

60. From Heligoland Island. Despatch 0900. Receipt 0920.
To *Seydlitz*.
An enemy light cruiser, 26 (should probably be 20) destroyers in the west in action with *Stettin* and our torpedo boat flotillas. Enemy destroyer, one hit in bows observed with certainty. Aircraft 21 and 29 fired at in 600 metres height without success—flying station.
61. From *L. 3*. Despatch 0910. Receipt 0932.
To S.O. (Scouts). 0750 retired in face of enemy cruiser in 142e. Am returning to *Fuhlsbüttel* on account of engine trouble.
62. From Heligoland Island. Despatch 0920-0940. Receipt 0940-0952.
To *Seydlitz*.
Aeroplane 21 left. Flying station.
63. From *Strassburg*. Despatch 0955. Receipt 1000.
To *Stettin*.
My position 138e. Please course and position.
64. From *Seydlitz*. Despatch Searchlight. Receipt 1000¹.
To *Stralsund*.
Proceed at once to support *Cöln*.
¹ *Stralsund's* time.
65. From Ist Torpedo-Boat $\frac{1}{2}$ Flotilla. Despatch 0930. Receipt 1013¹.
To *Cöln*.
At 0900 fired at two submerged submarines in 122e. Ist Torpedo Boat $\frac{1}{2}$ Flotilla.
¹ R.A. (Scouts) time.
66. From *V. 191*. Despatch 1800. Receipt 1020.
To *Cöln*.
To S.O.(T). Two more enemy cruisers 139e. turned west. I. Torpedo Boat $\frac{1}{2}$ Flotilla.
67. From *Strassburg*. Despatch 1020. Receipt 1022.
To Heligoland Island.
What is *Stettin's* position?
68. From *Strassburg*. Despatch 1020. Receipt 1025.
To Heligoland Island.
My position, course, and speed, 135e, north-west 24 kts. *Strassburg*.
69. From Heligoland Islands. Despatch 1025. Receipt 1026.
To *Strassburg*.
Out of sight to westward.
70. From S.O. (Scouts). Despatch 1025. Receipt 1030.
To *Danzig* via *Cuxhaven*.
Proceed to mouth of Elbe at once S.O. (Scouts).
71. From *Seydlitz*. Despatch 1025. Receipt 1031.
To C. in C.
Cöln, *Strassburg*, *Stralsund* proceeded. *Kolberg* follows. Our submarines are under way. S.O. (Scouts).
72. From *Seydlitz*. Despatch 1025. Receipt 1033.
To *Ariadne*. (S.O.'s ship of Jade-Weser harbour flotilla) and *Niobe*.
If possible proceed in support. S.O. (Scouts).
73. From Intelligence Service. Despatch Telephone. Receipt 1035.
To C. in C.
Following received from Heligoland for C.-in-C., High Sea Fleet: Wind east north-east, strength 1, sea calm, misty, visibility 4 miles. Telephone connection with *Wilhelmshaven* not yet established. N.S. 721.
74. From S.O. (Scouts). Despatch 1030. Receipt 1035.
To *Moltke* and *Von der Tann*.
Anchor at *Schillig*, in readiness to proceed.
75. From *Cöln*. Despatch 0955. Receipt 1038.
To C.-in-C. (II. Squadron received 0915.)
132b and 133e suspected mined. S.O.(T).
76. From *Cöln*. Despatch 1045. Receipt 1044.
To *V. 187*.
Report position.
77. From V. Torpedo Boat Flotilla. Despatch ? Receipt 1048.
To *V. 6*.
Collect minesweepers, 139e, 137e.
78. From *Danzig*. Despatch 1045. Receipt 1048.
To *Seydlitz*.
To S.O. (Scouts). My position 158e. Shall I return? *Danzig*.
79. From Ist Torpedo Boat $\frac{1}{2}$ Flotilla. Despatch 1050. Receipt ?.
To *Cöln* and *Rostock*. (*Rostock* was flagship of 2nd S.O.(T).
1st Torpedo Boat Flotilla is at *Sellebrunnen* Buoy. *G. 193* in patrol line, *V. 187* missing. . .
Note.—In $\frac{1}{2}$ Torpedo Boat Flotilla's war diary. "Not received by *Cöln* and *Rostock*."
80. From *Mainz*. Despatch 1046. Receipt 1050.
To *Strassburg* and *Stettin*.
My position, course and speed, 093e, N., 23 kts. *Mainz*.
81. From *Strassburg*. Despatch 1055. Receipt 1057.
To *Cöln* and *Seydlitz*.
To S.O. (Scouts) and S.O. (T). In 123e in action with destroyers, course west-north-west *Strassburg*.
82. From S.O. (Scouts). Despatch 1057. Receipt 1100.
To *München* and *Danzig*.
To *München* and *Danzig*. Await further orders in the Elbe mouth. S.O. (Scouts).
83. From ? Despatch ? Receipt 1107.
To ?
Am badly damaged. Both boilers out of action? a torpedo boat?
84. From Heligoland Island. Despatch 1035. Receipt 1108.
To *Seydlitz*.
To S.O. (Scouts). I have broken off the engagement in 133e for the moment; several English destroyers apparently badly damaged. The destroyers have retired. My W/T out of action. 4 dead, 2 badly and 8 slightly wounded. *Stettin*.
85. From *Strassburg*. Despatch 1108. Receipt 1112.
To *Seydlitz* and *Cöln*.
Am in action with 2 enemy cruisers and destroyer flotilla, position 122e, course north. *Strassburg*.
86. From *Cöln*. Despatch 1108. Receipt 1113.
To *Mainz*.
What is your position? I am proceeding to your support.
87. From Heligoland Island. Despatch 1000. Receipt 1115.
To *Seydlitz*.
Towing?—*V. 3*, *T. 33* to Heligoland then shall enter *Wilhelmshaven*. *Frauenlob*.

88. From C.-in-C., High Sea Fleet. Despatch, 1115 (Visual). Receipt ?
To S.O. (Scouts).
Hold your forces in readiness to proceed. Further movements depend upon the movements of the enemy. C.-in C.
89. From *Cöln*. Despatch 1120. Receipt 1120.
To *Mainz*.
What is your position?
90. From *Seydlitz*. Despatch 1119 (II. Squadron 1110). Receipt 1121.
To *Kolberg* and *Danzig*.
Kolberg, *Danzig* proceed immediately to *Strassburg*. S.O. (Scouts).
91. From *Seydlitz*. Despatch ? Receipt 1125.
To *Friedrich der Grosse*.
I am sending *Moltke* and *Von der Tann* to *Schillig* Roads. S.O. (Scouts).
92. From *Strassburg*. Despatch ? Receipt 1125.
To *Cöln*.
What is your position? *Strassburg*.
93. From *Cöln*. Despatch ? Receipt 1125.
To *Strassburg*.
Cöln is coming. Position 127e, left-hand side, steering N.N.W.
II. Squadron reads "121e."
94. From *B.d.A.* Despatch ? Receipt 1125.
To *Danzig*.
München and *Danzig* proceed immediately to *Strassburg*.
95. From Heligoland I. Despatch 1040. Receipt 1126.
To *Seydlitz*.
Aeroplane 59 proceeded north-west by west to scout. Flying station.
96. From *Strassburg*. Despatch 1125. Receipt 1128.
To *Cöln* and *Mainz*.
121e, approximate course west.
97. From *Stralsund*. Despatch 1130. Receipt 1130.
To *Seydlitz*.
Enemy submarine sighted in top right-hand corner of 148e. *Stralsund*
98. From *Stettin*. Despatch 1120. Receipt 1132.
To *Seydlitz*.
To S.O. (Scouts) 133e, broke off action; destroyers chased; apparently several damaged. *Stettin*.
This signal timed 0913, but could not be sent till 1120 on account of damage to W/T aerial.
99. From *Kolberg*. Despatch 1130. Receipt 1138.
To *Seydlitz*.
My position, at *Minsener Shoal*. *Kolberg*.
100. From *Stettin*. Despatch 1132. Receipt 1145.
To *Cöln*.
My position 151e, course west by north, 23 knots. *Stettin*.
101. From *München*. Despatch 1140. Receipt 1146.
To *Seydlitz*.
To S.O. (Scouts). Proceeded at 1140 at 23 knots. *München*.
102. From *Strassburg*. Despatch 1145. Receipt 1150.
To *Cöln* and *Mainz*.
Am in 117e. Course north. *Strassburg*.
103. From *Strassburg*. Despatch ? Receipt 1150.
To *Mainz*.
117e, steering west enemy south of me, *Cöln* 116e right; course north.
104. From *Mainz*. Despatch 1154. Receipt 1155.
To *Seydlitz*.
Am in action with destroyers. *Mainz*.
105. From *Strassburg*. Despatch 1150. Receipt 1157.
To *Cöln*.
Am in 117e, course west, enemy south of us. *Strassburg*.
106. From *Cöln*. Despatch 1158. Receipt 1159.
To *Mainz* and *Strassburg*.
Cöln's position 116e, right, steering north. S.O.(T).
107. From *Seydlitz*. Despatch 1150. Receipt 1200.
To *Cöln*.
General and Leader of VIII. Torpedo Boat Flotilla; VIII. Torpedo Boat Flotilla chase enemy submarines in 147e, protect inner Bight against enemy submarines according to plan.
108. From *Mainz*. Despatch 1200. Receipt 1202.
To *Cöln*.
Am chased by an enemy armoured cruiser. (Passed by *Cöln* to *Seydlitz*).
This is the last signal received from *Mainz*.
109. From *Cöln*. Despatch 1200. Receipt 1205.
To *Seydlitz*.
Am chased by an enemy armoured cruiser. *Mainz*.
110. From *Ariadne*. Despatch 1145. Receipt 1207.
To *Cöln*.
Ariadne is coming 135e.
111. From *Stralsund*. Despatch ? Receipt 1208.
To S.O. (Scouts)
Am in 135e, right-hand top corner, steering west.
112. From *Seydlitz*. Despatch 1207. Receipt 1210.
To *Moltke* and *Von der Tann*.
Proceed out in support. *Seydlitz* follows. S.O. (Scouts).
113. From *Stralsund*. Despatch ? Receipt 1214.
To C.-in-C.
Am in action with three enemy light cruisers. Course east.
114. From *Danzig*. Despatch 1215. Receipt 1220.
To *Strassburg* and *Cöln*.
Danzig's position 139e, right top corner. Steering west by north, 22 knots. *Danzig*.
115. From *Strassburg*. Despatch 1215. Receipt 1220.
To *Mainz*.
What is your position and course? Mine is 104e, south south-west. *Strassburg*.
116. From *Stettin*. Despatch 1210. Receipt 1225.
To *Cöln*.
My position 140e, left bottom corner. Course north-west. What is your position? *Stettin*.
117. From *Stettin*. Despatch 1221. Receipt 1225.
To *Seydlitz*.
VIII. T.B. Flotilla form submarine screen for armoured cruisers going out. S.O. (Scouts).

118. From *Stettin*. Despatch 1226. 133. From *Strassburg*. Despatch ?
To *Cöln*. Receipt 1227. To S.O. (Scouts). Receipt 1300.
My position 133e, centre. Course north-west, 105e, north north-west, 24 knots. Am chased
 $\frac{3}{4}$ west. *Stettin*. by an enemy armoured cruiser.
119. From *Cöln*. Despatch 1220. 134. From *Stettin*. Despatch 1305.
To *Stettin*. Receipt 1228. To C.-in-C. Receipt 1310.
105e, top centre, S.O. (T). Enemy armoured cruisers in 127e.
Strassburg reads large cruisers.
120. From *Cöln*. Despatch ? 135. From S.O. (Scouts). Despatch 1306.
To S.O. (Scouts). Receipt 1230¹. To *München*. Receipt ?
116e, course north. Am in action with destroyers. Scout towards Amrum Bank.
¹ B.d.A's time.
121. From Wilhelmshaven. Despatch Telephone. 136. From *Stettin*. Despatch ?
To Fleet. Receipt 1230. To *Kolberg*. Receipt 1310.
Shall proceed with armoured cruisers, S.O. (Scouts). Several enemy armoured cruisers in 127e.
Stettin.
122. From *Cöln*. Despatch ? 137. From S.O. (Scouts). Despatch 1310.
To *Seydlitz*. Receipt 1232¹. To *Von der Tann* and *Moltke*. Receipt ?
Am in action with destroyers. Attack towards 128e.
¹ *Strassburg*'s time. II. Squadron gives 1228. Last signal made by *Cöln*.
123. From *Hamburg* (Flag of Chief Despatch 1230. 138. From *Strassburg*. Despatch 1300.
of I. Submarine Flotilla). To *Seydlitz*. Receipt 1312.
To S 99. Receipt 1234. Am in 105e, course N.N.W., 24 knots. Am
Submarines attack the enemy off Heligoland. being chased by an enemy armoured cruiser.
Chief of submarine flotillas. *Strassburg*.
124. From *Hamburg*. Despatch 1230. 139. From *Stralsund*. Despatch 1308.
To III. Submarine Flotilla. Receipt 1235. To S.O. (Scouts). Receipt 1312.
Enemy off Heligoland. All possible sub- Am in 122e in action with three *Town* class
marines attack. Chief of submarine flotillas. light cruisers. Course E. Enemy's course,
E.N.E. *Stralsund*.
125. From *Strassburg*. Despatch 1235. 140. From *Stralsund*. Despatch ?
To *Cöln*. Receipt 1237. To C.-in-C. Receipt 1315.
105e, top left-hand corner; course west, 24 Am in action with two enemy cruiser
knots. *Strassburg*. squadrons. Course south. *Stralsund*.
126. From *Stralsund*. Despatch 1235. 141. From *Stralsund*. Despatch ?
To *Cöln* and *Strassburg*. Receipt 1240. To ? Receipt 1320.
123, top right-hand corner; course west north- Am in 122e, left centre. Am in action with
west, 23 knots. *Stralsund*. three enemy cruisers. *Stralsund*.
127. From *Stralsund*. Despatch ? 142. From *G 169*. Despatch 1320.
To *Seydlitz* and Heligoland I. Receipt 1240. To *G 173* (Leader of 6th
Cöln's W/T appears to be out of order. T.B. $\frac{1}{2}$ Flotilla). Receipt ?
Stralsund. Have been fired at and missed by enemy
submarine in 094e. *G 169*.
128. From Heligoland I. Despatch ? 143. From *Strassburg*. Despatch 1320.
To *Seydlitz*. Receipt 1244. To C.-in-C. Receipt 1320.
S. 13 and *V. 2* are standing by *D. 8*; will be Am in action with two enemy *Town* class
brought under escort to Wilhelmshaven. cruisers in 104e, course E. *Strassburg*.
129. From Ist T.B. Half Flotilla. Despatch 1120 (sent 144. From *Von der Tann*. Despatch ?
at 1247). To *Cöln*. Receipt 1250. To *Seydlitz*. Receipt 1322.
V. 187 sunk, *G. 11* and *G. 9* saved 44 men, 133e. Take VIII. T.B. flotilla with you. 3rd
Admiral, scouting vessels.
130. From Heligoland I. Despatch 1120. 145. From *Stettin*. Despatch 1321.
To *Seydlitz* and *Stralsund*. Receipt 1250. To *Seydlitz*. Receipt 1325.
Pass to *Cöln*. *V. 187* sunk. *G. 11* and *G. 9* *Ariadne* badly damaged in 121e. *Stettin*.
have saved 40 men in 133e. *G. 11*.
131. From *Danzig*. Despatch 1240. 146. From *Von der Tann*. Despatch ?
To *Stettin*. Receipt 1255. To *Seydlitz*. Receipt 1329.
Am in 134e, right top corner; course west by To VIII. T.B. Flotilla. My position 147e,
north. *Danzig*. lower right-hand corner, course N.W. by W.
23 knots. 3rd Admiral, Scouting vessels.
132. From *Strassburg*. Despatch ? 147. From C.-in-C. Despatch 1325.
To *Mainz*. Receipt 1255. To I. Squadron and III. Receipt ?
Stettin's W/T seems to be out of order. Squadron. Raise steam with despatch. C.-in-C.
Strassburg. Note.—*Stettin*'s W/T was in action again at
1100.

148. From *Strassburg*. Despatch 1330. 163. From *Stralsund*. Despatch ?
To C.-in-C. Receipt 1332. To S.O. (Scouts). Receipt 1407.
Enemy armoured cruisers in 104e, steering *Ariadne* is on fire in 129e right bottom.
S.W. *Strassburg*. *Stralsund*.
149. From *Strassburg*. Despatch 1333. 164. From *Seydlitz*. Despatch 1401.
To S.O. (Scouts) and C.-in-C. Receipt 1335. To *Rostock*. Receipt 1407.
Enemy armoured cruiser in 117e, *Strassburg*. *Rostock*, VII. and IV T.B. flotillas proceed at
once to the Jade mouth ready for a night
operation. S.O. (Scouts).
150. From *Strassburg*. Despatch 1335. 165. From *Strassburg*. Despatch 1401.
To C.-in-C. Receipt ? To *Seydlitz*. Receipt 1411.
117e 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, course Am in 119e left top. *Strassburg*.
S.W. *Strassburg*.
151. From C.-in-C. Despatch 1330. 166. From C.-in-C. Despatch 1406, (sent 1441).
To S.O. (Scouts). Receipt 3351. To S.O. (Scouts). Receipt ?
Recall all light cruisers. C.-in-C.¹ The large cruisers are not to become engaged
with the armoured cruiser squadron. C.-in-C.
¹ S.O. (Scouts)' time.
152. From C.-in-C. Despatch 1335. 167. From *Kolberg*. Despatch 1412.
To 2nd S.O. (T). Receipt ? To S.O. (Scouts). Receipt 1420.
When will *Rostock* be ready to proceed? All *Strassburg* and *Danzig* are saving the *Ariadne*'s
T.B. flotillas are to be ready to proceed this crew in 128e; *Kolberg* keeping guard 4 miles
evening. C.-in-C. north-west. *Kolberg*.
153. From *Von der Tann*. Despatch 1306. 168. From *Seydlitz*. Despatch 1404.
To *München*. Receipt 1336. To *Rostock*. Receipt 1420.
Scout towards Amrum Bank Lightship. S.O. III. T.B. flotilla get ready to proceed. Night
(Scouts'). operation. S.O. (Scouts).
154. From *Strassburg*. Despatch ? 169. From *Strassburg*. Despatch 1401.
To *Friedrich der Grosse*. Receipt 1340. To *Von der Tann*. Receipt 1421.
1st Battle Cruiser Squadron of the enemy in My position 119e, left top. *Strassburg*.
117e, *Strassburg*.
155. From *Von der Tann*. Despatch ? 170. From *Seydlitz*. Despatch 1405.
To *Seydlitz*, *Strassburg*, Receipt 1345. To all cruisers. Receipt 1423.
Stralsund. My position, course and speed 1430, 147e, left,
Von der Tann, VIII. T.B. flotilla in 138e, north-west by west 23 knots. S.O. (Scouts).
right centre. Course N.W. by W., 23 knots, 3rd Admiral, scouting vessels.
156. From *Seydlitz*. Despatch 1345. 171. From C.-in-C. Despatch 1425.
To Light Cruisers. Receipt 1350. To Chief of I. Squadron. Receipt ?
All light cruisers retire on *Moltke* and *Von Report when I. Division and III. Squadron are
der Tann*. ready to proceed. C.-in-C.
157. From *Danzig*. Despatch 1350. 172. From *Kolberg*. Despatch ?
To ? Receipt 1355. To ? Receipt 1425.
I am saving the *Ariadne* survivors. Am saving *Ariadne*'s crew in 128e; *Kolberg*
keeping watch towards . . . ? 4 miles north-
west. *Kolberg*.
158. From S.O. (Scouts). Despatch 1345. 173. From *Strassburg*. Despatch 1420.
To Light cruisers. Receipt 1356. To *Seydlitz*. Receipt 1430.
Retire on the armoured cruisers. S.O. (Scouts). My position, course and speed 1430, 130e,
middle, south-south-west, 22 knots. *Strassburg*.
159. From *Ostfriesland* (Flag of Despatch 1355. 174. From *Strassburg*. Despatch 1432.
Commander of I Squadron.) To *Seydlitz*. Receipt 1433.
To *Thüringen*. Receipt 1358. My position, course and speed 1430, 130e,
middle, south-south-west, 23 knots.
160. From *Von der Tann*. Despatch ? 175. From *Stettin*. Despatch 1416.
To *Seydlitz*. Receipt 1400. To *Seydlitz* and *Von der Tann*. Receipt 1440.
Von der Tann, *Moltke*, and VIII T.B. flotilla My position 145e top. *Stettin*.
in 135e, right top corner, steering north-west by west, 23 knots. 3rd Admiral of Scouting
vessels.
161. From *Stettin*. Despatch 1430. 176. From *Seydlitz*. Despatch 1440.
To *Seydlitz*. Receipt 1400. To *Rostock*. Receipt 1445.
To S.O. (Scouts). Request permission to To IVth. T.B. flotilla. You are not to
return to harbour to coal, land dead and proceed. S.O. (Scouts).
wounded.
162. From *Danzig*. Despatch 1400. 177. From *Rostock*. Despatch 1430.
To General. Receipt 1405. To IV. T.B. flotilla. Receipt ?
To S.O. (Scouts) *Danzig*'s position 121e, right IVth T.B. flotilla is not to proceed. S.O.
bottom. *Danzig*. (Scouts).
178. From *Von der Tann*. Despatch ? 178. From *Von der Tann*. Despatch ?
To *Seydlitz*. Receipt 1448. To *Seydlitz*. Receipt 1448.
My position, 134e, top left, near *Ariadne*.
3rd Admiral Scouting vessels.

179. From *Seydlitz*. Despatch 1432
To *Stettin*. Receipt 1450.
Return to harbour. S.O. (Scouts).
180. From *Kolberg*. Despatch 1445.
To *Strassburg*. Receipt ?
Where is the enemy?—*Reply*. Last sighted
in 117e, 4 battle cruisers.
181. From *Seydlitz*. Despatch 1455.
To *Von der Tann* and *Moltke*. Receipt 1500.
Von der Tann and *Moltke* are not to proceed
further than 128e. They are to await *Seydlitz*
there. S.O. (Scouts).
182. From S. 165. Despatch 1450.
To 5th T.B. $\frac{1}{2}$ flotilla. Receipt ?
One enemy cruiser with 2 destroyers steering
south-west at high speed, 074e. S. 165.
183. From *Seydlitz*. Despatch ?
To VIII. T.B. flotilla. Receipt 1502.
Search 147e for submarines and protect the
inner Bight. S.O. (Scouts).
184. From *Blücher*. Despatch ?
To *Seydlitz*. Receipt 1503.
My position, course, and speed 147e, north-
west by west, 21 knots. *Blücher*.
185. From *Seydlitz*. Despatch ?
To *Strassburg*. Receipt 1506.
Do you need support?
Reply: No.
186. From *Seydlitz*. Despatch 1501.
To *Mainz*. Receipt ?
What is your position? S.O. (Scouts).
187. From IV. T.B. flotilla leader. Despatch 1501.
To *Rostock*. Receipt 1512.
Am I to proceed?—IV. T.B. flotilla.
Compare signal No. 176.
188. From *Seydlitz*. Despatch 1510.
To General. Receipt 1514.
My position, course and speed at 1500, 134e,
bottom, north-north-west, 24 knots S.O. (Scouts).
189. From I. Squadron. Despatch ?
To C.-in-C. Receipt 1530.
I. Division will be ready to proceed at 1630.
III. Squadron at 1730. Squadron Commander.
190. From Neumünster. Despatch 1407.
To *Seydlitz*. Receipt 1540.
L 3 returns at 1220. Airship section.
191. From *Seydlitz*. Despatch 1535.
To I. T.B. Flotilla. Receipt 1548.
Pass to all T.B.'s Patrols; take up inner patrol
line. Report when in position. S.O. (Scouts).
192. From *München*. Despatch ?
To S.O. (Scouts). Receipt 1548.
My position 143e bottom.
193. From *Seydlitz*. Despatch 1531.
To I. T.B. Flotilla. Receipt 1548.
I. and V. T.B. flotillas return to harbour.
194. From C.-in-C. Despatch 1545.
To I. Squadron. Receipt ?
I. Division anchor at Schillig when ready.
C.-in-C.
195. From VIII. T.B. Flotilla. Despatch 1500.
To *Rostock*. Receipt 1548.
Proceed with eight boats. VII. T.B. Flotilla.
196. From Wilhelmshaven Intelli- Despatch 1010.
gent Department. Receipt 1610.
To Fleet.
Aeroplane 21 reports; one submarine on
surface 30 miles N.W. $\frac{1}{2}$ W. of Heligoland. On
my return (about 1200) sighted a periscope of
submarine steering W. 25 miles north of Juist.
Intelligence Department.
Delayed about six hours.
197. From *Seydlitz*. Despatch 1546.
To Heligoland. Receipt 1608.
VIII. T.B. Flotilla take up right outpost
position. S.O. (Scouts).
198. From S.O. (Scouts). Despatch 1602.
To General. Receipt 1612.
1730, Night patrols, VIII T.B. flotilla outer
line, outpost boats inner line. *Kolberg* southern
wing, *Hela* northern. *München* protect Heligo-
land Harbour, *Rostock*, VII. T.B. flotilla and
Strassburg in the river mouth. Aircraft scout
if possible.
*C.-in-C.'s minute. "At S.O. (Scouts) discretion
to place two flotillas in outer patrol line to-night."*
199. From *Friedrich der Grosse*. Despatch 1547.
(sent 1624).
To *Seydlitz*. Receipt 1624.
To S.O. (Scouts). Report immediately
whether battleship support is required.
C.-in-C.
200. *Danzig*. Despatch 1540.
Wilhelmshaven. Receipt 1628.
Shall arrive about 1830 with about 170
survivors, including 40 seriously wounded from
Ariadne. Please make necessary arrangements.
Danzig.
201. From *Seydlitz*. Despatch 1633.
To *Friedrich der Grosse*. Receipt 1635.
To C.-in-C. No enemy in sight. I am
returning to the Jade. S.O. (Scouts).
*C.-in-C.'s minute. Ask S.O. (Scouts) for news
of Cöln, Mainz, Strassburg and Stralsund.*
202. From *Seydlitz*. Despatch 1606.
To *Friedrich der Grosse*. Receipt 1636.
To Fleet Commander. Large cruisers,
München, *Strassburg*, *Kolberg*, VIII. T.B.
flotilla at 1615 in 128e, steering S.S.E.; sur-
vivors on board *Stralsund* and *Danzig*. Have
not been able to establish communication with
Cöln and *Mainz*. S.O. (Scouts).
203. From *Friedrich der Grosse*. Despatch 1658.
To General. Receipt 1700.
General: The following areas are suspected
to be mined: 154e, 155e, 133e, 132b, reference
No. 7. C.-in-C.
204. From C.-in-C. Despatch 1300.
To ? Receipt 1710.
Hospital ship *Hansa* is proceeding from the
outer Jade.
205. From Auxiliary minelayer "C" Despatch 1635.
To S.O. (Scouts). Receipt 1743.
To S.O. (Scouts). Line 2 in position. Aux-
iliary Minelayer "C."

206. From Heligoland J. Despatch 1600.
To *Seydlitz*. Receipt 1743.
To S.O. (Scouts). Aeroplane has carried out
reconnaissance N.W. by W. of Heligoland;
Sighted submarine 50 miles from Heligoland,
submerged quickly on my approach. Nothing
seen for 100 miles. Aeroplane 21 has returned
to Heligoland. Air Station.
207. From *Seydlitz*. Despatch 1731.
To *Friedrich der Grosse*. Receipt 1817.
To C.-in-C. Following ships took part in the
actions: Several *Town* class cruisers, several
isolated armoured cruisers of *Shannon* type,
four battle cruisers of *Lion* class, *Stralsund*
and *Strassburg* will make verbal report to-day.
The large cruisers are anchored at Schillig.
S.O. (Scouts).
208. *Friedrich der Grosse*. Despatch 1725.
To *Seydlitz*. Receipt 1825.
To S.O. (Scouts). It is left to your discretion
during the night by post two T.B. flotillas on
the outer patrol line. C.-in-C.
209. From S 165. Despatch 1735.
To 1725.(?) Receipt 1835.
G 169 sighted submarine and saw a torpedo
in 094e 7. Torpedo and submarine seen with-
out doubt. Fired at without success.
210. From Borkum Is. Despatch 1815.
To *Seydlitz*. Receipt 1816.
One submarine lying still in 059e, did not
reply to signals, two aeroplanes scouted from
Borkum 50 miles N.W. to Ameland. Borkum
Flying Station.

APPENDIX C.

C.

BRITISH FORCES.*

HELIGOLAND BIGHT—AUGUST 28TH.

Officer Commanding.	Designed seagoing full speed. Knots.	Officer Commanding.	Designed seagoing full speed. Knots.
1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.—Act. Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty.		Cruiser Force C.—Rear-Ad. Arthur H. Christian.	
<i>Lion</i> (Flag) - Capt. Alfred E. M. Chatfield	28·0 24·6	<i>Euryalus</i> (Flag) Capt. Eustace La T. Leatham.	
<i>Queen Mary</i> - Capt. William R. Hall	28·0 25·2	<i>Bacchante</i> (Flag). Rear-Ad. Henry H. Camp- bell.	
<i>Princess Royal</i> Capt. Osmond de B. Brock	28·0 24·6	Capt. <i>The Hon.</i> Algernon D. E. H. Boyle.	
Armament, 8—13·5-in., 16—4-in.		<i>Aboukir</i> - Capt. John E. Drummond	21·0 20·4
Cruiser Force K.—Rear-Ad. Sir Archibald G. H. W. Moore.		<i>Cressy</i> - Capt. Robert W. Johnson.	
<i>Invincible</i> Capt. Charles M. de Bar- (Flag). tolome.	25·0 23·2	<i>Hogue</i> - Capt. Wilmot S. Nicholson.	
<i>New Zealand</i> - Capt. Lionel Halsey	25·0 23·5	Armament, 2—9·2-in., 12—6-in.	
Armament, 8—12-in., 16—4-in.		<i>Amethyst</i> - Capt. Bertram S. Thesiger	22·2 18·6
Light Cruiser Squadron.		Armament, 12—4-in.	
<i>Southampton</i> - Commodore William E. Goodenough.	25·5 23·7	3rd Flotilla.	
<i>Birmingham</i> - Capt. Arthur A. M. Duff	25·5	<i>Arcthusa</i> - Commodore Reginald Y. Tyrwhitt.	28·5
<i>Nottingham</i> - Capt. Charles B. Miller.		Armament, 2—6-in., 6—4-in.	
<i>Lowestoft</i> - Capt. Theobald W. B. Kennedy.	25·0 23·8	3rd Flotilla. 1st Division.	
<i>Falmouth</i> - Capt. John D. Edwards	25·0 23·9	<i>Lookout</i> - Cdr. Arthur B. S. Dutton.	
<i>Liverpool</i> - Capt. Edward Reeves	25·0 23·9	<i>Leonidas</i> - Lt.-Cdr. R. Watkins Grubb.	
Armament, 8—6-in., except <i>Lowestoft</i> 9—6-in., <i>Liverpool</i> 2—6-in., 10—4-in.		<i>Legion</i> - Lt.-Cdr. Claud F. Allsup	29·0
With Cruiser Force K.		<i>Lennox</i> - Lt.-Cdr. Clement R. Dane.	
<i>Badger</i> - Cdr. Charles A. Freemantle.		Armament, all 3—4-in.	
<i>Beaver</i> - Lt.-Cdr. Kenneth A. Beattie	30·0	3rd Flotilla. 2nd Division.	
<i>Jackal</i> - Lt.-Cdr. John C. Hodgson.		<i>Lark</i> - Cdr. Rafe G. Rowley- Conwy.	
<i>Sandfly</i> - Lt.-Cdr. Frances G. C. Coates.		<i>Lance</i> - Cdr. Wion de M. Egerton.	
Armament, 2—4-in., 2—12-pdr.		<i>Linnet</i> - Cdr. Loftus W. Jones	29·0
		<i>Landrail</i> - Lt.-Cdr. Basil W. Lloyd Owen.	
		3rd Flotilla. 3rd Division.	
		<i>Laforey</i> - Cdr. Graham R. L. Edwards.	
		<i>Lawford</i> - Lt. Cdr. Arthur A. Scott.	
		<i>Louis</i> - Lt.-Cdr. Richard W. U. Bayly.	29·0
		<i>Lydiard</i> - Lt.-Cdr. Cecil R. Hemans.	

* Navy List, 1914, I.D. Quarterly Return, Oct. 1914.

Officer Commanding.	Designed seagoing full speed. Knots.	Officer Commanding.	Designed seagoing full speed. Knots.
3rd Flotilla. 4th Division.			
<i>Laurel</i> -	Cdr. Frank F. Rose, wounded at 1215 (<i>Mainz</i>).	<i>Ferret</i> -	Cdr. Geoffrey Mackworth.
	Lt. Chas. R. Peplow.	<i>Forester</i> -	Lt.-Cdr. Montague G. B. Legge.
<i>Liberty</i> -	Lt.-Cdr. N. W. K. Barttelot, killed at 1215 (<i>Mainz</i>).	<i>Druid</i> -	Lt.-Cdr. Edmond J. G. Mackinnon.
	Lt. Henry E. Horan.	<i>Defender</i> -	Lt.-Cdr. Walter J. Fletcher.
<i>Lysander</i> -	Cdr. Henry F. H. Wakefield.	1st Flotilla. 5th Division.	
<i>Laertes</i> -	Cdr. Michael L. Goldsmith.	<i>Goshawk</i> -	Cdr. Hon. Herbert Meade.
1st Flotilla.—Capt. D.I.			
<i>Fearless</i> -	Captain Wilfred F. Blunt -	<i>Lizard</i> -	Lt.-Cdr. Evelyn C. O. Thomson.
	25.0	<i>Lapwing</i> -	Lt.-Cdr. Alexander H. Gye.
	24.0	<i>Phoenix</i> -	Lt.-Cdr. Michael K. H. Kennedy.
	Armament, 10—4-in.	Commodore (S) R. Keyes.	
1st Flotilla. 1st Division.			
<i>Acheron</i> -	Cdr. Brian M. Money -	<i>Lurcher</i> -	Cdr. Wilfred Tomkinson.
<i>Attack</i> -	Lt.-Cdr. Cyril Callaghan -	<i>Firedrake</i> -	Lt.-Cdr. Alfred B. Watts -
<i>Hind</i> -	Lt.-Cdr. Geoffrey Corlett -		32.0
<i>Archer</i> -	Lt.-Cdr. Herbert F. Little-dale.	Submarines.	
	29.0	<i>E 4</i> -	Lt.-Cdr. Ernest W. Leir.
	28.0	<i>E 5</i> -	Lt.-Cdr. Charles S. Benning.
	27.0		15 surface.
	28.0	<i>E 6</i> -	Lt.-Cdr. Cecil P. Talbot.
	Armament, all 2—4-in, 2—12-pdr.	<i>E 7</i> -	Lt.-Cdr. F. E. B. Feilmann.
1st Flotilla. 2nd Division.			
<i>Ariel</i> -	Cdr. Dashwood F. Moir -	<i>E 8</i> -	Lt.-Cdr. Francis H. H. Goodhart.
<i>Lucifer</i> -	Lt.-Cdr. Ralph M. Mack -	<i>E 9</i> -	Lt.-Cdr. Max K. Horton.
<i>Llewellyn</i> -	Lt.-Cdr. Frederick B. Coppin.	<i>D 2</i> -	Lt.-Cdr. Arthur G. Jameson.
	29.0	<i>D 8</i> -	Lt.-Cdr. Theodore S. Brodie.
	See other L class.		14½/9
		Armament, E class, 4 torpedoes; D class, 3 torpedoes.	

D.

APPENDIX D.

GERMAN FORCES ENGAGED, 28TH AUGUST, 1914.¹

II. SUBMARINE FLOTILLA LEADER.

Stettin.
Commanding Officer.—Korv. Kap. August Neger.
Armament.—10—4.1-in.; 1—7-pr.; 2 S.T. (18-in.).
Speed.—23.26 knots.²

II. SCOUTING GROUP.³

Cöln (2nd Admiral of Scouts and S.O. (T.)).
Commanding Officer.—Rear-Admiral Maas.
Armament.—12—4.1-in.; 1—7-pr.; 2 S.T. (19.7-in.).
Speed.—26.5 knots.

Mainz.

Commanding Officer.—
Armament.—12—4.1-in.; 1—7-pr.; 2 S.T. (18-in.).
Speed.—27 knots.

Stralsund.

Commanding Officer.—Captain Harder.
Armament.—12—4.1-in.; 1—7-pr.; 2 S.T. (19.7-in.).
Speed.—28 knots.⁴

Strassburg.

