to C.-in-C., Portsmouth. 5.8.14.
Sent 11.9 p.m.
Glory is required to leave for Halifax without delay; she is to be completed to full war complement of coal. Report when she will be ready to sail. *Glory* will be used to convoy the trade from Canada to England.
25. Minister, Lisbon, to Foreign Office. 6.8.14.
Recd. 12.40 a.m.
32 Portuguese Government are fully prepared to act up to Alliance and will be guided by H.M. Government in any action (groups omitted) them to take. They place their land and sea forces such as they are unreservedly at the disposal of H.M. Government.
26. Adty. to R.A.C., 4th C.S. 6.8.14.
Sent noon.
136 *Condé* and *Descartes* have been placed under your orders. The southern entrance to the Gulf of St. Lawrence is threatened. Arrange to protect it as well as off New York.
(Received in *Suffolk* 5.52 a.m. 8th.)
27. *Cornwall* to Adty. 6.8.14.
Arrived Casablanca and have consulted French authorities, who informed me three transports will be ready to sail for Marseilles or Bordeaux 11th August. Propose to sail then and request instructions as to which route it is best to take.

28. Adty. to R.A.C., 5th C.S. 6.8.14.
Sent 6.45 p.m.
4 Important for one of your squadron to press on to St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, leaving one cruiser to deal with cruisers off Las Palmas.
29. Adty. to C.-in-C., Devonport. 7.8.14.
Sent 12.55 a.m.
Sutlej is to proceed on the trade route to Finisterre and temporarily join Cruiser Force I under Rear-Admiral de Robeck, who is to be informed.
30. Adty. to R.A.C., 6th C.S. 7.8.14.
Sent 1.10 p.m.
When coaled *Leviathan* is to proceed to the Azores economising coal as much as possible. Search Islands for German cruisers and colliers; get in touch with Consul if possible. If not possible to coal at the Azores fall back on Gibraltar. You are to try and keep in wireless touch . . .
31. Adty. to *Cornwall*. 7.8.14.
Sent 1.30 p.m.
Cornwall to return to Gibraltar. Complete with coal.
32. Embassy, Washington, to Foreign Office. 7.8.14.
Recd. 5.25 p.m.
Executive order issued last night prohibits "all wireless stations in jurisdiction of United States from transmitting or receiving for delivery messages of an unneutral nature, and from in any way rendering to any one of the belligerents any unneutral service during continuance of hostilities." Naval Officers have been detailed as censors.
33. *Amphitrite* to Adty. 7.8.14.
Recd. 6.12 p.m.
Admiralty message to *Amphitrite* not delivered to R.A., as he is on board *Vindictive*, and I am not yet in touch with her . . .
34. Adty. to *Cornwall* and R.A.C., 5th C.S. 8.8.14.
Sent 7.47 p.m.
Cornwall to sail from Gibraltar as soon as ready. Shape course for Madeira, get on the trade route and place herself under the orders of R.A., *Carnarvon*.
35. Ministry of Marine, Paris, to Adty. 10.8.14.
Recd. 6.15 p.m.
Cassard, *Cosmao* have received orders to patrol the coast of Morocco where the military transports are now protected. Thanks to *Cornwall*. Admiralty may now dispose of her as may be desired.
36. Adty. to R.A.C., 5th C.S. 11.8.14.
Sent 8.49 p.m.
Macedonia sails daylight 12th for St. Vincent to join your force. Admiral *Vindictive* informed.
37. British Consul, Guadeloupe, to Adty. 12.8.14.
Sent 12.45 a.m. Recd. 1.38 a.m.
Warships nationality unknown seen last night Lemoule.
Staff Note.—Le Moule is in Guadeloupe.
This ship is probably *Dresden*, which was reported at Barbados on 10th August.
38. Customs, Trinidad, to Adty. 12.8.14.
Recd. 3.55 a.m.
Drumcliffe reports as follows: German *Dresden* arrived E.S.E. August 6, 1.30 p.m. lat. 1.10 N. long. 45.5 W. Boarded me. Destroyed wireless.

39. Censor, Port of Spain, to Chief Censor, War Office. 12.8.14.
8.5. a.m.
In a telegram numbered 28 Port of Spain reports that steamer *Drumcliffe* was stopped on 6th August by cruiser *Dresden* 350 miles to the north-east of Cayenne and had her wireless apparatus destroyed. The report of yesterday was wrong or referred to another cruiser.
40. Adty. to *Leviathan*. 12.8.14.
Sent 12.10 p.m.
Leviathan after examining Azores for enemy cruisers proceed to St. Vincent, Cape Verde, to coal and then at once to the Cape for escort of troops . . .
41. Liverpool to Adty. 12.8.14.
Recd. 5.54 p.m.
Our steamer *Drumcliffe* left Buenos Ayres 24th July for New York in ballast arrived Trinidad for bunkers and reports her wireless destroyed by German cruiser 6th August. Joseph Chadwick and Sons, Shipowners.
42. Adty. to *Challenger* and R.A., *Vindictive*. 13.8.14.
Sent 4.30 p.m.
Challenger to proceed to Queenstown, complete with coal and act under orders of R.A., *Vindictive*.
43. Adty. to R.A.C., 5th C.S. 13.8.14.
Sent 8.35 p.m.
22 German cruisers reported near Duala, Cameroon River. Send one cruiser to Fernando Po to search for them and gain intelligence leaving one in vicinity of St. Vincent to guard trade.
44. Adty. to R.A.C., 4th C.S. 13.8.14.
Sent 11 p.m.
148 *Carmania* armed merchant ship with eight 4.7 guns leaves 15th August for your station. She will come to Halifax unless you wire for her to go anywhere else. *Good Hope* and *Glory* to coal on arrival and wait orders to return to England.
45. Adty. to R.A.C., 9th C.S. 13/14.8.14.
Midnight.
15 Armed merchant ship *Marmora* will sail from Tilbury in a day or two under your orders. She carries eight 4.7 in. guns.
46. R.A.C., 4th C.S., to Adty. 14.8.14.
Recd. 12.21 a.m.
248 . . . No aggressive acts have been reported nor is there any definite information of presence of hostile vessels on this side North Atlantic ocean trade routes. German agents are obviously sending false reports of their movements . . .
47. Adty. to R.A.C., 4th C.S. 14.8.14.
Sent 3.50 p.m.
154 German cruisers are reported to be in West Indies. They are being coaled at sea by German steamers who have embarked coal at St. Thomas for this purpose. They have been reported as follows: *Karlsruhe* at Curaçao 12.8.14; a German cruiser off Guadeloupe 12.8.14; German cruiser coaled in mouth of Para River 8.8.14, and was off the coast near Para 10.8.14; French steamer seized near Curaçao 7.8.14. They are apparently operating against West Indian trade. Believed some British ships have been captured.

48. Adty. to *Dwarf*, Sierra Leone.
21 Eastern Company cable steamer ordered transfer three German cables from off Monrovia to Sierra Leone. Accompany cable steamer and cover the operation. (Sent 6.6 p.m., 14.8.14.)
24 With reference to Admiralty telegram 21.—The transfer of German cables from Monrovia to Sierra Leone will not be carried out. (Sent 2.35 p.m., 16.8.14.)
- 14.8.14.
49. Adty. to R.A.C., 4th C.S. Sent 7.30 p.m.
- 155 My 154. Can you reinforce West Indies from the north?
Reply.
258 Your 155. Yes, if may send *Good Hope*, her speed most essential.
Admiralty reply.
161 Your 258. Approved to send *Good Hope* to West Indies. (Sent 10.45 a.m. 15.8.14.)
- 14.8.14.
50. R.A., 4th C.S., to Adty. Recd. 8.55 p.m.
- 255 If feasible may *Good Hope* remain on station to permit Captain Yelverton being Senior Officer in the north, and relieving me if necessary to go south.
Reply.
157 Your 255. *Good Hope* can remain for the present and (be) used as proposed.
- 15.8.14.
51. Panama to Foreign Office.
Panama Canal successfully inaugurated to-day by the passage ship Atlantic to Pacific Ocean.
- 15.8.14.
52. R.A.C., 4th C.S., to Adty. Recd. 8.32 a.m.
- 259 Your 154. As regards the German cruisers, an analysis of all the reliable information shows following are their probable movements. *Dresden*, 6th August, steering E.S.E., boarded S.S. *Drumcliffe* lat. 1° 10' N., long. 40° S., destroying wireless and allowing her to proceed; this received from ship's log by Governor, Trinidad. 8th August reported coaling Para. 10th August reported by Pernambuco seen between Para and Camocin. These movements apparently indicate *Dresden* proceeding south.
Karlsruhe arrived San Juan, Porto Rico, 9th August coaled and sailed. Arrived Curaçao Island 12th August coaled. Present position or objective not apparent. Have no information of capture of British ships. *Karlsruhe* having coaled twice in neutral ports request representations be made to all American States and Republics to prevent any further coaling in any neutral port. Imaginary and false information of movements of German cruisers being reported.
- 15.8.14.
53. British Adty. to French Minister of Marine. Sent 9.20 p.m.
The passage across the Atlantic quite safe. British trade running as usual.
- 16.8.14.
54. Adty. to R.A.C., 4th C.S. Sent 6.5 p.m.
- 169 *Carmania* sailed *viâ* Rockall on 15th for Halifax. Will not be recalled, but if not out of wireless touch could be deflected to Bermuda . . .

- 17.8.14.
55. Ministry of Marine, Paris, to Adty. Recd. 0.35 a.m.
(*Translation.*) In view of the present situation Morocco *Cassard* and *Cosmao* are to remain appropriated till further orders for good watch over coast of Morocco.
- 17.8.14.
56. S.N.O., Gib., to Adty. Recd. 3.14 p.m.
- 744 Union Castle liner *Galician* reports from Tenerife she was captured by *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* and released 5 a.m., 16th August, in 25.35 N., 17.20 W. . . . *Carnarvon*, *Cumberland*, *Cornwall*, *Leviathan* informed.
- 17.8.14.
57. Adty. to R.A.s, 4th, 5th, 9th, 11th C.S. Sent 4.15 p.m.
- Great care is to be taken in the diversion of neutral ships with neutral cargo. It is of prime importance to keep the United States of America as a friendly neutral. Diversion of doubtful ships should be reported to Admiralty.
- 17.8.14.
58. Adty. to R.A.C., 9th C.S., No. 20. Recd. 17.8.14.
R.A.C., 11th C.S., No. 17. Sent 9 p.m.
- Highflyer* is to be sent on to St. Vincent under orders of R.A., *Carnarvon*. One of the cruisers from Cruiser Force E is to be sent to join Cruiser Force I, name to be reported. *Juno* and *Isis* can be taken away from their present duties.
- 17.8.14.
59. Adty. to R.A.C., 5th C.S. Sent 9 p.m.
- 25 *Highflyer* is being sent to join your squadron.
- 17.8.14.
60. Adty. to all Ships. Sent 9.37 p.m.
- General instructions. The main object of cruisers being to destroy the enemy's armed ships, when prizes are taken cruisers are not to leave their stations or be diverted from their object. Prize crews should be put on board. Any necessary prisoners removed. If this is not possible and the cargo is mostly enemy, the crew should be removed and the ship sunk. If the cargo is neutral the captain must use his discretion for securing the prize.
- 18.8.14.
61. Adty. to R.A.C., 5th C.S., *Cumberland*,
Cornwall, *Macedonia*. Sent 12.40 a.m.
- Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* stopped *Arlanza* 16th, 1 p.m., lat. 24.40 N., long. 17.14 W.; destroyed wireless and released ship.
- 18.8.14.
62. Adty. to R.A.C., 9th C.S. Sent 4.10 p.m.
- 21 *Minerva* is being sent to join your Cruiser Force I.
- 19.8.14.
63. Adty. to R.A.C., 4th C.S. Sent 2.10 p.m.
- 180 *Glory* when coaled is to be ordered to cruise off New York, and thus relieve a cruiser and give an impression of power, Halifax being used as a coaling base . . .
- 19.8.14.
64. Adty. to V.A., 7th B.S. Sent 4.35 p.m.
- Three battleships of your squadron are required for the defence of trade at three focal points. *Canopus* at St. Vincent, Cape Verde; *Albion* with Rear-Admiral at Gibraltar; *Ocean* at Queenstown. Report when these ships will be complete with coal. Special orders will be sent to them.

65. Adty. to V.A., 7th B.S.

20.8.14.
Sent 1.55 a.m.

Albion and *Canopus* can sail in company for Gibraltar to-morrow when charts have been received. Ships to be spread en route for extra protection of trade route. Proceed at economical speed.

Albion, after coaling, to cruise off Cape St. Vincent, using Gibraltar as a base, and generally support cruisers of Cruiser Force I in protecting trade south of Lisbon. Opportunity to be taken to carry out firing when south of Ushant, warning ships beforehand within hearing by W/T.

Canopus, after coaling, to proceed to Cape de Verde, passing *via* Madeira and Canary Islands. *Canopus* is to place herself under orders of R.A., Cruiser Force D, and en route is to try and destroy any German cruisers, obtaining information of enemy from cruisers en route. On arrival at Cape de Verde to generally protect trade in those waters, using Sierra Leone, Dakar and Cape de Verde for coaling.

66. Adty. to V.A., 7th B.S.

20.8.14.
Sent 2.15 p.m.

Extra ratings to enable cruisers to provide prize crews will be sent to Portland for *Canopus* and *Albion* to embark and transfer to each cruiser . . .

67. Consul, Rio de Janeiro, to Adty.

20.8.14.
Recd. 7.41 p.m.

British ship *Hyades*, owners Houston Line, bound from Rosario to Rotterdam, with maize was sunk by *Dresden* 16th August, about 180 miles east of Pernambuco. Officers and crew brought to Rio by German ship *Prussia*. *Dresden* had *Baden* and *Pernambuco* as tenders and *Blücher* as wireless telegraphy intelligence agent. I have informed Brazilian Government.

68. Adty. to *Leviathan*, St. Vincent, Cape Verde Is.20.8.14.
Sent 8.20 p.m.

To await arrival. *Leviathan*, when coaled, to leave at once and proceed towards the Cape *via* Ascension and St. Helena, to meet transports under convoy of C-in-C., Cape, and return with them. Transports leave Cape 26th August.

69. Consul, Philadelphia, to Adty.

20.8.14.
Recd. 9.58 p.m.

German *Brandenburg* at this port last night took large quantities of provisions and is now coaling. She has not yet applied to Customs for clearance and may attempt to leave secretly. - I have warned United States authorities here.

Brandenburg sailed ostensibly for Bergen at about 5 or 6 this evening (21st). German steamships *Prinz Oskar* and *Rhaetia* are also apparently preparing for loading coal.

70. Knott, Newcastle-on-Tyne, to Adty.

21.8.14.
Recd. 12.3 p.m.

Our Rio Janeiro agents cable that British Consul there reports steamer *Siamese Prince* was stopped by German warship *Dresden*, 16th August, off Pernambuco, but was allowed to proceed with cargo to neutral port . . .

71. Consul, Pernambuco, to Adty.

21.8.14.
Recd. 5.45 p.m.

Suspect vicinity of Rocas Island being used as base by German cruiser *Dresden*.

72. Adty. to R.A.C., 9th C.S.

22.8.14.
Sent 6.20 p.m.

27 Reliable report from Bilbao states that the German ship *Frankenwald* was off Bilbao interfering with submarine cables. Send a ship to deal with her.

73. Adty. to R.A.C., 4th C.S.

22.8.14.
Sent 10.45 p.m.

188 *Good Hope* after coaling at St. Lucia is to proceed along the north coast of South America from Trinidad to Pernambuco searching for enemy's coaling base and cruiser *Dresden*. Off Para is a possible base. Coaling if necessary at Pernambuco, reporting arrival and wait further orders.

74. Adty. to R.A.C., 4th C.S.

23.8.14.
Sent 4 p.m.

189 *Niobe* will be ready for sea on 1st September and will join your cruiser squadron. Give the necessary orders.

75. Adty. to *Glasgow*.23.8.14.
Sent 4.21 p.m.

If you have certain information *Dresden* is your objective. Station limits are only a general guide.

76. R.A.C., 4th C.S., St. Lucia, to Adty.

23.8.14.
Recd. 6.22 p.m.

374 Your 188. Arrived with *Good Hope*, *Bristol*, and now coaling. *Berwick* arrives 25th August. Have planned to proceed to north coast of South America with *Berwick*, *Bristol* and make thorough search and clear up in those waters. Collier *Adamson* due at St. Lucia 28th August to follow to Para, also *Carnania* later on with cargo of coal from Bermuda. Coaling outside Pernambuco most improbable in August. *Good Hope* cannot leave before 24th August St. Lucia Island. Therefore request further instructions. *Condé* searching coast of Venezuela, afterwards St. Thomas Island touching at Martinique. *Descartes* later on guard ship St. Lucia Island.

77. Adty. to R.A.C., 4th C.S.

23.8.14.
Sent 10.35 p.m.

191 Your 374. Your proposal approved. Hunt the *Dresden* and her colliers.

78. Las Palmas to Adty.

24.8.14.
Recd. 1.48 a.m.

Reliable information German *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, armed merchant vessel, and German *Duala*, merchant vessel, arrived Rio de Oro, Spanish West Africa, daybreak, 17th August. Both in port 48 hours. Ignored Spanish authority. Transhipped coal from *Duala* to *Kaiser*.

79. R.A.C., 5th C.S., to Adty.

24.8.14.
Recd. 10.45 a.m.

Carnarvon has captured German steamer *Professor Woermann*, who has waited to north of Brava Island some days apparently for German cruisers. She is being taken by *Carnarvon* to Sierra Leone . . .

80. Adty. to all Ships.

25.8.14.
Sent 11.35 p.m.

Any properly authenticated French safe conduct for Austrian ship is to be respected. S.S. *Bathori* leaves Havre for Rotterdam shortly with such a pass.

81. Adty. to C-in-C., Home Fleets.

26.8.14.
Sent 3.45 p.m.

579 . . . *Albion*, *Glory*, *Canopus* and *Ocean* have been detached to form supports at focal points on trade route in anticipation of any raids by hostile battle cruisers . . .

82. S.N.O., Gib., to Adty. 26.8.14.
Recd. 7.33 p.m.
816 German Consul at Tenerife states that armed mercantile cruiser *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* sank British merchant vessels *Nyanga* and *Kaipara*; refuses to give details. *Nyanga* sailed from Calabar for continental ports 28th July; *Kaipara* sailed from Monte Video for England 1st August . . .

83. R.A.C., 4th C.S., to Adty. 26.8.14.
Recd. 7.42 p.m.
279 If hostilities are likely to last it would be certainly advantageous if two 6-in. or 4.7 guns, with personnel, could be sent to Castries, St. Lucia Island, considering its importance as a coaling base and centre for merchant shipping. Over 60 British ships have visited the island since outbreak of war.

84. Adty. to R.A.C., 9th C.S. 27.8.14.
Sent 0005.
28 Detach *Marmora* to the Canaries to work in conjunction with *Highflyer* under the orders of R.A. Stoddart.

85. Adty. to R.A.C., 5th C.S. 27.8.14.
Sent 0.45 a.m.
33 It is important that the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* should be captured or sunk as soon as you can. *Marmora* has been ordered from Cruiser Force I to join your command. It is suggested that *Highflyer* and *Marmora* should work together, *Macedonia* and *Cornwall* doing the same, but this arrangement is subject to your discretion. You have as much intelligence on the spot as Admiralty have.

86. *Highflyer* to Adty. 27.8.14.
Recd. 1.25 p.m.
Have sunk *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* off Ouro. Survivors landed in their own boats before sinking. 2135.

87. Adty. to C-in-C., Portsmouth. 28.8.14.
Sent 8.35 p.m.
Europa is to escort transport *Appam* to west coast of Africa . . . They are to call at Dakar . . . at Bathurst . . . and at Sierra Leone.

88. Consul, Las Palmas, to Foreign Office. 29.8.14.
Recd. 1.30 a.m.
. . . . At present remaining here still 13 German ships, two Austro-Hungarian. It is certain that this port is being used for obtaining steam coal and stores and supplies for transhipment to armed German ships elsewhere . . .

89. Consul, Tenerife, to Foreign Office. 29.8.14.
Recd. 2.30 a.m.
. . . . Governor of this Province has telegraphed to Las Palmas instructing them to exercise strict vigilance over movements and requirements of all shipping using port of Las Palmas. Governor assured me that the matter would receive special attention. I received no report on this matter until to-day.

90. Adty. to R.A.C., 9th C.S. 29.8.14.
Sent 11.40 p.m.
34 *Europa* is coming out from Portsmouth 1st September, convoying transport *Appam*. Arrange to relieve *Europa* off Las Palmas by either *Challenger* or *Minerva* about 6th September. Ship selected will be employed in West Africa under *Cumberland* and must be lighter draught than *Europa*. *Europa* subsequently joins your orders. Ship selected to be filled up with coal at Las Palmas by 6th September.

Reply.
Challenger will be about Las Palmas 5th September to relieve *Europa*.

91. Adty. to Intelligence Officer, Jamaica. 30.8.14.
Sent 11.15 p.m.
1 Report received from Consul-General, Baltimore, that Norwegian vessel *Molina* has gone to Norfolk and is probably not intending to coal German warship, but that Norwegian steamship *Hermion*, now at Newport News, will be used for that purpose. Report adds that Newport News is being used as base for supply of coal and stores to German ships.

Another report from Consul-General, New York, as follows:—Begins, Hamburg-Amerika Line have been chartering numerous neutral steamers which sail from Atlantic ports with large cargoes of coal and provisions carrying generally a German supercargo. They clear for very distant ports, but they are undoubtedly used to supply German cruisers. I have frequently approached local authorities, but they urge great difficulty finding legal cause for their detention.

Following names known. *Thor*, Norwegian, sailed 4th August, Newport News for Fray Bentos; *Nepos*, Norwegian, sailed 23rd August, Philadelphia for Tenerife; *Heine*, Norwegian Government, sailed 7th August, Philadelphia for La Guayra; *Berwind*, American, sailed 5th August, New York for Buenos Aires; *Lorenzo*, American, sailed 6th August, New York for Buenos Aires; *Johan Ludwig Mowinckel*, Norwegian, now at New York; *Pathfinder*, American, now at Caibarien.

92. Adty. to R.A.C., 5th C.S., No. 44. 30.8.14.
Sent 11.15 p.m.
R.A.C., 9th C.S.
S.N.O., Gib., No. 541.

Hamburg-Amerika Line have been chartering numerous neutral steamers which sail from Atlantic ports with large cargoes of coal and provisions, carrying generally a German supercargo. They clear for very distant ports, but they are undoubtedly used to supply German cruisers.

93. Adty. to R.A., *Albion*. 31.8.14.
Sent 12.20 p.m.
Proceed to Gibraltar and remain there till further orders.

94. Naval Attaché to Ministry of Marine, Paris. 31.8.14.
Sent 4.30 p.m.
291 As base of British Expeditionary Force has been changed to St. Nazaire, the Admiralty would be obliged if one division of armoured cruisers of the 2nd Light Squadron were sent at once to patrol and cover the route from Ushant to Finisterre. This would allow the British cruisers watching this route to spread further south.

At present there is no sign of enemy ships in the Bay of Biscay, but when it is known that the base has been changed it is possible that a raid may be made on the transports.

The other division of armoured cruisers should be kept at Cherbourg ready to relieve the first or go to the east(ward), as may be required.

Reply.
73 French division *Gloire* weighed anchor last night for cruise between Ushant and Finisterre as requested in your telegram 291. (Recd. 11.50 a.m. 1.9.14.)

95. Ministry of Marine, Paris, to Naval Attaché, 31.8.14.
Recd. 10.43 p.m.
Adty.

64 (*Translation*.) Some Moroccan tribes are spreading the report that England and France are at war. It appears to us useful for a British cruiser to go temporarily with one of our cruisers on the south coast of Morocco. If the Admiralty accepts this suggestion, the appointed cruiser might concert directly with General Lyautey at Rabat for duty not exceeding one week, which might consist of an appearance off the south coast simultaneously with French cruiser.

96. Adty. to R.A.C., 5th C.S. 1.9.14.
Sent 2.15 p.m.
46 *Macedonia* is to proceed to south-east coast of America under orders of *Glasgow*. *Empress of Britain* to remain under your orders in Cruiser Force D.

97. Adty. to R.A.C., 9th C.S. 1.9.14.
Sent 3.45 p.m.
37 A division of French armoured cruisers are proceeding now to guard the trade route from Ushant to Finisterre and thus relieves you of this area.

98. Adty. to C.-in-C., Devonport. 2.9.14.
Sent 1.29 p.m.
Amphitrite is not to sail till further orders. Probably will be required to sail on Friday (5th September) for convoy duty.

99. Adty. to *Minerva*. 2.9.14.
(a) Escort *Edinburgh Castle* to 100 miles from Ushant or until the French armoured cruisers are met. 1445.
(b) Proceed with *Edinburgh Castle* till near Plymouth, and then proceed to Plymouth, coal, and wait orders ready to convoy troops out to Gibraltar. R.A. *Argonaut* informed. 2348.

100. Vice-Consul, Pernambuco, to Adty. 2.9.14.
Recd. 10.53 p.m.
British ship *Bowes Castle* sunk by *Karlsruhe* 186 miles east of Barbados, 18th August. Officers and men were brought by German ship to Maranham to-day . . .

101. Adty. to R.A.C., 9th C.S. 2.9.14.
Sent 11.56 p.m.
39 *Amphitrite* is going to convoy a transport to Gibraltar, sailing probably Friday (4th September). *Minerva* is going into Plymouth to coal and will convoy out another transport; date will be communicated.

102. Adty. to R.A.C., 5th C.S. 3.9.14.
Sent 10.55 a.m.
Europa now conveying transport *Appam* out to Las Palmas, due there about 7th where she will be relieved by *Challenger*. A cruiser is required to relieve *Hyacinth* who is conveying homeward six transports in company with *Leviathan* and is due St. Vincent, Cape Verde, about the 10th. Report cruiser you propose for this service. *Europa* is available.

103. Adty. to R.A.C., 4th C.S. 3.9.14.
Sent 5 p.m.
200 You are to remain and take charge of S.E. Coast of America Station. Ships under your orders, *Good Hope*, *Berwick*, *Bristol*, *Glasgow*, *Monmouth*, *Carmania*, *Otranto*, *Victorian*; communicate with *Glasgow*.

104. Ministry of Marine, Paris, to Naval Attaché, 3.9.14.
Adty. Recd. 10.5 p.m.

88 (*Translation*.) I transmit to you following cablegram passing via P Q (?) Willemstad, Curaçao, on the 31st for Pleybe, Minister of Colonies, The Hague. Begins.

Karlsruhe arrived 12th, 7 o'clock, there being a rumour Holland also was in war, agreed before with Division Commander that if foreign warship came on (in) officer would go with pilot on board. Division Commander went himself on board asking Commander *Karlsruhe* if he knew rumour was true. Commander assured he convinced Holland still in peace, he requested to (may) enter for coaling, being entirely without coal. He was allowed bunker 1,200 tons. This quantity was considered to be for *Karlsruhe* not larger than neutrality proclamation permitted to give, that is, quantity to reach next harbour of its own country. *Karlsruhe* departed 7.30 p.m. Governor Nuyens.

105. Adty. to S.N.O., Halifax. 3.9.14.
Sent 11.40 p.m.
Following for *Suffolk*. Begins. *Suffolk* or one of your A cruisers that may be nearer is to proceed to St. Thomas, from whence it is reported that supplies of coal, food and ammunition are being sent to German cruisers, probably *Karlsruhe* and possibly *Dresden*. The vessel sent should remain in West Indies and operate there. It is urgent that the German cruiser and the colliers should be sunk. Report dispositions and orders given to *Niobe*.

106. Adty. to R.A., *Doris*. 4.9.14.
Sent 2 p.m.
30 As soon as convenient you are to transfer your flag to *Caronia* and proceed to North America. You will there transfer your flag to the *Glory*, and remain in charge of the North America and West Indies Station. *Caronia* is to remain under your orders . . .

107. Adty. to R.A., *Carnarvon* (via Dakar W/T). 4.9.14.
Sent 2.15 p.m.
48 On arrival of *Canopus* at St. Vincent she is to complete with coal and proceed to the Abrolhos Rocks, where she is to remain and guard the flying base that is to be formed there of colliers and supply ships. *Albion* is coming to take the *Canopus's* place at St. Vincent, Cape Verde. R.-A. Cradock in *Good Hope* is taking command S.E. Coast America. *Cornwall* to be under his orders. *Glasgow*, *Monmouth* and *Otranto* have gone on to Magellan Straits. Retain *Victorian* under your orders.

(Acknowledged in 13 from R.A.C., 5th C.S. Sent 4.30 p.m. 5.9.14.)

108. Adty. to R.-A. Tottenham, *Albion*. 4.9.14.
Sent 2.32 p.m.
You are to transfer your flag to *Sutlej* and return in her to take command of Cruiser Force E. *Sutlej* is to convoy the transports which are being got ready, including *Ultonia* from Malta. Probable date 9th at Gibraltar.

Albion is to complete with coal and proceed to St. Vincent, Cape Verde, under the orders of R.-A. Stoddart.

Ocean is being sent out to replace *Albion*. She will be under the orders of R.-A. de Robeck and stationed off Cape St. Vincent . . .

109. Adty. to R.A., *Charybdis*. 10.9.14.
Sent 4.45 p.m.
32 You and your squadron are going to be temporarily replaced by V.-A. Bethell and four battleships. As soon as V.-A. Bethell has relieved you, you are to get your squadron coaled and proceed to Canada, fill up with coal there and bring back a convoy of about 14 transports of Canadian troops. They expect to be ready to sail about 24th. Further details will be sent to you . . .

110. Adty. to A.C., 9th C.S. 11.9.14.
Sent 12.55 p.m.
46 *Ocean* and *Minerva* sail to-day with convoy of about 14 transports for Gibraltar. On arrival *Ocean* is to remain under your orders. Some of the transports are going on to Malta and are to be convoyed by *Minerva* or one other ship selected by you.

111. Adty. to C.-in-C., Devonport. 12.9.14.
Sent 9.30 a.m.
The following are orders for R.-A. Wemyss:—

Proceed with your three cruisers as soon as ready to Halifax. *Diana* to follow as soon as ready. Your squadron is to fill up with coal at Halifax and be ready to start back as soon as transports are ready. Further details on this subject will be sent to Halifax. Cruisers should be spread when going across and usual captures made with prize crews put on board.

There is a large number of German liners at present detained in New York, but they are ready for sea and we can't be sure they won't sail at any moment. Information will be sent by wireless as far as possible, both from England as well as *via* Cape Race and Halifax. R.-A. Hornby will be found in *Glory*, with *Lancaster*, *Suffolk*, *Niobe*, and *Caronia*, in the northern part of the station. *Berwick* and *Essex* are in West Indies. R.-A. Cradock has gone to south-east coast of America.

112. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 12.9.14.
Sent 11.12 p.m.

591 *Proserpine* is being sent out to act under your orders. The principal duty is to assist in the patrol of the Straits of Gibraltar.

113. Adty. to S.N.O., Halifax. 13.9.14.
Sent 12.20 p.m.

For the present cruiser watching St. Lawrence is to at once proceed off New York to prevent German ships escaping. Two ships are to be permanently left off New York.

114. Adty. to General. 13.9.14.
Sent 12.35 p.m.

The original purpose of our armed merchant cruisers was to capture or sink the armed merchant cruisers of the enemy.

There does not now appear to be as many armed merchant cruisers of the enemy as was anticipated. Each of our armed merchant cruisers should as far as possible work in conjunction with a cruiser.

If an armed merchant cruiser meets an enemy's cruiser, whose force in the Captain's opinion is so superior that she cannot engage her with good prospect of success, she should shadow her, keeping in touch by wireless with any of our cruisers near, and should not let her escape if possible.

115. Adty. to R.-A., *Carnarvon*, *Amphitrite*. 14.9.14.
Timed 1140.

Amphitrite is to arrange to relieve *Carnarvon* with *Europa* and convoy as far as latitude of Finisterre, after which *Europa* can continue alone. French cruisers are guarding the Bay and will be informed. *Carnarvon* can then return to her station.

Reply from R.A. de Robeck.

There is at present no ship available (to) relieve *Carnarvon* with convoy.

116. Adty. to all Ships (*via* Cleethorpes). 14.9.14.
Sent 2.25 p.m.

You have full authority to send into British ports neutral vessels which hamper your operations. Your own discretion will show you importance of not appearing to maltreat flag of a small neutral.

117. Adty. to R.A., *Carnarvon*, *Amphitrite*. 14.9.14.
Sent 8.45 p.m.

Carnarvon can return to her station when the latitude of Lisbon is reached. *Ocean* and *Minerva* escorting troops outward are off the coast; *Europa* to convoy transports to England.

118. Adty. to R.A., *Carnarvon*. 16.9.14.
Sent 12.35 p.m.

65 It is necessary that you should give temporary support to French cruiser *Cosmao* south of Agadir by an armed liner. Give orders accordingly. Acknowledge.

119. Adty. to S.N.O., Halifax. 17.9.14.
Sent 9.16 p.m.

For R.-A. Hornby. 4 *Glory* is required for convoy duty. You are to shift your flag to either *Caronia*, *Suffolk* or *Lancaster* as you think fit. *Glory* and *Niobe* are to be put under orders of R.-A. Wemyss and the whole convoy is to proceed when ready by route 9 blue shown on North Atlantic Route Chart. Convoy will be met by another battleship from England at a rendezvous lat. 49.30 N., long. 30 W. *Glory* will leave convoy when in longitude of Fastnet and proceed to Queenstown to coal and return to Halifax. Inform R.-A. Wemyss as soon as you are in touch with him.

120. R.-A. de Robeck to Adty. 19.9.14.
Recd. 4.53 a.m.

Rear-Admiral's flag hoisted *Argonaut*. *Amphitrite* will take over charge of convoy at St. Vincent on 19th September, escorting it to the Channel. *Ocean* is proceeding to Madeira and afterwards to Azores. 1718.

121. Adty. to R.A., *Argonaut*. 19.9.14.
Sent 11.45 a.m.

Approved for *Amphitrite* to convoy transports to England. *Ocean* to proceed to Port Said, coaling at Malta on the way. *Europa* is coming out to rejoin Cruiser Force I.

122. Adty. to S.N.O., Halifax. 22.9.14.
Sent 2.35 p.m.

12 Following for R.A. and all ships.

You are on no account to telegraph in to New York for supplies or newspapers. United States Government have called attention to this in a friendly way at present.

123. Adty. to R.A. North America and W. Indies. 25.9.14.
Sent 12.30 a.m.

20 *Niobe* to be retained under orders of R.-A. Hornby instead of escort under R.-A. Wemyss. Inform both Admirals.

124. Adty. to A.C., 9th C.S. 28.9.14.
Sent 6.50 p.m.

56 *Minerva* has been sent on to East Indies. *Calgarian* and *Donegal* are being sent to you as soon as ready. *Diana* also will be sent on return of Canadian convoy.

125. Adty. to R.A., *Argonaut*. 30.9.14.
Sent 1.40 a.m.

59 Gibraltar should be the principal coaling base for ships of your squadron, unless there are any other reasons for sending them to Plymouth. This especially applies to *Calgarian* on account of coaling from alongside.

