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NAVAL STAFF MONOGRAPHS
(HISTORICAL).
~~With Addendum to~~
FLEET ISSUE.

VOLUME III.

MONOGRAPH 6.—Passage of the British Expeditionary Force,
August, 1914.

MONOGRAPH 7.—The Patrol Flotillas at the Commencement
of the War.

MONOGRAPH 11.—The Battle of Heligoland Bight, August 28th,
1914.

MONOGRAPH 8.—Naval Operations connected with the Raid
on the North-East Coast, December 16th,
1914.

MONOGRAPH 12.—The Action of Dogger Bank, January 24th,
1915.

JULY 1921.

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NAVAL STAFF MONOGRAPHS (HISTORICAL).

FLEET ISSUE.

ERRATA.

- Page v.—Plan 5; for “4th” read “5th.”
,, vi.—Plan 3; for “1200” read “1206.”
,, 161.—3rd Flotilla 2nd Division; for “Lt.-Cdr. Basil
W. Lloyd Owen” read “Lt.-Cdr. Bruce
Lloyd Owen.”

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NAVAL STAFF,
TRAINING AND STAFF DUTIES DIVISION,
July 1921.

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TRAINING AND STAFF DUTIES DIVISION,
July 1921.

MONOGRAPH 6.

**THE PASSAGE OF THE BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE,
AUGUST, 1914.¹**

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¹ Late C.B. 1552.

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¹ Late C.B. 1573.THE PASSAGE OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE,
AUGUST, 1914.¹

INTRODUCTION.

This monograph covers the period August 4th to August 27th and deals more particularly with the Naval movements associated with the transport of the preliminary British Expeditionary Force, which covered the period August 9th to 23rd.

The subject has been treated from a Naval point of view and the paper, therefore, deals chiefly with the disposition of ships in Home Waters with the orders for the same and subsequent changes up to August 28th.

The paper must not be regarded as dealing with the subject from a transport point of view, and details of wharfage and harbour accommodation have not been included.

NOTE ON SOURCES.

1. Operations Division papers.

These give Commodore (T) and Commodore (S) orders to patrols, and other miscellaneous information bearing upon dispositions in Home Waters. Some of these are in Appendix C.

2. Positions and movements of Ships, Daily Returns in H.S. C 12, Volume I, August 17th to 31st, 1914.

States the movements of British ships if in harbour or at sea; but does not give detailed positions. Is not entirely reliable.

3. I.D. Daily Return of German, Austrian, and Italian ships.

4. Telegrams to and from Admiralty; bound in volumes in H.S. C.I.D. :—

H.S. 51 - - - - - August 1st to 4th.

H.S. 52 - - - - - August 5th to 7th.

H.S. 53 - - - - - August 8th to 11th.

&c.

H.S. 59 - - - - - September 1st to 4th.

All Home Waters telegrams are together, arranged chronologically; the page in the H.S. volume has been given in the Appendix A. to facilitate reference (*see p. 24*).

5. Inter-Departmental Conference Report, July 1914, drawn up by an Admiralty and War Office Committee. This was a pre-war report giving the plans and orders upon which the transport of B.E.F. was carried out. Extracts are in Appendix F.

6. Admiralty letter T. 9186/14 of October 2nd, 1914, with enclosures—a return sent to War Cabinet showing the progress of the transport of the Expeditionary Force. In Appendix G. (*see p. 66*).

7. Grand Fleet Narrative of Proceedings.

The daily report of C-in-C. giving movements and daily operations of Grand Fleet, but not of forces in the Southern North Sea or in Channel. Extracts are in Appendix D.

N.B.—V.A., Channel Fleet, did not send in any narrative of proceedings.

¹ Late C.B. 1537 : *Naval Movements in August, 1914, associated with the Transport of the British Expeditionary Force to France.*

8. Ships' Fair Logs.

9. Transport Departments Working Programme, Table of Transport Results.

These were obtained from the Ministry of Shipping from the old Transport Department records.

With personal interviews of officials who were in the Transport Department in 1914, they form the main source regarding the transport organisation.

10. Confidential Instructions to Transport Officers, Transport Regulations.

These were the Admiralty regulations upon which Transport Officers based their procedure.

CHAPTER I.

STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS ON OUTBREAK OF WAR.

1. *Preliminary Strategy.*—The outbreak of war with Germany found us not unprepared. The labours of a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, an organisation set on foot in 1911 to co-ordinate the work of the Departments of State, had produced a war book in which was detailed the action to be taken by each Department when war appeared threatening. The telegrams which put into action the various steps of the process from peace to war were decided upon and coded¹; and in each Department the staffs arranged the methods of carrying these steps into force. As regards the Navy, the general idea was to ensure the destruction of the enemy's naval forces and obtain command of the North Sea and Channel, with the object of preventing the enemy from making any serious attack upon British territory or trade or interfering with the transport of British troops to France should the situation necessitate their despatch.

The Home Fleets were organised in two battle fleets; one, the Grand Fleet, containing all "Dreadnoughts," "King Edward VII.'s," and modern ships, was to be stationed in northern waters resting upon the Scottish coast and islands, and the other, the Channel Fleet, consisting of battleships earlier than the "King Edward VII." class was to be stationed in the Channel. The Channel Fleet was to be based on Portland; the Grand Fleet was to take up a position between 1° east and 3° east and south of 58° N., approximately 200 miles east of Aberdeen. The main base and headquarters of the Grand Fleet was to be at Rosyth, with Cromarty and Scapa Flow as alternative fuelling bases, to which the Fleet should be taken from time to time, but during the period of strained relations Scapa Flow was to be used as a preliminary base.²

On the outbreak of war the Grand Fleet was to carry out frequent sweeps in the North Sea as far south as the 54th parallel with the idea of making the enemy realise that he could not venture far out of port without risk of encountering a superior force.³

Under the ægis of the Grand Fleet a cruiser force was to patrol east and north from the Shetlands, to deny the northern passage to enemy merchant vessels, whilst another force of cruisers was to patrol at the western end of the English Channel and deny that passage to the enemy.

2. *The Disposition of Channel Fleet, &c.*—The older battleships of the 2nd and 3rd Fleet, named the Channel Fleet, were to be stationed in the English Channel for the protection of the lines of military transport in that area, with the alternative duty of moving into the North Sea to co-operate with the Grand Fleet in attacking enemy transports if an invasion of the East Coast of England should be attempted.

At the southern end of the North Sea a force of modern destroyers was based on Harwich to patrol the waters between 52° N. and 54° N., to assist in the sweeps of the Grand Fleet or to join the Channel Fleet if the latter moved north. As a coastal defence force there were also patrol flotillas at the several dockyard ports, principal east coast ports, and across the Straits of Dover. The submarine flotillas were to work in conjunction with these patrol forces, except the latest boats, D's and E's, which were earmarked for offensive operations in the Heligoland Bight.

The Channel Fleet and forces west of Dover were to be under direct Admiralty control upon the outbreak of war, but to the C.-in-C., Grand Fleet, were left wide powers of discretion as to his particular strategy, together with control of the general disposition in the case of sweeps, subject to the proviso that he should always keep the Admiralty fully informed of his intentions and progress.

¹ For details, see Corbett; *Naval Operations*, Vol. I.

² Corbett: *Naval Operations I.*, p. 26.
³ Jellicoe: *The Grand Fleet*, p. 15.

3. *Change of Disposition.*—In the event of troops being sent to France, the Grand Fleet was to take up a position at sea to the southward of 56° N. (the latitude of the Forth) on the second day after the outbreak of war so as to be in a position to follow up and strike at the main battle squadron of the enemy should it attempt to interfere with any movement of British troops across the Channel.

The Fleet never actually, however, took up this position, for by the time war was declared at midnight on 4th–5th August its proposed dispositions had been changed. On July 28th the Grand Fleet was ordered by the Admiralty to leave Portland and proceed eastabout to its preliminary station, Scapa Flow.¹ Admiral Callaghan, who was then C.-in-C., repaired to the Admiralty, and presumably it was then decided to make Scapa Flow the principal war base instead of Rosyth, for, without further orders, this step was taken when war was declared, and the Fleet never took up its preliminary cruising position south of 58° N. Neither Scapa nor Rosyth possessed any anti-submarine defences, but the strong tides and difficult navigation of Orkney waters offered a certain amount of protection against submarine attacks, and this in conjunction with its greater distance from the enemy and its ample anchorage probably led to the selection of the former port. Admiral Jellicoe, then at the Admiralty as Second Sea Lord, went north on July 30th,² and subsequently took over the command of the Grand Fleet from Admiral Callaghan, hoisting his flag on August 4th. The Grand Fleet put to sea that day, and cruised in a position roughly between the Orkneys and Norway, and except for occasional sweeps to the south it remained between the latitude of 58° and 61° N. during the whole of August 1914.

4. *The Grand Fleet and High Seas Fleet.*³—The Grand Fleet in 1914 consisted of all our modern battleships and nearly all our modern cruisers and battle cruisers with the exception of three battle cruisers (“Indefatigable,” “Inflexible,” and “Indomitable”), the First C.S. and four light cruisers in the Mediterranean, H.M.A.S. “Australia” in Australian waters and the China squadron cruisers in the Far East. The whole available force of the German Navy was similarly concentrated in their home waters with the exception of one German battle cruiser and one light cruiser in the Mediterranean, two cruisers and two light cruisers in China, and four other light cruisers in the Pacific, Atlantic or East African waters. The relative strength of the two forces facing each other across the North Sea on August 4th, 1914, was as follows :—

	Great Britain.	Germany.
Dreadnoughts	20	13
Pre-Dreadnoughts	11	16
Battle cruisers	4	3
Cruisers	9	2
Light cruisers	12	15
Destroyers	42	88
Airships	0	1

The greater portion of the German Fleet was in the Jade River, the Battle Fleet having moved through the Kiel Canal on August 2nd, leaving in the Baltic only the older pre-Dreadnought battleships and the cruisers of the

At least 48 hours were needed to recall, coal and concentrate squadrons from the Baltic.⁽⁴⁾ The six newest battleships, forming the 3rd squadron, had to be lightened by discharging a great part of their coal before they could pass through the Canal.

¹ Admiral Jellicoe went north ostensibly as second in command, but apparently according to the intention of the Admiralty as C.-in-C. designate. He reached Scapa on August 2nd, and reported himself to the C.-in-C., Admiral Callaghan. Two days later, on August 4th, about 4 a.m., he received orders to open a secret envelope containing his appointment as C.-in-C. of the Grand Fleet, and took over the command from Sir George Callaghan, who struck his

sea at once. See Jellicoe, *The Grand Fleet*.

Tels. 22, 34, 35. Grand Fleet Narrative.

³ See Appendix B. The tabulated strength of the two fleets is taken from Jellicoe's *Grand Fleet, 1914–16*, page 31, 1st edition, and “Daily Return of Foreign Men-of-War, August 1914.” The number of ships changed slightly from time to time during August, *vide* Chapter III.

Further west a light force was based on the Ems River, consisting of two, sometimes three, light cruisers; and Heligoland and Sylt were bases for smaller patrol craft.

With the exception of the Baltic ships, all German naval forces were concentrated in August 1914 in the triangle Ems River, Sylt and River Jade.

The strategy on which the British dispositions was based can be most conveniently summarised by considering it with regard to these assumed objectives.

5. *Enemy Objectives: Comparison with our Dispositions.*—It was considered that there were three probable objectives on the part of the enemy in the North Sea :—

- (1) To break out of the North Sea in order to attack our trade.
- (2) To raid our East Coast, either on a small scale as a raid, or on a large scale as an invasion.
- (3) To attack in the Channel the transports moving to France.

The strategy on which the British dispositions was based can be most conveniently summarised by considering it with regard to these assumed objectives.

If the Germans attempted their first assumed objective, namely, to break out of the North Sea to attack trade, the whole Grand Fleet lay across their path and the cruiser forces on patrol completed what was practically a distant blockade of the Heligoland Bight.

If the Germans attempted to break through the Straits of Dover to attack Channel communications or the trade in the Channel, the Harwich flotillas constituted an outpost to give warning of their approach and enable the cross-Channel transport to be stopped in time and behind them were lines of submarines and the Dover Patrol in a position to report and attack the enemy. Cruiser Force C. supported the Harwich flotilla and the Channel Fleet protected the transport in the Channel from cruiser attack. If the attack was from the west instead of the east—and it was considered that minelayers and armed merchant ships might be used for this purpose—a cruiser force at the western entrance to the Channel and some French submarines were disposed so as to co-operate with the Channel Battle Fleet in defending the passage.

Finally if a raid or invasion of the English coast was attempted, the local defence flotillas would form one line of observation and defence; the Channel Fleet, preceded by the Harwich flotillas, would be in a position to move into the North Sea to attack the raiding force if the raid was not too far to the northward; and the Grand Fleet could move south to follow up the main battle squadron of the enemy. This was also the strategy contemplated in the event of a powerful force moving south to attack the Channel communications.

6. *British Expeditionary Force authorised.*—On August 5th, 1914, a War Council decided that five army divisions (four infantry and one cavalry division) were to be sent to France; the commencement of the transportation was fixed first of all for August 7th, but was changed later to August 9th, as the military arrangements could not be completed before that date. By this time, the Fleets in home waters had already taken up their war stations, and the initial critical period which had been regarded as presenting a possible opportunity for a great offensive stroke by the German Fleet had passed without any special signs of activity. Apparently the Germans were so confident of achieving military success on the continent that they were not inclined to accept the risks of a naval offensive in the face of our superior forces, and the Expeditionary Force commenced to move across the Channel in safety and unharassed by enemy attack; but the threat was none the less present and had to be anticipated.

3. *Change of Disposition.*—In the event of troops being sent to France, the Grand Fleet was to take up a position at sea to the southward of 56° N. (the latitude of the Forth) on the second day after the outbreak of war so as to be in a position to follow up and strike at the main battle squadron of the enemy should it attempt to interfere with any movement of British troops across the Channel.

The Fleet never actually, however, took up this position, for by the time war was declared at midnight on 4th–5th August its proposed dispositions had been changed. On July 28th the Grand Fleet was ordered by the Admiralty to leave Portland and proceed eastabout to its preliminary station, Scapa Flow.¹ Admiral Callaghan, who was then C.-in-C., repaired to the Admiralty, and presumably it was then decided to make Scapa Flow the principal war base instead of Rosyth, for, without further orders, this step was taken when war was declared, and the Fleet never took up its preliminary cruising position south of 58° N. Neither Scapa nor Rosyth possessed any anti-submarine defences, but the strong tides and difficult navigation of Orkney waters offered a certain amount of protection against submarine attacks, and this in conjunction with its greater distance from the enemy and its ample anchorage probably led to the selection of the former port. Admiral Jellicoe, then at the Admiralty as Second Sea Lord, went north on July 30th,² and subsequently took over the command of the Grand Fleet from Admiral Callaghan, hoisting his flag on August 4th. The Grand Fleet put to sea that day, and cruised in a position roughly between the Orkneys and Norway, and except for occasional sweeps to the south it remained between the latitude of 58° and 61° N. during the whole of August 1914.

4. *The Grand Fleet and High Seas Fleet.*³—The Grand Fleet in 1914 consisted of all our modern battleships and nearly all our modern cruisers and battle cruisers with the exception of three battle cruisers (“Indefatigable,” “Inflexible,” and “Indomitable”), the First C.S. and four light cruisers in the Mediterranean, H.M.A.S. “Australia” in Australian waters and the China squadron cruisers in the Far East. The whole available force of the German Navy was similarly concentrated in their home waters with the exception of one German battle cruiser and one light cruiser in the Mediterranean, two cruisers and two light cruisers in China, and four other light cruisers in the Pacific, Atlantic or East African waters. The relative strength of the two forces facing each other across the North Sea on August 4th, 1914, was as follows:—

	Great Britain.	Germany.
Dreadnoughts	20	13
Pre-Dreadnoughts	11	16
Battle cruisers	4	3
Cruisers	9	2
Light cruisers	12	15
Destroyers	42	88
Airships	0	1

The greater portion of the German Fleet was in the Jade River, the Battle Fleet having moved through the Kiel Canal on August 2nd, leaving in the Baltic only the older pre-Dreadnought battleships and the cruisers of the same period, though these could be moved through the Canal into the North Sea at short notice, the passage for an average ship taking about 14 hours.

* — SEE ATTACHED —

¹ Tels. 2, 8, 16.

² Admiral Jellicoe went north ostensibly as second in command, but apparently according to the intention of the Admiralty as C.-in-C. designate. He reached Scapa on August 2nd, and reported himself to the C.-in-C., Admiral Callaghan. Two days later, on August 4th, about 4 a.m., he received orders to open a secret envelope containing his appointment as C.-in-C. of the Grand Fleet, and took over the command from Sir George Callaghan, who struck his

flag at 8.30 a.m., the Fleet proceeding to sea at once. See Jellicoe, *The Grand Fleet*.

Tels. 22, 34, 35. Grand Fleet Narrative.

³ See Appendix B. The tabulated strength of the two fleets is taken from Jellicoe's *Grand Fleet*, 1914–16, page 31, 1st edition, and “Daily Return of Foreign Men-of-War, August 1914.” The number of ships changed slightly from time to time during August, *vide* Chapter III.

Further west a light force was based on the Ems River, consisting of two, sometimes three, light cruisers; and Heligoland and Sylt were bases for smaller patrol craft.

With the exception of the Baltic ships, all German naval forces were concentrated in August 1914 in the triangle Ems River, Sylt and River Jade.

The strategy on which the British dispositions was based can be most conveniently summarised by considering it with regard to these assumed objectives.

5. *Enemy Objectives: Comparison with our Dispositions.*—It was considered that there were three probable objectives on the part of the enemy in the North Sea:—

- (1) To break out of the North Sea in order to attack our trade.
- (2) To raid our East Coast, either on a small scale as a raid, or on a large scale as an invasion.
- (3) To attack in the Channel the transports moving to France.

The strategy on which the British dispositions was based can be most conveniently summarised by considering it with regard to these assumed objectives.

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Finally if a raid or invasion of the English coast was attempted, the local defence flotillas would form one line of observation and defence; the Channel Fleet, preceded by the Harwich flotillas, would be in a position to move into the North Sea to attack the raiding force if the raid was not too far to the northward; and the Grand Fleet could move south to follow up the main battle squadron of the enemy. This was also the strategy contemplated in the event of a powerful force moving south to attack the Channel communications.

6. *British Expeditionary Force authorised.*—On August 5th, 1914, a War Council decided that five army divisions (four infantry and one cavalry division) were to be sent to France; the commencement of the transportation was fixed first of all for August 7th, but was changed later to August 9th, as the military arrangements could not be completed before that date. By this time the German waters had already taken up their war stations, and the German Fleet, which had been regarded as presenting a serious threat to our superior force, had moved across the Channel in safety. The threat was none the less present and had

Force, with Mr. (now Sir) Graeme Thompson, Superintending Clerk in the Transport Department, as his assistant. Linking the Transport Department to the Masters of individual transports, there were Transport Officers appointed at each port. These officers were mainly retired naval officers, who in peace time had had short courses of instruction in transport work, and were more or less familiar with their duties and the proposed organisation for transporting the Expeditionary Force. They had the direction at their ports of the vessels requisitioned for transport service.

The Transport Department had prepared lists before the war of all British vessels suitable for the work, including in the list full details of each vessel, obtained from owners before the war. The vessels were classified for particular purposes—freight ship (men), freight ship (stores), frozen meat ships, horse transports, &c., &c.—according to their construction and suitability.

Of these vessels a certain number at any moment were abroad, a certain number in home waters, some with a full cargo, some empty, some half empty, &c.; a list had therefore been kept up to date daily of the vessels immediately available, the information being largely obtained through the Customs House officials.¹

10. On August 5th and 6th, telegrams were sent to the ships immediately available, requisitioning them for transport service, and directing them to particular ports. In the majority of cases the ships were to sail direct for the embarkation ports, freight ships (men) to Southampton, freight ships (stores) to Newhaven, &c., but a few vessels had first to go to "fitting ports." These were London, Southampton, Liverpool, and Glasgow, where before war there had been collected and stored such "fittings" as were required to convert a vessel for transport duties. Horse transports required most alteration in order to provide horse stalls; the ordinary troop and store ships required little alteration having their necessary fittings added to them whilst they were at the port of embarkation, rebunkering, loading, or raising steam. The fittings for a troop ship consisted only of boilers for hot water, a few washing basins, &c., and some upper deck latrines, which were placed on board in about 48 hours; the horse ships fittings took nearer four to six days² and ambulance carriers—big passenger liners converted temporarily into hospital ships for service during the three to four weeks that it took to prepare proper hospital ships—required 24 to 36 hours to fit out.

The vessels which were required for the first six days of embarkation when infantry were being transported (*see later*) had only to proceed from the ports where they were on 5th August direct to Southampton or Newhaven. As many vessels as were necessary were obtained in this way, but there was practically no reserve beyond two or three spare ships arising from the margin used in estimating the cargo that each ship could carry.

The total sailings programmed for August 9th to August 22nd inclusive, or up to the end of the 14th day of embarkation was 359, and 358 sailings were actually completed by the end of the 15th day of embarkation, August 23rd. During this period, August 9th to 23rd, the average number of sailings per day was 24, or a total gross tonnage of 1,340,575 tons, representing a daily average of nearly 90,000 tons.

The dates August 9th and August 23rd may be considered the first and final days of the Transport of the original Expeditionary Force, and this was also the period during which the naval forces were continuously disposed to cover the passage, and the period when the tonnage crossing the Channel for this stage of the war, reached its highest average.

11. *Organisation at Ports of Embarkation and Disembarkation.*—At the several ports of embarkation both in the United Kingdom and in France, transport officers were appointed, in accordance with pre-war organisation, early in August 1914.

These officers had various publications issued to them to guide them in the execution of their duties, which dealt fully with the various stages of a transport

¹ The information embodied in these paragraphs concerning the transport organisation has been derived partly from interviews with officials in the Ministry of Shipping, 1919, who had been in the Transport Department in 1914, and partly from various papers, Transport Regulations, &c., dealing with the subject.

² After certain delays, Treasury approval to construct and store wood partitions for use as horse stalls was obtained (about November 1913?) and delivery was commenced in April 1914. By August 4th, 1914, delivery at the "fitting" ports was nearly complete. If these fittings had not been ready the transport of the cavalry would have been very difficult.

operation, and it remained for the Transport Officers to see the orders executed, and to give individual transports directions where and when to move.¹

12. *Time Table of Movements and General Plan of Transport carried out.*—Having collected the transports at the ports of embarkation the next step was to move them to France in accordance with the programme. On August 8th, 1914, a programme was issued² arranging the sailings in accordance with the War Cabinet's decision. Most of the force was to sail from Southampton, but the 5th Division who were stationed in Ireland sailed from Dublin on August 13th and 15th direct to Havre, whilst a few other transports sailed from Queenstown and Belfast between August 13th and 21st carrying miscellaneous troop detachments, horses, and stores, which at the time were in Ireland.³ In order to retain two Divisions in England for Home Defence the 4th Infantry Division was taken out of the Expeditionary Force programme, and the 6th Infantry Division on August 12th was ordered from Ireland to England instead of to France. It moved from Queenstown, Dublin and Belfast to Fishguard, Holyhead and Liverpool, on August 14th to 16th, principally in the steamers of the railway companies, though a few transports were "lent" in addition for the purpose. Generally, its transport did not come under the direction of the Admiralty Transport Department, and it was not included in the programme.

The Transport Department possessed a reserve over pre-war estimates owing to the 4th and 6th Infantry Division having been omitted from the programme, but on August 18th the former was ordered to France and entered the programme on the 14th day of embarkation, though no arrangements for it had been made in the programme of August 8th.

The pre-war programme of movements had been as follows⁴:—

On the first, second and third days of embarkation the staffs and units necessary for duty on the lines of communication, &c., were to be transported; on fourth, fifth, and sixth days the infantry, less the 4th Division, were to embark; on the seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh days the cavalry and other units not in infantry divisions were to embark; on the twelfth and thirteenth days the 4th Infantry Division was to embark, and finally on the thirteenth and on the fourteenth days of embarkation base detachments were to be moved. The stores were to be moved concurrently.

The movements actually carried out did not differ very greatly from the pre-war programme, the only important variation being that the 4th Division when replaced in the programme was inserted on the fourteenth and fifteenth days of embarkation, the units programmed for these days being transferred to the twelfth and thirteenth days, which was rendered possible by the omission of the 4th Division and the general absence of delay.

In terms of dates, then, the moves actually carried out were:—

August 6th, 7th, 8th:—

Before programme. A few advanced detachments.

August 9th, 10th, and 11th:—

First, second, and third days of embarkation. Staffs, units for lines of communication, &c.

August 12th, 13th, and 14th:—

Fourth, fifth, and sixth days. 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 5th Infantry Divisions.

August 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th:—

Seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh days. 1st Cavalry Division, 5th Cavalry Brigade. Various units.

August 20th, 21st:—

Twelfth and thirteenth days. Base detachments.

¹ Transport Regulations, 1908 Edition, corrected to December 1913.
Regulations for H.M. Transport Service, 214 pages.
Instructions to Masters of Transports, 53 pages.
Instructions to Masters of Freight Ships (men), 10 pages.
Instructions to Officers of Transport Service, 38 pages.
Instructions to Officers of Transport Service (including Principal Transport Officers), 6 pages.

Instructions to Divisional Transport Officers, 1 page.
Instructions to Transport Officer in Charge of a Transport, 7 pages.
Instructions for Superintending Transport Officer, 22 pages.

² See Copy of programme in Appendix F2.

³ Enclosure to M.0070 of August 1914; see Appendix G2.

⁴ Para. 22 of pre-war Transport Conference Report in Appendix F1.

August 22nd, 23rd :—

Fourteenth and fifteenth days. 4th Infantry Division.

After August 23rd :—

Reinforcements, &c.

By the eighth or ninth day of embarkation, that is August 16th or 17th, a certain margin of time had been gained as troops had been embarking and transports sailing a few hours ahead of schedule. As soon as transports were ready, whether by day or night, they had sailed, subject of course to considerations of weather, pilotage and tide, and so the movements after the first few days were actually slightly ahead of the programme, and when referring to the above table for the date of a movement this should be remembered. For example, a proportion of the cavalry commenced to move on August 14th while the transportation of the infantry divisions was being completed although the "official" first day of embarkation for the cavalry was August 15th, but as some units of the cavalry division were still moving on August 19th, its dates of movement may be taken as the 15th to 19th August.

13. The number of transports engaged in carrying the British Expeditionary Force and its stores was 240 vessels. Of these, the majority made more than one passage, some making as many as nine between August 9th and 31st.¹

No transports were lost during the passage either by accident or by enemy action, and the Transport Department's working programme, which was drawn up on August 5th, required no modification on this account.

The organisation at the ports was controlled by the local transport officers as regards ordering particular transports to enter or to sail, providing them with pilots, &c., and in France the P.N.T.O., at Havre, exercised a general control over the N.T.O.'s at other ports. The decision as to whether troop transports should stop at Havre or proceed up the river to Rouen was in the hands of the N.T.O., Havre, who consulted with the military authorities in order to adjust disembarkation to the convenience of rail concentration.

The principle upon which the transports sailed and made their cross-channel passage is summarised in the Admiralty telegram to C.-in-C., Portsmouth, of 9th August² :—

"The transports will sail singly and not in groups, and make their best way from point to point. Patrol should not try to accompany each individual ship, but should be on the line in touch with each other, so as to be ready to be called up, if required."

The Patrol referred to was the Portsmouth life-saving patrol (*see* para. 30) which worked along the Southampton to Havre route. The transports, therefore, at all the ports of embarkation in England, Ireland, and Scotland, loaded up according to the military programme, sailed as soon as ready by the direction of the Transport Officer of the port, made their way as weather and tide permitted direct to their port of disembarkation, in most cases Havre or Boulogne, and there, after receiving orders from the Transport Officer to enter the port, unloaded their shipment of troops or stores, and returned to an embarkation port in the United Kingdom. To assist troop transports the port of Southampton was closed to commercial shipping from August 5th to 23rd and again on August 26th (Tels. 47, 215, 217).

Since no interference was attempted by the enemy, there is little to be said about the actual passage of the transports other than the plain fact that they were navigated from the United Kingdom to France without any incident of importance.

On August 21st the transport of the four Infantry Divisions and the 1st Cavalry Division, as authorised on August 5th by the War Council, was completed, and by August 23rd the 4th Infantry Division also had been transported to France. By August 23rd, then, the original British Expeditionary Force was landed in France and until September 8th, when the 6th Division was sent across, only reinforcements and minor detachments were being transported.

During this period there had been 358 sailings or a daily average of 24, by which 100,000 men and 12,000 cavalry had been transported, and over 120,000 tons of stores,⁴ requiring altogether a daily average of 90,000 tons of transport, or a total gross tonnage of 1,340,575 tons.⁵

¹ See Table in Appendix G3.

² Tel. 76.

³ The Press Bureau on August 18th announced that the B.E.F. had landed in France on August 16th, but for the reasons stated in this chapter, August 9th to 23rd are con-

sidered to be the more correct dates of the transport.

⁴ This figure has been roughly calculated from the working programme.

⁵ Appendix G1.

CHAPTER III.

DISPOSITION OF FORCES COVERING THE MOVEMENT.

14. In Chapter I. the general disposition of all squadrons in Home Waters during the passage of the British Expeditionary Force was reviewed, and it now remains to give the more detailed disposition of the ships actually covering the movement in the Channel.

The forces on patrol, enumerated from the westward, were :—

- (a) 12th C.S. (Cruiser Force G.) and French 2nd Light Squadron (on the western patrol).
- (b) Vice-Admiral Bethell's 3rd Fleet Battle Squadron (8th B.S.).
- (c) French line of submarines—Cape de la Hague to Portland.
- (d) Portsmouth Life Saving Patrol, on line Southampton to Havre.
- (e) Vice-Admiral Burney's 2nd Fleet Battle Squadron. (5th B.S.)
- (f) Cruiser Force C. (under Rear-Admiral Christian), "Bacchante," "Euryalus," "Aboukir," "Cressy" and "Hogue."
- (g) Dover Patrol (6th Destroyer Flotilla). French local defence flotillas at Calais and Dunkerque.
- (h) 4th and 8th Submarine Flotillas.
- (i) Harwich Destroyer Flotillas (1st and 3rd) on Broad Fourteens.

In addition the 11th Cruiser Squadron was on patrol in the Irish Channel, and there was, of course, the Grand Fleet in the Northern North Sea.

The composition and distribution of these forces was as follows :—

12th Cruiser Squadron, and French 2nd Light Squadron.⁴—Under the command of Rear-Admiral R. Wemyss were the "Charybdis," "Talbot," "Diana" and "Eclipse," which sailed from Devonport on August 4th, and joined at the western entrance of the Channel the French ships of the 2nd Light Squadron under Admiral Rouyer.¹

This latter force consisted of ten cruisers and four light cruisers based on Cherbourg and Brest, and contained all French ships in the Channel area except torpedo craft, for the greater part of the French Navy, including all their battleships, was concentrated in the Mediterranean.

This combined force continued on patrol from Ushant to Land's End from August 4th to August 24th, or during the whole period of passage of the first Expeditionary Force. The French patrolled the southern part of the line across the Channel and the 12th Cruiser Squadron the northern part, with the two flagships next to one another in the centre, while four of the large French cruisers were disposed to the eastward as a support ready to move to any threatened part of the line.¹ In addition to protecting the passage of the British Expeditionary Force these two squadrons carried out the control of traffic and trade at the mouth of the Channel stopping and examining all vessels on their way up; the active work of the cruisers almost wholly consisted in this latter duty.

The Admiralty laid special emphasis on the importance of searching all ships as a precaution against minelaying, and directed Admiral Wemyss to use Falmouth as an examination base for this purpose,² but the importance of the free and undisturbed continuance of trade led to this stringency of examination being relaxed later in the month. This western patrol served as a cruiser screen against the approach of a raiding force or minelayers from the Atlantic, for though no German men-of-war were thought to be in the North Atlantic in August 1914 armed merchantmen were expected to operate there as soon as hostilities commenced.³

15. 2nd and 3rd Fleet Battle Squadrons (Channel Fleet).—These squadrons were the naval force immediately covering the transport of the British Expeditionary Force.

During peace time the 2nd Fleet had consisted of old ships kept in commission with a nucleus crew, and the 3rd Fleet of still older ships with only a care and maintenance party on board.

¹ Corbett : *Naval operations*, I., p. 40.

² Tel. 58, August 8th, 1914.

³ AS 8794

⁴ Tel. 36, August 4th, 1914.

⁵ Appendix B2, B3.

Vice-Admiral Sir C. Burney was in command of the 2nd and 3rd Fleets and, on the outbreak of war, Vice-Admiral Bethell was appointed from the War College to hoist his flag in the "Prince George" as Admiral Commanding the 3rd Fleet under the general command of Vice-Admiral Burney in accordance with War Orders.

The 2nd Fleet was composed of the 5th and 6th Battle Squadrons, and the 3rd Fleet of the 7th and 8th, but on the 8th August they were re-organised, the 6th Battle Squadron ceasing to exist, and the 7th Battle Squadron being merged into the 8th.¹

For operational purposes this left Vice-Admiral Burney in command of the 5th Battle Squadron of 10 Second Fleet ships:—

"Lord Nelson" (Fleet Flag),	"Implacable,"
"Prince of Wales" (Squadron Flag),	"Irresistable,"
"Agamemnon,"	"Venerable,"
"Queen" (Squadron 2nd Flag),	"London,"
"Formidable,"	"Bulwark,"

with two attached cruisers, "Topaze" and "Diamond."

Vice-Admiral Bethell was left with the 8th Battle Squadron of eight 3rd Fleet ships—

"Prince George" (Flag),	"Vengeance" (Flag after August 15th),
"Caesar,"	"Goliath,"
"Jupiter,"	"Canopus,"
"Albion,"	"Ocean,"

with "Proserpine" attached.

Several other battleships which were originally in these two commands were detached for other duties before the passage of the British Expeditionary Force began,² viz., the "Illustrious" reduced to "care and maintenance party" to provide crew for the "Erin"; the "Hannibal" and "Magnificent," sent to Scapa as harbour defence ships; and the "Victorious" and "Mars" to Grimsby for the same purpose.

16. The 2nd and 3rd Fleet Battle Squadrons assembled at Portland between August 3rd and 6th as soon as they were ready for sea, having been ordered to complete to full numbers on July 27th and 28th,³ and were concentrated there in the above strength before the passage of the Expeditionary Force commenced on August 9th.

On August 8th orders were sent from the Admiralty to Vice-Admiral Burney charging him with the duty of covering the movement of the British Expeditionary Force, and suggesting that he should place his ships near the western end of the Varne and Ridge Shoals, which are between Dungeness and Boulogne, not far west of the narrowest part of the Dover Straits, and rather nearer the French than the English coast, as this would be a very favourable position to meet a raiding force, enabling him to deploy his fleet ready to receive them on a narrow front.⁴ Vice-Admiral Bethell was given separate orders to support the transports on the western side of the line from Southampton and Havre,⁵ and in accordance with these orders the two battle squadrons sailed from Portland on August 8th and 9th.

The reason of these dispositions was plain. There were two main lines of passage—Newhaven to Boulogne for stores and Southampton to Havre for troops.

The 5th, the stronger Battle Squadron, Vice-Admiral Burney's, was placed on the Newhaven-Boulogne line, which was the nearest to the expected source of danger—a raid from the North Sea—and thereby covered both lines, whilst the 8th Squadron, under Vice-Admiral Bethell, was placed near the line Southampton to Havre in close proximity to the transports and protecting them against a raid from the Atlantic.

¹ The 6th Battle Squadron consisted of the "Russell" (*) (Flag), "Cornwallis," "Albemarle," (*) "Duncan," "Exmouth," (*) and "Vengeance." Those marked (*) went to Grand Fleet on August 7th, 1914. The "Cornwallis" and "Duncan" were in dock not commissioned, and the "Vengeance" joined the 8th Battle Squadron. The 7th B.S. consisted of the "Prince George" (Flag), "Caesar,"

"Jupiter," and "Majestic." The "Jupiter" and "Majestic" were in dock-yard hands, and the "Prince George" and "Caesar" were attached to the 8th Battle Squadron. (See Appendix B4, p. 51.)

² Position and movements of H.M. ships in H.S.C. 12, Vol. 1.

³ Tel. 8.

⁴ Orders of August 8th, 1914, Appendix A. 63.

⁵ Tel. 64.

