

CHAPTER III.

THE EAST COAST OF ENGLAND, AUGUST 31ST TO OCTOBER 11TH.

20. *Revised Orders for Patrol Flotillas, August 31st.*—On August 27th, Rear-Admiral Ballard proceeded in a destroyer from Harwich to the Humber in order to examine the conditions in the channel off the East Coast of England, and visit the patrol flotilla bases at Grimsby and in the Tyne. This visit to the North-East Coast was almost coincident with the discovery of the Tyne and Humber minefields, and the Admiral of Patrols was able to investigate the circumstances connected with their laying on the spot. As a result of his enquiries he formed the opinion that they had been laid down by trawlers or disguised merchant ships unescorted by warships, and in view of this, decided that the time had come to issue new instructions with regard to the duties of the 7th and 9th Flotillas.

These directed that their whole attention should be devoted to the prevention of minelaying, since raids were apparently not part of the enemy's policy. As it was believed that the minelayers were neither armed nor escorted, it would be quite possible for a single destroyer to deal with one and dispersion to the fullest extent was required.

The patrol system was therefore completely re-organised. Instead of the destroyers operating in divisions, each responsible for repelling a raid on a particular portion of the coast, it was now arranged that they should be scattered singly along a 10-mile wide strip, roughly coinciding with the main route of shipping up and down the coast. This route passed inside the enemy minefields and across the mouth of the Wash, and for patrol purposes was divided into six portions, two watched by the 9th Flotilla from the Tyne and the remaining four by the 7th Flotilla, half of which was to be based on Grimsby and half on Yarmouth.

21. To provide a force adequate to carry out these orders the Local Defence divisions at the Tyne and Humber were abolished, and the torpedo boats composing them were added to the strength available for general patrol service. The total force was then divided into six divisions of six boats each, two divisions being stationed at each base—Tynemouth, Grimsby, and Yarmouth.¹ One half of each division (three boats) was to be on patrol at a time, the remaining vessels fuelling and resting in harbour. There would thus be three boats in each of the six patrol areas, and they were ordered to patrol singly at 10 knots in such a way as to cover the whole area for which they were responsible.²

These orders came into force in the flotillas on September 1st,³ but it was not certain for a time as to whether the Admiralty would confirm them, there being some doubt as to whether they met the case. All the enemy mines had been laid more than 10 miles from the coast, and the Inspecting Captain of Minesweepers (Captain T. P. Bonham) believed the mines must have been laid by a large vessel, and not by fishing boats.

On September 1st Rear-Admiral Ballard left the Tyne in H.M.S. "Patrol," and after calling at Grimsby for the night, next day continued his journey South in the "Skirmisher" and attended a Conference at the Admiralty on September 3rd. No report of this Conference has been traced, but apparently the views of the A.O.P. were accepted, as the orders of August 31st were allowed to stand.⁴

22. *Development of the War Channel.*⁵—The orders of August 31st had the effect of confining the efforts of the patrol flotillas to the prevention of minelaying in a channel about 10 miles wide off the East Coast of England, and it will be convenient here to describe briefly the development of the buoyed channel known as the "War Channel," which roughly coincided with the beats patrolled by the flotillas.

After the first hostile minelaying operation on August 5th, it was recognised that it would be desirable to have a definite and restricted route for men-of-war and

¹ Later six boats from Yarmouth were based on Harwich.

² Appendix B 4.

³ Appendix A 43.

⁴ This Conference is mentioned in M 05151/14. The Chief of Staff, 4th Sea Lord, Director of Operations Division, Inspecting Captain of Mine Sweepers and Director of Air Division were present to interview the

A.O.P. In M. 05146 is a Minute dated November 7th, stating that at the Conference it was decided that the destroyers should be "distributed to overhaul suspicious vessels and fishing craft and watch the swept channel."

⁵ Collection of papers in Admiralty Record Office, bound as C. 1059.

important vessels which could be patrolled and swept regularly. It was, therefore, decided at the Admiralty to buoy a channel from the Downs to the Outer Dowsing following the line of the light vessels, and on August 10th it was arranged to print special track charts showing the routes to be followed by all ships drawing over 12 feet of water. By August 11th all the buoys had been laid and arrangements were made for the channel to be patrolled continuously by 30 steam drifters hired for the purpose,¹ and on August 15th all men-of-war and certain specified auxiliaries were ordered to draw the special track charts before proceeding up or down the East Coast. The Channel was considered secret, the track charts had to be returned at the end of each passage and no notification was made to the mercantile marine regarding it.

The Admiral of Patrols was at Dover at this time and did not learn of the existence of the channel till August 20th, when he happened to receive news of it from the King's Harbour Master at that port. He requested that in future any special charts issued affecting the area for which he was responsible might be supplied to him.

By September 3rd the buoyed channel had been extended from the Outer Dowsing Light Vessel to Flamboro' Head, but in view of the Humber minefield this route was considered dangerous and was soon abandoned in favour of a channel further inshore. This ran from the Haisboro Light vessel to the Inner Dowsing Light Vessel and thence to Flamboro' Head. After being swept and buoyed this was substituted for the outer route on September 12th.

The war channel remained unchanged from this date until December 18th, when as a result of the Scarborough minefield it was decided to continue the buoyed channel to a position off Hartlepool, but the method of patrol underwent considerable changes as the auxiliary patrol and the submarine menace developed.

23. *The Minesweeping Service.*—The work of the patrol flotillas was naturally affected to some extent by the growth of the auxiliary services, and it is necessary to give an outline of their origin and development.

As early as 1908 it had been decided to make arrangements to hire trawlers for minesweeping in the event of war, and the scheme was gradually developed, a special branch of the R.N.R., known as the Trawler Section, being established for the purpose. By December 3rd, 1913, it was anticipated that 82 trawlers with crews would be available at any time. The work of training and organising this service was entrusted to the torpedo-gunboats employed on Fishery Protection duties in the North Sea (S.N.O., Captain Ellison of H.M.S. "Halcyon") under the supervision of Captain Bonham, Inspecting Captain of Minesweepers.

In accordance with his Orders the Admiral of Patrols was in general charge of the minesweeping arrangements on the East Coast after the commencement of hostilities, but it soon became evident that the service would expand greatly. On August 7th it was decided to form a minesweeping flotilla of 80 trawlers to ensure a clear channel from the Downs to the Outer Dowsing (see paragraph 22) and Captain Ellison was ordered to take charge of the Flotilla and organise it at Lowestoft.

By August 13th it was estimated that 100 trawlers were available for minesweeping service. On September 13th Rear-Admiral Charlton was appointed as Admiral-in-charge of Minesweeping (A.M.S.), and was entrusted with the task of co-ordinating the work in all areas.

24. *The Auxiliary Patrol.*—In the pre-war arrangements it was contemplated that hired fishing vessels would only be employed for minesweeping duties, but a very short experience of war conditions indicated that they were required for other purposes. The first mention of their use as patrol vessels seems to be a report from the Admiral Commanding the Coast of Scotland, dated August 7th, stating that the S.N.O., Invergordon, had been authorised to hire trawlers for patrol duties in the Moray Firth owing to the shortage of destroyers.

In connection with the patrol of the war channel 30 drifters were employed by August 15 as already described. These drifters were without signal appliances or armament, and their only method of communicating information was either verbally to a destroyer or by affecting a landing near some coastguard station.²

It was fully realised by this time after a fortnight of war what an important rôle auxiliary craft might play. Besides the minesweeping trawlers and the War Channel

¹ Appendix A. 41a.

² Appendix A. 42.

Patrol, drifters were hired for "watching" purposes in northern waters, and on August 17th orders were given for a number of trawlers to be fitted with the modified sweep¹ at Lowestoft. This was the earliest form of explosive sweep to be devised, and the trawlers so fitted were formed into a Northern Flotilla to operate against submarines in the neighbourhood of the Grand Fleet bases.

The system of hiring and commissioning small craft rapidly expanded, and by September 1st, 250 had been taken up and were based on various ports round the coast. It soon became evident that to deal with the large and continually increasing numbers of craft designed for peaceful purposes and manned by untrained crews some definite scheme of organisation, employment, and training must be adopted, and on September 2nd certain proposals which had been put forward were approved. These were that the auxiliary small craft should be utilised for watch and defence against minelayers and submarines. Yachts, trawlers, and motor-boats were to be organised in units each to consist of:—

- 1 yacht.
- 4 trawlers.
- 4 motor boats.

The yachts and trawlers were to be armed with guns, and it was hoped that this would enable the patrol destroyers to work further offshore. The approval of these proposals definitely established the Auxiliary Patrol as a separate organisation, and the process was carried a step further by the appointment of the Admiral-in-Charge of Minesweeping on September 13th.

The units of the Auxiliary Patrol were gradually constituted, and the next essential date in its history is December 20th, when the whole waters surrounding the British Islands were divided into areas each self-contained for auxiliary patrol purposes.

25. *Enemy Submarines.*—The first British warship to be sunk by an enemy submarine was H.M.S. "Pathfinder," carrying Captain D. 8. She was torpedoed on September 5th between St. Abb's Head and May Island while in charge of the destroyers stationed on the line St. Abb's Head to Gregness, which formed the Outer Patrol of the Forth Local Defence.²

The episode indicated the danger which attended ships patrolling in a limited area, and on September 9th Admiral Ballard issued a general order to the vessels under his command instructing them as to the precautions to be taken when on patrol and the methods to be adopted in attacking hostile submarines. In reality the only effective method of attack at this time was ramming, as the equipment of destroyers with an explosive sweep was not approved till later in the month.

All patrol vessels were ordered to alter course constantly while on their beats and heavy ships on passage were to be screened. If the presence of a hostile submarine was discovered all other objects were to be subordinated to dealing with it unless the vessels were proceeding on some urgent service such as stopping a hostile landing actually in progress. It was emphasised that the utmost vigilance was required, but it was not anticipated that the danger would be such as to throw undue strain upon officers or men or necessitate any excessive modification of general policy.³

The loss of the "Cressy," "Hogue," and "Aboukir" on September 22nd, an attack on the "Attentive" in the Straits of Dover on September 27th (*see* para. 33), together with constant reports of submarines sighted off the coast emphasised the growth of the new menace. On September 29th Admiral Lowry reported that minesweeping in the approaches to the Firth of Forth had been interrupted owing to the activity of hostile submarines and urged the importance of increasing the strength of the Auxiliary Patrol.

From the beginning of September onwards the search for enemy submarines absorbed a large proportion of the energy of the patrol flotillas without any result owing to the inadequate weapons available. No change, however, was made in the general scheme of patrol as laid down on August 31st, and in practice the method of

¹ The modified sweep consisted of a number of charges filled with high explosive towed astern of a ship. A "kite" regulated the depth-keeping and the charges were exploded electrically from the towing ship.

² H.M.S. "Sentinel" from Dover replaced the "Pathfinder" in the Forth.

³ M. 05152/14.

dispersing torpedo craft at considerable intervals along the coast was as suitable for operations against submarines as for checking the activities of hostile minelayers.

26. *Events on East Coast previous to October 13th.*—The work of the 7th and 9th Flotillas after the re-distribution of August 31st, was not marked by any incidents of great interest. In pursuance of the idea that the flotillas should not be confined to coast defence, the "Patrol," after taking the Admiral of Patrols from the Tyne to the Humber on September 1st, carried out a sweep with two divisions of the 9th Flotilla to the south-west of the Dogger Bank.

When the "Pathfinder" was sunk on September 5th, it was at first believed that her loss was due to enemy mines, and in view of the fact that the Grand Fleet was about to carry out an extensive sweep of the North Sea, the 9th Flotilla was ordered to proceed from the north-east coast to Peterhead, with a view to establishing a patrol of the approaches to the Moray Firth.

The 7th Flotilla thereupon took over the whole coast from the Farne Islands to Harwich and were instructed to establish the best patrol practicable. However, on September 7th the Tyne Flotilla were ordered to return to their base carrying out a sweep for minelayers on their way south, and arriving on September 9th they resumed their original patrol. The "Forward" was at the same time withdrawn from the Shetlands and sent to the Humber to join the 7th Flotilla.¹

In the middle of the month the A.O.P. visited the North-East Coast and carried out a tour of inspection. (*See* para. 27.)

On October 6th and 7th the 9th Flotilla searched an extensive area off the North-East Coast in order to ascertain whether the regulations restricting the activities of neutral fishing vessels were being obeyed.²

The "Patrol" with one destroyer and two torpedo boats proceeded from Tees Bay to a position in 54° 38' N., 2° 10' E., just north of the south-west patch of the Dogger Bank. At this point the Captain D. was joined by two destroyers from Scarborough and two destroyers from Longstone (Farn Islands). The various divisions having joined at the rendezvous swept back to the British coast along the parallel of 54° 27' N. without sighting any hostile craft.

About 1700, October 7th, torpedo-boat 21 of the 5th Flotilla, when 20 miles east-north-east of the Spurn Light Vessel, sighted three destroyers, which, when chased, steamed at high speed to the north-eastward and disappeared. It does not appear that any of our own destroyers were in this neighbourhood which was considered a dangerous area, and it is possible that the vessels sighted were actually hostile, especially when it is remembered that on October 17th, H.M.S. "Undaunted," with a division of "L" class destroyers, sunk four German torpedo boats which were cruising apparently unsupported, in the Broad Fourteens. On the 7th, however, no action resulted, but the "Sentinel" and two destroyers were sent out from the Forth to endeavour to intercept the enemy.³

27. *The Admiral of Patrols' Movements.*—The original orders directed that the Admiral of Patrols should exercise a general supervision over his scattered forces, moving from base to base as required. Accordingly, after mobilisation had been ordered, he paid a brief visit to Dover and then proceeded to Grimsby to supervise the working of the 7th and 9th Flotillas. He was recalled from Grimsby by Admiralty order on August 8th, and after visiting the Admiralty, went down to Dover to take charge of the flotilla which was then covering the passage of the Expeditionary Force. There he remained until August 26th when he went to Harwich by rail, and next day proceeded up the east coast in a destroyer to the Humber, communicating with the 7th Flotilla Patrols on the way. On arrival in the Humber he found many matters requiring his attention and spent two days there, leaving on August 30th in a destroyer for the Tyne.

While in the Tyne he issued his orders of August 31st, re-distributing the patrols leaving next day in "Patrol" for the Humber. From the Humber he continued his journey south to Harwich in the "Skirmisher," arriving at the Admiralty on

¹ Appendix A. 47, 48, 49, 50.

² These regulations came into force on October 1st, and stated that any neutral fishing vessel found to the westward of 1° E. north of 54° 30' N. and 2° 30' E. south of that latitude would be treated as under suspicion of minelaying. All East Coast ports were also closed to neutral fishing vessels.

³ Appendix A. 51, 52, 53, 54. It appears that our light-draught vessels sometimes entered the areas described as dangerous. Part of Patrol Section No. III. fell within the Humber Area. *See* Chapter V., para. 40, for A.O.P.'s remarks on this subject.

It appears from the German Official History that the vessels sighted by T.B.21 were not German.

September 3rd, where he attended the Conference already mentioned, and thence proceeded to Dover.

There Admiral Ballard remained until September 14th, when he left for Harwich to commence another inspection of the East Coast. He embarked in the "Forward," and, accompanied by two destroyers of the 7th Flotilla, proceeded to Grimsby on September 15th, carrying out a sweep outside the Swarte Bank and German mine areas on the way. On September 19th he left the Humber for the Tyne, examining on the way the area to the south-west of the Dogger Bank with two destroyers of the 9th Flotilla.

On September 22nd he left Jarrow (Tyne) in the "Skirmisher" and passed down the East Coast channel, communicating with all patrols on the way. One night was spent at Yarmouth, and on the 25th Admiral Ballard visited the Admiralty, afterwards proceeding to Dover, where he remained until October 10th.

28. *The Dover Command.*—If the period of 63 days between August 8th and October 10th be considered, it will be seen that the Admiral of Patrols had only been able to spend 20 days on the East Coast where the major portion of the forces under his command were stationed and a considerable number of these days had been occupied in travel.

The remainder of his time had been spent at Dover, where constant attention was required, first in connection with the passage of the Expeditionary Force and later in regard to the problems arising from the advance of the German armies.

The position became acute in the beginning of October. The first British mine-field had been laid in the southern portion of the North Sea on October 3rd, and this operation had involved a great deal of work on the part of Admiral Ballard and his staff at Dover. The decision to land the 7th Division of the army at Ostend and Zeebrugge added greatly to the complexity of the situation, while the critical situation of Antwerp and the influx of Belgian refugees all contributed to absorb Admiral Ballard's attention.

He had intended to leave Dover on October 5th for another visit to the East Coast, but the questions connected with the transport and disembarkation of the Seventh Division¹ rendered this impossible and his departure was indefinitely postponed.

All these events indicated that there was ample scope at Dover for a flag officer untrammelled by other responsibilities, and on October 7th it was proposed that a Rear-Admiral should be appointed to command the Dover Patrol. The suggestion was accepted, and Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace Hood was selected for the post. Admiral Ballard visited the Admiralty on October 10th to arrange for the transfer, and on the 13th Admiral Hood took over his new command.

CHAPTER IV.

THE DOVER PATROL, AUGUST 1914—JANUARY 1915.

29. *The Main Function of the Dover Patrol.*—The underlying policy of our strategy was the closure of the northern and southern approaches to the North Sea to the passage of all enemy shipping, whether mercantile or naval. The task of watching the northern entrance was carried out by the Grand Fleet and squadrons working directly under the orders of its Commander-in-Chief, while that of controlling the Dover defile was entrusted to a force under the command of the Admiral of Patrols.

¹ They were disembarked at Ostend and Zeebrugge, October 6th and 7th.

The unchanging physical conditions lend an essential unity to the work of the Dover Patrol, though in no area did the varying circumstances of the war involve greater changes in detail. Many other calls were made at various times on the force available, in particular the German occupation of Belgium and the extension of the military front to the coast gave rise to urgent and unexpected problems, but none the less the Straits had to be watched and denied to the enemy.

This chapter deals with the various methods employed to attain this end, other events in the Dover area being only touched on in so far as they affected the main dispositions.

30. *General Orders.*—It was intended that on the order being received to "Take up War Stations" the 6th Flotilla and the 3rd and 4th Submarine Flotillas should at once establish a patrol across the Channel from the South Goodwin Buoy to French territorial waters off Calais. In addition should France be allied with us a patrol of French submarines would be established between Cape Grisnez and the Varne Shoal.

The Dover force was under direct Admiralty control so far as strategical disposition was concerned, and the Orders issued to the Admiral of Patrols carried this idea a step further and gave definite instructions as to the duties the 6th Flotilla and its attached vessels were to carry out. These were to control the Straits, attacking and reporting enemy's war ships, and diverting all mercantile traffic to the Downs as far as possible. In the Downs an examination service was established which soon became a vital centre of our blockading system, and which was always comprised among the responsibilities of the officer in command at Dover.

The Dover Flotilla was ordered to patrol between the South Goodwin Light Vessel and Calais, on which line gas buoys would be laid to assist the patrols in maintaining their position, and the various vessels were not to pass beyond the lines East Goodwin to Outer Ruytingen Buoy to the eastward and Folkestone to Cape Grisnez to the westward, except in the event of being required to support the Nore Defence Flotilla in the protection of the Thames estuary.

It will be noticed that these very definite instructions form a great contrast to the full discretion as to disposition given to the Admiral of Patrols with regard to his remaining flotillas and indicate the inevitable strategic importance attaching to any force based on Dover in a war waged against a North Sea Power.

31. *The Outbreak of War and First Method of Patrol.*—War between France and Germany broke out on August 3rd, but the French frontiers had been violated the previous day and our Allies at once showed naval activity in the Straits. When the Admiralty orders to the patrols to take up War Stations was received at Dover, Admiral Rouyer's squadron of cruisers¹ was off the port and the 6th Flotilla at once proceeded to sea. A subsequent telegram was sent by land wire to Dover ordering a patrol to be taken up in conjunction with the French at 0800 August 4th, but failed to reach Captain D 6 and the patrol was actually established during the night of the 3rd-4th August.

The general disposition of the patrol varied slightly by day and night, but always consisted of a line of destroyers to the north-eastward supported by light cruisers a little further down channel.

During the day five destroyers patrolled singly so as to cover the line East Goodwin Light Vessel to S.W. Ruytingen Buoy. About four miles to the S.W. were three light cruisers disposed at approximately equal intervals across the Straits, and near each cruiser was stationed a group of two or three submarines. All these vessels remained normally stopped, but cruised at slow speed as required to maintain their stations or examine merchant vessels.

By night the destroyer force was increased to 12, and these patrolled in pairs between South Goodwin Buoy and Calais. To mark this line four light buoys were laid on mobilisation, and the destroyers were so arranged that there was one division (four boats) between each pair of buoys. The divisions were further divided into subdivisions each covering one half of the distance between the buoys, all turning simultaneously at the same end of their patrol. Further down channel were three light cruisers on the line South Goodwin-Sangatte,² but all submarines were with-

¹ Appendix A, 55, 56. This squadron was withdrawn immediately and worked in the Western approaches to the Channel.

² Sangatte is four miles west of Calais.

drawn during the dark hours.¹ Off Folkestone a division of destroyers with the fourth cruiser was anchored which was intended to act as a reserve in the event of the enemy attacking the Straits.

32. *Orders in the Event of an Attack.*—The patrol at the outbreak of the war was organised solely with a view to meeting an attack by surface craft on the Channel communications, a natural provision for the prospective transport of the British Expeditionary Force to France. That German submarines should attempt the passage of the Straits does not seem to have been contemplated, and two months elapsed before they actually made their appearance in the vicinity.

If a strong force of enemy surface craft appeared it was intended both to attack them in the Straits and maintain contact until they could be brought to action by the Channel Fleet cruising to the westward under Vice-Admiral Burney. By day two of the cruisers on patrol were to place themselves ahead of the enemy the remaining cruisers following. The destroyers, with heater torpedoes, were to carry out long range attacks in the Straits, those with cold (short range) torpedoes keeping touch ahead preparatory to delivering torpedo attacks after nightfall. The submarines were to attack whenever possible and both they and the destroyers were ordered to make hostile transports the first objective.

At night the centre cruiser on patrol was directed to proceed ahead of the enemy, the cruisers on each side rallying the neighbouring destroyers and leading them down to deliver close range torpedo attacks on the enemy vessels. The reserve division was to proceed to the westward and attack the enemy after they had passed the Varne Light Vessel, the area to the eastward being reserved for the submarines from Dover which were to act as surface torpedo craft.

After expending their torpedoes all destroyers were ordered to return and re-establish the patrol line across the Straits as soon as possible.²

33. *The Patrol as maintained till October.*—The method of patrol instituted at the outbreak of war was carried out with slight modifications until the early days of October, and, owing to the inactivity of the enemy, this period was for the most part uneventful.

In August light buoys were placed in positions A, B, and C to assist the cruisers in maintaining their position at night, and mooring buoys were placed near A and B buoys for the submarines to lie at during the day. After the transport of the main body of the British Expeditionary Force had been completed in safety, that is to say, by the end of August, the reserve division of destroyers remained in Dover harbour at night instead of anchoring off Folkestone.

The growth of the submarine menace led to orders being issued in September that the cruisers on patrol should keep constantly moving when on their beats in order to render an attack by the enemy's underwater craft more difficult. The necessity for this precaution was shown on September 27th, when H.M.S. "Attentive" was attacked at close range by a hostile submarine and had a fortunate escape, the torpedo passing along her side. This led to the cruisers being ordered to return to Dover and after this date they remained in harbour ready to proceed at short notice.³

In forwarding a report of this incident Admiral Ballard stated that "the actual presence of submarines in the Straits of Dover appears to justify the assumption that in the course of time they will push their way down channel and possibly threaten the approaches to the Solent or Portland."⁴ He stated that he saw no way of preventing this by a patrol of the Straits of Dover as there was nothing to prevent submarines running the whole distance submerged. To hamper the movements of the enemy it was proposed that the Sandettie, Ruytingen, West Hinder, and East Goodwin Light Vessels should be removed and the South Foreland and Dunkirk light houses reduced in visibility. It was hoped that this would prevent the submarines getting a good departure before submerging for the run through the Straits, but at the same time it was pointed out that a still more effective bar would be provided by running a line of mines N.W. from the Ruytingen Light Vessel and

¹ The light cruisers night positions were known as A., B. and C. See Chart, p. 70.

² See Operations Division 126 from A.O.P. to D.O.D. of August 1914.

³ Appendix A. 57. About this time the French submarines were withdrawn from the Grisnez to Varne Line and remained in readiness in Boulogne.

The first hostile submarine appeared on the Southampton to Havre route on October 13th.

declaring the wholly northern approach to the Straits of Dover dangerous.¹ This proposal had already been considered by the Admiralty and the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, and it was decided to adopt it.²

Though the cruisers remained in harbour after September 27th, the submarines still maintained the patrol by day until, on October 2nd, a torpedo was fired at one, which led to their being withdrawn and kept in harbour ready to proceed to sea should an attack by enemy surface craft appear probable. The destroyers carried on the original patrol system for a few days longer, but the pressure of events soon compelled the adoption of new methods.

34. *Proposed Scheme by Admiral Ballard.*—The Admiralty had some time previously given approval to a proposal that the Tribal destroyers at Dover should be fitted with the modified (explosive) sweep, but the fitting of this took time. After the attack on the "Attentive," Admiral Ballard had suggested that when fitted they should patrol continuously with sweep out from the East Goodwin to the South-west Ruytingen Buoy, the control of traffic being carried out by the older destroyers assisted by French torpedo craft. This suggestion was renewed on October 5th, the Admiral of Patrols remarking that the British minefield, which had been laid on October 3rd, necessitated some revision in the disposition of the Dover Patrol.

It was anticipated that enemy surface vessels attacking the Straits would pass through the Downs, while submarines would cross the minefield on the surface and make one of the light vessels before submerging. To deal with these new conditions it was proposed that four "Tribals," towing the modified sweep, should patrol the line East Goodwin to South-west Ruytingen Buoy. The remainder of the 6th Flotilla destroyers would maintain a patrol between the South Goodwin and the North-east Varne Buoy, the channel south of the Varne being protected by the French. Four submarines were to be stationed off the South Goodwin to guard the Downs channel, and four more spread on a line joining Folkestone and the Varne Light Vessel.

A general approval was given by the Admiralty on October 17th to these proposals, but by that time Dover had become a separate command, conditions had greatly changed, and they were never actually carried out.³

35. *Dover Area a Separate Command.*—In the first days of October, immediately after the laying of the British minefield, it was decided to land the 7th Division of the Army at the Belgian ports of Ostend and Zeebrugge in the hope of checking the German advance to the coast.⁴ This operation necessitated much work on the part of the naval authorities at Dover, and the Admiral of Patrols was forced to postpone a proposed visit to the N.E. Coast.

The continued German success in Belgium and the impending fall of Antwerp both led to an increased press of business at Dover, and it was evident that the Officer Commanding that area would soon have to devote his whole attention to the problems arising from the occupation by the enemy of the Flemish coast line. Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace Hood was accordingly appointed to command at Dover, to date October 11th, and the A.O.P. transferred the command to him on October 13th.

36. *Method of Patrol in October.*—On arrival at Dover, Admiral Hood's energies were at once absorbed by events on the Belgian coast, where the Germans had occupied Ostend and Zeebrugge on October 15th, and the principal activities of the Dover force were now for some time confined to supporting the left flank of the Belgian army. But all this time the watch on the Straits had still to be maintained, and in view of the reduced number of vessels available as well as the conditions resulting from the British minefield, a new system of patrol was devised.⁵

This is described in Revised War Orders for the Dover Patrol issued by Captain D 6 on October 26th, but the actual method described seems to have been brought into force previous to that date.⁶

According to these orders the primary duty of the 6th Flotilla lay in the formation of a cordon across the entrance of the North Sea to watch for and attack

¹ M. 02304/11.

² The first British minefield was laid on October 2nd-3rd. The southern limit of the area notified as dangerous was the parallel of 51° 15' N.

³ Appendix A, 58, 59.

o AS 8794

⁴ Disembarked, October 6th-7th.

⁵ Appendix A, 60, 61.

⁶ Appendix B 5. These orders commence with a general description of the functions of the Patrol Flotilla, evidently issued by A.O.P. See Chap. V.

enemy vessels of war which might attempt to pass the Straits. The general instructions with regard to the procedure to be adopted in the event of an attempt by enemy surface craft to break through resemble those issued in August (*see* para. 32), but are not so definite, and in view of the reduced numbers on patrol and the unlikelihood of the enemy heavy ships risking a passage through the minefields lay more stress on maintaining the "cordon" than following the enemy.

The actual patrol line to be maintained was not described in the body of the orders, but an addendum of the same date (October 26th) ordered the destroyers on patrol to hold both by day and by night the line from S. Goodwin Light Vessel through A., B., and C. buoys. The destroyers (normally five by day) were to distribute themselves equally along this line and cruise independently, keeping a good look-out for submarines.¹

A further memo., dated November 6th,² describes the destroyers as cruising by day to the N.E. of the patrol line, and at night and in thick weather steaming at right angles to it as far as the line E. Goodwin to Outer Ruytingen Buoy and back.

37. *Admiral Hood's Scheme.*—On November 10th Rear-Admiral Hood reported to the Admiralty that he had not been able to introduce Admiral Ballard's scheme of October 5th for a modified sweep patrol (*see* para. 34), owing to the fact that there were not sufficient sweeps available, and also that the line S. Goodwin to Varne Buoy was undesirable owing to its proximity to Dover and the risk of collisions.³ In a further letter of the same date he forwarded "a modified scheme to compete with the menace." In introducing these proposals he regretted that "there was small doubt that the present patrol of the Dover Straits was quite inefficient in preventing the free passage of enemy submarines by day or night," though it had probably been successful in preventing the passage of surface craft, both commercial and naval.

He now wished to hold the whole area of the Straits from the Mined Area to the line Dungeness-Boulogne with destroyers both by day and by night, and in order to carry this out, proposed to divide the whole Straits into areas according to the number of destroyers available, each being patrolled by a single boat.

Diagrams were attached dividing the Straits into eight, ten, and twelve areas.

Admiral Hood considered that this scheme would render it difficult for a submarine to pass through the Straits without being observed at some point of its journey and urged also in favour of this method that the risk of collision between the patrolling destroyers would be reduced, the modified sweep could be used in connection with it, and if at a future date it was decided to use drift nets in the Straits as an anti-submarine measure the arrangements would still be suitable.

It will be seen that this scheme was purely an anti-submarine one, and Admiral Hood recognised this fact by pointing out that at night or in thick weather it might be desirable to revert to the single "cordon" across the Straits in order to ensure surface craft being sighted and reported.⁴

This scheme was apparently never brought into force. The advent of the winter gales, which greatly reduced the value of the older destroyers and constant demands for various convoy services, left few destroyers available for the Channel Patrol, and the method introduced in October (*see* para. 36), was continued during the winter months until the introduction of indicator drift nets in January 1915, led to a general modification of the patrol arrangements.⁵

On December 8th Rear-Admiral Hood reported that he was not satisfied with the efficiency of the patrol of the Straits in bad weather, and that owing to calls on his available destroyers for convoy service to Havre or in the North Sea the patrol in the Straits had at times been reduced to a single boat.⁶ He therefore "earnestly requested" that more destroyers of a modern type might be sent him in order to carry out his orders relative to the patrol of Dover Straits. The need was recognised at the Admiralty, but no destroyers were available to comply with Admiral Hood's request and the patrol had to be maintained as efficiently as possible with the boats already allocated to Dover.

¹ H.M.S. "Hermes" was sunk by a submarine in mid-channel, October 31.

² Not given in Appendix.

³ M. 03569/14.

⁴ M. 03569/14.

⁵ Appendix A, 62, 63.

⁶ M. 04459/14.

CHAPTER V.

THE EAST COAST OF ENGLAND AFTER OCTOBER 13TH.

38. *The Admiral of Patrols new Appointment.*—The official letter informing Admiral Ballard that the Dover Area was to form a separate command directed that in future he would "be responsible for the East Coast Patrols from the Naze to St. Abb's and all the vessels working on these patrols," except the minesweeping trawlers and other vessels under the orders of Rear-Admiral Charlton, the Admiral in charge of Minesweeping.

To carry out these duties the 7th and 9th Destroyer Flotillas, and the 6th and 7th¹ Submarine Flotillas were placed under his orders; he was also informed that it was intended to constitute a new flotilla to be named the 10th Destroyer Flotilla. This flotilla would consist of some destroyers detached from the 7th Flotilla, and a large number of trawlers fitted with the modified sweep.

In reply to this the Admiral of Patrols forwarded detailed proposals as to the formation and organisation of the new flotilla. He suggested that the 10th Flotilla should be based on Yarmouth and Harwich, being responsible for Nos. 5 and 6 destroyer patrol areas as already established² with the auxiliaries carrying out sweeps in the Broad Fourteens or other waters likely to be used by hostile submarines.

This scheme, however, never came into operation owing to a number of unforeseen circumstances. On December 6th Admiral Ballard pointed out that nothing had been done towards the formation of the 10th Destroyer Flotilla, and in reply was informed that the proposal was in abeyance.³

The limitation of the A.O.P.'s command to the East Coast of England naturally tended to confine his presence to the North-East Coast bases, and though the London office was still maintained for a time, its importance diminished as the affairs of the Patrol Flotillas became localised in the Tyne and Humber. Captain Lowther Crofton relinquished his position as assistant to the Admiral of Patrols, and was appointed to the Operations Division of the Admiralty War Staff to act as a link between the Admiralty and the Admiral commanding the coast of Scotland, the Admiral of Patrols and the Dover Patrol and assist in the co-ordination of the work of the various flotillas.

39. *The Submarine Service.*—Since the establishment of an Admiral of Patrols in 1912, the holder of the appointment had a general responsibility for the Submarine Service as a whole, and this had continued in force after the outbreak of war. On October 15th Admiral Ballard submitted that the existing arrangements should be cancelled as nearly all the submarine flotillas were working under other officers and it was impossible and undesirable for him to attempt to regulate their activities. His responsibility for them was purely administrative and only led to delay in correspondence and unnecessary clerical work. The Commodore (S) entirely concurred in this suggestion, pointing out that though the assistance of the A.O.P. had been most valuable under peace conditions, the submarine service was now thoroughly organised and could be independent.

The Admiralty gave their approval to this proposal on October 20th, and the responsibility of Admiral Ballard was then limited to the submarines attached to the Patrol Flotillas.

These consisted of the 6th Submarine Flotilla of 6 C-boats in the Humber and 3 C-boats in the Tyne. The latter, which had originally been detached from the 7th Submarine Flotilla in the Forth, were now organised as a separate Flotilla and named the 10th.

Owing to the fact that the enemy did not carry out attacks on the ports where these submarines were stationed, they had no opportunity of effective action against surface craft during the period considered in this monograph, but occasional patrols were carried out with a view of attacking hostile submarines.⁴

¹ The greater part of the 7th Submarine Flotilla was actually under the Admiral at Rosyth. See next paragraph.

² These areas covered the coast from Cromer to Harwich.

³ Papers collected as X. 3766.

⁴ Appendix A. 64.