Commanding Officer.—Korv. Kap. Retzmann.
Armament.—12—4.1-in.; 1—7-pr.; 2 S.T. (19.7-in.).
Speed.—28.3 knots.⁴

III. SCOUTING GROUP.³*Frauenlob*.

Commanding Officer.—Frig. Kap. Mommsen.
Armament.—10—4.1-in.; 2 S.T. (18-in.).
Speed.—21.5 knots.

III. HARBOUR FLOTILLA.

Jade/Weser.

Ariadne (leader).
Commanding Officer.—Captain Seebohm.
Armament.—10—4.1-in.; 2 S.T. (18-in.).
Speed.—22 knots.

I. T.B. FLOTILLA.

V. 187 (Leader).

Commanding Officer.—Korv. Kap. Wallis.
Armament.—2—15-pr.; 4 T (19.7-in.).
Speed.—32.5 knots.

1st ½ Flotilla.

V. 188, 189, 190, 191, G. 197.

2nd ½ Flotilla.

G. 192, 193, 194, 195, 196.

V. T.B. FLOTILLA.

G. 12 (Leader).

Commanding Officer.—Korv. Kap. v.d. Knesebeck.
Armament.—2—15-pr.; 4 T (19.7-in.).
Speed.—32.5 knots.

9th ½ Flotilla.

V. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.

10th ½ Flotilla.

G. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11.

III. MINESWEEPING DIVISION.

D. 8.

Commanding Officer.—Kap. Leut. Wolfram.
Armament.—3—4-pr.; 1 S.T. (18-in.) 2 T (18-in.).
Speed.—23 knots.
12 boats, T class.
Armament.—1—4-pr.; 1 S.T. (14-in.) 1 T. (14-in.).
Speed.—20/22 knots.

APPENDIX E.

ORGANISATION OF GERMAN NAVAL FORCES.

I.—HIGH SEA FORCES.¹

C-in-C., Admiral von Ingenohl.
Chief of Staff, Captain von Mann.
Fleet Flagship, *Friedrich der Grosse*.

Ist Squadron, Vice-Admiral von Lans.

2nd Admiral, Rear-Admiral Gädeke.

Ostfriesland (flag), *Thüringen*, *Helgoland*, *Oldenburg*.

Posen (2nd flag), *Rheinland*, *Nassau*, *Westfalen*.

IIInd Squadron, Vice-Admiral Scheer.

2nd Admiral, Rear-Admiral Mauve.

Preussen (flag), *Schlesien*, *Hessen*, *Lothringen*.
Hannover (2nd flag), *Schleswig-Holstein*, *Pommern*, *Deutschland*.

IIIrd Squadron, Rear-Admiral Funke.

2nd Admiral, Rear-Admiral Schumann.

Prinzregent Luitpold (flag), *Kaiserin*, *Kaiser*, *König Albert*.
König (2nd flag), *Grosser Kurfürst*.

IVth Squadron, Vice-Admiral Schmidt.

2nd Admiral, Rear-Admiral Alberts.

Wittelsbach (flag), *Wettin*, *Mecklenburg*, *Schwaben*.
Braunschweig (2nd flag), *Elsass*, *Züringen*.

Vth Squadron, Vice-Admiral Grapow.

2nd Admiral, Commodore Captain Begas.

Kaiser Wilhelm II. (flag), *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, *Kaiser Barbarossa*.
Kaiser Friedrich III. (2nd flag), *Kaiser Karl der Grosse*, *Würth*, *Brandenburg*.

VIth Squadron, Rear-Admiral Eckermann.

2nd Admiral, Rear-Admiral Behring.

Hildebrand (flag), *Heimdall*, *Hagen*, *Frithjof*, *Aegir*, *Odin*, *Beowulf*, *Siegfried*.

CRUISERS.

Ist Scouting Group. First Senior Officer of Scouting Vessels¹.

Vice-Admiral Hipper.

Rear-Admiral Tapken, 3rd Admiral of S.O. (Scouts.)

Seydlitz, (flag) *Moltke*, *Blücher*.

Von der Tann, (flag) *Derfflinger*.

¹ Erste Befehlshaber der Aufklärungsschiffe., translated here S.O. (Scouts).

IIInd Scouting Group under Rear-Admiral Maas¹, the 2nd Admiral of S.O. (Scouts) and S.O. (T.)

Captain Hartog, 2nd S.O. (T.)

Cöln, (flag), *Mainz*, *Stralsund*, *Kolberg*.

Rostock (2nd S.O. (T.)) *Strassburg*, *Graudeuz*.

¹ Note.—Rear-Admiral Maas was not 2nd S.O. (Scouts), but 2nd Admiral of S.O. (Scouts).

IIIrd Scouting Group.

München, *Danzig*, *Stuttgart*, *Frauenlob*, *Hela*.

IVth Scouting Group. Rear-Admiral von Rebeur-Paschwitz, 2nd S.O. (Scouts).

Roon, (flag) *Yorck*, *Prinz Adalbert*, *Prinz Heinrich*.

Vth Scouting Group. Rear-Admiral Jasper, 2nd Admiral of the 2nd S.O. (Scouts).

Hansa (flag), *Vineta*, *Victoria Louise*, *Hertha*.

TORPEDO BOATS.

Ist Torpedo Boat Flotilla. Korvettenkapitän¹ Wallis in *V. 187*.

1st ½.—*V. 188, V. 189, V. 190, V. 191 G. 197.*

2nd ½.—*G. 192, G. 193, G. 194, G. 195, G. 196.*

¹ Commander.

IIInd Torpedo Boat Flotilla. Korvettenkapitän Schuur in *S. 149*.

3rd ½.—*S. 138, S. 139, S. 140, S. 141, S. 142.*

4th ½.—*S. 144, S. 145, S. 146, S. 147, S. 148.*

IIIrd Torpedo Boat Flotilla. Korvettenkapitän Hollmann in *S. 167*.

5th ½.—*V. 162, V. 163, V. 164, S. 165, S. 166.*

6th ½.—*S. 168, G. 169, G. 170, G. 172, G. 173.*

IVth Torpedo Boat Flotilla. Korvettenkapitän Herzbruch in *G. 113*.

7th ½.—*S. 115, S. 116, S. 117, S. 118, S. 119.*

8th ½.—*G. 108, G. 109, G. 110, G. 111, G. 112, G. 114.*

Vth Torpedo Boat Flotilla. Korvettenkapitän v.d. Knesebeck in *G. 12*.

9th ½.—*V. 2, V. 3, V. 4, V. 5, V. 6.*

10th ½.—*G. 7, G. 8, G. 9, G. 10 G. 11.*

VIth Torpedo Boat Flotilla. Korvettenkapitän Max Schultz in *V. 161*.

11th ½.—*V. 151, V. 152, V. 153, V. 154, V. 155.*

12th ½.—*V. 156, V. 157, V. 158, V. 159, V. 160.*

VIIth Torpedo Boat Flotilla. Korvettenkapitän v. Koch in *S. 24*.

13th ½.—*S. 14, S. 15, S. 16, S. 17, S. 18.*

14th ½.—*S. 19, S. 20, S. 21, S. 22, S. 23.*

VIIIth Torpedo Boat Flotilla. Korvettenkapitän Adolf Pfeiffer in *G. 174*.

15th ½.—*S. 126, S. 126, S. 121, S. 130, S. 131.*

16th ½.—*S. 176, S. 177, S. 179, G. 134, G. 120.*

U. BOATS.

Ist U. Boats Flotilla. Korvettenkapitän Herm. Bauer in *Hamburg*.

1st ½.—*D. 5, U. 5, U. 7, U. 8, U. 9, U. 10.*

2nd ½.—*S. 99, U. 13, U. 14, U. 16, U. 17, U. 18.*

IIInd U. Boats Flotilla. Korvettenkapitän Otto Feldmann in *Stettin*.

3rd ½.—*S. 100, U. 19, U. 20, U. 21, U. 22, U. 24.*

4th ½.—*S. 101, U. 23, U. 25, U. 27, U. 28* (under training).

¹ Compiled from German Official History, "Der Krieg zur See," Vol. I., and Quarterly Return of War Vessels, August, 1914.

² Quarterly Return of War Vessels, August, 1914, gave trial speed 24 knots.

³ Ships not engaged have been omitted.

⁴ Quarterly Return of War Vessels, August, 1914, gave speeds 1 to 1½ knots less.

Reserves (being equipped):—
Danzig.—U. 6, U. 11, U. 12.
Kiel.—U. 26.
Norway.—A. 5, U. 29.

MINELAYERS.

Nautilus, Albatross, Pelikan.
Assistant Minelayers.—*Königin Luise, Kaiser, Preussen, Silvana, Apollo.*

MINESWEEPERS.

Ist Minesweeping Division.—Korvettenkapitän Bob-sien.

D. 3, T. 24, T. 33, T. 42, T. 43, T. 44, T. 45, T. 74, T. 75, T. 76, T. 77, T. 78, T. 79, T. 80, T. 81.¹

IIInd Minesweeping Division.—Kapitänleutnant Schömann.

D. 6, T. 28, T. 30, T. 39, T. 46, T. 47, T. 49, T. 50, T. 51, T. 52, T. 53, T. 54, T. 55, T. 56, T. 57.

IIIrd Minesweeping Division.—Kapitänleutnant Wolfram.

D. 8, T. 25, T. 29, T. 31, T. 33, T. 34, T. 35, T. 36, T. 37, T. 40, T. 71, T. 72, T. 73.

¹ T class consisted of older torpedo boats.

II.—BALTIC FORCES.

Battle Ships.—None.

Cruisers.—*Augsburg* (Flag of Chief of the Coast Defence Division of the Baltic).
Amazon, Magdeburg, Lübeck, Undine, Thetis, Gazelle, Freya (Schoolship), *Panther.*

Torpedo Boats.—*S. 102, S. 91, S. 93, S. 94, S. 127, V. 186, V. 25, V. 26, Sloopner (T. 97), Carmen.*

U. Boats.—*D. 10, U. 3, U. 4, Ua.*

Minelayers.—*Prinz Waldemar, Prinz Sigismund, Prinz Adalbert, Deutschland.*

Note.—1. *König* and *Grosser Kurfürst* were appropriated to III. Battle Squadron 12th August 1914, although not yet ready for sea. R.A. Schaumann hoisted his flag on board *König* 17/18 August 1914.

2. IV. Battle Squadron were not yet ready for sea on 10th August. V. Squadron was fitting out at Kiel. VI. Squadron incorporated 12th August 1914.

3. *Derfflinger* joined I. Scouting Group at beginning of September 1914.

4. IV. Scouting Group was not ready for sea on 10th August. It became later the III Scouting Group. V. Scouting Group was formed on 12th August 1914.

Minesweepers.—Minesweeping Division in Neufahrwasser (Danzig), and in Swinemunde.

III.—HARBOUR FORCES.

Ems.—Korvettenkapitän v. Hippel.
Arcona (also minelayer), *D. 9, T. 85, T. 87* and 14 patrols boats.

Jade.—Weser, Kapitän zur See Seebohm.
Ariadne (flag), *Berlin, Niobe, Zieten, Blitz, Hay, Drache, Alice Roosevelt, S. 103, S. 107, S. 61, S. 62, S. 66, S. 68.*

Elbe.—Fregattenkapitän Evers.
Nymphe, Medusa, Pfeil, Fuchs, S. 92, S. 114, S. 67, S. 69, S. 59, S. 64.

Heligoland.—*D. 7, S. 82, S. 83, S. 84, S. 86, Helga.*

Kiel.—*Delphin, S. 58, S. 60, S. 63, S. 65.*

IV.—SPECIAL SERVICE.

Auxiliary Cruiser *Victoria Louise* (laid up).
" " *Berlin* (disposal of High Sea Fleet).
" " *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* (proceeded).

V.—FOREIGN.

East Asiatic Squadron.—Chief, Vice-Admiral Graf v. Spee.

Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Emden, Leipzig, Nürnberg, Illis, Jaguar, Tiger, Luchs, Vaterland, Otter, Cormoran, Titania (tender), *S. 90.*

Mediterranean.—Chief of Mediterranean Division—Rear-Admiral Souchon.

Goeben, Breslau, Loreley.

East America.—*Karlsruhe, Dresden.*

East Africa.—*Königsberg, Möwe.*

West Africa.—*Eber.*

South Sea.—*Geier, Planet.*

VI.—AIRCRAFT.

Airships.—L. 3 for North Sea. 1 large Parseval, 1 small Parseval. In Kiel.
At first.

Seaplanes.—6 in Heligoland, 4 in Kiel. 2 in Putzig, [later, 9 in Heligoland, 3 in Kiel, 2 in Putzig, 8 in Warnemünde].

Aeroplanes.—Some 8 in Wilhelmshaven, 4 in Geestemünde, 4 in Cuxhaven, 4 in Kiel.

APPENDIX F.

AMMUNITION EXPENDED AND DAMAGE.

Expended.			Expended.		
Ship.	Gun.	Torpedoes.	Ship.	Gun.	Torpedoes.
1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.			III/4th.		
<i>Lion</i>	143—13·5-in.	0	<i>Laurel</i>	214 lyd 91 com.	2 <i>Mainz.</i>
<i>Princess Royal</i>	54—4-in.(?)	0	Damage:—		
<i>Queen Mary</i>	63—13·5-in.	0	After funnel shot away, one boiler out of action, reduced to 10 knot.		
<i>Invincible</i>	78—13·5-in.	0	<i>Liberty</i>	212 lyd. 98 com.	3 <i>Mainz.</i> <i>Coln.(?)</i>
<i>New Zealand</i>	18—12-in.	0	<i>Lysander</i>	107 ³	3
	83—12-in.	2	Damage:—		
		at <i>Coln.</i>	<i>Laertes</i>	52	1 <i>Mainz.</i>
Total Battle Cruiser Squadron.	385 turret rounds.		Damage:—		
			W/T out of action. Considerable damage. Towed home.		
Light Cruiser Squadron.			Total	2,928—4-in.	30
<i>Southampton</i>	223—6-in. lyd. 12—com.	1	3rd Flotilla, Total: 3,926, (D.N.A.S. return).		
<i>Birmingham</i>	350—6-in. lyd. 20—6-in. com.	2	I/1st.		
<i>Falmouth</i>	351—6-in. lyd.	2	<i>Acheron</i>	?	?
<i>Liverpool</i>	40—6-in. 22—4-in.		<i>Attack</i>	45—4-in.	2
<i>Nottingham</i>	20—6-in. lyd.		<i>Hind</i>	16—12-pdr. 49—4-in.	2
<i>Lowestoft</i>	—?		<i>Archer</i>	10—12-pdr. ?	
Total Light Cruiser Squadron.	1,038 rounds. (excluding <i>Lowestoft's.</i>)		I/2nd.		
			<i>Ariel</i>	37—4-in.	1
<i>Arethusa</i>	157—6-in. lyd. 43—6-in. com.	2	<i>Lucifer</i>	19—12-pdr. 40	0
	194—4-in. lyd. 4—4-in. com.	at <i>Frauenlob.</i>	<i>Llewellyn</i>	56	0
Total.	398 rounds.		I/3rd.		
			<i>Ferret</i>	100—4-in. 35—12-pdr.	2
			<i>Forrester</i>	No record.	
			<i>Druid</i>	70—4-in.	
			<i>Defender</i>	50—12-pdr. 150—4-in. 52—12-pdr.	
			I/4th.		
			<i>Goshawk</i>	No record.	
			14 rounds left after action with V. 187. Considerable damage from V. 187.		
			<i>Lizard</i>	No record.	
			<i>Lapwing</i>	No record.	
			<i>Phoenix</i>	No record.	1 <i>Mainz.</i>
			Total, 1st Flotilla	1,416—4-in. 12-pdr. not stated in D.N.A.S. Return.	
			<i>Lurcher</i>	No record.	
			<i>Firedrake</i>	No record.	
			N.B.—The allowance of ammunition to L. class T.B.D.'s in August 1914 was 360 rounds (G. 5964/19). Approximately 50—21-in. torpedoes were expended; the <i>Mainz</i> was the only ship hit.		
			The <i>Lion's</i> Gunnery Report, 31st August 1914, emphasised the value of director firing over gunlayer firing and the need for open sights (M. 01773/14).		

¹ Signal Log gives 333 lyddite, 49 common, 299 cartridges.
² Several destroyers reported that a number of shell splinters came on board, but damage was immaterial.

³ Ninety-three rounds up to 8.30 a.m.

APPENDIX G.

G.

BRITISH AND GERMAN LOSSES, 28TH AUGUST 1914.

Ship.	Officers.			P.O.'s and Men.		
	Killed.	Wounded	Prisoners.	Killed.	Wounded.	Prisoners.
(a) British.¹						
<i>Princess Royal</i>	—	—	—	—	1	—
<i>Arethusa</i>	1	1	—	10	16	—
<i>Fearless</i>	—	—	—	—	8	—
<i>Laurel</i>	1	1 ²	—	9	8	—
<i>Liberty</i>	1 ³	—	—	7	11	—
<i>Lysander</i>	—	—	—	—	2	—
<i>Laertes</i>	—	1	—	2	8	—
<i>Druid</i>	—	—	—	—	1	—
<i>Defender</i>	—	—	—	? 1	1	—
<i>Goshawk</i>	—	—	—	—	—	6
<i>Lizard</i>	—	—	—	—	—	8
<i>Lapwing</i>	—	—	—	—	—	10
<i>Phoenix</i>	—	—	—	—	1	4
	3	3	—	29	57	28
(b) German.⁴						
<i>Ariadne</i>	3	2	—	61	63	—
<i>Cöln</i>	22	—	—	484	—	—
<i>Mainz</i>	6	—	12	83	—	336
<i>Frauenlob</i>	—	2	—	9	26	—
<i>Stettin</i>	1	1	—	3	13	—
<i>V. 187</i>	—	—	3	24	14	30
<i>V. 1</i>	—	—	—	1	2	—
<i>T. 33</i>	—	—	—	2	6	—
<i>D. 8</i>	2	1	—	11	19	—
	34	6	15	678	143	366

¹ Compiled from Despatches, Signal and W/T Logs, and D.N.A.S. Returns.² The Captain, Commander F. F. Rose.³ The Captain, Lieut.-Commander N. W. K. Barttelot.⁴ German Official History, "Der Krieg zur See," I, 44.

NAVAL OPERATIONS CONNECTED WITH THE RAID ON THE NORTH-EAST COAST, DECEMBER 16th, 1914.

(Short Title—SCARBOROUGH RAID)

INTRODUCTION AND NOTE ON SOURCES.

1. The narrative which follows deals with the naval operations connected with the German raid on the North-East Coast on December 16th, 1914, which is commonly known as "The Scarborough Raid"—a somewhat misleading title, as Hartlepool suffered more from the hostile fire than Scarborough.

In order to explain the general situation in December 1914, the first chapter gives a brief account of the enemy's attack off Yarmouth on November 3rd, which was the first occasion on which German capital ships approached the English Coast. This chapter is only an introductory sketch and is not intended to deal with these operations in detail.

The following papers in the custody of the Historical Section, Committee of Imperial Defence, have been consulted for this chapter:—

M. 03269/14. Engagement of "Halcyon" with enemy ships, November 3rd.

M. 03461/14. Reports from H.M.S. "Lively" and "Leopard."

M. 05151/14.

M. 03481/14. } Various papers relating to the Patrol Flotillas and their method of working.

M. 05146/14. }

M. 0081/14. }

Signal Logs of "Undaunted" and "Halcyon."

Admiralty telegrams bound up in Historical Section, Volume 72.

2. With reference to the operations of December 15th-16th, the reports from the Commander-in-Chief covering the narratives of the various Senior Officers concerned are contained in—

M. 04807/14.

M. 0473/15.

M. 04953/14.

M. 01718/15.

The reports from the various destroyers of the Fourth Flotilla will be found in—
M. 05091/14.

Reports from various trawlers which sighted the enemy on December 16th, and gave valuable information with regard to the German movements, were forwarded by the Admiral of Patrols in—

M. 04830/14,

and papers relating to the operations of the ships stationed at Hartlepool are in—

M. 04794/14.

M. 042/15.

A valuable German report is in N.I.D. 0117/20.

3. The *Ships' Logs* of the following vessels have been examined:—

Second Battle Squadron.

"King George V."

"Ajax."

"Centurion."

"Orion."

"Conqueror."

Battle Cruisers.

"Lion."

"Tiger."

"Queen Mary."

"New Zealand."

Light Cruisers.

"Southampton."

"Birmingham."

"Falmouth."

Third Cruiser Squadron.

"Antrim."

"Argyll."

"Devonshire."

"Roxburgh."

4. The *Signal* and *W/T Logs* of the following vessels have been examined:—

Second Battle Squadron.

"King George V."

"Orion."

Battle Cruisers.

"Tiger."

"Queen Mary."

"New Zealand."

Light Cruiser.

"Falmouth."

5. The *Signal Logs* only of the following vessels have been seen, but these contain signals made by wireless as well as visual signals :—

Second Battle Squadron.

"Monarch."
"Conqueror."
"Centurion."

Battle Cruiser.

"Lion."

Light Cruisers.

"Southampton."
"Nottingham."

Third Cruiser Squadron.

"Antrim."
"Roxburgh."

6. The principal signal logs for December 16th are :—

- (a) King George V. W/T log, December 8th–22nd. Even day log, Deptford No. 17837. This is carefully written up in pencil.
- (b) King George V. Signal log, November 16th–December 26th. Even day log, Deptford No. 16195. This is carefully written up in ink and contains most of the W/T signals.
- (c) Lion Signal log. November 20th–December 22nd. Even day log, Deptford No. 14281. This log contains both W/T and visual signals but a number of important signals are not logged though they were evidently received. It is carelessly written up in pencil, and a number of signals covering $5\frac{1}{2}$ pages and timed between 0657 and 1500 have been inserted out of their proper order after 1600.

7. In view of the frequency with which times have to be mentioned in the text, the twenty-four hour system has been adopted throughout, but it was not in use at the time, and therefore a.m. and p.m. times are used in the signals given in the appendices. All times are G.M.T.

In this connection it may be observed that there is frequently difficulty in deciding the actual time a signal was made or received. The times entered in the wireless logs are more or less synchronous but there are very considerable differences in the times attached to signals passed visually. (*See note at commencement of Appendix B.*)

8. Attention is drawn to the Note on the determination of positions which follows.

Besides the track charts which accompany this monograph, a copy of Chart 2182a North Sea, Southern Portion, is essential for reference.

NOTE ON THE DETERMINATION OF POSITIONS.

1. When endeavouring to reconstruct the movements of various ships and squadrons employed in such tactical operations there are four factors to be considered :—

- (a) Their tracks, *i.e.*, courses and distances run.
- (b) Their estimated geographical positions by observation or dead reckoning.
- (c) Their relative positions.
- (d) Their actual geographical positions.

2. Of these factors, the first and second are comparatively easy to determine if the courses, speeds and times have been accurately recorded. The actual track of a ship for a limited period should not differ greatly from that obtained by using the data in the ship's log, due allowance being made for currents and tidal streams.

By comparison with the estimated positions given in logs, signals &c., which are presumably based on the same data it is not difficult to arrive at a reasonably accurate estimate of the actual courses and distances covered.

3. The determination of the relative positions of different squadrons proceeding independently is not so simple unless records of bearing and distance have been kept, which is not always the case even when they are in sight of each other. If they are not in visual touch the difficulties are considerably increased.

In the present case there are only two direct items of information with regard to the relative positions of the 2nd Battle Squadron and the Battle Cruiser Squadron—one being the report from the "Southampton" at about 0710 that the Battle Squadron was bearing N.N.W., and the other a signal from the "New Zealand" to the "Shark" stating that at 0930 the Battle Squadron bore S. 30° W. 8 miles from the battle cruisers. Unfortunately this latter bearing is almost certainly wrong and so reduces the value of the information.¹

There are, however, other indications of the relative positions which have been used in compiling the accompanying track chart. In the first place it must be stated that the reckonings of the "Lion" and "King George V." are of little assistance in solving the problem. Their D.R. positions at 0800 are 14 miles apart when in point of fact the "Lion" was manœuvring to take up station 5 miles 270° from the "King George V." and the flagships were then and until 1015 in visual signal touch.

In adjusting the relative positions of the tracks the following facts have also to be borne in mind :—

- (a) The two squadrons were not in sight of each other about 1300, and though the visibility was reduced at this time they must have then been at least five miles apart.
- (b) The enemy last seen by the "Southampton" at 1155 bearing S. by E. 5 miles was sighted by the battleships at 1205 bearing N. by W. The probable track of the enemy if plotted acts as a check to the relative positions of the two British Squadrons.
- (c) The destroyers "Hardy" and "Spitfire" were detached from the battle cruisers about 1315 to proceed to the Humber. They came into visual touch with the battle squadron at about 1345 and this agrees with the relative positions as shown on the chart.

It must be realised, however, that absolute accuracy is almost impossible to obtain, and there is bound to be a certain margin of error.

4. With regard to the actual geographical positions, it is still more dangerous to be dogmatic, and only an approximate solution can be attempted. There are two conditions, however, to be satisfied :—

- (a) The "Conqueror" at 1145 and 1200 obtained soundings in 16 and 18 fathoms, which indicates that the Second Battle Squadron must have been to the southward of the south-west patch of the Dogger Bank.
- (b) Shortly before altering course to the northward at 1315 the battle cruisers were steaming over the Dogger Bank Patch, and were in shoal water.

The geographical positions as adjusted on the accompanying chart comply with these requirements.

NOTE.

Admiral Scheer's book, "Germany's High Sea Fleet in the World War" (Cassell & Co., 1920), which sheds a good deal of light on the German movements during these operations, was published after this monograph was in the press. It has, however, been possible to insert a few references and notes with regard to subjects which could previously only be conjectural. The most important matter relates to the cruise of the High Sea Fleet and the influence exercised by the destroyer action (pars. 29, 30), which does not appear to have been suspected at the time.

It must, however, be noted that Admiral Scheer's work is of the nature of an apologia and is at times distinctly unreliable. So far as these operations are concerned, however, there seems no reason to doubt the general accuracy of his account, which is in substantial agreement with British authorities, though unfortunately the amount of information given is often insufficient. Positions are mentioned without times, times without positions, courses without speeds, defects which render a complete reconstruction of the German movements difficult. The general outlines can be deduced with reasonable accuracy.

The account of the operations on December 16th will be found on pp. 67–72. A crude diagram of the movements of the High Sea Fleet is given on p. 65.

¹ B. 74.

CHAPTER I.

THE YARMOUTH INCIDENT.

1. *The Enemy's Minelaying Policy.*—German activity in the North Sea during the first three months of the war was practically confined to minelaying operations off the East Coast of England. These commenced immediately after the outbreak of war, when the converted merchant ship "Königen Luise" laid a minefield 30 miles off Orford Ness on August 5th, but was speedily intercepted and sunk by the Harwich force. This seems to have convinced the enemy that stronger forces were required, for in their next enterprise light cruisers and destroyers were employed, and it would appear that a preliminary reconnaissance was made, for on August 18th the "Strassburg" was sighted off Smith's Knoll. The "Strassburg" was sighted by the Harwich force when returning, and there was no further enemy activity in the southern part of the North Sea, though on the night of August 25th-26th extensive minelaying operations were carried out in the eastern approaches to the Tyne and Humber.¹

In these operations the light cruisers "Stuttgart," "Mainz," and the minelayer "Albatross," with numerous destroyers, are known to have been employed, and several fishing vessels were sunk and their crews captured. About 200 mines were laid in each area.

The action off Heligoland followed on August 28th, when the "Mainz" and two other light cruisers were sunk, and shortly afterwards the situation in East Prussia forced the enemy's fleet to turn its attention to the Baltic.

2. *British Intelligence as to German Mining.*—That the enemy would devote much attention to minelaying was not unexpected, and before the outbreak of war intelligence had been received which indicated that a number of minefields would be laid off the East Coast in the approaches to the various ports. The mines actually laid were soon discovered by ships striking them, and on August 27th and 28th the Admiralty promulgated to all ships information that the three areas described below were dangerous, and should be avoided:—

- (a) *The Southwold Area*, extending between 51° 30' N. and 51° 55' N. to the west of 3° E. to within 10 miles of the coast.
- (b) *The Flamboro' Head Area*, extending between 54° 15' N. and 53° 30' N. from eight to 30 miles from the coast.
- (c) *The Tyne Area* lying between lines running N.E. and S.E. (magnetic) from the mouth of the Tyne and between 20 and 50 miles from the coast.²

It was not the Admiralty policy to attempt any clearance of these mines, which were considered to form a protection to the coast, and they preferred to concentrate attention on sweeping an inshore channel 10 miles wide. The fact that the Germans were using warships to lay mines was not credited at the time, and it was generally though incorrectly believed that fishing trawlers and merchant vessels under a neutral flag were employed for the purpose, a view which had an important bearing on the patrol flotillas, and led to an alteration in their function. They had been originally intended to remain concentrated at suitable points in readiness to repel hostile raids or attempts at landing and support each other as required, but at the end of August they were split up into isolated units so as to cover the whole coast from the Farne Islands to Harwich, with the specific intention of preventing minelaying from unarmed ships within a distance of about 10 miles from the coast.

3. *Swept Channels.*—The minesweeping service was rapidly developing during the first months of the war, but the system of swept channels was then only in its initial stage. The route for coastwise traffic was swept periodically, but to the eastward there was only one regular channel, running from the Cross Sand Light Vessel off Yarmouth to a pillar buoy which had replaced the Smith's Knoll Light Vessel. Another channel running from the Haisboro' Light Vessel, about 30 miles due east, to a position in 52° 58' N., 2° 22' E., had been buoyed and was swept occasionally. The Harwich force when proceeding to the

¹ See C.B. 1549, "The Patrol Flotillas at the commencement of the war," for further details.

² Admiralty telegrams 491 and 518 of August 27th-28th, 1914.

eastward passed either north or south of the Southwold area, and do not appear to have been confined to any definite routes.

4. *British Mining Policy.*—In the first days of October a British minefield had been laid in the southern portion of the North Sea to cover the approaches to the Channel, and additions were made to it as the operations against the enemy on the Belgian coast developed during the month. The area described as dangerous lay between the parallels of 51° 40' N. (Kentish Knock) and 51° 15' N. (Goodwins), within the meridians of 1° 40' E. and 3° E., but at first only a small portion of this area was actually mined, and at this time our mines were of doubtful efficiency and broke adrift in large numbers.

A further minefield was laid in the Southwold area, south of the Corton Light Ship in the latter part of October.

GENERAL SITUATION ON NOVEMBER 2ND, 1914.

5. *The Grand Fleet.*—At this time Scapa Flow was still unprotected against submarine attack, though obstructions and nets were being hurriedly improvised, and reports of submarines in the Flow had led the Commander-in-Chief to transfer the fleet bases to Lough Swilly and Loch-na-Keal (Mull) on October 22nd. While in these waters H.M.S. "Audacious" was sunk by striking a mine off Tory Island on October 27th. This minefield, the first laid by the enemy outside the North Sea, was the result of operations undertaken by the converted liner "Berlin," which was interned at Trondhjem, in Norway, on her return journey.

By the end of October the Cromarty Firth was adequately protected by obstructions against submarine attack, and the two Battle Cruiser Squadrons were stationed there to operate in the North Sea as required.

On November 1st Sir John Jellicoe left the fleet at Lough Swilly to attend a conference at the Admiralty with Lord Fisher, who had just assumed the office of First Sea Lord, and it was decided to detach the 3rd and 6th Battle Squadrons from the Grand Fleet and add them to the Channel Fleet under Admiral Burney.¹

The 3rd Battle Squadron at this time was spread between the Shetland and the Faroe Islands, assisting the 10th Cruiser Squadron to maintain the blockade, and in accordance with the Admiralty decision orders were sent at 12.45, November 2nd, directing them to proceed to Portland, keeping outside the Hebrides and Ireland.

6. *The Channel Fleet.*—On November 2nd the Channel Fleet under Admiral Burney was at Portland, and consisted of the battleships "Lord Nelson," "Agamemnon," "Bulwark," "London," "Prince of Wales," "Formidable," with the light cruisers "Topaze" and "Diamond," but without destroyers.²

Calls had been made on this force in connection with operations on the Belgian coast, and the battleships "Irresistible" and "Venerable" were at Dover—the latter with fires out—and the "Queen" was at Sheerness.

7. *The Belgian Coast.*—The last half of October had seen the desperate fighting which followed the fall of Antwerp and the German attempt to advance along the coast, while further inland the first battle of Ypres was raging. On October 27th the Nieuport sluices were opened and the country inundated, and by the first days of November the fighting had died down, the Germans abandoning the left bank of the Yser on November 3rd.

During this critical time the squadron of old cruisers, monitors, and destroyers under Admiral Hood had been constantly employed in giving artillery assistance to the sorely tried Belgian Army, but the "Venerable" had now been sent back to Dover, and the "Hermes" had been torpedoed and sunk in the Channel on October 31st. Nowhere did naval activity on the part of the enemy seem so likely as in this southern area, 1,000 miles distant from the Grand Fleet at Lough Swilly, and barely 300 miles from the German bases, and it was probably this aspect of the situation which induced the Admiralty to order the 3rd and 6th Battle Squadrons to reinforce the Channel Fleet.

8. *British Mining.*—Our policy of mining the southern portion of the North Sea which had originally been intended to cover the Channel lines of communication was

¹ Jellicoe, *Grand Fleet*, p. 156. The 3rd B.S. was composed of ships of the King Edward VII. class, the 6th B.S. of ships of the Russell class.

² Tel. 1018 from French Naval Attaché to Ministry of Marine, November 3rd.

resumed, apparently with a view to covering the Belgian coast operations, and denying the use of Ostend and Zeebrugge to the enemy's naval forces. In pursuance of this intention it was intended that on the night of November 3rd two minelayers from Sheerness, covered by a detached force from Harwich, should lay a minefield between Thornton Ridge and the Schoonveld off the mouth of the Scheldt, to block the route between Zeebrugge and the German ports.

LOCAL SITUATION. MORNING OF NOVEMBER 3RD.

9. *The Harwich Force.*—Meanwhile Commodore T. had been maintaining a patrol in the Broad Fourteens to cover the operations on the Belgian coast,¹ and on November 2nd the light cruisers "Undaunted" (Capt. A. K. Waistell) and "Aurora" (Capt. A. G. Hotham), with nine destroyers of the 3rd Flotilla (L class), left Harwich to carry out the patrol. The "Undaunted" with six destroyers proceeded through the Smith's Knoll Channel to a rendezvous described as position Y in 53° N., 3° 13' E., and cruised in that neighbourhood during the night, being actually in position Y at 0800 November 3rd.

The "Aurora" with three destroyers proceeded by the southern channel past the North Hinder Light Vessel, intending to be on a cruising ground 20 miles south of the Haaks Light Vessel at 0500.

The "Arethusa" was in Harwich with Commodore T., and the "Fearless" (Capt. W. F. Blunt) had returned from patrol with the First Flotilla, and was coaling.

10. *Yarmouth.*—The torpedo-gunboat "Halcyon" (Commander G. N. Ballard) was in charge of the group of trawler minesweepers working from Yarmouth (Gorleston), and on November 2nd had swept the channel from Cross Sands to Smith's Knoll, finding it clear. She had anchored in Yarmouth Roads for the night, and at 0630, November 3rd, got under weigh to investigate a report of drifting mines near Smith's Knoll. At 0706 she was in 52° 34½' N., 1° 57' E., about 8 miles from Yarmouth, when she sighted vessels to the eastward, and at 0710 could distinguish two four-funnelled cruisers, four dreadnoughts, and two more cruisers, all steering S.S.W., which at once opened a heavy fire on her.

The destroyer "Lively" (Lieut. Baillie-Grohman) was about 2 miles to the south-west of the "Halcyon," patrolling to the eastwards, and 1½ miles astern of her, near the South Scroby buoy, was another destroyer, the "Leopard."

The "Halcyon" on coming under fire at once turned back, and the "Lively" took station on her port quarter and made a smoke screen.² The "Leopard" also closed, and both destroyers came under a heavy fire, but were not hit. The "Halcyon" was slightly damaged, but at 0740 the enemy turned away to the E.S.E. and ceased fire. The destroyers endeavoured to keep touch, but the German ships were soon lost to sight.

According to reliable German accounts their squadron on this occasion included the battle cruisers "Seydlitz," "Moltke," and "Von der Tann," the armoured cruisers "Blücher" and "Yorck," and the light cruisers "Kolberg," "Graudenz," and "Strassburg."

11. *Admiralty Intelligence and Orders, Nov. 3rd.*—At 0721, November 3rd, the Admiralty received the first news of the enemy in the form of a signal addressed by the "Halcyon" to all ships, stating merely that she was engaged by superior force and required reinforcement. No details of the composition of the enemy's force were given,³ nor was her own position notified, but it was already known that she was on her way from Yarmouth to Smith's Knoll.