This was the disposition by day. By night the 5th Battle Squadron joined Cruiser Force C, concentrating at 7 p.m. in a position lat. 50° 45' N., long. 1° E., called Position A, off Dungeness,¹ moving to the south-west during the first half of the night and returning towards Dungeness so as to arrive at "A" again at 5 a.m. By day distant touch was kept with Cruiser Force C, which patrolled during the day between Dungeness and Vergoyer Shoals a few miles ahead of the battle squadron. Meanwhile the 8th Battle Squadron remained west of the 5th Battle Squadron and patrolled by night and day near the Southampton-Havre line, along which the troop transports were continuously moving. One ship at a time from both battle squadrons was sent in to coal, the 5th Battle Squadron using Portsmouth or occasionally Dover, whilst the 8th Battle Squadron used Portland as their base.²

17. On August 10th the Admiralty approved a suggestion from Vice-Admiral Bethell that his patrol line should be withdrawn to between St. Albans and Cape de la Hague, about 60 miles west of the Southampton-Havre line, and here the 8th Battle Squadron patrolled for two days.³ On August 12th the Admiralty withdrew this patrol altogether⁴ and Admiral Bethell took his squadron to Portland and until August 25th proceeded to sea only for firing exercises.

Until August 23rd the 5th Battle Squadron remained on their patrol, but on this date the Admiralty signalled that the main body of the Expeditionary Force would be across that afternoon and that the Channel Fleet could now be withdrawn and the 5th Battle Squadron proceeded to Portsmouth accordingly.⁵ Here half the squadron at a time were to rest with fires drawn at 48 hours' notice; but on August 25th the Ostende operations were initiated, and both the 5th Battle Squadron and the 8th Battle Squadron were sent to their home ports to embark marine detachments with which, on August 26th and 27th, they sailed for Ostende.⁶ But meanwhile the 8th Battle Squadron had been depleted of three battleships—the "Ocean," "Albion," and "Canopus"—which were required for the defence of trade in the Atlantic,⁷ and on August 20th these had been detached from Vice-Admiral Bethell's command to take up their new duties.

The movements of the Channel Fleet during the passage of the British Expeditionary Force were uneventful. The speed on patrol was seldom more than 7 knots, the lines of patrol were mostly regular "up and down" lines, and though the ships passed daily up and down the same area, no attack, either by submarines, destroyers, or by other craft, was attempted by the enemy.

18. *Cruiser Force C*.—Cruiser Force C consisted of the "Euryalus," "Bacchante," "Aboukir," and "Cressy," under the command of Rear-Admiral H. H. Campbell, to which the "Hogue" was added on August 11th.⁸ They were 2nd Fleet ships based on the Nore, their area of operations being the southern North Sea, where they were intended to act primarily as a supporting force to the light forces from Harwich, and acted later as a link between them and the Channel Fleet battle squadrons.

The force was completed to full complement by Admiralty orders of July 27th,⁹ and on August 5th, 6th, and 7th patrolled the Broad Fourteens from the North Hinder Light Vessel to Terschelling.¹⁰

On August 8th they were sent from the North Sea through the Straits of Dover to take up a patrol off Dungeness whilst the British Expeditionary Force was crossing. This patrol was from Dungeness to Vergoyer Shoal, some 10 miles south-west of Boulogne, during the daylight hours, covering the main stores route, Newhaven to Boulogne. Their patrol, therefore, was contiguous to Admiral Burney's 2nd Fleet

¹ Tel. 73.

² Daily positions of ships.

³ Tels. 86, 87.

⁴ Tel. 115.

⁵ Tel. 183.

⁶ Tel. 212.

⁷ Tel. 171.

⁸ Tel. 106. Appendix B2.

⁹ Tel. 8.

¹⁰ Broad Fourteens is an area of water off the Dutch coast of an average depth of 14 fathoms, running roughly in longitude 4° E. between lat. 53° N. (latitude of

Texel) and lat. 52° N. (latitude of the Hague). It has no defined limits, but the Haaks Light Vessel, 30 miles west of the Texel, and the Maas Light Vessel, 10 miles west of the Hague, may be considered its rough northern and southern limits. It is about 60 miles long by 20 to 30 miles wide, running parallel to and about 20 miles from the Dutch coast, and is about 80 miles from the coast of England. It constitutes the eastern side of the North Sea Narrows. Chart 2182 A.

Battle Squadron, and they acted both as a cruiser screen and as a link between him and the Dover Patrol and light forces further east.

At night, from 8.0 p.m. until midnight, they "conformed to the Battle Squadron's movements," and steamed to the south-westward, turning at midnight on to the opposite course until 4.0 a.m., when they resumed their daylight patrol at 6 to 8 knots off Dungeness.¹ One ship at a time was sent to Spithead or to the Nore to coal, until on August 15th the force left the Channel and proceeded into the North Sea to support the Harwich flotillas off the Texel during the Grand Fleet sweep of August 16th.²

On this day, Admiral Christian was placed in command of the forces in the southern North Sea.³

After August 16 Cruiser Force C did not return to the Channel, but from August 17th to 22nd were on patrol at the southern end of the North Sea, supporting the Harwich flotilla. On this patrol the Admiralty could consider them as still employed in covering the transport of the B.E.F., for they remained a link between the Harwich flotilla and the Channel Fleet, although more advanced than in the Dungeness position, and to the east instead of the west of the Dover Patrol and submarine lines.

19. On August 22nd two cruisers of this force were detached to Ostende with two divisions of the Harwich flotilla to make a demonstration from seaward against German troops who had reached the coast, but the force was withdrawn on the same evening.⁴

On the next day, August 23rd, the passage of the originally-planned British Expeditionary Force was complete, and the Admiralty gave orders that the watching patrol on the Broad Fourteens could be withdrawn⁵ and Cruiser Force C returned to the Nore by midday on the 24th. The following day, however, the Admiralty issued orders for a landing to be carried out at Ostende, and Cruiser Force C was directed to embark a marine detachment from Chatham, with which they sailed for Ostende at noon on the 26th, arriving at 8.0 p.m. that evening.⁶ The marines were landed, and at 4.0 p.m. the next day, August 27th, the cruisers left Ostende to take part in the Heligoland Bight operations, and proceeded to Terschelling Light Vessel, where they were on patrol throughout the 28th as a support to the Harwich flotilla, and covered the retirement of the forces; they did not actually come into action, but were of assistance in towing and escorting the damaged ships back to Sheerness; they returned to the Broad Fourteens on the night of August 30th, and remained in support of the Harwich destroyer patrols until the disastrous September 22nd, when the "Hogue," "Cressy," and "Aboukir" were sunk in quick succession by "U. 9" on this patrol.

20. *The Dover Patrol.*—From the beginning of the war the Dover Patrol fulfilled an important function. Dover was the pre war base of the 6th Destroyer Flotilla, consisting of "tribal" class and 30-knot destroyers, the 3rd and 4th submarine flotillas, four scouts, and two gunboats. This force took over the duty of patrolling the Straits of Dover from the night of August 1st to 2nd.⁷ Emphasis in its orders was laid on the importance of this force denying passage to the Straits of Dover to an enemy, or, if the enemy was in strength, of reporting his presence to the V.-A., Channel Fleet, and, further, instructions had been issued that coastal flotillas were not to be diverted from their patrol duties without direct orders from the Admiralty.

Commodore Ballard, as Admiral of Patrols, was in general command, but as he was also in charge of the East Coast patrols and frequently away from Dover, Captain Lowther Crofton acted as S.N.O. during his absence. Captain C. D. Johnson was Captain (D) of the 6th Flotilla.

¹ Tel. 73. The course usually steered was approximately S. 60° W. (mag.) from 8 p.m. to midnight, and N. 60° E. from midnight to 4 a.m. "Bacchante's" log, August 9th, 8.0 p.m. to midnight, S. 57° W.; midnight to 4.0 a.m., N. 57° E. Appendix E.

² Map III. (Omitted in this issue.)

³ He nominally had command of Cruiser Force C, the Harwich Flotilla, and the 8th Submarine Flotilla. (Tel. 127, 135, 159), and he hoisted his flag first in the "Sapphire" and then in the "Euryalus," Tel. 153. When in

the latter ship, he was always with Cruiser Force C, and being seldom in visual touch of the Harwich flotilla or the submarines, was practically in touch only with Cruiser Force C. Rear-Admiral Campbell, however, remained in command of the squadron with his flag flying in the "Bacchante."

⁴ Tels. 180, 182.

⁵ Tel. 184.

⁶ Tel. 212.

⁷ Tels. 25, 30.

The disposition of the Dover Patrol, as arranged before war, were as shown in Map, p. 70, and were largely governed by the configuration of the coast. The approach to the Straits of Dover from the east consists of three channels and two coastal routes, the latter hugging the Kent coast and the Flanders coast respectively.

There are four principal patches of shoal water forming these channels: (a) The Goodwin Sands (dries several feet); (b) The South Falls (least depth, 4½ fathoms); (c) The Sandettie Bank (least depth, 3¼ fathoms); (d) The Outer Ruytingen (least depth, 1¾ fathoms).

At Dover, the rise and fall in springs is 18 feet and in neaps 14 feet, and a destroyer, therefore, would be able to cross the South Falls and Sandettie with safety at high water, but at low water a battleship or large cruiser drawing from 24 to 32 feet of water would not be likely to risk crossing them. The distances between the shoals at the southern, which is the narrowest, end, are:—

	Miles.
Between Goodwins and South Falls - - - - -	6
Between South Falls and Sandettie - - - - -	5
Between Sandettie and Ruytingen - - - - -	4

Between the Goodwins and the coast of Kent lies the route through the Downs, which for nearly 10 miles is, on an average, little more than 1 mile broad; and in this route, frequented by traffic, there would be little chance of an enemy squadron passing through undetected.

Off the opposite coast, from Calais to Ostend, for about 45 miles, are numerous shoal banks, amongst which a navigable passage can be found inshore; but in thick weather or by night, for an enemy who could not be certain of what navigational marks had been altered, this would be a passage difficult and daring in a destroyer and foolhardy in a large ship.

The navigational difficulties, then, of the passage from the North Sea into the Channel are considerable in themselves, and restrict a squadron to the practical necessity of passing through one of three narrow passages which converge on to a front of only 14 miles broad.

Along this front, from the South Goodwins to Ruytingen, the Dover patrol was disposed,¹ whilst the French local destroyers, torpedo boats and submarines forming the *défense mobile* patrolled the French coastal route, and two gunboats, assisted by tugs and other craft, were in the Downs examining the traffic and available to watch the English coastal route. The disposition of the Dover patrol by day consisted of a line of five destroyers, supported by three scouts patrolling from the South Goodwins to the East of Ruytingen Bank, and by night of a force of 12 destroyers, patrolling in pairs between the Goodwins and Calais on a line marked by gas buoys, on patrols about 2 miles to and fro, supported by the three scouts to the south-westward.

By August 11th a drifter patrol had been organised and commenced that night to work from the Outer Dowsing Light Vessel (off the Wash) down to the Downs. Trawlers were in use as minesweepers, and the minelaying squadron of six Naiad's was concentrated at Dover but was not employed; the monitors and other ships that operated later on the Belgian coast did not arrive at Dover until September 1914, for in August 1914 there was no German base nearer than the Heligoland Bight.²

21. *Submarine Patrols.*—Except for a few B. and C. Class submarines stationed at the East and South coast ports as local defence craft, all British submarines in home waters were concentrated in the southern North Sea, and the latest boats D.'s and E.'s, forming the 8th Submarine Flotilla were based on Harwich under the command of Commodore (S) Roger Keyes.

This flotilla had been placed under the direction of the C.-in-C., H.F., whose orders were that they would be employed, as far as their numbers permitted, in offensive operations on the German coasts, initially in the Heligoland Bight.

On July 31st Commodore (S) proposed to the C.-in-C.,³ H.F., to send only two boats into the Bight, awaiting a favourable report from them before sending

¹ See Map, p. 70.

² An Airship patrol was maintained across the Straits of Dover, *vide* Tel. 62, and also an intermittent aeroplane patrol. Tel. 79.

³ See letter of Commodore (S) of those dates in Appendix C1.]

others. The remainder he proposed to place so as to be in a position to attack the German High Sea Fleet with a considerable number should it endeavour to dispute the passage of our Expeditionary Force.

In pursuance of this intention arrangements were made with Commodore (T) and with R.A., Cruiser Force C., to have submarines towed by the light cruisers and the armoured cruisers of those forces when they were on the Broad Fourteens patrol, and this was done from August 5th to 7th, after which the practice was abandoned.

Commodore (S) had not been in favour of sending submarines into the Bight which he regarded as a hazardous experiment and preferred to use them as a watching patrol in southern waters.

The patrol first proposed consisted of two pairs, one patrolling on a line 14 miles south-east of the Outer Gabbard, the other on a line 14 miles north-west of the North Hinder.

On August 8th, being strongly of opinion that the German High Sea Fleet would attack our Channel communications, Commodore (S) decided to increase his patrol to 10 boats, to shift it some 15 miles to the southward to patrol on two lines, one 15 miles south-east of the Galloper, the other 15 miles north-west of the West Hinder, evidently as constituting a better position in narrower waters for the interception of the German Fleet, while he himself in the "Lurcher" with Captain Waistell in the "Firedrake," Commander Somerville in the "Lennox," and Commander Palmer in the "Legion," would remain between the Galloper and West Hinder (a stretch of about 30 miles) till the transportation of the British Expeditionary Force was completed.¹

On August 9th, "E. 6" and "E. 8" returned from Heligoland Bight and Commodore (S) in reporting this arrival stated that they did not recommend further work in the Bight in view of the number of trawlers there fitted with wireless.²

After one day on the Galloper—West Hinder lines, Commodore (S) proposed to shift his patrol still further to the southward on to the line North Goodwin—Sandettie—Ruytingen, presumably in order to reduce still further the area covered and make more certain of sighting the enemy.³ This was not at first approved in view probably of the close proximity of the proposed line to the 4th Submarine Flotilla on the South Goodwin to Calais line, but on his again pointing out, at daylight on August 10th, that his disposition with only two scouting vessels did not ensure full use being made of his submarines,⁴ his proposal was approved and the patrol was finally brought down to the line North Goodwin—Sandettie—Ruytingen, that is practically to the mouth of Dover Straits and only 7 miles north of the Dover Patrol.

On the evening of August 10th the Admiralty informed Commodore (S) that the submarine patrol might need to be maintained for a fortnight,⁵ and that he was to arrange relief accordingly, but on August 12th they ordered him to withdraw half his D and E boats to Harwich,⁶ to fuel and to send two to Yarmouth in case of an attack on the Norfolk coast, and the next day, August 14th, Commodore (S) was told to withdraw the patrol altogether,⁷ evidently in order that they might take part in the Grand Fleet sweep on August 16th. From this time the 8th Submarine Flotilla was more or less regularly employed in offensive operations, co-operating with the Grand Fleet in their sweeps on August 16th and in the operations of August 28th, 1914.⁸

23. The 4th Submarine Flotilla of C boats based on Dover, was disposed about 7 miles south-west of the North Goodwins—Ruytingen line. This line which had been proposed in 1913 to act in conjunction with the Dover Patrol surface ships stretched from the South Goodwins towards Dunkerque,⁹ and remained unaltered except that the eastern end was dropped back 2 or 3 miles when the 8th Submarine Flotilla arrived on August 10th and the line assumed then was South Goodwins to Calais.

Nearly 15 miles further to the south-westward of these two submarine patrol lines there was a third line formed by the French submarines based on Calais. Their

¹ Commodore (S) to Chief of War Staff, August 8th, 1914, Appendix C4, p. 55.

² Tel. 68.

³ Tel. 71.

⁴ Tel. 82.

⁵ Tel. 95.

⁶ Tels. 116, 122.

⁷ Tel. 130.

⁸ Tel. 142.

⁹ See Map, p. 70.

patrol was across the south-east half of the Dover Straits only, from the Varne shoal in mid-channel to Cape Grisnez on the French coast 12 miles from Calais. This submarine patrol had been arranged in the pre-war dispositions, and was maintained without alteration throughout the passage of the British Expeditionary Force. All three of these submarine patrols were maintained by day only, the boats going into harbour by night or in some cases resting by buoys or lightships near to their patrol lines.

24. The Harwich Force.—Watching Patrol on the Broad Fourteens.

To the northward of the submarine lines, forming the advanced force nearest to the enemy, were the 1st and 3rd Flotillas from Harwich, consisting of 35 L Class and Ariel Class Destroyers and two Flotilla Cruisers,¹ under the command of Commodore (T) R. Y. Tyrwhitt.² The general duty of the flotillas was that of sweeping the area to the southward of 54° N. and to the east of 2° E. with the object of keeping the eastern approaches to the English Channel clear of enemy torpedo craft and minelayers, and also to reconnoitre and give early information of the movements of any enemy vessels sighted.

On August 5th the Harwich force left harbour to patrol this area and at about 11 a.m. met and sank the "Konigen Luise" laying mines east of the Shipwash Light Vessel. The next day H.M.S. "Amphion" struck a mine on this minefield on her way back to Harwich and sank. This minefield, described later as the Southwold area from 51° 55' N. to 52° 30' N. west of 3° east,³ had the effect of restricting the passage of an enemy moving from Heligoland Bight towards Dover to the Dutch coast side of the southern North Sea, *i.e.*, to the Broad Fourteens, for the Germans were uncertain of its exact location.

On August 9th, the first day of embarkation of the Expeditionary Force, the Harwich Force took up a slightly different patrol line from the one which they had assumed on August 5th. The orders for this patrol stated that its main object was to give information of the approach of a force which it is expected will be sent to oppose the landing of the Expeditionary Force on the continent. This patrol, called the watching patrol in later Admiralty telegrams, was maintained by one-half of the Harwich force at a time, *i.e.*, one destroyer flotilla of 12 to 18 vessels with the "Amethyst" or the "Fearless," and patrolled N.N.E. and S.S.W. from the Maas light vessel to the Haaks Light Vessel, on roughly a 30 mile front, with subdivisions 3 miles apart.

From August 15th, Rear-Admiral Christian was nominally in command of Cruiser Force C., Commodore (T) and Commodore (S),⁴ and Cruiser Force C. acted directly in support of the flotillas. On August 21st further support was given by the creation of Cruiser Force K., consisting of the two battle cruisers "Invincible" and "New Zealand," which were detached from the Grand Fleet to be based on the Humber acting under the general orders of the Admiralty as a powerful advanced

¹ "Fearless," Captain (D 1) and "Amethyst," Commodore (T). "Amphion," Captain (D 3) was sunk on August 5th, and was not replaced until "Faulknor" came in September. "Arethusa" relieved "Amethyst" on August 26th, 1914, sailing at dawn on 27th for the action of Heligoland Bight. Captain D 3's duties were shared by Commodore Tyrwhitt and Captain Blount (D 1).

² Commodore T's position was somewhat exceptional. His pre-war status was Commodore of the First Fleet Flotillas, *i.e.*, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Flotillas which were kept manned at full complement. He was to command the 1st and 3rd Flotillas operating from Harwich; the 2nd and 4th Flotillas were to join the Grand Fleet when war was probable. Before the war and nominally at first during the war he was still under the general direction of the C.-in-C., H.F., and

received his instructions from him. The C.-in-C., however, issued him no orders after August 4th, and on August 9th submitted that he should work directly under the Admiralty. He was placed temporarily under the orders of Rear-Admiral Christian on August 15th (Tel. 135, 159). The course of events first of all separated the Southern forces from C.-in-C., G.F.'s control, and eventually left Commodore (T) in command of the Harwich Force, responsible directly to the Admiralty. In August 1914 the port of Harwich was within the command of C.-in-C., Nore; Captain George C. Cayley, R.N., in command of Shotley Training Establishment was S.N.O. at Harwich.

³ Tel. 223.

⁴ Tel. 125, 135, August 15th, 1914; this states that Commodore (T) and (S) would come under his command temporarily, *cf.* Tel. 67.

cruiser force for the support of the combined force under Rear-Admiral Christian.¹

Cruiser Force K, however, did not go to sea until August 27th, when it took part in the Heligoland Bight operations, after which it went north to Rosyth and was re-absorbed in the Grand Fleet, leaving Cruiser Force C as the only immediate support of the Harwich flotillas.

During the Grand Fleet's sweep from the north towards the Heligoland Bight on August 15th-17th, the Harwich Flotilla were at sea near Terschelling co-operating with the Grand Fleet and supported by Cruiser Force C, but no enemy ships were sighted. The "watching patrol" was then resumed, and the next day, August 17th, 18th, the "Fearless," with the 1st Flotilla, sighted the "Rostock" when about 20' west of Haaks Light Vessel. No action, however, developed, as the enemy was thought to be the "Yorck," and the "Fearless" did not attempt to close her until the mistake was discovered too late.² In view of the position of the watching patrol being now known to the enemy, the area patrolled that night was further to the southward.³

25. Except for the above operations the watching patrol on the Broad Fourteens was continuously maintained during the rest of the period of the transportation of the British Expeditionary Force, from August 9th to August 23rd. On this latter date, August 23rd, the Admiralty ordered the patrol to be withdrawn and the destroyers and armoured cruisers returned respectively to Harwich and the Nore.⁴

On August 22 part of the Harwich force had been sent to demonstrate off Ostende as described in the account of Cruiser Force C's movements, but they returned to Harwich the same evening. For the next three days the main body of the flotillas were in harbour resting, and then at daylight on August 27th the whole force sailed to carry out the operations which resulted in the action in the Heligoland Bight of August 28th.

Returning from this on the night of 28th to 29th August the ships which had suffered most damage were sent in to be repaired and others short of ammunition and fuel to be repleted, whilst 12 of the boats readiest for action were retained on patrol.⁵ On August 29th all boats were sent in to oil as it was thought unlikely that the enemy would be active immediately after the action of August 28th, and when complete with fuel the patrol on the Broad Fourteens was resumed and maintained during the ensuing weeks.

26. *The Grand Fleet.*⁶—The Grand Fleet had come from Portland to Scapa on July 29th to 31st, and on August 4th Admiral Jellicoe had hoisted his flag in the "Iron Duke" as C.-in-C., Grand Fleet.

Early that morning he had received orders to proceed to the eastward within 100 miles of the Norwegian Coast, when the cruisers were to make a wide semi-circular sweep to the southward and westward evidently with the intention of intercepting any enemy armed merchant cruisers attempting to break out.⁷

Acting on these orders he took the Grand Fleet to sea at 8.30 a.m. that day, and cruised in the latitude of 59° N. east of the Orkneys until the evening of August 6th, when he returned to Scapa to coal. Meanwhile the cruiser squadrons of the Fleet (2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadron, 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron) swept through the latitudes of 58° to 61° N from the Norwegian Coast to the Shetlands and Orkneys searching for enemy ships or bases.

The Fleet refuelled on August 7th, and passing west about through Fair Island Channel that night were in the same area—about latitude 59° N., 1° W. to 1° E.—during August 7th, 8th, and 9th, whilst the cruisers continued their sweeps up to 62° N., and in particular searched the Norwegian Coast for German bases reported as being there.

On August 8th the submarine problem began to affect the situation acutely—the "Monarch" was fired at when doing practice firings south of Fair Island, the "Iron Duke" sighted a periscope in about 58° 30' N., 0° 30' W., and the "Birmingham" at 4.0 a.m. on the 9th rammed and sank the "U. 15" in 58° 26' N., 1° 58' E. The

¹ Orders to Cruiser Force K., Appendix C8. Rear-Admiral Moore hoisted his flag in "Invincible" on August 12th, 1914, at Portsmouth.

² Tels. 161, 162.

³ Tels. 166, 169.

⁴ Tel. 184.

⁵ Signal Log, "Euryalus."

⁶ Grand Fleet Daily Narrative of Events and ship's logs of flagships. Appendix D.

⁷ Tel. 36.

safety of the Fleet's cruising area east of the Orkneys appeared to be threatened by enemy submarines, and though the experience of the "Birmingham" against this new and variously estimated danger was reassuring, the C.-in-C. proposed on August 9th to take the Fleet to the west of the Orkneys directly the British Expeditionary Force was across, and suggested as a matter for consideration whether the Battle Fleet should meanwhile remain in the North Sea. The Admiralty evidently considered that the risk involved was too great, for at 10 p.m. that evening the C.-in-C. was ordered to take all heavy ships to the northward and then to the west at once to a position north-west of the Orkneys.¹

The C.-in-C. had previously been informed, on August 7th, that the Expeditionary Force would move across to France on August 9th,² and that the Grand Fleet was to remain at sea, not going south of 57° N., but no fresh dispositions were made to bring the Fleet further south for the purpose of covering the Channel, and in fact it was on the very evening of the first day of embarkation, August 9th, that the Fleet retired to the west of the Orkneys. The movements of the Grand Fleet cannot, therefore, be said to have been immediately associated with and dependent on those of the British Expeditionary Force, and it is noteworthy that in the G.F. daily narrative of events there are only two brief references to its passage. On August 10th in view of the fact that Scapa had been discovered by the enemy, arrangements were made for establishing a coaling base at Loch Ewe.⁹

On August 11th and 12th the Fleet was west of the Orkneys and on the 13th went to Scapa to refuel, the cruisers meanwhile continuing their sweeps across to Norway, north of 58° N., examining merchantmen, sinking some German trawlers, but meeting no enemy ships nor finding the submarine or aeroplane bases, of which rumours were still current.

27. *Sweeps of the North Sea.*—On August 12th, the Admiralty, in view of the silence and inertia of the German Fleet considered it possible that an attempt at landing on a large scale might be pending and suggested that the Fleet should be brought back to the North Sea.³

The C.-in-C. in reply was of opinion that if he returned to the North Sea the object should be definite, and proposed a sweep for August 16 down to the line Horn Reef to Flamborough Head, with the co-operation of the 1st and 3rd Flotillas from Harwich and Cruiser Force C.⁴

This was approved and on August 14th movements began for the first sweep to the southward.

The Battle Fleet moved from the west to the east of the Orkneys, was joined by all the Cruiser Squadrons including the 10th but excepting the 6th on the Northern Patrol,⁵ and swept to the south-east towards the Heligoland Bight with the object of "examining the North Sea generally and getting in touch with the enemy if out."⁶ In the south it was arranged for Rear-Admiral Christian to be on a line N. 30° W. from Terschelling with 4 "Bacchantes," 36 destroyers, and 3 light cruisers, with 2 submarines off the Ems and 2 off the Jade.⁷ At 9.30 a.m. on August 16th the cruisers reached their southerly limit, a line joining Flamborough Head to Horns Reef Light Vessel, without sighting any enemy ships, and the Fleet then turned 16 points and withdrew to the northward. The Dreadnought Battle Fleet was sent to their new fuelling base, Loch Ewe, to coal, and the Cruiser Squadron swept up the Norwegian Coast.

On arrival at Loch Ewe on August 18th, Admiral Jellicoe at once proposed further operations of the same nature for August 23rd,⁸ but these were not approved by the Admiralty for that date, and the second sweep by the Battle Fleet was not made until September. The objective of this first sweep was apparently to endeavour to intercept enemy ships which might be at sea and to counter any

¹ Tels. 70, 77.

² Tels. 51, 60.

³ Tel. 117.

⁴ Tel. 123, August 13th, 1914.

⁵ The term Northern Patrol at this time referred to the 6th and 10th Cruiser Squadrons patrol north and east of the Shetlands.

⁶ C.-in-C., General, August 15th, 1914. Tel. 136.

⁷ Tel. 142.

⁸ Grand Fleet Narrative, August 17th, Proposed sweep for August 23rd, in Appendix D.

⁹ Tels. 94, 96, 107, 111.

attempt at a landing; the operation was in accordance with the pre-war plans and does not appear to have been directly associated with the fact that the transport of the British Expeditionary Force reached its maximum on these dates.¹

28. *Grand Fleet Bases.*—Throughout Admiral Jellicoe's reports of early August the problem of fuel and a safe harbour for the Fleet appears to have been uppermost in his mind together with the possibility of the Germans having advance bases in Norway or the Shetlands and employing torpedo craft to attack the Grand Fleet. The coal supply, which was too limited on August 4th to allow all ships to complete to full stowage,² had been improved by August 10th, and the C.-in-C. had it distributed between Scapa Flow, Rosyth, Cromarty, and Loch Ewe, the latter place being made the alternative coaling base for the Battle Fleet.

The Fleet went to Loch Ewe, after the sweep south, from midday on 18th to 7.0 p.m. on August 20th, when they returned to their previous cruising area east of the Orkneys, though from August 21st to 24th they were as far north as 60° instead of 58° to 59°. From the 26th until the end of August the Grand Fleet remained east of the Orkneys refuelling at Scapa and cruising between 58° north and 59° north, and usually between 1° west and 1° east, while the cruiser squadrons continued to sweep from Aberdeen to Norway, and the northern patrol guarded the northern exit from incoming or outgoing enemy vessels.

Three or four submarines were sighted during these patrols, but no successful attacks were made, and the Grand Fleet was able to maintain the positions selected by the Commander-in-Chief without further event.

29. *11th Cruiser Squadron (Cruiser Force E).*—A brief account of this squadron may be included, as its ships covered both the passage of troops from Ireland to England, and the passage of transports moving from Glasgow, Liverpool, the Irish ports and Avonmouth to France. The squadron consisted of the "Doris," "Venus," "Isis," "Minerva," and "Juno," 3rd Fleet ships, which were commissioned and placed under the command of Rear-Admiral Phipps-Hornby when war broke out and reached their station on August 5th and 6th.

Their function was to guard the Irish Channel, and principally the passage of transports across, from attacks of the enemy, which were expected to take the form of minelaying; they had also the duty of examining and searching merchant vessels homeward bound to establish their identity, and as in the case of the 12th C.S. the Admiralty directed the Rear-Admiral to hinder trade as little as possible in carrying out this duty.³

The "Juno" was stationed at the northern entrance to the Irish Channel, the other four ships in the south. Until August 12th the latter cruised some distance to the westward beyond Ireland, but on August 12th they were placed on a line from Queenstown to the Scillies.⁴ It was on this day, August 12th, that the 6th Division in Ireland received orders to move to England, and on 13th-16th they were on their way across. Meanwhile a certain number of transports were moving from Glasgow, Liverpool, and Avonmouth to France, and the 11th C.S. formed their immediate protection. Two armed merchant cruisers, the "Caronia," and "Tara," were added to the squadron to assist them on patrol, but no enemy ships were sighted and their patrol was maintained until August 18th without any event of interest.⁵

After August 18th a reduced patrol was continued in the same waters carrying out the same duties, of which the protection and examination of trade soon became the most important⁶ as the number of transports moving from Irish ports was very small.

¹ August 15th and 16th were the two heaviest days of transport (August 15th, 42 ships, August 16th, 41 ships), and it might be inferred that the sweep was definitely designed on this account. It appears, however, to have been only coincidentally connected with the British Expeditionary Force, for its origin is to be found in the telegram of August 12th, 1914 (Tel. 117),

which is more concerned with the possibility of a raid than with communications in the Channel.

² Grand Fleet Narrative, August 3rd, 1914, p. 75.

³ Tel. 98.

⁴ Tel. 121.

⁵ Telegrams referring to 11th C.S., 114, 121, 124, 145, 152.

⁶ Tel. 152.

30. *Portsmouth Life-saving Patrol and Local Defence Flotillas.*—This completes the covering dispositions for the Expeditionary Force, with the exception of a line of French submarines running from Cherbourg to Portland, the local defence flotillas in the vicinity of their respective ports, and a special life-saving patrol which was organised from Portsmouth. Of the former there is nothing important to be said. The French submarine line was assumed in accordance with pre-war arrangements (War Stations No. 2), and was maintained without incident until August 24th¹ and the local defence flotillas operated close to the coasts in their several areas without sighting the enemy; they had as yet no definite anti-submarine work assigned to them.

The Portsmouth life-saving patrol had not been included in pre-war orders. It originated in an order from the Admiralty to C.-in-C., Portsmouth, on August 8th, to organise a patrol along the Southampton-Havre line, consisting of "the entire force of T.B.D.'s, T.B.'s, tugs, and steamers at Portsmouth," who were to go out whether armed or not, and, keeping in touch with each other, be ready at hand to save life should any transport be sunk.² The C.-in-C., Portsmouth, pointed out that the local defence flotilla was not sufficiently strong to carry out the duty and that the tugs could not be spared, as they were essential for the daily dockyard work, and eventually some yachts were chartered for the purpose, reinforced by sundry steamers and such T.B.D.'s and T.B.'s as could be spared. They were stationed along the transport line Southampton to Havre, not accompanying the transports, but disposed so as to be able to assist any transport in distress.³ In order to keep clear of them, Admiral Burney, who patrolled near the same line, was directed to keep his fleet East of the Nab L.V.-Havre line on August 11th.⁴ On August 18th-21st the life-saving patrol rested, resuming patrol when the 4th infantry division was transported on August 22nd,⁵ after which it was again withdrawn. Its services were not actively utilised, as all transports made the passage in safety.

31. *German opportunity to Attack.*—This completes the movements of forces covering the British Expeditionary Force.

It is noticeable that, with the exception of the airship patrol at Dover⁷ and the Portsmouth life-saving patrol, there was no immediate anti-submarine protection for the transports which were not escorted and did not sail in convoys. The battle squadrons and Cruiser Force C can hardly be regarded as constituting a protection against submarines (except that they might have drawn the fire), and there were no other ships near the lines of passage. No attack, however, was made by submarines upon either the transports or upon the covering forces during the passage of the British Expeditionary Force. In the light of later knowledge it is clear that the Germans missed a good opportunity of success for the British dispositions were based rather on the expectancy of enemy action in the form of a surface ship raid, or of minelaying from merchant ships as carried out by the "Königen Luise" on August 5th. With transports sailing unescorted along a regular route submarines had a good opportunity for attack, though it is noticeable that later in the war they avoided working on the cross-Channel routes.

As regards the chances for a successful surface ship raid by the Germans, a comparison of the distances to be travelled by a raider and by a transport is all in favour of the latter. Southampton to Havre is about 100 miles, and the average time of a transport voyage was 13 hours. No transport, therefore, was ever much more than seven hours from port. The route Southampton-Havre is 100 miles west of Dover Straits and roughly 220 miles from the southern end of the Broad Fourteens Patrol. Let us suppose an enemy cruiser force, approaching at 25 knots, to be sighted by the Broad Fourteens Patrol; it would not reach the Southampton-Havre route until nine hours later, by which time all transports could have been recalled and would have reached harbour. The enemy could reach the Newhaven-Boulogne stores line more quickly than this—in from five to seven hours, but as the average time of transports crossing on this line was only 7½ hours the latter were never more than four hours from port, and, if fitted with wireless, should have been able to get safely into harbour.

¹ Tel. 198.

² Tel. 56.

³ Tel. 76.

⁴ Tel. 103.

⁵ Tels. 165, 177.

⁷ Tels. 62, 79, 80, 90, 92.

A raid on the transports, therefore, really depended for its success upon the Germans evading our patrols in the North Sea, which required either thick weather or darkness, but these conditions introduced certain difficulties for the enemy, for the raiding forces would then run the risk of working in narrow unlighted waters close to shoal water, and in the narrower waters of Dover Straits would be unlikely to evade the Harwich Force and Dover Patrol. The alternative was to overwhelm the patrols which were supported by the 2nd and 3rd Fleet battleships, an operation certainly not wholly impracticable, as may be surmised from the work of the Flanders flotilla later in the war. Feints also would have had their value, for a reconnaissance in force need not have entailed any serious loss, and the report of enemy ships would have dislocated the transport organisation and delayed the passage of troops, as occurred on a small scale on August 17th when the "Fearless" sighted the "Rostock."¹ There can be no doubt that the free and continuous passage of our troops was a great military asset to the Allies in France during this critical phase of the war, and the enemy's lack of initiative at sea reacted heavily on their military campaign.

¹ Tels. 167, 172.

CHAPTER IV.

MOVEMENTS AFTER AUGUST 23RD.

32. *Summary of Naval Events of August 1914.*—It will be seen that all home waters squadrons had taken up their war stations during the first week of August. The Grand Fleet in the north, when threatened by submarines, withdrew for a week to the west of the Orkneys from August 9th to 15th, then, in order to meet the possibility of a raid undertook a sweep of the North Sea on August 15th to 17th, the forces in the southern North Sea co-operating; apart from these movements it remained in the same area approximately round about the latitude of 59° N. between the Orkneys and Norway without encountering the enemy.

