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NAVAL STAFF MONOGRAPHS  
(HISTORICAL).

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FLEET ISSUE.

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VOLUME II.

Monograph 10.—East Africa to July 1915.

Monograph 5.—Cameroons, 1914.

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JANUARY 1921.

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**NAVAL STAFF MONOGRAPHS  
(HISTORICAL).**

**FLEET ISSUE.**

**VOLUME II.**

**Monograph 10.—East Africa to July 1915,  
pages 2-148.**

**Monograph 5.—Cameroons, 1914,  
pages 149-217.**

NAVAL STAFF,  
TRAINING AND STAFF DUTIES DIVISION.  
*January, 1921.*

**NAVAL OPERATIONS ON THE  
EAST COAST OF AFRICA.  
AUGUST 1914—JULY 1915.**

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NAVAL OPERATIONS ON THE EAST  
COAST OF AFRICA ;  
AUGUST 1914—JULY 1915.

NOTE ON SOURCES.

I. The under-mentioned volumes arranged and bound  
by the Historical Section (Naval) of the Committee of  
Imperial Defence contain papers and telegrams relating  
to the operations off the East African Coast:—

H.S. 8.—Cape. Docketed Papers, July to Decem-  
ber 1914. Contains the letters of  
proceedings from C-in-C., Cape.

H.S. 10.—East Africa. Part I.: Telegrams and  
docketed papers from  
July 25th, 1914, to  
October 1st, 1914.

H.S. 10.—East Africa. Part II.: Complete col-  
lection of papers *re*  
loss of "Pegasus."

H.S. 14.—East Africa. Telegrams from October  
2nd to December 12th, 1914.

H.S. 15.—East Africa. Docketed papers, October  
to December 1914. Contains reports  
from "Fox," "Chatham," &c.

H.S. 178.—Cape and East Africa. Telegrams  
from December 13th, 1914, to Feb-  
ruary 28th, 1915. Arranged in two  
parts, No. I., Cape; No. II., East  
Africa.

H.S. 198.—Cape and East Africa. Telegrams from  
March 1st, 1915. Arranged in one  
series.

2. The following papers in the custody of the Committee of Imperial Defence relate to the subject and have not at present (November 1920) been bound :—

(a) General letters of proceedings of C.-in-C., Cape.

M. 03361/15 - Covering period from January 21st, 1915—March 2nd.

M. 03362/15 - Covering period from March 2nd—March 22nd.

M. 04068/15 - Covering period from March 22nd—April 17th.

M. 05026/15 - Covering period from April 17th—May 15th.

M. 06337/15 - Covering period from May 15th—June 16th.

(b) Despatch relating to the destruction of the "Königsberg"—

M. 06236/15 - - Dated July 15th.

This contains a very full account of the operations on July 6th and 11th with the original orders, reports, &c., attached.

(c) Miscellaneous—

M. 01685/15 - "Fox's" report on capture of Mafia Island.

M. 02644/15 - "Weymouth's" report on proceedings between January 13th to February 3rd.

M. 02647/15 - Report on loss of tug "Adjutant" off Rufiji River.

M. 05048/15 - Report on voyage of monitor squadron from Malta to Mafia Island.

3. On the German side the principal source is General von Lettow-Vorbeck's account of his operations in East Africa. This has been published in a translated edition by Messrs. Hurst and Blackett under the title of "My Reminiscences"; it is referred to in footnotes as Lettow-Vorbeck. There is not very much information about the "Königsberg," and what is given is not always accurate, but there seems no reason to doubt the author's good faith and veracity so far as matters which came under his own observation are concerned.

Kapitän Leutnant Christiansen, who commanded the blockade-runner which reached German East Africa in April 1915, has published an account of his experiences in a volume entitled "Durch mit Kriegs-material zu Lettow-Vorbeck," Keutel, Stuttgart, 1919. This book has not been seen in the original, but from translated extracts it appears to be in reasonable agreement with British accounts.

4. Unofficial British sources consulted when compiling this monograph include :—

(a) The Naval Review—

Vol. III., No. 3.—Narrative of Proceedings. H.M.S. "Chatham."

„ No. 4.—An Outpost of the Empire, I. H.M.S. "Weymouth."

„ No. 3.—Synopsis of Doings of Cape Squadron to January 1915.

Attack on the "Königsberg." Letter from "Severn."

Vol. IV., p. 331.—An Outpost of the Empire, II. H.M.S. "Weymouth."

„ p. 335.—Narrative of attacks on "Königsberg."

„ p. 345.—Operations on East Coast after destruction of "Königsberg" (evidently by an officer of "Challenger").

Vol. VII., No. 2.—Account of boat attack at Dar-es-Salaam, November 1914.

(b) The German Empire in Africa, by A. F. Calvert; Werner, Laurie & Co., 1916. This book is compiled chiefly from German sources, and contains a large amount of information, economic and otherwise, with regard to the German Colonies in Africa. There are many photographs which give a good idea of the nature of the country.

5. For hydrographical information, Africa Pilot, Vol. III. and South Indian Ocean Pilot should be consulted.



The under-mentioned charts will be found necessary :—

- General* - - 748 B.—North Indian Ocean.  
597.—Delagoa Bay to Cape Guardafui.
- Rufiji Region* - 1032.—Channels from Kilwa Point to North Mafia Channel.  
662.—Kilwa Point to Zanzibar Channel.
- Tanga, &c.* - 663.—Tanga and Mansa Bays.  
1390.—Chale Point to Pangani.

## CHAPTER I.

### THE THEATRE OF WAR IN EAST AFRICAN WATERS.

#### GENERAL OUTLINE.

1. *The Theatre of War.*—The following monograph deals with the naval operations carried off the East Coast of Africa from August 1914 to July 1915 when the destruction of the “Königsberg” led to a change in the general situation. In this preliminary chapter the conditions governing the naval situation at the outbreak of hostilities will be described, and a brief sketch of the physical and political geography of these regions, in so far as it affects warlike activities, will be given.

The term “East Coast of Africa” might, strictly speaking, be applied to the whole littoral of Africa between Cape Guardafui and the Cape of Good Hope, but in practice it is generally limited to the coast-line south of the equator as far as Delagoa Bay in latitude 26° S.; for north of the Equator the arid and inhospitable shores of Italian Somaliland are of but little maritime or economic importance, while the interests of the Union of South Africa are directed more towards the Atlantic than the Indian Ocean. The term East Africa in this monograph must therefore be taken to refer to the Portuguese, German, and British East African Protectorates, together with the numerous islands situated in the south-western portion of the Indian Ocean.

The general outlook of this portion of Africa is towards the southern shores of Asia, and from a very

early period there has been an extensive traffic between the East Coast of Africa and Arabia, India and the East Indies, which has left its traces in the Arab Sultanate of Zanzibar and the Malay population of Madagascar.

The latter island with the adjoining Comoro Islands is now a French possession, but to the northward and westward lie a number of scattered groups under British sovereignty. These islands are for the most part of coral formation and of slight commercial importance, but their anchorages constitute possible bases for naval operations.

A number of islands and shoals of varying degrees of importance form a large arc further to the eastward. To the northward is the Seychelles group (British) with the excellent harbour of Port Victoria, cable communication, and a considerable commerce. To the south-eastward of this group is situated the extensive Saya de Malha shoal (least depth 4 fathoms), the northern extremity of a comparatively shallow ridge which extends for 500 miles to the southward, including the Nazareth Bank (least depth 14 fathoms) and terminating in the archipelago of islets, rocks, and shoals known as Cargados Carajos. These islets are under the jurisdiction of the British Governor of Mauritius, lying 250 miles to the south-westward with the seat of Government at the important harbour of Port Louis. To the east of Mauritius lies the British Island of Rodriguez and to the west the island of Réunion, a French possession. All these are connected by cables (par. 5).

2. *Physical Conditions and Climate.*—The physical features of the Portuguese, German, and British East African Protectorates are very similar. Along the coast stretches a plain 10 to 50 miles wide, densely wooded and intersected by numerous waterways, while to the westward the Central African plateau rises in steep escarpments to the elevated country in the interior which is often rugged and mountainous. The result of this formation is that the great majority of the rivers in these regions are only navigable for short distances from the sea and do not form such important means of internal communications as in other parts of Africa (for instance, the Cameroons).

The climate of the coastal district suffers from the defects common to tropical countries, heat, humidity, and unhealthiness. The exact seasons differ slightly in

various localities, but generally speaking the maximum temperatures and the maximum rainfall occur between December and March, the region of heaviest rains being in the neighbourhood of the German-British frontier.<sup>1</sup> The upland regions of the interior enjoy a much better climate, and considerable portions of the African plateau are suited for settlement by Europeans, but the German territory was noticeably inferior to the British in this respect and various insect-borne diseases such as malaria and sleeping sickness are endemic. A German military officer<sup>2</sup> writing before the war remarked that a force of white troops carrying out operations in the interior would soon become nothing but "a walking hospital," and our own experience in the latter stages of the campaign bore this out, the white South African troops suffering severely from disease.

An important feature of this coast from the maritime point of view is the "monsoon" system of winds which prevails in the Western Indian Ocean, for it is these seasonal winds which permit the large ocean-going dhows of Arabia and India to perform their voyages to and from East Africa.

They also make a considerable difference to the value of various harbours, as an anchorage may be perfectly safe during one monsoon and exposed to the full force of wind and sea throughout the remainder of the year.

The north-east monsoon commences in the Arabian Sea in October but does not usually commence to blow at Zanzibar till November and lasts until March. Though described as the north-east monsoon, it does not blow constantly from that direction, but south of the Equator the wind is frequently between E.N.E. and E.S.E., especially in February and March, and sailing traffic in either direction along the coast is thus possible. The change of the monsoon in March or April is marked by an interval of calms and unsettled weather, after which the south-west monsoon sets in, blowing along the African coast and attaining great strength in the Arabian Sea during July and August. The months during which this monsoon blows are the coolest and dries on the African coast.

The winds in the Mozambique Channel have special local characteristics which need not be described here,

<sup>1</sup> Annual rainfall: Mombasa, 52½ inches; Tanga, 61 inches; Lindi, 34 inches.

<sup>2</sup> Quoted by Calvert, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

but it may be mentioned that the currents, strong and variable along the whole of the African coast, are especially so in the Mozambique Channel and render navigation in these waters somewhat difficult.

3. *German East Africa.*—The German protectorate of East Africa with an area of 380,000 square miles was bounded on the north by British East Africa and Uganda, the great lake Victoria Nyanza forming a portion of the frontier; on the west by the Belgian Congo territory, Lake Tanganyika forming the natural boundary; on the south-west by the British possessions of northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and Lake Nyassa, while to the southward the Rovuma River separated German territory from Portuguese East Africa.<sup>1</sup> The general formation of the country has been already described, but it may be added that the contrast between the coast plain and the inland plateau is very much less marked in the south than in the north, and that in the neighbourhood of the Great Lakes the conditions are somewhat similar to those in the coastal plain.

In German territory, just within the northern frontier which makes a bend to include it, rises the snow-capped peak of Kilimanjaro (19,321 feet), the highest mountain in Africa, and between it and the sea lies the upland region of the Usumbara Mountains. This region, where the conditions are similar to those of British East Africa, was the most highly developed in the colony, and the bulk of the white population was settled in its vicinity. A railway connected New Moshi on the slopes of Kilimanjaro to the port of Tanga, which dealt with a large proportion of the produce of the Protectorate. Another line had just been completed from Dar-es-Salaam to Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika, passing through the centre of the Protectorate, but its effect on developing the country had not yet become fully apparent, and at the outbreak of war the centre of commercial gravity was still in the north, though the Central Railway was however of great strategical importance as a means of supplying forces on the Belgian and Rhodesian frontiers.

These two railways ensured communication from east to west, but communication from north to south was very defective, and its difficulties were increased by the numerous rivers which are useless for navigation and

<sup>1</sup> The Germans held a small area south of the Rovuma at its mouth.

merely form obstacles to traffic. The Rufiji<sup>1</sup> river in the south is, however, an exception, for it is navigable for small steamers up to 50 or 60 miles from its mouth, but the district it waters is somewhat undeveloped.

Though much had still to be done to develop the resources of the country, the growth of commerce had been constant; in 1902 the total value of trade was 707,088*l.* (36 per cent. exports), in 1913 these figures had increased to 4,445,477*l.* (40 per cent. exports), but in spite of this great expansion the administration of the colony involved a financial loss to the German Government. Unlike certain other German possessions—notably the Cameroons—British firms had no share in the trade, and there were few British Europeans resident in the Protectorate, but a large proportion of the retail trade was in the hands of Hindus who were disliked and oppressed by the German authorities. The total European population in 1913 was 2,536, nearly all of whom were Germans.

The regular military force in the Protectorate consisted of about 200 European officers and 2,500 Askari or native soldiers organised in 14 companies with a depôt at Dar-es-Salaam, the whole under the command of Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck, an officer of remarkable resolution and resource.<sup>2</sup> These companies were scattered about the country in isolated posts and according to their late commander it was difficult to arrange for the training of the large formations required to meet the forces of the British Empire. The infantry were in course of being re-armed with a modern carbine, but the majority of them still carried an old rifle of the 1871 pattern firing black powder. There were a few old field guns of 1873 pattern which also fired black powder, and still more important, three modern machine guns for each company.<sup>3</sup>

In addition to these regular troops there was a police force consisting of 45 Europeans and 2,100 natives, but von Lettow-Vorbeck complains that these had only a travesty of military organisation and their sub-division amongst scattered posts prevented their adequate training. Arrangements, however, were made for a proportion of police to be transferred to the regular "protective force"

<sup>1</sup> This spelling has been adopted in this monograph. It is also spelt *Rufigi* and *Rufidgi*.

<sup>2</sup> He took over the command in Jan. 1914. He had already seen service in China and S.W. Africa and had commanded the marine battalion at Wilhelmshaven.

<sup>3</sup> The Germans distributed numbers of old "Tower" muskets to friendly natives. These weapons were quite effective for fighting in the bush.

in time of war, and this permitted the German Commander to put three additional companies into the field in the first few months of the war. In conclusion, it may be remarked that a considerable proportion of the German settlers appear to have been either retired from the Regular German Army or officers of reserve and a number of German doctors who were investigating sleeping sickness in the interior proved useful in organising the medical services. An aeroplane arrived at Dar-es-Salaam, where an exhibition was about to be held, on August 1st, 1914, but it performed no useful service and it was destroyed and the pilot killed in an accident in November 1914.

4. *British East Africa.*—The British East African Protectorate which includes Uganda and the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba covers an area of 393,000 square miles, and is somewhat larger than the German territory, but the only portion which need be considered in this monograph is the region adjoining the German frontier through which the Uganda railway runs connecting Lake Victoria Nyanza with the sea at Mombasa. Mombasa, the coast terminus of the railway, is situated on an island and is connected with the mainland by a bridge 600 yards long, which, as it was only 50 miles from the German frontier, was a vulnerable point and a constant source of anxiety during the early days of the war. The harbour is one of the best on the coast, consisting of several land-locked anchorages such as Kilindini, Port Tudor, and Port Reitz which besides giving excellent shelter were difficult of access to an enemy vessel.

The large coral islands of Zanzibar and Pemba lying off the coast of German East Africa have formed part of the British East African Protectorate since 1890, and are administered by a British resident, the Sultan of Zanzibar only exercising a nominal authority. Zanzibar is of considerably greater importance than Pemba, the town of Zanzibar on its western side being a centre of local commerce and communications, but unfortunately its harbour is only an open roadstead sheltered by coral reefs which, though they give adequate protection from wind and sea, provide no cover to ships in the anchorage against an attack from the sea.

On the western side of Pemba there are several excellent anchorages, notably Chaki Chaki Bay, which are almost landlocked, but as the climate is exceedingly unhealthy for Europeans, the ports have not been developed to the same extent as that of Zanzibar.

None of the harbours of British East Africa are fortified and the only military forces in the Protectorate consisted of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  battalions of the King's African Rifles (one in Uganda) mustering at full strength about 60 officers and 2,200 men with 26 machine guns.<sup>1</sup> A considerable portion of this force was always required in the northern portion of the Protectorate where the unruly tribes on the Sudan and Somaliland frontiers frequently gave trouble, and in point of fact a field force was actually operating in these regions when hostilities with Germany commenced.

The total European population was about 3,500, chiefly congregated in the Nairobi district, and including a certain number of Germans. A Volunteer Reserve numbering about 650 Europeans had been organised in East Africa and Uganda.

5. *Communications.*—The centre of submarine cable communications in East African waters was the island of Zanzibar which is connected to Aden, and thence to Europe. From Zanzibar cables ran to Mombasa; to Bagamayo in German East Africa; to the Seychelles and thence to Mauritius; and to Mozambique, which was in communication with South Africa. Mozambique was also connected with Majunga on the N.W. coast of Madagascar, and thence by land wire to Tamatave on the east coast, which was the starting place of a cable to Réunion and Mauritius. Mauritius in addition to the Zanzibar line through the Seychelles as already described, was also in direct communication with Durban (Natal), and through Rodriguez and Cocos Keeling Islands to Australia and China. As these cables were under Allied control the outbreak of war cut off German East Africa from all cable communication, but with regard to wireless communication the enemy's position was slightly more favourable. Before the war, stations were established at Dar-es-Salaam, and also at Mwansa and Bukoba<sup>2</sup> on Lake Victoria Nyanza, and messages appear to have been received from Kamina (Togoland), until the fall of the latter station on August 24th. The station at Dar-es-Salaam was destroyed on August 8th, and after this date

<sup>1</sup> There was also half of the 1st Battalion, King's African Rifles in Nyasaland on the S.W. frontier of German East Africa. Full strength, 10 officers, 416 men (including reserves) with three machine guns, also a Volunteer Reserve of 143 Europeans.

<sup>2</sup> Normal range.—Mwansa, 400 miles; Bukoba, 120 miles.

no messages from the Protectorate could reach Europe though under exceptionally favourable conditions news could be received from Windhoek (S.W. Africa), and even from Nauen (Germany). These methods of communication, however, were unreliable, and the German commander does not appear to have received any definite instructions or information from Berlin.

The only British wireless stations in East African waters were low-power ones at Zanzibar and Pemba for maintaining communication between the two islands, but the French had stations at Diego Suarez, Majunga (Madagascar), and Mayotta (Comoro Islands) which were placed at our disposal.

6. *The Cape Station—British and German Forces.* The Cape of Good Hope station was commanded in July 1914 by Rear-Admiral H. King-Hall, and included portions of both the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Its northern limit in the Indian Ocean was the Equator from the African coast as far as the meridian of 70° E. and then the parallel of 13° S. as far as the meridian of 95°, which formed the eastern boundary. It thus included all the islands of the Southern Indian Ocean, *except* the Chagos Archipelago and the Cocos-Keeling group, which were comprised in the East Indies Station.

In the Atlantic the northern boundary was the parallel of 17° 15' S. (*i.e.*, the boundary between German and Portuguese territory) as far to the westward as the meridian of Greenwich and then the parallel of 15° S. as far as the meridian of 15° W. which formed the western boundary of the station. It therefore included St. Helena and the whole coast-line of German S.W. Africa. To the northward there was no regular station, the gun-boat "Dwarf" having a general responsibility for the West Coast of Africa.

The British squadron under the command of Admiral King-Hall consisted in July 1914, of three light cruisers:—

Name.	Captain.	Date of Completion.	Tonnage.	Seagoing Full Speed.	Armament.
"Hyacinth" (Flag).	D. M. Anderson	1900	5,600	18·2	11—6-in.
"Astræa" -	A. C. Sykes -	1894	4,360	16·7	2—6-in., 8—4·7-in.
"Pegasus" -	Commander J. Ingles.	1898	2,135	17·0	8—4-in.

One of these ships was generally stationed on the East Coast of Africa and the headquarters of the squadron were at the dockyard port of Simonstown near Cape Town.<sup>1</sup>

The German ships on the station in July 1914, consisted of:—

Type.	Name.	Date of Completion.	Tonnage.	Seagoing Full Speed.	Armament.
Light Cruiser -	"Königsberg"	1907	3,350	21·3	10—4·1-in.
Gunboat -	"Eber"	1903	984	14·0	2—4·1-in.
• Surveying Ship	"Möwe"	1906	650	9·5	3—1-pdr.

Of these ships the "Königsberg" and "Möwe" were known to be stationed in East African waters with their base at Dar-es-Salaam and the gunboat "Eber," which usually cruised in West African waters, was carrying out a refit at Cape Town in July.

7. *War Orders for the Cape Station.*<sup>2</sup>—In October 1913, Admiral King-Hall, to comply with the Standing Orders for Commanders-in-Chief abroad, prepared War Orders for the Cape Station, which were in force at the outbreak of war except for a few modifications regarding administrative details.

These orders stated that the primary object of the Cape Squadron was to protect the trade routes to Australia and Asia, its secondary object the destruction of the enemy's commerce. As the only way in which the enemy could interfere with our commerce would be by attacking it at some vulnerable point the objective of the Cape Squadron was to consist of any naval force which the enemy might possess in the waters of the Cape Station, and it was pointed out that all hostile vessels must be considered as potential armed merchant cruisers to be captured or destroyed wherever met with.

The War Orders provided for a German force of two sloops (or old cruisers) and two gunboats, and the "Seeadler"<sup>3</sup> in particular was expected to be on the East Coast of Africa. Actually, before the outbreak of war the German force had been reduced in numbers and increased in strength by the arrival of the "Königsberg"

<sup>1</sup> It was intended to reinforce the Cape Station by the light cruiser "Nottingham" which was to sail from England about the end of August. The outbreak of war caused her to be retained in Home Waters.

<sup>2</sup> B 1.

<sup>3</sup> Completed 1892. 16 knots, 8—4·1-in.

on the East African Station, but no change was made in the War Orders, which laid down that the focal area near the Cape and the neighbourhood of Dar-es-Salaam were the two points to be "controlled" in the case of war with Germany. It was estimated that on any day 46 per cent. of the British merchant vessels on the Cape Station were between Durban and the Equator and 42 per cent. within a radius of 800 miles of the Cape, and therefore the distribution of cruisers after the outbreak of war was to provide for two off the East Coast of Africa and one off the Cape, the Admiral making his headquarters at Simonstown. If any cruiser was already on the East Coast at the outbreak of war she was to bring the hostile cruiser to action without delay, and a second cruiser would be despatched from Simonstown as soon as possible to reinforce or relieve her. All ships were warned not to allow the limits of the station to hamper them in carrying out operations against the enemy.

In the event of the German men-of-war on the East Coast being destroyed, the British squadron was then to blockade Dar-es-Salaam and operate against German trade using Zanzibar as a base.

It will be seen from the above that the main idea underlying these War Orders was that one cruiser should protect the focal commerce area off the Cape of Good Hope while the two remaining cruisers operated off the coast of East Africa and endeavoured to bring the enemy forces to action. A variety of circumstances combined to prevent these dispositions ever becoming really effective under the conditions actually prevailing.

## CHAPTER II.

### THE OUTBREAK OF WAR AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE "PEGASUS."

8. *Movements previous to the Outbreak of War.*—In July 1914 the three ships of the Cape Squadron were carrying out a cruise in company, and left Mauritius on July 27th in order to proceed to Zanzibar, 1,382 miles distant. The international situation in Europe was critical, and in view of this fact, Rear-Admiral King-Hall arranged that a French liner lying at Mauritius should pass by wireless any messages arriving by cable after his

departure, and by this means he received the Admiralty telegram, warning all Commanders-in-Chief that there was a possibility of the British Empire being involved in hostilities with the Triple Alliance. Neither Austria nor Italy had any naval force within the limits of the Cape station, and the only German cruiser was the "Königsberg," known to be at Dar-es-Salaam, but there was always a number of German steamships in East African waters, and it was possible that some of these might be converted into merchant cruisers. The gunboat "Eber," after refitting at Cape Town, left on July 30th for an unknown destination.<sup>1</sup>

The squadron, therefore, continued on its course towards Zanzibar, a post favourably situated for watching the German coast line, and when the flagship called at Diego Suarez<sup>2</sup> on July 29th, in order to obtain the latest intelligence, the "Astræa" and "Pegasus" were sent on ahead, the former with orders to watch Dar-es-Salaam, and the latter to complete with coal at Zanzibar. After a stay of two hours at Diego Suarez the Admiral left to follow the other ships, and on the evening of July 31st was approaching the island of Zanzibar from the southward when, at about 7 p.m., the "Pegasus" reported passing the "Königsberg," and two hours later the German cruiser, steaming at high speed to the eastward, was sighted by the "Hyacinth." The latter was unfortunately short of coal, and as the patent fuel, which was all she had, gave a maximum speed of only 16 knots, it was impossible to shadow the "Königsberg," and there was no other alternative than to proceed to Zanzibar and coal there as previously arranged. The whole squadron was concentrated at Zanzibar on August 1st.

Admiral King-Hall here received the official "Warning Telegram" and also information that the Commander-in-Chief East Indies had been ordered to detach the "Dartmouth" to Zanzibar for the purpose of shadowing the "Königsberg."<sup>3</sup> Later information, however, showed that the "Dartmouth" was re-fitting, and would not be ready to leave Bombay (2,517 miles from Zanzibar) before 8th August, and the Rear-Admiral decided to leave the "Astræa" and "Pegasus" on the East Coast to cruise

<sup>1</sup> The "Eber" on August 29th met the liner "Cap Trafalgar" at Trinidad Island (S. Atlantic), and transferred her armament. She was subsequently interned at Bahia, Brazil.

<sup>2</sup> A French naval station near the north point of Madagascar.

<sup>3</sup> A 1, 2, 3, 4.

together in search of the "Königsberg." It was his opinion that the German cruiser would probably remain on the East Coast, but as her position was uncertain, he considered it unwise to leave the important trade routes off the Cape of Good Hope entirely unprotected, and accordingly sailed at daylight on August 2nd for Durban on the way to Simonstown,<sup>1</sup> in accordance with the general idea under-lying the War Orders described above. Before leaving he gave verbal instructions to the Captain of the "Pegasus" to the effect that his ship was no match for the "Königsberg," and that he was not to engage her unless in company with the "Astræa."<sup>2</sup>

9. *Zanzibar as a Base.*—In the telegram to the Admiralty which described his intended dispositions, Admiral King-Hall reported that the ships on the East Coast would be based on Zanzibar if its defence could be arranged for, but otherwise they would have to use Mombasa, 132 miles to the northward.

The defence of Zanzibar, however, was a difficult problem, as the open roadstead is only protected by coral reefs, and any ships lying there are exposed to long-range bombardment from the open sea. The island itself is 47 miles long, with numerous anchorages and landing places on its eastern side, separated from the coast of German East Africa by a channel only 20 miles wide, on the western shores of which lay the important towns of Dar-es-Salaam and Bagamoyo. The only organised force in the island was a company of King's African Rifles, 104 strong, with one white officer, and though two companies had been allowed for in the defence scheme drawn up prior to the war, the authorities in British East Africa decided that the protection of the Uganda Railway was so difficult and important that no troops could be spared to reinforce the Zanzibar garrison. The British Resident at Zanzibar reported this to the Colonial Office on August 1st, and the latter instructed the Governor-General of East Africa to confer with the Naval Commander-in-Chief, but as Admiral King-Hall sailed for the South without visiting Mombasa, no conference could be held.<sup>3</sup> On August 5th, however, the Governor-General of East Africa reported that the S.N.O. at Zanzibar (Captain Sykes, of the "Astræa") had undertaken to co-operate in the defence of the island against attack, which was considered adequate

<sup>1</sup> A 5. 7.

<sup>2</sup> M 26778/15.

<sup>3</sup> A 8, 9.

protection, and no reinforcements would be sent from East Africa.<sup>1</sup>

This understanding was not in accordance with the Admiral's original conception, for whereas the Admiral had intended that Zanzibar should only be used as a base if it could be suitably protected, this protection was now to be provided by the ships which used it as a base.

10. *Operations immediately subsequent to the Declaration of War.*—The "Hyacinth," which had left Zanzibar for Durban on August 2nd, on the way south received by wireless from the "Astræa" the message ordering hostilities to be commenced against Germany, and the Admiral at once sent orders to Captain Sykes to destroy the W/T installation at Dar-es-Salaam.

This operation was carried out without difficulty on August 8th; the German authorities not only offered no resistance to the British ships, but after a few shots had been fired at the wireless station they negotiated a truce and permitted Captain Sykes to impose terms.<sup>2</sup> These terms included the destruction of all wireless apparatus ashore and in the port, an undertaking from the Governor not to take any further part in the war, and an acknowledgment that all vessels in the harbours were lawful prizes of war. The latter included the liner "Tabora" (8,022 tons), which had been reported as fitted for conversion into a merchant cruiser but was now painted as a hospital ship.<sup>3</sup> As the Germans had sunk the floating dock across the entrance to the harbour, these ships could not be removed, but as this obstruction also denied the use of the port to the "Königsberg," the Germans were required to give an undertaking not to attempt to raise it. Captain Sykes, having imposed these terms, proclaimed a blockade of the ports of Dar-es-Salaam, Bagamoyo, and Tanga, and proceeded to enforce it with his two ships.<sup>4</sup>

Meanwhile, on August 7th, the "Dartmouth" left Bombay, and Admiral King-Hall, who had arrived that day

<sup>1</sup> A 10.

<sup>2</sup> The German civil authorities were willing to do anything to avoid bombardment of the coast towns, and seem to have been ready to adopt a passive attitude with regard to the war. Lettow-Vorbeck, p. 20, *et seq.* The surveying ship "Möwe" was sunk by the Germans, and her crew employed on the Great Lakes of the interior.

<sup>3</sup> As her name had not been notified by the German Government, the British authorities did not recognise her as a hospital ship.

<sup>4</sup> A 13, 18.

at Durban, ordered her to proceed first to Aden to make certain that the "Königsberg" was not working on the trade route between the Red Sea and India, and then, if nothing further had been heard, to Zanzibar.<sup>1</sup> These orders were received by the "Dartmouth," and the Admiral's intention was that while she was engaged in examining this northern area, the "Astræa" and "Pegasus" should remain together in the neighbourhood of Zanzibar, while the "Hyacinth" cruised in the south to protect the trade routes off the Cape.

The situation was, however, complicated by the Cape Squadron being required to perform a task in the Atlantic. The Imperial Garrison in South Africa was to be withdrawn and Admiral King-Hall was called on to escort them to St. Helena on their way to the European theatre of war. It was therefore arranged that as soon as the "Dartmouth" arrived at Zanzibar the "Pegasus" would proceed to the Cape, and, with the "Hyacinth," provide a convoy for the troops, but in any case she could hardly arrive before the end of the month.<sup>2</sup>

This plan, which provided forces in the Gulf of Aden, off German East Africa, and near the Cape of Good Hope, each capable of dealing with the "Königsberg," was frustrated by the Admiralty cancelling the despatch of the "Dartmouth" to East Africa. This was due to the impending departure from India of large numbers of troops which had been placed at the disposal of the War Office for service in Europe, and required extensive convoy arrangements. The first revised orders to the "Dartmouth" directed her to cruise for the protection of the trade routes between India and Aden, but on August 9th she was ordered to return to Bombay at once preparatory to convoying troops to Aden.<sup>3</sup> The same day Admiral King-Hall was ordered to keep the "Pegasus" on the East Coast, and escort the troops to St. Helena, with the "Hyacinth" as soon as the local situation permitted.<sup>4</sup>

11. *"Pegasus" left alone on the Coast.*—The retention of the "Dartmouth" on the East Indies Station and the Admiralty orders with regard to the convoy of the

<sup>1</sup> A 12.

<sup>2</sup> Bombay to Aden, 1,657 miles. Aden to Zanzibar, 1,722. Zanzibar to Simonstown, 2,366.

<sup>3</sup> A 11, 15. She did not receive these orders till she reached Aden in accordance with the C.-in-C., Cape's, instructions. She probably passed within a hundred miles of the "Königsberg" on the night of August 10th, but did not obtain any news of her.

<sup>4</sup> A 14.

the Imperial Garrison left the area in the vicinity of the Cape entirely open to enemy, and on August 12th Admiral King-Hall asked the Admiralty whether it was intended to reinforce his squadron by the "Nottingham" or some other light cruiser of similar speed, as there were various indications that the "Königsberg" was still on the Cape Station.<sup>1</sup> One of these indications was a report from Portuguese sources that the German cruiser was in the vicinity of Inhambane (Portuguese East Africa) and this was apparently accepted by the Admiralty as correct and if so, indicated that she was working south; the Admiralty, when informing the C.-in-C. that the "Nottingham" was not available, had ordered the "Astræa" to leave Zanzibar and proceed to the Cape in order to assist the "Hyacinth" in escorting the Cape troops,<sup>2</sup> which left the "Pegasus" alone at Zanzibar. Admiral King-Hall pointed out that he also thought that the enemy might be coming south, but would prefer to exercise his judgment with regard to keeping the "Astræa" and "Pegasus" on the East Coast.<sup>3</sup> The Admiralty, however, definitely ordered the "Pegasus" to remain at Zanzibar, and in view of the report of the "Königsberg" off Inhambane directed the "Hyacinth" to proceed to Durban in order to cover the trade route.

The "Astræa," before leaving Zanzibar for the south also sent an urgent message asking if the "Pegasus" was to be left at Zanzibar and receiving a reply in the affirmative sailed on August 14th. Commander Ingles of the "Pegasus" then took over the duties of Senior Naval Officer, Zanzibar.<sup>4</sup>

12. *Movements of "Hyacinth" and "Astræa."*—*News of "Königsberg."*—The "Hyacinth" left Simons Bay for Durban in accordance with Admiralty orders on August 14th, and on the same day information was received that the report of the "Königsberg's" being near Inhambane could not be considered very reliable and was only founded on vague intelligence received from a Portuguese steamer.<sup>5</sup> No further orders, however, were issued to the ships on the Cape Station until August 15th, when Admiral King-Hall suggested that, as offensive operations were being planned against German South West Africa, it seemed desirable

<sup>1</sup> A 16.

<sup>2</sup> A 17, 19, 20.

<sup>3</sup> A 21.

<sup>4</sup> A 22, 23, 24, 26.

<sup>5</sup> A 27. It is possible that this report was due to the "Hyacinth" being sighted when proceeding south. Both cruisers had three funnels.

that the "Hyacinth" should return to the Cape leaving the "Astræa" to search for the "Königsberg," a proposal which received Admiralty sanction. The "Hyacinth" reached Simons Bay on August 17th and Admiral King-Hall then sent a telegram to the Admiralty representing that the situation of the "Pegasus" unsupported at Zanzibar was very risky owing to the overwhelming superiority of the "Königsberg" in speed, guns and torpedoes.<sup>1</sup>

It was therefore suggested that when the "Astræa" had cleared up the situation off Inhambane, she should, instead of proceeding to the Cape, return to Zanzibar and carry out a close search of the coast in company with the "Pegasus." The Admiralty considered, however, that the risk to the "Pegasus" at Zanzibar was only a slight one and must be accepted, and Admiral King-Hall was directed to use both the "Astræa" and "Hyacinth" for escorting the troop convoys.<sup>2</sup> The Commander-in-Chief while awaiting the arrival of the "Astræa" employed the "Hyacinth" in cruising off the Cape to protect the trade routes.

Information was soon received, however, which made it evident that the "Königsberg" had not come south. On August 19th the German steamer "Zieten" arrived at the Portuguese port of Mozambique, and two days later the Admiralty learnt that she had on board the greater portion of the crew of the British steamer "City of Winchester," which had been captured by the "Königsberg" off the island of Socotra on August 6th. Subsequent information showed that the "Zieten" left the German cruiser at the Kuria Muria Islands (South Coast of Arabia) on August 11th with instructions to proceed to a neutral port.<sup>3</sup> This completely disposed of the Inhambane story and rendered it very improbable that the "Königsberg" would appear on the Cape trade route, but as the hostile cruisers in the Atlantic were unlocated the Admiralty orders to the Cape Station were not modified and the Imperial troops left Table Bay for St. Helena on August 26th, escorted by both the "Hyacinth" and "Astræa."

The C.-in-C. remained at Simonstown while his flagship proceeded to the northward. The actual movements of the "Hyacinth" and "Astræa" need not be described in detail as they did not affect the East Coast of Africa. The convoy of Imperial troops arrived at St. Helena on

<sup>1</sup> A 28, 29, 30.

<sup>2</sup> A 31.

<sup>3</sup> A 42, 43.



September 1st and the "Astræa" returned to Capetown in order to escort the South African troops to Luderitzbucht in German South West Africa where they landed on September 18th.

The "Hyacinth" accompanied by the "Leviathan" went on from St. Helena with the convoy as far as St. Vincent (Cape Verde) and did not return to South African waters until October 1st, when she arrived at Luderitzbucht.

On August 21st Admiral King-Hall had been given authority to communicate with the Government of India directly with regard to the expeditions which were being prepared for service in East Africa. This was the first intimation received by the Commander-in-Chief at the Cape that it was intended to carry out military operations in East Africa, and he asked for information concerning the composition and objectives of the expeditions, which was sent to him on August 27th.<sup>1</sup>

13. *The Military Expeditions from India.*—The military situation in British East Africa at the outbreak of war was in many respects unsatisfactory. A considerable number of the troops was engaged in operations connected with the native unrest in the north western portion of the Protectorate and was therefore not immediately available for defending the vitally important Uganda railway which throughout its whole length was within easy reach of the German frontier. On August 3rd the Governor-General reported that it would be desirable in the event of hostilities to hold troops in readiness in India to reinforce East Africa if necessary.

On the outbreak of war the Over Sea Attack Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence had been formed with Admiral Sir Henry Jackson as chairman, "for the consideration of combined naval and military operations in foreign territory, its object being to decide what objectives could be assigned to joint expeditions with a view to producing a definite effect on the course of the war," all proposals formulated by this committee being subject to the approval of the Cabinet.<sup>2</sup> At the first meeting of the sub-committee on August 5th, it was decided to recommend that an expedition should be sent from India against Dar-es-Salaam with the object of capturing the port and preventing its use by the enemy as a base for naval operations against our commerce, and

<sup>1</sup> A 44, 46.

<sup>2</sup> B 2.

the next day it was considered that a force of four native battalions with artillery would be sufficient for the purpose. It was recognised that a naval force would be necessary to convoy the expedition and support its operations, and a further proposal was made that a separate force of native troops should be sent from India to British East Africa to assist the King's African Rifles in suppressing any native unrest. These proposals were approved, and on August 7th the Government of India was warned that forces would be required for East Africa but for the moment its most important task was to prepare the expeditionary force, which it had been agreed should serve under the control of the War Office in Europe. This latter was described as Expedition A.

It will be seen from the above that the proposals of the sub-committee were at this time limited to the organisation of a direct attack on Dar-es-Salaam, while the position in British East Africa was to be secured by the despatch of reinforcements from India. The former enterprise (Dar-es-Salaam) was known in India as Expedition B and the latter as Expedition C.

14. The preliminary arrangements with regard to these forces underwent many changes which did not affect the naval situation on the East Coast of Africa and need not be described in detail. The decision to attack Dar-es-Salaam was supported by a report from the British Resident at Zanzibar which urged its capture as soon as possible in view of the military and moral effect which would be produced by its occupation. He pointed out that an advance could then be undertaken along the railway into the interior and that forces from British East Africa and the Belgian Congo State could attack German territory simultaneously. The German forces available were reported as:—

Native troops, 186 white officers, 2,500 men (Askaris).<sup>1</sup>

Native constabulary, 42 white officers, 2,000 men. European volunteers.—About 2,000 men.

Artillery.—12 field guns, 42 machine guns.<sup>2</sup>

These, however, would take some time to collect, and therefore the sooner the attack could be delivered the better, an opinion which he reiterated on August 12th.