126. Adty. to S.N.O., Halifax. 1.10.14.
Sent 9.45 p.m.

61 Intelligence centre, under Abraham, has been established at St. Johns, Newfoundland. . . . Foreign Office considers New York unsuitable as an Intelligence Centre.

127. Adty. to S.N.O., Gibraltar.

2.10.14.
Sent 7.14 p.m.

665. *Leviathan*, when ready for sea, is to await the arrival of four transports, *California*, *Corsican*, *Deseado* and *India*, due at Gibraltar about the 8th. *Leviathan* is to escort them to England and will then join the Sixth Cruiser Squadron with the Grand Fleet.

128. Adty. to R.A., *Argonaut*, *Sutlej*, etc.

5.10.14.
Sent 8.50 p.m.

Merchant vessels having green clearance labels issued by Customs may proceed to port named thereon without further examination. They should be handed on by signal through the different commands . . .

129. French Ministry of Marine to Naval Attaché.

7.10.14.

5703 . . . I have given orders for *Guichen* to cease cruising off Bilbao and to return to Cherbourg. Please let me know if Admiralty considers it desirable that a division of the 2nd Light Squadron should keep up a watch between Ushant and mouth of Loire, or whether they prefer these ships should be employed in Western Channel Patrol.

Reply.

Admiralty would be glad if you would maintain a patrol between Ushant and Cape Finisterre for the purpose of protecting the route for transports between England and Gibraltar as well as covering the mouth of the Loire. Three cruisers seem to be sufficient for the purpose.

130. Adty. to S.N.O., Gibraltar.

9.10.14.
Sent 12.45 p.m.

685 *Bacchante* and *Euryalus* leave to-day for Gibraltar with convoy of territorials for India. These may proceed to Malta unescorted unless naval situation in Western Mediterranean necessitates protection. Similarly transports from Malta can proceed to Gibraltar unescorted. *Euryalus* and *Bacchante* are to escort transports home from Gibraltar and will work to and from home every 16 days, according to programme now on its way to you. Give directions accordingly.

131. Adty. to R.A., *Carnarvon*.

9.10.14.
Sent 9.15 p.m.

89 *Astraea*, with two transports under convoy, sailed from St. Helena, 11 p.m., 8th. She was ordered to go to Sierra Leone. Arrange to convoy the transports across your station. *Astraea* can come as far as St. Vincent, Cape Verde, if necessary, but she is required back at the Cape as soon as possible. Report arrangements made.

132. Adty. to I.O., St. Vincent.

12.10.14.
Sent 3 p.m.

For *Carnarvon* and *Albion*. *Albion* is to complete with coal, proceed to Ascension, await further orders, probably will proceed then to Cape Station.

133. R.A., *Carnarvon*, to Adty. (*via* Dakar W/T).

12.10.14.
Sent 9.51 a.m.
Recd. 4.59 p.m.

As soon as my ships have taken stores from *Baron Ardrossan*, in the vicinity of St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, I propose taking *Carnarvon*, *Albion*, *Marmora*, *Empress of Britain* and collier to sweep southwards to St. Paul Rocks, Fernando Noronha Island, and Rocas Island, and thence to south limit of my station, remaining between St. Paul Rocks and latitude 10° S. while coal lasts . . .

134. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib.

14.10.14.
Sent 12.15 p.m.

703 *Defence*, on arrival, is to complete with coal and stores and proceed at highest possible speed to Monte Video, calling at St. Vincent, Cape Verde, and Pernambuco. The Captain and navigating officer of the *Defence* and *Euryalus* are to exchange ships. The *Euryalus* is to take home the Admiral's staff, retinue, baggage, and all necessary documents and is to take charge of the first homeward convoy. The *Defence* will be under the orders of R.-A. Stoddart in the *Carnarvon*, now on her way to Monte Video from St. Vincent, Cape Verde. Inform *Defence* and *Euryalus*.

135. Adty. to R.A., *Carnarvon*.

14.10.14.
Sent 1.15 p.m.

101 Proceed down the trade route to Monte Video, calling at Pernambuco and Rio on the way. *Defence* is following you down from Gibraltar. While you are there, *Cornwall*, *Bristol*, *Macedonia* and *Orama* will be under your orders. Keep sufficient force ready to concentrate in case German squadron from Pacific escape past Cradock, who has *Good Hope*, *Canopus*, *Monmouth*, *Bristol* and *Otranto*; *Empress of Britain* and *Marmora* to return when you think fit, to operate in the vicinity of Cape Verde under *Highflyer*. . . .

136. Adty. to *Highflyer*.

15.10.14.
Sent 6.50 p.m.

Astraea is bringing a homeward convoy of two transports up to the vicinity of St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, where you are to take them on till relieved by a cruiser from Cruiser Force I.

137. Adty. to all Intelligence Officers.

16.10.14.
Sent 2.45 p.m.

The following has been sent to H.B.M. representatives in all principal countries, to all self-governing colonies and Dominions, and to all important Crown Colonies. Begins:—

Experience of the first two months of war shows that no increase in loss of merchant shipping will be incurred by always keeping trade routes open. When hostile cruiser makes her presence known by sending crews of prizes into port she is unlikely to remain on same route, and short of closing all routes for indefinite time, there is no remedy, as next point of attack is matter of conjecture. At same time detention of insured vessels in port is extremely costly to owners and merchants and, if continued, defeats object of Government Insurance Scheme. Vessels sailing after dark and making good offing with dim lights, run little chance of capture. Any detention of shipping should be reported at once by cable. Admiralty considers it essential that trade should not be stopped.

138. S.N.O., Gib., to Adty.

16.10.14.
Sent 9.50 p.m.

156 Spanish merchant vessel which arrived Las Palmas to-day reports she was stopped by *Karlsruhe*, October 9th, 0.20 S., 29.40 W. *Karlsruhe* accompanied by two merchant vessels. R.A., 5th C.S., and all ships informed.

139. Adty. to *Kent* (*via* North Front).

17.10.14.
Sent 11.55 p.m.

Kent to remain in the vicinity of the Canaries for the present. Search for coaling bases in the neighbourhood. Communicate with *Highflyer* and place yourself under his orders.

18.10.14.
Sent 12.20 p.m.
140. Adty. to R.A., 9th C.S.
76 Cruiser required for homeward convoy of two transports now due at St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands. To be convoyed by *Highflyer* across his station until taken charge of by you. Arrange with *Highflyer* and report action taken. You should convoy as far as latitude of Finisterre.

18.10.14.
Sent 1.50 p.m.
141. Adty. to *Highflyer*.
1 It is at your discretion whether *Kent* takes *Astraea's* convoy instead of *Highflyer*.

20.10.14.
Sent 10.35 p.m.
142. Adty. to *Amphitrite*.
78 Whilst *Vindictive* is waiting for convoy let her proceed to search the Canary Islands.

21.10.14.
143. A.C., 9th C.S., to Adty.
Submit I may be informed when *Donegal* and *Diana* will join 9th Cruiser Squadron. 1021.
Reply.
79 *Donegal* is due to leave Plymouth on 23rd instant. *Diana* not coming for the present. 1735.

22.10.14.
144. R.A.C., 9th C.S., to Adty.
11 Request permission to direct any of my ships occasionally to visit Canary Islands whilst 5th Cruiser Squadron is short of ships in that area.
Reply.
80 Your 11 approved. *Highflyer* is now senior officer of Cruiser Force D. *Kent* is under his orders. Keep in touch with them.

145. Consul, Tenerife, to Adty.
(a) *Crefeld*, German merchant vessel, entering from south, said has 319 Britishers aboard, particulars later. (Sent 22nd October, 4.10 p.m.; recd. 5.58 p.m.)
(b) German merchant vessel *Crefeld* arrived Santa Cruz to-day with 419 crews and passengers belonging to undermentioned ships captured and believed sunk by *Karlsruhe* between equator and 4° S., 29.40 and 34.35 W. 70 Chinese obtained by Germans for working coal. *Strathroy*, *Maple Branch*, *Highland Hope*, *Indrani*, *Maria*, *Cornish City*, *Rio Iguassu*, *Farn*, *Niceto de Larinaga*, *Lynrowan*, *Cervantes*, *Pruth*, *Condor*. (Sent 22nd October, 5.45 p.m.; recd. 23rd October, 3 a.m.)
(c) German ship *Karlsruhe* when left on 13th October was taking fuel oil stores from *Condor*. She had in company two hospital ships, the *Rio Negro* and the *Asuncion*, and captured ships *Farn* and *Indrani* (latter name changed to *Hoffnung*), both with coal and cargoes. (Recd. 23rd October, 8 p.m.)
(d) Rocas Island and some bays on north coast of Brazil, eastward of Ceara, have been used by *Karlsruhe*. (Recd. 23rd October, 8.6 p.m.)

23.10.14.
Recd. 8.16 p.m.
146. *Edinburgh Castle*, Pernambuco, to Adty.
Following by wireless from *Carnarvon*, 22nd October, 1900, begins:—
Bristol, with *Edinburgh Castle* and *Kent*, are to search for German cruiser *Karlsruhe*, reported at anchor 20th October, 5° S., 36.8 W., with collier. *Karlsruhe's* beat may be between this position and Fernando Noronha Island. If *Karlsruhe* is not found by 30th October, *Kent* and *Bristol* are to return to Abrolhos Rocks and coal; *Edinburgh Castle* to proceed on her voyage. . . . ends L400.

24.10.14.
Sent 6.55 p.m.
147. Adty. to R.A., *Carnarvon*.
109 You need not proceed to the south for the present, until there is more definite news of *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*. *Kent* remains with *Highflyer*. *Defence* is instead of *Kent*.

A cruiser with an armed auxiliary must be maintained within about 300 miles of Cape San Roque. A ship must be near Abrolhos to guard supplies and colliers.

General principle of cruisers working with armed auxiliaries and patrolling in the vicinity of focal points should be continued.

With reference to your orders to Intelligence Officer, Pernambuco, he has been told that *Defence* is to take the place of *Kent*, and that *Edinburgh Castle* is to remain on the station for the present.

Distribution is left to your discretion, but there appear to be two focal points to be guarded and patrolled; they are the vicinity of Cape San Roque and a position between the Abrolhos and Rio. This latter includes looking out for any supplies and colliers at Abrolhos.

24.10.14.
Recd. 8.26 p.m.
148. Consul, Dakar, to Adty.
German war vessel *Karlsruhe* reported at anchor between Bissagos Island and Cassini River.

24.10.14.
Sent 10.40 p.m.
149. Adty. to I.O., Pernambuco.
Karlsruhe reported to be coaling near Dakar. This may or may not be true. Keep Admiralty fully informed of all you know and of all movements of ships.

25.10.14.
Sent 3 a.m.
150. Adty. to *Highflyer*.
Search vicinity of Bissagos.

25.10.14.
Sent 1 p.m.
151. Adty. to R.A., *Amphitrite*.
81 Can you detach a cruiser and *Calgarian* to look after the locality of Canaries at once. *Kent* and *Victorian* can then proceed further south on the trade route to look out for *Karlsruhe*. Report action taken.

Reply.
Now proceeding in *Amphitrite* to Canary Islands. *Calgarian* cannot be ready till 30th. Suggest *Bacchante*, now at Gibraltar, be directed to join me at Canary Islands. No other cruisers available. *Argonaut* at Devonport. *Vindictive* conveying transport convoy. *Europa* off River Tagus. (Recd. 25th October, 7.10 p.m.)

Reply.
Donegal will be ready for sea midnight 28th. *Bacchante* not available to join you, required for escort duty. (Sent 25th October, 9.25 p.m.)

26.10.14.
Sent 0015.
152. Adty. to *Kent* and *Highflyer*.
Kent to join *Highflyer* off Bissagos Island, Portuguese Guinea, using all despatch.

27.10.14.
Sent 12.15 a.m.
153. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib.
741 *Bacchante* to proceed towards Cape Finisterre, get in touch with and join outward convoy under *Diana*; both ships proceeding to Gibraltar with transports.

27.10.14.
 154. R.A., 5th C.S., Rio, to Adty. Recd. 11.41 p.m.
 46 I have received orders from Admiral Cradock to send *Defence* to Monte Video to coal, obtain chart, and to await further orders.

Submit I may be given two fast cruisers in place of *Defence*, as I do not consider force at my disposal sufficient to ensure capture of *Karlsruhe* as well as carrying out orders in Admiralty telegram 109, and leave *Orama* in Rio de la Plate, where I consider it necessary to keep ship.

Admiral Cradock to Adty. 26.10.14.
 325 With reference to orders contained in Admiralty telegram received 7th October to search for enemy, and our great desire for early success, consider it impracticable on account of *Canopus* slow speed to find and destroy enemy squadron. Consequently, I have ordered *Defence* to join me after coaling at Monte Video for orders. *Canopus* will be employed on necessary conveying colliers.

From experience 6th August most respectfully submit my opinion is depredations of *Karlsruhe* may continue until she meets with a vessel of superior speed.*

28.10.14.
 155. R.A., *Carnarvon*, Rio, to Adty. Recd. 4.3 a.m.
 45 In order to comply with your telegram 109 following will be disposition of ships under my orders.

Bristol, Macedonia, Edinburgh Castle, vicinity of north coast of Brazil, sweeping for the *Karlsruhe*.

Cornwall will leave Abrolhos when *Defence* arrives, and proceed to patrol San Roque, Rocas, Fernando Noronha area.

Carnarvon and *Defence* patrol Rio de Janeiro to Abrolhos Rocks. *Orama* remaining River Plate until further orders or until relieved by Admiral Cradock's ship. Cradock informed.

Reply.
 111 Your 45. Concur in your dispositions. Cradock has been informed that *Defence* is not to leave your command. (Sent 28th October, 4 p.m.)

30.10.14.
 156. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. Sent 11.15 a.m.
 759 Three transports from Malta to England, *Carnarvonshire, Arcadia* and *Nile*, due at Gibraltar, 3rd November, should await escort of *Diana*. Seven other transports from India due at Gibraltar 11th November, should be escorted by *Bacchante*. Arrange accordingly.

31.10.14.
 157. Adty. to *Highflyer*. Sent 11.55 p.m.
 8 Arrange so that *Highflyer* and *Kent* each have an armed liner to work with. *Empress of Britain* requires to go to Sierra Leone for cleaning boilers shortly . . .

3.11.14.
 158. Consul-General, Valparaiso, to Adty.
 (a) Three German warships approaching Valparaiso Bay. (Sent 10.35 a.m.; recd. 5.6 p.m.)
 (b) *Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Nürnberg* arrived. (Sent 12.30 p.m.; time of receipt not known.)

* This is the version in *Glasgow's Telegraph Log* No. 20110. The second paragraph as received at the Admiralty was made to run—
 "From experience 6 August most respectfully submit *not to oppose* depredation of *Karlsruhe*. *May it continue* until she meets vessel of superior speed."

3.11.14.
 159. Adty. to *Defence*, Monte Video, and R.A., Sent 6.20 p.m.
Carnarvon (No. 112).

Defence to proceed with all possible despatch to join Admiral Cradock on west coast of America.

4.11.14.
 160. Consul-General, Valparaiso, to Adty. Recd. 1.29 a.m.
 Chilian Admiral just informed me that German Admiral states his ships met *Good Hope, Monmouth, Glasgow, Otranto* at sunset on Sunday, north of Coronel, in thick and wicked weather. Fight ensued. After about one hour's action *Monmouth* turned over and sank. *Good Hope, Glasgow*, and *Otranto* drew off into the darkness. *Good Hope* on fire. An explosion was heard. It is believed she sank. German ships engaged included *Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Nürnberg*. (Sent 3rd November, 6.10 p.m.)

4.11.14.
 161. Consul-General, Valparaiso, to Adty. Recd. 7.48 a.m.
 German warships buying quantity of warm clothing and considerable telegraphing with Rio de Janeiro is proceeding.

4.11.14.
 162. Adty. to I.O., Monte Video. Sent 11.45 a.m.
Defence is to remain in the vicinity of Monte Video till *Carnarvon* and *Cornwall* join her.

4.11.14.
 163. Adty. to *Kent*. Sent 12.30 p.m.
 Proceed to the Abrolhos Rocks with all despatch and communicate *via* Rio. It is intended you shall join Admiral Stoddart's squadron.

4.11.14.
 164. Adty. to C-in-C., Home Fleets. Sent 12.40 p.m.
 171 Order *Invincible* and *Inflexible* to fill up with coal at once and proceed to Berehaven with all despatch. They are urgently needed for foreign service . . .

4.11.14.
 165. Adty. to British Minister, Rio. Sent 1.25 p.m.
 Following for *Carnarvon* begins :—
 114 In view of reported sinking of *Good Hope* and *Monmouth* by *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* off Coronel, 1st November, armoured ships on south-east coast of America must concentrate at once.

Carnarvon, Cornwall, should join *Defence* off Monte Video. *Canopus, Glasgow, Otranto* have been ordered if possible to join you there. *Kent*, from Sierra Leone, also has been ordered to join your flag *via* Abrolhos. Endeavour to get into communication with them. Enemy will most likely come on to the Rio trade route.

Reinforcements will meet you shortly from England.

4.11.14.
 166. Consul-General, Valparaiso, to Adty. Recd. 5.33 p.m.
Gneisenau, Scharnhorst, Nürnberg left. (Sent 11.20 a.m.)

4.11.14.
 167. Consul-General, Valparaiso, to Adty. Recd. 10.33 p.m.
 Arrival of . . . German armed merchant vessel *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*. (Sent 4 or 4.35 p.m.)

168. Adty. to C.-in-C., Home Fleets. 5.11.14.
Sent 12.15 a.m.
178 Secret and personal. From all reports received through German sources we fear Cradock has let himself be caught, or has engaged recklessly with only *Monmouth* and *Good Hope* armoured ships against *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*. Probably both British vessels sunk. Position of *Canopus* critical, and fate of *Glasgow* and *Otranto* uncertain. Proximity of concentrated German squadron of five good ships will threaten gravely main trade route Rio to London; essential recover control. First Sea Lord requires *Invincible* and *Inflexible* for this purpose. Sturdee goes C.-in-C., South Atlantic and Pacific. Oliver, Chief of Staff; Bartolemé, Naval Secretary. W.S.C.
169. Adty. to V.A., Channel Fleet. 5.11.14.
Sent 7.10 p.m.
Vengeance is to proceed to Gibraltar at ordinary speed, complete with coal and await orders.
170. Adty. to R.A. Stoddart. 11.11.14.
Sent 11.10 a.m.
121 *Inflexible* and *Invincible*, with Admiral Sturdee, are leaving Devonport to-morrow *via* St. Vincent for Abrolhos Rocks. *Kent* left Sierra Leone on 5th. *Warrior* and *Black Prince*, with possibly three French armoured cruisers, leave Gibraltar for west coast Africa about 14th.
171. Adty. to Admiral Hornby. 15.11.14.
Sent 5.35 p.m.
90 *Scharnhorst* squadron were still in neighbourhood of Valparaiso on 14th. After coaling at Halifax *Princess Royal* should operate off New York in case the German liners there break out, and to provide for contingency of powerful cruiser getting out of North Sea and driving off our ships. *Glory* should proceed to Jamaica.
91 (Sent 12.30 a.m., 16.11.14.) *Glory* is not to go to Jamaica for the present.
172. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 18.11.14.
Sent 7.15 p.m.
845 *Black Prince* is to join C.-in-C., Grand Fleet, proceeding to Devonport to coal. *Amphitrite* should remain at Gibraltar, as owing to movements of *Scharnhorst's* squadron, West Coast Squadron is being reconsidered, and Admiral de Robeck may have to transfer back to *Amphitrite*. Inform R.A.
173. Adty. to R.A. de Robeck. 20.11.14.
Sent 11.50 a.m.
Highflyer, with her three armed liners *Victorian*, *Marmora*, and *Empress of Britain*, is to remain Senior Officer of Cruiser Force D, and to continue to guard the trade routes in the vicinity of the Cape Verde Islands, based on Sierra Leone.
174. Adty. to Admiral Hornby. 30.11.14.
Sent 11.45 a.m.
110 *Princess Royal* is to proceed to Jamaica at once. (Repeated 11.35 p.m. to S.N.O., Halifax.)
175. Adty. to Admiral Hornby. 3.12.14.
Sent 12.40 p.m.
114 *Princess Royal* should be directed to provide for one cruiser maintaining wireless touch between Jamaica and Australia in the Pacific. In the event of *Scharnhorst's* squadron being reported in Panama Canal, the cruiser should at once fall back on Jamaica.

176. I.O., Monte Video, to Adty. 9.12.14.
Sent 10.30 a.m.
Recd. 4.43 p.m.
26 Received from Port Stanley (begins) Enemy squadron apparently *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Dresden*, *Leipzig*, *Nürnberg*, sighted at 8.30 ship time, morning, 8th December, and are in action with V.A. Sturdee's whole fleet, who were at Port Stanley coaling. *Canopus*.
177. I.O., Monte Video, to Adty. 9.12.14.
Sent 10.50 a.m.
Recd. 5.3 p.m.
27 The following message received from Stanley Port begins:—
18 *Gneisenau*, *Scharnhorst*, and *Leipzig* sunk; two colliers captured. All cruisers now searching for *Dresden* and *Nürnberg*, who spread and escaped during action. Our casualties very small. Some survivors saved from *Gneisenau* and *Leipzig*. Further report following. C.-in-C., *Invincible*.
178. Adty. to S.N.O., West Indies. 9.12.14.
Sent 5.5 p.m.
5 Send *Berwick* or *Lancaster* through Panama Canal to act as W/T linking ship between Jamaica and *Australia*. Another cruiser is if necessary to act as linking ship off Colon . . . (Cancelled 11.10 a.m., 10.12.14.)
179. Adty. to S.N.O., Jamaica. 9.12.14.
Sent 7.55 p.m.
6 *Princess Royal* is to proceed to Scapa Flow with all convenient despatch.
180. I.O., Monte Video, to Adty. 10.12.14.
Sent 9.35 a.m.
Recd. 3.20 p.m.
28 Received from Port Stanley. 17 Arrived 7th December forenoon with *Invincible*, *Inflexible*, *Carnarvon*, *Kent*, *Cornwall*, *Glasgow*, *Bristol*, *Macedonia*, leaving for Chilean coast p.m., 8th December, after coaling. No news of enemy cruisers, but two armed mercantile cruisers reported off Valparaiso 2nd and 4th December. *Orama* and collier due 11th December. *Crown of Galicia* cleared and leaving for England, 8th December.

APPENDIX B.

WAR ORDERS.¹

OFFICER COMMANDING CRUISER FORCE D.

1. Under separate cover you will receive a sealed copy of the general War Plans under which it is the intention of their Lordships to conduct operations in the event of state of war arising with the German Empire.²

2. The duty for which you will be responsible is the protection of the trade route from the south and south-west, particularly in the approaches to the British Isles at the commencement of the war.

3. Until relieved by Cruiser Force I (*see* paragraph 9 below) your station will be to the east of the 40th meridian of west longitude, and to the southward of a line W.S.W. (true) from the Bishop Rock (Scilly Isles).

4. To the northward of this line will be stationed Cruiser Force E, and to the westward of 40° W. Cruiser Force H, whose duties will be the protection of the trade in the North Atlantic and West Indies.

Should the political situation at the time allow it, vessels of the Mediterranean Squadron will safeguard the entrance through the Straits of Gibraltar, eastward of Cape St. Vincent.

The approaches to the Channel will be patrolled by Cruiser Force G.

Cruiser Force B, when ready, will act as a northern patrol between the Orkneys and the coast of Norway.

Occasions may arise when the vessels of Cruiser Forces E and H, on the one hand, and of Cruiser Force D on the other, may overlap, and the line dividing your respective stations is not, therefore, a matter of rigid demarcation, and every opportunity should be taken to exchange information as to your respective temporary areas of operations.

5. The general principles to be followed in the protection of trade will shortly be promulgated as a separate Memorandum ("War Standing Orders for Vessels employed in the Protection of Trade") to all ships concerned, and on receipt of the warning telegram you will take every step possible, so as to be ready to act immediately as detailed in those orders with the vessels placed under your command for this purpose.

6. Such of the cadet training cruisers as are abroad on the issue of the warning telegram, and require crews, should be directed to proceed home along the trade route at once to complete, and then act according to your orders.

7. Although you are given a free hand as to the disposition of the ships under your orders, the principles laid down in the "War Standing Orders for Vessels employed in the Protection of Trade" should be adhered to, and in the initial stages of the war the following stations of your ships should be taken up, unless there is very good reason, from action on the part of the enemy, to the contrary.

8. Your main station should be on the trade route off Cape Finisterre, but two of your ships should immediately proceed, in supporting distance of each other, to Cape Verde Islands, where they should coal.

¹ M. 0065.

² The War Plans are given in full in Monograph 6, C.B. 1537, Appendix C.

9. When Cruiser Force I is ready for sea, it will relieve you on the Finisterre Station, and you will proceed to your new station, which is comprised between latitudes 30° N. and 10° S. and longitudes 40° W. and 10° W. You can coal at Gibraltar en route. Your primary coaling bases will be Sierra Leone and Ascension.

10. The cadet cruisers on their outward voyage to this station should be directed to visit the Azores and Canary Islands, coaling at the latter and then acting under your orders.

11. In case of a breakdown or other unforeseen occurrence causing delay, the delaying vessel is to be left behind, but is to follow as soon as ready.

It is of importance that you should reach your station without delay, and for this reason interference with enemy merchant ships not armed, or vessels known not to be carrying contraband, is to be considered of minor importance. Such ships will probably be exempt from capture, as detailed in paragraph 5 of "War Standing Orders for Vessels employed in the Protection of Trade," and will generally have to pass through restricted areas watched by our cruisers before they can reach their own home ports. If, however, such vessels are seized, they should be sent to a base with a prize crew, and left there under guard arranged with the local authorities if possible. In extreme cases they may be sunk.

12. You are to take every opportunity of informing the Commander-in-Chief on the Cape of Good Hope Station of your movements, and of working in co-operation with him, should any of his vessels be in or near the area of your operations.

13. The most important interests, however, are on the trade route from the South American ports, along which our food-carrying ships proceed, and these are to be your special care. The *Glasgow*, till your arrival, will be the only vessel on this route, and you are to detach one of your fastest vessels, whose Commanding Officer is junior to the Captain of the *Glasgow*, to join that ship and work under him in concert with her on the southern part of the trade route.

14. If you experience any difficulty in getting coal at neutral ports on passage out, owing to shortage of stock or the action of the local authorities, you will demand the same from any British steamer which arrives with suitable fuel, on promise of payment.

Subsequently, you can coal once in other neutral ports if the local authorities grant permission, but after that the laws of neutrality will probably necessitate that all coaling must be carried out at your coaling bases or at Bathurst, or, in the case of the vessel detached to the south-east coast, at the anchorage inside the Abrolhos Rocks, where colliers will be sent. In all cases you should proceed to and from the trade routes by the shortest line.

The vessel detached to the south-east coast should first call at Pernambuco, unless, after communicating with the British Consul at Pernambuco by cable from St. Vincent, other movements are suggested by the Senior Officer on the south-east coast of America.

15. The subsequent movements and dispositions of the ships of your squadron must depend on the course of events, and are left to your discretion.

(Sgd.) W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Admiralty,
July 1914.
(C2191)

OFFICER COMMANDING CRUISER FORCE E.

1. With these Orders is enclosed a copy of the general War Plans under which it is the intention of their Lordships to conduct operations in the event of a state of war arising with the German Empire.

2. The duty for which you will be held responsible will be the protection of trade to and from the North Atlantic, east of the 40th meridian of west longitude, as far south as a line W.S.W. (true) from Bishop's Rock, Scilly Isles.

3. The general principles to be followed in the protection of trade will shortly be promulgated as a separate Memorandum ("War Standing Orders for Vessels employed in the Protection of Trade") to all H.M. ships concerned, and on taking up your appointment you will take every step possible so as to be ready to act immediately as detailed in those orders.

4. The armed mercantile cruisers *Mauretania*, *Lusitania* and *Aquitania* will, when ready, be placed under your orders, and you will also be reinforced by Cruiser Force J.

On the receipt of an order to mobilise, all the vessels of Cruiser Force E will at once receive their balance crews, and, when ready, should be ordered to join your flag off Queenstown, completing with coal there if necessary, and then proceeding to their stations as you may direct.

5. To the southward of the line from the Scilly Isles, Cruiser Force D will operate, till relieved by Cruiser Force I; to the west of 40° west longitude Cruiser Force H will be stationed; Cruiser Force B will, when ready, act as Northern Patrol from the Orkneys to the coast of Norway.

Occasions may arise when your respective vessels may overlap, and the line of demarcation between the stations is not to be considered as a rigid one, and every opportunity should be taken to exchange information between the adjoining squadrons as to their operations, so that co-operation in the work of protecting trade will take place between them.

6. It is important that after completing to full crew you should reach your station with the least possible delay, and, although you are given a free hand as to the distribution of ships, the general principles laid down in "War Standing Orders for Vessels employed in the Protection of Trade" should be observed, and your initial stations on the outbreak of war should be as follows, unless there is very good reason, on account of action on the part of the enemy, to the contrary.

Your main station is to be on the trade route to the west of the Fastnet, with a vessel or vessels detached to guard the northern entrance to the Irish Sea.

The main coaling bases of these divisions will be Berehaven and Lough Swilly.

7. The subsequent movements and dispositions of the ships of your squadron must depend on the course of events, and are left to your discretion.

(Sgd.) W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Admiralty,
July 1914.

OFFICER COMMANDING CRUISER FORCE H.

1. Under separate cover you will receive a sealed copy of the general War Plans under which it is the intention of their Lordships to conduct operations in the event of a state of war arising with the German Empire.

2. The duty for which you will be held responsible in such a war will be protection of the trade on passage between the British Isles and the North American Atlantic ports, and of the trade in the West Indies.

3. The general principles to be followed in the protection of trade will shortly be promulgated in a separate Memorandum ("War Standing Orders for Vessels employed in the Protection of Trade") to all ships concerned, and on the receipt of the warning telegram you will take every step possible, so as to be ready to act immediately as detailed in those orders, special consideration being given to paragraph 4 therein.

4. The extent of the area of your station and the difficulty of foretelling the number and disposition of enemy vessels which may operate therein are such as to render it inadvisable to lay down in advance the positions your squadron should specially watch in a period of strained relations, and this matter must be left to your judgment, with the proviso that it is considered a division of your force into a northern and southern squadron may, under the present dispositions of the German forces, be permissible, in which case your primary bases of operations would be Halifax and Jamaica respectively, and your responsibilities the North Atlantic trade route and the West Indian trade respectively. The former, being generally of the greatest importance, should be your special personal care.

5. The protection of the trade routes near home waters will be entrusted to other squadrons, and you should not proceed to the eastward of 40° W. longitude, except under special circumstances.

6. You will communicate these orders secretly to the Commanding Officers of your squadron, with your orders as to their dispositions and areas of operations.

You will arrange to coal as necessary, and are authorised to draw on the reserve at Bermuda for replenishing Halifax if necessary by hiring a vessel specially for the purpose.

(Sgd.) W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Admiralty,
July 1914.

OFFICER COMMANDING CRUISER FORCE I.

1. With these Orders is enclosed a copy of the general War Plans under which it is the intention of their Lordships to conduct operations in the event of a state of war arising with the German Empire.

2. The duty for which you will be primarily responsible is the protection of the trade routes in the approaches to the British Isles from the south and south-west.

3. Your station is comprised to the east of the 40th meridian of west longitude, and to the southwards of a line W.S.W. (true) from the Bishop Rock (Scilly Isles) as far as the 30th parallel of north latitude.

4. To the northward of this line will be stationed Cruiser Force E, and to the westward of 40° W. Cruiser Force H, whose duties will be the protection of the trade in the North Atlantic and West Indies.

Should the political situation at the time allow it, vessels of the Mediterranean squadron will safeguard the entrance through the Straits of Gibraltar, eastward of Cape St. Vincent.

The approaches to the Channel will be patrolled by Cruiser Force G.

Cruiser Force B, when ready, will act as a northern patrol between the Orkneys and the coast of Norway.

Occasions may arise when the vessels of Cruiser Forces D, E, and H, on the one hand, and of Cruiser Force I on the other, may overlap, and the line dividing your respective stations is not, therefore, a matter of rigid demarcation, and every opportunity should be taken to exchange information as to your respective temporary areas of operation.

5. The general principles to be followed in the protection of trade will shortly be promulgated as a separate Memorandum ("War Standing Orders for Vessels employed in the Protection of Trade") to all H.M. ships concerned, and on taking up your appointment you will take every step possible so as to be ready to act immediately as detailed in those orders with the vessels placed under your command for this purpose.

6. On receipt of an order to mobilise Naval Reserves, all the vessels comprising Cruiser Force I will receive their balance crews, and should be directed to join your flag at Plymouth.

7. When ready, you are to proceed to sea and take the place of Cruiser Force D, relieving the Officer Commanding that force, and informing him of your intention as long before as is possible.

Until Cruiser Force I proceeds to sea and relieves Cruiser Force D, the latter is responsible for the protection of the area allotted to you. It will then protect the trade routes to the South Atlantic beyond the limits of your station.

8. Although you are given a free hand as to the distribution of your ships, the following stations should be taken up, unless there is very good reason, on account of action on the part of the enemy, to the contrary.

9. Your main station is to be on the trade route off Ushant, with a portion of your squadron stationed off Cape Finisterre.

Your main coaling base will be Plymouth.

10. The subsequent movements and dispositions of the ships of your squadron must depend on the course of events, and are left to your discretion.

(Sgd.) W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Admiralty,

July 1914.

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HISTORICAL MONOGRAPHS ISSUED BY THE NAVAL STAFF.

- (1) O.U.6031. Operations leading up to the Battle of Coronel.
- (2) O.U.6029. The German Cruiser Squadrons in the Pacific, 1914.
- (3) O.U.6038. Operations leading up to the Battle of the Falkland Islands, November, 1914.
- (4) O.U.6040. *Cancelled.*
- (5) O.U.6039. Naval Operations in the Cameroons, 1914.
- (6) C.B.1537. Naval Movements, August, 1914, associated with the Transport of the British Expeditionary Force.
- (7) C.B.1549. The Patrol Flotillas at the commencement of the War.
- (8) C.B.1552. Naval Operations connected with the Raid on the North-East Coast, December 16th, 1914.
- (9) C.B.1555. A History of the White Sea Station, 1914-1919.
- (10) C.B.1558. Naval Operations on the East Coast of Africa, August, 1914, to July, 1915.
- (11) C.B.1571. The Battle of Heligoland Bight, 28th August, 1914.
- (12) C.B.1573. The Action of Dogger Bank, 24th January, 1915.
- (13) C.B. 923. Summary of the Operations of the Grand Fleet, August, 1914, to November, 1916.
- (14) C.B. 926. The First Australasian Convoy, 1914.
- (15) C.B. 931. Naval Operations in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf, from the Outbreak of War to the Fall of Kut, 29th April, 1916.
- (16) C.B. 930. The China Squadron, 1914 (including the *Emden* hunt).
- (17) C.B. 929. The East Indies Squadron, 1914.
- (18) C.B. 936A. The Dover Command, Vol. I.
- (19) C.B. 935. The Tenth Cruiser Squadron during the Command of Admiral de Chair, 1914-1916.
- (20) C.B. 939. The Cape of Good Hope Squadron, 1914.
- (21) C.B. 948A. The Mediterranean, 1914-1915.
- (22) C.B. 956. The Atlantic Ocean, 1914.
- (25) C.B. 955. The Baltic, 1914.