40. *General Conditions of Patrol, October.*—The principal duties of the Patrol Flotillas¹ in October were described as being :—

- (i) To prevent any raiding expeditions from attaining a landing ;
- (ii) To prevent the laying of mines off the coast,

while various other tasks, such as the protection of certain harbours, the capture of enemy merchant ships, and the supervision of light vessels were also to be performed. The method of patrol adopted to comply with these instructions was in accordance with orders of Admiral Ballard on August 31st, the destroyers patrolling singly and keeping a constant watch on a strip about 10 miles wide through which most of the coastal traffic passed. The original intention had been that 12 boats should be based on the Tyne, 12 in the Humber and 12 at Yarmouth, but the latter force had been divided and 6 of the boats were based on Harwich. The actual numbers available varied considerably, but there were generally 18 destroyers actually on patrol off the East Coast covering the coast from the Farne Islands to Harwich. Out of every 7 boats it was calculated that 3 could be on patrol, 3 in harbour fuelling and resting² and one with steam down being overhauled. These overhauls were carried out either at the Humber or at the Tyne, the Divisions at Harwich and Yarmouth being kept up full strength.³

The limits of the German minefields were as announced in August. There were three foul areas : one off Southwold in Lat. 51° 35' N. to Lat. 52° 30' N. to West of Long. 3° E. ; the Newcastle area between two lines bearing N.E. and S.E. from Tynemouth and between the distances 20 miles and 50 miles from Tynemouth ; and an area off Flamborough from Lat. 53° 30' N. to 54° 15' N. and between two lines parallel to the coast 8 miles and 30 miles out. In October the Admiral of Patrols drew the attention of the Admiralty to the fact that there was every reason to believe that the areas described as dangerous were unnecessarily large as vessels of the patrol Flotillas had traversed portions of them safely on several occasions and numerous fishing craft used them without meeting with disaster. The Admiralty, however, had decided not only to leave these areas unswept, but to reinforce gradually the enemy mines with British ones in order to form a barrier off the coast, and in accordance with this decision the limits of the dangerous areas were not amended.⁴

41. *The First Hostile Raid on the Coast.*—Since the hostile operations in August, which resulted in the laying of the Humber and Tyne minefields, the enemy had displayed little activity in the North Sea to disturb the routine patrols carried out by Admiral Ballard's forces, and the months of September and October passed almost without incident. In so far as no more mines were laid it might be assumed that the dispositions adopted at the end of August were highly successful, the isolated patrol destroyers forming a chain of observation posts in the coastal channel, but on November 3rd an event occurred which raised the whole question of the proper functions and employment of the patrol flotillas in an acute form.

At dawn on November 3rd, of the six destroyers of the Seventh Flotilla stationed at Yarmouth there were three, the "Lively," "Leopard," and "Success," on patrol. The two former had anchored for the night near the entrance to the Hewitt Channel into Yarmouth Roads, the "Success" being to the northward of the Roads and out of touch with the other two. These three destroyers were responsible for No. 5 Patrol Area and the "Lively" and "Leopard" weighed at daylight to proceed to carry out their duties. Shortly after getting under way at 0700 the "Lively" observed several men-of-war emerging from the mist to the north-eastward steering S., and altered course towards them in order to investigate. The torpedo-gunboat "Halcyon" (Commander G. N. Ballard, R.N.), which worked with the trawler minesweepers stationed at Yarmouth, was at this time proceeding towards the Cross Sand Light Vessel with the intention of sweeping, during the day, the channel which ran from that light vessel to Smith's Knoll. At 0710 she was about 1½ miles ahead of the "Lively" and had already identified the ships to the north-eastward as hostile, when, as the "Halcyon" was in the act of turning, they opened fire on her.⁵ The "Lively," followed by the "Leopard," closed at once, and made a smoke screen to shield the gunboat which, though under the concentrated fire of three battle cruisers, at a range of 7,000 to 8,000 yards, only sustained slight injury and was already entering the Yarmouth Roads, covered by the destroyers, when, at 0730, the enemy hauled off to the E.S.E. and soon disappeared in the mist, having laid an extensive minefield between Smith's Knoll and the Cross Sand Light Vessel.

¹ See Appendix B. 5, first portion. Though these are contained in a Dover order similar instructions appear to have been issued to all Flotillas.

² Two boats at short notice ; one at four hours' notice.

³ Authority, Memo. in M. 05146/14.

⁴ Appendix A. 65.

⁵ Appendix, A. 66, 67, 68.

As this monograph only deals with the patrol flotillas it is not necessary to describe here the various movements ordered by the Admiralty on receipt of the information that hostile battle cruisers were off the coast, but as this raid had a great influence on the subsequent patrol arrangements, the movements of the 7th and 9th Flotillas on the receipt of the intelligence may be considered.

After seeing the "Halcyon" into safety, the "Lively" and "Leopard" endeavoured to keep touch with the enemy, but their retreat was too rapid and the attempt failed. The "Success" to the northward never sighted the enemy, and of the three destroyers in Yarmouth harbour one was at four hours' notice, and though the remaining two proceeded to sea on receiving the news they were too late to obtain contact with the enemy. At 0940 the "Skirmisher" left the Humber to reinforce the patrols, but the enemy had already been steering east for two hours, and the situation off Yarmouth was normal by the time she arrived there. In view of the hostile activity the 9th Flotilla divisions on patrol remained concentrated during the day, but the enemy made no demonstration off the North-East coast.¹

The Admiral of Patrols at the time of the raid was at the Tyne on a visit of inspection and left for the Humber by rail, in accordance with his previous plan, about 1000.

42. *Fresh Admiralty Orders.*—The fact that a strong force of the enemy had been able to approach our coast and lay mines without being in any way hampered by the scattered patrol destroyers raised once again the whole question of the duties performed by the patrol flotillas. In a paper put forward by the Operations Division of the War Staff on November 6th, it was pointed out that while the functions of the vessels employed on the Dover, Thames, and Firth of Forth Patrol were "fairly well defined and understood," the conditions along the East coast were by no means so satisfactory. The isolated destroyers on patrol were unlikely to sight an enemy approaching the coast under cover of darkness, while in daylight, if the enemy was in force, our patrol vessels could do nothing and ran grave risks of being destroyed piecemeal.²

This view was adopted, and a memorandum on the working of the patrol flotillas was sent to Admiral Ballard on November 7th.³ This directed that the patrol flotillas should be kept concentrated at selected points along the coast ready to proceed to any point where the enemy were attempting to land, that no routine patrol was to be maintained and that the prevention of minelaying was to be left to trawlers. It was to be recognised that nothing in our dispositions prevented an enemy from approaching the coast and commencing to land troops, but that if the various flotillas were properly handled, the forces attacking him should continually increase until long before any considerable force had been landed the enemy would be overwhelmed. The coast itself was to be the line of observation and the policy approved for the Admiral of Patrols was the concentration of his flotillas at fixed points where they were to be maintained ready for action.

This memorandum completely destroyed the conception of the patrol flotillas as an observing and reporting force which had governed their employment since the end of August, and confined their activities to offensive action against a possible attempt at invasion.

It in fact reverted to the system suggested by Admiral de Robeck in April 1914, which was more or less implied in the original orders, and this fact was recognised in the telegram sent to Admiral Ballard prior to the despatch of the detailed instructions. This directed him to discontinue the present system of patrols and keep the vessels concentrated in divisions as originally laid down.⁴

43. *The Grand Fleet Requirements.*—The same telegram which enjoined Admiral Ballard to resume the system of patrol in force at the outbreak of war contained orders which considerably reduced the force at his disposal, as 12 destroyers were to be detached from his command and sent to Scapa Flow to work under the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet. This order was the outcome of a Conference held at the Admiralty on November 2nd at which Sir John Jellicoe discussed and explained his requirements of patrol vessels for the local defence of the Grand Fleet bases. He was informed that 12 destroyers would be detached from the patrol flotillas and sent north, and in spite of the incident off Yarmouth next day, it was decided to comply with this arrangement.

¹ Appendix A. 69, 70.

² M. 05146/14.

³ Appendix B. 6.

⁴ Appendix A. 72.

The attrition of the patrol flotillas was carried a stage further by orders issued on November 10th that one of the depôt ships attached to the patrol flotillas was to be sent north to work with the destroyers attached to the Grand Fleet for the local defence of the Orkneys.

Admiral Ballard selected the "Leander," depôt ship of the 7th Flotilla in the Humber, and she sailed for Scapa about the middle of the month.¹

44. *The A.O.P.'s Orders.*—On receipt of the telegram from the Admiralty on November 7th, Admiral Ballard, who was then in the Humber, detached 12 destroyers of the 7th Flotilla to Scapa Flow and proceeded to re-organise the patrol to be carried out by his remaining destroyers in accordance with the Admiralty instructions, although, as he pointed out, the reductions in the strength of his forces rendered it impossible to re-establish the arrangements made at the outbreak of war.² The principle of concentration by divisions was complied with, however, in the new dispositions.

The 7th and 9th Destroyer Flotillas were each organised in four divisions of four boats each, and one division of each flotilla was always kept with drawn fires to permit of boilers being cleaned and machinery refitted. Of the remaining three divisions of the 7th Flotilla, two were kept at Yarmouth in readiness for immediate service day and night, and one in the Humber. The latter division patrolled the entrance during the dark hours.

The 9th Flotilla sent one division to the Humber to work under the Captain D 7 and assist in the Humber patrol, and another division patrolled the coast between Flamborough Head and Hartlepool. The remaining division lay in the Tyne ready for immediate action.

Thus there were eight boats at Yarmouth, eight in the Humber, and eight on the coast north of the Humber, and these destroyers were ordered to confine their activities to the prevention of any hostile landing. Patrolling against hostile mine-layers, convoy work, and supervision of the fishing areas were not to be considered as part of their work.

45. *Events up to November 13th.*—The Admiralty Memorandum of November 7th had indicated that the patrol flotillas should occasionally undertake "bold reconnaissances" some 60 miles from the coast with the whole available force. An opportunity for such an operation soon presented itself, as on November 9th, from information received at the Admiralty, it was believed that a German "torpedo flotilla" would be patrolling near the Outer Gabbard during the nights of the 9th and 10th November. Admiral Ballard accordingly sent the "Skirmisher" with seven destroyers of the 7th Flotilla to search the neighbourhood in which the enemy was expected, leaving only six T.B.'s in the Humber; but nothing was sighted, and the vessels returned to their patrol stations.³

In the Admiral of Patrols' orders of November 8th one division of the 9th Flotilla was stationed in the Humber to work under the Captain D 7, and this indicated a tendency to amalgamate the flotillas, which was accentuated by the decision on November 10th to send the "Leander" to Scapa. On November 11th Admiral Ballard informed the Admiralty that he proposed to move the "St. George," depôt ship of the 9th Flotilla, from the Tyne to the Humber, as, owing to the reduced numbers, the two flotillas could be administered as a whole, and from this date the Humber becomes the centre of the Patrol Flotilla system, the extensive docks of the Great Central Railway at Immingham being used for destroyers undergoing overhaul and repairs.

46. *Admiral Ballard's Appreciation, November 13th.*—After receiving and considering the Admiralty Memorandum of November 7th, Admiral Ballard forwarded on the 13th a detailed appreciation of the situation which would arise in the event of the enemy attempting a landing.⁴ After a careful analysis of the forces available and the distances they would have to travel, he points out that should the enemy appear either off one of the undefended northern ports or the Norfolk or Suffolk coast, he could only be attacked by successive detachments of the patrol flotillas, each consisting of one light cruiser and six or seven destroyers, with several hours separating each attack, while the submarines, owing to their slow speed, could only be considered of

¹ Appendix A, 71, 75, 76.

² Appendix B, 7.

³ The Harwich force was also at sea. Appendix A, 73, 74, 77.

⁴ Appendix B, 8.

value for local defence. It therefore appeared that if the hostile escort consisted of only three or four light cruisers, the enemy would have little difficulty in disposing of the patrol flotillas in detail and effecting the disembarkation of troops without serious disturbance. He therefore urged that if it was considered that the enemy would not encounter any opposition or dangers on his passage the strength of the patrol flotillas should be at least doubled in all classes of vessels, especially light cruisers and large submarines. It was fully appreciated at the Admiralty that the situation on the East Coast was unsatisfactory, and in reply to a request from Sir John Jellicoe for more destroyers his attention was drawn to the fact that only a skeleton force was stationed between St. Abb's Head and Harwich.¹ But it was easier to discern the weakness of the patrol flotillas than to apply a remedy, for there were no destroyers or light cruisers available to supplement Admiral Ballard's meagre force without drawing on the resources of the Grand Fleet itself.

The problem was of acute importance, as many indications pointed to the probability of the enemy making a serious attempt at invasion during the month of November.

The various measures adopted to meet the situation, however, are part of the general organisation against invasion which was devised at this time, and though the Admiral of Patrols naturally played an important part in the scheme, it was by no means limited to the patrol flotillas. The whole subject involved such comprehensive and diverse considerations that it would be impossible to discuss it here adequately, and this date (November 13th) is, therefore, a convenient terminal point for a monograph dealing with the functions of patrol flotillas. After three and a half months of war they were working in accordance with the same theory as at the outbreak of hostilities, namely, that their true function was to deliver counter-attacks against an enemy offensive, the idea that they should act as an observing force having broken down under the stress of events.

APPENDIX A.

A

ADMIRALTY TELEGRAMS AND INTERCEPTED SIGNALS.

CHAPTER II.

1. *From Admiralty.* July 27th (no time given).
To Admiral of Patrols; C.-in-C., H.F.; S.N.O., Coast of Scotland.
Admiral of Patrols is to keep all his vessels and to be responsible for Scottish coast, including Firth of Forth and Shetlands; Orkneys and Cromarty to be defended by C.-in-C., Home Fleets with the eight river-class destroyers from the Patrol Flotillas, which eight are to remain under C.-in-C., Home Fleets. They are to be despatched to Cromarty when ready. Some of the destroyers now in 8th Flotilla to change with some ex-coastals for patrol of Forth; actual vessels to be detailed by the Admiral of Patrols.
2. *From Admiralty.* July 28th (no time given).
To Admiral, Rosyth.
Following instructions have been issued to 8th Destroyer Flotilla. On arrival of 7th Flotilla at Grimsby, about August 2nd, you will proceed at 12 knots with all destroyers and T.B.'s of 8th Flotilla and "Tyne" and "Aquarius" to Rosyth, where you will leave all the destroyers, except four, with "Tyne" and "Aquarius" to act under orders of S.N.O., Coast of Scotland, for defence of Forth from St. Abb's to Gregness. You will then proceed on in "Pathfinder" to Lerwick, taking remaining four destroyers with you in readiness for defence of Shetland Islands, which will be your war station should the order to take up war stations be issued.
3. *From Admiralty.* August 1st, Sent 2105.
To C.-in-C.'s at Home Ports and Admiral of Patrols.
Local defence flotillas and patrolling flotillas are to patrol during night time until further orders.
4. *From Admiralty.* August 3rd, Sent 1115.
To A.O.P. and Captains D.
Patrols take up your war stations.

¹ Appendix A, 79.

5. *From Admiralty.* August 5th, Sent 1150.
To A.O.P. and Captains D.
Patrol flotillas are to warn any fishing boats met with that war is declared against Germany. The flotillas should not leave their stations for this purpose.
6. *From C.-in-C., H.F.* August 6th, Received 0645.
To Admiralty.
Danger of submarines off Pentland Firth is increasing. My E. class destroyers fully employed guarding entrances. Can eight more destroyers be sent up from Coast Patrol to guard the approaches in view of detention of Expeditionary Force?
7. *From Admiralty.* August 6th, Sent 1340.
To A.O.P.
9th Flotilla is to send one division of E. class to reinforce C.-in-C. at Scapa Flow.
8. *From Admiralty.* August 6th, Sent 1345.
To A.O.P., Captain D. 7, Captain D. 9.
Coast must be patrolled day and night to prevent enemy minelaying.
9. *From Boston, Lines.* August 10th, Received 1206.
To Admiralty.
Collier "Airmyn" reports passing slate-coloured mine, apparently adrift, in 52° 10' N., 3° 05' E., at 9.30 a.m., 9th. Circular in shape, with tube 6 ins. to 9 ins. in diameter, 2 ft. long protruding. Strong S.W. wind. S.N.O., Clayhole.
10. *From Admiralty.* August 10th, sent 1750.
To A.O.P.
Floating mines painted grey reported adrift 9.30 a.m., 9th., 52° 10' N., 3° 05' E. Send out torpedo craft to destroy them with gunfire.
11. *From "Halcyon," Yarmouth.* August 10th, Received 2050.
To Admiralty.
"Spanker" proceeding in morning to investigate mines reported by collier.
12. *From "Victorious," Grimsby.* August 11th (time not given).
To Admiralty.
Following intercepted from "Spanker" to "Halcyon." Heading back to Smith's Knoll at slow speed, being in close W/T touch with several German war vessels, including battleship "Schlesien" and gunboat "Jaguar." Latter appears very close. I have seen nothing. My full speed only 13 knots; but if I can will get in touch and communicate accordingly (1100).
13. *From Admiralty.* August 11th, Sent 1625.
To S.N.O., Yarmouth.
Your patrol should keep a good look-out for the enemy as it is anticipated they are near.
14. *From "Ganges," Shotley.* August 11th, Received 1718.
To Admiralty.
Following intercepted from Captain "D 7" to 7th Flotilla, 2 p.m. "Spanker" reports German warships, including battleship "Schlesien" and gunboats, off Smith's Knoll Light Vessel. Look out.
15. *From A.O.P. (at Dover).* August 11th, Received 1825.
To Admiralty.
"Skirmisher" reports German battleship reported by "Spanker" off Smith's Knoll. Destroyers detailed for patrol of Norfolk coast were ordered yesterday to search for drifting mines elsewhere in accordance with Admiralty telegram received. Submit whether "Victorious" and "Mars" may be sent out from Humber with remainder of 7th Flotilla to search for enemy, as there is now no patrol on Norfolk coast (1750).
16. *From Admiralty.* August 11th, Sent 2100.
To A.O.P.
7. "Spanker" has now reported that no enemy are near
Patrol flotillas are not to be ordered to leave their beats to search for floating mines, but to look out for them when on their beats.
17. *From A.O.P. (at Dover).* August 12th, Received 0049.
To Admiralty.
With reference to your telegram 7, orders received by me yesterday to send destroyers to sink floating mines in 52° 10' N., 3° 5' E., which is 55 miles seaward of Yarmouth and therefore well outside their beat. It was to these that I referred in mentioning that no patrols are now on the Norfolk coast.
18. *From Patrol.* August 19th, Intercepted Admiralty 1631.
To 9th Flotilla.
Following received: "Orwell" to Captain "D 7." Cruiser previously reported giving chase appears hostile. I do not know which part of patrol is (remainder not received) (1545).

19. *From Hull Naval Centre.* August 19th, Received 1631.
To Admiralty.
21. 4.10 p.m. Following received from Captain D. Begins: "Orwell" reports three-funnel cruiser East 6 miles from Outer Dowsing. Appears hostile cruiser giving chase. Ends.
20. *From Captain D. "Skirmisher."* August 19th, Sent 1650. Received 1715.
To Admiralty.
"Orwell" reports cruiser "Königsberg" or "Emden" class.
21. *From Hull Naval Centre.* August 19th, Sent 1714. Received 1734.
To Admiralty.
23. 5.15 p.m. Refer my 21 message following from Captain D, "Skirmisher." Begins: Cruiser at 4.40 p.m. half-mile East of Outer Dowsing. Warn Newcastle. Ends.
22. *From Hull Naval Centre.* August 19th, Received 1805.
To Admiralty.
25. 5.45 p.m. Refer my 21 message. "Skirmisher" reports cruiser stopped near Outer Dowsing.
23. *From "Victorious," Grimsby.* August 19th, Received 1815.
To Admiralty.
"Skirmisher" left to watch for German light cruiser off Outer Dowsing steering North (1800).
24. *From Patrol.* August 19th, Intercepted 1828.
To "Skirmisher."
Would you like me to come out too? Let me know if enemy is coming north.
25. *From Captain D. 9 Patrol.* August 19th, Intercepted 2047.
To "Skirmisher."
Are you making any arrangements to drive cruiser off or attack him after dark?
26. *From Hull Naval Centre.* August 21st, Received 1238.
To Admiralty.
31. 12.5 p.m. Following received from Captain D., "Skirmisher." Begins: "Avon" informs that Outer Dowsing informs that a supposed German cruiser on Wednesday was "Speedy." Ends.
27. *From Captain D. 9.* August 21st, Intercepted 1327.
To 9th Flotilla.
No enemy ship is to be allowed to approach the British coast with impunity. Any sighting the enemy must stick to her out of range if necessary until she is brought to action somehow. The enemy must be shadowed across the North Sea if necessary (1220).
28. *From Chief Censor, War Office.* August 26th, 0400.
To Admiralty.
The following message has been intercepted. Extract from press telegram, Rotterdam to London. "Ymuiden." Dutch steamers 'Trompenberg' and 'Ittersun' arriving here to-day "report having been examined off Dogger Bank. German fleet composed of two cruisers, six "torpedo boats."
- 29.* *From Naval Intelligence Officer, Grimsby.* August 26th, Received 1244.
To Admiralty.
Master trawler "Elmira" reports having seen two German destroyers at 1533, August 25th, 120 miles N.E. ½ N. of Spurn Head, one destroyer coming alongside and questioning him, but left again suddenly towards flashes on horizon, which event revealed as two large men-of-war, apparently German steamers, W.N.W. and last seen at 1700.
30. *From Consul General, Rotterdam.* August 26th, Received 1940.
To Admiralty.
Hear from reliable source that master Norwegian vessel just arrived here states he was stopped 95' N.W. of Heligoland by five German cruisers and eight small craft, either T.B.'s or T.B.D.'s, at 6.30 p.m. August 24th.
31. *From S.N.O., Tyne.* August 27th, Received 0547.
To Admiralty.
Trawler S.N. 184 has lost net in reported minefield 30 miles N. 73° E. from Tyne. Two have received injuries; will send details as soon as possible.
32. *From "Victorious," Grimsby.* August 27th, Received 0716.
To Admiralty.
49. Last night herring trawler "City of Belfast," 15 miles off Outer Dowsing light-vessel, was shotted his nets when a mine exploded. Shortly after another exploded. He cut down his nets and reported same to patrol steamer "Ocean Retriever" (0545).
50. With reference to No. 49 mine reported by "City of Belfast," exploded at 10 p.m., 26th August, 15 miles north of Outer Dowsing. (0600.)

* Note.—A more detailed report was received at the Admiralty on August 27th.

33. *From* Vice-Consul, Bergen. August 28th, Received 0344.
To Admiralty.
Captain of Norwegian steamer, which arrived to-day from Grimsby, states that he was stopped late at night, August 25th, by three German cruisers 70 miles east of Flamboro' Head.
34. *From* A.O.P., Grimsby. August 28th, Received 1559.
To Admiralty.
58. Steam trawler reports vessel purporting to be "Linwood" of Middlesbro', flying signals of distress, but refused assistance when offered. Position E.N.E. 22 miles from Spurn Head. It seems probable was minelaying. Trawler "Martha" at about 1030, August 25th, observed two cruisers and one minelaying vessel 53° 17' N., 4° 07' E. Steering S.W. by S. (1500.)
35. *From* Captain D. 9. August 28th, Intercepted 1757.
To T.B. 22.
Hartlepool Customs report that steam trawler "Excelsior" reports a German trawler, "A. 29" of Emden, seen laying mines 29 miles S.E. of Blyth at 5 a.m. to-day. Pigeons on board. (1635.)
36. *From* Newcastle Naval Centre. August 28th, Received 1835.
To Admiralty.
33. Steam trawler "Excelsior" reports German lugger "A.E. 24" of Emden seven last night 55' E.S.E. of Blyth steering N. She has a large quantity of buoys, her crew on deck.
37. *From* Hull Naval Centre. August 29th, Received 0154.
To Admiralty.
42. 0115. Following received from N.I.O., Grimsby. Begins: Dutch trawler "Martha," Number 165, reports having seen at 0800, August 25th, when 33 miles N.E. by E.(a) of Terschelling Lightship, six German destroyers, four cruisers, and one minelayer steering W.N.W. At 1300, August 26th, saw large fleet of German warships, big and small, steering S.W. by W.
38. *From* Admiralty. August 29th, Sent 1435.
To S.N.O., Grimsby.
Following received from H.M.S. "Liverpool" noon to-day.
From conversation of German prisoners it appears that "Kolberg" and "Stettin" were out yesterday. They state "Mainz" laid mines on our coast off Hull 2 a.m. 26th.
39. *From* C.-in-C., Home Fleet. August 29th.
To Admiralty.
249. In view of ease with which mines are being laid off portion of our coast provided with patrol flotillas, submit for consideration that our patrols should be further seaward at night.
40. *From* C.-in-C., Home Fleet. August 30th, Received 0229.
To Admiralty.
254. The need of more destroyers for patrol work off Cromarty and Scapa Flow to meet the submarine and mine menace is much felt. Could 12 be spared from southern ports? A minefield in vicinity of these bases might prove disastrous. An efficient patrol would prevent mines being dropped.
41. *From* Admiralty. August 31st, Sent 2330.
To C.-in-C., Home Fleet.
Your 254. Not possible to spare more destroyers from the south. Eight armed trawlers are being sent you.

CHAPTER III.

- 41a. *From* Admiralty. August 11th, No time given.
To A.O.P., Com. S., Com. T.
The whole of the Channel from Outer Dowsing Light Vessel to the Downs will be patrolled from to-night continuously. Patrol boats are hired steam trawlers.*
42. *From* S.N.O., "Halcyon." August 15th, Intercepted Admiralty, 1100.
To "Victorious," "Leander," Captain D. 7.
Special Channel is buoyed from Outer Dowsing Lightship to the Downs following line of light-vessels. There are 30 drifters equally spaced constantly on patrol. They show no light at night and having no signal ratings are not to be flashed at. They hoist a white light over red, and challenge. Reply red over white. Report stranger to nearest coastguard station. When organised so, "Quail" (?) will constantly sweep the channel during daylight, anchoring in suitable position clear of channel at night. Please inform your ships concerned and warn to keep clear of buoys which are not lighted. (0945.)
43. *From* Captain D. 9. September 1st, Intercepted Admiralty, 1012.
To 9th Flotilla.
Destroyers to be at extreme visibility apart at once. Patrol passing at 15 knots going south. Extend destroyers distance from the shore up to 10 miles or further in clear weather. (0930.)

(a) Compare position in No. 34. The bearing should probably be S.W. by W
* They appear to have been actually drifters.

44. *From* Admiralty. September 1st, Sent 1202.
To S.N.O., Coast of Scotland.
75. In making a passage from Rosyth to the Tyne and Humber all ships are to keep within 10 miles of the coast.
45. *From* A.O.P., "Victorious." September 1st, Received 1858.
To Admiralty.
74. Frequent strong W/T signals having been heard apparently within 100 miles of Tynemouth, have arranged for patrol and two divisions of 9th Flotilla carrying out sweep outside mine area to south-west portion of Dogger Bank, returning to their inner patrol to-morrow. (1800.)
46. *From* Admiralty. September 5th, Sent 1800.
To all ships.
537. It is now evident that the Germans are using vessels disguised as neutrals or even British ships for the purpose of laying mines in the North Sea.
Commanding officers are therefore directed to use the utmost vigilance in stopping and searching every vessel they encounter in these waters.
47. *From* Admiralty. September 5th, Sent 2041.
To Captain D. 9, H.M.S. "Patrol."
"Patrol" with all available E class destroyers is to proceed as soon after daylight as possible to Peterhead, with a view to establishing a constant sweep of approaches to Moray Firth. Flotilla should hug the coast as far as the Farne Islands, then stand out 40 miles to seaward and steer for Peterhead; "St. George" to remain at Jarrow and take charge of T.B.'s and submarines for protection of Tyne and coast. Orders for patrol will be sent to Peterhead.
48. *From* A.O.P. September 6th, Sent 1940.
To Admiralty. Received 1952.
7th Destroyer Flotilla has been ordered to carry out best patrol practicable of whole of coast from Farne Islands to Harwich. Torpedo Boats of 9th Flotilla left in River Tyne have been ordered to act under orders of Captain D, 7th Destroyer Flotilla.
49. *From* Admiralty. September 7th, Sent 1140.
To C. in-C., H.F.
Some limit must be placed to the activity of the German minelayers. Tyne Flotilla has been sent to Peterhead for Moray Firth till Tuesday.
50. *From* Admiralty. September 7th, Sent 1938.
To Captain D. 9, Peterhead.
"Patrol" and 9th Flotilla temporarily sent North from Tyne on Saturday are to return to the Tyne when ready, carrying out a sweep for minelayers on passage approximately meridian of 1° W., closing coast as necessary to avoid mine area off Tyne. They will revert to their ordinary patrol on arrival.
51. *From* Naval Centre, Hull. October 7th, Sent 1835.
To Admiralty. Received 1852.
66. Message 7th, 6.30 p.m.
Following received from Captain D. 7. Begins: T.B. 21 sighted three destroyers apparently hostile, E.N.E. of Spurn Head Light Vessel, 20 miles, steering N.N.E. 25 kts. 1730. Ends.
52. *From* Naval Centre, Hull. October 7th, Sent 1847.
To Admiralty. Received 1903.
67. Message 7th, 6.50 p.m.
Refer my 66 message. T.B. 21 reports she has lost touch with enemy T.B.D.'s.
53. *From* Admiral, Rosyth. October 7th, Sent 2237.
To Admiralty. Received 2242.
225. With reference to destroyers reported by "Victorious" E.N.E. of Spurn Light Vessel. Are these to be considered hostile?
54. *From* Admiralty. October 7th, Sent 2335.
To Admiral, Rosyth.
349. Your 225. No other than patrol destroyers should have been in neighbourhood.

CHAPTER IV.

55. *From* Admiralty. August 2nd, Sent 2019.
To A.O.P. and C.-in-C.'s, Home Ports.
It is understood that French destroyers and submarines are being used to patrol the Straits of Dover by night and day. All ships and vessels are to be informed. Any ships known to be en route through the Straits to be informed by wire.
56. *From* Admiralty. August 2nd, Sent 2334.
To Captain D. 6 and A.O.P.
The Dover Patrol is to take up War Stations at 8.0 a.m. Tuesday. The Cross-Channel Patrol in conjunction with the French as in War Orders No. 2. No German vessels are to be attacked unless they first attack our vessels. The French will attack in any case.

57. *From Admiralty.* September 28th, Sent 1300.
To A.O.P., Dover.
Keep the scouts in. Send destroyers on day patrol out, as it is most important to know if enemy submarines are passing through and to meet them.
58. *From R.A., Dover.* October 17th, Sent 1215.
To Admiralty. Received 1350.
Are the new proposals for Dover Patrol, dated 5th October, approved? (1200.)
59. *From Admiralty.* October 17th, Sent 2250.
To R.A., Dover.
The new proposals for Dover Patrol, dated October 5th, are approved, subject to any modifications which Rear-Admiral Hood may have to suggest.
60. *From Admiralty.* October 22nd, Sent 1205.
To S.N.O., Dover.
Report the number of vessels and destroyers now off the coast of Belgium under Admiral Hood. Is Dover Patrol being effectively maintained?
61. *From Captain D. 6.* October 22nd, Sent 1721.
To Admiralty. Received 1758.
Eight destroyers and monitors only are working on Belgian coast. "Hazard" and "Foresight" returned to Dover last night. On Dover Patrol at present, six destroyers being maintained by night and four by day, besides convoy duty.
62. *From Admiralty.* November 21st, Sent 1350.
To R.A., Dover.
227. Your letter of 126 of November 14th* as to the disposition of Dover Patrol is approved
French are being informed, and you will be notified when this is done.
63. *From R.A., Dover.* November 21st, Received 1615.
To Admiralty.
139. Your telegram 227. Owing to the destroyers employed in operations on Belgian coast, proposed patrol cannot be put into force yet. Present scheme is therefore being continued with a much reduced patrol.

CHAPTER V.

64. *From A.O.P.* October 21st, Sent 1122.
To Admiralty. Received 1235.
A submarine of 6th Flotilla will be stationed from to-morrow off Flamboro' Head, cruising submerged during daylight and on the surface after dark on look-out for German submarines.
65. *From Admiralty.* October 30th, Sent 1610.
To A.O.P.
176. British mines have been laid in the Southwold area but not in the Flamboro' or Tyne areas for the present. It is important not to remove mines in either of the three mined areas.
66. *From "Halcyon."* November 3rd, Received at Admiralty 0721.
To all ships.
Am engaged by superior force, four. Require reinforcements.
67. *From Gorleston War Signal Station.* November 3rd, Received 0812.
To Admiralty.
0750. Six enemy cruisers have attacked patrols assembled and "Halcyon" off Smith's Knoll.
0805. Enemy cruisers steering to South. At least one battle cruiser and three or four others.
68. *From "Halcyon."* November 3rd, Intercepted at Admiralty 0845.
To Commodore T.
Enemy consisted of four 4-funnelled cruisers and four dreadnoughts. 52° 31' N., 2° 03' E., steering E.S.E.
69. *From Admiralty.* November 3rd, Sent 0856.
To S.N.O., Immingham, S.N.O., Harwich.
Have you sent all the reinforcements you can to the patrol attacked between Gorleston and Smith's Knoll?
70. *Captain D. 9.* November 3rd, Intercepted 1100.
To North Flotilla.
On account of enemy vessels being reported on coast divisions are to remain concentrated to-day (1038.)
71. *From C.-in-C., H.F.* November 4th, Sent 2040.
To Admiralty. Received 2052.
946. When may I expect 12 additional destroyers sanctioned at meeting on Monday last to arrive Scapa?
Second and Fourth Destroyer Flotillas need time for refit very urgently. (1847.)

* Letter was actually dated 10th.

72. *From Admiralty.* November 7th, Sent 1900.
To A.O.P.
196. Select 12 destroyers from where they can best be spared and send them without delay to Scapa Flow, where they will come under the orders of C.-in-C., Grand Fleet. Discontinue the present system of patrol and revert to the system [originally] laid down keeping the vessels concentrated in divisions. Acknowledge.
73. *From Admiralty.* November 9th, Sent 1755.
To A.O.P. and Commodore T.
For information. A German torpedo flotilla will probably be patrolling near the Gabbard to-night as well as to-morrow night.
74. *From A.O.P.* November 10th, Sent 1315.
To Admiralty. Received 1448.
In consequence of information re German movements, "Skirmisher" sailed to-day for Yarmouth with orders to take the seven destroyers which remain in 7th Flotilla and to visit vicinity of Outer Gabbard to-morrow and to arrive at Harwich in evening.
As boilers of "Forward" are under test she cannot leave the Humber before to-morrow Above arrangements will leave six F.B.'s only in Humber, none on the coast South of Humber. (1300.)
75. *From Admiralty.* November 10th, Sent 1550.
To A.O.P.
204. A depôt ship for the 22 destroyers attached to the C.-in-C., Grand Fleet, is required at Scapa at once.
One of the depôt ships attached to the patrol flotillas is to be detailed for this duty. Report which vessel can best be spared.
76. *From A.O.P.* November 10th, Sent 1913.
To Admiralty. Received 2014.
Your 204. "Leander" can be spared best. Estimate two days required to embark stores, &c.
77. *From "Skirmisher."* November 11th, Intercepted 1420.
To A.O.P.
Have patrolled to line between Outer Gabbard and Shipwash. No sign of enemy. Heavy W.S.W. wind and sea. (1214.)
78. *From Admiralty.* November 16th, Sent 1530.
To C.-in-C., H.F.
293. The coast has been so denuded of destroyers for the sake of strengthening the force with you (amounting now to 71 destroyers) that there is only a skeleton force of patrol vessels available on the East Coast amounting to 3 scouts, 23 destroyers, and 12 T.B.'s between the Naze and St. Abb's Head, a distance of 300 miles

APPENDIX B 2.