<sup>1</sup> The term "Askari" is the name given to all black soldiers in East Africa and does not refer to any particular tribe or race. Its literal meaning is "armed man."

<sup>2</sup> Compare para. 3.

There were, however, many difficulties in the way of sending troops from India, and the German forces reported were stronger than had been expected. It was, therefore, decided to expedite the reinforcements for East Africa, but with regard to the attack on Dar-es-Salaam the sub-committee decided on August 15th that no further steps could be taken until the date when the expedition would be ready to sail from Bombay was known.

On August 16th it was hoped that Forces B and C would be ready to sail in six transports on August 26th. It was intended that they should sail in company with the first echelon of Expedition A as far as the Gulf of Aden, being there detached to the southward under escort. This plan, however, was upset by the threatening attitude of Turkey which rendered it desirable to concentrate Indian troops in Egypt as soon as possible and the transports for Forces B and C were allocated for this purpose, the expeditions to East Africa being postponed till September.<sup>1</sup> One battalion, however (the 29th Punjabis) was sent from Karachi on August 19th to reinforce the Zanzibar garrison, as the Resident on August 13th, when the "Astræa" left, had pointed out the disastrous consequences which the capture of Zanzibar by the Germans would entail.<sup>2</sup> The situation, therefore, at this time may be summarised as follows: The attack on Dar-es-Salaam and the despatch of reinforcements to British East Africa were postponed more or less indefinitely, but one battalion of native infantry was on the way to Zanzibar where it might be expected to arrive about September 1st, escorted by the cruiser "Fox" of the East Indies squadron.<sup>3</sup>

15. *Proceedings on East Coast of Africa, August.*—The departure of the "Astræa" for the southward on August 14th left the "Pegasus" alone on the East Coast of Africa, and Commander Ingles, besides being responsible for watching the 600-mile coast line of the German East African Protectorate with its many ports and anchorages, had also to consider the protection of his own base at Zanzibar which was almost entirely dependent on the Navy for its defence (para. 9).

The first operation carried out by the "Pegasus" took the form of a visit to the German port of Tanga. On arrival, the white flag was seen to be flying on shore, and

<sup>1</sup> A 34.

<sup>2</sup> A 25, 32.

<sup>3</sup> A 38. "Fox," sister ship to "Astræa," Captain F. W. Caulfield, R.N.

terms were agreed to by the German Governor generally similar to those imposed at Dar-es-Salaam by the "Astræa" on August 8th (para. 10).<sup>1</sup> After concluding this truce the "Pegasus" returned to Zanzibar, and on August 18th Commander Ingles asked the Commander-in-Chief at the Cape whether he was free to proceed to Mombasa. On the previous day Admiral King-Hall had represented to the Admiralty the dangerous situation of the "Pegasus" at Zanzibar and been informed that the slight risk to her must be accepted and accordingly he replied that the "Pegasus" was only to proceed to Mombasa if absolutely necessary and was otherwise to adhere to the Admiralty instructions which were that she was to remain at Zanzibar.<sup>2</sup> Commander Ingles, however, did not construe these orders as entailing complete immobility, but carried out cruises on the coast of German East Africa, never being absent from Zanzibar for more than 48 hours. On August 23rd the "Pegasus" visited Bagamayo, the only important German port which had not accepted terms of truce, hoping to achieve the same success which had attended similar negotiations at Dar-es-Salaam and Tanga. A different spirit, however, was here manifested by the enemy, due to the influence of Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck, who was in command of the German forces, for, though the civil authorities were willing to comply with the British demands, they were overruled by the military, and as no conclusion could be reached the "Pegasus" bombarded the Custom House.<sup>3</sup>

Meanwhile the destination of the battalion which had left Karachi on August 19th for Zanzibar had been changed, and in view of the fact that the Germans had shown considerable activity in the direction of the Uganda railway, it was decided to land this reinforcement at Mombasa. The "Fox" was convoying the transport containing the troops, and on August 29th the "Pegasus" was ordered to cover the expedition and assist it as necessary.<sup>4</sup>

Commander Ingles proceeded accordingly to Mombasa where the "Fox" arrived on September 1st. Two days previously (August 30th) a report had been received that the "Königsberg" had entered Majunga, a French port on the North-West Coast of Madagascar, at dawn, and finding no ships there, steamed away at high speed to

<sup>1</sup> A 33, 37.

<sup>2</sup> A 35, 36.

<sup>3</sup> A 45. Lettow-Vorbeck, p. 31, says little damage was done.

<sup>4</sup> A 47, 52.

the north-west. This was the first definite intelligence received with regard to her since she had been reported at the Kuria Muria Islands on August 10th (para. 12); it was not credited at the Admiralty however, it being considered most unlikely that the German ship would reveal her position in such a manner.<sup>1</sup> A report had been received on the previous day that the "Königsberg" was off Sabang in the Dutch East Indies,<sup>2</sup> and though this was soon proved to be false it created an impression that the enemy was deliberately circulating rumours in order to distract our efforts.

16. *Arrangement with regard to the Truces.*—The original truce concluded at Dar-es-Salaam on August 8th had been accepted at the Admiralty without comment or notification to other departments, but the report from the "Pegasus" with regard to the terms imposed on Tanga was transmitted to the Colonial and Foreign Offices, who at once asked for information with regard to the earlier truce, and the former pointed out that the situation would require consideration in view of the fact that an expedition was being prepared for offensive operations against the coast of German East Africa.

The Admiralty on August 26th informed the Commander-in-Chief at the Cape that the Government did not ratify the terms as it was desired to retain entire liberty of action and asked for his opinion as to whether any local action should be taken towards denouncing these truces. Admiral King-Hall's opinion was that unless immediate action was to be taken against these ports a disclaimer was undesirable as it would give the enemy time to prepare his defences and the advantage of having imposed terms on the enemy would be lost. Accordingly the truces were allowed to stand, the Admiralty merely directing that before any further operations were undertaken against Dar-es-Salaam and Tanga suitable notice should be given to the Governors thereof.<sup>3</sup> To prevent further incidents of this nature, however, a general order was issued to the fleet forbidding Captains of H.M. ships to conclude terms with the enemy except with the permission of the local Commander-in-Chief and making all such terms subject to the ratification of the Home Government.

<sup>1</sup> A 54, 55.<sup>2</sup> A 51.<sup>3</sup> A 48, 50, 53.

17. *Proceedings on East Coast of Africa September 1st-18th.*—The "Fox" and "Pegasus" met at Mombasa on September 1st and the battalion of Indian troops was promptly disembarked and sent up country to assist in the defence of the Uganda railway which was now being seriously threatened by German forces.

Captain Caulfield of the "Fox" suggested that, on his return journey to Bombay, he should call at Zanzibar and the Seychelles Islands.<sup>1</sup> The latter had been a considerable source of anxiety to the local naval authorities for some time as they were quite undefended and there was a stock of 2,000 tons of coal there.

In August there had been rumours that an expedition was being prepared in German East Africa to occupy the group, and though these were subsequently discounted, it was still possible that the "Königsberg" might use the islands as a base, telegraphic communication being frequently interrupted by breaks in the cable.<sup>2</sup> The Admiralty, however, did not approve of this proposal in view of the "Königsberg's" superior speed and ordered the "Fox" to return to Bombay, the "Pegasus" proceeding to Zanzibar if considered desirable.<sup>3</sup>

On September 15th the Commander-in-Chief proposed to send the armed merchant cruiser "Kinfauns Castle" to the Seychelles with a gun which was to be mounted and manned locally, but in view of the fact that the "Königsberg" was at this time unlocated, and that there were no men-of-war available to support the "Kinfauns Castle," this suggestion was negatived by the Admiralty.<sup>4</sup>

The "Fox" left Mombasa for Bombay on September 2nd and the "Pegasus," again alone, returned to Zanzibar on the 5th. The British Resident at Zanzibar had suggested<sup>5</sup> that a tug, which was at Tanga, should be removed in accordance with the terms of the truce and the "Pegasus" performed this service, returning to Zanzibar when it was completed. On September 9th Commander Ingles reported that from wireless indications, together with the general impression received during the visit to Tanga, he had formed the opinion that the "Königsberg" was in the vicinity of Zanzibar.<sup>6</sup>

The "Pegasus" was employed from September 10th to 13th in protecting a cable ship engaged in repairing the

<sup>1</sup> A 56.<sup>2</sup> A 39, 41.<sup>3</sup> A 57.<sup>4</sup> A 62, 63, 64.<sup>5</sup> A 59.<sup>6</sup> A 60.

cable from Mombasa to Zanzibar, and on the latter date she went into Mombasa where the 12-pdr. field gun was landed and lent to the military authorities for use in the defence of Mombasa. The "Pegasus" then returned to Zanzibar. Commander Ingles ascertained there that persistent rumours were current to the effect that the "Königsberg" was lying in the Delta of the Rufiji River, 100 miles to the southward, and in order to investigate these reports he decided to proceed to the neighbourhood of Mafia Island. The search revealed nothing, but a native agent was landed at Ras Kinjani (south of Dar-es-Salaam) to obtain information and the "Pegasus" returned to Zanzibar anchoring there on September 18th.

18. *The Destruction of the "Pegasus" September 20th.*—On her return from Mafia Island on September 18th, the "Pegasus" anchored off the town of Zanzibar in a position  $2\frac{1}{2}$  cables, N.  $40^\circ$  W. from the Red Light on Ras Shangani Hospital Pier. Steam had been on the engines continuously since the ship left Mauritius on July 26th, and as it was now necessary to carry out minor adjustments and repairs, fires were banked at two hours' notice while at anchor in the roads. During the dark hours the guns were kept manned and ready for action, any vessels approaching the ship being fired on, a not infrequent occurrence for numerous dhows and fishing vessels used the roads at night.<sup>1</sup> The tug ("Helmuth") which had been removed from Tanga was stationed as a look-out ship in the Southern Pass,  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles to the southward, in charge of an R.N.R. officer with orders to fire a rocket if any hostile vessel attempted to enter from that direction. She lay normally at anchor off the Red Light Buoy near Mtwana. In Zanzibar Roads near the "Pegasus" lay the collier "Banffshire" with several thousand tons of coal on board.

At dawn, on September 20th, the weather was calm and clear with heavy clouds to the southward, and a haze limiting visibility to 5 miles; the "Pegasus" was swung to the south-eastward, and at 5.15 a.m. the guns crews were fallen out. Very shortly after this a vessel was sighted to the southward off Chumbe Island.<sup>2</sup> She almost

<sup>1</sup> On the night of the 19th a suspicious boat was fired on, which may possibly have been reconnoitring for the "Königsberg."

<sup>2</sup> Before opening fire on the "Pegasus" the "Königsberg" fired at the look-out tug and disabled it. The crew jumped overboard and no warning was given to the "Pegasus." The tug was salvaged and took part in subsequent operations.

immediately opened a heavy fire on the "Pegasus" and was soon identified as the "Königsberg." The "Pegasus" endeavoured to return the fire from her starboard guns which fired about 50 rounds, all of which fell short of the enemy,<sup>1</sup> but after eight minutes three of them were out of action, many casualties had been inflicted and Commander Ingles ordered the ensign to be struck. The story, which gained currency at the time, that the marines on the quarterdeck had held up the ensign after it had been shot away, was subsequently reported by Commander Ingles to be without foundation. The "Königsberg," after a pause occupied by turning, continued to engage the "Pegasus" until, about 15 minutes after opening fire, she steamed away to the southward and was lost sight of.

The "Pegasus" had been hit four times on the water-line and took a heavy list, but her engines and boilers being undamaged she had steam on the engines by 6.15 a.m. Several attempts were made to beach her in shallow water, but they were unsuccessful, and the ship turned over and sank at 2.30 p.m.<sup>2</sup> Her total casualties were 2 officers and 29 men killed or died of wounds, and 55 wounded out of an authorised complement of 234.

### CHAPTER III.

#### THE SEARCH FOR THE "KÖNIGSBERG" AND THE FIRST OFFENSIVE AGAINST GERMAN EAST AFRICA.

19. *Situation after the Sinking of the "Pegasus."*—The destruction of the "Pegasus" off Zanzibar on September 20th, led to a considerable change in the general situation on the African shores of the Indian Ocean. Since the departure of the "Astræa" for the Atlantic on August 12th, there had been no ships charged with the definite task of locating and destroying the "Königsberg," for the "Pegasus," besides being hampered by the defenceless condition of Zanzibar, could not be considered capable of either observing or engaging the

<sup>1</sup> The range was from 9,000 to 7,500 yards. The guns of the "Pegasus" were old and much worn.

<sup>2</sup> A 65, 69.

German cruiser. Of the remaining British vessels which might have been employed against her, the two ships of the Cape Squadron were absorbed in the Atlantic theatre of war, the "Hyacinth" carrying out escort duty and the "Astræa" supporting the South African troops which had landed in German South West Africa on September 19th. The situation which Rear-Admiral King-Hall had to face was further complicated by the fact that a rebellion had broken out in South Africa on September 15th which entailed the postponement of further offensive measures against German territory. It was therefore impossible for the Commander-in-Chief at the Cape to take any immediate steps towards restoring the situation in the north-eastern portion of his command.

The East Indies Squadron had also been unable to carry out an active search for the "Königsberg." Since the recall of the "Dartmouth" to Bombay on August 9th,<sup>1</sup> all the effective vessels ("Swiftsure," "Dartmouth," "Fox") at the disposal of Admiral Peirse had been occupied in conveying troop transports, and more particularly in escorting the large forces which had been placed at the disposal of the Home Government for service in Europe. The routes from Bombay and Colombo to Aden were very exposed to attack from the "Königsberg," and as she had been reported off the Arabian coast shortly after the outbreak of war,<sup>2</sup> it was apparently considered that her theatre of operations would probably be found in this northern area.

A large convoy had left Bombay on September 18th for Aden, and though the majority of the troops were destined for service in Egypt and Europe, five transports carried the remainder of Expedition C which had been prepared to reinforce the troops in British East Africa<sup>3</sup> (Force C, para. 13).

It had been arranged by the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, that the convoy should be met about 120 miles north-east of Socotra by the "Chatham,"<sup>4</sup> which had been sent in August from the Mediterranean for escort service in the Red Sea, and the transports for East Africa would then be detached to the southward under convoy of the "Dartmouth" and the R.I.M.S. "Harding."

<sup>1</sup> A 15.

<sup>2</sup> A 42.

<sup>3</sup> Two battalions Native infantry, one mountain battery, and various details.

<sup>4</sup> A 61.

20. *Orders issued to meet the Situation.*—When news of the destruction of the "Pegasus" arrived, it became clear that energetic steps must be taken to deal with the "Königsberg" and prevent the enemy from making use of his temporary command of East African waters. The local situation was somewhat critical, for, not only was Zanzibar almost defenceless, but the enemy was showing considerable activity on the frontier and particularly in the coastal region, where an advance of only 50 miles would bring him to Mombasa. This town had only a weak garrison, and it was not impossible, therefore, that the remainder of Force C would arrive to find their port of disembarkation in enemy hands and the forces holding the Uganda railway cut off from the sea.<sup>1</sup>

But though the appearance of the "Königsberg" on September 20th had led to a critical situation in East Africa, it simplified the convoy problem, for the "Königsberg" could not reach the Aden-Bombay route in time to deliver an attack. The "Emden" had also been located in the Bay of Bengal, and these were the only enemy cruisers in question. The Admiralty therefore ordered the "Chatham" to proceed from Aden to Zanzibar direct, while the transports with Force C were to be escorted by the "Dartmouth" and "Fox" to Mombasa—the former being then detailed to hunt the "Königsberg," in concert with the "Chatham," while the "Fox" was to return to Bombay.<sup>2</sup> Next day (September 21st) the Admiralty ordered the "Weymouth," which had just left Alexandria with a convoy for Marseilles, to return to Egypt and join the "Dartmouth" and "Chatham" on the East Coast of Africa in searching for the "Königsberg." The Commander-in-Chief of the East Indies Squadron was ordered to take the three ships which had been specially detailed to search for the "Königsberg" under his orders.<sup>3</sup>

—	Captain.	Completed.	Tonnage.	Seagoing Full Speed.	Armament.
"Chatham" -	S. Drury-Lowe	1912	5,400	23·2	8—6-inch.
"Weymouth" -	W. D. Church	1911	5,250	23·8	
"Dartmouth" -	J. D'Arcy	1911	5,250	23·8	

Admiral King-Hall was still nominally responsible for the East Coast of Africa, and on learning of the loss

<sup>1</sup> A 69.

<sup>2</sup> A 68.

<sup>3</sup> A 71, 73.

of the "Pegasus," he suggested that the "Hyacinth," due to arrive at St. Helena on September 22nd, should proceed to the Cape, where the Commander-in-Chief would embark in her, and then sail for the East Coast of Africa to take charge of the hunt for the "Königsberg."<sup>1</sup> In view of the situation in South Africa, however, this was not approved, and as it was evidently impossible for the C.-in-C. at Simonstown to control affairs on the East Coast, the Admiralty transferred on October 1st that portion of the Cape Station north of Delagoa Bay to the East Indies Station.<sup>2</sup>

21. *Progress of the Concentration on the East Coast.*—The "Chatham" arrived at Aden on September 21st, and, after completing with coal, sailed that night for Mombasa, arriving there on September 27th. A week had thus elapsed without any British ships appearing on the coast, but in spite of this fact the "Königsberg" had undertaken no further operations and there was no definite news as to her movements. The "Chatham" then proceeded on September 28th to Zanzibar, where the ship's company of the "Pegasus" had been organised as a garrison and endeavours were being made to salve guns from the wreck in order to mount them on shore.<sup>3</sup>

Meanwhile the transports with Force C had been detached from the main convoy on September 23rd, and were proceeding towards Mombasa, escorted by the "Fox" and "Dartmouth." Unfortunately, shortly before their arrival the "Chatham," when cruising off Mombasa on the night of October 1st, ran aground on the Leven reef just to the northward of the entrance to the harbour, and, though she was refloated 24 hours later without serious damage, it was necessary to carry out certain repairs and adjustments. On October 3rd she anchored in Mombasa harbour, and was joined there on the same day by the "Dartmouth," "Fox," and the transports.

The "Weymouth" arrived on October 6th, not having received the orders sent by the Admiralty on October 1st, ordering her to cruise in the vicinity of Socotra to protect the trade routes against the "Emden" and "Königsberg." As, however, the "Chatham" was out of action for the time being, and there were various indications that the "Königsberg" was still in East

<sup>1</sup> A 72.<sup>2</sup> A 76.<sup>3</sup> A 66.

African waters and there was no sign of the "Emden's" operating to the westward, the Admiralty decided that the "Weymouth" might work on the East Coast as had been originally intended,<sup>1</sup> and the C.-in-C., East Indies, was permitted to exercise his discretion with regard to her employment.

22. *Control of the Search of the "Königsberg."*—The original intention of the Admiralty was that the "Fox" should return to Bombay after escorting Force C to Mombasa, in order that she might be available for further convoy service in East Indian waters, and on September 29th the three "Town" class cruisers, "Chatham," "Weymouth," and "Dartmouth," were placed under the orders of Captain Drury-Lowe, of the "Chatham," to carry out concerted operations against the "Königsberg."<sup>2</sup> This arrangement, however, had to be slightly modified as it was decided to retain the "Fox" on the East African coast, and Captain Caulfield was senior to Captain Drury-Lowe. The retention of the "Fox" arose from the fact that Expedition B which had been organised in India to carry out offensive operations against German East Africa was almost ready to sail and the "Fox" had orders to be prepared to co-operate with the General Officer Commanding and assist the Force in its disembarkation and subsequent operations.<sup>3</sup> Until its arrival she was to cruise in the neighbourhood of Mombasa and Zanzibar and take general charge of the search for the "Königsberg" so long as it was carried out in East African waters, but as the Captain of the "Chatham" had already drawn up a scheme of search which had been approved by the Commander-in-Chief, the latter directed that this should be adhered to in its general outlines. Though the "Fox" was in general control the letters of proceedings describing this search were compiled by the Captain of the "Chatham," and it appears that the movements of the "Town" class cruisers were largely regulated by him.<sup>4</sup>

23. *The Area to be Searched.*—The location of the "Königsberg" was a difficult problem as there were no reliable indications of her whereabouts or movements since September 20th, though there were vague and unreliable rumours in circulation. The area to be searched was very large and contained numerous harbours

<sup>1</sup> A 75, 77, 79, 81, 82.<sup>3</sup> A 78.<sup>2</sup> A 74.<sup>4</sup> A 80.

and anchorages suitable for use by the "Königsberg," but to simplify description these can be divided into three main groups—those on the German coast, those on the Portuguese coast, and those amongst the islands of the Indian Ocean.

The German East African Protectorate possessed a coast line of about 450 miles in length, including many harbours, some of which not only provided excellent anchorage but were screened from observation by high ground and trees. There were, however, certain limitations on their use. It was improbable that the German cruiser could use the anchorages north of Dar-es-Salaam without being reported and the latter port was supposed to be blocked by the floating dock which had been sunk after the outbreak of war. There was however no certainty that the enemy was complying with the terms of the truce which forbade any attempt to raise the dock, and there were persistent rumours that the "Königsberg" had actually visited Dar-es-Salaam before sinking the "Pegasus."

Sixty miles southward of Dar-es-Salaam lies the large island of Mafia which was a German possession, and between this island and the mainland are a number of anchorages among the reefs and islets obstructing the channel. South-west of this area is the delta of the Rufiji River, an extensive maze of creeks and densely wooded swamps. All this region was unfrequented and only partially surveyed in 1914, but it was known that the entrance to the Rufiji was much obstructed by shoals and bars, a least depth of 8 feet at low water being reported in the principal channel.<sup>1</sup>

Between the Rufiji and the Rovuma River, which lies 150 miles to the southward and formed the boundary of Portuguese East Africa, are the harbours of Kilwa Kisiwani, Sangarungu, Lindi, Mgau Mwanja, Mikindani and Mto Mtwara, all land-locked bays or estuaries with extensive anchorages suitable for large vessels. There were also other roadsteads more open to direct observation from the sea, all or any of which might possibly be mined. The Germans had also organised all along the coast a number of signal stations connected by telegraph or telephone, and so long as the "Königsberg" was in German waters, these could be relied on to keep her fully informed as to the movements of our ships.

<sup>1</sup> Spring tides rise 15 feet.

The coast line of Portuguese East Africa from the German frontier to Delagoa Bay is over 1,000 miles in length, but the Portuguese authorities were friendly, and it was improbable that the Germans could use the regular ports such as Mozambique, Beira or Lorenzo Marques without being promptly reported and subjected to restrictions. Apart from these ports, however, there are numerous unfrequented anchorages on the coast, particularly among the Kerimba, Angoche, and Primera Islands which fringe the coast for a distance of nearly 600 miles south of Cape Delgado. The only persons likely to observe a vessel in these unfrequented waters are natives, and information supplied in this way was generally vague, inaccurate, and belated.

North and west of Madagascar there are several groups of small islands, the most important of which are the Comoro Islands, a French possession. These islands are situated half way between Africa and Madagascar in the northern approach to the Mozambique Channel and there are several anchorages among them, but only that of Mayotta can be described as a harbour. This latter island is the seat of the French administration and has a wireless station which maintains communication with Madagascar. To the northward of Madagascar lies a number of scattered islands which are sparsely inhabited and possess no means of telegraphic communication. Anchorage can be obtained off most of these, and the "Königsberg" had coaled at Aldabra Island on September 1st though this was not known until the end of the year. The guano deposits on St. Pierre Island (9° 19' S., 50° 43' E.) were worked by a German company, and this island was therefore considered a suspicious point and would have been visited had the "Königsberg" not been located at the end of October.

24. *The Search previous to October 14th.*—It will be seen from the above that so long as the "Königsberg" confined her activities to evading pursuit and did not attempt to carry out operations the search for her was likely to be both difficult and prolonged, even if all the three ships detailed for the purpose were available. In point of fact, various causes contributed at first to prevent the search being prosecuted with the vigour intended by the Admiralty. The "Chatham" was not ready for sea till October 15th, and until she was ready the remaining two "Town" class cruisers were employed in investigating certain reports which indicated that the

"Königsberg" might be using an island off the Portuguese coast as a base.

The "Dartmouth" left Mombasa on October 5th with orders to proceed to the southward, searching the German coast and the Comoro Islands. On October 7th she examined the entrance to the Lindi River and Rovuma Bay on the southern portion of the German coast line, but did not carry out the intended search of the Comoro Islands, as on October 8th information was received that the "Königsberg" was believed to be anchored off Caldeira Island, 380 miles south of Cape Delgado. This intelligence was received through the Commander-in-Chief at the Cape, and though the ships on the East Coast were no longer actually under his command, his suggestion that the "Dartmouth" should investigate the report at once was approved.<sup>1</sup>

At dawn on October 9th the "Dartmouth" was off Caldeira Island, a small sandy islet in 16° 38' S., 39° 45' E. with a tolerable anchorage in 8 fathoms, off its north-western shore, but found no signs of the "Königsberg" in the vicinity. The "Dartmouth's" cruise, however, was not destined to be entirely fruitless, for in the afternoon a German tug was captured in Casuarina Roads, 50 miles to the southward of Caldeira Islands. As her officers were naval reservists it seemed probable that she was working in conjunction with the "Königsberg," and as there were no facilities for interning her in the neighbourhood, she was made a prize. The "Dartmouth" took the tug in tow, and as she was short of coal, decided to return to Mombasa without searching the Comoro Islands.<sup>2</sup> The Admiralty on hearing of this incident apparently feared that the hunt for the "Königsberg" might be hampered by the prize, and ordered the most energetic measures to be taken against the German cruiser, the tug being either sunk or detached with a prize crew.<sup>3</sup> The "Dartmouth" received these orders on October 12th and adopting the latter alternative left the tug to make her own way to Mombasa, and proceeded there at 21 knots, arriving the next day (13th).

Meanwhile, it seemed for a time that the activities of the cruisers would be severely restricted by a shortage of coal, for though the Admiralty had taken steps to provide for the increased force on the East Coast, it was

<sup>1</sup> A 83.<sup>2</sup> A 87.<sup>3</sup> A 88, 89, 90.

some days before the colliers arrived. The "Weymouth" had coaled at Zanzibar on October 9th before proceeding to the southward to investigate the Caldeira Island report, and after her departure there was no Welsh coal left at either Mombasa or Zanzibar though the Senior Naval Officer estimated that 2,800 tons were required each week.<sup>1</sup> Colliers, however, gradually arrived and one was stationed in the Comoro Islands in order to avoid the necessity of ships in the Mozambique Channel returning to the northward to coal.

On receiving the report from the "Dartmouth" that no traces of the "Königsberg" had been found at Caldeira Island, the "Weymouth" was ordered to search Mikindani Harbour (south of Lindi) and then proceed to search the Comoro Islands, where she arrived on October 12th. A report was received the same day from Lorenzo Marques that the "Königsberg" was sheltering at Hurd Island, just to the northward of Caldeira Island. The "Weymouth" at once proceeded there, and on the 14th carried out a thorough search of the Angoche and Primeira Islands without result, after which she visited Mozambique on the 15th to obtain information. It was then realised that the second report was probably founded on the visit paid by the "Dartmouth" to Caldeira Island and its vicinity on October 9th.<sup>2</sup>

The operations in the first half of October were limited, therefore, on account of the enforced inactivity of the "Chatham" to the examination of certain harbours in German East Africa, a visit to the Comoro Islands and a thorough search of the Primeira and Angoche Islands.

25. *The "Chatham's" Plan of Search.*<sup>3</sup>—On October 14th, the day before the "Chatham" was ready to sail, Captain Drury-Lowe drew up instructions for the search. Two ships were to be based on the Comoro Islands—where a collier arrived on October 19th—and work in the Mozambique Channel to the southward of Cape Delgado with the remaining vessel cruising off the coast of German East Africa and using Mombasa as a base. The "Fox" was to remain either at Mombasa or Zanzibar in order to pass messages received by cable to the ships at sea.<sup>4</sup>

It was pointed out that, though the Admiralty had directed that the destruction of the "Königsberg" was

<sup>1</sup> A 86.<sup>3</sup> B 4.<sup>2</sup> A 91, 93.<sup>4</sup> A 94.



the primary object and cruisers were not to be diverted in order to capture merchant ships, it was nevertheless desirable to put certain specified ships, believed to be assisting the "Königsberg," out of action. Their capture or destruction would probably hamper the "Königsberg," but no time was to be wasted in sending them into port. The British cruisers were warned that the enemy had organised an excellent intelligence system and were ordered to take steps to ensure that the general appearance of the ships was as similar as possible.

For convenience of reference the coastal waters were divided into four areas:—

- Area W.—From Zanzibar to Cape Delgado.
- „ X.—From Cape Delgado to Mozambique (including Comoro Islands).
- „ Y.—From Mozambique to Kiliman River.
- „ Z.—From Kiliman River to Delagoa Bay.

It was intended that the "Dartmouth" and "Weymouth" should work at first in Areas X and Y, while the "Chatham" searched the coast of German East Africa (Area W).

Ten rendezvous off prominent points were also specified for use in making reports by W/T. Instructions were given for communication by W/T and ships proceeding to the Comoro Islands to coal were warned that should the "Emden" come to the East Coast of Africa she might possibly make the Comoro Islands as her land-fall.

26. *The Search for the "Königsberg" October 15th-23rd.*—The "Chatham" left Mombasa at about 4 p.m. on October 15th and proceeded *viâ* Zanzibar to the southward. The "Weymouth" sailed from Mozambique on the same day, and at 6 p.m. met the "Dartmouth" off Pomba Bay in Portuguese East Africa (120' north of Mozambique). The "Dartmouth" then proceeded south to the Angoche Islands to search the 90 miles of coast-line between Huddart Shoal (60' south of Mozambique) and Macalonga Point while the "Weymouth" worked along the coast to the north towards Cape Delgado near the Portuguese frontier.

On October 17th the "Chatham" arrived south of Mafia Island and proceeded to search along the German coast examining the South Mafia Channel, Kilwa Kivinje, Kilwa Kisiwani, Sangarungu, and Kiswere harbours. On the same day the "Weymouth" sent her boats in to

search Mto Mtwara, a few miles north of the Rovuma River.

At daylight on October 18th the "Chatham" joined the "Weymouth" at Tunghi Bay (south of Cape Delgado), and the "Weymouth" then proceeded to Mayotta, in the Comoro Islands, to coal, while the "Chatham" worked along the coast to the northward, searching all the bays and anchorages as far as Mgau Mwanja for signs of the "Königsberg."

On October 19th the "Chatham" arrived off the Lindi River, the entrance to which had already been examined. It was now decided to send the steamboat to search the inner anchorages, and about 3½ miles up the river the German steamer "Praesident," which had been reported as an auxiliary of the "Königsberg" was discovered. She was flying the Red Cross flag and the German governor stated that she was used as a hospital ship, but there were no signs on board of any equipment for this purpose. As she had not been duly notified, it was decided to disregard this claim, and she was accordingly claimed as a lawful prize, her engines disabled, and her charts and papers, which subsequently proved of considerable value,<sup>1</sup> removed.

Next day (20th) the "Chatham" continued her search to the northward, and on October 21st arrived at Zanzibar, where Captain Drury-Lowe was informed by the British Resident that the "Königsberg" was believed to be in Dar-es-Salaam Harbour. He accordingly proceeded there, but as there were most definite reports that the entrance had been mined, the "Chatham" anchored about 1½ miles off the entrance, from which position no direct view of the inner harbour could be obtained, owing to the high trees, though the mastheads of two vessels were visible. The "Chatham" then hoisted the international signal to send a boat, but as this was not complied with and the German flag was flying ashore, after half an hour fire was opened at the masts of a vessel which was considered to resemble the "Königsberg." After 30 minutes slow and deliberate firing white flags were hoisted on shore, and two German officials came off to the "Chatham," but though they could speak little English, they made it clear that the "Königsberg" was not present. The "Chatham" then proceeded to Zanzibar to obtain an interpreter, and returned to Dar-es-Salaam next day (22nd

<sup>1</sup> A 95.

when the Germans protested against the violation of the truce concluded by the "Astræa" (para. 10). Captain Drury-Lowe replied that as the terms had never been confirmed by the Admiralty, he could not recognise them, apart from the fact that the sinking of the "Pegasus" had completely changed the situation, for it was reported that the "Königsberg" had come from Dar-es-Salaam on September 20th.<sup>1</sup> The Germans, however, pointed out that the dock was still sunk across the entrance, a statement confirmed by an examination carried out under the white flag. The ship which had been fired at proved to be the S.S. "Feld Marschall," and she had been hit once. The "Chatham" then proceeded to Mombasa to coal and refit her condensers, arriving there on October 23rd.

Meanwhile the "Dartmouth," which had been cruising off the Angoche and Primeira Islands, paid a visit to Mozambique on the 19th, and then continued on her former beat until October 22nd, when she sailed for Mayotta to coal.

The "Weymouth" had coaled at Mayotta on October 20th, and then sailed for Cape Delgado. On October 23rd she searched the Kerimba Islands (south of Cape Delgado) with the adjacent mainland, and then proceeded to the southward on the way to Beira.

27. *The Location of the "Königsberg."*—On the "Chatham's" arrival at Mombasa on October 23rd, Captain Drury-Lowe reported that he considered the "Königsberg" was probably south of Mozambique, and that the "Weymouth" was searching for her in that region, but subsequently information led to an important modification of this view. Only one point on the coast of German East Africa had not been searched, and this was the extensive delta of the Rufiji River with its labyrinth of creeks. The "Pegasus," just before her destruction had paid a visit to the vicinity (para. 17), but without obtaining any information and it was generally believed that the entrances were impracticable for such a vessel as the "Königsberg." The papers captured in the "Praesident," however, contained valuable intelligence as they showed that on September 15th coal had been actually sent to Salali six miles up the Rufiji for the use of the "Königsberg" and the captured charts also revealed that the river, though

<sup>1</sup> A 99. It does not appear from the detailed report of the negotiations that Tanga was mentioned.

narrow, was navigable by the "Königsberg." In view of this news, Captain Drury-Lowe decided that as soon as the "Chatham's" defects were completed he would proceed to the Rufiji and search it with his boats while the "Weymouth" continued on her way to Beira, and the "Dartmouth" on completion of her coaling at Mayotta proceeded to Mozambique to gather information.<sup>1</sup>

On October 28th, the "Chatham" left Mombasa and after coaling at Zanzibar proceeded south. She arrived off the Rufiji delta on the 30th and sent her armed boats ashore for information. A landing was effected near a native village without opposition and three of the most intelligent natives were taken off to the ship. They willingly disclosed the fact that the "Königsberg" with auxiliaries was in the Suninga branch of the river, the entrance to which had been protected by trenches, guns, and maxims. The "Chatham" then closed the entrance and was rewarded by sighting the masts of two ships, one of which was undoubtedly the "Königsberg," but owing to navigational difficulties the ship could not approach within range.<sup>2</sup> Captain Drury-Lowe at once recalled the "Weymouth" and "Dartmouth" and the subsequent operations which resulted in the immobilisation of the "Königsberg" will be described in the next chapter.

28. *Indian Expeditionary Force B.*—It will be remembered that at the commencement of the war the Oversea Attack Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence had decided that two forces should be sent from India to East Africa, one (Force C) to reinforce the troops in British East Africa and assist in holding the Uganda railway, and the other (Force B) to operate directly against German East Africa territory. The whole of Force C had arrived in British East Africa by the beginning of October (para. 21), but various causes had combined to delay Force B, and it was not ready to leave Bombay until October 16th.

It had originally been intended that the first offensive operation to be undertaken by Force B should be the occupation of Dar-es-Salaam in view of the fact that this port might be used as a base for hostile cruisers, but subsequent events led to the modification of this intention. The Germans had shown considerable activity along their northern frontier, and both on the coast and in the Kilimanjaro region had occupied posts in British territory

<sup>1</sup> A 98, 100.

<sup>2</sup> A 102, 103.

from which they threatened the railway. Though all attempts to cut the line had been repulsed, the menace was serious, and on September 29th approval was given by the Cabinet to the orders drafted for the guidance of Major General Aitken commanding Force B, which outlined a scheme of operations very different from the original proposal.<sup>1</sup> It was now intended to bring the whole of German East Africa under British authority commencing with the country lying between Tanga and Kilimanjaro. The occupation of this territory would protect British East Africa, and it was suggested that when Force B had secured Tanga and its hinterland, an advance should be made by Force C in the Kilimanjaro region against the German railhead at Moshi. The first task assigned to General Aitken was to establish British authority over the whole of this region, and afterwards to prepare plans for the occupation of Dar-es-Salaam, and a subsequent advance along the central railway to Tabora. It was thought that the occupation of the north-eastern portion of the German Protectorate and the capture of Dar-es-Salaam might induce the Germans to ask for terms, which were to consist of nothing less than unconditional surrender.

The force under the command of Major-General Aitken consisted of two infantry brigades and a mountain battery, with a complete railway staff, stores for an armoured train, a bridging train and departmental troops. One of the infantry battalions was British (2nd Loyal North Lancashire Regiment), the remainder being native troops. In addition to these, there were already in British East Africa the three native battalions of Force C under the command of Brigadier-General Stuart.

Force B sailed for Bombay in 13 transports on October 16th and 17th under escort of the "Goliath"<sup>2</sup> which was ordered to accompany and assist the expedition in its operations.

### 29. *The Expedition arrives in East African Waters.*

—On October 22nd the Governor-General of East Africa was informed that as the first objective of Force B was the occupation of Tanga and the capture of the line to Moshi, presumably the troops would not disembark at Mombasa.<sup>3</sup> Actually the transports did not even visit the port. The "Fox," which had been already ordered to

<sup>1</sup> B 3.

<sup>2</sup> The R.I.M.S. "Hardinge" also escorted the convoy which included one transport with native troops to garrison Mauritius.

<sup>3</sup> A 97.

support the expedition met the "Goliath's" convoy at sea, 30 miles off Mombasa, on October 30th and then escorted the transport with the G.O.C. and his staff into Mombasa Harbour, leaving the convoy in the offing out of sight of land. General Aitken hoped by this means to keep the arrival of the Expeditionary Force secret, but it appears that the fact was already well known in Mombasa where there were many uninterned Germans on parole. On October 31st a conference was held at Mombasa at which Major-General Aitken, his two brigadiers (Tighe and Wapshare), Brigadier-General Stuart (Commanding Force C), and the Senior Naval Officer, were present. At this conference the orders received from home were discussed and it was decided that Force B should land at Tanga and then advance up the Usambara railway while Force C co-operated in the Kilimanjaro region. General Aitken reported subsequently: "All our information from whatever source pointed to the probability that the main strength of the enemy in the Tanga-Moshi area was concentrated at or about the head of the railway and that it was improbable that Tanga would be defended at all."<sup>1</sup>

After combined naval and military orders for the disembarkation had been prepared on the basis of this supposition, the conference broke up and the "Fox" with the General's transport proceeded to join the convoy. The "Goliath," which had accompanied the convoy from India, was, unfortunately, unable to go on as her engines and boilers were in urgent need of repair after several weeks' continuous steaming, and she entered Mombasa to refit, which it was estimated would take at least 10 days.<sup>2</sup> After the "Fox" and the General Commanding had rejoined the convoy, the whole force proceeded in the direction of Tanga, accompanied by six tugs and 18 lighters which had been prepared locally for the disembarkation of the troops. The weather was stormy and the native soldiers, who had already been a fortnight on board ship, appear to have suffered severely from sea-sickness.<sup>3</sup>

30. *The Landing at Tanga, November 2nd.*<sup>4</sup>—At day-break on November 2nd the convoy arrived at a position

<sup>1</sup> Despatch in M. 0884/15.