The C.-in-C.'s principal concern during these early days was the safety of the fleet anchorage at Scapa against submarines or other torpedo craft attacks, the preparation of an alternative fleet base, the provision of coal in sufficient quantity for the whole fleet, the location of reported enemy bases in the Norwegian fiords, and the patrol of the Northern area.

Further south the Harwich flotillas carried out patrols off the Dutch coast and were supported from August 16th by Cruiser Force C of "Cressy's." On August 5th they met and sunk the German minelayer "Königin Luise," and on August 17th the cruiser "Rostock" was sighted for a few minutes by the "Fearless."

The submarines of the 4th and 8th Submarine Flotilla were on patrol between the Dover Patrol and the Harwich Flotilla, the disposition of the 8th Flotilla having been gradually shifted further to the south, but their employment in offensive operations in Heligoland Bight was restricted by the presence of hostile trawlers in that area.

The Dover Patrol, co-operating with the French, maintained their station in the Straits without enemy interference.

In the Channel the battleships of the 2nd and 3rd Fleet patrolled without interference or any noteworthy event from August 8th to 23rd, and were throughout assisted by French light forces.

After August 23rd the Admiralty considered that the transport of the original British Expeditionary Force had been completed, and the patrols were withdrawn for a time though the passage of troops continued and gradually increased in number until the end of the war, but the general disposition of our squadrons was regarded as, and proved to be, a sufficient protection.

The C.-in-C. had meanwhile on August 18th proposed a plan for another fleet sweep on August 24th,¹ but this had been postponed. Commodore (S) had also on August 23rd² proposed a sweep based on the reconnaissance work of his submarines in the Bight, and orders for an operation of this nature were drawn up by the Admiralty on August 25th³ involving the use of two flotillas of destroyers (31 boats), Cruiser Force K and Cruiser Force C, and three groups of submarines. C.-in-C., on being informed, proposed to co-operate, but the Admiralty approved of only the Battle Cruiser Force taking part. The signal of the V.A., B.C.S., informing the Admiralty of his disposition, was not sent till August 27th,⁴ and the Admiralty signal repeating it to R.A., Cruiser Force C, Commodore (T) and Commodore (S), was not received by the two latter, as they had left Harwich when the signal arrived.

The action in Heligoland Bight was the outcome of the sweep; in it the Harwich flotillas and submarines were engaged, supported by the B.C.S. and 1st L.C.S. with Cruiser Force C in reserve off Terschelling.

Submarines and mines were actively employed by the enemy during August, but in the North Sea only, and until late in September no submarine was seen in the Channel west of Dover, nor were any mines laid there.

Three important minefields were laid by the Germans in the North Sea—one on August 5th, by "Königin Luise," about 30 miles east of Aldeburgh; the second, on 26th August, off Newcastle; and a third off the Humber about the same time.

¹ Tel. 163.

² Commodore (S) to C.O.S., August 23rd, 1914.

³ M.0073/14.

⁴ V.A., 1st B.C.S., to Admiralty, 1754, August 27th, 1914.

The German submarines operated chiefly east of the Orkneys in the cruising area of the Grand Fleet.

The movements of our ships early became of a routine nature, for they encountered no activity of the enemy, and the majority of the forces covering the British Expeditionary Force continued a regular uneventful patrol from August 9th until 23rd without change of disposition.

33. On the evening of August 23rd, the transport of the first five infantry and the one cavalry division had been completed, and from that date the passage of troops consisted only of reinforcements until September 8th, when the 6th Infantry Division crossed.

From August 24th onwards, although the German Naval forces made no active threat, military events on the continent induced an alteration in Naval dispositions, and created a great strain on our resources. The German advance to Antwerp seriously threatened the Channel ports of transport, including Boulogne, the main port of disembarkation of stores, and at 7.45 p.m. on August 24th the Admiralty felt compelled to issue orders to close and evacuate the harbour.¹ The new harbour chosen was St. Nazaire, at the mouth of the Loire, in the Bay of Biscay. This meant a redistribution of the covering forces, but just at this time a large portion of the Channel force was despatched to assist in the landing at Ostend, which had been authorised on August 25th,² and the 12th Cruiser squadron and the French 2nd light squadron were left to cover the line to St. Nazaire without the immediate support of the Channel Battle Squadron.³

34. *Demonstration off Ostende.*—Four days before, on August 21st, when German cavalry were approaching the town, a naval demonstration had been arranged at Ostende by the Admiralty, and two Bacchantes of cruiser force C., a light cruiser and two divisions of Harwich destroyers had been ordered to be off the port at daybreak on August 22nd and open fire at any German troops approaching the coast, but the force was withdrawn the same day as it was thought that the inhabitants of Ostende would lose more by German retaliation than they would gain by any attempt at protection from the sea.⁴ On August 25th Burney's squadron, Bethell's squadron and cruiser force C. were ordered to Portsmouth, Devonport, and Chatham respectively to embark a field force of marines.² The ships sailed that night from Spithead and Portland, where they had gone to refuel, embarked the troops on the 26th and sailed for Ostende the same day. At daylight on August 27th cruiser force C. disembarked their detachment; the battle squadrons arrived later in the day, and all three marine detachments were landed on the 27th under General Aston, with a strength of 2,000 men. Cruiser force C. then hurried away to take part in the Heligoland Bight operations of August 28th in which they were required as a supporting force off Terschelling, whilst Vice-Admiral Bethell remained in charge of the Ostende operations.

On August 29th, it was officially decided to make St. Nazaire the base for all transport, and the Channel Fleet battle squadrons being required to cover the new and longer line of communication, on August 30th it was decided to withdraw from Ostende.

35. *Channel Fleet Disposition after 24th August.*—The shifting of the ports of disembarkation on August 24th and 29th, the demonstration and landing at Ostende and the continued inactivity of the enemy's Fleet which was contrary to early expectation, all tended to create a fresh situation after August 24th, and the dispositions for covering the line of passage underwent considerable modification.

On August 23rd when the Admiralty ordered the Channel Fleet to Portsmouth⁵ the Broad Fourteens patrol had been withdrawn, and C-in-C., Portsmouth, was instructed to suspend the life-saving patrols. The Dover Patrol was maintained, but the 8th Submarine Flotilla line and the French and Channel submarine line were withdrawn. The new line of transport to St. Nazaire was covered by the 12th Cruiser Squadron (Cruiser Force G), and the French 2nd Light Squadron reinforced by two French armed merchant cruisers which extended their line of patrol though they still continued to examine all ships bound up Channel. The latter squadron had been told on August 24th to hold itself in readiness at Cherbourg⁶ for military operations to the eastward, *i.e.*, Ostende, but this was cancelled and they resumed their patrol.

¹ Tels. 187, 195, 201.

² Tel. 212.

³ Admiral Rouyer was directed on 24th to be ready to take his armoured cruisers to the eastward for military operations, and pro-

ceeded accordingly to Cherbourg. Tels. 198 and 202.

⁴ Tels. 180, 182.

⁵ Tel. 183.

⁶ Tels. 192, 233.

The Battle Squadrons of the Channel Fleet returned from Ostende with the re-embarked marine detachments on September 1st, but did not continue their patrol in the Channel. Burney's 5th Battle Squadron lay at Portsmouth until September 4th, when they moved to Portland and remained there during September, only going to sea for exercises. The 8th Battle Squadron, mustering now only four ships, for the "Glory," "Albion," "Canopus," and "Ocean" had been detached on August 20th to reinforce the cruiser forces abroad,¹ were also at Portland until September 12th, when they took over the western patrol duties of Cruiser Force G, which had been informed on September 10th that they would be sent across the Atlantic to escort the first Canadian troop convoy.

St. Nazaire remained the Army base until October 11th, when orders were given for it to be closed, and Havre once more became the main base with Boulogne as a secondary base,² and the passage of troops continued without interruption.

¹ Tel. 171.

² Tel. 235.

APPENDIX A.

TELEGRAMS.¹

HOME WATERS.

26th July-31st August 1914.

NOTE.—Notes in Italics are not in the original.

CALENDAR.

		August 1914.					
Sunday	26th July	-	2nd	9th	16th	23rd	30th
Monday	27th "	-	3rd	10th	17th	24th	31st
Tuesday	28th "	-	4th	11th	18th	25th	
Wednesday	29th "	-	5th	12th	19th	26th	
Thursday	30th "	-	6th	13th	20th	27th	
Friday	31st "	-	7th	14th	21st	28th	
Saturday	1st Aug.	-	8th	15th	22nd	29th	

CODE LETTERS FOR PORTS.

A.	was	Calais.	D.	was	{Dunkerque.
B.	"	Boulogne.	R.	"	{St. Nazaire.
C.	"	Havre.			{Rouen.

TELEGRAMS.

All Telegrams are in the Year 1914.

1. *From C.-in-C., H.F.* 24/7/14.
To Admiralty.
332. Your 250. First fleet squadrons all disperse Monday 27th in accordance with your approved programme.—(H.S. 50, p. 20.)
2. *From Admiralty.* 26/7/14.
To C.-in-C., H.F. Sent 1600.
No ships of First Fleet or flotillas are to leave Portland until further orders. Acknowledge—(H.S. 50, p. 28.)
3. *From C.-in-C., H.F.* 26/7/14.
To Admiralty.
338. Following ships of First Fleet are not present at Portland and Weymouth :—

" Bellerophon "	-	-	-	left for Gibraltar.
" Roxburgh "	-	-	-	at Devonport giving leave.
" Shannon " and " Natal "	-	-	-	at Sheerness.
" Nottingham "	-	-	-	at Devonport
" Lowestoft "	-	-	-	at Chatham

 } both giving leave.
 " Amethyst," First and Second Flotillas are at Home Ports giving leave.
 3rd Flotilla - - - - at Harwich.
 Minesweepers - - - - at Home Ports giving leave.
4. *From Admiralty.* 26/7/14.
To C.-in-C., H.F. ?
259. Complete First Fleet with coal. Gunnery practices arranged to be carried out from Portland can be continued.

¹"Home Waters" Telegrams in Historical Section, C.I.D. The number of the volume is shown thus : H.S. 50.

5. *From Admiralty.* 26/7/14.
To A.O.P.
Before giving leave to the 6th and 8th flotillas further Admiralty approval is to be obtained.
6. *From Admiralty.* 27/7/14.
To " Bellerophon." By W/T.
101. Return to Portland with moderate despatch. (Copy to C.-in-C., H.F.) (H.S. 50, p. 37.)
7. *From Admiralty.* 27/7/14.
To General and to Press.
The Secretary of the Admiralty begs to state that it has been decided not to re-open the Schools after the manœuvres for the present; consequently the balance crews of the Second Fleet ships and vessels will remain in their ships.—(H.S. 50, p. 40.)
8. *From Admiralty.* 27/7/14.
To C.-in-C., Home Ports, C.-in-C., H.F., etc.
261. The schools are to remain closed for present but boys and youths training establishments remain open. No men on four days' manœuvre leave, belonging to 1st or 2nd Fleet, to be recalled, but second detachment are not to proceed on leave. Complete all 2nd Fleet ships to full numbers so far as resources available allow until men on leave are back.
Existing orders for 6th C.S. hold good except that officers should be retained in " Drake " and " Leviathan." All 2nd and 3rd Fleet ships are to complete with coal, ammunition and stores.
The 36 ex-coastals to be completed to full crews, also all F. class destroyers in reserve.
All officers who served in 2nd Fleet ships during recent test mobilisation are to be directed to rejoin those ships at the same time as the active service ratings.
These orders are to be carried out as quietly as possible. Any peace appointments of officers not already taken up are to be suspended. C.-in-C. and V.A., 2nd and 3rd Fleets, and A.O.P. have been informed. You should inform R.A. of 2nd Fleet.—(H.S. 50, p. 43.)
9. *From Admiralty.* 27/7/14.
To C.-in-C., H.F.; S.N.O., Coast of Scotland; Ad. of Patrols.
262. Admiral of Patrols is to keep all his vessels and to be responsible for Scottish coast, including Firth of Forth and Shetlands. Orkneys and Cromarty are to be defended by C.-in-C., Home Fleets, with the 8-river class t.b.d.'s from Patrol flotillas, which eight are to remain under orders of C.-in-C., H.F. They are to be despatched to Cromarty when ready. Some of destroyers now in 8th flotilla to change with some ex-coastals for patrol of Forth.—(H.S. 50, p. 44.)
10. *From Admiralty.* 27/7/14.
To C.-in-C., H.F.
263. Any further long leave for officers is suspended. Officers already on long leave need not be recalled.
11. *From Admiralty.* 27/7/14.
To C.-in-C., H.F. At 2100.
265. 8th S/M. flotilla has been ordered to proceed to the Humber early to-morrow, 28th July.*—(H.S. 50, p. 53.)
* This was cancelled.
12. *From Admiralty.*
To C.-in-C., Nore, etc.
" Magnificent," " Victorious," " Hannibal," " Mars " to be brought up to active crews and report when they are ready to proceed to Humber. " Majestic " and " Jupiter " to proceed with re-tubing as arranged.
" Aboukir " and " Bacchante " will not go to Humber for the present.—(H.S. 50, p. 64.)
13. *From Admiralty.* 28/7/14.
To C.-in-C., H.F., and V.A., 2nd and 3rd Fleets.
5th and 6th Battle Squadrons and 5th Cruiser Squadron to assemble at Portland when ready for sea.
Battleships told off for the Humber to proceed to their destination as soon as ready.—(H.S. 50, p. 79.)
14. *From Admiralty.* 27/7/14.
To various S.N.O.'s abroad.
Secret. European political situation makes war between Triple Alliance and Triple Entente by no means impossible.
This is not the warning telegram, but be prepared to shadow possible hostile men-of-war, and consider dispositions of H.M. ships under your command from this point of view. Measure is purely precautionary. The utmost secrecy is to be observed and no unnecessary person is to be informed.—(H.S. 50, p. 65.)

15. From Admiralty. 28/7/14.
To C.-in-C., H.F. At 1700.
270. Secret. The First Fleet is to leave Portland to-morrow, Wednesday, for Scapa Flow. Destination is to be kept secret except to flag and commanding officers. As you are required at the Admiralty, Vice-Admiral, 2nd B.S., is to take command. Course from Portland is to be shaped to southward, then a middle channel course to the straits of Dover. The squadrons are to pass through the Straits without lights during the night, and to pass outside the shoals on their way North. "Agamemnon" is to remain at Portland, where the Second Fleet will assemble. Special arrangements for mails will be made by Admiralty in order to preserve secrecy.—(H.S. 50, p. 87.)
16. From Admiralty. 28/7/14.
To C.-in-C., H.F.
271. Arrange to come to the Admiralty by first train to-morrow, Wednesday, with your own proposals on the war plan, accompanied by any members of your staff you wish to bring. "Iron Duke" to meet you at Queensferry and rejoin Fleet *en route* to its destination.—(H.S. 50, p. 88.)
17. From Admiralty. 29/7/14.
To Various S.N.O's, At 1855.
All officers and men on leave are to be recalled by telegraph at once.—(H.S. 50, p. 171).
18. From V.A.C., 2nd B.S. 30/7/14.
To Admiralty. At 0055.
Midnight position¹: 51° 7' N., 1° 37' E.; course, N. 59° E.; speed, 15 knots.—(H.S. 50, p. 217.)
19. From A.C., 2nd B.S. 30/7/14.
To Admiralty. Received 1615.
144. Noon position as follows: Lat. 53° N., long. 24 E.² Three thirty a.m. course North four degrees W. Speed, fifteen. Fleet as yesterday, except that "Iron Duke" proceeded to Queensferry at noon.—(H.S. 50, p. 275.)
20. From Admiralty. 30/7/14.
To C.-in-C's, Home Ports.
Vessels of Patrol Flotillas now commissioning at Home ports should be warned that the procedure for entry to defended ports is now in force, and that torpedo craft are not allowed to enter defended ports by night except Dover.
21. From Admiralty. 30/7/14.
To C.-in-C., H.F. At 2230.
289. "Liverpool" and "Falmouth" have been ordered to join Rear-Admiral in "Shannon" for service in 1st Light Cruiser Squadron. "Carnarvon" has been ordered to sail at once to Gibraltar, and "Cornwall," "Cumberland" and "Monmouth" to complete and then proceed Gibraltar. V.A., 2nd and 3rd Squadron, informed.
22. From Admiralty. 31/7/14.
To C.-in-C., H.F.
298. Admiral Jellicoe has been appointed 2nd-in-Command, Home Fleets, to date 1st August. His flag should be hoisted on board H.M.S. "Centurion" to-morrow. Admiral Jellicoe informed.
23. From Admiralty. 1/8/14.
To C.-in-C., H.F., &c.
- The four "Majestics" on arrival in Humber are to be under orders of A.O.P.—(H.S. 51, p. 13.)
24. From Admiralty. 1/8/14.
To C.-in-C., H.F., Comm. (S), Comm. (T). At 1505.
304. Commodore (T) and Commodore (S) should be instructed to keep Cruiser Force C. informed of all movements in their command.—(H.S. 51, p. 98.)
See Tel. 158, 159.
25. From Admiralty. 1/8/14.
To C.-in-C., Home Ports, &c. At 2105.
310. Local Defence Flotillas and Patrolling Flotillas are to patrol during night time until further orders.—(H.S. 51, p. 173.)
26. From Admiralty. 2/8/14.
To C.-in-C., H.F. At 1258.
318. Your 372. 63,250 tons of coal has actually sailed from Cardiff for Scapa since July 28th. 24,000 tons should have arrived by to-day; 3,001 tons should arrive to-morrow; 37,000 tons³

¹ That is of Grand Fleet.² Evidently for 2° 4' E.³ Noted on original ? 30,000.

- should arrive on Tuesday. Remainder and any further floating cargoes secured to-day should arrive Wednesday.
- All colliers are being ordered to Scapa for the present. Any coal required for the Firth of Forth is to be sent on from Scapa.—(H.S. 51, p. 279.)
27. Cypher telegram to Sir F. Bertie (Paris). Despatched, 4.50, 2/8/14.
303. After the Cabinet this morning, I gave Monsieur Cambon the following aide-memoire :—
- (F) "I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German Fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British Fleet will give all the protection in its power.
"This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German Fleet takes place."
- I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues to consider, and that the Government felt that they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany to-morrow; but it was essential to the French Government, whose Fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their North coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German Fleet took the action indicated, but it did give a security to France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her Mediterranean Fleet.
- Monsieur Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what he should say about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter; we were considering what statement we should make in Parliament to-morrow, in effect whether we should declare violation of Belgium neutrality to be a *casus belli*. I told him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this point. I also explained how, at the beginning of a great catastrophe such as this European War, of which no one could foresee the consequences where we had such enormous responsibilities in our Empire, as in India, or as regards countries in our occupation such as Egypt, when even the conditions of naval warfare and the possibility of protecting our coasts under these conditions were untried, it was impossible safely to send our military force out of the country.
- Monsieur Cambon asked whether this meant that we should never do it. I replied that it dealt only with the present moment. He dwelt upon the moral effect of our sending only two divisions. But I said that to send so small a force as two or even four divisions abroad at the beginning of a war would entail the maximum of risk to them and produce the minimum of effect.—(H.S., Vol. 51.)
28. From Admiralty. 2/8/14.
To C.-in-C., H.F., &c. At 1855.
At 2.20 to-day, 2nd August, the following Note was handed to the French and German Ambassadors :—
The British Government would not allow the passage of German ships through the English Channel or the North Sea in order to attack the coasts or shipping of France.
Be prepared to meet surprise attacks.—(H.S. 51, p. 331.)
29. From Admiralty. 2/8/14.
To C.-in-C., Home Ports, A.O.P. At 2019.
It is understood that French destroyers and submarines are being used to patrol the Straits of Dover by night and day. All ships and vessels are to be informed. Any ships known to be *en route* through the Straits to be informed by wire.—(H.S. 51, p. 338.)
30. From Admiralty. 3/8/14.
To Capts. D, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th Flotillas. At 1115.
Patrols take up your war stations.
31. From ? 3/8/14.
To D.I.D., War Staff, Admiralty. Received 2150.
French Fleet, consisting of one six-funnel cruiser, 10 light cruisers, seven battleships, steaming slow from South to South-West off Dover, 4.59 p.m. About 12 to 15 miles distant, apparently patrolling.—(H.S. 51, p. 576.)

NOTE.—These were actually the cruisers and light cruisers of Admiral Rouyer's Squadron. There were no battleships.—T.S.D.D.

33. *From Admiralty.* 3/8/14.
To Capt. (D 6), A.O.P. At 2344.
The Dover Patrol is to take up war stations at 8 a.m., Tuesday. The Cross Channel Patrol is to act in conjunction with the French. No German vessels are to be attacked unless they first attack our vessels. The French vessels will attack in any case.—(H.S. 51, p. 610.)
34. *From Admiralty.* 4/8/14.
To Vice-Admiral, H.M.S. "Centurion," Kirkwall. At 0203.
3. Open secret personal envelope taken with you from London and act forthwith upon the instructions therein contained.¹ These orders are imperative.
35. *From Admiralty.* 4/8/14.
To C.-in-C., H.F. At 0216.
362. Their Lords have determined upon, and H.M. the King has approved, the appointment of Sir John Jellicoe as Commander-in-Chief. You are to strike your flag forthwith, embark in the "Sappho" or other cruiser, and come ashore at Queensferry, reporting yourself at the Admiralty thereafter at your earliest convenience. These orders are imperative.—(H.S. 51 p. 662.)
36. *From Admiralty.* 4/8/14.
To C.-in-C., H.F. At 0243.
363. The 1st Fleet with cruisers spread is to proceed to the Eastward at moderate speed to within 100 miles of Norwegian coast, when cruisers are to make wide semi-circular sweep to the southward and westward, when Fleet will again proceed towards Scapa. Report how soon you will be ready to sail. From information received, it is probable that a number of German armed merchant cruisers are trying to break into the Atlantic North about.—(H.S. 51, p. 666.)
37. *From Admiralty.* 4/8/14.
To V.A., "Lord Nelson."
French patrol in the Channel is being carried out from 8.0 a.m. this morning. Cruiser Force G² will be in place from to-morrow morning.
38. *From Admiralty.* 4/8/14.
To S.N.O.'s. At 1405.
The British ultimatum to Germany will expire at midnight G.M.T., 4th August. No act of war should be committed before that hour, at which time the telegram to commence hostilities against Germany will be despatched from the Admiralty.
39. *From C.-in-C., H.F.* 4/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received, 1804.
4. Presume movements should commence Friday.—(H.S. 51, p. 810.)
40. *From Admiralty.* 4/8/14.
To C.-in-C., H.F.
374. Your 4. Expeditionary Force not going. This movement need not take place.—(H.S. 51, p. 810.)
41. *From Admiralty.* 4/8/14.
To C.-in-C., H.F. At 2046.
372. Use your discretion about withdrawing the 2nd Cruiser Squadron from the Shetlands. You have complete freedom of action as to Fleet movements now. Firing has been heard off the Forth; patrol engaged, no details known. Report position and movements occasionally.—(H.S. 51, p. 867.)
42. *From C.-in-C., H.F.* 5/8/14.
To Admiralty. At 0130.
Please inform ships South of Rosyth His Majesty's gracious message. Will ships of "Duncan" class be ordered join Grand Fleet. I should much like them. The ships of Northern Patrol on way north.—(H.S. 52, p. 41.)
NOTE.—They sailed at 1130 on 5/8/14 from Portland. H.S. 52, p. 132 (T.S.D.D.).
43. *From Admiralty.* 5/8/14.
To C.-in-C., H.F. At 0130.
For the present you should keep north of 57° 30' N. unless there is some tactical reason. The domination of the northern entrance to the North Sea is most desirable.—(H.S. 52, p. 147.)

¹ To take up appointment as Commander-in-Chief. Jellicoe: *The Grand Fleet*, p. 5.

² i.e., 12th C.S. under Rear-Admiral Wemyss in Channel West.

44. *From Comm. (T).* 5/8/14.
To Admiralty.
"Amphion" report 3rd Destroyer Flotilla have sunk German minelayer "Königen Luise" at noon to-day. 1415.
NOTE.—Position reported later was 52° 34' N., 2° 34' E. approximate. Rough plan of minefield laid by "Konigen Luise" is on page 910 of Hist. Sec. C.I.D., volume 53, T.S.D.D.
45. *From Capt. (D.).* 5/8/14.
To 3rd Flotilla. At 1455.
If you have any trouble with prisoners, shoot them.—(Lance's Sig. Log.)
46. *From S.N.O., Harwich.* 5/8/14.
To Admiralty. At 2159.
With regard to sunken German minelayer, following remarks of German petty officers, prisoners of war here, forwarded for consideration of Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty: "If all the ships-of-war fire like them to-day, God help us."—(H.S. 52, p. 325.)
47. *From Admiralty.* 5/8/14.
To N.T.O., Southampton.
Immediate. Docks manager should be informed that Southampton is to be closed to commercial shipping at once.—(H.S. 52, p. 349.)
48. *From Admiralty, T.* 5/8/14.
To British D.N.T.O., St. Nazaire.
State how many transports can be dealt with in one day at St. Nazaire and Nantes respectively.
NOTE.—No reply to this signal has been traced.—T.S.D.D.
49. *From Admiralty.* 6/8/14.
To A.O.P. At 1345.
Coast must be patrolled day and night to prevent enemy minelaying.—(H.S. 52, p. 479.)
50. *From Admiralty.* 6/8/14.
To "Bacchante," "Amethyst," &c. At 2328.
Warning. Mines have been laid between British coast and 3rd Meridian E. and between 52 degrees and 52 degrees 30 minutes North. Armoured cruisers addressed are to return to the Downs, keeping to the eastward of this area and are to indicate present position. "Cressy" has been ordered not to sail. First Flotilla, when returning to Harwich, is to keep to eastward and southward of mined area. 2328.
51. *From Admiralty.* 7/8/14.
To C.-in-C., H.F. At 1210.
393. Expeditionary Force begin to move across the Channel on Sunday morning (9th August). Grand Fleet should remain at sea while transports are leaving, but should not go south of latitude 57° N.—(H.S. 52, p. 743.)
52. *From Admiralty.* 8/8/14.
To V.A., 2nd and 3rd Fleet, Portland. At 0115.
Secret. The military force will begin crossing the Channel Sunday morning next.¹ You should keep under way with "Lord Nelson," "Agamemnon" and the 5th Battle Squadron, and cruise between the longitude of Dungeness and the Owers. The transportation will last ten days; not more than two ships should be away coaling at a time.—(H.S. 53, p. 15.)
53. *From Commodore (S).* 8/8/14.
To Admiralty (Chief of War Staff). Received, 1118.
Immediate. My telegram was correctly cyphered, but apparently wrongly transmitted, as second group you quote is erroneous.
Telegram should read as follows: Propose postponing oversea operations from Yarmouth and concentrating all submarines in area arranged until after the transit of the Expeditionary Force. How many days will the passage occupy. As my whole force will be at sea, I am unable to say that either Captain of the "Maidstone" or I will be at Harwich.—(H.S. 53, p. 73.)
See Tel. 61.
54. *From Admiralty.* 8/8/14.
To V.A., "Lord Nelson" and "Prince George." At 1150.
6th B.S. ceases to exist. "Lord Nelson" and "Agamemnon" and "Diamond" join 5th B.S. "Vengeance" joins 8th B.S. Four "Majestics" on East Coast will be known as 9th B.S.—(H.S. 53, p. 79.)
cf. App. B 4, p. 51.
55. *From Admiralty.* 8/8/14.
To Rear-Admiral, "Bacchante." At 1200.
C.-in-C., Nore,
V.A., 2nd and 3rd Fleets.
C. Cruiser Squadron, which includes "Cressy," to join V.A., "Lord Nelson," off Portland, passing through the Straits of Dover before dark to-day. Inform A. of P., Dover, time of passage.—(H.S. 53, p. 82.)

¹ i.e., 9th August.

56. From Admiralty. 8/8/14.
To C.-in-C., Portsmouth. At 1310.
It is necessary that you should organise a life saving patrol across the Channell with the transports between Southampton and French ports from to-morrow morning. The danger to guard against is a transport being sunk by submarine. Employ your entire force of destroyers, torpedo boats, tugs and steamers. If weather permits, these vessels might tow harbour boats. Admiral Burney, with 10 battleships and six "Cressy's," will be at sea between meridians of Dungeness and Owers the whole time, so Portsmouth will be safe—(H.S. 53, p. 102.)
57. From Admiralty. 8/8/14.
To Captain D., 1st and 3rd Flotilla. At 1917.
Return to Harwich forthwith. Acknowledge. 1917.—(H.S. 53, p. 179.)
58. From Admiralty. 8/8/14.
To R.A. Wemyss, "Charybdis." (Cruiser Force G, Channel West.) At 2012.
10. For the safety of the Expeditionary Force from mines laid by merchant ships in disguise no ship of any description is to go or allowed to pass through the patrol line. Suspected ships are to be stopped and examined if weather permits.
The body of the trade will be innocent, and if clearly so, they may be sent on their voyage. Doubtful ships which you are unable to examine at sea are to be sent to Falmouth, ships being signalled in from one cruiser to another to prevent any ship evading the order.
All ships are to be informed that Southampton and Newhaven are not available.
Pass on to Admiral Rouyer and request him to give necessary instructions. 2012.—(H.S. 53, p. 198.)
59. From R.A.C., 10th C.S. 8/8/14.
To C.-in-C., G.F. At 1559.
In view of long distance of patrol from Scapa it is proposed to use Lerwick Harbour as coaling station for cruiser force B. as convenient to test; two colliers could be sent there, and also as base for prizes. As there are so few ships in each, it necessitates their radius of action (?) being reduced much by having to return all the way to Scapa to coal. If you approve will you ask Admiralty. (1400.)
NOTE in G.F. Narrative of Proceedings after above signal:—Approved. Colliers ordered to Lerwick and R.A. instructed to divert them to Grunting Voe¹ owing to submarine menace.
60. From C.-in-C., G.F. 8/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 2014.
48. Propose to be in area to the north of latitude 57 between second and fifth meridians east longitude during passage of the army. Expect this area is free from mines and submarine boats.—(H.S. 53, p. 109.)
61. From Admiralty. 8/8/14.
To Commodore S., c/o. "Ganges," Shotley Gate. At 2255.
21. Your telegram 8th August addressed to C.O.S. approve postponing oversea operations (stop). The transit will be completed on August 27th.—(H.S. 53, p. 224.)
See Tel. 53.
62. Secret and urgent. Admiralty, 8/8/14.
Sir,
I am commanded by My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to request that you will inform the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that orders have been issued for the establishment of an airship patrol over the Straits of Dover, and for seaplane patrol between the North Foreland and Ostende.
2. My Lords would be glad if the Belgian and French Governments could be informed of these arrangements, and if the former Government could be requested to permit the establishment of a seaplane station at Ostende in connection with the seaplane patrol.
3. It is also desired that the Belgian and French Governments should be requested to afford facilities in the event of one of H.M. airships getting into difficulties and being forced to land in France or Belgium, and also to arrange that the British airships are not fired on by the coastal forts.
4. In connection with the Dover Straits Patrol My Lords would be glad if enquiry could be made of the French Government as to whether they could spare an airship to co-operate with the three British naval airships which have been detailed for that purpose.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient servant.
(Signed) J. W. ANDERSON.
The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.
(H.S. 53, p. 243.)
63. Orders to V.A., "Lord Nelson." (V.A., 2nd and 3rd Fleets.) 9/8/14.
M.0070, Despatched 8/8/14.
In confirmation of Admiralty telegram 64 of to-day's date, I am instructed to inform you that to-morrow, Sunday, the 9th instant, will be the first day of the "Expeditionary Force programme."

¹ Grunting Voe, anchorage on West Coast of Shetlands in 60° 12' N., 1° 33' W.

- You will be charged with the duty of covering the passage of the Expeditionary Force. Without in any way hampering your freedom of action, based upon your superior local knowledge, My Lords suggest to you that in case the enemy attempt to come through the Straits of Dover in force, a very favourable position for you to meet them would be as they pass the western end of the Varne and Ridge shoals. By this means your fleet can be deployed ready to receive them on a narrow front
I am, &c.,
(H.S. 53, p. 250.)
64. Orders to V.A., "Prince George." (V.A., 3rd Fleet.) M.0070 of 8/8/14.
I am instructed to inform you that the Expeditionary Force programme (of which 10 copies are enclosed) starts to-morrow.¹
In order to give confidence to the troops and to protect them if necessary the 7th and 8th B.S. (including "Vengeance") are to weigh to-morrow morning, the 9th instant, and support the transports on the western side of the line from Southampton to Havre. Boats should be kept ready in case they may be required to assist transports en route. Vice-Admiral Sir C. Burney, with the 5th B.S. and Cruiser Force C, will be to the eastward.—(H.S. 53, p. 250.)
¹ See Appendix F2, p. 88.
65. M. Branch (Admiralty) acquaint. 8/8/14.
Commander Fullerton, H.M.S. "Severn," reports from Barrow that "Severn," "Humber," and "Mersey," commissioned at 9 a.m. to-day (8th August).—(H.S. 53, p. 252.)
66. From R.A., "Euryalus." 8/8/14.
To V.A., "Lord Nelson." At 1725.
Cruiser Force C will pass Straits of Dover about 5.30 p.m. to-day steering S. Westward.
67. From C.-in-C., Home Fleet. 9/8/14.
To Admiralty. Sent at 2358, 8/8/19.
Received 0001.
54. While Grand Fleet is distributed in northern waters submit that Commodore T and Commodore S and supporting cruisers may work directly under Admiralty orders instead of from myself.—(H.S. 53, p. 256.)
See Telegram 135.
68. From Commodore S. 9/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 0224.
Submarines E6 and E8 have returned, they do not recommend further operations in Heligoland Bight at present. The whole Bight is full of trawlers fitted with wireless telegraphy. Two cruisers and one submarine were sighted in the distance, but they were evidently warned by trawlers and returned. Our submarines were undoubtedly seen and were forced to dive all day owing to trawlers. Recommend a trawler drive after transport of army is completed. Am proceeding with "Lurcher" "Firedrake," and 13 submarines to take up patrols.—(H.S. 53, p. 276.)
69. From Admiralty. 9/8/14.
To C.-in-C., Portsmouth. At 0955.
7. Report whether the arrangements are complete for life saving. The first transport leaves about noon to-day.—(H.S. 53, p. 326.)
70. From C.-in-C., Home Fleets. 9/8/14.
To Admiralty. At 1020.
60 H.M.S. "Birmingham" sank submarine boat No. 15 at 4.0 a.m., Lat. 58.26 N., Long. 1.58 E. Three others seen yesterday, one fired at "Monarch." Propose to keep Battle Fleet west of Orkney Islands directly Expeditionary Force across. Clear North Sea with light craft. It is for consideration whether Battle Fleet should even remain in North Sea during passage of the army. 1020.—(H.S. 53, p. 332.)
71. From Comm. (S) via H.M.S. "Maidstone." 9/8/14.
To Admiralty. At 1142.
..... begins. Owing to withdrawal of scouting vessels it is necessary to remove patrols. Inform all concerned that I propose shifting patrols to North Goodwin-Sandettie-Ruytingen line. Request Admiralty to lay buoys in position as follows instead of those previously proposed. B South 61 East 6½ miles North Goodwin East 4 miles Sandettie. Also one in latitude 52.30 North Eastwards and 3 East longitude.—(H.S. 53, p. 349.)
Written on original telegram.—"Not approved."
72. From C.-in-C., Portsmouth. 9/8/14.
To Admiralty. At 1236.
Submit I may be informed of outline of the transport scheme for Expeditionary Force to guide me organising a life-saving project. Until 11 o'clock last night I had no hint such transport arrangements were in progress. It is necessary to know destination and probable time to be occupied transporting entire force, as with the exception of six destroyers vessels available are not fit to face bad weather in the English Channel nor accommodate their crew for more

than a few hours at a time. Their coal capacity also is small. 26 vessels are available, but except six destroyers none have speed to keep up with the transports. To take dockyard tugs paralyses essential work, and I am obliged to recall two this evening. I am trying to commandeer, on terms to be settled, yacht for life saving. Remember U.S. "Alabama" crew saved by yacht.—(H.S. 53, p. 354.)