B 2.

A.O.P.'s ORDERS TO 7TH FLOTILLA, JULY 27TH, 1914.¹

Office of Admiral of Patrols.

To Captain F. Clifton Brown, R.N.,
H.M.S. "Skirmisher."

MEMORANDUM 0226.

When the watch on leave have returned and balance crews have joined you, you will proceed at 15 knots to Grimsby with all destroyers and torpedo boats of 7th Flotilla and "Leander."

2. Should you receive the order "Take up war stations," you will dispose the flotillas in patrols as shown on the attached list.

4. You will remain at Grimsby in the "Skirmisher" in immediate touch with Grimsby Port War Signal Station and supervise the movements of all patrols from there unless your own presence is urgently required at any point between Flamboro' Head and Harwich, in which case you will transfer the supervision of the patrols to the Commanding Officer of "Leander."

5. The patrols are to remain at anchor at their allotted stations with steam on the engines in immediate readiness to proceed to any point ordered. They are to remain in constant touch with the nearest war signal station except No. 7, which is to keep in wireless touch with Grimsby W/T station. Their principal duty will be to prevent hostile raids on any part of the section of coast for which they are responsible.

6. The "Leander" is to lie in the Humber above Paull Point Battery if war stations are taken up.

7. The 6th Submarine Flotilla will be under your orders.

Note.—Orders on similar lines were issued to the 9th Flotilla (Tyne).¹ M. 05149/14.

Enclosure to Secret Memorandum 0226 of July 27th.

LIST OF PATROLS.

9TH FLOTILLA.

Number of Patrol.	Station.	Force.	Area for which responsible.
1	Blyth - - -	1. Destroyer Division (4)	Berwick to a point half way between Blyth and Tees Bay.
2	Tynemouth - - -	1. T.B. Division (4)	River Tyne and immediate vicinity.
3	Hartlepool - - -	1. Destroyer Division (4)	From point half-way between Blyth and Tees Bay to point half-way between Tees Bay and Scarborough.
4	Scarboro' - - -	1. Destroyer Division (4)	From point half-way between Tees and Scarborough to point half-way between Scarborough and Spurn Point.

7TH FLOTILLA.

5	Humber - - -	1. Destroyer Division (4)	From point half-way between Scarborough and Spurn Point to Skegness.
6	Humber - - -	2. T.B. Divisions (8)	River Humber and immediate offing.
7	Dudgeon Lightship	1. Destroyer Division (4)	Skegness to Cromer.
8	Yarmouth - - -	1. Destroyer Division (4)	Cromer to Dunwich.
9	Harwich - - -	1. Destroyer Division (4)	Dunwich to Harwich.

B 3.

APPENDIX B 3.

MINELAYING BY ENEMY TRAWLERS.¹

SIR,

I AM commanded by Their Lordships to request that you will lay before Secretary Sir E. Grey the following statement, which should be given as wide a circulation all over the world as may be thought advisable.

2. Although the Admiralty have reserved to themselves the right of laying mines in view of the Germans having done so, the previous statement by H.M. Government that no British mines have been laid is absolutely true at this moment.

3. The mines off the Tyne were laid 30' to seaward. They were not laid as part of a military operation or by German ships of war. They were laid by German trawlers, of which a considerable number appear to have been engaged in this work. The number of one such trawler actually seen to be doing this was A.E. 24 Emden.

It would be well if the conduct of those who ordered her to perform this act were carefully considered by neutral powers.

The Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.

I am, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
(Signed) W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Note.—The substance of the above was sent to the Press Bureau on August 30th for circulation to British and Foreign newspapers. It provoked a rejoinder from the German Government, which stated that no mines had been laid except from German war vessels.

B 4.

APPENDIX B 4.

ORDERS ISSUED BY ADMIRAL OF PATROLS, AUGUST 31st, 1914.²

COVERING MEMO. TO CHIEF OF STAFF.

Submitted.

As the original disposition of the Patrol Flotillas to meet raids requires considerable amendment to deal as far as may be possible with the minelaying which is now apparently the policy of the enemy on an extensive scale the attached revised disposition has been issued by me. It had partly taken effect already as a result of the minelaying off Harwich at the beginning of the war.

¹ Undocketed.² M. 05151/14.

2. It will be noticed that I have withdrawn the local defence divisions in the Humber and Tyne altogether and added the 12 T.B.'s thus available to the Coast Patrols.

3. This step appears to me justified from the fact that the indiscriminate minelaying off the approaches to these ports seems to indicate that the enemy have no intention of subjecting them to other forms of attack. In any case the local submarine sections will remain supported in the Humber by the armed trawlers and in the Tyne by strong land defences.

4. To that extent therefore I am departing from the strict letter of the directions contained in my Admiralty War Orders.

ORDERS TO 7TH AND 9TH FLOTILLAS, AUGUST 31st.

MEMORANDUM.

The following modification of my previous orders regarding the dispositions of the destroyers on Patrol Duties in the 7th and 9th Flotillas are to come into force forthwith:—

2. They are based on indications that raids on the Coast are not part of the war policy of the enemy, and that in consequence the whole attention of the Patrol Flotillas must be devoted to the prevention of minelaying in so far as that may be possible with the limited number of destroyers available for the purpose.

3. It is to be borne in mind that the minelayers are not formidable vessels in themselves and do not appear to be escorted. It is quite possible, therefore, for a single destroyer to deal with one if encountered, and the necessity for keeping the divisions concentrated for mutual support as originally arranged for meeting raids no longer prevails. Dispersion to the fullest extent is now what is required.

4. For the purpose of patrolling the coast will be divided into six new beats as follows:—

- (1) Longstone Light to Tynemouth.
- (2) Tynemouth to Scarborough.
- (3) Scarborough to Spurn Light Vessel.
- (4) Spurn Light Vessel to Cromer Knoll Light Vessel.
- (5) Cromer Knoll Light Vessel to Yarmouth.
- (6) Yarmouth to Harwich.

Of these Nos. (1) and (2) will be patrolled by the 9th Flotilla and the remainder by the 7th Flotilla.

(SUMMARY.—The local defence divisions at Tyne and Humber are to be withdrawn and utilised for these patrols.

The organisation is to be in divisions of six each which will allow one division to each beat. Half of each division are to be under way day and night, the other half in harbour, one with steam at half-hour's notice, the others with drawn fires.)

"8. The coaling bases of the several beats are to be as follows:—

- (1) and (2) Tynemouth.
- (3) ,, (4) Grimsby.
- (5) ,, (6) Yarmouth.

"There will be twelve vessels using each base"

"10. The actual line followed in patrolling is to be approximately as shown on the attached chart.¹ Vessels are to patrol singly at 10 knots maintaining intervals of about 20 miles as far as the delays caused by closing or boarding passing ships will allow"

APPENDIX B 5.

B 5.

EXTRACTS FROM DOVER PATROL, LOCAL WAR ORDERS.

REVISED ORDERS ISSUED BY CAPTAIN D. 6, 26TH OCTOBER 1914.²*General Duties of Patrol Flotillas.*

"Each destroyer Flotilla with accompanying submarines and minesweeping trawlers will be responsible in the following particulars for the areas allotted to them:—

- (a) To prevent any raiding expeditions from attaining a landing.
- (b) To protect a fleet or single ship at anchor in certain harbours.
- (c) To prevent the breaking through of any ships of the enemy from the North Sea to the English Channel.
- (d) To prevent the laying of mines off the coast, and if mines have been laid to render them ineffective.
- (e) The capture of any merchant ships of the enemy.
- (f) In certain cases to ensure a safe conduct to British or friendly merchant vessels from port to port."

Duties of Patrol Flotillas in War.

"The visiting of British Light Vessels and Light Buoys in their respective areas is part of the duties of the Patrol Flotillas.

"If a sweep is ordered it should be undertaken by two sections of the flotillas stationed at adjoining war bases.

"On these occasions the Flotilla Cruiser, if one exists, should accompany the flotillas....."

"The sending of small numbers of destroyers to sea away from their war base is to be avoided, and where it is necessary for patrol vessels to proceed away from defended ports, they should, if possible, be accompanied by a Flotilla Cruiser, and in as great a strength as circumstances permit."

¹ See Chart No. III.² M 05144/14.

Orders for Vessels under Captain D, 6th Flotilla.

"The 6th Destroyer Flotilla and the 3rd and 4th Submarine Flotillas acting under the immediate orders of the Senior Officer are to form a cordon across the entrance to the North Sea to watch for and attack any of the enemy vessels of war which may attempt to pass through the Straits of Dover, and to capture his merchant vessels."

Instructions with regard to Diverting Traffic to the Downs and the Examination Service established there.

"Circumstances may arise in which the 6th Flotilla requires the support of other destroyers, in which case the Senior Officer is to communicate with the Commander-in-Chief, the Nore, by the quickest available method, and ask for assistance from the Thames Patrol. Conversely, the latter may require support from him, in which case he is to furnish it without delay, but always leaving not less than six destroyers on the cordon."

Patrol of Straits of Dover.

"The patrol duties will be divided into two parts, a night patrol and a day patrol
"No vessel is to pass to the eastward of a line joining East Goodwin Light to Outer Ruytingen Buoy or to the westward of a line joining Folkestone and Varne Buoy, except under very urgent circumstances."

Night Patrol Destroyers.

THE USUAL NUMBER WILL BE 8 IN THE STRAITS AND 6 IN RESERVE.

"The method of patrolling will be arranged by the Senior Officer on the line according to the weather and visibility, destroyers must keep on the move on account of the submarine menace. If a boat leaves the line the adjacent boats will cover the gap."

Day Patrol Destroyers.

"Five destroyers will carry out this duty, and in misty weather their number will be increased.
They will also act as scouts for the submarines, who would leave harbour if enemy was reported."

Submarines by Day.

"Two groups in harbour ready for sea. Remainder at short notice. One group would always take up position between Folkestone and Varne Buoy, the remainder as may be ordered."

*Cruisers.**Duty to assist Destroyers and obtain Information if Enemy appears.*

(Here follows a section giving details of the duties to be performed by the patrol vessels, by day and by night in the event of attack by surface craft.)

General.

"The Dover Straits Patrol is always to endeavour to maintain the patrol line by day and night; if driven off or dispersed by superior numbers the line is to be re-established with as little delay as possible.

"The destroyers in reserve at night are—in the event of the enemy breaking through the lines and proceeding west—to keep in touch with them until opportunity offers for attack. They are not, however, to proceed west of the meridian of the Owers."

Addendum No. 1 to above, dated October 26th.

"The line to be held both day and night is one from S. Goodwin Light Vessel through A, B, and C positions to one mile beyond the latter, No. 1 day patrol will be one mile from the light vessel, No. 5 at the end of the line, the remainder equally spaced between, that is about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles apart.

"The destroyers on patrol must keep on the move and keep a sharp look out both day and night to prevent hostile submarines getting in to the Channel."

B 6.

APPENDIX B 6.

MEMORANDUM TO THE WORKING OF PATROL FLOTILLAS,

DATED NOVEMBER 7th 1914.¹

(To Cancel previous Arrangements).

1. The coast with its cyclists, signal stations, and watch is the line of observation and the only line of observation which can *certainly* report the arrival of an enemy.

2. The patrol flotillas, both of submarines and destroyers, instead of being frittered away on useless cordon and patrolling duties should be kept concentrated and ready for action at selected sally-ports along the coast, ready to proceed in force to any point where on sure information an enemy is attempting to land.

3. There is to be nothing like routine or sentry-go patrolling, except at the mouths of harbours, and from time to time occasional good bold reconnaissances 60, 70 and 80 miles out to seaward should be pushed from each sally-port by the whole of the boats available varied occasionally by the scouting of a single destroyer.

¹ M. 0081.

4. The prevention of minelaying can only be done by trawlers, who must summon help from the nearest patrol centre if necessary.

It must be recognised that nothing in our dispositions prevents an enemy from approaching the British coasts with transports and beginning a landing there, but that if the flotillas are properly handled he should be attacked within a few hours by submarines and destroyers, and that the numbers and strength of the forces against him should continually increase until long before any considerable force can be landed the enemy's transports and escort would be overwhelmed and those who are landed hopelessly cut off. The only alternative to this policy of letting the enemy begin to land and then attacking him while his landing is in progress, is the close blockade of the Heligoland Bight. There is much to be said for and against both courses; but the intermediate course of "distributing" a weak and thin cordon of patrols at a short distance from the coast in the hopes of putting up some defensive shield or screen is utterly futile.

The policy at present approved is to concentrate the flotillas at fixed points and keep them strong and fresh and fit for action, while relying upon the coast watch to give early and accurate information of any attack by the enemy.

5. A raid on a port, accompanied by landing of troops or solely for the destruction of vessels in port, may be expected at dawn in preference to other hours of the day or night. This also applies to disembarkation of troops on the coast.

6. Destroyers and submarines should be on the alert and prepared to move, as a matter of daily routine, an hour before daylight fully prepared for action.

7. Submarines in harbour must be ready to dive or to move quickly to a position where they can safeguard themselves from being put of action by gunfire while on the surface in the event of a port being suddenly rushed by enemy vessels. The enemy vessels must be attacked if possible.

APPENDIX B 7.

B 7.

LETTER FROM ADMIRAL OF PATROLS.¹

(New System of Patrol.)

SIR,

H.M.S. "Leander,"

November 8th, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to report that in accordance with Admiralty telegram No. 196 of November 7th, 1914, the 12 under-mentioned destroyers were despatched for duty at Scapa Flow next day:—

"Griffen."	"Dove."	"Thorn."	"Leopard."
"Bullfinch."	"Sylvia."	"Sprightly."	"Success."
"Orwell."	"Arab."	"Lively."	"Locust."

2. In obedience to Their Lordships' orders as conveyed in the same telegram I have cancelled the orders lately in force for the patrol work of the two flotillas under my command, and have issued fresh orders, of which a copy is herewith submitted for approval. The wording of the above-quoted telegram directs that I am to revert to the system laid down in the original war orders, keeping the vessels concentrated in divisions. The considerable reductions which have taken place in the original composition of the flotillas, however, renders it impossible to establish the former arrangements as they stood, and I have modified them accordingly. But in doing so the principle of concentration by divisions has been observed.

3. Allowing for 25 per cent. of the total number in each flotilla to be drawn under fires—which three months' war experience has shown to be the absolute minimum—there will be under the new dispositions eight vessels to watch the coast north of the Humber, eight in the Humber, and eight to watch the coast south of the Humber as far as Harwich.

I have withdrawn the local defence division from Harwich altogether as there are always first fleet destroyers in that port and the local division is more required elsewhere.

REVISED WAR ORDERS FOR DESTROYER PATROL FLOTILLAS ON THE EAST COAST, ISSUED BY ADMIRAL OF PATROLS.

MEMORANDUM.

H.M.S. "Leander," November 8th.

Orders having been received from the Admiralty to despatch 12 destroyers from the patrol flotillas to Scapa Flow and revert to the war policy of concentrating the remainder at important points, the following revised War Orders are issued for the guidance of the vessels left in the 7th and 9th Destroyer Flotillas. All previous dispositions are cancelled.

7th Flotilla.

The 7th Flotilla is to be organised in four divisions. Two divisions will be in the Humber, one with drawn fires inside Immingham Docks for the usual period of cleaning boilers and adjusting machinery, and the other in the river off Immingham with steam in readiness in the daytime and on Spurn Point patrol at night.

The other two divisions will be at Yarmouth with steam in readiness for immediate service by day or night. When the weather is fine or the wind off shore—that is to say, when the conditions are favourable for the disembarkation of a raid on the coast—the Yarmouth Divisions are to be in the Roads. When the conditions are otherwise they may be in Yarmouth Haven. All eight vessels are to keep steam in constant readiness in either case. When lying in the Roads cables should be ready for shipping in case of a sudden appearance of enemy's ships such as occurred on November 3rd.

All four divisions will work on a regular roster changing round stations in order that each may have a stand off at Immingham in turn.

¹ M. 03481/14.

9th Flotilla.

The 9th Flotilla is to be organised in four divisions. Two divisions will be in Tyne, one with fires drawn for the usual period of cleaning boilers and one with steam in constant readiness for immediate service and hawsers ready for shipping.

One division will patrol the coast in company in the daytime between Hartlepool and Flamboro' Head maintaining continual wireless touch with Tynemouth or the ships at Jarrow.

This division may anchor at night with lights out, but in a position at least 10 miles from where they were at sunset. They will be known as the Whitby Patrol. One division will lie in the Humber off Immingham by day and form part of the Humber Patrol at night. This division will be temporarily under the orders of the Captain D. 7th Flotilla while so employed as regards their movements and dispositions. All four divisions will work on a regular roster arranged by Captain D. 9th Flotilla, changing stations in turn in order that each may have a periodical stand off at Jarrow.

From henceforward the duty of the two Patrol Flotillas will be confined to acting as a guard against the landing of raiding forces of the enemy. Patrolling against minelayers convoy work and supervision of the fishing areas are not to be considered as part of their duties as the number of vessels now available does not permit of their being carried out without impairing the effectiveness of the coast protection which they might be able to afford.

B 8.

APPENDIX B 8.

LETTER FROM ADMIRAL OF PATROLS.¹

(Appreciation of Situation.)

H.M.S. "St. George,"
November 13th.

SIR,

As regards paragraph 2 of their Lordships' Memorandum as to the working of Patrol Flotillas, I respectfully submit that the frittering away of flotillas on useless patrol duties which is therein referred to was carried out as a direct result of orders received by me to maintain a coastwise channel for traffic clear of minelayers.

"With reference to paragraph 4, I submit that in the reduced state of the two patrol flotillas which are still under my command, an enemy cannot be 'overwhelmed before he has had time to land any considerable force,' if his escort consists of even three or four light cruisers. A period of six or eight hours may very possibly elapse in spite of the best arrangements before the defending force of one light cruiser and six or seven destroyers can be reinforced at the point of attack. A detailed statement of the composition of the two flotillas as they now stand can make this clearer."

[SUMMARY.—Only 22 old destroyers available, with heaviest gun 12-pdr. There are also 12 torpedo boats only really suitable for port defence duties.

Of these 34, one quarter must always have fires drawn for overhaul and from two to six are always away due to breakdowns or accidents. Therefore, at the most there are only from 18 to 24 boats available for the immediate defence of the 300 miles of coast line from Harwich to St. Abbs at any given moment.

It is proposed to dispose of these as follows: 8 in the Humber, 8 north of the Humber, 8 south of the Humber, 8 boiler cleaning.

There are also three light cruisers. One of these is always under drawn fires. One is in Tyne and one in Humber for immediate service.]

"It will thus be seen that if an enemy arrives off the Tyne or one of the undefended northern ports the utmost force which can attack him, exclusive of submarines, will be one light cruiser and six or seven destroyers or T.B.'s until about six or seven hours have elapsed, allowing time for the transmission of the news. If the Humber was not simultaneously threatened the local defence divisions could reach the point of attack after that period, and would represent the first reinforcement, consisting of one light cruiser and seven torpedo boats, arriving about an hour before dark, if the enemy had appeared off the port about an hour after daylight on a winter morning.

"The next reinforcement would come from Yarmouth and require about 10 hours to reach the spot. This would consist of another six or seven destroyers, and possibly the third light cruiser if she could close up machinery and raise steam in time. This reinforcement would not arrive till well after dark in winter. The final six or seven could arrive next day.

"It is evident that if the enemy's escort consists of no more than three or four light cruisers he will have little difficulty in dealing with such opposition as the Patrol Flotillas can offer to his landing. The first small detachment might arrive on the scene within an hour of his appearance, but would be easily driven off or sunk, and for at least six hours more his disembarkation would progress unopposed unless by submarines. Each reinforcement would probably meet the same fate in detail and not improbably find the enemy's troops already on shore."

[SUMMARY.—Same considerations apply to a raid on Norfolk or Suffolk coast.

Twelve submarines on coast, six in Humber, six between Tyne, Blyth, and Sunderland. These can only be considered as affording local defence as they are slow, and, if transports are beached, useless.]

"I submit, therefore, that there is no possibility of the patrol flotillas 'overwhelming' an enemy long before any considerable force could be landed" if his escort is even a single light cruiser squadron, and that with such an escort they cannot hope to overwhelm him at all in their present reduced state.

On the contrary, I am convinced that if a hostile raiding force left the Ems or Jahde in a few large fast transports escorted by four of the light cruisers now at Wilhelmshafen and steered for a point on the coast

not less than 50 miles from the Humber they would certainly succeed in landing, given suitable weather, unless they were intercepted on the passage. The patrol flotillas are too weak to interfere with effect and neither the submarines nor even the two battleships in the Humber could arrive in time to stop them.

I have assumed that no such interruption on the passage takes place because the Memorandum distinctly states that nothing in our dispositions prevents an enemy reaching the coasts and beginning to disembark.

In the conclusions drawn from the frequent controversies on the subject of invasion and raids which have occupied the attention of the Committee of Imperial Defence at intervals for the last 10 years it has always been assumed that the enemy would encounter his greatest dangers on the passage. If that is no longer to be considered the case, the patrols on the East Coast should, I submit, be at least doubled in all classes of vessels, and especially strengthened in light cruisers and the larger submarines.

[SUMMARY.—He considers it his duty as responsible officer to set forth these facts.]

"I am confident that the officers and men would do their best in all circumstances, but in the event of a raid escorted in even minor force, I have very little hope that they would succeed in defeating or even seriously delaying the enemy operations."

APPENDIX C.

C.

NAVIGATIONAL LIGHTS IN 1914.

1.—*Light Vessels.*—The following Light Vessels were in the positions given in August 1914, and are either not shown on the present charts (1919) or are in different positions:—

Name of Light Vessel.	Approximate Position.		Remarks.
	Latitude.	Longitude.	
Sandettie (French)	51° 14' N.	1° 54' E.	Extinguished Sept. 27 th , ^{REMOVED Oct. 20th}
Ruytingen (French)	51° 14' N.	2° 13' E.	Removed Oct. ^{do}
West Hinder (Belgian)	51° 22' N.	2° 27' E.	REMOVED Oct. 26 th
North Hinder (Dutch)	51° 35' N.	2° 38' E.	Moved to 51° 48' N., 2° 40' E. in Oct. 29 th
Galoper	51° 43' N.	1° 57' E.	Extinguished Oct. 27th.
Longsand	51° 48' N.	1° 40' E.	"
Outer Gabbard	52° 01' N.	2° 06' E.	Continued burning.
Shipwash	52° 02' N.	1° 42' E.	"
Corton	52° 31' N.	1° 49' E.	Extinguished Sept. 7th.
Cross Sand	52° 38' N.	1° 54' E.	"
Smith's Knoll	52° 43' N.	2° 17' E.	Removed Sept. 7th.
Dudgeon	53° 15' N.	0° 58' E.	"
Cromer Knoll	53° 16' N.	1° 19' E.	"
Inner Dowsing	53° 20' N.	0° 35' E.	Extinguished Sept. 7th.
Swarte Bank	53° 28' N.	2° 44' E.	Removed Sept. 7th.
Outer Dowsing	53° 34' N.	1° 00' E.	"

2. All lights on the East Coast of England and Scotland between Ness Head (near Wick) and Orford Ness were extinguished after September 7th, as described in the following telegram from the Admiralty to all ships dated September 6th:—

"To-morrow, Monday, and until further orders no lights on the coast and on light vessels on the East Coast of England and Scotland from Ness Head Light to Orford Ness inclusive will be lighted.

"The Shipwash, Outer Gabbard, and entrance to Thames lights will not be extinguished for the present. The Swarte Bank Light Vessel is being removed. Dudgeon and Cromer Knoll Light Vessels will be removed. Outer Dowsing and Smith's Knoll Light Vessels will be removed and replaced by pillar buoys."

3. The lights of the entrance to the Thames were dealt with on October 27th when certain traffic regulations came into force prohibiting navigation during dark hours and confining merchant shipping to specified channels. The following telegram was transmitted to all ships on this date:—

"All light ships, light buoys, and buoys are being removed from Thames approaches between the meridians of 1° 25' E. and 0° 50' E. and between parallels of 51° 49' N. and 51° 23' N. with the exception of the Tongue Light Vessel and those marking the Edinburgh Channels and Black Deep and Channel south of Knock John and Knob Buoys and the Oaze Deep.

"All light vessels west of 2° E. will not show their usual lights or riding lights at night between 7 p.m. and 6 a.m."

THE BATTLE OF HELIGOLAND BIGHT, 28th AUGUST 1914.

SOURCES.

(a) "HELIGOLAND BOX" IN HIST. SECN., C.I.D. X $\frac{3933}{1914}$.

CONTENTS.

1. Report of Capt. (D) 1, dated 30th August 1914.
2. Summary of information obtained from German wounded.
3. R.-A. *Invincible's* letter of proceedings, 30th August 1914.
Plan *Invincible's* course during action. M. 01695.
4. R.-A. *Euryalus* 6/022 of 1st September 1914. M. 01719.
5. Letter of Commodore (S) reference submarine work, including reports of
D 2, D 8, E 4, E 5, E 6 (with plan), *E 7, E 8, E 9*.
6. Report of Comm. (T) *Arethusa*, 30th August 1914.
7. " " V.-A., 1st B.C.S. *Lion*, 1st September 1914. M. 02014.
8. Verbal account given by Lieut.-Cdr. Lechler of German *T.B. 187*.
9. Track chart of ships by R.-A. Christian.
10. *Lance's* track chart.
11. Allegations *re* firing on Germans in the water.
12. Services of submarines since 4th August.
13. Information obtained from a German officer, 30th November 1914.
14. Despatches of Comm. (T.), Capt. (D), and destroyers of 1st and 3rd flotillas.
Bound in volume X. 3933/1914.

(b) PAPERS IN HIST. SECN., C.I.D., "ACTION OF HELIGOLAND BIGHT," 28TH AUGUST 1914." (No number.)

This box is supplementary to the "Heligoland Box," and chiefly contains translated, extracted, or copied information.

1. Summary of evidence used in constructing charts. (This has been compiled in the H.S./C.I.D. mainly from signal, W/T, and deck logs of ships engaged, but times have been adjusted from the original.)
2. C-in-C., H.F., remarks on the action of 28th August 1914. 67 H.F. 0022 of 31st August 1914.
3. Preliminary report by Comm. (S), 29th August 1914.
Operations Orders, Comm. (S)'s Orders 007 of 26th August 1914.
4. Comm. (S.)'s report of submarine reconnaissance, 16th-23rd August.
(This includes suggestions for a sweep.)
5. Operations Orders. M. 0073/14.
6. Plan of *Arethusa's* movements made by Lieut. (N.).
7. Remarks on gunnery by Capt. Chatfield. M 01773/14.
8. Plans of certain destroyers and submarines.
Typed copies of destroyers' despatches, chronological abstract of events, précis narrative, &c., by C.I.D.

(c) TELEGRAMS (*see* HIST. SECN. C.I.D.).

- (1) H.S. 57. HOME WATERS, GENERAL OPERATIONS, 24TH-27TH AUGUST.
- (2) H.S. 58. " " " " 28TH-31ST AUGUST.

These volumes contain the full text of the telegrams bearing on the operations.

(d) LOG OF WAR ROOM OPERATIONS DIVN., SECTION "A," 25TH AUGUST-6TH SEPTEMBER 1914.

Contains a few telegrams supplementary to Operation Orders.

(e) GERMAN OFFICIAL HISTORY ("DER KRIEG ZUR SEE," 1914-1918, "DER KRIEG IN DER NORDSEE, VOL. I., BERLIN, 1920.")

NOTES ON SOURCES.

1. *Despatches and reports* were written largely from signal logs and general memory and are not always accurate as regards times or details.

2. *The following are considered the most important records* :—

Lt. (N.) *Arethusa's* plan. (Up to 1040.)

Lark's plan.

Lookout's despatch.

Lizard's " "

Laertes' " "

Goshawk's signal log.

Fearless' " "

Lark's " "

Lookout's " "

V.-A., 1st B.C.S. despatch.

Comm. (S.) " "

1st B.C.S. Signal logs.

1st L.C.S. " "

Arethusa's despatch and signal log.

Fearless' " " "

3. *Ship's D.R. positions* cannot be relied upon.

4. *German Official History*.—This work is designed to comprise the following series—the North Sea, the Baltic, Turkish Operations, the Cruiser War, the U. Boats Campaign. Volume 1 of the War in the North Sea appeared in July 1920, and covers the first month of the war. It emanates from the Marine Archives, and is issued by Vice-Admiral E. v. Mantey, Superintendent of Archives, compiled by Korvetten Kapitän O. Groos. Its narrative is clear and the work appears to be accurate and is written in a moderate tone. The charts and plans are drawn somewhat approximately and the movements of British Ships seem to be plotted largely from conjecture. The principal discrepancies are in the *Arethusa* and *Frauenlob* action which in the G.O.H. runs east and west and not north and south. The *Frauenlob* evidently came up from the south of Heligoland. The action attributed in the C.I.D. history¹ to the *Stralsund* was with the *Strassburg*. In the *Mainz's* action the 1st L.C.S. and *Fearless* are credited with damaging her and disabling the rudder before she met the *Arethusa*.

There is a valuable appendix (Appendix 21) of the wireless signals on August 28th. This has been reproduced (*see* Appendix "B").

NOTE.—All times in the German Official History and German Wireless Signals have been converted into G.M.T. (that is one hour earlier).

Abbreviations—(S) = Signal Log; (R) = Report or Despatch; (L) = Ship's Log;
(W) = Wireless Log.

¹ Corbett: *Naval Operations* i, 110.

HELIGOLAND BIGHT—THE ACTION OF AUGUST 28th, 1914.

CHAPTER I.

THE SITUATION AND ORIGINAL PLAN.

1. During the early days of the war the German High Sea Fleet was known to be lying in its North Sea harbours, but none of its heavy ships had been met at sea. Its menace had hung darkly over the despatch of the expeditionary force, but in spite of the far-reaching results it might have achieved from a sudden and heavy blow aimed at the Channel Passage, it did not stir.

Our own strategical dispositions were based on a policy of "containing" the German Fleet in Heligoland Bight. In the north was the Grand Fleet, including 29 battleships, 4 battle cruisers, 8 armoured cruisers and 6 light cruisers. In the Channel was the Channel Fleet of older battleships; Dover Straits was patrolled by the 6th Flotilla supported by submarines, while the Narrows were watched by the 1st and 3rd Flotillas at Harwich and the 8th Submarine Flotilla with Cruiser Force "C" in support.¹

2. August 16th, the Grand Fleet, led by its battle cruisers and light cruisers, had pushed to within some 40 miles of Heligoland, whilst Cruiser Force C and the Harwich flotillas swept up from Terschelling Light,² but the sweep had been barren of results, and not a single enemy ship had been seen. It was considered at the time that the passage of the Expeditionary Force would offer a tempting objective to the German Cruiser Forces and a sudden raid by them was confidently expected, but by the 21st August the main body of our troops had moved across without incident or mishap, and the tension of the first few weeks began to relax.

On the East Coast however, the appearance of one or two cruisers had aroused considerable apprehension, and on August 21st the *Invincible* and *New Zealand* were formed into a squadron designated Cruiser Force K, and were stationed in the Humber to support Cruiser Force C and the Harwich flotillas and to render "strong offensive operations possible."³

3. **Proposals for a Sweep.**—As days passed and the German battle fleet still showed little signs of activity, the prospect of another sweep suggested itself to the senior officers in the North Sea, and proposals were submitted independently by the C.-in-C., Rear-Admiral Christian, and Commodore (S). Their substance was briefly as follows:—The C.-in-C., Grand Fleet, on August 18th proposed "a sweep in force at dawn on August 24th, to within 30 miles of Heligoland, the flotillas leading, covered by "cruisers with the battle fleet supporting, and submarines keeping east of longitude 7° 40' E. and south of 54° N."⁴

The Admiralty, however, were evidently not inclined to use the Grand Fleet for this purpose at the moment, and replied on August 20th that no sweeping movements would be carried out at present. Rear-Admiral Christian proposed

¹ According to Admiralty Signal of 18th August, 1914, Rear-Admiral Christian was in command of Harwich Flotillas and Oversea submarines. See *Passage of British Expeditionary Force*, Appendix A., 135, 158, 159.

² H.F. 0022 of 13th August 1914, in Grand Fleet Narrative.

³ M. 0072 of 21st August to Rear-Admiral, *Invincible*.

⁴ C.-in-C. to Admiralty; plan was sent up on August 18th, evidently 26/H.F./0022. See *Passage of British Expeditionary Force*, Appendix A. 163, 174.

apparently about the same time¹ a sweep to the eastward commencing on a line from Terschelling. The Harwich flotillas were to lead in and be supported by the armoured cruisers of Cruiser Force C with submarines stationed off the Ems. The sweep was to commence at 1800 from a position in latitude 53° 45' N., longitude 5° E. The destroyers were to proceed towards Heligoland, endeavouring to inflict the utmost damage possible on any detached bodies of small craft or minelayers, but were not to seek or accept action with distinctly superior forces. Commodore (S)'s proposals were put forward in conjunction with a written report on the reconnaissance work carried out by his submarines in the Bight from August 16th to 23rd, 1914,² which indicated that during the day a large number of destroyers were usually patrolling north and south of Heligoland at a speed which did not permit of submarine attack. The destroyers for night work apparently went out about 4 p.m. or 6 p.m., being escorted by light cruisers, and then, spreading out like a fan, proceeded to sea at good speed, returning at daylight. The majority of destroyers had been seen round about a position some 40 miles N.N.W. (true)³, and Commodore (S) therefore suggested a sweep from east to west to cut off these patrols. He did not enter into details, but the essence of his plan was to surprise and cut off the enemy by a flank and rear attack, and it differed therefore from those of the C.-in-C. and Rear-Admiral Christian's, which were essentially of the nature of drives or frontal attacks. The plan actually adopted embodied this conception of a sweep from east to west, and was evidently based on the suggestions of Commodore (S).

These operations were apparently conceived independently of those on the Belgian Coast, for the orders were issued on August 25th, and must have been in draft on the 24th at least, before the question of Ostend became acute.⁴

An Admiralty telegram of August 26th informed the C.-in-C. that it had been decided to occupy Ostend, and also that a destroyer sweep was "in orders for Friday," but there was no definite indication that the two operations were associated in any way, and the C.-in-C. in his telegram proposing co-operation made no reference to Ostend. In fact, there seems to have been an impression that the Ostend operations would interfere with the sweep, for the Admiralty telegraphed on August 26th at 1130 to R.-A., *Euryalus*, to say "that the destroyer sweep ordered will be carried out as arranged."

It may therefore be accepted that though the two were coincident, they were independently conceived and were independently executed.

4. **Original Plan of Operations.**—According to the original plan⁵ of the operations, the force was to consist of the *Arethusa*, *Fearless*, and two flotillas of 36 boats in all, with the *Invincible* and *New Zealand* in support, and in reserve Cruiser Force C, the *Euryalus*, *Sapphire*, and *Amethyst*.