<sup>2</sup> A 108. "Goliath," Captain Thomas L. Shelford, 1900, 12,953 tons, 4—12 inch, 12—6 inch.

<sup>3</sup> The "Hardinge" and the transport for Mauritius were detached before the expedition proceeded in the direction of Tanga.

<sup>4</sup> See Plan No. 1.

15 miles east of Tanga, and the "Fox" proceeded into the outer harbour to communicate with the German authorities and repudiate the truce. Although the Captain of the "Chatham" had reported on October 23rd that he had denounced the truces at both Dar-es-Salaam and Tanga to the German Acting Governor at Dar-es-Salaam, it was apparently considered that the denunciation only applied to the "Königsberg" operations, and that the Admiralty orders to give suitable warning before commencing hostile operations still held good. In view of the possibility of the Germans having mined the inner harbour, the "Fox" did not go beyond the outer anchorage. The German officials who came on board asked the nature of the terms of possible surrender, and on learning that surrender must be unconditional returned to the shore, having been given one hour to arrive at a decision. At the end of this period, as the German flag was still flying, Captain Caulfield left the harbour and proceeded to join the convoy which had been waiting out of sight in the offing. It was now desirable to effect the disembarkation as soon as possible, for the German forces which were believed to be concentrated in the Kilimanjaro region could easily reach Tanga by rail in from 15 to 18 hours, and the negotiations of the morning did not indicate any considerable local strength on the side of the enemy. It had already been decided that the troops should land on the eastern side of Ras Kasone and the "Fox" had taken advantage of her visit to reconnoitre the only possible landing place—a sandy beach which broke the line of mangrove trees, and was immediately under a building described as the Red House. All the tugs and lighters were sent towards this point at once, but a delay occurred in the case of the sea-going transports, which had a very unfortunate influence on subsequent events, as their masters were unwilling or incompetent to enter even the outer harbour without a pilot. As only three pilots were available—including the navigating officers of the "Fox" and (late) "Fegasus"—only three transports could enter the harbour at a time, and the consequent delay was rendered more serious by the fact that navigational difficulties prevented entry at night.

The first three transports<sup>1</sup> anchored off the Red House. A landing was effected at 5.0 p.m., and the actual disembarkation rendered possible by the full moon commenced after dark. The landing place was by no means

<sup>1</sup> These carried one British and two native battalions.

ideal as the coast was fringed by a reef extending for 500 yards off shore, and, except at low water, the troops had to wade this distance, which made the disembarkation slow. Fortunately the enemy only made a slight attempt to oppose the landing, which proceeded without hindrance after the enemy's fire had been silenced by a few rounds from the "Fox." By dawn on November 3rd, two native battalions were on shore and the patrols thrown out had established contact with a German outpost line supported by machine guns covering the approach to Tanga from the east. As time was of importance, the General did not wait for the British battalion to complete its disembarkation, but gave orders for an immediate advance on Tanga.

31. *The Battle of Tanga, First Day, November 3rd.*—The course of military events on shore need not be described in detail, but a brief account is necessary in order to explain the subsequent re-embarkation.

The two Indian battalions, which had been ordered to advance under General Tighe at dawn on November 3rd, found their advance impeded by the difficult country, but by 7.0 a.m. had reached the line of the railway cutting which was held in force by the enemy. Meanwhile the inner harbour had been swept during the night, and as no mines were found, the "Fox" proceeded at daybreak to the small bay to the westward of Ras Kasone, and anchored there in order to cover the right flank of the advance. Owing to the dense bush and high ground no direct view of Tanga could be obtained from the "Fox," and for the same reasons it was extremely difficult to discover what was happening on shore, although the continuous heavy fire showed that serious resistance was being encountered.

At about 9.0 a.m. the "Fox" observed a party of native troops retiring along the shore, and their officer, with the aid of a megaphone, requested that the jungle near the German hospital should be shelled. This was done, the hostile fire was soon silenced, and our right flank was able to retreat unmolested to a position covering the landing.

The two native battalions had proved unable and unwilling to advance against the German defences. The losses in British officers had been heavy; a counter attack on the left had only been repulsed by the strenuous exertions of a few individuals, and in view of the marked

unsteadiness of the native troops, General Tighe had decided to withdraw them to a position covering the landing for the remainder of the force. This was accomplished successfully by 10 a.m., and the North Lancashire Regiment, which was now ashore, assisted to secure the position.

Every endeavour was now made to accelerate the disembarkation of the remaining five battalions, for which two more landing places were now available, one at the extremity of Ras Kasone, and one on its western side, but considerable delay was entailed by the pilotage difficulties already mentioned. Before dark on November 3rd, only two additional battalions had been actually landed, but all the convoy had been piloted in, including the transport "Bharata" with the mountain battery on board. General Aitken decided that in view of the thick scrub the battery would be of little use on shore and the guns were accordingly prepared for service on board the transport, which proceeded as far as possible up the inner harbour and anchored off the German hospital. Even in this position, however, the high thick trees which covered the shore between the hospital and the pier rendered it extremely difficult to pick out any targets or enfilade the railway cutting. The "Fox" remained in the same position as in the morning. Early on November 4th, the remainder of the troops landed, and by noon General Aitken was ready to resume his advance.<sup>1</sup>

### 32. *The Battle of Tanga, Second Day, November 4th.*

—When the advance of Force B commenced at noon on November 4th, General Aitken intended that the right wing should capture Tanga by direct assault across the railway cutting when the left wing would be swung round in order to cut off the enemy's retreat.

At first all went well though the great heat and the close country rendered the advance extremely trying to the troops. By 2.30 p.m. the railway cutting had been reached, and the native battalions on the right, after carrying the enemy's positions advanced along the sea front into the town which had been thoroughly prepared

<sup>1</sup> On November 3rd, seeing that considerable reinforcements were landing, the Germans had abandoned Tanga in the evening, but this was not detected by us. Von Lettow-Vorbeck arrived from Moshi during the night and after reconnoitring the position ordered the town to be re-occupied. Lettow-Vorbeck, 38.

for defence.<sup>1</sup> The "Fox" co-operated by shelling the houses facing the sea though the observation of fire was difficult. Further to the southward half a battalion of the Loyal North Lancashires had also succeeded in fighting their way into the town and joined hands with the troops on their right. The latter succeeded in advancing along the front for a distance of over a quarter of a mile, storming several fortified houses and capturing machine guns. Had it been possible to support these troops, it appears probable that the whole town might have been occupied. Unfortunately there were no reserves available, for four native battalions had become completely demoralised and retired to the landing places. All endeavours to rally them proved unsuccessful and their defection left the fighting line dangerously weak as the enemy were delivering strong counter attacks on our left flank. Another counter attack drove the Lancashires out of the town, and almost simultaneously the remaining native battalion, which had hitherto fought gallantly on the left, gave way and exposed our flank to the enemy.

The situation at this time—about 5 p.m.—was critical, as it appeared that the enemy might penetrate the centre of our fighting line and divide the force into two. General Aitken accordingly ordered a general withdrawal with a view to taking up a position near the German hospital buildings and to assist the retirement of the troops still in the town he ordered the "Fox" to carry out a general bombardment of Tanga, which was done. The selected position was taken up shortly after dark and the enemy did not harass our withdrawal.<sup>2</sup> The General, who had come to the conclusion that nothing but re-embarkation could save disaster, went to Ras Kasone at about 7 p.m. and held a conference with his brigadiers and Captain Caulfield of the "Fox."

### 33. *The Re-embarkation from Tanga, November 5th.*—

At the conference held on the night of November 4th the question of re-embarkation was discussed in order that the

<sup>1</sup> These native troops which fought well throughout were the 2nd Kashmir Rifles and a half-battalion of the 3rd Kashmir Rifles. The other half of the battalion consisted of Gwalior Infantry and was quite useless.

<sup>2</sup> This was due to a misunderstanding on the part of certain German units who believed that orders had been given to take up a position to the westward of Tanga.


S.N.O. might prepare his orders. The problem was not easy for the greater part of the force was thoroughly demoralised, while those units which were known to be reliable had been heavily engaged all day and had suffered severely. It was therefore evident that should the enemy deliver determined attacks on the troops covering the re-embarkation the situation would be most serious, and it was decided that every precaution must be taken to prevent the Germans realising what was in progress. The only landing place available therefore was the original Red House landing, as B and C beaches were in full view of the Germans, and during the night the troops fell back from the vicinity of the hospital to a position covering the disembarkation point.

During the night, Captain Caulfield, in concert with the Naval Transport Officer (Commander Headlam, R.I.M.), drew up his instructions for re-embarkation, laying stress on the necessity for speed and secrecy.<sup>1</sup> The five transports in the inner harbour which were in view of the enemy, were not to be moved, with the exception of the "Bharata," which was to cover the re-embarkation with her battery—her place at the head of the inner harbour being taken by the "Fox." The six tugs with a lighter each side and one astern were to anchor close to the edge of the coral reef; these lighters were to be filled by the ordinary ship's boats of which there were 30 available, and as it was low tide at noon, it was expected that the troops might have to wade a considerable distance before reaching the boats. The main object was stated to be the removal of the troops out of rifle range from the beach as soon as possible, their distribution among the transports was to be regarded as a secondary consideration. The time fixed for the commencement of the operation was 1 p.m., November 6th.

The night passed uneventfully, and before dawn Captain Caulfield took his orders ashore to the G.O.C., who concurred in them, and at 8 a.m. the "Fox" moved into the "Bharata's" billet off the hospital, and later in the forenoon sent away the beach party consisting of 8 officers and 132 men, who, with 30 or 40 volunteers from the transports, were to take charge of the difficult operation of re-embarkation (Beach-master Lieutenant C. H. Petrie, R.N.).



<sup>1</sup> B 5.

SCALE.  
400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 Yards.



SKETCH MAP  
TO ILLUSTRATE  
**THE OPERATIONS AT TANGA,**  
NOVEMBER, 1914.

Topography reproduced from the map accompanying the report forwarded by H.M.S. Fox, with certain additions inserted from the maps accompanying the despatch of the G.O.C. Anchorage positions of "Fox" and Transports thus: ⊙



During the whole period of her stay in the inner harbour the "Fox" had been sniped at from the shore, though no casualties had been caused. At 11.0 a.m. on November 5th a shell burst in the water near her, but the gun—apparently a 3-pdr.—was soon silenced by a few rounds of lyddite, and the fire of snipers was answered by rifle fire from the "Fox." A transport—the "Laisang"—carrying transport material, and anchored off the pier, came under a very heavy fire and was twice hit by shell. To avoid this fire she went full speed astern and proceeded in this way for nearly a mile down the harbour, dragging her anchor behind her.<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile the enemy had done little to harass our troops, and every endeavour had been made by sending out patrols and making false signals to prevent his appreciating the situation. By noon the demoralised native troops had been got into some sort of order, and the embarkation commenced. It was at first orderly, but a burst of firing, as the result of a patrol encounter on shore, caused a panic to break out and a rush was made for the boats. In spite of this the beach party "sometimes up to their necks in water, threatening, beating, driving, and lifting," succeeded in restoring order, and by about 3.30 p.m. the covering party was embarked and all troops were out of range of the shore. Nearly 7,000 men were embarked in 3½ hours.<sup>2</sup> An armistice was then arranged to permit the wounded to be collected, and the "Fox" and all transports left the inner harbour. Next day (6th) the wounded were embarked and the troops redistributed among the transports. The enemy ordered the force to be clear of the harbour before daybreak on the 7th or they would be shelled by heavy guns which were being mounted. The ships accordingly left on the evening of the 6th, and, after a slow journey, entered Mombasa Harbour on November 8th.

<sup>1</sup> The German artillery—two old guns of 1873 pattern—only arrived on the morning of November 5th and could take no part in the action beyond shelling the ships in the inner harbour. They used black powder and so were difficult to conceal.

<sup>2</sup> Our total losses were about 1,100, together with a quantity of arms, ammunition, and equipment very useful to the Germans. The German force, given as a little over 1,000, suffered a loss of about 70 killed. Lettow-Vorbeck, 45.



## CHAPTER IV.

FROM THE LOCATION OF THE "KÖNIGSBERG"  
TO THE COMPLETION OF THE  
AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE, DECEMBER 1914.

34. *The Rufiji Delta.*—On October 30th the "Chatham" had definitely ascertained that the "Königsberg" was lying off (Salali) Sarari, a small village in the northern portion of the delta of the Rufiji River. As this river approaches the sea in latitude 8° S., it divides into a large number of branches forming a delta 30 miles wide, and connected by a maze of creeks, which meander through a densely-wooded alluvial plain. So far as the "Königsberg" was concerned, however, the only portion of this extensive water system which had to be considered was that comprising the various branches which flow in a north-easterly direction, and debouch into the North Mafia Channel.

Here on a front of 12 miles there are four principal openings in the coast-line named (from the north), the Kikunya, Simba Uranga, Kiomboni, and Msala mouths, but all intelligence available, whether from captured charts or from native reports, showed that the Simba Uranga mouth was the only one which would permit a vessel of the size of the "Königsberg" to get well up the delta. Just inside the entrance is situated Suninga Island, which divides the stream into two branches, one named the Simba Uranga Channel was reported to be much obstructed by sand-banks, the other, known as the Suninga Channel, was the usual ship channel where the "Königsberg" had found anchorage. All the coastal waters fringing this delta were extremely shoal, the three-fathom line being from 5 to 7 miles off shore, and in the absence of navigational marks, access to the river was extremely difficult.<sup>1</sup>

The natural conditions, however, though favouring the "Königsberg" so long as she was content to remain passive, placed serious obstacles in the way of her escape. She could only leave the delta during a comparatively short period each day,<sup>2</sup> and then had many difficulties to surmount. To the southward is the narrow Msala Channel, between Mafia Island and the mainland, much obstructed by reefs and impassable at night. To

<sup>1</sup> Spring tides rise 15 feet, neap tides 10 feet.

<sup>2</sup> Draught of "Königsberg" 15 feet.

the northward also the navigable channel is reduced by dangers, so that a patrol there would probably ensure her being brought to action if she attempted to leave. This greatly simplified the work of the British cruisers, but the task of destroying her, should she choose to remain on the defensive, was not an easy one.

35. *Preliminary Operations against the "Königsberg."*—During the afternoon of October 30th the "Chatham" had actually sighted the "Königsberg's" masts in a position which showed that she was lying some miles within the Simba Uranga Channel, and information supplied by natives indicated that this entrance was defended by trenches, guns, and possibly mines. Captain Drury-Lowe, when informing the Admiralty that he had not been able to approach within 5 miles of the entrance, suggested that small steamers might be armed in order to assist in its seizure by troops. Meanwhile, he proposed to concentrate his cruiser force off Mafia Island, and suggested that as the "Königsberg" was probably short of coal, it might be necessary to block her in,<sup>1</sup> if she could not be induced to come out.

When first proposing to search the Rufiji Delta, Captain Drury-Lowe had suggested, on October 26th, that a seaplane would be invaluable for reconnoitring the difficult country bordering the various river mouths, and the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, supported this proposal, though he had no aircraft at his disposal to send.<sup>2</sup> At the Cape, however, there was a seaplane which had been employed to patrol off the coast. It had proved unsatisfactory for long-distance flights but, on receiving news that the "Königsberg" had been located, Rear-Admiral King-Hall suggested that it might prove a useful auxiliary off the East Coast of Africa, and his proposal to place it on board the A.M.C. "Kinfauns Castle" for transport to the Rufiji received Admiralty approval.<sup>3</sup>

After locating the "Königsberg" the "Chatham" commenced to watch the delta and carry out such preliminary operations as were practicable. At spring tides on November 3rd it was hoped the "Chatham" or one of the other light cruisers would be able to approach within range of the enemy, and it was therefore desirable to sound and buoy a channel towards the Simba Uranga entrance since, in view of the constantly shifting mud banks, even the

<sup>1</sup> A 104.

<sup>2</sup> A 101.

<sup>3</sup> A 106. "Kinfauns Castle," Captain D. B. Crampton.

German charts were not considered reliable. Accordingly the boats were employed in surveying and marking the channel while the "Chatham" cruised in the vicinity, bombarding the German signal stations round Mafia Island and at high water proceeding as close as possible to the entrance in order to shell the enemy entrenchments. On November 2nd when the "Chatham" was endeavouring to bombard the auxiliary "Somali," whose masts were visible, the "Königsberg" was seen to move further up the river. By this time the sounding of a channel had been completed and the "Dartmouth" and "Weymouth" arrived from the southward the same day (2nd). The former had only 200 tons of coal on board,<sup>1</sup> and in the afternoon succeeded in getting within two miles of the entrance and bombarding the "Somali" at a range of 8,900 yards. She then left for Mombasa to coal.

Next day at the top of spring tides the "Chatham" closed to within a mile and a half of the entrance and shelled the "Königsberg" at extreme range while the "Weymouth" bombarded the enemy's positions. The control of fire was extremely difficult as the "Königsberg" had now struck her top-masts and disguised her mast-heads with foliage so that she was only visible from aloft and the guns had to be laid indirectly. On the failure of this attempt Captain Drury-Lowe reported that he did not intend to close the entrance again owing to the grave risk of grounding. He proposed to obtain steamers to sink in the narrow part of the channel and, when troops were available, to occupy the delta in order to cut off the "Königsberg" from communication with the shore.<sup>2</sup> On November 4th the Admiralty approved of the old and empty collier "Newbridge," then at Zanzibar, being used as a blockship, but before this operation was commenced, it was decided to make a reconnaissance of the river and endeavour to sink the "Somali" by a steamboat torpedo attack. By November 6th the "Goliath's" picket boat fitted with dropping gear and 14-inch torpedoes had arrived in tow of the "Duplex," a light draught steamer, armed with two 3-pdrs., and it was arranged that the picket boat with the steam cutters of the three light cruisers—the "Dartmouth" arrived on November 6th—should close the entrance before dawn on November 7th and enter the river as soon as it was light, the cruisers covering them by a heavy bombardment of the German

<sup>1</sup> Draught 13 ft. 6 ins. forward, 17 ft. 6 ins. aft.

<sup>2</sup> A 110, 111.

positions. Instructions were given, however, not to force the attack home if the hostile opposition from the river-banks was found to be serious, which, in fact, proved to be the case.

On rounding the entrance point at sunrise the boats came under a heavy fire from invisible machine guns, one of the torpedoes was accidentally released and the boats thereupon put back, returning without casualties. A bombardment of the "Somali" by the "Chatham" was more successful as she was set on fire and completely burnt out, a quantity of stores and provisions for the "Königsberg" being destroyed. The "Chatham" then sailed for Zanzibar to complete the arrangements for the blockship and left the "Weymouth" and "Dartmouth" to keep watch.

36. *The Admiralty Orders, October 30th–November 4th.*—News of the location of the "Königsberg" in the Rufiji River reached the Admiralty at 10.18 p.m. on October 30th, and the first instructions sent to the "Chatham" were simply to the effect that she was to be held and "fought without fail."<sup>1</sup> On October 31st, however, the Admiralty, to meet the altered situation, issued orders which, if carried out, would have effected a new distribution of the forces on the East Coast of Africa.

The "Fox" which had previously been intended to cover and assist Force B during its operations against German territory was now ordered to join the "Chatham" off the Rufiji and act against the "Königsberg," leaving the R.I.M.S. "Hardinge" to work with the troops. The "Goliath" was to be held in readiness to proceed to the Cape when ordered, and the "Dartmouth" and "Weymouth" were to proceed to Bombay carrying out a search for the "Emden" en route.<sup>2</sup>

For various reasons these orders, which would have left the "Chatham" and "Fox" alone to operate against the "Königsberg," were never carried out. Before they reached Mombasa the "Fox" had already left to assist the expedition against Tanga, the "Hardinge" had sailed with the transport for Mauritius, and neither of these ships was able to comply with the Admiralty orders.<sup>3</sup>

The "Weymouth" and "Dartmouth" as already described were to the southward and did not join the

<sup>1</sup> A 103.

<sup>2</sup> A 105.

<sup>3</sup> The "Fox" did not receive the orders till the operations at Tanga were actually in progress.

"Chatham" till November 2nd, by which time Captain Drury-Lowe had received a further Admiralty message designating the destruction of the "Königsberg" as a matter of the highest importance and urging him to employ every means available without delay.<sup>1</sup>

Under these circumstances, as it was evident that the "Fox" might be detained for some time in connection with the military operations at Tanga, Captain Drury-Lowe, in order to ensure two cruisers being always off the Rufiji, retained the "Weymouth" and "Dartmouth" in accordance with his original intention. The Admiralty issued no further orders with regard to the ships on the East Coast until on November 4th the news of Coronel was received and rendered a world-wide redistribution of our cruiser forces necessary (para. 38).

37. *The Blocking of the Suninga Channel.*—In his first detailed report with regard to the "Königsberg," Captain Drury-Lowe had suggested that if the German cruiser was short of coal, and would not or could not come out, she would have to be immobilised by sinking blockships in the navigable channel.

The Admiralty had already approved of the old collier "Newbridge" (3,800 tons) being used for this purpose, and on November 6th, Captain Drury-Lowe reported that not more than one such vessel would be required since the Suninga branch only was believed to be navigable by the "Königsberg."<sup>2</sup>

"The Chatham" arrived at Zanzibar during the afternoon of November 7th, and next day commenced to prepare the "Newbridge" for this service. The steering position was protected by steel-plates and sand-bags with similar shelter fore and aft for the parties detailed to work the anchors which were to hold her across the channel while sinking. Gun-cotton charges were placed in her bilges and under her bottom and fitted for firing from outside the ship. The main inlets were also prepared for removal. This work was finished by the evening of November 8th, and the "Chatham" and "Newbridge" then sailed for the North Mafia Channel arriving off the Rufiji on the afternoon of November 9th, when orders were issued for the operation.

It had already been decided that the most suitable place for sinking the "Newbridge" would be at the first bend of the Suninga Channel, where the river was

<sup>1</sup> A 107.

<sup>2</sup> A 117.

reported to be narrowed by sand-banks which would involve the blockship passing for a distance of 2,000 yards along a narrow channel, of which both banks were held by the enemy and where little support could be afforded by the fire of the light cruisers. A flotilla was organised to cover her approach, and it was arranged that she should reach the entrance at sun-rise—which occurred simultaneously with high water on November 10th.<sup>1</sup> The "Dartmouth" was anchored on the previous evening 8½ miles from the entrance in order to act as a point of departure and stern-mark for the attacking flotilla, consisting of the "Newbridge," armed steamer "Duplex," "Goliath's" picket boat and the steam-cutters of the three light cruisers, under the command of Commander FitzMaurice of the "Chatham" in the "Newbridge." The function of the "Duplex" and boats was to engage the enemy's shore defences while the "Newbridge" proceeded up the river to remove the blockship's crew when she was in position.

The operation was carried out successfully at dawn on November 10th. The "Newbridge" got under weigh at 4 a.m. and reached the entrance at about 5.20 a.m. shortly after the "Chatham" and "Weymouth" had opened fire on the right and left bank of the entrance.

By 5.25 a.m. the "Newbridge" was through the entrance and had turned up the Suninga Channel where she and the boats accompanying her came under a heavy fire from light guns, pom-poms, machine guns and rifles situated on both banks of the river. The boats replied vigorously and the "Newbridge" though repeatedly hit reached the pre-arranged position by 5.30 a.m., the improvised protection proving very valuable. The collier was swung across the stream, the main inlet valves were removed and at 6.15 a.m. the crew having abandoned ship in the "Chatham's" steam-cutter, the explosive charges were fired and the boats withdrew down the river.<sup>2</sup> The last view obtained of the "Newbridge" at 6.35 a.m. showed that she was sinking rapidly and apparently turning over; the boats then passed the entrance and by 6.45 a.m. were out of range of the enemy's fire. The casualties in this gallant and successful exploit amounted to two men killed and nine wounded,

<sup>1</sup> Both occurred at 5.35 a.m. Twilight in the tropics is very short.

<sup>2</sup> The picket-boat fired a torpedo at the "Newbridge," but it dived into the mud and did not run.

occurring chiefly in the "Duplex" and the "Weymouth's" steam-cutter.

The Suninga Channel might now be regarded as blocked, which, if this was the only navigable channel, meant that the "Königsberg" was finally immobilised. In view, however, of the inaccuracies discovered in the existing charts, the situation remained uncertain, and little more could be done until the seaplane was available to investigate the position.

38. *The Admiralty Orders after Coronel.*—The Admiralty orders issued on October 31st allotted the "Fox" and "Chatham" to deal with the "Königsberg," the "Hardinge" to co-operate with Force B and the "Dartmouth" and "Weymouth" to assist in the search for the "Emden" in the Indian Ocean, but various causes had combined to delay these dispositions when the news of Coronel reached the Admiralty on November 4th and completely changed the whole cruiser situation. The "Dartmouth," then coaling at Mombasa, was at once ordered to proceed to Simonstown and reinforce the Cape Station; the "Goliath" was to proceed there too in order to carry out a refit and then work with the "Albion" already in those waters. The "Dartmouth" was slightly delayed by taking part in the Rufiji blocking operations on November 10th, but on the afternoon of that day she left for the south and did not return to the East Coast of Africa. The "Goliath's" defects prevented her from steaming, and before she was ready for sea on November 7th her orders were cancelled in consequence of the reverse at Tanga, and she was retained on the East Coast.<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile the Admiralty had not realised how deeply the "Fox" was involved in the Tanga operations—indeed there seems to have been a belief that she was still at Mombasa—for on November 5th, the day of the evacuation, a telegram was sent to Captain Caulfield, ordering him to join the "Chatham" forthwith.<sup>3</sup> In view, however, of the situation arising from the re-embarkation of the troops at Tanga Captain Caulfield could not for the moment comply with these orders and returned to Mombasa with the convoy (para. 33). Captain Drury-Lowe in reporting the withdrawal from Tanga had hinted at the possibility of the "Chatham" and "Dartmouth"

<sup>1</sup> See para. 36.

<sup>2</sup> A 120, 122.

<sup>3</sup> A 113.

assisting the "Fox" but was informed that no military considerations were to divert him from the vital duty of blocking the "Königsberg."<sup>1</sup>

From the first Captain Drury-Lowe had maintained that if the "Königsberg" were to be destroyed a military force would be required to seize and hold the enemy positions at the entrance, and on November 7th he reported that though he estimated that half a battalion would be sufficient for the purpose he would ask one of the Generals to come down in the "Fox" to examine the situation. The India Office then directed the G.O.C. to send General Tighe to the Rufiji River should the S.N.O. apply for his services, and he left in the "Fox" on November 9th.<sup>2</sup>

The next orders of importance were issued from the Admiralty on November 12th. The "Emden" had been destroyed on November 9th and the most important theatre of war was now the Atlantic where von Spee's squadron might be expected to appear. Accordingly Captain Drury-Lowe was ordered to exchange commands with Captain Caulfield and take under his orders the "Fox," "Goliath" and "Kinfauns Castle" (when the latter arrived from the Cape). The "Chatham" and "Weymouth" were then to proceed with all despatch to Gibraltar leaving the ships under Captain Drury-Lowe to prevent the escape of the "Königsberg" and effect her speedy destruction or capture. To this end he was to prepare a plan with General Tighe which was to be forwarded to the Admiralty for approval, and in the meantime at least one ship was to keep watch on the Rufiji.<sup>3</sup>

In reply to this Captain Drury-Lowe, who had arrived in the "Chatham" at Mombasa to coal, pointed out that he had already prepared a plan with the Generals (para. 39), but the co-operation of two light cruisers was essential to its success. It was a serious objection to the Admiralty scheme that the "Fox" drew five feet more water than the "Chatham," but the handicap would be far greater in the case of the "Goliath," which could not approach within 10 miles of the entrance. The retention of one Town-class light cruiser was urged as essential and the

<sup>1</sup> A 114, 115.

<sup>2</sup> A 118, 119.

<sup>3</sup> A 125.

Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, strongly supported this contention.<sup>1</sup>

In reply the Admiralty informed Captain Drury-Lowe that the objects to be attained ranked in the following order:—

First.—The “Königsberg” must be prevented from escaping.

Second.—The “Chatham” must be released for service elsewhere as soon as possible.

Third.—The “Königsberg” must be destroyed or captured.

If the first object could only be attained by the presence of the “Chatham,” then she was to remain on the coast, military operations being pushed on so as to insure her early release, but if the “Fox” alone or with the “Goliath” or “Kinfauns Castle” could keep an effective watch on the German cruiser then the “Chatham” was more urgently needed elsewhere.<sup>2</sup>

Captain Drury-Lowe could only reply on November 14th that until it had been definitely ascertained that the “Königsberg” was not able to escape they were acting in the dark and the “Chatham” would have to remain, as the other ships could not deal with her.<sup>3</sup> The “Chatham” accordingly remained on the coast while the “Weymouth,” whose destination had been changed to Simonstown, sailed for that port on November 14th.

39. *The Proposed Military Operations.*—It has been mentioned in the previous paragraph that military operations were contemplated in order to ascertain the precise situation in the Rufiji Delta, and it is now necessary to consider these proposals in greater detail.

The Admiralty on November 1st had authorised the Captain of the “Chatham” to ask for troops, but in view of the operations proceeding against Tanga it was evident that some time must elapse before any force would be available. The unfortunate reverse at Tanga led to a complete change in the situation, and on November 6th the Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence decided that in view of the serious military situation on the frontiers of British East Africa they were unwilling to recommend the despatch of troops

<sup>1</sup> A 129.

<sup>2</sup> A 131.

<sup>3</sup> A 124, 126, 128.

to the Rufiji Delta. Two days later (8th) approval was given for some of the reliable troops of force B to be sent up the Uganda Railway into the interior; on November 9th the North Lancashire Regiment was at Nairobi with other reliable troops at Gazi (south of Mombasa) and an offensive movement by the enemy was expected.

On November 7th Captain Drury-Lowe had reported that a half battalion would be sufficient to seize the Rufiji positions on shore and authority had been given subsequently to the G.O.C. to send Brigadier General Tighe to reconnoitre the scene of the proposed operations. This was done on November 11th and the next day the “Chatham” returned to Mombasa where a conference was held with the G.O.C. (General Aitken) at which a plan of operations was decided on. The force to be employed was one battalion of reliable troops (European) who were to seize and hold Kiomboni Point, Suninga Island and Simba Uranga Island—that is to say, the land commanding the entrance. They would be assisted in this operation by the fire of two armed tugs and two light cruisers, and when the enemy's positions had been seized, one of the latter drawing less than 18 feet, was to enter the river and remain there protected by the military from close range fire. From the anchorage inside the entrance it was hoped that it might be possible to bring the “Königsberg” under an effective fire.

It was not possible, however, to decide when the troops would be available, and next day (13th) General Aitken reported that as the German forces were estimated at 5,000 Europeans and 9,000 natives he had decided on a strictly defensive policy until reinforcements arrived.<sup>1</sup> On November 14th he added that as he had only 4,000 reliable rifles in British East Africa he could not possibly spare troops for operations against the “Königsberg.” He returned the same answer to Captain Drury-Lowe, and even when the latter's demand was reduced to 400 men he could only reply on November 17th, that as matters stood he could not spare a man for the Rufiji.<sup>2</sup>

The Captain of the “Chatham” in reporting this to the Admiralty pointed out that though the lack of

<sup>1</sup> A 130. This estimate of the German forces was certainly too high. Von Lettow-Vorbeck gives his maximum strength at the end of 1915 as 3,000 Europeans and 11,000 natives. In 1914 his forces were considerably smaller.

<sup>2</sup> A 132, 134, 135, 136.

military assistance was regrettable, he hoped that the seaplane would enable him to ascertain definitely whether the "Königsberg" could escape and that, when definitely located, he would be able to approach close enough to bombard her.

40. *The First Seaplane Reconnaissance.*—After the blocking operation carried out on November 10th, no important events occurred off the Rufiji Delta until the arrival of the "Kinfauns Castle" carrying a seaplane on November 15th. This ship was met by the "Chatham" off Mafia Island, and the "Fox" which had been keeping watch off the Delta during the absence of the "Chatham" at Mombasa. It was some time, however, before an air-reconnaissance could be carried out as the engine of the seaplane gave considerable trouble. On November 19th the seaplane was ready and flew for two hours, but owing to low clouds could not make any useful observations, and the pilot finally lost his way and came down near a small island 18 miles south of Mafia Island. On the same day the "Chatham's" evaporators broke down owing to the distillers being choked with mud—a direct result of her being employed in such shallow water, and when the "Fox" arrived next day the "Chatham" sailed for Mombasa to remedy her defects. Two armed tugs arrived the same day and were employed sweeping the approaches to the entrance in case the enemy had laid mines.

It was not till November 22nd that the seaplane was able to fly again, and on this occasion she succeeded in locating the "Königsberg" seven or eight miles from the entrance—that is to say, definitely out of range of any ships not actually inside the delta. Unfortunately an observer could not be carried so that really accurate information was not obtained, but the pilot reported that the "Newbridge" appeared to block the Suminga Channel.

On her return the seaplane damaged her hull beyond repair, and it was decided to send the "Kinfauns Castle" to Durban to obtain another hull which had been sent there.

The Admiralty inquired on November 23rd whether the "Newbridge" blocked the channel so effectively as to prevent a light draught gunboat such as the French "Styx" approaching within range of the "Königsberg." If so, the Captain of the "Chatham" was directed to

prepare to sink other blockships in order to ensure that no egress was possible, which would enable the "Chatham" to leave.<sup>1</sup>

Captain Drury-Lowe reported that it was improbable that a gunboat could approach the "Königsberg," but before deciding to sink another blockship he considered an air reconnaissance at low water desirable. This would indicate the channels available for the "Königsberg" and enable a position to be selected for the second blockship. In another telegram of the same date, he reported that the present position of the "Königsberg" showed that the plan for employing troops to seize the entrance and permit of long-range bombardment was no longer practicable, but that all the indications went to prove that the "Königsberg" was short of fuel and must have deteriorated in seagoing qualities after two months' stay up a tropical river.<sup>2</sup>

From this date onwards until the arrival of the seaplane at the beginning of December only minor operations, such as surveying the entrances, stopping the coastal traffic and destroying German signal stations, were carried out in the vicinity of the Rufiji.

41.—*The operations at Dar-es-Salaam, November 1914.*—The reverse at Tanga on November 4th and 5th, 1914, led to the temporary cessation of operations directed against German East Africa, and as already described (para. 39) a defensive attitude was adopted by the military forces. This gave little opportunity to such ships as were available at Mombasa to carry out active operations against German territory, for though the Admiralty had directed that Tanga and Dar-es-Salaam should be bombarded at the first convenient opportunity, the local authorities were strongly of opinion that bombardment without immediate occupation would have a bad moral effect, especially on the native mind.<sup>3</sup> No bombardment was therefore carried out, but on November 26th Captain Caulfield reported that, as information received from Dar-es-Salaam tended to show that the sunken dock did not block the entrance, the merchant vessels there might escape and possibly sink themselves in the entrances to Mombasa Harbour. He therefore proposed to employ the two armed vessels "Duplex" and "Helmuth" covered by

<sup>1</sup> A 137. The "Styx" carried one 10-inch gun and was stationed in Indo-China.

<sup>2</sup> A 138, 139.

<sup>3</sup> A 121, 122, 123.

the "Fox" and "Goliath"<sup>1</sup> to capture or disable the merchant ships.

The ships lying in Dar-es-Salaam were three in number, the "Tabora," "König" and "Feld Marschall." These had been claimed and admitted as prizes of war under the truce concluded by the "Astraea" in August (para. 10), but this truce had been denounced by the "Chatham" when she bombarded the ships on October 21st (para 26). Two of these vessels were known to be lying nearly three miles up the harbour and completely concealed from observation by high land and trees, but the "Tabora" was off the town and was reported to be used as a hospital ship.

At dawn on November 28th, the "Fox," "Goliath," "Duplex" and "Helmuth" arrived off Dar-es-Salaam and anchored. The shore signal station promptly hoisted the white flag and after some delay the Acting Governor came on board the "Fox" when Captain Caulfield informed him of his intentions and that if any opposition was offered from the shore the town would be bombarded. The Acting Governor "who was very nervous" said he could give no guarantee and asked for time to consult the military authorities. This was refused and the German representatives then returned to the shore.

The original intention of Captain Caulfield had been that the "Duplex," "Helmuth" and "Goliath's" picket boat should carry demolition parties which would "act as nearly as possibly simultaneously" against the engines of the German ships and then capture all tugs, lighters, &c. Unfortunately the picket boat, when proceeding in with a flag of truce, ran aground and sustained damage which put her out of action. The engines of the "Duplex" broke down and the only vessels available to perform the work were the armed tug "Helmuth" (one 3-pdr) and the "Goliath's" steam pinnace.

These entered the harbour about 10.30 a.m. and were lost to sight.

Three white flags were still flying ashore and as there was no sign of any hostile activity Captain Caulfield proceeded in the "Fox's" steam cutter to carry out an examination of the sunken dock in the entrance to the harbour. This was located and the steam-cutter was just leaving when, at about 1 p.m. a heavy fire was opened from both sides of the entrance at her and she only

reached the "Fox" with difficulty, one man being killed and two wounded. About 1.30 p.m. the "Helmuth" (Lieutenant H. J. Orde) was observed coming out of harbour towing two lifeboats with the crews of the "Feld Marschall" and "König" (including one woman). She had to pass through a heavy fire, her Captain and four men being wounded besides one of the German prisoners. To cover the "Helmuth's" withdrawal the "Fox" and "Goliath" opened fire on the town and the Governor's palace was demolished by three 12-inch projectiles.

The "Goliath's" steam pinnace (Commander Ritchie)<sup>1</sup> was not sighted till 4.30 p.m. when she was seen leaving harbour towing five large lighters which she had captured. Being covered by the fire of the ships she succeeded in getting out, with two officers and five men wounded, but had to slip the lighters.

The casualties in this affair were one man killed and three officers and 11 men wounded, in addition to four officers and eight men who were, through some misunderstanding, left behind and made prisoners. The results achieved were three steamers placed out of action, one floating crane, one pumping lighter, two large water tanks and several small lighters sunk, and in addition it had been ascertained that the dock definitely barred the entrance to vessels of any size.

Throughout the day three white flags had been flying ashore and this was naturally interpreted as deliberate treachery on the part of the enemy, but it seems to have been due to a conflict of opinion between the German civil and military authorities, the former being willing to do anything to avoid bombardment of the town while the latter were in favour of resistance. On hearing of our proposed operations von Lettow-Vorbeck at once wired from Moshi that the entrance of the British vessels was to be resisted by force of arms, but these orders were only received in time for the Germans to hamper the retreat of our boats.<sup>2</sup>

On November 30th the "Goliath" and "Fox" carried out a punitive bombardment of Dar-es-Salaam, but though a few small fires were caused it was difficult to spot the

<sup>1</sup> Awarded V.C. for conduct on this occasion.

<sup>2</sup> Lettow-Vorbeck, p. 52. The Germans stated that it had been agreed on the morning of 28th that only one boat with a few men should enter harbour and that they should only visit and inspect the ships. This does not agree with the British version.

shots and it does not appear that any serious damage was inflicted.

42. *The second Seaplane Reconnaissance.*—The "Kinfauns Castle" arrived off the Rufiji River on December 3rd, having brought a new hull for the seaplane which it was hoped would be strong enough to carry either an observer or bombs. She joined the "Chatham" in the North Mafia Channel and the seaplane was at once prepared for service, a base being established on Niororo Island about 20 miles from the river entrance. On December 4th, a successful reconnaissance was carried out at low water, Commander FitzMaurice of the "Chatham" acting as observer.