At 0742 the "Halcyon" reported that she was returning to port, and that the enemy had "cleared off."⁴ This still left the situation vague, and it was not till 0812 that news was received from Gorleston Signal Station that there had been at least one battle cruiser present and three or four others steering south from Smith's Knoll. At 0845 a further message from the "Halcyon" was intercepted, reporting four dreadnoughts and four cruisers steering E.S.E. from 52° 31' N., 2° 03' E., a position about 10 miles to the eastward of Lowestoft. This seemed to

¹ On October 17th the force engaged in this patrol had sunk four small German T.B.'s.

² This appears to have been the first time a smoke screen was actually used in action.

³ "Halcyon" to all ships: "Am engaged by

"superior force, four, require reinforcements."

⁴ "Halcyon" to Lowestoft S.S., received Admiralty 7.42 a.m.: "Enemy have now cleared off. Am now coming into Roads." (0745) (*sic.*)

constitute a menace to the Channel or the Belgian coast, and as it might be the prelude to further operations, the Admiralty issued a series of orders to the fleets from 1000 onwards.

The orders to Admiral Bradford (3rd Battle Squadron) to proceed to Portland were cancelled and he was directed instead to go to Scapa, to join the Commander-in-Chief. The Grand Fleet was ordered to leave Lough Swilly and proceed with despatch to Scapa, to be followed by the "Iron Duke," which remained behind for Sir John Jellicoe, then on his way from London after the conference of November 1st and 2nd.

Admiral Beatty was directed to use his discretion as to proceeding from Cromarty to the vicinity of Heligoland with his battle cruisers, in order to cut off the enemy, and the light cruisers from Scapa were ordered to join him. He sailed at noon that day.

The Channel Fleet was ordered from Portland to Spithead, and the "King George V.," which had just arrived at Portsmouth for refit, was ordered to join it. The "Irresistible" from Dover and the "Queen" from Sheerness were to concentrate at the Tongue Light Vessel, and four submarines from Sheerness were sent to join them.

The Dover and French submarines were to take up their stations in the Channel. Admiral Hood on the Belgian coast did not receive the news till the afternoon, when he apparently returned from Dunkirk with all destroyers.

12. *The Movements of the Harwich Force.*—On intercepting the "Halcyon's" first signal at 0721 on November 3rd, Commodore Tyrwhitt ordered the "Undaunted" and "Aurora" to proceed towards Smith's Knoll and support her, but at 0805, after hearing that the enemy had cleared off, he ordered the forces on patrol to proceed towards Terschelling in order to intercept the enemy. The "Aurora," however, did not receive this signal.

The Commodore himself with the "Arethusa," "Fearless," and five destroyers left harbour about 0930 and proceeded by the inshore channel towards position Y (53° N., 3° 13' E.).¹ Meanwhile, the "Undaunted," on her way to Terschelling,² had at 0940 sighted four enemy cruisers in 53° N., 3° 30' E. (some 45 miles west of the Texel), which chased her north and which she reported as two "Roon" class and two other four-funnelled cruisers. The "Undaunted" was ordered by the Commodore to endeavour to draw the enemy south, and so kept away to the westward. The Germans, however, did not pursue, and steering towards Terschelling, were lost sight of at 1037.

The Admiralty meanwhile had, at 1115, ordered the Commodore not to patrol off Terschelling for the time being, adding that a concentration of light cruisers was desirable.³ At 1240 the "Fearless" was sent back to Harwich to coal, and at 1530 the Commodore concentrated the "Arethusa," "Undaunted," "Aurora," and 13 destroyers at position Y. The "Aurora" was then detached to the southward in order to assist in covering the minelaying operation arranged for that night. (*See para. 8.*)

13. *Resumption of Normal Conditions.*—The report from the "Undaunted" at 0940 had made it fairly clear that the enemy were not proceeding south, and the situation was therefore eased. By 1600, November 3rd, it was considered certain that the Germans did not intend to carry out extensive operations, and the various movements ordered that morning were cancelled.

The Harwich force remained out during the night and proceeded to Terschelling, but nothing being sighted the Commodore turned back at 2300. The battle cruisers had left Cromarty at noon, and the Grand Fleet was just leaving Lough Swilly for Scapa when they were both recalled, and next day (4th) the Battle Fleet carried out full-calibre firing at the Bills Rocks off the coast of Mayo.

The Third Battle Squadron resumed their interrupted journey to Portland, arriving there on November 6th, and on the night of November 3rd/4th mines were laid off Thornton Ridge as previously arranged (*para. 8.*)

¹ The Commodore T. in proceeding to the eastwards must have passed very near the minefield laid by the enemy off Smith's Knoll, the existence of which was not yet known. Submarine D. 5 had been sunk on this field at 10.30 a.m.

² Terschelling Light Vessel was then in its old position, 53° 38' N., 4° 52' E.

³ Admiralty to Comdre. T. "Negative Terschelling Patrol for the time. 'Undaunted' to watch enemy movements, keeping out of range. Concentration of light cruisers desirable."

14. *Result of Raid.*—The only direct result of the German raid of November 3rd was an enlargement of the Southwold danger area. The Germans laid a series of short lines of mines commencing in 52° 55' N., 2° 42' E., and extending to the southward and westward as far as about 52° 38' N., 2° 12' E., and then curving round to the south-eastward for another 10 miles.¹

The new limits of the original Southwold area as promulgated by us were between 52° 55' N. and 51° 55' N. and the meridians of 2° E. and 3° E., and on its northern border a swept channel was maintained from Haisborough Light Vessel to Jim Howe Bank.²

It seems probable that the real object of the German operations was to lay this minefield and not to bombard the coast, for although a few projectiles fell on Gorleston beach they were apparently fired at the "Halcyon," and the enemy's claim to have "bombarded the coast defences of Yarmouth" may have been intentionally fictitious.

On the morning of November 4th the enemy armoured cruiser "Yorck" was sunk on a German minefield in the approaches to the Jade, during the return of the squadron.

15. The news of Coronel reached the Admiralty that day (November 4th)³ and its effect was seriously to weaken the Battle Cruiser Force. The "Invincible" and "Inflexible" were detached to the South Atlantic and the "Princess Royal" to North America, and as the "Tiger" had not yet completed her trials,⁴ the only ships left under Admiral Beatty's command were the "Lion," "Queen Mary," and "New Zealand."

In view of the possibility of the enemy taking advantage of the situation to repeat his Gorleston exploit, it was considered desirable for the Grand Fleet to return to Scapa, and for an additional force to be stationed further south. Accordingly the Third Battle Squadron left Portland on November 13th for Rosyth, proceeding round the west of Ireland and coaling at Scapa. They were delayed by bad weather, and did not reach the Firth of Forth until November 20th, where they were joined by the Third Cruiser Squadron ("Devonshire" class). The battle cruisers remained based on Cromarty.

16. The raid had also indicated the weak points of the system of scattering the patrol destroyers along the coast to look out for supposed minelaying trawlers, for had a landing been attempted there would have been no concentrated force available to attack the transports. On November 6th it was pointed out in a Staff Memorandum that the duties of the patrol flotillas as originally laid down had been completely altered,⁵ and on November 7th the Admiral of Patrols was directed to revert to the system of patrol laid down in the original war orders, in which the vessels were to be kept concentrated in divisions⁶ and it was left to the trawlers of the auxiliary patrol, which were now increasing in numbers, to deal with any attempts at minelaying by enemy or neutral trawlers.

CHAPTER II.

PRELIMINARY ORDERS AND DISPOSITIONS.

17. The news of Admiral Sturdee's victory off the Falkland Islands reached the Admiralty on the evening of December 9th, and disposed of any anxiety as to our foreign stations, but it was evident that some time must elapse before its full effects could be felt in the home theatre of war. It might be expected that the Germans would realise this fact and attempt to take advantage of our temporary weakness, and on December 11th a telegram was despatched to Sir John Jellicoe, giving an appreciation of the situation.⁷

¹ O.U. 6020a. Particulars of German minefields supplied under Armistice terms.

² A 14-fathom patch in 52° 56' N., 2° 25' E.

³ Maclean, Valparaiso, to Admiralty, received November 4th, 1.29 a.m.

⁴ The "Tiger" joined Admiral Beatty's flag,

November 24th; on November 3rd she was at Bantry calibrating.

⁵ M. 05146/14, Memo. on the Patrol System.

⁶ Telegram 196 to A.O.P. of November 7th.

⁷ A. 1.

This stated that the enemy must know that he could never have so good a chance as in the next three weeks, and the British forces should therefore be "conserved and prepared," in order to have the maximum possible strength always ready for action.

On December 14th it became clear that the expectation of enemy activity was justified. There were considerable movements in the Bight, and various indications led the Admiralty to think that a German force might be again expected on the East Coast.¹ There was reason to believe that the forces operating would consist of battle cruisers, light cruisers and destroyers, and the Admiralty decided to endeavour to intercept the enemy, on their return.

18. *Disposition of Forces, December 15th.*²—On December 15th the Grand Fleet, based on Scapa Flow, was in harbour, with the exception of the various cruisers engaged in maintaining the blockade. The First (and only) Light Cruiser Squadron at this time consisted of six ships,³ but of these two were not available for service, as the "Liverpool" was refitting and the "Lowestoft" was on patrol, leaving only four vessels under Commodore Goodenough's command. The "Blanche" was attached to the Squadron to remedy this deficiency.

The four battle cruisers, "Lion," "Queen Mary," "New Zealand," and "Tiger," were at Cromarty, together with a portion of the Fourth Destroyer Flotilla. In the Firth of Forth were the Third Battle Squadron—eight "King Edward VII." class battleships—and the Third Cruiser Squadron—four "Devonshire" class armoured cruisers. All these belonged to the Grand Fleet. The East Coast of England was watched by the patrol flotillas, the Ninth Flotilla being responsible for the stretch from Flamboro' Head to the Farne Islands. Two divisions (eight boats) worked from the Tyne, and one (four boats) from Hartlepool. In the latter port were also the light cruisers "Patrol" and "Forward." The "Skirmisher" was in the Humber, where the Admiral of Patrols had his headquarters, and the Seventh Destroyer Flotilla was responsible for patrolling the coast from the Humber to Harwich.

At Harwich, under the command of Commodore T., were the light cruisers "Arethusa," "Aurora," "Undaunted," and "Fearless," with seven destroyers of the Third Flotilla ("L" class), 16 destroyers of the First Flotilla ("I" class), and in addition three of the new "M" class ready for service. At the same base Commodore S. had eight oversea submarines available, including one French vessel.

In the southern portion of the North Sea were eight battleships of the Channel Fleet at Sheerness, due to carry out firing in Black Deep on the 16th. There was also the "Majestic" at Dover, and at Dunkirk Admiral Hood with the "Revenge," and a force of destroyers was supporting the military operations in Belgium. These latter forces were not affected by subsequent events.

19. *Orders to Grand Fleet.*—In view of the likelihood of enemy operations the Admiralty, at 2130, December 14th, informed the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, of the situation, and ordered him to despatch at once a Battle Squadron, the Battle Cruiser Squadron, and the Light Cruiser Squadron to some point where, on the morning of December 16th, they would be in a position to intercept the German forces on their return. It was hoped that Commodore T. would obtain contact with the enemy if he appeared off the English coast, shadow him, and keep our forces informed of his movements.⁴

To comply with these instructions Admiral Jellicoe ordered the following movements. The Second Battle Squadron with the Battle Cruisers, Third Cruiser Squadron, and Light Cruiser Squadron were to be in a position 54° 10' N., 3° 0' E. at 0730 December 16th. Two divisions of the Fourth Destroyer Flotilla (seven boats) from Cromarty were also attached to the force, but the Commander-in-Chief in reporting his dispositions emphasised the fact that the junction of the Harwich Force was very desirable, as, owing to bad weather, it was possible that the destroyers from Cromarty might not reach the rendezvous. It is also to be noted that the Third Cruiser Squadron from the Firth of Forth was subsequently added by the Commander-

¹ The "Scarborough Raid" was originally fixed by the German Staff for the end of November, but was postponed owing to the belief that the British had knowledge of what was planned. (N.I.D. 0117/20.)

² For ships employed in operations see end of chapter.

³ "Southampton" (Commodore W. Goodenough), "Birmingham," "Nottingham," "Falmouth," "Lowestoft," "Liverpool."

⁴ A. 2. It was stated that the German Battle Fleet would probably not come out, but this proved to be quite incorrect.

in-Chief to the forces originally specified by the Admiralty, in order to compensate for the two light cruisers¹ "Liverpool" and "Lowestoft."²

The position (54° 10' N. 3° E.) selected for the rendezvous is on the line joining Heligoland and Flamborough Head, 180 miles from the former and 110 miles from the latter. It is also approximately equidistant from the lines Heligoland-Tyne and Heligoland-Humber, and barely seventy miles north of the track between the German fortress and Yarmouth.

At 7.30 a.m., December 16th, the detachment from the Grand Fleet would therefore be in a most favourable position for intercepting any enemy squadron returning from the English coast.

20. *Orders to Harwich Force.*—At 0155, on December 15th, orders were sent to the Commodore (S.) at Harwich to concentrate all available oversea submarines off Gorleston (Yarmouth) by 1300 as a preparative measure. If they were then told to carry out the plan ordered they were to spread on a line running S.S.E. from a position 53° 50' N., 4° 30' E. (thirty miles north-west of Terschelling) to the ten fathom line off the Dutch coast.³

As the Commodore (S.) was reluctant to proceed during the dark hours with so many submarines through the channel which led from the Haisboro' Light Vessel north of the Southwold mine area, the Admiralty ordered the submarines to leave by the most suitable route in order to take up the patrol line ordered by daylight on December 16th, and at 1430 eight submarines left Harwich to proceed to their station by the southern route *viâ* the North Hinder Light Vessel.

The Commodore followed at 1700 with the "Lurcher" and "Firedrake," which were to scout to the eastward.⁴

At 1400 on December 15th, orders were sent to Commodore (T.) instructing him to concentrate the First and Third Flotillas with all available light cruisers off Yarmouth by daylight. They were to be under weigh and ready to move to any point where the enemy might be reported, in order to get in touch with them and keep the Grand Fleet Detached Force informed of their movements. The position and composition of the force from the northern bases were also stated, and directions given for two of the latest destroyers to be detailed for special reconnaissance duties. One was to patrol to the south in the neighbourhood of the North Hinder Light Vessel, the other to the north on a line running south from a point 53° N., 3° 5' E. (*i.e.*, some five miles N.E. of the Southwold area). Both were to be in position by midnight, and remain on their stations until 0900 if no enemy were sighted previously.

Commodore Tyrwhitt was further ordered, in the event of an engagement, to endeavour to effect a junction with Sir George Warrender's force, in order to deal with the enemy's torpedo craft, using the light cruisers in case the weather proved too bad for destroyers.⁵

In accordance with these instructions, 4 light cruisers and 23 destroyers⁶ left Harwich for Yarmouth at 0215, December 16th, having been preceded by the "Minos," which was responsible for the special patrol to the north, and the "Miranda," detailed for the same duty near the North Hinder.

21. *Orders to other Forces.*—The orders to the main forces engaged in the operations having been despatched, the Admiralty proceeded to arrange for certain precautionary measures on the part of the various patrol forces. Admiral Ballard was instructed that the flotillas under his command should be specially alert on the morning of December 16th, being under weigh off their bases before daylight in positions suitable for rapid communication.⁷

The Commander-in-Chief, Coast of Scotland, received somewhat similar instructions with regard to the flotilla (Eighth) entrusted with the local defence of the Forth.⁸ The Dover destroyers and submarines were ordered to watch the Straits between South Goodwin and Outer Ruytingen with all available vessels in conjunction with the French. It appears, however, that the Admiralty did not consider it very probable that the enemy would appear in the Dover area, as at 0200 on December 16th,

¹ App. A., 5, 6.

² The attached cruiser "Blanche" was also added to the Light Cruiser Squadron.

³ App. A., 4.

⁴ A. 7, 8, 9, 10, 19.

⁵ A. 15, 25.

⁶ H.M.S. "Lark" fouled a buoy on the way out, and was left behind.

⁷ A. 23.

⁸ A. 29.

Admiral Hood was ordered to continue the support which his force was giving to the military operations on the Belgian coast.¹

22. *Summary of Admiralty Dispositions.*—It will be seen that in order to meet the situation which would arise from the appearance of enemy battle cruisers accompanied by light cruisers and destroyers at some point on the East Coast about daylight on December 16th, the Admiralty and the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, had made the following dispositions:—

A force consisting of six battleships, four battle cruisers, four armoured cruisers, and six light cruisers, with an uncertain number of destroyers, was to be in a position S.E. of the Dogger Bank by daylight ready to intercept the enemy on his return.

The Harwich Force of light cruisers and destroyers were to assemble off Yarmouth at dawn ready to move to any point and get in touch with the enemy. In this position they were over 100 miles to the south-westward of the rendezvous of the main forces. Two isolated destroyers were detached in the hope of gaining early information, one to the north of the Southwold mine area, half-way between the English and Dutch coasts, the other to the south of the same area near the North Hinder Light Vessel.

In addition to these forces eight submarines were spread on a line stretching 30 miles offshore from the north-western corner of Holland across the route from the German ports to the southern portion of the North Sea.

23. *Details of Forces:*—

Second Battle Squadron, Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender.

Battleships:—

"King George V." (Flag).	"Orion" (Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot).
"Centurion."	"Monarch."
"Ajax."	"Conqueror."

Note.—"Thunderer" was refitting at Devonport.

Attached cruiser.—"Boadicea."

Battle Cruiser Squadron, Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty.

"Lion" (Flag).	"Tiger."
"Queen Mary."	"New Zealand."

Third Cruiser Squadron, Rear-Admiral W. C. Pakenham.

"Antrim" (Flag).	"Devonshire."
"Roxburgh."	"Argyll."

First Light Cruiser Squadron, Commodore W. E. Goodenough.

"Southampton" (Broad Pendant).	"Falmouth."
"Birmingham."	"Blanche."
"Nottingham."	

Two Divisions of Fourth Destroyer Flotilla (seven boats).

"Lynx" (Commander R. Parry).	"Shark" (Commander Loftus W. Jones).
"Ambuscade."	"Acasta."
"Unity."	"Spitfire."
"Hardy."	

Harwich Force, Commodore Reginald Tyrwhitt.

Light Cruisers:—

"Arethusa" (Broad Pendant).	"Aurora."
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¹ A. 24, 27, 28, 30.

Third Flotilla.

Light Cruiser "Undaunted"
(Captain F. St. John).

Torpedo Boat Destroyers:—

"Laforey."
"Lawford."
"Lucifer."
"Laertes."
"Lennox."
"Leonidas."

"Minos" (patrolling in 53° N., 3° 5' E.).
"Miranda" (patrolling off North Hinder).

Submarines, Commodore Roger Keyes.

Torpedo Boat Destroyers:—

"Lurcher."

"Firedrake."

Submarines.—E 2, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15.

French Submarine.—Archimède.

First Flotilla.

"Fearless" (Captain W. Blunt).

"Meteor."
"Hornet."
"Tigress."
"Sandfly."
"Jackal."
"Ariel."
"Attack."
"Lapwing."
"Lizard."
"Beaver."
"Badger."
"Hind."
"Druid."
"Ferret."
"Forester."
"Defender."
"Goshawk."

CHAPTER III.

MOVEMENTS PRIOR TO THE BOMBARDMENTS.

24. *Concentration of Grand Fleet Detached Force*.—Sir George Warrender left Scapa Flow with the 2nd Battle Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron at 0530 on December 15th in order to proceed to the position (54° 10' N., 3° 0' E.) which had been selected as a rendezvous for the purpose of intercepting the enemy on his return. In the Pentland Firth the heavy seas forced the Squadrons to reduce speed, and the two small cruisers "Boadicea" and "Blanche" were so seriously damaged as to compel their return, thus depleting the cruiser force at Sir George Warrender's disposal.¹

Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty meanwhile left Invergordon with his four battle cruisers at 0600, the seven destroyers of the 4th Flotilla proceeding independently, and at 1100 he effected his junction with the 2nd Battle Squadron in a position 58° 20' N., 1° 30' W. off the Moray Firth. At 1500 the four ships of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron from Rosyth were sighted, so that before dark the whole force was concentrated.

25. *Sir George Warrender's Appreciation and Plans*.—Sir David Beatty had apparently not received particulars of the situation before leaving Invergordon, but after joining the battle squadron he was informed by Sir George Warrender of the state of affairs, and that a raid on Harwich or the Humber was considered probable.

Sir George also explained his plans in the same signal. After reaching the position ordered at 0730, December 16th, he intended to steer 90° at 14 knots till 1030, and then, turning 16 points, would steer 270° until by 1330 he would have returned to the original rendezvous, when if nothing had been reported he would steer north. The cruiser squadrons, under the orders of Sir David Beatty, were to follow the battle squadron while steering east, precede it when steering west, and make every endeavour to draw any enemy sighted towards the battleships. The principal duty of the cruisers in action would be to engage the German light cruisers and destroyers, and special attention was drawn to the danger which might be anticipated from the strong hostile flotillas in the event of Commodore T. with the Harwich Force failing to join.²

In reply to this signal Admiral Beatty suggested that a speed of 14 knots was too slow in view of the submarine menace, and he also asked when and where Commodore T. was expected to join. In response to these suggestions, Sir George Warrender altered the speed to be maintained after reaching the rendezvous to

¹ A. 11.

² A. 12.

18 knots, and requested the Admiralty to order the Commodore T. to join him at 0730, December 16th.¹

26. The Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, when detailing his dispositions early on December 15th had stated that it was very desirable that the Harwich Force should join the Detached Force, and on the morning of the 15th, when reporting the return of the "Boadicea" and "Blanche," repeated that it was "very important" that the Commodore T. should join in the event of an engagement. This reached the Admiralty at 1219 on December 15th, and an hour later the signal from Sir George Warrender was received asking that the Harwich Force should be directed to join him at 0730, December 16th.²

As it was believed that three German flotillas—33 boats at full strength—might be present, whereas there were only seven destroyers with the Grand Fleet detachment, this anxiety was natural, but the Admiralty orders to Commodore Tyrwhitt, sent out at 1405, only directed him to be under weigh off Yarmouth at daylight,³ in which position he would be 100 miles as the crow flies and 115 by the swept channel from the Second Battle Squadron's rendezvous.

27. *The German Minefields*.—In December 1914 the method of promulgating information with regard to German minelaying had not been elaborated, and no periodical mine charts were issued, the only special charts in existence being those showing the swept war channel up the East Coast of England.⁴ The Vice-Admiral of the Battle Cruiser Squadron had not been able to obtain these before leaving Cromarty Firth, and accordingly at about 1400 on December 15th asked Sir George Warrender for information with regard to the method of approaching the English Coast south of latitude 55° north.⁵

As described in Chapter I., it was definitely known that German minefields were in existence off the Tyne, the Humber, and the Norfolk and Suffolk coasts, and the areas to be considered dangerous had been promulgated to all ships. In addition to these, however, it was believed that the enemy would probably lay other mines off the North East Coast, and the information supplied to Sir John Jellicoe indicated the whole of the North Sea lying to the westward of a line drawn 149° from a point in latitude 56° on the meridian of Greenwich as dangerous. That is to say, all the waters within 50 to 60 miles of the English Coast were regarded as being possibly mined, and the whole area was considered as a minefield, and is so referred to in signals.

In reply to Sir David Beatty's signal, the Vice-Admiral of the Battle Squadron informed him of the limiting line, and that mines had been reported just outside it.⁶

28. *Night Cruising Disposition*.—Before nightfall the various squadrons took up their stations for the night. The Battle Cruiser Squadron was placed five miles ahead of the "King George V." with the light cruisers five miles on Beatty's starboard beam, and the Third Cruiser Squadron disposed similarly to port. The destroyers were stationed ten miles distant on the port beam of the "King George," and soon lost touch with the big ships, the night being overcast and moonless.⁷

Before darkness rendered visual signalling undesirable, Sir David Beatty informed the cruiser squadrons that at 0730, December 16th, he intended to alter course to the northward in order to reach the rendezvous at 0750, and would then follow the battle squadron to the eastward. Both cruiser squadrons were to close in at daylight and establish visual communication with the "Lion."⁸

The course during the night of December 15th was S. 17° E. (148°), the speed 14½⁹ knots, and the position of the "King George V." at 2000, 56° 30' N., 0° 40' E.

29. *The Destroyer Action, December 16th*.¹⁰—During the night the destroyers apparently steered a course somewhat more easterly than that of the main body, and thus increased their distance from the battleships. At 0520 the "Lynx," the leading destroyer, sighted a destroyer¹¹ on her port bow, which, when challenged, replied with

¹ A. 13, 13a, 14.

² A. 6, 11, 13a.

³ A. 15.

⁴ Sec. C.B. 1549. The Patrol Flotillas at Commencement of War, para. 22.

⁵ A. 16.

⁶ A. 17.

⁷ A. 22.

⁸ A. 20.

⁹ A. 21. "King George's" log gives average speed 14½ knots.

¹⁰ See Appendix D. for original reports.

Scheer states that at 5.20 a.m. M.E.T. a German torpedo-boat sighted four British destroyers in 54° 55' N., 2° 10' E. This is not mentioned in British accounts.

¹¹ "V. 155." Her commander at first mistook our destroyers for German boats, and nearly ten minutes elapsed before it was established that they were hostile. "V. 155" approached within 330 yards of our third destroyer ("Unity") N.I.D. 0117/20.

green and white lights. The Captain of the "Lynx," concluding that she was *hostile*, opened fire and chased her to the northward, being followed by the other destroyers.

After chasing for about 20 minutes the "Lynx" was hit by two projectiles at about 0545, which, besides flooding her fore magazine, caused the helm to jamb and forced her to turn 16 points to port. These shots came from the original antagonist, but by this time the destroyers in the rear of our line had sighted other enemy vessels and had come under fire. They all followed the "Lynx" round, however, and about 0550 the "Ambuscade," the third ship, was badly hit forward, and had to haul out of line. Shortly afterwards, when steering on a S.S.W. course, a cruiser (Hamburg) was seen on the port bow, which promptly switched her searchlight on the "Hardy" and opened a heavy fire.¹ The "Hardy" was hit and her steering gear put out of action, but she was able to fire a torpedo, and the enemy altered course to the south-east and was lost sight of. The "Hardy" stopped to effect repairs, and the "Shark," "Acasta," and "Spitfire," which had been following her, stood by her while this was done. The time was then about 0605, and the "Lynx" and "Unity" apparently continued their course to the southward.

Like all destroyer night actions, the details of this episode are uncertain. The "Lynx" states that after her helm had jammed the *original* course was resumed, that is to say, presumably S. 17° E., but all the remaining destroyers refer to S.S.W. or S.W. courses after the turn. At about 0610 it appears that the "Lynx" and "Unity" were near to one another, and out of touch with the "Hardy," "Shark," &c. The crippled "Ambuscade" was alone, steering to the north-westward, for the "Unity," ordered by the "Lynx" to assist, had failed to find her. The "Lynx" then steered S.S.W. in the hope of sighting our battle squadron, but at daylight sighted a hostile cruiser to the south-eastward, and altered course to the westward. Three destroyers, therefore, the "Lynx," "Unity," and "Ambuscade," were leaving the field and took no part in the subsequent proceedings.²

30. Meanwhile the "Shark," "Acasta," and "Spitfire" stood by the disabled "Hardy" until at 0620 she was able to proceed, and steering from the engine room took station astern of the division, which then proceeded S.S.W. at 25 knots. Five minutes later course was altered to S. 15° E., parallel to the pre-arranged course of the Second Battle Squadron, of whose position there was no indication. At 0659 five hostile destroyers were sighted to the eastward, and although Commander Loftus-Jones had only four boats, one of which was partially disabled, he put on a bold front and proceeded to chase the enemy at full speed, and opened fire on them. The German destroyers fell back to the eastward, and at 0710 the "Shark" sighted a four-funnelled cruiser behind the destroyer's smoke, which resembled the "Roon."³ The cruiser and destroyers continued to steer to the eastward, and did not attempt to engage the "Shark's" division, which kept touch at a distance of about four miles. Even at 0740, when it became misty, and the "Shark" closed to within 5,000 yards of the cruiser, no attempt was made to drive the British vessels off. At 0750, however, the weather cleared, and three German light cruisers⁴ were sighted to the eastward, which promptly chased, and the "Shark's" division had to retire to the westward at full speed till 0835, when the enemy were lost sight of. Commander Jones then proceeded to the southward in the hope of joining Sir George Warrender, and at 0850 sighted the First Light Cruiser Squadron, which was then spreading to the northward of the battle cruisers. The encounter of "V 155" with the 4th Destroyer Flotilla had borne fruits far beyond anything realised at the time. Unknown to the Admiralty and the Commander-in-Chief, the High Sea Fleet was out, and out in force, making for a rendezvous in about 2° 40' E. It included the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battle Squadrons, numbering some 20 battleships, and during the night had been steering 274° from a position 54° 30' N., 7° 42' E. Had it held on, it would have been approximately some 30 to 40 miles north-west of Warrender at 0730. But when news of the destroyer action came in, the German Admiral, in order to avoid an encounter with hostile torpedo craft in the dark, turned at 0530 to south-east and shaped course

¹ Scheer says that the cruiser was the "Hamburg," and gives the time as 6.58 a.m., *i.e.*, 0558. The "Hamburg" had sighted the flashes of the action in which "V 155" was engaged, and received her W/T call for assistance. The commanding officer of the "Hamburg" claims to have sunk the "Hardy," and in his report (N.I.D.0117/20) he describes her sinking in detail.

² B. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12.

³ This cruiser cannot be identified with certainty from the German account. She would seem to have been the "Hamburg" appearing once more.

⁴ Probably the "Stuttgart" and two others who were screening on the northern flank of the Main Fleet.

for home, thus relieving Warrender from a situation which was developing very unexpectedly for ourselves. Another factor which weighed with Von Ingenohl was the possibility that British heavy ships were behind the destroyers which "V 155" had encountered. The Kaiser's instructions as to the employment of the High Sea Fleet were to the effect that the Fleet was to be held back and to avoid any action in which heavy casualties might be suffered. The Fleet was not to accept action outside the German Bight. Von Ingenohl's screening forces were weak, consisting only of the 3rd and 4th Scouting Groups, and he considered they would have been unable to prevent the British light craft from keeping touch during the day.¹

31. *Movements of Sir George Warrender's Force.*—The movements of our main force were not at the time affected by the destroyer action. The Second Battle Squadron and its attendant cruiser squadrons had continued on the pre-arranged course during the night, and the first news indicating the presence of the enemy was received at 0540 from the "Lynx" to the effect that she was chasing hostile destroyers to the north-west. A series of intercepted signals showed that German cruisers had been sighted, and both the "Ambuscade" and "Hardy" damaged.² Though a large number of signals were received by the flagships the situation remained obscure, especially as no position had been mentioned in the various reports. The "Lion" had observed gunfire to the north-eastward between 0550 and 0600, which must have given some idea of the position of the destroyer action, but nothing could be done till daylight to support our destroyers, and in view of the strict orders against the use of wireless,³ Sir George Warrender refrained from making any signals to the destroyers or reporting the action to the Commander-in-Chief.

The cruiser squadrons commenced to close in on the "Lion" at daylight, and by 0710 the squadrons under Sir David Beatty were in visual touch with the Second Battle Squadron,⁴ which at 0717 had by their reckoning reached the rendezvous (54° 10' N., 3° E.), and then turned to the eastward. The battleships proceeded to zigzag at 18 knots on a mean course of 90°, while the battle cruisers, which were to the southward of them, altered course 16 points at 0730 in order to take up the pre-arranged position five miles astern of the battle squadron.⁵ Sir David Beatty ordered the First Light Cruiser Squadron to spread on a line north (true) from the "Lion," and the Third Cruiser Squadron to spread south (true).⁶ As the mean course was east (true), this would have the effect of stationing the cruisers as look-outs on a line at right angles to the advance of the fleet. At 0800 the "Lion" was astern of the battleships and ordered the battle cruisers to alter course 16 points to follow them.⁷

By this time, however, an important signal with regard to the enemy had been received, though Sir David Beatty was not yet aware of it. At about 0730 the "Shark" reported that she was in touch with the "Roon" and five destroyers steering east, and gave her position at 0705 as 54° 22' N., 3° 20' E., or 16 miles 43° from the battle squadrons' rendezvous.⁸ There was a delay on the part of the "New Zealand" (Destroyer Wave Guard) in passing this signal to the "Lion," and at 0755 Sir George Warrender asked the Battle Cruiser Admiral whether he intended to go after the "Roon."⁹ Sir David Beatty replied that he had heard nothing of the "Roon." The signal was immediately passed to him by the "King George V." and was received just after turning 16 points at 0800. The battle cruisers were at once ordered to increase to 24 knots, and altered course in an endeavour to intercept the enemy reported by the "Shark."¹⁰ The previous orders to the First Light Cruiser Squadron were confirmed, and they continued to spread to the northward, but the Third Cruiser Squadron could not maintain the speed of the battle cruisers, and was ordered to take station as look-outs to the south of the battleships.¹¹ On receiving a further report from the "Shark" the battle cruisers shaped course east (magnetic), and Admiral Warrender informed Sir David Beatty that he would follow him till 1430, adding a warning against proceeding too far to the eastward.¹²

As a result, therefore, of the intelligence received from the "Shark," Sir George Warrender's plan (para. 25) of steering to the eastward, followed by the cruiser squadrons until 1030 and then returning towards the English coast, with Sir David

¹ N.I.D. 0117/20. The 3rd Scouting Group probably consisted of four or five light cruisers, and the 4th of four armoured cruisers.

² B. 1-15.

³ A. 3.

⁴ B. 16.

⁵ B. 18-23.

⁶ B. 17.

⁷ B. 27.

⁸ B. 28.

⁹ B. 24, 34, 39.

¹⁰ B. 32.

¹¹ B. 29, 31.

¹² B. 30, 35, 36, 37.

Beatty's force ahead of the battleships, had been abandoned, and the battle cruisers and light cruisers were engaged in chasing to the north-eastward in an endeavour to establish contact with the German forces which had attacked our destroyers and were actually a portion of the High Sea Fleet.

32. *News of the German Raid on the Coast.*—Hitherto there had been no news of the anticipated hostile operations on the East Coast of England and attention had only been directed to the German forces to the north-east of the Grand Fleet detachment. At 0842, however, a signal was intercepted from the light cruiser "Patrol" of the Ninth Destroyer Flotilla, reporting that she was heavily engaged by two battle cruisers, but giving no position or details. Almost simultaneously the "Lion" intercepted a report from the "Shark" that she was being chased to the westward by hostile light cruisers, and a signal from Scarborough to the Admiralty stating that that place was being shelled at 0830.¹ In view of this intelligence, Sir David Beatty, at 0854, altered course to north, which had the effect of closing the "Shark," and also prevented his force drawing away from the English coast.

Between half-past eight and nine two signals were despatched from the Admiralty to Admirals Warrender and Beatty giving information of an enemy attack on Scarborough. One was sent at 0835 and another at 0900 (B. 49, 59). The first reached the "Lion" at 0856, but apparently was not received by the "King George V." till 0915. It stated that Scarborough was being shelled at 1820, an error which caused some misunderstanding but did not affect subsequent operations. The second, sent at 0900, was received by the "Lion" at 0911, and in view of these two signals Admiral Beatty turned some six points to port and shaped course W.N.W. for Scarborough.

The "King George" had meanwhile intercepted the signal from the "Patrol" (0842) and Sir George Warrender immediately ordered Admiral Beatty to rejoin him (0906) and steered in his direction, evidently under the impression that the attack was being delivered off the Humber, and with the intention of shaping course thither, for he informed Admiral Beatty at 0907 that he was steering in that direction. Beatty replied that in view of Admiralty signal 0900 he was steering W.N.W., and Sir George Warrender probably received the Admiralty signal almost immediately afterwards, for he never actually altered course towards the Humber but continued to follow the Battle Cruiser Squadron.

The error of 1820 for 0820 in the first Admiralty signal had no serious result, but was apparently interpreted to mean 6.20 a.m., and in conjunction with the signal intercepted at 0933 of the enemy's appearance off Hartlepool, led Admiral Beatty to think that the enemy were working up the coast.

The final outcome of these signals was to leave the Battle Cruiser Squadron at 0945 steering W.N.W. for Scarborough with the 2nd Battle Squadron following in their track.