The destroyers were to be in a position latitude 55° 20' N., longitude 6° 45' E. (Position II.), about 30 miles from Horn's Reef, at 4 a.m. on the 28th, thence to sweep down towards Heligoland on a course S. 8 E. (magnetic), so as to arrive at latitude 54° 5' N., longitude 7° 33' E. (Position III.), at 8 a.m. on the 28th. There they were to turn to W. ¼ S. (magnetic), and on a 9-mile front sweep towards Terschelling steering W. ¼ S. at 20 knots, so as to cut off any craft patrolling to the west of Heligoland.

Supporting the destroyer flotillas, which had only the two flotilla cruisers with them, were to be two battle cruisers, the *New Zealand* and *Invincible*, constituting Cruiser Force K., from the Humber, who were to be given four destroyers⁶ by Commodore (T.) for screening purposes.

This supporting force was to be in latitude 55° 10' N., longitude 6° E. at 5 a.m., was then to turn to south (magnetic) and proceed to a position latitude 54° 30' N., longitude 6° 20' E. by 0830, which was approximately 60 miles N.W. of Heligoland, and 50 miles from the position where the flotillas were to turn to W. ¼ S. at 0800.

¹ Draft Orders, marked, in pencil, August 1914, "Admiral Christian's Raid."

² Commodore (S) to Chief of War Staff, 23rd August 1914.

³ Apparently from Heligoland.

⁴ The position at Ostend became acute on August 25th, and the orders for a field force of marines to embark went out at

6.45 p.m. There is no mention or reference to the sweep in any of the orders concerning Ostend; nor is there any mention of Ostend in the orders for the sweep.

⁵ Operations in Heligoland Bight, M. 0073/14. See Plan I.

⁶ *Badger*, *Beaver*, *Jackal*, and *Sandfly*, were despatched by Commodore (T.).

Cruiser Force C, with the *Euryalus* and *Amethyst*, was to form a reserve force, and to be off Terschelling¹ Light-vessel at 5 a.m., and to patrol to the N.W. in line abreast. The original orders included directions for a seaplane carrier—the *Engadine*—to be ready with seaplanes, two fitted with bombs and one with a torpedo, to leave the Nore at 9.30 a.m. on Thursday 27th, and proceeding at about 13½ knots escorted by the *Sapphire*, to be in a position latitude 53° 35' N., longitude 5° 30' E. (about 40 miles true west of Borkum), by 2.30 a.m. on the 28th. The seaplanes were to proceed to the Western Ems to attack a cruiser lying 4 miles N.W. of Rottum² Lighthouse.

The *Sapphire* and *Engadine* were then to prepare for the return of the seaplanes, and as soon as the latter had been re-embarked, were to retire behind Cruiser Force C.³

The orders included general instructions for the disposition of submarines. They were to be in position by 4 a.m. on the 28th, three inshore by Heligoland to the eastward of the destroyer course, one to be off the Western Ems, and three in positions to be arranged by Commodore (S) in longitude 6° 48' E.

Commodore (S) on August 26th issued further orders for the submarines to take up the following positions, and added another submarine off the Eastern Ems:—

Inner Line *E 4*, 10' S.S.W. of Heligoland. Outer line *E 6*, latitude 54°, longitude 6° 48' E.

E 5, 10' north „ „ *E 7*, latitude 54° 12' N., longitude 6° 48' E.

E 9, 25' „ „ „ *E 8*, latitude 54° 24' N., longitude 6° 48' E.

D 2, 7 miles north of Western Ems.

D 8, 7 miles north of Eastern Ems.

There were therefore to be two lines of submarines, an inner line north and south of Heligoland, and an outer about 40 miles west of the Island.

The object of the inner line was to attack any enemy cruisers that might come out to drive off the destroyers, and they were therefore to remain unseen till the destroyers turned to the westward. The object of the outer line was to draw enemy's destroyers away from Heligoland and the submarines in it were therefore to cruise on the surface, bearing in mind that the flotilla would probably pass over them when course was altered to the westward.

The submarines off the Ems were to attack any enemy entering or leaving the river. The *Lurcher* and *Firedrake* were to steer a course to keep well clear of the destroyer flotilla, and at least 20 miles southward of the battle cruisers, and during the southerly course of the latter, between 0500 and 0830, would keep a good look-out for enemy submarines and give warning of any to the battle cruisers.⁴

It is noticeable that the original orders did not specifically place the operation under the direction of a single commander, and it was apparently understood that within the limits prescribed each would play a more or less independent part.

There is little doubt that both Commodore (S) and the Admiralty regarded the former's rôle as an independent one, and though Commodore (T) and Commodore (S) were nominally under Rear-Admiral Christian, and both sent in their reports to him, the relationship seems to have been a somewhat loose one.⁵

¹ Then in its old position (latitude 53° 27' N., longitude 4° 52' E.)

² A small island at the entrance to the Western Ems opposite Borkum.

³ The air operations were cancelled, as doubts arose as to the nationality of the steamer to be attacked.

⁴ Memorandum 007, Commodore (S), Harwich, August 26th, 1914.

⁵ On August 14th, V.-A., Channel Fleet, was informed that Rear-Admiral Christian had been given command of a "combined force"

consisting of Cruiser Force C, Commodore (T) and Commodore (S). Admiralty telegram of August 15th, 0005, however, only stated that the two latter "will come under his command temporarily." The command never received an official designation, and although Corbett refers to it as the "Southern Force," this was not its official title, and it is very rarely referred to in this way. The Chief of the War Staff occasionally used the term "combined force."

CHAPTER II.

ALTERATIONS TO PLANS.

5. On August 26th the C.-in-C. was told that it had been decided to occupy Ostend in order to relieve pressure on the left wing of the Allied army "which might cause some movement of the High Sea Fleet," and the same message informed him that a destroyer sweep of the 1st and 3rd Flotillas with submarines was "in orders for Friday" from east to west, commencing between Horn Reef and Heligoland, with battle cruisers in support.

This message went out at 1305, and the C.-in-C. replied at once¹ with a proposal to co-operate in the sweep by moving the Grand Fleet cruisers and destroyers to a suitable supporting position with the battle fleet in the neighbourhood, and in the meantime, steam was ordered for the 1st B.C.S., 1st L.C.S., 2nd and 4th Flotillas for 5 a.m.²

The Admiralty seem to have been preoccupied at the time with the prospect of the Germans gaining Calais and Dunkirk and the changes of disposition which this would necessarily require,³ and possibly they did not wish to see the Grand Fleet involved in operations in the Bight. In any case they replied that the co-operation of the battle fleet was not required, but that the battle cruisers could be sent in support, and gave the rendezvous allotted to the Humber battle cruiser force.

The C.-in-C.'s action was fully justified by subsequent events, but the signal made about midnight on August 26th–27th necessitated important amendments to the operation orders at the last moment with the possibility that these might never reach the commands involved. This is precisely what happened. Commodore (T) and Commodore (S) did not receive the signals containing these amendments, and the latter never heard of them, which naturally led to considerable misunderstanding and confusion fortunately unattended by any serious consequences.

6. **Information as to the Operations.**—The First Battle Cruiser Squadron was then at Scapa, and apparently the operation orders were not telegraphed in full to the C.-in-C. or to Sir David Beatty. The C.-in-C., however, apparently saw the Vice-Admiral on the evening of the 26th⁴ and gave him the general outline of the operations, so far, at least, as he knew them.

Admiral Beatty when he sailed at 0520 on the 27th, had therefore a rough idea of the plan proposed and a knowledge of the rendezvous of the Humber Cruiser Force⁵ contained in the Admiralty telegram of approval which arrived at Scapa in the early hours of the 27th, but he was still very much in the dark as to what the submarines were to do, and as to the precise part to be played by the *Euryalus* and Cruiser Force C. At 8 a.m. he had told his squadron all he knew himself, namely, that they were to rendezvous with the *Invincible* and *New Zealand* in latitude 55° 10' N., longitude 6° E., at 5 a.m., to support destroyers and submarines, and he concluded by saying that he knew very little but hoped "to learn more as they went along."

Nearly 12 hours passed and about midday of the 27th an important series of orders was despatched from the Admiralty. Rear-Admiral, *Euryalus*, and Rear-Admiral, *Invincible*, were first of all informed at 1105 of what Commodore (S) intended to do, namely, to scout with the *Lurcher* and *Firedrake* for submarines towards the enemy coast, and to keep a good look-out south and south-east for enemy submarines. At 1230 the Vice-Admiral, 1st B.C.S., was told that the light cruisers were to support and follow the destroyers and to keep to the northward of the destroyer sweep. The same signal gave him the rendezvous and movements proposed for the Harwich Flotilla and told him to report his proposed methods of support.

About half an hour later a message of first rate importance was despatched to Rear-Admiral, *Euryalus*, Commodore (T) and Commodore (S) stating that Beatty with

¹ 26th August, 1635. Appendix A 2.

² *Queen Mary* (S), 1945.

³ "You should address your mind to a naval situation, which may arise when Germans control Calais and French coasts, and what ought to be the position of the Grand Fleet in that event." August 24th, 1914. Telegram to C.-in-C.

⁴ *Lion* (S).

⁵ *Lion* to B.S.C., signals, 27th August, 0640, 0840; also *Lion* to R.-A., *Invincible*, August 0425 *et seq.* The C.-in-C. evidently had a fair idea of the sweep. App. A 9-17.

three battle cruisers and six light cruisers was on his way to support the two battle cruisers and was steering for the *Invincible's* 5 a.m. position. The light cruisers were steering for the destroyers' 4 a.m. position, and would keep to the northward of the destroyers, supporting them during the sweep. The *Euryalus* and *Invincible* received the signal; Commodore (T) and Commodore (S) did not.¹ The former had left Harwich at 5 a.m. that morning (the 27th); the latter at 10.30 p.m. the night before (the 26th). The messages lay at Harwich till they came back, and neither the *Euryalus* nor *Invincible* seems to have repeated them or asked the Commodores whether they had received them. Commodore (T) fell in with Goodenough at the rendezvous the next morning and received a brief account of the later arrangements, but Commodore (S) remained unaware of Beatty's and Goodenough's co-operation till after the commencement of operations, and accordingly never informed his submarines.

At 1754 Beatty informed the Admiralty of his proposed dispositions for the light cruisers.²

These were very simple. At 0500 they would be 10 miles N. 8° W. of the destroyers, steering S. 8° E. until 0800, when they would turn W. ¼ S. until noon, when they would retire north on the 1st B.C.S. The battle cruisers from the 5 a.m. rendezvous would conform to the movements of the flotilla, keeping north-west of them. Their position at 0800 would be latitude 54° 19' N., longitude 6° 34' E. They would then steer W. ¼ S. until noon.

A couple of hours later, at 1830, Beatty issued a final signal to the 1st B.C.S. and 1st L.C.S. This gave the destroyers' rendezvous and ordered the 1st L.C.S. to support them, the eastern pair to be 10 miles N. 8. W. of the destroyers 5 a.m. position at 0500. The light cruisers were to alter course to W. ¼ S. at 8 a.m. and to preserve their position in support to the northward until noon or till the signal to retire was made.

Beatty was still in the dark as to the movements of the submarines, but received information as to their general position from Rear-Admiral Moore when they met early in the morning, and also a message that the Admiralty had signalled the evening before (August 27th), "Commodore (S) reports enemy submarines and warns battle cruisers of the area in which they were seen."³ It may be accepted then that when the operations commenced, Rear-Admiral Moore and Rear-Admiral Christian were conversant with the proposed dispositions; Commodore Tyrwhitt knew that Beatty and Goodenough were behind him, but was probably rather vague as to the intended movements of the former, while Commodore (S) and his submarines were still quite unaware of the arrival of Beatty and Goodenough on the scene.

In these circumstances there was a possibility of the submarines making a determined attack on the 1st L.C.S. and 1st B.C.S., but, in actual practice, the simplicity and brevity of the instructions and signals issued by the Admiralty and the various senior officers tended to make the situation clear, and the quickness and commonsense of the Submarine Commanders compensated for the poor visibility and their imperfect knowledge of the forces present.

After these alterations to the original plan the forces⁴ employed in the operations consisted of:

Supporting Force :—

(a) Grand Fleet Detachment—

First Battle Cruiser Squadron (Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty), *Lion*, *Queen Mary*, *Princess Royal*.

First Light Cruiser Squadron (Commodore Goodenough), *Southampton*, *Birmingham*, *Nottingham*, *Lowestoft*, *Falmouth*, *Liverpool*.

(b) Cruiser Force K. (Rear-Admiral A. G. Moore), *Invincible*, *New Zealand*, and four destroyers.

In Reserve :—


(c) Cruiser Force C. (Rear-Admiral Christian), *Euryalus*, *Aboukir*, *Bacchante*, *Cressy*, *Hogue*.

¹ The signal was sent to Rear-Admiral Moore by wireless direct at 1205 and repeated at 1310 with a slightly different wording to Rear-Admiral, *Euryalus*, Commodore (T) and Commodore (S). App. A 12, 13A.

² Admiralty, 27th August 1914, 1754.

³ A 21b, *Lion* (S): This signal evidently refers to A 11.

⁴ For complete list, see Appendix C.



¹ Tyrwhitt says in his report, "a disaster was narrowly averted." Tyrwhitt's report, 30th August 1914, X 3933/14.

² *Southampton* (S).


³ *Aboukir*, *Cressy*, *Bacchante*, *Hogue*.

⁴ Courses 0725, S. 63 E.; 1300, S. 32 E.; 1700, S. 31 E.; speeds 0725, 17½ knots; 1955, 16 knots.

PLAN OF OPERATIONS (M0073/14) AND GERMAN PATROLS.

Aug. 28th. 1914.

PLAN 1.



NOTE.
Grand Fleet battle fleet was at sea off the Orkneys, but was not in immediate support.

Night of 27/28 August

I & III Flotillas
Pos. I.
1900 on 27th Aug.

B.C.S. Position A. 55° 10' N., 6° 0' E.
" B. 54° 30' N., 6° 20' E.
Flotillas Position I 54° 0' N., 4° 0' E.
" II 55° 20' N., 6° 45' E.
" III 54° 5' N., 7° 33' E.

Cruiser Force C.
Euryalus, Amethyst
0500

Heligoland, Kolberg in mouth of Jade.
Seydlitz, Moltke, Von der Tann at Wilhelmshaven
also Strassburg, Stralsund, Rostock, Hamburg (dock),
Köln (coaling) Blücher.
Fleet Flagship, 6 ships of I Squadron, 2 of II, 4 of III
Danzig, München in the Elbe.
Hela, 10 miles east of position shown on chart.

Sweeping Forces :—

- (d) *Arethusa*, Commodore Tyrwhitt.
Fearless, Captain Blunt.
 III. Flotilla 16 "L" Boats.
 I Flotilla 15 *Acheron* class boats.
- (e) *Submarines*.
 By Heligoland—E 4, E 5, and E 9.
 Outer Line—E 6, E 7 & E 8.
 Off the Ems—D 2, D 8.
- (f) *Submarine Tenders* :—
Lurcher, Commodore Keyes, Commodore (S).
Firedrake.

7. Movement to Initial Positions.—On August 26th the submarine flotilla began to move, and by August 27th all forces were on the way to their appointed positions. The *Arethusa* had only hoisted Commodore Tyrwhitt's broad pendant in the forenoon of August 26th, and on the 27th, at 0500, before the pendant had been 24 hours at her masthead, she sailed with the 1st and 3rd Flotillas, picked up the *Fearless*, which had left Sheerness at 0633, at 1400, and passing through the first position, latitude 54° N., longitude 4° E., shaped course for the 0400 second position in latitude 55° 20' N., longitude 6° 45' E.

At 0345 on the 28th, as day was breaking, three grey hulls were seen indistinctly on the port bow, and were at first thought to be the enemy.¹ But the challenge was made and answered; the cruisers turned out to be Goodenough's squadron, and there was a brief interchange of signals. Tyrwhitt asked, "Are you taking part in the operations?" and Goodenough answered, "Yes, I know your courses and will support you. Beatty is behind us."²

Tyrwhitt now knew that Beatty and Goodenough were supporting the flotillas, and shortly afterwards turned S. 8 E. on the initial course.

Commodore (S) and the Submarines.—Commodore (S) was away to the southward. The *Firedrake* had left Harwich with *E 4*, *E 5*, and *E 9* (the inner and eastward line of submarines) at 2230 on August 26th, followed two hours later by the *Lurcher*, escorting *E 6*, *E 7*, *E 8* (the westward or outward line). On arriving in the Bight, the submarines went on to take up their stations, and the *Lurcher* and *Firedrake* cruised during the night of the 27th–28th to the southward of the positions allotted to the battle cruisers and waited for the morning.

Rear-Admiral Christian's Force, consisting of the *Euryalus*, Cruiser Force C,³ and *Amethyst*, left the Nore at noon on the 27th, and, after an uneventful voyage, arrived off Terschelling at about 5 a.m. on the 28th.

Vice-Admiral Beatty's Force.—The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron left Scapa at 0520, and proceeding at 17½ knots⁴ for most of the time, met the *Invincible* and *New Zealand* at 0415 and arrived at the prearranged position, latitude 55° 10' N., longitude 6° E., at 0500.

The Light Cruiser Squadron left Scapa with them and apparently drew off to the eastward about 2000, steering for the position where they were to meet Tyrwhitt and the Harwich Flotilla. They had come down spread 2 miles apart, but at nightfall formed three divisions in line ahead disposed abeam, columns 2 miles apart.

Nothing had disturbed the journey. The 10th Cruiser Squadron had been passed soon after leaving Scapa, and the 3rd Battle Squadron had been sighted early in the afternoon.

Rear-Admiral Moore's Force.—The *Invincible* and *New Zealand* left Grimsby at 1030, and proceeding quietly at 15 knots, sighted the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron at 0415 on the 28th, and took station on the *Lion's* starboard beam. Orders had been issued that no wireless signals were to be made except to report the enemy or on matters of the utmost importance, and the night had passed uneventfully.

Situation at 0500.—By 0500 on the 28th the forces taking part in the operation were in their initial positions. Commodore (T) with the 3rd Flotilla had reached the second position (latitude 55° 20' N., longitude 6° 45' E.) at 0400, and was now pro-

¹ The signal was sent to Rear-Admiral Moore by wireless direct at 1205 and repeated at 1310 with a slightly different wording to Rear-Admiral, *Euryalus*, Commodore (T) and Commodore (S). App. A 12, 13A.

² Admiralty, 27th August 1914, 1754.

³ A 21b, *Lion* (S): This signal evidently refers to A 11.

⁴ For complete list, see Appendix C.


¹ Tyrwhitt says in his report, "a disaster was narrowly averted." Tyrwhitt's report, 30th August 1914, X 3933/14.

² *Southampton* (S).

³ *Aboukir*, *Cressy*, *Bacchante*, *Hogue*.

⁴ Courses 0725, S. 63 E.; 1300, S. 32 E.; 1700, S. 31 E.; speeds 0725, 17½ knots; 1955, 16 knots.

ceeding S. 8 E. at 20 knots, with the III. Flotilla in divisions disposed abeam on each side, and the *Fearless* and I. Flotilla 2 miles astern. The 1st L. C. S. was 8 miles astern of the *Fearless*, the Battle Cruiser Squadron some 30 miles to the westward.



CHAPTER III.

GERMAN STRATEGICAL POLICY AND DISPOSITIONS IN THE BIGHT.

8. **German Policy.**—The Germans from the first adopted a policy of the defensive, and the German view of the general naval situation may be briefly summarised as follows¹:—The British fleet by concentrating at the outlets of the North Sea had performed its task, for this concentration covered the great lines of maritime trade, cut off Germany from the ocean, secured the British Isles against invasion, and simultaneously covered the passage of the army to the continent. England's geographical position alone constituted a blockade of Germany, and the Grand Fleet in taking up its position secured its principal objective. The only other objective left to the British fleet was the annihilation of the German fleet which would only be necessary in the event of the latter menacing the objects which it was their business to defend. Under the recognised conditions of inferiority in the two most important aspects of strategical policy—material strength and geographical position—the German navy was forced to adopt a defensive attitude. Its policy became one of attrition; it hoped by energetic operations against the blockade gradually to wear down the blockading forces, and by ruthless minelaying and a U-boat offensive, to reduce the British superiority to a reasonable level. Then as reserves of personnel and material became available, and when the ships under construction had joined the fleet, a decisive battle could be dared. A preliminary defensive policy accompanied by a strategy of attrition with hopes of a decisive action in the future, were therefore basic conceptions of the German naval policy. The statesmen went even further.² They were thinking of peace preliminaries and wished to shield the fleet from harm in order to retain a powerful instrument of negotiation in their hands, a conception based on the idea of a rapid military decision on the continent. They expected a day of victory close at hand; they could not see the real day waiting for them in the misty reaches of the Forth. The Admiral Staff adopted the idea of a defensive policy with the reservation that every favourable opportunity was to be taken of striking at the enemy. It recognised that a great distinction lay between England's defensive and their own. England only had to maintain her situation in order to keep control of the waterways of the world. Germany must go out and wrestle for that control, and her struggle for it would involve a far greater amount of offensive effort.

9. **War Orders for North Sea Forces.**—The operations orders for the North Sea area were based on this policy, and were as follows:—

His Majesty the Kaiser issues the following orders for the conduct of war in the North Sea:—

- (1) The object of operations is to injure the British Fleet by offensive attacks against the forces watching or blockading the German Bight as well as by ruthless mining, and, where possible, a U boat offensive directed against the British coast.

¹ G.O.H. i, 44.

² *Idem*, 53.

- (2) When by this form of warfare a balance of strength has been attained, after preparing and concentrating all our forces we must seek to bring on a battle under favourable conditions. If a favourable opportunity offers itself earlier, it must be used.
- (3) War on commerce is to be conducted according to prize orders. To what extent it is to be waged in home waters will be regulated by the Chief of the High Sea Forces. The ships intended for war on commerce abroad are to be despatched as soon as possible.¹

These orders were based on the assumption of a watch or blockade of the Bight. Practically nothing was known of the British plans, but their probable policy was classified under two heads—a close blockade and a distant blockade. This classification was based chiefly on the reports of manœuvres, and on the measures taken in the crisis in 1911. In the event of a close blockade, the Germans expected the inner blockade positions to run from Amrum to Spiekeroog, held by day by light cruisers, submarines, and destroyers, with battle cruisers, based on the Thames and Humber, in main scouting positions some 50 miles by day and 70 by night from Heligoland. These, it was supposed, would be supported by detached battle squadrons lying some 120 to 160 miles from Heligoland.² A German Staff memorandum³ drawn up about 1913 gives the policy which it was thought England would adopt.

In the event of a distant blockade, the German Staff expected German waters to be watched by submarines, and submarine minelaying and destroyer attacks to be directed against the fleet; the North Sea exits and the Skagerack to be watched by British cruisers, and endeavour to be made to entice the main German fleet into distant encounters and cut them off. In the British manœuvres of 1912 and 1913 the blockade line had run from Flamborough Head to Skudesnaes or Hantsholm, but it was considered that a more northerly and shorter line would be taken up, either from Ratray Head to Obrestad, 240 miles long, or from Out Skerries in the Shetlands to Helliso, 165 miles long. Of these, the more northerly, with bases at Scapa and Lerwick, was considered the more probable. A close blockade meant a strategical offensive on England's part; a distant blockade—a strategical defensive. In spite, however, of the latter being regarded as more probable in the staff memorandum mentioned above, the Germans could not bring themselves to believe in the assumption of a defensive attitude by the British Fleet. Just as the English mind was obsessed by the thought of invasion, so the German mind was obsessed with the idea of an advance of the English Fleet into the Bight, which would open the way to a German policy of attrition.

The whole training, tactics and construction of the German Fleet were based on the idea of a decisive action in the Bight, which rested on the assumption that the English Fleet would establish a close blockade to cut Germany off from the sea and force her fleet to come out and fight.⁴

The idea of a blockade of the North Sea instead of one of the Bight had been mooted by contemporary naval writers, but was met by the answer that neutrals, and especially the U.S.A., would not tolerate such a blockade and that England would discover that without a close blockade of the North Sea coasts they would neither be able to hamper the activities of the German Fleet, especially of its minelayers, nor attain their object of cutting off German imports. In pursuance of this idea, Vice-Admiral Scheer in his spring manœuvres report of 1914 expressed the opinion that English prestige would not permit her to renounce the policy of a blockade and close observation of the German Bight. The patrol of the Bight was therefore closely associated with a fundamental aspect of German naval policy, and was consequently a service to which they would naturally devote a large amount of attention.

10. **Patrol of the Bight.**⁵—On 1st August, 1914, Vice-Admiral Hipper, flying his flag in the *Seydlitz*, assumed command of the Bight Patrol and issued the following orders for its execution:—

- (a) From dawn to dark, a U-boat patrol on the line Wangeroog—Heligoland—Amrum. At night the U-boats to lie in Heligoland Harbour.

¹ *Idem* 54. The fear of inducing a crisis prevented their being armed and despatched before the outbreak of war.

² *Idem*, 57.

³ Groos quotes this at length, p. 58 *et seq.*

⁴ Admiral v. Ingenohl, quoted in G.S.H., 62.

⁵ German Official History, i, 30.

- (b) The 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla to be relieved at 8 p.m. by the 4th, to cruise to and fro on a look-out line, Spiekeroog—Heligoland—Schmal Deep.
- (c) Three light cruisers, the *Stralsund*, *Mainz*, *Kolberg*, to push out in the forenoon on the radii of a circle 50 miles from Heligoland.
- (d) Battle cruisers in the Bight.¹

From August 3rd, a look-out service (*Vorpostendienst*) of capital ships was arranged, consisting of one ship of the 1st and 3rd Squadron, or a battle cruiser, ready for action at anchor in Schillig Roads, but this service was intended merely for the defence of the Jade against torpedo attacks, and not for the support of the patrols at sea.

11. On August 1st, the C-in-C. arrived at Wilhelmshaven, and, as a result of a conference held on board the *Friedrich der Grosse*, issued the following instructions for the patrol of the Bight. The S.O. (Scouts)² was to be responsible for the patrol of the Bight. By day, an outer line was to be stationed consisting of a torpedo boat flotilla 35 miles, and an inner line consisting of a minesweeping division 23 miles from Elbe Lightship I.³ U boats were to lie between the two lines, and light cruisers to be at hand behind the inner line.

By night, the outer line, and the U boats were to be withdrawn, and the inner line replaced by a torpedo boat flotilla.

All cruisers, torpedo boat flotillas, U boat flotillas, M.S. divisions, and aircraft were placed under the S.O. (Scouts).⁴

General principles were issued at the same time dealing with the object and execution of the patrol.

The work was to be performed largely by the older light cruisers in accordance with the conception then prevalent that the war would be short, and the newer and valuable ships were to be nursed for a decisive action.⁵

By day, the patrols were to act, first, against submarines, secondly, against minelayers. The former were to be opposed by torpedo boats and the minesweeping division (of older torpedo boats), who were to retire on the approach of destroyers. Light cruisers were to be used against destroyers but not against submarines. At night, the task of the patrols was to protect the Bight against minelaying. They were to retire before light cruisers, resuming their posts as soon as possible, but were to attack minelayers vigorously. The use of aircraft was mentioned, but the number available at the time was small, consisting of only six, and later of nine, which were not to be flown more than 70 miles from Heligoland.

Only one airship (L 3) was available, and was employed in practice flights along the coast.

These orders were excellent so far as they went, but there was one vital omission; they entirely overlooked the very contingency which was regarded as probable, namely, the incursion of a force of heavy cruisers into the Bight, and the necessity in that contingency of supporting the light cruisers.

In accordance with these instructions, on August 5th, when war was declared, the system of patrol consisted by day of an outer and inner circle, each of one torpedo boat flotilla, the outer being 35 miles, and the inner 23 miles, from the Elbe Lightship. Between them lay a flotilla of U boats on a concentric arc of 29 miles radius.

Behind each wing was stationed a light cruiser and another off Heligoland Harbour. In the Weser was a cruiser (flotilla leader) with a T.B. flotilla ready to go out, and in the river were three T.B. flotillas standing off.

By night the torpedo boats of the outer line and the U boats were withdrawn, leaving only the inner torpedo boat line.⁶

On August 6th, on the urgent representations of the chief of the 1st U Flotilla,⁷ the U boats were withdrawn, and the majority allotted to high seas work. Their withdrawal placed a heavier strain on the torpedo boats, and the tax on the latter proved too great. On August 7th, the inner patrol line was abandoned in order to release a flotilla for offensive purposes, and to compensate for this, the outer line was ordered to cruise in the area between the 35-miles and 29-miles circles instead of cruising at right angles to the outpost line. The state of instant readiness of the T.B. flotilla in the Weser had to be relaxed, and the demands on men, boilers, and engines necessitated the abandonment of the T.B. flotilla in reserve. It was

¹ G.O.H., 29.

² i.e., Rear-Admiral Hipper, *Seydlitz*.

³ Latitude 54° N., longitude 8° 15' E.

⁴ G.O.H., 32.

⁵ G.O.H., 34.

⁶ G.O.H., 132.

⁷ Korvettenkapitän (Commander) Hermann Bauer.

generally felt that the employment of the flotillas on this service was a deviation from their true offensive purpose; but they could not be released from it till it was decided to close the Bight against enemy craft by minefields—a policy not adopted till September.

Instructions of August 18th.—On August 18th, 12 trawlers were added to the patrol for use against submarines, and new instructions were issued by the S.O. (Scouts).¹ These were on much the same lines as before.

By night a torpedo boat flotilla was to be stationed on the circumference of a circle with a radius of 25 miles from the Elbe Lightship I.,² cruising to and fro in the direction of the outpost line. Between Heligoland and South Hever³ there were to be five, and between Heligoland and Spiekeroog, seven look-outs (trawler) cruising perpendicular to the direction of the outpost line, and behind the look-outs there were to be some three light cruisers⁴ and a flotilla leader cruiser in one of the river entrances.

A light cruiser for the protection of Heligoland Harbour was to be behind the Sand Island⁵ with a torpedo boat flotilla ready to proceed and U Boats inside the harbour.

A look-out ship (battleship or large cruiser with nets) was stationed in the Jade at No. 9 buoy for purposes of anti-torpedocraft attack.

In the Ems lay a light cruiser and a torpedo boat flotilla in addition to the old cruiser *Arcona* and four trawlers. The patrol forces at night in the Bight mustered, therefore, five light cruisers.

The task of covering Heligoland by day fell to submarines, and on August 25th the Chief of the I. U-Boat Flotilla issued instructions for 5 U-Boats to lie for this purpose on a line running 12 miles south of Heligoland and four on a line running 9 miles east, for the protection of Heligoland and the Bight, the remainder to assemble south-east of Heligoland.

On the same day, in view of representations made by the C-in-C.,⁶ the patrol service was strengthened and a threefold circle was again instituted for the day with a double circle for the night consisting of an outer line of torpedo boats at 25 miles from Heligoland, and an inner line of minesweeping craft 12 miles behind them. These were supported by the three cruisers mentioned in S.O. (Scouts) orders of August 18th.

This was the system of patrol in force on the night of August 27th–28th. There were two important points it overlooked; one was an attack by capital ships; the other was the tide flowing quietly seaward on the bar of the Outer Jade.

CHAPTER IV.

THE FIRST PHASE.

13. **Enemy Sighted—Laurel and III/4 go in the chase.**—It was light at four and the sun rose about five. The sea was smooth, visibility poor, and the sky overcast. A light wind was blowing from the north-west. The flotillas left their rendezvous at 0400 on their course S. 8° E., and at 0653 sighted an enemy destroyer on the port bow to the south-east in the direction of Heligoland.⁷ The 4th Division (*Laurel*, *Liberty*, *Lysander* and *Laertes*) was on the port wing and received orders to chase. The *Laurel* increased to full speed⁸ and forming her division in single line drew off to the south-east. Fire was opened some five minutes later at 0658⁹ at a range of not less than 7,000 yards. The destroyer made off at full speed to the south-east in the direction of Heligoland, returning our fire. The *Laurel* followed, but could not gain on her, and the range was too great to permit of effective fire.

0726. Commodore (T) joins in the chase.—As the 4th Division moved off, Commodore (T) warned the *Laurel* not to lose touch with him, and continued his

¹ G.O.H., 138.

² Latitude 54° N., longitude 8° 15' E.

³ Latitude 54° 20', longitude 8° 23'.

⁴ 'Etwä 3 Kleine Kreuzer'; the implication is three cruisers if possible.

⁵ A small island half a mile east of Heligoland.

⁶ G.O.H., 139. On account of a submarine attack on G. 111.

⁷ G. 194 of the First T.B. Flotilla. The signal as logged is "Chase S.W." and it may be that G. 194 was to the S.W. and ran off S.E. She was steering a north-westerly course. App. A 22.

⁸ Say 28 knots.

⁹ G.O.H., 0657.

course S. 8° E. at 20 knots. At 0718 he signalled to her to rejoin,¹ but the signal was not received. Other destroyers were sighted about this time to the S.E., and fearing that she might get too deeply engaged Commodore (T) turned at 0720² 4 points to port with his flotilla and joined in the chase. A few minutes later at 0721 the *Laurel* signalled that the first destroyer had been joined by two more and at 0740 Commodore (T) turned another 2 points to port,³ formed his three divisions separately in line abreast to bring the destroyers' guns to bear, and increased to full speed with the intention of cutting off the enemy from Heligoland.

As the chase proceeded, bringing the 4th Division and 3rd Flotilla nearer to Heligoland, several enemy torpedo boats (belonging to the inner patrol) were occasionally sighted ahead and on the starboard bow; the whole 3rd Flotilla were now in line abreast with ships somewhat strung out as the divisions altered course at intervals to bring their guns to bear, but the enemy was able to keep his distance, and the range remained too great for effective fire. The *Laurel's* division, some 8 miles to the north-east, were still pursuing their chase.

14. **Fearless joins chase.**—The *Fearless*, 2 miles astern, continued on the original course S. 8 E. until 0728, when some destroyers were sighted on the port bow and Captain (D) turned 4 points to port.⁴ A few minutes later⁵ he formed his division into line abreast and increased to full speed, then at 0740⁶ altered course another 2 points to port. He was now on the port quarter of the *Arethusa*, some 4 miles north-west of her. The enemy were practically out of range, and though the I./5th on the port wing opened fire, the 1st Flotilla was too far off to take any real part in the engagement.

Commodore (T) had meanwhile been chasing steadily to the eastward firing intermittently but without much result, when at 0757⁷ he suddenly sighted two cruisers ahead coming up from the eastward, and turned 6 points to starboard⁸ to engage the nearest—the northward—at 7,000 yards. This was the *Stettin*,⁹ and her appearance brought the chase abruptly to a stop.

The *Arethusa*, after turning 6 points, appears to have swung back 4 points to port¹⁰ and engaged the *Stettin* on opposite courses for a few minutes apparently without result.¹¹

Fearless and Stettin.—The *Fearless*, some 5 miles north-west, had turned the 1st Flotilla 4 points to starboard at 0756¹² and shortly afterwards, at 0758,¹³ sighted the *Stettin* in her turn, and altering course to S. by W. at 0805¹⁴, opened fire.