The "Königsberg" was located in one of the creeks which connect the Simba Uranga and Kikunya Channels about eight miles from the entrance, but owing to the labyrinth of small channels in this vicinity it was difficult to fix her position exactly. From this position there was water communication with the Kikunya, Simba Uranga, Kiomboni and Msala mouths and one of the principal objects of this reconnaissance was to ascertain whether the sand-banks visible at low-water in these channels would prohibit navigation by the "Königsberg" even at high water.

All our information hitherto had indicated that only the Suninga Channel, which had been blocked by the "Newbridge" on November 10th, could be used by the German cruiser, but observation from the air unfortunately showed that there was apparently a possibility of her using either the Kikunya or the Simba Uranga Channel if great care were exercised.

On December 6th, the "Chatham" was forced to leave the "Kinfauns Castle" alone off the Rufiji as her engines were giving considerable trouble and she required a short refit at Mombasa. During the "Chatham's" absence no further flights were carried out till December 10th owing to defects in the seaplane and, on the latter day, the pilot was compelled to make a forced landing off the Kikunya entrance. He was taken prisoner and though the machine was subsequently salvaged by our armed auxiliaries it proved to be damaged beyond repair, and any further air reconnaissance was indefinitely postponed.

43.—*Survey of Situation on East Coast of Africa, December 1914.*—The successful air reconnaissance carried out on December 4th established the opinion that though

the "Königsberg" might be able to escape by the Kikunya and Simba Uranga Channels at high water spring tides, lack of coal would probably prevent her making the attempt.

The possibility however could not be neglected, and this involved keeping a cruiser in the vicinity of the Rufiji Delta. Little more could be done, for to block all the channels was impracticable owing to the large number of blockships required and Captain Drury-Lowe had come to the conclusion that long-range bombardment by improvised light-draught vessels was impracticable. He suggested, however, that armoured, light-draught vessels carrying 6-inch guns might be able to get within effective range of the "Königsberg" and mentioned the new monitors (*i.e.*, "Severn," "Humber" and "Mersey") as suitable craft for the purpose.<sup>1</sup> The Admiralty asked the French for the "Styx" (para. 40), but she had been paid off and was not available.

The ships on the East African coast at this time were the battleship "Goliath," light cruisers "Chatham" and "Fox" with the armed vessels "Duplex," "Helmuth" and "Adjutant." Of these the "Goliath" required an extensive refit, and on December 5th it was reported that if she did not at once proceed to Simonstown where repairs could be effected she would soon be unserviceable. The "Chatham" also was suffering severely from leaky feed-tanks and condenser troubles and required five days at Mombasa to render her efficient. The naval force on the East Coast of Africa was therefore considerably below its nominal strength, but fortunately this did not lead to any serious consequences.

On November 21st, the War Office had taken over from the Indian authorities the control of operations in East Africa, and on December 4th they informed Brigadier-General Wapshare who had relieved General Aitken as G.-O.-C. that, as there was no immediate prospect of reinforcements being sent him, he was to adopt a defensive attitude coupled with such minor offensive measures as might seem desirable,<sup>2</sup> and on December 8th the War Office informed the Admiralty that so far as they were concerned it would be a convenient moment for the ships on the East Coast to refit.

<sup>1</sup> A 141.

<sup>2</sup> A 142.



Naval activities were therefore confined to minor operations in the vicinity of the Rufiji such as the occupation of some of the small islands in the Mafia Channel, and the capture of local dhows, combined with an occasional bombardment of the enemy's positions on shore carried out by the light craft. Then came the Falkland Islands action on December 8th which eased the situation in all waters and rendered a more favourable distribution of the cruiser forces possible in the immediate future.

## CHAPTER V.

### MINOR OPERATIONS OFF THE EAST AFRICAN COAST UP TO THE DECLARATION OF A BLOCKADE. DECEMBER 1914—MARCH 1915.

44. *Re-organisation of Naval Forces on East Coast of Africa.*—On December 11th the "Chatham" reported that her efficiency was seriously impaired by a leaky main-feed tank, and, on the 14th, a thorough refit was stated to be urgently necessary. The "Goliath" had already sailed for Simonstown on the 8th, and the departure of the "Chatham" would leave the "Fox" as the only regular man-of-war on the coast to watch the "Königsberg" and assist the military forces, which could not be considered a satisfactory situation, since the last air reconnaissance had shown that, given favourable circumstances, the "Königsberg" might be able to leave the Rufiji. The battle of the Falkland Islands, on December 8th, however, permitted a redistribution of the British cruiser forces throughout the world, and the Admiralty, on December 13th, issued orders that the "Weymouth" was to be docked at Simonstown, and, on completion of her refit, proceed to the East Coast of Africa to relieve the "Chatham," which was subsequently directed to return to the Mediterranean on the arrival of her relief.<sup>1</sup> The "Weymouth" left Simonstown on December 20th, and arrived at Mombasa on December 28th.

It will be remembered that though Captain Caulfield, of the "Fox," was actually senior officer on the coast, the

<sup>1</sup> A 144.

Admiralty had specially entrusted to Captain Drury-Lowe, of the "Chatham," the control of the operations against the "Königsberg." The arrival of the "Weymouth" disturbed these arrangements, for Captain Church, of the "Weymouth," was considerably junior to Captain Caulfield,<sup>1</sup> and, on December 19th, the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, suggested that when the "Chatham" left the Captain of the "Fox" should carry out all the duties of S.N.O., East Africa, including the direction of the "Königsberg" operations.<sup>2</sup> This arrangement, however, was only in force for a short time, for, on December 19th, Captain Caulfield reported that the "Fox" was suffering from severe condenser trouble, and required refit before full speed could be developed, though she could carry out operations at moderate speed for another fortnight.

To meet this situation, on December 24th, the Admiralty ordered the "Fox" to be relieved on the East Coast by the "Pyramus" from the Persian Gulf, and reinforced the squadron with the "Pioneer" from Australia.<sup>3</sup>

The "Chatham" sailed from Mombasa for the Mediterranean on January 2nd, leaving Captain Caulfield with the "Fox," "Weymouth," "Kinfauns Castle," and the armed vessels, "Duplex," "Helmuth," and "Adjutant" under his orders. On the last day of 1914, the "Pyramus" left Bombay to relieve the "Fox," but the "Pioneer" was somewhat later in sailing, and could not be expected before the beginning of February.

With a view to establishing a blockade of the German Coast (para. 48), the naval authorities at the Cape were ordered, on December 23rd, to take up and arm four small vessels suitable for blockade service off the coast;<sup>4</sup> four small whalers<sup>5</sup> were accordingly taken over and fitted for service, but were not ready to sail until the middle of January.

<sup>1</sup> Seniorities.— Captain Caulfield, 31.12.08 ; Captain Drury-Lowe, 30.6.09 ; Captain Church, 31.12.10.

<sup>2</sup> A 145.

<sup>3</sup> A 148. "Pyramus" (Commander Viscount Kelburne, "Pioneer" (Commander Biddlecombe, R.A.N.). These were both "Pegasus" class.

<sup>4</sup> A 147.

<sup>5</sup> These whalers (two of which were German prizes) were renamed "Pickle," "Fly," "Childers," and "Echo." They were of about 400 tons displacement, 10 knots speed, and carried two 3-pdr. guns apiece. They were commanded by R.N.R. officers.

45. *Minor Operations—Capture of Mafia Island.*—

The destruction of the seaplane, on December 10th, rendered direct action against the "Königsberg" impossible, and the operations of our cruisers were confined to keeping a watch on the Rufiji, occupying the small islands in the vicinity, and preventing dhows from communicating with the enemy. The military forces were also somewhat inactive, as extensive re-organisation was necessary after the defeat at Tanga, but, on December 19th and 20th, General Tighe advanced along the coast to the southward of Mombasa, where the enemy had occupied positions in British territory. This advance was assisted by a feint of landing, carried out by the "Fox," off Tanga, on December 18th, and, by the 21st, General Tighe had advanced to the line of the Umba River, occupying Vanga, and establishing an advanced post in German territory at Jasin, about 3 miles from the sea.

The "Fox" then proceeded southward, and, on December 23rd, sent the armed vessels, "Duplex" and "Adjutant" to reconnoitre the Simba Uranga mouth of the river and ascertain whether explosions which had been heard were the result of attempts by the enemy to remove the "Newbridge." The vessels were able to enter unmolested at dawn, but, subsequently, came under heavy fire from an invisible enemy, and withdrew with one man killed and one wounded, having ascertained that the "Newbridge" was still in position and apparently undamaged by the enemy.

Captain Drury-Lowe had suggested, on December 21st, that it would be desirable to occupy Mafia Island immediately troops could be spared, as the island would be useful to us as a base for small craft and seaplanes, and its occupation would assist in the isolation of the "Königsberg."<sup>1</sup> The operation in the Umba Valley having been successfully completed, General Wapshare reported that he was able to spare four companies of the King's African Rifles to occupy the island, and they were landed from the "Kinfauns Castle" on January 10th. The landing place selected was the sandy beach at the south-west extremity of the island, where, covered by fire from the "Fox," the troops effected a landing without difficulty, and advanced into the interior of the island, the "Fox" supporting them as much as possible with shell-fire, while the "Weymouth," "Duplex," "Adjutant," and

<sup>1</sup> A 146. The "Königsberg" was often seen to signal by search-light to Mafia Island.

an armed dhow cruised off the coast to cut off sea-communication. The small German garrison defended themselves vigorously, but, on the 11th, their commander was wounded and captured, and next day the hostile forces surrendered unconditionally.

This success, besides giving us control of a large and fertile island, was of importance from a strictly naval point of view as it enabled our ships to make use of the sheltered anchorage of Tirene (on the western side of the island) as a coaling base, thus obviating the necessity of frequent visits to Mombasa or Zanzibar.

46. *Assistance given to Military at Vanga.*—While the operations at Mafia Island were still in progress the "Pyramus" arrived, and Captain Caulfield having turned over the command of the station to Captain Church of the "Weymouth," sailed on January 14th in the "Fox" to refit at Bombay. Shortly afterwards the "Kinfauns Castle" left for the same destination to refit, and it was arranged that two seaplanes should be sent out to her from home to be used on the East Coast of Africa on her return.

This left only the "Weymouth" and "Pyramus" to watch the "Königsberg," and in view of the possibility of the "Dresden," which was still at large, crossing the Pacific, the Admiralty did not wish the "Weymouth" to be tied irretrievably to the East Coast. They, therefore, on January 12th ordered Admiral King-Hall to transfer his flag to some other ship, and to send the "Hyacinth" to join the ships on the East Coast.<sup>1</sup>

She left Durban on January 16th, and joining the "Weymouth" on January 24th proved a welcome reinforcement, for Captain Church had been forced to devote his attention, and divert his ship, to dealing with unexpected developments in the military situation.

The occupation of the Umba Valley region (para. 45) in the middle of December apparently convinced the German Commander who was organising and training his forces at Moshi, that our troops intended to advance down the coast on Tanga.<sup>2</sup> He accordingly decided to deliver an attack on the advanced post at Jasin in the hope that the main British forces to the northward would

<sup>1</sup> A 149.

<sup>2</sup> This was not actually our intention, as owing to the unhealthy nature of the country our troops were about to be withdrawn, when the enemy attacked.

advance to its assistance when they might be engaged under favourable circumstances in difficult enclosed country. Jasin was attacked on January 17th, and after heavy fighting all attempts to relieve the garrison were defeated, and the post surrendered on the 19th.

The attack was at first considered to be the prelude to a general advance on the part of the Germans, and on the 18th the General sent an urgent message to the "Weymouth," then off Mafia Island, asking for a man-of-war to be sent to co-operate on his left flank. Captain Church accordingly proceeded to Vanga, leaving the "Pyramus" to watch the Rufiji, and assisted the military by shelling the German positions, fire being controlled from the shore with the aid of a portable wireless installation.<sup>1</sup>

The Admiralty approved of the "Weymouth" staying off Vanga for a few days, but she was not actually able to leave till February 9th when our troops were withdrawn to positions further north. Meanwhile the "Hyacinth" had arrived on January 23rd, and was at once sent to the Rufiji to assist the "Pyramus" on the receipt of intelligence that the "Newbridge" no longer blocked the Channel.

47. *Outline of Operations.—February 1915.*—It would be unnecessary and confusing to describe in detail the various activities of the ships on the East African Coast during the month of February as there were few events of importance. The general policy pursued was to keep a constant watch on the entrance to the Rufiji while the ships, not employed in doing this, cruised off the coast, endeavouring to put a stop to all coastal traffic and assisting the military as required. No direct action could be taken against the "Königsberg" as she was out of reach of the sea, and no troops were available to cut her off by land.

It had been reported on January 21st by native agents that the "Newbridge" had swung round so as to make the Suninga Channel practicable for the "Königsberg" and in addition to the possibility of her escaping by this route the flood-season was about to commence when the river rises several feet with a maximum depth in all the channels. The possibility of the "Königsberg's" escape could therefore not be neglected, and an incident which occurred in the early part of February

<sup>1</sup> A 150, 151.

showed that the German forces guarding the entrance were alert and efficient.

Since the reconnaissance of the Simba Urunga entrance on December 23rd when the enemy had proved to be in considerable strength and well concealed (para. 45) our patrolling vessels had avoided closing the shore till on February 6th, Captain Anderson of the "Hyacinth" sent the armed tug "Adjutant" to examine the entrance. She was unfortunately hit by a projectile which disabled her engines, and the flood tide carrying her into the river she was forced to surrender, the fire which the "Hyacinth" opened to assist her proving ineffective. One man had been killed, and two officers and sixteen men were made prisoners.<sup>1</sup> Next day the "Pyramus" proceeded as close as possible, and destroyed the "Adjutant" by gun-fire to prevent the enemy's making use of her.

On February 11th the Admiralty suggested sending two battalions of Royal Marines with a battery of 12-pdr. field guns to the delta in order to capture the "Königsberg," but the local authorities expressed their strong disapproval of the project as during the rainy season all the Rufiji region was most unhealthy. The proposal was abandoned, and the Marine battalions were finally employed in the Gallipoli campaign. On February 17th, Captain Church reported that the General contemplated the occupation of Das-es-Salaam later in the year, and that an advance by land on the "Königsberg" might be undertaken from there.<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile it was hoped that bomb attacks from the air might result in putting the "Königsberg" out of action as the two seaplanes<sup>3</sup> which had been sent out from England were supplied with 100-lb. bombs. The "Kinfauns Castle" arrived at Niororo Island (N.W. of Mafia Island) on February 21st, and the Admiralty directed that when both machines had been thoroughly tested, a surprise attack should be made on the "Königsberg." Unfortunately the engines of these machines were not sufficiently powerful to overcome the difficult climatic conditions, which hamper flying in the tropics, and one machine crashed on February 24th. Extensive

<sup>1</sup> Lettow-Vorbeck, p. 85, says that the "Adjutant" was captured and used as an auxiliary warship on Lake Tanganyika. This is due to confusion with another "Adjutant" which was already on the lake.

<sup>2</sup> A 155.

<sup>3</sup> Sopwith seaplanes, 2-seaters, with 100-h.p. Gnome engines.

trials were carried out with the remaining seaplane, but without success, and no aerial reconnaissance was carried out until more powerful machines arrived from home in April.

The "Pioneer" arrived at Mombasa on February 3rd having proceeded in company with a collier from Fremantle *viâ* Cocos-Keeling Islands and Diego Garcia (Chagos Arch.) and the arrival of the four whalers at Zanzibar on February 6th completed the forces which the Admiralty had allocated for service on the East Coast of Africa. On February 9th Captain Church was asked when he would be prepared to commence a formal blockade of the German Coast. March 1st having been selected as the date when the blockade should commence, the Admiralty, on February 20th, ordered the Commander-in-Chief at the Cape to hoist his flag in the "Goliath," and proceed to Mafia Island to take charge of the blockade.<sup>1</sup> The original limits of the Cape Station were restored, and Rear-Admiral King-Hall left Simonstown in the "Goliath" on February 25th.

48. *The Blockade of the East African Coast.*—In the first days of the war, the "Astræa" had proclaimed a blockade of the ports of Dar-es-Salaam, Bagamayo and Tanga, but in view of the small British forces operating on the coast it had not been considered effective, and was never formally notified by the Admiralty (para. 10). During the operations subsequent to the location of the "Königsberg" in the Rufiji, every endeavour had been made to prevent assistance or supplies reaching her from the sea, but no general blockade of the coast was carried out, though, of course, all German owned vessels were captured whenever met with.

Captain Drury-Lowe on December 21st had reported that food supplies were believed to be scanty in the German territory, and one of the reasons for the proposed capture of Mafia Island was that it formed a suitable base for small craft employed in preventing dhows carrying on traffic along the coast.<sup>2</sup> This coastal traffic was of considerable importance to the enemy for, although there were two railways running from the coast towards the interior, communications in a north and south direction were difficult and for the most part the only transport was by means of native carriers. It was not easy to stop the

<sup>1</sup> A 156.<sup>2</sup> A 146.

traffic of these dhows as they crept along close inshore, were familiar with the numerous navigational dangers, and, when chased, could beach themselves at many points on the coast. It was therefore evident that only small craft could deal with them, and, as already stated, four small whalers had been taken over and armed at the Cape which arrived at Zanzibar on February 6th<sup>1</sup> (para. 47). The other ships which the Admiralty had despatched to the East Coast were by this time on the station and the declaration of a formal blockade could be considered in view of the forces now available, consisting of the following four light cruisers and six smaller craft:—

Light Cruisers	-	"Weymouth," S.N.O.
		"Hyacinth."
		"Pyramus."
		"Pioneer."
Armed Steamer	-	"Duplex."
Armed Tug	-	"Helmuth."
Armed Whalers	-	"Fly."
		"Pickle."
		"Echo."
		"Childers."

In addition to the above the armed liner "Kinfauns Castle" was completing her refit at Bombay and was expected to arrive on the coast about February 20th.

49. *System of Blockade to be adopted.*—The Admiralty telegraphed to Captain Church of the "Weymouth" on February 9th, asking him to report the date on which the blockade could be commenced, and proposing a scheme to be considered by him with a view to suggesting any modifications which might appear desirable.<sup>2</sup>

This scheme divided the coast of German East Africa into five sections, each of which was to be patrolled by one cruiser and one whaler, the "Kinfauns Castle" being considered as a cruiser, and the "Duplex" as a whaler. The sections proposed were:—

- (a) Vanga to Pangani Bay. A 50-mile stretch of coast including Tanga and Mansa Bays.
- (b) Pangani Bay to Ras Kanzi. 110 miles of coast including Bagamoyo and Dar-es-Salaam.
- (c) Ras Kanzi to Rufiji River. A 60-mile section including the North Mafia Channel.

<sup>1</sup> A 147.<sup>2</sup> A 152.

- (d) Rufiji River to Kiswera. 90 miles. This section would include the South Mafia Channel and the harbours of Kilwa Kivinje, Kilwa Kisiwani and Sangarungu.
- (e) Kiswera to C. Delgado. 100 miles of coastline with Lindi, Mgau Mwanja, Mto Mtwara and Mikindani Harbours.

The whole coastline was to be considered as divided into two halves by Ras Kanzi, the "Hyacinth" and "Weymouth" being each responsible for one of these. Zanzibar and Mafia Island were to be used as coaling bases, but it will be seen that no arrangements were provided for reliefs nor was the fact that the "Kinfauns Castle" might be required to work with the seaplanes allowed for.

On February 12th, Captain Church replied that he would be ready to commence the blockade on March 1st, and suggested the following modifications in the Admiralty scheme.<sup>1</sup> On the 120-mile stretch of coast in the south between Cape Delgado and Kilwa Kisawani, the "Pioneer" and "Kinfauns Castle" were to work arranging their own reliefs for coaling. The South Mafia Channel was to be watched by one whaler and the "Weymouth" and another whaler would be responsible for the North Mafia Channel as far as Ras Kanzi. In this position the "Weymouth" could combine the blockade with a permanent watch on the "Königsberg."

North of Ras Kanzi the "Hyacinth" and "Pyramus" would cruise off the coast as far to the northward as the German frontier working their own reliefs and assisted by the "Duplex" and one whaler between Ras Kanzi and Pangani Bay with the remaining whaler to the northward. This arrangement would divide the available force into three sections, two cruisers being south of the Rufiji, one cruiser and two whalers in the Rufiji neighbourhood, and two cruisers and three auxiliary vessels off the northern portion of the coast. Captain Church's proposals were approved by the Admiralty on February 15th, and he was given definite orders to commence the blockade on March 1st after giving due notice not later than February 24th.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A 153.

<sup>2</sup> A 154. It was intended that no days of grace for neutral ships to leave after the commencement of the blockade should be given, but at the request of the Foreign Office it was decided on February 21st to grant them. It does not appear, however, that there were any neutral vessels in the German harbours.

50. *Commencement of the Blockade and Detailed Orders.*—The blockade commenced as ordered on March 1st, 1915, and on March 6th, Vice-Admiral King-Hall,<sup>1</sup> who had been directed to take charge of it, arrived at Mafia Island in the "Goliath." Captain Church had already issued detailed orders, and these, as modified by the Commander-in-Chief on March 14th, will now be described.<sup>2</sup>

It must be borne in mind that though one of the principal objects of the blockading force was to prevent the coastal traffic carried on by the enemy small craft, this could have been stopped without the declaration of a formal blockade which only affected neutral vessels, but it was considered probable that the vessels which would attempt to run the blockade were large ocean-going dhows from Arabia, Persia, or even India. In the orders, no mention is made of the possibility of a blockade runner coming from Europe with supplies for the German Protectorate, although it is suggested that traffic might continue between Portuguese East Africa and German territory.

In his operation orders Admiral King-Hall accepted the general system which had been proposed by Captain Church, but made a number of modifications with regard to details.

The coast was to be divided into three sections described as Northern, Southern, and Rufiji. The Northern Section extended from Vanga to Ras Kanzi, and was patrolled by the "Pioneer" (S.O.), "Kinfauns Castle" (when available), and the "Duplex" and one whaler. The coaling bases were Mombasa and Zanzibar. The Southern Section extended from the Kiassi mouth of the Rufiji as far as the Portuguese frontier, and was watched by the "Pyramus" (S.O.) and one whaler, based on Mafia Island. Between the Northern and Southern Sections lay the Rufiji Section in which were the "Weymouth" (S.O.), "Hyacinth," and two whalers.

The Senior Officer of each Section was responsible for arranging the movements of all vessels under his orders, except that the Admiral retained the organisation of the cruiser reliefs in his own hands. The local Senior Officers were to inform the Commander-in-Chief daily as to their positions and the proposed movements of the various

<sup>1</sup> He had been promoted to Vice-Admiral on March 5th.

<sup>2</sup> B 6.

vessels during the next 24 hours. They were also given discretion to detail anchorages for the use of the whalers which could not be expected to remain continuously under weigh, but the patrol was not to be neglected at night.

These orders remained in force till May 1st, but the force of circumstances frequently led to their being modified in practice.

## CHAPTER VI.

### THE BLOCKADE OF THE EAST AFRICAN COAST AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE "KÖNIGSBERG." MARCH TO JULY 1915.

51. *Progress of the Blockade.*—The blockade of the East African Coast which commenced on March 1st was at first uneventful so far as attempts by neutral vessels to run the blockade were concerned, and the only untoward event was the grounding of the whaler "Fly" off Songa Songa Island (30 miles south of Mafia Island) on March 6th. As she was not fitted with wireless, no communication with regard to this accident reached the cruisers, but after nothing had been seen of her for two days the Commander-in-Chief sent the "Pyramus" in search of her, and she was located on March 9th. On arrival at Songa Songa the "Pyramus" learnt that a party of 15 German native troops with a white officer had come over from the mainland in two dhows to attack the helpless whaler. The cruiser at once destroyed the dhows in order to cut off the enemy's retreat, but in view of reported activity on the part of the "Königsburg," it was not considered desirable to send a landing party ashore till the 14th when, after two days' operations in the dense bush which covered the island, one of the enemy was killed and the remainder surrendered. The "Fly" had been refloated without serious damage on the 13th.

The delay in dealing with the small party of the enemy was due to persistent reports that the "Königsberg" intended to escape during the period of equinoctial spring tides occurring on March 17th, and there were other signs of enemy activity which seemed to indicate that some movement was in prospect.

A considerable amount of signalling by searchlight was observed, and on the night of March 9th, a small steamboat towing other craft attempted to leave the Simba Uranga mouth. She was engaged by the "Echo" patrolling off the entrance and though she promptly slipped a canoe with a light in it—probably to divert the attention of the whaler—the ruse failed, and she was forced to return to harbour.

Admiral King-Hall, in the "Goliath," had left Mafia Island on March 8th, and on the 9th held a conference at Zanzibar with the local authorities and the Captain of the "Hyacinth," who was in charge of the Northern Section of the Blockade. The flagship then proceeded to Mombasa, but on receiving news of a certain liveliness in the Rufiji area the Admiral decided to redistribute his forces so as to strengthen the Rufiji section of the coast<sup>1</sup>. The "Hyacinth" accordingly was ordered to leave the Northern Blockade section in charge of the "Pioneer" and to patrol the South Mafia Channel. The "Goliath" proceeded from Mombasa to support her, while the "Weymouth" with two whalers watched the northern approach. The "Pioneer," "Duplex," and "Pickle" remained on the Northern Blockade Section, and the "Pyramus" and "Fly" on the Southern. These general dispositions remained in force, except that the Admiral in the "Goliath" exercised a general supervision over the coast and did not remain permanently in the South Mafia Channel; on March 17th he visited Mombasa, and on March 20th bombarded Lindi, after a request for the surrender of 10 officers, 100 white troops, and 150 Askaris had been refused.

The force at Admiral King-Hall's disposal, however, was soon to be reduced. On March 19th he reported the "Pyramus" in urgent need of a refit, and she sailed accordingly for Simonstown on March 24th.

A further reduction in the squadron on the East Coast of Africa took place on the receipt of orders from the Admiralty on March 25th, directing that the "Goliath" should proceed to Suez with a view to joining the squadron off the Dardanelles. She was slightly delayed by having to wait for a steamer with stores then on the way from the Cape, but on March 27th Vice-Admiral King-Hall transferred his flag to the "Hyacinth," and on April 2nd the "Goliath" sailed for Aden, leaving the "Weymouth"

<sup>1</sup> A 157.

"Hyacinth," and "Pioneer" as the only regular men-of-war on the coast.

52. *The German Supply Ship—Intelligence and Dispositions.*—For over a month after the commencement of the blockade on March 1st the vessels employed in enforcing it had little to do beyond intercepting coastal traffic, and the only disturbance to the normal routine had been caused by the above rumours of the "Königsberg's" activity. The whole situation, however, was radically changed on April 4th by the receipt of information that a German supply ship might be expected early in April to be at some 360 miles to the north-eastward of the Rufiji, and that the "Königsberg" might endeavour to break out in order to join her. The Admiralty directed Admiral King-Hall to intercept the supply ship and at the same time keep a close watch on the "Königsberg," so as to ensure bringing her to action. In order to reinforce his squadron, the "Chatham," which was refitting at Bombay, was to proceed to the East Coast, but her completion was delayed, and she did not actually arrive in time to take part in the subsequent operations.<sup>1</sup>

Admiral King-Hall had now to consider what dispositions he could make with his somewhat attenuated forces in order to carry out the Admiralty instructions to both intercept the supply ship and watch the "Königsberg."

Either the "Hyacinth" or "Weymouth" could perform the latter duty so far as armament was concerned, but, unfortunately, the flagship was in urgent need of a refit, and her maximum speed was only 16 knots, which would not be sufficient to ensure bringing the "Königsberg" to action should she once get clear of the river. This consideration entailed keeping the "Weymouth" as much as possible in the Rufiji section when there was any possibility of the "Königsberg" leaving, but on April 3rd, shortly before the alarm was received, she had been sent to Zanzibar for a short rest and could not return to the North Mafia Channel until April 7th.

With regard to intercepting the supply ship, the Commander-in-Chief was of opinion that as she might be armed with 4.1-inch guns, similar to those of the "Königsberg," the only ship at his disposal capable of dealing with her was the "Hyacinth." He therefore decided to break up the blockade and concentrate the whole squadron off the Rufiji, sailing with his flagship to

<sup>1</sup> A 158.

intercept the blockade-runner as soon as the "Weymouth"<sup>1</sup> was in position to deal with the "Königsberg." She arrived early on April 7th, and Admiral King-Hall, after coaling, sailed at 5 p.m. in his flagship for the rendezvous 360 miles N.E. of the Rufiji.

53. *Operations to intercept the Supply Ship.*—On arriving at the position indicated at daylight on April 9th, nothing whatever was seen, and, after searching for 15 miles in all directions, the Admiral decided to return to support the watch on the Rufiji. He arrived there before dark on the 10th, and received further instructions from the Admiralty to send a ship to cruise for the blockade-runner, which might be expected to remain for some days in the vicinity.<sup>2</sup>

During the night of the 10-11th, the "Hyacinth" patrolled the North Mafia Channel, coaled next day and sailed at 4.0 p.m., April 11th, on her second journey to the rendezvous, but before she had proceeded far to the north-eastward the Admiral changed his plans.

On the chance that the supply ship might proceed to the Kilulu Channel (Lat. 4° 46' S. north of Tanga) and discharge her cargo in Mansa Bay—a land-locked harbour 8 miles north of Tanga, the flagship on April 12th and 13th patrolled on a line some 50 miles to the eastward of Zanzibar<sup>2</sup> and Pemba in the hope of intercepting the German ship should she close the coast. After dark on April 13th the "Hyacinth" proceeded between the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba and during the night patrolled between the north point of Pemba and the mainland which is here fringed at a distance of some 5 miles from the shore by coral reefs, Kilulu mountain being a leading mark for passing into the clear channel inshore of them.<sup>3</sup> As there are no navigational aids, the "Hyacinth" did not close the channel until shortly before dawn at 4.40 a.m., when she passed inside the reefs. At this moment by a most unfortunate chance her starboard engine broke down and she was proceeding at a greatly reduced speed with the port engine when smoke was sighted ahead at about 5 a.m. The "Hyacinth" at once endeavoured to chase to the southward and the growing light soon showed that the

<sup>1</sup> A 159, 165. Captain Church, of the "Weymouth," had been invalided to the Cape. His place was taken by Captain Crampton, of the "Kinfauns Castle," and the command of the latter ship was given to Lieut.-Commander W. B. Wilkinson.

<sup>2</sup> A 164, 165.


<sup>3</sup> Chart 1390, Chale Point to Pangani.

stranger was evidently the expected supply-ship but with her reduced speed the flagship could not get within range before the enemy, steaming at her utmost speed and disregarding a launch carrying a pilot, entered Mansa Bay and was hidden by the wooded Boma Peninsula.

The Admiral then proceeded towards the entrance of Mansa Bay, but before arriving there he found that the position of the German ship was revealed by smoke and steam rising over the land and at once opened fire with the "Hyacinth's" 6-inch at a range of 8,000 yards. At 6.40 a.m. the flagship turned into Mansa Bay, and was able to bring direct fire to bear on the blockade-runner whose crew were seen to be abandoning the ship which was on fire forward and apparently aground. The "Hyacinth" anchored at 7.12 a.m., and sent a party to the ship to endeavour to extinguish the fire and float the vessel, failing which it was hoped that it might be possible to capture at least some of her cargo. On getting aboard however, it was found that the fire was too firmly established to be extinguished, that the ship had been scuttled, and that owing to a large deck cargo of timber access to the holds was difficult. A certain amount of work was possible in the after holds, but nothing but timber was discovered, and at 9.20 a.m. the salvage party was recalled. While working on the hostile vessel they had come under machine gun fire from the shore, but a few rounds of shrapnel from the "Hyacinth" had silenced this and there were no casualties. After the party had returned to their ship, a deliberate bombardment of the enemy vessel was carried out at a range of 1,600 yards to ensure her destruction, and she was soon a mass of flames fore and aft, one large and two smaller explosions occurring on board. She was also evidently firmly aground, and at 10.45 a.m. Admiral King-Hall, considering his task completed for the moment, sailed for Zanzibar intending to revisit the wreck in a few days when it had cooled down. As he proceeded south the smoke of the blazing ship remained visible for over 20 miles.<sup>1</sup>

The Commander-in-Chief's intention to revisit the wreck was not however fulfilled for on April 16th intelligence was received that a second supply ship was

<sup>1</sup> A 167, 170.








# EAST AFRICA

## Nº 3



Longitude East of Greenwich (depending upon the English Consulate, Zanzibar, being in 39° 21' E.)

coming. The "Hyacinth" at once proceeded to cruise for this ship, and with the "Pioneer" searched for some days without sighting anything, and it is possible that the report was deliberately circulated by the Germans in order to draw our ships away from the vicinity of Mansa Bay.<sup>1</sup> It certainly had this effect and the Germans took advantage of the respite to mine the entrance so as to prevent approach to the scuttled blockade-runner.

By April 18th the period of spring tides was over, and the escape of the "Königsberg" became daily more improbable. The blockade was resumed on the same lines as before except that the "Kinfauns Castle" undertook an extended cruise off the coast in search of the second supply ship. In particular, she visited Aldabra Island which was known to have been used by both the "Königsberg" and the supply ship, but found nothing there.

54. *The Cruise of the German Supply Ship.*—Before entering on a description of the operations which culminated in the destruction of the "Königsberg," it will be as well to give a brief history of the voyage of the blockade-runner before her arrival in East African waters, and of what happened to her after being scuttled in Mansa Bay on April 14th.

The ship appears actually to have been the ss. "Rubens"—(3,587 tons gross register), one of the British vessels detained by the Germans at Hamburg on the outbreak of war, but she was painted and disguised as the ss. "Kronberg" of Copenhagen. When the party from the "Hyacinth" boarded her on April 14th, no papers of any importance could be found to identify her, and the only evidence with regard to her movements was provided by a chart on which her noon positions throughout the voyage were marked. From these it appears that she sailed from some Baltic port, probably Kiel, on February 18th, and passed through the Fair Island Channel at about 6 p.m. on February 21st. She steered west to the meridian of 6° 40' W., then altered course to pass about 50 miles west of Ireland, and land was not sighted again till the night of March 5th when she passed between the Islands of Teneriffe and Grand Canary.

Cape Agulhas was rounded at a distance of 20 miles on March 28th, and the German vessel then set a course

<sup>1</sup> A 171, 172.

to pass through the Mozambique Channel, keeping about 70 miles clear of the South African Coast. On the afternoon of April 3rd the small uninhabited Europa Island (22° 20' S., 40° 19' E.) was sighted, and three days later, on the night of April 6th, the ship passed between the islands of Mohilla and Johanna in the Comoro group. She then altered course, probably in accordance with instructions received by wireless, and proceeded to Aldabra Island, a small island some 220 miles to north-westward of Madagascar, where she arrived on April 8th, and proceeded into the lagoon, the inhabitants being informed that she had put in to effect repairs to her engines on a voyage from Suez to the Cape. She sailed on the evening of April 10th for a rendezvous in 6° S., 45° E., another 220 miles to the north-west, where she arrived early on the 12th, and then set course for the north end of Pemba (320 miles), which was abeam at about 2 a.m., April 14th. A few hours later she was sighted by the "Hyacinth" shortly after 5 a.m., when she was already inside the reefs.

Her commander was Kapitän-Leutnant Carl Christiansen, and in his account of the episode he states that after entering Mansa Bay he was uncertain whether the "Hyacinth" would follow, but that when fire was opened over the land he at once gave orders to set fire to the deck cargo of timber and scuttle the ship "as had been pre-arranged." The second salvo from the "Hyacinth" hit, and doubtless assisted to sink the ship and ignite the cargo, for the order was at once given to abandon ship, the captain leaving just as the "Hyacinth" entered the bay. He was severely wounded, shortly after landing, by a shell from the "Hyacinth."

It would appear that all the important portion of the cargo was stowed low down in the ship, and covered with a quantity of timber, for Christiansen records his satisfaction at seeing the ship sinking since he reckoned the fire would do little harm to the arms and ammunition. It certainly did some damage, however, as other German sources mention that all the medical stores were destroyed.

Unfortunately a large proportion of the remainder of the supplies was salvaged by divers from the "Königsberg" in serviceable condition. The exact quantity is uncertain,

but it is recorded that the greatest amount recovered during one day included—

293 rifles,  
375,000 rounds of ammunition,  
1 field gun,  
4 machine guns,  
100—4·1-inch shells,  
150—3·5-inch shells,

and a large amount of equipment.

A considerable number of the cartridges proved to have been injured by their submersion, but it was found possible to break up the ammunition, clean the powder, and refill the cartridges. That the enemy should have obtained this supply was the more regrettable, as their expenditure during the actions round Jasin in January amounted to 200,000 rounds, and von Lettow-Vorbeck calculated that he had only sufficient remaining for three more general actions on this scale. The arrival of the stores from Germany enabled him to hold out during the remainder of 1915, and through the heavy fighting at the commencement of 1916 until the arrival of a second supply ship in March 1916 again freed him from anxiety. There can be little doubt, too, that the unexpected succour from Europe had an important moral effect on the German forces, as it proved that their activities were known and appreciated by the authorities at home.

The fact that this extensive salvage work was accomplished without any molestation from British warships was due in the first place to the false rumour with regard to a second supply ship and then to the report of the entrance to Mansa Bay being mined.

Admiral King-Hall had been of opinion that the explosions and the fierceness of the conflagration precluded the prospect of the cargo being salvaged in a useful condition, but he had recognised that it was desirable to examine the wreck thoroughly when it had cooled down, and on April 16th had stated that he hoped to visit the place again in a few days' time.<sup>1</sup> This visit had to be postponed on

<sup>1</sup> A 168, 170. Compare also M. 04068/15. Letter of proceedings dated April 17th: "I propose proceeding to Mansa Bay in a few days to examine the wreck when it has had time to cool, though I am of opinion that the destruction of the ship and cargo is complete, and that with the possible exception of any heavy guns at the bottom of the hold, it will be found that any attempt at salvage will prove fruitless."

account of the visit to Mikindani to intercept the second supply ship, and before Mansa Bay could be examined again a report was received that mines might have been laid outside its entrance.<sup>1</sup>

Intelligence was also received on April 29th that the Germans, after two days' unsuccessful work, had abandoned all attempts to salve the cargo of munitions,<sup>2</sup> and no further move was made until on May 14th the Commander-in-Chief reported that he was about to proceed in the "Hyacinth" to examine Mansa Bay. The reply to this was an urgent telegram from the Admiralty forbidding the "Hyacinth" to approach Mansa Bay on account of the mine danger.<sup>3</sup>

These definite orders prevented any further steps being taken until June 22nd, when a report was received from the military authorities that a party of Germans and natives was at work on the store ship and was salvaging rifles, ammunition, and timber. In forwarding this to the Admiralty, Admiral King-Hall repeated his opinion that the ammunition had been destroyed, and asked whether in view of the previous Admiralty orders he should send a ship to investigate the state of affairs. The answer was that no ship should be sent, and no reply was sent to a suggestion from the Commander-in-Chief that a ship could approach close to the Boma Peninsula  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles north of the entrance to the bay and fire over the land at the supply ship.<sup>4</sup>

When the General Officer Commanding in East Africa asked on July 1st whether the salvage operations in Mansa Bay could not be stopped, the Admiral could only reply that the Admiralty orders prevented him sending a ship there.<sup>5</sup>

It was not until after the destruction of the "Königsberg" on July 11th and the arrival of four additional whalers which had been fitted with mine-sweeping gear at Simonstown, that the Admiral again proposed to examine Mansa Bay, and Admiralty approval was obtained, but by the time the "Challenger" reached the bay on July 22nd the salvage operations had been completed and no signs of activity were visible.