IN PREPARATION.

Home Waters, August, 1914.
 Home Waters, September to December, 1914.
 Atlantic, 1915.

CONFIDENTIAL.

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~~C.B. 956A.~~

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THE ATLANTIC OCEAN

FROM THE BATTLE OF THE FALKLANDS TO MAY 1915.

(Short Title:—Atlantic II.)

Monograph No. 26.

NAVAL STAFF,

TRAINING AND STAFF DUTIES DIVISION,

October 1922.

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Home Waters, August, 1914.
Home Waters, September to December, 1914.
Atlantic, 1915.

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THE ATLANTIC OCEAN

from the Battle of the Falklands to May 1915.

Introduction.

This volume, following on the volume titled "Atlantic Ocean, 1914," completes the study of the operations in the Atlantic for the protection of trade against attack by commerce destroyers of normal type. The period covered is that between the arrival of the German Cruiser Squadron in the Atlantic, in December 1914, and the internment of the last of the armed merchant vessels in April 1915. From this time forward Atlantic trade was immune from any organised attack by surface vessels, except for the few disguised raiders who, at long intervals, made brief appearances on the trade routes; and German effort became devoted to the use of submarines based on their own home ports, rather than to the employment of armed surface vessels equipped for cruiser warfare in distant seas. One of the reasons for this policy, as the following narrative will show, was undoubtedly the extreme difficulty of ensuring supplies to ships abroad, a difficulty to which the Germans themselves contributed by a certain disregard of the susceptibilities of neutral powers, who, in their own defence, were forced to make and uphold regulations of considerable stringency. Crippled by these, and hampered by the careful watch carried on by our squadrons, the German supply officers were unable to maintain their cruisers; and Germany's attack on our trade in its first phase—that is, by surface vessels—died from lack of support.

Note on Sources.

The principal sources for the movements of British ships are their deck, signal and wireless logs, now kept at Deptford Victualling Yard.

The following volumes of Admiralty telegrams have been used—

- H.S. 134. North America and West Indies. Telegrams. 13 December 1914 to 30 April 1915.
- H.S. 135. Mid-Atlantic. Telegrams. 16 December 1914 to 30 April 1915.
- H.S. 136. West and South-East Coasts of America. Telegrams. 13 December 1914 to 31 January 1915.

H.S. 137. West and South-East Coasts of America. Telegrams. 1 February 1915 to 30 April 1915.

Another useful volume is H.S. 23, which contains papers collected in the Trade Division concerning the commerce-raiding activities of the *Dresden*, *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, and *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*.

Important telegrams are reproduced in Appendix A.

Admiralty papers dealing with this period are not yet bound. They are quoted in the footnotes by their registered numbers or Record Office titles.

The War Records of the Intelligence Division are quoted by the letters I.D.H.S. (Intelligence Division Historical Section) and the number of the volume in that series. The footnotes explain which volumes have been used.

German and French printed authorities are scarce. The most valuable is—

Kreuzerkrieg, Vol. I.—This is that section of the German official history which treats of the cruise of Admiral von Spee. It also contains the career of the *Dresden*.

Apart from this, the chief information published in Germany is contained in scattered articles and letters, collected in certain volumes of the Intelligence Division Historical Section Series.

Until the second volume of *Kreuzerkrieg* is published our knowledge of the movements and intentions of the German armed merchant cruisers will be incomplete. It is not thought desirable to delay the issue of this monograph till the appearance of *Kreuzerkrieg, Vol. II.*

The times given are those in the original documents. Neither the deck logs nor signal logs contain any provision for indicating the standard time being kept on board; but it has been assumed to be that of the zone in which the ship happens to be. Unless it appeared important, no attempt has been made in this monograph to verify this assumption.

THE ATLANTIC OCEAN

from the Battle of the Falklands to May 1915.

CHAPTER I.

THE SEARCH FOR THE *DRESDEN*, 9 DECEMBER 1914 TO 4 JANUARY 1915.

1. **Movements immediately after the Battle of the Falkland Islands.**—By the evening of December 8 the Battle of the Falkland Islands was over. The *Scharnhorst* sank with all hands at 4.17 p.m.; the *Gneisenau* at 6 p.m. in 52.45 S, 56.5 W. The two ships had kept together when the German squadron scattered at 1.25 p.m., and had been followed by the *Invincible* (flag of Vice-Admiral Sturdee), *Inflexible* and *Carnarvon*; these remained on the spot till all possible efforts had been made to save the survivors of the *Gneisenau*,¹ and then at 7.40 p.m. started to sweep south-westward in the direction of the German light cruisers. About the same time the *Bristol*, which had captured the supply ships *Baden* and *Santa Isabel* in 52.30 S, 57 W, entrusted the final stages of their destruction to the *Macedonia*, and proceeded eastward to join Admiral Sturdee. The Admiral regarded the *Carnarvon* (Rear-Admiral Stoddart) as of little use in a sweep for the German light cruisers, on account of her slow speed,² and at 9.15 p.m. detached her to find and escort the *Orama*, which was making her way to the Falkland from Abrolhos with eight colliers. The *Bristol* joined him a little later and swept south-westward with the *Invincible* and *Inflexible*. By 9.40 p.m. he knew that the *Leipzig* had been sunk in 54.9 N, 56.2 W by the *Glasgow* and *Cornwall*; but there was no news of the *Kent*, *Nürnberg*, or *Dresden*, except that the last two had escaped to the south-eastward when the *Glasgow* engaged the *Leipzig*, and that the *Kent* was chasing the *Nürnberg*. The Admiral, therefore, at 11.16 p.m., ordered the *Glasgow* to proceed to prevent the enemy entering Magellan Strait; but learning that both the *Glasgow* and *Cornwall* had fired nearly all their ammunition, and that the *Cornwall* had only 250 tons

¹ Admiral Sturdee sent a sympathetic message to the senior officer saved and received his thanks for their kind reception. See Appendix A 1.

² "Of the ships available to follow the *Dresden*, the *Carnarvon* and *Macedonia* were of no use." Admiral Sturdee, Report on Search for *Dresden*. (M. 0408/15.)

of coal available, he sent both ships to Port Stanley. Early next morning the *Glasgow* reported that according to the prisoners rescued from the *Leipzig* the German supplies of coal on the west coast were completely exhausted, and that Admiral von Spee's last order to the light cruisers was that they were to make for the east coast of South America. Nothing had been heard of the *Kent* for a long time. She was very short of coal; and fearing that she, like the *Cornwall* and *Invincible*, had been holed under water, and might be in need of assistance, Admiral Sturdee determined to make a search for her. The *Macedonia* had brought the crews of the *Baden* and *Santa Isabel* to Port Stanley and had just finished coaling there. She was his only available ship, and at 12.55 p.m. December 9 he ordered her to proceed at once to search for the *Kent* at high economical speed, returning in 36 hours.¹ Just as the *Macedonia* was leaving harbour she sighted the *Kent* coming in, and was able to inform the Admiral that Captain Allen had managed to keep up with and destroy the *Nürnberg*. This news reached the flagship simultaneously with further statements from the *Glasgow's* prisoners that a third collier, the *Seydlitz*, had been with the German squadron. This vessel and the *Dresden* were thus the only survivors of von Spee's force.

Our own squadron was complete, and all either at, or making for Port Stanley. The Admiral himself turned back at noon December 9, when 50 miles east of Staten Island, and swept back to Port Stanley, detaching the *Bristol* to search the numerous harbours of the Falkland Islands for German supply ships. The two battle cruisers were back at Port Stanley by 7 p.m., December 11, and found the whole squadron at anchor, except the *Orama*, which had not yet arrived.

The *Glasgow*, *Cornwall*, *Macedonia* and *Kent* had been coaling and making repairs since the 9th. The *Bristol*, having found no signs of the enemy in the Western Falklands, came in early on the 11th. The *Carnarvon* arrived a short time before the battle cruisers. She had obtained wireless touch with the *Orama*, and arranged a rendezvous with her for daybreak, December 10. There the two ships met, but to Admiral Stoddart's surprise the *Orama* was alone. It appeared that at midnight the beam sea was so heavy that the colliers, which by this time were considerably scattered, were unable to carry on. Captain Segrave, of the *Orama*, reported this to Admiral Stoddart, but the latter did not understand the message; consequently, when the *Orama* signalled that she was proceeding as ordered to the rendezvous the Admiral did not realise that she was leaving behind the colliers they were both supposed to be

¹ The actual signal reads as if he intended the *Glasgow* to accompany *Macedonia*, and Captain Luce altered course accordingly. At 2.25 p.m., however, the Admiral ordered the *Glasgow* back to Port Stanley. See Signal Logs 16369 16371, on which this section is based.

escorting.¹ Luckily, no enemy ship was near and all arrived safely. By the evening of December 11 the whole squadron was assembled at the Falkland Islands.

2. **The Scheme of Search and News of the "Dresden."**—On the way back to the Falkland Islands Admiral Sturdee decided on his next step. He intended to divide his squadron into three divisions and carry out an organised search of the east coast of South America. Admiral Stoddart, in the *Carnarvon*, was to take the *Bristol* under his orders and form one division for the coast of Patagonia; Captain Phillimore, of the *Inflexible*, would have charge of the *Glasgow* and *Cornwall* and search the Tierra del Fuegian Archipelago; while the remaining ships when ready were to proceed off the coast of Brazil.² The search was to begin at 4 p.m., December 13, by which time the *Inflexible* would be ready. He had no intention of sending his ships to the west coast of Chile; and he suggested to the Admiralty that the German armed liners there should be dealt with by the Anglo-Japanese squadron then off the coast of Ecuador.³ This view the Admiralty shared; indeed, as soon as they heard of the victory at the Falklands, they ordered the *Newcastle* to proceed south with the Japanese ships and search for the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, last reported off Valparaiso, and any German supply vessels. Admiral Sturdee was to detach the *Kent* and one armed merchant cruiser and send them to work northward up the west coast to meet the *Newcastle*, the *Kent's* place in the South-East Coast Squadron being taken by the *Dartmouth* from the Cape Squadron.⁴

As only light German ships were left in the Atlantic, the Admiralty wished our heavier vessels at home as soon as possible. The *Princess Royal* was called home from Jamaica, and the *Minotaur* and *Defence* from the Cape. On the 12th Admiral Sturdee was ordered to transfer the command of all vessels, except the battle cruisers, to Admiral Stoddart, and come home with the *Invincible* and *Inflexible*.

But before this order reached him he had received intelligence of the *Dresden* which to some extent modified all the plans. At 3 a.m. on the 13th he learned that the *Dresden* had put in to Punta Arenas during the afternoon of December 11. Admiral Sturdee at once ordered his three fast ships, *Inflexible*, *Glasgow* and *Bristol*, to raise steam for 16 knots and follow her. The *Bristol*, as she could be ready for 16 knots by 4.45 a.m., he ordered to Punta Arenas to communicate with the Consul and

¹ *Orama* Signal Log 19496. December 10, 8.3 a.m.

² See Signals 3.28 p.m. December 10 and 6.25 p.m. December 12 in *Invincible's* Signal Log 16358; also A 3.

³ The squadron consisted of *Australia*, battle cruiser, flag of Vice-Admiral Patey; *Newcastle*, light cruiser; *Hizen*, Japanese battleship; *Idzumo* and *Asama*, Japanese cruisers.

⁴ A 2, 5.

get the latest information; she sailed at 5.35 a.m. and thus took the *Cornwall's* place in Captain Phillimore's division. The *Inflexible* and *Glasgow* got away between 8 and 9 a.m.

Admiral Stoddart sailed at 4 p.m. in the *Carnarvon* for Port Madryn on the east coast in 43° S, to work down the coast from there and meet the *Dresden* in case she should double back. He was followed next morning by the *Cornwall*, which had been coaling and was now put under his orders in place of the *Bristol*.

Captain Phillimore intended, should the *Bristol* fail in getting information at Punta Arenas of the position of the *Dresden*, that she should continue searching Magellan Strait, while he, with the *Glasgow* and *Inflexible*, examined Picton Island and the harbours south of Tierra del Fuego; the three ships would rendezvous off Cape Pillar, the western exit of the Strait. Both he and Captain Luce considered the *Dresden's* hiding place more likely to be on the east coast than the west, and they intended to wait at Cape Virgins, the eastern entrance to the Strait, for the *Bristol's* report before proceeding further west. At 6.30 p.m., December 13, when they were not more than 100 miles from the Falklands, the *Glasgow* intercepted a wireless message in Spanish to the effect that the *Dresden* was interned at Punta Arenas. It was necessary to verify the news; if it were true, Admiral Sturdee, who by this time knew that the battle cruisers were wanted at home, ordered the *Inflexible* to return at once to Port Stanley, the *Glasgow* and *Bristol* also to coal at Port Stanley preparatory to beginning a search for the *Karlsruhe*. While waiting for the *Bristol's* report the *Glasgow* looked in at Port Gallegos, the first inlet north of the entrance to the Straits, where a vessel was reported to be ashore. Nothing was seen there; and as the Commander-in-Chief wished both *Bristol* and *Glasgow* to be at Punta Arenas in case the *Dresden* should come out again, Captain Phillimore put the *Bristol* under the orders of Captain Luce, of the *Glasgow*, and sent him on at full speed. At 3.29 a.m. on the 14th the *Bristol's* report was received. It was to the effect that the *Dresden* was not interned; she had coaled at Punta Arenas and left five hours before the *Bristol's* arrival, steering westward.¹

3. "Dresden" at Punta Arenas, 13 December 1914.²—In the thick weather prevailing in the afternoon of December 8, during the later phases of the battle of the Falkland Islands, the *Dresden* managed to escape from the British cruisers pursuing her. Her commanding officer, Captain Lüdecke, at first intended to make for Picton Island, which he understood to be the rendezvous signalled by Admiral von Spee soon after the commencement of the battle; but when he failed to get replies

¹ This section is based on *Inflexible's* Signal Log 32220. By westward is probably meant southward, since from Punta Arenas, where the Strait runs north and south, ships making for the Pacific steer southward.

² Based on the German official history, *Kreuzerkrieg* I, 386-9.

to his calls to the supply ships, which he knew were being chased, he concluded that they had been captured; and he determined to try to get into touch with Punta Arenas, where he hoped to be able to arrange for supplies. The idea of going to Puerto Santa Elena, where 7,000 tons of coal was waiting the arrival of von Spee, does not seem to have occurred to him. Thinking the entrances to Magellan Strait and Beagle Channel would certainly be watched by the British cruisers, he gave them a wide berth, choosing instead the difficult passage of Cockburn Channel, which he negotiated on December 10; that day at 4 p.m. he anchored in Sholl Bay, 60 miles due south of Punta Arenas. As there was only 160 tons of coal on board, Captain Lüdecke sent men ashore to cut down trees and bring off water. That night he was boarded by officers from the Chilean destroyer *Almirante Condell*, who told him he must not stay more than 24 hours. It was not, however, till 10 a.m. on the 12th that he left for Punta Arenas, where he hoped to get a good supply of fuel from the *Minnesotan*, an American collier especially chartered by the German Government. In this he was disappointed, for the master of the ship refused to coal a man-of-war, although the local authorities, who were unaware that the *Dresden* had recently coaled in Chilean waters, gave permission for her to be supplied with 850 tons. She ultimately had to be content with 750 tons of briquettes from the Roland liner *Turpin*, which had been at Punta Arenas throughout the war. To get this amount on board took the *Dresden* till the evening of December 13. The Chilean Admiral allowed Captain Lüdecke a stay of 51 hours in his port, this being the length of time allowed to the *Otranto* when she entered Punta Arenas on October 1. Nevertheless, it was too dangerous to stop long, and at 10 p.m. on the 13th, 32 hours after anchoring, the *Dresden* departed southward.¹

This incident was reported by our Consul at Punta Arenas² to the Admiralty and to his Minister at Santiago³; but owing to the slowness of communication it was not till December 17 that our Minister protested to the Chilean Government against this, the second known coaling of the *Dresden* in Chilean territory during the months of November and December. It appears that the Chilean Government were waiting for an official report of the events at Mas-a-fuera before issuing definite instructions to the port authorities in this matter; their telegrams despatched to Punta Arenas as soon as they knew the *Dresden* was there, took so long to reach their destination *viâ* Buenos Aires, the only route, that Captain Lüdecke had departed with his briquettes before it was known that he was forbidden to have them.⁴

4. Chilean Decree of 1 January 1915, as to Coaling.—The Chilean Government, incensed at the *Dresden's* violation of their neutrality, on December 15 issued a decree to become operative

¹ Based on *Kreuzerkrieg*.

² Mr. C. A. Milward.

³ Mr. F. Stronge.

⁴ Papers Titled Z 22/1915.

on 1 January 1915, to the effect that, in continuation of Article 19 of the XIIIth Hague Convention, which allows belligerent men-of-war to take sufficient fuel for a voyage to their nearest home port and to coal a second time after three months' interval, in future Chile—

- (1) Would permit belligerent warships to take coal only enough for a voyage to the nearest coaling port of a neighbouring country;
- (2) Would withhold coal from ships of any mercantile company a steamer of which broke the rules;
- (3) Would concentrate and watch merchant ships either interned or showing no signs of moving before the end of the war.

Chile, moreover, at a Conference of all the American States, held at Washington on 8 January 1915, urged the general adoption of these rules.¹

5. Search for the "Dresden," December 14–20.—The region in which the *Dresden* now found herself is remarkable for the number of places in which a ship can hide herself. Magellan Strait itself extends in an elongated zigzag from longitude 68° W to 75° W. From the eastern entrance as far as the approach to Punta Arenas, the only town on its shores, the general trend of the channel is westward; but from about 10 miles north of the port it turns suddenly southward for 50 miles. Then, narrowing considerably, it continues between high and forbidding cliffs in the general direction of north-west. Its eastern half is bounded to the southward by the large island of Tierra del Fuego; two other large islands, Clarence Island and Santa Ines, complete the southern wall. Mountainous and rocky, intersected by deep and tortuous fiords of a complexity unsurpassed elsewhere, the Magellanic area has a climate more continuously tempestuous than any other part of the world. The scenery is magnificently stern, and glaciers extend in many places from the barren mountains as far as the level of the sea.² The fiord-like character of the coast continues from Magellan Strait northward up the coast of Chile for 600 miles. Everywhere there are deep gulfs and crooked straits completely screened by high mountains. Such was the archipelago which Captain Phillimore was detailed to search.

On learning that the *Dresden* had left Punta Arenas, Captain Phillimore decided to investigate Picton Island and Orange Bay, on the south coast of Tierra del Fuego, but he did not intend to take the *Inflexible* further west than that, as he had heard from

¹ Alvarez: *La Grande Guerre Européenne et la Neutralité du Chile* (Admiralty Library, Xa 324); also Papers titled: *F.O.*, 9 February 1915, containing M. 0330/15. The Hague Convention is given in the Prize Manual.

² *South America Pilot*, Part II.

Admiral Sturdee that the battle cruisers were wanted at home. The Admiralty, however, when they knew of the *Dresden's* arrival at Punta Arenas, gave Admiral Sturdee discretion as to his immediate action to catch her, and impressed upon him that they preferred her destruction to her internment.¹ In the circumstances Admiral Sturdee considered he might employ the *Inflexible* in the hunt for a fortnight, though he intended to return home in the *Invincible* as soon as she was ready. He sent Captain Phillimore orders to continue to search for the *Dresden* till December 29; if the enemy was not destroyed by that date the three ships were to return to the Falklands, whence the *Inflexible* would proceed for home, the *Glasgow* and *Bristol* joining Admiral Stoddart in the search for the *Karlsruhe*. In his instructions he explained to Captain Phillimore that the *Orama* and *Kent* would leave Port Stanley on December 15 to assist in the search for the *Dresden*, and that the *Newcastle* and two Japanese cruisers were coming south on the same mission; the *Australia* also, which it was now discovered could not use the Panama Canal, would make her passage by Magellan Straits in three weeks' time.

On receipt of this order Captain Phillimore revised his plans. He had been considering the *Dresden's* probable course of action. He thought she would, while at Punta Arenas, have made arrangements for a coal supply, most probably from Valparaiso; Mas-a-fuera seemed a likely rendezvous for these colliers, and he determined to make straight for that island, after examining which he intended to visit Juan Fernandez and Valparaiso, and then thoroughly investigate the inlets on the Chilean coast with his three ships as they made their way south for the Falklands. He accepted a suggestion from Captain Luce that the *Glasgow* and *Bristol* should search the inshore channels on the way north, and carried out this programme till he was in the latitude of San Quintin Sound (47° S). He then called the two ships to him and at 9.50 p.m., December 17, proceeded in line abreast for Mas-a-fuera. Early next morning, however, the *Inflexible* intercepted a signal from the *Australia* to the effect that the *Newcastle* would visit Mas-a-fuera on the 21st. It was therefore useless for him to go also to the island, and he detached the *Glasgow* and *Bristol* to continue searching the inlets north of San Quintin Sound, while the *Inflexible* proceeded for Coronel, to get news.

Meanwhile the Admiralty had delayed the *Invincible's* departure from Port Stanley till the 17th; they then ordered Admiral Sturdee to come home at once with the battle cruisers, leaving to Admiral Stoddart the task of pursuing the *Dresden*.² The order to return reached Captain Phillimore at 8.50 p.m., December 18; he turned over the command of his division to

¹ A 10.

² A 10, 16, 18.

Captain Luce and altered course for Port Stanley. When he reached the entrance to the Straits the weather was so thick that he thought it safer to go round the Horn.¹ The *Orama* and *Kent* were then just coming out; they proceeded up the coast outside the islands. So far, none of the vessels on the west coast had discovered any clue to the whereabouts of the *Dresden*.

Admiral Stoddart's own division on the east coast had been scarcely more fortunate. The *Carnarvon* examined Port Madryn (43° S) on the 16th; the *Cornwall* joined in the course of the day and the two ships looked into every likely anchorage on their way south to the Straits of Magellan. On the 17th, in Puerto Santa Elena, the *Carnarvon* observed the German supply ship *Patagonia* at anchor, guarded by an Argentine cruiser; proceeding southward she arrived at Punta Arenas on December 20.

6. Admiral Sturdee Returns Home.—Admiral Sturdee failed to receive in time the Admiralty's telegram of the 16th ordering him to remain at the Falklands²; he left the islands at 2 p.m. that day for Monte Video. The *Canopus* left two days later to take up her old station at Abrolhos, and the *Macedonia*, with the German survivors, proceeded for home on the 14th, in company with an empty store ship.

On arrival at Monte Video on December 20 the Admiral learned that there was strong evidence of the presence of the *Von der Tann* and two other German battle cruisers within wireless range of the port. The probability of the truth of this seemed so great that he proposed to suspend his voyage home and return to Port Stanley, ordering also the *Canopus* back again. But the Admiralty knew for certain that the German battle cruisers were in their own home waters, and the *Invincible* continued her voyage to England.³

The *Inflexible* was back at the Falklands by December 23, and proceeded for home next day.

7. Movements of German Supply Ships in South America.—The colliers dismissed by von Spee when he left the west coast of America found their way as ordered to west coast ports. The *Memphis* reached Coronel on November 29; as she had left Punta Arenas, another Chilean port, without clearance, the Chilean authorities at first detained and finally interned her. The *Luxor* put in to Callao (Peru) on December 10, and was interned as a fleet auxiliary the next day. The *Rhakotis* also chose Callao, putting in there on December 13; although she had the master and crew of the *North Wales* on board, the master was unable to give evidence sufficient to prove the *Rhakotis* guilty

¹ Phillimore, Letter of Proceedings. M. 0649/15.

² A 16.

³ A 18.

of unneutral service, and the Peruvian Government did not intern her.¹ She remained at Callao.

The *Eleonore Woermann*, *Mera*, *Patagonia*, and *Josephina*, waiting for the German Cruiser Squadron at the rendezvous near Puerto Santa Elena on the east coast of Argentine, dispersed when they found it useless to remain longer. The *Patagonia* was arrested by an Argentine warship for breach of Argentine's neutrality. The *Mera* put back to Monte Video, and was interned on December 26. The *Josephina* also went to Monte Video on the 23rd. No proof could be given that she had acted as a fleet auxiliary, and she was allowed to leave again on the 30th, nominally for the west coast on a purely commercial voyage, but really to join the *Dresden*.² The *Eleonore Woermann* did not go into port again.

A suspicious Danish ship, the *Nordpol*, put in to Rio on December 24 with 2,000 tons of American coal, consigned to Buenos Aires; she was considered by us to be intended to serve the *Karlsruhe*, and a watch was kept on her. In fact, though our suspicions were based on inferences, they were justified. She was one of the colliers intended for von Spee; but there seems to have been some hitch in the arrangements, and when she sailed from Rio on January 5 it was to deliver her coal to the German depot at Buenos Aires and not to the *Dresden*.³

The *Josephina* also failed to reach the anxious cruiser. As Admiral Stoddart in the *Carnarvon* came out of the Straits of Magellan on January 6 he met the *Josephina* coming in, and as her papers were unsatisfactory, he took her with him to Port Stanley, where he arrived on the 9th.

The *Sierra Cordoba*, which had been lying at Monte Video since November 22, departed once more on December 18, with Callao as her ostensible destination and commerce as her declared object. In the light of her former career, both were open to doubt.

8. Operations on the West Coast in December 1914.—While the South Atlantic Squadron was making its way back to the Falkland Islands after the action, Admiral Patey, with the *Australia*, *Newcastle*, and the three Japanese ships *Hizen*, *Idzumo* and *Asama*, was assembling his force in a bay near the entrance to the Panama Canal. As soon as it was known that the *Dresden* had left Punta Arenas, his whole force was ordered south to search for her and for the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, and any supply vessels. The *Australia* herself was intended for the West Indies, where Admiral Patey was to take charge;⁴ she could not use the canal on account of her length, and, consequently, would have to make the passage by Magellan Strait.

¹ M. 21407/14, 22307/14, 15304/15, 17366/15.

² I.D.H.S. 1480/42.

³ I.D.H.S. 1480/42.

⁴ A 4, 11, 13, 14.

The *Hizen* was ordered back to Japan, and the other four ships swept southward together as far as the parallel of Callao (12° S). Here the British ships parted company from the Japanese, who remained north of Callao; while the *Newcastle*, which had been ordered by the Admiralty to search the coast of Chile, went on in advance by way of St. Felix and Juan Fernandez, islands on the 80th meridian. The *Australia* steamed along inshore as far as Iquique, and on December 24 also examined St. Felix before calling at Valparaiso. On December 29, off Corcovada Gulf (42° S), she passed the *Orama* and *Kent*.¹

These two ships, with Captain Segrave, of the *Orama*, as senior officer, left the Falkland Islands on December 15 with orders to proceed to the Pacific for the purpose of intercepting the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* and other ships that might be interfering with British trade in these waters. They were off Punta Arenas on the 18th. The *Orama* went in to the port and heard that the *Dresden's* departure had been against the advice of the German Consul, who had strongly urged Captain Lüdecke to intern his ship. The *Orama* and *Kent*, with their two colliers, proceeded through the Strait, searching the coast, and reached Vallenar Roads (46° S) on the 22nd, where, a few hours later, the *Glasgow* and *Bristol* joined them. Captain Luce, of the *Glasgow*, being senior to Captain Segrave, took charge till he was recalled by Admiral Stoddart, leaving Captain Segrave to carry out his original orders of searching for the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*. All the intelligence received, vague as it was, implied that she was to the northward. On December 9 firing had been heard off Corral (40° S); on the 11th a searchlight was seen in 35° S, and signals passed between the German ships at Pisagua (20° S) and an unknown vessel off the harbour.² This was practically all the intelligence available; and on the strength of it Captain Segrave proceeded northward on the 29th. He visited Valparaiso on January 2, and found that the Chilean Government, in accordance with their recent decree, had decided to intern the vessels of the Kosmos Line, to which the *Luxor*, *Memphis*, *Rhakotis* and *Amasis* all belonged. After leaving Valparaiso, Captain Segrave made a careful search of the coast and adjacent waters up to Callao (12° S), but failed to find any trace of the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* or *Dresden*.³

9. Admiral Stoddart's Operations, 21 December 1914 to 4 January 1915.—When Admiral Sturdee sailed for Monte Video for home, the command of the vessels engaged in searching for the *Dresden* devolved upon Admiral Stoddart, who, on that date, December 21, had just left Punta Arenas in the *Carnarvon*. The *Glasgow* and *Bristol*, after an examination of the channels

¹ Track Chart in Patey, L. of P. M. 0517/15.

² Daily Return of Enemy, British, and Allied Ships Abroad.

³ Segrave, L. of P. M. 02341/15.

on the west coast, were on their way to Vallenar, where they were to coal from the colliers brought by the *Kent* and *Orama* which were patrolling the Gulf of Penas. His intention was for the *Carnarvon* and *Cornwall* to search the eastern portion of the Straits of Magellan and Tierra del Fuego, with Punta Arenas as their telegraphic headquarters, while the four other ships examined the western bays and inlets as far as Chiloe Island; the *Otranto*, which arrived at Port Stanley on the 16th, was to search the Falkland group.¹ To the Admiralty it seemed dangerous for the *Otranto* to be alone, and they instructed him to keep her within supporting distance of a man-of-war; this requirement he met by sending the *Cornwall* to the Falklands, and both ships remained at anchor at Port Stanley.

The *Cornwall* stayed only a few days. On the 27th the Admiralty ordered her to St. Helena. For some months the shipment of gold from South Africa had been in abeyance; but now that the menace from von Spee had been removed the accumulation was to be brought home, and to convey it was the *Cornwall's* new service.²

Admiral Stoddart had left Punta Arenas on the 21st and returned on the 23rd. In the interval there came in the *Amasis*, the German collier which had been serving von Spee. She was promptly detained by the Chilean Government, and remained at Punta Arenas.

After coaling, the Admiral proceeded westward to meet the *Glasgow* and *Bristol*, which he had called down from the west coast. He passed Punta Arenas at 11 a.m., December 26, a few hours after the *Sierra Cordoba*, which had left Monte Video, ostensibly for Callao, on December 18. We had objected mildly to her re-fuelling at Monte Video preparatory to departure, for she was known to have served the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*; but at the Admiralty's request the objection was not pressed, as we were afraid that Uruguay might stop our wireless communication in cypher with Port Stanley if we insisted too much on her neutrality.³ Seeing the *Carnarvon* follow so closely on the *Sierra Cordoba*, the authorities at Punta Arenas despatched the Chilean destroyer *Almirante Condell* to ensure that their neutrality was not violated.⁴ A few hours later the *Carnarvon* came upon the *Sierra Cordoba* anchored in Snug Bay, 53.50 S., 71.25 W. "She was boarded, and stated she was bound for Callao, with no cargo, and had put in for engine repairs. In view of the fact that she was anchored in an inhabited harbour she was not further interfered with."⁵ Next day the *Carnarvon*, *Glasgow* and *Bristol* met in Tamar Bay, at the western end of the Straits; after searching that vicinity for a couple of days the

¹ Tel. 64 from R.A., *Carnarvon*, 21.12.14.

² A 22, and M. 0137/15.

³ M. 04352/14. ⁴ Alvarez., p. 167.

⁵ Stoddart, L. of P. M. 01964/15.

three ships came eastward, the flagship calling at Punta Arenas on January 2 for intelligence. The three ships coaled in Possession Bay, east of Punta Arenas, and on January 6 the Admiral proceeded to the Falklands, leaving the *Glasgow* in charge of the search.

So far, the Strait itself and most of the bays and channels opening out of it had been carefully examined. Beagle Channel, between Tierra del Fuego and the islands fringing its southern coast, had been visited by the *Glasgow* and *Bristol* before they joined the flagship in Possession Bay. The chief places not yet searched were certain large fiords in the northern shores, Barbara Channel between the two largest islands west of Tierra del Fuego, and the archipelago of small islands which extend from Cape Horn to the western entrance of the Strait. These were imperfectly charted, and the navigation of them would be a matter of some danger.

The *Australia* passed through Magellan Strait on December 31, and coaled at the Falklands. Leaving again at daybreak, January 5, she sighted a steamer in the afternoon of January 6, and, as the position was entirely outside any legitimate steamer track, she gave chase. The steamer immediately ran away. The *Australia* had damaged one of her propellers, and did not put on a high speed; consequently, at sunset, the steamer, which had originally been sighted on the sky line, was still 10 miles off. To bring her to, the *Australia* fired a 12 in. round from the foremost turret, and this had the effect of stopping the chase. The steamer proved to be the *Eleonore Woermann*, doubtless on her way to join the *Dresden*. Admiral Patey had heard from Admiral Stoddart that the *Eleonore Woermann* was a supply ship; she had no papers for her cargo, although it included 1,800 tons of coal, which must not reach the German cruiser. The *Australia* could not spare a prize crew, and, moreover, German warships were at large in the Atlantic. Feeling that the *Australia* could not afford the time to escort her to a British port or to wait for the arrival of another cruiser to take over the prize, the Admiral gave orders that she was to be sunk.¹ Thus, out of all the German supply ships made ready for von Spee's squadron, only the *Sierra Cordoba* had any chance of serving the *Dresden*.

¹ Patey, L. of P. M. 0817/15.

CHAPTER II.

THE KRONPRINZ WILHELM'S CAPTURES IN DECEMBER 1914.

10. Movements of "Kronprinz Wilhelm," November 21 to December 21.—Nothing had been heard of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* since the report that she was 300 miles east of Santos in mid-November. An unreadable wireless message addressed to her from Olinda Station, near Pernambuco, had been intercepted on December 16, but that gave little hint as to her position. There was another movement which might possibly be connected with her. A Hamburg-Amerika steamer, the *Otavi*, had been lying quiet at Pernambuco since August 17; on the German Consul's declaration that her mission was commercial, she was allowed to put to sea on December 4 with the ostensible destination of Fernando Po. A month later, on January 4, she arrived at Las Palmas, bringing the crews of three ships sunk by the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, the position (3° S, 29° W) of the last showing that the raider had moved northward, and was now at work in much the same area as that chosen by the *Karlsruhe*.

For a week after sending off the *Sierra Cordoba* the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* continued her endeavour to clear her last capture, the French barque *Union*, of her coal¹; in the process the German liner suffered a good deal of damage, and, finally, the *Union* capsized, still with 800 tons on board. Just before this, on November 21, another French sailing vessel was captured, the *Anne de Bretagne*, bound for Melbourne with Scandinavian wood. This prize was difficult to get rid of; she was rammed, three bombs were exploded inside her, and 25 rounds were fired at her. Finally she sank in 27° S, 32° W. Having now sufficient coal, and perhaps disheartened by his experiences with sailing vessels, Captain Thierfelder now made for the steamer route north-east of Cape San Roque, where the *Karlsruhe* had had her successes.² Here he made two captures on December 4. The first was the *Bellevue*, a British collier bound for Monte Video with 5,400 tons of coal and general cargo. Her master was keeping away from the trade route in accordance with the Admiralty instructions, and his capture in 3° S, 29° 9' W was

¹ The earlier movements of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* are given in Monograph 22 *Atlantic*, Vol. I.