33. *The actual Bombardments.*—The German force which attacked the north-east coast of England on December 16th consisted of the battle cruisers "Seydlitz," "Moltke," "Von der Tann," and "Derfflinger"; the armoured cruiser "Blücher" and several light cruisers, including the "Kolberg," carrying mines. Two or three destroyer flotillas accompanied the force. The slowest ship present was probably the "Blücher" with a maximum speed of 23 knots. The whole force left Wilhelmshaven on December 15th, and early in the morning of the 16th appear to have separated, the "Blücher," "Seydlitz," and "Moltke" proceeding off Hartlepool while the remaining ships proceeded to Scarborough with the exception of the "Kolberg," which laid 100 mines off Filey, being covered by the "Derfflinger" during the operation.³ The light cruisers and destroyers were detached to the eastward owing to the heavy swell.

On the morning of December 16th a light haze shrouded the north-east coast, limiting visibility to a few miles, and the presence of German ships was neither seen nor suspected until fire was opened. The bombardment of Scarborough commenced at about 0805, and lasted for at least 20 minutes. The "Kolberg," after completing her minelaying, apparently left the English coast at once,⁴ and the two heavy ships ("Derfflinger" and "Von der Tann") steered north to join the vessels which had been operating off Hartlepool, passing Robin Hood's Bay about 0900.⁵

¹ B. 44, 45, 47.

² B. 55.

³ Account written by a prisoner from "Blücher" after action of January 24th.

⁴ Filey reported a three-funnelled cruiser (evidently "Kolberg") altered course to east at 0830. She had been steering south. This agrees with the positions of the mines laid.

⁵ English newspapers of December 18th and subsequent dates.

In Hartlepool harbour were the light cruisers "Patrol" and "Forward" and the submarine "C. 9." These vessels were under the orders of the Admiral of Patrols and in common with the other Patrol Flotillas had received the Admiralty Orders to be specially alert on the 16th, and, weather permitting, to be out of harbour before daylight. In the early hours of the morning, however, there was a heavy swell on Hartlepool Bar, and as the tide was falling rapidly,¹ the Senior Officer decided at about 0600 that it was not desirable to take the ships out of harbour. This decision involved their being practically imprisoned in the harbour, as at low water the bar is too shallow to permit of a light cruiser leaving easily.

A division of destroyers² was patrolling during the night off Hartlepool, at a distance of about five miles from the shore, and at 0800 when about six miles N.E. of Hartlepool, these destroyers sighted a number of ships approaching from the east at high speed. The British destroyers turned and closed to examine these vessels, which altered course to the northward inshore of them, and opened fire at about 0805. The "Doon's" division was driven off without difficulty, the "Doon," "Test," and "Moy" being hit by the enemy's projectiles, and at 0815 the German battle cruisers opened fire on the towns of East and West Hartlepool at a range of a little over 4,000 yards.

On the enemy being reported, the ships in Hartlepool endeavoured to leave, but a heavy fire was concentrated on the entrance. The "Patrol" was struck three times by heavy shell, grounded on the bar, and with difficulty reached the Tees. Submarine "C. 9" had to dive to avoid the enemy's fire, grounded, and could not get clear in time to attack. The "Forward" was delayed in leaving, and by the time she was at sea the enemy's ships had disappeared, and though she proceeded for some miles to the eastward nothing was sighted.³

The naval forces on the north-east coast, therefore, could do nothing to hinder the bombardment, but the military battery of three 6-inch guns situated near Hartlepool lighthouse engaged the enemy with some effect, the "Blücher" being hit six times and suffering casualties. At about 0845 the bombardment ceased and the enemy withdrew. They were steering north when last sighted, but altered course to the eastward later and joined the battle cruisers from Scarborough, which, after bombarding Whitby at 0915, had been lost sight of.⁴

CHAPTER IV.

PROCEEDINGS SUBSEQUENT TO THE BOMBARDMENTS.

34. *Admiralty Intelligence and Dispositions.*—On the morning of December 16th no news of the enemy was received at the Admiralty until 0748, when a portion of the signal from the "Shark" reporting the "Roon" in sight was intercepted. This left the situation vague, but at 0818 and 0828 signals were intercepted from the destroyers "Waveney" and "Test" which reported "Enemy in sight" and "In action with two Dreadnoughts" respectively. At 0830 an urgent message, timed 0820, was received from Scarborough, reporting that the town was being shelled, and telegraphic communication broke down immediately afterwards. Eight minutes later Hartlepool War Signal Station reported three three-funnelled cruisers off that port, and there could be no doubt that a German squadron was delivering an attack on the north-east coast.

The first step taken was to inform the force under Sir George Warrender of the situation, an unfortunate error being made with regard to the time of the Scarborough bombardment.⁵ Orders were then despatched to the other forces available. First, the Commodore T., then off Yarmouth, was ordered at 0855 to get in touch with the enemy off Scarboro' and Hartlepool—120 to 115 miles distant from his position at the time;⁶ at 0940 the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, was ordered to bring his fleet out in case the Germans were chased north, and five minutes later the Third

¹ High water, Hartlepool, December 16th, 0215; low water, 0840.

² "Doon" (S.O.), "Waveney," "Test," "Moy."

³ See Naval Review, Vol. VII., No. 2, for details.

⁴ Casualties at Scarboro', 17 killed, 99 wounded; at Hartlepool, 103 killed, 344 wounded; at Whitby only 2 were killed. Among the casualties at Hartlepool were a number of the New Army who were manning the coastal trenches.

⁵ B. 49.

⁶ B. 62.

Battle Squadron, which was already proceeding to sea to carry out firing off the Firth of Forth, was directed to join the Second Battle Squadron. The latter was described as steering for the Humber—an error evidently due to Sir George Warrender's signal 0556 previously mentioned¹ (para. 32).

These orders to the Third Battle Squadron, however, were superseded by a signal from Sir John Jellicoe, ordering Admiral Bradford to proceed to position 55° 50' N., 1° 10' W. (thirty miles east of Berwick) with all available cruisers and destroyers from the Firth of Forth, in order to intercept the enemy if they came north.² Sir John Jellicoe reported later that the Grand Fleet, which had been at one hour's notice for steam since 0400, would be leaving harbour between noon and 1300. None of these forces, however, succeeded in establishing contact with the enemy.

35. *The Detached Force steers West.*—On receipt of the news that Scarborough was being shelled, Sir David Beatty at 0903 ("Lion" D.R. 54° 20' N., 3° 35' E.) shaped course W.N.W. towards the English coast.³ The Second Battle Squadron altered course to N.N.W. at 0850 to close the battle cruisers, Sir George Warrender intending to steer for the Humber after joining Admiral Beatty, but intelligence received subsequently left no doubt that the German battle cruisers were off Scarborough and Hartlepool, and at 0935 ("King George," D.R. 54° 17' N., 3° 35' E.) the Second Battle Squadron altered course to W.N.W.⁴ Both portions of the Grand Fleet detachment were therefore at this time steering on parallel courses towards the English coast, the battleships with the Third Cruiser Squadron at 18 knots, and the battle cruisers, with the light cruisers spread to the northward, at 24 knots. Both flagships were in visual touch, and the force was completed by the arrival of the "Shark's" four destroyers from the north. These sighted the Light Cruiser Squadron at about 0900, but any information which they could give with regard to the enemy light craft to the north-eastward was entirely overshadowed by the news from the English coast,⁵ as it was not realised that the High Sea Fleet was at sea and close at hand.

36. *The Battle Cruisers proceed to Northward.*—The Grand Fleet detachment was now steering at nearly full speed towards the boundary of the supposed German minefields, and as yet there was no information as to whether the enemy force had left the English coast or was still operating in the neighbourhood of Hartlepool, where it had been last reported. In his anxiety to establish contact with the enemy, Sir George Warrender at 0930 informed Admiral Beatty that the light cruisers must go in through the supposed minefields to locate the enemy. Almost simultaneously, Sir David Beatty directed Commodore Goodenough that his principal duty was to prevent hostile light cruisers sighting our main forces.⁶

Shortly afterwards Admiral Warrender asked the Admiralty whether it would be safe to go straight across the minefields, and meanwhile continued on his course. The battle cruisers, however, which were somewhat to the northward, at 1006 altered course to N. 40° W., in order to avoid passing over the south-west patch of the Dogger Bank, a bad bit of ground with a least depth of seven fathoms and several wrecks scattered over it. Sir David Beatty, when informing Admiral Warrender of this, added that the enemy appeared to be working up the coast, an opinion probably based on the fact that the enemy had been reported first off Scarborough, then his light cruisers off Hartlepool, and finally his Dreadnoughts off Hartlepool, for the signals received had not made it clear that the Germans had bombarded both places almost simultaneously.⁷

Sir George Warrender apparently agreed with this opinion, as, in replying to Admiral Beatty's signal, he expressed a hope that the battle cruisers might cut off the enemy to the north-west of the Dogger Bank, and altered course to follow them.⁸

Very shortly after this, however, an important signal was received from the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, informing the Admirals Commanding that it was believed a gap existed in the German minefields between 54° 40' N. and 54° 20' N. as far west as the meridian of 0° 20' E., and that it was probable the enemy's vessels which had been attacking the coast would come out there.⁹ This was the first indication received of the probable movements of the enemy after leaving the coast,

¹ B. 69, 70.

² B. 75, 91.

³ B. 63.

⁴ B. 59, 61, 62, 73.

⁵ B. 57, 60, 71, 74, 79. A signal at 0935 from "Lion" to "New Zealand" "Do not get ahead of me," makes it appear possible that

the battle cruisers had formed line abreast, but no signal to this effect has been traced.

⁶ B. 76, 77.

⁷ B. 47, 61, 73, 85.

⁸ B. 85, 90.

⁹ B. 88. Actually there were no German minefields in the vicinity at the time.

and at 1025 the Second Battle Squadron altered course to 270° so as to steer straight for the southern portion of this "Gap," passing south of the Dogger Bank Patch. At 1035 the battle cruisers were ordered to keep south of the Dogger Bank and go through the "Gap," of which intelligence had been received, but by this time they had proceeded too far on their north-westerly course and could not return to the southward. Sir David Beatty replied that at 1100 he would alter course to W.N.W. and proceed with his light cruisers spread ahead to fill the gap.¹ Thus the Second Battle Squadron and Third Cruiser Squadron were proceeding south of the Dogger Patch, while the battle cruisers with the light cruisers were about to pass north of it.

The two portions of the Grand Fleet force seem to have lost sight of each other shortly after 1030. At about 1050 Sir George Warrender received from the Admiralty the answer to his request as to whether he should enter the minefields. He was definitely ordered to remain outside the minefields and endeavour to intercept the enemy on his way back to Heligoland.²

37. At 1100 the Battle Cruiser Squadron altered course to W.N.W., passing to the northward of the Dogger Patch with the light cruisers spread ahead. The order of the light cruisers from south to north was "Southampton," "Birmingham," "Nottingham," and "Falmouth," the first two being on the "Lion's" port bow and the latter on the starboard bow. The interval between each ship was about 4 miles, and the line on which they were spread was 5 miles ahead of the flagship. It was Sir David Beatty's intention to alter course to west at noon and steer straight for the "Gap."³ At 1100 he sent his Senior Officer a brief appreciation of the situation, to the effect that the "Gap" between the minefields should be blocked, the light cruisers working to the northward and the Third Cruiser Squadron to the southward. The Third Battle Squadron would be off the Farne Islands in case the enemy went north along the coast, while it was believed Commodore T. would be off Flamboro' Head. Sir George Warrender made no reply to this signal as it crossed one he had already made directing Sir David Beatty to carry out the orders from the Admiralty to remain outside the minefields and intercept the enemy.⁴

During the earlier hours of the forenoon it had been remarkably fine, calm, and clear, but shortly after 1100 a breeze sprang up, accompanied by drizzling rain, and soon it was blowing hard from the westward with driving rain squalls, sometimes reducing the visibility to less than a mile.

Meanwhile, the Battle Squadron with the Third Cruiser Squadron, which had been spread on a line S.S.W. from the "King George," continued on its course of 270° out of sight of the battle cruisers and separated from them by the S.W. Patch of the Dogger Bank.

38. *The Harwich Force.*—The exact movements of the various components of the Harwich Force need not be given as they exercised no influence on the course of events. The cruisers and destroyer flotillas under Commodore T. left Harwich at 0200 in accordance with Admiralty orders, which had directed them to be under weigh off Yarmouth by daylight. On receiving information of the German raid, the "Undaunted," with the Third Flotilla and the "Fearless," with the First Flotilla, were ordered at 0915 to proceed at full speed to join the Battle Fleet.⁵ The Admiralty orders to get in touch with the enemy off Scarborough were apparently received later, and at 0945 Commodore T., then off the Would Light Vessel and steering N. 26° W. at 25 knots, asked Sir George Warrender for further instructions.⁶

Admiral Beatty, when he intercepted this signal just before the battle cruisers lost touch with the Battle Squadron, expressed a hope that the Harwich Force might be ordered to join, and at 1040 Sir George Warrender directed Commodore Tyrwhitt to proceed with all despatch to a position 54° 20' N., 1° 30' E. This position was on the southern edge of the "Gap," 65 miles east of Scarborough, and 90 miles from the "Arethusa's" 0945 position.⁷ At 1100 the Commodore T. reported his position as being 53° 14' N., 1° 47' E., course N. 5° E. 25 knots. If it had been possible to maintain this speed, the Harwich Force would have reached the appointed rendezvous at about 1345, but the weather grew rapidly worse, the destroyers had to be

¹ B. 98, 101.

² B. 104.

³ B. 100, 102.

⁴ B. 109, 110.

⁵ B. 65, 66.

⁶ AS 8794

⁶ B. 62, 86. It appears that the "Fearless," with the First Flotilla, proceeded up the East Coast War Channel towards Flamboro' Head and not directly towards the Battle Fleet.

⁷ B. 97, 99.

sent back to Yarmouth, and the cruisers were forced to reduce speed. At 1320 the Commodore reported that he expected to reach the rendezvous at 1500, but it was too late then to hope to intercept the enemy, and he was ordered to return to his base.¹

39. *The first Contact with the Enemy.*—In December, 1914, the various vessels composing a force, when making reports, &c., did not use any system of "reference" positions based on the flagships' reckoning, as was usual in the later stages of the war. The result of this was that when—as in the present case—two portions of a force lost sight of each other, there was soon considerable uncertainty as to their relative positions, since the reckonings of the two flagships were in all probability different.²

If both flagships had proceeded as anticipated, the situation at noon would have been the battle cruisers in D.R. position 54° 41' N., 1° 43' E., steering west at 24 knots, with the Battle Squadron distant about 26 miles on the port quarter in D.R. position 54° 24' N., 2° 22' E. Various causes, however, combined to disturb these plans.³ At 1111 Sir David Beatty reduced the speed of his squadron to 18 knots, probably on account of the change in the weather, which, as already mentioned, was becoming thick. About this time the "Nottingham" lost touch with the "Birmingham" to the southward, and altered course to close inwards—an apparently minor incident which had a considerable consequence.

40. At about 1115 the "Nottingham" sighted a vessel in the mist to the south-westward, apparently steering N.W.⁴ This unidentified vessel seems to have been soon lost sight of, but at about 1130 the "Southampton," being then 6 miles west of the "Lion," sighted a number of light cruisers and destroyers right ahead. These were identified as a hostile squadron consisting of "one armoured cruiser, two or three light cruisers, and numerous destroyers,"⁵ which at once altered course to the southward and opened fire. The "Southampton" turned and engaged them on a similar course, and was supported by the "Birmingham," but a choppy sea had already been raised by the increasing wind, and the fire of both sides was ineffective.

About this time the "Nottingham," closing down from the northward, came in sight of the "Lion," and at 1150 was ordered by the Vice-Admiral to resume her look-out station. Unfortunately this signal was addressed to the First Light Cruiser Squadron instead of to the "Nottingham" alone, and the latter ship duly repeated it to the "Birmingham" and "Southampton," which accordingly broke off the action at about 1155, and altered course to the northward to take up their original stations.⁶ While steering north the "Southampton" exchanged shots on opposite courses with a three-funnelled German cruiser, believed at the time to be an armoured cruiser, but which was actually the "Stralsund," and this vessel followed the others to the southward, where they disappeared in the mist. The enemy was not sighted from the "Lion," nor apparently from the other battle cruisers, though an entry in the "Tiger's" log seems to indicate something of the kind.

41. *Situation at Noon.*—While steering to the southward the "Southampton" sent two signals reporting that she was engaged with the enemy, but did not make it clear that she had sighted more than one cruiser and a few destroyers.⁷ When returning towards the "Lion" after reporting the bearing of the last enemy sighted, Commodore Goodenough was asked by Sir David Beatty what had happened to the other enemy cruisers, which was followed by an order to engage the enemy, but there were then no hostile vessels in sight.⁸ The battle cruisers had meanwhile altered course to S.S.W. at 1154 in order to avoid some fishing vessels, but resumed the W.N.W. course at 1205.

Intelligence had been intercepted that the enemy had been off Hartlepool, over 100 miles distant, at 0850, and it was therefore impossible for them to have got to

¹ B. 106, 113, 163, 176.

² There seems to have been at least five miles difference between the "Lion's" and "King George's" reckonings.

³ B. 112. This signal evidently should read "position, course, and speed at noon will be, &c." The position given is impossible as a 1100 position, and so is the course. The signal, however, does not seem to have been questioned at the time.

⁴ B. 115. It was probably a trawler.

⁵ "Southampton" ship's log. Actually they were the light cruisers of the 2nd Scouting Group ("Stralsund," "Strassburg," and "Graudeuz") and the 1st and 9th Flotillas.

⁶ B. 122.

⁷ B. 118, 121.

⁸ B. 130, 132, 134, 135, 142, 143.

the eastward of the battle cruisers.¹ Sir David Beatty considered that the vessels sighted by the "Southampton" were probably a screen of light forces in advance of the German battle cruisers, and continued to steer to the westward in the hope of encountering the enemy's main force.

The Second Battle Squadron had continued to steam along the parallel of 54° 24' without incident. The Third Cruiser Squadron was spread on a line S.S.W. from the "King George V." Sir George Warrender reckoned that at 1230 he would reach the meridian of 2° E., and he then intended to cruise up and down parallel to the limit of the minefields and about 10 miles outside them. The Battle Squadron would alter course every 15 minutes, and the Third Cruiser Squadron was to spread to the north-westward.²

42. *Second Contact with the Enemy.*—At about 1205 the "King George V." sighted a number of hostile destroyers and light cruisers on her starboard bow, steering to the eastward at high speed, which altered course to the northward when they distinguished the Second Battle Squadron. Sir George Warrender ordered the Third Cruiser Squadron to follow him³ and hauled round to N.E. by E. in an endeavour to bring the enemy to action. The German force was identical with that engaged by the "Southampton" ten minutes previously, viz., the light cruisers of the 2nd Scouting Group, and the 1st and 9th Destroyer Flotillas. The enemy were only visible intermittently between rain squalls, and though it was nearly half-an-hour before they were finally lost sight of, it was considered impossible to engage them effectively and fire was not opened.⁴ The Third Cruiser Squadron had been ordered to take station ahead and attack the enemy destroyers,⁵ but they had not sufficient reserve of speed to carry out these orders, and at 1240 Sir George Warrender, having been outpaced by the enemy light craft, altered course to return to the position south of the Dogger Bank Patch, which he had previously intended to take up.

43. *Movements during Afternoon.*—Meanwhile Sir David Beatty, after the "Southampton's" contact with the hostile light cruiser screen, was pressing on to the westward in the hope of sighting the German battle cruisers, which he probably would have done about 1 p.m. had he held on, when at 1225 he received intelligence that the Battle Squadron had sighted the enemy, and were steering to the north-eastward.⁶ The battle cruisers at once altered course 16 points and steered E.S.E. till 1315, when the squadron found itself on the Dogger Bank Patch, and course was altered to the northward to get into deeper water. It was now known that the Battle Squadron had lost touch with the enemy,⁷ but Admiral Beatty was of opinion that the main body of the enemy were still to the westward, and he intended when clear of the bank to patrol to the westward and spread the light cruisers in that direction to search for the enemy.⁸ But before this could be done intelligence was received which put a different aspect on the situation. The Admiralty at 1345 informed all ships that the enemy battle cruisers had been in a position 54° 33' N., 1° 07' E. at 1215, steering to the eastward at high speed.⁹ This indicated that the enemy were apparently about to pass right over the Dogger Bank Patch, which Sir David Beatty had considered improbable, and the only chance left of bringing them to action was to proceed eastward at full speed, and intercept them to the eastward of the Dogger Bank. Accordingly, at 1355 course was altered to the eastward and speed increased.¹⁰

Meanwhile, Sir George Warrender had decided that nothing more could be done by the Battle Squadron, having apparently come to the conclusion that the hostile battle cruisers must have been with the vessels sighted at 1215, and at 1324 he shaped course to the north-westward parallel to the boundary of the supposed minefields.¹¹

At 1425 a message was received from the Admiralty stating that the High Sea Fleet was believed to be to the eastward, and warning our squadrons not to go too far in that direction.¹² A further message from the Admiralty was received shortly after 1500, indicating that at 1245 the German battle cruisers had altered course to

¹ B. 120. "Lion's" position at noon by D.R. 54° 38' N., 1° 54' E. The High Sea Fleet was in approximately 54° 30' N., 5° 40' E. at 1200.

² B. 123, 131.

³ B. 136.

⁴ The German force ascribes its escape without being fired at to the use of the British recognition signal previously made to it by the "Southampton." (N.I.D. 0117/20.)

⁵ B. 146, 147, 149.

⁶ B. 140, 144, 148.

⁷ B. 155.

⁸ B. 161, 164.

⁹ B. 166.

¹⁰ B. 168, 169, 170, 171, 172.

¹¹ B. 178.

¹² B. 173.

north. It was now impossible for Sir David Beatty's force to meet them before dark, and at 1545 Sir George Warrender ordered the battle cruiser squadrons to relinquish the chase and rejoin the Battle Squadron in the morning. Both portions of the British force steered to the northward during the night.

44. It was due to the intelligence of our movements furnished by their screen of light forces that the battle cruisers were enabled to avoid our battleships. After bombarding Whitby they seemed to have united somewhere East of that place shortly after 0900. At one o'clock the "Stralsund" signalled that the enemy was out of sight and that the light forces were proceeding on an Easterly course in close order.¹ They needed no longer the support of the battle cruisers. Circling round to the Northward of the Second Battle Squadron, the German battle cruisers then made good their escape, and the only remaining chance of getting touch with them was through our Submarines.

45. **Movements of Submarines.**—Commodore Keyes in the "Lurcher," with the "Firedrake" and Submarines E2, E7, E8, E10, E11, E12, E15 and "Archimède" was on his station on the Terschelling line,¹ when at 10.30 a.m. he intercepted a very faint signal from "Monarch" to "Ambuscade" which told him that the enemy was off Scarborough. Knowing nothing of the dispositions of our own fleet or of the enemy, and being out of W/T sending range, he despatched the "Firedrake" at full speed to ask for instructions; meanwhile he steamed up and down the line to collect his submarines so as to be ready to obey any orders he might get. The weather on the passage out had been dirty and rainy, with the results that the submarines had lost touch with one another and were out of station; by 5 p.m. he had been able to collect only four boats—E15, "Archimède," E10 and E11. Meanwhile, at 3.35 p.m. he received orders from the Admiralty, timed 1410, to proceed to the Bight and intercept the High Seas Fleet, which, it was expected, would pass South of Heligoland to make the Weser Light.² The four submarines he had found he sent off to stations ranging from 5 miles North-West to South of Heligoland; E11 was to be off the entrance to the Weser. The weather steadily grew worse, and failing to find any more of his vessels he proceeded towards the North Hinder Light to intercept them there on their return. On the way, another Admiralty message reached him; it was to the effect that his destroyers also might get a chance to attack at 2 a.m. The message had been despatched from the Admiralty at 2012, but instead of being sent *via* the submarines' depôt ship and the "Firedrake," which was the route he had arranged, it was directed to Ipswich W/T station, and failed to reach the Commodore till 1.20 a.m., when he was 200 miles from the Bight and could not possibly get there in time. The four submarines, however, were in position. E11 (Lieutenant-Commander Nasmyth) sighted Heligoland at 1.30 a.m.; passing between the Minefields on which D2 had been lost only a few weeks before, and avoiding the searchlights and trawler patrols, she was 2 miles North of the site of the Weser Light Vessel at 6.20 a.m. An hour later Nasmyth observed a destroyer flotilla coming from the Northward; while he was watching it, it suddenly scattered and searched in all directions. Behind the destroyers two vessels, which proved to be the leading ships of the German battle fleet, came in sight and he shaped course to the North-West to cut them off; they were zigzagging, and he had to turn with them before he could get a shot. E11 was rolling and though only at 400 yards range the torpedoes ran deep and passed under the target. He then tried for the third ship, but she came straight for him and he had to make a sudden dive, luckily reaching 70 feet before she passed over him. On coming up he broke surface and the German battle fleet scattered and got away into safety. The three other submarines did not see the Germans at all,¹ who in the course of December 17 arrived safely back in their own harbours.

¹ N.I.D. 0117/20.

¹ See paragraph 20.

² B 184.

¹ Reports of Commodore S., H.S. 225, pp. 374 to 390.

SCARBOROUGH RAID.

APPENDIX "A."

TELEGRAMS AND SIGNALS.

DECEMBER 11TH TO 15TH.

1. *From Admiralty.*
*To C.-in-C., H.F.*¹ Date, December 11th.
Although we are keeping secret names of battle cruisers detached, Germans must know that disappearance of "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" means a great reinforcement at home operative about three weeks hence. They can never have so good a chance as now, and you will no doubt consider how best to conserve and prepare your forces in the interval so as to have the maximum possible always ready and fresh.
"Princess Royal" is rejoining you with all convenient despatch.
2. *From Admiralty.* Date, December 14th.
To C.-in-C., H.F. Sent, 2130.
Not to be sent by W/T.
523. It is expected that a German cruiser squadron with destroyers will leave Jade River on Tuesday morning early and return on Wednesday night. The battleships are unlikely to come out. The enemy force will have time to reach our coast. Send at once, leaving to-night, the B.C.S. and L.C.S., supported by a battle squadron, preferably the Second.
At daylight on Wednesday morning they should be at some point where they can make sure of intercepting the enemy on his return. Tyrwhitt with his light cruisers and destroyers will try to get into touch with the enemy off the British coast and shadow him, keeping Admiral informed. It is believed that the German cruiser squadron will consist of four battle cruisers and five light cruisers, and there will probably be three flotillas of destroyers.
NOTE.—Precis of original telegram.
3. *From Admiralty.* Date, December 14th.
To C.-in-C., H.F. Sent, 2340.
Not to be sent by W/T.
524. My 523. While the ships are at sea the use of W/T should be restricted to messages of urgent necessity.
4. *From Admiralty.* Date, December 15th.
To Commodore (S.). Sent, 0155.
136. As a preparative measure all overseas submarines which are available are to be sent to Gorleston to arrive by 1 p.m. Tuesday. Should they be told to carry out the plan ordered, they are to proceed in a line extending in a S.S.E. direction from a position in 53° 50' N., 4° 30' E. to the 10-fathom line off the Dutch Coast.
They are to be spread on this line by daybreak on Wednesday and remain on it until nightfall, when they are to return to Harwich. German vessels may be crossing this line at any time on Wednesday.
5. *From C.-in-C., H.F.* Date, December 15th.
To Admiralty. Received, 0217.
406. Your 523. Am sending 3rd C.S. as well. Some of L.C.S. not available. (0150.)
6. *From C.-in-C., H.F.* Date, December 15th.
To Admiralty. Sent, 4.6 a.m.
Received, 5.4 a.m.
407. 2nd Battle Squadron, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, 3rd Cruiser Squadron, Light Cruiser Squadron, will be in position 54° 10' N., 3° 0' E. at 7.30 a.m., December 16th. Please inform Commodore T. of composition of force and 7.30 a.m. position. Very desirable his T.B.D.'s should be with Vice-Admiral should engagement ensue.
Probable that two divisions of T.B.D.'s being sent by me may not reach rendezvous owing to heavy weather.
(Passed to Com. T.)
7. *From Commodore (S.).* Date, December 15th.
To Admiralty. (Telephone message,
received 0525.)
Your 136. Submit very undesirable to attempt passage through Haisbro' swept channel with a number of submarines after dark. If undesirable to proceed round Hinder Light Vessel propose to proceed direct and wait for orders eastward of Smith's Knoll. Would prefer N. Hinder Light Vessel route. Telephone because must get away very soon if going former route. I am going myself with T.B.D.'s.

¹ Though the term Grand Fleet had been in general use since the outbreak of war, in the addresses of telegrams and signals the Commander-in-Chief was frequently referred to as C.-in-C., H.F.

8. *From Admiralty.* Date, December 15th.
To Commodore (S.). Telephone sent, 0620.
Your telephone message. Remain at Harwich ready for sea.
9. *From Commodore (S.).* Date, December 15th.
To Admiralty. Sent, 0815.
Received, 0900.
63. Seven "E" class, one "D" class, one "S" class, two "C" class, and "Archimede" (French) standing by at Harwich.
Two "D" class standing by at Yarmouth.
10. *From Admiralty.* Date, December 15th.
To Commodore (S.). Sent, 1115.
137. Your 63. Eight submarines will be sufficient. Leave by most suitable route in time to be spread on patrol line by to-morrow, daybreak, Wednesday. Patrol line extends S.S.E. to the 10-fathom line from 53° 50' N., 4° 30' E. Submarines to remain on look-out from daybreak to nightfall on Wednesday, and then to return to Harwich. They are also to be ordered to return if weather gets too bad. Warn them that British ships will also be at sea. Report whether orders are understood, also time of sailing and proposed route.
11. *From C.-in-C., H.F.* Date, December 15th.
To Admiralty. Sent, 1135.
Received, 1219.
408. *Re your 523.* "Boadicea" and "Blanche" returned. "Boadicea" considerably damaged by heavy seas. Now only four light cruisers with force. Probably destroyers will be forced to return. Very important Com. (T.) should effect junction in event of engagement.
12. *From V.A., 2nd B.S.* Date, December 15th.
To V.A., 1st B.C.S. (Visual.) Passed, 1240.¹
German Squadron, four Battle Cruisers, five Light Cruisers, and three Flotillas leave Jade River daylight to-day, return Wednesday night. Am proceeding to R.V. 54° 10' N., 3° E. 7.30 a.m. Hope to get news from Commodore T. and join him. If nothing heard at 7.30 a.m. shall steer 90° till 10.30, 270° till 1.30, speed 14 knots, and then return North. Considering your strength do not get more than five miles from me. Steering 90° I want you astern, otherwise ahead with 3rd C.S. and 1st L.C.S. under your command. I think raid probable Harwich or Humber. If you get engaged draw enemy towards battle squadron. If Commodore T. does not join up I fear enemy destroyers only. On joining 3rd C.S. take station one mile on your port beam. 1st L.C.S. one mile on starboard beam opening to five miles for night closing at daylight. They are then under your command to engage light cruisers and keep off destroyers as you may direct. Battle stations by 7.30 a.m. and steam for full speed at midnight. Warn cruisers to beware of mines floating or dropped astern. (Have you any suggestions? As soon as you understand take station five miles ahead. If this weather continues, if possible, engage to windward and steering to North to hinder destroyers.)² (1140.)
13. *From V.A., "Lion."* Date, December 15th.
To V.A. 2. Passed, 1330.
Submit that 14 knots is too slow for menace from submarines after daylight. Assume when you steer 90° you want B.C.S. and Cruiser Squadrons to westward of you. Where and when will Commodore T. be expected to join you? (1320.)
- 13A. *From S.O., 2nd B.S.* Date, December 15th.
To Admiralty via Aberdeen. Received, 1320.
Having few T.B.D.'s with me. Commodore T. should join me at 7.30 a.m.
14. *From V.A. 2.* Date, December 15th.
To V.A., "Lion." Passed, 1347.
I will steam at 18 knots to the eastward and probably zig zag. I want cruisers astern to West of me as I anticipate enemy coming from English coast. Commodore T. is to shadow enemy and inform me. I have asked for him to join me at 7.30 a.m. at rendezvous. 90° means East true, 270° means West true. (1335.)
15. *From Admiralty.* Date, December 15th.
To Commodore T. Sent, 1405.
273. There is good probability of German Battle Cruisers, cruisers, and destroyers being off our coast to-morrow about daybreak. One "M" class destroyer is to patrol vicinity of N. Hinder Light Vessel from midnight till 9.0 a.m. A second destroyer is to patrol a line extending S. (mag.) from position 53° N., 3° 5' E. from midnight till 9.0 a.m. The duty of these destroyers is to look out for and report the enemy and trust to their speed to escape. If the weather is too bad they are to return to Harwich. Report their names.
The First and Third Flotillas with all available light cruisers are to be under weigh off Yarmouth before daylight to-morrow ready to move to any place where the enemy may be reported from, whether it is to the northward or southward. Their duty is to get in touch with the enemy, follow him and report his position to the V.A., 2nd B.S. and V.A., 1st B.C.S.

¹ "King George's" Signal Log. Time of Despatch.² This signal was repeated to all ships by visual with the exception of portion in brackets.

- The 2nd B.S., 1st B.C.S., 3rd C.S. and L.C.S. will be in a position in 54° 10' N., 3° 0' E. at 7.30 a.m. ready to cut off retreat of enemy. Should an engagement result your flotillas and light cruisers must endeavour to join our fleet and deal with enemy destroyers. If the weather is too bad for destroyers use light cruisers only and send destroyers back.
16. *From V.A., "Lion."* December 15th.
To V.A. 2. Passed, 1416.
Have you any recent information *re* approaching English Coast, South of 55°? Special swept Channel Chart was not obtained before sailing. (1350.)
17. *From V.A. 2.* December 15th.
To V.A., "Lion." Passed, 1415.
Do not go inside a line drawn 149° from a position 56° N. 0°. Mines have been reported just outside this line, especially one on December 1st, Lat. 54° 09' N., 2° 30' E. (1359.)
18. *From V.A. 2.* Passed, 1420.
To V.A., "Lion."
Warn your ships to look out for our destroyers at 7.30¹ a.m. and that the destroyers distinguishing sign is a V shape. (1355.)
19. *From Commodore S.* Date, December 15th.
To Admiralty. Sent, 1443.
Received, 1520.
64. Your 137. Orders understood. "Archimede" and seven "E" class left 2.30 p.m., Hinder route, "Archimede" taking southern extremity of line.
"Lurcher" and "Firedrake" leaving 5 p.m. will scout to eastward of line. Please inform me what British ships may be sent.
20. *From V.A., "Lion."* Passed, 1455.
To "Southampton," Antrim.
If no other orders are received by 7.30 a.m. I shall alter course to the northward to arrive at rendezvous 54° 10' N., 3° 0' E. at 7.50 a.m., when course will be altered 90° to follow 2nd B.S. You are to close at 7.30 a.m. and get in visual touch with me. Report if all instructions are clear. That is all I have received. (1430.)
21. *From V.A. 2.* Passed, 1550.
To V.A., "Lion."
Course and speed will be altered without further signal to 14½ kts. at 4 p.m. and S. 17° E. and will be maintained during night. (1539.)
(Passed to cruiser squadrons.)
22. *From V.A. 2.* Passed, 1555.
To "Shark."
Destroyers take station ten miles on port beam, closing in at daylight. Squadron may be altering to East true at 7.30 a.m. My present course and speed is S. 15° E. 16 kts.
23. *From Admiralty.* Dated December 15th.
To Admiral of Patrols. Sent, 1605.
305. All patrol flotillas should be specially alert to-morrow, Wednesday, morning. Weather permitting they are to be under weigh off their harbours before daylight in such positions that they can be communicated with quickly.
24. *From Admiralty.* Date, December 15th.
To S.N.O., Dover. Sent, 1735.
Weather permitting all available destroyers and submarines are to be under weigh to-morrow, Wednesday, before daylight. The submarines should be spread between S. Goodwin and Outer Ruytingen (West End). It is believed some German ships will be sent out to-night. The French should be asked to have their patrols out also.
25. *From Commodore T.* Date, December 15th.
To Admiralty. Received, 1730.
429. Your 273. Miranda detailed for Hinder Patrol.
Minos " " Northern " "
26. *From Commodore T.* Date, December 15th.
To Admiralty. Received, 1919.
430. I do not consider "Galatea" fit for service and have not included her in my orders for to-morrow.
27. *From S.N.O., Dover.* Date, December 15th.
To Admiralty. Received, 1937.
235. Your telegram of to-day. Orders for submarines to be spread in one line across Straits of Dover conflict with arrangements now in force with French by which I have two lines this side and they have two lines the other side.

¹ Logged in "Lion" and repeated to cruisers as 5.30 a.m.

It appears to be desirable to adhere to existing arrangements now in force with French by which I have two lines this side and they have two lines the other side. It appears to be desirable to adhere to existing arrangements to prevent confusion with French.

Instructions are requested by telegraph.