<sup>1</sup> A 173.

<sup>2</sup> A 176.

<sup>3</sup> A 180, 181. The mines were probably some of those improvised at Tanga. Lettow-Vorbeck, 86.

<sup>4</sup> A 186.

<sup>5</sup> A 187.

55. *Situation on East Coast of Africa, May 1915.*— On April 6th, after hearing that an enemy supply ship was expected and that the "Königsberg" might attempt to break out, Vice-Admiral King-Hall requested that in addition to the "Chatham," which had already been ordered to join him, another light cruiser might be attached to the squadron.<sup>1</sup> He detailed the defects of the various ships under his command, and pointed out that in tropical waters all ships required careful nursing and frequent short refits. The Admiralty complied with this request, and on April 20th ordered the "Cornwall" (Captain W. M. Ellerton), then at the Cape, to proceed to the Rufiji, where she arrived on April 27th. The "Chatham" left Bombay on April 23rd and joined the squadron on May 1st, the same day as the "Kinfauns Castle" left for the Cape, after being relieved by the A.M.C. "Laconia,"<sup>2</sup> which had arrived at Niororo anchorage (N. Mafia Channel) on April 23rd with three Short seaplanes. She was fitted as a store-ship, and the Admiral therefore decided to retain her with his squadron in lieu of the "Kinfauns Castle." On May 1st, therefore, the squadron consisted of the—

"Hyacinth" (Flag),  
 "Cornwall,"  
 "Chatham,"  
 "Weymouth,"  
 "Pioneer,"  
 "Laconia,"

with various small craft on the coast and the "Pyramus" refitting at the Cape. In view of the above reinforcements, the Admiral proceeded with the "Hyacinth" and "Weymouth" to Zanzibar in order to carry out a short and much-needed refit.

The events of the past two months had shown that so long as the "Königsberg" was "in being" and not definitely immobilised, the possibility of her escape could not be overlooked by the squadron blockading the German Coast, and air reconnaissances carried out on April 25th and 27th showed that she was still apparently in a seaworthy condition (para 56).<sup>3</sup> On the other hand it was considered probable that she could only move during the period of spring tides, and in view of this situation

<sup>1</sup> A 161.

<sup>2</sup> Captain C. S. Wills.

<sup>3</sup> During these reconnaissances, photographs were taken.

Admiral King-Hall on May 1st issued revised orders for the blockade.<sup>1</sup>

These orders were characterised by the establishment of two organisations; one (organisation A) to be in force during spring tides when the "Königsberg" might be expected to escape; the other (B) for use during the period of neap tides. The general principle underlying these orders was that the three fast cruisers and whalers should watch the Rufiji, the blockade of the remainder of the coast being carried out by the "Hyacinth," "Duplex" and smaller cruisers. During the neap tide period one fast cruiser was stationed in the North Mafia Channel and one in the South Mafia Channel, while the third refitted at Zanzibar.

During the critical period of spring tides, the force in the North Mafia Channel was increased to two light cruisers which, with the armed merchant cruiser permanently stationed there, allowed for all the exits to the open sea being watched. The whalers watched close in to the various mouths of the Rufiji in order to give early information of hostile movements.<sup>2</sup>

This scheme which allowed for a force of three fast cruisers could only be applied in detail for a short time as ships were being withdrawn from the station in connection with the Gallipoli campaign, but the general principles continued in force.

On May 9th the Admiralty directed that the "Chatham" should proceed to the Mediterranean for service with the squadron off the Dardanelles, but owing to the "Weymouth" being temporarily out of action she did not sail till the 16th. Orders also arrived on the 10th for the "Cornwall" to proceed to the Dardanelles, and her departure on the 11th reduced the squadron to the "Weymouth," "Hyacinth" and "Laconia."

This reduction however was to some extent counterbalanced by the fact that the Admiralty now took decisive steps to ensure the destruction of the "Königsberg," and put an end to a situation which absorbed the activities of so many warships.

56. *Offensive Measures against the "Königsberg."*—Admiral King-Hall after his arrival on the East Coast early in March had soon recognised that the position with

<sup>1</sup> B 7.

<sup>2</sup> For details of positions of ship watching the Rufiji, see B 7, para. 8. Chart 662 is the most useful chart in connection with this.

regard to the "Königsberg" was unsatisfactory so long as there was any possibility of her proceeding to sea. The seaplane which had arrived in February proved so unsuited for the climate that it was impossible either to attack the German cruiser with bombs or even to reconnoitre her position, which had not been definitely fixed since December 4th (para. 42).

The Admiral therefore had to devise other means, and on March 19th proposed that a night attack should be carried out by boats carrying either spar-torpedoes or boarding parties with explosives as there was reason to believe that the majority of the "Königsberg's" crew was accommodated in camps on shore. The Admiralty however vetoed this scheme in view of the risks involved, and the fact that if the Germans were keeping a good look-out it was improbable that the boats would ever get near the "Königsberg."

On March 20th, three 160 h.p. two-seater Short seaplanes were despatched from England to the Cape for passage to the East Coast of Africa in the "Laconia." She arrived at Niororo anchorage on April 20th, and preparations were at once made to carry out a reconnaissance with a view to fixing the position of the "Königsberg," and ascertaining if she appeared to be in any way dismantled.

Two successful flights were carried out on April 25th and 27th, photographs being taken of the "Königsberg" and her position fixed off Kokotoni Island, 8 miles from the Simba Uranga Mouth, and near the junction of the Simba Uranga, Suninga and Kikunya branches. She appeared to be in seaworthy condition with steam up, but owing to the awnings spread it was impossible to ascertain whether any guns had been landed, and in view of the fact that the seaplanes could not climb above 800 or 1,000 feet at which height they came under a heavy fire, and were repeatedly hit by shrapnel, the Admiral decided to carry out no more flights in the vicinity of the "Königsberg" for the present.

On May 5th, he forwarded a further proposal to the Admiralty to the effect that an attack should be made on the "Königsberg" with 14-inch torpedoes fitted in the "Laconia's" motor launch if the latter could be made to run silently. If this could not be achieved, he requested that an electric launch might be sent out from England for the purpose, but the Admiralty had already taken

effective steps to secure the destruction of the "Königsberg," and when informing the Commander-in-Chief that his proposal was not approved, he was also told that two monitors would shortly be placed under his orders<sup>1</sup> for the purpose.

It may be remembered that as early in the "Königsberg" operations as November 23rd the Admiralty had considered the question of using a light draught armoured vessel such as the French "Styx" against the German cruiser (para. 40), and early in December, Captain Drury-Lowe had suggested that the new monitors might be able to get within effective range of the "Königsberg," but at the time they were not available (para. 43).

Early in 1915 it had been decided to send the "Severn," "Humber," and "Mersey" to the Mediterranean for use in connection with the Dardanelles operations, and they arrived at Malta on April 4th having been towed out from England. The monitors which had been originally designed for river work only were specially strengthened for the passage, and were accompanied by the auxiliary "Trent" in which the crews were accommodated.

The dislocation of the blockade in East African waters in the middle of April, caused by the arrival of the blockade-runner, and the number of ships required to watch the "Königsberg," apparently emphasised the necessity of putting an end to the career of the only German cruiser outside European waters, for, on April 19th, orders were sent to Malta directing the "Severn," "Mersey,"<sup>2</sup> and "Trent," with the tugs, to proceed to Zanzibar as soon as they could be prepared for the long voyage.<sup>3</sup> The "Humber" was retained for service in the Mediterranean, and took part in the Gallipoli campaign.

On April 28th, the force left Malta for Port Said, but Admiral King-Hall was not informed of the reinforcements joining him until May 5th, when the monitors were at Suez.<sup>4</sup>

57. *Preparations for the Attack on the "Königsberg."*  
—When the Admiralty informed the Commander-in-Chief, on May 5th, that the monitors were already on the way to

<sup>1</sup> A. 177.

<sup>2</sup> "Severn," Captain E. J. Fullerton; "Mersey," Commander R. A. Wilson. The monitors were 265 feet in length, 49 feet beam, and drew 6 feet. Armament:—Two 6-inch, two 4·7-inch howitzers, four 3-pdrs., and six machine guns.

<sup>3</sup> A 174.

<sup>4</sup> A 177.

join him, it was stated that further instructions would be sent with regard to their employment against the "Königsberg," but, in point of fact, some weeks elapsed before the question was discussed. It was evident, however, that whatever method was employed to destroy the hostile cruiser, air reconnaissance would be of great importance, and, on May 8th, the Admiralty directed that the seaplanes then on the East Coast of Africa should be husbanded until the arrival of the monitors.<sup>1</sup> The climatic conditions, which render flying in the tropics difficult and dangerous, were now fully realised at home, and, in view of the inferior climbing powers of seaplanes, it was decided to send out land machines for service in the proposed operations. On May 11th, the Commander-in-Chief was asked whether they could be used, and three days later he reported in favour of the proposal, adding that a suitable aerodrome would be prepared on Mafia Island. Arrangements were accordingly made to send machines and aerodrome equipment overland to Marseilles, whence they were transported by sea to Aden.

On May 24th, the Admiralty asked Admiral King-Hall to consider and report on the employment of the monitors, suggesting that, if possible, the main, or Simba Uranga, entrance should not be used, owing to the possibility of its being mined.<sup>2</sup> The Commander-in-Chief had already considered the matter, and on the same day forwarded his plan. This was that the two monitors should proceed up the Kikunya, or northern branch of the river, to within 11,000 or 12,000 yards of the "Königsberg," and bombard her from this position. The advantages of the Kikunya branch lay in the belief that it was only lightly held by the enemy, that it gave a nearly direct approach to the "Königsberg," and a careful survey of the bar had shown a greater depth of water than that marked on the German charts. It was suggested that the monitors should enter the river at dawn near high water, as, with the normal rise of tide, this would ensure their being safe from mines. The Admiralty approved of this plan, which was the one actually carried out six weeks later.<sup>3</sup>

Subsequently, on June 12th, the Vice-Admiral reported that he intended to carry out the operations during neap-tides,<sup>4</sup> in order that the monitors might be able to enter or leave the river at any time, and also to

<sup>1</sup> A 178.

<sup>2</sup> A 182.

<sup>3</sup> A 183.

<sup>4</sup> Neap tides, June 22nd, July 5th.

obtain the advantages of a weaker current, which, in view of the unhandiness of the monitors, was an important consideration.

The first date selected for the operations was June 22nd, but, owing to a delay in the arrival of the aeroplanes, it had to be postponed until the next neap-tides occurred early in July.

The Monitor Squadron (Senior Officer, Captain E. J. A. Fullerton, R.N.), after leaving Suez, on May 6th, proceeded to Aden, where they arrived on the 15th, after a trying voyage down the Red Sea, which resulted in two deaths from heat-stroke. Admiral King-Hall had requested, on May 9th, that the squadron should be ordered to proceed direct to Mafia Island without calling at Zanzibar in order that no news of the monitors' arrival might reach the enemy, and suggested that if a call for coal was essential, the port used should be Chaki-Chaki, in Pemba, where there was little probability of information reaching the enemy.<sup>1</sup> The Admiralty approved of this proposal, and when the monitor squadron left Aden, on May 17th, his was their destination.

The squadron arrived off Chaki-Chaki on June 1st, after a voyage through the Indian Ocean, which had been difficult and anxious owing to the heavy seas encountered, and they were met by the "Hyacinth" off the port. Some of the tugs had to proceed into harbour to fuel, but the remainder, with the monitors, continued the journey towards Mafia Island, and anchored in the North Mafia Channel before dark on June 3rd. Work was at once commenced on removing the special fittings which had been necessary for the voyage and getting the monitors into fighting trim. Additional protection was also provided, and all vacant spaces were filled with sealed petrol tins to assist in the preservation of buoyancy if the vessels were holed below the water line.

Meanwhile, there had been certain additions to the squadron on the East Coast. On May 10th, when the Admiralty despatched the "Chatham" and "Cornwall" to the Dardanelles, they ordered the light cruiser, "Challenger," and the armed merchant cruiser, "Laurentic," to proceed to the East Coast of Africa.<sup>2</sup> The latter vessel arrived off the Rufiji from the Cape on May 25th, and on May 31st was sent to Aden to meet the aeroplanes which

<sup>1</sup> A 179.

<sup>2</sup> "Challenger," Captain A. C. Sykes; "Laurentic," Captain V. G. Gurner.

were on their way from Europe, and she did not return until June 18th.

The "Challenger," which had been employed in the Cameroons, required refit and did not join the Commander-in-Chief's flag until July 8th after the first attack on the "Königsberg" had been delivered. The "Pyramus," however, which had been refitting at the Cape, since the early part of April, arrived on June 17th, and brought the squadron up to its full strength, and the Admiral proceeded to make his final arrangements.

58. *Orders for the Attack on the "Königsberg."*—On June 16th, Vice-Admiral King-Hall drew up his orders for the operation which he intended to carry out on July 6th. These provided for—

- (a) the main attack, to be delivered by the monitors.
- (b) support for the monitors.
- (c) feints and diversions.

With regard to the main attack this was to be at dawn by way of the Kikunya Mouth as previously decided, and the monitors were directed to proceed up it as far as the first large island which lies on the eastern side of the channel about  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles from Ras Simba Uranga at the entrance. It was hoped that in this vicinity they would be able to bombard the "Königsberg" from a distance of 9,000 to 12,000 yards, but the necessity was emphasised of manœuvring the monitors so as to bring the enemy within effective range as the charts could not be considered strictly accurate. The monitors were to moor head and stern, and fire simultaneously after each had been separately spotted on to the target either by direct observation, if possible, or by aeroplane reports. Two aeroplanes would be available for spotting duties, working reliefs from the aerodrome at Tirene, Mafia Island, 30 miles distant.

A third aeroplane was to endeavour to distract the enemy's attention at the commencement of the attack by bombing the "Königsberg."

The monitors were to be supported as far as possible by the "Weymouth" and "Pyramus." The Admiral would hoist his flag in the former ship, and both vessels were to follow the monitors over the bar and close the entrance to the river in order to shell the banks and prevent the enemy from strengthening his defences to harass the monitors on their return journey.

The "Hyacinth" and "Pioneer" were directed to close the Simba Uranga entrance at dawn and bombard the German defences there in order to divert the enemy's attention. The "Laconia" in the South Mafia Channel was to keep watch on the Msala Mouth.

In order to prevent the enemy from sending reinforcements of troops from Dar-es-Salaam, 60 miles distant, the "Laurentic" was detailed to demonstrate off that port on the day previous to the attack on the Rufiji. A few native troops were to be embarked at Zanzibar, and the "Laurentic" in company with a collier and three empty transports was to arrive off the port at dawn and send boats away ostensibly for minesweeping purposes. The troops were also to be practised in getting into boats, and every endeavour was to be made to give an impression that a landing was in prospect.

The attack on July 6th was delivered in accordance with these orders, the only important event in the interval being a successful air reconnaissance carried out on June 23rd, when the "Königsberg" was definitely located lying off the North-western point of Kokotoni Island close in to the western bank of the Channel. Practices were also carried out to exercise the aeroplanes in spotting for the monitors, and it was considered that satisfactory results were obtained.<sup>1</sup>

59. *The First Attack on the "Königsberg," July 6th.*— On July 5th the "Laurentic" carried out the demonstration off Dar-es-Salaam, as previously arranged, and apparently met with some success for though no troop movements were seen, at night considerable fires were observed on shore which appeared to indicate that the enemy was clearing vegetation in front of his positions in anticipation of a landing. At dusk the various vessels off the Rufiji anchored in pre-arranged positions in readiness for the operations next day, the monitors being guided to their anchorage off the Kikunya Mouth by lights displayed by the whalers which had anchored during daylight hours in accurately fixed positions.

At 4.15 a.m., July 6th,<sup>2</sup> the monitors weighed and proceeded towards the river regulating their speed so as to reach the entrance at dawn. As they approached at

<sup>1</sup> No attempt is made in this monograph to deal with the technical questions relating to the bombardment. These are fully described in M. 06236/15.

<sup>2</sup> H.W. Rufiji, 10 a.m. approximately.

5.40 a.m. while it was still dusk a field gun situated on Kikaguni Point to the northward of the entrance, opened fire but without effect and by 5.40 a.m. the monitors had passed Ras Simba Uranga and were in the river. Machine gun and rifle fire was promptly opened on them from the western bank, but it was somewhat feeble and easily suppressed by the monitors' fire; a party of men was also seen endeavouring to launch a torpedo, but it was soon dispersed, and the torpedo destroyed by the fire of the "Severn." By 6.20 a.m. the monitors had reached the northern end of the small island which divides the channel off Gengenji, and the two monitors anchored 2 cables apart close to the eastward of it at an estimated range of 10,800 yards from the "Königsberg."

A slight delay took place owing to the current swinging the monitors in an unexpected direction which forced the "Severn" to shift billet in order to bring both her guns to bear, but by 6.48 a.m. she was ready, and, the spotting aeroplane being in position, fire was opened by the "Severn." The "Mersey" followed suit shortly afterwards, and the two ships fired alternate salvos, but difficulty was experienced in receiving the spotting corrections. Meanwhile the remainder of the ships had proceeded in accordance with the pre-arranged orders, the "Hyacinth" and "Pioneer" bombarding the Simba Uranga entrance while the "Weymouth" and "Pyramus" crossed the Kikunya bar at 6.30 a.m. and opened fire at the enemy's positions directing special attention to the vicinity of Pemba Village which was believed to be the site of a German observation post.

The monitors meanwhile continued firing without any hits being reported, and at 7 a.m. the "Königsberg" commenced to reply with four and five-gun salvos. The enemy quickly obtained the range, and both ships were soon straddled; the enemy then concentrated on the "Mersey." At about 7.30 a.m. two shells burst very close to her, destroying the motor boat which was lying alongside and causing slight underwater injuries. As the enemy evidently had the range to a nicety her captain decided to shift billet further down the river, and was just weighing when a shell struck the fore 6-inch gun shield, putting the gun out of action, causing a cordite fire, and inflicting eight casualties (six killed or died of wounds). The "Mersey" then weighed, and at 7.40 a.m. proceeded down the river for a short distance to repair damages.



It would appear that the two ships firing alternately had confused the spotting aeroplane, which could not identify the salvos, as no sooner was the "Severn" firing alone than she commenced to hit at 7.51 a.m., and for about 20 minutes continued to make good shooting, scoring several hits and almost silencing the "Königsberg's" fire. At 8.10 a.m. the "Mersey" returned and commenced to fire with her one remaining gun, but with little success, as both monitors now got off the target, and the "Königsberg" resumed fire with three-gun salvos. The "Severn's" anchor had dragged so that only one gun would bear, and as shots were falling all around the ship Captain Fullerton decided to shift billet and open the range somewhat. This was done at 9.15 a.m., a position being taken up on the western bank of the channel about 11,300 yards from the "Königsberg." From this point the "Königsberg's" masts were just visible from the masthead. At 9.50 a.m. fire was opened again, but at this time there was no aeroplane spotting, as the machines had developed engine defects, and though firing was continued at intervals until 1.30 p.m. it appeared to have little result. On the other hand a hostile observation post established in the trees ashore had been detected and destroyed just before shifting billet, after which the "Königsberg's" firing became inaccurate and did not seriously trouble the monitors.

The Commander-in-Chief in the "Weymouth" withdrew from the river entrance, and passed outside the bar at 12.30 p.m. At about 11.30 a.m. he had ordered the monitors to close the "Königsberg" as necessary, but in view of there being no aeroplane available at this time the monitors remained in their previous position.<sup>1</sup>

At 1.30 p.m., as it was impossible to spot, the "Severn" weighed, and was proceeding down the river in order to close the "Weymouth" and ask for another aeroplane, when one appeared, and the monitor at once returned. She opened fire at a range of 11,000 yards at 2.30 p.m., but for some reason all her shots were spotted short, and she failed to get on to the target.

<sup>1</sup> In this despatch dated July 15th the Commander-in-Chief states that at 12.30 p.m. the monitors moved up the river and sighted the "Königsberg's" masts. This does not agree with Captain Fullerton's report of July 8th, from which it seems clear that "Königsberg's" masts were sighted after opening the range at 9.15 a.m. This is confirmed by the chart he attaches showing the positions of the monitors as it shows that the original 6.30 a.m. position was the nearest point of approach to the "Königsberg" on July 6th.

The monitors' guns by this time were excessively heated and considerably worn, which tended to disturb the calibration, and as no results were being obtained the Senior Officer decided at 3.30 p.m. to withdraw from the river, which was accomplished without further loss, though the ships were heavily shelled by the field guns near Kikunguni on the way out.

The expenditure of ammunition against the "Königsberg" on this day amounted to 633 rounds of 6-inch, besides a considerable quantity fired from the secondary armament against the enemy's shore defences. It was estimated that the German cruiser had been hit about 10 times, and the airmen reported that a small fire had been observed on board, but there was no certainty that any vital damage had been done, and the Commander-in-Chief decided that another attack would be necessary.

60. *The Final Attack on the "Königsberg" July 11th.*— It was obvious that the sooner the attack took place the better, since there could be no longer any question of surprise, and every day which elapsed would give the enemy more time to perfect his defensive arrangements. It was not, however, possible to resume the attack at once. Both monitors required to have their guns recalibrated; one gun of the "Mersey" required repair, and the aeroplanes required extensive refit and tuning up. It was decided that July 11th<sup>1</sup> would be the date of the next attack, and advantage was taken of the delay to introduce certain changes which experience had shown to be desirable.

It was now decided that only one monitor should be in action at a time to avoid confusion of salvos, and the "Severn" was to be the first vessel firing. She was to proceed past the previous position up the western bank of the channel where it is divided by the island off Gengen, and moor when within about 10,000 yards of the "Königsberg."

While the "Severn" was proceeding to this position the "Mersey" was to remain under way near the previous firing ground, *i.e.*, north of the island, and open fire at the "Königsberg." This fire was not to be spotted, and was solely intended to attract the "Königsberg's" attention until the "Severn" was ready to commence. If the "Severn" had not succeeded in putting the "Königsberg" out of action in an hour, the "Mersey"


<sup>1</sup> H. W. Rufji, 2.30 p.m. approximate.

was to proceed past her to within 7,000 yards of the enemy, and if this still proved indecisive the "Severn" was to complete the destruction of the "Königsberg" from a range of 6,000 yards. Emphasis was laid in the orders on the fact that the "Königsberg" must be accounted for, and subsequent attempts would probably be increasingly dangerous. To assist the crews of the monitors a Lieutenant (G), one Lieutenant, R.N., one Sub-Lieutenant, and several active service ratings were lent from the "Hyacinth."


The monitors were to cross the bar at 11 a.m., but otherwise the general disposition of the ships was similar to that on July 6th, except that the "Challenger" replaced the "Laconia" in the South Mafia Channel, and there was no demonstration off Dar-es-Salaam.

On July 11th the monitors crossed the bar at the pre-arranged time. At 11.35 a.m. the field guns on Kikaguni Point opened fire, hitting the "Mersey" twice and wounding two men slightly, but by 11.45 a.m. both vessels were within the entrance, and passed up the river almost unopposed. At 12.12 p.m. the "Mersey," having reached her allotted position north of the island, remained there, and the "Severn" was going on ahead to her firing station when the "Königsberg" opened fire, all shots falling at first considerably short. The "Mersey" at once opened fire to cover the advance of the "Severn," but did not succeed in diverting the enemy's attention. The Germans were firing rapid four-gun salvos, which drew gradually nearer to the "Severn," until just as she let go her first anchor and commenced to moor head and stern, the enemy straddled her. The situation was now somewhat critical, as it seemed very probable that the "Severn" would be hit and possibly put out of action before she could open fire, but happily this was not the case, for though repeatedly struck by splinters no damage was inflicted, and the first salvo was fired at 12.31 p.m.

The estimated range was 9,500 yards, but as five salvos were not spotted the range was reduced to 8,800 yards. The sixth and seventh salvos were a little over and to the left, and finally at 12.42 p.m. the eighth salvo was reported as hitting. The "Severn" continued to obtain hits until at 12.49 p.m. the spotting aeroplane was brought down by shrapnel fire and forced to land in the water near the "Mersey." While planing down the airmen gave the "Severn" the valuable information that though the range was accurate all the hits hitherto had



# EAST AFRICA No 4



NOTE:  
Sounding to fair line  
are by H.M.S. Chatham (1914)

Var. 5° 55' W (1918) decreasing about 9' annually

Longitude 39 20' East from Greenwich

been in the forward portion of the "Königsberg," and the result of this intelligence was seen when, after a suitable correction had been placed on the "Severn's" sights, a salvo fired at 12.52 p.m. was followed by a large explosion and dense clouds of smoke from the "Königsberg."

After this the enemy ceased firing, and the "Severn" continued firing till 1.46 p.m., when Captain Fullerton ordered the "Mersey" to close to within 7,000 yards and complete the destruction. About this time a number of explosions occurred in the "Königsberg" although no ship was firing at her, and it is probable that these were the result of an attempt to destroy the ship, which could no longer be defended.<sup>1</sup>

The "Mersey" proceeded up the river until stopped by a bar about 8,000 yards from the "Königsberg," but owing to the strength of the tide could only bring one gun to bear. At 2.15 p.m. the "Mersey" opened fire with an aeroplane spotting, and scored a hit with the third shot.

After the "Mersey" had fired 28 rounds it was evident that the "Königsberg" was heavily on fire,<sup>2</sup> had lost at least one funnel, and had a heavy list. Captain Fullerton realised that his task was completed, and at 2.30 p.m. ordered the monitors to withdraw from the river.

This was effected without difficulty, the "Pyramus" having earlier in the day steamed a distance of 3 miles up the river bombarding the German posts on the way, though at 3.35 p.m., as the monitors were approaching the bar, the field guns at Kikaguni opened fire again and hit the "Mersey" with a shell which failed to explode.

During this highly successful operation on July 11th, 1915, which put an end to the career of the "Königsberg," cleared up the situation on the East Coast of Africa, and brought to a final close the cruiser operations of the enemy, the expenditure of ammunition was 164 rounds of 6-inch lyddite and 40 rounds of 6-inch common, apart from the quantity used by the secondary armament of the monitors. The only casualties were the two men of the "Mersey" who had been slightly wounded early in the day.

<sup>1</sup> Lettow-Vorbeck, p. 85, states that the "Königsberg" was blown up and the guns disabled before being abandoned. The guns, however, were subsequently repaired and used ashore.

<sup>2</sup> Smoke was pouring from the top of her lower mast "like a factory chimney."

## A. 1. APPENDIX A.

## TELEGRAMS.

NOTE.—East African Time was  $2\frac{1}{2}$  hours fast on Greenwich. Indian Time 5 hours fast on Greenwich.

1. *From* Admiralty. July 28th (no time).  
*To* C.-in-C., Cape; C.-in-C., East Indies.  
Until "Nottingham" joins Cape Station, "Dartmouth" must be prepared to shadow German cruiser "Königsberg," now at Dar-es-Salaam.
2. *From* Admiralty. July 30th,  
Sent 11.30 a.m.  
*To* C.-in-C., Cape; C.-in-C., East Indies.  
"Dartmouth" is to proceed to Zanzibar.
3. *From* C.-in-C., East Indies. July 30th,  
Sent 11.50 a.m.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 11.15 a.m.  
Movements ordered. "Fox" to Colombo. . . . "Dartmouth" to Zanzibar, as soon as possible undock Bombay shadowing "Königsberg." "Swifsture" remaining Colombo ready for sea.
4. *From* C.-in-C., East Indies. July 30th.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 3.50 p.m.  
Your telegram. "Dartmouth" will not be ready to proceed until August 8th. C.-in-C., Cape, informed.
5. *From* C.-in-C., Cape. Zanzibar. August 1st.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 7.40 a.m.  
88. Arrived, coaled. "Königsberg" sighted 6 p.m. July 31st off Dar-es-Salaam, steaming fast to eastward. Unable to follow, owing to her speed. Confidently believe that she will remain on coast, but as her destination is unknown "Hyacinth" will proceed Cape; "Astræa" and "Pegasus" remain together on coast. Propose if war to arrange convoy system, if possible. If I can arrange for defence of Zanzibar, that place will be base; otherwise Mombasa, being less exposed for coaling ship and auxiliaries.  
Steam vessel "Tabora" arrived here July 30th; now in Dar-es-Salaam. Had on board an airman and aeroplane. "Pegasus" arrived.
6. *From* Admiralty. August 1st,  
*To* C.-in-C., East Indies. Sent 10.55 a.m.  
Consul Dar-es-Salaam reports "Königsberg" left 4.30 p.m. northerly with decks clear, coal, and provisions, water. "Königsberg" sighted by "Hyacinth" 6 p.m. July 31st off Dar-es-Salaam steaming fast to eastward. Unable to follow owing to her speed. C.-in-C., Cape, confidently believes she will remain on coast. Communicate to "Dartmouth."

7. *From* C.-in-C., Cape. Zanzibar. August 1st.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 8.15 p.m.
92. "Astræa" arrived, coaling. I leave daylight August 2nd Simonstown *via* Durban, arriving at latter August 7th. Cables for me should be sent to Durban and Zanzibar for transmission by W/T.
8. *From* British Resident, Zanzibar. August 3rd.  
*To* Colonial Office. Received 10.42 a.m.  
Admiral, after coaling, left here August 2nd, south. He left here temporarily two ships of war. The High Commissioner had no means of discussing with him the question of Zanzibar garrison.
9. *From* Governor-General, B.E.A. August 3rd.  
*To* Colonial Office. Received 8.25 p.m.  
(Gives details of troop positions.) . . . .  
O.C. troops concurs in opinion that it is impossible to spare an additional company for Zanzibar. I am unable to consult Admiral, who has returned south without coming to Kilindini. O.C. troops strongly advises the following troops be held in readiness India embark East Africa:—One regiment cavalry, one battery artillery, one brigade infantry, departmental services, and that warship be stationed at Mombasa.
10. *From* Governor General, B.E.A. August 5th.  
*To* Colonial Office. Received 11.30 a.m.  
S.N.O., Zanzibar, reports that if an attack is made he will co-operate in support. The O.C. troops considers that adequate protection is afforded by the arrangement. Owing to wide distribution of our troops, I have decided not to attempt reinforcement from the East African Protectorate.
11. *From* Admiralty. August 7th,  
*To* C.-in-C., East Indies, Colombo. Sent 1.55 p.m.  
"Dartmouth" left Bombay for Zanzibar this morning G.M.T., and you should now order her to assist in protection of trade route between India and Aden. Similar telegram sent "Dartmouth."
12. *From* C.-in-C., Cape, Durban. August 7th.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 8.25 p.m.
97. Arrived, coaling, sailing to-morrow Saturday night for Simonstown. Disposition of squadron as follows.  
Until "Dartmouth" arrives, "Astræa," "Pegasus" remaining East Coast with headquarters Zanzibar, and endeavouring to locate and capture "Königsberg." "Hyacinth" cruising off Cape in protection of trade focus. When "Dartmouth" arrives "Pegasus" will rejoin flag at Cape of Good Hope. Arrangements will then be made to escort garrison to St. Helena.  
Following telegram sent "Dartmouth" begins: Have lost touch with "Königsburg" since August 3rd. She is believed to have been joined by collier. It is possible she may go south of Red Sea. Proceed Aden quickly, looking out for her, and

if in that locality, destroy her. On arrival at Zanzibar, if there is no news of her, proceed Zanzibar. Ends. My telegraphic address, Simonstown.

13. *From Zanzibar.* August 8th,  
Sent 10.35 p.m.  
*To Admiralty.* Received 11.15 p.m.  
Following from "Astræa": Dar-es-Salaam installation has been destroyed, 2 a.m. Large mercantile auxiliary inside harbour disabled. Harbour closed by sunken floating dock. "Tabora" inside the harbour, acting as German hospital ship.
14. *From Admiralty.* August 9th,  
*To C.-in-C., Cape.* Sent 11.45 a.m.  
For the present "Pegasus" is to remain on East Coast. Armed cruiser, "Kinfauns Castle," sails to-day for the Cape, and will act under your orders. Leave for St. Helena with the garrison as soon as you feel the situation permits.
15. *From Admiralty.* August 9th,  
*To C.-in-C., East Indies.* Sent 12.35 p.m.  
"Swiftsure" and "Dartmouth" are to return to Bombay forthwith at highest possible speed complete with coal. Prepare to convoy troops to Aden.
16. *From C.-in-C., Cape.* August 12th,  
*To Admiralty.* Received 0055.  
101. C.-in-C., East Indies, informs me that "Dartmouth" has been re-called Bombay. From various reports received, it would seem that "Königsberg" is still on Cape of Good Hope Station. May I be informed when "Nottingham" or some fast ship may be expected.
17. *From Consul, Lorenzo Marques.* August 12th,  
*To Admiralty.* Received 12.26 p.m.  
Following despatched August 11th to S.N.O., Durban: Local naval authorities report that merchant vessel of the Empriza Hat de Navagacao, a Portuguese company, states that German ship "Königsberg" is in vicinity of Inhambane.
18. *From S.N.O., Simonstown.* August 12th,  
*To Admiralty.* Received 9.30 p.m.  
104. "Astræa" destroyed wireless station at Dar-es-Salaam on August 8th. She has made following terms with governor. (*Begins*):—  
First, that we are allowed to remove instruments and render ineffective your shore telegraph station.  
Second, that we are allowed to remove and render ineffective wireless installations of all ships lying in harbour.  
Third, an assurance from yourself that no further hostile acts shall be committed by you during the remainder of the war.  
Fourth, I require a guarantee that there are no guns, ammunition, or coal in your port which could be of use to a possible enemy, and that you give authority to the officer who

bears this to satisfy himself that my terms have been complied with.

Fifth, I claim all Government and merchant vessels now lying in the harbour as lawful prizes of war, and demand a guarantee that the masters of the said vessels will make no further attempts to take their vessels out or take further part in the war.

Sixth, I require a guarantee that the floating dock now sunk and blocking up entrance to harbour will not be raised. (*Ends terms.*) Terms accepted as affecting Dar-es-Salaam harbour and municipality only. Blockade Dar-es-Salaam, Bagamayo, and Tanga has been proclaimed by "Astræa."

19. *From Admiralty.* August 13th,  
*To C.-in-C., Cape.* Sent 11.40 a.m.
86. Your 101. "Nottingham" not available. "Astræa" ordered to Cape to convoy troops together with "Hyacinth."
20. *From Admiralty.* August 13th,  
*To "Astræa," Zanzibar.* Sent 11.55 p.m.  
Proceed to the Cape. "Königsberg" reported in vicinity of Inhambane.
21. *From C.-in-C., Cape.* August 15th,  
*To Admiralty.* Sent 11.15 a.m.  
Received 12.39 p.m.
107. "Hyacinth" proceeded to patrol line 50' long. South, from Cape of Good Hope. "Königsberg's" whereabouts still uncertain, but she may be working south. With reference to Admiralty cable 86, may I exercise my judgment as to keeping "Astræa," "Pegasus" on coast?
22. *From Admiralty.* August 13th,  
*To C.-in-C., Cape.* Sent 5.5 p.m.
87. "Königsberg" reported in vicinity of Inhambane. "Pegasus" to remain Zanzibar. To cover Durban and trade from "Königsberg," abandon the patrol mentioned in your 107, and proceed to Durban.
23. *From "Astræa," Zanzibar.* August 13th,  
*To Admiralty.* Sent 6.30 p.m.  
Received 6.03 p.m.  
Urgent. Following telegram received from Admiralty (*see* No. 20 *supra*): Is "Pegasus" to be left at Zanzibar?
24. *From Admiralty.* August 13th,  
*To Zanzibar.* Sent 10.00 p.m.  
"Pegasus" is to remain at Zanzibar.
25. *From British Resident, Zanzibar.* August 13th,  
*To Colonial Office.*  
I am informed by S.N.O., that Admiral who is at Cape Town contemplates ordering men-of-war now here to proceed South.

This will leave Zanzibar entirely unprotected, as garrison consists of one lieutenant and 104 natives. Fall of Zanzibar into German hands would be disastrous to our position in Africa. I, therefore, strongly urge necessity for men-of-war being ordered for the present to remain at Zanzibar.

26. *From Zanzibar.* August 14th,  
*To Admiralty.* Sent 9.30 a.m.  
"Astræa" sailed for South. I have assumed duties of S.N.O., Zanzibar. "Pegasus."
27. *From S.N.O., Simonstown.* August 14th,  
*To Admiralty.* No time given.
110. Consul-General, Lorenzo Marques, states report about "Königsberg" off Inhambane not very reliable. Report comes from Portuguese steamer, which saw vessel a long way off and thought it was "Königsberg."
28. *From C.-in-C. Cape. Durban.* August 15th,  
*To Admiralty.* Received 4.37 a.m.
112. Secretary of State for the Colonies has requested Union Government to seize Swakopmund and Luderitz Bay without delay. Governor-General asked me for escort for expedition which is being prepared. I submit "Hyacinth" return to Cape forthwith and leave "Astræa" to search for and deal with "Königsberg."
29. *From Admiralty.* August 15th,  
*To C.-in-C., Cape.* Sent 10.55 a.m.
93. Your 112. Approved "Hyacinth" to return to Cape. "Astræa" search for and deal with "Königsberg."
30. *From C.-in-C., Cape.* August 17th,  
*To Admiralty.* Received 5.59 a.m.
116. I submit "Pegasus" being alone at Zanzibar is very risky, as "Königsberg" has just double weight of broadside, superior speed, and torpedoes. I recommend that instead of proceeding to Cape as ordered by telegraph to "Astræa," August 13th, she should return from Inhambane, if "Königsberg" should not have been met with, and that she and "Pegasus" should act in company. Colliers with Welsh coal and oil due Zanzibar to-morrow, and I propose when both ships are completed they should closely search coast in company.
31. *From Admiralty.* August 17th,  
*To C.-in-C., Cape.* Sent 11.50 a.m.
102. Your 116 convoy of Cape troops must be escorted by both "Astræa" and "Hyacinth." Slight risk to "Pegasus," which is to remain at Zanzibar, must be accepted.
32. *From Admiralty.* August 17th,  
*To C.-in-C., East Indies.* Sent 3.42 p.m.
133. Order "Fox" to meet at a suitable rendezvous the transport carrying the 29th Punjabis to Zanzibar, and convoy her to Zanzibar. India Office is anxious for this force to be sent at once.