73. *From* 2nd and 3rd Fleets. 9/8/14.
To Admiralty. At 1340.
Cruiser Force C and "Topaze" will patrol between Dungeness and Vergoyer Shoal from 4.0 a.m. to 8.0 p.m. At 8.0 p.m. cruisers will close to the north and will stand to the S.W. until midnight, return to the southward of patrol by 4.0 a.m. Battle Fleet will arrive in the vicinity of R.V. "A." in Lat. 50° 45' Long. 1° E. at 5.0 a.m. and 7.0 p.m. each day, shape course as requisite during the day and stand towards S.W. during the first half the night. Request English and French patrol be informed accordingly. Direct to give me immediate warning of enemy's approach. Some of Cruiser Force C will require coal shortly. Where should they go? It would be convenient if battleships could coal at Spithead.—(H.S. 53, p. 379.)
74. *From* Admiralty. 9/8/14.
To Admiral, Devonport. At 1444.
14. "Illustrious" to be reduced to C. and M. complement at once so as to provide crew for "Erin." All officers to remain on books of "Illustrious" until further orders. Inform Vice-Admiral, 3rd Fleet Battleships.—(H.S. 53, p. 377.)
75. *From* V.A.C., 2nd and 3rd Fleets. 9/8/14.
To Admiralty. At 1926 of 1919.
67a. Urgent. Requested that I may be informed whether English or French torpedo craft or submarines may be expected to be met with at night in area 6 miles either side of a line south of 56 West 50 miles from a position 50° 45' N. and 1° E.—(H.S. 53, p. 443.)
76. *From* Admiralty. 9/8/14.
To C.-in-C., Portsmouth. At 1915.
Table showing the number of transports sailing from Southampton each day was sent to you last night. The principal line to be provided for is the Southampton-Havre one, and if you have any vessels to spare after that Beachy Head to Boulogne. The transports will sail singly and not in groups, and make the best of their way from point to point. Patrol should not try to accompany each individual ship, but should be on the line in touch with each other so as to be ready to be called up, if required.—(H.S. 53, p. 441.)
77. *From* Admiralty. 9/8/14
To C.-in-C., G.F. At 2140 timed 1830).
369, 423. Take heavy ships to northward then west at once, and remain north-westward of the Orkney Islands.—(H.S. 53, p. 428.)
They remained to westward till August 14th.—T.S.D.D.
78. *From* Admiralty. 9/8/14.
To V.A.C., 2nd and 3rd Fleets. At 2232.
71. Your tel. 67a. Reply is in the negative. The orders for submarines and destroyers are as laid down in the plan of Anglo-French channel patrol. War Stations No. 2.—(H.S. 53, p. 443.)
79. *From* Seair, Sheerness. 9/8/14.
To Aircraft, London.
Grain patrol stopped. Wind south-westerly, force 35 miles per hour. Bad sea in Channel. Will not resume unless Admiralty wish risk taken. If machines came down at sea, total destruction almost inevitable.—(H.S. 53, p. 444.)
80. *From* Aircraft, Westrand. 9/8/14.
To Seair, Sheerness. At 1920.
Cease seaplane patrol till weather moderates.—(H.S. 53, p. 445.)
81. *From* Admiralty. 10/8/14.
To C.-in-C., Portsmouth. At 0120.
Your proposal to hire yachts is approved.—(H.S. 53, p. 513.)
82. *From* Comm. (S) *via* Felixstowe W/T. 10/8/14.
To Admiralty. At 0344.
..... begins. Commodore (S), "Lurcher." Have resumed Galloper Light Hinder line, but it is evident to me that even in such weather as yesterday this disposition, particularly with only two scout vessels, will not ensure full use being made of submarines.
Opinion unchanged respecting this and it is intended to keep a reserve at Sandtette.
See Tel. 71.

83. *From* "Fearless" from Comm. (T.) 10/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 0635.
Following message received from Commodore (S) begins: "Our large submarines are on the line north of Goodwin Lightship, Sandtette Lightship, Ruytingen Lightship. Any submarines to the northward of that line are enemies." Ends.
84. *From* A.C., 2nd and 3rd Fleets. 10/8/14.
To A.C., 7th Squadron. Intercepted 0820.
Following received from "Marseillaise" begins:—"French submarines are obliged to leave Cherbourg during the night in order to be sufficiently far to the northward of Cherbourg at daybreak as arranged by the two Admiralty's. A recent occurrence has made me fear that British ships cruising off (?) do not know this (0800)."
Note on original telegram "V.A., 2nd and 3rd Fleets dealing with this."—(H.S. 53, p. 546.)
85. *From* Comm (S.). 10/8/14.
To Admiralty. At 1035.
Have resumed Galloper Hinder line.—(H.S. 53, p. 528.)
86. *From* A.C., 3rd Battle Fleet. 10/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 1015.
0930. Propose to retire my patrol line to between St. Albans Head and Cape de la Hague where I shall be better placed for intercepting minelayers. Request approval.—(H.S. 53, p. 559.)
87. *Reply.*
Approved between St. Albans and Cherbourg. French submarine patrol is between Portland and Cape de la Hague. Western patrol are stopping and examining all vessels.—(H.S. 53, p. 570.)
88. *From* C.-in-C., G.F. 10/8/14.
To Admiralty. ? a.m.
62. Telegram 423 received. Battle Fleet and battle cruisers proceeding to station north about, under Vice-Admiral Commanding Second Battle Squadron. I am proceeding Scapa Flow in "Iron Duke," to meet Rear-Admiral Commanding 2nd Cruiser Squadron, and concert measures for work of light vessels.—(G.F. Narrative of Events.)
89. *From* Commodore (S.) Lurcher. 10/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 1205.
It is important that I should know how long the patrol¹ is likely to be required, in order that I may arrange for relief. 1100.—(H.S. 53, p. 584.)
See Tel. 95.
90. *From* Admiralty. 10/8/14.
To P.N.T.O., Havre. At 1235.
Add following to paragraph 9 sailing orders for Expeditionary Force Transports: No other lights are to be shown at night than Navigation lights. Scuttles are to be kept closed at night and deadlights are to be down. Also add new paragraph 13: Three airships will probably be used to assist in patrolling the waters between S.E. England and the French and Belgian coasts during the transport of the Expeditionary Force.
It has been arranged that on sighting a submarine the airship should display a black ball from the car, and when heading in the same direction as the submarine she will work the ball up and down quickly as a signal to the transport. If certain the submarine is a hostile one, proceeding to the attack of the transport, the airship will endeavour to drop bombs on her.—(H.S. 53, p. 588.)
91. *From* C.-in-C., Home Fleet. 10/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 1235.
64. Your 427 proposing to commence search Norwegian fjords to-morrow morning, with a view to immediate offensive measures against any submarine boats found using them as base, or more than 24 hours at anchorage. Please telegraph if approved as soon as possible. 1120.—(H.S. 53, p. 593.)
92. *From* Admiralty. 10/8/14.
To A.O.P., &c. At 1430
Airships "Parseval," "Delta," "Astra Torres" and seaplanes are patrolling Straits of Dover and in vicinity of Straits.—(H.S. 53, p. 606.)
93. *From* Admiralty, Transports. 10/8/14.
To Principal Transports, Havre. At 1545.
All arrivals transports to be reported to me at once by wire. Stop. Instruct Divisional Naval Transport Officers. Stop. Have "Laura Sarnia Vera" arrived.

¹ i.e., 8th Submarine Flotilla.

94. From Admiralty. 10/8/14.
To C.-in-C., G.F. At 1554.
421. Secret. Scapa having been discovered by enemy as our war anchorage it is necessary provide for another one on North-west coast of Scotland, Loch Ewe and Loch Broom are both suitable. Where do you propose fuel to be sent? One hundred modified sweeps are being made for defensive use by trawlers or destroyers. How many do you want?
95. From Admiralty. 10/8/14.
To Commodore S, "Lurher." At 1710.
Your 1100. The Patrol may be required for a fortnight, arrange reliefs, keeping a good force for two days until we are sure what action enemy will take.—(H.S. 53, p. 634.)
- 95A. From Admiralty. 10/8/14.
To C.-in-C., Home Fleets. At 1930.
435. Your 64. You are authorised to do what you consider necessary to cope with submarines abusing Norwegian ports, remembering always that we do not want to offend Norway more than we can help.—(H.S. 53, p. 664.)
96. From C.-in-C., G.F. 10/8/14.
To Admiralty. At 2030.
72. Your 431. Propose to establish secondary coaling base, Loch Ewe, as soon as the following coal allocation has been arranged. Am sending 10,000 tons from here to Rosyth, 10,000 to Cromarty, keeping 25,000 here, which, if colliers due here to-day and to-morrow are not late, should permit me to divert about 12,000 tons to Loch Ewe, but before diverting any coal, a suitable naval officer should be appointed for charge of base; he should have cypher "C" and two small tugs. When this has been done, request that colliers leaving Cardiff may be diverted to Loch Ewe. A temporary signal station is essential and a motor bus service for mails and provisions from Auchnasheen 36 miles, *vide* Home Fleets submission 854/799 of 9th June. The postal and telegraph arrangements must be largely augmented and a port coaling officer appointed.—(G.F. Narrative of Events.)
97. From Admiralty. 10/8/14.
To Admiralty Transports, Southampton. At 2305.
Newhaven.
Avonmouth.
Liverpool.
Transports going Rouen should arrive Havre Roads two hours before high water Havre, they enter River one hour before high water Havre, length of passage up river six hours, tidal conditions of Seine are normal.—(H.S. 53, p. 689.)
98. From Admiralty. 11/8/14.
To R.A.C., "Vindictive," at sea off Vigo (135) At 0400.
R.A.C., "Doris," at sea off S.W. Ireland (135).
R.A.C., "Carnarvon," at sea *en route* to St. Vincent Island (135).
R.A.C., "Charybdis," at sea. Mouth of the Channel (388).
C.-in-C., Portsmouth (3).
" Devonport (2).
" Chatham (2).
Most important British trade be interfered with as little as possible. Vessels should not be deflected or sent in for orders unless absolutely necessary.—(H.S. 53, p. 734.)
99. From C.-in-C., Portsmouth. 11/8/14.
To Admiralty At 0915.
7. Your telegram No. 53¹, 10th August, arrangements are working satisfactorily.—(H.S. 53, p. 734.)
100. From Admiralty. 11/8/14.
To Tidal, Dover. Received 0945.
Report day and night every four hours state of sea in Channel, calm, moderate or rough. Acknowledge.—(H.S. 53, p. 760.)
101. From C.-in-C., G.F. 11/8/14.
To Admiralty. At 1145.
80. Request to be informed as soon as convenient of progress operations further South, latest information *re* hostile mines. Also when Expeditionary Force across, so that I may coal Grand Fleet.—(G.F. Narrative of Events.)
102. From C.-in-C., Home Fleets. 11/8/14.
To Admiralty. Sent 1218.
Received 1341.
80. Request to be informed as soon as convenient of progress of operations South, and latest information *re* hostile mines. Also when Expeditionary Forces across (? cross) so that I may coal Grand Fleet.—(H.S. 53, p. 796.)

¹ Re precautionary arrangements for life saving.

103. From C.-in-C., Portsmouth. 11/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 1543.
Admiral Burney's ships have been met both in fog and at night by the life-saving patrol. This constitutes a danger to his ships, to transports, and the patrol. Submit he may be requested keep his ships clear to the eastward of the line Nab Light, Havre.—(H.S. 53, p. 817.)
104. From Admiralty. 11/8/14.
To V.A., "Lord Nelson." At 1543 ?
Owing to possibility of meeting life-saving patrol in fog or at night you should keep fleet clear to the eastward of Nab to Havre line.—(H.S. 53, p. 817.)
105. From Admiralty. 11/8/14.
To Principal Transports, Havre. At 1556.
Yours. French sending one hundred mechanics for working cranes from Cherbourg. Two hundred dredger men will be sent from England as soon as possible for stevedore work. British military will also assist unloading.—(H.S. 53, p. 818.)
106. From Admiralty. 11/8/14.
To V.A., "Lord Nelson." At 2015.
"Hogue" join Cruiser Force C, neighbourhood Beachy Head. "Euryalus" to return to Nore on 13th.—(H.S., pp. 861 and 865.)
107. From Admiralty. 11/8/14.
To C.-in-C., G.F. At 2039.
443. Admiral Purefoy appointed Senior Naval Officer, Loch Ewe. He will endeavour to leave town to-morrow night, 12th August.
108. From Admiralty. 11/8/14.
To A.O.P., Comm. (S), Comm. (T).
The whole of the Channel from Outer Dowsing L.V. to the Downs will be patrolled from to-night continuously. Patrol boats are hired steam trawlers.—(H.S. 53, p. 884.)
109. From Admiralty. 11/8/14.
To C.-in-C., H.F.
Expeditionary Force not across until August 27th. Main body after 21st, mainly details. Coal half a division at a time. Enemy shows no signs of activity. No more mines known to be laid. Channel and as far North as the Haaks well patrolled. Channel swept, buoyed and watched from the Outer Dowsing to the Thames.—(H.S. 53, p. 890.)
110. From Admiralty (T). 11/8/14.
To Admiralty Transports, Southampton. At ?
Newhaven.
Liverpool.
Glasgow.
For Boulogne.
(1) Large vessels drawing 22 feet can enter two hours before or after low water.
(2) Small vessels drawing 17 feet can enter at all times.
(3) Entrance difficult for large steamers when wind very fresh from west to north-west, and for small steamers when stormy.—(H.S. 53, p. 904.)
111. From Admiralty. 11/8/14.
To C.-in-C., G.F. At 2359.
444. Arrange to send ships in to coal at Loch Ewe. Coal is being ordered there, and colliers should be sent from Scapa until they arrive.
112. Omitted.
113. From "Canopus." 12/8/14.
To "Prince George." Intercepted 1205.
Patrol of French submarines and destroyers run north and south of line drawn from Cap de la Hague (France, N.W.) up to North, Latitude 50° 14'.¹—(H.S. 54, p. 74.)
114. From Admiralty. 12/8/14.
To 11th Cruiser Squadron. Sent 1450.
9. Transports with Expeditionary Force will be crossing from Queenstown, Dublin and Belfast to France, commencing to-morrow. You must arrange to prevent any enemy's cruisers from interfering with their passage as far as the latitude of the Scillies.—(H.S. 54, p. 113.)

¹ 50° 30' N. is latitude of Portland Bill.

115. *From Admiralty.* 12/8/14.
To V.A., 7th and 8th B.S. and Sent 1635.
V.A., 2nd and 3rd Fleet.
- The seventh and eighth Battle Squadron Patrol can be withdrawn. Fleet to return to Portland complete with coal and be ready for further service. Draw fires in boilers not required for 11 knots.—(H.S. 54, p. 132.)
116. *From Admiralty.* 12/8/14.
To Commodore (S). Sent 1855.
32. Reference my 31. Half D and E submarines to be withdrawn from Patrol and sent Harwich to fuel. Two E boats then proceed Yarmouth in case of raid Norfolk coast, remainder await orders at Harwich. Acknowledge.—(H.S. 54, p. 153.)
117. *From Admiralty.* 12/8/14.
To C-in-C., G.F. At 2000.
452. In addition to the possibility explained in Admiralty appreciation situation sent you on the 8th,¹ we cannot wholly exclude the chance of an attempt at landing during this week on a large scale, supported by High Sea Fleet. Extraordinary silence and inertia of enemy may be prelude to serious enterprises. Our view remains as expressed in policy appreciation, and even if larger landing force were employed the general principle action will remain unaltered except the urgency of interrupting the landing will of course be greater. You ought, however, to be nearer the theatre of decisive action as we originally contemplated, and now that you have shaken off the submarine menace, or as soon as you can do so, it would appear necessary to bring Fleet to the eastward of the Orkneys, passing either north or south of the Shetland Islands, keeping well out of sight of land. Stop traffic if necessary. Cruiser sweeps to the south and south-east should be made as convenient. Acknowledge receipt of this immediately. 1755.—(H.S. 54, p. 143.)
 See Tel. 123.
118. *From C-in-C., G.F.* 12/8/14.
To Admiralty. Sent 2224.
 Received 0036,
 13th.
90. Am keeping Battle Fleet to westward and north westward Orkney Islands. 3rd B.S. coal 13th, remaining ships probably 14th, either Loch Ewe or Scapa, depending on amount of coal, Loch Ewe. Cruisers established on search areas south-east of a line stretching 100 miles N.E. of Kinnaird Head, sweeping 100 miles southeast daily. Destroyers watching area between cruisers and Orkneys. "Drake" arrives Faroe Islands 12th. "Endymion" and "Gibraltar" left to-day to support her and watch line Faroe Islands-Iceland. 2nd and 3rd C.S. using Cromarty as a base. Request to be furnished with any information gained as to position of hostile mines in southern area, and of areas in which our submarines work; also if any indication of presence south of German submarines.
 Telegrams sent land-wire to Scapa will be sent out to me by t.b.d. Should be very glad to receive R.N.V.R. artisan and other ratings, especially artisans.—(H.S. 54, p. 203.)
119. *From C-in-C., G.F.* 12/8/14.
To Admiralty. ?
97. Coaling Fleet Thursday, Scapa and Loch Ewe. Expect to leave Thursday night, going north about unless emergency arrives Thursday
120. *From C-in-C., G.F.* 12/8/14.
To Admiralty. At 2306.
- "Drake" reports position Faroe Islands quite satisfactory. No German men-of-war or merchant ships except trawlers have been there for two years. Ends.
 Following orders have been sent to "Drake." Begins: Your 1950. Remain with "Drake," "Endymion," "Gibraltar," and patrol between Faroe Islands and Iceland on look-out for enemy's merchant ships, armed or unarmed, until desirable return to complete with coal. Report 24 hours before you return. Ends.
121. *From Rear-Admiral, "Doris."* 12/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 2103.
6. Referring to your 412, 11th Cruiser Squadron and "Caronia" will proceed to take up position on line Daunt Rock, Bishop Light, at intervals of 25 miles, commencing 15 miles from Daunt Rock.² Suggest transports should be informed of the position of these cruisers, so that if attacked they can run for support. "Juno" proceeds to guard North Channel.—(H.S. 54, p. 171.)
122. *From H.M.S. "Lurcher."* 13/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 0200.
- With reference to Admiralty telegram No. 32³, submarines D2, D3, D7, D8 proceeding to and awaiting orders at Harwich, and E5, E7 proceeding to Yarmouth with sufficient fuel for 2,000 miles.—(H.S. 54, p. 208.)

¹ No record of this; it is not mentioned in G.F. Narrative.

² See Tel. 124.

³ Tel. 116.

122A.

13/8/14.
At 0900.

Disposition of Effective Submarines.

Base.	Flotilla.	Numbers of Submarines.
Devonport	1st	A 8, 9.
Portsmouth	2nd	A 6.
Dover Patrol	3rd and 4th	C 14, 15, 16, 17, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, D 1.
Sheerness	Part of 5th	C 2, 5, 6.
Harwich	Part of 5th	C 1, 3, 4.
Harwich	Part of 8th	D 2, 3, 7, 8.
Sandettie Lightship Patrol	8th Flotilla	E 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, D 5.
Commodore (S) in "Lurcher."		
Yarmouth	Part of 8th	E 5, 7.
Grimsby	6th	C 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13.
Tyne	Part of 7th	C 19, 20, 21.
Firth of Forth	Part of 7th	C 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30.
Ardrossan (Clyde)	9th	A 10, 11, 12.

Position of Submarines Out of Action, Completing, &c.

B 3, 4, 5.	D 4.	E 10.
A 5, 13, B 1.	D 6.	C 18.
S 1.	E 1.	C 28.

(Signed) A. P. ADDISON,
 for Commodore (S), 13/8/14.
 (H.S. 54, p. 225.)

123. *From C-in-C., G.F.*
To Admiralty.

13/8/14.
 At 1200.
 Received 1544.

105. Your 452. I am of opinion that when Grand Fleet goes into the North Sea the object should be definite, and as soon as the object is accomplished Fleet should withdraw. Indefinite movements entail risk from mines and submarines with no compensating advantages. With this object in view, I propose to take Grand Fleet through North Ronaldshay Fair Island passage midnight 14th August, arriving Latitude 58° 40' N., Longitude 3° 45' E., 6 p.m. 15th August, and Latitude 57° N., Longitude 4° E., 3 a.m., 16th August. From that position to sweep with cruisers to a line Horn Reef-Flamboro' Head, cruisers reaching from Horn Reef to about 3° E., arriving on line 9.0 a.m. If this movement can be supported, I request that by 9.0 a.m., 16th August, 1st and 3rd Flotillas, supported by Cruiser Force C., may be on line from Latitude 54° 30' N., Longitude 3° E. to Haaks Lightship, having swept out area to westward; also that our submarines may be warned of movements, and not to be within thirty miles of line Horn Reef-Flamborough Head.

On completion of sweep, I propose returning with Grand Fleet to west of Orkneys, and coal Loch Ewe and Scapa.—(H.S. 54, p. 296.)

NOTE.—This was the origin of the sweep of August 16th (see Tel. 117).

124. *From Admiralty.*
To Devonport,
Queenstown,
Pembroke,
Liverpool,
Kingstown } Groups.

13/8/14.
 At 1825.

Pass to transports. In case of attack, there are friendly cruisers every 25 miles on line Daunts Rock-Bishops Light.¹—(H.S. 54, p. 329.)

125. *From Admiralty.*
To C-in-C., G.F.

13/8/14.
 At 1944.

Your telegram 105 approved. Orders will be given for the combined movement from the southward.

See Tel. 123.

126. *From D.N.T.O., Rouen.*
To Admiralty.

14/8/14.
 Sent 1130.

Six 36-ft. horse brows and four 26-ft. urgently required Rouen for purpose of disembarking Cavalry Brigade, 16th August. Submit Southampton supply immediately.—(H.S. 54, p. 447.)

127. *From Admiralty.*
To V.A., 2nd and 3rd Fleets (79).
R.A., "Bacchante" (17).

14/8/14.
 Sent 1253.

Cruiser Force C will be detached from your command and take a more advanced position under the general orders of Admiral Christian, who will be in command of a combined force. Flag temporarily in "Sapphire." Cruiser Force C is to assemble in the Downs at 4.0 p.m. to-morrow, Saturday.—(H.S. 54, p. 463.)

¹ Daunt Rock—off Queenstown, 51° 43' N., 08° 15' W. Bishop Rock Light—49° 52' N., 06° 27' W., South-western extreme of Scilly Island.

128. From Admiralty. 14/8/14.
To C-in-C., G.F. At 1315.
472. "Oceanic" and "Alsatian" will be sent in a day or two to join Cruiser Force B under your orders. There seems to be a possibility, if the High Sea Fleet comes out and your attention is diverted to meeting it, a cloud of commerce destroyers may be let loose. Two more will be sent as soon as ready.—(H.S. 54, p. 469.)
129. From Admiral, Portsmouth. 14/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 1610.
32. Your 23. Delay caused by insufficiency of Southampton pilots, who are kept at Southampton for outgoing transports. Local efforts being made to obtain more, also dispense with them in some cases; also for one pilot to take back three or four empty at a time.—(H.S. 54, p. 491.)
130. From Admiralty. 14/8/14.
To "Lurcher." Sent 1634.
36. Withdraw Patrol and proceed to Harwich with all submarines. Await further orders.—(H.S. 54, p. 499.)
131. From C-in-C., G.F. 14/8/14.
To R.A.C., 10th C.S.
- What is your position? What movements yesterday and projected movements for to-day?—(G.F. Narrative of Events.)
132. From R.A.C., 10th C.S. 14/8/14.
To C-in-C., G.F. At 1220.
- Your 1030. My position 10.0 a.m.: Latitude, 60° 30' N.; Longitude, 0° 14' W. Movements of 10th C.S.: "Crescent" and "Theseus" on south part of patrol; "Royal Arthur" and "Hawke" on north part of patrol; "Grafton" and "Edgar" to coal at Busta Voe; "Endymion" and "Gibraltar" at Faroe Islands with "Drake." To-day, "Hawke" on north sweep position at 10 a.m., Latitude 62° 20' N., Longitude 1° 34' E.; "Crescent" to Lerwick this afternoon and coal and repair leaky joint; "Endymion" and "Gibraltar" still with "Drake" (1200).—(G.F. Narrative of Events.)
- Busta Voe, West Coast, Shetlands, near Swarbacks Minn, 60° 23' N., 1° 22' W.*
133. From C-in-C., G.F. 14/8/14.
To R.A., 10th C.S. At 1355.
- If you have enough coal for three days steaming at 12 knots, and have no important project in contemplation, meet me with three other ships, 8.0 a.m., to-morrow, Saturday, 15th August at rendezvous Latitude 59° 0' N., Longitude 0° 30' E.—(G.F. Narrative of Events.)
134. From R.A., 10th C.S. 14/8/14.
To C-in-C., G.F.
- I shall be at rendezvous 59° 0' N., Longitude 0° 30' E., at 8.0 a.m., to-morrow, Saturday.—(G.F. Narrative of Events.)
- NOTE.—That is for sweep of August 16th.—T.S.D.D.
135. From Admiralty. 15/8/14.
To R.A.C., Cruiser Force C. Sent 0005.
Commodore (T).
Commodore (S).
- R.A., Christian, whose flag is now flying in "Euryalus" at Sheerness, will transfer his flag to "Sapphire" at Dover at 4 p.m., 15th August, and from that time Cruiser Force C and Commodore (T) and Commodore (S) will come under his command temporarily pending further orders.—(H.S. 54, p. 578.)
- See Telegram 67,127.
136. From C-in-C., G.F. 15/8/14.
To General (to ships in company). At 0635.
- For information. The Grand Fleet to-day will sweep to eastward, the direction of the sweep being altered to southward this evening. Cruisers will be spread well-ahead. If nothing occurs in the interval, the Fleet will return North on Sunday. The object of the movement is to examine the North Sea generally, and get in touch with the enemy if out. Our forces to southward are co-operating.—(G.F. Narrative of Events.)
137. From Divisional Transports, Boulogne. 15/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 0815.
- Tugs available numerically sufficient and capable of carrying out work in calm weather, but lack power for very large vessels now arriving, should weather change for the worse submit that three powerful tugs may be sent.—(H.S. 54, p. 619.)
138. From Admiralty. 15/8/14.
To Admiral, Portsmouth. Sent 1115.
- Your 32 yesterday.
- Ships urgently required to embark troops are still delayed by examination service in Sandown Bay. Immediate arrangements must be made to bring them up, otherwise military programme will be disorganised.—(H.S. 54, p. 651.)

139. From V.A.C., 2nd and 3rd Fleets. 15/8/14.
To Admiralty. Sent 1140.
- 85A. Following received from "Marseillaise." Begins: With reference to signal of "Prince George" stating she is leaving patrol line, please confirm that there will not be any British ships patrolling between Cherbourg and English coast. In that case, I propose extending French patrol further northwards. Ends.
- I have concurred in French Admiral's proposal. 1140.—(H.S. 54, p. 656.)
140. From C-in-C., Portsmouth. 15/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 1209.
14. There is some congestion of empty transports Sandown owing to rain and fog. Master of transports declines responsibility of proceeding without pilot. Have telegraphed for 12. I hope to clear away congestion without much more delay.—(H.S. 54, p. 664.)
141. From Admiral, Portsmouth. 15/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 1336.
19. Referring to your telegram No. 12, delay not to be attributed to Examination Service at all, but to causes already explained in preceding telegrams 20 and 23 of 14th August and 14 of 15th August. Already this forenoon 10 transports have been sent and only two remain. Every possible effort to facilitate and expedite transport service is being made, importance being fully realised.—(H.S. 54, p. 690.)
142. From Admiralty. 15/8/14.
To C-in-C., G.F. At 1400.
480. Four "Bacchantes," thirty-six destroyers and three light cruisers will be on a line N. 30° W. from Terschelling Light, forty miles in length by 9.0 a.m., to-morrow, Sunday; two submarines off the Jade and two off the Ems by 6 a.m. Sunday. Regular submarine blockade established. No submarines will operate north of Latitude 54° 30' N. The Force under Rear-Admiral Christian.
- It is believed no mines recently laid. Routes Esjberg to Hull and Bergen to Newcastle are considered clear; merchant ships are running.—(H.S. 54, p. 702.)
143. From Havre Docks. 15/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 1648.
- Request Irish and West Coast transports to be instructed to report through War Signal Station probable time of arrival at oversea port if practicable *en route*. Estimated time of arrival now telegraphed has proved to be not sufficiently accurate, which makes oversea railway transport difficult. Priority forms over land lines would be advisable for these reports.
- The ports concerned are Avonmouth, Belfast, Dublin, Liverpool, Queenstown. Have instructed transports that, in reporting to War Signal Stations (para. 46 of their instructions), they should communicate probable time of arrival oversea port. Will you please instruct the War Signal Stations to pass the messages on to the oversea ports, using priority forms.
- The telegraphic addresses are: Divisional Transports, Havre.
" " Rouen.
" " Boulogne.
- D.O.D. GRAEME THOMSON,
for D. of T., 15/8/14.
—(H.S. 54, p. 734.)
144. From P.N.T.O., Havre. 15/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 1703.
- Weather and other conditions permitting, much time would be saved if horse brows could be left rigged during voyage. Submit that Master of Transports be instructed to bring that side of ship alongside which has been prepared for discharging horses; very necessary to prevent mistakes being made.—(H.S. 54, p. 738.)
145. From A.C., 11th Cr. Squadron (Cruiser Force I). 16/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 0226.
- 11th Cr. Squadron all employed covering transports and guarding cables. When may the "Lusitania" be expected?—(H.S. 55, p. 16.)
146. From C-in-C., Home Fleet. 16/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 1040.
123. Went 10 miles beyond line Horn Reef-Flamborough Head, sighted nothing. Now steering N. by W., sweeping front 150 miles broad. (0950).—(H.S. 55, p. 47.)
147. From P.N.T.O., Havre Docks. 16/8/14.
To Admiralty. Sent 1052. Received 1158.
- Transports "Eaton Hall," "Hazelwood," are being diverted to Rouen at request of military authorities.
148. From Admiralty. 16/8/14.
To R.A., "Sapphire" (R.A. Christian, Cruiser Force C). Sent 1720.
- Have you anything to report?—(H.S. 55, p. 109.)

149. From D. of T. 16/8/14.
To D.O.D. At 1730.
Transport "Matheran," No. 8120, left Havre, 12.30 a.m., to-day for Queenstown or Liverpool requires to be diverted to Dublin to arrive there to-morrow for embarkation 18th.
Can you get into touch with her and convey the above orders?
(Signed) GRAEME THOMSON,
for D. of T.
—(H.S. 55, p. 125.)
150. From "Sapphire." 16/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 2032.
Arrived off Western Ems noon to-day; nothing seen of enemy. Sighted one Dutch cruiser off the Texel 6.30 o'clock this morning; two Dutch torpedo boats off Stote Meik¹, 10.2 a.m.; small Dutch destroyer off Terschelling Island at 11 a.m. Repeating operations to-morrow 6.45.—(H.S. 55, p. 153.)
Note on original "Suggest preliminary arrangements stand. It only means a more advanced position for destroyers giving early information for Expeditionary Force."
151. From C.-in-C., Home Fleets. 16/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 2303.
To-day there were 23,000 tons of coal Scapa Flow, 3,400 Cromarty, 21,000 (corrupt group—probably Loch Ewe), just over replenishing Grand Fleet. Number of colliers quite insufficient for rapid coaling, and amount arriving hardly keeps pace with expenditure. Consider situation very serious.—(H.S. 55, p. 176.)
152. From Admiralty. 16/8/14.
To R.A., "Doris," At 2320.
W/T Pembroke.
Armed Fleet Messenger "Tara" will relieve "Juno" to-morrow or Tuesday. The main body of transports will finish Tuesday. One ship sufficient to guard after Monday. Approve "Minerva" docking Queenstown, Tuesday. Arrange coaling in sequence from now. 2320.—(H.S. 55, p. 179.)
153. From Admiralty. 16/8/14.
To R.A., "Sapphire." At 2350.
Signal received. An advance beyond the Terschelling line is not to be made to-morrow, Monday. Arrange about reliefs of destroyers who, after noon, Monday, can fall back on original patrol line; C Cruiser Force to return to the Downs at noon. Return in "Sapphire" as convenient to transfer your flag to "Euryalus," now ready for sea. "Arethusa," when ready, will be attached to "Euryalus."—(H.S. 55, p. 186.)
154. From C.-in-C., Home Fleet. 17/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received, 0853.
132. Your 491 urgent. Unless considerably more colliers can be sent for use of Grand Fleet, operations will be most seriously hampered. Supplies are getting less instead of greater. Only just sufficient for rarest (sic) fill, and that slowly.—(H.S. 55, p. 236.)
155. Disposition of Effective Submarines. 17/8/14.
At 0900.
- | Base. | Flotilla. | Number of Submarines. |
|--|-----------------------|--|
| Devonport - - - - - | 1st - - - - - | A 8, 9. |
| Portsmouth - - - - - | 2nd - - - - - | A 6. |
| Dover (Dover Patrol) - - - - - | 3rd and 4th - - - - - | { C 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35
D 1. |
| Inverness - - - - - | Part of 5th - - - - - | C 4, 5, 6. |
| Harwich - - - - - | Part of 5th - - - - - | C 1, 2, 3. |
| Harwich - - - - - | Part of 8th - - - - - | { D 3, 7, 8.
E 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9. |
| Commodore (S), in "Lurcher," at Harwich. | | { D 2, 3.
E 8, 7. |
| At Sea - - - - - | Part of 8th - - - - - | |
| Grimsby - - - - - | 6th - - - - - | C 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13. |
| Tyne - - - - - | Part of 7th - - - - - | C 19, 20, 21. |
| Firth of Forth - - - - - | Part of 7th - - - - - | C 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30. |
| Ardrossan (Firth of Clyde) - - - - - | 9th - - - - - | A 10, 11, 12. |
- (Signed) A. P. ADDISON,
for Commodore (S), 17/8/14.
—(H.S. 55, p. 239.)

¹ For Stortemelk, a channel between Terschelling and Vlieland, close to Vlieland.

156. From Admiralty. 17/8/14.
To Naval Centre, Guernsey. At 0945.
War Signal Stations:
Lizard.
Beachy Head.
Reports from transports giving probable time of arrival at French ports are to be passed direct to Divisional Transports, Havre, Rouen or Boulogne, as the case may be, on Priority Forms. This in addition to reports to Admiralty.—(H.S. 55, p. 247.)
157. From Admiralty. 17/8/14.
To Commodore (T). Sent 1435.
Sweep number two¹ is deferred. The original patrol² for giving early notice to Expeditionary Force of approach of enemy is to be resumed.—(H.S. 55, p. 300.)
158. From C.-in-C., Home Fleet. 17/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 2248.
138. Of what force is Rear-Admiral Christian in command?—(H.S. 55, p. 390.)
159. From Admiralty. 18/8/14.
To C.-in-C., Home Fleet. At 1040.
Your 138. C Cruiser Force. "Euryalus," "Arethusa" (when ready), 1st and 3rd T.B.D. Flotillas. Oversea submarines.—(H.S. 55, p. 390.)
160. From Admiralty. 18/8/14.
To C.-in-C., Home Fleets. At 0050.
500. It is considered important to continuously maintain the Northern Patrol to prevent ships getting in or out of the North Sea. Four armed merchant ships are being sent up as soon as ready to assist in making the patrol more effective.
The patrol can spread in any direction you propose.—(H.S. 55, p. 416.)
161. Intercept from Capt., D., 1st Flotilla, 18/8/14.
to "Sapphire," A.C., 7th Cruiser Sq. Received 0619.
To Admiralty.
52.40 N. 2.15 E. Am engaging enemies' cruiser(s).—H.S. 55, p. 434.)
NOTE.—Some twenty signals which ensued as the result of this enemy report are in H.S., Vol. 55, but are not reproduced here. They passed between Admiralty, Comm. (T), R.A. "Euryalus," C.-in-C., H.F., &c.—T.S.D.D.
162. From Captain D., 1st Flotilla, to Commodore (T). 18/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 0921.
Collecting flotilla, majority of ships engaged reported cruiser was not "Yorck" but "Rostock," I am therefore steering N.W. in direction in which cruiser was last reported at 22 knots in order to engage her myself.
163. From C.-in-C., Home Fleets. 18/8/14.
To Admiralty. Sent 1030; received 1245.
139. Am sending by post to-day, due London to-morrow morning, general plan of next movement south which involves co-operation with 1st and 3rd Flotillas and ordering submarine boats in Heligoland Bight. The general scheme is a sweep in force at dawn within 30 miles of Heligoland, flotilla leading, covered by cruisers with Battle Fleet supporting. If flotillas are available, Sunday, August 23rd, p.m., would be suitable date for them to meet me at a rendezvous to be given later, the actual movement taking place at daylight August 24th. I am sending to Commodore (T) a copy of the general idea of scheme for his information so that he may be prepared. If the date is suitable request that eastern submarine boats may be directed to keep east of Longitude 7.40 East and western submarine boats south of North Latitude 54° North, on August 24th up to noon.—(H.S. 55, p. 526.)
See Telegram 174.
164. From Admiral, Portsmouth. 18/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 1258.
17. Do Their Lordships desire that life-saving patrol should be kept up any longer or can they be reduced.—(H.S. 55, p. 529.)
165. From Admiralty. 18/8/14.
To C.-in-C., Portsmouth. At 2335.
With reference to previous signal another division crosses in three or four days. Life saving patrol should be rested and held ready.—(H.S. 55, p. 663.)