The *Stettin* turned 16 points to starboard and retired in a south-easterly direction. The range was about 8,000 yards and spotting was difficult in the haze; under these circumstances many destroyers did not open fire at all, nor did the 1st and 2nd Divisions on the *Fearless* starboard hand, as their fire was masked. Firing continued till about 0812, when Captain (D) received signal, W. $\frac{1}{4}$ S.,¹⁴ and breaking off the action, which seemed purposeless at the long range, turned to the new course. This was in accordance with the operation orders, and Captain (D) re-formed the 1st Flotilla in cruising order, divisions in line abreast, disposed abeam to port, reduced speed to 20 knots, and commenced the westerly sweep.

15. **Arethusa and Frauenlob.**—Meanwhile the two funnelled cruiser, which turned out to be the *Frauenlob*, had been closing from the southward¹⁵ and Commodore (T) instead of turning W. $\frac{1}{4}$ S. according to plan turned to engage her on a south-westerly course. The *Frauenlob* turned to port on a parallel course at almost 9,000 yards. By 0810 the range had closed to 6,000 yards, and the action became close and severe.

¹ *Arethusa* (S).

² *Arethusa* (R), *Lookout* (S) 0730, (R) 0727

³ *Arethusa* (R) 0733, (S) 0738, *Lookout* (S) 0740, (R) 0740, (N) 0742 Co. S. 75 E.

⁴ *Fearless* (R) says: "In accordance with W/T message," but signal logs do not corroborate. *Fearless* (L) 0727, (S) 0728, *Lizard* (R) 0727, *Goshawk* 0732.

⁵ *Fearless* (S) 0735.

⁶ *Fearless* (S) 0740, *Goshawk* (S) 0740.

⁷ *Arethusa* (R) 0757, *Lookout* (N) 0755.

⁸ *Arethusa* (R) 0757, (S) 0752, 4 pts. to S., *Lookout* (N) S. 30 E. 0755.

⁹ *Stettin* three funnels) 10 4·1-inch, speed 22 knots. *Frauenlob*(two funnels)10 4·1-inch,

speed 19 knots. G.O.H. gives *Frauenlob* 21½ knots and *Stettin* 23-26.

¹⁰ 4 points to port *Arethusa* (R) 0800, *Lookout* (S) 0759, (N) 0800 S. 36 E.


¹¹ No mention in German account of the *Stettin* having been in action with *Arethusa*.—G. O. H. 149.

¹² *Fearless* (R) 0805 S. by W., (S) 0756, *Goshawk* (S) 0755.

¹³ *Fearless* (R) 0805 S. by W., (S) 4 to S., *Lucifer* (R) 0805, *Ferret* 0758.



¹⁴ *Fearless* (S) 0811, 0812, *Ferret* (R) 0815, *Llewellyn* (R) 0815, *Lizard* (R) 0815, *Goshawk* (S) 0815.

¹⁵ G.O.H., also *Leonidas* (R), *Lennox* (R), *Laforey* (plan).



HELIGOLAND BIGHT

AUGUST 28th 1914
PLAN 2.
STETTIN, FRAUENLOB and V187.
0730 - 0900.



The 3rd Flotilla boats were assisting the *Arethusa*, and some of the German boats which had formed the southerly wing of the outpost circle were streaming in on the starboard side; but the real fight lay between the two cruisers. The enemy's fire was heavy and accurate. The *Arethusa* was repeatedly hit by the *Frauenlob's* shell, and was only hitting the enemy occasionally. By 0815 the enemy's fire was telling heavily. P.I. and P. 3 4-inch guns had jammed; the Q.D. 6-inch gun could not be trained, and at P. 2 an enemy shell had caused a big cordite blaze. The signal officer (Lieutenant E. P. Westmacott) had been killed on the bridge beside the commodore. Only the forecastle 6-inch gun remained in action, and at 0820 the commodore ordered both torpedoes to be fired; the *Lance* and *Lawford* each fired theirs at about the same time, but none of them hit. The gunfire of the destroyers was of little avail, though the *Landrail* on the *Arethusa's* port quarter drew the *Frauenlob's* fire for a few minutes. About this time a German torpedo boat¹ was sighted ahead of the 3rd Flotilla trying to cross their line of advance and reach the shelter of Heligoland. She was engaged by several destroyers at close range and badly damaged. On fire from end to end and shrouded in smoke she was left on the port hand apparently sinking, but succeeded later in reaching port. A merchant steamer flying the Norwegian flag was unfortunate enough to come on the scene from the north at this time, and tried to make to the eastward across the *Arethusa's* bows. She was the *Kong Guttorm* on her way from Christiania to Bremen, but the destroyers took her for a minelayer (as the *Stettin* had done half an hour before), and opening fire on her forced the crew to take to their boats. Meanwhile the action continued, and the *Arethusa's* situation was beginning to look critical. No support could be expected from the *Fearless*, which had turned W. $\frac{1}{4}$ S., at 0812, and was now some distance off to the north-west; the 1st L.C.S. was away to the westward, and Heligoland was unpleasantly close. But at 0825 the situation was suddenly relieved. With her one remaining gun the *Arethusa* obtained a 6-inch hit by the *Frauenlob's* forebridge, and the enemy hauled off to port, whereupon Commodore (T) turned to West $\frac{1}{4}$ South, and reformed the flotilla in close cruising order. The *Fearless* at this time was some 8 miles to the north-west.

The disposition of the destroyers during the action had been approximately in single line ahead, the III/1st and III/2nd ahead of the *Arethusa*, the III/3rd astern and the III/4th under the *Laurel* closing on the starboard quarter from the northward after their detached chase and engaging both enemy cruisers distantly on their way.

The casualties incurred in this phase of the action were inconsiderable except in the case of the *Arethusa*. The destroyers were at times under heavy fire and some were straddled and occasionally hit, but their losses amounted to only one man wounded in the flotilla. The material damage was also negligible; all boats were left with full steaming powers and only two had so much as a gun out of action, though they had expended a good deal of ammunition. The *Arethusa* suffered more severely; she had 1 officer and 8 men killed, and 10 wounded, and most of her armament was out of action, though this damage was mostly of a temporary nature and except for two 4-inch guns was soon repaired. In the engine room more serious injury had been sustained; a shell had entered the main feed tank; the forward engine room was flooded to a depth of 3 feet and the ship gradually lost speed and by 10.30 could do no more than 10 knots. Her wireless and searchlights were out of action and she was left with flags and semaphore as the only methods of signalling, and for the former there were hardly any halliards left. The *Frauenlob* too had suffered severely; she received some 10 hits, one on the port edge of the conning tower, another on the after control position, and another in the foretop which destroyed the wireless; she lost 5 dead and 32 wounded.² Of the enemy's torpedo boats several had been hit, and *D. 8* badly damaged; but none had been sunk. Both flotillas had now turned to the prescribed course and were steering W. $\frac{1}{4}$ S. at 20 knots.³

¹ *D. 8* belonging to the minesweeping division in the inner patrol line.

² G.O.H., 158, but on p. 206, 9 killed and 28 wounded.


³ According to one destroyer's report, the actual speed of the 3rd Flotilla was only 12 knots.

CHAPTER V.

GERMAN ACCOUNT OF PHASE I. 0530-0830.¹

16. **German Dispositions.**—The Bight Patrol consisted of an outer line consisting of a torpedo flotilla of new destroyers and an inner line of older boats as in the plan below.

GERMAN PATROLS.
August 28th, 1914 (not to scale).



These were the arrangements in force on August 28th. Unfortunately the patrol cruisers that day were very weak vessels, namely, *Frauenlob*, *Stettin*, and *Hela*, of which the last was quite incapable of joining in a serious engagement. The *Cöln* had gone to Wilhelmshaven to coal; the *Strassburg*, *Stralsund*, and *Rostock* were there too; the *Kolberg* was in the Roads, the *Danzig* and *München* had just entered Brunsbüttel on their way from the Baltic; the *Mainz* was off the Ems.

At 0430 the 1st Torpedo Boat Flotilla had just taken up its day position according to plan; shortly after 0500, *G. 194* in her position some 16' N.W. of Heligoland sighted only 150 feet from her starboard side the double periscope of a submarine, which immediately dived after firing two torpedoes.² After a delay of nearly 25 minutes he informed S.O. (T.)³ on board the *Cöln*, who at 0710 ordered the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla in Heligoland to chase the submarine, and the S.O. (Scouts)⁴ ordered the Flying station on Heligoland to send out aircraft to assist.

¹ German Official History, Vol. I.

² The correct German title is Führer der Torpedoboote, i.e., torpedo boat leader; but the term S.O. (T.) will express it clearly.

³ E 7 states she fired a torpedo at a destroyer at 0415.

⁴ That is, Befehlshaber der Aufklärungsschiffe or senior officer, scouting vessels.

Meanwhile, at 0657, *G. 194*, after evading the submarine attack, had turned to a N.W. course, when shots falling close at hand revealed the presence of enemy craft, though these at first could not be made out. Kapitän-Leutnant Busz turned and ran on a S.E. course, and from this time a succession of signals began to pass between *G. 194*, *G. 196*, and *V. 187* reporting the appearance of hostile surface craft, and clearly indicating that an enemy force had broken through the outer line.

By 0710 *G. 194* could make out that the enemy numbered about 9 T.B.D.'s and 2 Light Cruisers, but unfortunately the wireless report to S.O. (T) did not get through to the *Cöln* till 0725.

The next patrol to the north, *G. 196*, leader of the 2nd T.B. Flotilla,¹ had not sighted *G. 194* at the patrol distance of 7½ miles on account of the low visibility; but hearing firing to westward at 0705 he ran towards it, and sighting the enemy, sent a wireless to the *Cöln* at 0715: "*G. 194* chased by cruiser in 142 e."²

The *Stettin* and *Frauenlob* had already been ordered to chase destroyers, for which purpose the former had weighed and proceeded from behind Heligoland.

The *Cöln* and *Strassburg*, both in Wilhelmshaven, were ordered to support; the *Kolberg* to get steam up; the *Stralsund* to proceed to the Roads; the *Danzig* and *München* to come down the Elbe.³

G. 194 and *G. 196* were now running for Heligoland, chased by the *Laurel's* division.

Fire was opened at 7,000 metres on *G. 196*, but discontinued after about 14 shots.

The 5th T.B. Flotilla were meanwhile on their way at 21 knots to hunt the submarine when at 0725 *G. 9*, their foremost boat, sighted several destroyers ahead and observed the flash of guns. Doubtful whether the vessels were his own or the enemy, he went on a little till he could clearly make out they were English. He immediately turned round and opened fire. The boats behind him at first took the shells bursting near him to be his guns firing on the submarine, but soon afterwards saw the profiles of four destroyers.⁴

The first wireless from *G. 192*⁵ had not got through to them; they were strung out irregularly and were not in close formation. For a time the enemy's fire was practically ineffective. At first the shots fell 800 metres short—a further advantage lying in the fact that most of the destroyers' shells did not burst and could be clearly distinguished from the 6-inch shots of the cruiser. The *Fearless* could now be seen on the right wing of the enemy, and the number of destroyers had increased by 0738 to 10, then to 18 or 20. The commencement of fire had been reported to the *Cöln*, and received by her at 0729, and at 0738⁶ the number and position of the enemy were reported, viz., a cruiser and 20 T.B.D.'s in 142 e (54° 25' N., 7° 35' E.). The situation shortly afterwards began to grow more serious as *V. 1* and *S. 13* could not maintain their speed. The fires burnt down in the latter, and her speed fell to 20 knots; her range dropped to 5,500, and *V. 1's* to 3,500; and at 0745 the flotilla leader asked for cruiser support. *S. 13* remained undamaged, but *V. 1*, on the left wing, was surrounded by enemy salvos.

At 0750 the first shell, apparently from a 4-inch, hit her on the upper deck and penetrated the stokehold, killing one man and wounding two. The enemy concentrated their fire on the damaged boat⁷ and another shell hit on the starboard side, which damaged the steering control and the forward turbine. Several torpedo tracks passed parallel to her and her situation was becoming critical, when the *Stettin* appeared on the scene,⁸ and opening fire, drew off the destroyers' fire.

17. **The Arrival of the *Stettin*.**—At 0732, when the first report of enemy destroyers arrived, the *Stettin*⁹ had steam up in only eight boilers, lying at anchor to eastward of Heligoland Dune (Sand Island), and was immediately despatched by S.O. (Scouts). The visibility was poor at the time—between 5,000 and 9,000 metres—which prevented

¹ Each Flotilla of 10 boats was organised in half-flotillas of five boats. Thus the First Flotilla consisted of the first and second half-flotillas.

² For geographical positions see Appendix B, 049.

³ G.O.H., 142.

⁴ *Laurel's* III./4th Division.

⁵ App. B. 12.

⁶ G.O.H., 148.

⁷ There is no mention of this in the British reports.

⁸ About 0756 by British reports.

⁹ Korvettenkapitän Karl August Nerger, later of *Wolf*.

Heligoland batteries¹ joining in though it was within their range, and the chief of the 5th T.B. Flotilla had asked for their fire.

At 0758 the *Stettin* opened fire at 8,500 metres on the middle group of the enemy² and reported to the S.O. (Scouts), "Am in action with destroyers," but, due to a mistaken report that the vessels fired on were German, fire was interrupted for a time.

About 0805 there was seen behind the enemy a cruiser with four funnels,³ which was reported to S.O. (Scouts). Shells were falling freely round the *Stettin* by this time. The 5th T.B. Flotilla was retiring to Heligoland, confirmed in this decision by a signal at 0810 ordering it and the 1st Flotilla to get under the Heligoland guns.

The *Stettin* had only received one hit at No. 4 gun the starboard side, which had killed two men and wounded five, but her speed had fallen to 15 knots and at 0810 the action was broken off at 9,000 metres, and the captain decided to turn back to Sellebrunnen buoy⁴ to get all boilers well alight. A merchant vessel was seen at this time behind the enemy's line and a signal was accordingly made reporting 154e and 155e⁵ as suspected mine areas. She turned out later to be the Norwegian steamer *Kong Guttorm* carrying out her regular trip between Christiania and Bremen, and about to take up a German pilot north of Heligoland. The *Stettin* had been in time to cover the retirement of the northern wing of the 1st and the 5th T.B. Flotillas, and these got safely into harbour.

18. **The Minesweeping Division on the Inner Patrol.**—The retirement of the *Stettin* was regrettable as it left the III. Minesweeping Division exposed, and from 0740 *D. 8*, the leader's boat, was under a lively fire. The delay in passing *G. 194's* signal⁶ brought the enemy down on the inner patrol as a surprise. At 0730 they saw German boats making at full speed for Heligoland and shortly afterwards sighted English craft behind them and shaped course for Heligoland. Fire was opened on *D. 8* at 0740 and the enemy were seen to be a cruiser and 10 to 14 destroyers. Up to 0830 the boat was constantly under fire, but sustained most of her damage when she came within close range of the 3rd Flotilla destroyers. She was saved, however, by the low visibility and received only five hits, of which one 6-inch hit the bridge, killing the captain⁷ and lieutenant, disabling 15 to 20 men and damaging the auxiliary steam piping, which shrouded the ship in a protective cloud of steam. The engines were still working, however, and just at this moment Heligoland loomed up out of the mist, the *Frauenlob* was sighted and the enemy drew off. The other boats of the 3rd Minesweeping Division,⁸ *T. 34* to the north and *T. 33*, *T. 37*, *T. 35* to the south, came under the enemy's fire in the same way. None received any wireless report of the enemy; all took the firing at first to be gun practice and were suddenly surprised, and as they had a speed of only 15 knots would have been lost if the *Frauenlob* had not saved them as the *Stettin* did the 5th Flotilla in the north, and enabled them all to escape in safety, except *D. 8* and *T. 33*,⁹ which were so severely damaged that they had to be towed into Heligoland. The latter had seen *T. 34* at 0710 in the N.N.E. being chased by the enemy and steering for Heligoland. She ran to the southward but was hit at 8 a.m. by a shell which killed one man and wounded another, when the *Frauenlob* appeared steering a northerly course and engaged the enemy. Two more shells struck her, one hitting a ventilator, and one entering the engine-room wounding five men and stopping the engines. The destroyers were still approaching and the range had fallen to not more than 800 metres when they turned to the S.W. to engage the *Frauenlob* and made off at high speed.

19. **The Frauenlob.**—The *Frauenlob* was lying north of the Jade, and when the firing commenced quickly grasped the fact that it was no question of gun practice and made at full speed for the sound of the guns. As she proceeded to the north

¹ When the first wireless had come in, and on the sound of the guns, the alarm had been sounded for the 8-inch batteries and those on the mole, but by 0750 the whole fortress was standing to. Soon afterwards a number of T.B.D.'s could be seen, some steering for the harbour, others passing down to westward, but so swathed in mist that it was impossible to distinguish friend or foe.

² *i.e.*, the 1st Flotilla.

³ *Fearless*.

⁴ N.W. corner of Heligoland.

⁵ As these squares are well to the northward, the *Kong Guttorm* must have been presumably on a south-westerly course at this time.

⁶ App. B. 12.

⁷ The Chief of the 3rd Minesweeping Division, Kapitän-Leutnant Wolfram.

⁸ According to G.S.H., *D. 8*, *T. 25*, *T. 29*, *T. 31*, *T. 32*, *T. 34*, *T. 35*, *T. 36*, *T. 37*, *T. 40*, *T. 71*.

⁹ These must have been two of the boats engaged during the *Arctusa*—*Frauenlob* action.

westward, torpedo boats and trawlers of the outpost lines could be seen streaming in at full speed, shells began bursting in the vicinity, and finally there emerged from the mist a ship with one mast and three funnels, firing vigorously, on a W. by N. course with some 6 destroyers behind and about the same number ahead of it. At 0808 the *Frauenlob* opened fire at 6,000 metres and at 0815 obtained a hit with a 4-inch salvo on the third funnel. According to the *Frauenlob's* account,¹ the *Arctusa* turned to N.W. followed by the *Frauenlob* on the same course and the range fell to 3,200 metres, when the cruiser disappeared with her destroyers in the mist. The *Frauenlob* did not escape unhurt. She received about 10 hits, and lost 5 dead and 32 wounded,² chiefly belonging to the guns and gun control. One shell struck the port edge of the conning tower, another the foremost fighting top, but the fighting capacity of the ship was unaffected and all guns remained in action. *V. 3* had now come up; *T. 33* badly damaged was in sight and was taken in tow, and the *Frauenlob* arrived at Wilhelmshaven at 1030.

Another vessel of the outer patrol, *V. 188*, had received *G. 194's* signal reporting the presence of enemy destroyers and had steered for Heligoland at full speed about 0730. Sighting the 1st L.C.S. on the port beam at 0750 she had turned two points to starboard and again to starboard on sighting the *Nottingham* and *Lowestoft*; then six points to port shortly afterwards, when she met *V. 190* who followed her.

About 0825 they were joined by *V. 189*, *V. 191*, and *G. 197*, and shaped course for the Jade. By half-past eight from the German point of view the sweep was practically over. The patrols had been driven in, but with the exception of *V. 187* all had returned or were returning and only three³ out of 22 had been seriously damaged. But this was only the beginning of the day.

CHAPTER VI.

PHASE II.—THE FIRST L.C.S. AND THE FLOTILLAS SWEEP TO THE WESTWARD.

20. **The Light Cruiser Squadron.**—It will be remembered that the 1st L.C.S. were following astern of the flotillas, some eight miles behind the *Fearless*. At 0750 Comm. (T) sent a signal to say that his destroyers were engaged with enemy destroyers, and at 0805 Commodore Goodenough increased to full speed⁴ and detached the *Nottingham* and *Lowestoft* to support them. These two cruisers drew off to the eastward and shortly afterwards (0812) opened fire at long range apparently without effect at some destroyers⁵ running towards Heligoland. The 1st L.C.S. were at this time well to the westward of the flotillas, for while the latter had been chasing to the eastward from 0726 to 0812, the former had continued on the original course, sighting two destroyers W. by N. about 0820,⁶ and at 0830⁷ altering course to W.N.W. and shortly afterwards reducing speed to 20 knots.

The *Nottingham's* and *Lowestoft's* movements are rather more doubtful. They ran to the eastward for a short time, but must then have returned to southward, for at 0840 they were on a south-westerly course and engaged *V. 187* to the south-eastward.⁸

¹ G.O.H., 158.

² G.O.H., 158. In the analysis of losses the numbers given are 9 killed, 28 wounded (possibly includes 4 died of wounds).


³ *V. 1* (Outer Patrol), *D. 8*, *T. 33* (Inner Patrol). Speed 23 knots, *Southampton* (S) 0755, *Nottingham* (S) 0803, *Falmouth* (S) 0800.

⁴ Probably *V. 188* and *V. 190*.

⁵ *Falmouth* (S) "Two destroyers bearing W. by N." These were apparently the *Lurcher* and *Firedrake*, which were keeping touch with the 1st L.C.S., mistaking them for the enemy.

⁶ *Liverpool* (S) 0830, *Southampton* (S) 0830. This is apparently the moment which Goodenough referred to when he says that at 0815 on receipt of *Lurcher's* signal he went off to support her.

⁸ Corbett's plan (Vol. 1, Map 5) makes them appear to southward of *V. 187*, but the German Official history is quite explicit and states that "suddenly at 8.45 there appeared in the north-west two light cruisers with four funnels, steering the same course (*i.e.*, south-west) at high speed," who opened a lively fire at 3,500–4,000 metres. Lechler's (prisoner-of-war) account says, "sighted on starboard bow two British *Town* cruisers, who opened fire," and in his attached sketch they bear about west. *Nottingham* and *Lowestoft* say, "0840, a/c S.W. engaged T.B.D. steering S." *Llewellyn* (1/2nd) which was with *Fearless* at 0830 says, "heavy firing on port bow, evidently light cruisers turning enemy destroyers."



At 0900 they sighted the *Fearless*, were challenged by her¹ and passed her and the Flotillas (see Plan 2); then at 0907, as there was nothing in sight to the southward, altered course N. by W. and reduced to 22 knots.

21. **The First Flotilla and V. 187.**—At 0812 the *Fearless* had turned with the first flotilla to W. $\frac{1}{4}$ S. in accordance with Com. (T)'s signal, and shortly afterwards² sighted an enemy destroyer steering about S.S.W. some 6,000 yards almost right ahead and sent the 1st/5th division in pursuit.³ This was V. 187 trying to make Heligoland. She had sighted the 1st L.C.S. about 0720 and again at 0805 on the port beam about 5 miles off, and having no information of the flotillas to the eastward had proceeded at full speed, sending a W/T signal to the *Cöln*. At 0825 gunfire was heard to E.N.E. and four English destroyers were sighted two points on the port bow evidently trying to cut her off. She turned accordingly to the south⁴ to reach the Jade, then as the destroyers came gradually up altered course to S.W. The destroyers were firing at 6,000 metres and V. 187 opened fire at 4,800. The position was not considered unfavourable and the captain hoped that the mist and her own thick smoke would enable him to escape. Suddenly at 0845 there appeared in the north-west two light cruisers⁵ with four funnels steering the same course at a high speed which were at first taken to be friends, but a lively fire opened by them at 3,500–4,000 metres left no doubt as to their character. It was now seen that only a bold onset could save the boat. The midship tube was trained to starboard, the torpedo set for 1 metre, and life-saving vests strapped on. The helm was put over, and the boat turned sharp round in an attempt to break through to the north and eastward.⁶ She passed the 5th division at about 2,000 yards range with little damage, and the captain hoped that he had got through, when there appeared on the port bow another destroyer division⁷ coming down at full speed; meanwhile the division behind (3rd/5th) had turned and re-opened fire. V. 187 was now in a trap encountering a heavy fire from north-west and south-east. One shell struck the foremost gun, another entered the fourth boiler room, another the bridge, then hits rained everywhere shrouding the boat in smoke, fume and gas. She turned helplessly round and was brought to a dead stop at 0850⁸ by the point blank fire of the 1st/5th Division who passed her at 600 yards range. All the boilers were hit, the captain was badly wounded, the fore part was in flames, but she fought bravely to the last. Ignoring a signal to 'surrender,' blazing, with only her after gun in action, she still fired desperately on the *Goshawk* as the latter closed to save survivors. Thereupon the *Goshawk*, *Phoenix*, and *Ferret* opened fire again and sank her at 0910.

¹ *Fearless* (S) "0903 cruisers ahead and on port bow challenged. L.C.S. replied." The *Fearless* states she sighted *Southampton*, but this is evidently a mistake, for *Southampton* had been well to westward of her at 0830 and had been steering W.N.W. since then.

² *Llewellyn* 0820, *Fearless* (R) 0815, *Lizard* (R) 0825, G.S.H. 0825.

³ Captain (D)'s report says he recalled the chase thinking the T.B.D. was the *Lurcher* which was reported to be coming in from seaward. "Negative chase" was not made, however, till 8.35 a.m. and it is doubtful if the *Goshawk* received it. Anyhow she did not act upon it.

⁴ *Lizard* (R) says "enemy turned to West," "did not appear to be doing more than 25 knots,"

⁵ "To starboard at 0845 in the north-west on the same course at high speed two light cruisers with four funnels apparently accompanied by torpedo boats," G.S.H. 161. The cruisers must have been *Nottingham* and *Lowestoft*; the torpedo boats if seen probably belonged to I/3rd.

⁶ *Lizard* (S) says turned to N. for a short time, then turned and came down on an opposite course to *Goshawk*.

⁷ The III/3rd detached about 0837.

⁸ *Ferret* (S) *Goshawk* (S), gives time about 10 minutes later. Above account largely from German Official History i, 159–162. G.O.H. says she was sunk by explosive charges, but this seems to have been a work of supererogation.

Stettin attacks 3rd and 5th Divisions of 1st Flotilla 0915.—The destroyer's boats were still engaged in picking up survivors from V. 187 when at 0915¹ a German light cruiser suddenly appeared from the south-eastward and opened fire on their destroyers and their whalers in the waters. This was the *Stettin*, which had received at 0830 a wireless that the 1st T.B. Flotilla was being attacked and had proceeded at full speed (22 knots) to its assistance.

The two divisions recovered their boats' crews and proceeded at full speed to the N.W., but the enemy had appeared so suddenly that the *Defender* had to abandon two of her boats full of wounded prisoners and containing one of her own officers and nine men.

The *Stettin's* fire was not very accurate and she did not seriously damage the *Ferret*, which closed and fired a torpedo, nor the other boats which were stopped or just getting way on, though she herself received 3 hits which killed 2 and wounded 9 men.

By 0937 the 1st/3rd and 5th had drawn out of range and firing had ceased; they proceeded to rejoin the *Fearless* and the rest of the flotillas who were now steering to the Westward.

22. **The *Fearless* rejoins *Arethusa* 0900.**—The *Fearless* had meanwhile continued on a W. $\frac{1}{4}$ S. course till 0330 when she altered course to S.W. by W. $\frac{3}{4}$ W. About this time she received a signal to say that the *Lurcher* and *Firedrake* were coming in from seaward, and under the impression that V. 187 might be the *Lurcher* she made a signal to the 1st/5th to negative chase, which was not acted upon as the vessel's hostile character was now unmistakable. The *Fearless* did not herself support the two divisions, but left them to deal with V. 187 by themselves. At 0849 she altered course 6 points to port and at 0855 sighted the *Arethusa* and took station.² Two of the 1st L.C.S. were in sight and passed not far off.³ The operations up to 0900 had resulted in one German destroyer being sunk and three damaged, with the retirement of the German patrols to the shelter of Heligoland. The *Arethusa's* speed had been reduced to 10 knots and her gunfire reduced by two 4-in. guns, but no other British ships had suffered any serious damage. The situation of the flotillas was satisfactory, although they could not hope to cut off any more patrols; they were some 12 to 15 miles west of Heligoland steering W. $\frac{1}{4}$ S. with the 1st L.C.S. and battle cruisers available in support. Our light cruisers had no doubt been reported to the German C.-in-C. by the destroyers fired on at 8 a.m., but the presence of our battle cruisers was probably still a secret, though in the prevailing low visibility it was always possible that strong enemy forces might suddenly appear within gun range. But though the situation was not unsatisfactory the results had hardly fulfilled expectations; but before going further with the flotillas, it is necessary to say something of the movements of Commodore (S), who was unaware of the presence of the 1st L.C.S. and whose signals were tending to confuse the situation.

23. **Commodore (S) with the *Lurcher* and *Firedrake*.**—Commodore (S)'s signals between 8 a.m. and 10 a.m. added a distinct element of excitement to the operations. He had sighted at 0745 two 4-funnel cruisers⁴ to the north-west steering to the southward, and not knowing that British light cruisers were taking part in the operations had reported them to Comm. (T.) as enemy craft and had shadowed them until 0840.

This signal intercepted by Goodenough gave him the impression that two enemy cruisers lay to the westward of him, and the Vice-Admiral of the supporting force was no doubt misled in the same way, but no immediate action seems to have been taken on this information.⁵ At 0910 Commodore (S) began to suspect the presence of British light cruisers, for he asked Commander (T) if our light cruisers had entered the area, but at 0945 sighting Goodenough's four ships, forming the main body of the light cruiser squadron now on a W. $\frac{1}{4}$ S. course, he reported to the *Invincible* that he was being chased by four enemy light cruisers and was leading them towards him.

¹ In the German account the British destroyers were sighted at 0900 and fire opened at 0908.

² See Plan 2.

³ Captain (D) calls them *Southampton* and a cruiser, but they were evidently the *Nottingham* and *Lowestoft*. What was their bearing? Did they have the flotillas on the starboard or port hand? How far

off were they from the flotillas? These are points on which the logs say nothing and on which further information is desirable.

⁴ Probably the westward division of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron.

⁵ Goodenough says that at 0815 he proceeded in support of the *Lurcher*, but he did not alter course till 0830.

Commodore (T.) by this time on a westerly course with the *Fearless* and flotillas received the signal and turned 16 points to the support of his apparently hard-pressed friend. But at 1000 in a momentary lift of the haze Commodore (S) saw the cruisers more clearly, challenged them by searchlight and was answered. He closed the *Southampton* and the misunderstanding was soon explained; but the explanation left both Commodores concerned for the mutual safety of the light cruisers and submarines. The *Southampton* at 0930 had already sighted one of our submarines, *E. 6*, and had attempted to ram her, and Goodenough was sufficiently impressed by the mutual risks of the situation to signal at once to the *Lion* at 1015 proposing to withdraw. This he proceeded to do and the 1st L.C.S. accordingly withdrew some 15 miles to the westward and remained there till 1125 when Beatty sent them in again in answer to an urgent call for help from the flotillas then in action with the *Strassburg*.

24. **Commodore (T)'s Flotillas.**—Commodore (T) after his action with the *Frauenlob* had turned to W. $\frac{1}{4}$ S. at 0825. The *Fearless* and 1st Flotilla were on his starboard bow steering a similar course, and the former after detaching the 1st/3rd and 1st/5th to deal with the *V. 187* joined Commodore (T) at 0900. Meanwhile Beatty and the *Euryalus* were "marking time" near their prearranged rendezvous, watching the situation as well as they could and waiting the development of events.

Commodore (T) proceeded on his way west till 0945¹ when he received the *Lurcher's* signal "am being chased by four light cruisers," and, turning the 1st and 3rd Flotillas 16 points, steered eastward again to support, sending a W/T asking Goodenough to do the same. A few minutes later (0954) the 1st/3rd and 1st/5th divisions came in sight to the eastward rejoining the *Fearless* after the sudden interruption of their rescue work by the *Stettin's* attack. At 0950 the *Stettin* herself had been sighted by the *Fearless*, who at once chased, but in moving off the latter almost collided with one of our destroyers and having to go astern lost ground and fired only a few shots at long range before the enemy disappeared in the mist.

The *Fearless* now closed the *Arethusa*, which had been fully occupied since 0830 in repairing the damages received from the *Frauenlob*. By 1000 she had all her guns except P3 and S3 4-inch ready for action again, but her speed had gradually dropped so that she could steam only 10 knots and even at that speed was liable to break down. Her searchlights and wireless were still out of action, and from 1017 to 1039 she and the *Fearless* stopped engines and communicated by semaphore. The 3rd Flotilla was ordered to continue west at 10 knots in charge of the Senior Officer (Commander A. B. S. Dutton of the *Lookout*), and the *Fearless* also made a signal that any boats which were short of ammunition could continue to the westward, but none of them thought it necessary to do so.

As they lay close to one another, Commodore (T) asked the *Fearless* whether the *Lurcher* or *Firedrake* was with her, which she answered in the negative, and that nothing had been seen of them. Tyrwhitt then concluded that the *Lurcher* must have been reporting our own ships (signals 0745, 0905) and decided that no further movement should be made to the eastward till the situation with regard to the *Lurcher* was cleared up. The Flotilla was lying only some 20 miles west of Heligoland, after having been in touch with the enemy for over three hours; and with the prospect of attack by a strong force at any moment, it looked as if the time had come to retire. Accordingly at 1039 the *Arethusa* with the *Fearless* and 1st Flotilla got under way again and followed the 3rd Flotilla steering N. 75 W. 20 knots, the *Fearless* being warned to keep the *Arethusa* in sight, as the temporary repairs made in the engine-room might not permit of that speed being maintained.

CHAPTER VII.

PHASE III., FLOTILLAS IN ACTION WITH *STRASSBURG* AND *CÖLN*. 1046-1140.

25. **Strassburg appears from S.E.**—The *Arethusa* and *Fearless* had hardly got under way before a fresh action developed.

¹ Despatch says 1000, but much evidence tends to make time 0945.

At 1046¹ a German light cruiser was sighted to the S.E. coming up on the port quarter on a N.N.W. course, and the *Arethusa* at once engaged her, altering to about south-west (mag.) to bring the enemy on the port beam. This was the *Strassburg*,² and she opened a heavy fire on the *Arethusa*. The *Fearless* on the *Arethusa's* disengaged side turned to close the enemy, hoisting the "disregard" to her flotillas; the 3rd Flotilla which had gone on to the westward under Commander A. B. S. Dutton, hearing the firing turned 16 points and made for the sound of guns. Comm. (T) ordered the *Fearless* and 1st Flotilla to attack with torpedoes, and three divisions of the 1st Flotilla (2nd, 3rd, and 5th) then turned to the south-west to follow *Fearless*. But the *Strassburg* evidently did not intend to close. She circled to port and held on to the northward again, passing the *Arethusa* on an opposite course, and disappeared into the mist without having appreciably closed the range from the 6,000 to 7,000 yards at which she was first sighted. The *Fearless* and her Flotilla moved at full speed towards the enemy, passing astern of *Arethusa*, but Commodore Tyrwhitt neither wished to make further ground to the eastward nor to have his Flotillas separated, so he recalled the *Fearless* at 1100, and the latter turned to rejoin the *Arethusa*.

26. 1105, A second German Light Cruiser.—As they did so, another German cruiser, the *Cöln*, was sighted to the S.E. on their port quarter and they turned to engage her at 1105. Had these enemy cruisers been concentrated and fought as fiercely as the *Frauenlob* had done earlier in the day, our light forces might have suffered very severely; but on this occasion, and again later on, the Germans, appeared one by one out of the mist, fired a few salvos and passed on, apparently unwilling to fight the British Flotillas single-handed. The *Cöln* disappeared and about 1110 the *Fearless* once more turned to the westward and the *Arethusa* signalled to her "I am proceeding my utmost speed now, please keep me in sight."