² The chief German authorities for the operations of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* are diaries and letters of members of her crew, now bound in I.D.H.S. 551. One of these, Mahlstedt, says she moved north because she was being actively searched for (I.D.H.S. 551, p. 175). This was not the case.

considered by the Admiralty to be due to pure mischance.¹ While the *Kronprinz Wilhelm's* crew were busy with the prize, another vessel came up, the *Mont Agel*, a French steamer in ballast, bound for South America. She was of no use to the raider, and she was sunk by ramming.² The *Bellevue* was, however, of great value. Not only had she coal; her general cargo supplied many needs, and the captors noted with pleasure that she carried toilet soap, cigars, chocolate, sweets, and whisky. Taking her well away to the north-westward, the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* spent from December 8 to 20 in transshipping from the prize everything of value, and then, opening the sea-cocks, allowed her to sink. The master of the *Bellevue*, though without any nautical instruments, estimated the courses and distances of the raider since the capture of his ship, and, allowing for the current, judged the position to be 6° N, 40° W.

Meanwhile, on December 12, the *Otavi* had joined from Pernambuco. After the provisions and equipment brought by her had been put aboard the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, the prisoners from the captures were sent over to the *Otavi*, and on December 21 she parted company for Las Palmas, leaving the raider in 4° 8' N, 37° 50' W. As the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was full of stores, and even luxuries, Captain Thierfelder seems to have decided to continue commerce raiding, instead of accepting the German Admiralty's suggestions that he should lay his ship up in a neutral port. At any rate, no light on his future intentions could be thrown by the *Otavi* on arrival at Las Palmas on January 4.³

11. **Area I, December 1914.**—The *Otavi* reached Las Palmas at a period when the watch so continuously kept by Admiral de Robeck happened to be relaxing. At the time of the battle of the Falklands the Admiral, in the *Amphitrite*, was in the neighbourhood of Madeira, now his centre of communications. The *Argonaut* was attending to defects at Gibraltar, and his third cruiser, the *Europa*, was patrolling off the Tagus. Of his three armed merchant cruisers, the *Calgarian* was with him at Madeira, and the *Carmania* and *Victorian* were both at Gibraltar, in dockyard hands. The *Carmania* got away on the 11th, and took over the Tagus patrol from the *Europa*, which was to proceed home with a convoy and be fitted with Poulsen wireless apparatus. She left Gibraltar on December 16 with the *Assaye* and eight other transports,⁴ and did not join Force I again for some months.

The Canaries were, however, visited by the Admiral, who took the *Calgarian* with him in the middle of December. That Germans were still at work there was indicated by the fact that

some of the coal in the *Alwina*, a Dutch collier suspected of belonging to the German supply system, had been bought by a local Spaniard, who was to supply it to the *Cap Ortegal*, one of the convertible liners in the Canaries. We registered a protest against this transaction, and it was cancelled, the coal being disposed of to a reputable British merchant.¹ When Admiral de Robeck arrived, the situation seemed quite satisfactory, except that the German auxiliaries *Walhalla* and *Crefeld* had not yet been officially interned. The cargoes of the three highly suspicious Dutch colliers *Nepos*, *J. L. Mowinckel*, and *Alwina* were on sale, and the general opinion was that the wireless stations were no longer being used, even surreptitiously, by the German agents.² Admiral de Robeck therefore returned to Madeira, where, on the 20th, he shifted his flag to the *Argonaut*, sending the *Amphitrite* to Gibraltar to look after her usual defects. The *Calgarian* also had to go to Gibraltar, her place with the flagship being taken by the *Victorian*. The *Carmania*, on the Tagus patrol, should have gone to Gibraltar to coal on the 23rd, but Admiral de Robeck could not relieve her; neither at first could the Admiralty, whose neatly arranged convoy programme had by this time been completely disorganised by circumstances. Instead of the 16-day intervals laid down in October, convoys were leaving and arriving almost weekly. On the 19th the *Talbot*, from the Western Channel Patrol, arrived at Gibraltar with the *Aragon* and five other transports; she departed again on the 24th with three home-ward-bound transports. On the 28th the *Eclipse*, also of the Western Channel Patrol, reached Gibraltar with a convoy, and returned a week later with the *Alaunia* and seven other transports. With such a programme the Admiralty could not spare a cruiser; but they arranged that the old battleship *Prince George*, from the Channel Fleet, should work up her drills and refit her boilers while lying off the Tagus; accordingly she relieved the *Carmania* there on the 29th.

The Canaries were again visited by the Admiral on the 25th. The condition of affairs continued to be satisfactory; the Germans seemed anxious to dispose of their cargoes, and their ships showed no desire to proceed to sea, though in the absence of official internment there was nothing to prevent the *Walhalla* and *Crefeld* from escaping at night.³ He returned four days later to Madeira, leaving the *Victorian* behind to resume her long vigil over the islands. She was at Las Palmas on January 1 and at Tenerife on January 3; at 6.45 p.m., after a visit from the Vice-Consul, the *Victorian* proceeded northward from Tenerife to meet the *Argonaut* near the Salvages, and to return with her to Las Palmas. The two ships anchored at Las Palmas on the

¹ M. 15679/15.

² Letter from Master of *Bellevue* to his owners. H.S. 23/303/13.

³ I.D.H.S. 1414, No. 196; 1479, No. 383.

⁴ *Europa*, L. of P. M. 04917/14.

¹ Papers titled *F.O., December 16 1914. Unneutral Service.*

² De Robeck, L. of P. M. 04877/14.

³ Admiral de Robeck to Admiralty, 30.12.14, in Papers titled X.3927/14.

morning of the 5th, and the Admiral found that the *Otavi* had arrived the previous day and had landed the crews of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm's* captures. He took immediate steps to have the *Otavi* interned. But this had been done provisionally, before the Admiral's protest reached the Governor; her internment was definitely confirmed by orders from Madrid on January 7.¹

12. **North America and West Indies.**—When the *Otavi* left Pernambuco on December 4 it was at first thought she had gone to join the *Karlsruhe* at some pre-arranged rendezvous, for the destruction of the *Karlsruhe* and *Indrani* was so well concealed that for several months searches and operations were conducted with the idea of finding them or their bases. On December 24 it was reported that Caicara, at the foot of Lavandeira Reef in 5° S, 36° W, was being used by German cruisers, one having been seen there early in December; a Foreign Office official went across from Macau to examine it. The Consul at Para, however, considered the *Karlsruhe* was using Maraca Island in the mouth of the Amazon and St. Anna Channel near Maranhão, and he was authorised to send a small steamer to search those places.² The Admiralty ordered the *Melbourne* to coal at St. Lucia and then search the coast of Brazil from Trinidad to Para, while the *Dartmouth*, which reached Pernambuco on December 16, examined the remainder of the coast from Cape San Roque westward. As far as the *Melbourne* was concerned this was not carried out; she did not reach Bermuda from Madeira till the 20th and arrived at St. Lucia only on December 26, whereupon she was ordered by the Admiralty to search westward from Trinidad as far as the Panama Canal.³ The *Dartmouth* by that time was at Trinidad. She had seen nothing at Lavandeira Reef, which she visited on December 20, nor at Maraca Island or Santa Anna Channel. The last two places she found dangerous through the unreliability of the charts and she considered as false the rumours that they were being used as bases. She was now ordered to come home, visiting ports on the coast as far as Para and coaling at Maranhão; if on arrival at Maranhão no news of the *Karlsruhe* had come to hand she was to return home *viâ* St. Vincent, Cape Verde.⁴ Further instructions were given her that should she find an enemy ship in an unfrequented river or bay inside territorial waters the enemy was to be sunk; but if the vessel were lying in an inhabited and properly constituted port it was to be blockaded.⁵ In ordering these movements the Admiralty had telegraphed direct to the ships and Admiral Hornby asked if they were under him or not. In reply he was

¹ Admiral de Robeck to Admiralty, 21 January 1915, in Papers titled X.8840/15; and L. of P. M. 0946/15.

² H.S. 134, pp. 33, 38, 40, 74.

³ A 19, 21.

⁴ A 21.

⁵ A 23.

told that the *Dartmouth* was coming home and that the *Melbourne* would be under his orders till the arrival of Admiral Patey.

13. **Reorganisation of the North America and West Indies Stations. December 28, 1914.**—The Admiralty had now decided to separate the West Indies from the North America command, the parallel of 28° N to be the limit between the two; Rear-Admiral Hornby was to retain command of the North American half, and Admiral Patey on arrival would become Vice-Admiral Commanding the West Indies Station.¹ The *Lancaster* and *Berwick* in the West Indies were to come home on relief by the *Melbourne* and *Sydney*, and as the *Melbourne* was already on the station the *Lancaster* was to start as soon as possible. She left Bermuda finally for Plymouth on January 16. The *Sydney* was due at Bermuda on January 6.

14. **Reports of German Supply Ships from North America in December 1914.**—None of the operations in the West Indies revealed any trace of the *Karlsruhe*, and, indeed, there was a press report that she had reached Germany on December 26. Nothing reliable had been heard of her for a long time and the idea arose that she might have foundered in a storm, but this was dispelled when it was learned from Barbadoes that for two months there had been no weather danger to shipping.² But there were movements of possible supply ships which might be intended for her. One, the Danish vessel *Fanny*, suspected since October 30, sailed on December 13 from Norfolk, Virginia, with 1,800 tons of coal consigned to Buenos Aires. She arrived there on January 26, but seems to have escaped the notice of our agents; it is not known what happened to her coal. The German liner *Neckar*, which had been quiescent at Baltimore, began to coal, but though expected to make a rush for sea she did not move.

The most suspicious of all was the *Gladstone*, a Norwegian vessel which, since her arrival at Norfolk, Virginia, in November, was very strongly suspected. She was reported to have a German captain and to be intended to serve German cruisers. While at Newport News she fitted up a wireless installation, and endeavoured to change her flag to that of Chile. After a month's delay she sailed from Newport News on December 15 with the name of *Mariana Quesada*, and under the flag of Costa Rica, having obtained permission to fly it from the Costa Rican representative in the port. The long delay and suspicious nature of her proceedings at Newport News enabled all our authorities to be warned about her should she stray from her course. She, however, proceeded straight to Port Limón, in Costa Rica, which had been declared her first port of call. But there she was unfortunate; the Costa Rican Government

¹ A 24, 30.

² H.S. 134, pp. 182, 193.

definitely repudiated her change of flag, and ordered her detention as a supply ship. She disappeared, however, from the port early on January 1, without papers or flag.¹

15. Departure of the "Holger" from Pernambuco, 1 January 1915.—Another probable supply ship left port on January 1. At Pernambuco was lying the *Holger*, a Roland liner, which on December 2 had been detected reporting by wireless the departures and cargoes of British ships, and had been the subject of a Foreign Office protest at the Admiralty's instigation. On January 1 she slipped out secretly without clearance papers. Her double violation of their neutrality led the Brazilian Government to decide on the removal of the essential parts of the wireless apparatus of all ships at Pernambuco and of any ship in their ports found communicating, as had been requested by us on December 7. They also decided to refuse permission to leave to all ships of a company, any one of whose vessels had escaped in violation of Brazilian regulations. The captains of the port and guardship were dismissed; Fernando Noronha wireless station was closed; and a vigorous search was made for clandestine wireless stations ashore.² Although the movements of the *Holger* were then unknown, she presumably steamed northward and the *Inflexible* had some chance of overtaking her. The battle cruiser passed outside Pernambuco at 15 knots during the morning of January 2 and continued on the direct route for St. Vincent. Possibly the *Holger* made a wide detour to eastward, for she was not seen by any of our ships, and succeeded in joining the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*.

16. Movements of "Kronprinz Wilhelm," 21 December 1914 to 7 January 1915.—Captain Thierfelder, in the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, had now come back to the station east of the trade route where he had made his two previous prizes. There, in 4.20 S, 29.25 W, he captured another British vessel, the *Hemisphere*, on December 28, at 6 p.m. She was carrying coal from Hull for the Central Argentine Railway, and was too good a prize to be summarily despatched. Putting an armed crew on board he steamed off with her eastward till dawn on the 30th, when, feeling he was safe from the chance of an encounter, he commenced to digest his prize.³

Since November 27, when the *Macedonia*, on her way south from Sierra Leone to join Admiral Sturdee, called at Fernando Noronha for telegrams,⁴ the area in which the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was at work had been almost unvisited by our cruisers. The patrol and search near Cape San Roque, in which the *Bristol* and *Macedonia* had been employed, came to an end when Admiral


¹ H.S. 134, pp. 176, 228.

² Papers titled *F.O.*, 22.12.14; *Attempt by Germany to get in touch with Karlsruhe*. M. 15483/15.

³ Depositions of Master of *Hemisphere*. H.S. 23/304/3.

⁴ Deck Log *Macedonia*.

Sturdee absorbed them into his squadron; and since then no organised scheme had been re-instituted. The only armed vessels the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* had a chance of meeting were the cruisers on passage to and from other stations, but these steered mostly across and not along the trade route. For example, the *Otranto*, on her voyage from Sierra Leone to the Falklands, passed by way of the island of Trinidad, which she examined on December 9. The *Dartmouth*, leaving St. Helena on December 10, at first steered for Trinidad, but on the 13th altered course for Pernambuco, from which port she coasted the northern shores of Brazil on her way to join the West Indies Squadron. Thus neither of these ships went near the usual trade route from St. Vincent to Rio. The only armed vessel which followed the route even approximately was the *Celtic*, a newly commissioned armed merchant cruiser taken up for a new purpose. Two months' experience of the actual conditions of war showed the weakness of the squadron supply system; the slow supply ships in use had great difficulty in reaching the vessels for which they



carried stores, owing to the constant re-distribution of the cruisers on foreign stations, and their unarmed condition made them a source of anxiety in special moments of stress. Accordingly, on October 19 it was decided to take up and arm two vessels of good cargo capacity, large radius of action, and a speed of 15 to 16 knots, to take the place of the slower, unarmed, unconvoyed fleet auxiliaries. The vessels selected were the *Celtic* (White Star Line) and *Laconia* (Cunard Line); they were each armed with eight 6 in. guns and were commissioned at Liverpool on November 24. The *Celtic* left Devonport on December 10 to serve the squadron on the south-east coast of America; the *Laconia* on the 17th for the squadrons in the East Atlantic and on the Cape Station.¹ By December 22 the *Celtic* was approaching the area of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm's* activities. She passed near the position of the capture of the *Hemisphere*, but, unfortunately, three days too soon. The *Macedonia*, on the way home with the German survivors from the *Gneisenau*, was about 180 miles to the eastward of it the previous day. The *Invincible* left Pernambuco on the 29th, and, after a look at Lavandeira Reef, steered for St. Vincent; the *Inflexible* was following her three days astern. It was as well, therefore, for Captain Thierfelder that he, unlike Captain Köhler of the *Karlsruhe*, decided to move safe away from the trade route before commencing to clear his prize.

The process occupied him till January 7. On the previous day the *Holger* joined. She turned over her stores to the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* and took on board the crew of the *Hemisphere*. Captain Thierfelder then returned to his station east of the trade route.

¹ Papers titled *Admiralty, 17 October 1914. Squadron Supply Ships for Atlantic*; and *Admiralty, 8 December 1914. Sailing Orders, Celtic*.

CHAPTER III.

SWEEPING FOR THE *KRONPRINZ WILHELM*, JANUARY AND EARLY FEBRUARY 1915.

17. The "*Kronprinz Wilhelm*" moves away Southward.— Soon after returning to the trade route, Captain Thierfelder took two prizes. On January 10 he captured the British steamer *Potaro* in 5.48 N, 25.58 W, and sent her off with a prize crew. Coming southward, on January 14, in 2.46 N, 26° W, 160 miles east of the most easterly steamer routes, he was lucky enough to take the *Highland Brae*, a vessel with general cargo and passengers for Buenos Aires, which was keeping so far out in hopes of safety. Before he had moved away with the *Highland Brae* another vessel met him, the *Wilfred M.*, a small sailing ship of Canadian register bound from Nova Scotia with dried fish for Bahia. The Germans had no use for this cargo, and, after the crew of the *Wilfred M.* had been taken off, the little vessel was rammed and cut in half by the big liner, which then steamed off eastward and southward with the *Highland Brae* in company to meet the *Holger*. The four ships, *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, *Highland Brae*, *Holger*, and *Potaro*, steamed southward for a week, more or less in company, the cruiser taking stores of all kinds from the latest prize during the daylight hours, and continuing her southerly course at night. Finally, at the end of January, after everything of any value had been removed from the *Highland Brae*, she was sunk by opening her sea-cocks, in a position estimated by her master, who was aboard the cruiser, to be some hundred miles to the south-eastward of Trinidad.¹ This was far from all steamer tracks, but within reach of the sailing-ship route from the Horn. Before long, on February 3, a barque was sighted, which proved to be the *Semantha*, a Norwegian bound for the Channel with wheat. This cargo Captain Thierfelder decided to keep from delivery in England, and he sank the *Semantha* in 26° 30' S, 27° W. Then, calling up the *Potaro*, he systematically ransacked her, sinking her also on February 6.² Six days later the *Holger*, with all the crews of the captures on board, was sent off to Buenos Aires.

¹ Deposition and letters from Master of *Highland Brae*. H.S. 23/306.


² Deposition of Master of *Potaro* in H.S. 23, p. 305. Fayle's statement (*Seaborne Trade I*, 377, line 3) that the *Semantha* was captured in much the same position as the *Highland Brae* is due to a misunderstanding of a mutilated telegram. See A 43. The same mistake is to be found in Corbett, *Naval Operations II*, p. 253.

18. The "Highflyer's" Two Sweeps.—Captain Thierfelder had acted wisely in leaving the trade route after sinking the *Wilfred M.* Had he stayed where he was to loot his prize in the manner of his predecessor, Captain Köhler, he would have been in some danger, for a hunting squadron was out after him. The information given by the British and French crews released from the *Otavi* on January 4 placed the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* in 3° S, 29° W on December 4, a month before; it was not much clue to her position in January. But on January 9 an intercepted telegram revealed that a steamer, presumably the *Holger*, had been despatched from Pernambuco to meet the raider on January 6 in 1° N, 20° W. The Admiralty at once passed the information to all the Intelligence Officers in the Atlantic; at the same time they ordered Cruiser Force D from St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, to sweep for the raider, and the *Dartmouth*, from the coast of Brazil, to examine Rocas Reef and Fernando Noronha on the way to St. Vincent.¹

Cruiser Force D was now assembled at or near St. Vincent in company with the *Vengeance*, which had arrived on December 15. The *Marmora*, which had been patrolling near Sierra Leone, left the coast of Africa on December 20, and joined the *Highflyer* and *Empress of Britain* at St. Vincent. Thus the whole squadron—*Highflyer*, *Empress of Britain*, *Marmora*—was ready assembled at St. Vincent when the order to search arrived; and they sailed on January 11, leaving the guard of the colliers to the *Vengeance*. The three ships reached the indicated spot on January 14. Nothing was there. They continued as far west as $25\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ W, and, passing close to the spot where the *Highland Brae* had been captured three days before, on the 17th they turned back for Sierra Leone to coal. Their search had revealed no trace of the raider.

The *Dartmouth* left Para on January 9. Skirting the coast, she reached Maranham on the 11th, but, finding it an unsatisfactory harbour for coaling, proceeded to the Sao João Islands, where she completed with coal. From there she steamed direct to Rocas Reef and Fernando Noronha. No definite news of the *Karlsruhe* had been obtained, and, in accordance with her orders,² the *Dartmouth* headed for St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands.

Of all our ships, the only one to find a trace of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was the *Canopus*, which, on January 14, was relieved as guardship at Abrolhos by the *Vindictive* from Ascension, and proceeded for the Mediterranean. On the 19th she received from the steamer *Demerara* a signal stating that on January 18, when in 1° N, 24° – 27° W, she had heard German signalling between five vessels, three of which had Telefunken wireless.³ This area the *Canopus* reached on January 21, and commenced



#377 C W 16820 P 4053 450. 10/22 J. W. L. P.

¹ A 28, 29.

² A 29.


³ *Canopus* W/T Log 31335.

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#3771 C. W. 16620/P. 4053. 4.50. 1922. J. W. L. P.

¹ A 28, 29.

² A 29.

³ *Canopus* W/T Log 31335.

to sweep. Just after sunset her lookouts, warned by a very fishy smell, sighted something awash in 2.40 N, 25.50 W. It was the waterlogged wreck of the *Wilfrid M.* Not connecting this in any way with the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, and thinking the derelict a danger to navigation, Captain Heathcoat Grant attempted to sink it by ramming.¹ Although the *Canopus* was a battleship specially fitted for this operation, she was unable to defeat the *Wilfrid M.*, a portion of whose fore part still remained afloat when Captain Grant resumed his course. Unknowingly, he must next day have steamed up the route down which the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* had come a week before, and at 6 p.m., January 22, he passed about 30 miles east of the spot where the *Potaro* had been captured.²

On January 28 the *Highflyer*, *Marmora*, and *Empress of Britain*, having coaled at Sierra Leone after their first sweep of the mid-Atlantic area, proceeded again for a second sweep. They were to be back by February 9, for amongst other reasons the engine-room complements of the two armed merchant cruisers were clamouring to go home; by the terms of their agreement disciplinary powers over them ceased in the *Marmora* on February 9 and in the *Empress of Britain* on February 18, on which days they demanded relief. In any case, the *Empress of Britain* required docking, as her speed was much reduced. The three ships, spread over a front of about 60 miles, searched along the parallel of 4° N from 17° 45' to 23° W; thence they proceeded to St. Paul Rocks, returning east along the parallel of 1° 20' S as far as 20° W. They were back at Sierra Leone by February 12, having seen nothing and heard no German wireless signals. Next day the *Marmora* left for Gibraltar, the *Empress of Britain* following her on the 15th, while the *Highflyer*, by Admiralty orders, remained at Sierra Leone.³

19. **The West Indies. The "Bavaria" and the "Farn."**—Active sweeping for the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* could be undertaken only by ships on the mid-Atlantic area; the contribution towards her destruction by the other squadrons had to be limited to keeping in port any possible supply ships. At Havana was lying the Hamburg-Amerika liner *Bavaria*, which had been there since the outbreak of war. Soon after arrival she took in large supplies of coal and provisions, and was expected to sail at any moment; but no definite movement was apparent till the end of December 1914, when a German agent endeavoured to buy coal at any price from the Havana Coal Company. The manager of this firm was British. He refused the offer, and reported the matter; whereupon attention was drawn to the *Bavaria*, which was the only chance the Germans had of getting coal away from

¹ *Canopus* Deck Log.

² The wreck of the *Wilfrid M.* finally drifted ashore at Grenada on April 28. H.S. 23/307/6.

³ H.S. 135, pp. 499, 692, 715.

Havana. She had 1,700 tons on board, and was ready to leave at any moment.¹ As, moreover, her name appeared in two separate German telegrams we had intercepted,² the suspicion that she would move was strong enough for the Admiralty to order the Senior Officer, West Indies (Captain Clinton Baker, in the *Berwick*), to watch her, as she might be intended for the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*.³ The only ship he had available was his own; the *Condé* was at Martinique. The *Berwick* accordingly proceeded to Havana, to remain off the port till she could be relieved by the *Melbourne* on January 17. On the way the *Berwick* examined the shores of Haiti, where St. Nicholas Mole, a deserted port, was rumoured to be a base for the *Karlsruhe*; but she saw nothing suspicious there. The latest orders were that the *Berwick* should return home as soon as the *Sydney* arrived on the station. That ship reached Bermuda on January 6; but since the *Australia*, having damaged her propeller, would be later than was expected in arrival on the West Indies Station, Admiral Hornby was allowed to retain the *Berwick* temporarily. The standing order that a cruiser should be detailed for the particular duty of maintaining wireless touch with the Japanese cruisers on the other side of the Panama Canal was at the same time relaxed; in future, arrangements were to be made for passing messages at fixed intervals.⁴ From this time onwards till June the Havana Patrol was continued, entailing the loss of two ships from the West Indies Squadron for general duties.⁵

San Juan, Porto Rico, attracted attention again when, on January 12, there came in a vessel flying the German flag, and with the name *K.D.3* on her stern. It was soon discovered that this was really the *Farn*, a British collier known to have been captured by the *Karlsruhe*; she was now in charge of a German prize crew. By Admiral Hornby's orders the *Sydney* left Jamaica on the 13th to watch off San Juan, whence a plentiful crop of reports were coming in. The French Consul stated on the 14th that the *Farn* and the *Präsident*, a small vessel known to have been acting for the German supply service, were both ready for sea. The *Farn* had on board the Chinese of her original crew. Efforts were made by the German captain to tranship these to the *Odenwald*, another German steamer in port; but difficulties arose from the United States immigration laws, which would not allow the Chinamen to leave their ship. The presence of the *Farn* gave rise to the rumour that the *Karlsruhe* was coming to San Juan; the cruiser was actually reported as off the port on January 21. These rumours died away after January 25, when the United States authorities interned the *Farn* on the grounds that she was an Admiralty collier, captured

¹ H.S. 134, p. 137.

² I.D.H.S. 1338, Nos. 258, 268.

³ Tel. 11 to Senior Naval Officer, West Indies, 7.1.15.

⁴ A 27.

⁵ M. 04818/15.

and converted into a tender of the German Navy.¹ The Admiralty protested that the vessel was not an Admiralty vessel, and at the time of capture was carrying commercial cargo to the River Plate; but the United States refused to hand over the ship to her owners, and she remained at San Juan.² Her internment released the *Sydney*, and that ship proceeded to Martinique.

No definite location of the *Karlsruhe* had, of course, taken place since November; but towards the end of January there were vague rumours that she had returned to Germany. However, on February 5, Grand Admiral von Koesler, President of the German Navy League, in the course of a lecture at Kiel, stated that the *Karlsruhe* was continuing her activities in American waters with success, which seemed to dispose of the stories that she was at Wilhelmshaven,³ and the possibility that she might turn up in the West Indies had still to be taken into consideration. Barbados had only the local volunteers and their rifles for defence, but St. Lucia had now four French 5 in. B.L. guns mounted, and temporary crews were arranged for, so that the island was to some extent protected in case of a raid.⁴

20. North America. The Second Canadian Convoy. 1915 to February 18.—The principal duty of the North American Squadron remained as before, to prevent the escape of the convertible liners at New York and Boston. Communication with our cruisers off New York had been maintained by means of a merchant ship with wireless to act as a link with the Intelligence Centre at St. John's, and by this method the average time of transmission of intelligence was nine hours. But the severe conditions of the winter weather caused defects to develop in each of the linking ships engaged, and Admiral Hornby, early in January, discharged them, preferring to trust to direct communication between Cape Sable and the New York Patrol for the month which must elapse before the new medium power station erecting there would be ready.⁵

The ships of the squadron—*Glory* (flag), *Suffolk*, *Essex*, *Niobe*, *Caronia*—were all more or less in need of dockyard attention. Indeed, so defective was their condition that Admiral Hornby obtained permission to use for the New York patrol between January 6 and 13 the *Charybdis*, which had come over from the Western Channel Patrol to escort home a second Canadian contingent. This, however, was not yet ready to sail and the *Charybdis* was available. Unfortunately, she collided on January 9 with the United States s.s. *Bayato* in the approach

¹ H.S. 134, pp. 401, 410, 421.

² Papers titled *Foreign Office*, 6.2.15, containing M. 01216/15.

³ H.S. 134, pp. 393, 506, 563.

⁴ Papers titled *Colonial Office*, 25.2.15, *Barbados*; and H.S. 134, p. 497.

⁵ H.S. 134, pp. 59, 70, 199.

to New York, broke her own stem and badly damaged her deck plates. She had to go at once to Bermuda. There it was discovered that her repairs would monopolise the whole staff of the dockyard for at least eight weeks; in view of the state of his squadron, the Admiral considered this undesirable, and she was paid off, her repairs to be carried out in the intervals of refitting the other ships.¹

On January 12 the North American Squadron was disposed as follows: the *Suffolk* and *Caronia* off New York, with the *Essex* at Bermuda with orders to relieve the *Suffolk*. The *Niobe* was at Halifax waiting for the departure of a transport conveying a draft of 500 men for the First Canadian contingent; she was to escort it as far as 40° W, the limit of the North American Station.² The *Glory* had just left Halifax for the Chesapeake. The watch on New York had been so close and continuous that at length, on December 23, our Ambassador was privately informed by the United States Foreign Office that a continuance of the practice might be construed into an act of unfriendliness requiring some action on the part of the United States Government. Admiral Hornby immediately issued orders that his ships were not to approach nearer than six miles from Ambrose Lightship; this action was reinforced by instructions given from the Admiralty, who also, on January 25, re-defined his duties. In future, he need not stop ships for the removal of contraband or reservists, as this could be better arranged in the United Kingdom or at Gibraltar; his attention was to be primarily devoted to the stoppage of enemy vessels, or neutrals whose actions gave reasonable ground for suspicion; above all, he was to see that no act was committed liable to cause the Americans unnecessary irritation.³ A special case was that of the *Dacia*, a Hamburg-Amerika liner bought by an American for the purpose of carrying cotton from Galveston to Rotterdam. We refused to recognise the change of flag, but for political reasons Admiral Hornby was instructed not to interfere with or board her, leaving all action against her to be taken in home waters.⁴

The *Charybdis* being unavailable, some other arrangement had to be made for the escort of the Second Canadian contingent. It was finally decided on January 25, that the *Essex*, which was in need of a considerable refit, should bring the transports home and join the 6th Cruiser Squadron of the Grand Fleet after refitting, while the *Berwick* came up from the West Indies to take her place in the North American Squadron.⁵ The *Berwick*

¹ H.S. 134, pp. 275, 323, 333, 339, 432.

² When the transport actually sailed, on January 20, the *Niobe* was not ready, and it went without escort (H.S. 134, pp. 326, 364, 372).

³ H.S. 134, pp. 130, 233, 237; Papers titled *F.O.*, 24.9.14; and A 31.

⁴ Tel. to Admiral Hornby, 17.1.15, and Papers titled *F.O.*, 7 January, 1915, *Dacia*.

⁵ M. 0698/15.

left Jamaica on February 11 for Bermuda and thenceforward operated under Admiral Hornby, leaving Captain Silver of the *Melbourne* as Senior Officer in the West Indies until Admiral Patey should arrive. The *Essex* sailed from Halifax on February 23 with three transports¹ containing the 1,000 troops of the Second Canadian contingent.

21. **Area I. Departure of Admiral de Robeck.**—The sweeps for the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* had been undertaken as a result of deciphering an intercepted telegram in which her rendezvous was mentioned. Another intercepted message indicated that the German collier *Macedonia* at Las Palmas might try to coal the raider, and on January 7 Admiral de Robeck was instructed to keep a watch on this vessel.² His force was to be lessened by the transfer of the *Calgarian*, then at Gibraltar, to the North American Squadron; but her place in Force I would soon be filled by the arrival of the *Edinburgh Castle*, which, after taking ammunition and escorting some colliers to St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, would return to join Force I. In the interval, however, Admiral de Robeck would have no ship to watch the Canaries while the *Victorian* coaled, and when he represented this he was allowed to keep the *Calgarian* till the arrival of the *Edinburgh Castle*.³

A few days later, however, the Cabinet decided to prepare for an expedition to capture the Dardanelles. For this, the older battleships would be required; the *Canopus* was recalled from Abrolhos as soon as she could be relieved by the *Vindictive*, and the *Vengeance* was to come from St. Vincent. It was decided that the *Edinburgh Castle*, which reached Gibraltar on January 13, should take the place of the *Vengeance* as guardship at St. Vincent till she could be relieved, Admiral de Robeck retaining the *Calgarian* until he was joined by the *Edinburgh Castle*.⁴ On the 18th the Admiralty repeated their instructions for the Canaries to be watched, as they knew a collier was to be despatched to the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* from there if possible.⁵

To Admiral de Robeck, who had not been told the source of the Admiralty's information, this anxiety that the enemy might utilise certain steamers at the Canaries seemed unnecessary. On January 21 he wrote reassuringly that there was nothing locally to lead one to suppose that any German ships would then leave the Canary Islands with coal for the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*. The chief authority in the Islands, His Excellency José Centano, Civil Governor of Tenerife, was determined to enforce strict neutrality and had interned the *Otavi* 24 hours after her arrival, before Admiral de Robeck's application

¹ *Missanabie*, *Megantic*, *Vaderland*.

² H.S. 135, pp. 301.

³ H.S. 135, pp. 234, 254, 275, 279; M. 095/15, 03686/15.

⁴ H.S. 135, pp. 401, 459.

⁵ Tel. 117 to S.N.O., Gibraltar.

reached the Governor of Las Palmas. So convinced was the Admiral that the Spanish authorities in the Islands intended to uphold their neutrality, that, to avoid hurting their susceptibilities, his policy was to patrol across the trade routes to the southward of the Canaries rather than to keep ships actually lying off the ports. Information of any movement of the German vessels in port would quickly reach the watching cruisers, the news being cabled from the Islands to Madeira and passed thence by the new wireless station. There seemed little chance of any vessel moving; the most likely vessel for employment as a fleet auxiliary was the *Cap Ortegál*, and she had very little coal, the German stock of which was small. Altogether he thought it more probable that supplies for the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* would come either from Wales or the United States in neutral steamers.¹

This letter was not received at the Admiralty till February 3. In the meantime Admiral de Robeck had been given another, and, as events proved, most important appointment. On January 22 he was ordered to turn over his present command to his senior captain, hoist his flag in the *Vengeance* at Gibraltar, and proceed to Malta to join the Vice-Admiral, Eastern Mediterranean Squadron as his second-in-command. The approaching Dardanelles operations had robbed the Atlantic squadrons of their battleship supports and now they took away Admiral de Robeck. On January 30 he transferred the command of Force I to Captain Grant-Dalton of the *Amphitrite*, then at Madeira,² and hoisted his flag in the *Vengeance* at Gibraltar.

CHAPTER IV.

THE DRESDEN IN HIDING.³

22. The "Dresden" in Hewett Bay.—By the end of 1914 our cruisers in Magellan Strait had not succeeded in finding the *Dresden*. Nor had any supply ships been found in the Patagonian channels. The *Amasis*, now safely detained at Punta Arenas, was not at the time associated by our cruisers with the *Dresden*; but she had, unknown to us, been able to render her important service. After leaving von Spee, the *Amasis* went to Fox Bay, about 45 miles SSE of Punta Arenas and from there communicated by boat with the port, landing an officer, Lieutenant zur Helle, specially sent by von Spee

¹ de Robeck to Admiralty, 21 January 1915, in Papers titled X. 8840/15.

² Grant-Dalton, Letter of Proceedings. M. 01561/15.