28. *From* Admiralty. *To* S.N.O., Dover. Date, December 15th. Sent, 2250.
Your 235. Adhere to existing arrangements.
29. *From* Admiralty. *To* Admiral, Rosyth. Date, December 15th. Sent, 2345.
678. It is believed several enemy's vessels are at sea to-night. Your local defence flotilla should be under weigh and alert at daybreak to-morrow. Inform V.A., 3rd B.S.
30. *From* Admiralty. *To* Admiral Hood. Date, December 16th. Sent, 0200.
Continue support of military operations Wednesday.

APPENDIX "B."

TELEGRAMS AND SIGNALS.

DECEMBER 16TH.

NOTE.—First time given is that at which signal was passed as ascertained from log of ship concerned. Times of other ships are added for purposes of comparison. (w) = wireless log. (s) = signal log. Destroyer signals were passed to "Lion" by "New Zealand," which was keeping destroyer wave.

1. *From* "Lynx." *To* S.O., 1st B.C.S. 0540.
Am chasing enemy's destroyers in N.W. direction. 0530.
2. *From* "Victor."* *To* "Lynx."
Big cruiser astern 0559.
3. *From* "Unity." *To* "Lynx." 0647.
"Ambuscade" † needs assistance. 0600.
4. *From* "Lynx." *To* S.O., 1st B.C.S. 0661.
Am being chased by enemy's cruiser; am steering S.S.W. 0601.
5. *From* "Lynx." *To* "Unity." "New Zealand," 0612.
"Lion," 0645.
"K.G.V.," 0654.
"Unity" assist ‡ "Ambuscade." 0605.
6. *From* "Lynx." *To* "Ambuscade." "Tiger," 0654.
At what speed are you able to go? 0612.
REPLY.—*T= knots, 0618.*
7. *From* "Unity." *To* "Lynx." 0658.
Am cut off from "Ambuscade" by cruiser. 0615.
8. *From* "Ambuscade." *To* "Lynx." 0618?
Ten knots. 0618.
9. *From* "Shark." *To* S.O., 1st B.C.S. 0642.
"Hardy" W/T and steering gear disabled, steering from engines. 0620.
10. *From* "Ambuscade." *To* "Lynx." 0648.
Lower mess is full up, require some one to stand by me. 0615.
11. *From* "Lynx." *To* "Ambuscade." "Lion," 0657.
"New Zealand," 0624.
Retire to N.N.W. 0623.

* Evidently "Unity" is meant.

† "Lion's" log has "Alligator."

‡ This reading in "New Zealand" and "K.G.V." "Lion's" log has "Unity" to "Lynx." "Unity" assisting Ambuscade."

12. *From* "Unity." *To* "Lynx." "Lion," 0715.
"New Zealand," 0630.
Am following you; have lost "Ambuscade." 0625.
13. *From* "Lynx." *To* S.O., 1st B.C.S. 0710.
Have reason to believe one destroyer sunk. "Ambuscade" damaged, "Unity" standing by her. 0635.
14. *From* "Lynx." *To* "Ambuscade." "Lion," 0736.
How are you getting on? 0650.
15. *From* "Unity." *To* "Ambuscade." "Tiger," 0720.
What is the matter? 0652.
16. *From* "Southampton." *To* Flag. 0710.
Battle Fleet bearing N.N.W.
17. *From* S.O., 1st B.C.S. *To* 1st L.C.S. 0726.
Take station N. (true), 5 miles from "Lion," and spread North (true) for look-out. 0725.
(A similar signal stationed the 3rd C.S. South (true).)
18. *From* S.O., 1st B.C.S. *To* General. 0730.
Alter course 16 points to port in succession speed, 18 knots.
19. *From* S.O., 2nd B.S. *To* General. "Orion" (s) 7.40 a.m. 0735.
Turn together 8 points to port. 0735.
20. *From* "Ambuscade." *To* "Lynx" and "Unity." "Tiger" (w) 0739.
Two shells exploded fore lower mess deck; think oil tanks are pierced; keeping water under present moment and maintaining 10 knots.
21. *From* "Lynx." *To* "Ambuscade." 0742.
You are to proceed to nearest port and dock. 0742.
22. *From* S.O., 2nd B.S. *To* General. "Orion" (s) 0748.
Turn together 4 points to starboard, speed 18 knots. 0742.
23. *From* "Lion." *To* Cruisers. "Tiger" (w) 0754.
Course N. 76 W.
NOTE.—Recd. in "New Zealand" 0758—"Queen Mary" 0756.
24. *From* S.O., 2nd B.S. *To* S.O., 1st B.C.S. 0755.
Are you going after "Roon"?
REPLY.—Have heard nothing of "Roon"; what course are you steering?
25. *From* S.O., 2nd B.S. *To* S.O., 1st B.C.S. 0755.
Shall not go South of this line unless enemy are sighted; keep me informed of your movements. 0750.
26. *From* S.O., 2nd B.S. *To* 2nd B.S. "Tiger" (w) 0754.
Turn together 4 points to starboard. 0750.
27. *From* S.O., 1st B.C.S. *To* Cruisers. "Queen Mary," 0804.
"Tiger," 0801.
Alter course in succession 16 points to starboard. 0800.
28. *From* "Shark." *To* S.O., 1st B.C.S. "Lion," 0805. (See note below.)
My position is Lat. 54° 22' N., Long. 3° 20' E.; am keeping in touch with large cruiser "Roon" and five destroyers steering East. 0705.

NOTE.—"New Zealand" was keeping destroyer wave. "New Zealand" signal log gives time of receipt 0730, but her wireless (auxiliary cabinet) log says 0723. "Monarch" (w) 0722. "Orion" 0730. "King George V." says received auxiliary at 0734, passed to "Lion" at 0758. "Tiger" (w) 0751. "Palmouth" (w) 0758. Entered in "Lion" (s) as received by searchlight at 0805, note in same. Repeated main W/T "King George V." and on auxiliary W/T by "New Zealand." "Antrim" (w) 0801.

29. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. "Southampton," 0806.
To 1st Light Cruiser Squadron.
Spread North and look out for "Roon."
30. From "Shark." 0809.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
My position Lat. 54° 28' N., Long. 3° 40' E. steering East 22 knots, 0730.
NOTE.—"Lion's" signal log has "Received from 'King George V.' 0809" with note "repeated on Auxiliary W/T by 'New Zealand' at 8.10."
31. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 0815.
To "Antrim."
Preserve your station on battleships and look out to southward.
32. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. "Queen Mary," 0815.
To Cruisers.
Course E. ½ N., speed 24 knots. 0810.
33. From "Lynx." 0815.
To "New Zealand."
Have been attacked by four enemy cruisers; believed one of our flotilla has been sunk. "Ambuscade" fore mess deck flooded, "Scourge" badly holed forward, fore magazine and shell rooms flooded; No. 2 oil tank no use. Am proceeding Newcastle for repairs, "Unity" escorting. One man badly hurt. 0815.
34. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 0816.
To "New Zealand."
Signals from destroyers are being delayed in passing in. Why is this? 0816.
35. From Flag. "Southampton," 0815.
To "Southampton."
Course East. 0816.
36. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 0820.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
Am leaving 3rd Cruiser Squadron with you. Am proceeding East with Light Cruiser Squadrons to try and cut off "Roon." 0817.
37. From S.O., 2nd B.S. 0820.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
Shall follow you and retire North at 1430. Do not go too far East, inform me your movements occasionally. 0820.
38. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 0825.
To 1st L.C.S.
Preserve your Compass bearing. 0825.
39. From Flag "Lion." 0825.
To "New Zealand."
What time was 0705 from "Shark" received in "New Zealand." 0825.
REPLY.—0730.
40. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 0836.
To "New Zealand."
How fast can you go for a prolonged chase? 0830.
REPLY.—25½ knots.
41. From "New Zealand." "Lion," 0832.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
Your 0816. Auxiliary Office interfered with Main Office readings. Has to wait when signals are faint. 0836.
42. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 0847.
To "Shark."
Report every half-hour enemy's position, course, and speed. 0830.
43. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 0840.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
Have you any news of Commodore (T.)? 0830.
44. From "Shark." 0840.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
Intercepted, Aux. W/T 0835.
Urgent—I am being chased to Westward by light cruisers; my position, Lat. 54° 34' N., Long. 3° 48' E. 0815.
NOTE.—"Tiger" has "Are we to chase 'Leonidas' W. by two-funnel cruiser?"

* Evidently for "Lynx." "Scourge" was in Mediterranean. "Lion's" log says "Fire Queen," a yacht at Portsmouth.

45. From "Patrol." Intercepted "Lion," 0842.
To "Jupiter."
Heavily engaged two battle cruisers.
NOTE.—"King George V." has "heavily engaging two enemy battle cruisers."
46. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 0845.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
Have you any knowledge whether our submarines are likely to be met with. 0823.
NOTE.—Apparently no answer made to this signal.
47. From Scarborough. Intercepted "Lion," 0845.
To Admiralty.
Urgent—Scarborough being shelled. 0830.
48. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. "New Zealand," 0855.
To General. "Queen Mary," 0859.
"Tiger," 0856.
Course North. (0852.)
49. From Admiralty (703) Via Ipswich, 0856.
To S.O., 2nd B.S. "Lion."
S.O., 1st B.C.S.
Urgent.—At 1820² Scarborough was being shelled. (0835.)
NOTE 1.—Received (w) "King George V." via "Centurion" 0915; "Orion" 0856; "Tiger" 0858; "Falmouth" 0855; "Antrim" 0855.
NOTE 2.—"Orion" has 6.20 p.m. (?); "Antrim" 6.20 p.m.; "King George V." 1820; "Tiger" 1820. "Lion's" 8.30 a.m. probably inserted later.
Corrected at 0945. From Admiralty.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
In Signal 703, 6.20 p.m., read 8.20 a.m. 0945.
(See Signal No. 89.)
This signal was taken to be 6.20 a.m., and led to the idea that the enemy had proceeded from Scarborough to Hartlepool. See No. 85.
50. From Flag "Lion." 0900.
To General.
Course N.W. by W. 0900.
NOTE 1.—Received "New Zealand" 0902; "Queen Mary" 0904; "Tiger" 0900.
NOTE 2.—"Queen Mary" has W.N.W.; "Tiger" W.N.W.; "New Zealand" W.N.W.
Ships' logs give course W.N.W.
51. From "Shark" ("New Zealand"). 0905.
To "New Zealand" (S.O., 1st B.C.S.).
What is position of Battle Cruisers and Battle Fleet. 0845.
52. "Ambuscade." "Antrim," 0905.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
Estimated position, Lat. 55° 44' N., Long. 2° 54' E. Course N. 70° W., 12½ knots. 0855.
53. From "Lynx." Intercepted "Lion," 0906.
To C-in-C., H.F.
Repetition of Signal 0815, see No. 33.
54. From S.O., 2nd B.S. "Lion," 0906.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
Rejoin me. 0844.
NOTE 1.—Received "Lion" 0906; "Southampton" 0859; "Orion" 0915; "Queen Mary" 0905; "Falmouth" 0900; "Antrim" 0900. Sent from "K.G.V." 0859. "K.G.V." adds "Urgent."
55. From S.O., 2nd B.S. 0907.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
I am steering for Humber. 0854.
NOTE.—Received "Lion" 0907; "Southampton" 0905; "Orion" 0909; "Tiger" 0908; "Falmouth" 0907; "Antrim" 0907. Sent "K.G.V." 0907. See para. 32.
56. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 0908.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
Evidently¹ screen of enemy light cruisers should like to keep light cruisers. 0905.
NOTE 1.—"K.G.V." has "evidence of."
57. From "Southampton." 0910.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
Three columns of smoke N. ½ W. our destroyers.
58. From S.O., 2nd B.S. Intercepted Admiralty, 0911.
To Commodore T.
My position S. 82° E. 23 miles from rendezvous steering S. 77° E., 16 knots. Shall retire N. at 1430. 0830.

59. *From Admiralty.* 0911.
To S.O., 2nd B.S., and S.O., 1st B.C.S.
Urgent. Three battleships "Dreadnought" class reported off Scarborough. 0900.
60. *From Southampton.* 0912.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
"Birmingham" reports three columns of smoke bearing north. Four of our destroyers steaming at high speed.
61. *From Admiralty.* Sent 0845.
To Vice-Admiral, 3rd Battle Squadron Intercepted "K.G.V." and "Lion," 0920.
Enemy "Dreadnoughts" reported firing on Scarborough at 8.30 a.m. and enemy light cruiser off Hartlepool. 0850.
62. *From Admiralty.* Sent 0855.
To Commodore T. Intercepted "K.G.V.," 0925.
Enemy battleships "Dreadnought" off Scarborough. Get in touch. Enemy's light cruisers off Hartlepool.
63. *From S.O., 1st B.C.S.* 0919.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
In view of Admiralty 0900 am steering W.N.W. 0915.
64. *From S.O., 1st B.C.S.* 0921.
To "New Zealand."
Proceed at 24 knots. 0921.
65. *From Commodore (T.).* Intercepted "K.G.V.," 0921.
To "Undaunted."
Urgent. Proceed at full speed with your Flotilla by swept channel to Haisborough Light Vessel and from there to position of Battle Fleet. 0915.
66. *From Commodore (T.).* Intercepted "Falmouth," 0922.
To "Fearless." "Antrim," 0922.
Proceed full speed with your Flotilla by swept channel to Haisborough and from there to position of Battle Fleet. 0912.
67. *From C-in-C., H.F.* Intercepted "Lion," 0923.
To S.O., 3rd B.S.
Raise steam for full speed with all despatch and report when ready to proceed. Have destroyers ready. 0921.
NOTE.—Intercepted "Lion" 0923; "King George V." 0924; "Falmouth" 0923; "Antrim" 0935.
68. *From "Lynx."* 0925?
To C-in-C., H.F.
What orders for "Unity." I no longer need her. 0925.
69. *From Admiralty.* Sent 0945.
To V.A. 3.
2nd B.S. and 1st B.C.S. were in 54° 10', 3° 0' at 7.30 a.m. and are steering for Humber. Endeavour to join them.
See Nos. 55, 63.
70. *From Admiralty.* Sent 0940.
To C-in-C., H.F.
Enemy shelling Scarborough and Hartlepool. In case their vessels are chased north you should bring your fleet out.
71. *From "Shark."* 0932.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
Am being chased by light cruisers. 0918.
72. *From S.O., 1st B.C.S.* 0933.
To "New Zealand."
Has "Shark" received our position, course, and speed? 0935.
73. *From Sheerness.* Intercepted "Lion," 0933.
To "Aurora" or "Lord Nelson." "King George V.," 0933.
Tynemouth intercepted—3 battleships of "Dreadnought" class attacking, enemy off Hartlepool. Hartlepool reports 3 three-funnelled cruisers S.E. Urgent.
74. *From "New Zealand."* 0936?
To "Shark."
Battle Cruisers at 0930. Lat. 54° 20' N., Long. 3° 28' E. steering W.N.W. 24 knots. Battle Fleet eight miles S. 30° W. from Battle Cruisers steering 270° 0920.
NOTE.—Bearing should probably be S. 30° E.

75. *From C-in-C., H.F.* Intercepted, "Lion," 0937.
To S.O., 3rd B.S.
Proceed to sea as soon as you are ready. Take destroyers as submarine screen. Further to follow. 0930.
76. *From S.O., 2nd B.S.* 0939.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
Urgent. Light Cruisers must go in through minefield to locate enemy. 0929.
NOTE.—"Lion" 0939; "Southampton" 0938; "Orion" 0940; "Queen Mary" 0944; "Tiger" 0940; "Falmouth" 0938; "Antrim" 0939. Sent by "King George V." 0939 (repeated by visual at 1005).
77. *From S.O., 2nd B.S.* 0940.
To "Southampton."
Your duty is to clear enemy light cruisers from our front so they will not obtain information as to our position. Do not close me any more. 0934.
78. *From V.A. 2.* 1011.
To Admiralty.
My position, 54° 17' N., 3° 35' E. I am steering towards Scarborough. 0930.
79. *From "Southampton."* 0941.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
Add to "Shark's" signal. I have been chased by three light cruisers until 0815. They are probably steering east in company with "Roon."
80. *From "Shark."* Intercepted, "Lion," 0942.
To "Lynx."
Present position, Lat. 54° 18' N., Long. 3° 51' E., "Acasta," "Hardy," "Spitfire" in company, steering gear and W/T put out of action. 0945.
81. *From "Falmouth."* Intercepted, "Lion," 0943.
To "King George V."
Position of "Shark" when chased at 0830 was Lat. 54° 37' N., Long. 3° 37' E.
82. *From S.O., 2nd B.S.* Sent, 0954.
To Admiralty. Received, Admiralty, 1011.
Is it safe to go straight across minefields? 0941.
83. *From "Lynx."* Intercepted, "Antrim," 1000.
To "Shark" and S.O., 1st B.C.S., via "New Zealand."
Position at 0900 Lat. 54° 53' N., Long. 1° 40' E. Course, N. 39° W., 23 knots. Proceeding Newcastle for repairs, "Unity" in company. 0910.
See No. 49.
84. *From S.O., 1st B.C.S.* 1000.
To General.
Course, N. 40° W.
85. *From S.O., 1st B.C.S.* 1003.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
Shall have to haul to N. 40° W. to clear S.W. Dogger Bank Patch. Enemy appear to be working up coast. 0950.
86. *From Commodore T.* 1005.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
My position at 9.45 a.m. is by Would Light Vessel steering N. 26° W. 25 knots. Request instructions. 1000.
87. *From "Lynx."* Intercepted, "Antrim," 1006.
To "Shark."
Proceeding Newcastle for repairs, report casualties. 0940.
88. *From C-in-C., H.F.* "K.G.V.," 1011.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
S.O., 1st B.C.S.
Gap in minefield between parallel Lat. 54° 40' and 54° 20', and as far as 20' E. Long. Enemy will in all probability come out there. 1004.
NOTE.—Not logged in "Lion," but apparently received.
89. *From Admiralty.* 1012.
To S.O., 2nd B.S. } via "Centurion."
S.O., 1st B.C.S. }
In 703, for 6.20 read 0820 a.m. 0945.
See Signal 49.
90. *From S.O., 2nd B.S.* 1016 (by visual).
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
Reply to 0950. We must catch him. Keep me informed. I think you might probably cut him off about 55° N., 1° 21' E. 1000.

91. From C.-in-C., H.F. Intercepted, "K.G.V.," 0952.
To S.O., 3rd B.C.
Third Battle Squadron proceed Lat. 55° 50' N., Long. 1° 10' W. to intercept enemy if coming north. Take all available cruisers and destroyers. 0945.
92. From S.O., 2nd B.S. 1017.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
Dreadnoughts reported off Hartlepool, also three-funnelled cruisers. 0956.
93. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 1024.
To "Shark."
What course were light cruisers which chased you steering when last seen. 1015.
94. From "Shark." Intercepted, "Tiger" (w) 1025.
To "Lynx."
What destroyers have you in company? 0955.
REPLY.—"Unity" in company.
- 95, 96. Deleted as unimportant.
97. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 1030.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
Hope you can collect Commodore (T.) from south.
98. From S.O., 2nd B.S. "Orion," 1037.
"Tiger," 1037.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S. "Falmouth," 1035.
"Antrim," 1035.
Urgent. Keep south of Dogger, go through gap between Lat. 54° 40' N. and 54° 20' N. up to 20' E. 1035.
NOTE.—Not logged in "Lion."
99. From S.O., 2nd B.S. Intercepted, "Lion," 1040.
To Commodore (T.).
Proceed with all dispatch to Lat. 54° 20' N., Long. 1° 30' E.
100. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 1040.
To "Southampton."
Light Cruisers take station W.N.W. from "Lion" and spread for look-out duties N.N.E. and S.S.W. Shall steer W.N.W. at 1100. 1030.
101. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 1050.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
Propose to steer W.N.W. at 1100 with light cruisers spread ahead of me to fill gap through minefield. 1035.
102. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 1053.
To "Southampton."
Shall steer W.N.W. at 1100. Shall steer west at noon. Idea is to block gap between minefields. Act accordingly. 1050.
103. From "Shark." 1055.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
When last seen steering W.S.W., but they probably turned away to eastward.
104. From Admiralty. 1055.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
164. Urgent. Enemy is probably returning towards Heligoland. You should keep outside minefield and steer so as to cut him off. 1030.
"Tiger" intercepted 1047. "Antrim" 1045.
105. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. "Southampton," 1051.
To General. "Tiger," 1100.
Course W.N.W. 1100 (visual).
106. From Commodore (T.). 1104.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
I have ordered destroyers to Yarmouth. 1103.
107. From "Lynx." 1105.
To "Ambuscade."
Have given directions for "Unity" to escort "Ambuscade" to Newcastle. 1105.
108. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 1105.
To General.
Speed 22 knots.
109. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 1106.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
Think we should block gap between minefields. Light Cruisers to the northward. 3rd Cruiser Squadron to the southward. 3rd Battle Squadron guard by Farne Islands. Commodore (T.) off Flamborough Head. 1050.

110. From S.O., 2nd B.S. 1108.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
Obey the purport of Admiralty signal 1030.
111. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 1109.
To General.
Speed 18 knots.
112. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 1109.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
My position, course, and speed Lat. 54° 41' N., Long. 1° 43' E., West, 24 knots. Light Cruisers spread ahead. Indicate your position, course, and speed. 1100.
NOTE.—Position and course given are incorrect. Compare No. 138, and footnote, p. 17.
113. From Commodore (T.). "Lion," 1115.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
My position 10 a.m. Lat. 53° 14' N., Long. 1° 47' E. 25 knots. 1115.
NOTE 1 "King George V." has 11 a.m. which appears to be correct.
NOTE 2 "King George V." inserts Course N. 5 E.
114. Deleted. Unimportant.
115. From "Nottingham." 1119.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
Urgent. Vessel S.W. steering N.W.
116. From "Queen Mary." Intercepted, "Tiger," 1121.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
Vessels south-westerly steering N.W. 1115.
(This is probably a repetition of No. 115.)
117. From "Shark." Intercepted, "Antrim," 1130.
To "Lynx" and S.O., 1st B.C.S., via "New Zealand."
Have one man killed, 1 officer and 3 men wounded, steering gear and W/T damaged. Where is "Ambuscade." 1020.
"Tiger" has "Hardy," which is evidently correct.
118. From S.O., 1st L.C.S. 1141.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
Engaging a cruiser and destroyers. 1130.
119. From S.O., 2nd B.S. Intercepted, "Lion," 1143.
To Admiral of Patrols.
My position 54° 24' N., 2° 50' E., N. 75 W., 20 knots. 1100.
120. From Aberdeen. Intercepted, "Lion," 1145.
To C.-in-C., Grand Fleet.
Following received from Naval Centre, Newcastle. Scarborough bombarded from 0807 till 0830. Hartlepool bombarded from 0820 till 0850. Enemy last seen proceeding north.
121. From S.O., 1st L.C.S. "Lion," 1146.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S. "Tiger," 1149.
"Antrim," 1147.
Chasing an enemy's cruiser and some destroyers steering south. 1144.
122. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 1150.
To Light Cruisers.
Resume your position for look-out duties. (Take station ahead 5 miles.)
NOTE.—Words in brackets not logged in "Southampton."
123. From S.O., 2nd B.S. "Lion," 1155.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S. "Tiger," 1157.
"Falmouth," 1153.
"Antrim," 1154.
My position 12.30 p.m., Lat. 54° 24' N., Long. 2° 0' E., shall then steer S. 15 E., speed 20 knots, altering 16 points every ½ hour. Commodore (T.)'s position 60 miles South. 1140.
NOTE.—Sent from "King George V." at 1155. Position not in "Lion's" log.
124. From S.O., 1st L.C.S. 1157.
To "Nottingham" and "Falmouth."
My course S.E. by S. 1155.
125. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 1155.
To Destroyers.
Close investigate Trawlers.
See Nos. 137, 150.
126. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 1156.
To General.
Course, S.S.W.

127. From "Nottingham."
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
Several smokes S.S.W. 1205.
128. Deleted. Unimportant.
129. From "Southampton."
To S.O., 1st B.C.S. 1206.
What speed.
Reply, 18 knots.
130. From "Southampton."
To S.O., 1st B.C.S. "Lion," 1210.
Enemy's cruisers bearing S. 60 W.
NOTE 1.—S. by E. in "Southampton's" log; time of sounding 1158.
131. From S.O., 2nd B.S. Intercepted, "Lion," 1210.
To S.O., 3rd C.S.
Urgent. At 12.30 I shall alter course to S. 15 E., speed 18 knots. 3rd C.S. is to spread N. 15 W. from me 3 miles apart by 1230. I shall alter course 16 points every quarter of an hour. 1143.
132. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 1213.
To "Southampton."
What have you done with enemy light cruisers. 1210.
Reply.—They disappeared steering South when I received your signal to resume station.
133. From Admiral of Patrols. 1215.
To S.O., 2nd B.S., and
S.O., 1st B.C.S.
I am off Flamborough Head in "Skirmisher." There is no sign of enemy between Flamborough Head and Humber. 1210.
134. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 1215.
To "Southampton."
Engage the enemy. 1213.
135. From "Southampton."
To S.O., 1st B.C.S. 1217.
No enemy in sight. 1217.
136. From S.O., 2nd B.S. "K.G.V.," 1215.
To S.O., 3rd C.S.
Follow. 1209.
137. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 1218.
To Destroyers.
Close me on completion of present duty. 1215.
(See No. 125.)
138. From "Falmouth." 1220.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
Will you please give me your Noon position.
Reply, 54° 38' N., 1° 54' E.
139. From C-in-C., G.F. 1220.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
? left 1000 for 55° 50' N., 1° 10' W. 1220.
NOTE 1.—Presumably Third Battle Squadron.
140. From S.O., 2nd B.S. 1225.
To 1st B.C.S.
My course is N.E. by E. 1218.
141. From "Shark." Intercepted, "Tiger," 1225.
To C-in-C., H.F.
? Have reported themselves safe. "Acasta," "Spitfire," "Hardy" are with "Shark." "Unity" has been detailed to escort "Ambuscade" to Newcastle. "Lynx" proceeding to Leith. "Hardy" steering gear and W/T disabled. "Ambuscade" as before reported. Casualties: "Hardy" one man killed, "Lynx" one man wounded, "Hardy" one officer and three men wounded.
142. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 1225.
To "Southampton."
When and where was enemy last seen. When you sight enemy engage him. Signal to resume station was made to "Nottingham." 1220.
143. From "Southampton." 1225.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
At 1155 bearing South 5 miles steering about S,S,E. 1225.

144. From S.O., 2nd B.S. 1216.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
Urgent—Enemy's cruisers and destroyers in sight. 1216.
NOTE.—"K.G.V." (p) 1216, (s) 1225. Intercepted "Falmouth," 1226; "Antrim," 1225. "Tiger" has C-in-C., H.F., to S.O., 2nd B.S., and intercepted at 1228. Not logged in "Lion," but apparently received.
145. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 1230.
To General.
Alter course in succession 16 points to Port.
146. From S.O., 2nd B.S. 1231.
To 3rd C.S.
Take station ahead.
147. From S.O., 2nd B.S. 1236.
To 3rd C.S.
Attack enemy's destroyers. 1227.
148. From S.O., 2nd B.S. 1241.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
Enemy's course East—no battle cruisers seen yet. 1238.
149. From S.O., 2nd B.S. 1245.
To 3rd C.S.
Close me. 1241.
150. From "Shark." 1250.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
Trawlers are all from Hull transferring fish. They report they have not seen any strange vessels. "Hardy" has defective steering gear; propose sending her into Humber escorted by "Spitfire." She has one man killed, one officer and three men wounded. 1225.
Reply—Approved.
151. From Flag "Lion." 1250.
To General.
Speed 20 knots.
152. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 1245?
To "Hardy" and "Spitfire."
Proceed to Humber. 1245.
153. Deleted. Unimportant.
154. From Commodore (T.). 1255.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
My speed is from 16 knots. Request your position. 1247.
155. From S.O., 2nd B.S. 1257.
To S.O., 1st B.S.C.
2nd Battle Squadron have assumed original position. 1250.
156. From "Shark." 1300.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
Please give me your position.
Reply—54° 35' N., 1° 52' E.
157. From "Hardy." 1303.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
Permission to proceed in execution of previous order.
Reply—Approved.
158. From R.A., "Orion." 1310.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
I think two of the enemy's ships were battle cruisers. I distinctly saw one isolated funnel on each. 1300.
NOTE.—"ORION" was mistaken. There were no German battle cruisers with this force.
159. From Flag ("Lion"). 1315.
To General.
Course, North.
160. From Admiral of Patrols. 1319.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
All German vessels steered East from neighbourhood of Whitby and Filey Bay about 0900 and have not since reappeared.
161. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 1322.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
Am patrolling to Northward of you. Light Cruisers spread to Westward. "Spitfire" is escorting "Hardy," injured, to Humber. 1315.

162. From Flag ("Lion"). 1325
To General.
Speed 16 knots.
163. From Commodore (T.). 1329.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
Expect to arrive rendezvous 1500. 1320.
164. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. "Lion," 1330.
To "Southampton." "Southampton," 1340.
I am going to steer North until clear of Bank and then turn West again. Enemy must be to Westward. I want you to extend your distance from me further West.
165. From "Shark." Received, 1331.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
Am in company with "Lion," position, 1315, Lat. 56° N., Long. 2° E. 15. Course, North. 1315.
166. From Admiralty. "Lion," 1343.
To all ships.
At 12.15 p.m. G.M.T. enemy battle cruisers were in Lat. 54° 33' N., 1° 7' E., steering E. by S., 23 knots. Urgent. 1325.
NOTE.—Received "Lion" 1343; "King George V." 1340; "New Zealand" 1345; "Queen Mary," 1340; "Tiger" 1338; "Falmouth" 1401; "Antrim" (via "Centurion") 1440; "Monarch" 1352; "Birmingham" 1400; "Conqueror" 1405.
167. From S.O., 2nd B.S.
To Commodore (T.).
My position Lat. 54° 23' N., Long. 2° 17' E., steering round and round. 1324.
NOTE.—Intercepted by "Lion" 1347; "Orion" 1348; "Queen Mary" 1350; "Tiger" 1350; "Antrim" 1346. Sent by "King George V." 1346.
168. From Flag ("Lion").
To General.
Turn together to East by South. Speed, 22 knots. 1355.
NOTE.—Received by "Nottingham" 1358; "Southampton" 1355; "Queen Mary" 1355; "Tiger" 1354.
169. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. "K.G.V.," 1359.
To S.O., 1st L.C.S. "New Zealand," 1359.
Course E. by S., 22 knots. 1355.
170. From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To General.
Speed, 24 knots. 1402.
171. From S.O., 1st B.C.S.
To General.
Alter course to E.S.E., speed 25 knots. 1408.
172. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. Received, 1410.
To "Southampton."
Chase E.S.E. 1408.
173. From Admiralty.
To C.-in-C., H.F.; S.O., 2nd B.S.; S.O., 1st B.C.S.; and Commodore (T.).
(708.) High Sea Fleet is out and was in Lat. 54° 38' N. 5° 55' E. at 1230 to-day, so do not go too far East. Acknowledge (through a medium power station). 1350.
Received "Lion" 1422; "King George V." 1425; "New Zealand" 1440; "Orion" 1420; "Queen Mary" 1429; "Tiger" 1502 (Cleethorpes); "Falmouth" 1500; "Antrim" 1440; "Monarch" 1419; "Conqueror" 1418.
174. From Flag ("Lion"). 1424.
To General.
Alter course to S.E. 1424.
175. From S.O., 3rd B.S. 1425.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
My position Lat. 56° N., Long. 2° W. Course S.E. by S., 16 knots. 1340.
176. From S.O., 2nd B.S. Intercepted, "Orion," 1425.
To Commodore (T.). "Falmouth," 1426.
"Tiger," 1428.
Return to your base. 1354.
(Sent 1425½.)
177. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 1427.
To S.O., 1st L.C.S.

178. From S.O., 2nd B.S. 1435.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
What is your position? I fear battle cruisers were, with remainder, seen by me at 1215. 1414
179. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 1436.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
My position, course, and speed: Lat. 54° 42' N., Long. 2° 23' E. S.E., 25 knots. 1430.
180. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 1441.
To Admiralty. Via "Queen Mary" and "Aberdeen."
Your message, series No. 708, has been received and understood. 1435.
181. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 1446.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
What is your position, course, and speed? 1445.
182. From C.-in-C., H.F. Intercepted, "K.G.V." } 1452.
To S.O., 3rd B.S. and "Lion," }
Re Admiralty telegram 1325—steer to intercept enemy if they move North. 1430.
183. From "Shark." 1510.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
"Shark" has only 100 tons of oil left and is burning 8 tons an hour at this speed.
184. From Admiralty. "Falmouth," 1511.
To Commodore (S.) and "Adamant" via Ipswich.
High Sea Fleet is at sea, and at 12.30 p.m. was in Lat. 54° 38' N., Long. 5° 55' E. They may return after dawn to-morrow, so proceed to Heligoland and intercept them. They probably pass 5 miles west of Heligoland steering south for Weser Light. 1410.
185. From Admiralty. "Lion," 1522.
To S.O., 2nd B.S.; S.O., 1st B.C.S.; S.O., 3rd B.S.; S.O., 1st L.C.S.
(709.) Enemy's Battle Cruisers' position at 12.45 p.m. was Lat. 54° 26' N., Long. 1° 25' E., steering N. 7° E., 21 knots. Urgent. Acknowledge.
"King George V." (via "Centurion") 1507—passed at 1523 to "Lion"; "New Zealand" 1545; "Southampton" 1523; "Orion" 1504; "Queen Mary" 1510; "Tiger" 1509; "Antrim" 1504.
186. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 1525.
To "Shark."
Proceed to harbour and re-fuel.
187. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 1538.
To General.
Speed, 20 knots.
188. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 1544.
To General.
Course, North.
189. From S.O., 2nd B.S. 1545.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.
Relinquish chase—Rejoin me to-morrow. My present position is Lat. 54° 43' N., Long. 1° 55' E., N. 15° W., 18 knots. 1500.
190. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 1548.
To 1st L.C.S.
Close "Southampton." Course, North, 1540.
191. From "Unity." 1550 ?
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
My position, 1530. Lat. 55° 12' N., Long. 0° 51' E., steering N. 56° W. 10 ? knots. 1550.
192. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 1558.
To General.
Speed, 18 knots.
193. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. 1600.
To General.
Course, N. 15° W.
194. From S.O., 2nd B.S. "Lion," 1649.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S.; S.O., 3rd B.S.; S.O., 3rd C.S.; S.O., 1st L.C.S.
Course for night, North, 1616.

195. From C.-in-C., G.F. 1718?
To S.O., 2nd B.S.
What news? Give your position, course, and speed. Am steering for Lat. 57° 10' N., Long. 2° 10' E. 1703.
196. From V.-A., 2nd B.S. 1800.
To Admiralty and C.-in-C., G.F.
Enemy cruisers and destroyers seen by 2nd B.S. in mist and rain, about 1215, steering E. by S., full speed. Altered course to North when chased. 54° 25' N. 2° 18' E.
Present position, 54° 43' N., 1° 55' E. Course, N. 15° W., 18 knots. 3rd C.S. in company. Am proceeding to base. 1500.

APPENDIX "C."

1. EXTRACT FROM THE LOG¹ OF H.M.S. "KING GEORGE V." (FLAGSHIP, SECOND BATTLE SQUADRON).

16th December, 1914.

REMARKS.

7.17, a/c E.S.E. 7.23, a/c S. 15° E., 16 knots.
7.33, a/c 8 points to port. 7.42, a/c 4 points to starboard, 18 knots.
7.50, a/c S. 15° E. 7.53, a/c S. 75° E. 7.58, a/c N. 58° E., zigzagging.
8.18, a/c S. 77° E. 8.30, a/c S. 32° E.
8.50, a/c N.N.W.
9.53, a/c W.N.W. 9.58, a/c N.W.
10.3, increased to 19 knots. 10.11, increased to 20 knots.
10.25, a/c N. 75° W.
11.30, wind got up from West accompanied by rain, squalls; visibility at times less than 3 miles. 11.41, reduced to 18 knots.
Position, noon (D.R.) 54° 23' N., 2° 22' E.
12.5,² sighted enemy's cruisers and destroyers on starboard bow.
12.15, a/c N.E. by E., increased to 20 knots.
12.18, 21 knots. 12.40, a/c N. 75° W., enemy's vessels disappeared in mist.
1.2, a/c S. 6° W. 1.11, reduced to 18 knots.
1.24, a/c to N. 15° W.
4.0. 4.6, a/c North.

2. EXTRACT FROM THE LOG OF H.M.S. "CENTURION"³ (2ND B.S.).

16th December, 1914.

7.0 exercised action. 7.20, a/c E.S.E., increased to 16 knots.
7.25, a/c S. 17° E. 7.33, a/c N. 73° E. 7.43, a/c E. 62° E.
8.0, 54° 05' N. 3° 30' E.
Hands at action stations.
Noon, position 54° 20' N., 2° 30' E.
Made good, 7.30 to noon, N. 53° W. 31'.
4.0, made good, noon to 4 p.m., N. 25° W. 48'.
4.7, a/c North.