27. *Strassburg* reappears.—It was fortunate that Commodore Tyrwhitt had decided to keep his forces together, for soon afterwards at 1116³, the *Strassburg* reappeared to the northward on his starboard quarter and steering the same course to the westward opened a heavy fire on the *Arethusa*. "We were receiving," Commodore Tyrwhitt reports, "a very severe and almost accurate fire from this "cruiser; salvo after salvo was falling between 10 and 30 yards short, but not "a single shell struck; two torpedoes were also fired at us, being well directed, "but short."

28. Battle Cruisers asked to support; 1100 and 1130.—When the *Cöln* first appeared at 1105, Tyrwhitt, taking the newcomer for a ship of the *Roon* class, had sent an urgent signal to Beatty stating that he was attacked by a large cruiser, and a few minutes later again asked for support.

When the *Strassburg* reappeared to the northward at 1116 and the *Fearless* and her flotilla were becoming heavily engaged, Captain Blunt, appreciating that the arrival of another cruiser might be of serious consequence, sent another signal to Beatty stating that assistance was "urgently required."

Fortunately, the *Cöln* did not join the *Strassburg*; but the two engagements resulted in the despatch of three signals to Beatty between 1100 and 1130, asking for support.

29. Third Flotilla Attack with Torpedoes.—Meanwhile, the action between the *Strassburg* and *Arethusa* continued, both ships running to the westward.

The *Arethusa* altered a little to starboard and brought her 6-inch guns to bear on the enemy, whose salvos were falling for the most part between her and the 1st and 2nd divisions of the Third Flotilla on her starboard beam. These two divisions, led by *Lookout* of the 1st division, at once opened out to starboard, and at 1135, when the Commodore hoisted a general signal to the destroyers to attack with torpedoes, the *Lookout*⁴ led the 1st division off at full speed on a northerly course to close the *Strassburg*. The 2nd division⁵ followed the 1st a few minutes later, and the eight

¹ 1046 in *Arethusa's* plan; 1055 in Commodore (T)'s despatch.


² *Strassburg*, completed 1912, speed 26.7 knots. 12—4.1-inch guns, 6 on broadside.

³ Signals from Commodore (T) to 3rd Flotilla: 1116 "Open fire." 1118 "Cease firing."

1119 "Open fire. Attack the enemy with torpedoes." 1122, to *Fearless*, "Attack the enemy with torpedoes." 1135, General, "Attack the enemy with torpedoes."

⁴ *Lookout*, *Leonidas*, *Legion*, *Lennox*.

⁵ *Lark*, *Lance*, *Linnet*, *Landrail*.



HELIGOLAND BIGHT

AUGUST 28th 1914.

PLAN 3.

"ARETHUSA" and "FEARLESS" v "STRASSBURG",

"FEARLESS" v "KÖLN".

1046-1105.

Compiled from signal logs and despatches of Ships engaged.


Evidence is not sufficiently detailed to plot exact movements of Ships.

2000 Yards 1000 0 1 2 3 4 5 Sea Miles. scale

1121
I/1st distant about 9 miles;
rejoining "FEARLESS"



1123
III Flotilla turn from
Westward to form
on "ARETHUSA"



HELIGOLAND BIGHT

AUGUST 28th 1914.


PLAN 4.

"ARETHUSA", "FEARLESS" and Flotillas v "STRASSBURG".

1116 - 1143.

Compiled from signal logs and despatches of Ships engaged.

2000 Yards 1000 0 1 2 3 4 5 Sea Miles.



enemy cruisers were to westward of the flotillas, and that the 1st L.C.S. were seeking for them; but nothing appeared in sight, and the Vice-Admiral waited at his rendezvous up to 0930 for the situation to become clearer, circling round by four point alterations of course to guard against submarine attack. It was difficult to appreciate correctly what was happening to the eastward, and at 0930 the Vice-Admiral, as he had no news of Comm. (T)'s position since 0815, assumed that the whole sweep was moving west, and proceeded West $\frac{1}{4}$ South at 20 knots with the 1st B.C.S. spread. But at 0941 he received the signal from *Lurcher* referred to above: "Am being chased by four light cruisers, am leading them in your direction," and on the strength of it at 1000 the Vice-Admiral reduced to 16 knots and "marked time" in a D.R. position about $54^{\circ} 28' N.$, $6^{\circ} 25' E.$

32. View of Situation by Vice-Admiral at 1000.—Two conclusions appeared likely to Admiral Beatty. First, that the *Lurcher* had probably mistaken our light cruisers for the enemy, an assumption supported by an intercepted signal 0945 and confirmed by another at 0951, and, secondly, "that something was wrong," as no definite report from Commodore (T) had been received since he was first engaged at 0750.¹

To avoid further confusion between the forces the Vice-Admiral signalled to S.O., 1st L.C.S., at 0955: "Do not get too far to the southward, keep well to the northward of destroyers." When Goodenough after meeting the *Lurcher* at 1000 suggested that the light cruisers should withdraw Beatty made no answer, evidently considering that his signal of 0955 would meet the occasion; but to make it quite clear that the 1st B.C.S. was waiting and ready to support, if required, the Vice-Admiral signalled to all ships and destroyers present his 10 a.m. position $54^{\circ} 26' N.$, $6^{\circ} 14' E.$, and added "remaining here."

These two brief signals 0955 and 1000 were the only signals made by the Vice-Admiral and were intended to meet the contingencies which he thought had arisen, first that the *Lurcher* was mistaking our own for enemy cruisers; secondly, that something had gone wrong with the flotillas.

33. The Battle Cruisers, 1130.—The Battle Cruiser Squadron waited for over an hour in the position it had taken up at 10 o'clock, steaming on various courses at 24 knots, and during this time, except for a submarine attack² at 1100, which was avoided by speed and helm, nothing eventful occurred. A lull took place in the fighting at this time, and between 10 o'clock and 1040 all forces had a "breathing space." From 1017 to 1040 the *Arethusa* and *Fearless* had been stopped carrying out temporary repairs and communicating with each other as to the state and movements of the flotillas. The two divisions, 1st/3rd and 1st/5th, detached to deal with *V. 187*, had rejoined the *Fearless*, the *Lurcher* had recognised and joined the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron at 1000, and as the *Fearless* had sighted the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron³ at 0903 all our forces were comparatively clear as to the general situation and their positions relative to one another. At 1050 the Battle Cruisers had sighted the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and completed the link of communication between all forces present.

This was most fortunate, for the most decisive and most critical phase of the action was about to begin.

At 1046 Commodore (T) had sighted and engaged the *Strassburg*, then at 1105 a second light cruiser had appeared which the *Fearless* had attacked, and at 1116 the *Strassburg* had reappeared and was firing heavily on the *Arethusa*. The *Arethusa's* W/T was working again when the second cruiser appeared about 1105 and Commodore Tyrwhitt signalled to the Vice-Admiral that he was being attacked by a large cruiser in $54^{\circ} 0' N.$, $7^{\circ} 13' E.$, which Admiral Beatty received at 1125. Three minutes later came a second signal⁴ from Commodore Tyrwhitt asking for support, and stating that he was hard pressed.

¹ *Arethusa's* W/T was out of action from 0825, and the *Fearless* and destroyers previous to Beatty's signal of 1000 were probably only vaguely aware of his position and movements. It will be remembered that Tyrwhitt had learnt of Beatty's presence only

that morning at 4 a.m., and probably many destroyers knew nothing about it.

² Not mentioned in German accounts.

³ *Nottingham* and *Lowestoft*.

⁴ Beatty's despatch.

Admiral Beatty had already ordered the whole of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron at 1120 and then the *Invincible* to go to Tyrwhitt's assistance.

At this moment another urgent appeal came in from Captain D I (*Fearless*), implying that the position of the flotillas was critical, and Beatty decided to take his whole force into the Bight.

34. **V.-A., B.C.'s Appreciation.**—It was now 1130, and the situation as it appeared to Admiral Beatty can be best described in the words of his despatch.¹

VICE-ADMIRAL'S DESPATCH.

"11.25 a.m.—Received signal from Commodore (T) :—

"Am attacked by large cruiser, 54° 0', N. 7° 13' E. No course received."

"11.28 a.m.—Received signal from Commodore (T) :—

"Respectfully request that I may be supported. Am hard pressed."²

"11.30 a.m.—Received from Captain D, 1st Flotilla :—

"Assistance urgently required, 54° 9', N. 6° 5' E."

"At 11.30 the B.C.S., in 54° 9' N., 6° 5' E., turned to E.S.E. and worked up to full speed.

"These signals, received 11.25, 11.28, and 11.30, were practically the first news we had got since 7.55 a.m. as to the movements of the flotillas, or the result of an action which had apparently been in progress for 3½ hours. The situation appeared to me to be extremely critical, the flotillas had advanced on their sweep only 10 miles since 8 a.m., and thus were only 26 miles from an enemy base in their rear,³ with another base 25 miles on their flank to the westward of them,⁴ *Arethusa* was already reduced to 10 knots, and there was the possibility of a grave disaster.

"At 11.30, I therefore decided that the only course possible was to take the B.C.S. at full speed to the eastward. To be of any value the support must be overwhelming and carried out at the highest speed possible, and as there were indications of the presence of 3 or 4 enemy ships, one of which was reported a large cruiser, I did not deem the L.C.S., two of whose ships were detached,⁵ to be strong enough to deal with the situation sufficiently rapidly.

"I had not lost sight of the danger to my Squadron from the following :—

"(1) Enemy submarines; (2) our own submarines; (3) the possible sortie of a large enemy force from their base, especially in view of the state of the weather, which to the south-east was misty.

"(1) I discounted by the fact that our high speed made their attack difficult, and the smooth state of the sea made their detection easy when keeping a good look-out.

"(2) I discounted, partly for the same reason and partly because I had now been able to communicate with Comm. (S), who was now in sight, and informed me at 11.55 a.m. that our submarines were 20 miles ahead, *i.e.*, to the Eastward. This gave room to manœuvre, and his presence with me was some measure of protection.

"(3) I discounted because our force was so powerful that we could only have been stopped by a Battle Squadron, which was unlikely to be out in time if we were sufficiently rapid in our support."

Judging then that the occasion justified the risks to be taken, at 1135 Admiral Beatty turned his squadron to the south-east and increased to 26 knots. At 1124 he formed the battle cruisers in single line ahead with the *Lion* leading, worked up to full speed (27 knots), and proceeded E.S.E. to throw the weight of his whole force into the balance of the day.

CHAPTER IX.

PHASE IV.—ENGAGEMENT WITH MAINZ AND ARRIVAL OF 1ST LIGHT CRUISER SQUADRON.

35. **1st 2nd, 3rd, and 5th Divisions sight Mainz 1130.**—The 2nd, 3rd, and 5th Divisions of the 1st Flotilla had taken little part in the second engagement with the *Strassburg*,⁶ for they had continued to the westward at 1105, when the *Arethusa* recalled the *Fearless* and the flotillas after the *Strassburg's* disappearance

¹ This was written on 30th August after the action, when Admiral Beatty had considerably more information than on 28th August, but it embodies his appreciation of the situation at 1130.

² Not in signal logs, *Lion* or *Arethusa*.

³ Heligoland and/or Wilhelmshaven.

⁴ Emden.

⁵ *Viz.*: *Nottingham* and *Lowestoft* detached at 0805 by Commodore L.C.S. on receipt, at 0800, of signal from Comm. (T) that he was engaged with enemy destroyers.

⁶ Most of the destroyers report firing a few rounds at *Strassburg* at long range.

HELIGOLAND BIGHT

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
PLAN 5.

I/2nd, 3rd and 5th Divisions v "MAINZ"

Arrival of First Light Cruiser Squadron.

1150.
Compiled from signal logs and despatches of Ships engaged.
Evidence is not sufficiently detailed to plot exact movements of Ships.

"STRALSUND" appears
for a short time and
fires a few rounds
at Destroyers.



to the northward in the mist.¹ At 1130 these 11 boats were 4 or 5 miles ahead of *Arethusa* when they sighted, almost ahead of them, a three-funnel German light cruiser making to the northward. This was the *Mainz*,² which had left the Ems at about 9 30 that morning when reports were coming in of the presence of our ships in the Bight. As our 1st flotilla sighted her they altered course to the northward, formed into single line ahead, with the *Ariel* leading the 2nd division, followed by the 3rd and 5th divisions, and all 11 boats opened fire. The *Mainz* returned the fire and quickly found the range, placing salvos all round the destroyers, whereas our boats, owing to the long range and difficulty of spotting in low visibility, were unable to develop an effective fire. The *Ariel* led the three divisions round to starboard, first to the north and then to the north-east, the flotilla still firing ineffectively and still receiving an accurate return fire from the *Mainz*.

Between 1135 and 1150 the *Ferret*, *Defender*, and *Phoenix* fired torpedoes at the enemy, but, as might be expected against a single ship target, without success; in fact, despite the great numerical odds in their favour, viz., 11 ships to one, the destroyers found the limitations of their armament too great to enable them to stand up against a light cruiser, and they steered to open the range and escape her fire.

From 1140-1150 the *Mainz* was practically chasing the 1st Flotilla to the northward, and the latter were edging away to starboard to open the range. The danger to our destroyers lay in the chance of a lucky salvo hitting their boiler or engine rooms, but fortunately, despite the number of shells that fell all around them, no damage was done. Meanwhile, the *Mainz* was being led away clear of the westward line of retreat of the main flotillas, which had an important bearing on the situation, for if she had joined with the other German cruisers, viz., *Stralsund*, *Stettin*, *Ariadne*, *Cöln* (from the Jade), and *Strassburg* (which fired on the 1st Division at 1150), and had these all concentrated on the already hard-pressed flotillas, there can be little doubt that matters would have gone very hardly with them and the crippled *Arethusa*.

36. **The Light Cruiser Squadron Arrives, 1150.**—The *Mainz* continued to drive our 1st Flotilla to the northward, when at 1150 the situation underwent a dramatic change.

From out of the mist on the port bow of the 1st Flotilla there appeared four cruisers, steaming S.S.E. in quarter line at high speed. This was Goodenough coming down from the north-west in pursuance of Beatty's signal, "Support Commodore (T)." For a moment the flotilla was uncertain whether they were friend or foe; then the British forces recognised each other and with a feeling of relief the two leading destroyer divisions turned to port and joined the cruisers.

The *Mainz* must have sighted the light cruisers (or perhaps heard their W/T) two or three minutes before they were seen by the destroyers, for at 1150 she had turned sharp about and steered to the southward.

The 1st L.C.S. sighted her almost ahead and opened fire with their bow guns at about 10,000 yards. For a few minutes they gained on the *Mainz* and were hitting her. She replied with her starboard and after guns. She then apparently increased to full speed for she drew away from our light cruisers and disappeared to the south-eastward, dogged only by the 5th division of the 1st Flotilla, which had turned sharp about also at 1155 and stationed themselves on her port quarter. It was at this time that, receiving a report of *Mainz* that she was being chased by armoured cruisers, the German battle cruisers were ordered out in support.

37. **The Mainz runs into 3rd Flotilla.**—About 1140 the *Strassburg* had hauled off to the northward and left the 3rd Flotilla to reform on the *Arethusa* and continue for a time their retirement to the westward unhindered. The respite was not for long, for at 1208 the *Mainz*, escaping from the 1st L.C.S. and with the *Fearless* engaging her on her port quarter, came in sight, steaming to the south-eastward almost direct for *Arethusa* and the 3rd Flotilla, and running into a trap much as *V. 187* had done earlier in the day. The *Mainz* swung to the southward³ and the 11rd/1st and 2nd divisions, on *Arethusa's* starboard side turned to the northward and with the *Arethusa* engaged her on opposite courses.

The 3rd/3rd and 1st/1st division⁴ respectively on the port beam and astern of *Arethusa*, opened out as best they could to avoid masking the *Arethusa's* and each

¹ See para. 25.

² *Mainz*, 4,300 tons, completed 1908, speed 27 knots, 12—4·1-inch guns, 6 on broadside, and two 18-inch torpedo tubes.

³ The German account states that *Mainz* had already been damaged by [the fire of the

Fearless and that her rudder was jammed 10°, causing her to turn slowly to starboard. See paragraph 39.

⁴ *Acheron's*, which had formed on *Arethusa* after their torpedo attack on *Strassburg*, 1121 to 1145.

others' fire, whilst the 3rd/4th division on the port wing swung to port and steering to the southward closed the *Mainz*.

The firing became general at a range of between 4,000 and 5,000 yards, and our ships at once commenced to hit the *Mainz*.

The *Mainz* concentrated on the 3rd/4th division, who were about 5,000 yards away, steaming only 15 knots. The leading boat *Laurel* was hit with her first salvo, and the fourth salvo detonated the lyddite shell in the ready racks at No. 2 gun¹ and put the gun and all its crew out of action, blew away half the after funnel, wounding the captain² seriously, and doing other considerable damage. Smoke and steam poured out from the after funnel and engine room, and saved the ship by so completely enveloping her in smoke that the enemy lost the range and she was able to crawl slowly away.

The *Liberty*, the *Laurel's* next astern, ran into the zone of fire and was hit in a number of places, chiefly forward. The mast was shot down, the bridge almost blown away, and the captain was killed.³

These two ships were hit just as they were turning away after firing two torpedoes each at the *Mainz*, but the third in the line, the *Lysander*, had been compelled to haul out to port when the *Liberty* had stopped in order to avoid a collision, and in so doing just escaped a salvo from the enemy. *Laertes*, the rear ship of the division, fired a torpedo, but as she turned away after firing she ran into the same barrage and was hit. The range now was only 4,000 yards, but the German guns were so well calibrated that from this salvo the *Laertes* received four separate hits, a ricochet at the bow, one in No. 2 boiler room, a third at the base of the centre funnel, and a fourth aft in the captain's cabin. No water was left in the boiler, the *Laertes* was stopped dead and was cut off from the rest of her shattered division.

38. **Mainz Torpedoed and Sunk.**—But in spite of these losses, the destroyers had done effective work. Of the torpedoes they had fired one (at least) hit the *Mainz*⁴, and this added to the effect of the gun fire of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, the *Arethusa*, the three other destroyer divisions and the *Fearless*, which had come down from the starboard side of *Arethusa* across the latter's bow to reinforce *Laurel's* division, left the *Mainz*, despite her spirited defence in a crippled condition.

At 12.15 she turned away to the westward pursued by the flotillas and steaming at much reduced speed; then the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron came up to her again; she had fought gallantly, but was now doomed.

The light cruisers opened an overwhelming fire upon her, no more than 5,000 yards away, and soon reduced her to a wreck. No ship could stand the punishment she received; lyddite shell set her on fire, she was down by the bows, her mainmast and two after funnels were blown away, and her upper works were wrecked. An "indescribable" slaughter filled her decks, where dead and wounded men had been hit time and again by the stream of shells that came on board.

At 12.25 Goodenough ordered "Cease fire" and the *Liverpool*, *Firedrake*, and *Lurcher* closed to rescue survivors. Our men boarded her and saved as many as they could; the *Liverpool* took off 87 officers and men, the *Lurcher* 224, and *Firedrake* 33, but there were still a few living on board her, when at 8 minutes past one she settled more deeply by the bows, hung for a moment with her screws above water, then sank head first.

39. **The German Account.**⁵—The *Mainz* in the Ems had raised steam for full speed on receipt of W/T reports of the engagement of the patrols with enemy light forces, and was underweigh shortly after 0900. In the river were also 6 boats of the 2nd torpedo flotilla (the other 4 with the flotilla leader were at Emden, coaling), but they were ordered to remain to protect the Ems.

The *Mainz* steered a northerly course with the intention of meeting the enemy on their withdrawal westward and soon after ran into thick weather. The Borkum aeroplane was sent to scout ahead, but returned after a short flight without sighting the enemy, and it was on the W/T report of the *Strassburg* that *Mainz* realised she might expect to meet the enemy at about 11.30.

¹ The centre line gun between the funnels.


² Commander F. F. Rose.

³ Lient.-Commander N. W. H. Barttelot.

⁴ *Louis* and *Lydiard* reports say this was fired by *Lydiard* (just after the *Laurel* received her big salvo), and that it brought down the mainmast and two aft funnels.

Most of the destroyers' despatches agree that at least one torpedo took effect on the *Mainz*. The following destroyers also claim hits:—*Legion*, *Landrail*, *Liberty*, (2) *Laertes*. German Official History states she was hit by one torpedo.

⁵ German Official History, pp. 175 et seq.



HELIGOLAND BIGHT


AUGUST 28th 1914.

PLAN 6.

"ARETHUSA" and III Flotilla v "MAINZ"
1205 - 1235.

Compiled from signal logs and despatches of Ships engaged.
"FEARLESS" track approximate owing to lack of exact evidence.

Scale
2,000 Yards. 1000 0 1 2 3 4 5 Sea Miles.



At 11.30 the *Arethusa* and 8 destroyers¹ appeared to the N.E. 7,000 yards distant, on a westerly course. *Mainz* altered course to the N.W. to bring her guns to bear, and the enemy turned away to the north after the first salvo; the visibility was poor, and *Mainz* altered course slightly to starboard to keep the enemy in range, and continued the engagement, remaining unhit, though hits were observed on two of the enemy destroyers.

At 11.45 smoke was suddenly discovered to the north-west, and a few minutes later three *Town* class cruisers were discerned. The *Mainz* immediately turned hard-a-starboard, but in spite of this began to be hit. She shifted her fire to the new arrivals, the flotillas being by now out of sight in the mist.

By 11.55 the enemy could only be discerned by the flashes of his guns, and shortly afterwards fire ceased. The *Mainz* steered a south-westerly course for the Eastern Ems, but now, another cruiser (the *Fearless*) appeared on the port beam, with six destroyers in close formation, slightly ahead of her. An engagement developed, many torpedoes being fired at the *Mainz*, when about 1200 the rudder suddenly jammed 10° to starboard. No damage to the steering gear could be discovered, and it was concluded that a shell bursting under water had bent the rudder.

The port engine was stopped, but the *Mainz* continued to turn slowly to starboard.

By now, three guns with their crews were totally out of action, and the three *Town* cruisers with the *Arethusa* and her eight destroyers were able once more to come up, until *Mainz* was in action with no less than 5 cruisers and 20 destroyers. On the latter she concentrated her fire at close range and scored a number of hits. But she had suffered terribly; by 12.20 almost all the guns and their crews were out of action, the upper deck was a shambles, the ammunition supply had stopped, and many of the compartments had to be evacuated. Speed had been reduced to half-speed with one engine.

The ship was then struck by a torpedo, port side amidships, apparently in the 4th boiler room, and most of the communications to the conning tower were destroyed. The captain ordered the vessel to be sunk and the crew to save themselves by swimming.

As a consequence of the torpedo hit the guns ceased fire, but fire was opened again with two guns through the exertions of the 1st Lieutenant (Lieut.-Commander Thalens) who had not heard the Captain's order; three torpedoes, too, were fired, but without success, as the ship could not be steered and the enemy were now almost astern and out of torpedo range.

The enemy, who had ceased fire at the same time as the *Mainz*, reopened with her. A 12-inch (sic) shell, according to one report, penetrated to the main deck without bursting, and huge bursts were raising great splashes around the ship.²

At 12.35 the order to sink and abandon the ship was repeated. Ten minutes later the enemy ceased firing, the seacocks were opened in the port engine and torpedo rooms, and the men came up from below.

The state of the *Mainz* at this time was indescribable; she had been hit 200 to 300 times. The W/T Office was destroyed, two funnels were down, and huge holes had been made in the ship. The ruins of the upper deck were glazed over with green and yellow stuff from bursting shells, which emitted suffocating gas. At the last, one gun only was firing, served by the single survivor of its crew. When the final round was expended, the enemy also ceased fire.

Down below, the ship was equally helpless.

At about 12.15 she was struck by a torpedo. The lights gradually went out until electric torches were the only means of illumination. The engines stopped, and the ship was found to be sinking slowly by the head. Attempts to locate the leak proved in vain, as no replies could be got from various departments. Communication was broken with the conning tower. Water poured out of the speaking tubes, showing that it had risen above the armoured deck, and that the ship was doomed.

Directly fire ceased the enemy made every effort to save the survivors. The *Lurcher* laid herself alongside the ship aft, (for up to 1300 the *Mainz* took no list, the port bunkers being full of coal) and all the wounded were transferred to her.

At 1310, shortly after she had taken a list to port, the *Mainz* sank, with colours flying.

In the Western Ems the 3rd Flotilla, which could clearly bear the sound of the action, was held in readiness just outside the entrance. At 12.30, G. 169 (Lieut.-Commander Lemelsen) sighted a periscope and at 1317³ a torpedo was fired at him, missing him ahead only by 15 metres.

At 1350, S. 165 (Lieut.-Commander Bothmer) sighted smoke in the north-north-west, steamed towards it, and at 1450 made out an enemy cruiser with two destroyers in 074e., 35 miles from Borkum. He reported the fact by W/T, but lacking the support of cruisers, and orders from the command, no action could be taken.

CHAPTER X.

THE BATTLE CRUISER SQUADRON COMES IN.

Situation at 1225.—It was now 1225. Commodore (T), seeing the *Mainz* in flames and sinking, recalled the *Fearless* and the destroyers, and was about to resume his retirement to the westward.

¹ Actually, the 1/2nd, 3rd and 5th divisions, viz., 11 destroyers, detached from the flotillas.

² There is no mention in British sources of the battle cruisers firing on the *Mainz*. They did not do so. The German Official History

discounts the fire of the *Arethusa*, and states that it was from the light cruisers she received the first hit, and she fell a victim only to their superiority. G.O.H., 199.

³ At 1305 according to D 2's despatch.



HELIGOLAND BIGHT

AUGUST 28th 1914.

PLAN 7.

Sinking of "KÖLN" and "ARIADNE".
1238-1310.

Compiled from signal and deck logs, and despatches of Ships engaged.
Track of B.C.S. shows times at which "LION" altered course.



damage beyond breaking a few electric circuits. Four destroyers passed over the area without seeing any trace of survivors, and only one man was saved.¹ Of the other German ships, the *Strassburg*² and *Stralsund* had disappeared, though at 1310 during a lift in the mist, the Light Cruiser Squadron had sighted a four-funnel German cruiser³ away to the southward near the German coast. The squadron was then steaming to the eastward in wake of the *Invincible*, about 4 miles astern of the *Lion*. A few shots were interchanged with her, but the battle cruisers did not open fire, and after a few minutes she disappeared in the mist, and was not seen again.

42. **Retire at 1310.**—The general situation of the forces was not without danger, for though the cruiser squadrons had sunk the *Mainz* and *Cöln*, damaged the *Ariadne* irretrievably, and by their opportune arrival extricated the flotillas from an unfavourable situation, the day was not over. The Battle Cruiser Squadron was only 25 miles from Heligoland, and the *Arethusa* and three or four destroyers were crippled and would have to be escorted home. Our forces had been engaged with the enemy for over six hours, and strong German reinforcements might arrive at any moment.

The risk from mines and submarines was also an appreciable one, and in view of these considerations, Admiral Beatty decided that it was time to withdraw, and at 1310 made the general signal to retire. Fifty minutes later the German battle cruisers⁴ were crossing the bar of the Outer Jade.

CHAPTER XI.

THE GERMAN ACCOUNT.

43. The German view of the situation can best be studied in the wireless signals which passed during the day.⁵

Three distinct phases can be discerned in them, for it was only gradually that the nature and magnitude of the attack began to be appreciated. The steps taken early in the morning up to 0630 were directed merely against the submarine which had fired at *G. 194*. Then came reports of the appearance of light cruisers and destroyers and finally the receipt of the *Mainz's* signal at 1203 made it clear that battle cruisers had penetrated into the Bight.

It may be as well to summarise once more the cruiser and battleship forces in the Bight.

These were—

<i>Stettin</i> , Heligoland (patrol at anchor).	<i>Strassburg</i> .	} Wilhelmshaven.
<i>Frauenlob</i> , off the Jade (patrol at anchor).	<i>Stralsund</i> .	
<i>Ariadne</i> , off the Jade.	<i>Rostock</i> .	
<i>Hela</i> , off Heligoland.	<i>Cöln</i> ⁶ (to coal).	} In the Elbe.
<i>Kolberg</i> , Wilhelmshaven Roads.	<i>Danzig</i> .	
<i>Mainz</i> , of the Ems.	<i>München</i> .	

The battle cruisers *Moltke*, *Von der Tann*, *Blücher* and *Seydlitz*, were in Wilhelmshaven Roads. The last-named was having her port condenser retubed.⁷

The squadrons were disposed as follows:—

Friedrich der Grosse Fleet Flagship in dock, Wilhelmshaven.

I. Squadron—Heligoland (relieved by *Thüringen*, 8 a.m.) in the Jade. *Ostfriesland*, *Oldenburg* in Wilhelmshaven Roads. *Posen*, *Rheinland*, *Nassau*, *Westfalen*, in Wilhelmshaven.

¹ The German Official History states that one man was picked up on 30th August by one of their torpedo boats (flotilla and boat not specified).

² Cf. German account which states that at 1330 *Strassburg* passed the First Battle Cruiser Squadron at 7,500 yards.

³ The *Stralsund*; the *Southampton* scored some hits on her; vide Cap. XI., para. 47.

⁴ The *Moltke* and *Von der Tann*; the *Seydlitz* followed later. G.O.H., 196.

⁵ App. B.

⁶ Rear-Admiral Maas, S.O. (T).

⁷ G.O.H., 142.

II. Squadron—*Preussen, Hessen, Schlesien, Lothringen, Hannover, Schleswig Holstein, Pommern, Deutschland*, in the Elbe.

III. Squadron—Four ships, *Kaiser* class, in Wilhelmshaven Roads.

IV., V., VI. Squadrons in the Baltic at Kiel, also the *Koenig* class.

The Light Cruisers.—As the light cruisers proceeded and worked independently, it is desirable to give a brief review of the movements of each.

The engagements between the *Stettin* and *Fearless*, and between the *Frauenlob* and *Arethusa* have already been described. The *Frauenlob*, after breaking off action with the *Arethusa*, picked up *T. 3* and towed her to Heligoland, then proceeded to Wilhelmshaven where she arrived at 1030.¹

44. **The *Stettin***, after engaging the *Fearless*, returned to Sellebrunnen buoy (N.W. of Heligoland) to get steam up in all boilers, which prevented her covering the return of the 3rd Minesweeping Division as she had done that of the 5th T.B. Flotilla. At 1030 she received a wireless signal that hostile cruisers were chasing the 1st T.B. Flotilla in 133e (54° 9' N., 7° 25' E.) and proceeded thither at her full speed of 22 knots, sighting, at 0906, the eight destroyers which had just sunk *V. 187*, gathered in a bunch; turning to port she opened fire at 0908 at about 7,000 metres; at the fourth salvo the destroyers scattered, and at 0913 the *Stettin* turned to the N.E. to avoid a torpedo attack. The destroyers, however, left their mark on her. She received a shot through the W/T rigging, which put it out of action till 1100, one in the after funnel and one by the third gun starboard. Her casualties in this short fight were two killed and nine wounded.²

She remained in the vicinity of Heligoland repairing her wireless and giving orders to the submarines, for she had the Chief of the 2nd U-Boat Flotilla on board. At 1100, her wireless was ready again, and as the signals coming in showed the other cruisers to be steering more or less for the same spot,³ she shaped course to the westward at full speed. She arrived in time to see the end of the *Ariadne*, which she sighted at 1240 and took at first for a British cruiser. At 1245 she heard firing, which at 1255 she recognised as coming from heavy guns. A few minutes later the gun flashes were seen and the *Stettin* turned 16 points to starboard. As she turned she recognised the *Lion*, which, she states, opened fire on her without result at 1305. At 1320 the *Danzig* was sighted to the southward on the starboard beam on a westerly course, but turned east on being informed that the *Stettin* was being chased by a battle cruiser. The *Ariadne* was now seen in flames, but the British had ceased to pursue, and as the *Danzig* had gone to her assistance, the *Stettin* returned to Heligoland to get in touch with the submarine flotillas.

45. **The movements of the *Strassburg***.—The *Cöln*, *Strassburg*, and *Stralsund* had all been at Wilhelmshaven, and the *Cöln* which had gone there to coal had stated at 0830 that she was proceeding in support.⁴

The *Strassburg*⁵ passed the Outer Jade at 0934,⁶ proceeded on a W.N.W. course, avoiding the squares reported as possibly mined, and at 1055 met the *Fearless* and *Arethusa* accompanied by 10 to 12 destroyers; these attacked her immediately, forcing her to turn to port. Fire was opened on the foremost cruiser, and after the third salvo three thick brown pillars of smoke were seen rising from her stern; and turning to the northward she ran behind her destroyers. This brief action took place at 8,400 to 6,800 metres, and the British were now disappearing in the mist. The *Stettin* turned to follow the destroyers and 10 minutes later sighted them again on the port bow at 8000 yards. The same manœuvre was repeated. The destroyers attacked; the *Strassburg* turned to starboard and opened fire at a range of 7,800–5,400 metres; one torpedo ran parallel to port, a second passed by the stern and the destroyers then disappeared in the mist. The captain then decided to attempt to drive the enemy to westward on to the *Mainz*, but his intention was frustrated by the sudden appearance of enemy forces to starboard⁷ at 1127, and a new onset drew the ship further and further to the north.

¹ G.O.H., 159.

² G.O.H., 167.


³ *Strassburg*, 1108 in 122e is actually the only signal about that time.

⁴ B. 44.

⁵ Fregatten-Kapitän Retzmann.

⁶ G.O.H. 173.

⁷ According to the chart of her movements (G.O.H., Karte 27) these consisted of one English cruiser with destroyers; they appear to the northward again at 1149 (English destroyers) and at 1204 (two English cruisers with destroyers) and cannot be identified with any forces in the British accounts.



After a final attack at 1204 by the flotilla to the Northward¹ heavy gunfire was heard to the south or south-west and she steered in that direction, running into another bunch of destroyers and by 1240 was in action with two groups². Heavy firing was heard in the south-east and she steered for the sound of the guns. Twice she asked the *Mainz* for her position, but no answer was returned. Suddenly at 1300 a battle cruiser appeared ahead to the south-east steering north-east³, but the *Strassburg* turning to the north escaped without fire being opened on her. At 1308 two *Town* class cruisers were sighted at 8,000 metres on the port quarter, but an alteration of one point to starboard took her clear of them. She now commenced a big circle to the north-east to join the other German cruisers to the south, when at 1330 there appeared suddenly in 104e (54° 16' N., 6° 45' E.) to the south-east, four battle cruisers in single line on a south-westerly course 8,000 metres off. Fregatten Kapitän Retzmann every moment expected them to open fire and meanwhile kept a steady course to make them believe he was a friend and sent a wireless signal, "1st B.C.S. 117e course S.W."—the first definite and authentic⁴ report of the British battle cruisers. The stratagem succeeded. The British made a searchlight signal (apparently a challenge, U.A.R.) which he did not answer, and they passed out of sight about 1342⁵. Almost at the same moment came the signal from the C.-in.-C. "Recall all light cruisers" (B. 151) and the *Stettin* making a wide circle came down on a southerly course and met the German heavy cruisers on their way out at 1515.

¹ This engagement rests on *Strassburg's* authority only and must not be confused with her engagement with the *Arethusa* and *Fearless*.