33. *From "Pegasus," Zanzibar.* August 17th,  
Sent 6.15 p.m.  
Received 9.19 p.m.  
*To Admiralty.*  
Have visited Tanga. Flag of truce flying on arrival. Terms of truce communicated to C.-in-C., Cape of Good Hope. Found in harbour and detained there, German ship "Markgraf" temporarily disabled by Germans. Also seven good steel lighters and one tug in good order, which have been claimed as lawful prizes.
34. *From India Office.* August 17th (no time).  
*To Viceroy, Army Department.*
507. Reference to previous correspondence regarding Expeditions A.B.C. Situation is changed by ambiguous attitude of Turkey. In circumstances, most desirable to reinforce Egypt as rapidly as possible. Consequently Expeditions B and C will be postponed and remainder of Expedition A expedited. 29th Punjabis may, however, proceed to Zanzibar if naval arrangements still admit.
35. *From "Pegasus."* August 18th.  
*To C.-in-C., Cape.*
27. Urgent. . . . . Am I to proceed to Mombasa if it is necessary?
36. *From C.-in-C., Cape.* August 18th.  
*To "Pegasus."*
25. Your 27. Yes, if you find it absolutely necessary; otherwise adhere to Admiralty instructions.  
(NOTE.—Nos. 35 and 36 are obtained from M.26778/15. Further report from Commander Ingles, late of "Pegasus.")
37. *From C.-in-C., Cape.* August 18th,  
Sent 10.45 a.m.  
*To Admiralty.* Received 11.38 a.m.
119. Following received from "Pegasus." (*Begins.*)  
(Details of operation at Tanga. *See No. 33 supra.*)  
The following terms were imposed:—  
No. 1. Same as Dar-es-Salaam No. 3.  
No. 2. Same as Dar-es-Salaam No. 5.  
No. 3. All telegraph instruments at Tanga communicating with South are to be rendered useless.  
No. 4. Not more than 50 armed native police are to be maintained for protection of residents and town, and this is to be the only force maintained.  
No. 5. Dhows are to comply with Clause 3, Chapter II., Hague Convention, 1907.  
No. 6. Guarantee that coal at present in town and on board "Markgraf" will be left intact, with the exception of 55 tons for local purposes.  
Terms agreed to, subject to your approval and the British Government. (*Ends.*)

38. *From* C. in-C., East Indies. August 19th,  
Sent 10.40 a.m.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 6.40 a.m.  
126. Your telegram 133. Transport "Nairung," with 29th Punjabis, left Karachi to-day. Will be met by "Fox" north of Seychelles and thence convoyed to Zanzibar.
39. *From* C.-in-C., Cape. August 20th,  
Sent noon.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 12.37 p.m.  
130. Following message received from "Pegasus" :—  
Have information that Governor of Mozambique reports that Germans have abandoned fort on north bank of Rovuma River, and that they have 500 white troops and 1,500 native troops on Portuguese frontier near Palmas. Also that there is a German merchant ship like "Tabora" hiding in vicinity of Rovuma River. This looks as if an expeditionary force is being organised. Request permission to send "Pegasus" to destroy ship referred to. Both cables to Seychelles are cut, and there is a considerable quantity of coal there quite unprotected; it might be worth while for Germans to seize it.
40. *From* Admiralty. August 20th,  
*To* "Pegasus," Zanzibar. Sent 6.6 p.m.  
Your proposal to destroy merchant ship of "Tabora" class approved. C.-in-C. informed.
41. *From* C.-in-C., Cape. August 21st,  
Sent 1.05 a.m.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 2.12 p.m.  
134. Your 112. "Pegasus" reports rumour now denied. I have ordered her to remain at Zanzibar.
42. *From* C.-in-C., Cape. August 21st.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 7.10 a.m.  
Following telegram received :—(*Begins.*) Mozambique, 19th, German steamer "Zieten" came in to-day when sailing from Colombo to Aden on 9th instant, met near Cape Guardafui German cruiser "Königsberg," three funnels, who had captured British steam vessel "City of Winchester." "Königsberg" ordered "Zieten" to reach neutral port with her passengers, 268, including 31 German seamen coming from New Guinea and take 17 men of captured ships' crews, including all captains (?) "Zieten" has not coaled. She took 250 tons from British ships at anchor for the purpose on Arabian coast. "Zieten" has plenty of flour as cargo and no coal. (*Ends.*) Repeating to ships on East Indies station.
43. *From* Consul, Mozambique. Intercepted by W.O.  
Censor.  
*To* Hall Line, Liverpool August 21st, 9.30 a.m.  
19th August 12.5 a.m. "Winchester" captured by Germans off Socotra. Crew Mozambique, except Second Officer, third engineer, carpenter, retained on board. All well.

44. *From* Admiralty. August 21st,  
*To* C.-in-C., Cape; S.N.O., Zanzibar. Sent 7.30 p.m.  
116. Government of India are empowered to communicate direct with C.-in-C., Cape, as to expeditions within Cape Command on matters of intelligence sending duplicates to S.N.O., Zanzibar. Replies may be sent similarly, but Admiralty must be kept fully informed except as to local details.
45. *From* S.N.O., Zanzibar. August 23rd.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 6.25 p.m.  
16. Visited Bagamayo to-day, could not come to terms. Eventually bombarded Custom House and vicinity for half an hour, and then left. Germans absolutely refused to allow anyone to land or inspect cable. Military appeared to be in charge. Although the District Commissioner came to an agreement with . . . (?) on application of "Pegasus" similar to terms of agreement given to Dar-es-Salaam and Tanga on landing he was apparently overruled by the military authorities who refused to recognise commissions authority. I give (sic) them one hour before bombarding.
46. *From* C.-in-C. Cape, Simonstown. August 25th,  
Sent 4.40 p.m.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 5.10 p.m.  
150. Referring to your telegram 116 submit I may be informed of expedition intended for East Africa—constitution of forces—what operations are contemplated and where.
47. *From* Admiralty. August 26th,  
*To* S.N.O., Zanzibar. Sent 12.25 p.m.  
The three battalions of Indian infantry for British East Africa under escort of "Fox" are to be landed at Mombasa. If naval situation permits, inform them accordingly by wireless, and that it is unnecessary to call at Zanzibar.  
(*Note.*—Only one battalion was actually on the way at this time.)
48. *From* Admiralty. August 26th,  
*To* C.-in-C., Cape. Sent 10.35 p.m.  
128. Your telegrams, 104 and 119, terms of truce Dar-es-Salaam and Tanga not approved as it is desired to reserve entire liberty of action. Report whether any immediate disclaimer locally is thought to be necessary. Letter follows.
49. *From* Admiralty. August 27th,  
*To* C.-in-C., Cape. Sent 1445.  
130. *Re* your telegram, 150 August 25th. One battalion Indian troops left Karachi August 19th for British East Africa to reinforce our troops there. "Fox" escorts them from Seychelles till "Pegasus" is met and takes over escort. "Fox" then proceeds Seychelles.



Expedition B consists of seven battalions, one mountain, and one howitzer battery. One company sappers, and is for offensive operations in German East Africa. Expedition C consists of three battalions of infantry to reinforce British East African troops. Both will leave India when ready and when C.-in-C., East Indies, can arrange escort probably middle of September.

50. From C.-in-C., Cape. August 27th  
Sent 3.40 p.m.  
Received 3.33.  
To Admiralty.
156. Your telegram No. 128. No immediate disclaimer considered necessary unless immediate action against them is contemplated when it would be advisable to inform them of expiration of truce at a certain date otherwise defences might be prepared and advantage of having imposed terms will be lost.
51. From Intelligence Officer, Singapore. August 29th.  
Received 11.27 a.m.  
To Admiralty.  
Captain and crew British vessel landed at Sabang ex "Königsberg."
52. From Admiralty. August 29th,  
Sent 7.25 p.m.  
To S.N.O., Zanzibar.  
"Fox" escorting "Nairung" with one battalion Indian troops for Mombasa should arrive shortly. Report their arrival and date. "Fox" will have coaled and be ready to return to her station. You should cover the expedition and assist it as necessary. Inform "Fox."
53. From Admiralty. August 30th,  
Sent 0.50 a.m.  
To S.N.O., Mombasa.  
H.M. Government does not ratify terms of truce Dar-es-Salaam and Tanga. You should inform Governors of the two towns of this at a convenient opportunity shortly before any further offensive is taken against either of the towns.
54. From S.N.O., Mombasa. August 30th.  
Received 11.32 a.m.  
To Admiralty.
21. Following received from Majunga.  
(Begins.) Warship painted grey, three funnels, two masts entered port 5.0 a.m. this morning, full speed, flying German flag, mainmast, bow, ship turned quickly and disappeared full speed towards North West.  
Note.—This was considered by the Admiralty to be a German report manufactured for our consumption.
55. From S.N.O., Mombasa. August 30th  
Received 12.15 p.m.  
To Admiralty.
22. Governor Madagascar notifies, officially, cruiser mentioned in my 21 is the "Königsberg."

56. From "Fox," Mombasa. September 2nd,  
Sent 10.0 a.m.  
Received 10.0 a.m.  
To Admiralty.  
It is most desirable that "Fox," if time permits, should en route to Bombay, visit Zanzibar, and Seychelles Islands in connection with reports of proximity of "Königsberg" and other matters. Request approval by telegraph.
57. From Admiralty. September 2nd,  
Sent 1.08 p.m.  
To "Fox," Mombasa.  
Yours of to-day in view of "Königsberg" superior speed this visit useless. Proceed as ordered to Bombay for convoy duties. "Pegasus" can be sent to Zanzibar if desirable.
58. From Admiralty. September 3rd,  
Sent 7.20 p.m.  
To C.-in-C., East Indies.
151. Expedition B for operations in German East Africa will not be sent from India at present. Expedition C and 1 battalion Indian infantry for Mauritius will be ready about 16th.  
Suggest "Fox" might act as escort. She is now returning to Bombay from Mombasa via Seychelles\* and should arrive Bombay about September 14th. "Fox" on return voyage from Mauritius is to form escort to British battalion en route to England from Mauritius as far as Aden.
59. From C.-in-C., Cape. September 4th.  
Received 9.30 p.m.  
To Admiralty.
183. Following received from Resident at Zanzibar: "Owing to our continued inactivity on this side of Africa it is evident that Germans in G.E.A. are disposed to adopt more active measures. Continued immunity of "Königsberg" from interference has no doubt encouraged them.  
"(Proposes that small steamer and tug at Dar-es-Salaam and Tanga should be captured as they might lay mines.)" I concur in proposal to remove steamer and tug and have directed "Pegasus" to do so when convenient.
60. From "Pegasus," Zanzibar. September 9th,  
Sent 7.10 p.m.  
Received 8.50 p.m.  
To Admiralty.  
By . . . . . impression conveyed to us at Tanga consider "Königsberg" is in this vicinity.
61. From C.-in-C., East Indies. September 12th,  
No time recorded.  
To Admiralty.  
Have arranged for "Chatham" to meet us in East longitude 55° when "Dartmouth" and "Hardinge" will be detached with East African force. "Dartmouth" considered preferable to "Fox" for this service as "Königsberg" on September 9th was reported in vicinity of Zanzibar.
62. From C.-in-C., Cape. September 14th,  
Sent 11.0 p.m.  
Received 11.17 p.m.  
To Admiralty.
212. It is rumoured Delagoa Bay that "Königsberg" proceeding Seychelles Islands for coal.

\* NOTE.—This was not the case. Compare No. 57.

63. *From C.-in-C., Cape.* September 15th,  
Sent 1.10 p.m.  
*To Admiralty.* Received 1.58 p.m.
215. Union Government have asked me to arrange for safe conveyance to Durban from Mombasa of cargo of ammunition which Government of India sent to them due at Mombasa October 1st. . . . I propose to send a gun to Seychelles if they can man it. I propose to do these services with "Kinfauns Castle." In view of Admiralty telegram 158 request approval.  
(NOTE.—Admiralty telegram 158 directed that armed merchant cruisers were only to be employed in conjunction with men-of-war.)
64. *From Admiralty.* September 16th,  
*To C.-in-C., Cape* Sent 1.20 p.m.
162. Your 215, In view of "Königsberg" being unlocated it is not desirable for "Kinfauns Castle" to go alone merely to convoy some ammunition. She can be worked in conjunction with "Astræa" and "Hyacinth" on trade protection and convoy work in Atlantic or near the Cape.
65. *From Resident, Zanzibar.* September 20th,  
Sent 7.53 a.m.  
*To Admiralty.* Received 6.30 a.m.
- Following from Captain, "Pegasus," begins:—  
Regrets "Pegasus" obliged to strike flag bombarded by "Königsburg" Zanzibar Harbour at dawn to-day while repairing engines and cleaning boilers. Our guns could not reach enemy. (*Message ends.*)  
"Königsberg" has disappeared towards the South.  
(Several other reports followed.)
66. *From C.-in-C., Cape.* September 20th,  
*To Admiralty.* Received 11.6 a.m.
232. Following telegram sent to Resident, Zanzibar: Urge every assistance be given to "Pegasus" landing and mounting her 4-inch Q.F. guns and forming ship's company into garrison.
67. *From C.-in-C., Cape.* September 20th,  
Sent 11.10 p.m.  
*To Admiralty.* Received 11.18 a.m.
280. Following telegram received from "Pegasus" (*begins*):  
Regret that "Pegasus" obliged to strike flag bombarded "Königsberg" Zanzibar Harbour dawn to-day whilst repairing engines and cleaning them. Our guns could not reach enemy. "Königsberg" has disappeared towards South.  
Following telegram sent to Zanzibar for "Pegasus" (*begins*):  
As "Königsberg" has left and not taken possession of you re-hoist flag. Report as soon as possible whether ship is seaworthy and fit for service, also casualties. (*Ends.*)
68. *From Admiralty.* September 20th,  
*To C.-in-C., East Indies.* Sent 12.30 p.m.
175. The "Königsberg" was in action at Zanzibar this morning September 20th, afterwards steaming south. "Emden" is also

- located. Neither of these two ships can reach convoy before Aden. "Dartmouth" and "Fox" are to convoy East African Expedition at best speed of transports to Mombasa. Order "Chatham" to proceed Zanzibar at once. "Dartmouth" after arrival of convoy is to hunt "Königsberg" in concert with "Chatham." Most urgent this ship should be destroyed. "Fox" to return for convoy duties.
69. *From Resident, Zanzibar.* September 20th,  
Sent 3.0 p.m.  
*To Admiralty.* Received 1.27 p.m.
25. Following from High Commissioner East African Protectorate and at his request: It seems probable result Zanzibar will be advance in force by (? land or landing) on Mombasa. Naval assistance absolutely necessary defence for safety of landing facilities remainder force C. Pray inform naval authorities.  
Following from Captain Ingles:—  
"Pegasus" has turned over in comparatively shallow water.
70. *From C. in-C., East Indies.* September 20th,  
Sent 6.10 p.m.  
*To Admiralty.* Received 2.19 p.m.
172. After arrival of "Dartmouth" Mombasa with convoy I propose that "Dartmouth" should search out and destroy "Königsberg" before returning to East Indies Station. Can continue convoy programme with five ships of war then left available.
71. *From Admiralty.* September 21st,  
*To Admiral Superintendent, Malta.* Sent 12.30 p.m.
- "Minerva" to relieve "Weymouth" on escort duty to Marseilles. "Weymouth" to escort "Minerva's" transports to Egypt and at once proceed *via* Suez Canal to join "Dartmouth" and "Chatham" in hunt for "Königsberg."
72. *From C.-in-C., Cape, Simonstown.* September 21st,  
*To Admiralty.* Received 3.30 p.m.
236. I suggest that instead of "Hyacinth" relieving "Astræa" at Walfisch Bay she should come direct to Cape from St. Helena . . . . and that I should proceed in "Hyacinth" with "Kinfauns Castle" to East Coast and search for "Königsberg" in co-operation with "Chatham," which has been ordered from Aden to Mombasa.
73. *From Admiralty.* September 21st,  
*To C.-in-C., East Indies.* Sent 7.20 p.m.
180. "Weymouth" is being sent from the Mediterranean and placed under your orders to assist "Chatham" and "Dartmouth" in searching for "Königsberg."

74. *From Admiralty.* September 29th,  
*To C.-in-C., East Indies.* Sent 7.45 p.m.
192. "Chatham," "Dartmouth," and "Weymouth" are to act under the orders of Captain of "Chatham" as soon as the ships are available for concerted movements against "Königsberg."
75. *From Admiralty.* October 1st,  
*To S.N.O., Aden, for "Weymouth."* Sent 2.30 p.m.
- "Weymouth" is to coal as quickly as possible and proceed to cruise in the vicinity of Socotra. She should keep not more than about 200 miles from Socotra, picking up all the information possible from passing ships and by W/T from Aden and deal with "Emden" if she comes into that locality. "Königsberg" also might come North.
- (NOTE.--"Weymouth" did not receive these orders.)
76. *From Admiralty.* October 1st,  
*To C.-in-C., Cape.* Sent 8.0 p.m.
198. In order to relieve pressure on your resources the East Coast of Africa North of Delagoa Bay has been transferred for all purposes to East Indies Station. . . . C.-in-C., East Indies, informed.
77. *From C.-in-C., East Indies.* October 4th,  
Sent 1.25 p.m.  
*To Admiralty.* Received 11.41 a.m.
196. I have directed that if "Chatham" is unable to continue search for "Königsberg" "Weymouth" is to be detained, Mombasa instead operating off Socotra as ordered in Admiralty telegram 198.
78. *From Admiralty.* October 4th,  
*To East Indies.* Sent 1.35 p.m.
205. "Fox" will be required at Mombasa to assist G.O.C. Expedition B and is to be given orders to co-operate with him and assist him in disembarkation and operations on coast of German East Africa. "Fox" should assist in search for enemy cruisers till required for above operations in the vicinity of Zanzibar.
79. *From Admiralty.* October 4th,  
*To C.-in-C., East Indies (206).* Sent 6.45 p.m.  
"Chatham," Mombasa.  
*C.-in-C., Cape (203).*  
. . . . "Königsberg" may be in East African waters.
80. *From C.-in-C., East Indies.* October 5th,  
Sent 4.20 p.m.  
*To Admiralty.* Received 12.42 p.m.
201. Your 205. Following sent to S.N.O., East Africa :—  
(Begins.) "Fox" is to take "Chatham," "Dartmouth," and "Weymouth" under orders and assume charge of search

- for "Königsberg" so long as operations remain in area convenient to control by "Fox," but in event of "Königsberg" being reported at a distance from Mombasa, charge is again to be transferred to "Chatham," and "Fox" is to remain in vicinity of Mombasa. Details of search programme already approved are to be obtained from "Chatham," and are not to be interfered with, but "Fox" may suggest modifications.
81. *From C.-in-C., East Indies.* October 7th,  
Sent 6.25 p.m.  
*To Admiralty.* Received 3.2 p.m.
208. "Weymouth" did not receive Admiralty Telegram No. 198 at Aden. S.N.O., Mombasa, has been directed to send her back to Socotra in accordance therewith.
82. *From Admiralty.* October 8th,  
*To C.-in-C., East Indies.* Sent 2.0 a.m.
217. Your 208. As "Emden" does not appear to have gone west, use your own discretion in ordering "Weymouth" to join in "Königsberg's" search.
83. *From C.-in-C., Cape.* October 7th,  
Sent 3.45 p.m.  
*To Admiralty.* Received 6.0 p.m.
282. [Paraphrase.] Believed "Königsberg" is anchored off Aldeira Island, near Angoche. Have informed "Dartmouth" by W/T and told him I think he should proceed there at once.
84. *From C.-in-C., East Indies.* October 8th,  
Sent 11.50 a.m.  
*To Admiralty.* Received 7.27 a.m.
211. My telegram. "Weymouth" now ordered to Caldeira Island, "Königsberg" having been reported anchored there.
85. *From "Fox," Mombasa.* October 8th,  
Sent 5.55 p.m.  
*To Admiralty.* Received 6.56 p.m.
- I have ordered "Weymouth" to Zanzibar to complete with coal, then to proceed to vicinity of Angoche Island.
86. *From Mombasa.* October 9th,  
Sent 2.50 p.m.  
*To Admiralty.* Received 1.46 p.m.
24. Operations by "Fox," "Chatham," "Dartmouth," "Weymouth" against "Königsberg," cannot be continued without increased supply of Welsh coal. 800 tons per week for each "Chatham," and 400 tons per week for "Fox," should be available to avoid possibility of checking search operations, that is total per week 2,800 tons Welsh coal. To-day, 9th October, no Welsh coal left at Mombasa or at Zanzibar.
87. *From C.-in-C., Cape.* October 10th,  
Sent 10.50 a.m.  
*To Admiralty.* Received Noon.
292. Following received from "Dartmouth."  
Have searched Angoche and Primeira Islands. No trace of "Königsberg." Captured German tug "Adjutant" in Casuarina Rapids inside three-mile limit. Officers mostly Naval Reserves. As no means of leaving her interned, I am towing her towards Mombasa. (Ends.)

88. *From* "Fox," Mombasa. October 10th,  
Sent 4.25 p.m.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 6.35 p.m.  
Following received from "Dartmouth" (*see* No 87.)  
Request instructions. Will be unable to search Comoro Islands owing to coal. (*Ends.*)  
"Fox" endeavoured to get following message sent to "Dartmouth" through "Weymouth," then near Zanzibar, but up to noon, October 10th, unable to do so. Begins.  
As "Dartmouth," with German tug Adjutant in tow, is now outside Portuguese territorial waters "Dartmouth" is to tow on escort tug to Mombasa taking greatest to keep well clear of all land and, if possible to be sighted by no one until tug has been safely deposited at Mombasa.
89. *From* Admiralty. October 11th,  
*To* C.-in-C., East Indies, S.N.O., Sent 5.30 a.m.  
Mombasa.  
For "Chatham" and "Fox."  
The most energetic measures in co-operation are to be taken to hunt the "Königsberg." Colliers are to be taken so as to avoid continually returning to Zanzibar to coal. "Dartmouth" should either remove the crew of tug and sink the tug, or remove some of the prisoners and place a prize crew on board.
90. *From* "Fox," Mombasa. October 12th,  
Sent 1.50 a.m.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 1.43 a.m.  
*Re* your telegram October 11th. Will pass instructions to "Dartmouth" when in wireless touch. I had already arranged for a collier to be stationed at Comoro Islands, but no collier has yet arrived at Mombasa. "Chatham's" repairs cannot be completed till 15th. I propose employing two "Chathams" in Mozambique Channel up to latitude of Comoro Islands. Third "Chatham" patrolling the coast along Cape Delgado to Zanzibar and "Fox," Mombasa, Zanzibar and vicinity. Until collier is available, however, regret cannot take action.
91. *From* British Consul General, October 12th,  
Lorenzo Marques. Sent 1.50 p.m.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 3.55 p.m.  
21. Urgent. German ship "Königsberg" sheltering behind Hurd and Caldeira Islands near Angoche. Local authorities presume German ship either damaged or out of coal.
92. *From* Admiralty. October 13th,  
*To* "Chatham," Mombasa. Sent 4.40 p.m.  
"Königsberg's" position confirmed by Portuguese naval authorities. Use all prudent despatch and attack her without regard to neutral waters.
93. *From* "Chatham," Mombasa. October 14th,  
Sent 11.30 p.m.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 11.46 p.m.  
33. "Weymouth" reports no sign of "Königsberg" after complete search of Angoche Islands. I consider that report of

- "Königsberg" sheltering under Hurd Island very probably due to "Dartmouth" having searched same position on October 9th and being mistaken for "Königsberg."
94. *From* "Chatham," Mombasa. October 15th,  
Sent 3.0 p.m.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 2.20 p.m.  
"Chatham" sailed. "Dartmouth" and "Weymouth" continuing search coast South Cape Delgado using Comoro Islands as coaling base at present. "Chatham" will search coast North Cape Delgado and keep in touch by wireless as far as possible Zanzibar and Mombasa through "Fox." C.-in-C., East Indies, informed.
95. *From* "Chatham," Zanzibar. October 21st,  
Sent 8.50 a.m.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 8.55 a.m.  
During search Lindi Harbour, October 19th, "Chatham" captured German steamer "President," German East Africa Line, 2,000 tons, four miles up River Lindi from entrance. "President" has been often reported as working with "Königsberg." I found her flying hospital flag, but not painted white as in para. 5, p. 67, Naval Prize Manual, and not fitted as a hospital ship . . . Consequently I have disabled her and notified she is a prize . . . There are numerous harbours such as Lindi along German Coast where "Königsberg" could easily shelter completely hidden "Chatham." "Chatham" searching there with ships and with boats.  
I consider that any German steamer which can be of use to the "Königsberg" should be destroyed or disabled if met with during searches, provided operation of searching is not delayed thereby and have given instructions accordingly. Collier "Bronmer" arrived at Mayotta 19th October.
96. *From* Admiralty. October 21st,  
*To* "Chatham." Sent 6.55 p.m.  
Your action *re* "President" approved. Capture or destroy every German ship.
97. *From* Colonial Office. October 22nd,  
*To* Governor-General, British East Sent 5.45 p.m.  
Africa.  
Force B in 13 transports sailed October 16th and 17th, due Mombasa about October 27th. Intention is in first place to secure line from Tanga to Moshi. Presumably therefore there will be no disembarkation at Mombasa.
98. *From* "Chatham," Mombasa. October 23rd,  
Sent 5.35 p.m.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 9.38 p.m.  
Consul reports Germans at Mozambique nervous and telegraphing everywhere for news of the tug captured by the "Dartmouth." This news confirms my opinion already telegraphed that . . . "Königsberg" is probably south of Mozambique. Have ordered "Weymouth" to continue search coast north and south of Mozambique, and "Dartmouth," when finished coaling, to proceed to Mozambique for information.

99. From "Chatham," Mombasa. October 23rd,  
Sent 7.40 p.m.  
Received 10.20 p.m.  
To Admiralty.  
Report from Zanzibar 21st October indicates possibility that "Königsberg" is at Dar-es-Salaam. Accordingly "Chatham" proceeded to Dar-es-Salaam p.m. 21st October, keeping 3 miles from entrance for fear of mines. (Fired at wireless aerial resembling "Königsberg." White flag hoisted.) Next morning sent Officers in to search harbour. . . . "Königsberg" not there. . . . Informed Acting Governor I considered truce arranged by "Astræa" and "Pegasus" with Dar-es-Salaam and Tanga was to be disregarded after sinking of "Pegasus" by "Königsberg," and also as many reports received "Königsberg" had been using harbour.
100. From "Chatham." October 25th,  
Sent 12.25 p.m.  
Received 1.19 p.m.  
To Admiralty.  
Present position as follows: Have searched the whole coast of German East Africa except Sarari 6' up delta of Rufiji River. Chart 662. It seems probable therefore that "Königsberg" is south of Cape Delgado or at Sarari. "Dartmouth" and "Weymouth" continue to search coast south of Cape Delgado. "Weymouth" goes to Beira and "Dartmouth" to Mozambique from Mayotte. Papers captured in the "President" show coal was sent in lighters September 15th from Lindi to Sarari for use of "Königsberg," and German charts show river navigable by "Königsberg," but very narrow. Propose, if possible, to search river up to Sarari in boats, after destroying numerous signal stations in vicinity.  
Expect to finish repairs to condensers by morning October 27th and leave the same day.
101. From C.-in-C., East Indies. October 26th.  
To Admiralty. Received 2.25 p.m.  
240. Following received from "Chatham," Mombasa (*begins*): Re my telegram October 25th, reporting present situation. Is a seaplane available to be sent to Mombasa for use in search operations, as it is impossible for "Chatham" to cover boats employed in searching river up to Sarari? (*Ends.*)  
Request seaplane may be sent, as one would be invaluable for this service.
102. From C.-in-C., Cape. October 30th,  
Sent 10.20 p.m.  
Received 10.18 p.m.  
To Admiralty.  
342. Following from Zanzibar.  
Report received from "Chatham" (*begins*): Located "Königsberg" at Sarari, 6 miles up River Rufiji. (*Ends.*)
103. From Admiralty. October 31st.  
To C.-in-C., Cape. Received 2.2 a.m.  
235. Your 342. Pass following to "Chatham":—  
Well done, hold her and fight her without fail.

104. From "Chatham." October 31st.  
To Admiralty. Received 2.10 a.m.  
In continuation of previous telegram re "Königsberg," "Chatham" arrived off delta of Rufiji daylight 30th October, sending in armed boats to Kiomboni, see Chart 662. Seized three natives, who stated definitely "Königsberg" at Sarari, 6 miles up Simba Uranga with Somali and three small steamboats. Troops entrenched on each side of mouth S. Uranga with light guns and maxim guns and entrance mined. Natives have seen "Königsberg" with force digging trenches. Subsequently proceeded as close S. Uranga mouth as soundings permit, and distinguished mast ship undoubtedly "Königsberg" showing clearly above trees; also masts, Somali.  
"Chatham" cannot approach within 5 miles from S. Uranga mouth. Propose to use two small steamers from Zanzibar and Mombasa armed with guns Q.F. 3-pdr. Vickers attack trenches and some troops to co-operate by landing at Kiomboni.  
Have asked for "Fox" as soon as she can be spared, meanwhile recalling "Dartmouth" and "Weymouth." Am watching off Mafia Island with due precaution. Consider "Königsberg" most probably short of coal, and if she will not come out I must block her in.
105. From Admiralty. October 31st,  
Sent 4.35 p.m.  
To C.-in-C., China; C.-in-C., Cape; C.-in-C., East Indies; S.N.O., Mombasa.  
Captain Caulfield, of "Fox," is to embark in "Hardinge," and "Hardinge" is to remain to cover military expedition Mombasa, Dar-es-Salaam. (*Sic.*)  
"Fox" is to be sent to act under orders of "Chatham." "Chatham" to report whether "Fox" can bring long-range fire to bear on "Königsberg." "Chatham" and "Fox" to hold capture or destroy "Königsberg" without fail. . . .  
"Goliath" to stand by for a few days and prepare to proceed with all despatch to Cape when ordered. One of "Goliath's" picket boats with dropping gear and torpedoes can be left with "Chatham" if considered desirable.  
"Dartmouth" and "Weymouth" to operate against "Emden" proceeding *via* St. Pierre (Providence Islands), Diego Garcia up the Maldivé Islands to Minekoi and thence to Colombo.
106. From C.-in-C., Cape. October 31st,  
Sent 1.35 p.m.  
Received 2.6 p.m.  
To Admiralty.  
345. Am paying off hydroplane to-day as not satisfactory for long flight, but it is still available and might be useful for attack on "Königsberg." I have had some bombs made at Kynochs, Durban, and can get more. Shall I send machine up to "Chatham" in "Kinfauns Castle"?  
(NOTE.—This was approved.)
107. From Admiralty. November 1st.  
To "Chatham." Sent 1.45 p.m.  
238. Destruction or capture of "Königsberg" is a matter of the highest importance. Don't miss your opportunity on any

account. Wire your plans. . . . Do you require troops? Ask for whatever you want which is locally available, but act with promptitude. Keep Admiralty informed, but don't delay action.

108. *From* "Goliath," Mombasa. November 1st,  
Sent 6.10 p.m.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 6.24 p.m.  
Arrived at Mombasa repairing thrust block joints and defects due to condensers leaking necessitating steam down for at least 10 days.

109. *From* Governor-General, East Africa. November 1st.  
*To* Colonial Office. Received 6.5 p.m.

178. Nov. 1st. Tanga will be occupied by Force B and they will advance in the direction of Moshi. An advance on Moshi from Logido *via* Arusha will simultaneously be made by part of C Force. Moshi is reported to be strongly garrisoned and entrenched.

110. *From* "Chatham." November 3rd.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 4.15 a.m.

During morning of November 2nd completed sounding work from boats obtained depth of water only 6 feet at low water 4 miles from entrance. "Dartmouth" and "Weymouth" arrived noon to-day. ("Königsberg" out of sight. Considers she is probably short of coal.)

As "Königsberg" is definitely outside range of our guns, propose to obtain steamers to sink in narrow part of river at first bend . . . also to stop all communication between "Königsberg" and shore by occupying mainland with troops. "Fox" informs me that to-day G.O.C. stated that he cannot spare any troops for 10 days. Meanwhile I am guarding entrance. I shall consider possibility of attacking with torpedoes from steamboats when troops are available for holding banks of river.

111. *From* "Chatham." November 3rd,  
Sent 10.10 p.m.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 10.16 p.m.

At top of spring tide "Chatham" got within 1-1½' of entrance 14,000 yards of "Königsberg." Depth of water for over 3' approach varies from 3 to 4 fathoms soft mud at highest tide . . . (Fired for half an hour at "Königsberg" and Somali.) Owing to the grave risk of grounding, I do not propose to go in close again, especially as spring tide now over.

112. *From* Admiralty. November 4th,  
*To* "Chatham." Sent 1.30 a.m.

(Suggests that a 6-inch gun should be mounted in some local shallow-draught vessel.)

"Fox" and "Chatham" should continue to blockade "Königsberg." Attack by boats, either with or without torpedoes, may result in heavy losses, owing to the ease with

which they can be ambuscaded in mangrove creeks, and provided "Königsberg" cannot escape she should not be attacked without good chances of success.

113. *From* Admiralty. November 5th,  
*To* S.N.O., Zanzibar; S.N.O., Mombasa. Sent 2.10 a.m.  
"Fox" is to proceed at once to assist "Chatham" in watching "Königsberg." Zanzibar to procure merchant ships or dhows for blocking channels and send them to "Chatham" as soon as possible.

114. *From* S.N.O., Mombasa. November 5th,  
Sent 9.0 a.m.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 10.55 a.m.

Following received from "Fox":—Regret to report information as follows received 9 p.m. November 4th from G.O.C. Force B (*begins*): Opposition far more serious than was expected. Numerous casualties. Large proportion of Indian troops proved unreliable makes it absolutely necessary to re-embark whole of force, an operation fraught with considerable danger. (*Ends.*) Scheme for re-embarkation of whole force has been completed, and hope and expect will be carried out successfully this afternoon, November 5th. Do not think it necessary to divert "Chatham," "Dartmouth" from "Königsberg" operation.

115. *From* Admiralty. November 5th,  
*To* S.N.O., Mombasa. Sent 11.30 p.m.

*For* "Chatham."

On no account stop blocking "Königsberg." Let no military considerations or needs, however urgent, divert you from this vital duty, for which you are held absolutely responsible.

116. *From* S.N.O., "Mombasa." November 6th.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 12.40 a.m.

Following received from "Fox":—Re-embarkation of whole of Force B successfully carried out this afternoon, November 5th. No casualties. G.O.C. has asked for truce to embark wounded to-morrow morning. "Fox" escorting convoy to Mombasa.

117. *From* "Chatham." November 6th.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 7.15 a.m.

"Königsberg" is up the Suninga branch, and it is the only branch she can use. Simba Uranga and Kiomboni branches not navigable at high water, even for dhows or steamboats, owing to numerous intricate banks, consequently unnecessary to block any other entrance than Suninga Branch. (Proposal to arm a light draught vessel with 6-inch gun considered impracticable, as no direct observation is possible.)

118. *From* "Chatham," November 7th,  
Sent 7.15 p.m.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 8.18 p.m.

Consider that half battalion of troops reinforced by detachment from "Fox," "Chatham," and "Goliath" sufficient for

destroying enemy on shore. Will telegraph for one of the generals to come down in the "Fox" to advise; hope to block entrance morning 10th November. Referring to use of light draught vessels with 6-inch guns the position where observation station in trees I could use against "Königsberg" is on Suninga Island but this must be commanded by guns of "Königsberg."

119. <sup>125</sup> *From* India Office. November 7th  
*To* General Aitken, Mombasa. No time given.  
 No. 1337. Government direct that if S.N.O. applies for his services General Tighe should be despatched to the Rufiji River to report on situation there and possibility of military co-operation.
120. *From* Admiralty. November 7th,  
 Sent 12.45 a.m.  
*To* C.-in-C., Cape; C.-in-C., East Indies; S.N.O., Mombasa.  
 "Goliath" will remain in East African waters for the present to assist in operations on that coast.
121. *From* Admiralty. November 9th,  
 Sent 1.30 a.m.  
*To* S.N.O., Mombasa.  
 Keep Admiralty fully informed by a daily telegram of your future proceedings. Report on desirability of bombarding Dar-es-Salaam.
122. *From* Admiralty. November 9th,  
 Sent 1.5 p.m.  
*To* S.N.O., Mombasa.  
 "Goliath" is to assist G.O.C. in operations on East African coast and when able to proceed can bombard Tanga to inflict maximum possible damage to combatants, there and elsewhere. Inform G.O.C.
123. *From* "Fox," Zanzibar. November 10,  
 Sent 5.5 a.m.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 4.28 a.m.  
 I have discussed with General, Resident at Zanzibar, and others, the question of moral effect on natives of systematic and ruthless bombardment, and their opinion was unanimous that unless the bombardment was followed up by occupation, its ultimate effect on British prestige would be prejudicial.
124. *From* "Chatham." November 11th,  
 Sent 4.40 p.m.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 5.5 p.m.  
 "Chatham" now proceeding to Mombasa, coal and obtain stores, returning to meet "Kinfauns Castle" with seaplane off Mafia Island 14th or 15th November. For watching off Simba Uanga. Average draught of "Fox" is five feet more than "Chatham" and "Weymouth," which severely handicaps "Fox" . . . "Fox" could not approach close enough to shell entrance which would be necessary to cover landing of troops

without grave risk of grounding, and "Fox's" guns much shorter range than "Weymouth." Consequently, submit "Weymouth" be detailed to work with "Chatham" in place of "Fox." "Weymouth" at present proceeding to Mombasa to coal . . .

125. *From* Admiralty. November 12th,  
*To* S.N.O., Mombasa. Sent 2.30 a.m.  
 Captain Caulfield will exchange into "Chatham" taking temporary command of "Chatham" and proceeding at once to Gibraltar. "Weymouth" will also proceed to Gibraltar, both ships with all despatch Captain Drury-Lowe is appointed S.N.O., East African Coast. "Fox," "Goliath," and "Kinfauns Castle" when she arrives are placed under his command. His first duty is to prevent escape of "Königsberg," secondly to effect her speedy destruction or capture . . . A definite plan must now be made by Captain Drury-Lowe after consultation with General Tighe. This plan should be communicated without delay to the Admiralty for approval.  
 Meanwhile one ship is always to watch to prevent escape of "Königsberg."
126. *From* Chatham, Mombasa. November 12th,  
*To* Admiralty. Received 5.16 p.m.  
 I have to-day, 12th November, conferred with G.O.C. re-employment of troops, and I have arranged definite plans. Troops cannot leave Mombasa before 15th November. The military plan required support of guns from two ships which had proposed should be "Chatham" and "Weymouth," as "Fox" draws too much water . . . I submit "Fox" cannot safely approach river to cover troops landing or for other operations and guns have 4,000 yards less range. . . . Retention of at least one light cruiser is necessary.
127. *From* Admiralty. November 12th,  
*To* C.-in-C., East Indies. Sent 6.40 p.m.  
 S.N.O., Mombasa.  
 "Weymouth's" orders to proceed Gibraltar cancelled. She is to proceed at once to Simons Bay. Acknowledge and report when she has sailed.
128. *From* C.-in-C., East Indies. November 13th,  
*To* Admiralty. Sent 9.40 a.m.  
 Received 6.16 a.m.
281. "Chatham" represents that "Goliath" and "Fox" are quite unsuited for operations required for which ships of lighter draught are essential, also that covering fire which is necessary for success of operations cannot be brought to bear by ships of such draught. I agree and urge that decision to withdraw "Chatham" be reconsidered.  
 Moreover, most undesirable to leave station without single fast cruiser and attack of Tanga requires full attention of "Fox."

282. I assume that Admiralty are conducting the operations, and will give decision and reply direct to "Fox" and "Chatham" with regard to their proposals, telegraphed 12th November, for attack on Tanga and "Königsberg." Is this correct?  
(Reply sent 1.20 a.m. November 14th. Your 282; Yes.)

129. *From Admiralty.* November 13th,  
*To S.N.O., Mombasa.* Sent 8.15 p.m.  
C.-in-C., East Indies.  
Following for "Chatham."  
The three objects to be attained rank in importance and urgency as follows, viz. :—  
First and vital, not to let "Königsberg" escape.  
Second, to release "Chatham" for serious needs elsewhere.  
Third, to destroy or capture "Königsberg."  
If presence of "Chatham" is the only way in which first can be secured, she must stay, and in that case the military operations proposed in your telegram of November 13th should proceed so as to get "Chatham" free at earliest possible date, but if "Fox" alone, or with "Kinfauns Castle" and with "Goliath" if necessary, can make certain of keeping "Königsberg" blocked in without fail then it is more urgent to set free "Chatham" than to destroy "Königsberg."  
All operations on East African Coast can stand over. Telegraph fully one way or the other, meanwhile captains should not exchange ships.