3. EXTRACT FROM THE LOG OF H.M.S. "ORION"⁴ (2ND B.S.).

16th December, 1914.

7.21, a/c 108°, 16 knots. 7.26, a/c 150°. 7.33, a/c 60°.
7.41, course 108°, 18 knots. 7.55, a/c 166°. 7.56, a/c 100°.
8.0, course 55°, 19 knots. 8.20, course 95°.
8.33, course 135°. 8.53, course 327°.
9.38, course 270°.
10.02, course 315°. 10.11, 20 knots.
10.28, course 270°. 11.48, 18 knots.
Noon, position D.R., Lat. 54° 33' N., Long. 2° 30' E.
0.18, course 50°, 21 knots. 0.42, course 270°, 18 knots.
1.04, course 180°, 18 knots. 1.28, course 333°, 18 knots.
4.0.

¹ Ship's log, H.M.S. "King George V.," 27.10.14—28.2.15, Deptford, No. 19648.² 12.15 has been erased.³ Ship's log, H.M.S. "Centurion," 10.5.14, Deptford, No. 19645.⁴ Deptford, No. 19649. In comparing times for altering course, it should be remembered that the "Orion" was Rear-Admiral's flagship of the 2nd Battle Squadron, and was the fourth ship in the line, the order being "King George V.," "Ajax," "Centurion," "Orion," "Monarch," "Conqueror."4. EXTRACT FROM THE LOG OF H.M.S. "LION"¹ (FLAGSHIP, FIRST BATTLE CRUISER SQUADRON).

16th December, 1914.

6.0, saw flashes of gunfire to N.E.
1st L.C.S. and 3rd C.S. joined flag.
7.35, course N. 17° W., 18 knots.
7.53, N. 76° W.
8.0, a/c S. 76° E. Position, 54° 10' N., 3° 3' E.
8.3, E.N.E., 22 knots. 8.10, E. ½° N.
8.12, speed 24 knots. 8.16 a/c E. 8.54, a/c N.
9.3, a/c W.N.W.
10, a/c N. 40° W.
11, a/c W.N.W. 11.7, 22 knots.
11.11, 18 knots. Took up position for intercepting enemy's B.C.'s returning *via* coast.
11.30, "Southampton" and "Birmingham" opened fire on enemy's light cruisers and destroyers.
11.54, a/c S.S.W.
Noon, position D.R., Lat. 54° 38' N., 1° 54' E.
05, a/c W.N.W. 0.35, a/c E.S.E., 20 knots, endeavouring to intercept enemy's battle cruisers reported making to eastward.
1.15, a/c N. 1.25, 16 knots. 1.52, chased E., 22 knots.
2.0, Lat. 54° 45' N., 2° 02' E. 2.2, 24 knots.
2.6, E.S.E. 200 revs.² 2.24, a/c S.E.
3.38, 200 revs. 3.45, a/c N. Abandoned chase.
4.0, N. 15° W., 18 knots.

5. EXTRACT FROM THE LOG OF H.M.S. "TIGER"³ (1st B.C.S.).

16th December, 1914.

Noon, position 54° 35' N., 2° 0' E.
12.2, heard gun firing on port bow. Rang alarms. Enemy's battle cruisers on port hand between 2nd B.S. and 1st B.S.
12.10, heavy squall came on; visibility, 500 yards. Enemy disappeared. Course and speed as requisite.

6. EXTRACT FROM THE LOG OF H.M.S. "QUEEN MARY"⁴ (1st B.C.S.).

16th December, 1914.

7.30, course and speed as requisite, searching for enemy's ships in neighbourhood of Dogger Bank.
8.0, course and speed as requisite.
11.40, heard gunfire 54° 33' N., 2° 18' E.
11.50, passed an empty whaler.⁵
Noon, position D.R., Lat. 54° 34' N., Long. 2° 5' E., Variation, 14° W. Course and speed as required.
4.0.

7. EXTRACT FROM THE LOG OF H.M.S. "ANTRIM"⁶ (FLAGSHIP, 3RD C.S.).

16th December, 1914.

6.30, course S.S.W., 102 revs.
7.0, exercised action.
7.15, course S. 16° E.
7.30, course as requisite to take station on 2nd B.S.
8.0.
9.0, course and speed as requisite to conform with movements of 2nd B.S.
Noon, position 54° 07' N., 2° 13' E.
Course and speed as requisite.
4.0.

8. EXTRACT FROM THE LOG OF H.M.S. "DEVONSHIRE"⁷ (3RD C.S.).

16th December, 1914.

6.28, a/c S.S.W., course and speed as requisite until noon, following and taking station in 1st B.C.S. and 2nd B.S.
7.30, closed in on port beam of 1st B.C.S. Exercised action.
Noon, position D.R., 54° 15' N., 2° 23' E.
From noon to 2.30, following 2nd B.S., made good, N. 25° W. 21'.
3.10, a/c North, 3.20, N. 15° W.
3.15, 10 knots to take station astern of "Antrim." Formed single line ahead.

¹ Deptford, No. 19727.² Evidently for 250 revs.³ Deck Log (original in pencil).⁴ Deptford, No. 19719.⁵ Evidently the whaler cut away by the "Birmingham."⁶ Deptford, 19523.⁷ Deptford, No. 19520.

Courses and Distances made good.

6.28-8.04, S. 21° W. 19'.
 8.04-9.10, N. 78° W. 12.5'.
 9.10-10, N. 30° W. 15'.
 10-11, N. 70° W. 19'.
 11-noon, S. 85° W. 21'.
 Noon-2.30, N. 25° W. 21'.

9. EXTRACT FROM THE LOG OF H.M.S. "ROXBURGH" (3RD C.S.).

16th December, 1914.

6.34, altered course S. 5° W.
 7.30, courses and speeds as requisite.
 Noon, position D.R., Lat. 54° 23' N., Long. 2° 17' E.
 12.15, sounded off action.
 2.30, dispersed. Watch at defence stations.
 3.30, took station 1 mile S.S.W. from "King George V."
 4.10, formed single line ahead in open order.

10. EXTRACT FROM THE LOG¹ OF H.M.S. "SOUTHAMPTON" (1st L.C.S.).

16th December, 1914.

7.5, a/c to S. 55° E., 10 knots to close 1st B.C.S.
 7.17, S. 18° E., 14.5 knots. 7.29, a/c to E.N.E.
 7.35, a/c N. ½ E., 20 knots. 7.43, a/c to N. 30° E.
 7.50, a/c to N.W. 7.57, N. 60° W. 8.0, East, 18 knots.
 8.6, 22 knots. 8.8, E.N.E. 8.13, 24 knots. 1st L.C.S. spread as look-outs ahead² of B.C.S.
 8.17, East. 8.20, 25 knots.
 8.30 a.m. (position), Lat. 54° 10' N., Long. 3° 24' E.
 8.54, N., 24 knots. 9.1, W.N.W. 9.5, W. ½ N. 9.10, W.N.W.
 9.17, 350 revs. 10.0, N. 40° W. 10.21, N. 60° W. 10.25, N. 40° W.
 10, D.R., 54° 18' N., 3° 02' E.
 10.40, N. 72° W. 25 knots. 11.0, W.N.W. 24 knots. 11.7 W.
 11.7,³ sighted enemy's light cruisers and destroyers ahead (German). "Southampton" and "Birmingham" engaged enemy squadron consisting apparently of one armoured cruiser, two or three light cruisers, and numerous destroyers. Result of action, nil. Courses during action various. Noon, rejoined 1st B.C.S. and took station as look-outs. Course West. 18 knots.
 Position noon, Lat. 54° 20' W., 2° 47' E.
 12.06, West. 18 knots. 12.16, W.N.W. 12.40, N.E. 12.45, E.S.E. 15 knots.
 12.40, 20 knots. 1.25, North. 16 knots.
 1.40, N.W. 2.5, 24 knots. 2.12, E.S.E. 2.27, S.E.
 2.30 p.m., D.R., Lat. 54° 29' N., Long. 2° 30' E.
 2.57, S. 55° E. 3.35, S. 67° E. 3.44, North. 4.10, N. 15° W. 18 knots.

11. EXTRACT FROM THE LOG OF H.M.S. "BIRMINGHAM"⁴ (1st L.C.S.).

16th December, 1914.

7.30, course and speeds as requisite for searching for enemy's raiding force.
 11.15, observed enemy's cruisers and T.B.D.'s bearing West in the mist. "Southampton" opened fire and was engaged by enemy. 27-ft. whaler complete with fittings, including sails, cover, &c., cut adrift before going into action.⁵ Closed "Southampton" and fired in direction of enemy's smoke to assist.
 0.30,⁶ resumed station in accordance with signal.
 2.0, chased E.S.E. at 25 knots.
 2.15, Co. S.E.
 4.15, 1st L.C.S. formed single line ahead.
 NOTE.—No noon lat. and long. in log.

APPENDIX D.

1.

The Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets.
 Submitted.

SIR,

In accordance with the Commander-in-Chief's signal 1800 of 19th December, I have the honour to report my proceedings between 6 a.m. and 4 p.m. on December 16th.

¹ Ship's Log 6.11.14-28.2.15, Deptford, No. 19695.² Noted in pencil "2' N." initialled R.C.H.³ Noted in pencil "11.25," initialled R.C.H.⁴ Ship's Log 3.2.14-25.1.15, Deptford, No. 19691.⁵ Compare "Queen Mary's" log, C. 6.⁶ No position is given for 8 a.m. or noon.

Copies of Signal and W/T logs attached.

6.5 a.m. Standing by "Hardy," who had steering gear disabled in action. Destroyers in company were "Acasta," "Spitfire," and "Hardy."

6.20 a.m. "Hardy" steering from engine room took station astern of "Spitfire" at the rear of the Division. Proceeded S.S.W. at 25 knots.

6.25 a.m. Course S. 15° E.

6.50 a.m. Position, Lat. 54° 22' N., Long. 3° 20' E.

6.50 a.m. Sighted smoke to S.E., about 3 miles distant.

6.59 a.m. Enemy's destroyers seen steering about N.E. There were five destroyers. Altered course to Eastward and chased at 30 knots. Enemy's destroyers altered course to Eastward. It was then getting light.

7.8 a.m. Opened fire ranging shots at about 4,000 yards.

7.10 a.m. Sighted large cruiser behind destroyers' smoke. Destroyers were in close order astern of her. Altered course to N.E. and kept cruiser on my bow about 4 miles. Speed about 21 knots. Cruiser did not open fire on me though I was within 4,000 to 5,000 yards of her for a short period. His reason for withholding fire was apparently to draw me into a more effective range. The cruiser appeared to be the "Roon."

7.25 a.m. Reported position, course, and speed of enemy to "Lion" by W/T through "New Zealand."

7.40 a.m. Misty. Closed "Roon."

7.50 a.m. Weather cleared. Sighted three light cruisers to Eastward, *i.e.*, ahead. Cruisers did not answer challenge.

7.55 a.m. Altered course to Northward and then to West. Increased to 30 knots. Enemy's cruisers chased.

8.15 a.m. "Hardy" reported unable to steam more than 500 revolutions (25 knots). Reduced to 25 knots.

8.30 a.m. Course W.S.W.

8.35 a.m. Course S.S.W. Lost sight of chasing cruisers, who probably turned Eastward, though owing to smoke I could not be certain.

8.45 a.m. Course S. 15° E. To rejoin our Battlefleet, whose position was supposed to be in that direction.

8.50 a.m. Sighted 1st Light Cruiser Squadron.

9.20 a.m. Took station on starboard beam of "Liverpool." Course W. by N.

9.25 a.m. Course N. 70 W.

11.0 a.m. Course West.

12.0 a.m. Closed "Lion."

12.0 a.m. Examined Trawlers on Dogger Bank.

12.25 p.m. Rejoined "Lion."

12.25 p.m. "Spitfire" detached to escort "Hardy" into Humber.

12.30 p.m. Courses variable.

2.7 p.m. Course E.S.E., 25 knots.

3.0 p.m. Course S.E.

3.30 p.m. Detached by "Lion" to proceed into Port to fuel.

I have the honour to be,
 Sir,
 Your obedient servant,
 (Signed) LOFTUS W. JONES,
 Commander.

Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets,
 through Captain D.,
 4th Destroyer Flotilla.

2.

NOTE.—All times in this report are about 20 minutes slow.

H.M.S. "Lynx,"
 4th Destroyer Flotilla,

Thursday, December 17th, 1914.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to report the circumstances attending the action between destroyers of 4th Flotilla and enemy light cruisers and destroyers on the morning of Wednesday, December 16th.

Flotilla consisting of "Lynx," "Ambuscade," "Unity," "Hardy," "Shark," "Acasta," and "Spitfire" were steaming in single line ahead. Course S. 17° E. (Mag.), 14½ knots, and stationed 10 miles on port beam of battle squadron.

At 5 a.m., when in Lat. 54° 42' N., Long. 2° 40' E., sighted a suspicious craft off port bow. Challenged, and she replied with green and white light horizontal; concluded her to be enemy destroyer, and I opened fire at 500 yards (?) range and the action became general. I have reason to believe our fire took effect, as several explosions and an escape of steam were observed.

Enemy destroyer retired at high speed in a north-north-easterly direction, firing rapidly with two 3.5-inch (?) and automatic guns; her shots at first were largely "over," but about 5.25 a.m. she got the range and "Lynx" was hit by one or two moderate-sized shell, one of which burst on fore lower mess deck between 25 and 39 stations, making a large hole in capstan engine exhaust pipe, breaking fire main and filling the compartment with steam, thus temporarily stopping the supply of ammunition to foremost 4-inch gun. Both fore magazine and shell room became flooded, partly by water from fire main and partly by water through hole in ship's side.

The deck above No. 2 oil tank was also pierced in several places, causing an overflow. Splinters from this shell penetrated upper deck in vicinity of galley, severely wounding Leading Stoker Bernard Colclough, Off. No. 309726.

At 5.25 a.m. my helm jammed, causing ship to turn 16 points to port, the remainder of the flotilla following in my wake, and each ship appeared to engage enemy destroyer throughout this turn.

Defect to my steering gear was speedily remedied and the flotilla resumed original course and speed.

Between 5.30 and 5.35 a.m. "Ambuscade" reported she was badly holed forward and had to quit the line.

At this juncture enemy cruiser came up from the Eastward and commenced firing at the flotilla in general and "Hardy" in particular, and "Unity," which I had ordered to stand by "Ambuscade," was unable to do so, owing to fear of being cut off by enemy cruisers, three of which I sighted on my starboard quarter (6.15 a.m.). The leader challenged me, making five green flashes, to which I replied with four white and five green. This appeared to satisfy enemy and he disappeared to the Eastward.

As it was now getting light I deemed it expedient to retire, and ordered flotilla to withdraw to the S.S.W., in the hope of meeting battle squadron at daylight. Flotilla now became scattered, and at dawn I found myself with only "Unity" in company. At daylight none of our ships being in sight shaped course N.N.W. with the object of returning to port for repairs, as No. 2 oil tank had been put out of action and oil available was thus reduced to between 80 and 90 tons.

Shortly after this sighted what appeared to be enemy cruiser steering N.W. and bearing E.S.E., distant about 5 miles. I therefore steered to the Westward at full speed for about 20 minutes, when she was no longer in sight, and I reduced speed and resumed my course.

During the course of the day got into communication with remainder of flotilla. Gave "Ambuscade" orders to proceed for repairs, detaching "Unity" about midday to escort her.

In conclusion, I would submit that the use of fighting lights be restricted to ships who for some cause or other have to leave the line, as these lights present too good a target; also that loading lights be reduced in brilliancy as much as possible for the same reason.

H.M.S. "Lynx" and "Ambuscade" arrived at Leith on the morning of the 17th instant and have been taken in hand for repairs.

I beg to report that the behaviour of the officers and men in H.M. Ship under my command throughout the action was excellent. Firing was deliberate and well under control.

I wish particularly to bring to your notice the way in which Surgeon Probationer R. P. Langford-Jones, although suffering badly from sea-sickness, attended to the wounded man under the very difficult conditions of the ship rolling and washing down.

Re damage to enemy destroyer:—

"H.M.S. 'Ambuscade' reports that Lieutenant Colin S. Thomson observed one 4-inch shell in vicinity of enemy destroyer's fore-castle, and shortly afterwards a volume of steam rise from her amidships completely enveloping her."

I cannot report with any certainty that this vessel was sunk.


I have the honour to be,


Sir,

Your obedient servant,


(Signed) R. ST. P. PARRY,
Commander.

The Commander-in-Chief,
H.M. Ships and Vessels,
Coast of Scotland.





OPERATIONS
 OF
 2nd B.S., 3rd C.S., 1st B.C.S., 1st L.C.S.
 AND
 TWO DIVISIONS OF 4th DESTROYER FLOTILLA.
 ON
 DECEMBER 16th 1914.
 [Scarborough Raid]
 From Ships Logs and Signal Logs.
 Longitudes and Latitudes have been adjusted.
 SEE APPENDIX.



Trawler 'CASSANDRA' in 54°30'N. 1°50'E. reported German Cruisers. Noon.
 Trawler 'OCTAVIA' in 55°N. 1°54'E. reported 6. Battleships, steering East.
 Trawler 'IMPERIAL QUEEN' in 55°15'N. 1°E. reported 6. Battleships.
 Trawler 'ZANINA' in 54°30'N. 1°24'E. reported 3 German Battleships, and
 3-3 funnelled cruisers came from N.W. then
 altered course E.+N. by W.

See Addendum to 1.

THE ACTION OF DOGGER BANK—24th JANUARY 1915.

NOTE ON SOURCES.

1. The Dogger Bank box in the custody of the Historical Section, Committee of Imperial Defence, contains, amongst others, the following papers:—

- (a) **Reports.**—Despatch from Admiral Commanding First Battle Cruiser Squadron (M. 01014/15, 01136/15, 01137/15); reports from Rear-Admiral, Second Battle Cruiser Squadron, Commodore, First Light Cruiser Squadron, and Commodore (T) (M. 0843/15, 0849/15), and from commanding officers of certain of the ships and vessels engaged, including Captain Alfred Chatfield (*Lion*), Captain Osmond Brock (*Princess Royal*), and Captain H. B. Pelly (*Tiger*), with remarks by Commander-in-Chief.¹ Copies of plans of phases of the action, mentioned in certain reports, are missing.
- (b) **Signal Logs, &c.**—Copies of signal and W/T logs made for Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet. Copy of *Lookout*, Navigating Officer's Notebook; this records all alterations of course and other information useful for purposes of checking.
- (c) **Papers, Miscellaneous.**—Information obtained from prisoners of war, translation of German accounts of the action. These papers are of little historical value. Times given are Central European Time (1 hour fast of Greenwich M.T.).

2. **Bound Volume of Telegrams, Home, January 23–24, 1915.**—(H.S. 87) contains telegrams sent from and to the Admiralty prior to and during the action.

3. **The Ship's Logs** of the following vessels have been examined:—

First Battle Cruiser Squadron.—*Lion, Princess Royal.*

Second Battle Cruiser Squadron.—*New Zealand, Indomitable.*

First Light Cruiser Squadron.—*Southampton, Nottingham, Lowestoft.*

Flotillas.—*Aurora, Undaunted, Meteor.*

The logs of *Princess Royal* and *Lowestoft* are valuable for plotting the tracks of the Battle Cruiser Squadron and First Light Cruiser Squadron respectively.

4. The Signal and W/T logs of the *Iron Duke* and Flag- and Senior Officers' ships of the supporting forces and of all ships and vessels engaged have been examined, with a few exceptions (destroyers).

5. Times in general are much at variance and should be accepted with reserve. A note by Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty (M. 01824/15) states that while the times given in the *Lion's* signal log are necessarily approximate, those in his despatch are correct. A report (M. 01137/15) by Rear-Admiral Moore states that the times given in *New Zealand's* signal log were found to be six minutes fast. In the copies of signal and W/T logs submitted to Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet (*see* Dogger Bank Box), times appear in certain cases to have been corrected by the light of subsequent information.

6. The following abbreviations are employed in this monograph:—Ship's log (l), signal log (s), W/T log (w), Despatch or Report by Officer Commanding a squadron, ship, &c. (r).

7. Positions in the North Sea were expressed in wireless signals by giving a true bearing and distance from various lettered rendezvous. Thus a position 53 miles 220° true from rendezvous H would be signalled as 220 H 53, the bearing coming first.

The positions of the rendezvous were given in Home Fleet Memoranda (H.F. 0015—positions occurring in text of W/T messages) and altered from time to time. The earlier dates of these Memoranda are December 22nd, 1914, February 22nd, 1915, April 28th, 1915, June 12th, 1916. The Memorandum of December 22nd, 1914, gives the rendezvous in force at the time of the Dogger Bank actions, and though these positions are not required to reconstruct the action, they are necessary in order to verify the exact position of the supporting force.²

¹ These are now bound as volume H.S. 303.

² Difficulty was experienced in finding a copy of the memorandum of December 22nd, 1914, but Mr. H. G. A. Leveson, of the

H.S. C.I.D., fortunately obtained a copy from the *Queen Elizabeth* just before the monograph went to press.

THE DOGGER BANK ACTION.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL DISPOSITIONS.

1. **Situation, January 23rd.**—At noon on January 23rd, 1915, the various squadrons and forces which composed the Grand Fleet under the command of Sir John Jellicoe, were distributed as follows:—¹

Scapa Flow	- -	1st, 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons. 1st, 2nd and 6th Cruiser Squadrons. 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron. 2nd Destroyer Flotilla.
Cromarty Firth	- -	4th Destroyer Flotilla.
Firth of Forth	- -	3rd Battle Squadron. 1st and 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadrons. 3rd Cruiser Squadron. 1st Light Cruiser Squadron.
Harwich	- - -	1st and 3rd Destroyer Flotillas. 10th Destroyer Flotilla (in process of formation). 8th Submarine Flotilla.

A few days previously the Battle Cruiser Squadrons had carried out a sweep into the German Bight, in conjunction with the Harwich Force, and at dawn on January 19th had reached a position 60 miles north-west of Heligoland. Though hostile aircraft were observed, no German vessels were sighted, and the forces concerned returned to their bases on January 20th.

The Germans apparently entertained serious apprehensions at this time that we would try to block the entrance to their ports, and believed our sweep on the 19th to have been associated with some such plan.² For this and other reasons it was decided to despatch the 1st and 2nd Scouting Groups in the direction of the Dogger Bank in order to reconnoitre that neighbourhood and capture or destroy any British fishing vessels met with.³

2. **Admiralty Dispositions to meet the Situation.**—During the forenoon of Saturday, January 23rd, intelligence reached the Admiralty of a hostile movement of this sort. The various components of the Grand Fleet were at once warned to be ready to sail that night,⁴ and at 1445 a telegram was sent giving an outline of the situation, and the measures to be taken to deal with it.⁵ These orders were elaborated in later telegrams⁶ into the following scheme of operations.

The two Battle Cruiser Squadrons (five ships) with the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron were to leave Rosyth and proceed so as to reach a position 55° 13' N., 3° 12' E., 230 miles distant, at 0700 on January 24th. There Admiral Beatty would be joined by Commodore (T) with the Harwich Flotillas. The whole force would then operate under the orders of Sir David Beatty, and endeavour to locate and engage the enemy.⁷

The position selected as a rendezvous was 180 miles from Heligoland, nearly on a line between that island and the mouth of the Firth of Forth, and the route which the battle cruisers had to take lay along the edge of an area suspected of containing mines on account of the large number of drifting mines seen in the vicinity. This was

¹ For composition of the various squadrons see Appendix C, E.

² Scheer, 75. It was also believed in England about this time that the Germans would attempt to block our harbours; cf. Signal from S.N.O., Harwich, to All Ships, 1635 of January 21st, 1915: "Two German vessels loaded with sand are believed to have sailed to-day. Patrol vessels should

"be vigilant off Harwich and Yarmouth (Norfolk) in case of an attempt being made to block entrance."

³ For composition of German squadrons see Appendix D.

⁴ A. 1 to 5.

⁵ A. 6.

⁶ A. 7 to 16.

⁷ A. 6, 12.

before the days of paravanes, and it was left to the decision of the Vice-Admiral, B.C.S., to take his force through it or risk losing an opportunity of intercepting the enemy. He determined on the former course.¹ The Harwich force coming from the southward had only to pass round the North Hinder Light Vessel (51° 48' N., 2° 40' E.) and steer direct for the rendezvous. The battle cruisers might therefore anticipate sighting it to the southward on the morning of the 24th at about 0700 or nearly an hour before sunrise.

In addition to these squadrons and flotillas whose task it was to bring the enemy to action, the Admiralty arranged for forces to be disposed to the northward in support to assist in intercepting the German Squadron.

The 3rd Battle Squadron and the 3rd Cruiser Squadron were directed to leave Rosyth after dark and proceed to a position 55° 35' N., 2° E.,² some 45 miles to the North-Westward of the Battle Cruiser rendezvous, in order to head off the enemy should he be driven north. The Admiralty orders did not specify the time of arrival at the rendezvous, but as it was 190 miles from Rosyth and the 3rd Battle Squadron could steam at over 15 knots it might be anticipated that it could reach it by dawn; Admiral Bradford subsequently reported to the Commander-in-Chief that he expected to arrive there at 0745 on the 24th.³

To provide for any unforeseen developments, Sir John Jellicoe was directed to proceed with his "main fleet" towards the 3rd Battle Squadron rendezvous, which was about 250 miles from Pentland Skerries by the shortest route. As the Commander-in-Chief wished to avoid entering the mine-suspected area, he decided not to proceed direct but somewhat to the eastward and reported to the Admiralty that at 0700 he would be in Lat. 57° 28' N., Long. 1° 25' E., 150 miles N.N.W. of the Battle Cruisers' Rendezvous.⁴

The Commodore S. had been ordered at 1410 on January 23rd to leave Harwich and proceed with *Lurcher*, *Firedrake* and four submarines in the direction of Borkum.⁵ He was informed of the situation and warned that further orders would be sent to him, but as there was some delay in the receipt of this telegram, he did not leave before 1730. By that time it was improbable that the submarines could reach a position to attack the enemy if the latter returned before dusk on the 24th, and the Admiralty accordingly ordered the submarines to be disposed off Heligoland and Norderney in the hope of intercepting the enemy should his return be delayed till the morning of the 25th.⁶

From the above it will be seen that the general dispositions ordered by the Admiralty provided for a force of battle cruisers, light cruisers and destroyers being in a position at dawn on the 24th where they might hope to establish contact with the enemy during the day.

3. **The Progress of Operations during Night of 23rd-24th.**—The 1st, 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons with their attendant cruiser squadrons and flotillas left Scapa between 1830 and 2030 on the 23rd and proceeded independently during the night towards a rendezvous in 270. M 15 (57° 0' N., 2° 20' E.) where the Commander-in-Chief intended to concentrate his fleet at 0930 on the 24th. The vessels at Cromarty received similar orders, and Sir John Jellicoe intended, after concentrating his forces, to proceed to the southward with the cruisers and the light cruisers spread ahead.

Meanwhile, the battle cruisers with the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, after leaving Rosyth at 1800 on the 23rd, proceeded towards their rendezvous followed by the 3rd Battle Squadron, and 3rd Cruiser Squadron at 2030. The voyages of both these forces were without incident.

About 0630 Admiral Beatty sent a wireless signal to Commodore (T) directing him, after meeting the battle cruisers, to spread his force on a line North and South to the Westward of them,⁷ and just before the enemy were sighted, the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, which had been stationed on the port beam of the *Lion* during the night, was directed to spread on a line North-East by North from the *Lion*.⁸

¹ See Plan 1 and note to A. 14.

² A. 5.

³ A. 16.

⁴ A. 13.

⁵ A. 4.

⁶ A. 4, 11.

⁷ A. 18; not logged in *Arethusa* and no reply was made.

⁸ A. 21.

This disposition would have enabled touch to be gained with the enemy, whether he was to the eastward or westward of the rendezvous at daylight.

Commodore (T) had intended that the vessels under his command should leave harbour at 1730 in the order:—

Arethusa, with M class Destroyers (10th Flotilla).

Undaunted, with 3rd Flotilla.

Aurora, with 1st Flotilla.

The whole force was to concentrate outside and proceed in company past the North Hinder Light Vessel to the appointed rendezvous. Owing to a dense fog, however, the flotillas became somewhat scattered, and the three divisions proceeded independently, the *Arethusa* setting course for the rendezvous after rounding the North Hinder at 2140, the *Undaunted* at 2215, and the *Aurora* at 2238. As a result of this dispersion at 0700, when the *Arethusa* was approaching the rendezvous and almost within sight of our battle cruisers, Commodore (T) had only 7 destroyers in company, the remainder of the Harwich force being still some 14 miles to the southward; the *Aurora* was nearly astern of the *Arethusa*; the *Undaunted* at dawn was in sight of the *Aurora* on her port bow.

4. **The first Encounter with the Enemy and Preliminary Manœuvres.**—At 0700 it was estimated on board the *Lion* that the rendezvous ($53^{\circ} 13' N.$, $3^{\circ} 12' E.$) had been reached, and course was altered to $S. 12^{\circ} W.$ at a speed of 18 knots.¹ Shortly afterwards, at about 0710, the *Arethusa* with the leading destroyers of the Harwich force was sighted right ahead, and had hardly been identified, when flashes of gunfire were observed to the S.S.E.

Just before sunrise with a calm sea and good visibility the *Aurora*, in rear of and to the eastward of the Harwich force, had sighted against the dawn a three-funnelled cruiser accompanied by destroyers; she altered course a little towards her² and challenged; in reply the stranger flashed a single letter and immediately opened fire, which was returned by the *Aurora*. The enemy's ship was the *Kolberg*.³ A short engagement ensued, at a range of about 8,000 yards, as a result of which the German cruiser was hit, and at about 0725 broke off the action.

The *Undaunted* on the port bow was too far away to support the *Aurora* in this brief encounter,⁴ but the firing had been seen in the *Lion*, and Sir David Beatty at once cancelled the order for the light cruiser squadron to spread to the North-Eastward and ordered them to chase to the Southward.⁵

At about 0730 vessels were sighted by the *Southampton* on both bows, those to the eastward disregarding the challenge, while on the starboard bow communication was established with the *Aurora*, who reported that she had distinguished hostile battle cruisers to the south-eastward.⁶

These were soon sighted from the *Southampton* and at first appeared to be steaming to the northward.⁷ The light cruisers altered course to the eastward to close them, and when the enemy was discovered to be on a south-easterly course,⁸ the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron kept away so as to take up a position on his port quarter. A light north-easterly breeze enabled the enemy's movements to be observed without interference from the dense smoke clouds pouring from the German ships as they increased to full speed, and the hostile squadron was seen to be composed of light cruisers and destroyers in addition to four heavy ships.

Admiral Beatty with the British battle cruisers had altered course to S.S.E. in the direction of the *Aurora*'s action at 0735⁹ and commenced to work up to full speed, with the intention of getting to the southward of the Germans if possible.¹⁰ He had two reasons for regarding this as a position of tactical advantage. The first report from the *Southampton* indicated that the hostile squadron was steaming north,¹¹ in which case there seemed to be an excellent prospect of cutting it off from its base and bringing it to action under conditions which would ensure a decisive result. Even if this could not be achieved and the action resolved itself into a running fight the

¹ A. 19.

² *Aurora* (r).

³ *Kolberg*, 4,280 tons, 23–25 knots, 12—4·1-in. guns, 2—S.T.

⁴ *Undaunted* (r).

⁵ A. 22.

⁶ A. 27, 28, *Southampton* (s).


⁷ A. 30, *Southampton* (r) says: The enemy were steering N.W. when sighted.

⁸ A. 32.

⁹ *Lion* (s).

¹⁰ Admiral Beatty's Despatch.

¹¹ A. 30.



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
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lee-gauge would still be preferable, as the British vessels would be able to engage the enemy without being hampered by the smoke, inevitably produced by coal-burning vessels proceeding at high speed.

As the situation became clearer from frequent reports of the enemy which were coming in, Sir David Beatty gradually altered the course of his battle cruisers to the south-eastward,¹ and by 0800 he had the hostile vessels in sight on his port bow, steering a south-easterly course at high speed.² The enemy battle cruisers were probably still occupied in collecting their light forces and covering their retirement; but at 0830 they settled to a south-easterly course³ and began the long rush towards Heligoland, with their light cruisers and destroyers ahead and on the starboard bow out of reach of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron. A few minutes later (0837)⁴ the British squadron set a course approximately parallel to the enemy and settled down to a long chase.

Meanwhile, as a result of these various manœuvres the Harwich Force under Commodore (T) found itself to port of and ahead of the British line, and almost between the latter and the enemy. As the battle cruisers increased speed the flotillas, with the exception of the new "M" class destroyers, found it difficult to maintain their position, and at 0843 they were ordered to take station astern⁵ in order to avoid fouling the range. The "M" class destroyers under the *Meteor*, however, were able to maintain their position abreast of the head of the British line, till about 0840 when the *Blücher*, the rear ship of the enemy, fired a few rounds at the *Meteor* which had approached within 7,000 yards on her port quarter⁶; the destroyers were not hit, but Captain Meade,⁷ who had by now ascertained the number and disposition of the enemy, altered course and took station again on the *Arethusa*.

CHAPTER II.

THE ACTION.

5. **Commencement of the Chase.**—The action between the opposing battle cruisers, which was now about to commence, took the form of a long chase, and the maximum speeds of the various vessels are therefore of great importance in endeavouring to reconstruct the course of events. On the German side the ships were apparently in the order—*Seydlitz*, *Derfflinger*, *Moltke*, *Blücher*, the fastest vessel being the recently completed *Derfflinger*, with a speed of about 27 knots, and the slowest the *Blücher*, whose

Actually she maintained a speed of slightly over 22 knots until 1030 when she was badly hit. The highest speed steamed by the German Squadron during the action was 23 knots, to which *v. Hipper* increased about 0930. An hour later the "*Blücher*" has fallen five cables astern of station. rendered accurate judgment of speed impossible are considered. The highest speed recorded is 28.5 knots, which is mentioned in Admiral Beatty's despatch as being attained by the *Lion*,⁹ but the speed of the rear ships was considerably less, and she had to ease down at 0952 to keep them within mutual supporting distance.¹⁰

¹ A. 39, 43.

² Beatty, in his despatch, says that at 0750 the enemy battle cruisers were distant 14 miles, which accords with the range of slightly over 20,000 yards at 0852.

³ A. 42, 46.

⁴ A. 46 (see Notes on Sources with reference to times given in *Lion's* Signal Log).

⁵ A. 48.

⁶ *Meteor* (r).

⁹ On the other hand, *Lion's* log only gives 27 knots.

¹⁰ The slowest ship was the *Indomitable*, which probably did 25 knots and dropped badly astern; the *New Zealand* is credited with 27 knots by Captain Lionel Halsey, though she had only done 26 knots on her trials two years before. She certainly kept up better than was expected, but until the *Lion* reduced speed at 0952, the *Tiger* was the only vessel which can be said to have

¹¹ G.O.H. III, Karte 18 gives speeds as follows:—
 "Seydlitz" 28.1kts., "Derfflinger" 28 kts.,
 "Moltke" 28.4kts., "Blücher" 25.8kts., but
 elsewhere in the volume it is stated that the
 "Derfflinger" was the fastest of the battle cruisers.

see
attached

lee-gauge would still be preferable, as the British vessels would be able to engage the enemy without being hampered by the smoke, inevitably produced by coal-burning vessels proceeding at high speed.

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see attached

With regard to the speed of our own vessels, there is considerable diversity in the estimates made at the time, which is not unnatural when the conditions which rendered accurate judgment of speed impossible are considered. The highest speed recorded is 28.5 knots, which is mentioned in Admiral Beatty's despatch as being attained by the *Lion*,⁹ but the speed of the rear ships was considerably less, and she had to ease down at 0952 to keep them within mutual supporting distance.¹⁰

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⁵ A. 48.

⁶ *Meteor* (r).

⁷ *Meteor*.

⁸ Designed 24 knots, trials 25.8 knots. Information supplied by I.D. gives the speed of the German ships at 23 knots.

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SEE ATTACHED

... actually she maintained a speed of slightly over 22 knots until 1030 when she was badly hit. The highest speed recorded by the German squadron during the action was 25 knots, to which a slight increase happened about 0930. An hour later the "Blücher" has taken five cables astern of a station.

... "Derfflinger" was the fastest of the battle cruisers. "Moltke" 25.4 knots, "Blücher" 21.9 knots, "Seydlitz" 23 knots. ...