³ Taken from *Kreuzerkrieg*, unless otherwise stated.

to arrange coal supplies. The presence of a ship at Fox Bay was learned by our Consul at Punta Arenas, but though at first he reported this as a German transport, he corrected this later by saying "Steamer in Fox Bay was *Alaska* of New York; sailed towards Atlantic, December 6, after sending steam launch twice to this port."¹ This may have been the *Amasis*; but it was not in the Atlantic that she next appeared. When at Punta Arenas the *Dresden*, which had not succeeded in obtaining coal from the *Minnesotan*, arranged with Lieutenant zur Helle that efforts should be made to get this coal transferred to the *Amasis*; when he left Punta Arenas, Captain Lüdecke (*Dresden*) went to Hewett Bay, at the southern end of Barbara Channel, in which the *Amasis* was anchored. While there, he was kept informed from Punta Arenas of the movements of our ships, and on the 19th learned that the *Sierra Cordoba* was coming to join him with 1,600 tons of coal. Next day, he had to send the *Amasis*, which was short of coal, to Punta Arenas to get a supply from the *Minnesotan*, only to find that the transfer was forbidden. Moreover, the Chilean authorities made an attempt to remove the cylinder covers of the *Amasis* to immobilise her; but the German Consul protested so energetically that she was merely detained. The *Sierra Cordoba* also was prevented by the activities of our searching cruisers from making her way to the *Dresden*, which had to cut down timber ashore and bring off water in order to conserve what remained of coal on board.

23. The "Dresden" Discovered.—In this predicament she was found on December 26 by a motor sailing boat named *Galileo*, owned by a French hunter. The *Dresden's* crew gave evasive answers to the Frenchman's questions, but Captain Lüdecke, feeling that his resting place was discovered, and that some of the hunting cruisers would soon visit his bay, searched for a more secluded place in which to hide till his supplies could reach him. With his steam pinnace sounding ahead he ultimately made his way into Christmas Bay, an arm of the sea shown on the charts in his possession as solid land.

Captain Lüdecke was right in his surmise. The French hunter, on arrival at Punta Arenas on January 3, went straight to the British Consul, who, on January 4, telegraphed to the Intelligence Officer, Monte Video, and to the Admiralty—

"To day I have received information that she (*Dresden*) was seen on December 22 in harbour with two transports near Isabella Island, south of Ines Island, north of Furies."

This intelligence was received by the *Glasgow* at 4.30 a.m., January 6, in an intercepted message from Cerrito to Port Stanley.² Unfortunately, it did not reach the Admiralty, nor

¹ H.S. 43, pp. 974, 1006.

² N.I.D. 6933/15 and *Glasgow* Signal Log 20112.

was it repeated by the Intelligence Officer; and the Consul's subsequent references to it were misunderstood.¹

But even if it had been received, there are discrepancies to be explained. The date, December 22, given in the telegram and repeated three months later by the French hunter, does not agree with the December 26 which the German official history states was the day of the encounter.² The transports mentioned by the hunter are difficult to identify. According to him one had two masts and two funnels, the other two masts and one funnel. From the German history we know that Captain Lüdecke sent the *Amasis* away on December 20, and she was certainly at Punta Arenas on December 22; the *Sierra Cordoba* was searched in Snug Bay on December 26 by the *Carnarvon*, and did not join the *Dresden* till much later. While at Hewett Bay, however, the *Dresden* kept up communications with Punta Arenas by means of motor boats or tugs from the port, and it may have been one of these that was with her when the French hunter came upon her.

24. Search of Magellanic Area, January 1915.—Captain Luce, of the *Glasgow*, who was now in charge of the search, went to Punta Arenas on January 7. He learned that the German pilot who left Punta Arenas in the *Dresden* had returned in a boat. He looked upon the Consul's information as nothing more than rumours, unreliable and indefinite at that; he accordingly made no attempt to examine the suspected spot, but arranged to watch the eastern and western entrances to the Straits. The *Glasgow* took the eastern entrance and the *Bristol* the western. On the west coast the *Kent* and *Orama* watched the Gulf of Penas.³

On the 12th the Admiral ordered the *Glasgow* to Punta Arenas to send some telegrams which he passed to her by wireless. These the *Glasgow* had some difficulty in dispatching. By a Chilean decree issued on January 5 Consuls were no longer allowed to use cypher, but Captain Luce managed to persuade the Chilean Admiral to countersign his messages and they were accepted by the telegraph office. Even so, there was some delay, for the land line had broken down; but they reached London on the 18th.⁴

The *Glasgow* then returned to watch the eastern exit, and at Captain Luce's suggestion the *Bristol* joined him in Possession Bay on the 15th. The Admiral arrived that day with the *Carnarvon* and *Celtic*; the latter, after transferring stores to the *Glasgow* and *Bristol*, proceeded to the west coast to meet the *Kent* and *Orama*. The Admiral now sent the *Glasgow* to search the south-east coast of America as far north as Monte Video,

¹ See War Registry Copy of Telegrams from Consul, Punta Arenas, recd. 6.30 p.m., 7.2.15, and 10.10 p.m., 7.2.15; and A 55.

² *Kreuzerkrieg I*, 391, and *Anlage 4*.

³ A 26.

⁴ *Glasgow Signal Log 20112* and H.S. 136, pp. 483, 485.

while the *Carnarvon* and *Bristol* took up the patrol of the Straits. He went to Punta Arenas on the 20th and 24th and interviewed various pilots, one of whom, a man suspected by the Consul of being in German pay, assured the Admiral that there were no good bays where a ship could lie in the neighbourhood of the place stated by the Consul to be the *Dresden's* hiding place.¹ The southern coasts of the Patagonian Islands have not been completely surveyed, and the neighbourhood is naturally dangerous for ships, but Barbara Channel, at the southern end of which lies Hewett Bay, has a good chart.² Nevertheless, the Admiral preferred to keep to the eastward, using Sholl Bay in Magdalen Sound as his base, and searching Cockburn Channel at frequent intervals with the *Carnarvon* and *Bristol*. His presence there had the effect of preventing the *Sierra Cordoba* from immediately joining the *Dresden*; after leaving Snug Bay she appears to have found a hiding place in Magdalen Sound, and could not escape from it until our cruisers had gone elsewhere.³ During these searches, the nearest approach of our ships to the *Dresden's* reported hiding place was on January 26, when the *Bristol* proceeded as far as Magill Islands (longitude 72.10). Next day the *Carnarvon* came as far as Kirke Rocks (longitude 71.45). In this search the cruisers were accompanied by a local tug, the *Eduardo*, chartered for the purpose, and she was sent on to Kempe Island (longitude 72.30), but instead of proceeding further to Isabella Island in longitude 73° and searching the district indicated by the Consul, they all turned back, the men-of-war going to Dawson Island, while the tug was sent by the Admiral to examine Beagle Channel to the southward.⁴

25. Distrust of our Consul at Punta Arenas.—The Admiral was half inclined to think that the Consul's intelligence was untrustworthy. The Consul, Mr. Milward, himself was to a certain extent suspected by the British residents at Punta Arenas, since he had a German partner in his firm; so much did they doubt his good faith that in October they had petitioned for a salaried Consul to be appointed in his place.⁵ Mr. Milward naturally at once tendered his resignation; but as he could not at the time be relieved of his duties he continued to act as Consul.⁶ In these circumstances, the Admiral thought the statement that the *Dresden* was in such a difficult area might be a trap to entangle his ships in unnavigable waters while she made her escape. Moreover, a German signal had been intercepted, which, though partly unreadable, brought him strongly to the opinion that she had moved out of her hiding place in the southern channels at the end of January and probably intended

¹ N.I.D. 6933/15.

² No. 1306, with Hewett Bay as inset.

³ *Kreuzerkrieg I*, 390.

⁴ N.I.D. 6933/15. See plan at p. 33.

⁵ Papers titled *F.O.*, 23 November 1914.

⁶ N.I.D. 6933/15.


to work in the Atlantic. He therefore determined to examine the coast of Argentine once more as far as Monte Video and Abrolhos.¹

On the 29th a telegram from our Naval Attaché at Rio was received, to the effect that the *Dresden* was reported in a harbour called Kempe, anchored, with her torpedo tubes trained to command the entrance.² The source of this report was local Punta Arenas gossip brought to the Naval Attaché by a steamer calling at Rio,³ though he did not say so in his telegram. The ships had just examined Kempe Island and had found nothing there. There was, however, a Kempe harbour on the north side of Clarence Island. This the *Bristol* visited on January 30 without result.

Next day the *Glasgow* joined in the entrance to the Strait, and Admiral Stoddart, turning over the guard of the southern channels to Captain Luce, proceeded with the *Carnarvon* and *Bristol* to coal at the Falklands preparatory to their voyage up the east coast. Consul Milward, however, was still convinced that the *Dresden* was hiding in the same place; none of our ships had seen the *Esplorador*, a small Chilean steamer chartered by the Austrian Consul, which had left Punta Arenas with four casks of sausages and other provisions, for the second time, on January 29, and this confirmed him in his belief that she had gone down Barbara Channel to join the *Dresden*.⁴ In point of fact the *Esplorador* first went south-eastward to Admiralty Sound to embark bullocks. She was met by a British warship, probably the *Carnarvon*, on the 31st, just as she passed Magdalen Sound,⁵ and that evening she joined the *Dresden* at her hiding place in the recesses of Stokes Bay.

26. The "Dresden" decides on Commerce Warfare.—Since January 19 the *Sierra Cordoba* had been with the *Dresden*, and her arrival gave Captain Lüdecke some freedom of movement. The German Admiralty staff had long ago abandoned all hope of successful commerce warfare, and recommended him to come home by the sailing-ship route in the middle of the Atlantic. But the prospect of such a voyage was not inviting. The rendezvous, Lavandeira Reef, at which the Admiralstab⁶ guaranteed to provide colliers, was too far for the *Dresden* to reach with one coaling, and the engines of the ship were in so bad a state that he must refit and overhaul them at some safe place en route. Such a place was not to be found in the Atlantic, since Santa

¹ Stoddart, Letter of Proceedings. M. 01965/15.
² *Glasgow* W/T War Log 20112.
³ N.A. Rio, Report 6. M. 01577/15.
⁴ Enclosure 7 in N.I.D. 6933/15.
⁵ Enclosure 5 in N.I.D. 6933/15. The meeting is not recorded in the logs of either *Carnarvon* or *Bristol*.
⁶ This German title will occasionally be used to distinguish the German Admiralty from our own.



5371 C. N°16820/1°4058 450. 10/22. J. W. 1°

Elena, Trinidad, and Rocas were all compromised. He therefore rejected the idea of making for home and decided instead that he would operate to the westward as far as the East Indies. He even asked for a collier to be sent to the Dutch Indies by the middle of April.¹ To this the Admiralstab replied—

“Further coal supply for Pacific and Indian Oceans is impossible. Voyage home by sailing ship route recommended. Collier awaits you in 5° S, 36° W.”²

On January 28 the *Dresden* was found once more, this time by a German otter-hunter, who had, however, some natives among his crew. A few days later arrived the *Esplorador* with a German pilot on board. Our Consul at Punta Arenas had persuaded the Customs House to send one of their minor officials in her, but he was put ashore at a farm and bribed to stay there till the *Esplorador's* return.³ After her stores had been transhipped, Captain Lüdecke sent her to find another safe hiding place for him and the *Sierra Cordoba*; then, sending her back to Punta Arenas, he left his second harbour of refuge for his third. This, like the second, was shown as solid land on the chart; it was behind William Island, south of Santa Ines, and even more secluded than Christmas Bay. Here he anchored on February 5. His position was daily becoming more difficult. His hiding place might be discovered at any time and the possibility of coal reaching him seemed very slight. The only chance of getting fuel appeared to be to capture it, and Captain Lüdecke determined to go out once more for cruiser warfare, though, in view of the reply of the Admiralstab, he had abandoned his idea of operating in the East Indies. Before leaving, he sent a letter to Punta Arenas asking for coal to be sent, if possible, to a rendezvous in 37° S, 80° W, by March 5. Then at 5.30 p.m., February 14, the *Dresden* left her anchorage and, steaming west to about 200 miles off the Chilean coast, lay in wait on the sailing-ship route, the *Sierra Cordoba* looking out about 100 miles to the north of her.⁴

27. Our Cruisers ordered away from the Strait.—Captain Luce, on taking over duty in the Straits of Magellan, proceeded to Punta Arenas. On arrival on February 1, he was assured by Consul Milward that the most likely place in which to find the *Dresden* was Puerto Lobero, a small bay in 54.5 S, 72.40 W, not marked on the charts but opening out of Stokes Bay; the Consul suggested that a tug he had hired for searching purposes should be sent there.⁵ Captain Luce, however, remained in

This was correct

¹ Telegram dated February 3 from *Dresden*; reached Berlin February 9. See *Kreuzerkrieg* I, p. 393.

² This telegram reached Punta Arenas February 10. *Kreuzerkrieg*, p. 393.

³ N.I.D. 6933/15.

⁴ From *Kreuzerkrieg*.

⁵ N.I.D. 6933/15.

outside territorial waters. Not content with sending the *Glasgow* and *Kent*, they ordered also the *Bristol* from Monte Video to search Last Hope, warning her captain not to trust Consul Milward.¹ Even when captain Luce's announcement that he had made arrangements to be informed of the arrival of ships in Last Hope reached the Admiralty, it had been so mutilated on its passage from Port Stanley to the Colonial Office that it was unintelligible² and made no difference to the decision to send our cruisers out of Magellan Strait.

Thus, just as the *Dresden* made her way along the southern shores of Santa Ines Island into the open ocean, the *Glasgow* passed along the northern shore to spend the next ten days in Union Sound and Port Condell. The *Bristol* joined her on the 20th and the two waited for the arrival of the *Kent* with charts before venturing further into the unknown waters which terminated in the aptly named Last Hope.

CHAPTER V.

FEBRUARY 15 TO MARCH 4.—SEARCHING FOR THE *KRONPRINZ WILHELM* AND *DRESDEN*.

28. **The German Rendezvous at Lavandeira Reef.**—Before the end of 1914 a copy of one of the German codes had come into our possession and by its means certain intercepted telegrams were deciphered. The enemy became aware of this³ and changed the key from time to time; but German ships abroad still used the code, a few copies of which had been distributed to our cruisers when Admiral Sturdee came out to the Falklands. On January 16 the Cerrito wireless station near Monte Video made a signal addressed to the *Von der Tann*; it was in this code, and, though partly mutilated, was sufficiently intelligible for Admiral Stoddart to conclude that it was meant for the *Dresden* and that she intended to work in the Atlantic. It was not, however, till after February 5 that the message as intercepted reached the Admiralty. There it was found that it specifically mentioned Lavandeira Reef in 5° S, 36° W, as a place in which a collier would be waiting for the *Dresden* on February 20. It gave the name of the collier as *Gladstone* or *Bangor*,⁴ and implied that the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* might also be near the rendezvous.⁵

¹ A 38, 39, 41.

² See A 40.

³ As early as 5 November 1914 the German Admiralty were aware that we had that particular code. I.D.H.S. 1414, No. 86.

⁴ The Admiralty thought the *Huron* was also mentioned, but this was a misreading of a corrupt group.

⁵ See A 33, 42.

We knew that the *Gladstone* was by this time unavailable. She had arrived at Pernambuco on January 23, and in view of her suspicious behaviour was detained by the Brazilian Government, who eventually disabled her machinery lest she should escape.¹

The *Bangor*, of the same Norwegian line as the *Gladstone*, had been suspected by us since the end of November, when it was reported that she had been bought by an agent of Herr Ballin, the shipowner of Hamburg. She fitted up with wireless apparatus at New York, and at the end of January went to Baltimore to load 9,000 tons of coal. On February 4 she sailed, nominally for Buenos Aires, so that she could easily reach Lavandeira Reef by the 20th.

29. **Orders for the Watch of Lavandeira Reef.**—Although a month had elapsed since the signal was made there was still time to act. On February 15 the Admiralty ordered the *Sydney* from St. Lucia to Lavandeira to be met by the *Edinburgh Castle*, which was to come from St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, with two colliers fitted with wireless apparatus. The guard at St. Vincent was to be taken over by the *Macedonia*, due there from Liverpool next day. The latter was now better able to cope with an attacker since she had been fitted with 6 in. guns in place of the 4·7 she had formerly carried; her orders on leaving home were that she was to join the South-East Coast Squadron.²

Admiral Stoddart was to come up from Abrolhos Rocks in the *Carnarvon* to direct the operations, with orders to sink the *Dresden* or other German vessels if they were found in unfrequented waters. All ships engaged in the search were to keep wireless silence in order not to frighten the Germans they hoped to find.³

30. **The "Highflyer" sent to the Congo.**—Further study of the intercepted signal brought to light another rendezvous, written simply as Hewett. Some member of the Naval Staff suggested this might be Hewett Creek in the Congo, and thither the *Highflyer* was sent to search for the *Dresden*, *Bangor* or *Gladstone*.⁴

The *Highflyer* got away from Sierra Leone on February 18. She found no trace of the suspected ships in the Congo River and after a month's cruise in the neighbourhood went back to Sierra Leone.

¹ Tel. 23, Treaty Rio to F.O., 26.2.15. H.S. 137, p. 277. The German History says she was detained because of a mutiny. *Kreuzerkrieg I*, 392.

² M. 01024/15. ³ A 42.

⁴ Tel. 15 to *Highflyer*, 17.2.15.

31. **Arrival of the "Holger" at Buenos Aires. February 17.**—Admiral Stoddart, in the *Carnarvon*, reached Monte Video during the morning of February 16, and proceeded again at 1.14 p.m. to take charge of the operations at Lavandeira Reef. Even before the new movements were under way more light was thrown on the activities of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*. On February 17, at 4 p.m., a German ship came in to Buenos Aires; it was the *Holger*, with the crews of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm's* captures. She had passed within sight of Monte Video at 9.30 a.m.¹ while the *Carnarvon* was at anchor there; but Admiral Stoddart did not know in time and she continued unmolested to Buenos Aires, 110 miles to the westward.

At Buenos Aires, however, the Argentine Government decided that the *Holger* was an auxiliary of the German Fleet, liable to be interned after 24 hours' stay. The Admiralty sent orders for the *Celtic*, which was at Port Stanley, to cruise off the River Plate if the *Holger* showed signs of leaving; but this movement proved unnecessary, for though there was once a report that the German vessel had got away, on March 2 we were officially informed that she was interned till the end of the war.² The *Holger* had been so long in port before she escaped from Pernambuco that her bottom was very foul; she was incapable of more than seven or eight knots, and in the five days between leaving the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* and reaching Buenos Aires cannot have steamed a thousand miles. The *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, therefore, if she had proceeded direct to Lavandeira Reef would still have some 1,500 miles to go; but this she could easily do before February 20.

32. **Operations off the Brazilian Coast.**—After having missed the *Holger*, Admiral Stoddart had further ill-luck. He coaled at Abrolhos,³ and with 1,600 tons on board started at 5.30 p.m., February 22 for Bahia. Half an hour later the *Carnarvon* struck a rock; two stokeholds became flooded and it was clear she was seriously damaged. The *Vindictive* was at anchor at Abrolhos Rocks acting as guardship for the colliers; shifting his flag to her while the *Carnarvon* was beached close to the lighthouse at Abrolhos, Admiral Stoddart decided to remain at the Rocks. He seems to have been unaware that the *Dartmouth* had left the station and he accordingly signalled to the *Sydney* that the *Dartmouth* was to take charge of the operations, sending the *Edinburgh Castle* to Abrolhos Rocks as soon as she could be spared. A fresh German message had been intercepted which, though badly mutilated, seemed to imply that the *Karlsruhe*, *Dresden*, *Kronprinz Wilhelm* and a steamer *Bolivar* were to meet on February 23 at some rendezvous, unfortunately unreadable; this news he also passed for the *Dartmouth* and

¹ From I.O., Monte Video. Sent 3.40 p.m., 16.2.15.

² H.S. 137, pp. 208, 214, 321, and M. 02412/15.

³ From the *Buresk*, an Admiralty collier which had been captured and used by the *Emden*, recaptured by the *Sydney*, and was again in Government service.

Sydney.¹ Even so late as February 27 he was still sending orders for the *Dartmouth*, and on the 28th the *Sydney* signalled to the *Dartmouth* for instructions.²

On examination the *Carnarvon* was found to have a rent 95 ft. long extending over two boiler rooms. Temporary repairs were effected, and she left Abrolhos at 6.35 p.m. March 4 for Rio, at 6½ knots. She arrived on March 7 and commenced repairs in the dry dock.

The first to arrive at Lavandeira Reef was the *Sydney* (Captain J. C. T. Glossop, C.B., R.N.). She left St. Lucia in the afternoon on February 15, and proceeding at 17½ knots, was at the Reef by 10 a.m. February 20. No ships were in sight. The *Sydney* did not wait at the Reef, but continuing on to Pernambuco, picked up off the port the mail steamer *Alcantara* and escorted her out. The reason for this proceeding appears to be that the Intelligence Officer, Pernambuco, had heard a rumour that the Germans intended to capture the *Alcantara* in 7° S, 34° W; the Admiralty were aware of this rumour but sent no special instructions beyond the general orders for merchant vessels to take precautions to avoid captures.³ At 10 p.m. on February 21, while the *Sydney* still had the *Alcantara* under escort, she passed the *Bangor*, one of the ships she had been warned to expect. They were then near the place where attack was expected, and the *Sydney* made no attempt to stop the *Bangor*, allowing her to continue her voyage in safety.⁴ As soon as the *Alcantara* was clear of the supposed danger area the *Sydney* steered again for Lavandeira Reef. From 1.52 p.m. February 22 till noon February 26 she remained at anchor on the west side of the Reef, waiting for something to appear. No German ship showed itself, though she took in a number of German signals which, having no copy of the code, she was unable to decypher.

The *Edinburgh Castle*, after relief by the *Macedonia*, left St. Vincent at daybreak February 17, having sent the wireless-fitted colliers *Thornhill* and *Fullerton* on ahead the previous day; she arrived at the Reef during the forenoon of February 25. Just before she anchored she bumped on the bottom slightly but distinctly. As she seemed to have suffered no damage, she anchored in company with the *Sydney*. It was now a week since the date of the rendezvous, and nothing had been seen at it. Captain Glossop decided to sweep towards the trade route. At noon on the 26th the *Sydney*, *Edinburgh Castle*, and the colliers *Fullerton* and *Thornhill* left Lavandeira Reef and steered eastward in line abreast, 20 miles apart, altering to line ahead at sunset. They passed Rocas Reef before dawn on the 27th and Fernando Noronha in the afternoon, and continued their easterly course. But at midnight the sphere of operations was altered.

¹ A 46.

² *Carnarvon* W/T Log 26626.

³ H.S. 137, pp. 157, 159, 171.

⁴ *Sydney* Deck Log, and Stoddart, Letter of Proceedings. M. 03073/15.

Admiral Stoddart, at Abrolhos, was informed by one of his colliers, the *Manchester Civilian*, that she had been chased by a German man-of-war at 11 a.m., February 26, in 15.20 S, 38.45 W, about 180 miles north of Abrolhos itself. He at once ordered Captain Glossop, if he had no reliable information of the enemy, to sweep south from Rocas Reef to Abrolhos with his squadron. This order he addressed also to the *Dartmouth*, for he still did not know she was in the Mediterranean.¹

Captain Glossop received this order when 60 miles east of Fernando Noronha. At midnight March 1-2 he turned and commenced to sweep southward towards Abrolhos, which he reached in the afternoon of March 4, having seen nothing of the enemy. The damaged *Carnarvon* was by then sufficiently repaired to proceed under her own steam to Rio for further repairs, and on the 6th, after the *Sydney* had coaled and provisioned, Admiral Stoddart shifted his flag from the *Vindictive* to the Australian cruiser.

¹ A 50.



33. **Attack on Colliers at St. Vincent expected.**—A repetition of Admiral Stoddart's message that the *Karlsruhe*, *Dresden*, *Kronprinz Wilhelm* and *Bolivar* would meet together on February 23 reached the Admiralty via the *Macedonia* at St. Vincent. In telegraphing it she did not make it clear that she herself had not intercepted it, and as she added that German code with strength 6 had been heard in lat. 12° N, and that the colliers at St. Vincent were ready in case of attack,¹ the Admiralty thought they should have more force at St. Vincent to resist what might be a concerted raid by the combined German squadron. As can be seen, the Admiralty had always been sensitive where St. Vincent was concerned. Now, within a few hours of receiving the intelligence, they ordered the *Otranto*, which had proceeded for home on the 23rd, to be recalled to St. Vincent, a cruiser from Force I to go there at once with despatch, and the *Laurentic*, an armed merchant cruiser which had left Gibraltar on February 21 for the Cameroons, to proceed at full speed to the Cape Verde Islands.²

Cruiser Force I was now under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir Archibald G. H. W. Moore, K.C.B., C.V.O.,³ with his flag on board the *Europa*, which left Portsmouth at last on February 13. He took over the squadron from Captain Grant-Dalton at Funchal on the 19th. When he received the Admiralty's order to despatch a ship to the Cape Verde Islands the disposition of his squadron was as follows: *Europa* patrolling off Madeira, *Argonaut* at the Azores, *Amphitrite* off the African coast near Cape Juby, *Calgarian* on the Canaries Patrol, *Victorian* off the Tagus, *Carmania* at Gibraltar. Admiral Moore accordingly ordered the *Amphitrite* to St. Vincent Island, and proceeded himself to the Canaries to relieve the *Calgarian*, which then took over the Tagus Patrol from the *Victorian*, to enable her to coal at Gibraltar before returning to the Tagus. The *Calgarian* was then to go to Halifax to join Force H.⁴

By March 2 no attack on St. Vincent had occurred, and the Admiralty dispersed the squadron assembled there. The civilian crew of the *Otranto* had let it be known that as their agreement expired on February 11 they would certainly refuse duty if ordered to sea except for the purpose of proceeding to England.⁵ She received orders to come home to Liverpool. The *Laurentic* was sent on to the Cameroons, and the guard of St. Vincent was left to the *Amphitrite* and *Macedonia*.⁶

34. **"Liverpool" and "Gloucester" detached from the Grand Fleet to South America.**—With the *Carnarvon* and *Bristol*

¹ A 46.

² A 47.

³ Appointed February 8. M. 01096/15.

⁴ Moore, Letter of Proceedings. M. 02033/15.

⁵ H.S. 135, p. 861.

⁶ A 51. The Consul, St. Vincent, in his dispatch covering this period (M. 02445/15), does not mention any expected attack.

both damaged, and the armed merchant cruisers demanding to return home, the squadrons searching for the *Dresden* and *Kronprinz Wilhelm* were in such a weakened state that the Admiralty decided to detach the *Liverpool* and *Gloucester*¹ from the Grand Fleet to assist in the operations. The two ships were at Scapa Flow. The order detaching them left the Admiralty at 8 p.m. February 27,² and they were away before dawn next morning. On March 5 they left Gibraltar for St. Vincent.

35. **The Search of Last Hope, February 20-24.**—Meanwhile, although the intercepted telegram of January 16 implied the presence of the *Dresden* at Lavandeira Reef on February 20, the Admiralty did not lose sight of the possibility that she might still be hiding among the archipelago of south-west Chile. They therefore made no change in their orders to Captain Luce, who, having obtained from the Chilean Government charts of Last Hope Inlet, and found that it was navigable, passed Kirke Narrows with the *Glasgow* and *Bristol* on February 20, and began to make a thorough search of the fjords inside, anchoring at nightfall in what appeared to be secure positions. The first night, however, the *Glasgow* found a 19-foot sounding alongside her, and had to shift billet. The *Bristol* was more unfortunate; in Last Hope itself, on February 22, she touched a shoal heavily, and seriously damaged her rudder. Luckily this accident occurred at the end of the search. All the bays and inlets had been examined without revealing any trace of the *Dresden*, and on the 24th the two ships again negotiated Kirke Narrows, and emerged into the comparatively open waters of Union Sound.

While this operation was in progress, Consul Milward at Punta Arenas had been visited on February 19 by another informant, who brought the news that he had seen the *Dresden* on the 14th at the southern end of Barbara Channel. The Consul immediately telegraphed to the Admiralty and to his Intelligence Officer at Monte Video, asking him to send a man-of-war at once. This request reached Captain Luce in Last Hope Inlet³ on the 21st as he was starting his search.

The Admiralty received Consul Milward's telegram at 10.30 a.m. February 20. It merely said: "Have news of whereabouts *Dresden* seen February 14," with no details of the position.⁴ Shortly afterwards Captain Segrave (*Orama*) telegraphed from Valparaiso that the Chilean Admiral believed the *Dresden* and *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* were together in the Pacific.⁵

¹ *Bristol* Class, 2-6 in., 10-4 in.; 26 knots trial speed. *Liverpool*, Captain E. Reeves; *Gloucester*, Captain W. A. Howard Kelly, M.V.O.

² A 48.

³ It was sent to Port Stanley by the Intelligence Officer and thence made by wireless.

⁴ A 44.

⁵ H.S. 137, p. 220.

The information about Last Hope, however, seemed to the Admiralty so reliable that they felt nothing else should be undertaken until it was established for certain that the *Dresden* was not in that inlet. They ordered the *Orama* to Punta Arenas to maintain communication between the telegraph there and the squadron at Last Hope, warned Captain Segrave not to trust Consul Milward, and as by this time it had occurred to them that the "Hewett" of the intercept of January 16 might be Hewett Bay in Barbara Channel, they ordered that bay to be searched should nothing be found in Last Hope.¹

36. Attempt to act on Consul Milward's Information.—A repetition of Consul Milward's message, "I have news of *Dresden*; send ship-of-war as soon as possible," reached Captain Luce on the 24th, as he was approaching Kirke Narrows on his return from Last Hope. His search there had achieved nothing except the damage to the *Bristol*, and he decided to go to Punta Arenas himself to investigate the Consul's report. He knew that the *Kent* was coming to join him, and he ordered her to get in touch with and meet the *Bristol* at Port Tamar, in the western entrance to Magellan Strait.²

At Punta Arenas, on the 25th, the Consul engaged the *Galileo* and an experienced Chilean pilot who knew the Patagonian channels to search for the *Dresden* in her last reported position, Puerto Lobero, an uncharted inlet on the southern shores of Stokes Bay, in 54.6 S, 72.40 W.³ Captain Luce did not at once proceed in search. He had to coal before running the chance of meeting the *Dresden*, and his collier was in Union Sound. On the way there he was stopped at noon, February 26, by a tug with the news that the *Dresden* had been seen in Last Hope Inlet that day. The *Kent* was near; ordering her to watch Kirke Narrows, he hurried there himself, calling up the *Bristol* from Port Tamar to join him. That evening the three British cruisers were again in Union Sound. By the 28th Captain Luce was convinced that they were on a false scent; he determined to give Consul Milward's information a chance, and proceeded with the *Glasgow* and *Kent* for Sholl Bay in Magdalen Sound, which was the rendezvous appointed for the *Galileo*. The *Bristol* he sent to Fortescue Bay at the northern exit of Barbara Channel, and the *Orama* he ordered to join the *Bristol*. Thus both the *Kent* and *Orama* were absorbed into the search for the *Dresden* in the Magellanic area, although they had been sent to the west coast to look for the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*.

37. Intelligence of the "Prinz Eitel Friedrich," February 26.—Throughout January and the greater part of February the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* was considered to be north of Callao,

¹ A 45.

² *Glasgow* W/T Log 46989.

³ N.I.D. 6933.

though no definite intelligence of her presence there was forthcoming beyond the fact that on January 15 and 19 the *Orama*, in lat. 15° S, took in German wireless calls. A few days later the *Orama* and *Kent* were recalled to patrol south of Valparaiso and get their stores from the *Celtic*. Captain Segrave considered it most probable that the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* was still to the northward in equatorial latitudes; it seemed to him unlikely that she would come south of Valparaiso.¹ The *Orama* and *Kent*, in moving south to Valparaiso, changed places with the *Newcastle*, which, on January 20, was ordered to the coast of Mexico, it being considered necessary that we should have a light cruiser on the coast of North America.² The Japanese cruisers also moved northward. Off San Bartolomé, in Lower California, the *Asama* ran aground on February 4, and seemed likely to be a total wreck. The *Idzumo* was in need of dockyard attention, and the Japanese Admiralty decided to replace the *Asama* and *Idzumo* by two other cruisers, the *Tokiwa* and *Chitose*, which left Japan February 20 under Vice-Admiral Tochinai.³

The idea that the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* had been off Equatorial and North America was dispelled on February 26, when there came in to Coronel a British vessel with news of her. This ship, the *Skerries*, when passing Easter Island, which lies 2,000 miles out into the Pacific from Valparaiso, noticed a party ashore signalling, and put in to investigate. She found they were the crews of two sailing vessels, the *Jean* and *Kildalton*. These vessels had been captured by the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, who had landed the men on Easter Island early in January. The *Skerries* offered to bring away the marooned party, but they refused to embark.⁴

Before the arrival of the *Skerries* at Coronel the latest definite location of the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* was when the crew of the *Charcas* were landed by her near Valparaiso on December 6. The instructions given to Captain Thierichens when von Spee left him behind were that he was to remain off the Chilean coast till the early part of December, in order to lead us to think the German cruiser squadron was still there. The time was now up, but just as he was preparing to come round into the Atlantic, he intercepted, on December 10, wireless messages between Monte Video and Port Stanley, from which he guessed the fate of the squadron; a few days later he took in a message from the "Daily Mail," asking the Bishop of the Falkland Islands for details of the sinking of the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau* and *Leipzig*.⁵ This news made it obvious that the Southern Atlantic was occupied by a strong British force, and he decided to remain

¹ *Orama*, Letter of Proceedings. M. 02341/15.

² H.S. 136, p. 439.

³ H.S. 137, p. 211.

⁴ A 49. M. 21034/15.

⁵ Interview with Thierichens. *Weser Zeitung*, 14.4.15. Translation in N.I.D. 6816/15.

for a time in the Pacific. On December 11, in 44.50 S, 81.40 W, about 300 miles from the Chilean coast, he came across and captured the French barque *Jean*, with 3,500 tons of Welsh coal, a most valuable prize. He determined to move away with her in order to clear her, and, taking her in tow, steered for Easter Island. Next day, while the *Jean* was still in tow, he met another barque, the *Kildalton*, of Glasgow, in 44.24 S, 82.35 W. This vessel had a general cargo and was sunk after anything useful had been removed. The *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* was at Easter Island from December 23 to January 2, most of the time being occupied in transferring the *Jean's* coal to the liner's bunkers. When she departed, the crews of the *Jean* and *Kildalton* left behind on shore had no idea where she was going.

Easter Island was too remote, and the present position of the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* too uncertain for the intelligence to make necessary any change in the operations in progress. It did not affect either Admiral Stoddart's movements on the east coast or the search of the Patagonian channels for which Captain Luce had gone to Magellan Strait.

38. **Hewett Bay searched for the "Dresden," March 3.**—By March 1 the *Glasgow* and *Kent* were both at Sholl Bay, and Captain Luce arranged the programme of movements. Proceeding through Cockburn Channel and Adelaide Passage, the two ships were to search Hewett Bay and all the inlets in the southern part of Barbara Channel, while the *Bristol* and *Orama* examined the other half of the channel. This programme was carried out on March 3. The previous day the *Glasgow* took in an order from the Admiralty to search Last Hope again, where the *Dresden* was definitely located. Captain Luce considered that the supposed *Dresden* was really the *Glasgow*, since the information agreed in time and place with his own movements; consequently, he proposed to continue searching Santa Inez Island.¹ But on March 3 the Admiralty telegraphed that, subsequently to February 27, the *Dresden* had been seen in Worsley Sound, and that the *Glasgow*, *Bristol* and *Orama* were to go and dispose of her; the *Kent* was to wait in 37° S, 80° W, about 200 miles south of Mas-a-fuera, for the collier *Gotha*, which had left Monte Video during the night of February 20 and, according to an intercepted telegram, was to be at the rendezvous given from March 5 to 30.²

Captain Luce had no alternative. On March 4 he relinquished his operations in the southern channels and proceeded once more to Last Hope with the *Glasgow* and *Orama*. The

¹ *Glasgow* W/T Log 46989.