² The *Strassburg* was evidently on the northern edge of the *Mainz's* final phase and this is her account of it. G.O.H., 191.

³ G.O.H., Chart 27.

⁴ *G. 194* had reported a large enemy cruiser at 0705 (B. 19), and the *Mainz* at 1200 (B. 109).

⁵ G.O.H., the *Strassburg* gave her position by wireless regularly during the forenoon. These were 0955, 138e; 1020, 135e north-west, 24 knots; 1055, 123e in action *Arethusa* and flotillas; 1108, 122e, in action two enemy cruisers; 1125, 121e; 1145, 117e, course north; 1150, 117e course west; 1215, 104e, co. south-south-west; 1235, 105e, co. west; 1300, 105e co. north-north-west 24 knots; 1320, 104e, co. east.

46. **The movements of the Cöln.**—The *Cöln* followed the *Strassburg* out of the Jade at full speed about 1000¹ and they must have drawn together when the *Strassburg* came into action with the *Arethusa* at 1055.

The *Cöln* was then some 7 miles astern of her with the *Mainz* apparently some 20 miles to the westward in the same latitude. Till 1150 the *Cöln* followed the *Strassburg* gaining a mile or two on her as the latter altered course to avoid torpedoes. The *Mainz's* last signal at 1200 reporting herself being chased by an enemy armoured cruiser was sent to the *Cöln* and passed by the latter to the *Seydlitz*, S.O. (Scouts)².

The *Cöln* probably altered course about 1150 to the west-south-west³, led to do so possibly by the heavy firing of the *Mainz's* engagement with the destroyers, only some 9 miles off on the port beam. It is almost self-evident that a S.O. (T) would steer to the sound of the guns in such a case, and in these circumstances she probably sighted the *Arethusa* on the port bow. The *Cöln* may have altered course in order to encircle the British destroyers, for at 1230 she sent a wireless to say she was in action with them on a northerly course. This was the last heard of her⁴.

47. **The Stralsund.**—The *Stralsund* left Wilhelmshaven lock about 1000, and on passing the *Seydlitz* received a signal "Proceed at once to assist *Cöln*." Later about 1030, came a report from the *Cöln* that 132e and 133e were believed to be mined⁵ an error arising from incorrect transmission of the squares in the *Stettin's* earlier signal, and the course taken to avoid these areas prevented her junction with the *Cöln*. She passed the Outer Jade at 1120, and, hearing of the *Strassburg's* engagement at 1027, steered for her, and was fired at on the way by an enemy submarine. No reply was received to several signals made to the *Cöln*; nor was touch made with the *Stettin* on the starboard side, and the *Stralsund*, shaping course to the westward, was in 128e (54° 9' N., 7° 15' E.) when at 1306, two points on the starboard bow, she sighted gun flashes, and shortly afterwards made out three British cruisers of the *Town* class on a north-easterly course in action with some opponent on their further side. The *Stralsund* turned at once to east-north-east, parallel to them, and opened fire at 7,200 metres on the foremost ship⁶; the fire was returned, and one of the first salvos damaged the wireless aerial; another passed through the ship's side above the armour without bursting, and further hits were only avoided by rapid alterations of course. Apparently at this time the action with the unseen ship ceased, for the fire of the three cruisers was now concentrated on the *Stralsund*, which was forced to turn away, without being followed by the foe. At about the same time, and within a circle of only 8 miles, three other and entirely separate engagements had developed, two of which proved fatal to the *Cöln* and *Ariadne* respectively. The *Stralsund* proceeded at 1330 to the north-eastward, joined the *Danzig* at 1404 in assisting the sinking *Ariadne*, and at 1535 joined up with the battle cruisers three and a half miles north-eastward of the spot where the *Ariadne* had gone down⁷.

48. **The Ariadne.**—On August 28th the *Ariadne* was senior officer's ship⁸ of the Jade and Weser Harbour flotillas. She had gone out on the *Stettin's* asking for cruiser support at 0810, but had turned back as the gunfire died away. Off the mouth of the Jade she met the *Cöln* proceeding westwards at high speed, and received an order from the *Seydlitz* at 1033, sent to her and the *Niobe*: "If possible proceed in support."⁹ The *Niobe* was coaling in Wilhelmshaven, so the *Ariadne* followed the *Cöln*, whose higher speed soon took her out of sight. Wireless messages came in from the *Mainz* and *Strassburg*, and, with due regard for mine suspected areas,¹⁰ course was shaped for them. The *Cöln*, from her wireless reports, seemed to be taking the same course. At about 1200 an enemy submarine¹¹ was sighted on the port beam, which dived and attempted unsuccessfully to get into a position for attack. Shortly afterwards gun-fire was heard on the port bow, and just before 1300 a battle cruiser appeared out of the mist. The *Ariadne* turned 16 points in a vain effort to escape. The battle cruiser chasing the *Cöln*¹² at the time,

¹ G.O.H., Chart 28.

² B 108, 109.

³ G.O.H., 189; also Chart 28.

⁴ B 120.

⁵ B 75; cf. B 55.

⁶ The *Southampton*.

⁷ G.O.H., Chart 25.

⁸ Führerschiff, G.O.H., 184. Fregatten-Kapitän Seebohm.

⁹ B. 30, 72. The speed of the *Ariadne* was 22 knots.

¹⁰ B. 75.

¹¹ E. 4.

¹² In the original "the *Stettin*." G.O.H., 185 footnote.

transferred her fire to the *Ariadne*. The latter very soon received a hit in the foremost boiler-room, which kindled a fire in the bunker, necessitating the evacuation of the boiler-room, and reducing the speed to 15 knots. For nearly half an hour a battle cruiser of the same class engaged the *Ariadne* at ranges of from 5,500 to 4,000 and 3,000 metres. The *Ariadne* received many hits from big shell, and a whole succession in the after part, which burst into flames. The fore part was also hit many times, one shell penetrating the armoured deck and putting the torpedo room out of action, a second destroying the dressing station and personnel, but by some miracle the bridge and midship portion escaped untouched. Many shells burst on hitting the stays; others struck the water without bursting, the English firing in salvos at fairly long intervals. The effect of the shells was mainly incendiary. Forward and aft the living spaces were in flames, which could not be quenched on account of the violence of the fire and the destruction of fire equipment above the armoured deck. At 1330 the enemy turned suddenly west, no doubt because the *Ariadne*, enveloped in smoke, could no longer be seen in the mist. Up to this moment the *Ariadne* had continued to fire, the gunlayers firing independently towards the end, as all means of communication were destroyed. All attempts to extinguish the fires failed; the wounded were removed; the magazines were ordered to be flooded, the foremost being already filled with water; access to the after magazine was impossible. The ready racks began to explode. The engines, boiler, and rudder were still intact, but smoke and heat made the ship more and more unbearable. It was decided to abandon the ship, and two cutters, which had not suffered much, were lowered. Just before 1400 the *Danzig* closed and sent boats. The wounded were lowered into them; the rest of the crew sprang overboard, swimming, some to the *Danzig*, some to the *Stralsund*. The non-swimmers were taken into the boats. The captain had gone over to the *Stralsund* to arrange for her being taken in tow when the ship suddenly listed heavily and capsized at 1525, with her flag flying. The keel remained above water for a little while.¹

49. **The other Light Cruisers, Hela, Kolberg, Danzig.**—It will be seen that between 0930 and noon the light cruisers all left harbour independently as soon as they were ready to proceed.²

The movements of all have been described except the *Danzig*, *Kolberg*, and *Hela*.

The *Hela*³ (Fregatten-Kapitän Paul Wolfram), already on patrol in the morning, on receiving the first report of the enemy in her position, north-east of Heligoland, had steamed west at full speed, but turned round at 1005 in a position 15 miles S.W. of Heligoland on bearing from the *Stettin* that the enemy had withdrawn, and resumed her position as quickly as possible behind the northern wing of the patrol line.

The *Kolberg*⁴ left at 1200 to join the *Strassburg*, but her slow speed of 22 knots handicapped her. At 1305 she heard firing on the port bow, which signals received about the same time indicated to be from the *Stralsund*. The latter came in sight about 1320 and the *Kolberg* turned east, as further progress to the west seemed impracticable on account of the large cruisers reported by the *Strassburg* and *Stettin*.⁵ The burning *Ariadne* then came in sight and the captain of the *Kolberg* decided to push to the north-west in order to cover her against further attack, a measure all the more necessary as signals made the British armoured cruisers only 14 miles away. The S.O. (Scouts) was informed of this movement, and at 1445 the *Strassburg* appeared from the north with news that the four enemy cruisers had last been seen in 117e; soon afterwards the German battle cruisers *Moltke*, *Von der Tann*, and *Seydlitz* came in sight.⁶

The Danzig's Movements.—The *Kolberg* and *Danzig* had received orders at 1121 to proceed and join the *Strassburg*.⁷ The *Danzig* proceeded west in fulfilment of this order and found herself at 1309 close to the scene of the *Ariadne's* action. The sound of heavy gunfire was heard and she turned to N.W. by W. to endeavour to join her own forces. On this course she met the *Stettin* withdrawing to the north-east; behind her the *Ariadne* came in sight and the *Danzig* turned on a parallel course to

¹ G.O.H., 184-7.

² Time of passing Outer Jade:—*Strassburg*, 0934; *Cöln*, 1000; *Ariadne*, 1050; *Stralsund*, 1120; *Danzig* (Elbe Light Vessel), 1130; *Kolberg*, 1200.

³ G.O.H., 167.

o AS 8794

⁴ G.O.H., 195.

⁵ At 1300 and 1312, B. 133, 138.

⁶ G.O.H., 196.

⁷ G.O.H., 194. Three App. B. 90, see also B. 82, 41.

the *Stettin*, and received from her an account of the situation. At 1320 a wireless came in from the *Stralsund* stating she was in action with three enemy cruisers,¹ and the *Danzig* turned again to S.S.W. to join her. But shortly afterwards the *Ariadne* made a signal, "Assistance urgently required." She was on fire fore and aft, and out of control, and the *Danzig* turned towards her and set about saving her crew.

The *München* had been sent towards Amrum to guard against an enemy incursion from the north.

50. **The Battle Cruisers.**—Between 0745 and 0800 it had become clear that a considerable force of cruisers and destroyers had invaded the Bight. Up to that time the conduct of operations remained in the hands of Rear-Admiral Hipper, the S.O. (Scouts), but at 0820 the Commander-in-Chief intervened and ordered the Battle Cruisers to raise steam and prepare to proceed immediately.²

Unfortunately they could only prepare to proceed and could not actually proceed for the Outer Jade Bar stood in the way. It was low water on the Bar at 0933,³ the least depth would then be about 25 feet,⁴ and the Bar could not be passed between 0700 and 1200, that is, roughly, within 2½ hours of low water. The Battle Cruisers were lying in Wilhelmshaven Roads. Rear-Admiral Hipper had asked permission at 0850⁵ for the *Moltke* and *Von der Tann* to proceed in support, which had been granted, and by 1100 these two ships were ready. The *Seydlitz's* port condenser was being re-tubed, and she had only one engine available. By that time the *Cöln*, *Strassburg*, and *Stralsund* had proceeded, the *Kolberg* was following them, the submarines were under way.⁶ But the latter were only underway off Heligoland in pursuance of the prevailing belief that in any attack on the Bight the British heavy forces would advance right up to the rivers in order to attack the German ships as they came out. It had not yet been grasped that submarines would find no opportunity in the Inner Bight of attacking British capital ships, but must seek their targets further out.⁷

Commander Hermann Bauer, Chief of the 1st U Flotilla, did not take further action till the news of the presence of the enemy Battle Cruisers came in,⁸ and by that time it was too late.

Between 1000 and 1115 constant signals were being made by the various cruisers working independently in the Bight, and at 1115 the Commander-in-Chief ordered Rear-Admiral Hipper to hold his forces in readiness to proceed.⁹

At 1205 an important signal was received through the *Cöln* from the *Mainz* that the latter was being chased by an enemy armoured cruiser.¹⁰ This was not in accordance with fact, but was accepted as correct and supplied a correct forecast of the general situation. It was clear that it was no longer an affair of outposts, but that heavy ships were in the Bight, and five minutes later, at 1207, the *Moltke* and *Von der Tann* were ordered by S.O. (Scouts) to proceed in support.¹¹

They passed the Outer Jade at 1400 under Rear-Admiral Tapken.¹² The *Seydlitz* with the S.O. (Scouts) was still delayed by condenser trouble, and the *Blücher* had only just come out of harbour.¹³

Nothing had been heard of the *Cöln* or *Mainz* for two hours, and Rear-Admiral Tapken accordingly decided to steer for position 121e (54° 9' N., 7° 5' E.), where the *Stettin's* signal of 1321 reported the *Ariadne*¹⁴ to be badly damaged, particularly as a signal from the *Strassburg* at 1331 dispelled any notion of her requiring assistance.

On his way he received at 1500 a signal from Rear-Admiral Hipper ordering him not to proceed beyond 128e (54° 9' N., 7° 15' E.), but to wait there for the *Seydlitz*.¹⁵

¹ B. 141.

² B. 47.

³ G.O.H., 142.

⁴ North Sea Pilot, 1908, Part IV., 188, G.S.H., 142, Wilhelmshaven is about 25 miles above the Outer Jade Bar. Curiously enough this very important factor is not mentioned in operation orders or in any of the British reports.

⁵ B. 51.

⁶ B. 71.

⁷ Commander Otto Feldmann's (Chief of the 2nd U Flotilla) Report, G.O.H., 181.

⁸ Even had they been sent out earlier it is very doubtful if they could have done much judging by the small achievements of the British submarines.

⁹ B. 38.

¹⁰ B. 109.

¹¹ B. 112.

¹² 3rd Admiral der Aufklärungsschiffe, G.O.H., 196.

¹³ G.O.H., 196.

¹⁴ B. 145.

¹⁵ B. 181; cf. B. 150.

At a speed of 25 knots and accompanied by the 8th Torpedo Boat Flotilla the battle cruisers reached the *Ariadne* at 1425, and the 16th Half Torpedo Boat Flotilla was immediately sent to the westward to supplement the patrol already instituted by the *Kolberg* (par. 49). An hour later the *Ariadne* capsized and sank in Lat 54° 6' 8" N., Long. 7° 14½' E. Rear-Admiral Hipper arrived on the scene with the *Seydlitz* at 1510 and carried out a short reconnaissance movement to the north-north-west, with the *Kolberg*, *Stralsund*, *Strassburg* and 8th Torpedo Boat Flotilla forming an advance guard, while the heavy ships followed at 15 knots extended in a broad formation 8,000 metres apart. The 3rd Torpedo Boat Flotilla was ordered to hold itself in readiness for night operations.

At 1441 the Commander-in-Chief had sent a signal ordering the large cruisers not to become engaged with the enemy's armoured cruiser squadron¹.

This limited the purpose of the reconnaissance to a search for the *Cöln* and *Mainz*. Wireless calls to them failed to elicit any reply, and unfortunately they did not push on to the spot where the *Cöln* had sunk, though at the northern limit of their advance the battle cruisers were only 8 miles off, and one of the light cruisers reached a point only 4 miles away.

It was regarded as certain that the British would have saved all survivors, and this is the only explanation for neither light craft nor torpedo boats being despatched on a further search of the area. At 1600 the *Blücher* had joined the battle cruisers; and in view of the danger from submarines and the necessity of making the entrance of the Jade before dark and getting in before low water, they broke off the movement and shaped course for home. Aircraft having reported no enemy ship visible within 100 miles north-west of Heligoland, the dispositions for the night patrol were made. The 8th T.B. Flotilla took up the outer line and the patrol vessels the inner line, with the cruisers, *Kolberg*, *Hela* and *München*, in support. At 2003 the *Seydlitz* anchored in Wilhelmshaven Roads and Rear-Admiral Hipper proceeded on board the flagship to make a verbal report.

CHAPTER XII.

SUBMARINES.

51. Interwoven with the actions of the surface craft on 28th August, there runs the thread of the submarine movements.

The Operation Orders had detailed *E 4*, *E 5*, and *E 9* for inner positions close to Heligoland, *E 6*, *E 7*, and *E 8* on the outer line West of it, and *D 2* and *D 8* off the Ems. The particular task of the outer group was to attract the enemy's destroyers westward, away from Heligoland.

E 7 of the Outer Group commenced the day by firing an unsuccessful shot shortly after 0430 at *G. 194* who was on patrol.² From 0700 the sound of firing was heard by the group louder and louder as the destroyer chase swept by to the eastward, and at 0730 the *Fearless* passed over *E 7*, but although enemy destroyers were sighted flying from our flotillas no opportunity to attack presented itself. Throughout the day the very calm sea and the high speeds of the enemy vessels ranging over a wide area, militated against the successful attack of anything except enemy destroyers on patrol.

The Inner Group heard the destroyer action proceeding from 0700 to 0830, and the boats steered westward towards the sound of firing. At 0820, *E 4* sighted one of the German destroyers flying from the British, but as in the case of the outer group at this time, no opportunity of attack presented itself.

The enemy destroyer sighted by *E 4* was *V 187* being chased by the 1st Flotilla, for shortly afterwards she was seen sinking, and the destroyers lowering boats to pick up survivors. Shortly afterwards when the *Stettin* appeared on the scene, and scattered the flotilla, *E 4* attacked her, but she turned away before *E 4* could get into position. Twenty minutes later (0928) *E 4* came to the surface and saw some pulling boats full of men lying deserted on the water. These were the *Defender's* boats which had been left behind in the scurry of withdrawal and whose crews were now to be rescued in this unexpected manner. They clambered gleefully on board, and Lieutenant Commander Leir, taking, "as a

¹ B. 166.

² G.O.H. 140 gives time as "shortly after" 0500.

sample" of the Germans, one officer, petty-officer and a stoker, left the remainder with provisions and a compass to find their way to Heligoland.¹ Hearing heavy firing to the south-west he then proceeded in that direction, and at 1210 attacked a cruiser of the *Hela* class² but without success; later, at 1315, this cruiser, accompanied by the *Stettin* passed him once more, but the distance of 3 miles was too great for attack.

Meanwhile *E 6* (Lieutenant Commander Talbot) and *E 7* (Lieutenant Commander Feilmann) had both met Goodenough's light cruisers, and the former had attacked them twice under the impression that they were hostile. In her first attack at 0925, *E 6* was sighted by the light cruisers and they attempted to ram her, but she dived in time. In a second attack, at 1145, Lieutenant-Commander Talbot had reached a position only 400 yards on the beam of his target when he recognised the colour of the ensign and held his fire. These incidents account for the anxiety felt by Commodores Goodenough and Keyes at 1000, when they met and realised the nature of the misunderstanding that prevailed.

E 7 had also sighted the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron at 1003, but did not close to attack as Lieutenant Commander Feilmann recognised by the silhouette that they were our *Town* class. An hour and a half later, 1240, he saw a German 3-funnel cruiser (probably the *Cöln*) but could not close to attack her.

D 2 and *D 8* off the Ems had seen a ship of the *Kolberg* class, followed by five T.B.D.'s, leave harbour at 1000 and patrol off the mouth of the Ems, and had made unsuccessful attacks on them. At 1015 the cruiser, which was evidently the *Mainz*, suddenly turned from the north-westerly course on which she had been steaming at moderate speed, to east, and proceeded along the coast at high speed, having presumably received orders to reinforce the German ships engaged to the eastward, and later she turned to the north, and came into action with the *Arethusa* soon after noon. This was apparently the only reinforcement that came from the Ems; and those that came from Wilhelmshaven offered no opportunity for attack; the submarines therefore did not play a very great part in the operations, a circumstance which was largely due to the unfavourable weather conditions and the absolutely calm sea which added to the difficulty of attack.

52. **German Submarines.**—Two attacks stated to have been made by German submarines on our battle cruisers during the operations, namely, at 1100 and 1400 were both unsuccessful.³ The first is reported to have been made by three submarines and was avoided by increasing to full speed and turning away. The second, directed against the *Queen Mary*, was avoided by the use of her helm.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE RETIREMENT.

53. With the sinking of the *Cöln* the day's fighting ended and there remained only to withdraw safely from the Bight. The battle cruisers with the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron remained on the starboard quarter (roughly, N.N.E.) of the flotillas steering to the north-westward, until 1630, when the *Invincible* and *New Zealand* were detached to reinforce the *Euryalus* on the direct line of the flotillas' westerly retirement.

Cruiser Force C had been off Terschelling light vessel throughout the action and had not moved to the Eastward in support, as the battle cruisers had done.

At 1600 they steered to the eastward for half an hour, and at 1630 sighted the *Lurcher*, *Firedrake*, *Laurel*, and *Liberty*, whose wounded and prisoners were transferred to them for medical treatment. The *Laurel* was taken in tow by the *Amethyst*.

At 1715 the *Fearless* with *Laertes* in tow and with five other boats had stopped and collected the wounded; at 1850 she met the *Aboukir*, received medical assistance, and was convoyed to the west through the night.

¹ They were picked up at noon by *G 11* and *G 9*.

² The *Ariadne*.

³ G.O.H. states that no attacks by submarines were made.

Arethusa.—Meanwhile the *Arethusa* with the main body of destroyers had proceeded westward, first at 6 knots and later at 12 knots, but at 2100 the damage to her feed tank made it impossible for her to keep her boilers alight any longer, and she was forced to stop and ask for assistance. She was then approximately in 54° N. 5° E., roughly 50 miles north-east of Terschelling L.V.¹

At 2130 the *Hogue*, of Cruiser Force C., arrived from the westward and in the pitch dark, lighted only by two small hand lanterns, took the *Arethusa* in tow and brought her away safely to the westward.

As various forces converging towards Terschelling were sighted by each other, "enemy alarms" occurred, but actually no enemy vessels were met after 2.0 p.m., and all ships finally withdrew in safety from the Bight and reached harbour on 29th August.

The *Liverpool*, with the prisoners from the *Mainz*, went to Rosyth, the damaged ships of the flotilla to Chatham, and the remainder returned to their previous bases, except certain cruisers and destroyers², required to stay out on the Terschelling patrol.

54. **The German Staff View of the Action.**—Viewing the operation as a whole, it was from the German point of view a distinct success for the British.³ Not a single ship was lost by them, while on the German side the loss of three light cruisers was particularly regrettable in view of the small numbers of these craft available and the slow progress of new building. On the other hand the German Staff History points out that they suffered little further damage⁴ while the British cruiser *Arethusa* and the destroyers *Liberty*, *Laertes* and *Laurel* suffered so severely that only the timely assistance of the Battle Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron saved them from further loss.

The superiority of the British destroyers seems to have been regarded as one of the lessons of the action.

"The British destroyers had been built with the specific object of engaging torpedo boats, and their superiority was evident on August 28th in single-handed combats; the odds of a 20 per cent. to 50 per cent. greater displacement in boats of the same date and 3—4-inch and a machine gun against 2—8.8 cm. and 4 machine guns were too unequal in artillery duels. The larger calibre of these guns permitted the English to stand off and fire, while the 8.8-cm. gun could neither stop nor sink a British destroyer."⁵

"It was found too that a single light cruiser afforded insufficient support for a flotilla, as it could not use its guns with decisive effect against a group of destroyers. In the *Stettin's* first action it was practically impossible to indicate to the guns the target to be engaged, a difficulty which emphasised the necessity of electrical directors. From the German point of view the raid was evidently intended to demonstrate the readiness of the British fleet for battle; the German fleet had hitherto, in spite of its weakness, taken the initiative; but the British, without abandoning their true rôle of the strategical defensive, had to make some reply to the activities of the German cruisers, minelayers and 'U' boats, in order to show that the old traditional spirit of the British Navy was still potent, though altered conditions of naval warfare no longer allowed it to adopt the historic rôle of keeping watch before the enemy's harbours. Had the Germans' capital ships been able to come into action, the high hopes cherished of their fleet would have been justified. The operation was conceived solely as a lightning stroke against the German outposts and by using the tactical advantages, which in such circumstances belong to the attack, the enemy was able in the single ship combats to bring an overwhelming force to bear. In spite of this the issue of the day hung upon a hair; the *Arethusa* had been badly damaged in her engagement with the *Frauenlob*; and in the morning attack only a single torpedo boat had been sunk. As they withdrew they found themselves in the afternoon surrounded by German light cruisers and threatened with destruction, when just at the right moment, and wonderfully favoured by fortune, the inrush of the battle cruisers and of the light cruiser squadron decided the day in England's favour.⁶ It must be regarded as tragical that it was just the German spirit of attack which led to the fatal

¹ D. R. position 1600, 53° 43' N., 5° 42' E. *Arethusa* (S).

² 3 cruisers of Cruiser Force C., and 10 destroyers of Harwich Flotillas were asked for by R.A., *Euryalus*.

³ G.O.H. 205.

⁴ Except to *T 33*, *D 8* and the *Frauenlob*.

⁵ G.O.H. 208.

⁶ G.O.H. 210.

outcome, for after the threatened outposts were once in safety, the cruisers ought not to have been allowed to follow the enemy to the west; this incident was the great mistake of the day. The responsibility was not so much with the cruiser commanders as with the command.¹ Even if the conduct of the war² prescribed an independent working for the cruisers, it was the business of the authorities to place some limit on it, which would have called a halt to independent movements in view of the state of the weather, known since 1030 and of the possibility of support by heavy craft being hampered by the circumstances of low water. In one point important to appreciation of the situation, the cruiser commanders left the command uninformed. It was only from Heligoland and then only at 1030 that the C.-in-C. was informed of the low visibility; not one of the ships at sea reported the decreasing range of visibility and the gathering of fog. As the weather was perfectly clear at the river mouth, the command was working unconsciously under a false impression.³

"A further question arises whether it would not have been appropriate, at 0800, when wireless signals reported an action fully joined north-west of Heligoland, to send out from the Elbe in support the Second squadron, which was hampered by no navigational difficulties.⁴

"But even with all despatch it would only have been able to reach 116e (54° 10' N., 6 56' E.) the critical point of the cruiser action with four ships at 1330 and then everything tends to show that it would have been surprised by the five British battle cruisers just as the light cruisers were. The outcome of an action between the latest big ships and old battleships could not long remain in doubt; the latter must have been overwhelmed even though they might first have damaged the enemy severely."

55. German Commander-in-Chief's Report.—In his report of August 30th, the Commander-in-Chief said the enemy raid into the Bight was an extensive and well prepared operation, greatly assisted by the prevailing weather and low visibility. It may be taken for granted that the submarines repeatedly seen in the Bight since August 21st had reported the position of our patrols and that the enemy waited for suitable weather with low visibility for the execution of his project. "The first lesson to be drawn is that we must on the repetition of such a raid either withdraw our own forces, however mortifying this may be, or at once proceed out with the whole fleet risking the possible losses from submarines. The enemy when he comes will come only with his latest craft and in such superiority as to secure him from a serious reverse. Under similar weather conditions we expect a repetition of this undertaking and our own measures must ensure that previous to the decisive action no vessel of any importance shall fall a victim to the enemy in such incursions, unless the operation demands a counter attack in full strength, as in the case for instance of an attempt to block the Jade, &c."

56. German Staff View. (continued).—But the order for the immediate withdrawal of the patrols on the approach of danger did not go to the heart of the matter, for unless big ships were available for an immediate counter attack, there still remained the danger of the outpost craft being rolled up by faster and superior enemy forces.

The mistake which lay in the employment of light craft in positions comparatively far from their bases was not yet clearly recognised. The report of the Chief of the 1st torpedo boat flotilla⁵ is interesting on this point, for he stated that the comparatively great distance of the outpost line from its base, Heligoland, was disadvantageous to torpedo boats, and this handicap would always remain in thick weather with a slow flotilla. He recommended that the outpost line should be close to Heligoland, and the flotilla cruisers should be held in readiness there. Another commander was of opinion that a strengthening of the patrols by day and night was urgently necessary, and the Chief of the 5th flotilla asked for armoured cruisers as supports of the outpost line.

The German Staff History goes on to say that curiously enough in not a single war diary, not even in that of the Chief of the Squadron, can any allusion be found to the fact that the reverse was due rather to the weakness of the system than to the particular measures taken. However much the patrols were strengthened by small

¹ Führung.

² Seekriegsanleitung.

³ It is obvious that ordinary visibility would have assisted the light cruisers to escape.

⁴ The II. squadron consisted of the Deutschland class of much less draught.

⁵ Korvetten-Kapitän Tegtmeyer, G.O.H. 212.

cruisers or even big ships, it would always remain possible for an enemy, previously informed by submarines of the necessarily more or less systematic disposition, to attack it suddenly with superior force at some spot before reinforcements could arrive. This was also the opinion of the Chief of the Admiral Staff, von Pohl. Any increase too of the patrol vessels must find a limit in the number of available ships and their necessary relief for coaling, overhaul and rest. The use of big ships in fixed patrol positions would expose them to submarine attack. The real weakness lay in the system and with it there arose a fear that the balance of strength¹, which the Germans strove for, would by a repetition of such attacks slowly but surely tend to the disadvantage of Germany².

It was necessary therefore to investigate whether the protection of the Bight could not be more easily and more appropriately secured by other measures. The patrol system, as the events of August 28th clearly proved, in spite of a triple line of vessels, had not been able to prevent enemy submarines penetrating into the Bight right up to the river mouths. In the development of this organisation the thought of a closer watch of the German Bight by the enemy had unconsciously played a part.

As opinion gradually grew clearer over the attitude of the English Fleet and the evaluation of the submarine danger, a fundamental change in the system of defence had to be introduced. It could no longer extend³ from the area commanded by the guns of the bases but must be handed over to harbour defence craft. This meant a great saving in personnel and material. Minefields must take the place of far advanced patrol lines, and these laid in the main approaches would sooner or later cause losses to the enemy, especially to his submarines, and introduce an element of surprise and uncertainty into his operations. The farther they were from Heligoland, the more surprising would be their effect, while navigation through or round them would be easier for ourselves than for the foe.⁴

A proposal to this effect was at once submitted by the S.O. (Scouts) on the grounds that the disadvantages accruing from the hindrance it offered to our own movements were outweighed by the advantages. The opinion hitherto held by the Admiral Staff that it would hamper the free movement of our Fleet only applied so long as one expected the enemy to offer battle in the vicinity of Heligoland. As this expectation, in view of the defensive attitude of the enemy, could hardly be sustained, everything was in favour of defending the approach to the Bight by minefields.

The command⁵ decided in favour of the proposal, and, after the necessary preliminaries, began to lay mines off Heligoland in September. The S.O. (Scouts) further proposed that aeroplanes, airships, and submarines should undertake the patrol⁶ of the minefields as well as the service of scouting outside the range of the guns of the bases, in order to report in time the approach of enemy forces. His further proposal for a line of submarines 60 miles out would have greatly interfered with their much needed employment in offensive operations. The closing of the Bight by minefields set free a large portion of the light craft for other duties; instead of being tied to patrol lines they could support the reconnaissances of airships and aeroplanes and also by sudden and unexpected movements make it more difficult for enemy submarines to lie in the Bight. In the event of an enemy raid, too, there would be a larger force available for counter attack and a better prospect for attaining the desired balance of strength. One thing, however, remained essential—not only light cruisers, but big ships, ready for immediate attack, must in such cases be available to cover the torpedo boats.

This gave rise to the following consideration. The 28th of August had shown that the English if they came would come with fast ships in strong force. If battle cruisers or a squadron of battleships were sent out to support our own outposts, an engagement between big ships might develop at any moment, from which it might be difficult to withdraw once any damage had been sustained, for then the entry of other squadrons might be unavoidable, and a battle might develop under conditions unfavourable for us, 'or at a time not in conformity with the political point of view.'⁷

¹ Kräfteausgleich.

² Cf. Tirpitz Diary, M.I.R., No. 13, 52 "If this kind of thing continues we shall soon be exhausted by attrition."

³ hinaus erstrecken (*lit.*, stretch out from).

⁴ G.O.H. 214.

⁵ Flottenleitung.

⁶ Ueberwachung.

⁷ "Oder zu einem Zeitpunkt, der nicht den Wünschen unserer politischen Leitung entsprach." G.O.H. 215.

These limitations dictated our policy of operations in the North Sea and found their expression in the holding back of the big ships.

The severest injury sustained on the 28th August was less in the material than in the psychological field. The failure of the big ships to support them was bitterly felt by light cruisers and torpedo boats.

The resistance offered by the older ships, the shooting, the behaviour of their crews left no doubt that with a little more favourable adjustment of the relative strength, victory would have been found on the German side. The responsibility was laid at the door of the command¹. To the disappointment that the big ships had not taken the offensive was added the feeling difficult to suppress that they had not been energetically led even in their defensive rôle. Instead of seeking the fault in the organisation of the patrol, the fleet wearied itself in pointing out and exaggerating deficiencies in details—typical outcome of an unfortunate first collision with the foe².

57. **Conclusion.**—The real import of the action lay not in the sinking of three cruisers, but in its ulterior effect on the naval policy of Germany. The events of August 28th not only confirmed the Kaiser in his decision that the fleet was to be held in reserve, but encouraged his fatal inclination to circumscribe the initiative of the C.-in-C., to the extent even of suggesting to the Chief of the Admiral Staff that Ingenohl should ask for his consent before joining in decisive action³.

Tirpitz, the Minister of Marine, wearied himself with protestations and complaints. He was in favour of a bold policy; his son had been in the *Mainz*, and was now a prisoner in England, so he had a personal interest in studying the details of the action. "It seems to me" he wrote "that they allowed themselves to be surprised."

He saw a picture of the German fleet—his fleet—shut up in a "great half circle of mines." "Our fleet will be bottled up. It is terrible for me." He declaimed against Von Pohl, against Ingenohl, against the Emperor himself. "It is the Emperor who holds Ingenohl back; he will take no risks with his fleet⁴."

Beatty, when he entered the Bight, did much more than sink three cruisers; he drove a great wedge into German naval Policy. On the British side the success came at an opportune time. The vast tide of the German advance was then at its flood; Liège had fallen; the Germans were drawing daily closer to Paris; no one then could see as far as 1918, and the retreat of our Army was viewed with something like dismay. In this dark hour the news of a naval engagement in which three ships had been sunk off the very mouth of the enemy's harbours brightened the prevailing gloom.

It strengthened the nation's heart, and gave it faith that the men of the navy were equal to their gigantic task. It sent a ray of hope and encouragement too to our hard-pressed army; the threat to their transports appeared less formidable; the fear of a raid began to subside. It gave the fleet confidence in its commanders, for those who saw Beatty's swift swoop in the nick of time felt that where they were he would be; and it gave the commanders confidence in the Commander-in-Chief, "warden of all and of so many cares," to whose insight and decision the despatch of the cruiser squadrons was due.

Four long years and more were to pass before the German fleet was to see the dawn of another misty day off the Firth of Forth, but the action fought in the mists of the Bight on August 28th was no small contribution towards the final consummation and will rank as one of the most important naval engagements of the war.

¹ Führung.

² The above is a summary and free translation of the view expressed by the German Staff History, i, 209-16.

³ Von Pohl, September 13th, 1914, in Monthly Intelligence Report (Intelligence Division) June 15th, 1920. "After that outpost action, His Majesty feared that the fleet

" might engage a superior enemy just as the light cruisers had done. In his anxiety to preserve the fleet, he wished you to wire for his consent before entering a decisive action."