At 0830 the hostile squadron bore from the *Lion* S. 61° E., or about two points on the port bow, and the *Blücher* was distant about 11 miles, with the range slowly closing.¹ By 0852 the range of the rear ship had decreased to 20,000 yards, and the *Lion* fired a single shot from her midship turret, which fell short.² The *Lion* continued to fire single shots deliberately in order to test the range, the Admiral having already ordered the battle cruisers to form on a line of bearing seven points abaft his beam so as to bring their guns to bear.³ At 0900 the *Tiger* opened fire, also on the rear ship, and at about 0905, the *Blücher* being within gun range, the Admiral gave the order for all ships to open fire and engage the enemy.⁴ The *Princess Royal* then commenced to fire ranging shots also at the *Blücher*, but the range was too great for the 12-inch guns of the *New Zealand* and the *Indomitable*, which had been gradually dropping astern since 0815⁵ could do nothing. The enemy soon commenced to reply,⁶ but for some time without effect.

6. **The Action becomes General.**—At 0924 the *Lion* shifted her fire to the third ship in the line (Moltke).⁷ Four minutes later she was hit on the water line aft, the shell penetrating to the bunkers. Three of the enemy's ships were now concentrating on the *Lion*, and at 0935 the Admiral directed each ship to engage her opposite number in the enemy's line,⁸ and shifted his fire to the *Seydlitz*, the leading ship, at a range of 17,500 yards. This signal clearly meant that the *Tiger* should engage the next ship, the *Derfflinger*, the *Princess Royal* the *Moltke*, and the *New Zealand* the *Blücher*,⁹ as it was evident that the *Indomitable* was a considerable distance astern, and out of range. Unfortunately, the *Tiger* apparently did not realise that only four British battle cruisers were then in action,¹⁰ and, instead of engaging her opposite number as ordered, she endeavoured to concentrate with the *Lion* on the *Seydlitz*. This left the *Derfflinger* without any ship firing at her, and, moreover, tended to confuse the control, as the *Tiger* apparently mistook the *Lion's* salvoes for her own, and considered that she was hitting when actually her shots were observed and reported¹¹ by the light cruisers to be falling more than 3,000 yards over¹² the enemy.

At 0950 the *Lion* scored an important success by hitting the after turret of the *Seydlitz*, the resulting cordite fire putting both the after turrets out of action, and necessitating the magazine being flooded.¹³ The *Blücher* also by this time was showing signs that she had been hit several times, and the *Tiger* had now (0950) transferred her fire to her,¹⁴ so that she was the target of two ships. The situation at this time, therefore, appeared very favourable to us, as none of the British battle cruisers had sustained serious damage, and the *Indomitable* was available to deal with any damaged craft which might drop astern.

7. **The Breaking-off of the Action.**—The enemy now repeatedly zigzagged to avoid our salvoes, thus making effective gunfire most difficult, and the range was frequently lost. The German destroyers were very favourably placed for carrying out an attack on the head of our line, and evidently caused considerable anxiety from about 0940 onwards,¹⁵ for the Harwich flotillas were some distance astern,¹⁵ and had not sufficient speed to get ahead and engage them.

¹ A. 45.

² *Arethusa* and *Indomitable* considered shot was over.

³ A. 37.

⁴ A. 52.

⁵ *Indomitable* (r).

⁶ It appears that their gun mountings would only permit of an elevation for some 180 hm. (19,675 yards).

⁷ A. 54.

⁸ *New Zealand* opened fire on *Blücher* at about 0935.

⁹ C.-in-C., H.F. No. 443/H.F. 0022A. Encl. No. 2.

¹⁰ A. 55.

¹¹ Ranges 0943: *Lion*, 16,775 yards; *Tiger*, 20,000 yards.

¹² Scheer, p. 81.

¹³ Owing to smoke obscuring the leading battle cruisers. *Tiger* (r).

¹⁴ A. 57. At about 0945 the German destroyers were engaged by the secondary armaments of the *Lion* and *Tiger*, after which they

once more retired to their position on the starboard bow of the enemy battle cruisers. The S.O. (T) (*Rostock*) had orders to attack "if necessary"; but Admiral Hipper did not wish to lose any torpedo boats unnecessarily, nor to fight until he had drawn the British forces into the Bight. In the first phase of the action, viz., until the *Blücher* left the line, he did not consider it necessary to order the torpedo boats to attack. (Information supplied by I.D.) Some of the German destroyers could only maintain the speed with difficulty, and they dropped astern, crossing over from starboard to port between the lines of the battle cruisers. This seems to have been taken by some of our ships to indicate an intention to attack.

¹⁵ Comm. (T) to C.-in-C., H.F.: "1st and 3rd Destroyer Flotillas are astern of battle cruisers 2 miles (0905)" See also A. 50, 51, 53.

5' 10' 15' 20' 25' 30'

PLAN 2

BANK, 24TH JANUARY, 1915.

PLAN OF ACTION 0700 - 0945.

0945 *LION* & *TIGER* engaging enemy destroyers with secondary armament *ARETHUSA* & FLOTILLAS trying to get ahead of B.C.S. to attack enemy destroyers

REFERENCE.

BRITISH.	GERMAN.
Battle Cruiser Squadron	Battle Cruisers
Light Cruiser Squadron	Light Cruisers
" <i>Arethusa</i> "	Submarines
" <i>Undaunted</i> "	
" <i>Aurora</i> "	
Destroyers	

5' 10' 15' 20' 25' 30'

The *Princess Royal* and *New Zealand* were dropping astern by this time and the ^{A LONG WAY} *Blücher* was dropping astern. On being hit at 0943, Admiral Hipper turned his line a point to port, whilst Admiral Beatty, too, had just altered course outwards a little. The range was opening again, the squadron had to keep clear of the wake of the enemy destroyers which were supposed, according to intelligence reports, to be carrying mines.

The enemy's two leading ships now concentrated effectively on the *Lion*, and about this time "A" turret received a hit on the roof, which did not penetrate, though it dented a plate and put the left gun out of action. The *Tiger* was still firing at the *Blücher*, so that the ^{Moltke} *Derfflinger*, the second ship in the German line, was left unharassed. The *Lion*'s observation of fire at this time was greatly hampered by splashes from the enemy's short shots; only one in every five or six shots could be spotted, the firing had frequently to be checked, and there was great uncertainty as to the fall of shot.¹ At 1001 an 11-inch shell from the *Seydlitz* pierced the *Lion*'s water-line armour aft and passed through the top of the 4-inch magazine trunk, without exploding. The after switchboard compartment was flooded and had to be abandoned shortly; Nos. 2 and 3 dynamos were short circuited, putting the after fire control and 4-inch gun circuits out of action. At 1018 two 12-inch shells from the *Derfflinger* hit the ship; one of them pierced the armour near the water line forward, and burst, blowing open the hatches and flooding several compartments up to the main deck.

The other ships were also experiencing difficulties about this time, and both the *Tiger* and *Princess Royal* had to check fire from time to time, owing to the impossibility of getting a range, smoke interference, &c. The critical period of the action was now approaching. In order to bring the rear of our line into action again, Sir David Beatty at about 1022 ordered the battle cruisers to form on a line of bearing N.N.W. from the *Lion*, i.e., about six points abaft the beam,² and to proceed at their utmost speed. The repeated hits, however, were now beginning to tell on the *Lion*, and at about 1045 she began to drop back, and to be overhauled by the remaining battle cruisers. The *Blücher* had also felt the effect of the prolonged action, and was now on fire; since about 1005 she had been dropping astern of the German squadron, being harassed from time to time by the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, which had maintained its position on the port quarter of the enemy.³ At about 1045 she finally quitted the enemy's line and altered course to northward, apparently in an endeavour to escape; but by this time the *Indomitable* had come within range of her; and becoming a target for three ships, she suffered heavy punishment. Admiral Beatty evidently intended that the *Indomitable* should deal with her, for he ordered the *Indomitable* to attack the enemy breaking away to the northward.⁴

At 1047 an important signal⁵ was made by the *Lion* "to close the enemy as rapidly as possible consistent with keeping all guns bearing." It seems probable that this signal was only partially received, for the *Tiger* is the only ship with any record of it, and in her case only the first part "close the enemy" was logged.⁶

It was evidently, however, the Vice-Admiral's intention that ships should alter course to port the requisite amount to comply with this signal, but no ship had yet done so, and as the *Lion* was dropping astern with the *Tiger* on her port side, she could not alter herself. Just about this time⁷ the *Lion* was badly hit and the shock was felt throughout the ship. All light and power failed.⁸ A minute or so later (1054) a periscope was sighted on the starboard bow,⁹ and the Vice-Admiral gave the order "eight blue" for the battle cruisers to alter eight points to port together, which would have swung the squadron towards the enemy as well as keeping it clear of the submarine. The signal was received by all ships and hauled down at 1102, bringing the squadron on a N.N.E. course. The German destroyers had just been ordered to

¹ About 1020 the *Lion* "came down" 4,500 yards.

² B. 1.

³ At 1005, the *Blücher* attacked the 1st L.C.S. and forced them to turn to port for a few minutes to open the range. A. 60.

⁴ Beatty's despatch, and Rear-Admiral Moore's report. No record in *Lion*'s and *Indomitable*'s signal log.

⁵ B. 5.

⁶ The signal log must of course only be regarded as a rough guide, for in the heat of action a signal might be made and not logged, or logged and not made, or made and not received.

⁷ Between 10.49 and 10.51 (Captain Chatfield's report, 27/1/15).

⁸ Due to No. 1 dynamo (the only remaining one) being thrown off by a short circuit, probably by water in the submerged flat reaching the ring main. Up to this time the forward fire control system was in operation, with the exception of Evershed's bearing transmitters, which stopped with No. 2 dynamo between 1020 and 1030. (Torpedo and Electrical Report.)

⁹ German submarines were in 54° 27' N., 5° 35' E., and 54° 9' N., 5° 15' E., about this time.

ATTACHED

The *Princess Royal* and *New Zealand* were dropping astern by this time and the *Lion* reduced speed at 0952 to 24 knots to keep them within mutual supporting distance. It seems that the rear ships of the enemy turned considerably away about this time and increased the range, and though every endeavour was made to close it again, the squadron had to keep clear of the wake of the enemy destroyers which were supposed, according to intelligence reports, to be carrying mines. A LONG WAY
SEE ATTACHED

The enemy's two leading ships now concentrated effectively on the *Lion*, and about this time "A" turret received a hit on the roof, which did not penetrate, though it dented a plate and put the left gun out of action. The *Tiger* was still firing at the *Blücher*, so that the *Derfflinger*, the second ship in the German line, was left unharassed. The *Lion's* observation of fire at this time was greatly hampered by splashes from the enemy's short shots; only one in every five or six shots could be spotted, the firing had frequently to be checked, and there was great uncertainty as to the fall of shot.¹ At 1001 an 11-inch shell from the *Seydlitz* pierced the *Lion's* water-line armour aft and passed through the top of the 4-inch magazine trunk, without exploding. The after switchboard compartment was flooded and had to be abandoned shortly; Nos. 2 and 3 dynamos were short circuited, putting the after fire control and 4-inch gun circuits out of action. At 1018 two 12-inch shells from the *Derfflinger* hit the ship; one of them pierced the armour near the water line forward, and burst, blowing open the hatches and flooding several compartments up to the main deck.

The other ships were also experiencing difficulties about this time, and both the *Tiger* and *Princess Royal* had to check fire from time to time, owing to the impossibility of getting a range, smoke interference, &c. The critical period of the action was now approaching. In order to bring the rear of our line into action again, Sir David Beatty at about 1022 ordered the battle cruisers to form on a line of bearing N.N.W. from the *Lion*, i.e., about six points abaft the beam,² and to proceed at their utmost speed. The repeated hits, however, were now beginning to tell on the *Lion*, and at about 1045 she began to drop back, and to be overhauled by the remaining battle cruisers. The *Blücher* had also felt the effect of the prolonged action, and was now on fire; since about 1005 she had been dropping astern of the German squadron, being harassed from time to time by the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, which had maintained its position on the port quarter of the enemy.³ At about 1045 she finally quitted the enemy's line and altered course to northward, apparently in an endeavour to escape; but by this time the *Indomitable* had come within range of her; and becoming a target for three ships, she suffered heavy punishment. Admiral Beatty evidently intended that the *Indomitable* should deal with her, for he ordered the *Indomitable* to attack the enemy breaking away to the northward.⁴

At 1047 an important signal⁵ was made by the *Lion* "to close the enemy as rapidly as possible consistent with keeping all guns bearing." It seems probable that this signal was only partially received, for the *Tiger* is the only ship with any record of it, and in her case only the first part "close the enemy" was logged.⁶

It was evidently, however, the Vice-Admiral's intention that ships should alter course to port the requisite amount to comply with this signal, but no ship had yet done so, and as the *Lion* was dropping astern with the *Tiger* on her port side, she could not alter herself. Just about this time⁷ the *Lion* was badly hit and the shock was felt throughout the ship. All light and power failed.⁸ A minute or so later (1054) a periscope was sighted on the starboard bow,⁹ and the Vice-Admiral gave the order "eight blue" for the battle cruisers to alter eight points to port together, which would have swung the squadron towards the enemy as well as keeping it clear of the submarine. The signal was received by all ships and hauled down at 1102, bringing the squadron on a N.N.E. course. The German destroyers had just been ordered to

¹ About 1020 the *Lion* "came down" 4,500 yards.

² B. 1.

³ At 1005, the *Blücher* attacked the 1st L.C.S. and forced them to turn to port for a few minutes to open the range. A. 60.

⁴ Beatty's despatch, and Rear-Admiral Moore's report. No record in *Lion's* and *Indomitable's* signal log.

⁵ B. 5.

⁶ The signal log must of course only be regarded as a rough guide, for in the heat of action a signal might be made and not logged, or logged and not made, or made and not received.

⁷ Between 10.49 and 10.51 (Captain Chatfield's report, 27/1/15).

⁸ Due to No. 1 dynamo (the only remaining one) being thrown off by a short circuit, probably by water in the submerged flat reaching the ring main. Up to this time the forward fire control system was in operation, with the exception of Evershed's bearing transmitters, which stopped with No. 2 dynamo between 1020 and 1030. (Torpedo and Electrical Report.)

⁹ German submarines were in 54° 27' N., 5° 35' E., and 54° 9' N., 5° 15' E., about this time.

attack (1100), but¹ this sudden alteration of course on the part of our battle cruisers rendered the order futile, and it was cancelled at 1107.

Up to this moment no real difficulty had been experienced in getting signals through, but by this time the *Lion* was in a critical state. She had received 15 hits. With the port engine stopped, all lights extinguished, reduced to 15 knots, listing 10° to port, with only two signal halliards, and neither searchlights nor wireless, she was no longer able to perform the duties of flagship.² Meanwhile the squadron was rapidly increasing its distance, and it was probable the Second-in-Command was unaware of the reason of the eight-point turn.

It was urgently necessary for the squadron to resume the chase of the flying enemy and Sir David Beatty ordered two signals to be hoisted, viz.: "Compass B—Course N.E." and "A.F.—Attack the rear of the enemy," and then a third "Keep nearer the enemy—repeat the signal Admiral is now making."³ These were hoisted practically simultaneously.

The course of N.E. would have led the battle cruisers clear of any mines dropped by the enemy destroyers and would have cut the enemy's battle cruisers off from the *Blücher* should they turn to support her as Admiral Beatty anticipated they would; should they leave her to her fate our ships could again have turned to a parallel course when clear of the track of their torpedo craft.⁴

Instead, however, of being understood as two separate signals, they were read as one signal "A.F.—Compass B."—attack the rear of the enemy bearing north east."

By the time the *New Zealand* received it, she had been steering for several minutes on a N.N.E. course, and according to Rear-Admiral Moore's despatch, as the *Blücher* then bore about North-East with the remainder of the enemy about East by North, he took the signal to mean that the *Blücher* was to be attacked. All ships therefore continued to steer towards her roughly in line abreast, with the *Tiger* drawing ahead and coming up on the starboard wing, and the *New Zealand* on the port.

As they proceeded in this direction Scheer⁵ states that the three remaining German battle cruisers altered course to S. by W. for a time, in order to enfilade our line at right angles, and concentrated their fire on the *Tiger*, which was the only ship able to engage them, as she had drawn ahead and was fouling the range of the *Princess Royal*. This they may have done for a short time. In any case the *Tiger* received a concentrated fire and suffered considerable damage, being hit seven times in about fifteen minutes, and having one turret put out of action. The enemy then resumed their S.E. course,⁶ and rapidly drew out of range. The *Lion* was lying crippled, and as no further orders were received from the Second-in-Command, the battle cruisers continued to engage the *Blücher*, while the enemy drew every minute further away.

8. Sinking of the *Blücher*.—The eight point turn at about 1100 had brought the fleet into an irregular line abreast steaming about north by east, with the *Blücher* on the starboard bow, and the *Lion* astern. The *Tiger* and *Princess Royal* seem to have been steaming considerably faster than the *New Zealand* and slightly more to port, as they both crossed the bows of Admiral Moore's flagship, and then steered to circle round the *Blücher*, leaving her on the starboard hand. The *Indomitable* coming up passed under the *New Zealand's* stern, and then altered to port in order to follow the remainder in their circle round the *Blücher*. The condition of the German ship was now hopeless, but she continued to show fight. Besides the four battle cruisers firing at her, she was engaged by the First Light Cruiser Squadron from the northward, and the four "M" class destroyers on the starboard side of the *Tiger* now delivered a torpedo attack. But the *Blücher* was not yet silenced; she opened fire on the leading destroyer (*Meteor*) with both her main and secondary armament, and hit her five times. Three of the five shells failed to burst, but an 8.2-inch wrecked the foremost boiler room, killing four men; and the *Meteor* had to be towed back to the *Humber*.⁷ But the *Arctusa* was now coming up with the Harwich flotillas, and at 1138 she fired two torpedoes into the *Blücher*, and effectively silenced her.

¹ From information supplied by I.D.

² Beatty's despatch.

³ B. 7, 8, 9.


⁴ Beatty's despatch. H.S. 303, p. 46.

⁵ Scheer states, p. 82, that at 1100 the German battle cruisers "took up a southerly course, intending to open an encircling fight with the enemy, and, if possible, render help to the *Blücher*," and that after steaming for a short while on this course,

they again turned S.E. to break off the fight. This is quite possible, but in the British reports there is no evidence to this effect. Scheer's diagram is wrong in showing the British cruisers turning to starboard instead of port. But see J. 8.

⁶ Probably at 1114, when the *Seydlitz* ceased fire.

⁷ She was taken in tow by the *Liberty* at about 1240.





PLAN 3

DOGGER BANK, 24TH JANUARY, 1915.

PLAN OF ACTION 0945 - 1206.

BRITISH.		GERMAN.	
Battle Cruiser Squadron	—	Battle Cruisers	—
Light Cruiser Squadron	—	Light Cruisers	—
"Arethusa"	—	Submarines	⊕
"Undaunted"	—	Destroyers	—
Destroyers	—		



Meanwhile, the battle cruisers had circled round the *Blücher*, passing her from 4,000 to 6,000 yards off, and by 1140 had resumed a south-easterly course in pursuit of the remaining ships of the enemy.¹ Our battle cruisers appear to have either followed the *Tiger's* movements or acted independently. At about 1145, Commodore Tyrwhitt signalled that the *Blücher* appeared to have struck²; the battle cruisers ceased fire, and the *Arethusa* closed the enemy ship to rescue survivors.

While thus engaged, a Zeppelin³ which had been sighted and fired at by the *Southampton* at about 1030⁴ was hovering overhead; and now (1230), in conjunction with a German seaplane which had arrived on the scene, commenced to drop bombs⁵ indiscriminately on the men struggling in the water and on the rescuing ships and boats, though without hitting any of the latter. The seaplane was engaged by the *Arethusa*,⁶ and at 1240 Commodore Goodenough, returning from shadowing the German battle cruisers, and seeing the situation, ordered the rescuing ships and destroyers to leave the spot at once.⁷ It is probable that most of the survivors who had not been killed by the bombs of their own countrymen had by this time been picked up.⁸

9. **Rear-Admiral Moore assumes Command.**—The *Blücher* had sunk,⁹ listing heavily to port, with fires “raging between decks through the enormous shot-holes in her sides”; the battle cruisers, having carried out the supposed intentions of the Vice-Admiral, were now steaming in no particular formation in the direction of Heligoland, drawing every moment further away from the *Lion*, which had last been seen with a heavy list. For half an hour no W/T communication had been received from Beatty; at 1152 Rear-Admiral Moore assumed active command of the battle cruiser squadron, and directed them to form single line ahead and steer west,¹⁰ he “had grave fears for the safety of the *Lion*” and decided to return to her. The battle cruisers were ordered to cease firing,¹¹ and at 1202 Commodore Goodenough, who had just reported that he had lost touch with the enemy,¹² was directed to retire north-westward.¹³

10. **Beatty hoists his Flag in the “Princess Royal.”**—Meanwhile in the *Lion*, Beatty had made a signal at 1112 for destroyers to close, and at 1125 had transferred his flag to the *Attack*, ordering Commodore (T) to form a submarine screen round the *Lion*. Proceeding at utmost speed to rejoin the squadron, he met them at noon retiring N.N.W. and at once ordered them to turn 16 points to resume the chase.¹⁴ Going alongside the *Princess Royal* he hoisted his flag in her about 1220,¹⁵ but it was soon realised that, owing to the start the enemy had gained, there was no hope of overtaking them. Moreover, the High Sea Fleet was coming out,¹⁶ enemy submarines were in the vicinity, and the *Lion*, reduced to ten knots, was nearly 300 miles from Rosyth. At 1245 the squadron turned back, and steered to close the *Lion*.

Results of the Action.—When the action was broken off the German battle cruisers were some 80 miles from Heligoland. The sinking of the *Blücher* and the serious damage inflicted on the *Seydlitz*, though satisfactory in themselves, by no means represent the results which might have been achieved had the signal to attack the rear of the enemy¹⁷ not been misinterpreted, and the action in consequence been broken off. The evidence leaves no doubt that before the action was discontinued the *Seydlitz* had her two after turrets put completely out of action, and one other German battle cruiser in addition to the *Blücher* had been damaged. Tyrwhitt¹⁸ stated that “fires were observed in all ships except the *Moltke*,” and that the *Derfflinger* and *Seydlitz* were “blazing at the end of the action.”

¹ Moore (r).

² A. 64.

³ “L. 5” (Scheer).

⁴ 1030, engaged *Blücher* and Zeppelin airship for 15 minutes. *Southampton* (l).

⁵ *Arethusa* (s).

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ 1240. *Southampton* to *Aurora*: “Leave the spot at once” (1235). Reply: “Survivors are rescued now.” See also A. 71.

⁸ 231 prisoners from the *Blücher* were handed over to the military authorities, Edinburgh, on January 26th.

⁹ *Southampton* (l) says she sank at 1220, *Arethusa* (s) 1227, Commodore (T) (r), 1210.

¹⁰ AS 8794

¹¹ A. 65. *Tiger* does not log this signal. *Princess Royal* and *Indomitable* have “Course N.W.”

¹² A. 67.

¹³ A. 68.

¹⁴ A. 69.

¹⁵ *Tiger* (s) 1228; *Indomitable* (s) 1220; *New Zealand* and *Princess Royal* do not log this signal.

¹⁶ Beatty, Despatch; *Princess Royal* (l) says 1227.

¹⁷ A. 62, 66.

¹⁸ B. 8.

¹⁹ Commodore (T) (r). Tyrwhitt mistook the *Derfflinger* for the *Moltke*.

CHAPTER III.

MOVEMENTS OF THE SUPPORTING FORCES AND SUBMARINES.

11. At this time (1245) the Grand Fleet was some 125 miles distant to the north-westward, steaming at 19 knots along the shortest line to close the battle cruiser squadrons.

The various units composing the main fleet, steering a south-easterly course from Scapa Flow, passed through their rendezvous in 57° 28' N., 10° 25' E. at 0700. Half an hour later the *Aurora's* signal was intercepted, reporting that she was in action with the German fleet,¹ followed in quick succession by reports of sighting the enemy from Goodenough and Beatty respectively.² Jellicoe at once (0756) altered course to support the battle cruisers, ordering Vice-Admiral Bradford with the Third Battle Squadron and Third Cruiser Squadron (0820),³ to steer towards P. (55° 35' N., 3° 25' E.) at full speed "to act in immediate support." The Second Light Cruiser Squadron was sent on to join Admiral Bradford's force, which it was expected they would do about noon.⁴ Jellicoe himself increased speed, and by 1021 the main fleet was steaming 19 knots. As the fleet passed the northern limit of the suspected minefield, floating mines were continually seen.

12. **The Meeting with Beatty.**—On receipt of Jellicoe's signal, Admiral Bradford had altered course and steered towards Heligoland at 16 knots, disposing the Third Cruiser Squadron 15 miles ahead of him. The Battle Cruiser Squadrons were met retiring at 1345, and Admiral Bradford turned N.N.W. to conform to their course, the Second Light Cruiser Squadron being placed under Beatty's orders for screening the retirement.

The main battle fleet had been steering at full speed to close the battle cruiser force; at 1530 Bradford, and an hour later Beatty, was sighted, and Jellicoe reduced speed and turned northward in their company.

The *Lion*, meanwhile, had developed trouble in her remaining boilers, and at 1530 the *Indomitable* was ordered to take her in tow. Screened by the First and Second Light Cruiser Squadrons, the Second and Fourth Destroyer Flotillas,⁵ and in company with the battle fleet and the Harwich Flotillas (except such as were short of fuel), the *Lion* proceeded in tow of the *Indomitable* at 1724.⁶ At dusk the battle fleet and the battle cruisers "stood to the northward to be clear of torpedo attack. The night passed without incident, the First and Second Light Cruiser Squadrons joining the battle cruisers during the dark hours." The *Indomitable* towed the *Lion* throughout the whole of the next day, the weather fortunately remaining calm, and reached Rosyth in the early hours of the following morning.

13. **Movements of Submarines.**—Commodore (S) with the *Lurcher*, *Firedrake*, E4, 7, 11 and 8 on the way to their stations to intercept the returning German vessels were apparently sighted about 4 p.m., when 22 miles North of Borkum by a Seaplane which made off towards the Ems. Shortly afterwards a periscope was seen; the Commodore in the *Lurcher* endeavoured to ram the submarine but passed over it without a collision. He did not reach his station North of Heligoland till 8.44 p.m. About 8.15 p.m. he had seen in the distance a glare of searchlights on the island, but they were extinguished at 8.30 p.m., and he assumed from this that the fleet had got in before his arrival. Though E11 was in position at Nordency at 6.30 p.m. on the 24th she saw no men-of-war; the three other submarines passed Heligoland about 8.30 p.m., and as they also saw no large ships they were presumably too late. E8, however, to the N.N.W. of the island, had a shot in the early morning of the 25th at a destroyer flotilla in close order in quarter line, which gave a continuous target; but the torpedo, set at 6 feet, did not take effect.⁷

¹ A. 20.

² The following signals from Beatty's force were received or intercepted by the *Iron Duke* up to 8 o'clock: A. 20, 27, 32.

³ *Iron Duke* (s). At 0915 they were ordered to steer towards Heligoland.

⁴ C.-in-C. to A.C., 3rd B.S. and A.C., 2nd L.C.S.: "2nd L.C.S. to join 3rd B.S. You should meet about noon." (1010.)

⁵ The Fourth Destroyer Flotilla joined Jellicoe at 0945 from Invergordon.

⁶ *Indomitable* (1).

⁷ Reports of Commodore (S) H.S. 294, pp. 59 to 64 and 199 to 202.

APPENDIX A.

A. 1.

TELEGRAMS AND SIGNALS.

- | | | | |
|---|---|---|--|
| 1. From Admiralty.
To Commodore (T). | Jan. 23rd.
Sent Noon. | 7. From Admiralty.
To C.-in-C., H.F. (212).
V.A., <i>Lion</i> (16). | Jan. 23rd.
Sent 1420. |
| "58. Negative Plan Z. All your destroyers and light cruisers will be wanted to-night. Negative sending destroyers to Sheerness for escort." | | "You should send any light cruisers you can spare to join V.A., <i>Lion</i> , to-morrow morning to increase his chance of getting in touch with enemy. Acknowledge. This telegram has been sent to C.-in-C., Home Fleet, and V.A., <i>Lion</i> ." | |
| 2. From Admiralty.
To V.A., <i>Lion</i> . | Jan. 23rd.
Sent 1225. | 8. From Admiralty.
To C.-in-C., H.F. | Jan. 23rd.
Sent 1445. |
| "13. Get ready to sail at once with all battle cruisers and light cruisers and sea-going destroyers. Further orders follow." | | "213. Proceed with your main fleet towards the 3rd Battle Squadron's rendezvous, 55° 35' N., 2° 0' E., and act as you think best to intercept the enemy. Avoid using wireless if possible until after daylight to-morrow, or until enemy is reported. Acknowledge. Telegram has been repeated to V.A., 3rd Battle Squadron, and V.A., <i>Lion</i> , for information." | |
| 3. From Admiralty.
To C.-in-C., H.F. | Jan. 23rd.
Sent 1305.
Received 1400 (app.). | 9. From Admiralty.
To C.-in-C., H.F. | Jan. 23rd.
Sent 1620. |
| "209. 1st, 2nd, and 4th Battle Squadrons, Cruisers, and Light Cruisers should be ready to sail after dark this evening. Acknowledge." | | "214. We attach great importance to V.A., Battle Cruiser Squadron, having as many light cruisers as possible to-morrow morning. Telegraph, if you have time before sailing, the position your battle squadrons will be in at 7.0 a.m. to-morrow." | |
| 4. From Admiralty.
To Commodore (S). | Jan. 23rd.
Sent 1410. | 10. From Commodore (S).
To Admiralty. | Jan. 23rd.
Sent 1640.
Received 1705. |
| "30. Proceed with <i>Lurcher</i> , <i>Firedrake</i> , and four submarines in the direction of Borkum Rif, but do not get out of wireless touch and await any orders you may receive.
"All our available forces will be at sea to-night and to-morrow. Acknowledge."* | | "13. Your 30 received on returning with submarines. I am proceeding with four submarines as ordered." | |
| 5. From Admiralty.
To C.-in-C., H.F.; V.A.,
3rd B.S.; V.A., <i>Lion</i> . | Jan. 23rd.
Sent 1415. | 11. From Admiralty.
To Commodore (S). | Jan. 23rd.
Sent 1815. |
| "After battle cruisers have sailed after dark, 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron are to proceed to a rendezvous in 55° 35' N., 2° 0' E., and be prepared to intercept enemy if they are headed off by our battle cruisers and attempt to escape north.
"V.A., 3rd Battle Squadron, should not interfere with ships under command of V.A., Battle Cruiser Squadron. Telegram has been sent to C.-in-C.; V.A., 3rd Battle Squadron; V.A., <i>Lion</i> ." | | "31. In case German ships are delayed returning on Sunday evening and return on Monday morning, send four submarines to the following positions:—
"One to N.N.E. of Heligoland,
"Two to N.N.W. of Heligoland,
"One to the entrance of swept Channel near Norderney Gat,
and are to return on Monday evening. They are to return at once if bad weather comes on. Reply if it is possible for them to get to their stations by Monday morning" | |
| 6. From Admiralty.
To C.-in-C.; V.A., <i>Lion</i> ;
Commodore (T); V.A.,
3rd B.S. | Jan. 23rd.
Sent 1445. | 12. From Admiralty.
To V.A., <i>Lion</i> . | Jan. 23rd.
Sent 1850. |
| "All available battle cruisers, light cruisers, and destroyers from Rosyth should proceed to a rendezvous in 55° 13' N., 3° 12' E., arriving at 7.0 a.m. to-morrow. Commodore (T) is to proceed with all available destroyers and light cruisers from Harwich to join V.A., <i>Lion</i> , at 7.0 a.m. at above rendezvous. If enemy is sighted by Commodore (T) while crossing their line of advance, they should be attacked. W.T. is not to be used unless absolutely necessary. Telegram has been sent to C.-in-C., Home Fleet; V.A., <i>Lion</i> ; V.A., 3rd Battle Squadron; and Commodore (T)." | | "18. After reaching rendezvous use your discretion to find and engage enemy, taking under your orders Commodore (T) and give instructions to him about 6.0 a.m., when he will have passed enemy's probable line of advance. Acknowledge" | |
| | | 13. From C.-in-C., H.F.
To Admiralty. | Jan. 23rd.
Sent 2128.
Received 2226. |
| | | "214. Your 214. Battle Squadron, 7.0 a.m. 57° 28' N., 1° 25' E." | |

* This telegram also conveyed information that an enemy force, including battle cruisers, was expecting to sail that night to scout on the Dogger Bank.

14. From C.-in-C., H.F. Jan. 23rd.
To Admiralty. Sent 2128.
Received 2229.
"215. Request I may be informed for future guidance whether it is considered desirable for ships to pass over area of drifting mines extending from coast to latitude 56° 40' N., 2° 20' E. Rosyth ships must apparently do this to-night to reach rendezvous at time ordered. See Admiralty signal, January 15th."¹
- ¹ The signal of 15/1/15 referred to, warned ships that numerous floating mines had been sighted in an area contained by lines joining the points:—
(a) 56° 4' N., 0° 56' W.
(b) 56° 38' N., 2° 22' E.
(c) 56° 15½' N., 2° 05' E.
(d) 55° 40' N., 0° 37' E.
(e) 56° 04' N., 0° 56' W.
15. From Commodore (S). Jan. 23rd.
To Admiralty. Sent 2250.
Received 2310.
"Your telegram 31 received and understood. Submarines will be in position Monday morning." (2245.)
16. From A.C., 3rd B.S. Jan. 23rd, 2230.
To C.-in-C., H.F.
"Your 2204. No time mentioned in order. I shall be at rendezvous at 7.45 a.m." (2204 reads:—"Were you not ordered to 103 D 43 at 7 a.m.?)
17. From Admiralty. Jan. 24th.
To C.-in-C., H.F. Sent 0015.
"221. Your 215. Direct course leads south of area indicated in signal of January 15th. Area does not extend to coast."

Signals, January 24th, 1915.

18. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. Lion 0630.
To Commodore (T). Southampton 0635.
Arethusa, not logged.
"My position at 7.0 a.m. 199 P. 23.¹ Course S. 12° W., speed 18 knots. When we meet spread north and south to form look-out line to the westward of me. Subsequent movements will be ordered by visual. Indicate your position, course and speed." (0615.)
No answer was made.
¹ Lat. 55° 13' N., Long. 3° 12' E.
19. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. Lion 0705.
To S.O., 1st L.C.S. Southampton 0701.
Arethusa, not logged.
"My position, course and speed at 7.0 a.m. at rendezvous S.12W., 18 knots." (0700.)
20. From Aurora. Iron Duke 0730, Lion 0722,
To Commodore (T). Southampton 0730,
Arethusa 0730.
"Am in action with German fleet." (0723.)
(Made three times. Arethusa passed signal to Lion by searchlight.)
21. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. Lion 0725.
To 1st L.C.S. Southampton 0717.
"1st Light Cruiser Squadron spread for look-out duties N.E. by N., spread as far apart as possible keeping within signal distance."
No code time logged.
22. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. Lion 0727.
To 1st L.C.S. Southampton 0718.
"Cancel last signal. Chase 10° E." (0718.)
23. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. Lion 0737.
To Commodore (T) and Arethusa 0720.
Destroyers.
"Take station ahead three miles. Course S. 12° W., 20 knots."
No code time.
24. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. Lion, not logged.
To Commodore (T). Arethusa 0725.
"What force have you in company?"
Reply: "Seven destroyers in company. 3rd Flotilla, half are now astern of me, first half are now astern of them. 3rd Flotilla bears S.E. from me six miles."
Neither of these signals are logged in Lion.
25. From A.C. 1st B.C.S. Iron Duke 0752.
To C.-in-C. Southampton 0753.
"Enemy in sight 44 K.34.¹ Course E. Battle cruisers and cruisers, number unknown." (0730.)
¹ Lat. 54° 54½' N., Long. 3° 30' E.
26. From Commodore (T). Lion 0745.
To Lion. Arethusa 0737.
"We have three flotilla cruisers and 30 destroyers." (0745.)
27. From S.O., 1st L.C.S. Iron Duke 0742.
To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S. Lion 0739.
Southampton 0743
"My position 96 P. 45.¹ Enemy in sight Battle cruisers E.S.E." (0735.)
¹ Logged in Lion as 76 P. 45. 96 P. 45 is Lat. 55° 30' N., Long. 4° 43½' E., which is evidently incorrect.
28. From S.O., 1st L.C.S. Lion 0737.
To Lion. Southampton 0736.
"Aurora S.S.W. reports enemy cruisers E.S.E. Enemy battle cruisers S.E." (0735.)
(Made by visual.)
29. From Aurora. Lion 0745.
To Lion. Aurora 0755.
"Enemy's battle cruisers, E.S.E."
Reply: "How many?" Further reply: "Four, I think."
30. From S.O., 1st L.C.S. Iron Duke, not logged.
To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S. Lion 0747.
Southampton 0808.
"Enemy sighted are four battle cruisers, course north. Enemy steaming 24 knots." (0745.)
31. From Lion. Lion 0747.
To B.C.S.
"Speed, 22 knots."
32. From S.O., 1st L.C.S. Iron Duke 0802.
To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S. Lion 0759.
Southampton 0800.
"16 P 30.¹ Enemy in sight consisting of B.C.'s and L.C.'s steering between S.E. and S." (0755.)
¹ Lat. 55° 07' N., Long. 3° 43' E.
(Position not logged in Lion.)
33. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. Lion 0800.
To S.O., 1st L.C.S. Southampton (w) 0804.
"Keep in touch with enemy's battle cruisers and report movements." (0755.)
(Made by wireless and visual.)
34. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. Lion 0800.
To Arethusa. Arethusa 0758.
"Destroyers chase E.S.E. and report enemy." (0755.)
(Passed to destroyers.)
35. From S.O., 1st L.C.S. Iron Duke 0840 (?).
To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S. Lion 0815.
Southampton 0815.
"Enemy ships have altered course to north-east." (0810.)
Birmingham (s) and Nottingham (w) give code time 0800.