¹ Apparently a sweep mentioned by C.-in-C., H.F., see Tel. 163.

² That is the Watching Patrol on Broad Fourteens.

166. *From Admiralty.* 18/8/14.
To R.A., "Euryalus" and Commodore (T.). At 2350.
In view of the position of our destroyer patrol being known the destroyers must be more concentrated and a position further south taken up with the cruisers acting as a support not more than 20 miles to the southward. Suggest patrolling on the parallel of Smith's knoll across the expected course of enemy from 3° E. to the Dutch coast until time to meet Commodore (S) and support submarines. Acknowledge.—(H.S. 55, p. 665.)
167. *From Adpatrols, "Arrogant," Dover.* 19/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 1247.
Request information whether it is considered safe for transports and mine sweeping trawlers bound north to proceed to their destination. Several were turned back yesterday by Thames patrol and are now here. 1155.—(H.S. 55, p. 776.)
Note on original "This is the outcome of the small engagement going on yesterday, which resulted in local action being taken along the coast holding up everything."
168. *From Admiralty.* 19/8/14.
To P.N.T.O., Sent 1316.
4th Division will be moved on 22nd August.¹ Programme for 13th day will be carried out on 12th day, for 14th day on 13th day, and so on in view of move of 6th division being cancelled Confer with military.—(H.S. 55, p. 777.)
169. *From "Euryalus."* 19/8/14.
To Commodore (T.). Received 1439.
Destroyer patrol to-night is to go to South of 52° 20' North and should be on their limit at 10 p.m. Cruisers should come South inshore to East of you. Report when destroyers have been informed. 1330.—(H.S. 55, p. 793.)
170. *From P.N.T.O., Havre.* 19/8/14.
To Admiralty. Sent 1615; Received 1633.
With reference to your telegram of to-day referring to 4th and 6th Division I have conferred with military authorities and arrangements have been made accordingly.—(H.S. 55, p. 809.)
171. *From Admiralty.* 19/8/14.
To V.A., 7th Battle Squadron, "Vengeance." At 1635.
Three battleships of your squadron are required for the defence of trade at their focal points. "Canopus" at St. Vincent, Cape de Verde. "Albion" with Rear-Admiral at Gibraltar. "Ocean" at Queenstown.
Report when these ships are complete with coal. Special orders will be sent to them.—(H.S. 55, p. 810.)
172. *From Admiralty.* 19/8/14.
To C.-in-C., Nore. Sent 1800.
It appears that when news of reported presence of German vessels was received on morning of 18th, all transports, mine sweeping trawlers and merchant traffic were held up for a considerable period and considerable dislocation of traffic ensued and unnecessary alarm caused. This action should be used as sparingly as possible and steps should be taken to restore normal conditions as soon as possible. When local authorities stop traffic owing to immediate presence of enemy Admiralty should be at once informed.—(H.S. 55, p. 833.)
173. *From Admiralty.* 19/8/14.
To P.N.T.O., Havre Sent 2145.
Reference previous telegram War Office now decided embark 4th Division on Sunday 23rd. This causes following alterations: Thursday 20th will take the programme for the 13th day. Friday 21st takes the programme for the 14th day. Saturday 22nd takes the programme for the 15th day, and Sunday 23rd takes the programme for the 12th day.—(H.S. 55, p. 881.)
174. *From Admiralty.* 20/8/14.
To C.-in-C., Home Fleets. Sent 1415.
523. Your letter No. 26/H.F. 0022. No sweeping movement is to be carried out for the present. Fleet can be rested. Tactical exercise could be carried out east of Shetlands. You may rely on having Harwich Flotillas with you before fleets meet. A fifth division starts crossing to France on Sunday. "Fearless" and her flotilla were driven in by a cruiser of "York" class. Another appeared off Dowsing. It is necessary to provide powerful supports. "Invincible" has been ordered to the Humber where "New Zealand" should be directed to join the R.A. They will act under Admiralty, but join in any sweeping movement by Grand Fleet and generally act as your advanced cruiser force, being shortly joined by three "Arethusas." "Inflexible" now homeward bound, will join you, local defences of Scapa now being considered. Make your suggestions as to men, guns, and lights required.—(H.S. 56, p. 110.)

See Telegram 163.

¹ Telegram at 2145 altered this to 23rd August, and Telegram at 1630 on 20th August altered it again to 22nd August.—T.S.D.D.

175. *From Admiralty.* 20/8/14.
To (1) Principal Transports, Havre; (2) Repeated to Transports, Southampton. At 1630
Reference previous telegrams. War Office now decide move 4th Division, Saturday 22nd This causes following changes: Friday the 21st takes programme for 14th day. The 15th day stands in its original place in programme 23rd inst., details of 4th Division in programme for 13th and 14th days will be despatched on 15th day. Transports.—(H.S. 56, p. 144.)
176. *From Admiralty.* 20/8/14.
To Commodore (T.).
Your 190. The proposed operation is deferred¹ (stop).
Continue watching under R.A., "Euryalus" (stop). Expeditionary Force still crossing till Tuesday next (stop).—(H.S. 56 p. 184.)
177. *From Admiralty.* 21/8/14.
To C.-in-C., Portsmouth. At 1315.
Arrange for life-saving patrol to recommence at daylight to-morrow, Saturday.—(H.S. 56, p. 308.)
178. *From Admiral, Portsmouth.* 21/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 1528.
26. Your telegram² 24. Already arranged to recommence this afternoon as transport has commenced to pass.—(H.S. 56, p. 352.)
179. *From Havre Docks.* 21/8/14.
To Admiralty. Sent 1737. Received 1815.
With reference to your telegram, 19th August, I have visited Rouen and am of opinion that tugs are only required in river and estuary to be ready to assist immediately if a transport should be grounded or be in difficulties with possibility of blocking river. Five tugs will be sufficient for this and seven are required at Havre at the present time.—(H.S. 56, p. 387.)
180. *From Admiralty.* 21/8/14.
To R.A., "Euryalus," and Commodore (T.). At 2015.
German cavalry force may be expected at Ostend to-morrow morning, Saturday. Arrange for a light cruiser and two divisions of destroyers to make a demonstration before Ostend and along the coast supported by two "Bacchantes" outside the shoals.—(H.S. 56, p. 427.)
181. *From Transports.* 21/8/14.
To Admiralty Transports, Southampton, Newhaven. At 2030.
Masters Transports to be instructed to illuminate their special number when entering Havre during hours of darkness.—(H.S. 56, p. 429.)
182. *From Admiralty.* 22/8/14.
To R.A., "Euryalus." At 1740.
12. Your 1135, August 22nd.³ Withdraw the whole force, giving necessary orders.—(H.S. 56, p. 610.)
183. *From Admiralty.* 23/8/14.
To V.A., 2nd and 3rd Fleet, "Lord Nelson." At 1456.
86. The main body of the Expeditionary Force will have crossed this afternoon. You can return with the Channel Fleet to Spithead after 4 p.m. to-day.
Inform C.-in-C., Portsmouth, probable time of arrival. 1456.—(H.S. 56, p. 779.)
184. *From Admiralty.* 23/8/14.
To R.A., "Euryalus." At 1750.
16. The watching patrol on the Broad Fourteens is to be withdrawn. Destroyers are to return to Harwich. You should give the necessary orders. All ships of Cruiser Force "C" are to carry out target practice to-morrow, unless any of the ships are short of coal. After target practice, unless conditions change, ships are to return to the Nore to coal ready for further service.
Commodore (T.) to be at Admiralty to-morrow, Monday, at 3 p.m.
Report time and area of firing and give due warning to Naval Centres and to ships in the vicinity.—(H.S. 56, p. 805.)
185. *From Admiralty.* 23/8/14.
To C.-in-C., Portsmouth. Sent 2240.
The life-saving patrol may be suspended, but may be required again in a few days.—(H.S. 56, p. 865.)

¹ Apparently that mentioned in Telegram 163.

² Related to life-saving patrol.

³ Not traced. The withdrawal referred to the demonstration off Ostend, Telegram 180.

186. *From Admiralty.* 23/8/14
To Admiral, Chatham. At 2245.
In view of congestion at Southampton it is desirable to allow some of Union Castle steamers to lie at Southend. This is to be arranged, if possible. Telegraph reply.—(H.S. 56, p. 886.)
187. *Directions to Director of Transports.* 24/8/14.
1. Stop all sailings of ships with men and stores under orders to proceed to Havre and Boulogne, pending further instructions.
2. Report amount of stores actually accumulated or now under way at Boulogne or Havre, if any.
3. Report arrangement capable of being at once made to transfer stores, &c., to Cherbourg.
4. War Office must be immediately consulted about what stores should not be removed because wanted immediately for the Army.—(H.S. 57, p. 79.)
Note on original "No action other than report on (2) and (3) until (4) is clear."
188. *From Admiralty (T).* 24/8/14.
To Transports, Newhaven, Sussex. At 1110.
No transport is to sail to Boulogne or Havre until further orders. Acknowledge.
189. *From Admiralty (T).* 24/8/14.
To Principal Transports, Havre.
Report number of tons stores now at B and C¹ and the number of transports required to convey them to Cherbourg.—(H.S. 57, p. 82.)
190. *From C.-in-C., Portsmouth.* 24/8/14.
To Admiralty, Sub-Committee. Received 1121.
7. Vice-Admiral Burney, Channel Fleet, has arrived Spithead and states that although Fleet is now efficient, desirable when circumstances permit to draw fires for 48 hours to clean sweeping tubes, &c., as steam has been continuously up for 24 days. If you approve, suggest ships come into harbour at 1 p.m. to-day—please telegraph if approved as soon as possible.—(H.S. 57, p. 85.)
191. *From Admiralty.* 24/8/14.
To C.-in-C., Portsmouth. At 1310.
One half of ships at a time may draw fires for 48 hours, but this may be interrupted any moment. Several battle squadrons to be kept ready for sea during this time. Inform Admiral Bethell.—(H.S. 57, p. 85.)
192. *From Naval Attache.* 24/8/14.
To Marine, Paris. At 1140.
The Admiralty think it essential in the Naval interest to defend Dunkerque, Calais and Boulogne as long as possible. The Admiralty authorises the Squadron of Admiral Rouyer to co-operate in the defence by land of these three places. (*En clair*) to be continued.—(H.S. 57, p. 95.)
193. *From Admiralty (T).* 24/8/14.
To Admiralty Transports, Avonmouth. At 1140.
No transports to sail for B or C¹ until further orders. Acknowledge.—(H.S. 57, p. 89.)
194. *From Admiralty.* 24/8/14.
To C.-in-C., Home Fleet (? about noon.)
556. Personal. News from France is disappointing and serious results of battle cannot yet be measured as it still continues over enormous front.
I have had the telegrams about it repeated to you.
We have not entered the business without the resolve to see it through and you may be assured that our action will be proportioned to the gravity of the need.
I have absolute confidence in final result.
No special action is required from you at present, but you should address your mind to a Naval situation which may arise where Germans control Calais and French coasts and what ought to be the position of Grand Fleet in that event.—(H.S. 57, p. 112.)
195. *From Admiralty (T).* 24/8/14.
To Divisional Transports, Boulogne, Havre. At 1240.
Stop unloading until further orders. Acknowledge. Order applies to any other Store Transports not unloaded.—(H. S. 57, p. 120.)
196. *From Attaché Naval.* 24/8/14.
To Marine, Paris. At 1400.
260. (Translation.) Continuation of No. 259.
The British Government is examining the desirability of transporting from Boulogne to Cherbourg all military stores of British Expeditionary Force. It desires to know the views

¹ B = Boulogne, C = Havre.

- of the French Government on the necessity for this transportation when the results of the present battle become more apparent. The War Office has informed the Admiralty that it is consulting you on the question of the permanent defence of the Isthmus of the Cotentin in case the course of the war should necessitate its being made a place of arms and a sea base for British reinforcements.—(H.S. 57, p. 146.)
197. *From Admiralty (T).* 24/8/14.
To Divisional Transports, Boulogne. At 1545.
"Woodfield" sailed Avonmouth for Boulogne this morning. Wheeled vehicles may be unloaded but no stores.—(H.S. 57, p. 169.)
198. *From Admiralty.* 24/8/14.
To Marine, Paris. Sent 1830.
262. . . Admiralty wishes a line of watch to be kept in the Western part of the English Channel. It might be constituted of four British cruisers and of French light and auxiliary cruisers under the orders of Admiral Wemyss. The armoured cruisers under Admiral Rouyer might replenish at Cherbourg in order to hold themselves ready for military operations in the East. The submarines and torpedo boats from Cherbourg are no longer of use and may take a rest. Would you suggest how they might be used subsequently.—(H.S. 57, p. 204.)
199. *From Admiralty (T).* 24/8/14.
To Principal Transports, Havre. At 1850.
Yours to-day Presume you are obtaining number tons measurement stores now at B. and C. (stop) Information urgently required.—(H.S. 57, p. 209.)
200. *From Admiralty (T).* 24/8/14.
To Admiralty Transports, Avonmouth. Sent 1945.
Transports can be despatched to C. or R., not to B.¹ Repeat to Admiralty Transports, Newhaven; Admiralty Transports, Southampton. (H.S. 57, p. 221.)
201. *From Admiralty (T).* 24/8/14.
To Principal Transports, Havre. At 2153.
Boulogne to be closed down, supplies now there to be used up where possible (stop) Balance and ordnance stores and transport stuff to be transferred to Port C.¹ by ships now at Boulogne. Report progress. (H.S. 57, p. 222.)
202. *From French Admiralty.* 24/8/14.
To Admiralty (French N.A.). Received 2220.
18. In agreement with British Admiralty I give orders to Rear-Admiral Rouyer to leave to Admiral Wemyss, for barring the West of the Channel, light cruisers and auxiliaries (French), and to go to Cherbourg to replenish his armoured cruisers ready to contribute to defence of Northern ports—he will send back to Cherbourg torpedo boats and submarines from Cherbourg.—(H.S. 57, p. 239.)
203. *From Principal Naval Transports Officer, Havre.* 24/8/14.
To Admiralty (T). Sent 2305
B. 64. The 60,000 tons at this place are tons measurement. Boulogne has been ordered to report direct to Admiralty.—(H.S. 57, p. 243.)
204. *From Admiralty.* 24/8/14.
To Principal Transports, Havre. At 2325
Your B. 60. Release transports held at C.¹ They should be unloaded and return to embarkation ports Achlibster and Nuceria will be sent to Boulogne to assist remove stores to Cherbourg (stop). "Saturnia" should not remain at Boulogne (stop) Inform D.N.T.O.—(H.S. 57, p. 246.)
205. *From Admiralty.* 24/8/14.
To (1) Divisional Transports, Calais; (2) Principal Transports, Havre.
(1) Leave for Havre at once and report yourself to Principal Transport Officer.
(2) D.N.T.O., Calais, has been ordered to report himself to you at Havre.—(H.S. 57, p. 247.)
206. *From First Lord.* 25/8/14.
To C.-in-C. At 0130.
568. British retirement on French frontier successfully and skilfully effected Army now in strong position well supported Our casualties reported not severe considering continual engagement with two German Corps and two Cavalry Divisions (.) Main battle has still to be fought General impression better than this morning
Hope all is well with you.
207. *From A.C., 12th C.S.* 25/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received, 1139.
French Rear-Admiral Rouyer has withdrawn all armoured cruisers both from patrol and from supporting force. He has left me four light cruisers and three mercantile auxiliaries with which I am continuing the Western patrol. 0945.—(H.S. 57, p. 312.)

¹ R = Rouen, C = Havre, B = Boulogne.

208. From Admiralty. 25/8/14.
To Divisional Transports, Boulogne. At 1215.
Stores personnel, &c., are to proceed to Havre not Cherbourg.—(H.S. 57, p. 322.)
209. From R.A., 11th Cruiser Squadron, H.M.S. "Doris." 25/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 1053.
15. Is it still necessary to keep a cruiser between Queenstown and Scilly Isles.—(H.S. 57, p. 344.)
210. From Admiralty. 25/8/14.
To R.A., 11th Cruiser Squadron, H.M.S. "Doris." At 1400.
25. Your 15 No. Troops have finished crossing.—(H.S. 57, p. 344.)
211. From C.-in-C., Home Fleets. 25/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 1810.
202. The fact that Northern Patrol has sighted nothing during long period indicates that either German vessels passed them at night or went up inside Fjords, or are not moving. The watch kept off the Nord Fjord latterly points to the latter conclusion. A more effective use could be made of cruisers if the 10th Cruiser Squadron came South to cover an area to Southward and Eastward of Kinnaird Head where they would not require support; freeing more powerful cruisers for offensive work further East and South. The watch off Kinnaird Head is necessary for covering movements of vessels to and from and in Scapa Flow and Cromarty Firth and at present is performed by valuable cruisers. Armed merchant cruisers will be kept off Shetland Islands. Tenth Cruiser Squadron would join any large operations Southwards.—(H.S. 57, p. 378.)
212. From Admiralty. 25/8/14.
To V.A., "Lord Nelson," Portsmouth. Sent 1825.
Proceed at once to Devonport with ships in company and be prepared to embark Field Force of Royal Marines on arrival for conveyance to a destination which will be communicated later.
NOTE.—Telegrams on same date of similar sense to R.A., "Euryalus," and V.A., "Vengeance," and to C.-in-C., Home Ports, to embark other Home Port detachments. A number of signals from 25th August onwards about the landing at Ostende and the operations in Heligoland Bight of 28th August are not included here. Hist. Sec., Vol. 57, has telegrams 24-27th August, and H.S., Vol. 58, telegrams 28-31st August 1914.—T.S.D.D.
213. From C.-in-C., Home Fleets. 25/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 2006.
203. Communication with Scapa Flow has been difficult of late by Destroyers owing to weather. Much mist also. German submarines have been reported to Eastwards of Orkney Islands and off Fair Isle (Shetlands) last few days and it is therefore not safe to approach to within 60 miles from Orkneys. Destroyers have been engaged in hunt for them. Continual reports received of presence of aeroplanes over Shetland Isles and Orkneys. I do not believe report as all probable bases have been searched. All ships would benefit by two or three days in harbour both material and personnel. It is preferable to coal all Dreadnought types and give them this rest together, so that periods when Fleet is weak may not be prolonged. May I be informed with reference to your telegram No. 560 when I may recommence coaling all Dreadnought types together. First and Third Battle Squadrons will be out 26th August. 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons and 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron coaling. All will be out 27th August. Next coaling should commence early part of next week. My coaling policy is on the following principles, first to keep ships perpetually with sufficient fuel to permit of their proceeding South, if this cannot be done operations likely to require high steam. Minimum depletion allowed is between 30 and 40 per cent. Secondly, as all Grand Fleet Battleships and Cruisers will be required South simultaneously they should be coaling as near as possible at same time, approaching base being meanwhile covered by force of cruisers which could give main body ample time to leave and yet have sufficient coal for distant operations. If movements South desired this week and circumstances admit, I would send ships to harbour half at a time but we can easily stay out if necessary.—(H.S. 57, p. 409.)
214. From Admiralty. 25/8/14.
To R.A., "Charybdis." (?) At 2200.
(? 481.) Number your telegrams. The Western patrol will be maintained. Can any ships be spared from your Force for other duties. What kind of vessels are the mercantile auxiliaries. Would they be suitable for the trade route?—(H.S. 57, p. 312.)
215. From Transports. 26/8/14.
To Admiralty Transports, Southampton. At 0140.
Following reinforcements require conveyance embarkation to commence earliest possible moment: 141 Officers, 9,500 troops, with infantry proportion of horses in addition to 700 horses already arranged for. Consult military and arrange. Docks Board informed port must be closed at once till further orders. Acknowledge.—(H.S. 57, p. 463.)
216. From Admiralty (T). 26/8/14.
To Principal Transports, Havre.
Reinforcements: 9,680 officers and men proceed at once from Southampton. First ships probably sail evening 26th. Acknowledge.—(H.S. 57, p. 465.)

217. From Admiralty. 26/8/14.
To (1) Stewart, Secretary Chamber of Commerce, Southampton. At 0320
(2) Admiralty Transports, Southampton.
The whole port of Southampton must again be closed immediately to commercial traffic pending further orders.—(H.S. 57, p. 473.)
218. From Admiral Commanding, 12th Cruiser Squadron. 26/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 0359.
1. Your 481. No ship can be spared. None of the mercantile auxiliaries at present here suitable for trade route. 0235.—(H.S. 57, p. 475.)
219. From Admiralty Transports. 26/8/14.
To Principal Transports, Havre. At 0900.
Ship urgently required at Dunkirk for conveyance 500 refugees to England. If possible, and you consider it advisable send ship from Boulogne replacing by one from Havre. Otherwise send ship direct from Havre. Report ship and time due Dunkirk.—(H.S. 57, p. 495.)
220. From R.A., "Euryalus," Sheerness. 26/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 0925.
Propose to take one seaplane carrier with three seaplanes for reconnaissance, submitted for approval. I consider four minesweepers should sweep the approach to Ostend from the North as weather lately has been most suitable for mine-laying. 0845.
221. From Admiralty. 27/8/14.
To C.-in-C., Home Fleet, Scapa.
584. Your 203. Restrictions named in my 560 are removed. Your coaling policy approved.
222. From Admiralty. 27/8/14.
To V.A., "Vengeance." At 1359.
45. On arrival at Ostend you will take charge of the Naval situation remaining there with your four battleships "Proserpine" and the six destroyers.
You are to victual and support whole of Marine Force making what arrangements you think fit in co-operation with General Aston.
You are to send Rear-Admiral Curry's Squadron back to rejoin Vice-Admiral Burney.
Keep Admiralty informed of the situation.
None of the ships' companies are to be landed.
Acknowledge. 1359.—(H.S. 57, p. 833.)
223. From Admiralty. 27/8/14.
To All ships. At 1830.
491. Following is state of case as regards mines in North Sea up to 27th August.
There are three foul areas.
The Southwold area is Lat. 51.55 to Lat. 52.30 to Westward of Long. 3° East. This area has a swept track on its inshore side marked by buoys.
The Newcastle area is between two lines bearing N.E. and S.E. from Tynemouth and between the distances 20 miles and 30 miles from Tynemouth.
The Flamborough area is from Lat. 53.40 N. to 54.15 N., and between two lines parallel to coast 8 miles and 30 miles out.—(H.S. 57, p. 902.)
224. From Admiralty. 29/8/14.
To All ships. At 3210.
518. With reference to Admiralty message 491 Area foul from mines.
The Newcastle area is increased and is now between the distances 20 miles and 50 miles from Tynemouth.
The Flamborough area extends to the South as far as latitude 53.30 N.—(H.S. 57, p. 902.)
225. From Comm. (T) via "Euryalus." 28/8/14.
To Admiralty. Received 0920.
7.50 this morning destroyers in action with destroyers 0090.¹—(H.S. 58, p. 50.)
226. From A.C., 1st B.C.S. 28/8/14.
To C.-in-C., H.F. Received 1840.
Destroyers to-day heavily engaged¹ with enemy destroyers, result satisfactory. Details unknown. One British destroyer one flotilla cruiser seriously damaged. 1st flotilla cruiser seriously damaged. 1st light cruiser squadron sank "Mainz" and received slight damage. 1st Battle cruiser squadron sank one cruiser "Koln" class and another cruiser disappeared in mist heavily on fire in sinking condition. These only three cruisers (? sighted). Battle cruiser squadron undamaged. All force now retired. Battle cruiser squadron was attacked by submarines and floating mines were reported but successfully evaded them. Waiting to cover retirement of torpedo flotilla when will sweep North as directed. 1740.—(H.S. 58, p. 177.)

¹ Action of Heligoland Bight.

227. *From Admiralty.* 29/8/14.
To R.A., "Euryalus." At 1240.
41. Send destroyers into Harwich to oil. Approved for "Euryalus" to carry out firing, giving necessary warning. There will be little chance of a German destroyer attack for a day or two. To guard ships at Ostend watch Southern end of Broad Fourteens. Some destroyers will be sent out as soon as oiled. Acknowledge.—(H.S. 58, p. 367.)
228. *From Admiralty.* 30/8/14.
To P.N.T.O., Havre. At 0220.
Yours 29th August. Southampton has been instructed to send three ships to Havre and three to Rouen for conveyance of stores to St. Nazaire. 6,000 reinforcements proceed tomorrow night; some of the ships conveying these can also be used if necessary.—(H.S. 58, p. 563.)
229. *From Admiralty.* 30/8/14.
To C-in-C., Portsmouth. At 1110.
Arrange for life-saving patrol from 6.30 this evening.
230. *From Admiralty.* 31/8/14.
To P.N.T.O., Havre. At 1257.
Your telegram to-night. All Naval Staff from C. and R. should proceed to St. Nazaire and await further instructions.
231. *From Marine, Paris.* 31/8/14.
To Admiralty. (?)
66. The War Ministry wishes to transport urgently to ports on the Atlantic and Mediterranean stores of oil refineries existing at Rouen and Havre. The stores comprise 60,000 tons of oil and petrol, 40,000 at Rouen and 20,000 at Havre. Out of this total there are 30,000 tons petrol which it is necessary to carry first. No ship is available for this purpose, can you find at once in England tank steamers available . . . —(H.S. 58, p. 104.)
232. *From P.N.T.O., Havre.* 31/8/14.
To Admiralty (T). Received 1332.
B. 124. Transports still required 15,000 troops, 1,500 horses also two store ships moderate size one of them suitable for carrying petrol.—(H.S. 58, p. 1051.)
233. *From Admiralty.* 31/8/14.
To Naval Attaché, Marine, Paris. Sent 1630.
291. As base of British Expeditionary Force has been changed to St. Nazaire, the Admiralty would be obliged if one division of armoured cruisers of the second light cruiser squadron were sent at once to patrol and cover the route from Ushant to Finisterre. This would allow the British cruisers watching this route to spread further South. At present there is no sign of enemy's ships in the Bay of Biscay, but when it is known that the base has been changed it is possible that a raid may be made on the transports. The other divisions of armoured cruisers should be kept at Cherbourg ready to relieve the first or go to the East as may be required.
234. *From Admiralty.* 1/9/14.
To P.N.T.O., Havre.
(Made after explanations that 15,000 troops were from the depots at Havre.)
Yours to-night ships for 15,000 troops and 1,500 horses are being despatched from Southampton at once.—(H.S. 58, p. 1051.)
235. *From Admiralty.* 11/10/14.
To P.N.T.O., Nantes.
It has been decided to close Saint Nazaire as a base and no more ships will be despatched there. It is now proposed to make Havre the main base and Boulogne a secondary base.

APPENDIX B.

ALLIED AND ENEMY FORCES.

CONTENTS.

1. Summary of Strength of Allied Fleets.
2. Composition of British Squadrons in Home Waters.
3. Composition of French Squadrons in the Channel.
4. Pre-war organisation and war disposal of 2nd and 3rd Fleet battleships.
5. German ships in Home Waters on 5/8/14.

APPENDIX B1.

ALLIED FORCES.

SUMMARY OF STRENGTH OF FLEETS IN HOME WATERS.

August, 1914.

(The class names is approximate; e.g., town class, light cruiser includes a "Southampton" or a "Liverpool.")

GRAND FLEET.	DOVER PATROL.
20 Dreadnought class.	4 Light cruisers of scout class.
8 "King Edward VII." class.	20 T.B.D.'s of "Tribal" and 30-knots class.
3 "Albemarle" class (from 7/8/14).	14 S/M's "C" class.
4 Battle Cruisers (Add. "Invincible" from 19/8/14, "Inflexible" from 30/8/14).	CHANNEL FLEET.
4 "Shannon" class cruisers.	20 Battleships pre-Dreadnought classes. ¹
4 "Argyll" class cruisers.	3 attached cruisers.
2 "Drake" class cruiser. Northern Patrol.	11th C.S. (by Irish Channel).
8 "Crescent" class cruiser. Northern Patrol.	5 Cruisers of "Doris" class.
6 town class light cruisers.	12th C.S. (at Western entrance to Channel.)
40 T.B.D.'s of "Acorn" and "Acasta" class.	4 Cruisers of "Talbot" class.
Minesweeping gunboats and auxiliaries.	
HARWICH FLOTILLA.	FRENCH 2ND LIGHT SQUADRON.
2 Light Cruisers.	(At Western Entrance to Channel.)
35 T.B.D.'s of "Ariel" and "L" class.	10 Cruisers.
	4 Light cruisers.
CRUISER FORCE C.	FRENCH SUBMARINES.
5 "Cressy" class cruisers.	At Calais 6 (Varne patrol).
	At Cherbourg 16 (mid-Channel patrol).
SUBMARINES IN SOUTHERN NORTH SEA.	¹ Number varied during August 1914, being reduced to 15 by August 31st.
8th S/M flotilla—16 boats D. and E class.	

APPENDIX B2.

BRITISH FLEET IN HOME WATERS.¹

GRAND FLEET.	2nd Battle Squadron—cont.
"Iron Duke" - Admiral (Act.) Sir John Jellicoe	"Orion" - R.A. Sir R. K. Arbuthnot
"Oak" (T.B.D.)	M.V.O. (sen. 13/7/12).
1st Battle Squadron—	"Ajax"
"Marlborough" V.A. (Act.) Sir Lewis Bayly,	"Audacious."
K.C.B., C.V.O. (sen. 13/12/13).	"Centurion."
"St. Vincent" - R.-Ad. H. Evan-Thomas,	"Conqueror."
M.V.O. (sen. 9/7/12).	"Monarch."
"Colossus."	"Thunderer."
"Hercules."	"Boadicea" (light cruiser).
"Neptune."	
"Vanguard."	3rd Battle Squadron—
"Collingwood."	"King Edward VII" V.A. E. E. Bradford, C.V.O.
"Superb."	(sen. 10/2/14).
"Bellona" (Light cruiser).	"Hibernia" - R.A. M. E. Browning, M.V.O.
2nd Battle Squadron—	(sen. 22/9/11).
"King George V." V.A. Sir George Warrender,	"Africa."
K.C.B., K.C.V.O. (sen. 4/6/13)	"Britannia."

¹ Position and movements, H.M. Ships, War Vessels and Aircraft, British and Foreign, Parts I. and II., August 1914.

3rd Battle Squadron—continued.

"Commonwealth."
 "Dominion."
 "Hindustan."
 "Zealandia."
 "Blanche" (light cruiser).

4th Battle Squadron—

"Dreadnought" V.-A. Sir D. A. Gamble,
 K.C.V.O. (sen. 8/12/13).
 "Temeraire."
 "Bellerophon."
 "Agincourt."¹
 "Blonde" (light cruiser).

6th Battle Squadron—

{Joined G.F. at Scapa 7/8/14, worked with
 3rd B.S.).
 "Russell" - R.-A. S. Nicholson, M.V.O.
 (sen. 30/7/12).
 "Albemarle."
 "Exmouth."

1st Battle Cruiser Squadron—

"Lion" - V.-A. (act.) Sir D. Beatty,
 K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O. (sen.
 3/8/14).
 "Queen Mary."
 "Princess Royal."
 "New Zealand."
 "Invincible." Joined 19/8/14, previously com-
 pleting, &c., after big refit.
 (Flag of R.-A. G. H. W.
 Moore, C.V.O., C.B.)
 "Inflexible." - Joined 30/8/4, from Mediter-
 ranean.

2nd Cruiser Squadron—

"Shannon" - R.-A. Gough-Calthorpe, C.V.O.,
 C.B. (sen. 27/8/11).
 "Achilles."
 "Cochrane"
 "Natal."

3rd Cruiser Squadron—

"Antrim" R.-A. W. Pakenham, C.B.,
 M.V.O. (sen. 4/6/13).
 "Argyll."
 "Devonshire."
 "Roxburgh."

6th Cruiser Squadron² (Northern Patrol)—

"Drake" - R.-A. W. L. Grant, C.B. (sen.
 26/10/09).
 "King Alfred." (Joined 21/8/14).

10th Cruiser Squadron (Northern Patrol)—

"Crescent" - R.-A. de Chair, C.B., M.V.O.
 (sen. 31/7/12).
 "Edgar."
 "Endymion."
 "Gibraltar."
 "Grafton."
 "Hawke."
 "Royal Arthur."
 "Theseus."

¹ Joined Fleet, 25/8/14; joined 4th B.S., 7/9/14.

² Reinforced later, during August, by 3 armed mer-
 chant ships.

1st Light Cruiser Squadron—

"Southampton" Commodore W. Goodenough,
 M.V.O. (sen. 1/1/05).
 "Birmingham."
 "Lowestoft."
 "Nottingham."
 "Falmouth."
 "Liverpool."

Flotillas with Grand Fleet.

2nd Destroyer Flotilla—

"Active" - Capt. J. R. P. Hawksley,
 M.V.O. (sen. 30/6/12).
 20 T.B.D.'s of "Acorn" (H) class.

4th Destroyer Flotilla—

"Swift" - Capt. C. J. Wintour (sen.
 30/6/13).
 20 T.B.D.'s of "Acasta" (K) class.

HARWICH FLOTILLAS.

"Amethyst," Commodore (T) R. Y. Tyrwhitt
 (sen. 30/6/08).

1st Destroyer Flotilla—

"Fearless" - Capt. W. F. Blunt (sen.
 31/12/11).
 20 T.B.D.'s of "Acheron" ("1") class.

3rd Destroyer Flotilla—

"Amphion" - Capt. C. H. Fox (sen. 31/12/11)
 Sunk 5/8/14.
 15 T.B.D.'s of "L" class.

CRUISER FORCE C.

"Euryalus" - R.-A. A. H. Christian, M.V.O.,
 from 16/8/14 (sen. 21/8/11).
 "Bacchante" - R.-A. H. H. Campbell, C.V.O.
 (sen. 20/9/12).
 "Hogue."
 "Cressy."
 "Aboukir."

DOVER PATROL.

Ad. of Patrols, Commodore G. A. Ballard, C.B.
 (sen. 30/6/06).
 Asst. to Ad. of Patrols, Captain Lowther-Crofton
 (sen. 31/12/09).
 "Adventure."
 "Foresight."
 "Sentinel."

6th Destroyer Flotilla—

"Attentive" - Capt. C. D. Johnson M.V.O.
 (sen. 31/12/09).
 20 T.B.D.'s of "Tribal" and 30 knct class.

3rd and 4th Submarine Flotilla—

B 3-5
 C 14-18
 C 31-35
 D 1 } 14 S.M's.

Minelayer Squadron—

7 minelayers, "Iphigenia," &c., were at Dover
 part of Aug. 1914, but were not employed;
 3 joined Grand Fleet 24/8/14.

Downs Boarding Flotilla—

"Harrier."
 "Niger."
 5 Tugs.

11TH CRUISER SQUADRON.

"Doris" - R.-A. Phipps Hornby, C.M.G. (sen.
 15/5/13).
 "Isis."
 "Venus."
 "Minerva."
 "Juno" (patrolled northern entrance to Irish
 Sea).
 "Caronia" Armed merchant cruiser joined
 squadron, and 2 other A.M.C.'s
 worked on Irish coasts.

CHANNEL FLEET.¹

5th Battle Squadron (8/8/14)—

"Lord Nelson" - V.-A. Sir C. Burney, K.C.B.,
 K.C.M.G. (sen. 20/9/12).
 "Prince of Wales" R.-A. B. Currey (sen. 2/3/11).
 "Queen" - R.-A. C. Thursby (sen. 17/9/11).
 "Agamemnon."
 "Formidable."
 "Implacable."
 "Irresistible."
 "Venerable."
 "London."
 "Bulwark."
 "Topaze" (light cruiser).
 "Diamond" " "

8th Battle Squadron (8/8/14)—

"Prince George" V.-A. Sir A. Bethell, K.C.B.,
 K.C.M.G. (sen. 10/5/13).
 "Vengeance." Flagship from 15/8/14.
 "Albion" - R.-A. Tottenham (sen. 30/4/10).
 Detached 20/8/14.
 "Ocean" - Detached 20/8/14.
 "Caesar."
 "Goliath."
 "Canopus" - Detached 20/8/14.
 "Glory" - " "
 "Jupiter" - In dockyard.
 "Majestic" - Did not join.
 ("Illustrious" was reduced to care and main-
 tenance party on 9/8/14, and her crew commis-
 sioned H.M.S. "Erin.")
 "Sapphire" - Joined cruiser force C, 15/8/14.
 "Proserpine."