⁴ Tirpitz Diary, September 3rd, 1914, translated Intelligence Division, M.I.R. No. 13.

APPENDIX A.

A. I.

BRITISH SIGNALS—AUGUST 25th—29th.

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| <p>1. From Admiralty. 25th August.
To R.A., <i>Invincible</i>. 1200.
(The Humber, Grimsby.)</p> <p>470. "You are required for service on Thursday as to which the orders are being sent by post. Until then you are free to carry out target practice, but all concerned must be warned beforehand. Acknowledged." 1200.</p> <p>2. From Admiralty. 26th August.
To C.-in-C., H.F. 1305.
"It was decided last night to occupy Ostend with 3,000 marines to relieve the German pressure on the left wing of Allied army. Belgian force have broken out of Antwerp and are attacking German communications. The ships will arrive off Ostend this afternoon, landing commencing to-day or to-morrow morning. This flank attack may cause some movement of the High Sea Fleet.
"A destroyer sweep of 1st and 3rd Flotillas with submarines suitably placed is in orders for Friday from east to west, commencing between Horn Reef and Heligoland, with battle cruisers in support." 1305.</p> <p>3. From C.-in-C., H.F. 26th August.
To Admiralty. 1635.
"Propose to co-operate in sweep on Friday (28th), moving Grand Fleet Cruisers and Destroyers to suitable supporting position with Battle Fleet near. Request I may be given full details of proposed operations by land wire to-night. I am leaving at 6 a.m. to-morrow," 1635.</p> <p>4. From C.-in-C., H.F. 26th August.
To Admiralty. 1754.
216. "Your 577. Until I know the plan of operations I am unable to suggest the best method of co-operation, but the breadth of sweep appears to be very great for two flotillas. I could send a 3rd flotilla, holding a fourth in reserve, and can support by light cruisers. What officers will be in command of operations, and in what ships, so that I can communicate with them.
"What is the direction of the sweep, and northern limits, and what ships take part?" 1754.</p> <p>5. From Admiralty. 26th August.
To R.A., <i>Euryalus</i>. 2345.
(Via Ipswich W/T.)</p> <p>493. "The sweep ordered for Friday will be carried out as arranged. After landing the Expedition¹ and on R.A., Channel Fleet, arriving, turn over the command afloat to him. Time your departure for Friday operation.
"When this is completed two cruisers can proceed to coal and make good engine defects. Three are to remain at sea with 12 destroyers to watch the Broad Fourteens. Acknowledge." 2345.</p> <p>6. From Admiralty. 27th August.
To C.-in-C., H.F. 0030.</p> <p>583. "Your 211. Co-operation by battle fleet not required. Battle cruisers can support if convenient. <i>Invincible</i> and <i>New Zealand</i> will be at 7 p.m., August 27th, in latitude 54° 0' N., longitude 3° 0' E.; at 5 a.m., August 28th, in latitude 55° 10' N., longitude 6° 0' E.; at 8.30 a.m., 28th, latitude 54° 30' N., longitude 6° 20' E.; at noon, August 28th, latitude 53° 56' N., longitude 4° 38' E. Report what you propose." 0030.</p> | <p>6A. From Commodore (S). 27th August.
To Admiralty. Received 0056.
"Admiralty letter M. 0073 has been received too late to supply copy of submarine orders to Rear Admirals cruiser forces C. and K. Submit they may be informed that Commodore (S) in <i>Lurcher</i>, and <i>Firedrake</i> will scout for submarines, towards enemy's coast, 27th August. . . . When battle cruisers proceed southward <i>Lurcher Firedrake</i> will keep a good lookout S. and S.E. for enemy's submarines. If any submarines are sighted, battle cruisers will be warned to avoid danger area. Commodore (T) and destroyers have been supplied with submarine order."</p> <p>7. From Admiralty. 27th August.
To R.A., <i>Euryalus</i>, R.A., <i>Invincible</i>, 0235
R.A., Cruiser Force C., <i>Bacchante</i>.
"During combined operations, two submarines will be sent to the Ems entrances, instead of one as detailed in orders. Flotilla cruisers and destroyers of the 1st and 3rd destroyer flotillas have been supplied with the following signals:—
"For use by day, rocket which, on explosion, displays red flag suspended from parachute signifies enemy capital ships in sight. Ditto with blue flag signifies enemy light vessels in sight. For use by night, red rockets signify enemy capital ships in sight, white rockets signify enemy light vessels in sight." 0235.</p> <p>8. From C.-in-C., H.F. 27th August.
To Admiralty. 0558.
"Battle cruisers and six light cruisers proceed to 5 a.m. rendezvous, 28th August. Submit that proposed action for light cruisers be signalled direct to Vice-Admiral, Commanding 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron to-day." 0558.</p> <p>9. From <i>Lion</i>. 27th August.
To Commodore, 1st Light Cruiser Squadron. 0800.
"Only battle cruisers and light cruisers are co-operating in Heligoland Bight. Have to rendezvous latitude 55° 10' N. and longitude 6° E. at 5 a.m. with <i>N. Z.</i> and <i>Invincible</i>. Am waiting instructions as to how Admiralty wish light cruisers to be employed." 0800.</p> <p>10. From Flag. 27th August.
To General. 0800.
"We are to rendezvous with <i>Invincible</i> and <i>New Zealand</i> in lat. 55° 10' long. N., 6° E. 5 a.m. to-morrow to support destroyers and submarines. Operations consisting of a sweep of a line north and south true from Horn Reef to Heligoland to westward. Imagine 7th cruiser squadron and odds and ends will also take part, but know very little. Shall hope to learn more as we go along." 0800.</p> <p>11. From Commodore (S). 27th August.
To R.A., <i>Euryalus</i>. 1105.
R.A., <i>Invincible</i>.
"With reference to to-morrow's operations, Commodore (S) in <i>Lurcher</i> and <i>Firedrake</i> will search for submarines towards enemy's coast-28th August. They will keep clear of destroyer flotilla and battle cruisers during night. When latter proceed southward, <i>Lurcher</i> and <i>Firedrake</i> will keep good look-out south and south-east for enemy's submarines. If any submarines sighted, battle cruisers will be warned to avoid danger area." 1105.</p> |
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¹ i.e., the Ostend Force.

12. From Admiralty. 27th August.
To R.A., Commanding. 1205.
Invincible and New Zealand.
"Your 12. Noon position immaterial, hope the enemy will be met before then.
"Beatty with three battle cruisers and six light cruisers coming to support. Beatty steering for your 5 a.m. position. Light cruisers for destroyers' 4 a.m. position, and will support them from the northward. Expect them. Two minesweepers ordered off Humber to sweep you out, but may not arrive in time. No mines reported near the Outer Dowsing Light Vessel. This seems the best course to shape. Acknowledge." 1205.
13. From Admiralty. 27th August.
To V.A., 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron. 1230.
"78. The light cruisers should support and follow the destroyer sweep. At 4 a.m. destroyers in latitude 55° 20' N., longitude 6° 45' E. Then at 20 knots turn to S. 8 E. (magnetic) and at 8 a.m. should arrive in latitude 54° 5' N., longitude 7° 35' E., when they will turn to W. ¼ S., (magnetic) and with a front of 9 miles sweep on that course. Light cruisers keep to the northward of the destroyer sweep. Report your proposed method for supporting, so that all Squadrons may be informed."
- 13A. From Admiralty. 27th August
To R.A., *Euryalus*. 1310.
Commodore (S) *Arethusa*.
Commodore (T) *Maidstone*.
500. "Beatty's three battle cruisers and six light cruisers coming to support battle cruisers steering for 5 a.m. position, *Invincible*; light cruisers steering for 4 a.m. position destroyers and will keep to the northward of destroyers in support during whole sweep. You must expect to see them there. 1310.
NOTE.—Commodore (S) and Commodore (T) did not receive this signal till their return on 29th August.
14. From Admiralty.
To R.A., *Invincible* R.A., *Euryalus*.
Commodore (T) Commodore (S).
"There being doubt as to whether the ship behind Rottum Lighthouse is German or Dutch, the air attack will not be made." 1312.
- 14A. From V.A., 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron. 27th August.
To Admiralty. Received 1754.
140. "At 0500 a.m. light cruisers will be 10 miles north of destroyers steering S. 8 E. until 0800 a.m., then turn west quarter south, until noon when they retire north on battle cruiser squadron. Battle cruisers from rendezvous at 5 a.m., 55° 10' N., 6° 0' E., will conform to movements of flotilla keeping north-west of them. Position 8 a.m., 54° 19' N., 6° 34' E., then steer west, quarter south, until noon." 1635.
15. From Commodore. 27th August.
To 1st Light Cruiser Squadron. 1825.
"Form divisions in line ahead columns abreast to port in following order, 3rd Division, 1st Division, 2nd Division, columns to be two miles apart." 1825.
16. From V.A., 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron. 27th August.
To Commodore (1st Light Cruiser Squadron.) 1800.
"At 4 a.m. Flotilla will be at 55° 20' N., steering S. 8 E. magnetic, 20 knots. At 8 a.m. they should arrive latitude 54° 5' N., longitude 7° 33' E., when they will turn west a

¹ *Invincible* (S) has "would look out for enemy's submarines and warn."

quarter south, and with a front of 9 miles sweep on that course, light cruisers to support them. Eastern pair to be at 5 a.m. 10 miles north 8 west from destroyers' 5 a.m. position. 8 a.m. alter course to W. ¼ S., and preserve your position as support to the northward until noon, or I signal retire. Battle Cruiser's will steer from 5 a.m. position, latitude 55° 10' N., longitude 6° S 49 E., 17 knots, until 6.30 then S. 16 W. until 8 a.m., then will be in latitude 54° 32' N., longitude 6° 34' E., and will then turn to W. ¼ S. until noon or I signal retire. When retire is signalled, battle cruiser squadron will turn to north and signal speed; you will then close." 1800.

17. From Flag. 27th August.
To 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron. 1830.

"At 4 a.m. destroyers will be latitude 50° 20' N., longitude 6° 45' E. Light cruisers 10 miles to the northward of the whole steering S. 8 E. until 8 a.m. at 20 knots. Then sweep W. ¼ S. with a front of 9 miles. At noon, light cruisers retire on battle cruisers. At 5 a.m. battle cruisers from rendezvous, 55° 10' N., 68° E., will conform to movements of flotilla keeping north west of them.

"Position 8 a.m., 54° 31' N., 6° E; then steer W. ¼ S. till noon. Should signal retire be made, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron will turn north and signal speed, light cruisers will then close." 1830

18. From *Lion*. 28th August.
To *Invincible*. 0240.

"Please inform me of your instructions. Do you know locality of our submarines." 0420.

19. From *Invincible*. 28th August.
To *Lion*. 0440.

"My instructions are to be in latitude 54° 30' N. Longitude 6° 20' E. at 8.30 a.m. from there to steer N. 80 W. magnetic. No speed given but by inference, 12 knots. Submarines are as follows:—3 in Heligoland Bight, 3 in longitude 6° 48' E., latitude unknown, but as arranged by Commodore (S) 2 off the Western Ems. 0440.

20. From *Invincible*. 28th August.
From *Lion*. 0500.

"The Destroyer Flotilla position at 8 a.m. should be 54° 5' N, 7° 33' E.; from then they steer W. ¼ S. magnetic. I was ordered to steer south magnetic from 0500 position. 0500.

21. From *Lion*. 28th August.
To *Invincible*. 0510.

"It is alright. Admiralty has been informed of what I intend to do; shall pass through 54° 30' N., longitude 6° 20' E., at 8.30 a.m. on a westerly course. Twelve knots is too slow in enemy's submarine waters." 0510.

- 21A. From *Invincible*. 28th August.
To *Lion*. *Lion* (S) 0535.

Commodore (S) is in *Lurcher* with *Firedrake* searching for submarines, S. to S.E. of my 0500 position. *Invincible* might do 25 knots for a very short time.

- 21B. From *Invincible*. 28th August.
To *Lion* (*Lion's* signal log, received 0652).

Admiralty signal last evening says Commodore (S) reports¹ enemy submarines and warns battle cruisers of the area in which they were seen. Attack by aircraft is not to take place. About noon a signal may be expected from *Euryalus* to say that operations are to cease and all vessels to return to their bases. I have no further information. 0645.

¹ *Invincible* (S) has "would look out for enemy's submarines and warn."

ACTION, AUGUST 28th.

22. From Commodore (T).
To 4th Division.
Chase S.W. 1 0655.
1 G. 194.
23. From Commodore (T).
To *Laurel* (4th Division).
Do not lose touch of me. 0656.
24. From Commodore (T).
To 4th Division.
Rejoin. 0718.
(Not answered.)
25. From *Laurel*.
To Commodore (T).
We have chased enemy to eastward, he is joining two more of me. 0729.
26. From Commodore (T).
To Commodore, Light Cruiser Squadron.
Destroyers are in action with destroyers. 0750.
(Battle Cruiser Squadron received this at 0755.)
Reply from Comm. Light Cruiser Squadron.
Where?
27. From *Lurcher*.
To Commodore (T).
Two four-funnel cruisers¹ 4 miles on port beam. 0745. *Nottingham* (w) 0747. *Southampton* (s). 0815.
¹ Light Cruiser Squadron mistaken for enemy.
28. From *Southampton*.
To *Nottingham*.
Support destroyer on your port hand. 0805.
29. From *Lookout*.
To Commodore (T).
Am engaging enemy on port bow. My division has very little ammunition left. 0855.
30. From Commodore (T).
To *Euryalus*.
Have been in action with two German cruisers, and many T.B.D.'s. *Arethusa* is badly damaged, 3rd Flotilla are intact. Report from 1st Flotilla not yet received. My position 53° 58' N., 7° 20' E. Course, N. 75° W., 20 knots. (Time, between 0830 and 1000). *Arethusa* (s).
¹ Also to *Southampton*, as far "damaged."
31. From *Lurcher*.
To *Invincible*.
Two enemy cruisers¹ 4 miles N.W. My position 0800, 54° 10' N., 6° 48' E. 0755.
(Received *Badger*. Intercepted *New Zealand* 0840, passed to *Lion*, received *Lion* about 0900.)
¹ Light Cruiser Squadron mistaken for Enemy.
32. From *Lion*.
To *New Zealand*.
Ask *Lurcher* for position, course, and speed. 0925.
33. From I. C. Submarines.
To Commodore (T), Captain (D.I.), and Captain 3rd Flotilla.
Lurcher and *Firedrake* closing from seaward. 0840.
(Intercepted *New Zealand*, passed to *Lion* 0857.) *Nottingham* (w) has code time 0830.
34. From A.C., 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.
To S.O., 1st Light Cruiser Squadron.
Am marking time round latitude 54° 32' N., longitude 6° 32' E. 0840.
35. From I. C. Submarines.
To Commodore (T).
Have our Light Cruisers come to this area. (No reply logged.)
Intercepted *New Zealand* 0926, passed to *Lion* 0952. Code Time, *New Zealand* (s) 0915, *Lookout* (s) 0915.
36. From S.O., 1st Light Cruiser Squadron.
To A.C., 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.
My position 0930, 54° 3' N., 6° 53' E., steering S. 88 W. 20 knots. Ships in company *Birmingham*, *Falmouth*, *Liverpool*. Situation very confused owing to thick weather. 0915.
37. From V.A., 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.
To *Badger*.
Tell *Lurcher* to make as much smoke as possible.
38. From Captain (D) (*Fearless*).
To *Southampton*.
Goshawk reports he is being attacked by cruiser¹. Position, probably astern. 0920.
¹ The *Stettin*, after *V 187* had been sunk.
39. From *Lion*.
1st Light Cruiser Squadron and *Lurcher*.
My position 54° 29' N., 6° 30' E., steering W. ¼ S. 20 kts. 0930.
40. From *Lurcher*.
To *Invincible*.
Am being chased by four light cruisers; ¹ am leading them in your direction. 0905.
¹ These were Light Cruiser Squadron which had turned to W.N.W. 0830.
² From *New Zealand*(s).
41. From Commodore (T).
To *Southampton*.
Please chase eastward. Commodore (S) is being chased by 4 light cruisers. 0945.
Received 1008 *Southampton* (s).
42. From Commodore (T).
To *Firedrake*.
I am fast coming to your assistance. Give me your position. 0951.
43. From *Lion*.
To S.O., 1st Light Cruiser Squadron.
Do not get too far to the south; keep well to north of destroyers. 0955.
44. From *Lurcher*.
To Battle Cruiser Squadron.
Cruisers are our cruisers whose presence in this area I was not informed. 0950.
45. From Commodore (T).
To S.O., 1st Light Cruiser Squadron.
I was not informed you were coming into this area; you run great risk from our submarines. Position of Commander (T) at 0945 should read 45 miles west. Please give me present position. Your unexpected appearance has upset all our plans. There are submarines off Ems. 1000.
Reply:
I came under detailed orders. I am astonished that you were not told. I have signalled to *Lion* that we should withdraw. *Nottingham* and *Lowestoft* are somewhere in the vicinity.
46. From *Lion*.
To S.O., 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, and all Destroyers, especially *Lurcher*.
My position 54° 26' N., 6° 14' E., remaining here. 1000.

47. From Commodore (T).
To Captain (D).
Is *Firedrake* and *Lurcher* among you?
1012.
Reply: No.
48. From Commodore (T).
To *Linnet*.
Go and see if *Firedrake* and *Lurcher* are
amongst those destroyers on the port beam.
(Time—about 1000).
49. From Commodore (S).
To Commodore, 1st Light Cruiser Squadron.
You are steering too close to the submarines
off Ems.
50. From S.O., 1st Light Cruiser Squadron.
To A.C., 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.
Commander (S) and Commander (T) had no
knowledge 1st Light Cruiser Squadron taking
part. I consider we should withdraw at once.
Submarines are closing to us. 1010.
51. From *Laforey*.
To Commodore (T).
Enemy's destroyers are laying mines. I
passed close to three of them when first engaged.
1030.
52. From V.A., *Lion*.
To Commodore, 1st Cruiser Squadron.
Who is supporting Commodore (T)?
Reply:
Commodore (S) is now astern of me. I
imagine Commodore (T) to be now retiring west,
but cannot get his position. Have you got it?
1050.
53. From *Lurcher*.
To *Fearless*.
My position at 1100, 53° 57' N., 6° 25' E.,
steering W. ½ S. Would like to join you.
1050.
54. From *Goshawk*.
To Captain (D).
German cruiser¹ coming up in south-east.
(Passed to *Arethusa*). 1055.
¹ *Strasbourg*.
55. From Commodore (T).
To *Fearless*.
Cruiser has turned round. Negative chase.
1100.
56. From *Arethusa*.
To *Fearless*.
I am proceeding at my utmost speed now.
Please keep me in sight. 1102.
57. From *Arethusa*.
To *Fearless*.
Cruiser is coming up again. 1104.
58. From *Arethusa*.
To General.
Enemy in sight N.E. 1105.
59. From Commodore (T). Received 1125.
To 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.
Am attacked by large cruiser. My position
54° N., 7° 13' E. 1100.
60. From V.A., 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.
To *Southampton*. Sent 1125.
Urgent. Detach two light cruisers to sup-
port Commodore (T) latitude 54° 0' N., 7° 13' E.
1115.
61. From Commodore (T).
To A.C., 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.
Respectfully request that I may be supported.
Am hard pressed.
Note.—Received by *Lion* at 1128, according to
V.A.'s despatch. No record in *Lion* (s) or in
Arethusa (s).
62. From A.C., 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron. Sent
1129.
To Light Cruiser Squadron,
Support Commodore (T). 1120.
63. From Flag *Lion*.
To *Invincible*.
Support Commodore (T). Steer E.S.E.
1140.
64. From Captain (D. 1).
To A.C., Battle Cruiser Squadron.
S.O., 1st Light Cruiser Squadron.
Assistance urgently required. 54° 0' N.,
7° 0' E. 1130.
65. From A.C., 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron. Sent
1142.
To Captain (D. 1).
Reply. Am proceeding to your support.
54° 13' N., 6° 5' E., S. 70° E., 24 knots. 1130.
66. From Captain D.
To 1st Flotilla.
Attack with torpedoes. 1120. *Fearless* (s).
67. From Commodore (T).
To *Fearless* and 3rd Flotilla.
Attack the enemy with torpedoes. 1135.
68. From *Goshawk*.
To Captain (D).
Am engaging a large three-funnelled cruiser.
1153.
69. From Captain (D).
To Commodore (T).
Three-funnelled cruiser bearing north-west.
1200.
(This was the *Mainz*.)
70. From S.O., 1st Light Cruiser Squadron.
To A.C., 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.
My position 54° 10' N., 6° 42' E. Course,
South. Engaging big cruiser. 1205.
71. From Commodore (T).
To Destroyers.
Enemy in sight bearing north-east. 1225.
From *Lookout* (s), about 1230.
72. From *Arethusa*.
To *Lion*.
Enemy in sight north-east. There is another
one to the right of that one. About 1235.
These were the *Köln* and *Stettin*.
73. From *Goshawk*.
To Captain (D).
Battle cruisers are in sight. 1245.
74. From Commodore (T).
To General.
Look out for mines. 1240.
Also made general by A.C., 1st Battle
Cruiser Squadron at 1310.

75. From *Lark*.
To *Lookout*.
I have no torpedoes left and only about half
a dozen rounds. 1252.
76. From *Lark*.
To *Arethusa*.
Submit I have no ammunition, and that I may
go ahead and get some from another destroyer.
1405.
(She borrowed 100 rounds from *Leonidas*.)
77. From *Southampton*.
To *Invincible*.
Enemy on my starboard quarter. 1310.
(This was the *Stralsund*.)
78. From A.C., 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.
To General.
Retire. 1310.
79. From A.C., 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.
To *Euryalus*.
All destroyers should be able to get clear.
Will you collect them and assist? 1410.
80. From A.C., 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.
To S.O., 1st Light Cruiser Squadron.
Shall pass through 54° 33' W., 6° 0' E., 4 p.m.;
you must use despatch to get out of enemy
waters. 1430.
81. From *Liverpool*.
To A.C., 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.
S.O., 1st Light Cruiser Squadron.
No casualties. *Mainz* sank at 1.8 p.m.
Prisoners on board 7 officers, 79 men, including
2 officers, 17 men wounded. 1440.
82. From *Lark*.
To Commodore (T).
Following received from *Lurcher* and *Laurel* to
Commodore (T). After funnel shot away, after
boiler out of action. Maximum speed 12 knots,
1 officer and 9 men killed, captain and 8 men
wounded. 1450.
83. From *Phoenix*.
To Captain (D1).
Submit may I transfer wounded most badly
damaged in great pain.
Reply:
You must retain your wounded until clear of
enemy waters. I will then endeavour to trans-
fer them for you. 1550.
84. From V.A.
To R.A., *Invincible*.
I cannot leave this vicinity yet. It is desir-
able to remain until destroyers are safe.
Euryalus is ordered to cover their retreat. Take
New Zealand and destroyers and support
Euryalus. 1612.
85. From *Euryalus*.
To Commodore (T).
Send 10 uninjured destroyers over here at
once; enemy's destroyers in sight. 1842.

APPENDIX B.

B.

GERMAN WIRELESS SIGNALS.¹

(Times converted to G.M.T.)

NUMBERED SQUARES.

Geographical positions of centres of squares mentioned in German account². Squares are 7 miles square,
and distance from centre to corners is 5 miles.

	Latitude N.	Longitude E.	Latitude N.	Longitude E.	
116b -	54° 27'	7° 5'	134e -	54° 3'	7° 25'
131b -	54 34	7 25	135e -	53 57	7 25
132b -	54 27	7 25	136e -	53° 40' to	7 25
133b -	54 27	7 35		53° 53'	
059e -	53 50	5 44	137e -	53° 40' to	7 35
074e -	54 4	6 5		53° 53'	
093e -	53 52	6 24	138e -	53 57	7 35
094e -	53 45	6 24	139e -	54 3	7 35
104e -	54 16	6 45	140e -	54 9	7 35
105e -	54 3	6 48	142e -	54 22	7 35
116e -	54 10	6 56	143e -	54 22	7 45
117e -	54 15	6 56	145e -	54 9	7 45
119e -	54 22	7 5	146e -	54 3	7 45
121e -	54 9	7 5	147e -	53 57	7 45
122e -	54 5	7 5	148e -	53° 40' to	7 45
123e -	53 57	7 5		53° 3'	
127e -	54 3	7 15	151e -	54 3	7 55
128e -	54 9	7 15	154e -	54 22	7 55
129e -	54 15	7 15	155e -	54 22	8 5
130e -	54 22	7 15	158e -	54 3	8 5
131e -	54 22	7 25			
132e -	54 15	7 25			
133e -	54 9	7 25			

¹ G.O.H. i, App. 21, p. 272.² G.O.H. i, Chart 5

1. From *G. 194*. Despatch ?
To I. Torpedo Boat Flotilla Receipt 0526
Fired at by enemy submarine in 142e; enemy craft steering north-west.
2. From *G. 194*. Despatch 0525.
To Cöln, Flagship of S.O. (T). Receipt 0550.
Fired at, at 0500, by submerged submarine 142e, 54° 22', 7° 35', middle, two torpedoes, did not hit. Saw periscope, 500 metres off, false alarm impossible. Enemy boat is steering north-west.
3. From *Seydlitz*. Despatch 0612.
To Heligoland Islands. Receipt —
To Air detachment. Look for enemy submarines 142e, if possible.
4. From *Seydlitz*. Despatch 0610.
To Cöln. Receipt 0614.
Vth Torpedo-Boat Flotilla hunt enemy submarine 142e.
5. From Cöln. Despatch 0610.
To Vth, Torpedo Boat Flotilla. Receipt 0625.
Vth Torpedo-Boat Flotilla, hunt enemy submarine, dived 142e (54° 22', 7° 35'). Proceed as soon as possible.
6. From Cöln. Despatch 0630.
To *V. 185* (read *G. 194*). Receipt --
Why was enemy submarine not reported immediately?
7. From Heligoland Islands. Despatch 0625.
To Fleet Command and *Seydlitz*. Receipt 0635.
To S.O. (Scouts). Aircraft 59 has flown to north to look for enemy submarine.
8. From *G. 196*. Despatch 0706.
To ? Receipt ?
G. 194 is being chased by enemy cruisers in 142e (54° 22' N., 7° 35' E).
9. From *V. 187*. Despatch 0720.
To Cöln. Receipt 0723.
To S.O. (T). 2 Destroyers in 116 B.
10. *V. 160* (read *G. 194*). Despatch 0705.
To Cöln. Receipt 0722.
V. 160 (read *G. 194*) is trying to cut off enemy submarine. The submarine reported is steering north-east by east.
11. From *G. 194*. Despatch 0750.
To Cöln. Receipt 0725.
Single enemy vessels, 142e. The enemy forces reported steering north-east by east.
12. From *G. 194*. Despatch 0705.
To Ist Torpedo Boat Flotilla. Receipt 0725.
G. 194 attacked by enemy cruisers. Enemy is in 142e, 54° 22', 7° 35', steering south.
¹ Delayed 20 minutes.
13. From Vth, Torpedo Boat Flotilla. Despatch 0725.
To Cöln. Receipt 0729.
9th Half Flotilla is being fired at, 142e, left middle (54° 22' N., 7° 30' E.)
14. From *V. 187*. Despatch —
To Cöln. Receipt 0730.
To S.O. (T). The enemy forces reported steering south-south-east.
15. From *G. 194*. Despatch ?
To Cöln. Receipt 0731.
142e. Trying to cut off submarine.
16. From *G. 196*. Despatch ?
To Cöln. Receipt 0735.
Single enemy forces 142e, left middle. Am being fired at.
17. From Vth Torpedo Boat Despatch 0829.
Flotilla. Receipt —
To 10th Torpedo Boat Half
Flotilla. Receipt —
Run into Heligoland.
18. From *G. 9*. Despatch 0725.
To Cöln. Receipt 0738.
To S.O. (T). 4 Destroyers in 142e, steering south.
19. From *G. 194*. Despatch 0705.
To Cöln. Receipt 0740.¹
G. 194 is attacked by enemy large cruiser.
¹ Time of receipt by C.-in-C., received Cöln with 35 minutes delay.
20. From *V. 187*. Despatch ?
To Cöln. Receipt 0745.
To S.O. (T). Two enemy light cruisers in 132b (54° 27', 7° 25') steering south-east.
21. From *Seydlitz*. Despatch 0702.
To Stettin. Receipt 0747.
Stettin hunt destroyers.
22. From V. Torpedo Boat Flotilla. Despatch ?
To Cöln. Receipt 0750.
A cruiser and 20 destroyers chasing Vth Torpedo Boat Flotilla.
23. From *V. 187*. Despatch 0745.
To S.O. (T). Receipt 0750.
Two more enemy cruisers, in 131b¹ (54° 34' N., 7° 35' E).
¹ Perhaps meant for 131e, see No. 34.
24. From *Seydlitz*. Despatch 0702.
To *Frauenlob*. Receipt 0750.¹
Frauenlob proceed against Destroyers.
¹ C.-in-C. time of receipt. *Frauenlob* must have received it before 0730, or proceeded before receipt.
25. From *G. 12*. Despatch ?
To Cöln. Receipt 0750.
To S.O. (T) and S.O. (Scouts). Nine enemy destroyers in 142e, right bottom. (54° 21', 7° 41').
26. From V. Torpedo Boat Flotilla. Despatch 0745.
To Cöln. Receipt 0755.
Cruiser support please.
27. From Stettin. Despatch 0750.
To *Seydlitz*. Receipt 0758.
To S.O. (Scouts). Stettin proceeding to 142e 54° 22' 7° 35' U boats taking up attack positions.
28. From Stettin. Despatch 0806.
To S.O. (Scouts). Receipt ?
In action with enemy destroyers.
29. From *Seydlitz*. Despatch 0750.
To *G. 12* and Cöln. Receipt 0807.
To Vth Flotilla. Stettin and *Frauenlob* coming at once.
30. From *G. 12*. Despatch ?
To Cöln. Receipt 0810.
Stettin wants support.

31. From Cöln. Despatch ?
To Ist and Vth Torpedo Boat Receipt 0810.
Flotillas.
I. and V. Torpedo Boat Flotillas retire under guns of Heligoland.
32. From *Seydlitz*. Despatch Telephone.
To *Stralsund*. Receipt 0810.
As soon as possible proceed to the roads.
33. From Stettin. Despatch ?
To S.O. (Scouts). Receipt 0815.
Assistance urgently required, 142e. Enemy cruiser behind the enemy flotillas.
34. From *V. 187*. Despatch 0745.
To Cöln. Receipt 0817.
Besides the enemy forces reported, two enemy cruisers 131e (54° 22' N., 7° 25' E).
35. From *V. 187*. Despatch 0805.
To Cöln. Receipt 0818.
Enemy forces reported out of sight; course South-east.
36. From *G. 12*. Despatch ?
To Cöln. Receipt 0820.
Frauenlob is engaged with destroyers in 146e (54° 3', 7° 45' E), steering south-west.
37. From V. Torpedo Boat Flotilla. Despatch ?
To S.O. (Scouts) Receipt 0822.
Am being fired at by destroyers in 146e 54° 3', 7° 45', steering south-west.
38. From *G. 12*. Despatch ?
To Cöln. Receipt 0823.
Six enemy cruisers in 132e.
39. From *Frauenlob*. Despatch ?
To Cöln. Receipt 0823.
Engaged. Destroyers, 146e (54° 3' N., 7° 45' E.) steering S.W.
40. From *V. 190*. Despatch ?
To Cöln. Receipt 0824.
Six enemy cruisers in sight, 123e (54° 15' N., 7° 25' E.)
41. From *Seydlitz*. Despatch 0800.
To *Danzig, München*. Receipt 0828.
Proceed forthwith with all despatch.
42. From Ist Torpedo Boat Flotilla. Despatch 0829.
To Cöln. Receipt ?
Two enemy cruisers, 133e (54° 9' N., 7° 25' E.) chasing Ist Torpedo Boat half flotilla.
43. From Ist Torpedo Boat Flotilla. Despatch ?
To Stettin. Receipt 0831.
Ist Torpedo Boat Flotilla, 133e (54° 9' N., 7° 25' E.) chased by enemy cruisers.
44. From Cöln. Despatch 0830.
To Ist & Vth Torpedo Boat Flotilla. Receipt 0832.
Cöln is proceeding from Wilhelmshaven.
45. From *V. 187*. Despatch ?
To Cöln. Receipt 0833.
To S.O. (T). Two enemy cruisers chasing 1st T.B. ½ flotilla in 133e (54° 9' N., 7° 25' E.)
46. From Ist Torpedo Boat ½ Flotilla. Despatch ?
To S.O. (Scouts). Receipt 0834.
Six enemy cruisers in sight, 132e (54° 15' N., 7° 25' E.)
47. From C-in-C. Despatch 0820.
To S.O. (Scouts). Receipt 0842.
Battle cruisers raise steam and prepare to proceed immediately.
48. From *V. 191*. Despatch ?
To Cöln. Receipt 0843.
To S.O. (T). Enemy cruisers have turned to west in 134e (54° 3' N., 7° 25' E.) right top.
Added in War Diary, S.O. (Scouts). "The reported enemy cruisers out of sight with course S.E."
49. From *Seydlitz*. Despatch 0822.
To Mainz. Receipt 0847.
Mainz forthwith attack in rear enemy flotillas by Heligoland.
50. From Ist Torpedo Boat ½ Flotilla. Despatch 0850.
To Cöln. Receipt ?
Two submerged submarines 139e (54° 3' N., 7° 35' E.) fired at.
51. From *Seydlitz*. Despatch 0850.
To C-in-C. Receipt 3850.
May *Moltke* and *Von der Tann* proceed in support as soon as they are clear?
52. From *Frauenlob*. Despatch 0845.
To Heligoland Island. Receipt 0900.
To *Frederick der Grosse* and *Seydlitz*. Been in action with cruiser, three funnels; flotilla visible ahead, 10 boats. Lively action. Enemy retired to north-west. Am damaged, coming in. Slight losses, (5 dead, 13 severely wounded, 19 slightly wounded.)
53. From *Seydlitz*. Despatch 0835.
To Heligoland. Receipt 0900.
U boats to be ready to attack.
54. From C-in-C. Despatch 0830.
To S.O. (Scouts) and Air station. Receipt 0903.
Heligoland.
Aircraft scout to north-west. Report class of enemy cruiser, determined whether and what forces are behind them.
55. From Stettin. Despatch 0843.
To *Seydlitz*. Receipt 0907.
Enemy in force—one cruiser, 29 destroyers, 154e (54° 22' N., 7° 55' E.) 155e suspected mined.
56. From C-in-C. Despatch 0903.
To *Seydlitz*. Receipt ?
To S.O. (Scouts). *Moltke* and *Von der Tann* can proceed according to instructions of S.O. (Scouts) if enemy is still there.
57. From Stettin. Despatch 0953.
To *Seydlitz*. Receipt 0910. (Posen).
Enemy before the barrier. One cruiser, 20 destroyers. 154e, 155e; mines suspected.
58. From Stettin. Despatch 0910.
To *Seydlitz*. Receipt 0912.
In action with enemy destroyers in 133e (54° 9' N., 7° 25' E.)
59. From Heligoland Island. Despatch 0900.
To *Seydlitz*. Receipt 0915.
To Stettin. U boats already proceeded.