36. From Lion. Lion 0812.
To B.C.S.
"Speed 24 knots."
37. From Lion. Lion 0816.
To B.C.S.
"Form in single port quarter line, ships to be seven points abaft the beam. Speed 26 knots."
38. From Lion. Lion 0819.
To B.C.S.
"Course S.E. by S."
39. From S.O., 1st L.C.S. Iron Duke 0827.
To C.-in-C., S.O., 1st B.C.S. Lion 0824.
Southampton 0829.
"Position 146 P.40.¹ Enemy in sight consisting of four battle cruisers, five light cruisers, steering between east and south-east." (0823.)
¹ Lat. 55° 02' N., Long. 4° 04' E.
40. From Arethusa. Lion 0828.
To Lion. Arethusa 0817.
"German destroyers are to starboard of their fleet. Enemy's battle fleet cruisers course S.E. in single line ahead (—)."
41. From Meteor. Lion 0829.
To S.O. 1st B.C.S. Meteor, not logged.
"Enemy is altering course to E.S.E." (0820.)
42. From Lion. Lion 0830.
To B.C.S.
"Course S. 40 E."
43. From Meteor. Lion 0831.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S. Meteor, not logged.
"Enemy has destroyers." (0823.)
44. From Lion. Lion 0834.
To B.C.S.
"Speed 27 knots."
45. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. Iron Duke 0836.
To C.-in-C. Lion 0835.
"Enemy sighted is of class denoted four battle cruisers, four light cruisers, destroyers number unknown, bearing S. 61° E. 11 miles. My position 54 K.34.¹ Course S. 40° E. 26 knots."
¹ Lat. 54° 50' N., Long. 3° 37½' E.
46. From Lion. Lion 0838.
To B.C.S.
"Course S. 50° E."
47. From Lion. Lion 0843.
To B.C.S.
"Speed 28 knots."
48. From Lion. Lion, not logged.
To Arethusa and Destroyers. Arethusa 0843.
"Take station astern."
49. From Lion. Lion 0854.
To B.C.S.
"Speed 29 knots."
50. From Lion. Lion 0900.
To Arethusa. Arethusa, not logged.
"Destroyers—close me, my course and speed S. 50° E. 28 knots."
51. From Lion. Lion 0905.
To Destroyers. Arethusa 0910.
Take station ahead (0900).
52. From Lion. Lion 0905.
To B.C.S.
"Open fire and engage the enemy."
53. From Lion. Lion 0920.
To Destroyers. Arethusa 0920.
"Destroyers take station ahead. Proceed at your utmost speed." (—)
54. From Lion. Lion 0938.
Tiger 0941.
New Zealand 0950.
"Engage the corresponding ships in the enemy's line. Enemy destroyers are approaching."
55. From S.O., 1st L.C.S. Lion 0944.
To S.O., 1st B.C.S. Tiger, not logged.
Southampton 0945.
"Salvoes of three apparently from Tiger falling consistently over." (0940.)
56. From Lion. Lion 0952.
To B.C.S.
"Speed 24 knots."
57. From Lion. Lion 1010.
To Destroyers. Arethusa 1005.
Undaunted 1015
"Attack enemy destroyers."
58. From Lion. Lion 1010.
To B.C.S.
"Speed 26 knots."
59. From S.O., 1st B.C.S. Iron Duke, not logged.
To C.-in-C. Lion 1013
"My position 90 K.58.¹ Course S.E. by S. 24 knots. Heavily engaged." (0945.)
¹ Lat. 54° 30' N., Long. 4° 17' E.
60. From S.O., 1st L.C.S. Lion, not logged,
To S.O., 1st B.C.S. Southampton 1012.
"Enemy has detached rearmost battle cruiser. Am driven off." (1008.)
61. From Lion. Lion 1015.
To B.C.S.
"Course E.S.E."
For Course Signals between 1015 and 1115, see Appendix B.
62. From Admiralty. 1055.
To Commodore (S), Firedrake, Lurcher.
"Send submarines to Heligoland Bight. High Sea Fleet are coming out. Our battle cruisers are chasing German battle cruisers at 9.23 a.m., Lat. 54° 39' N., Long. 4° 16' E. Very important."
Commodore (S) received 1105.
63. From Undaunted. 1145.
To Commodore (T).
"We cannot go more than 20 knots."
64. From Arethusa. 1145.
To Tiger.
"Enemy has struck."
65. From Flag, New Zealand. 1158.¹
To B.C.S.
"Form single line ahead in sequence of 4, 3, 2, 5,² course west."
Note.—Princess Royal has, 1155, "course N.W." Tiger, not logged. Indomitable has, 1147, "course N.W."
¹ New Zealand's times are 6 minutes fast.
² New Zealand, Princess Royal, Tiger, Indomitable.

66. From S.O., 2nd B.C.S. 1200. To C.-in-C.
 "My position, 212 F.60,¹ course N.N.W., speed 20 knots. Commodore (S) reports High Sea Fleet coming out. Am retiring."
¹ Lat. 54° 19' N., Long. 5° 15' E.
67. From Flag, *New Zealand*. 1202. To B.C.S.
 "Cease firing."
68. From S.O., 1st L.C.S. 1204. To S.O., 2nd B.C.S.
 "Lost touch with enemy. What are your course and speed?" (1204.)
69. From S.O., 2nd B.C.S. 1208. To S.O., 1st L.C.S.
 "Retire N.W." (1205.)
70. From A.C., 1st B.C.S. 1215. To C.-in-C.
 "One enemy's battle cruiser sunk, two are seriously damaged. *Lion* badly damaged, reduced to 12 knots. Shifted flag to *Princess Royal* and covering her retirement. High Sea Fleet out, enemy submarines sighted."
71. From S.O., 1st L.C.S. To *New Zealand*.
 "I have ordered destroyers to leave the spot at once as Zeppelin was dropping bombs."

B.

APPENDIX B.

SIGNALS MADE BETWEEN 1027 AND 1115 BY V.A., 1st B.C.S., DURING THE CRISIS OF THE ACTION.

<i>Lion</i> .	<i>Tiger</i> .	<i>Princess Royal</i> .	<i>New Zealand</i> . ¹	<i>Indomitable</i> .
(1) 1027. Form on a compass line of bearing N.N.W. and proceed at your utmost speed. (Flags.)	1022. Form on a compass line of bearing N.N.W. 1024. Proceed at your utmost speed.	1023. Form on a compass line of bearing N.N.W. 1028. Proceed at your utmost speed.	1035. Course N.N.W. 1036. Proceed at your utmost speed.	1015. Course N.N.W.
(2) Not logged - - -	Not logged - - -	Not logged - - -	1040. Speed 26 knots. 1042. Correct -	Not logged.
(3) 1035. Turn together 1 point to port. (Flags.)	1035. Correct ² -	1035. Correct -	1042. Correct -	Not logged.
(4) 1045. Turn together 1 point to port. (Flags.)	1045. Correct -	1047. Correct -	1050. Correct -	Not logged.
(5) 1047. Close the enemy as rapidly as possible consistent with keep-all guns bearing. (Flags.)	1051. Close the enemy.	Not logged - -	Not logged - -	Not logged.
(6) 1105. ³ Turn together 8 points to port. (Flags.)	1102. Correct -	1105. Correct -	1110. Correct -	Not logged.
(7) 1110. ⁴ Course N.E. (Flags.)	- - - -	Not logged - -	- - - -	- - - -
(8) 1112. ⁵ Attack the rear of the enemy. (Flags.)	1115. Attack the rear of the enemy bearing N.E.	1120. Attack the rear of the enemy.	1121. Attack the rear of the enemy bearing N.E.	1108. Attack the rear of the enemy bearing N.E.
(9) 1113. ⁵ Keep nearer the enemy. Repeat signal Admiral is now making.	Not logged - -	1121. Repeat signal Admiral is now making.	Not logged - -	1110. Repeat signal Admiral is now making. Attack the rear of the enemy.

¹ *New Zealand's* times were 6 minutes fast (M. 01137).² "Correct" indicates that signal was received as logged in *Lion*.³ Admiral Beatty's despatch says 1100.⁴ From copy of log made for C.-in-C. after action. Not logged in *Lion's* signal log. Despatch says 1105.⁵ Admiral Beatty's despatch says that this and the following signals were hoisted 1105 and kept flying until the remainder of the squadron had passed out of sight. *Lion's* gives time as 1112. Signals 7, 8, and 9 may be regarded as ordered to be made simultaneously or in rapid succession. No further course signals are logged as having been made until R.A., *New Zealand*, ordered single line ahead to be formed, course west (1158).

APPENDIX C.

C.

BRITISH FORCES. DOGGER BANK—JANUARY 24TH, 1915.

Ship.	Officer Commanding.	Speed Designed. Seagoing full speed. Knots.	Ship.	Officer Commanding.	Speed Designed. Seagoing full speed. Knots.
1st Battle Cruiser Squadron. —Act. Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty.			1st Flotilla. 3rd Division.		
<i>Lion</i> (Flag)	Capt. Alfred E. M. Chatfield	28·0	<i>Ferret</i>	Cdr. Geoffrey Mackworth	27·0
		24·6	<i>Forester</i>	Lt.-Cdr. Montague G. B. Legge.	27·0
<i>Tiger</i>	Capt. Henry B. Pelly	30·0	<i>Defender</i>	Lt.-Cdr. Cecil H. H. Sams	27·0
<i>Princess Royal</i>	Capt. Osmond de B. Brock	28·0	<i>Druid</i>	Lt.-Cdr. Roger V. Allison	27·0
		24·6			
Armament, 8—13·5-in., 16—4-in. (<i>Tiger</i> 12—6-in.)			1st Flotilla. 4th Division.		
2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron. —Rear-Admiral Sir Archibald G. H. W. Moore.			<i>Hornet</i> - Cdr. Cecil G. Chichester - 27·0		
<i>New Zealand</i> (Flag)	Capt. Lionel Halsey	25·0	<i>Tigress</i>	Lt.-Cdr. Paul Whitfield	27·0
		23·5	<i>Sandfly</i>	Lt.-Cdr. Francis G. C. Coates.	27·0
<i>Indomitable</i>	Capt. Francis W. Kennedy	25·0	<i>Jackal</i>	Lt.-Cdr. John C. Tovey	27·0
		23·2			
Armament, 8—12-in., 16—4-in.			1st Flotilla. 5th Division.		
1st Light Cruiser Squadron.			<i>Goshawk</i> - Cdr. Dashwood F. Moir - 27·0		
<i>Southampton</i>	Commodore William E. Goodenough.	25·5	<i>Phoenix</i>	Lt.-Cdr. Michael K. H. Kennedy.	27·0
<i>Birmingham</i>	Capt. Arthur A. M. Duff	25·5	<i>Lapwing</i>	Lt.-Cdr. Alexander H. Gye	27·0
		23·2	Armament 1st Flotilla, 2—4-in., 2—12-pdr., 2—T.		
<i>Nottingham</i>	Capt. Charles B. Miller	25·5	<i>Undaunted</i>	Capt. Francis G. St. John - 28·5	
		23·2	Capt. (D. 3)		
<i>Lowestoft</i>	Capt. Theobald W. B. Kennedy.	25·5	Armament, 2—6-in., 6—4-in., 2-6-pdr., A.A., 2—T.		
		23·2	3rd Flotilla. 1st Division.		
Armament, 8—6-in., 2—S.T. (<i>Lowestoft</i> 9—6-in.)			<i>Lookout</i> - Cdr. Arthur B. S. Dutton - 29·0		
1st Fleet Destroyer Flotillas.			<i>Lysander</i> - Lt.-Cdr. George W. Taylor - 29·0		
<i>Arethusa</i>	Commodore Reginald Y. Tyrwhitt.	28·5	<i>Landrail</i> - Lt.-Cdr. Bruce Lloyd Owen - 29·0		
Armament, 2—6-in., 6—4-in.			3rd Flotilla. 2nd Division.		
10th Flotilla. "M" Division.			<i>Laurel</i> - Cdr. George P. England - 29·0		
<i>Meteor</i>	Capt. Hon. Herbert Meade	35·0	<i>Liberty</i>	Lt.-Cdr. Reginald B. C. Hutchinon.	29·0
<i>Miranda</i>	Cdr. Barry E. Domville	35·0	<i>Laertes</i>	Cdr. Malcolm L. Goldsmith	29·0
<i>Milne</i>	Lt.-Cdr. Henry R. Clifton-Mogg.	34·0	<i>Lucifer</i>	Lt.-Cdr. Ralph M. Mack	29·0
<i>Mentor</i>	Cdr. Rafe G. Rowley Conwy.	35·0			
<i>Mastiff</i>	Lt.-Cdr. James L. Forbes	35·0	3rd Flotilla. 3rd Division.		
<i>Minos</i>	Lt.-Cdr. Ernest H. B. Williams.	35·0	<i>Laforey</i> - Cdr. Graham R. L. Edwards.		
<i>Morris</i>	Cdr. Reginald Henniker-Heaton.	34·0	<i>Lawford</i> - Lt.-Cdr. Arthur A. Scott - 29·0		
Armament, 3—4-in., 2—T.			<i>Lydiard</i> - Lt.-Cdr. George H. Knowles.		
<i>Aurora</i> (Capt. D. 1).	Capt. Wilmot S. Nicholson	28·5	<i>Louis</i> - Lt.-Cdr. Richard W. U. Bayly.		
Armament, 2—6-in., 6—4-in., 2—6-pr. A.A., 2—T.			3rd Flotilla. 4th Division.		
1st Flotilla. 1st Division.			<i>Legion</i> - Lt.-Cdr. Claud F. Allsup - 29·0		
<i>Acheron</i>	Cdr. Brien M. Money	29·0	<i>Lark</i> - Lt.-Cdr. Charles E. Hughes White.		
<i>Attack</i>	Lt.-Cdr. Cyril Callaghan	28·0	Armament, 3rd Flotilla, 3—4-in., 4—T.		
<i>Hydra</i>	Lt.-Cdr. Robert S. Buchanan.	27·0			
<i>Ariel</i>	Lt.-Cdr. James V. Creagh	29·0			

D. APPENDIX D.

GERMAN FORCES. DOGGER BANK—JANUARY 24TH, 1915.

Ship.	Speed Designed. Sea-going full-speed. Knots.	Armament.	Ship.	Speed Designed. Sea-going full-speed. Knots. (From G.O.H.)	Armament.
1st Scouting Group.			15th 1/2 Flotilla.		
Full speed, Knots (from G.O.H. III).					
"Seydlitz"	28.1	3 T.	..	28.1	..
"Moltke"	28.4	3 T.	..	28.4	..
"Derfflinger"	28.0	3 T.	..	28.0	..
"Blucher"	25.8	3 T.	..	25.8	..
"Stralsund"	28.3	3 T.	..	28.3	..
"Graudenz"	29.0	3 T.	..	29.0	..
"Rostock"	27.3	3 T.	..	27.3	..
"Kolberg"	26.3	3 T.	..	26.3	..
2nd Scouting Group.			5th Flotilla.		
<i>Stralsund</i>	26.75	12—4.1-in. ; 2—S.T.	<i>G. 12</i> (Leader). V. 2, 3, 32.5 2—15-pr. ; 4—T. 4, 5, 6, G. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11.		
<i>Graudenz</i>	27.5	12—4.1-in. ; 2—S.T.			
<i>Rostock</i>	27.25	12—4.1-in. ; 2—S.T.			
<i>Kolberg</i>	25.0	12—4.1-in. ; 2—S.T.			
	23.0	S.T.			

E. APPENDIX E.

BRITISH SUPPORTING FORCES. DOGGER BANK—JANUARY 24TH, 1915.

Iron Duke —(Flag of C.-in-C.), <i>Oak</i> .	6th Cruiser Squadron. — <i>Drake</i> (flag), <i>Cumberland</i> , <i>Leviathan</i> .
1st Battle Squadron. — <i>Marlborough</i> (flag of Vice-Admiral), <i>Collingwood</i> , <i>Colossus</i> , <i>Hercules</i> , <i>Neptune</i> , <i>St. Vincent</i> (flag of Rear-Admiral), <i>Vanguard</i> , <i>Bellona</i> .	2nd Light Cruiser Squadron. — <i>Falmouth</i> (flag), <i>Gloucester</i> , <i>Yarmouth</i> , <i>Dartmouth</i> .
2nd Battle Squadron. — <i>King George V.</i> (flag of Vice-Admiral), <i>Ajax</i> , <i>Audacious</i> , <i>Centurion</i> , <i>Monarch</i> , <i>Orion</i> (flag of Rear-Admiral), <i>Thunderer</i> , <i>Boadicea</i> .	2nd Destroyer Flotilla. — <i>Galatea</i> (Capt. D.), <i>Broke</i> . About 16 destroyers.
4th Battle Squadron. — <i>Benbow</i> (flag of Vice-Admiral), <i>Agincourt</i> , <i>Bellerophon</i> , <i>Dreadnought</i> , <i>Emperor of India</i> (flag of Rear-Admiral), <i>Erin</i> , <i>Temeraire</i> , <i>Blonde</i> .	4th Destroyer Flotilla. — <i>Caroline</i> (Capt. D.), <i>Faulknor</i> . About 17 destroyers.
1st Cruiser Squadron. — <i>Defence</i> (flag), <i>Black Prince</i> , <i>Duke of Edinburgh</i> , <i>Warrior</i> .	3rd Battle Squadron. — <i>Dominion</i> (flag of Vice-Admiral), <i>Africa</i> , <i>Britannia</i> , <i>Hibernia</i> (flag of Rear-Admiral), <i>Hindustan</i> , <i>King Edward VII.</i> , <i>Zealandia</i> , <i>Blanche</i> .
2nd Cruiser Squadron. — <i>Shannon</i> (flag), <i>Achilles</i> , <i>Cochrane</i> .	3rd Cruiser Squadron. — <i>Antrim</i> (flag), <i>Argyll</i> , <i>Devonshire</i> .
	Submarine Flotilla. — <i>Lurcher</i> (Commodore (S)), <i>Fire-drake</i> , 4 submarines.

APPENDIX F.

F.

AMMUNITION EXPENDED.

British Ships.			German Ships. ¹		
Ship.	Gun.	Torpedoes.	Ship.	Gun.	Torpedoes.
1st Battler Cruiser Squadron.			1st Light Cruiser Squadron.		
<i>Lion</i>	243—13.5-in. A.P.C.	0	<i>Southampton</i>	62—6-in.	0
<i>Tiger</i>	249—13.5-in. A.P.C.	2	<i>Nottingham</i>	98—6-in.	0
	54—13.5-in. C.P.C.		<i>Birmingham</i>	88—6-in.	0
	52—13.5-in. H.E.		<i>Lowestoft</i>	70—6-in.	0
<i>Princess Royal</i>	268—6-in. A.P.C.	0	Flotillas.		
	95—13.5-in. H.E.		<i>Arethusa</i>	38—6-in.	2
	2—13.5-in. Shrapnel.			11—4-in.	
2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron.			<i>Aurora</i>	20—6-in.	0
<i>New Zealand</i>	8—12-in. C.P.C.	0		39—4-in.	
	139—12-in. H.E.		<i>Meteor</i>	0	1
<i>Indomitable</i>	40—12-in. A.P.C.	0	<i>Miranda</i>	0	2
	15—12-in. C.P.C.		<i>Mentor</i>	0	3
	79—12-in. H.E.		Total: 871—13.5-in.; 283—12-in.; 644—6-in.; 50—4-in.; 10 torpedoes.		
	2—12-in. Shrapnel.				

¹ From information supplied by I.D.

APPENDIX G.

G.

POSITIONS IN TEXT OF WIRELESS.
MEMO. H.F. 0015 OF DECEMBER 22ND, 1914.

Distinguishing Letter.	Latitude.	Longitude.	Distinguishing Letter.	Latitude.	Longitude.
R	53° 10' N.	3° 40' E.	N	57° 15' N.	0° 10' E.
K	54° 30' N.	2° 50' E.	Q	57° 45' N.	4° 50' E.
F	55° 10' N.	6° 10' E.	L	58° 30' N.	2° 30' E.
D	55° 45' N.	0° 45' E.	W	58° 40' N.	0° 30' W.
P	55° 35' N.	3° 25' E.	C	59° 50' N.	1° 00' E.
H	56° 30' N.	5° 50' E.	J	60° 30' N.	3° 20' E.
M	57° 00' N.	2° 45' E.	U	61° 20' N.	0° 45' E.

POSITIONS OCCURRING IN THE TEXT OF W/T MESSAGES.

- When ships of the Grand Fleet are engaged in operations in the North Sea, all positions occurring in W/T messages (other than those in cypher), and including those occurring in emergency reports of the enemy, are to be fixed by TRUE bearing (in degrees) and distance (in miles) from certain lettered rendezvous. In cypher messages the position is to be cyphered in accordance with the present practice.
- The distinguishing letter and latitude and longitude of these rendezvous will be communicated from time to time on a separate page.
- Positions fixed in this manner are to be transmitted by W/T, in a SINGLE GROUP, which is not to be coded or transposed, and, being self-evident, requires no prefix.
- This group is to be constructed as follows:—
 - Numerals indicating the TRUE bearing in degrees of the position FROM the lettered rendezvous.
 - The distinguishing letter (or letters) of the rendezvous FROM which the bearing and distance of the position is measured.
 - Numerals indicating the distance in miles of the position FROM the lettered rendezvous indicated in (ii) above.

D.

APPENDIX D.

GERMAN FORCES. DOGGER BANK—JANUARY 24TH, 1915.

Ship.	Speed Designed. Sea-going full-speed. Knots.	Armament.	Ship.	Speed Designed. Sea-going full-speed. Knots. (FROM G.O.H.M.)	Armament.
1st Scouting Group.					
<i>Seydlitz</i> (Flag of Rear-Admiral Hipper).	26.5 23.7	10—11-in.; 12—5.9-in.; 12—22-pr.; 4—S.T.	15th 1/2 Flotilla.		
<i>Moltke</i>	25.0 22.8	10—11-in.; 12—5.9-in.; 12—22-pr.; 4—S.T.	<i>G. 174</i> (Leader). <i>S. 128, 126, 121, 130, 131.</i>	31.5 27.0	2—15-pr.; 4—T. 3—4-pr.; 3—T.
<i>Derfflinger</i>	26.5	8—12-in.; 12—5.9-in.; 12—22-pr.; 4—S.T.	18th 1/2 Flotilla.		
<i>Blücher</i>	24.0 21.9	12—8.2-in.; 8—5.9-in.; 16—22-pr.; 4—S.T.	5 T.B.D.'s of latest type. 32.5 2—15-pr.; 4—T.		
2nd Scouting Group.					
<i>Stralsund</i>	26.75 24.5	12—4.1-in.; 2—S.T.	5th Flotilla.		
<i>Graudenz</i>	27.5	12—4.1-in.; 2—S.T.	<i>G. 12</i> (Leader). <i>V. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, G. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11.</i>	32.5	2—15-pr.; 4—T.
<i>Rostock</i>	27.25 24.8	12—4.1-in.; 2—S.T.			
<i>Kolberg</i>	25.0 23.0	12—4.1-in.; 2—S.T.			

E.

APPENDIX E.

BRITISH SUPPORTING FORCES. DOGGER BANK—JANUARY 24TH, 1915.

Iron Duke —(Flag of C.-in-C.), <i>Oak</i> .	6th Cruiser Squadron. — <i>Drake</i> (flag), <i>Cumberland</i> , <i>Leviathan</i> .
1st Battle Squadron. — <i>Marlborough</i> (flag of Vice-Admiral), <i>Collingwood</i> , <i>Colossus</i> , <i>Hercules</i> , <i>Neptune</i> , <i>St. Vincent</i> (flag of Rear-Admiral), <i>Vanguard</i> , <i>Bellona</i> .	2nd Light Cruiser Squadron. — <i>Falmouth</i> (flag), <i>Gloucester</i> , <i>Yarmouth</i> , <i>Dartmouth</i> .
2nd Battle Squadron. — <i>King George V.</i> (flag of Vice-Admiral), <i>Ajax</i> , <i>Audacious</i> , <i>Centurion</i> , <i>Monarch</i> , <i>Orion</i> (flag of Rear-Admiral), <i>Thunderer</i> , <i>Boadicea</i> .	2nd Destroyer Flotilla. — <i>Galatea</i> (Capt. D.), <i>Broke</i> . About 16 destroyers.
4th Battle Squadron. — <i>Benbow</i> (flag of Vice-Admiral), <i>Agincourt</i> , <i>Bellerophon</i> , <i>Dreadnought</i> , <i>Emperor of India</i> (flag of Rear-Admiral), <i>Erin</i> , <i>Temeraire</i> , <i>Blonde</i> .	4th Destroyer Flotilla. — <i>Caroline</i> (Capt. D.), <i>Faulknor</i> . About 17 destroyers.
1st Cruiser Squadron. — <i>Defence</i> (flag), <i>Black Prince</i> , <i>Duke of Edinburgh</i> , <i>Warrior</i> .	3rd Battle Squadron. — <i>Dominion</i> (flag of Vice-Admiral), <i>Africa</i> , <i>Britannia</i> , <i>Hibernia</i> (flag of Rear-Admiral), <i>Hindustan</i> , <i>King Edward VII.</i> , <i>Zealandia</i> , <i>Blanche</i> .
2nd Cruiser Squadron. — <i>Shannon</i> (flag), <i>Achilles</i> , <i>Cochrane</i> .	3rd Cruiser Squadron. — <i>Antrim</i> (flag), <i>Argyll</i> , <i>Devonshire</i> .
	Submarine Flotilla. — <i>Lurcher</i> (Commodore (S)), <i>Fire-drake</i> , 4 submarines.

APPENDIX F.

F.

AMMUNITION EXPENDED.

British Ships.			German Ships. ¹		
Ship.	Gun.	Torpedoes.	Ship.	Gun.	Torpedoes.
1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.			1st Light Cruiser Squadron.		
<i>Lion</i>	243—13.5-in. A.P.C.	0	<i>Southampton</i>	62—6-in.	0
<i>Tiger</i>	240—13.5-in. A.P.C.	0	<i>Nottingham</i>	98—6-in.	0
			<i>Birmingham</i>	88—6-in.	0
			Total: 871—13.5-in.; 283—12-in.; 644—6-in.; 50—4-in.; 10 torpedoes.		
2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron.					
<i>New Zealand</i>	8—12-in. C.P.C. 139—12-in. H.E.	0			
<i>Indomitable</i>	40—12-in. A.P.C. 15—12-in. C.P.C. 79—12-in. H.E. 2—12-in. Shrapnel.	0			
			Total: 310—12-in.; 666—11 in.; 100—5.9-in.; 100—4-in.		

¹ From information supplied by I.D.

APPENDIX G.

G.

POSITIONS IN TEXT OF WIRELESS.

MEMO. H.F. 0015 OF DECEMBER 22ND, 1914.

Distinguishing Letter.	Latitude.	Longitude.	Distinguishing Letter.	Latitude.	Longitude.
R	53° 10' N.	3° 40' E.	N	57° 15' N.	0° 10' E.
K	54° 30' N.	2° 50' E.	Q	57° 45' N.	4° 50' E.
F	55° 10' N.	6° 10' E.	L	58° 30' N.	2° 30' E.
D	55° 45' N.	0° 45' E.	W	58° 40' N.	0° 30' W.
P	55° 35' N.	3° 25' E.	C	59° 50' N.	1° 00' E.
H	56° 30' N.	5° 50' E.	J	60° 30' N.	3° 20' E.
M	57° 00' N.	2° 45' E.	U	61° 20' N.	0° 45' E.

POSITIONS OCCURRING IN THE TEXT OF W/T MESSAGES.

- When ships of the Grand Fleet are engaged in operations in the North Sea, all positions occurring in W/T messages (other than those in cypher), and including those occurring in emergency reports of the enemy, are to be fixed by TRUE bearing (in degrees) and distance (in miles) from certain lettered rendezvous. In cypher messages the position is to be cyphered in accordance with the present practice.
- The distinguishing letter and latitude and longitude of these rendezvous will be communicated from time to time on a separate page.
- Positions fixed in this manner are to be transmitted by W/T, in a SINGLE GROUP, which is not to be coded or transposed, and, being self-evident, requires no prefix.
- This group is to be constructed as follows:—
 - Numerals indicating the TRUE bearing in degrees of the position FROM the lettered rendezvous.
 - The distinguishing letter (or letters) of the rendezvous FROM which the bearing and distance of the position is measured.
 - Numerals indicating the distance in miles of the position FROM the lettered rendezvous indicated in (ii) above.

H.

APPENDIX H.

CASUALTIES.—DOGGER BANK, JANUARY 24TH, 1915.

Ship.	Officers.		C.P.O.'s, P.O.'s, and Men.		Total.	
	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.
<i>Lion</i> - - - -	—	—	1	20	1	20
<i>Tiger</i> - - - -	1	3	9	8	10	11
<i>Meteor</i> - - - -	—	—	4	1	4	1
Total - - - -	1	3	14	29	15	32

¹ Compiled from A.G. return. "Killed" includes "died of wounds."

J.

APPENDIX J.

OF ACTION
NOTES TO PLANS 1 AND 2

1. *Aurora* Deck Log gives "0655, sighted 3-funnelled cruiser, challenged; 0705, enemy opened fire, engaged him at 8,000 yards; 0715, enemy turned away and ceased fire." But *Aurora's* report (Encl. No. 2 to 100849/13) gives "0715, enemy opened fire," which time has been adopted, times of sighting and of breaking off the action being adjusted accordingly. *Southampton* (r) has: "0715, firing observed ahead," and Admiral Beatty's despatch: "At 7.25 a.m. the flash of guns was observed S.S.E." which times coincide with the commencement and conclusion of the action between *Aurora* and *Kolberg*.

2. *Aurora's* track from 0730 to 0845 has been plotted to conform generally with that of *Undaunted*, who at 0730 sighted enemy B.C.'s and turned away, following *Aurora's* movements. *Undaunted's* track is based on *Lookout*, Lieut. (N's) notebook. Certain times in the latter have been adjusted in the light of other evidence, particularly between 1039 and 1203, where the times as given appear to be five minutes slow.

3. There is not sufficient evidence to plot the exact positions of *Aurora* and *Undaunted* at 0705, when the former sighted the *Kolberg*; and the tracks of the flotillas prior to 0830 are necessarily approximate.

4. 1st B.C.S.—The track plotted is that of the *Lion*, and is largely based on *Princess Royal's* deck log, the correct allowance being made for difference in times of turning of *Lion* and *Princess Royal* respectively when altering course in succession. 27 knots has been allowed for "utmost speed."

5. From about 0833 to 0952, when *Lion* eased to 24 knots, *Tiger* was the only ship which kept station, and she was probably 5 cables astern. *New Zealand* kept up fairly well with *Princess Royal*, but both the latter dropped considerably, and at 0952 were almost out of mutual supporting distance. (Admiral Beatty.)

6. From 0954 the tracks of the enemy's B.C.'s are largely based on the ranges and the rate of change of

range as recorded by *Lion*, but the times given in *Lion's* transmitting room log have been adjusted, as these are stated to be slightly inaccurate.

7. The 1st L.C.S. turned to N. 40° E. at 0753 and to S.E. by S. at 0757, presumably in conformity with the movement of the German B.C.'s which turned at 0747 and 0752; but it has not been possible exactly to reconcile the times of turning of the two forces.

8. The German B.C.'s.—The courses of the enemy prior to 0830 are necessarily approximate. They are based upon a selection of the available evidence, and the best "fixes" during this period are considered to be at 0730 (A 28) and 0754 (four German B.C.'s bearing S. 65 E.—*N.Z.'s* deck log). Scheer's diagram (*Germany's High Sea Fleet*, p. 77) makes the enemy battle cruisers turn to port after 0730 and not to starboard as shown in plan 2; but this point cannot be definitely settled until further evidence (e.g., the account in the German Official History) becomes available. Scheer's diagram, p. 83, makes the *Seydlitz*, *Derfflinger*, and *Moltke* at 1100 turn S. by W. for some minutes to engage the *Tiger*, *Princess Royal*, and *New Zealand*, and to come to the assistance of the *Blücher*. Admiral Moore's report says: "When *Blücher* struck (corrected "time 1145) the other enemy B.C.'s were distant about "12½ miles" consequently the German ships (if they turned at all) could not have held on a S. by W. course for more than two or three minutes, or they would not have increased their distance from some 17,000 yards at 1100 to 25,000 yards at 1145. From information received from I.D. it appears that the German B.C.'s at 1100 did actually turn to S. by W. for a short time; but the *Seydlitz* had only 200 rounds of ammunition left and her two after turrets were out of action; consequently the intention to go to the assistance of the *Blücher* was abandoned. Admiral Hipper considered it doubtful in any case whether his B.C.'s would have been in time to prevent our light craft from finishing off the *Blücher*."

LIST OF NAVAL STAFF MONOGRAPHS (HISTORICAL) ISSUED TO THE FLEET.

C.B. 917 (octavo).	Vol. I.	Monograph 1.	Coronel.
		"	2. German Cruiser Squadron in Pacific.
		"	3. Falklands.
		"	4. "Goeben" and "Breslau."
C.B. 917A (octavo).	Vol. II.	"	5. Cameroons, 1914.
		"	10. East Africa to July 1915.
C.B. 1585 (foolscap).	Vol. III.	"	6. Passage of B.E.F., Aug. 1914.
		"	7. Patrol Flotillas at commencement of war.
		"	8. Raid on N.E. Coast, Dec. 16, 1914.
		"	11. Heligoland Bight, Aug. 28th, 1914.
		"	12. Dogger Bank, Jan. 24th, 1915.
C.B. 917B (octavo).	Vol. IV.	"	15. Mesopotamia.

LIST OF NAVAL STAFF MEMBERS ISSUED TO THE PUBLIC

THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF THE MEMBERS OF THE NAVAL STAFF WHOSE NAMES ARE ISSUED TO THE PUBLIC IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE NAVAL STAFF ACT, 1912.

NAME	RANK	BRANCH	DATE OF ISSUANCE
1. ADMIRAL	ADMIRAL	ADMIRALTY	1912
2. VICE ADMIRAL	VICE ADMIRAL	ADMIRALTY	1912
3. CAPTAIN	CAPTAIN	ADMIRALTY	1912
4. COMMANDER	COMMANDER	ADMIRALTY	1912
5. LIEUTENANT	LIEUTENANT	ADMIRALTY	1912
6. LIEUTENANT	LIEUTENANT	ADMIRALTY	1912
7. LIEUTENANT	LIEUTENANT	ADMIRALTY	1912
8. LIEUTENANT	LIEUTENANT	ADMIRALTY	1912
9. LIEUTENANT	LIEUTENANT	ADMIRALTY	1912
10. LIEUTENANT	LIEUTENANT	ADMIRALTY	1912
11. LIEUTENANT	LIEUTENANT	ADMIRALTY	1912
12. LIEUTENANT	LIEUTENANT	ADMIRALTY	1912
13. LIEUTENANT	LIEUTENANT	ADMIRALTY	1912
14. LIEUTENANT	LIEUTENANT	ADMIRALTY	1912
15. LIEUTENANT	LIEUTENANT	ADMIRALTY	1912
16. LIEUTENANT	LIEUTENANT	ADMIRALTY	1912
17. LIEUTENANT	LIEUTENANT	ADMIRALTY	1912
18. LIEUTENANT	LIEUTENANT	ADMIRALTY	1912
19. LIEUTENANT	LIEUTENANT	ADMIRALTY	1912
20. LIEUTENANT	LIEUTENANT	ADMIRALTY	1912