² A 52. The German Chargé d'Affaires gave a declaration that the *Gotha*, on leaving Monte Video, "would proceed immediately on her voyage, her destination being reserved on account of the state of war," and this declaration was accepted by the Uruguayan authorities, who permitted her departure. Papers titled F.O., 26 February 1915, *Action of Uruguayan Government*.

Bristol, after visiting Punta Arenas, remained in Port Tamar; she was unable to steer at higher speeds than 10 knots. Captain Luce endeavoured to persuade the pilot in the *Galileo* to come to Last Hope, but this he refused to do, being certain that the *Dresden* was not there. At length, Captain Luce ordered him to search the south of Santa Inez Island and then go back to Punta Arenas. Thus, two months after Consul Milward had located the German cruiser, the spot he indicated was examined. It was too long an interval; the *Galileo* found evidence of her presence, trees felled, water chutes cut, and even pieces of bread floating;¹ but, as we know, the nest was empty and the *Dresden* was away in the open sea. There remained only the chance that she might be found at the rendezvous given to the *Gotha*.

CHAPTER VI.

FINDING AND SINKING THE DRESDEN.

39. **The "Dresden" sighted by the "Kent," March 8.**—The *Kent* (Captain Allen), which had been ordered to wait on the *Gotha's* rendezvous in 37° S, 80° W, reached the spot just before daylight on March 7. The *Gotha* was not there; nevertheless she might arrive at any time, and Captain Allen decided to stay as long as he had enough coal. Next morning broke misty with drizzling rain, but towards afternoon the visibility improved till at 2.15 p.m. it was clear enough for a ship to be seen about nine miles to westward. It was not the *Gotha* but the *Dresden* herself. The *Kent* was stopped, but Captain Allen put the engine-room telegraphs over to full speed ahead and steered for the German, who made off westward, and a hot chase developed. In a short time the *Dresden* began to draw ahead, although the engine-room department of the *Kent*, remembering their success in the battle of the Falklands, did their utmost to catch up. At times the supports and casings at the back and sides of the economisers in the boilers were practically red hot; but the *Kent's* bottom was foul, and though by running the fans at 600 revolutions nearly 6,000 more horse power was developed than at the contractor's trial, only a speed of 21½ knots was obtained. The *Dresden* seemed to have two more knots and to be able to maintain the speed. At nightfall she was only just in sight, and after dark Captain Allen turned back, thinking the best course to be to return to the rendezvous. Although the

¹ N.I.D. 6933.

Dresden's escape was a bitter disappointment to all, the Admiralty were so impressed by the fine performance of the *Kent's* engines and staff that they expressed their appreciation of it to the engine-room department of the *Kent*, and wrote to Messrs. Hawthorn, Leslie and Co., of Newcastle, the builders of the engines, congratulating them on the excellent work they had turned out.¹

The *Kent* remained on the rendezvous till the afternoon of the 9th, when, as she had less than 200 tons of coal left, Captain Allen proceeded to Coronel to coal.

40. **Movements of "Dresden," February 14 to March 8.**²—Since leaving her hiding place on February 14 the *Dresden* had been lying to, approximately in the position 37° S, 80° W, with the *Sierra Cordoba* 200 miles to northward of her, both ships on the look out for sailing vessels, which, in this neighbourhood, keep 200 miles from the coast. For nearly a fortnight they saw nothing, but on February 27 the *Dresden* sighted a British full-rigged ship, the *Conway Castle*, from Valparaiso for Australia with barley. Captain Lüdecke sank this vessel in 37° 21' S, 81.58° W,³ taking her crew on board and transferring them a week later to a Peruvian barque which happened to pass. By this time the *Sierra Cordoba's* coal was running short, and though the *Dresden* several times gave her some coal by means of her own boats, the auxiliary had to be detached to Valparaiso. Arriving on March 3, the *Sierra Cordoba* took in 1,200 tons, and was allowed to sail again on the 7th with the nominal destination of Callao. Not only the German supply centre at Valparaiso, but those at Monte Video and San Francisco made efforts to get supplies to the *Dresden*. From Monte Video the *Gotha* had been sent. The supply officer at San Francisco endeavoured to arrange for the dispatch from Honolulu of one or other of the German ships there, using as his agent the Commander of the *Geier*, Korvettenkapitän Carl Grasshof, interned in the island.⁴ Luckily, only Japanese or Australian coal was arriving at Honolulu, the shippers in both cases forbidding the sale of it to Germans or their agents. The only German coal was in the *Holsatia*, of the Hamburg-Amerika Line, and the local authorities forbade her departure with any coal cargo. Honolulu as a supply centre was therefore useless.

On March 7 the *Dresden* got into wireless communication with the *Gotha* and *Sierra Cordoba*. It was while she was awaiting their arrival that the *Kent* suddenly appeared out of the mist.

¹ *Kent*, Letter of Proceedings. M. 02864/15.

² Based on *Kreuzerkrieg*.

³ The deposition of the master of the *Conway Castle* gives 57° 20' S, 81.45 W, but the casualty return says 37.20, 81.40 (M. 19294/15). The position given by *Kreuzerkrieg* is not likely to be incorrect.

⁴ Although interned, he seemed to have no difficulty in communicating with San Francisco, presumably in cypher. See *Kreuzerkrieg* I, p. 396.

The *Dresden* had steam for 14 knots and immediately moved off westward; getting up steam in all boilers she gradually drew away, and, when darkness fell, the *Kent* was hull down on the eastern horizon.

41. **Movements of "Glasgow" and "Orama."**—While the *Kent* was chasing the *Dresden*, the *Glasgow* was in Worsley Sound, part of the Last Hope labyrinth, which she had been investigating for the past five days. Captain Luce had already come to the conclusion that the Admiralty information was quite unreliable, and he submitted that in future he should be permitted to investigate reports before being given definite orders based on them.¹ He was alone. The *Bristol*, with her damaged rudder, was at Port Tamar, and as she could steer only with her screws he ordered her to Abrolhos to await Admiralty instructions. The *Orama* was at Punta Arenas.

The news that the *Dresden* had been seen was received by the *Glasgow* at 10.10 p.m., Chilean time, March 8. Captain Luce at once ordered the *Orama* to send colliers to Vallenar and come to assist in the chase of the *Dresden*. He himself was bottled up in Last Hope. The passage of Kirke Narrows is only possible for ships in the daytime and during the short period of slack water; there was no chance of his crossing till nine the next morning. When at length he was able to pass the Narrows he shaped course out of the archipelago for the *Gotha* rendezvous. The *Orama* joined him in the afternoon of the 12th and they were on the rendezvous just before dawn on the 13th. Captain Luce's intention, should nothing be found there, was to leave the *Orama* in position till the *Kent* arrived on the 14th, proceeding himself to Mas-a-fuera and Juan Fernandez, where he thought it likely the *Dresden* or her colliers would be found.²

The *Bristol* could not join in the operations, and Captain Luce ordered her to look out for the *Bangor*, about which he had just received two messages—one that she left Monte Video on the 7th for Valparaiso, and the other that our Minister at Monte Video considered her proceedings sufficiently suspicious to warrant her capture.³ He was also aware from the German intercept of January 16 that she was intended for the *Dresden*.⁴ Another piece of intelligence received by him at this time was that the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* was off Iquique on March 7, communicating by signal at night with a German ship in harbour, and from this he thought the *Dresden* would not make for Magellan Strait, but would be more likely to remain in the Pacific and possibly join the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*.⁵

¹ H.S. 137, p. 423.

² Luce: Report. M. 03155/15.

³ *Glasgow* W/T Log 46989.

⁴ See A 33. In *Glasgow* W/T Log 46988, p. 28, the groups "Send name can put to sea" read "Bangor can put to sea."

⁵ *Glasgow* W/T Log 46989.

42. The "Dresden's" Resting Place discovered, March 13.—The *Kent*, arriving at Coronel with 43 tons of coal, took in 1,300 tons, and at 8 a.m. on the 13th left again for the *Gotha* rendezvous. While chasing the *Dresden* she had taken in two signals made by the German cruiser, and these she had passed to the *Glasgow*, where there was a copy of the German code. The signals were at first unreadable, but, by working at them, Lieutenant C. G. Stuart, of the *Glasgow*, early on March 13 discovered the key to the cypher and found the signals to be orders for some unknown ship to go to Juan Fernandez.¹

This definite clue confirmed Captain Luce's surmise that Mas-a-fuera or Juan Fernandez would be the next rendezvous of the *Dresden*. He ordered all three ships there, the *Glasgow* and *Orama* to approach Cumberland Bay, the principal anchorage in the island, from the west, the *Kent* from the east, if possible at the same time.

The *Dresden* had run full speed all through the night after losing sight of the *Kent*, but the utmost efforts of her engine-room staff could obtain only 20 knots from her worn-out engines. At 8.30 a.m., March 9, she was anchored in Cumberland Bay with only 80 tons of coal on board. That night she received a wireless message: "His Majesty the Kaiser sets you free to lay yourself up." Captain Lüdecke was informed by the principal Chilean official in the island that he must leave within 24 hours or be interned, but he determined to wait till a Chilean warship, expected in a week, should arrive before accepting internment, his plea for putting off the evil day being that, by Article 17 of the Hague Convention, he was entitled to make his ship seaworthy without incurring the penalty of internment. To avoid being surprised he kept up a daily patrol of the harbour entrance by his steamboat. On the 12th he sent away six officers in a sailing ship so that they should avoid internment. There was, therefore, no idea in his mind that the *Dresden* was interned when, early on March 14, his patrol boat returned with the news that a British cruiser was approaching. He made preparations to fight and got up steam in a second boiler to work the auxiliary machinery. Nevertheless, he thought it unlikely he would be attacked, as he was anchored within 400 metres of the shore.²

43. Sinking of the "Dresden," March 14.³—The ship sighted was the *Glasgow*, which, with the *Orama*, was approaching from the westward. The *Kent* at the same time closed from the east. Smoke was issuing from the *Dresden's* funnels, and to Captain Luce it appeared she was preparing to get under weigh. He determined to attack her, but, anxious to avoid doing damage to

¹ *Glasgow* W/T Log 46988.

² *Kreuzerkrieg* I, pp. 397-399.

³ Based on Luce: Report. M. 03155/15.

the few scattered houses on shore, he spent half an hour manœuvring to get into a position from which no possible harm could result to the inhabitants. The *Dresden* was flying the German ensign and jack, and as soon as he was in position Captain Luce opened fire, the *Dresden* replying at once. The *Orama* and *Kent* joined in. After a few minutes the German cruiser hoisted a white flag, and as her national colours had disappeared our squadron ceased fire and closed in towards the anchorage. She was on fire aft, and her crew could be seen swimming towards the shore. Captain Luce lowered a boat and sent his commander and staff surgeon to board the *Dresden*, but before they reached her a German officer came alongside the *Glasgow* and explained that he had been sent by his Captain to state that the *Dresden* was interned.¹ Captain Luce replied that he must have unconditional surrender, and asked what the white flag meant. This, it appeared, was hoisted merely because Captain Lüdecke wished to open negotiations, and, these having failed, the German officer returned to the *Dresden*, which re-hoisted her ensign, and after a little time blew up and sank, still flying the white flag. While she was sinking, her crew lined up on shore and, led by their captain, sang "Deutschland, Deutschland, über alles."

Captain Luce had meanwhile made a general signal for all the doctors to go ashore and assist the wounded, for whom the resources of the island were quite insufficient. The severe cases were removed, with Captain Lüdecke's consent, to the *Orama* and taken by her to Valparaiso.

It appeared that the local official, styled the Maritime Governor, and serving as lighthouse keeper, had started off in a boat to board the *Glasgow* as soon as she appeared. Unfortunately, he had forgotten to hoist any flag, and being close to the *Dresden*, was unnoticed by our ships. His boat had a lucky escape from our shells, the splashes from which soaked the crew, who from fright completely lost control of their oars.² Having got safely ashore, the Maritime Governor, as soon as the fighting was over, put off again with a flag and protested to Captain Luce that he had notified the Captain of the *Dresden* that his ship was interned; she should, therefore, have been immune from attack. Captain Luce, in reply, expressed his regret for the incident, explaining that there was no means of telling that she was interned, since she was flying German colours and had her guns trained on our ships. He deemed it politic to give ample payment without too close inquiry, for all the claims for damage done; amongst others to a schooner owner, who received 10,000 pesos for alleged damage to his boat and the ~~death of a~~ ^{amalgam loss} ~~thousand lobsters~~ caused by the firing.

¹ The German Government later officially informed the Chilean Government that Captain Lüdecke refused to accept internment. *Alvarez*, p. 233.

² Letter from A. Arancibia in Z 22/1915.

the chance of selling a thousand lobsters, which were however eaten by the ship's companies present (letter from Capt. Allen, VERNON, 5 DTED 23/12/22).

The Chilean Government, on learning of the affair, protested both to ourselves and to Germany against the various violations of their territory involved in the incident. Our Foreign Office, after consultation with the Admiralty, accepted the Chilean version of the squadron's proceedings, which agreed with Captain Luce's telegraphed report,¹ and at once offered a full and ample apology. A useful point to bring to the notice of the Chilean Government was afforded by the arrival of the crew of the *Conway Castle* at Valparaiso on March 11; this was conclusive proof that the *Dresden*, after two months' stay in Chilean harbours, had recommenced her attacks on merchant shipping, and led to the presumption that if she had not been dealt with at Juan Fernandez she would have repeated this programme. Our prompt apology was accepted, and the affair passed off to the satisfaction of everybody but the Germans.²

On our side there were no casualties and no damage was suffered. The *Dresden* lost seven killed, 15 severely and 14 slightly wounded; one was missing. The 15 severely wounded were taken by the *Orama* to the German hospital at Valparaiso, and the remainder of the *Dresden's* crew, including Captain Lüdecke, were brought to Valparaiso by a Chilean warship, and interned on an island in Valparaiso harbour.

It was clear from the conversation and diaries of the wounded in the *Orama*³ that the *Dresden* had never been to Last Hope, but had spent her resting time in the Patagonian channels, more or less in the position which Consul Milward had so often urged our ships to investigate. An officer, Commander Speranza, R.N.R., specially sent out to relieve him, reported most favourably on his *bona fides* throughout the war;⁴ and the Admiralty, feeling that Mr. Milward had been greatly maligned, ultimately presented him with a gold watch.

44. Remarks on the "Dresden's" Career.—The career of the *Dresden* as a commerce destroyer was not markedly successful. On the outbreak of war the ship was on her way home to refit, after what had been intended as only a few months' cruise in the West Indies, and Captain Lüdecke seemed to think it unwise to begin attacking commerce till his engines had been put in as good order as could be achieved by the personnel of the ship.⁵ As the middle part of the South American trade route had been chosen by the *Karlsruhe* as her field of operations, Captain Lüdecke took the neighbourhood of the Rio de la Plata for his zone. In his search for a secure harbour in which to

¹ A 63.

² Papers titled Z 22/1915. The letters exchanged between the Chilean and German Governments are given in *Alvarez*.

³ The diary of a warrant officer, J. Zeus, is especially valuable. The original is now I.D.H.S. 115.

⁴ N.I.D. 6933.

⁵ The career of the *Dresden* up to the Battle of the Falklands is treated in detail in Monograph 22, *Atlantic Ocean I*.

carry out repairs he went as far as Cape Horn, sinking two ships, the *Hyades* and *Holmwood*, on the way. It was while refitting in the harbour he had chosen on the coast of Patagonia that Captain Lüdecke heard of the approach of von Spee, and shortly afterwards was ordered to join him. Thus he was never able to carry out an organised attack on the Plate trade. The next ship he sank, the *North Wales*, was met while he was acting with the German Cruiser Squadron, and his only success when he was again alone was the sailing vessel *Conway Castle*. These four vessels were all that Captain Lüdecke could account for in the eight months of his career. One reason for what, in comparison with the other German commanders, appears to be Captain Lüdecke's lack of enterprise was that he considered the arrangements for supply and refitting in the La Plata zone to be inadequate and unsuitable, so much so that the Pacific looked to be the better field for operations, and it was while he was in this mood of indecision that he was ordered to work under von Spee.¹

His one success in hindering British trade was made when he sent in the crew of the *Holmwood*, whose arrival had the effect of disturbing shippers to such an extent that for a short time there was some risk of a general interruption of services.² Apart from this, his operations passed almost unnoticed by shipowners. In the later stages his presence was a great embarrassment to Chile; and all classes in that country hailed with relief the news that the *Dresden's* existence had been brought to an end.

45. Movements of "Kent," "Orama" and "Glasgow" after the Sinking of the "Dresden."—The *Kent* remained in the neighbourhood of Juan Fernandez in the hope of catching the German auxiliaries ordered there by the *Dresden*. Captain Lüdecke, however, seems to have succeeded in warning them, for nothing appeared at either rendezvous. The *Sierra Cordoba* arrived at Callao on March 17, and the *Gotha* at Valparaiso on March 20. A third ship, the *Alda*, which had been signalling to the *Dresden* for instructions, had left Valparaiso on the 10th with provisions; she reappeared at Antofagasta on the 15th.³ The fourth collier known to be connected with the *Dresden*, the *Bangor*, passed Punta Arenas on the 13th. In the afternoon of the 14th she was coming out of Magellan Strait when she was stopped by the *Bristol*, which had got under weigh half an hour earlier for the purpose of capturing her. A prize crew was put on board, and next day she was sent off to Port Stanley to be tried in the Prize Court, the *Bristol* remaining at anchor to continue the repair of her rudder.

¹ Taken from *Kreuzerkrieg I*.

² Fayle: *Seaborne Trade*, I, 175.

³ A 58. The German history says that the attempt to make the *Alda* available for the *Dresden* was not successful (*Kreuzerkrieg I*, 392). The Chilean Government apparently insisted on one of their officials taking passage in her for Antofagasta, her declared destination (*Glasgow W/T Log* 46988, p. 30).

The *Orama* rejoined the *Kent* from Valparaiso on the 19th at the *Gotha* rendezvous. Thenceforward the two ships remained on the west coast, as in their original orders, to operate against supply ships.

The *Glasgow* had to coal. Captain Luce then proposed to return to the east coast, and this the Admiralty approved, as it was now known that the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* was no longer on the west coast.

CHAPTER VII.

ACTIVE SEARCH FOR THE *KRONPRINZ WILHELM*, MARCH 1915.

46. Arrival of the "Prinz Eitel Friedrich" at Newport News, March 10.—Until March 10 the last report of the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* was the statement that she had been seen off Iquique on March 7. The Admiralty and all other British authorities naturally assumed her to be off the coast of Peru, and it was therefore a great surprise to find that a steamer which anchored at Newport News in the morning of March 10 was none other than the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* herself.¹

After leaving Easter Island, on January 6, Captain Thierichens, of the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, seems to have decided to make his way into the Atlantic with the idea of running the blockade and reaching Germany.² He passed well south of the Horn and, keeping wide of the South American coast, steamed northward up the Atlantic sailing-ship route. On January 26, 27, 28 he made four captures—the Russian barque *Isobel Browne*, two French barques the *Pierre Loti* and the *Jacobsen*, and a four-masted American ship, the *William P. Frye*. These were all taken in the neighbourhood of 30° S, 29° W, some 800 miles from the coast of Brazil.³ The three Allied ships were speedily sunk, but Captain Thierichens hesitated a little in regard to the *William P. Frye*. She was carrying a cargo of wheat from Seattle, consigned to Queenstown, which he determined to get rid of. At first, attempts were made to throw the cargo overboard in order that the vessel might be released, but this proved

¹ A 56.

² Unless otherwise stated, this section is based on an interview with the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*'s officers, published in the *Weser Zeitung*, 14 April 1915. A translation of this is in N.I.D. 6721, 6816/15.

³ Position and dates from N.I.D. 15305/17.

so slow a method that he determined to sink the ship and leave other authorities to settle the question of compensation. She was accordingly sunk on January 28. Just about this time the Admiralstab were sending out messages from their Berlin wireless stations to the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* suggesting that she should lie up in a Spanish or an American port.¹ Probably Captain Thierichens considered the suggestion applied to him also, for at this point he abandoned his first idea of reaching Germany. For a fortnight he cruised about and was only 200 miles further northward when on February 12 he captured and sank his first British ship in the Atlantic, the barque *Invercoe*, with wheat from Portland, Oregon, for Great Britain.²

Continuing his course northward he soon arrived on the South American steamer route, and there he took three vessels. The first, the *Mary Ada Short*, of Sunderland, from Rosario, he captured early on February 18 in 5.49 S, 28.36 W, well away from the normal peace track. The *Mary Ada Short* had no coal to give him, and spending only a few hours over her, he sank her at 11 a.m., and continued his course northward. It was perhaps fortunate for him that she was of no value as a prize, since the *Otranto*, coming homeward with the German survivors from the Falklands battle, was approaching. In fact she passed within sight of the spot next morning.³

But by that time the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* was well away, engaged in sinking the *Floride*, a French liner, in 2.28 S, 31.10 W. On February 20 Captain Thierichens took the third of his South American ships, the *Willerby*, of Stockton, bound for the Plate; but she was in water ballast and useless to him. None of the three ships had any coal to give him, and he concluded that he had no chance of getting away. He does not seem to have communicated with any of the German supply officers; throughout his career in the Atlantic he cut himself off from the shore and relied entirely on himself. The coal on board was now insufficient for a voyage to Germany; his boilers and engines began to break down; his prisoners were as many as his crew. In the circumstances he decided to run for a neutral harbour, choosing Newport News. Sinking his last prize, the *Willerby*, at 3 p.m., February 20, in 1.18 S, 29.54 W, he set his course for Virginia, more than 3,000 miles away.

Apart from the *Otranto*, whose presence was accidental, there were at the moment no British warships in the neighbourhood of Fernando Noronha, but the *Edinburgh Castle*, with two colliers fitted with wireless, was on her way from St. Vincent to Lavandeira Reef, and it is probable that her course and that of the raider crossed between February 21 and 22.⁴ A few

¹ I.D.H.S. 1338, No. 287.

² Position 26° 31' S, 26° 15' W, as given by her Chief Officer. H.S. 23/323/3.

³ See Plan at p. 39.

⁴ See Plan at p. 39.

days later the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* entered the area for which Admiral Hornby was responsible.

47. **The North America Division.**—Admiral Hornby was not long to remain in command, for on March 6 the Admiralty reconsidered their plan of separating the West Indies from the North America command, and appointed Admiral Patey as Vice-Admiral Commanding the North America and West Indies Station, with Rear-Admiral Hornby as his second in command. The *Australia* was not to be the flagship; she was to remain at home in the Battle Cruiser Squadron, and Admiral Patey was to fly his flag in the *Leviathan*,¹ which was to leave home for Halifax as soon as possible. On the arrival of the *Leviathan* the *Berwick* was to return to the West Indies.² His arrival would not thus increase the number of ships in the North America Division.

The watch on New York involved the maintenance of two cruisers off the port, and the fact that Halifax and Bermuda are 650 and 740 miles respectively from New York by the routes taken, combined with the age and bad state of repair of the ships available for the service, necessitated three cruisers and one armed merchant cruiser, or five cruisers, being detailed for this duty alone, especially in the winter, with its severe weather and heavy seas. Hence little attention could, as a rule, be paid to the Chesapeake, Delaware or approaches to Boston.³ The week before the arrival of the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* was a specially anxious one. Since the destruction of von Spee's squadron the rumour-mongers at New York had been comparatively quiet, but on March 7 these started again. It was reported to our Canadian authorities that the German ships in New York were ready to start at any moment, a report that was the more disquieting in that there was no United States man-of-war at New York to enforce the regulations. Moreover, the State Department appeared to hold that, even if the vessels had guns on board, they were simply armed merchantmen, and there was no reason to detain them. As a result of our Ambassador's representations to the United States Government, they sent an ancient gunboat, the *Dolphin*, carrying two 4 in. guns, to New York. The President assured the Ambassador that "we are doing everything that is practically possible to prevent any miscarriage in our precautions against rigid and effective neutrality"; but the Ambassador believed that the supposed search of the ships for guns was a farce. Another United States ship was ordered to Boston to watch that harbour. But the Ambassador, thinking the arrival of the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* at Newport News was intended to draw away our cruisers from

¹ *Leviathan*—14,100 tons; 2—9·2 in., 16—6 in.; designed speed, 23 knots; Captain Marcus R. Hill.

² M. 01659/15.

³ Admiral Hornby to Admiralty. M. 04818/15, p. 5.

New York, urged that there should be no relaxation in the vigilance of our guard.¹

Admiral Hornby had the *Caronia* and *Niobe* off New York. The *Suffolk* was on her way to Halifax to relieve one of them when the Admiral received the news of the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich's* arrival. He accordingly ordered her on to the Chesapeake to prevent the escape of the armed liner. She worked up to 15 knots, and by 9.30 a.m. March 12 was in position at the entrance.

48. **Intelligence of "Kronprinz Wilhelm" brought by the "Chasehill," March 12.**—On this same date more intelligence of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was received. Search of the two rendezvous mentioned in the German intercepted telegrams—Lavandeira Reef and the position in 1° N, 20° W—having had no result, the Admiralty ordered Admiral Stoddart to make sweeps for the raider with the *Sydney*, *Edinburgh Castle*, and the two wireless colliers, taking care not to leave the colliers at Abrolhos unguarded.² In accordance with this order, he proceeded on March 6 with the squadron for a sweep northward in the vicinity of Abrolhos, leaving the *Vindictive* behind. Soon after starting he took in a signal from a merchant vessel saying she was being chased by a suspicious ship about 250 miles south of Abrolhos. On this, he directed the sweep towards the spot, but found nothing there. At daylight, March 9, he sent the remainder back to Abrolhos, and proceeded with the *Sydney* to search Trinidad, anchoring once more at Abrolhos on March 13.³ On his return he learned that the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* had been far away to the northward, for on March 12 the British ship *Chasehill* came into Pernambuco with the passengers and crew of the French liner *Guadeloupe*, sunk by the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, which had last been seen at 7 p.m., March 9, in 7° S, 26° W.⁴

49. **Movements of "Kronprinz Wilhelm," February 12 to March 10.**—After his excursion southward, which resulted in the capture of the *Semantha*, Captain Thierfelder returned to the South American trade route north of Pernambuco, taking station, as before, a long way east of the peace-time track. At midnight, February 20–21, he was in 10° S, 28° W,⁵ and it is therefore probable that he did not go near Lavandeira Reef, which, in any case, was a rendezvous for the *Dresden's* colliers, and not for the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*. Some days elapsed before he made a capture; but on February 22, in 6.15 S, 28° 10' W, he met and took possession of the *Chasehill*, with 2,860 tons of coal from South Wales for the River Plate. Here again the collier was over 250 miles to the east of the usual track from

¹ F.O. Telegrams in H.S. 134, pp. 677–745.

² A 53.

³ Stoddart: Letter of Proceedings. M. 03073/15.

⁴ A 57.

⁵ Glasgow W/T Log 46988, p. 36.

St. Vincent to Brazilian ports, and her capture was pure mischance, though an undoubted piece of luck for the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, for whom the supply of coal from the shore was becoming almost hopeless. Captain Thierfelder remained on the spot, and soon afterwards captured a French mail steamer, the *Guadeloupe*, from Rio for Bordeaux. Amongst other items this vessel contained grey cloth intended for the French army; this was a welcome find, and soon was converted into uniforms for the *Kronprinz Wilhelm's* crew. The *Guadeloupe* was sunk, but Captain Thierfelder kept the *Chasehill* in company for a fortnight while her coal was transferred to the German cruiser. Besides a crew of 151, the *Guadeloupe* had carried 143 passengers, including women and children. These had to be got rid of, and Captain Thierfelder was compelled to forgo his prize. On March 9 all these people, together with the original crew of the collier, were sent back to the *Chasehill*, which was then discharged to Pernambuco. The position in which he left the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was given by the master of the *Chasehill* as 6.57 S, 26.5 W.¹ Next day the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* stopped and released the Belgian steamer *Anvers* in 3.40 S, 29.9 W²; this is 300 miles from the position given by the master of the *Chasehill* for 7 p.m. March 9, and it is improbable that they can both be right.

During these operations the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* ran little danger of molestation. The *Macedonia*, on her way out to the south-east coast again, in the morning of March 10 passed close to the spot where the *Chasehill* and *Guadeloupe* had been captured. The *Sydney* and *Edinburgh Castle*, in their sweep eastward from Lavandeira Reef, might have come into the *Kronprinz Wilhelm's* neighbourhood if they had not been diverted southwards by the report from the *Manchester Civilian* that the enemy was near Abrolhos.³

50. Orders based on the "Chasehill's" Report.—Admiral Stoddart sent off the *Edinburgh Castle* to Bahia with telegrams informing the Admiralty that his next move would be another sweep to the southward, to be joined by the *Liverpool* and *Gloucester* after they had coaled at Abrolhos. He does not seem to have been informed that the Admiralty on the 10th had ordered them to Sierra Leone with their two wireless colliers, sweeping from there down the Cape trade route to 3° N, and thence across to Pernambuco.⁴

Before sailing he received the reports from the *Chasehill* which implied that the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was more likely to be found to the northward. He therefore decided to sweep to the north instead of to southward, and asked that the

¹ A 57, and Papers titled *Board of Trade*, 13.3.15.

² This was not reported till March 20 on her arrival at Las Palmas.

³ See Section 32.

⁴ A 61, 54.

Liverpool and *Gloucester* might be directed to sweep towards Rocas to meet him.¹

The *Chasehill's* information also modified the Admiralty's orders to the *Liverpool* division. They were now instructed to sweep the areas in which the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* had been making her captures, and to which it appeared she took them to tranship their cargoes. This latest order they repeated to Admiral Stoddart, to let him know what the two ships were doing, and told him to carry out his original intention of sweeping south from Abrolhos, adding the armed merchant cruisers *Macedonia* and *Celtic* to his squadron.²

51. The German Supply Ship "Macedonia" escapes from Las Palmas, March 15.—Among the German ships interned³ in the Canary Islands was the Hamburg-Amerika liner *Macedonia*. This vessel had arrived at Santa Cruz de la Palma on October 17, having left New York on 30 August 1914. It was clear she had been waiting at some rendezvous to get in touch with German cruisers, and the Spanish authorities moved her to Las Palmas, where they interned her and, to prevent her escape, removed a cylinder cover. She seemed perfectly secure. Nevertheless, at 1.30 a.m. on March 15 she quietly steamed out of the harbour and disappeared.

It appears that the ingenious supply officer at Las Palmas had a spare cylinder cover ready as soon as she reached his port; even from November 12 onwards she had been ready to sail. Accordingly, when the German coal supply in the *Nepos* and other steamers was sold, that in the *Macedonia* was retained on board, and on March 4 the supply officer was instructed to have her ready to run out for the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*.⁴

52. Area I.—For some time no close watch had been kept on the Canary Island ports, in order to avoid hurting Spanish susceptibilities, and Admiral de Robeck had left the station under the impression that strict neutrality was being enforced. His policy was continued by his successor, Admiral Moore. At the time of the *Macedonia's* escape the nearest vessel to Las Palmas was the flagship *Europa*, about 60 miles SSW of Gran Canaria, endeavouring to intercept a Portuguese ship with 11 enemy subjects on board; this was successfully accomplished at 5 a.m. March 15, and the *Europa* then steered for the east side of Gran Canaria, so that if the *Macedonia* had gone south or south-west from Las Palmas she would almost certainly have been seen. In spite of the chain of communications in force, it was not till 7.16 p.m. March 15, that is,

¹ Stoddart: Search for *Kronprinz Wilhelm*. M. 03067/15.

² A 62.

³ The *Walhalla* was interned on February 14. M. 09428/15.

⁴ I.D.H.S. 1414, Nos. 130, 175, 275.

17 hours after the event, that Admiral Moore received the news, through Madeira wireless station, that the *Macedonia* had escaped, a later repetition adding that she had gone eastward.¹ He searched the east side of the Canaries and the coast of Africa from Cape Juby to Cape Bojador, ordering the *Argonaut*, which was coaling at Funchal, to Las Palmas to inquire into the exact circumstances of the vessel's escape, and what measures the Spanish authorities were taking to prevent other interned steamers from getting away.²

There was only one other ship of Force I available—the *Carmania*, on the Tagus Patrol. The *Calgarian* was gone; she left Gibraltar on March 13 for Halifax. The *Amphitrite* was guarding the colliers at St. Vincent; but on the 18th the Admiralty ordered the *Highflyer* from Sierra Leone to relieve her, so that she might again be available to keep guard over the ports containing German supply ships.

The *Victorian* by this time had gone home to pay off. The intention was to relieve her by the *Ophir*, of the Orient line, but this vessel did not commission till March 2, and was not ready to leave England till the 19th. Meanwhile the agreement signed by the mercantile crew of the *Victorian* expired on February 21, while she was on patrol off the Tagus, and when she came to Gibraltar to coal the firemen announced that they wished to leave the ship and live on shore till sent home, considering themselves as civilians in respect of discipline and the granting of leave. Moreover, they informed Captain Somerville, quite respectfully, but firmly, that they would take the *Victorian* direct to England, but did not intend to go again on patrol. There was no surprise in this attitude of theirs; Captain Somerville, early in January, had ascertained that this was what they would do, and had at once informed the Admiralty, whose delay in providing relief put him in the humiliating position of being obliged to submit to the dictates of these men as to whether they would or would not continue at their work. A ship over which discipline could not be maintained, and whose crew refused duty, was useless at Gibraltar, and on March 5 the Senior Naval Officer obtained permission to send the *Victorian* home to pay off without relief.³

53. The West Indies.—The escape of the German *Macedonia* from Las Palmas had been quite unexpected, and no preventive measures had been possible. The *Bavaria*, however, at Havana, which had been mentioned in a German telegram, was being carefully watched, the *Melbourne* and *Condé*, the only cruisers in the West Indies, relieving each other on guard outside the port. The West Indies force was brought up to three in number

¹ See A 64.

² Papers titled X 8840/15.

³ Papers titled X 8999/15.

on March 13, when the *Descartes* completed her repair at Fort de France and left for Jamaica. On March 19 the *Odenwald*, a German ship which had been sheltering at San Juan, Porto Rico, since the beginning of the war, suddenly showed signs of activity, and on March 22 tried to escape from the port. She was fired on by the port authorities and made to return, but the incident caused the *Melbourne* to be stationed off San Juan from March 24 till the *Odenwald* was interned on March 29, while the *Condé* and *Descartes* shared the watch over the *Bavaria* at Havana.¹

54. Another Rendezvous discovered, March 18.—By March 18 it was known that the supply ship *Macedonia* was probably making for a rendezvous with the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* in long. 33° W on the equator, and this information was passed to the *Liverpool*, which had reached Sierra Leone on the 16th. The two wireless colliers which, with the *Gloucester*, formed the division, proved to be capable of only 7·2 knots instead of 9 to 10½, and two days' delay at Sierra Leone was necessary for them to clear their boilers.² On the 19th, in the afternoon, they started, proceeding in accordance with the Admiralty orders of the 13th in the direction of the area in which the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* dealt with her captures. But on the 20th the Admiralty ordered them direct to 0°, 33° W, and then to search NW from that position for 80 miles till April 9, after which they were to begin sweeping the *Kronprinz Wilhelm's* areas.³ This order the *Liverpool* received about 9 a.m. on the 21st.