130. *From General Aitken, Nairobi.* November 13th.  
*To India Office.* Received 8.16 p.m.  
S. 38. Have had consultation with Governor and Stewart regarding present situation and future action offensive and defensive.  
As regards offensive, present strength in colony of enemy estimated at least 5,000 Europeans and 9,000 natives. An unknown factor in the number of reinforcements from Far East and Australia which may prove to materially increase above estimate<sup>1</sup> . . . . . Our original information was not only meagre but very inaccurate, and I do not know what opposition we may meet. In view of above and size of the county, I am of opinion that at least two divisions of first-class troops would be required possibly more to completely occupy country. (Has distributed his reliable troops to defend the railway.) Governor thinks that unless offensive operations can be thoroughly carried out, defensive operations only had better be undertaken.

131. *From "Chatham," Mombasa.* November 14th,  
Sent 10.5 a.m.  
*To Admiralty.* Received 9.5 a.m.  
Your telegram 13th November.  
With reference to three objects to be obtained. First :—  
Consider it essential to ascertain definitely if "Königsberg" is capable of escaping or not, otherwise we are acting in the

<sup>1</sup> This statement was due to unfounded rumours that numbers of German reservists had reached German East Africa from Australia and China after the outbreak of war.

dark, and neither "Fox," "Goliath," nor "Kinfauns Castle" could make certain of preventing escape of "Königsberg," owing to draught, short range of guns, and low speed.

To obtain this definite information it is necessary to employ troops, and presence of "Chatham" is essential. General Tighe considers the land investment and holding of positions recommended impossible of success without preliminary heavy bombardment of entrenched positions; this cannot be effected except with light cruisers, owing to depth of water. . . . . "Fox" must now act in place of "Weymouth" as far as it is possible. I have told General Tighe of urgency for immediate action and asked for earliest date troops will be ready. General Tighe states British troops must be employed, and is now inquiring of G.O.C. if they are available, stating he cannot undertake operations with Indian troops. . . . .

Meanwhile "Chatham" leaves, November 14th, to meet "Kinfauns Castle" and get seaplane reconnaissance started which should definitely locate "Königsberg" and give valuable information for the military operations.

132. *From Admiralty.* November 14th,  
*To "Chatham," Mombasa.* Sent 8.0 p.m.  
Your telegram sent at 10.5 a.m., 14th, approved. Number your telegrams.
133. *From General Aitken.* November 14th,  
*To India Office.* Sent 10.40 p.m.  
S. 42. I have less than 4,000 reliable rifles in British East Africa, including C Force. One-and-a-half reliable battalions reported necessary for "Königsberg." I cannot possibly spare these at present. Please inform Admiralty.
134. *From S.N.O., Mombasa.* November 16th,  
Sent 1.56 a.m.  
*To Admiralty.* Received 2.40 a.m.

Following received from "Chatham."

"Goliath" communicated by W/T to me this morning, 15th November, and stated that G.O.C. could not at present supply the 1½ battalions considered necessary for "Königsberg" operations. On receipt of this I sent following to "Goliath." (*Begins*):—Ascertain earliest date G.O.C. considers troops can be spared. Force required was originally estimated at one battalion. . . . . (*Ends*.)

Have now received following reply from G.O.C. (*Begins*):—I can only repeat my former answer that I cannot spare requisite troops from those under my command in British East African Protectorate. Should be glad to help if I could but circumstances render it impossible. (*Ends*.)

I hope to get seaplane started November 16th, and thereby obtain definite information as to the exact position and condition of "Königsberg." If her position is such that I can get within range at high water I will attempt long-range bombardment, usings eaplane for observation of firing.



135. *From* "Chatham." November 17.  
*To* G.O.C. *via* "Goliath."  
Ask G.O.C. if he can spare 400 reliable troops which combined with marines I consider sufficient to effect temporary landing during daylight hours . . . to ascertain as far as possible position of "Königsberg" and if river is entirely blocked.  
If 400 troops not available what is maximum number G.O.C. could spare.  
(Passed to Admiralty by "Chatham.")
136. *From* "Chatham." November 17th.  
*To* Admiralty. 8.32 p.m.  
4. Repairs to seaplane . . . . will be completed by daylight, November 19th. Reconnaissance will then be started immediately.  
Following reply to my message received from G.O.C. (*Begins*): Regret as things stand at present am unable to spare any men at all to operate against "Königsberg." (*Ends.*)  
Inability of military to help is regrettable, but I am most hopeful that seaplane reconnaissance will enable me definitely to ascertain if "Königsberg" is capable of escaping or not. I hope to approach close enough on November 20th to again shell her when her exact position has been located by seaplane.
137. *From* Admiralty. November 23rd,  
*To* Chatham *via* "Zanzibar." Sent 5.30 p.m.  
3. Does your first blockship close channel effectually. Would it prevent a light draft gunboat like French "Styx" getting near enough to destroy "Königsberg." If so we must definitely abandon attack by ships and you should proceed to sink other blockships to make sure no egress possible.  
Can you make any blocking arrangements which could be guarded by "Fox" and enable "Chatham" to leave.  
Do not sink more blockships till your reply has been considered here.
138. *From* "Chatham." November 24th,  
Sent Noon.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 12.44 p.m.  
15. Your telegram 3, consider it most probably impossible for light draught gunboat to get near enough.  
(Aeroplane reconnaissance at low water desirable.)  
Best position of another blockship if required can be then determined. Consider "Fox" could then guard entrance retaining "Kinfauns Castle" for occasional reconnaissance of hydroplane and enabling "Chatham" to leave.
139. *From* "Chatham." November 24th,  
Sent 11.55 a.m.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 12.58 p.m.  
("Königsberg" close into bank of island and hidden by high trees. Thinks "Königsberg" has no coal and not capable of escaping. Only method of destruction, bomb attack.)  
"Aerial reconnaissance has now shown that plan for employment of troops to allow bombardment at long range either from

- light cruiser or light-draught vessel is not practicable owing to distance of "Königsberg" up river . . . . .
- I consider the best procedure will be to continue observations by seaplane of "Königsberg's" position in river holding a block vessel always in readiness should it be found necessary to use one, and to cut off all supplies to "Königsberg" by water by patrolling coast which in any case is necessary.  
(Points out that the situation of the enemy must be most unhealthy and bad for the ship and crew.)
140. *From* S.N.O., "Fox." November 26th,  
0.30 p.m.  
*To* Admiralty. 11.50 p.m.  
68. Information received from Dar-es-Salaam tends to the belief that sunken dock does not block entrance, moreover interned merchant vessels may endeavour to escape with possibility of subsequent blocking of entrance to Mombasa Kilindini harbour.  
In any case consider advisable a prompt capture or putting out of action of all craft remaining at Dar-es-Salaam. Am consequently sending "Duplex" and armed tug to carry out this work. "Fox" and "Goliath" covering ready to bombard town in event of opposition. "Chatham" remaining inside Mafia Island guarding "Königsberg."
141. *From* "Chatham." December 5th,  
Sent 5.30 a.m.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 8.18 a.m.  
21. . . . . As regards destruction of "Königsberg" latest reconnaissance confirms previous opinion that destruction by light-draught vessels at long range is impossible . . . . . To engage "Königsberg" it would be necessary for light-draught vessels to approach very close range and with river banks held by enemy an armoured light-draught vessel with one or two guns B.L. 6-incl is necessary similar to new monitors. This appears the only possible way of getting at "Königsberg."
142. *From* War Office. December 5th,  
*To* General Wapshare, Mombasa. No time stated.  
Until arrangements can be made to reinforce East Africa offensive on any considerable scale is impracticable. It is not possible to say when re-inforcements will be available, but immediate resumption of the offensive must not be lost sight of, and meanwhile defensive attitude should be adopted coupled with such minor offensive measures as seem practicable.
143. *From* "Chatham." December 7th,  
Sent 6.0 p.m.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 6.55 p.m.  
24. Submit for consideration following with reference to "Königsberg" situation. "Königsberg" was not located up Rufiji Delta until October 30th. From September 21st to October 30th, "Königsberg" remained up the Rufiji Delta, and did not attempt to attack trade routes. Inference is "Königsberg" either unable to come out or else deterred by presence of one British cruiser off coast . . . . .  
Consider probability is that she is unable to come out and most likely reason will be want of coal.

144. *From* Admiralty. December 18th,  
*To* "Chatham" and C.'s concerned. Sent 11.37 a.m.  
Cancel previous telegrams as to "Chatham" refitting at Cape. "Weymouth" will relieve "Chatham" as previously arranged and "Chatham" will proceed to Mediterranean, dock at Malta and relieve "Dublin" at Dardanelles to enable "Dublin" to refit.
145. *From* C.-in-C., East Indies. December 19th,  
Sent 4.20 p.m.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 3.38 p.m.  
364. I submit on "Weymouth" relieving "Chatham" very desirable to avoid dividing responsibility that Captain of the "Fox" should assume full duties of S.N.O., East Africa, including charge of operations against "Königsberg."
146. *From* "Chatham" December 21st,  
Sent 4.5 p.m.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 5.21 p.m.  
46. Natives report food supplies everywhere short. Armed tug is being used wherever available to isolate "Königsberg" as much as possible by cutting off supplies and communications by sea. As soon as G.O.C. can spare troops consider it most desirable to occupy Mafia Island in order to permanently cut off communications and supplies between Mafia Island and Rufiji, and to use as a base for a small tug or steamer to operate against dhows coasting with supplies . . . Also, Mafia Island would serve as an excellent base for any future hydroplane operations.
147. *From* Admiralty. December 23rd,  
*To* S.N.O., Simonstown. Sent 7 p.m.  
25. It is desired to obtain four small vessels which would carry 3-pdr. guns to blockade the coast of German East Africa. Report if any suitable small steamers, tugs or trawlers can be obtained in South African Ports.
148. *From* Admiralty. December 24th,  
*To* C.-in-C., East Indies. Sent 3.50. p.m.  
S.N.O., Bombay.  
S.N.O., East Africa.  
"Fox" is to refit at Bombay and then proceed to Persian Gulf. "Pyramus" is to relieve "Fox" in East Africa. "Weymouth" will relieve "Chatham" and be S.N.O., East Africa. "Chatham" will proceed to Malta to refit and then relieve "Dublin" off Dardanelles. "Pioneer" has been ordered to East Africa.
- 1915.
149. *From* Admiralty. January 12th,  
*To* C.-in-C., Cape. Sent 1.30 a.m.  
21. Owing to pending military operation and the necessary of liberating "Weymouth" in case "Dresden" crosses Pacific, "Hyacinth" is required on East Coast of Africa. You should transfer your flag and send "Hyacinth" to Mombasa.

150. *From* "Weymouth." January 18th,  
Sent 8.0 p.m.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 8.34 p.m.  
"Weymouth" proceeding to Huri Vanga in reply to very urgent request of G.O.C. for man-of-war to co-operate at once. "Pyramus" and "Duplex" off Rufiji.
151. *From* S.N.O., East Africa. January 21st,  
Sent 3.15 p.m.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 4.20 p.m.  
G.O.C. earnestly desires retention of "Weymouth" at Vanga for shelling strong German position. Portable W/T installation landed . . . "Pyramus" reports all quiet at Rufiji . . . "Newbridge" reported apparently swung so as to allow "Königsberg" to come out at high tide.
152. *From* Admiralty. February 9th,  
*To* S.N.O., "Weymouth." Sent 8.0 p.m.  
10. Report date you can commence blockade of German East African coast and period you propose to allow for neutral ships to withdraw should blockade be decided on. Consider and report any modifications proposed in following suggested plan. One cruiser including "Kinfauns Castle," accompanied by one armed whaler including "Duplex," to patrol each of the following five sections of coast:—Vanga to Pangani to Ras Kanzi to Rufiji to Kiswere to Cape Delgado. Coaling bases Zanzibar and Mafia Island. S.N.O. to arrange patrols north of Kanzi and "Hyacinth" south of Kanzi or *vice versa*.
153. *From* "Weymouth," Zanzibar. February 12th,  
Received 2.20 a.m.  
*To* Admiralty. Sent 12.30 p.m.  
8. In answer to your 10. Date of commencement of blockade—March 1st. Period of withdrawal of neutral ships four days. Suggest following modification:— "Kinfauns Castle" and "Pioneer," C. Delgado to Kilwa Kisiwani working own relief. One whaler thence to Rufiji. "Weymouth" and one whaler thence to Kanzi. "Duplex" and one whaler with assistance of Zanzibar Patrol, thence to Pangani, a whaler from there to Vanga. "Hyacinth" and "Pyramus" working their own relief. Kanzi to Vanga.
154. *From* Admiralty. February 15th,  
*To* S.N.O., East Africa. Sent 2.45 p.m.  
Your 8. Modifications as to disposal of blockading vessels approved. Declare blockade of German East African sea coast and islands to commence at midnight, 28th February-1st March. Communicate the declaration not later than 24th. . . .
155. *From* S.N.O., East Africa. February 17th,  
Sent 4.50 p.m.  
*To* Admiralty. Received 4.55 p.m.  
12. Having conferred with G.O.C., I am of opinion that best course would be an advance on "Königsberg" from Dar-es-Salaam in August, as part of combined operations he contemplates.

156. *From* Admiralty. February 20th,  
*To* C.-in-C., Cape. Sent 3.20 p.m.
73. Should situation remain satisfactory at the Cape, you should transfer your flag to "Goliath" when she is ready and leave Rear-Admiral Gillett as S.N.O. at the Cape.  
"Goliath" should proceed to Mafia Island to watch over the Rufiji Delta and supervise the blockade of German East Africa. If circumstances require your return to the Cape, you should return. "Kinfauns Castle" has seaplanes with 100-lb. bombs which should reconnoitre and locate "Königsberg" and endeavor to damage her if possible, but operations against the German defended positions with lightly armed craft are not advisable.
157. *From* C.-in-C., Cape. March 14th,  
*To* Admiralty. Sent 7.35 p.m.  
Received 4.55 p.m.
173. A certain liveliness has been apparent at the Rufiji recently. On the night of March 9th, "Echo" discovered steamboat with boat in tow coming out. They returned on being fired at. On the night of March 13th searchlights were seen in direction of Simba Uranga entrance. In view of the approach of the unhealthy season combined with spring tides, consider that special watching of "Königsberg" necessary and have redistributed squadron for that purpose.  
"Weymouth," "Hyacinth," "Childers," and "Echo" will blockade Rufiji. "Pioneer," "Duplex," and "Pickle"—Coast to north of Delta. "Pyramus" and "Fly"—Coast to south of Delta. "Kinfauns Castle," when available, will assist in the north and "Goliath" waiting relief generally supervising along the whole coast.
158. *From* Admiralty. April 4th,  
*To* C.-in-C., Cape. Sent 1.55 p.m.  
Received.
114. [Paraphrase.] A supply ship for "Königsberg" may be expected early in April to be some 360 miles north-eastward of the Rufiji. "Königsberg" may break out to meet her. Steps should be taken to intercept supply ship and a close watch must be kept on Rufiji River. "Chatham" will be sent from Bombay to assist.
159. *From* C.-in-C., Cape. April 4th,  
*To* Admiralty. Sent midnight.  
Received 10.55 p.m.
213. Your message 114 has been received and is understood. Blockade must be abandoned for the present.
161. *From* C.-in-C., Cape. April 6th,  
*To* Admiralty. 5.30 p.m.  
5.20 p.m.
217. . . . . It is desirable that besides "Chatham" an additional second-class cruiser should be here for blockade. Request that additional second (*sic*) cruiser may be detailed for East Coast of Africa. Present squadron is insufficient satisfactorily to carry out requirements. . . . . "Hyacinth," "Chatham," and "Weymouth" are only ships fit to watch "Königsberg," and all ships in these waters require careful nursing. . . . .

163. *From* C.-in-C., Cape. April 9th,  
*To* Admiralty. Sent 8.25 p.m.  
Received 8.2 p.m.
221. Have visited rendezvous. Nothing seen. Am returning to watch Rufiji.
164. *From* Admiralty. April 10th,  
*To* C.-in-C., Cape. Sent 12.55 a.m.
122. You should send a ship to cruise for [the supply ship].
165. *From* C.-in-C., Cape. April 10th,  
*To* Admiralty. Sent 1.0 p.m.  
Received 11.49 a.m.
224. "Hyacinth" after coaling will return to the rendezvous. She is only ship other than "Weymouth" fit to meet a ship possibly armed with 4 1-inch guns.
167. *From* C.-in-C., Cape. Zanzibar. April 14th,  
*To* Admiralty. Sent 10.0 p.m.  
Received 9.30 p.m.
230. German supply ship sighted in Kilulu Channel before daybreak this morning at distance of about 7 miles. Unfortunately, owing to starboard engine of "Hyacinth" having completely broken down  $\frac{1}{2}$  hour earlier, she could only use one engine and was unable to close nearer. Supply ship entered Mansa Bay full speed, and as it was feared attempt would be made to land rifles before "Hyacinth" came up, firing was opened at her over the land at about 8,000 yards at the position whence her steam could be seen rising. On "Hyacinth" entering Mansa Bay, all the ship's boats were seen just making for shore, and ship herself was found heavily on fire forward. It was no doubt due to this that she was in a great hurry. "Hyacinth" anchored about a mile from ship, and party of officers and men under Acting-Commander Bridges was sent on board to endeavour to extinguish fire and float ship, which was aground forward, and failing this, to salve rifles and small guns. It was found impossible to do this, owing to the fierceness of the fire, and owing to the fact that she had been scuttled. Having received signals to this effect I recalled party and subjected ship to systematic bombardment, with a view to utter destruction of everything in ship and preventing enemy from salvaging cargo with divers at their leisure. . . . . After short time whole ship was ablaze, and three big explosions at separate intervals appeared to indicate ammunition was destroyed. I am of opinion that any cargo which enemy may succeed in salvaging will be useless, with the possible exception of any heavy guns ship may have had. Party sent on board were attacked by rifle fire from shore, which was kept down by shrapnel from "Hyacinth." There were no casualties.
168. *From* Admiralty. April 15th,  
*To* C.-in-C., Cape. Sent 11.45 p.m.
126. Are you satisfied that supply ship has been so damaged that rifles or other stores of use to enemy cannot be salvaged by enemy?

169. *From C.-in-C., Cape.* April 16th,  
Sent 5.50 p.m.  
*To Admiralty.* Received 5.20 a.m.
238. As suitable tides for attempted escape of "Königsberg" are over 18th April, propose then reverting to former disposition and resume coast blockade.
170. *From C.-in-C., Cape.* April 16th,  
Sent 11.50 a.m.  
*To Admiralty.* Received 9.56 a.m.
239. Your 126. I consider scarcely likely that any cargo can be salvaged or would be worth salvaging, with possible exception of any heavy guns, and the ammunition appeared to explode, but I propose to visit place again or send a ship within the next few days to make certain. In any case, work would be very difficult, and I do not think that ship could be approached for a few days as she was red-hot in places and was still burning hard at 4 p.m., when smoke was still visible 20 miles distant.
171. *From Admiralty.* April 16th,  
*To C.-in-C., Cape.* Sent 7.25 p.m.
128. There is a second supply ship [coming].
172. *From C.-in-C., Cape.* April 17th,  
Sent 6.35 p.m.  
*To Admiralty.* Received 5.16 p.m.
243. Your 128. I am proceeding with "Hyacinth" and "Pioneer." I am in constant W/T communication.
173. *From Admiralty.* April 17th,  
*To C.-in-C., Cape.* Sent 11.55 p.m.
132. [Believed] mines have been laid outside Mansa Bay.
174. *From Admiralty.* April 19th,  
*To Admiral Superintendent, Malta.* Sent 2.30 p.m.
784. . . . . "Severn," "Mersey," and "Trent," and a good collier are to be prepared for a voyage to Zanzibar. "Trent" and the collier are to be supplied with towing hawsers and gear to enable them to relieve the tugs between Aden and Zanzibar. . . . . Monitors must be very thoroughly prepared for voyage.
175. *From C.-in-C., Cape.* April 19th,  
*To Admiralty.* Sent 8.35 p.m.  
Received 7.45 p.m.
- Your 132. Supply ship did not appear last night. "Hyacinth" proceeded south at daylight 19th, and searched coast as far south as Cape Delgado, and is now proceeding north, searching bays en route. "Pioneer" remains in neighbourhood of Mikindani.
176. *From C.-in-C., Cape.* April 29th,  
*To Admiralty.* Sent 10.25 a.m.  
Received 8.58 a m
263. *Re* my message 239, Intelligence report from Mansa Bay states that for two days Germans tried without success salvage cargo of supply ship. Enemy has abandoned attempt.

177. *From Admiralty.* May 5th,  
*To C.-in-C., Cape.* Sent 6.10 p.m.
140. Your 274. Proposal is unlikely to be successful and is not approved. Two monitors with 6-inch guns are being sent out and instructions will be sent to you as to their use in attacking "Königsberg."  
(NOTE.—C.-in-C.'s 274 related to a proposed attack on "Königsberg" with torpedoes.)
178. *From Admiralty.* May 8th,  
*To C.-in-C., Cape.* Sent 11.45 p.m.
144. You should husband the seaplanes and get them in order until the two monitors "Severn" and "Mersey" reach you. They left Suez on 6th May. m9J
179. *From C.-in-C., Cape.* May 9th,  
*To Admiralty.* Sent 10.45 a.m.  
Received 11.45 a.m.
279. Your 144. Request orders may be given monitors to proceed direct from Aden to Tirene, Mafia Island, without calling at Mombasa or Zanzibar. If coal necessitates calling somewhere request they may be ordered Chaki-Chaki, Pemba Island, where colliers can be sent to meet.
180. *From C.-in-C., Cape, Zanzibar.* May 14th,  
*To Admiralty.* Sent 9.20 a.m.
296. . . . . "Chatham" leaves Rufiji 15th May for Aden calling Zanzibar. "Hyacinth" leaves p.m. to-day to examine Mansa Bay, thence to Rufiji.
181. *From Admiralty.* May 14th,  
*To C.-in-C., Cape.* Sent Noon.
- Urgent. "Hyacinth" must not go to Mansa Bay [on account of mine danger].
182. *From Admiralty.* May 24th,  
*To C.-in-C., Cape.* Sent 2.55 p.m.
176. Consider and report how you propose to employ the monitors for destruction of "Königsberg." Forcing passage past gun defences by main channel between Kiomboni and Simba Uranga which may be mined should be avoided if other channels can be used to bring them in range "Königsberg."
183. *From C.-in-C., Cape.* May 24th,  
*To Admiralty.* Sent 11.0 p.m.
317. Your 176. I propose monitors proceed up Kikunya branch and they should find sufficient water and room to manoeuvre in vicinity of island 4 miles up marked on Chart 662, and be 11,000 to 12,000 yards from "Königsberg." If possible they should enter at dawn towards the end of flood tide, and with the rise of 12 to 14 feet they should pass over any mines. . . . . From latest native reports "Königsberg" has all her guns on board, but Germans are transporting heavy guns from Dar-es-Salaam for her protection.

184. From C.-in-C., Cape. June 22nd,  
Sent 7.40 p.m.  
To Admiralty. Received 7.25 p.m.
366. Following message received from Military Authorities East Africa. (*Begins*):—  
Ten Germans with native troops working store ship Mansa Bay salvaging rifles, ammunition, and timber. (*Ends*.) In view of heavy explosion I witnessed I do not think there would be any ammunition. With reference to my message 296 and Admiralty message 153, shall I send ship to investigate?
185. From Admiralty. June 22nd,  
To C.-in-C., Cape. Sent 11.55 p.m.
201. In view of fact that entrance is probably mined, do not send ship.
186. From C.-in-C., Cape. June 23rd,  
To Admiralty. Sent 12.15 p.m.  
Received 1.0 p.m.
358. Your 201. I could send ship to a position N.E. by N.  $\frac{1}{2}$  N.,  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles from Kwale Island. See Chart 663. Ship would be quite clear entrance, would be 5,000 yards from the wreck of storeship and might destroy any salvage apparatus.  
(NOTE ON ORIGINAL.—“This was not replied to.”)
187. From C.-in-C., Cape. July 1st,  
Sent 8.5 p.m.  
To Admiralty. Received 6.50 p.m.
374. General Officer Commanding, British East Africa, asks if I can stop reported salvage operations on vessel in Mansa Bay. I have informed him that Lords Commissioners of Admiralty do not approve of ships going there in view of the danger of mines.

## B 1.

## APPENDIX B 1.

## WAR ORDERS FOR THE CAPE STATION.

[Forwarded October 1st, 1913, by C.-in-C., Cape, in accordance with para. 37 of War Standing Orders C.'s-in-C. abroad. Admiralty approval was given in letter M. 0048, dated 24.1.14. Matter enclosed within square brackets is summarised from original.]

## 1. OBJECT.

The Cape of Good Hope Squadron being situated on the line of communication to Australia and the Far East, its object is to keep this line open by preventing the enemy from interfering with it.

The secondary object is to destroy the enemy's trade, and these objects must be the same whatever the country with which we are engaged in war.

## 2. OBJECTIVE.

The only way in which the enemy can interrupt the British line of communication is to attack it at some vulnerable point with a naval force. The objective of the Squadron is, therefore, any naval force that the enemy may leave in these waters.

[All enemy vessels must be considered potential armed cruisers, and captured or destroyed.]

## 3. STRATEGIC CONDITIONS.

[Details forces of possible enemies. Germans, two sloops and two gunboats. The German base on East Coast is at Dar-es-Salaam and on West Coast at Duala. (Kamerun.) Conditions governing arming of merchant cruisers.]

In the case of war with Germany, the two points to be controlled on this station are the Cape itself, where all trade round the Cape converges, and Dar-es-Salaam, which, lying on the flank of our East Coast trade route, could be used as a base for attacking that trade.

## PARS. 4, 5, 6. DISTRIBUTION OF VESSELS ON ANY ONE DAY (AVERAGE).

German.		British.
6	Durban and north to Kismayu - -	22
4	The Cape and radius of 800 miles from it -	20
3	Trade beyond 800' N.W. - -	4
1	Trade beyond 800' E. - -	2
—		—
14		48

## 7. BRITISH FORCE AND ITS DISTRIBUTION AFTER OUTBREAK OF WAR.

East Coast - - - 2 cruisers.  
Cape of Good Hope - - - 1 cruiser.

This is on the assumption that the German cruiser "Seeadler" is on the East Coast. Any variation of strategic conditions would possibly call for a modification of this distribution.

## 8. HEADQUARTERS OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

The Commander-in-Chief will make Simon's Bay his Headquarters as the most central position for reinforcing any threatened point.

\* \* \* \* \*

## 10. ACTION TO BE TAKEN ON OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES.

*With Germany.*

The ship on the East Coast will at once use every endeavour to bring to action and destroy the "Seeadler," or other hostile vessel. The second cruiser at Simon's Bay will be ordered to proceed to Zanzibar to reinforce or, if necessary, to relieve the other vessel, and the latter, after being relieved, will proceed to Simon's Bay for repairs, if the damage received in action necessitates it.

After the destruction of any German war vessels on the East Coast, the British force will blockade Dar-es-Salaam, and do as much damage as possible to German trade, using Zanzibar as a base.

\* \* \* \* \*

## 20. LIMITS OF STATION MAY BE PASSED.

In undertaking any hostile operations against the enemy forces at sea, it is to be understood that the limits of this station, as defined in peace-time, are not to prevent ships proceeding beyond these limits should the operations in which they are engaged render such a course necessary. Such movements and operations generally are to be reported to the Commander-in-Chief of the station affected.

[The remaining paragraphs referred to administrative details.]

DECISIONS OF SUB-COMMITTEE OF COMMITTEE OF  
IMPERIAL DEFENCE, *RE* EAST AFRICA.

(a) This Sub-Committee was formed :—

“For the consideration of combined naval and military operations in foreign territory, its object being to decide what objectives could be assigned to joint expeditions, with a view to producing a definite effect on the course of the War.”

(b) At a meeting held on August 5th, it was agreed with regard to German East Africa :—

“That the Sub-Committee should submit to H.M. Government their opinion that an expedition should be sent from India against Dar-es-Salaam.

“The Sub-Committee believed that by the reduction of this point d'appui of the German naval forces off the coast of East Africa, the Admiralty arrangements for the protection of commerce would be facilitated, and that by thus taking the offensive, the defence of the British possessions in East Africa could be best guaranteed. They considered that the project was a feasible one, provided that the details should be left to the Indian Government to work out in consultation with the naval Commander-in-Chief.”

(c) At a meeting on August 6th, it was agreed with regard to German East Africa :—

“That, as the Army Council were depending on getting from the Government of India one cavalry brigade and two divisions, any deduction from this force would upset the War Office plans, which were based on a definite strategic object. The Sub-Committee, therefore, were strongly of the opinion that troops to be used for the proposed expedition against the Dar-es-Salaam should be entirely independent of the force which had been promised to the War Office by the Government of India.

“It was considered that an expeditionary force of a strength not exceeding four native battalions, one battery, half company sappers, one troop cavalry, and such additional ordnance as the Government of India might consider desirable, ought to be sufficient to undertake the proposed operations against Dar-es-Salaam. Further, it was suggested that to the expeditionary force should be added, for the purpose of safeguarding against possible native unrest, if the Indian Government could spare them, two battalions to reinforce the King's African Rifles in the East African Protectorate; and again, it was pointed out that a naval force to convey the expedition, and to cover the landing against organised resistance, would be necessary.”

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE GENERAL OFFICER  
COMMANDING, INDIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE B.

APPROVED BY THE CABINET, SEPTEMBER 29TH, 1914.

1. The object of the expedition under your command is to bring the whole of German East Africa under British authority. But while the British flag may be hoisted to signify the occupation of territory, you will make no formal proclamation of annexation without definite instructions from His Majesty's Government.

2. On arrival at Mombasa, you will, after conferring with the G.O.C., Force C, Sir H. Belfield, Governor of British East Africa, and the S.N.O., make such arrangements as you deem necessary for executing the wishes of H.M. Government. The Governor will be instructed to put at your disposal for this purpose such of the forces in British East Africa, including those in Force C, as can be spared with due regard to the preservation of order in the Protectorate.

3. H.M. Government desire that you should, in the first instance, secure the safety of British East Africa by occupying the north-eastern portion of the German colony, viz., the country between Tanga and Kilimanjaro. For this purpose, it is suggested that you should first occupy Tanga with Force B, and that when this move has had its due moral effect on the Germans occupying the hinterland of Tanga, Force C should, if possible, advance from Tsavo and threaten Moshi. It is, however, for you to judge whether such an operation is practicable and advisable, and whether Force C should be strengthened by you for this purpose.

4. It will be your first duty to establish British authority over the whole region above indicated.

5. After the effective control of this region has been secured, it will be for you to consider and report your plans for the occupation of Dar-es-Salaam-Fabora line, which should be the next object of attack.

6. It is possible that the occupation of the Usambara country and of Dar-es-Salaam may be sufficient to lead the German authorities to endeavour to obtain terms. If so, you should make it clear that you are not empowered to accept anything short of unconditional surrender.

(The remaining clauses deal with such matter as the relations of the military to the civil authorities, attitude towards the natives, &c.)

Paragraphs 1-6 were transmitted by cable to Major-General Aitken, G.O.C., Force B.

B 4.

## APPENDIX B 4.

## ORDERS FOR "KÖNIGSBERG" SEARCH.

ISSUED BY CAPTAIN S. R. DRURY-LOWE, H.M.S. "CHATHAM"<sup>1</sup>,  
OCTOBER 14TH, 1914.

H.M.S. "Chatham," at Mombasa,  
October 14th, 1914.

SECRET MEMORANDA No. 1.

The Admiralty have ordered "Chatham," "Dartmouth" and "Weymouth" to act as a detached and separate squadron under orders of Captain of "Chatham," to be exclusively employed hunting "Königsberg," and direct that on no account are ships to be diverted from their sole object, namely, capture of "Königsberg," by any pretence like capture of tugs or enemy merchant ships.

With reference to above, I request you will note the following remarks:—

1. We know that "Königsberg" has been and is being helped in her movements by an extremely well-organised intelligence system, including look-out stations along the coast, and that the information so obtained is sent to her by the German wireless stations inland. Included in this intelligence system is the use of certain tugs and steamers, which have been reported and named from time to time as operating with "Königsberg."

Their names are:—

"Adjutant" - - Captured.  
"Leutnant" - - Last reported as having left Beira about  
October 3rd, possibly at same time as  
"Adjutant."

"Somali" - - } Occasionally reported to have been  
"President" - - } seen with "Königsberg."  
"Niagra" - - ?

Two German ships at Mozambique - Seen by collier "Burbridge" on  
October 9th.

The capture of any of the above, if met with, should be effected as a means of helping to corner "Königsberg," but on no account is time to be wasted by taking or sending any captured ship into port unless special circumstances necessitate so doing. Captains will exercise their own discretion in this, keeping in mind the spirit of the Admiralty instructions quoted above.

2. The following wire from the Admiralty is of great importance and must be acted on without hesitation:—

"Attack 'Königsberg' without regard to territorial waters."

From the above I consider we can regard Portuguese neutrality as, at any rate, friendly.

3. Area of operations (*see also* para. 10). We have a very big coast line to watch, the rough limits of which are Mombasa to Lorenzo Marques, consequently until "Königsberg" is definitely located, two light cruisers will be based (for coaling) on Comoro Islands to operate generally from Cape Delgado to southward, and the 3rd Light Cruiser between Cape Delgado and Mombasa, based on Mombasa.

This distribution is to be regarded as in no way binding and all three of us must co-operate as closely as circumstances will allow.

I have asked "Fox" to remain at Zanzibar or Mombasa during my absence to pass on all telegrams by wireless telegraphy.

<sup>1</sup> M, 03104/15.

B 4.

4. "Dartmouth" and "Weymouth" will start by using the Comoro Islands as a base, and the first collier available at Mombasa will be sent at once to Mayotta Island, which appears the best centre to use, as having W/T installation on shore.

5. Coal. A list of all the colliers of which I have so far been advised is attached. The Commander-in-Chief, Cape, has telegraphed that collier "Fluent" is being sent to Diego Suarez, Madagascar.

I have asked the Commander-in-Chief, Cape, to communicate routes which colliers are ordered to follow, so as to facilitate intercepting them, if necessary.

Note that Beira is about midway between Mayotta and Durban, and consequently if a light cruiser finds herself to south of Beira and short of coal, it would probably be best to go to Durban for it.

The Port Captain, Durban, reports amount of Admiralty stock Welsh coal now on charge is 3,000 tons. Arrangements to coal should be made through Port Captain, Durban.

6. W/T stations which may be of use:—

Durban - - Best address to wireless station, Durban,  
as, however, they have no code they  
can only be asked *by cable* to pass  
coded messages, and so are not of  
much use.

Diego Suarez.  
Mayotta Island.  
Majunga, Madagascar.

7. A table of rendezvous is attached which can be used at option if found convenient to abbreviate messages.

8. Commander Ingles at Zanzibar has been requested to use money payments to establish an intelligence system among local craft at Zanzibar which may be of use.

9. The same method should be employed, if practicable, whenever opportunity offers in any area of our operations.

10. Area of operations. For convenience of general reference the coast line we have to watch will be divided into four areas as follows:—

Area W - - Zanzibar to Cape Delgado.  
Area X - - Cape Delgado to Mozambique.  
Area Y - - Mozambique to Kilman River.  
Area Z - - Kilman River to Delagoa Bay.

11. "Chatham" will generally be in a position to maintain W/T touch with Zanzibar and with other light cruisers. Should this fail "Dartmouth" and "Weymouth" are to send any important messages to "Chatham" through W/T stations at Majunga or Diego Suarez which have been requested to receive W/T messages in cypher and to pass them on by cable to Zanzibar. In such cases call sign for "Dartmouth" is to be P.C.R. and call sign for "Weymouth" is to be L.R.T., the call signs for Majunga and Diego Suarez being their ordinary call signs. There is no necessity to put any address or signature *en clair* as Diego Suarez and Majunga will cable all cypher messages to Zanzibar. Majunga is to be used in preference.

12. It is important that we should all present an appearance similar as possible. Ships are therefore to cover their names on stern with wood and all funnel bands are to be painted out.

13. Should the "Emden" come to East Coast of Africa, she may possibly make Madagascar first or Comoro Islands. Ships proceeding to Mayotta to coal should bear this in mind.

(Signed) S. R. DRURY-LOWE,

Captain, Commanding Detached Light Cruiser  
Squadron, East Coast of Africa.  
To the Officers Commanding  
H.M. Ships "Dartmouth"  
and "Weymouth."

RENDEZVOUS OFF EAST AFRICA.

(Orders for "Königsberg" Search October 14th, 1914.)

Rendezvous.	Distance and Bearing (Magnetic).	Locality.
A.	5 miles south-east of Ras Serani - -	Mombasa.
B.	15 miles south-east of Ulenze Island Light.	Tanga.
C.	15 miles north-east of - - - -	Dar-es-Salaam.
D.	5 miles north-east of Moresby Point -	Mafia Island.
E.	15 miles east of Ras Miranba - - -	Kilwa Kivinge.
F.	15 miles east-north-east of Lindi Town -	Lindi.
G.	10 miles east of Cape Delgado - - -	
H.	10 miles north-east of north point of Johanna Island.	Comoro Islands.
J.	10 miles north of Cape Amber - - -	Madagascar.
K.	10 miles east of St. George Island Lighthouse.	Mozambique.

## B 5.

## APPENDIX B 5.

ORDERS ISSUED BY CAPTAIN F. W. CAULFIELD,  
OF H.M.S "FOX," AT TANGA,<sup>1</sup> NOVEMBER 4TH, 1914.

NAVAL ORDERS FOR THE RE-EMBARKATION OF FORCE "B"  
FROM TANGA ON NOVEMBER 5TH, 1914.

*Situation prior to Embarkation.*

By 1.0 p.m. on Thursday, November 5th, 1914, the embarking situation is to be as follows :—

"Khalifa," "Cupid," and four tugs ("Mvita," "Bajune," "Hel-muth," "Tanga") are to be anchored abreast of Red House landing well outside reef.

The above six steamers are to have one lighter secured each side and a third lighter made fast astern.

The distance from reef is to be just sufficient to prevent the lighters astern from touching the reef at lead low water.

<sup>1</sup> M. 04840/14.

The main features as regards the scheme of embarkation are :—

- (a) That no ships in inner harbour are to be moved till last moment.
- (b) That no troops whatever are to be embarked in these ships, *i.e.*, in ships anchored in inner harbour.
- (c) That the whole of the troops now on shore are to be embarked from a position out of sight of Tanga, *i.e.*, from Red House landing.
- (d) That to ensure expedition, the embarkation of troops in each tug or lighter is to proceed simultaneously.
- (e) That it is not necessary to embark the troops in transports immediately after leaving the beach, but merely to tow the filled lighters out of rifle range.

The embarkation will start at 1.0 p.m., November 5th, and be conducted independent of tide, and, to ensure this, the ordinary ships' boats to the number of 30, will be used for conveying the troops from beach to lighters.

NOTE.—If tide is very low, it may be necessary for troops to wade out a considerable distance across the reef before the ships' boats can be reached and made use of.

Each ship's boat will be manned by five seamen—two oars each side and one coxswain in charge—and five boats will serve each group (a group consisting of one tug and three lighters).

The troops will, so far as possible, remain in their "units," but, as the utmost expedition is of primary importance, it may be necessary to mix units in order to fill all lighters quickly and simultaneously.

Lighters are, for the sake of safety in embarkation, to be towed alongside the seaward or far side of transports.

The distribution of the filled lighters to the different transports will be communicated later, as will also the order of sailing for the convoy as a whole.