12th Cruiser Squadron (Cruiser Force G)—

"Charybdis" - R.-A. R. Wemyss (sen. 19/4/11).
 "Eclipse."
 "Talbot."
 "Diana."

¹ Admiralty letter, 8/8/14, "Reconstruction of Battle
 Squadrons" altered the pre-war organisation of
 the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Battle Squadrons.
 The 6th B.S. ceased to exist (3 ships went north
 to join the Grand Fleet and worked with the
 3rd B.S.); 7th and 8th B.S. were combined into
 the 8th B.S.; "Agamemnon" and "Vengeance"
 joined respectively the 5th and 8th B.S. This
 new organisation is given here, as it was assumed
 before the Channel Fleet put to sea at noon on
 8/8/14 to cover the passage of the B.E.F. The
 original organisation is attached showing also the
 eventual dispositions of units (see Appendix B4).

PATROL FLOTILLAS AND LOCAL DEFENCE.

Ad. of Patrols - Commodore G. A. Ballard, C.B.
 The Nore - Ad. Sir R. Poore, K.C.B.,
 C.V.O. (sen. 17/7/11).

12 old T.B.D.'s.
 20 Torpedo boats.

5th S/M Flotilla—

C 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 (6 boats).

Portsmouth - Ad. Sir H. Meux, G.C.B.,
 K.C.V.O. (sen. 2/3/11).

6 T.B.D.'s.
 23 Torpedo boats.

Devonport - Ad. Sir G. Egerton, K.C.B.,
 (sen. 21/3/13).

4 T.B.D.'s.
 8 Torpedo boats.

SUBMARINES.

Commodore (S) R. Keyes, C.B., M.V.O. (sen.
 30/6/05).

6th S/M Flotilla, Humber—

C 7-13, 7 boats.

8th S/M Flotilla, Harwich—

D 2-8 } 16 boats.
 E 1-9 }

ARMED MERCHANT CRUISERS.

Between 21/8/14 and 30/8/14 the following were
 in commission:—

With Cruiser Force B (Northern Patrol)	-	3
" " " D (Atlantic)	-	2
" " " E (11th C.S.)	-	1
" " " H (Atlantic)	-	1
Irish Coasts	-	2
With C-in-C., H.F.	-	2
On Atlantic trade routes	-	5
In Mediterranean	-	1
In China	-	4
Total	-	21

TRAWLERS²

The following numbers were commissioned and
 stationed by 30/8/14. (Before that date the dis-
 position of hired trawlers is not shown in I.D.
 returns.)

At Devonport	-	7
" Portland	-	4
" Portsmouth	-	11
" Dover	-	6
" Sheerness	-	15
" Harwich	-	6
" Lowestoft	-	92
" Humber	-	8
" N. Shields	-	4
" Firth of Forth	-	24
" Peterhead	-	4
" Cromarty	-	8
" North Flotilla	-	19
Total	-	208

² Trawlers were commissioned as minesweepers and
 for other auxiliary duties from 4/8/14.

APPENDIX B3.

FRENCH FORCES.

2ND LIGHT SQUADRON.					1st Destroyer Flotilla; Headquarters, Rochefort—											
R.A. Rouyer.					8 T.B.D.'s.											
	Date.	Ton- nage.	Speed.	Arma- ment.	2nd and 3rd Destroyer Flotilla; Headquarters Cherbourg—											
					12 T.B.D.'s.											
					1st and 3rd Submarine Flotilla; Headquarters, Cherbourg—											
					13 Submarines.											
					4 T.B.D.'s.											
					3 Submarines.											
					1 T.B.D.											
					2nd Submarine Flotilla; Headquarters, Calais—											
					6 Submarines.											
					2 Destroyers.											
					Defense Mobile; Cherbourg—											
					Torpedo boats—1st class - - 12 boats.											
					Training - - 4 "											
					Reserve - - 14 "											
					4 Submarines.											
					Defense Mobile; Dunkerque and Calais—											
					Torpedo boats—1st class - - 8 boats.											
					Training - - 4 "											
					Reserve - - 10 "											
10 Cruisers.																
Marseillaise	1904	10,000	21/19	Inch. { 2-7.6 8-6.4												
Admiral Aube																
Gloire																
Gueydon																
DupetitThouars																
Jeanne D'Arc	1902/5	9,000	21/19	Inch. { 2-7.6 8-6.5												
Desaix																
Kleber																
Chateaurenault	1899	8,000	24/20	Inch. { 2-6.5 6-5.5												
Guichen																
4 Light Cruisers.																
Lavoisier	1898	2,300	18	6-5.5 3.9												
D'Estrees	1899	2,400	18	6-5.5 3.9												
Surcouf	1890	2,000	15	4-5.5												
Friant	1895	3,900	19/18													

APPENDIX B4.

PRE-WAR ORGANISATION AND WAR DISPOSAL OF SECOND AND THIRD FLEET BATTLESHIPS.

SECOND FLEET.		OTHER BATTLESHIPS.		
5th B.S.—		"Magnificent" -	Sent to Humber for local defence; arrived 1/8/14.	
"Prince of Wales" (Flag)	Remained in 5th B.S.	"Victorious" -	8th B.S. Flagship until 15/8/14.	
"Bulwark" -			Light cruiser "Sapphire" detached 15/8/14 to work with R.-A., Christian.	
"Formidable" -			8th B.S.—	
"Implacable" -			"Albion" -	In 8th B.S. until 20/8/14,
"Irresistible" -			"Canopus" -	when detached to rein-
"London" -			"Glory" -	force cruiser squadrons
"Queen" -			"Ocean" -	abroad.
"Venerable" -		"Goliath" -	8th B.S.	
Light cruiser "Topaze."		Light cruiser "Proserpine."	8th B.S.	
6th B.S.—				
"Lord Nelson" (Fleet Flagship)	Joined 5th B.S.			
"Russell" (Flag)	Joined Grand Fleet, 7/8/14.			
"Exmouth" -				
"Albemarle" -				
"Duncan" -	In dock for long refit, not commissioned during Aug 1914.	"Hannibal" ¹	Sent to Humber for local defence. Arrived 1/8/14. Sent from there to Scapa for local defence. Arrived 10/8/14.	
"Cornwallis" -				
"Vengeance" -	Joined 8th B.S. 8/8/14.	"Mars" ¹	Sent to Humber. Arrived 1/8/14 and stayed there as local defence ships.	
Light cruiser "Diamond"	joined 5th B.S.	"Jupiter" ¹	In dockyard until late Sept. 1914.	
N.B.—"Agamemnon" of 4th B.S.	remained at Portland when Grand Fleet went North on 29/7/14, and joined 5th B.S.	"Majestic" ¹	Commissioned 22/8/14 as training ship for gun-layers.	
THIRD FLEET.				
7th B.S.—				
"Caesar" -	Joined 8th B.S.			
"Illustrious" -	Reduced to care and maintenance party, 7/8/14; to Loch Ewe, 30/8/14 as local defence ship.			

¹ Pre-war organisation contained a 9th Battle Squadron consisting of "Hannibal," "Mars," "Jupiter" and "Majestic," to be based on the Humber, but it was not constituted a command.

APPENDIX B5.

DISPOSITION OF GERMAN SHIPS.¹

(10th Aug. 1914.)

(See Monograph No. 11, Appendix E.)

APPENDIX C.

GENERAL ORDERS.

1. Commodore (S) to C.-in-C., H.F., 31/7/14.
2. Commodore (S) to C.-in-C., H.F., 1/8/14.
3. Commodore (S) Orders to 8th Submarine Flotilla, 8/8/14.
4. Commodore (S) to Chief of War Staff, Admiralty, 8/8/14.
5. Commodore (S) to Chief of War Staff, Admiralty, 14/8/14.
6. Commodore (T) War Orders No. 1 to 1st and 3rd Flotillas, 4/8/14.
7. Commodore (T) War Orders No. 2 to 1st and 3rd Flotillas, 9/8/14.
8. War Orders to Rear-Admiral "Invincible" (Cruiser Force K), 21/8/14.

APPENDIX C1.

From Commodore (S).
To Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet.

31st July 1914.

Submitted: I arrived at Harwich this morning with "Maidstone," "Adamant," and 10 submarines of the 8th Flotilla, and will make that my headquarters until I receive further orders.

As it is essential to spare the submarines as much as possible while on the surface, both in regard to material and personnel, I have arranged for the two which will first operate in the Heligoland Bight to be towed as far as Terschelling Light Vessel, in rear of the destroyer sweep which will leave Harwich on the outbreak of war. A copy of their orders is attached.

I have been informed that the four "Bacchantes" will take the place of the four "Drakes," and that the former cannot take up their station until about four days after the outbreak of war.

Under the circumstances, and with a view to the possibility of the German Fleet proceeding to the southward to attack the Expeditionary Force in transit, I propose to station four submarines to the southward of the destroyer sweep.

These will be relieved from time to time by four which will be held in reserve at Harwich.

I hope to have two more submarines in the course of a week.

If the two selected submarines which go to the Heligoland Bight return and report favourably, I will send two more, but I look upon this operation as a hazardous experiment, and in the early stages of the war I submit that the remainder will be better employed as I have arranged, particularly in view of the small number available, and the fact that their engines are still somewhat unreliable for long surface cruises.

The First Sea Lord and Chief of the War Staff concur in these proposals, and I trust you will approve.

ROGER KEYES, Commodore (S).

¹ App. A., Tel. 68.

APPENDIX C2.

From Commodore (S).
To Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets.

1st August 1914.

I propose to send two pairs of submarines to patrol between the Outer Gabbard Light Vessel and the North Hinder Light Vessel

2. One pair will remain on a line 14 miles South-east from the Outer Gabbard, and the other on a line 14 miles North-west from the North Hinder.

3. They will take up these stations when war is declared, and will be relieved by two more pairs as necessary.

4. On the arrival of the four "Bacchante" class cruisers, I will confer with the Rear-Admiral Commanding as to future movements in this area.

5. In the event of the 1st and 3rd Flotillas being withdrawn to join the Channel Fleet, the Commodore (T) has arranged to detail a destroyer to scout for each pair of submarines.

6. One submarine of each pair will be fitted with W/T.

7. Copies of this communication have been furnished to Admiral of Patrols, Commodore (T), Captain (D), 6th Flotilla, and to the Chief of the War Staff.

ROGER KEYES, Commodore (S).

APPENDIX C3.

COMMODORE (S) ORDERS TO 8TH SUBMARINE FLOTILLA.¹

(Copy.)

Memorandum.

H.M.S. "Maidstone" at Harwich,
8th August 1914.

Submarines will take up the following positions, commencing daylight, Sunday, 9th August :—

Position "A" - - - - "E 4."	Position "F" - - - - "E 7."
"B" - - - - "E 9."	"G" - - - - "D 3."
"C" - - - - "E 2."	"H" - - - - "D 2."
"D" - - - - "D 7."	"I" - - - - "D 8."
"E" - - - - "E 5."	"J" - - - - "E 3."

Spare—

"D 5," "E 6," and "E 8."

2. Daylight Positions.

- "A" and "B."—Between Galloper Light Vessel and position 7½' S.E.
 "C" and "D."—Between positions 7½' and 15' S.E. of Galloper Light.
 "E."—Between West Hinder Light and Fairy Bank.
 "F."—Between Fairy Bank and position 7½' N.W. of West Hinder Light.
 "G" and "H."—Between positions 7½' and 15' N.W. of West Hinder Light.
 "I."—At position 5' S.E. of Long Sand Light.
 "J."—At position 4' S.W. of West Hinder Light.

These positions are not to be left until dark.

3. Night Positions.

- "A" and "B."—Close as possible to Long Sand Light Vessel.
 "C" and "D."—Close as possible to Galloper Light Vessel.
 "I."—Close as possible to Kentish Knock Light Vessel.
 "E," "F," and "J."—Close as possible to West Hinder Light Vessel.
 "G" and "H."—Close as possible to Ruytingen Light Vessel.

These positions are to be left in time to be on patrol at daylight.

On patrol submarines of a pair should keep about one mile and a half apart, and are on no account to get to the N.E. of their lines.

Until buoys are laid "B" and "C," and "F" and "G," are to sight each other every hour at positions 7½ miles S.E. and N.W. from their respective Light Vessels, in order to correct the position of the outer boats. "F" is to sight "E" at the half-hour to correct its position.

4. There will probably be destroyers stationed in the following positions: 5 miles N.E. of "A" and "B" patrol, 5 miles N.E. of "C" and "D" patrol, and 5 miles N.E. of "F" patrol. If altering their positions and approaching the patrols of other submarines, destroyers will fly an ensign at the masthead. If the enemy is sighted, these destroyers will signal by Black Flag Code, and will endeavour to keep directly ahead and so indicate the direction in which the submarines should proceed.

5. Buoys will probably be laid shortly in the following positions :—

- (1) 7½ miles S.E. of Galloper Light Vessel.
- (2) 15 miles S.E. of Galloper Light Vessel.
- (3) 7½ miles N.W. of West Hinder Light Vessel.
- (4) 15 miles N.W. of West Hinder Light Vessel.
- (5) Lat. 52° N., Long. 3° E.

6. If they can be supplied in time, the following signals will be used by all destroyers :—

By Day.

- | | |
|---|-------------------------------|
| Rocket which on explosion displays a red flag suspended from a parachute. | Enemy capital ships in sight. |
| Ditto, with blue flag | Enemy light vessels in sight. |

By Night.

- | | |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Red rockets (which have been ordered) | Enemy capital ships in sight. |
| White Service rockets | Enemy light vessels in sight. |

(Signed) ROGER KEYES, Commodore (S).

The Officers Commanding, 8th Submarine Flotilla, and H.M. Ships "Lurcher," "Firedrake," "Lennox," and "Legion."

Copies to Commander-in-Chief, The Nore, Commodore (T), Captain H.M.S. "Actæon," S.N.O., Harwich, and C.O., 4th Submarine Flotilla.

(NOTE.—Commodore (S) will be in "Lurcher," and will remain in the vicinity of the submarine patrol as long as it is maintained.)

¹ The dispositions of this memo. were apparently only adhered to on 9th August. On 10th August the 8th S/M Flotilla were re-disposed on the line N. Goodwin-Sandettie-Ruytingen.—(T. & S.D.D.)

APPENDIX C4.

From Commodore (S).
To Chief of the War Staff, Admiralty.
No. 07.

8th August 1914.

After much consideration, I submit the following :—

If the German Navy is as gallant and efficient as we have reason to believe, I feel sure that it will come out to dispute the passage of our expeditionary force.

2. The reverse of the German Army in Belgium, I think, makes this all the more probable, and I propose to act on the supposition that, mainly as the result of this reverse, orders will be given to the High Sea Fleet to prevent reinforcements being sent to France, at all costs.

3. How could the German High Sea Fleet justify its existence the proud boasts of the Emperor, or face the Army and its women-folk, if it rests in harbour when the army has been checked and reinforcements are being poured into France

4. If it elects to act by demonstrating on our coast, I presume it will be dealt with by the Grand Fleet, and in any case, I submit it could achieve nothing of vital importance.

5. I therefore propose to embark in "Lurcher" this evening, and to remain between the Galloper and West Hinder until the transportation of our Expeditionary Force is complete. The name of the vessel to which I will transfer, when the "Lurcher" returns to fuel, will be communicated later.

6. I consider it most desirable that officers possessing good submarine experience should be in destroyers in touch with the submarines, and I propose to send Captain Waistell, of "Maidstone," to embark in "Firedrake," Commander Sommerville of "Adamant," to embark in "Lennox,"¹ and Commander Palmer, of "Thames," to embark in "Legion" if the Commander-in-Chief of the Nore approves of a submission I have made to him.

7. I have made satisfactory arrangements for the care of the submarine depôt ships during the absence of these officers.

8. Two lines of submarine will be stationed by day as follows (11 "D" and "E" class submarines now available—13 when "E6" and "E8" return) :—

- 15 miles S.E. from Galloper Light Vessel.
- 15 miles N.W. from West Hinder Light Vessel.

At night they will be in the vicinity of these Light Vessels

9. Commodore Tyrwhitt is submitting his dispositions.

10. I will communicate with the Rear-Admiral Commanding Cruiser Force C, with a view to obtaining his co-operation.

11. If my hopes are not realised, no harm will have been done. The Expeditionary Force will have been afforded good protection, and the destroyers and submarines will be ready to operate elsewhere within two hours of the completion of the transportation.

ROGER KEYES,
Commodore (S).

APPENDIX C5.

From The Commodore (S).
To Chief of the War Staff, Admiralty.
No 010.

14th August 1914.

Submitted. With reference to my No. 09 dated 13th instant, and to a letter from Captain A. P. Addison, written by your direction: As it would appear that the enemy's capital ships have no intention of coming into the Channel, I presume that the Sandettie Patrol will be withdrawn when the Expeditionary Force has been landed.

2. The present position is: "Adamant" was sent to Dover on receipt of information that the patrol might be required for about a fortnight.

3. It is understood that half the 8th Submarine Flotilla is to maintain the Sandettie Patrol, the remainder being held in readiness for offensive operations. With regard to the former, I propose that four submarines should remain on patrol and two should rest at Dover.

4. "D2," "D3," "D7," and "D8" will return to the patrol on Saturday, 15th, releasing "D5" and "E2" (defective clutches) to proceed to Dover to rest as relief for Sandettie Patrol, and "E3," "E4," "E6," "E8" and "E9" to proceed to Harwich to rest preparatory for oversea operations.

5. "E5" and "E7" are at Yarmouth awaiting orders.

6. "Firedrake" is proceeding to Harwich for rest, and will return to the patrol on Saturday forenoon, 15th instant. If you concur, I propose then to proceed in the "Lurcher" to Harwich, visiting Admiralty on arrival to submit proposals for offensive operations.

(Signed) ROGER KEYES,
Commodore (S).¹ H.M.S. "Lennox" and "Legion" were required by Com. (T) and reference to them in paragraph 6 was ordered to be deleted by Letter 9/8/14, H.M.S. "Maidstone" to C.O.W.S., Admiralty.—(T. & S.D. Div. 1919.)

DISPOSITION OF 8TH S/M FLOTILLA.¹


(10 a.m., 10th August 1914.)

"Maidstone," "Adamant," "E6," at Harwich; "E2," "E3," "E4," "E5," "E7," "E8," "E9," and "D2," "D3," "D5," "D7" and "D8," holding line between North Goodwin Lightship, Sandettie and Ruytingen Lightships.
 "Lurcher" and "Firedrake" scouting.
 Commodore Keyes is in "Lurcher."

DISPOSITION OF 4TH S/M FLOTILLA.²

(10 a.m., 10th August 1914.)

Holding line, S. Goodwin to Calais.
 Base.—H.M.S. "Arrogant" at Dover.
 Rough plan showing relative position of the two flotillas:—



A. P. ADDISON, Captain,
 Assistant to Commodore (S).

APPENDIX C6.

COMMODORE (T.)'S WAR ORDERS³ No 1.
 (To 1st and 3rd Flotillas.)

Secret and Personal.
 No 001.—Memorandum.

"Amethyst," at Harwich,
 4th August 1914.

WAR ORDERS FOR THE 1ST AND 3RD DESTROYER FLOTILLAS.

The 1st and 3rd Flotillas will work under the orders of the Commodore (T).
 Base.—Harwich.

The object of the sweeps described later is to keep the eastern approaches to the English Channel clear of enemy's torpedo craft, and minelayers, and also to reconnoitre and give early information as to the movements of enemy vessels which may be sighted.

Our chief duty, therefore, is to prevent the enemy's vessels passing unobserved and unattacked through the area south of Lat. 54° N. and east of Long. 2° E.

In the event of meeting German transports, which will probably be accompanied by war vessels, the transports are to be attacked and sunk in preference to the accompanying war vessels.

2. *Position of Friendly Forces.*—Friendly forces in the vicinity will be:—

(a) Cruiser Force C, consisting of "Bacchante" (Flag of Rear-Admiral H. H. Campbell, C.V.O.) "Aboukir," "Euryalus," and "Cressy."

Cruiser Force C acts in support of the 1st and 3rd Flotillas, its itinerary being:—

Noon	-	-	-	-	-	Leave "Z," steer N.E. by N. (Mag.) 8 knots.
8.0 p.m.	-	-	-	-	-	Arrive "Y," turn 16 points, steer S.W. by S.
4.0 a.m.	-	-	-	-	-	Arrive "Z," turn 16 points, steer N.E. by N.
8.0 a.m.	-	-	-	-	-	Arrive "X," turn 16 points, steer S.W. by S.
Noon	-	-	-	-	-	Arrive "Z," turn 16 points, steer N.E. by N.
8.0 p.m.	-	-	-	-	-	Arrive "Y," turn 16 points, steer S.W. by S.; and so on.

¹ Enclosure to letter Comm. (S) to Chief of War Staff, Admiralty, 014 of 14/8/14. See Tels. 122c, 155.

² 4th S/M Flotilla were "C" Boats.—T. & S.D. D.

³ The dispositions given in the following orders were assumed by the Harwich Force on 5th August 1914, but with certain modifications due to the minefields laid by "Königin Luise," that morning, and to a decision not to go as far east as 6° East. Fresh dispositions, vide Comm. (T.)'s War Orders No. 2, were assumed on 9th August to cover the movement of the Expeditionary Force to France. The portion of War Orders No. 1 given here will be sufficient to show the general purpose of the dispositions first assumed when war was declared.

This line will not be rigidly adhered to, but will be varied anything up to 15 miles to the N.W. by W. or S.E. by E.

Positions of "X," "Y," and "Z":—

"X," Lat. 52° 49' N., Long. 3° 36' E.

"Y," Lat. 53° 19' N., Long. 3° 55' E.

"Z," Lat. 52° 19' N., Long. 3° 18' E.

(b) Two submarines ("E6" and "E8") operating on the enemy's coast. They will be towed to their stations by "Amethyst" and "Ariel" (see paragraph 12).

(c) Four submarines ("E4," "E9," "D3" and "D5"). The following orders have been issued to them by the Commodore (S.):—

WAR ORDERS FOR SUBMARINES "E4," "E9," "D3" AND "D5."

Submarines "E4" and "E9" are to patrol during daylight hours on a line 14 miles North-west from North Hinder Light Vessel, and "D3" and "D5" on a line 14 miles South-east from Outer Gabbard Light Vessel.

(2) When on patrol during the day, the submarines of a pair are to remain in sight of each other, and are never to be more than 5 miles apart.

(3) During dark hours the submarines are to patrol near the following positions:—

"D3."—6 miles South East Outer Gabbard Light Vessel.

"D5."—17 miles S.E. by E. Outer Gabbard Light Vessel.

"E4."—6 miles S.E. Galloper Light Vessel.

"E9."—6 miles N.W. North Hinder Light Vessel.

(4) They are to return to Harwich on being relieved, which will probably be during the forenoon of the third day of patrol, and may proceed by the shortest route. Torpedo craft belonging to the Nore Defence Flotilla may be met near the Long Sand Vessel.

3. Destroyers are not to go north of Lat. 54° N. nor East of Long. 6° East.

In case of necessity, destroyers are to fall back on Cruiser Force "C," which is there for that purpose.

The general attitude is to be offensive to anything that can be attacked with a reasonable chance of success, and if not to fall back on Cruiser Force "C."

[Paragraphs 4 to 21.—Give detailed orders for the patrol, movements in and out of Harwich, reliefs, fighting lights to be used, &c., together with a plan of patrol. The patrol was to commence at the Outer Gabbard Light Vessel, be spread to the Maas Light Vessel, and extend up to the Haaks Light Vessel, then turn East on a 23 mile front by Terschelling Light Vessel to the longitude of 6° E. Units were not to be more than 3 miles apart, and the Senior Officer present was to decide which portion of the patrol would be searched. The 1st and 3rd Flotillas together were to sweep the area the first time, after which only one flotilla at a time would be on patrol.]

APPENDIX C7.

COMMODORE (T.)'S WAR ORDERS No. 2 TO 1ST AND 3RD FLOTILLAS.

0016 of 9.8.14.

The "No. 1 Destroyer Sweep" contained in Commodore (T.)'s War Orders, No. 001 dated, 4th August is suspended.

The orders contained in Commodore (T.)'s War Orders, No. 0015, dated 8th August 1914 (issued to part of 3rd Flotilla only), are cancelled and are to be burnt upon receipt of this Memorandum.

2. The following orders have been approved by the Admiralty and are to be followed by the 1st and 3rd Flotillas.

3. The main object of the sweep described herein (Destroyer Sweep No. 2) is to give information of the approach of a force which it is expected will be sent to oppose the landing of the British Expeditionary Force on the Continent.

4. The attached plan, which is to be plotted on Chart 2182 (a), North Sea, Southern portion, shows the lines of patrol, each of which is to be occupied by a sub-division by day and night, except in thick weather when the even numbered sub-divisions are to form astern of the divisional leaders without orders.

The Captain (D.) is to order the divisions to close at his discretion.

5. The general idea is for the sweep to arrive on D.E. at daylight and to return to B.C. during the day.

Ships are on no account to cross the following area in which hostile mines have been laid, viz.:— Between the British Coast and the 3rd Meridian of East Longitude and between Latitude 52° and 52° 30' N.

On the attached plan the position "A" indicates the South-eastern corner of the mined area, and Trinity House have promised to lay a buoy to mark this position.

6. Red rockets and bombs containing coloured flags are being provided as night and day signals respectively for generally informing ships in the vicinity of the approach of the enemy, and these signals are not to be repeated until the enemy is actually sighted:—

Red rocket indicates capital ships; white rocket indicates light craft.

Bomb parachutes: Red flags indicate capital ships; blue flags indicate light craft.

7. It is to be clearly understood that no action is to take place until the information of the approach of the enemy has been given to the Flotilla Cruiser.

Should no Flotilla Cruiser be present, a T.B.D. is to be detached to proceed at utmost speed to the Southward until her W/T call has been answered, and in the event of her not being able to get the message through, she must proceed towards Harwich and report to the Senior Naval Officer there through Felixstowe W/T station.

It is of vital importance that the Admiralty, Fleets, and the ships of the Expeditionary Force should be aware of the approach of the enemy.

8. The enemy is to be attacked by the Duty Flotilla at night, but not in the daytime. On the approach of the enemy during day, the flotilla should close on their Flotilla Cruiser and endeavour to entice the advanced enemy ships towards the other flotilla, which is to be ready to leave Harwich at a moment's notice.

The flotilla at Harwich must be ready to proceed with all despatch to the Galloper Light Vessel and assist the retreating flotilla, or take action as may be desirable.

9. "Amethyst" will act as Flotilla Cruiser of the 3rd Flotilla, until Captain Fox arrives in "Faulknor."

10. There will be a strong force of British submarines to the Southward. Their positions are shown in the orders of the Commodore (S.); copies of these orders have already been issued to the 1st Flotilla and copies are attached for the 3rd Flotilla.

The 1st and 3rd Flotillas must keep clear of the submarines.

11. The following programme is to be followed:—

First Flotilla.

Sunday, 9th August - - - Leave Harwich at 1 p.m. and arrive B.C. at 8 p.m.
Arrive on D.E. at 4 a.m., Monday, 10th August.
Monday, 10th August - - - Arrive on B.C. at noon.
Return to Harwich.

Third Flotilla.

Monday, 10th August - - - Leave Harwich at 4 a.m.
Arrive on B.C. at 10 a.m.
Patrol in the immediate vicinity to the northward of B.C. until 8 p.m.
Leave B.C. at 8 p.m.
Arrive D.E. at 4 a.m., Tuesday, 11th August.
Arrive B.C. at noon.
Leave B.C. at 8 p.m.
Arrive D.E. at 4 a.m., Wednesday, 12th August.
Arrive B.C. at 10 a.m.
Return to Harwich.

First Flotilla.

Wednesday, 12th August - - - Leave Harwich at 4 a.m. and carry out same programme as 3rd Flotilla.

12. The orders contained in Commodore (T.)'s War Orders, Memorandum 001 of 4th August, from paragraph 15 to the end, still remain in force.

R. Y. TYRWHITT, Commodore (T.).

The Captains (D.) and Officers Commanding H.M. Ships of the 1st and 3rd Destroyer Flotillas.

Copies to: Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets; Chief of War Staff, Admiralty; Commodore (S.).

Submarines; Senior Naval Officer, Harwich (Shotley).

100—9/8/14.

APPENDIX C8.

ADMIRALTY ORDERS TO REAR-ADMIRAL, "INVINCIBLE."

M. 0072 of 21/8/14.

The "New Zealand" is being detached from 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and will be placed under your orders.

The "Invincible" and "New Zealand" will act under the general orders of the Admiralty and will use the Humber as its main base, and will be named Cruiser force "K."

Rosyth and the Downs can be used as alternative bases at the Rear-Admiral's discretion, according to circumstances.

Their Lordships' intention is that the two battle cruisers will be a powerful advanced cruiser force for the support of the combined force under Rear-Admiral Christian, consisting at present of five ships of the "Bacchante" class, 1st and 3rd Destroyer Flotillas, oversea submarines, and seaplane carrying ship.

For the present, while Expeditionary Force is crossing, "Euryalus" force is watching the approaches to the Straits of Dover in the Broad Fourteens. Later, more active operations will be undertaken by this force when Cruiser Force K will be required to support "Euryalus" force.

Rear Admiral, "Invincible," is to keep in communication with Rear-Admiral, "Euryalus," in order to know how and when the support will be required.

Their Lordships do not want the valuable battle cruisers unduly risked, but as they are the only fast powerful cruisers in southern waters, they are of opinion that with concerted action some strong offensive operations may from time to time as directed, be carried out.

Cruiser Force "K" will be directed to combine in any advanced operations of the Grand Fleet.

By command of Their Lordships,
W. F. NICHOLSON,
for Secretary.

Admiralty,
21st August 1914.

Secret and personal.

M. 0072.

Sir,

21st August 1914.

In confirmation of telegraphic orders, I am commanded by My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you that orders have been given that Rear-Admiral A. G. H. W. Moore in "Invincible," with "New Zealand" (this force being known as Cruiser Force K) is to operate as a powerful advanced cruiser force for the support of the combined force under the Rear-Admiral, "Euryalus."

2. Cruiser Force "K" will use the Humber as its main base, and you are to keep Rear-Admiral, "Invincible," informed of all dispositions within your sphere, including those of the sweeping trawlers. You should inform him when these latter are ready for work.

3. The Rear-Admiral, "Invincible," has been instructed that you are to continue your existing duties notwithstanding his presence.

4. The receipt of this letter is to be acknowledged by cypher telegram in the form: "Admiralty letter of the 21st August, M.0072, received."

I am, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
(Signed) W. F. NICHOLSON,
for Secretary.

The Senior Naval Officer,
Humber.

APPENDIX D.

EXTRACTS FROM GRAND FLEET DAILY NARRATIVE OF EVENTS.

3rd-31st AUGUST 1914.

The G.F. Narrative was a daily report sent by the C.-in-C., Grand Fleet, to the Admiralty, summarising the work and movements of the Grand Fleet for the 24 hours commencing 8 a.m. the previous day to 8 a.m. on the day of the report. When Fleet was at sea near Scapa, H.M.S. "Oak" was usually employed to carry these and other despatches to the mainland.

In these extracts the more important parts are quoted in full.

Sentences in () are summaries of the sense of the reports.

As abbreviations, V.-A., 1st B.C.S., is written for Vice-Admiral, Commanding 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, &c.

There were few direct references to the passage of the British Expeditionary Force. Squadrons' positions are plotted on attached maps.

3rd-4th August 1914 (0800-0800).

Battle squadrons of Grand Fleet, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, five cruisers of 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons, "Southampton," and "Birmingham" at Scapa coaling and storing.

Coal available insufficient to fill all ships

Arrangements made for three cruisers (at anchor) to guard Hoxa Sound, and one each Hoy and Holm Sounds; also for six destroyers of 4th Flotilla (at Longhope) to patrol outside.

. 4 a.m.¹ Orders from Admiralty for Grand Fleet to proceed to sea to sweep east as far as 2° East, and then to send cruisers on a wide sweep to southward and south-westward.

Sir John Jellicoe ordered to assume command of Grand Fleet in succession to Sir George Callaghan, who struck his flag at 8.30 a.m.

4th-5th August 1914 (0800-0800).

8.30 a.m. Grand Fleet left Scapa, "Iron Duke," 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Battle Squadrons, "Southampton," "Birmingham," "Boadicea," and "Blonde," 4th Flotilla.

R.-A., 2nd C.S., with "Shannon," "Natal," "Roxburgh," "Nottingham," "Falmouth," and "Liverpool," and 2nd Flotilla left Rosyth for a R.V. in 58° 40' N., 1° 30' E.

V.-A., 1st B.C.S. and 3rd C.S., ordered to sweep area between lat 60° and 61° N. eastward from Shetlands as far as 2° E., where they arrived at 4 p.m. and then changed direction to the south-eastward, continuing the sweep in that direction until at 5 a.m. they arrived on a line drawn S.W. from Haugesund,² eastern ships being 20' from the coast.

R.-A., 2nd C.S., with cruisers and flotilla swept N.E. on a broad front on his way to the R.V., and at 9 p.m. changed direction to E.S.E.'d, continuing the sweep to 2½° E. Battlefleet cruised to eastward all day and until 3 a.m., 5th, when it turned 16 points, having then reached Long. 2° E. Received information from Admiralty that war had been declared against Germany at midnight 4-5 August. Situation at 8 a.m., battlefleet steering to westward. Battle Cruiser Squadron, cruisers and light cruisers closing battlefleet after completing their sweeps, 4th Flotilla with battle fleet.

¹ 4th August.

² Between Bergen and the Nahe in South-west Norway

5th-6th August 1914 (0800-0800).

3rd. B.S., 3rd C.S., at Scapa fuelling. Left 8 p.m.
2nd Flotilla at Rosyth.
"Dreadnought" battle fleet cruising north of 58° 30' N. all day. Admiralty orders received to remain north of 57° 30' N. At 8 p.m., Battle Fleet were in Lat. 59° 20' N., 1° W., steaming to N.E. at 7 knots. . . . 3 p.m., 2nd Cruiser Squadron and "Devonshire" ordered to sweep to eastward from 1° W. at 15 knots between 59° 10' N. and 60° N.; 1st L.C.S. carrying out similar sweep to southward of 2nd C.S. At 3 a.m. (daylight) Battle Fleet turned to S.W. for R.V. in 59° N. 1° E. to meet 3rd B.S. and 3rd C.S.

2 a.m., 6th. Reported Germans have established a base in Norway. Lat. 62° N., exact position unknown.

Thursday, 6th August.

"Dreadnought" Battle Fleet cruising between Lat. 59° and 60° North, Long. 1° E. and 1° W. . . . 2nd C.S. and L.C.S. swept eastward 58 and 60 parallels, then north along Norwegian coast as far as 61° 30', then west to Shetlands, and to Scapa *via* East and West coasts. . . . No further news as to German base in Lat. 62° N. . . .

7th-8th August 1914 (0800-0800).

"Dreadnought" Battle Fleet arrived Scapa at 6 a.m. Now coaling, will return to sea this evening. . . . (Search of Norwegian coast being carried out by 3rd C.S. and 2nd Flotilla between Lat. 61° N. and 62° 30' N.)

General Notes Lack of defences at Scapa is causing anxiety—the defences which it has been possible to extemporise being inadequate to protect the Grand Fleet and secure it from attack by torpedo craft.

6.30 p.m. Battle Fleet proceeded to sea to westward. . . . 6th B.S. proceeding to Scapa were met outside. . . . During the night the Battle Fleet cruised by squadrons round the Orkneys; at 8 a.m., 8th, in 59° 20' N., 2° 4' W. . . . Received news from Admiralty that Expeditionary Force was to be sent, and that it would commence moving on Sunday.¹ . . . Admiralty telegraph "Hannibal," "Magnificent" ordered north for defence of Scapa Flow.

8th-9th August 1914 (0800-0800).

8 a.m. "Iron Duke," 1st B.S. (less "Vanguard") 2nd and 4th B.S. and "Blonde" in company rounding Orkneys.

11.45. Reports of submarines received from "Orion," "Monarch" and "Ajax" to southward of Fair Island, and "Monarch" reported she was fired at in 59° 21' N., 1° 41' W.