By noon on the 27th they were at the rendezvous, and began steaming off and on for 80 miles NW as ordered. Next day at noon, the *Gloucester* (Captain W. A. Howard Kelly) sighted a steamer with the name *Hendrick*, flying Dutch colours. The steamer was steering SE when sighted, but she immediately altered course to north, only to be overhauled by the *Gloucester* and boarded. The boarding party soon discovered her to be the runaway *Macedonia*, and made prize of her. Captain Howard Kelly removed the German crew to his own ship, and manned the prize from the *Gloucester*,⁴ and she was kept with the squadron on the rendezvous in the hope that the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* would appear. The *Liverpool*, on March 20, went off to coal under the lee of Rocas Reef, but was back at the rendezvous on April 2, relieving the *Gloucester* to coal at Lavandeira Reef. She returned to the rendezvous on April 7, and remained there till later information showed it to be useless to stay longer.

¹ H.S. 134, pp. 781–835.

² H.S. 135, pp. 1026, 1038.

³ A 65, 66. The information was obtained by decoding messages from the high-power station at Nauen in Germany; see I.D.H.S. 1501.

⁴ The *Macedonia's* own chief engineer, four warrant officers, and eight hands volunteered to work in her. They received the same wages as they had been paid by the German company. Papers titled Cap. K 9/1915.

55. **Movements of the "Kronprinz Wilhelm" after March 10.**—For the fortnight after releasing the *Anvers* on March 10, the *Kronprinz Wilhelm's* movements are at present unknown. She may have remained as before to the east of the trade route, and possibly a stationary mail steamer sighted at 2 a.m., March 21, in 1.15 S, 26.40 W, by the French liner *Meuse*, was the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*.¹ What was probably the same vessel was seen by the Italian *Italia* on the 23rd in 1° S, 29° 30' W.²

Captain Thierfelder made no further captures till March 24, when he stopped the *Tamar* with nearly 4,000 tons of coffee from Santos for Le Havre.³ Taking the crew on board, he sank the vessel and waited for another. Next day one was sighted, but she proved to be the Italian *Ascaro*, and was released.⁴ On the 26th another Italian, the *Fede*, was met. The *Fede* passed on southward, warning the next British steamer she met.⁵ After these two Italians it was a relief to Captain Thierfelder to meet next day the *Coleby*, a British steamer with 5,500 tons of wheat from South America. He set her on fire and fired 12 shots into her to sink her.⁶

His coal supply was now much reduced. He seems to have gone to the *Macedonia's* rendezvous and actually to have seen her there with the *Liverpool*. The unwelcome sight decided him to act on the discretion he had been given. Food was scarce, and many of his crew were down with scurvy or beri-beri; he gave up the hope of further commerce destruction, and began to steer northward to lay up his vessel in a neutral port.⁷

The orders from the Admiralstab gave another spot in 3° N, 37° W, as a rendezvous for the *Macedonia* after April 9,⁸ but this was now useless, and without waiting there he pressed on for his chosen port of refuge.

¹ Reported by *Meuse*, March 28, at St. Vincent. See H.S. 135, p. 1135.

² Reported April 3. H.S. 137, p. 727.

³ Position 14 miles N. 20 E. (True) from 2° 6' S, 28° 50' W. Master's deposition. M. 21265/15.

⁴ She reported the encounter on arrival at Dakar. The position as given by I.O., Monte Video, is 2.16 S, 27.20 W; the Ministry of Marine, Paris, gave the longitude as 25.29 W, which seems improbable. H.S. 137, pp. 727, 729.

⁵ Position given by *Fede* is 1° S, 30° W, obviously an approximation. H.S. 137, p. 765.

⁶ Position 1° 58' S, 30° W. Deposition of master. M. 21265/15.

⁷ In a statement published in the *Weser Zeitung*, 8 May 1915, he says: "We had hoped to meet German supply ships, but, unfortunately, none put in an appearance. Once only we saw a collier which we had expected, followed by two British cruisers, and it was lucky they did not catch sight of us." The master of the *Tamar* on board the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* learned one afternoon that a British cruiser was in sight. H.S. 23/309/3.

⁸ I.D.H.S. 1484, March 19.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE END OF THE PRINZ EITEL FRIEDRICH AND KRONPRINZ WILHELM.

56. **The "Prinz Eitel Friedrich" at Newport News.**¹—Captain Thierichens, of the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, managed to spread the impression that he had no intention of interning his ship if permitted to repair her. Her machinery was reported to be "all to pieces," and to need at least three weeks' refit. She came out of dock on March 14, and by March 18 was rumoured to be in such condition that she could proceed to sea at any moment. Our Naval Attaché at Washington went down to Newport News and learned that her armament consisted of four 4 in. guns, six 12 pdr. and 10 pom-poms. Amongst other repairs the vessel had her bottom re-coated with anti-fouling composition. To this our Ambassador protested on the grounds that it was an undue increase of speed; the same view was taken by Admiral Patey, who arrived at Bermuda on March 26 in the *Leviathan*, and took charge of the North America and West Indies Station. His first step was to telegraph to the Ambassador, of whose protest he was unaware, that the re-coating was against the Hague Convention, and that the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* should be interned. By Foreign Office instructions the Ambassador renewed his protest, and received from Washington the reply that a foul bottom was damage experienced from the sea, and, therefore, to clean it was an allowable repair.

The United States Government on March 26 passed a decree that she must not leave port less than 24 hours after an Allied merchant vessel, a pronouncement which Admiral Patey heard with some dismay, as the frequency of the departures of Allied merchant ships virtually constituted a blockade of the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, and the retention of his cruisers at the Chesapeake seemed likely to become indefinite. He tried to arrange that the sailings should be suspended as soon as the German cruiser's repairs were complete, in order to force her either to intern or proceed to sea;² and with this the United States Government were so far in agreement that they announced that clearance was to be withheld from such merchant vessels for 24 hours before the expiration of the time allowed to the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* for repairs. This date was, of course, not imparted

¹ Based mainly on Papers titled *F.O.*, 25.3.15, *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, and the *F.O.* telegrams in H.S. 134.

² Patey, Letters of Proceeding. M. 02972/15.

to us, but on April 3 it was reported as April 6. It was further arranged that she must leave United States waters direct, or be interned at the expiration of the time limit, though she might move within the three-mile limit up to that time, a United States cruiser being detailed to watch her should she do so.

She landed all her prisoners, and some feeling was aroused in America when among them were found the crew of the *William P. Frye*, the United States sailing vessel carrying wheat from Seattle, which Captain Thierichens had sunk on January 28. For this he offered to make reparation, but the United States Government would not dismiss the matter so lightly, and there ensued with Germany a warm controversy which came to no definite conclusion during the war.

57. The Watch on New York. March and Early April.—

As soon as the Admiralty learned that the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* had arrived at Newport News they ordered the *Calgarian* from Gibraltar to Halifax with dispatch, and directed the *Cumberland*,¹ which they had intended for Force I, also to Halifax. She was to proceed with all convenient dispatch from Scapa.² The *Calgarian* they considered specially suitable for the North American Station; her armament, speed and coal capacity rendered her of more use for maintaining position off port than any cruiser they could afford to send.³ The *Cumberland* arrived at Halifax on March 20 and the *Calgarian* on the 21st; both proceeded to the Chesapeake when ready.

However, the Admiralty did not intend the major part of the North America Division to be concentrated on the guard of the Chesapeake. As usual, rumours began to run to the effect that the New York liners were about to escape. For instance, the *Pisa*, one of the liners, coaled, and was reported as ready to put to sea on March 28.⁴ In addition, there were rumours that large cruisers were about to break out from Germany to drive away our squadrons; and to meet this contingency Admiral Patey issued special orders. If sure intelligence of a break away in force of cruisers from Germany was received his squadron was to concentrate at Bermuda, except for the armed merchant cruisers, which were to stay in position as long as possible and then run for Halifax, or, in the last resort, into neutral waters.⁵

There was a blizzard on April 2 in which it was at first thought the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* had escaped. All communications with Newport News were wrecked by the storm, and some time

¹ *Cumberland*, Captain C. T. M. Fuller, 9,800 tons, 14—6 in. The C.-in-C., Home Fleets, was informed on March 6 that she was to join Force I (M. 01659/15).

² H.S. 134, pp. 715, 727, 731.

³ M. 0859/15.

⁴ H.S. 134, pp. 853, 862, 867, 872.

⁵ A 68. The actual orders for concentration are dated April 1; Memo. 014C in M.02972/15.

elapsed before the Admiral knew that the German raider was still in port. On April 5 she was taking in stores and conveying the impression that she would soon sail. Admiral Patey had four of his ships off the Chesapeake—the *Calgarian*, *Cumberland*, *Glory* and *Niobe*—and only the *Caronia* off New York. The *Berwick* since March 28 was refitting; the *Suffolk* was coaling; and the *Leviathan*, with Admiral Patey on board, was still at Bermuda.

The disposition of so much force at the Chesapeake to look out for one German ship, while the 30 New York liners were watched by only one armed merchant cruiser, was in accordance with the Admiral's opinion that little credence was due to the usual rumours about great activity at New York, and the probability of a break away from that port, although these were specially prevalent during April 2.¹ The Admiralty, however, did not share his opinion. On April 5 they ordered him to watch the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* with only one ship, using all the others for the New York patrol; they thought the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* would eventually be interned, but considered the enemy were using her to induce us to weaken our force off New York.²

In accordance with this Admiral Patey ordered the *Glory* and *Calgarian* from the Chesapeake to New York. The *Cumberland* should have gone too, but had to remain to recover an anchor.

58. The “*Prinz Eitel Friedrich*” Interned.—The Admiral had arranged that Allied ships should sail from Chesapeake ports only in the forenoons, in order that the 24 hours allowed to the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* should not give her the advantage of darkness in leaving. At 1.30 a.m. on April 6 he heard from Norfolk that the Customs had instructed the local pilots not to take out any Allied ships until further orders; and from Washington that no clearances would be issued to Allied ships till noon April 6. This intelligence appeared to fix the expiration of the German cruiser's time limit at noon, April 6, and the Admiral, therefore, directed the *Cumberland* to remain with the *Niobe*. The *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* was reported to have taken a pilot on board, and the suspense was kept up until 3 a.m., April 8, when the Admiral received from his Intelligence Officer the news that the German liner was interned. This was confirmed by our Ambassador,³ and the Admiral sent the *Cumberland* off to coal at Halifax. He relieved the *Niobe* by the *Suffolk*, thinking he ought still to keep a cruiser off the Chesapeake to intercept the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* should she be driven by Admiral Stoddart's squadron to seek refuge in the bay.⁴

59. Further Sweeps for the “*Kronprinz Wilhelm*.”—The *Kronprinz Wilhelm*'s second rendezvous with the supply ship *Macedonia* was discovered in the Admiralty late on April 3. The

¹ Patey, Letter of Proceedings. M. 03205/15.

² A 71.

³ A 72.

⁴ Patey, Letter of Proceedings. M. 03205/15.

position, 3° N, 37° W, was nearly 500 miles north of Lavandeira Reef; here the *Macedonia* was to have waited for the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* from April 9 to 23. The intelligence was sent to Admiral Stoddart, and the *Laurentic* was ordered across from Sierra Leone to join in the search, afterwards proceeding to Pernambuco for orders.¹

Admiral Stoddart, it will be remembered, had been ordered by the Admiralty to carry out his intention of sweeping southward with all his ships, except the *Liverpool* and *Gloucester*. He went as far as Monte Video himself in the *Sydney*, sending the *Macedonia* and *Edinburgh Castle* on to look at 43° S, 52° W, where the *Eleonore Woermann* had been met by the *Australia*. The *Celtic* was with him for part of the sweep, but he sent her back to Abrolhos to be available to store the *Carnarvon*, which left Rio on April 2 with her repairs completed. The *Glasgow* joined him on April 7. The operation did not produce any particular result; indeed, during it the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* had been making her last captures 2,000 miles to the northward.

On April 8 Admiral Stoddart started a new sweep to the *Macedonia's* second rendezvous. The arrival of the *Carnarvon* at Abrolhos freed the *Vindictive*, which had been so long at anchor, for a cruise; she was sent on ahead the day before the rest of the squadron left. The *Sydney* and *Glasgow*, with the armed merchant cruisers *Macedonia* and *Edinburgh Castle*, steamed in line abreast, 10 miles apart, for 3° N, 37° W, whence they were to sweep westward, returning, when necessary to coal, to Rocas Reef, where the *Celtic* awaited them with two wireless colliers. On the 12th they passed the *Liverpool*, *Gloucester*, and their two wireless colliers proceeding to Lavandeira Reef to coal.²

The *Laurentic* left Sierra Leone on receipt of her orders. She was at the *Macedonia* rendezvous on April 9 and remained there patrolling.

Admiral Patey in the north, being freed from much of his anxiety by the internment of the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, on April 8 proposed to take part in the operations against the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*. He thought that as the time was approaching when she must go into port for docking and repairs she might possibly come up the trade route from Cape San Roque into the Gulf of Mexico. He ordered the *Melbourne* to patrol the passage between Grenada and Trinidad, and obtained Admiralty approval to proceed to Jamaica in the *Leviathan*, leaving Admiral Hornby in command in the north, and the *Suffolk* on guard off the Chesapeake.³

But all these sweeps and arrangements were in vain; on April 11, at 5 a.m., the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* quietly steamed into

¹ A. 69, 70.

² Stoddart, Letter of Proceedings. M.03384/15.

³ Tels. 23 from and 20 to Admiral Patey, April 8 and 9.

Newport News, having successfully eluded the *Suffolk* patrolling outside the bay.¹

60. **Movements resulting from the Arrival of the "Kronprinz Wilhelm" at Newport News.**—According to the statements of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm's* officers they were aware that the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* had preceded them at Newport News. They also knew through British wireless telegrams that she was interned, and noticing that, immediately afterwards, the conversations between British men-of-war ceased, Captain Thierfelder concluded that all our ships except one had dispersed, and that it would be safe to risk entering Chesapeake Bay.²

The *Suffolk*, which throughout the night of April 10–11 was stopped near No. 2 C B buoy at the entrance to the channel into the bay, heard from a passing steamer that the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* had arrived, and telegraphed the news to Admiral Patey. He was about to start for Jamaica, but as soon as the report was confirmed he proceeded in the *Leviathan* for Chesapeake Bay and ordered the *Melbourne* to join him there after coaling at Bermuda. He asked the Admiralty to send up a vessel from South America to take the *Melbourne's* place temporarily, and in view of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm's* speed asked that the *Sydney* and another fast ship from the South Atlantic should join him to watch off the Chesapeake.³

The fact that the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was in a United States port relieved the South American station of much of its work, and the Admiralty on the 13th ordered Admiral Stoddart to shift his flag from the *Sydney* to the *Liverpool* and come home with her and the *Gloucester*, while the *Sydney* went back to her former station in the West Indies; the *Carnarvon* was ordered from Abrolhos to Bermuda.⁴

The transfer of flag took place on April 16 at 9.15 a.m., off Rocas Reef, where the whole South American Squadron was assembled: *Sydney*, *Glasgow*, *Liverpool*, *Gloucester*, *Vindictive*, *Macedonia*, *Edinburgh Castle*, *Celtic*, and, in addition, the *Laurentic* from Sierra Leone. Captain Luce, of the *Glasgow*, became once more Senior Naval Officer, South-East Coast of America, having in the interval served under Admirals Cradock, Sturdee, and Stoddart. The *Liverpool*, *Gloucester* and the prize *Macedonia* proceeded for St. Vincent; the *Laurentic* returned to Sierra Leone; and the South-East Coast Squadron, consisting of the *Glasgow*, *Celtic*, *Vindictive*, *Edinburgh Castle* and *Macedonia*, returned to Abrolhos.

61. **The Watch on New York to End of April 1915.**—The arrival of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* synchronised with a revival of

¹ A 73.

² *Weser Zeitung*, 8 May 1915.

³ Tel. 32 from Admiral Patey. Recd. 6.47 a.m., 12.4.15.

⁴ A 74.

the rumour that German cruisers were approaching New York to drive off our watching squadron. The *Von der Tann* and *Karlsruhe* were mentioned as being among them, but the *Von der Tann* was known to be in German waters, and as for the *Karlsruhe*, the Admiralty had publicly announced on March 20 that she had been sunk off the West Indies at the beginning of November, a statement that was corroborated by the Berlin correspondent of a Danish newspaper.¹ The rumour, therefore, obtained no credence either in London or with Admiral Patey, who, moreover, was confident that should any German ships be off the coast the fishermen would at once give information in view of their anger at Germany's treatment of the *William P. Frye*. Communications as usual were unsatisfactory. Admiral Hornby complained that he was getting no intelligence, and as messages dated April 11 were still being passed from Cape Sable on April 14, Admiral Patey sent the *Cumberland* north to act as linking ship between Cape Sable and New York, until the new high-power station at Barrington should be working, its anticipated date being the 17th.²

Early in April the United States Government objected that our cruisers off New York were in the line of fire of ordnance tests being carried out from Sandy Hook; they affirmed their intention not to relax their vigilance in maintaining neutrality, and orders were sent by the Admiralty for our cruisers to keep out of the line, thus increasing their distance from the port to 13 miles.³

62. Escort of the Second Canadian Contingent.—The Admiralty's main object in sending out the *Cumberland* was that she should escort home the second contingent of Canadian troops, which should reach England about May 1. Certain details and remounts in single ships had come across unescorted,⁴ but it had been decided that the second contingent, instead of coming, like the first, in one large convoy, should be sent in groups, each of which must be escorted. Three transports were to be ready at Halifax on April 18, but as only one escort was available, the War Office sent instructions to Canada that these and the second group should both sail together on the 23rd, the Admiralty telling Admiral Patey to escort them with the *Cumberland*. But after the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* was interned, the War Office agreed to the sailing of the first group of the contingent on the 18th in two transports, the *Northland* and *Grampian*, and informed the Canadian Government that the Admiralty would provide escort. This agreement appears

¹ H.S. 134, pp. 806, 994, 1062.

² Patey, Letter of Proceedings. M. 03373/15; also Papers titled *Qa* 181 and 190/1915.

³ M. 20560/15.

⁴ *Dominion*, February 5; *Mongolian*, February 17; *Montreal*, March 6; *Orduna*, March 20; *Missanabie*, March 28; *Monmouth*, April 1; *Metagama*, April 10; *Missanabie*, April 24.

not to have been communicated to Admiral Patey, who, on that date, had the *Cumberland* off New York. That night he sent her to Halifax to coal in order to be ready for the convoy leaving, as he thought, on the 23rd. Next morning, to his astonishment, he received a message: "Barrington to Commander in Chief, via *Cumberland*. *Grampian* and *Northland* sailed with troops. St. John's, Admiralty, have been informed." There was nothing to show from whom the telegram originated, nor from what port the transports had sailed. It was not till the Admiralty inquired whether the *Cumberland* had sailed with the transports that he realised that this was the voyage she should be escorting. He sent out urgent inquiries whether they were going to England direct or to some other Canadian port, and gave instructions that if they had sailed direct for England without Admiralty authority they were to be recalled. Rear-Admiral Hornby succeeded in stopping them at Cape Race, and learned that the second group was not sailing that month. The *Cumberland*, after a hurried coaling at Halifax, overtook them on the 21st, and proceeded with them to England. It appears that the order for them to sail was given by the Canadian Militia Department.¹

63. The "Kronprinz Wilhelm" interned.—Meanwhile the Admiral had visited the Chesapeake, where the *Leviathan* joined the *Suffolk* on April 14. Four days later the *Melbourne* relieved the *Suffolk* to coal at Halifax. The Admiral learned that Captain Thierfelder had asked for three weeks in which to repair the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, including the damage to her plates caused by her ramming the *Wilfred M.*; he complained to our Ambassador that this was not a repair which, by the Hague Convention, should be allowed, and obtained from him a reply that the United States authorities would not permit the repair of any damage not caused by the sea. On the 19th she went into dry dock, and Admiral Patey seized the opportunity to visit the New York Patrol. After examining the arrangements for the conduct of the patrol, and finding them satisfactory, he returned to the Chesapeake, arriving at 7 a.m. on the 23rd, 16 hours after the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* had undocked. She, like the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, had her bottom coated, but Admiral Patey, in view of the United States attitude on this subject, withheld what he considered a reasonable protest. Her bow was not repaired, nor were the plates in her side which had been damaged by coaling at sea.

On the 24th he heard from the Ambassador that the 24 hours' grace to the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* would date from midnight, April 29–30. This enabled him to coal the *Leviathan* at Bermuda and be back in time. He proceeded at once, ordering

¹ Patey, Letter of Proceedings. M. 03787/15. The telegrams received by the Admiralty on the subject of the convoy are in A 75.

the *Calgarian* from New York to join the *Suffolk* at the Chesapeake. He reached Bermuda on the 26th. That same day the German commenced coaling. An opinion was current in Newport News that Captain Thierfelder intended to make a dash out before his time limit expired, and trust to his speed to escape, but Admiral Patey was quite sure that the United States authorities would not acquiesce in such a proceeding. In addition, the *Neckar*, which had so long been quiescent in Baltimore, was reported to have her crew on board and to be ready with 2,000 tons of coal; possibly both might try to escape together.¹

On April 27, however, the Admiral heard at 2 a.m. from his Intelligence Officer that the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* had been interned. By 5 p.m., the latest time at which it was possible to get away from Bermuda, no confirmation from our Ambassador had been received, and the Admiral put to sea to return to the Chesapeake. Early next morning the Ambassador's confirmation arrived, and as all was now arranged, for nothing further was heard of the *Neckar*, he returned to Bermuda in the *Leviathan*, sent the *Calgarian* back to New York, the *Melbourne* to follow when coaled. Only the *Suffolk* was left behind to patrol off the Chesapeake.²

64. The Atlantic Forces at the end of May 1915.—Although German armed vessels had completely disappeared from the trade routes, there were still numbers of potential cruisers in various Atlantic ports, and the Admiralty, even by the end of May, made little reduction in the strength of the cruiser forces.

Off West America the *Rainbow*,³ *Newcastle*, *Kent*, and *Orama* still operated in conjunction with the Japanese cruisers, and the *Otranto*, after a refit, left Liverpool to join them.

On the South-East Coast of America the *Glasgow* remained in charge with the three armed merchant cruisers *Celtic*, *Edinburgh Castle*, and *Macedonia*; the *Vindictive* continued to keep guard and wireless watch at Abrolhos.

The East Atlantic forces were somewhat reduced. The *Highflyer* remained near St. Vincent, while to the northward of her operated the *Amphitrite*, *Argonaut*, *Marmora*, and *Ophir*, the last named a newly commissioned armed merchant cruiser.

In the North America Squadron the *Glory* was under orders to proceed to the Dardanelles. The other vessels—*Leviathan*, *Suffolk*, *Niobe*, *Berwick*, *Carnarvon*, *Melbourne*, and *Calgarian*—were chiefly occupied in the watch off New York. In the West

¹ The *Neckar* had been ready since the beginning of March, and the German Admiralty hoped to get her away if the *Macedonia* had failed to escape from Las Palmas (I.D.H.S. 1479/B.240).

² This section is based on Patey's Letter of Proceedings. M. 03373/15, 03787/15, 03987/15.

³ A light cruiser of the Royal Canadian Navy.

Indies the *Sydney* patrolled in conjunction with the *Condé* and *Descartes*. The *Cumberland*, having safely escorted her convoy, coaled at Queenstown and returned to North America. She was now in dockyard hands at Bermuda.

A noticeable distribution of this distribution of force, in comparison with the scheme of commerce protection outlined in the War Plan, is that the south and west coasts of America, for which the *Glasgow* and one other cruiser had been considered sufficient, were now to be patrolled by at least 11 ships. The actual course of the war had been such that the South American Station had been the scene of the most important engagements overseas, and of the most sustained attacks on trade.

The *Karlsruhe* had made 18 captures, the *Dresden* 9, the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* 15, and the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* 11, a total of 53 ships, of which 7 were released for various reasons. All of these were taken off the coast of South America.

But there was now no enemy abroad in the Atlantic. With the internment of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* and the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* Germany's first attempt, half-hearted as it was, to interfere with our overseas trade by recognised methods, came to a tame conclusion, and for many months merchant vessels, except in home waters, proceeded on their voyages secure from any but the ordinary perils of the sea.¹

¹ Until the issue of the German official history dealing with the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* and *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, any detailed criticism of their careers seems to be futile and is not attempted here.

APPENDIX A.

TELEGRAMS AND SIGNALS.

A 1. Flag to *Inflexible*.
8.12.14.
10.30 p.m.
Please convey to Commander of *Gneisenau*. The C-in-C. is very gratified that your life has been spared and we all feel that the *Gneisenau* fought in a most plucky manner to the end. We much admire the good gunnery of both ships; we sympathise with you in the loss of your Admiral and so many officers and men. Unfortunately, the two countries are at war; the officers of both navies who can count friends in the other have to carry out their country's duty which your Admiral, Captain and officers worthily maintained to the end.

Commander *Gneisenau* to Admiral.

In the name of all officers and men saved I thank Your Excellency very much for your kind words. We regret as you do the cause of our fight, as we have personally learned to know during peace time the English Navy and her officers. We are all most thankful for our good reception.¹

A 2. Adty. to I.O., Monte Video, 38.
11.12.14.
Sent 2.5 a.m.
Pass to V.A. *Invincible*.—14 *Newcastle*, *Idzumo* and *Asama* are proceeding south from Galapagos Islands to search for armed liner *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* and other German supply vessels on Chilean coast. When possible send *Kent* and one armed merchant cruiser to west coast to search bays and inlets and to work to northward to meet *Newcastle*. They should take colliers sufficient for their own requirements. *Canopus* should proceed to Abrolhos from St. Helena. A search for *Karlsruhe* and *Kronprinz Wilhelm* will be the next operation. *Carnarvon*, *Glasgow* and two armed merchant cruisers will remain on South-East Coast Station. Destination of other ships after *Karlsruhe* operation will be telegraphed shortly.

A 3. V.A. Sturdee to Adty.
11.12.14.
Sent 10 a.m. Recd. 5.20 p.m.
21 Search has been made for *Dresden* to 51 miles to the east of Staten Island, wide sweep round Falklands for possible sea rendezvous. All the inlets in the Falkland Islands examined. Ships returning to Port Stanley to coal and repair damage. Dividing force into three squadrons; one to search all round Tierra del Fuego; the second, coast of Patagonia to Monte Video; third, when ready, to proceed north and get off coast of Brazil. Suggest that armed merchant cruisers on the west coast may be dealt with by the force now in the Pacific Ocean . . .

A 4. Adty. to S.N.O., Halifax.
12.12.14.
Sent 12.20 a.m.
122 *Australia*, *Sydney* and *Melbourne* will be stationed in West Indies under Vice-Admiral Patey. As soon as he arrives at Jamaica *Berwick* and *Lancaster* will return to England . . . *Caronia* should refit at Halifax. *Edinburgh Castle* will be sent out again to join your flag. *Essex* will remain under your orders.

¹ *Inflexible* Signal Log 32219. 8.12.14, 10.30 p.m., and 9.12.14, 3.55 a.m.

A 5. Adty. to I.O., Monte Video, 46.
12.12.14.
Sent 8.30 p.m.
Pass to *Invincible*, 17. It is desired to get battle cruisers home as soon as possible. Send *Kent* and one armed liner to Pacific coast as indicated in my telegram 38 and transfer command of all vessels, except battle cruisers, to Admiral Stoddart.

After searching for *Dresden*, Stoddart is to work to northward in search of *Karlsruhe* and *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, taking *Dartmouth* under his orders.

Australia cannot use Panama Canal and will arrive at Falklands in about three weeks' time. Leave a collier at Port Stanley with 3,000 tons coal or send one from Abrolhos Rocks.

A 6. Adty. to *Vindictive*, Ascension.
13.12.14.
Sent 9 a.m.
Pass to *Dartmouth* by W/T. *Karlsruhe* reported at Bahamas. Proceed to Pernambuco as fast as possible, coal and wait orders.

A 7. Adty. to *Melbourne*.
13.12.14.
Sent 9.10 a.m.
Karlsruhe has been reported at Tongue of Ocean, Bahamas. Proceed as fast as possible to Bermuda for orders.

A 8. Adty. to I.O., Jamaica.
13.12.14.
Sent 9.15 a.m.
65 Send *Newcastle* through Canal if it is possible to do so and order her to get in touch with Jamaica by W/T and follow Admiral Hornby's orders.

A 9. Adty. to Glacé Bay Radio Station.
13.12.14.
Sent noon.
Make the following signal to British warship *Princess Royal*. Begins: *Princess Royal* is to proceed to New Providence to search for *Karlsruhe*, reported to be at Tongue of Ocean, Bahamas, on 11th. *Berwick*, *Condé* and *Edinburgh Castle* are co-operating.

A 10. Adty. to I.O., Monte Video, 50, 51.
13.12.14.
Sent 4.45 p.m.
For Admiral, *Invincible*. Begins: 19. We want your battle cruisers home as soon as possible, but use your discretion as to immediate action to catch *Dresden*.

20 (Sent 8.10 p.m.) Object is destruction and not internment of *Dresden*. Press your chase.

A 11. Adty. to I.O., Jamaica, 71.
14.12.14.
Sent 10.45 a.m.
Pass to *Australia*. *Newcastle* is to proceed south as fast as possible. *Dresden* has apparently escaped and is going into Pacific. She was coaling at Punta Arenas, Magellan Straits, on 13th December.

A 12. British Consul, Punta Arenas, to Adty.
14.12.14.
Sent 9 a.m. Recd. 8.8 p.m.
Dresden left southward 10 p.m.

A 13. Adty. to I.O., Jamaica, 72.
15.12.14.
Sent 1.40 a.m.
Pass to *Australia*. *Dresden* escaped Sturdee and left Punta Arenas on 13th possibly for Pacific coast. Proceed south and assist *Idzumo*, *Asama* and *Newcastle* to search for *Dresden*, *Prinz Eitel* and German supply vessels.

A 14. Adty. to Consul-General, Panama. 15.12.14.
Sent 6.30 a.m.
Inform *Newcastle* that he is to proceed to coast of Chile and search for *Dresden*, which escaped from Punta Arenas on 13th December, *Newcastle* is not to go through Canal and is to leave Panama at once.

A 15. Adty. to *Dartmouth*, Pernambuco. 15.12.14.
Sent 1.50 p.m.
After coaling proceed to Demerara.

A 16. Adty. to I.O., Monte Video, 56. 16.12.14.
Sent 12.20 a.m.
Pass to V.A., *Invincible*. 22 Remain at Falkland Islands for the present.

A 17. Adty. to S.N.O., Halifax. 16.12.14.
Sent 7.12 p.m.
129 Direct *Princess Royal* to proceed to Scapa Flow when coaled and to report where she intends to coal en route. She should use all convenient despatch.

A 18. Adty. to I.O., Monte Video. 17.12.14.
Sent 5.30 p.m.
For V.A., *Invincible*. 24 Return home at once with the two battle cruisers, replenishing with ammunition at St. Vincent, C.V., leaving to Admiral Stoddart the task of pursuing *Dresden*.

A 19. Adty. to C.-in-C., North America and West Indies. 18.12.14.
Sent 2.45 p.m.
133 *Dartmouth* left Pernambuco yesterday for Demerara and is to search north coast Brazil for *Karlsruhe* en route. Report has been received from Para yesterday that *Karlsruhe* was rumoured to be in neighbourhood of River Amazon and Maranham.

Send *Melbourne* to St. Lucia to coal and then proceed along north coast of South America searching for *Karlsruhe* en route to Para. Give *Melbourne* a set of West Indian charts for *Dartmouth*.

A 20. Adty. to I.O., Monte Video, 78. 25.12.14.
Sent 2.20 p.m.
Pass to Falkland Islands for R.A., *Carnarvon*. Begins: 130 *Dresden* should be sunk if found in an unfrequented river or bay inside territorial waters. When attacking beware of mines.

She should not be attacked if lying in an inhabited and properly constituted port, but should be blockaded.

A 21. Adty. to S.N.O., West Indies. 26.12.14.
Sent 9.20 p.m.
Following has been sent to *Melbourne*. Begins: *Melbourne* is to make a thorough search of South American coast from Trinidad to Colon. Ends.
And following to *Dartmouth*. Begins: *Dartmouth* is to search coast from Trinidad to the eastward, visiting ports in British, Dutch, and French Guiana, and is to visit Para and communicate with British Consul. Collier ordered from Jamaica to Demerara on 20th December should be taken on to Maranham. *Dartmouth* should coal at Maranham.

If definite news of *Karlsruhe* is not received *Dartmouth* will proceed from Maranham to St. Vincent, Cape Verde, and thence to England. Ends.

A 22. Adty. to I.O., Monte Video, 80. 27.12.14.
Pass to R.A., *Carnarvon*. *Cornwall* is to proceed to St. Helena. Admiralty and C.-in-C., Cape, being informed of date she will arrive.

A 23. Adty. to *Dartmouth*. 27.12.14.
8.30 p.m.
... *Karlsruhe* or any other enemy's ships should be sunk if found in an unfrequented river or bay inside territorial waters. When attacking beware of mines.

They should not be attacked if lying in an inhabited and properly constituted port, but should be blockaded.

A 24. Adty. to R.A., Cruiser Force H and I.O., Monte Video. 28.12.14.
Sent 3.42 p.m.

Following for V.A., *Australia*. Begins: Following will be limits of North American Station and West Indian Station.

North American Station on the east, longitude 40° W; on the west, North American coast; on the south, latitude 28° N. West Indian Station on the north, latitude 28° N, but the whole of the Gulf of Mexico is included; on the east, longitude 40° W; on the west, coast of Central America; on the south, coast of South America as far as longitude 40° W.

Rear-Admiral Hornby will be in charge of North American Station, and Vice-Admiral Patey of West Indian Station.

A 25. Las Palmas to Adty. 4.1.15.
Sent noon. Recd. 4.8 p.m.
Otavi arrived from S.W. Has aboard full crews *Bellevue* (British), *Mont Agel* (French), *Anne de Bretagne* (French), Captain, Chief Officer, and one man *Union* (French) sunk by *Kronprinz Wilhelm*. French Consul and myself taking charge of crews.

Bellevue captured 4th December, lat. 3 S, long. 29 W. Steamed west with *Kronprinz Wilhelm* 600 miles, when all cargo, coal and general, and provisions were transhipped to *Kronprinz Wilhelm*. *Bellevue* sunk 20th December. *Kronprinz Wilhelm* transhipped coal, cargo and provisions from *Union*, provisions from *Anne de Bretagne*. *Otavi* joined *Kronprinz Wilhelm* 12th December; transhipped coal, provisions, water, to *Kronprinz Wilhelm*; left 21st December, proceeding here.

A 26. *Glasgow* to *Carnarvon*. 9.1.15.
Sent 3.5 a.m.
German pilot who left Punta Arenas with *Dresden* has returned in boat. Rumours as to her movements appear to be unreliable and indefinite, but it is probable she was in waters of Tierra del Fuego up to about 10 days ago. Propose to watch entrances to Magellan Straits and Gulf of Penas as previously arranged. (From *Glasgow* Signal Log 20112.)

A 27. S.N.O., Halifax, to Adty. 9.1.15.
Recd. 8.5 a.m.
11 *Berwick* reports she is proceeding to Havana in compliance with Admiralty orders, arriving 12th January. *Condé*, now at Fort de France, will be used for intercepting *Bavaria* if necessary. Have now ordered *Melbourne* to leave Jamaica 13th January to relieve *Berwick*. Information is requested whether orders for *Berwick's* proceeding to England are now modified. Is it necessary to maintain wireless touch between Jamaica and Japanese ships in Pacific Ocean?

Reply 12 to S.N.O., Halifax. Sent 7.35 p.m., 10.1.15. Your 11. Retain *Berwick* for the present as *Australia* will not arrive in West Indies as soon as expected.

It is not necessary to maintain continuous wireless touch between Jamaica and Japanese ships, but times should be arranged every two or three days for passing messages.

9.1.15.

A 28. Adty. to Intelligence Officers, Atlantic Ocean. Sent 7.55 p.m.

We have certain information that *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was to be in lat. 1° N, long. 20° W, on 6th January, and that a supply steamer from Pernambuco was to meet her there. Inform H.M. ships.

To *Highflyer*, St. Vincent, C.V. (sent 8 p.m.). We have certain information that *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was in lat. 1° N, 20° W, on 6th January to meet a supply ship from Pernambuco. *Highflyer* and armed merchant cruisers are to proceed to search for her. *Dartmouth* is at Para and is coming to Maranham and St. Vincent, C.V.

9.1.15.

A 29. Adty. to Consul, Para. Sent 8.50 p.m.

Following for *Dartmouth* in Naval Code. Begins: We have certain information that *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was in lat. 1° N, long. 20° W, on 6th inst., to meet a supply ship from Pernambuco.

Highflyer, *Marmora* and *Empress of Britain* have been ordered from St. Vincent to search for her.

After leaving Maranham proceed to Rocas and Fernando Noronha and search them en route to St. Vincent.

(Repeated 12.40 p.m., 10.1.15, to Consul, Maranham.)

12.1.15.

A 30. Adty. to Naval, Ottawa. Sent 5.30 p.m.

12 Rear-Admiral Hornby will be in charge of North American waters as far as long. 40° W and lat. 28° N, and will be styled R.A.C., North American Station. Vice-Admiral Patey will take charge of waters south of lat. 28° N as V.A.C., West Indies Station.

25.1.15.

A 31. Adty. to R.A., North America and West Indies. Sent 9.15 p.m.

30 The overhauling and boarding of neutral vessels whose identity is well established should be avoided, unless the vessel is performing some unneutral service or behaving in an obviously suspicious manner. Stoppages for removal of contraband or reservists are as a rule unnecessary, as this can be better arranged at a United Kingdom port or at Gibraltar.

Your attention should be primarily devoted to the stoppage of enemy vessels or neutrals whose actions give reasonable ground for suspicion. It is most important that no act should be committed liable to irritate the Americans unnecessarily, and this should be impressed on all H.M. ships under your command.

26.1.15.

A 32. Adty. to I.O., Monte Video. Sent 1.40 a.m.

34 Pass to *Carnarvon*. 7 If *Dresden* is on south-east coast America she is probably hidden in some creek or river. The coast from River Plate northward should be thoroughly searched bit by bit, making sure before leaving southern waters that *Dresden* is not hidden in Patagonia.

Carnarvon, *Bristol* and *Glasgow* should each be allotted to a different area. One collier should be left at Port Stanley for contingencies and the remainder taken to Abrolhos Rocks and left in charge of *Vindictive*. A small vessel should be engaged to maintain regular communication between the cable at Bahia and *Vindictive*, and full use made of her long distance wireless. One armed liner should patrol off River Plate to provide against *Kronprinz Wilhelm*. Acknowledge, and report your proposed arrangements for search of coast and keep Admiralty informed as frequently as possible of your dispositions.

A 33. I.O., Monte Video, to Adty.

5.2.15.

26 Following message received from Port Stanley. Begins: Following is interpretation of wireless message sent from Cerrito on 16th January ostensibly to *Von der Tann*, probably intercepted Port Stanley. Begins: For *Dresden* (group omitted) sent 7th January 2 groups sent 7th January (2 groups omitted) St. Thomas. Has *Dresden* orders for *Gladstone* then inform a trustworthy person Pernambuco. Send name can put to sea from Norfolk 25th January for *Dresden*. Port Huron (group omitted) altered fittings (group omitted) fathoms (group omitted) at springtide 3 (group omitted) reef 36° W, 5° S (mutilated group probably representing late date in January) according to wishes *Dresden*. Ends.

A 34. Minister, Monte Video, to Foreign Office.

10.2.15.

Recd. 5 p.m.

6 A messenger whom I sent to Punta Arenas with war code reports that British Consul informed him that he knows exactly where *Dresden* is, and he told Admiral, who considers it too risky to take a ship of war into place. He says that she is being provisioned from Punta Arenas.

10.2.15.

A 35. Adty. to I.O., Monte Video.

Sent 7.20 p.m.

Ascertain and report at once whether Last Hope Inlet, Magellan Straits, lat. 51.35 S, long. 72.45 W, has been examined by our ships. If it has not been examined tell *Glasgow* to watch the passage into it.

Reply.

Captain of *Bristol* states that Last Hope Inlet has not been examined. Your telegram sent to Port Stanley last night, also to Punta Arenas.

10.2.15.

A 36. Adty. to Consul-General, Valparaiso.

Sent 8.20 p.m.

Pass following to British warship *Kent* or *Orama*. Begins: Urgent. Obtain charts of Last Hope Inlet, Magellan Straits, lat. 51.25 S, long. 72.45 W, in Valparaiso, and search it should it be navigable.

11.2.15.

A 37. Adty. to British Consul, Monte Video.

Sent 12.10 p.m.

Your telegram 6 to Foreign Office respecting whereabouts of *Dresden*. Please communicate with Rear-Admiral *Carnarvon* and ascertain if he was told by British Consul, Punta Arenas, of whereabouts of *Dresden*. Direct him to report fully to Admiralty whether this is the case or not, and if so, whether the place is Last Hope Inlet.

Reply.

Bristol just arrived and Captain informs me that the only place mentioned by Consul which had not been visited is Pleiades. Captain states that Consul's information has hitherto proved untrustworthy, though he gives it with much confidence. Consul did not mention Last Hope Inlet.

12.2.15.

A 38. Adty. to *Glasgow*, Punta Arenas.

Sent 12.5 a.m.

We have good information that *Dresden* is in Last Hope Inlet anchored near Port Consuelo, where German Consul, Punta Arenas, owns an estancia which is connected by telephone with Punta Arenas. Milward, British Consul at Punta Arenas, is not trustworthy; be careful of him.

Glasgow is to watch the passage to Last Hope Inlet without fail, until *Kent* arrives with large scale chart from Valparaiso. Action is then to be taken against *Dresden*. (Pink.)

(C2264)

G

A 39. Adty. to I.O., Monte Video.12.2.15.
Sent 11 a.m.

53 Send *Bristol* at once to assist *Glasgow* to search Last Hope Inlet. *Dresden* is believed to be anchored near Port Consuelo, where German Consul, Punta Arenas, owns an estancia which is connected by telephone with Punta Arenas. *Bristol* should be secret and not trust Consul Milward. Acknowledge.

Reply.

Bristol acknowledges receipt of your telegram 53. *Bristol* sailed at 9 a.m. (Sent 12.2.15, 12.10 p.m.)

A 40. *Glasgow* to Port Stanley.12.2.15.
Sent 2.50 p.m.

For Admiralty. Begins: *Glasgow* has not examined Last Hope Inlet, but English manager of company owning all land in the vicinity, who returned to Punta Arenas from there in January, informs me nothing had been seen there then and that he will arrange any arrival to be reported to Captain of *Glasgow*.¹

Note.—As received by the Admiralty at 8.40 a.m., 13.2.15, this was made to read: *Glasgow* has not examined Last Hope Inlet, but English manager of committee composed of owners of all land in vicinity who returns to Punta Arenas from them in Italian vessel informs me has everything ready to carry on. See my telegram 13th thereon and that he will arrange for any (corrupt group). Request permission to carry out gunlayers' test.

A 41. Adty. to *Bristol*.14.2.15.
Sent 7.50 p.m.

Abuse of Chilean neutrality by *Dresden* justifies British ships in attacking her if found in Last Hope or any similar desolate waters out of the effective control of Chilean Government, whether inside or outside territorial waters. She is to be attacked and sunk accordingly when found.

A 42. Adty. to R.A., *Carnarvon*.15.2.15.
Sent 5.20 p.m.

A German supply ship probably named *Gladstone* or *Huron* or *Bangor* may be at Lavandeira Reef in 5° S, 36° W, on 20th February, to meet *Dresden*, and *Kronprinz Wilhelm* may also be in the vicinity. *Sydney* from St. Lucia should arrive at Lavandeira Reef about 20th February, and armed merchant cruiser *Edinburgh Castle* in company with two colliers fitted with W/T should sail to-morrow for the same destination from St. Vincent, C.V. Speed of colliers is about 10 knots. Ships have been warned not to frighten German vessel with W/T.

Carnarvon should proceed north to direct operations.

I.O., Pernambuco, is to warn *Vindictive* to be on the look-out and not to expose her colliers to attack.

Dresden or the German vessels are to be sunk if found in unfrequented territorial waters.

(Sent to R.A., *Carnarvon*, through I.O., Monte Video, and I.O., Pernambuco.)

A 43. Consul-General, Buenos Aires, to Foreign Office.19.2.15.
Recd. 3.30 p.m.

32 Following ships captured by *Kronprinz Wilhelm*. *Hemisphere*, of Liverpool, 28th December, lat. 4.20 S, long. 29.25 W; *Potaro*, of Belfast, 10th January, lat. 5.48 N, long. 25.58 W; *Highland Brae*, of London, 14th January, British sailing vessel *Wilfred*, 4th January, both lat. 2.46 N,

long. W (group undecypherable); *Bonan*, of Galle, 3rd February, lat. 26.30 S, long. 27° W. Passengers and crew landed here. (Sent 5.20 p.m., 18th February.)

39 My telegram 32. Groups are lat. 2.46 N, long. 25.55 W. *Semantha*. (Sent 6.40 p.m., 23rd February.)

A 44. Consul, Punta Arenas, to Adty.20.2.15.
Recd. 10.30 a.m.

Have news of whereabouts *Dresden*, seen 14th February.

A 45. Adty. to British Consul, Coronel.21.2.15.
Sent 12.20 p.m.

Following for *Orama*. Begins: *Kent* has been ordered to assist *Bristol* and *Glasgow* to search Last Hope Inlet. Before anything else is undertaken it must be established for certain that *Dresden* is not hidden there. *Orama* should proceed to Punta Arenas, and maintain communication between squadron off Last-Hope Inlet and telegraph cable, going backwards and forwards as necessary.

Consul Milward telegraphed on 19th February that he knew whereabouts of *Dresden* on 14th February, but neglected to state where she was. Interrogate Milward, but do not trust him, we think he misleads us. Consult Mr. Cameron, of firm of Duncan Fox, who is reliable.

Should Last Hope Inlet prove blank, search Hewett Bay, Barbara Channel.

A 46. *Macedonia*, St. Vincent, to Adty.24.2.15.
Recd. 6.42 p.m.

Following wireless signal was intercepted by *Orama*, 23rd February, 4 a.m., passed from *Carnarvon* to *Glasgow* for *Sydney*. (Begins.)

Carnarvon has struck rock, and therefore will not join you. R.A. will shift flag to *Vindictive* and remain for the present at Abrolhos Rocks. *Dartmouth* is to take charge of operations and send *Edinburgh Castle* to Abrolhos Rocks when she can be spared. Intercepted German W/T message states that the *Karlsruhe*, *Dresden*, *Kronprinz Wilhelm* and steamer *Bolívar* will meet together 23rd February, but position is unintelligible.

Otranto heard German code strength (? 6) lat. 12° N. Collier has steam up and instructions in case of attack. (Sent 3.15 p.m., 24th.)

From Admiralty to *Macedonia*, 24.2.15. Sent 8.35 p.m.: Your telegram to-day. Telegraph German message in original.

From Admiralty to I.O., St. Vincent, 25.2.15. Sent 1.55 p.m.:—Following for *Macedonia*. Begins: Your telegram sent 3.15 p.m., 24th, is not intelligible. *Orama* is in Pacific south of Coronel. *Dartmouth* has been in Mediterranean for some weeks. *Edinburgh Castle* with two colliers should be at Lavandeira Reef. *Glasgow* is in Magellan Straits. Can you give any further information?

Note.—No reply from *Macedonia* can be traced in the Admiralty, T.S.D.D.

A 47. Adty.

24.2.15.

To *Laurentic*. (Sent 8.40 p.m.): Proceed full speed to St. Vincent, Cape Verde.

To R.A., *Europa*. (Sent 8.45 p.m.): Urgent. Send *Amphitrite* or ship of same class to St. Vincent, Cape Verde, with despatch.

To I.O., St. Vincent. (Sent 10.50 p.m.): 53 *Otranto* is to remain at St. Vincent until further orders; recall her by wireless if she has sailed.

¹ From *Glasgow* W/T Log 20137.

A 48. Adty. to C.-in-C., Home Fleets. Sent 8 p.m.
Very secret. *Carnarvon* has run on shore at Abrolhos Rocks, and there is little prospect of salving her. *Bristol* has been badly on shore in Magellan Strait, rudder damaged and must be docked. *Dresden*, *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, and two supply vessels are operating off S.E. coast of America, and have sunk four vessels.

Send *Liverpool* and *Gloucester* to Gibraltar en route to S.E. Coast.

A 49. Consul, Coronel, to Adty. Recd. 11.50 p.m.
British vessel *Skerries* which called off Easter Island in attention to signal reports found crews of ships *Jean* and *Kildalton* sunk by *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* in December, former ship sunk less than a mile off shore, after transhipment of all coal. Crews landed by *Prinz Eitel* commencement of January on Easter Island.

Continuation: *Skerries* reports offered to bring away both crews and land them here, but they refused to come.

A 50. R.A., 5th C.S. to Sydney and Dartmouth. Sent 10.38 p.m.
Collier *Manchester Civilian* reports man-of-war chased her in 15° 20' S, 38° 45' W, at 11 a.m., 26th February, and then went in an easterly direction. Unless you have other orders or have reliable information as to whereabouts of enemy, collect all ships you can, including all colliers fitted with wireless, and sweep south from Rocas Island to Abrolhos. Inform Admiralty by telegraph and I.O., Pernambuco. R.A., 5th C.S. 1700-27. (From *Carnarvon* W/T Log 26626.)

A 51. Adty. to S.N.O., St. Vincent. Sent 1.25 p.m.
Otranto is to proceed to Liverpool, passing 50 miles west of Scilly Islands and proceeding up Irish Channel at night and arriving at Liverpool about daylight. Full speed should be maintained from lat. 50° N to Liverpool. *Laurentic* is to proceed to Duala. *Amphitrite* and *Macedonia* are to remain at St. Vincent for the present.

A 52. Adty. to Kent, Orama, Glasgow, Bristol. Sent 5.20 p.m.
Resulting from their search subsequent to 27th February, Duncan Fox have reported exact position of *Dresden* in Worsley Sound to Consul-General, Valparaiso. *Glasgow*, *Bristol* and *Orama* are to deal with *Dresden* and ensure exit being stopped until she is disposed of.

From another source we know Germans intended *Dresden* to rendezvous with collier *Gotha* on 5th March in 37° S, 80° W, and that *Gotha* would wait near rendezvous until end of March. *Kent* is to proceed to rendezvous and deal with *Gotha*.

Wireless signal by which *Dresden* and *Gotha* will get in touch is any three letters with X in the middle or MUS.

A 53. Adty. to R.A. Stoddart. Sent 7.10 p.m.
24 *Dartmouth* proceeded to Mediterranean on January 13. *Sydney*, *Edinburgh Castle*, and her two colliers fitted with wireless should be used for sweeps to find *Kronprinz Wilhelm*. Colliers at Abrolhos must not be left unguarded. *Holger* and *Patagonia* are both interned. *Dresden* is still believed to be about Magellan Strait, and was located in Worsley Sound, Last Hope Inlet, in latter part of February, by an expedition initiated by Admiralty, and *Glasgow*, *Bristol* and *Orama* have been ordered to deal with her. *Kent* is going to vicinity of Valparaiso to intercept German supply ship *Gotha*.

Liverpool and *Gloucester* are proceeding to S.E. Coast to assist in search for *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, accompanied by two wireless colliers.

A 54. Adty. to S.N.O., *Amphitrite*, St. Vincent. Sent 1.25 a.m.
Liverpool is to take *Gloucester* and wireless colliers *Djerissa* and *Gisella* under her orders and proceed in company to Sierra Leone. After coaling at Sierra Leone the squadron is to sweep down the steamship track towards Cape of Good Hope as far as 3° N.

Squadron is then to sweep across Atlantic to Pernambuco. One vessel is to enter and communicate and remainder are to be out of sight of land. After communicating at Pernambuco squadron is to proceed to Abrolhos Rocks.

Kronprinz Wilhelm or German supply ships are the objective.

Amphitrite is to remain at St. Vincent.

From *Amphitrite*. Recd. 9.20 p.m., 10.3.15: *Liverpool*, *Gloucester*, colliers 231, 232, have sailed.

A 55. Consul Punta Arenas to Adty. Recd. 1.42 p.m.
Dresden still as reported 4th January. Exact position Puerto Loberto Lexeno, N.W. of Stokes Bay, entrance eastern end, other foul. News 10 days old. Port Gallant full of spies. (Sent 1.50 p.m., 6.3.15.)

To Consul, Punta Arenas, 18.3.15: The only telegram received from you on 4th January was one reporting that *Carnarvon* had sailed. It appears that you sent another telegram on 4th January which never reached the Admiralty, due possibly to the work of German agents. Repeat your telegram of 4th January now.

A 56. Consul, Norfolk, Va., to Adty. Recd. 6.12 p.m.
German auxiliary cruiser *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* arrived this morning, and is anchored off Old Point territorial waters.

A 57. I.O., Pernambuco, to Adty. Recd. 12.3.15.
127 (Sent 11.45 a.m. Recd. 4.18 p.m.) Urgent. British ship *Chasehill* arrived to-day with passengers and crew of French ship *Guadeloupe*. The former captured by *Kronprinz Wilhelm* 22nd February in 6° S, 28° W, and the latter on 23rd February approximately same position. *Kronprinz* then steamed in north-easterly direction until she arrived in 9° S, 21° W, where she stopped one week and transferred coal, etc., from British ship. *Kronprinz* last seen 7 p.m., 9th March, in 7° S, 26° W. All centres and R.A.C., 5th C.S. informed.

128 (Sent 2.30 p.m. Recd. 7 p.m., 12.3.15.) Captain *Chasehill* informs me that from information he has picked up on board *Kronprinz*, he is thoroughly convinced *Kronprinz* patrols between equator and 7° S, and between 25° to 33° W, and takes captured vessels into the area between equator and 2° S, and between 20° and 24° W, as this area is off the track and weather conditions favourable for transferring cargo.

R.A., 5th C.S., and St. Vincent have been informed.

A 58. Consul-General, Valparaiso, to Adty. Recd. 12.3.15.
(Sent 1.0 p.m.) British sailing vessel *Conway Castle* sunk by *Dresden* 37.50 S, 27th February. Crew arrived at Valparaiso. (Recd. 8.50 p.m., 12.3.15.)

(Sent 4.20 p.m.) My telegram to-day. Crew *Conway Castle* landed from Peruvian sailing vessel. Captain reports left *Dresden* 7th March, position 37.20 by 79.16. *Dresden* short of coal and provisions. German steamer *Alda* expected to leave Valparaiso to night. Have repeated above to *Kent*. (Recd. 10.47 p.m.)

(Sent 5.25 p.m.) *Dresden* said to have been awaiting *Sierra Cordoba* or other merchant vessel intending coaling by boats calculated can take 350 tons per day. (Recd. 1.26 a.m., 13.3.15.)

(Sent 10.40 p.m.) German steamer *Alda* left 9.30 p.m. (Recd. 5.18 a.m., 13.3.15.)

A 59. Adty. to *Laurentic*.

13.3.15.
Sent 2 p.m.

Proceed to lat. 3° N, long. 11° W, and patrol the Cape steamship track to the northward as far as Cape Verde. Continue this patrol until further orders, using *Sierra Leone* for coaling. When within range of *Sierra Leone* or *Dakar* report your position by wireless to Admiralty occasionally, so that further orders may be sent you. *Kronprinz Wilhelm* may be off *Sierra Leone* on the trade route about 20th March. Except as above directed use wireless only when absolutely necessary, as it scares German commerce raiders . . .

A 60. Adty. to S.N.O., *Sierra Leone*.

13.3.15.
Sent 2.25 p.m.

For *Liverpool*. *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was last seen in 7° S, 26° W, on 9th March. *Kronprinz* operates in the following area, between equator and 7° S and the meridians of 25° W and 33° W. Captures made here appear to be taken to eastward to an area between equator and 2° S, and between 20° W and 24° W. Proceed direct with *Gloucester* and the two colliers and patrol and sweep these two areas. You can coal at *Rocas* or behind *Lavandeira Reef* to north-west of *Cape San Roque*. If you use wireless you will destroy all chance of a capture. This cancels previous orders.

Sierra Leone to Adty. (Recd. 2 a.m., 14.3.15): With reference to Admiralty message to *Liverpool* referring to acting with *Gloucester*, there is no information as to whereabouts of these vessels. Request instructions.

Reply.

Keep message till ships arrive.

A 61. R.A. *Stoddart* to Adty.

37 12th March. Request all Admiralty telegrams may in future bear date of origin.

Sydney arrived *Abrolhos*, 13th March. After completing with stores, *Sydney*, *Edinburgh Castle*, and two W/T colliers will sweep south after *Kronprinz Wilhelm*. After *Liverpool* and *Gloucester* complete with coal at *Abrolhos* they, with their colliers and *Celtic*, will sweep south joining me. (Recd. at Admiralty 12.17 a.m., 15.3.15.)

A 62. Adty. to I.O., *Pernambuco*, 84.

15.3.15.
Sent 3 p.m.

Pass following to R.A., *Vindictive*. 30 Following telegram has been sent to H.M.S. *Liverpool*: *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was last seen in lat. 7° S, long. 26° W, on 9th March. *Kronprinz* operates in the following area: between equator and 7° S lat. and the meridians of 25° W and 33° W. Captures made here appear to be taken to eastward to an area between the equator and lat. 2° S and between long. 20° W and 24° W. Proceed direct with *Gloucester* and the two colliers and patrol and sweep these two areas. You can coal at *Rocas* or behind *Lavandeira Reef* to N.W. of *Cape San Roque*. If you use wireless you will destroy all chance of a capture. This cancels previous orders. Acknowledge. (Ends.)

Arrangements have also been made for Cape trade route from *Cape Verde* to lat. 30° N to be patrolled in case *Kronprinz Wilhelm* crosses to it as she did on a previous occasion. *Liverpool*, *Gloucester* and their colliers should work as ordered above, the southern sweep which you propose being carried out with remaining ships. Use *Celtic* and *Macedonia* also, as the arrangements for obtaining the rifles which *Celtic* was to bring home have not matured.

Bristol is being sent to *Abrolhos Rocks* by S.N.O., *Glasgow*. *Bristol* has a damaged rudder and should dock at *Rio Janeiro*. (Sent 15th March.)

A 63. I.O., *Monte Video*, to Adty.

15.3.15.
Recd. 4.52 p.m.

58 Following received from Captain of *Glasgow*. Begins: *Glasgow*, *Orama* and *Kent* found *Dresden* at anchor in *Cumberland Bay*, *Juan Fernandez Island*, at 9 a.m., on 14th March. After engagement lasting five minutes *Dresden* hoisted white flag and hauled down her colours. She was much damaged and her crew were leaving her. An officer was sent from *Dresden* to negotiate, but was told that unconditional surrender only could be accepted. *Dresden's* crew set her on fire and after an explosion she sank at 11.37 a.m., local time. Crew are all on shore, with exception of 15 engineer officers,¹ badly wounded, who have been temporarily sheltered in *Orama* for treatment. *Dresden's* captain claimed had already interned, but there was nothing to show this when we approached. Have sent all available medical assistance. No British casualties or damage. *Orama* proceeding to-night to *Valparaiso* to land German wounded. *Glasgow* proceeding to-morrow to *Vallenar* to coal and afterwards to east coast, calling at *Punta Arenas*. *Kent* remains in vicinity of *Juan Fernandez* to watch for German auxiliary. *Dresden* lay apart 20 and drowned.² 14th March.

Reply.

Admiralty to *Glasgow*, 16.3.15. *Kent* and *Orama* will remain on Pacific coast to catch German supply ships or merchant ships. Approved for *Glasgow* to proceed to east coast. *Bristol* will repair at *Rio de Janeiro*, when *Carnarvon* comes out of dock. Admiralty congratulates the squadron on the successful result of the operations.

A 64. *Las Palmas* to Adty.

15.3.15.

(Sent 9.25 p.m. Recd. 12.7 p.m.) *Macedonia* left going east midnight 14th March.

Admiralty to Governor, *Sierra Leone*. (Sent 16.3.15, 11.45 a.m.):— Please inform any of H.M. ships within wireless range that German steamer *Macedonia*, which was interned at *Las Palmas*, escaped on 14th instant.

A 65. Adty. to *Liverpool*, *Sierra Leone*.

18.3.15.

Sent 7 p.m.

. . . Lat. 0, long. 33° W has been reported as a rendezvous where *Kronprinz Wilhelm* meets supply ships. When searching, one cruiser should keep within supporting distance of the colliers when they are spread, and the other cruiser should make use of her speed to cover a wider extent of ground. (Pink.)

A 66. Adty. to *Liverpool*.

20.3.15.

Sent 4.50 p.m.

Proceed with *Gloucester* and colliers direct to lat. 0°, long. 33° W, and then search N.W. from that position for 80 miles. Continue to sweep N.W. and S.E. on that line till 9th April, then follow the orders already given.

A 67. Adty. to *Highflyer*.

31.3.15.

Sent 1.15 p.m.

32 *Highflyer* and *Marmora*, one ship should cruise and the other remain at *St. Vincent* as guardship, relieving each other as necessary.

A 68. V.A., *North America* and *West Indies* to Adty.

2.4.15.

Recd. 1.5 a.m.

14 In the event of sure intelligence being received of breaking away in force of German cruisers from Germany, I have given orders to my squadron to concentrate immediately at *Bermuda*, except armed auxiliaries which are to remain at their stations as long as possible, retiring to *Halifax* or in the last resort to neutral waters.

¹ The words "engineer officers" were not signalled by *Glasgow*. See her W/T Log 46989.

² This sentence should have read "Twenty German killed and wounded." *Glasgow* W/T Log 46989. A correct version of this same telegram was received from *Valparaiso*, 16.3.15, at 8.30 p.m.

A 69. Adty. to Governor, Sierra Leone. 4.4.15.
Sent 12.40 a.m.

Pass following to *Laurentic* by W/T. Begins: Proceed to lat. 3° N, 37° W, and search a circle of 80 miles radius from this position. We have information that *Kronprinz Wilhelm* will meet *Macedonia* within this circle on some date between 9th and 23rd April. Continue search until 23rd April. Ships from South American Station are also being ordered to search here. Do not advertise your presence to German ships by using wireless.

After 23rd April proceed to Pernambuco for orders. (Pink.)

A 70. Adty. to I.O., Pernambuco, 97. 4.4.15.
D.O., Monte Video, 101. 1.50 a.m.
N.A., Rio.

Pass to H.M. ships at once for transmission to Rear-Admiral. We have good information that *Macedonia* and *Kronprinz Wilhelm* will try and meet between 9th and 23rd April at 3° N, 37° W, or within a circle of 80 miles radius from this position.

Laurentic has been ordered to proceed there from Sierra Leone to assist. Ships are not to alarm German vessels by using W/T. (Pink.)

A 71. Adty. to V.A., North America. 5.4.15.
Sent 2.32 p.m.

16 One ship should watch *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* and all other available ships should watch New York. We think *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* will eventually be interned, but the Germans mean to make use of her to induce us to weaken the force off New York if possible in the meantime.

A 72. I.O., St. Johns, to Adty. 8.4.15.
Recd. 5.55 a.m.

77 Vice-Consul, Norfolk, telegraphs. Begins: Collector of Customs informs me that German cruiser is interned. Ends. Sent to Halifax, Bermuda.

Washington to F.O. 7th April. German cruiser interned at Newport News. (Recd. at F.O., 9.45 a.m., 8th April.)

A 73. Washington to Foreign Office. 11.4.15.

332 Vice-Consul at Norfolk reports that German armed cruiser *Wilhelm der Grosse* arrived at Newport News at 5 this morning. (Recd. at Foreign Office, 6.40 p.m.)

333 My immediately preceding telegram. Vice-Consul at Norfolk reports that German ship anchored at 11.30 in Newport News. Collector of Customs at Norfolk has left for Newport News and will give information. (? United States Government) stated that ship sank 12 British ships. Names unknown as yet. (Recd. at Foreign Office, 9.10 p.m.)

334 My immediately preceding telegram. I now hear that German ship is *Crown Prince Wilhelm*. (Recd. at Foreign Office, 8.45 p.m.)

A 74. Adty. to I.O., Pernambuco. 13.4.15.
Sent 2.5 p.m.

Pass to Rear-Admiral. In consequence of *Kronprinz Wilhelm* having arrived at Chesapeake Bay following arrangements are to be carried out:—

Rear-Admiral to transfer command of station to Captain Luce of *Glasgow*, and return to England in *Gloucester* or *Liverpool*. *Laurentic* to return to Sierra Leone. *Gloucester* and *Liverpool* to return to England. *Sydney* to proceed immediately to St. Lucia. *Carnarvon* to proceed to Bermuda.

A 75.

(a) Gen. Hughes, Minister of Militia, Canada, to Earl Kitchener, 10.3.15:—
Second Overseas Contingent. Do you wish them to cross in one large flotilla or in groups of 3,000 or 4,000 each. About what time should we prepare to send them . . .

(Admiralty Staff Note: Groups of 5,000. As late as possible when trained, direct to France. H.B.J., 11.3.15.)

(b) Earl Kitchener to Gen. Hughes, 11.3.15:—

The second contingent should preferably come in groups of about 5,000, for which cruiser escort can be provided. They should be prepared to arrive about 1st May . . .

(c) Ad. Patey to Adty., 31.3.15:—

13 Ottawa states three transports ready to leave Halifax on 18th April and asks if escort is available. I have replied that a cruiser will be available after *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* is dealt with, to escort transports to 40° W. At the limit of my station my cruiser should be relieved by a cruiser from another squadron.

(d) Adty. to Ad. Patey, 1.4.15:—

9 *Cumberland* should be used for escort and should accompany the convoy the whole way. She was sent out with this object in view.

(e) Adty. to Ad. Patey, 6.4.15:—

17 Your 13 and my 9. War Office report that a further contingent will be ready to sail on 23rd April. War Office has been informed that contingent ready on 18th April must wait for that ready on 23rd April and both sail together under convoy of *Cumberland*.

(f) Minister of Militia to War Office, 6.4.15:—

Only two steamers are available and the number of troops has to be correspondingly reduced. Can you receive them about 2nd May . . .

(g) Minister of Militia to War Office, 7.4.15:—

Northland and *Grampian* are already engaged to take the first group which sails on 18th April. Cancelling this arrangement would mean much inconvenience and profitless expenditure. In the circumstances, may the arrangement already made for the first group hold good, and may the second group if possible sail in two ships on 23rd April as was originally intended.

(h) War Office to Minister of Militia, 8.4.15:—

As we previously informed you, the first and second groups should sail together under one escort, and 23rd April should be adhered to as the date of departure of both groups since the second group will be ready on that date . . .

(i) Minister of Militia to War Office, 9.4.15:—

Will you please reconsider your decision as arrangements have already been closed for the *Grampian* and *Northland* to sail with the first group on 18th April . . .

(j) War Office to Minister of Militia, 9.4.15:—

The despatch of first group of Second Contingent in the *Northland* and *Grampian* on 18th April is agreed to, and an escort for them is being arranged for that date by the Admiralty. It is not possible to say when the escort for the second group will be available at present.

(k) Dockyard, Halifax, to Adty., 19.4.15:—

Grampian and *Northland* sailed with troops.

(l) Adty. to Dockyard, Halifax, 19.4.15:—

Did *Cumberland* sail with *Grampian* and *Northland*.

(m) R.A. Hornby to Adty., 21.4.15:—

Cumberland will leave 11 p.m., 20th April, overtaking transports on track 20 miles north of blue 10 and conveying them to England.

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- (1) O.U.6031. Operations leading up to the Battle of Coronel.
- (2) O.U.6029. The German Cruiser Squadrons in the Pacific, 1914.
- (3) O.U.6038. Operations leading up to the Battle of the Falkland Islands, November 1914.
- (4) O.U.6040. *Cancelled.*
- (5) O.U.6039. Naval Operations in the Cameroons, 1914.
- (6) C.B.1537. Naval Movements, August 1914, associated with the Transport of the British Expeditionary Force.
- (7) C.B.1549. The Patrol Flotillas at the commencement of the War.
- (8) C.B.1552. Naval Operations connected with the Raid on the North-East Coast, 16 December 1914.
- (9) C.B.1555. A History of the White Sea Station, 1914-1919.
- (10) C.B.1558. Naval Operations on the East Coast of Africa, August 1914, to July 1915.
- (11) C.B.1571. The Battle of Heligoland Bight, 28 August 1914.
- (12) C.B.1573. The Action of Dogger Bank, 24 January 1915.
- (13) C.B. 923. Summary of the Operations of the Grand Fleet, August 1914 to November 1916.
- (14) C.B. 926. The First Australasian Convoy, 1914.
- (15) C.B. 931. Naval Operations in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf, from the Outbreak of War to the Fall of Kut, 29 April 1916.
- (16) C.B. 930. The China Squadron, 1914 (including the *Emden* hunt).
- (17) C.B. 929. The East Indies Squadron, 1914.
- (18) C.B. 936A. The Dover Command, Vol. I.
- (19) C.B. 935. The 10th Cruiser Squadron during the Command of Admiral de Chair, 1914-1916.
- (20) C.B. 939. The Cape of Good Hope Squadron, 1914.
- (21) C.B. 948A. The Mediterranean, 1914-1915.
- (22) C.B. 956. The Atlantic Ocean, 1914.
- (25) C.B. 955. The Baltic, 1914.
- (26) C.B. 956A. The Atlantic Ocean from the Battle of Falklands to May 1915.

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- (23) Home Waters, August 1914.
- (24) Home Waters, September to December 1914.

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G Great Belt. Mining of Germans
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B Bombardments 18" gun Dover S. 37

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D Dresden in Last Hope Inlet Att II, p. 41.
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K Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse, Atlantic, p. 38
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