Battle Fleet increased speed and altered course to south-westward and then back to S.S.E.'d later.

6.45 p.m. O.O.W. in "Iron Duke" reported periscope about 1½ cables on starboard bow; ship immediately altered towards it and increased speed—nothing more seen of it.

Fleet remained on course S. 71° E., 8 knots during the night until 3.30 and then altered to N. 71° W. position at 4 a.m., 58° 31' N., 1° 9' E.

4 a.m. "Birmingham" reported she had rammed and sunk German submarine, U. 15.² On receiving reports of submarines from "Orion" ordered "Blonde," "Active," and half of 2nd Flotilla to search area until dark and to ascertain that Fair Island was still in British possession.

NOTES.—. . . asked Admiralty to direct operations of Commodore (T) and Commodore (S) whilst Grand Fleet is in North—no news at all received from them up to present.

9th-10th August 1914 (0800-0800).

. . . . Battle Fleet and 1st B.C.S. noon position 58° 41' N., 0° 15' W. During both forenoon and afternoon the fleet being in an area suspected to be frequented by submarines made frequent blue pendant turns. . . . Position at midnight, 57° 51' N., 1° 2' E.

5 a.m. (10th) "Iron Duke" parted company and proceeded to Scapa; Battle Fleet and 1st B.C.S. proceeded under V.A., C. 2nd B.S., to northward of Shetlands, keeping out of sight of land. Battle cruisers ordered to make a wide sweep to northward and eastward when rounding Shetlands.

(2nd C.S. and 1st L.C.S. swept from 3° 15' E. to 0° 30' W. at visibility distance south of 58° N.; then swept east between 56° 50' N. and 57° 50' N. 3rd C.S., 2nd and 4th Flotilla sweeping around Orkneys and Shetlands and near Battle Fleet.)

NOTES.—From 1 p.m. to 3 p.m. the Battle Fleet was passing through the suspected submarine area and "St. Vincent" reported sighting a periscope at 2.30 p.m. . . .

10 p.m. Admiralty telegram received ordering the C-in-C. to take all heavy ships to northward and then to westward to a position north-west of the Orkneys at once.

10th-11th August 1914 (0800-0800).

"Iron Duke" at Scapa. . . . Remainder of Battle Fleet at sea. . . . under V.A., C. 2nd B.S., proceeding north about to a position to westward of Shetlands. . . .

(3rd C.S., 1st L.C.S. sweep east along 58° N. across North Sea; then to search for submarine base suspected near Stavanger (Norway).)

NOTES.—No reports of German submarines received during the day. Aeroplanes reported as flying over Fair Island and Orkneys both on evening of 10th and 11th; base thought to be either in Shetlands or parent ship. . . . A number of telegrams passed between C-in-C. and the Admiralty on the subject of Norwegian neutrality. . . . About 50,000 tons coal now at Scapa; 10,000 tons of this ordered to both Rosyth and Cromarty, and an alternative coaling base now to be formed at Loch Ewe, provided quantity at Scapa is maintained at not less than 25,000 tons.

¹ 9th August.

² Position was 58° 26' N. 1° 58' E. (C-in-C. to Admiralty 1020, 7/8/14).

11th-12th August 1914 (0800-0800).

"Iron Duke" proceeding to R.V. 1st, 2nd, 4th B.S. and 1st B.C.S. joined at 5 p.m. Position, 60° 8' N., 3° 20' W. Fleet cruising to westward of Orkneys during the night.

(2nd C.S., 3rd C.S., 1st L.C.S. sweeping from Norway to Cromarty, 10th C.S. noon, three ships 60° 23' N., 0° 1' E., three ships 61° 49' N., 2° 25' E.). . . . Loch Ewe to be used as a coaling base as an alternative to Scapa; R.A., Purefoy, in charge. News received from Admiralty that main body of Expeditionary Force will not cross before 21st, and that all details will not have left before 27th.

12th-13th August 1914 (0800-0800).

(Battle Fleet to the westward of the Orkneys. Noon position 59° 20' N., 4° 12' W.).

Sent 3rd B.S. to Loch Ewe to coal. 1st, 2nd, and 4th B.S. detached at midnight to proceed by squadrons to Scapa to coal. . . .

(1st B.C.S. coaling at Scapa, left before dark to cruise in vicinity Sule Skerry¹ economising fuel.

2nd C.S. and "Falmouth" sweeping S.E. from Kinnaird Head.² 2nd Destroyer Flotilla patrolling east and south-east of Orkneys for submarines. 10th C.S. on northern patrol. Mine sweepers sweeping round Orkneys.)

13th-14th August 1914 (0800-0800).

Battle Fleet at Scapa coaling; left 7.30-8.30 p.m. for sea to westward of Orkneys. . . . 3rd B.S. at Loch Ewe. (1st B.C.S. at sea off Sule Skerry. . . . 2nd C.S. at Cromarty, 3rd C.S. patrolling S.E. and N.W. of Aberdeenshire. . . . "Drake" and two ships, 10th C.S., patrolling to Northward of Faroes.)

NOTES.—No news whatever of enemy movements in North Sea nor of operations proceeding in southern theatre.

Coaling at Scapa rather delayed owing to insufficient number of colliers available; 10,000 tons having been diverted to Loch Ewe, Cromarty, and Rosyth. The fuelling situation will be easier when the full war stocks are maintained at the two latter places and Scapa. No supply ships arrived yet. C-in-C. saw the flag officers present at Scapa at 11 a.m. and explained operations contemplated for 15th and 16th.

14th-15th August 1914 (0800-0800).

Battle Fleet and battle cruisers spread for target practice during forenoon. Noon position: 59° 11' N., 4° 27' W. . . . 4 p.m.-7 p.m., exercised deployments. . . .

NOTES.—All ships of Grand Fleet concentrating daylight, 15th, for a sweep towards the Heligoland Bight. Full details of cruising orders and sweeps are contained in operation orders for 15th-17th August.

No news received of German ships, nor of operations in southern theatre.

15th-16th August 1914 (0800-0800).

Grand Fleet proceeding east until 5 p.m., and then south for sweeping movement into the German Bight. . . . Noon position: 58° 16' N., 1° 45' E. 4 a.m. position: 16th August, 56° 43' N., 4° 5' E. 4 a.m., 16th August, no reports of German ships received; ordered cruisers to continue south until 9.30 a.m. (instead of 9 a.m.).

NOTES.—Admiralty telegraphed that Cruiser Force C and 1st and 3rd Flotillas would sweep the area to the southward as planned, and that two submarines would be off the Ems and two off the Jade by 6 a.m., 16th. . . . (The use of drift nets against submarines to be tried at Scapa.)

SUMMARY OF H.F., 0022/3 of 13/8/14.³

Orders for

Sweep of North Sea, 15th, 16th, and 17th August.

Battle Fleet.—Courses to be steered from west of Orkneys to reach 57° N., 4° E., at 0300, 16th.

Flotillas.—2nd and 4th, leaving Scapa on 14th to join Battle Fleet at 0400, 15th, in 59° 7' N., 0° 40' W.

Will be stationed as submarine screens during the day, and about 10 miles on the flank of the Battle Fleet as a torpedo craft screen by night. Two divisions to search astern and on quarters before sunset, rejoining at daylight.

Mine Sweepers.—Six gunboats to be with Grand Fleet to sweep ahead of Battle Fleet and B.C.S.

Battle Cruisers.—To take station ahead of Battle Fleet.

1st L.C.S. to be 40' ahead of Battle Fleet, ships 10 miles apart.

2nd and 3rd C.S. to be 10 miles astern of the light cruiser screen. . . . Distances to be reduced at night.

Mines.—If signal L.D.O. is received by W/T., or a mine exploded ahead of the Fleet, Commanders will turn their columns 16 points to starboard in succession.

16th August.

Cruisers and Light Cruisers to sweep on a 110 mile front at daylight as far as a line joining Flamboro' Head and Horns Reef, eastern ship being 15' S.W. of Horns Reef Light Vessel.

Battle Fleet will act in support.

Cruiser Force C, 1st and 3rd Flotillas to sweep the south-western area, as far to the east as a line joining Haaks L.V. to 54° 30' N., 3° 0' E., in order that the movement may be a general one and cover as much of the North Sea as possible.

¹ 30 miles west of Orkneys.

² N.E. corner Aberdeenshire.

³ Summary made from the copy enclosed with Grand Fleet Narrative.

Withdrawal.—About 0900 Cruisers and L.C.'s to turn 16 points and return.

"This assumes that the enemy will not be met, or, at any rate, not in force; but if he is other action will be ordered. Ships are not to cross the line Horns Reef-Terschelling L.V. unless ordered to do so by me, nor are they to approach the German coast within 20 miles. It is considered not improbable that a line of mines running north-easterly and south-westerly will have been laid over a distance of 50 to 60 miles in the centre of the Heligoland Bight within 100 miles of Heligoland."

17th-18th August 1914 (0800-0800).

(Dreadnought Battle Fleet and B.C.S. steering north-westerly at 12 knots to pass between Fair Island¹ and Orkneys after dark, *en route* to Loch Ewe. Noon position: 58° 59' N., 1° 35' E. Midnight: 59° 27' N., 2° 25' W. 0800, 18th: 58° 44' N., 4° 47' W. 3rd B.S. and B.C.S. to Scapa to coal.)

(2nd C.S. swept up Norwegian coast as far as 60° North. 10th C.S. resumed northern patrol.)

NOTES.—C-in-C. communicated with Admiralty as to North Sea operations proposed to be commenced on 23rd.

18th-19th August 1914 (0800-0800).

"Dreadnought" Battle Fleet arrived Loch Ewe early p.m.

NOTES.—Received report early on 18th that 1st Flotilla was being chased by German cruiser off Brown Ridge²; no further news except that Admiralty have ordered the destroyer patrol to be stationed further back with 7th C.S. in support.

Reports received as to laying defensive mines in several Norwegian harbours.

C-in-C. informed by Admiralty that R.-A., Christian, is in command of forces in the southern portion of North Sea, viz., Cruiser Force C, "Euryalus," "Arethusa" when ready, 1st and 3rd Destroyer Flotillas and 8th Submarine Flotilla.

19th-20th August 1914 (0800-0800).

"Dreadnought" Battle Fleet at Loch Ewe, coaling, storing, &c. 3rd B.S. and cruisers at Scapa or Cromarty.

NOTES.—No news of German ships of any sort. . . . R.A.C. 10th C.S. informed that northern patrol should be chiefly on an east and west line; three ships are off Norway, three north of Shetlands and two in harbour.

20th-21st August 1914 (0800-0800).

"Dreadnought" Battle Fleet left Loch Ewe 6.30 p.m. Anchored off Sule Skerry³ 7.15 a.m. on account of fog.

NOTES.—Admiralty ordered "New Zealand" to proceed to the Humber to join "Invincible" to form stronger support to flotillas and cruisers operating in southern North Sea theatre.

21st-22nd August 1914 (0800-0800).

Battle Fleet doing battle practice N.W. Orkneys.

NOTE.—No news of German ships.

22nd-23rd August 1914 (0800-0800).

Battle Fleet cruising to eastward of Shetlands.

Noon position: 60° 3' N., 0° 27' W. Midnight: 59° 34' N., 1° 58' E.

(1st B.C.S. target practice west of Fair Island then proceed to 59° 15' N., 1° E. to support cruisers sweeping areas 4 and 5⁴.)

NOTES.—Heard of no movements of German ships other than that a submarine sighted 55° 4' N., 1° 35' E., early on 20th August. . . . Portsmouth floating dock left p.m. 21st for Cromarty west about . . .

23rd-24th August 1914 (0800-0800).

Battle Fleet: Noon position, 60° 14' N., 3° 12' E. Midnight, 59° 55' N., 2° 58' E., cruising to northwards and southwards in the vicinity of 60° N., Long. 3° E. throughout the 24 hours.

(3rd B.S. to Scapa.) 1700 "Ruby" reported a submarine. Fleet *a/c.* four points by blue pendant twice and increased to full speed—nothing seen.

(B.C.S. supporting cruisers in areas 4 and 5; 2nd C.S., area 4; 3rd C.S., Cromarty. 1st L.C.S., area 1, supported by 6th C.S. "Naiad," "Thetis," "Latona," expected to arrive from Dover to join C-in-C. noon 24th.)

NOTE.—Japan declared war on Germany noon 23rd. . . . Admiralty informed C-in-C. that German trawlers fitted with W/T., and acting as scouts may be treated as warships — no warning necessary.

24th-25th August 1914 (0800-0800).

"Dreadnought" Battle Fleet, "Liverpool" and "Blonde": Noon position: 60.21 N., 02.07 E. Midnight position: 59.25 N., 00.04 W.

Exercised deployment during forenoon . . . exercise rather marred by low visibility.

Cruising to eastward and westward to the northward of 59° N., Mean Long. 1° E., during remainder of day and night.

(1830, 1st B.S.C. to Scapa to coal.)

(1st L.C.S. and 2nd C.S. covering Battle Fleet in areas 4 and 5 supported by B.C.S. "Swift" and 4th Flotilla sweeping for submarines to westward of Orkneys. . . .)

NOTES.—No definite news of enemy ships. V.A.C. 1st B.C.S., reported 11 a.m. he could hear four German ships signalling, and that they might be fairly close—nothing came of it. . . . C-in-C. informed Admiralty that yacht patrols on coast would be useful. . . . Coal stocks at fleet bases—Scapa and Loch Ewe—now well up to requirements.

¹ Between Orkneys and Shetlands.

² 52° 40' N., 3° 20' E. about 30 miles S.W. of Haaks L.V.

³ 30 miles west of the Orkneys.

⁴ From 30 to 110 and 120 to 200 miles respectively from Rattray Hd. N.E., Aberdeenshire, G.F. Order IXXX, lv. of 24/8/14, see Map IV.

25th-26th August 1914 (0800-0800).

"Iron Duke," 2nd and 4th B.S., "Liverpool" and "Blonde." Noon position: 59° 9' N., 0° 10' W. Midnight, 58° 22' N., 1° 25' W. Cruising North of 58° 30' N. during the day, mean Long. 0° 0', zig-zagging.

5.30 p.m. Submarine reported seen from the bridge in 58° 42' N., 1° 10' W. Spread fleet clear of danger position, nothing further seen of it. . . . Fleet arrived Scapa, 7.30 a.m., 26th.

(1st B.S. left Scapa 8.30 a.m., 26th, to join 3rd B.S., supporting cruisers in areas 1 and 2. 6th C.S. patrolling 0° to Norwegian coast on 60th parallel. "Agincourt" joined the fleet.)

NOTES.—No definite news of enemy ships; another submarine report from Linga Sound¹ in the evening.

26th-27th August 1914 (0800-0800).

"Iron Duke," 2nd and 4th B.S. at Scapa coaling, &c. 1st B.S. left at 8.30 to join 3rd B.S. 3rd B.S., Noon position: 58° 19' N., 0° 43' W.

(1st B.C.S. and L.C.S. left at 6 a.m. 27th to take part in operations to the southward on 28th. Cruisers in areas 1 and 2.)

No definite news received of enemy ships.

27th-28th August 1914 (0800-0800).

"Iron Duke," 2nd and 4th B.S. and "Blonde" at Scapa till 5.45 p.m., then to R.V. with 1st and 3rd B.S., at 7 a.m., 28th. 8 a.m. position: 28th, 58° 19' N., 0° 0' E. Course E.S.E. 8 knots. . . . (1st B.C.S., 1st L.C.S., and southern forces operating to southward; cruisers patrolling.)

NOTES.—No news of enemy's heavy ships. German submarine reported off St. Abb's Head⁴ on night 26th-27th; Admiral Rosyth, asked to send a submarine after her. . . . Admiralty telegraphed position of three mined areas known to exist: (i) off Harwich, (ii) off Flamboro' Head, (iii) off Tynemouth. . . .

28th-29th August 1914 (0800-0800).

"Dreadnought" Battle Fleet. Noon position, 58° 19' N., 0° 21' E. Midnight position: 59° 31' N., 0° 40' E.

(Heligoland Bight operations reported; "Mainz," "Augsburg," and two destroyers sunk by our forces and another cruiser and other destroyers severely damaged. After retiring from Heligoland Bight B.C.S. and L.C.S. swept northward east of Long. 4° E. Position, 5 a.m., 29th, 57° 18' N., 4° 19' E. 2nd C.S. sweeping through area 5 to Norwegian coast. 3rd C.S. working areas 1 and 5.)

NOTES.—Reports received during 24 hours of mines laid off Would³ and St. Abb's Head⁴; reports of enemy mines being laid on coast was very frequent. Admiralty also telegraphed that Germans were fitting out trawlers as mine layers. . . .

29th-30th August 1914 (0800-0800).

"Dreadnought" Battle Fleet and attached cruisers cruising between 58° N. and 59° N., and 1° E. and 1° W. during the day, and to eastward on 59th parallel during night.

Noon, 58° 52' N., 0° 7' W.; midnight, 59° 5' N., 1° 24' E.

"Inflexible" arrived at Scapa.

(6th and 10th C.S. working area No. 6. Three mine layers patrolling south portion, area 3.)

NOTES.—No reports of enemy's heavy ships during the day except that an N.I.D. report states that two of the battleships formerly at Kiel (probably of "Elsass" class) have been moved to North Sea.

C-in-C. drew attention of Admiralty to the need of having more destroyers and torpedo boats for patrol work off Cromarty and Scapa; stating also that he considered patrol flotillas should work further off the coast at night in view of the fact that enemy have been laying mines indiscriminately without detection by the patrol flotillas.

Asked that 20 drift net fishing vessels may be taken up for service at Scapa to act as look-outs in approaches.

All recent indications point to the enemy doing his utmost to reduce our fleet by mining, the salient points of our coasts and the approaches to our harbours, but so far only one minelayer has been seen and caught by our ships. The necessity for a more complete watch by small craft is apparent.

30th-31st August 1914 (0800-0800).

"Dreadnought" Battle Fleet and attached cruisers cruising between parallels of 58° 30' N. and 59° 30' N. between Orkneys and Norway. Noon position: 59° 10' N., 2° 9' E.; midnight position: 58° 29' N., 1° 30' W.; arrived at Scapa 7 a.m., 31st. 3rd B.S. left Scapa daylight 31st for a position north of 59° N. and east of 0°.

"Inflexible" arrived Scapa, 7 p.m., 30th, and joined 1st B.C.S.

(6th and 10th C.S. working area No. 6. Armed merchant cruisers patrolling 60th parallel east of Shetlands.)

NOTES.—No news of enemy's fleet. Admiralty informed C-in-C. that they were arming trawlers for patrol duties on coast as quickly as possible. Admiralty telegraphed that arrangements are being made for Scapa defences, which include laying of mines; mechanical mines are not, however, considered safe for use in or near fleet bases, and C-in-C. is informing the Admiralty to this effect.

Now know that light cruisers sunk on 28th were "Coln" and "Ariadne" by 1st B.C.S.; "Mainz" by 1st L.C.S.; "Rostock" appears to have got away.

¹ By Stronsay I., 20' N.E. of Scapa.

² 10 miles north of Berwick, 50 miles from Rosyth.

³ Off the coast of Norfolk, by Haisboro' Light Vessel.

⁴ 10 miles north of Berwick, 50 miles from Rosyth.

APPENDIX F1.

EXTRACTS FROM INTERDEPARTMENTAL CONFERENCE REPORT,¹
ADMIRALTY, 30/7/14.

PARA. 1.—In the course of their investigations the Conference have been impressed with the fact that, in order to ensure the concentration of the Expeditionary Force at the required place within the limit of time allowed by the plan of operations, it is necessary that transports should assemble, troops embark, transports sail, and troops disembark as nearly as possible according to the prearranged programme. Elasticity has been introduced into the organisation as far as practicable, but should a delay occur beyond that for which it has been found possible to make provision, the railway plans on both sides of the Channel may be upset and far-reaching effects on collateral arrangements will result.

2. In order to provide for contingencies, every effort should be made to ensure the arrival of each transport at the port of embarkation at least 24 hours before the time at which she is to commence to embark her troops or stores.

3. We have been informed that the Admiralty covering dispositions are such that the safety of the lines of passage and communication will be assured. We have, therefore, assumed that nothing will interfere with the sailing of the transports either by day or by night as required.

(PARA. 8.) *Mobilisation and Embarkation. Executive Orders.*—The following procedure is proposed :—

- (1) On issue by the Admiralty of the warning telegram the Director of Transports will make preliminary preparations which do not involve publicity or the engagements of transports and crews.
- (2) On receipt of instructions from the Cabinet the War Office will issue the order "Embark."
- (3) On issue by the War Office of the order "Embark" the prearranged military scheme for the transport of troops and stores to the ports of embarkation will be put into force.
- (4) In the absence of special instructions, full executive action by the Admiralty in connection with the provision of sea transport for the Expeditionary Force should not be taken before the issue by the War Office of the order "Embark."
- (5) On the issue by the War Office of the order "Embark" the Director of Transports will take up the necessary shipping, as detailed in paragraph 2.

(PARA. 11.) *Method of taking up Tonnage.*—It is understood that Their Lordships intend to utilise their existing powers to requisition vessels needed for the transport of the Expeditionary Force. A complete list of all British vessels suitable for the work (some 2,000 in number) is being compiled by the Admiralty Transport Department, and will contain particulars as to accommodation and other details. This will be printed and circulated to the officers concerned, and corrections will be issued quarterly. Under the Transport Department Intelligence Scheme the lists of vessels to be actually taken up (some 200) will be kept complete and corrected daily, and all the papers necessary for engaging the transports will be constantly ready to be despatched. The procedure will be that on the issue by the War Office of the order "Embark" the Director of Transports will address telegrams to the owners of vessels required, informing them that under the terms of a Royal Proclamation issued or about to be issued the vessels specified are requisitioned for Admiralty service. These telegrams will be confirmed by letters containing full instructions as to the action to be taken by the shipowners and the conditions of charter. The owners will be informed at the same time that payment for the service rendered will be settled by arbitration.

Ships to be taken up for all purposes (colliers excepted) :—

	Average.
Tyne and Tees (including Hartlepool)	21
Hull	9
South Wales ports	33
Manchester	7
Holyhead	9
Folkestone	4
	83

(PARA. 21.) *Ports of Embarkation.*—The ports of embarkation of the Expeditionary Force are as follows :—

- (1) Southampton.—For practically all units of the Expeditionary Force other than M.T. from England and Scotland—three aeroplane squadrons, three ambulance ships, and a small amount of M.T.
- (2) Newhaven.—For practically all stores.
- (3) Avonmouth.—For M.T. and petrol.
- (4) Liverpool.—For M.T. and frozen meat.
- (5) Belfast.—For troops from North Ireland.
- (6) Dublin.—For troops from Central Ireland and some M.T.
- (7) Queenstown and Cork.—For troops from Southern Ireland.
- (8) Glasgow.—For two remount depôts and one aeroplane squadron.

¹ Folio, no cover, print, 22 pp., signed, Edmond J. W. Slade, Vice-Admiral, E. M. Harper, Colonel, Herbert Savory, Director of Transports, O. A. K. Murray, R. Stuart-Wortley, Lieut.-Col., Claude H. Sinclair, Commander, Victor H. T. Weekes, Secretary, printed at Foreign Office, 30/7/14.

(PARA. 22.) *Order of Movement.*—The order in which the movement is to be carried out is, generally, as follows :—

- (a) The staffs and units necessary for the first organisation of the lines of communication and the advanced portions of various headquarters embark on the first, second, and third days of military mobilisation.
- (b) Supplies and stores are sent on the first and following days.
- (c) The infantry (less 4th Division) embark on the fourth, fifth, and sixth days.
- (d) The cavalry and the remainder of the fighting troops (less 4th Division) embark between the seventh and eleventh days, both inclusive.
- (e) The 4th Division embarks on the twelfth and thirteenth days.
- (f) The base detachments embark on the thirteenth and fourteenth days.

(PARA. 47.) *Disembarkation.*—(a) The disembarkation will take place at Ports C., R., and B.¹ Arrangements have been made for using Port A. if the naval situation allows as an alternative to Port B., when necessary owing to bad weather or other causes.

(b) Port C. is the principal base and Port R. is a subsidiary base. It is intended to use Port B. mainly during the period of concentration, but it may be necessary to make use of it also for despatching supplies during the period of operations.

(PARA. 48.) *Capacity of the Ports.*—The daily capacity of each port for the purposes of this scheme has been estimated at the following :—

Port C.,	30 ships.
Port R.,	20 ships (12 by day, 8 by night).
Port B.,	11 ships.
Port A.,	9 ships (other than "C" class).

The list of ships due to arrive at each port has been kept at about these limits.

(PARA. 62.) *Reserve of Transports to meet Contingencies.*—From the tests carried out, little or no reserve of ships can be guaranteed on mobilisation, but the list of suitable ships (with the important exception of cattleships) (paragraph 26) is steadily increasing, and the position improving correspondingly.

Certain ships allocated for one voyage only, will be available for further service if required, on their return to the United Kingdom; vessels arriving after the ships first required have been taken up will also form a reserve. There is a certain amount of spare accommodation in the ships already allotted.

¹ A = Calais, B = Boulogne, C = Havre, D = Dunkirk, R = Rouen.—Ed. note.

APPENDIX F2.

EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

SHIPS LEAVING PORTS OF U.K. EACH DAY.

Enclosure, A.L.M. 0070 of 8/8/14.

a = Horse ship. *Av* = Avonmouth. *Du* = Dublin. *Ne* = Newhaven.
b = Infantry ship. *Be* = Belfast. *Gl* = Glasgow. *Qu* = Queenstown.
c = Cross Channel ship. *Co* = Cork. *Li* = Liverpool. *So* = Southampton.
d = Cargo ship. *Ch* = Channel Islands.
f = Frozen meat.

Date.	So.	Ne.	Av.	Li.	Gl.	Qu.	Du.	Be.	Co.	Ch.	Total.	
											Day.	Since Aug. 9th.
August.												
Sun., 9th -	—	3 <i>c</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	3
Mon., 10th -	5 <i>c</i>	5 <i>c</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 <i>c</i>	13	16
	2 <i>b</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Tues., 11th -	3 <i>c</i>	5 <i>c</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	9	25
	1 <i>d</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Wed., 12th -	5 <i>a</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	6 <i>b</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1 <i>c</i>	8 <i>c</i>	2 <i>c</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	3 <i>d</i>	—	—	2 <i>f</i>	1 <i>d</i>	—	—	—	—	—	28	53
Thurs., 13th -	5 <i>a</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	9 <i>b</i>	—	—	—	—	—	3 <i>b</i>	—	—	—	—	—
	1 <i>c</i>	7 <i>c</i>	8 <i>d</i>	4 <i>d</i>	1 <i>a</i>	1 <i>a</i>	3 <i>c</i>	—	—	—	42	95
Fri., 14th -	3 <i>b</i>	—	1 <i>c</i>	—	1 <i>a</i>	—	—	2 <i>b</i>	—	—	—	—
	2 <i>d</i>	7 <i>c</i>	7 <i>d</i>	4 <i>d</i>	—	—	1 <i>d</i>	1 <i>c</i>	9 <i>c</i>	—	38	133
Sat., 15th -	14 <i>a</i>	7 <i>c</i>	9 <i>d</i>	5 <i>d</i>	—	1 <i>a</i>	5 <i>a</i>	—	—	1 <i>c</i>	42	175
Sun., 16th -	17 <i>a</i>	7 <i>c</i>	7 <i>d</i>	5 <i>d</i>	—	—	1 <i>d</i>	1 <i>c</i>	—	—	41	216
Mon., 17th -	13 <i>a</i>	7 <i>c</i>	6 <i>d</i>	—	—	—	4 <i>a</i>	2 <i>a</i>	—	—	33	249
	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 <i>d</i>	—	—	—	—	—
Tues., 18th -	12 <i>a</i>	8 <i>c</i>	1 <i>d</i>	—	—	—	3 <i>a</i>	—	—	—	24	273
Wed., 19th -	12 <i>a</i>	8 <i>c</i>	1 <i>d</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	21	294
Thurs., 20th -	10 <i>a</i>	—	—	—	—	1 <i>a</i>	—	—	—	—	25	319
	6 <i>b</i>	8 <i>c</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Fri., 21st -	13 <i>a</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	2 <i>b</i>	—	—	—	—	—	1 <i>b</i>	—	—	—	28	347
	3 <i>c</i>	8 <i>c</i>	—	—	—	1 <i>c</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—
Sat., 22nd -	1 <i>a</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	5 <i>b</i>	6 <i>c</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	12	359
Sun., 23rd -	1 <i>a</i>	6 <i>c</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	366
Mon., 24th -	—	6 <i>c</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	372
Thurs., 27th -	1 <i>c</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	373
		156	106	42	20	3	4	25	6	9	2	373

NOTE.—The above was circulated as the programme on 8/8/14. It allows for 4 infantry and 1 cavalry division, which were actually transported by August 21st. Another infantry division, the 4th, crossed on August 22–23rd. The figures do not agree with those in Appendix G1.

APPENDIX G.

TABLES, &c., OF TRANSPORT RESULTS.

CONTENTS.

1. Admiralty Letter T. 9186 of 2/10/14 on the Transport of the Expeditionary Force, with Enclosures:—

1*a*. Number and Tonnage of Transports passing for each day.

1*b*. Days occupied on Voyage from different ports.

1*c*. Numbers transported up to October 18th 1914.

Summary of transport used.

2. Summary of Transport carried 9th August—Midnight, 6th September 1914. Taken from tables in A.L. T. 9186/14.

3. Names of Transports with number of passages made 9th–31st August 1914. Obtained from Ministry of Shipping.

APPENDIX G1.

Enclosure to Admiralty Letter T. 9186 of 2/10/14 addressed to Secretary, C.I.D., in reply to a request by the Prime Minister made on 22/9/14 for certain information concerning the transport and maintenance of the Expeditionary Force.

CONTENTS.

Review of the pre-war scheme.

Navy and Army responsibility.

Summary of results.

Enclosure 1.—Daily number of transports that sailed 9th August–31st August 1914.

Enclosure 2.—Return showing ports used and average time on voyage.

Enclosure 3.—Summary of transport 9th August–19th October 1914.

Summary of additional transport caused by evacuations, &c.

1.—(a) The general scheme for the transport and maintenance of the Expeditionary Force (consisting of six divisions and a cavalry division) had been worked out by the Transport Department of the Admiralty and the War Office, over a period of some three years, culminating in the appointment of a joint Naval and Military Conference in February last (1914), which fully discussed the arrangements and prepared a report, under discussion at the outbreak of the war.

The scheme fell into six parts:—

- (1) Arrangements for concentration of the men, equipment and stores in the United Kingdom. These arrangements were made by the War Office in concert with the railway companies.
- (2) Organisation of joint naval and military arrangements at the ports for embarkation duties.
- (3) Naval arrangements for obtaining and fitting the ships necessary for sea transport.
- (4) Naval arrangements for safeguarding route and entering oversea ports.
- (5) Naval and military arrangements for disembarkation and reception of troops, &c., at oversea ports.
- (6) Military arrangements with the French for conveying troops by rail to concentration point.

The division of responsibility between the Navy and Army is laid down as follows:—

- (i) The entire operations of landing and shipping troops, animals, guns, regimental stores and baggage, and stores (cargo), whether alongside wharves or piers, either Government or mercantile, or to and from a beach, will be controlled by the Navy, who will provide the boats, lighters and tugs, and any labour required in connection with the same. All other labour required will be found by the Army, except in cases where the circumstances render it desirable that the Navy should provide some or all the labour. The ultimate decision on this point will rest with the Naval authorities.
- (ii) The Navy will be responsible for the berthing of all ships, lighters, tugs and boats; but the convenience of the Army must be considered as far as practicable in the positions allotted. For landings and embarkations the Navy will have full control of the entire beach up to high-water mark, and of such further portions of the same, and of piers and wharves as they consider necessary to enable them to control the work of embarkation and disembarkation. Within these portions the military officers will carry out all instructions issued by the naval officer in charge, but beyond them the responsibility for the safety and transportation of men, animals, guns, vehicles, and stores on shore will rest with the Army.
- (iii) While the foregoing are the general rules governing the division of duties between the Navy and Army, it is to be clearly understood that each Service is working for a common object, and will render the other all the assistance which lies in its power.

Roughly, for the shipment of the Expeditionary Force, the military were in entire control of the movement of troops, &c., until they reached the wharves of embarkation. The Navy was responsible for all arrangements on the wharves, all work connected with berthing and loading of transports, the supply of boats, lighters, &c., the embarkation, sailing and disembarkation. Naval responsibility ceased when the troops, &c., were landed on the quays oversea. From this point military resumed full responsibility.

The scheme included:—

- (a) The provision of naval and military staffs at the Home and Oversea ports to be used, arrangements for mobilisation, preparation of full instructions for their guidance, provision of accommodation, &c.
- (b) Arrangements for the impressment of ships of different kinds under Royal Proclamation, for the disposal of cargo on board, for their fitting by contractors under specifications drawn up for the service, coaling, manning and the like.
- (c) The provision of 20,000 sets of portable horse stall fittings (to ensure the safe conveyance of horses), and of other material, horse and passenger brows, slings, &c., for use both here and oversea.
- (d) Arrangements for tugs, launches, lighters, &c.
- (e) The provision of labour at different ports.

A copy of the time-table is attached, from which it will be seen that the move was to be completed in 14 days, with slight exceptions.

1.—(b) Orders were received 5th August to put the scheme into execution, the first day of embarkation to be the 7th August. Ultimately the first day of embarkation was fixed for Sunday, the 9th August.

(c) The transports were ready, as a rule, on the day before (that) required to embark troops. Where fitting for men and horses was necessary, the work occupied from two to six days.

Except on one occasion, owing to fog, there was no want of transports on any day.

1.—(d) The original scheme was modified as follows :—

It was originally intended to embark six divisions. The 4th and 6th Divisions were taken out of the scheme, when the order to embark was received.

The 4th Division was put back into the scheme, and embarked on the 22nd August—the 14th day of embarkation, the moves originally fixed for the 13th day of embarkation took place on the 12th day, and those for the 14th day on the 13th day of embarkation. The 6th Division was conveyed from Ireland to England, and ultimately embarked for France on 8th and 9th September. Otherwise the programme followed exactly the course laid down.

2.—(a), (b), (c), (d), figures attached. As regards (a) the figures *per day* are not available at the War Office, who have supplied this information.

(e) Transports were despatched singly as ready, by day and night.

3. The numbers to be carried were actually worked out from the ships or from plans, allowing 8 superficial feet of 'tween deck space per man (or berths where cabins exist), and a stall of 7 to 8 feet long by 2 ft. 6 ins. wide, with necessary gangways per horse.

The holds were also measured for guns, vehicles, &c., and in most instances the ships were able to take the full numbers which were required to accompany the unit.

4. Daily average of ships, 13. Daily average of tonnage, 52,125 tons gross.

5. Statements attached.

APPENDIX G1. (Enclosure 1.)

EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

RETURN SHOWING THE TOTAL NUMBER AND GROSS TONNAGE OF TRANSPORTS USED EACH DAY, FOR THE CONVEYANCE OF TROOPS (AND STORES) FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM TO FRANCE, FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE MOVE UNTIL MIDNIGHT 20TH SEPTEMBER.

Date, 1914.	Total Number of Transports used.	Total Gross Tonnage.	Remarks added by T. and S.D. Division.
9th August	6	5,361	} August 9th–21st. Four infantry and one cavalry crossing.
10th "	9	9,417	
11th "	15	22,067	
12th "	23	81,743	
13th "	30	100,872	
14th "	44	154,361	
15th "	31	113,050	
16th "	39	171,188	
17th "	33	129,104	
18th "	34	150,103	
19th "	23	84,404	
20th "	20	81,931	
21st "	16	51,735	
22nd "	22	130,761	} 4th Infantry Division crossing, <i>i.e.</i> , five infantry and one cavalry divisions completed by 23rd.
23rd "	13	44,479	
24th "	5	3,755	Boulogne being evacuated from 24th August and Havre used.
25th "	6	17,528	
26th "	8	22,930	
27th "	14	27,522	
28th "	6	18,150	
29th "	7	12,187	
30th "	12	52,995	
31st "	13	45,038	From 31st August Havre and Boulogne being evacuated ; St. Nazaire became main base .

APPENDIX G3.


STATEMENT OF TOTAL EMBARKATIONS AND SHIPMENTS.

9th August—Midnight, 6th September 1914.


(Summarised from Enclosures to A.L. T. 9186 of 2/10/14.)

Port.	Troops and Civilians.	Horses.	Food and Forage.	Petrol.	Ammunition.	Vehicles. ¹	Stores.	Remarks.
Southampton	132,210	41,784	Tons. —	—	Tons. —	6,019	—	Also 1,696 bicycles. And 1,733 stretchers; 1,990 buckets.
Newhaven -	396	—	42,724	4,000 gallons.	4,131	511 and 1,443 tons.	14,761	
Avonmouth -	4,499	—	—	4,008 tons	—	1,619	1,371	
Liverpool -	1,757	—	—	—	—	403	—	
Irish Ports combined.	26,747	10,184	—	—	—	—	2,985	
Total -	165,609 men.	51,968 horses.	71, 423 tons.			8,552 vehicles.		

¹ Includes guns and limbers 2-and 4-wheeled vehicles, cars, heavy motor vans, ambulances, forage and water carts, &c.



DISPOSITION OF DOVER PATROL DURING PASSAGE OF EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, AUGUST 1914



REFERENCE.

- Light Cruisers (Day) shown thus. ○
- " (Night) " " ○●
- Destroyers (Day) " " ○●
- " (Night) " " ○●
- Submarines (Day) " " ⊗

THE PATROL FLOTILLAS AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE WAR.

NOTES ON SOURCES.

1. The telegrams reproduced in Appendix A have been obtained from the set of Admiralty telegrams arranged by the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Those relating to Home Waters for the period under review are bound in 28 volumes numbered H.S. 50 to 77, the arrangement being strictly chronological.

2. The more important documents consulted are detailed below and may be arranged under three headings:—

- (a) Collection of papers in the Admiralty Record Office with Record Office number.
- (b) Documents which have passed through the Military Branch Confidential Registry but not through the Record Office.
- (c) Miscellaneous Papers without an M number or Record Office number, chiefly originating from the Naval staff, deposited with H.S./C.I.D.

3. The following Admiralty Record Office collections have been referred to:—

Title.	Description.
Council Office, 24.6.12.	Institution of Admiral of Patrols.
C. 1059 - -	East Coast War Channel.
X. 2990 - -	Movements of A.O.P. in 1914.
X. 3766 - -	Proposed 10th Destroyer Flotilla.
X. 3906 - -	Report of T.B. 21 <i>re</i> sighting enemy destroyers on October 7th.

4. The following documents are here listed in the order of their Branch Registry numbers. They all belong to the 1914 series:—

M. 0081* - -	Disposition of Patrol Flotillas, November 7th.
M. 01728 - -	Proposals <i>re</i> Auxiliary Patrol, August 1914.
M. 02304 - -	Report of attack on H.M.S. "Attentive" with A.O.P.s Remarks. Dated September 29th.
M. 02354 - -	Proposed modification to Dover Patrol, September 30th.
M. 02587 - -	Report of Sweep carried out by Tyne Flotilla, October 6th-7th.
M. 02603 - -	Appointment of R.A. Hood to Dover and letter to A.O.P., dated October 12th.
M. 02722 - -	Submarine Service Relations with A.O.P., October 15th.
M. 03269 - -	Engagement of "Halcyon" with enemy ships, November 3rd.
M. 03461 - -	Reports from "Lively" and "Leopard" <i>re</i> action of November 3rd.
M. 03481* - -	Letter from A.O.P., November 8th, enclosing revised Orders to Patrol Flotillas.
M. 03569 - -	Dover Patrol. Proposed new Scheme, November 10th.
M. 03570 - -	Dover Patrol. Admiral Hood's remarks, November 10th.
M. 03635* - -	Letter from A.O.P., November 13th. Appreciation of situation.
M. 04012 - -	Investigation <i>re</i> conduct of Officers at Yarmouth.

* Documents marked with an asterisk are reproduced in whole or in part in Appendix B.

- M. 05144* - - Dover Patrol. Revised War Orders, October 26th.
 M. 05146 - - East Coast Patrols, November 6th. Contains important minutes, &c., *re* the raid of November 3rd.
 M. 05149* - - A.O.P.'s orders, dated July 27th.
 M. 05150 - - Remarks on Patrol Flotilla Local War Orders, August 21st.
 M. 05151* - - Revised orders to prevent Minelaying.
 M. 05152 - - A.O.P.'s orders *re* Hostile Submarines, September 11th.

5. Un-numbered papers now in Custody of Historical Section, Committee of Imperial Defence :—

- (a) Document entitled "Composition of Patrol Flotillas," dated April 1914. Contains proposals and remarks by Admiral de Robeck and Captain Lowther Crofton to the Director of the Operations Division.
 (b) Dover Straits Patrol, A.O.P.'s orders. August 1914. This is marked O.D. 126.
 (c) A.O.P.'s letter 0226 A/42 of October 5th. Proposed revised disposition of Dover Patrol.

* Documents marked with an asterisk are reproduced in whole or in part in Appendix B.

CHAPTER I.

THE ADMIRAL OF PATROLS.

ORIGIN AND FUNCTIONS.

1. *The Original Appointment, 1912.*—At the beginning of 1912 the torpedo craft in Home Waters were all attached to the Home Fleet,¹ the 1st and 2nd Flotillas under the Commodore (T.) being fully manned and working with the fully-manned vessels of the 1st and 2nd Divisions, Home Fleet.

There remained a large number of the older classes of destroyers and torpedo-boats organised in flotillas and placed under the orders of the Vice-Admiral Commanding 3rd (nucleus crew) and 4th (reduced nucleus crew) Divisions of the Home Fleet. These torpedo craft were manned by nucleus crews and ranged from the River Class destroyers, only lately released from the "running flotillas," to the obsolescent twenty-seven knotters—the earliest destroyers built. The River Class destroyers and the ex-coastal destroyers (oil T.B.'s) were based on Harwich, the remainder being organised in two flotillas at Portsmouth and Plymouth respectively. The submarines were divided into sections under the same command. Though the Vice-Admiral Commanding the 3rd and 4th Divisions, Home Fleet, was in command of these scattered flotillas, there was no central authority analogous to Commodore (T.), to co-ordinate their training and exercises, while their task in war—the patrol of the East Coast—was entirely distinct from the duties allotted to the older battleships and cruisers which composed the 3rd and 4th Divisions.

In view of these considerations a Conference was held at the Admiralty on February 14th, 1912, and it was decided to recommend that a Rear-Admiral should be appointed "to arrange for the efficient war training of flotillas not directly affiliated to sea-going fleets" and to be in charge of the coast patrols in time of war. There was some discussion as to the title to be attached to the new post. Admiral, Coast Patrols (A.C.P.), which had been first suggested, was rejected as disclosing the nature of the duties the flotillas would perform in time of war; Rear-Admiral (T.) was also considered unsatisfactory, and finally the title of Admiral of Patrols was adopted with A.O.P. as the recognised abbreviation.²

2. *Rear-Admiral De Robeck appointed.*—The recommendations of the Conference of February were carried into effect by the appointment of Rear-Admiral J. M. de Robeck as Admiral of Patrols on April 8th, 1912. His orders were to take over on May 1st from the Vice-Admiral Commanding 3rd and 4th Divisions the four nucleus crew flotillas and all submarine sections,³ except those for the local defence of Portsmouth and Plymouth. The office of the Admiral of Patrols was to be in the Admiralty⁴ and he was to be directly responsible to the Board in the same way as the the Admiral Commanding Reserves and the Commanders-in-Chief at Home Ports.

With regard to the Submarine Service, the Inspecting Captain of Submarines (later Commodore S.) remained responsible for all technical details of his service, and was authorised to communicate direct with the Controller of the Navy on such subjects. He was also to remain in charge of the elementary training of the submarine personnel, but all exercises which required submarines to work in conjunction with other craft were to be arranged by the Admiral of Patrols who was also generally responsible for the administration of the submarine service.

Admiral de Robeck was also specially enjoined to work in close co-operation with the military authorities and concert with them measures for the defence of the East Coast Ports. He had, moreover, no concern with the defences of the Home Ports or

¹ Except the flotillas for the local defence of the Home Ports.

² For early history of A.O.P., see Admiralty Record Office collection of papers entitled "Council Office, 24.6.12."

³ The "sections" were later known as "flotillas."

⁴ It was later moved to Central Buildings, Westminster.

the local defence flotillas attached to them. His actual War Orders were issued separately, and those in force on the outbreak of war will be considered later.

3. *Admiral de Robeck's Command of the Patrol Flotilla.*—Rear-Admiral de Robeck held the position of Admiral of Patrols till May 1st, 1914, his tenure of the command being exactly two years, and during this period the organisation and composition of the patrol flotillas remained essentially the same though there were many changes in detail which it is not necessary to follow. Much experience was gained by various exercises carried out in the North Sea either under the Admiral of Patrols himself or the Captains (D) of the various flotillas who were accommodated in light cruisers of the "Scout" class.

Before relinquishing his command Admiral de Robeck sent to the Director of the Operations Division (Captain A. C. Leveson) in April 1914, some suggestions on the working of the patrol flotillas, and also various proposals put forward by Captain E. G. Lowther Crofton, who, after serving as Captain D. 9, had become Assistant to the Admiral of Patrols in January 1914.¹ These proposals were in substantial agreement with Admiral de Robeck's views, and were to the effect that the flotillas in war time should be kept concentrated at fortified ports in order to be ready, as far as possible, to repel hostile raids of which no warning could be expected. Detached destroyers scattered along the coast were described as quite useless for this purpose, and it was urged that a motor-boat reserve should be formed at once to carry out the duties of observation and patrol.

Admiral de Robeck in his remarks also emphasised that the flotillas, if used for the purpose of repelling raids, ought to act as a whole, being supported by the flotilla cruisers. He also agreed with a proposal which had been put forward that he should be responsible for the East Coast of England only from Dover to St. Abbs,² the Admiral Commanding the Coast of Scotland (Admiral R. S. Lowry) taking charge of the Forth Local Defence and the Scotch coast.

The views expressed in these memoranda are of considerable importance, as they indicate the lines on which pre-war training had been carried out, and Captain Lowther Crofton later (August 21st, 1914) drew attention to the fact that they had not been reduced to writing as a whole.³

On May 1st, 1914, Captain G. A. Ballard, lately Director of the Operations Division, was appointed Admiral of Patrols, being granted the rank of Commodore, 1st Class.

4. *Duties of Defence and Patrol Flotillas.*—It was now decided that the patrol flotillas on the East Coast and the local defence flotillas under the S.N.O's. of dockyard ports should have as their war duty that of dealing with raids by detached forces of the enemy and of supporting the shore defences of bases.

The Coast Patrol Flotillas were not to be employed in the sweeps carried out by the Grand Fleet except under extraordinary circumstances.

On receipt of the "warning telegram"⁴ all the patrol flotillas were to complete to full crews and proceed to their war stations, the Admiral of Patrols with the ships under his command (except the Dover Patrol) then coming under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, who was to issue whatever orders were necessary to make the disposition of the Patrol Flotillas supplement and conform to his main operations." This arrangement, however, never came into force, and the Admiral of Patrols remained directly under the Admiralty.

On taking up war stations the 6th Flotilla was to proceed to Dover and establish a patrol across the Channel being assisted by the 3rd and 4th Submarine Flotillas.

The 7th, 8th⁵ and 9th Destroyer Flotillas and 6th and 7th Submarine Flotillas were to be stationed on the East Coast at various unspecified points from Harwich to St. Abbs.

¹ Contained in box marked "Staff Papers, Miscellaneous, 1914," H.S. C.I.D. The docket is unnumbered and marked "Constitution of Patrol Flotillas 1 IV. 14."

² With the exception of the Thames Estuary, which was defended by the Nore Defence Flotilla.

³ M. 05150/14.

⁴ See Corbett: *Naval Operations* for meaning of "warning telegram."

⁵ It was at this time intended to form a local defence flotilla for the Firth of Forth, but this had not been done before the outbreak of hostilities, and the 8th Flotilla had to be used for the purpose.

5. The vessels of the Patrol Flotillas were allotted three tasks on the outbreak of war:—

- (a) The passage of the Straits of Dover was to be denied to the enemy.
- (b) All east-bound ships passing up the English Channel were to be diverted to the Downs, where an examination service would be established.
- (c) The East Coast of England from the Forth to Harwich was to be patrolled with the object of preventing the near approach of hostile vessels thereto without their being attacked and reported, and to assist the coast batteries in the defence of the ports on which the flotillas were based against raids by the enemy.

In addition, the Admiral of Patrols was made responsible for keeping the approaches to the East Coast ports clear of mines, and was responsible in consultation with the Inspecting Captain of Minesweepers that the trawlers which were to be hired on the outbreak of war performed their duties properly.

It will be seen that two of the three clauses above relate to the work of the Dover Patrol, which was essentially different in character from that of the other patrol flotillas. The 6th Flotilla was specially allocated for this service, and detailed instructions were issued as to the disposition of the ships. These will be considered in Chapter IV., but it may be noted here that besides the cruisers, destroyers, and submarines responsible for watching the Straits, the Admiral of Patrols was also in charge of the Downs Examination Service and the flotilla of small craft attached to it.

6. The disposition of the ships in the Straits of Dover was definitely laid down by the Admiralty, but with regard to the remainder of the flotillas the Admiral of Patrols was allowed considerable discretion.

A force of four destroyers and three submarines was to be attached to each of the three fortified ports of Harwich,¹ the Humber, and the Tyne, to co-operate with the shore batteries in the local defence of these bases. The remaining forces available were to be disposed as the Admiral of Patrols thought best in order to comply with his instructions, bearing in mind the varying nature of the coast, and old armoured vessels were to be stationed in the Tyne and Humber to support the local flotillas.

The Admiral of Patrols was also directed to keep in constant communication with the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet and the Vice-Admiral Commanding the Channel Fleet. As regards his own movements, he was to endeavour to exercise a general supervision over the operations of his flotillas without restricting the individual action of the officers commanding further than was necessary.

He himself was to move from station to station, first satisfying himself that the 6th Flotilla and the Downs Boarding Flotilla were carrying out their duties.

7. *Summary of A.O.P.'s Orders.*—From the foregoing it will be seen that the command of the Admiral of Patrols in time of war comprised two separate and distinct theatres of operations. The functions and composition of the force stationed at Dover were regulated by the Admiralty, and it played an essential part in the closure of the North Sea, which was the basis of Admiralty war policy. Thus from the outbreak of war the Dover Patrol was a unit distinct from the remaining flotillas, and for this reason it is considered in a separate chapter (Chapter IV.), and matters connected with it are only touched on incidentally elsewhere.

The remaining flotillas were to be disposed at the discretion of the Admiral of Patrols to protect the coast from the Forth to Harwich, being supported on the north by the Forth Local Defence and on the south by the Nore Defence Flotilla under the local Commanders-in-Chief. The part to be played by them was not very clearly defined. Their duty was to prevent minor raiding enterprises on the part of the enemy; the coast was to be patrolled not only with the object of preventing raids, but also in order to ensure that *any* hostile vessels were reported and attacked if they approached near the coast.

There are evidently two conceptions discernible here, which cannot be entirely reconciled with each other. The repelling of a raid is a tactically offensive operation

¹ At the time of mobilisation the First and Third Flotillas were stationed at Harwich under Commodore T.

which, as Admiral de Robeck had previously pointed out, implied concentration of force. On the other hand, the reporting of hostile craft seems to contemplate a service of information requiring dispersion over a considerable area.¹ It is important to emphasise this point, for the two conceptions are both discernible in the dispositions of the patrol flotillas throughout the period under consideration.

It must be remembered that at the outbreak of hostilities, besides being in charge of Dover and the East Coast of England, the Admiral of Patrols was also generally responsible for the administration of the submarine service and the organisation of the hired minesweeping trawlers. But the stress of actual war soon demonstrated the impracticability of one and the same officer travelling about the country controlling such diverse activities, and before three months had passed the responsibility of the Admiral of Patrols was confined to the East Coast, and he was permanently stationed in the Humber.

8. *Composition of Patrol Flotillas.*—The Patrol Flotillas in July 1914 consisted of the 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th Destroyer Flotillas with the 3rd, 4th, 6th and 7th Submarine Flotillas.

The vessels which formed the Destroyer Flotillas may be considered as comprising four classes :—

- (i) The "F" class or Tribals; 12 boats of approximately 1,000 tons displacement and 33 knots speed. They were from four to six years old and mounted either 2—4-inch or 5—12-pdr. 12 cwt. guns, with two torpedo tubes, and burnt oil fuel.
- (ii) The "E" or "River" class were of about 550 tons displacement with a designed speed of 25½ knots, but as they were from 9 to 10 years old few could attain this speed. They were armed with 1—12-pdr. 12 cwt. and 3—12-pdr. 8 cwt. guns with two torpedo tubes and burnt coal.
- (iii) The "B," "C" and "D" class or "thirty-knotters" displaced about 400 tons with a designed speed of 30 knots. Their age varied from 14 to 17 years and their speed had fallen off proportionately. The armament consisted of 1—12-pdr. 12 cwt., 5—6-pdrs. and two torpedo tubes.
- (iv) Torpedo boats 1—36 or ex-coastals. These displaced from 250 to 300 tons, were five to seven years old and designed for 26 knots. Their armament consisted of 2—12-pdr. 12 cwt. guns and three torpedo tubes and they burnt oil fuel.

The light cruisers attached to the flotillas all belonged to the so-called "Scout" class built ten years previously and armed with 9—4-inch and two above water torpedo tubes. The submarines in the Patrol Flotillas consisted of the small "B" and "C" class boats of about 300 tons displacement.

The composition of the various flotillas after mobilisation was as follows, but it must be realised that all these vessels were not immediately available as some were undergoing extensive refits when the war broke out.²

Sixth Flotilla.

Light cruisers.—"Attentive" (Captain D.), "Adventure," "Foresight," "Sentinel."
12 "F" class. 12—30-knotters.
No depôt ship.

The 12 "F" class destroyers had been lying at Portsmouth paid off with only reserve crews on board.

Seventh Flotilla.

Light cruiser.—"Skirmisher" (Captain D.).
20—30-knotters; 12 torpedo boats.
Depôt ship, "Leander."

¹ Cf. M. 0053. The Patrol Flotillas are "intended to keep the approaches (to East Coast ports) clear of minelayers and torpedo craft, and to give notice of the approach of any enemy vessels, and to work in co-operation with the shore batteries."

² From List marked "Ultimate disposition of Patrol Flotillas, 31st July," in M. 05149/14.

Eighth Flotilla.

Light cruiser.—"Pathfinder" (Captain D.).
12—30-knotters, 12 torpedo boats.
Depôt ships, "Tyne"; "Aquarius."

Ninth Flotilla.

Light cruiser.—"Patrol" (Captain D.).
16 "E" class.
Depôt ship, "St. George."

There were also eight "E" class destroyers, nominally detached from the 9th Flotilla, attached to the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet. These were kept nearly fully manned and were detailed for the local defence of the Orkney Islands and Moray Firth in time of war.

The 3rd, 4th, 6th and 7th submarine Flotillas consisted of from six to twelve boats each (*see* paragraph 12), under the orders of the Admiral of Patrols.

CHAPTER II.

THE EAST COAST OF ENGLAND, FROM MOBILIZATION TO AUGUST 31st.

9. *Situation at End of July.*—On July 27th the Patrol Flotillas were all in southern ports, the 6th being at Portsmouth, the 7th at Devonport, the 8th at Dover, and the 9th at Harwich. The 7th and 9th were giving leave after the mobilization and exercises of the summer, the remainder being on an active (nucleus) crew basis, with the exception of the 12 "Tribal" class at Portsmouth which had only a reserve complement. On this day (27th) the 8th Flotilla, consisting of the "Pathfinder" and 11 destroyers, was ordered to leave Dover for the Humber on the way to the Firth of Forth. Orders were also sent to stop the second watch of the 7th and 9th Flotillas proceeding on leave and complete the Tribals and torpedo boats to full crew.

Next day (28th), a general order was sent that the patrol flotillas were to be completed to full crew so far as could be done without upsetting other mobilization arrangements or recalling men from leave, and the crews of the various vessels concerned were gradually brought up to full numbers.

10. *Orders of July 27th.*—On July 27th the Admiral of Patrols issued orders to the Captains D. of the various flotillas instructing them as to their movements and the procedure to be adopted in the event of their being ordered to take up war stations.

The orders to the 6th Flotilla (Dover Patrol) will be considered separately, as the composition and functions of this force were throughout very different from those of the remaining flotillas.

The orders to the 7th Flotilla were very similar to those for the 9th, and these two flotillas, which were responsible for the whole East Coast of England from Berwick to Harwich, must be regarded as acting in co-operation and subject to the same strategical considerations.

The 7th Flotilla, after completing to full crew, was ordered to proceed to Grimsby, and on arrival to detach four T.B.'s to join the 9th Flotilla, which would be based on Tynemouth. This division of T.B.'s was to be employed in the local defence of the Tyne.

The Captains D. in the "Skirmisher" and "Patrol" were to remain in the Humber and Tyne respectively, keeping in close touch with the War Signal Stations and Intelligence organisation, and not proceeding to sea unless their presence was urgently required off the section of coast for which they were responsible.

The whole coast was divided into nine patrols numbered from north to south (*see* Appendix B., 2, and Chart No. 1). Two of these patrols (Nos. 2 and 6) were for the local defence of the Tyne and Humber, and were maintained by T.B.'s. The remaining patrols consisted of a division of T.B.D.'s (four) in each section. These patrols were instructed to remain at anchor at various allotted stations in immediate readiness to proceed to any point ordered, their principal duty being to prevent hostile

raids on any part of the section of coast for which they were responsible. This was in accordance with the general conception of their function as described in Chapter I.¹

The 8th Flotilla was ordered to proceed from Grimsby to Rosyth and there place itself under the orders of the Senior Naval Officer, Coast of Scotland, for the defence of the Firth of Forth from St. Abb's Head to Gregness.² It had originally been intended that the Admiral of Patrols should be responsible for the whole coast of Scotland with the exception of the Orkneys and Cromarty,³ a reversion to previous practice, but this decision must have been rapidly reconsidered in view of the increasing probability of hostilities, and on the 28th Admiral Lowry was informed by telegram of the new orders to the 8th Flotilla.⁴

The Orkneys and Cromarty were to be protected by the 8 River Class destroyers attached to the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, but he was not responsible for the Shetlands which were provided for by orders to the 8th Flotilla to detach a division of four destroyers to Lerwick after arrival in the Forth. At first it was intended that the "Pathfinder" with Captain D. 8 should accompany them, but later the "Forward," which had been employed on the Irish Coast,⁵ was substituted.

11. *The Humber Battleships.*—The four old battleships which were to be placed at the disposal of the Admiral of Patrols for the defence of the Humber were the "Victorious," "Magnificent," "Hannibal" and "Mars."⁵ These had been reduced to reserve complement after the Test Mobilisation, but on July 27th orders were issued that they were to be brought up to active (nucleus) complement at Sheerness. On July 30th Commodore Ballard issued orders to Captain Roland Nugent, H.M.S. "Victorious," instructing him to proceed with the four ships to Grimsby and act in concert with Captain D. 7 for the defence of the Humber. The especial function of the Squadron was to protect the oil fuel depôt at Killingholme from all forms of sea attack, and three seaplanes were placed at Captain Nugent's disposal for use against hostile aircraft.

The four battleships left Sheerness on July 31st and arrived in the Humber next day where the crews were gradually completed to full complement.

12. *Submarine Flotillas.*—Four submarine flotillas⁶ were originally allotted for service under the Admiral of Patrols on the East Coast of England, and their general disposition was not dissimilar to that of the destroyer flotillas. The 3rd and 4th Flotillas were definitely assigned to the Dover Patrol, and the greater part of the 7th Flotilla—being stationed in the Firth of Forth—came under the orders of the Admiral Commanding the Coast of Scotland as in the case of the 8th Destroyer Flotilla.

At the end of July it was estimated that the ultimate composition and distribution of these flotillas would be :—

3rd and 4th Flotillas	-	-	Dover	-	-	3 B Class.	10 C Class.
6th Flotilla	-	-	Humber	-	-	6 C Class.	D 1.
7th Flotilla	-	-	Firth of Forth	-	-	9 C Class.	
			Tyne	-	-	3 C Class.	

Thus part of the 7th Submarine Flotilla was under the orders of the A.O.P. and part under the Admiral at Rosyth. Owing to their small size and low speed, these submarines could not carry out extensive operations, and with the exception of those at Dover they seem to have remained at their ports in readiness to assist the shore batteries and local defence divisions in repelling an enemy raid.

It must be remembered that at the outbreak of war the Admiral of Patrols had administrative charge of the whole submarine service, including the 8th Submarine Flotilla, which carried out oversea operations under Commodore S. His operational responsibility, however, was confined to the flotillas stationed at ports under his orders.

13. *Patrol Flotillas take up their Stations.*—The mobilization of the various destroyer flotillas was completed by July 30th, on which day the 7th sailed from Devonport for Grimsby, to relieve the 8th which had received its balance crews at the latter port. The 9th left Harwich in the evening for the Tyne, and by August 1st all

¹ Appendix B2.

² About 5' south of Aberdeen.

³ Appendix A1.

⁴ Appendix A2.

⁵ The intention to send old armoured ships to the Tyne was never carried out.

⁶ 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th Flotillas.

the patrol flotillas were at their war bases with the exception of the 8th Flotilla, which was still on its way to the Firth of Forth from Grimsby. The arrival of the four battleships in the Humber and the concentration of the 6th Flotilla at Dover completed the preliminary movements.

14. *Commencement of Hostilities.*—The first orders from the Admiralty relative to the patrol flotillas were sent on the evening of August 1st, and were to the effect that the patrol flotillas and local defence flotillas were to patrol during the night until further Orders.¹

This was followed on August 3rd by an order to the patrols to take up their war stations, that is to say, presumably those described in the A.O.P.'s. orders of July 27th, and in accordance with these instructions the flotillas proceeded to sea.²

The declaration of war led to no further immediate orders, except that the patrols were directed not to leave their stations in order to warn fishing vessels of the outbreak of hostilities,³ and it would appear that the patrol divisions were expected to remain at definite points in readiness to repel a raid as described in the orders of July 27th. It is, however, difficult to be certain whether or not they actually remained at anchor by day.

15. *Orders for Continuous Patrol, August 6th.*—The first activity of the enemy after the commencement of hostilities was the minelaying operation carried out by the auxiliary "Königin Luise" on August 5th when a minefield was successfully laid off the Outer Gabbard, though the German ship was immediately afterwards sunk by the Harwich force. The patrol flotillas played no part in the episode, but it nevertheless had a great influence on their future employment. Hitherto the principal object of the patrol flotillas had been the prevention of raids, but on August 6th the Admiralty issued orders that the coast was to be patrolled day and night to prevent minelaying.⁴ Thus the whole function of these flotillas was changed and a great additional strain thrown on the personnel and matériel of the old vessels which were all the Admiral of Patrols had at his disposal. This strain was increased by the fact that a division of the 9th Flotilla, from the North East coast, had been ordered on August 6th to join the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, and assist in the defence of the Northern bases.⁵ The battleships "Hannibal" and "Magnificent" were also withdrawn from the Humber on the 9th August for the same purpose.

The patrol system, however, was still organised on the same lines as it had been when hostile raids were the principal objective, and the boats theoretically were concentrated in divisions, though, allowing for vessels fuelling and broken down, it seems probable that there were seldom more than a pair of boats on each patrol.⁶

Captain Lowther-Crofton, the Assistant to the Admiral of Patrols, in a memorandum, dated August 21st, drew attention to the fact that the orders to the patrol flotillas were still based on Admiral de Robeck's policy, while their function had been completely changed. The continuous patrol which was being carried out was quite contrary to the previous orders and would shortly become impracticable, as the vessels of the 7th Flotilla were already giving out.⁷

No definite change, however, was made until August 31st, by which time important events had occurred.

16. *False Alarms of August 11th and 19th.*—To attempt to describe in detail the actual working of the patrols would be confusing and difficult, but two incidents which occurred during the month of August are of some interest as showing what actually took place when a raid appeared possible.

On August 10th a collier reported having sighted a mine adrift in position 52° 10' N., 3° 5' E. (50 miles east of Southwold) on the morning of the 9th.⁸

Orders were sent to the Admiral of Patrols (then at Dover) to detail destroyers to sink these mines, and in accordance with this order he directed the vessels patrolling off the Norfolk coast to leave their beat and destroy the mines. Captain Ellison, who was acting as S.N.O., Yarmouth, reported that the "Spanker" (minesweeping gunboat) was on her way to investigate the report, but in spite of this the orders to Commodore Ballard were not cancelled.⁹

¹ Appendix A. 3.

² Appendix A. 4.

³ Appendix A. 5.

⁴ Appendix A. 8.

⁵ Appendix A. 6, 7.

⁶ The 7th Flotilla used Grimsby, Boston Deep, Yarmouth and Harwich as coaling bases during the month of August.

⁷ M. 05150, Remarks on Patrol Flotillas Local War Orders.

⁸ Appendix A9.

⁹ Appendix A10, 11.

Next day (11th), in a signal timed 1100, the "Spanker" reported that wireless indications showed that German ships were in the neighbourhood of Smith's Knoll apparently including one battleship.¹ The alarm was passed along the coast, and at 1750 the Admiral of Patrols pointed out that the patrol had left the coast to sink mines and asked whether the two battleships in the Humber and the remainder of the 7th Flotilla should search for the enemy.²

It was soon discovered that the alarm was false, and when informing Commodore Ballard of this the Admiralty directed that patrol flotillas should not leave their beats to search for floating mines, apparently not realising that the action taken only the previous day had been in pursuance of their own orders.³

In connection with this false alarm it should be noted, firstly, that the position of the Admiral of Patrols at Dover rendered it very difficult for him to keep in touch with events further north, and secondly, that there was evidently a certain vagueness, even at the Admiralty, as to the precise function of the patrol flotillas.

On August 19th there was another false alarm. The destroyer "Orwell" of the 7th Flotilla reported a hostile cruiser chasing her off the Outer Dowsing at 1545. The "Orwell" was apparently alone, and later reported that the cruiser was of the "Königsberg" or "Emden" class, (*i.e.*, three funnels), and stopped near the Outer Dowsing. After this, touch was lost and though the "Skirmisher" proceeded to sea from the Humber at 1740 she sighted nothing and returned to harbour.⁴

This so-called enemy cruiser turned out to be the minesweeping gunboat "Speedy," but this was not known till three days later, and it was generally believed at the time that the alarm was genuine.⁵

Under these circumstances it will be seen that the original conception of using the patrol flotillas was breaking down. The single destroyer which sighted the enemy could not deliver an attack, there seem to have been no reserves at hand to support, and it was two hours after the first sighting before the "Skirmisher" left the Humber. Under these circumstances the flotilla could neither have prevented the laying of mines nor have delivered a prompt attack on a hostile raiding force. After this episode the Captain D. of the 9th Flotilla issued an order that every endeavour was to be made to keep touch with any enemy vessels sighted off the British coast, and if necessary they were to be followed across the North Sea. Though this was only a local order it tended to emphasise the importance of the patrol flotillas as scouting and reporting squadrons rather than flotillas to be employed in tactical offensives.⁶

17. *The German Operations.*—After the minelaying operation of August 5th there do not seem to have been any hostile movements of importance for nearly a fortnight. On August 18th a German cruiser was sighted by one of our submarines off Smith's Knoll Light Vessel at daylight, and shortly afterwards the 1st Flotilla, which was patrolling from Harwich, sighted a four-funnelled enemy cruiser in the Broad Fourteens, but these episodes had no effect on the work of the Patrol Flotillas.⁷

On August 21st and 22nd the enemy carried out a sweep in the direction of the Dogger Bank with cruisers and destroyers. Numerous British fishing vessels were captured or sunk, and the enemy appear to have approached within 30 miles of the British coast, but were not sighted, and no report of this episode was received till September, when neutral subjects serving in the captured crews were released from Germany.

Finally, on the night of the 25th-26th August, two large minefields were laid off the Humber and Tync. A number of vessels, both light cruisers and destroyers, took part in these operations, and the "Mainz" in particular is known to have been employed in laying the Humber field. This was laid to the north and east of the Outer Dowsing Light Vessel, and contained 200 mines. A similar number were sown off the Tyne about 30 miles from the land. It appears that the enemy intended to lay them much closer inshore but, possibly owing to misty weather, mistook the position.

18. *British View with regard to Minelaying.*—The fact that the first enemy minefield had been laid by a converted merchant steamer (Königin Luise) acting

¹ Appendix A12.

² Appendix A13, 14, 15.

³ Appendix A16, 17.

⁴ Appendix A18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25.

⁵ Appendix A26. The details of this episode are not quite clear as no special report was made on it.

⁶ Appendix A27. Compare Chap. I., Par. 7.

⁷ As a result of this report and the supposed cruiser off the Dowsing on the 19th, H.M.S. "New Zealand" and "Invincible" were sent to the Humber to act as a support to the vessels in the Southern North Sea, then engaged in covering the passage of the original Expeditionary Force. See C.B. 1537, Naval Movements, August 1914.

without an escort seems to have convinced the British authorities that all enemy minefields would be laid in a similar manner. Reports received from neutral steamers, which had left German ports after the outbreak of war, lent colour to the belief, numerous trawlers and steamers being reported as loaded with mines and ready to sail.

There were also constant reports from war signal stations, coastguards, &c., of "suspicious vessels" seen off the coast, and, though investigation generally showed these reports to be unfounded, they, no doubt, left a certain residuum of suspicion.

The first news of the Tyne minefield was received at the Admiralty in the morning of August 27th,¹ and further reports during the day showed that it was of considerable extent, two steamers and a sailing vessel being sunk, together with two trawler minesweepers, which were engaged in investigating the area.

Shortly after the news of the Tyne field had been received mines were reported north of the Outer Dowsing, and there could be little doubt that the enemy had carried out extensive operations off our coast.²

It seems to have been at once assumed that only unarmed vessels were employed, and this belief was confirmed by a report received on August 28th that a German fishing boat had been seen actually laying mines that day. This report was almost certainly erroneous, but it was evidently immediately accepted as corroborating the Admiralty views, for an official letter was sent to the Foreign Office definitely stating that the Tyne minefield had been laid by German trawlers, and recommending that the attention of neutral powers should be drawn to this conduct.³

This unfortunate misconception was general and was shared by the Admiral of Patrols, then visiting the North East Coast Bases, although a considerable body of evidence was available which indicated that German warships had been active in the North Sea from August 24th to 26th.

There were a number of reports of neutral ships being stopped and examined on the Dogger Bank by German cruisers and destroyers on the night of August 25th. Another had been stopped 95' N.W. of Heligoland on the evening of August 24th. Trawlers fishing north of Terschelling reported seeing a German minelayer, accompanied by cruisers and destroyers steering W. early on August 25th, while there was a detailed report from the British trawler "Elmira," of Hull, which had been fishing 90 miles east of the Tyne on the afternoon of August 25th. A German torpedo boat had actually come alongside her but had then cast off in response to signals from the two larger ships, one with three funnels. Finally, on August 29th, it was known that prisoners taken from the "Mainz" in the Heligoland action of August 28th, reported that their ship had been employed in laying mines off the Humber at 0200, August 26th. In spite of all this information, however, the official view was not apparently changed, and it was still believed that these mines had been laid by disguised auxiliaries, the statement to that effect sent to the Foreign Office on August 28th being circulated to the Press two days later.⁴

19. *Anxiety with regard to Minelaying.*—By whatever method these minefields had been laid there was at least no doubt of their existence, and the fact that they had been laid off important sections of our coast without any interference from the patrol flotillas caused some anxiety.

On August 29th, Sir John Jellicoe suggested that the patrols should keep further from the coast at night, and next day after pointing out the disastrous consequences which might result from a minefield near the Northern bases, he requested that 12 destroyers might be sent to strengthen the local patrols off the fleet bases.⁵ It was not possible to grant this request as the destroyers available were even then insufficient for an adequate patrol of the East Coast, and on this day Rear-Admiral Ballard⁶ issued orders to the 7th and 9th Flotillas to meet the situation. These orders marked the definite abandonment of the original policy regulating the employment of the patrol flotillas, and they will be described in the next chapter, together with the gradual development of the auxiliary services which endeavoured to preserve a safe channel for shipping through the coastal waters off Eastern England.

¹ Appendix A 31.

² Appendix A 32.

³ Appendix B 3, Appendix A 35, 36.

⁴ Appendix A 28, 29, 30, 33, 34, 37, 38.

⁵ Appendix A 39, 40.

⁶ He had been promoted to Flag Rank on August 27th.