PLAN OF EMBARKATION FROM RED HOUSE LANDING.

No. of Men  
carried  
per Group.

1,600 "Khalifa" Group - - - - -


1,600 "Cupid" Group - - - - -

1,000 "Mvita" Group - - - - -

1,000 "Bajune" Group - - - - -

1,000 "Helmuth" Group - - - - -

1,000 "Tanga" Group" - - - - -



H.M.S. "Fox," at Tanga,  
11.0 p.m., Nov. 4th, 1914.

(Signed) F. W. CAULFIELD,  
Captain and Senior Naval Officer,  
East Coast of Africa.

## APPENDIX B 6.

## B 6.

ORDERS FOR BLOCKADE OF GERMAN EAST  
AFRICAN COAST.<sup>1</sup>

[Originally issued by Captain W. D. Church, of H.M.S. "Weymouth," February 22nd, 1915.

Reproduced as modified by the Commander-in-Chief, Cape Station, March 14th, 1915.]

I. General Orders.

II. Operations Orders.

## I. GENERAL ORDERS.

1. A blockade of the coast of German East Africa and the islands pertaining thereto has been ordered by the Admiralty, to commence midnight February 28th—March 1st.

The limits of the blockade are from Vanga, Lat.  $4^{\circ} 41' S.$ , to Cape Delgado,  $10^{\circ} 40' S.$  Neutral ships will be allowed to pass out until midnight on the 4th March.

2, 3. (References to Naval Prize Manual.)

4. . . . . Captures are not to be destroyed without reference being first made to the C.-in-C. When possible, captures are to be sent to Zanzibar for adjudication by the Prize Court. All captures are to be reported to the C.-in-C. as soon as particulars are known.

5. Capture by "Duplex" and whalers is in all cases to be reported to the nearest light cruiser, who will give the necessary orders as to procedure.

6. On the northern section it will usually be possible to escort a capture to Zanzibar, turning her over from one ship to another. Sending in a capture under a prize crew should usually be avoided.

All captures in Rufiji and southern sections are to be sent to Tirene, Mafia Island.

7. The officer-commanding at Zanzibar will take charge of all captures brought in to Zanzibar, and will communicate with the Prize Court.

8. Vessels which may be expected are the large ocean-going dhows from Arabia, Persia, and India. There may be traffic going on between Portuguese East Africa and German East Africa in the neighbourhood of Cape Delgado. . . .

9. (Instructions with regard to Persian flag, which resembles the German.)

## II. OPERATION ORDERS.

*Sections.*

Northern, from Vanga to Kauzi.

Rufiji, from Kanzi to Kiassi.

Southern, from Kiassi to  $1' N.$  of C. Delgado.

<sup>1</sup> M. 03370/15.

*Blockading Force and Dispositions.**Northern.*

- "Pioneer" (S.O. of Section).
- "Duplex."
- "Pickle."
- "Kinfauns Castle" (when available).

*Rufiji.*

- "Weymouth" (S.O. of Section).
- "Hyacinth."
- "Childers" (W/T).
- "Echo" (W/T).

*Southern.*

- "Pyramus" (S.O. of Section).
- "Fly."

The S.O. of Northern Section should confer, as necessary, with the O.C., Zanzibar, who considers that he can be responsible for communications between Zanzibar Island and the mainland.

*Bases (for coaling, &c.).**Northern Section.*

For (a) Light cruisers, Mombasa. (b) "Duplex" and "Pickle," Zanzibar.

*Rufiji Section.*

Tirene, Mafia.

*Southern Section.*

Tirene, Mafia.

*Orders for Sections.*

Senior officers of sections will issue the necessary orders for relief and coaling of whalers and small craft attached to their respective sections, informing Commander-in-Chief of action taken.

The detailed orders issued by "Weymouth" and "Hyacinth" are to remain in force until superseded by any fresh orders which senior officers of sections may consider necessary to meet revised conditions. . . .

*Coaling.*

Coaling and reliefs for all vessels other than the whalers and small craft will be ordered by the Commander-in-Chief.

*Boilers.*

Three-fifths boilers are always to be connected and ready for steaming.

One-fifth boilers may be in process of cleaning.

One-fifth boilers are to have fires laid and ready.

*Movements.*

Senior officers of sections will regulate all movements in their sections, and are to report their positions daily to the Commander-in-Chief at noon, at the same time informing him briefly of their approximate movements during the next 24 hours; also of the attached whalers and small craft. . . . It is realised that "Duplex" and whalers cannot be expected to remain under weigh continually day and night. Suitable anchorages may be detailed for these craft by senior officers of sections, but the patrol at night is not to be neglected.

*Darkening Ship.*

All ships are to be completely darkened at night when on patrol duty, whether under weigh or at anchor.

(Instructions with regard to signalling, W/T communication, &c., followed.)

EXTRACTS FROM THE REVISED ORDERS FOR THE  
CONDUCT OF BLOCKADE (GERMAN EAST AFRICA),  
DATED MAY 1ST, 1915.<sup>1</sup>

1. *Organisation.*—Two separate organisations will be adopted for conducting the Blockade of the Rufiji Delta and of the coast of German East Africa :—

(a) During the periods of Spring Tides, when the "Königsberg" may be expected to attempt to break out.

(b) During the period of the Neap Tides, when she is not so likely to make the attempt.

\* \* \* \* \*

4. *Dispositions* :—

For (a) the disposition of the ships will be as follows :—

In North Mafia Channel	Two fast cruisers. Two whalers (one with W/T). One armed merchant cruiser (during the day working with seaplanes).
In South Mafia Channel	One fast cruiser (who will also during daylight be available for patrolling the coast to the south). One whaler with W/T.
Northern Section -	One small cruiser and (or) "Duplex."
General Control -	"Hyacinth" (Flag). Available also, if necessary, for patrol of Southern Section.
Refitting at Zanzibar -	One whaler.

For (b) the ships will be disposed as follows :—

In North Mafia Channel	One fast cruiser. Two whalers (one with W/T). One armed merchant cruiser (during the day working with seaplanes).
In South Mafia Channel	One fast cruiser. One whaler (with W/T).
Northern Section -	One small cruiser and (or) "Duplex."
Southern Section -	One fast cruiser or "Hyacinth."
Refitting at Zanzibar -	One fast cruiser or "Hyacinth." One small cruiser or "Duplex." One whaler.

\* \* \* \* \*

6. *Sections of Blockade* :—

Northern Section -	From Vanga to Ras Kanzi.
Rufiji Section -	From Ras Kanzi to Ndahi Mouth :— North Mafia Channel.—Ras Kanzi to Msala Mouth. South Mafia Channel.—Msala Mouth to Ndahi Mouth, including Okuza Island.
Southern Section -	From Ndahi Mouth to parallel of 10° 40' S.

\* \* \* \* \*

<sup>1</sup> M. 05026/15.

8. *Bases* :—

Headquarters and base for Zanzibar.  
general purposes.  
Local bases, Northern Mombasa.  
Section.  
Rufiji and Southern Niororo, Tirene, and Kibondo.  
Sections.

NOTE.—For ships in North Mafia Channel, base is Niororo.  
For ships in South Mafia Channel, base is Kibondo.

\* \* \* \* \*

16. *Positions.*—The following positions are to be marked on charts and lettered. They will be occupied as ordered by ships and whalers employed on the Rufiji section :—

A. 5' E.N.E. of North Fanjovi Island.	} Forming the extremes of outer patrol line A.—C.
C. 10' N.N.W. of Moresby Point.	
B. 14' N., 9° W., of northern extremity of Niororo Island.	Position for collier anchored as light vessel.
E. 2·5' E.S.E. of North Fanjovi Island.	Night position for cruiser guarding Koma Channel.
F. 2' W.N.W. of north end of Dira Shoal.	Night position of blockading cruiser guarding central exit, North Mafia Channel.
G. 4' N.W. of centre of Niororo Island.	Night position of blockading cruiser guarding eastern exit, North Mafia Channel.
X. 2·75' S., 53° W., south point of Koma Island.	Position of whaler watching Kikunya and Simba Uranga Mouth.
Y. 6·5' S., 17° E., southern point of Koma Island.	Position of whaler watching Simba Uranga Mouth.
Z. 14' S., 23° E., southern point of Koma Island.	Position of whaler watching Kiomboni Mouth.
R. 3·5' E. of high tree clump Mdahi Mouth.	Position of whaler watching Ndahi and Kiassi Mouths and inshore channel from north.
S. 6·3' S., 20° W., from Mange Reef Beacon.	Night position of blockading cruiser guarding South Mafia Channel.
P. 5·2' S.E.S. Kibondo Light	} Forming extremities of outer night patrol line. P.Q.
Q. 4' E.S.E. Okuza Island Light.	
[These were temporary Lights established.]	
T. $\frac{3}{4}$ ' S., $\frac{1}{2}$ ' E., western extremity of Boydu Island.	Alternative position during S.W. winds for whaler usually stationed at "R."

(NOTE.—All bearings are magnetic.)

*For North Mafia Channel.*—The positions F, G, E, in the order named, are considered the most important, and ships will be detailed as far as numbers permit to anchor at night in these berths. The line A—C will be patrolled if there are sufficient ships available to permit of one being detailed for this duty. In this case a collier should be sent at dusk to anchor at position B and show a light. She should return to Niororo at daylight.

Whalers, as far as numbers permit, are to anchor from dusk to dawn at Y, X and Z, shifting their positions as requisite during the day. One whaler should always be at anchor or cruising in the vicinity of Y.

*For South Mafia Channel.*—At night one cruiser should anchor at S and if a second is available she should patrol on the line P—Q. One whaler should always be at anchor or cruising in the vicinity of R.

17. Senior Officers of the North and South Mafia Channel patrols should detail a ship to visit the entrances each morning, communicating as necessary with whalers stationed there.

18. All ships should take up their night positions at dusk to prevent as far as possible the enemy ascertaining the whereabouts of the blockading ships.



# THE THEATRE OF WAR

IN

## EAST AFRICA

1914-15.

SCALE 1/8,000,000.



BEI

Wireless Stations shown thus W/T.

5° S





## NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE CAMEROONS, 1914.

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### INTRODUCTION.

This monograph deals with the commencement of those combined operations which, after a tedious campaign of 18 months in a tropical and difficult country, resulted in the complete occupation of the German Possession of Kamerun by the spring of 1916. In considering such a campaign, which involves the close co-operation of naval and military forces, the operations of the two Services can not be entirely separated, but it will generally be found that there are phases during which either the one or the other is of primary interest.

The standpoint adopted in this study is naval, military details being only considered in so far as they reacted on the naval side of the expedition or influenced the general course of events, and the narrative terminates with the departure of H.M.S. "Cumberland" from Duala in December 1914: for, though in the succeeding months the naval forces continued to perform valuable and, indeed, essential, duties, this work was chiefly auxiliary to the warfare in progress ashore; whereas during the first period the troops were really of secondary importance as compared with the various vessels.

In dealing with these operations it may appear that apparently trivial affairs have been treated in unnecessary detail, but it is considered that the minor tactics of the struggle waged among the creeks and swamps of the Cameroon estuary are of interest, as the Navy is always liable to be called upon to take part in similar expeditions against savage or semi-civilised adversaries.

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## NOTE ON SOURCES.

## I.—OFFICIAL.

The official documents relating to the Cameroons campaign have been arranged by the H.S., C.I.D., as follows:—

Telegrams and undocketed papers bound up in Volume H.S. 18. This contains most of the material relating to the inception of the expedition.

Reports to Colonial Office from Governor-General of Nigeria have been bound up in H.S. 48.

These relate chiefly to the military operations on the Nigerian frontier, but also contain a certain amount of information with regard to the Nigerian Marine.

Captain Fuller's Final Report on the Cameroons Campaign. This is the principal source, being drawn up by Captain Fuller, and dated May 1st, 1917. It has been bound up in five volumes as below. H.S. 27 contains the report. This is in diary form. It has numerous Appendices as below:—

## APPENDIX 1.

- Part I.—Alphabetical list of all ships and vessels mentioned in the despatch.
- „ II.—List of H.M. ships, French war-ships, Nigerian Marine craft, &c. employed, with names of Commanding Officers.
- „ III.—List of prize vessels captured in the Cameroons.

APPENDIX 2.—Movements of larger transports, store-ships, and colliers in connection with expeditionary force.

## APPENDIX 3.

- Part I.—Duala dockyard.
- „ II.—List of vessels locked in floating dock.
- „ III.—List of vessels repaired on slipway.

- APPENDIX 4.—Salvage operations.
- „ 5.—Account of transfer of port and dockyard to French in 1916.
  - „ 6.—Medical.
  - „ 7.—Details of German forces which retreated into Spanish territory at conclusion of campaign.
  - „ 8.—Number of native refugees who returned to their homes after accompanying German retreat.
  - „ 9.—List of officers and men mentioned in despatches.
  - „ 10.—List of despatches forwarded by S.N.O., Duala.
  - „ 11.—Various documents of interest:—
    - No. 1.—Copy of terms of surrender.
    - „ 2.—Translation of letter from German Consul at Fernando Po to German Consul at Monrovia.
    - „ 3.—Translation of letter from S.M.S. "Bremen," dated August 1913, proposing scheme of defence for Duala.
    - „ 4.—Translation of extracts from diary of Lieutenant Nothnagel, Commandant of Duala on its surrender.
    - „ 5.—Translation of extracts from diary of W. Schumacher, Chief Engineer of S.S. "Kamerun."
    - „ 6.—Arabic document and translation of same found near Campo.
 Of these, Nos. 3, 4, 5 are of great interest.
- APPENDIX 12.—Declaration of blockade of Cameroon coast and notice with regard to raising same.
- „ 13.—List of officers and men of R.N. and Nigerian Marine who lost their lives during the operations.
  - „ 14.—List of enclosures forwarded with despatch.



Volume H.S. 28.—Consists of orders and reports relating to the operations. These are of first-class value as being original authorities, but the series is not quite complete for some of the smaller boat affairs.

„ H.S. 29.—Contains intelligence notes, correspondence with the Governor of Fernando Po, and local Navy list.

The first two sections do not concern the operations dealt with in this monograph.

„ H.S. 30.—Photographs of ships and vessels, &c. employed during the operation.

„ H.S. 31.—Plans of gun mountings improvised. Rough sketch surveys made by the boats of the creeks. Charts and maps. Drawings of unsalved steamers.

The maps include a photographic reproduction of a good German map of the Cameroons, shaded to show relief.

The original papers from which Captain Fuller compiled this report are contained in four box-files. All papers relating to 1914 are in one box, marked “Cameroons, 1914.” The other boxes are labelled: “Cameroons, Naval;” “Cameroons, Military,” and “Cameroons, Miscellaneous;” but with one exception, to be mentioned later, all these papers are subsequent to 1914.

In box “Cameroons, 1914,” are:—

Letters of proceedings from Captain Fuller, dated and numbered as below—

27th Sept.	-	-	-	M. 03139/14.
8th Oct.	-	-	-	M. 03501/14.
2nd Nov.	-	-	-	M. 04430/14.
5th Nov.	-	-	-	M. 04418/14.
11th Nov.	-	-	-	M. 04420/14.
12th Nov.	-	-	-	M. 04419/14.

Despatches from General Dobell to Colonial Office:—

22nd Sept.	-	-	-	M. 03458/14.
27th Sept.	}	-	-	M. 03827/14.
8th Oct.				
15th Oct.				
28th Oct.	-	-	-	M. 04386.
6th Nov.	-	-	-	M. 05049.
12th Nov.	-	-	-	M. 0193/15.

There is also in this box an N.I.D. docket giving copy of an intercepted letter from a German interned at Kano, Northern Nigeria. It is evidently from the organiser of the torpedo attacks on the “Dwarf,” and the name of the writer is given as “Ebeling,” but it would appear the real name was Phoelig.

In box marked “Naval Operations” is N.I.D. 13726/17, giving translation of an article in *Überall* of June 1917 by Lieut. Wendling, Captain of the “Nachtigal.”

## II.—UNOFFICIAL.

The unofficial sources consulted in writing this monograph are—

(a) *The Naval Review*, Volume 3, Nos. 1, 2, 3.

Nos. 1 and 2 contain an article “Naval Work in the Cameroons.” This does not contain much information beyond that in the official papers.

Nos. 2 and 3 contain “Proceedings of H.M.S. ‘Cumberland,’ from the Diary of an Officer.”

This was kept by a lieutenant of the “Cumberland” and is very useful. It is generally accurate and supplements the official documents in many interesting particulars.

(b) “The Cameroons,” by A. F. Calvert, London. (Werner, Laurie & Co., 1917.)

This book is compiled from German sources and contains much information with regard to the country, chiefly from an economic point of view. There are many photographs, which give a good idea of the country.

(c) “Some Sidelight on the Cameroons Campaign.” (*Royal United Service Institution Journal*, August 1919.)

This is the diary of Major Meyer-Griffiths, who was employed as a French interpreter and Ordnance Store Officer with the Expeditionary Force. He was killed in action in May 1915. This diary is not very full for the period covered by this monograph, and is not entirely accurate with regard to naval details.

## CHAPTER I.

## THE THEATRE OF WAR.

1. *History of the Cameroons.*\*—In the latter half of the nineteenth century various German firms established "factories" and trading stations on the West Coast of Africa in territory to which Great Britain laid a vague and nominal claim, and in 1884 Bismarck dispatched a Doctor Nachtigal to consolidate German interests in those regions. With considerable enterprise and audacity the Imperial emissary concluded several hasty treaties with native chieftains, and, hoisting the German flag at suitable points, proclaimed a German protectorate over Togoland and the Cameroon hinterland. These proceedings apparently took the British Government of the day by surprise, and, after some negotiations, the position was legalised by a treaty in 1885, Germany agreeing to renounce some shadowy claims to territory at the mouth of the Niger, while in return Great Britain waived her prior rights with regard to Dr. Nachtigal's acquisitions. A similar bargain was made with France in the same year.

In 1911 the Agadir incident occurred, when the Germans appeared to challenge in the most deliberate manner the claims of France to supremacy in Morocco, and brought Europe to the verge of war. The result of this act of aggression was that the French Government, under the premiership of the notorious M. Caillaux, permitted large areas of French territory to be added to the German Kamerun Protectorate, and the areas thus ceded had considerable strategic importance. The Germans gained access to the sea at Corisco Bay, south of the Spanish possession of Rio Muni and adjoining the French possession of Gaboon, while two other important extensions of territory were also obtained: one to the eastwards to a point on the River Ubangi (an affluent of the Congo), and one southwards to the Congo itself.

\* The word "Cameroon" is derived from the name "Rio de Camarões" (Prawn River), which the Portuguese navigators of the fifteenth century gave to the estuary facing the island of Fernando Po, the high mountains which rise to the northward also becoming generally known as "the Cameroons." The Germans, however, denominated the whole area of their protectorate "Kamerun," though it extended into regions remote from the district originally described by that name.

The effect of this latter extension was to insert a strip of German territory about 70 miles wide between the French Congo and French Sudan, and the Germans proceeded to organise strong garrisons in this belt, which also constituted a threat to the Belgian Congo Free State.

In 1913 the total area of the German Protectorate, including the new acquisitions, was about 230,000 square miles, with an estimated population of 1,871 Europeans (1,643 Germans) and about 2,650,000 natives.

2. *Boundaries.*—The German Kamerun Protectorate was bounded on the north-west by British Nigeria, the line of demarkation having been finally settled by a joint boundary commission in 1912-13. It may be noted here that it ran along the spurs of the Cameroon mountains and separated the wild and only partially explored highlands from the fertile alluvial plain of the Niger and its tributaries.

In the extreme north, German, British, and French territory meet at Lake Chad, and thence to the south Kamerun was bordered by French Ubangi. The extensions of German territory to the River Ubangi and the Congo have already been described, while on the south the protectorate bordered French Congo or Gaboon.

The Spanish possession of Rio Muni or Spanish Guinea forms an *enclave*, while off the coast are the islands of Fernando Po and Annobom, belonging to Spain, with San Thomé and Príncipe, famous for their cocoa plantations, belonging to Portugal.

3. *The Nature of the Country.*—The most important physical feature is the mountain range of the Cameroons in the north-west, which rises to a height of over 13,000 feet; it is volcanic, and the main *massif* is surrounded by many subsidiary ranges and broken country, which towards the Nigerian border form a region undeveloped and almost unexplored. The remainder of the country is for the most part an upland plateau, falling away to swamps round Lake Chad, and elsewhere interspersed with rocky formations which rise in places to considerable elevations. The coast region, however, with which the naval operations were naturally most concerned, is the alluvial plain, clothed with dense vegetation and fringed with mangrove swamps characteristic of tropical Africa.

The country is traversed by numerous rivers, but the only one of importance, as being navigable for large ships, is the estuary known as the Cameroon River,

formed by the junction of several streams, such as the Mungo, the Duala, the Wuri, and the Lungasi Rivers. The estuary itself is surrounded by a maze of creeks which intersect the swampy lowlands.

The valleys of the Sanaga and Nyong Rivers further south are important physical features, but the streams are so much obstructed by bars at their mouths as to be of little use as means of navigation.

4. *Climate.*—The whole coastal district is warm and humid, but, considering its latitude, not excessively hot, the average temperature at Duala being 78° F., with little variation throughout the year; the maximum is reached in February and the minimum in July. In the higher regions the climate is naturally cooler, and snow falls on the mountain tops.

In spite of its comparatively moderate temperature the coast has the reputation of being one of the most pestilential for Europeans in the whole continent of Africa, while large portions of the hinterland, especially in the south, are infested with the tsetse fly, making it impossible to use horses or cattle in any way. These regions are also plagued by sleeping sickness, which claimed two victims among the naval forces. Malaria in its malignant form attacked 25 per cent. of the *personnel* in the ships concerned.

The rainfall is heavy near the coast, and seems to pass through two phases in the course of the year. From November to June is known as the dry season, while a wet season lasts from June to October; but rain is liable to fall throughout the year. The average rain fall at Duala amounts to 150 inches, of which quantity 120 inches falls in the five months between June and October.

5. *Towns and Railways.*—The capital, Duala, was estimated to have a population of about 200 Europeans in 1914, and the remainder of the white population was scattered in various settlements throughout the country, among which may be mentioned Garua in the north, an important trading centre near the Nigerian frontier; Victoria on Amba Bay, west of the Cameroon estuary, with Buea, a former seat of government, about 10 miles inland on the slopes of the Cameroon mountains; and Edea, on the Sanaga River, 40 miles from its mouth.

The Germans had planned two important lines of railway to improve the very deficient communications of the Protectorate.

The northern line was to run from Bonaberi opposite Duala to Lake Chad, but only about 100 miles had been completed in 1914, while the Central Railway was in use as far as a point on the River Nyong, passing through Edea on the way.

A light railway connected Victoria and the settlements on Amba Bay with Buea.

The communication by sea was chiefly maintained by the Woermann line, which possessed over 30 ships, some of them passenger vessels of considerable size, and they had a small floating dock at Duala capable of lifting 1,200 tons.

6. *Products.*—The German authorities had endeavoured to develop the country with their usual scientific ability, and it was believed that there were unlimited possibilities before the Protectorate when the means of communication were improved; but up to 1914, in common with all other German colonies except Togoland, Kamerun had not paid its way.

The principal products were timber, palm oil, cocoa, and rubber. Elaborate experiments had been made with regard to the scientific production of timber on the slopes of the Cameroon mountains, and the trade in it was rapidly increasing. Rubber trees were cultivated in the south with success, and oil palms in the coastal belt, especially round Duala. Great hopes were also entertained as to the future of cotton and tobacco plantations, and though in 1914 these had hardly been organised on a commercial basis, money was lavishly spent in developing them.

The mineral resources of the country appear to be small and are quite undeveloped, except in so far as the natives work the iron ores which are common.

It is worthy of notice, that in spite of all the German energy and enterprise, more than half the trade of the Colony was dealt with by three British firms, of which John Holt & Co., of Liverpool, was by far the most important.

7. *Military Forces—British and German.*—The British forces on the West Coast of Africa were entirely composed of native troops, and consisted of the West African Regiment at Sierra Leone and the West African Frontier Force. All the officers of these corps are, of course, British, with a proportion of the N.C.O.'s; but whereas the West African Regiment is a part of the regular army, recruited from partially civilised negroes,

and administered by the War Office, the West African Frontier Force is under the control of the Colonial Office.

The latter consists of—

- (i) The Nigeria Regiment. Four battalions of infantry, one battalion of mounted infantry, two batteries of man-transported field guns.
- (ii) The Gold Coast Regiment.
- (iii) The Sierra Leone Battalion.
- (iv) The Gambia Company.

This force was chiefly raised from the Hausa tribes of the West Coast, a warlike Mahomedan race not purely negroid.

The Germans maintained a force of about 185 Europeans and 1,550 natives. Many of these natives were also Hausas and proved good fighting material, while it must be remembered that probably every German in the Protectorate was a trained soldier, whereas in the British possessions the commercial firms placed obstacles in the way of their employees undergoing military training, even after the commencement of hostilities. The Governor-General of Nigeria found it necessary to proclaim martial law in order to permit the whole British population to be organised.

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## CHAPTER II.

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### THE INCEPTION OF THE CAMEROONS EXPEDITION AND PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS.

8. *The Togoland Expedition.*—Immediately after the outbreak of war, a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, with Admiral Sir Henry Jackson as chairman, was formed to consider operations against the German oversea possessions; and with regard to West Africa, it was decided to make the high power W/T station at Kamina in Togoland the first objective. This installation was one of the most powerful in existence, being able to communicate direct with Berlin, south-west Africa, and German East Africa, thus forming a vital link in the enemy's scheme of communications. It was considered probable that the occupation of the German

Colony would not present any great difficulty, and on August 5th orders were sent to the Gold Coast to prepare an expeditionary force to carry out these operations.

At the same meeting of the Sub-Committee on August 5th it was decided that, in order to deliver an effective attack on the Cameroons, reinforcements, both naval and military, would be required, and that the initiation of offensive operations should be deferred for the time being.

On August 8th this decision was repeated, but with the addition that the Admiralty and Colonial Office were asked to work out details of forces required, while the Foreign Office approached the French Government with regard to naval and military co-operation.

The operations in Togoland were completely and speedily successful. The Gold Coast forces occupied the capital (Lome) and the coastal regions on August 7th without encountering opposition, the German Governor retiring inland. Our troops in their advance towards Kamina, about 100 miles from the coast, had to overcome considerable resistance, but on August 25th the enemy destroyed the W/T station and the Governor surrendered the whole Colony, the northern portions of which had already been occupied by French columns from Senegal and Dahomey.

9. *The Situation in Nigeria.*—On the outbreak of war the troops in Nigeria took up stations on the eastern frontier in accordance with a pre-arranged defence scheme, being under the orders of Colonel C. H. P. Carter, Commandant of the Nigeria Regiment, who established his headquarters at Lagos. The available forces were divided into five columns, two in the north based on Maidguri and Nafada (in the Lake Chad neighbourhood), one based on Yola, half way down the frontier, and two further south, working on the Cross River and near Calabar. Of these columns, that based on Yola appears to have been the strongest, consisting of four companies of infantry,\* one company mounted infantry, and two field guns, and it faced the important German post of Garua, about 25 miles across the frontier.

The Governor-General of Nigeria, Sir Frederick Lugard, was at home on leave at this time, and the Deputy Governor reported on August 5th that the

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\* A Company of the W.A.F.F. consisted of from 120 to 150 men.

Commandant was anxious to invade the Cameroons with Duala as the objective.\* It was believed that the French had 2,000 men at Fort Lamy on the eastern frontier of the German territory, and Colonel Carter appears to have considered an offensive desirable, but, in accordance with the decision of the Sub-Committee, instructions were sent that nothing was to be undertaken without orders from home.† The Deputy Governor Boyle, on receiving these instructions, tried to induce the military authorities to modify their dispositions in view of the internal situation of the Colony, but was not successful, and endeavoured to obtain approval from the Colonial Office for his suggestions.‡

10. *First Steps towards the Offensive.*—On August 8th the Colonial Office and Admiralty had been asked to work out details of the forces required for an expedition against Duala, and on the same evening the telegram from Nigeria, asking that the disposition of the military forces should be altered, was received. Next day, in reply inquiries were made as to whether an attack on Duala without naval co-operation was possible, what forces could be spared from Nigeria for this purpose and the Deputy Governor was further directed to communicate with the French Governor-General at Dakar in order to arrange co-operation.§

The same day (August 9th) Sir Henry Jackson drew up "Naval Notes" with regard to an attack on the Cameroons for the use of the Oversea Attack Sub-Committee. These described the objective as being the capture of Duala with its Government offices, wireless station and dock, which formed a base from which hostile naval operations could be carried out against our trade.||

It was considered impossible for a naval force to co-operate effectively with a Nigerian force acting from the interior owing to the lack of communication and the difficult country lying between Duala and the frontier, but it was recognised that preliminary action in the hinterland might induce the enemy to reduce his coast garrisons and so facilitate the direct attack on the capital. Sir Henry Jackson did not anticipate that the defences would prove formidable and suggested that,

\* Appendix No. 1.

† Appendix No. 2.

‡ Appendix No. 3.

§ Appendix No. 4.

|| Appendix No. 5.

provided there were no German armed ships in the river, the gunboat "Dwarf,"\* then at Sierra Leone, should be used to convoy the transports and support the attacking force.

These "Naval Notes" were supplemented on August 10th by "Remarks on the Situation," by Sir Henry Jackson, which were also prepared for the Sub-Committee.†

It had been ascertained that the "Dwarf" was boiler-cleaning, and would not be ready for sea until August 14th, so that immediate action could not be taken. It was suggested that the expedition should be prepared at Sierra Leone ready to start at short notice, while the proposed operations in the Nigerian hinterland need not be affected in any way. It was hoped that the naval situation on the west coast of Africa would be clearer in a few days.

There was at this time great obscurity with regard to the movements of those German war-vessels which might possibly be in the neighbourhood of the Cameroons, and the situation was not made clearer by a series of rumours, of which the first were received on August 9th, to the effect that the Germans had seized the Spanish W/T station at Fernando Po, and the "Dresden" was expected to arrive at Duala.‡ The rumour with regard to Fernando Po was repeated from several sources, while the German gunboats, "Eber" and "Panther," were both reported in the vicinity; the whole uncertainty being increased by the difficulty of maintaining communication with our cruisers off the Cape Verde Islands.

11. From the previous paragraph it will be seen, that on or about August 10th, the naval idea was that there should be a diversion made by the Nigerian troops in the interior, while an expedition from Sierra Leone, accompanied by the "Dwarf," occupied Duala; the date of the latter operation being dependent on the local naval situation. Meanwhile the Foreign Office had approached the French Government with regard to co-operating in the attack on Duala, and, when doing so, gave an estimate of the total German forces as being 170 white troops with 1,350 native troops and 700 native police;

\* "Dwarf," Commander F. Strong, R.N., 710 tons, 2—4 in., 4—12 pdrs.

† Appendix No. 6.

‡ Appendix No. 7.

their artillery consisting of nine field guns and 17 machine guns.\*

The French in reply offered naval co-operation on the coast in any measures we might take, while, simultaneously, their troops would invade Kamerun from the north-east—that is to say, from the regions of Lake Chad and Ubangi.†

12. The Colonial Office received a reply to the questions of August 9th on August 12th, and this telegram stated that the Commandant was of opinion that naval co-operation would be required for the attack on Duala and that Nigeria could spare 2,000 men and 10 guns for this service, but it was not considered practicable to arrange co-operation with the French owing to the great distances involved. Colonel Carter was also very anxious to advance on Garua and clear the north, before any offensive commenced on the coast, the final form of his proposed operations being one or two columns acting from the land frontier combined with a strong attack from the sea.‡ It was emphasised that a preliminary reconnaissance of the frontier was essential, and on August 14th the Colonial Office approved of this being carried out provided that the forces did not get involved in serious hostilities and could be easily recalled.§

13. *A Cruiser ordered to Duala.*—Meanwhile there had been no direct intelligence as to the condition of affairs at Duala, but numerous rumours indicated that there might be enemy cruisers in the neighbourhood; which, together with reports of German merchant ships collecting there, and the possible seizure of Fernando Po, seemed to point to the possibility of naval activity being contemplated by the enemy. Rear-Admiral Stoddart, commanding cruiser Force "D" ("Carnarvon," "Cumberland," "Cornwall") was, therefore, ordered on August 13th, to detach a cruiser to the Cameroon River and to investigate the truth of these reports|| and the "Cumberland" (Captain Cyril Fuller), then in the neighbourhood of the Canary Islands, received orders to this effect in the evening of August 17th.

At a meeting of the Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence on August 14th it was decided to

\* Appendix No. 8.


† Appendix No. 10.

|| Appendix No. 14.

‡ Appendix No. 9.

§ Appendix No. 11.

# SKETCH MAP OF GERMAN KAMERUN PROTECTORATE



postpone commencing operations against Duala pending further information regarding the situation in the Cameroons and Fernando Po, but Brigadier-General Dobell, the Inspector-General of the West African Frontier Force, then at home, was called upon to prepare plans for an offensive in conjunction with the Admiralty.

14. *The Allied Conference of August 15th.*—Hitherto the expedition had been only tentatively considered, but on August 15th it assumed much more definite form as the result of an Allied conference held at the Admiralty. The French had concentrated a force of Senegalese troops at Dakar, originally intended to reinforce their garrisons in Morocco, but our Allies later decided to use them against the Cameroons; the joint conference was summoned to decide the general outline of the expedition, and Sir Henry Jackson prepared a memorandum as to the decisions arrived at.\*

Fortunately, just before the Conference assembled, a long telegram had been received from the Administrator of the Gold Coast containing information received from the native crew of the Woermann liner "Marina,"† who had mutinied at sea and forced their officers to take the ship into a British port.

Their reports showed clearly that the Germans were preparing to defend the river, ships having been sunk in the fairway, all buoys removed and guns mounted to command the entrance. It was also believed that mines had been laid and that the gunboat "Eber"‡ had recently left Duala. On the other hand, it appeared that there was considerable scarcity of native food, and the population was disaffected.

In view of these reports the Conference recommended that a blockade of the Cameroons should be established by cruisers, the "Dwarf" and the French gunboat "Surprise" to concentrate at Lagos and await orders. As this blockade would prepare the enemy for subsequent operations, it was considered that the expedition should not be unduly delayed.

The French contingent from Dakar would consist of about 2,000 men, with six field guns, while our

\* Appendix No. 14.

† The "Marina" had been sent from Duala to Monrovia with Krooboys (native sailors) from German ships remaining at Duala.

‡ 1,000 tons; armament, 2—4-inch.



garrison at Sierra Leone would send 600 men and Nigeria 1,700, with 10 guns. All these forces would need transporting, and escort to Victoria or Ambas Bay, which was selected as the point of disembarkation, the troops then to advance on Duala, about six days' march distant.

A number of armed launches and shallow draught gunboats were to be improvised locally for river work, some being fitted for mine-sweeping. The question as to who should command the military forces was left to be settled between the two Governments.

15. *Orders to the "Cumberland."*—On August 17th Rear-Admiral Stoddart informed the Admiralty that the "Cumberland" was on her way to Fernando Po and would coal at Sierra Leone on her way.\* This would bring her in touch with the "Dwarf" and the troops from Sierra Leone which had been detailed for service elsewhere, so the Admiralty decided to send them to Lome (Togoland) under escort of the "Cumberland" and "Dwarf"; once at Lome, they would be in a position either to reinforce the column then fighting its way to Kamina, or to be used as part of the expedition against Duala. The "Dwarf" was informed of this plan,† and on August 19th instructions were sent to await Captain Fuller at Sierra Leone, telling him of the proposed expedition and giving the latest intelligence with regard to the defences of Duala.‡

On August 21st the "Cumberland" arrived at Freetown, Sierra Leone, and received the new orders. Captain Fuller appears to have been doubtful as to whether they superseded the original directions to proceed at once to Fernando Po and Duala; there was, at the moment, no transport available for the troops, and the Admiralty were asked for instructions as to the "Cumberland's" further proceedings.§

The matter was considered by Sir Henry Jackson and General Dobell, and it was decided that the orders issued on August 19th should stand; that is to say, the "Cumberland," with the "Dwarf" and "Surprise," should escort the troops from Sierra Leone to Lome. It was noted that if no other cruiser was available the

\* Appendix No. 15.  
‡ Appendix No. 17.

† Appendix No. 16.  
§ Appendix No. 18.

"Cumberland" would have to return to escort the contingents from Dakar and Nigeria, and it was anticipated that the operations might begin about September 18th.\* The transport difficulty at Sierra Leone had been solved by the arrival of the Elder-Dempster steamer "Akabo" on the 22nd, and at 4 p.m., August 23rd, the force sailed for Lome, the "Cumberland" towing the "Dwarf" and escorting the "Akabo."† The French gunboat "Surprise,"‡ which had been ordered to Sierra Leone, had broken down, and so was unable to work with the "Dwarf" as had been originally intended.

The "Cumberland" arrived at Lome early on August 28th, and the same evening left for Lagos *en route* to Fernando Po in accordance with her instructions, while the "Dwarf" proceeded to Lagos, and the troops disembarked from the "Akabo" to await further orders.

16. *Military Arrangements.*—The French originally proposed that the commander of their troops from Dakar should be in supreme command of the military side of the expedition, but this conflicted with the desire of the British authorities that the Inspector-General of the West African Frontier Force should be in charge of the operations.

On August 22nd the French Government, in view of General Dobell's unique experience of West African warfare, agreed to place their troops under his orders, and, with this important point settled, the final arrangements were made at home. Into the details of these military arrangements it is unnecessary to go, especially as there were constant minor modifications, but the main idea was that General Dobell would sail from England in a large vessel suitable for use as hospital ship, transport, and headquarter offices. The various British Colonies would meanwhile prepare their forces for embarkation, and the General would proceed along the coast, picking up contingents from Sierra Leone, Gold Coast, Togoland, and Nigeria on his way. The Colonial Office ordered the Nigerian authorities to arrange specially for the provision of surf boats suitable for landing on an open beach, and it was hoped that the French from Dakar would join at Sierra Leone. It may be noted here that the peculiar conditions of West

\* Appendix Nos. 19, 20. † Appendix No. 21.  
‡ "Surprise," 617 tons, 2—4-inch, 4—9-pdrs.

African warfare, which render any form of animal transport impossible, involve the use of large numbers of native carriers—approximately three carriers to every two fighting men—these being chiefly recruited in Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast.

17. *Modification of Plan of Attack on Duala.*—The formal instructions to Brigadier - General Dobell were drafted at a meeting of the Overseas Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence on August 27th, and were confirmed by the Government next day.\* They described the initial objective of the expedition as being the capture of Victoria, Buea, and Duala, particularly the wireless station at the latter place, and laid down general rules to guide the Brigadier in his dealings with the French and Colonial authorities.

The large Elder-Dempster liner "Appam" was taken over by the Government to convey the General and his staff to the theatre of war and act as a floating base; she was due to leave Liverpool on August 31st, and arrangements were made for the "Europa" from Portsmouth to escort her to Sierra Leone.

On August 29th the Sub-Committee met to consider recent and reliable information to the effect that the country between Victoria and Duala was quite impracticable for military operations during the rainy season then prevailing. It was agreed that, if this proved to be correct, the operation would have to be more of a combined naval and military nature than had been originally contemplated; but, in view of the fact that it was believed a suitable addition to the naval forces would be made, the existing arrangements were allowed to stand, any necessary modifications being made on the spot.†

The reinforcement referred to was arranged by the Admiralty through Rear - Admiral de Robeck, commanding Cruiser Force I.‡ The "Europa" was now only to escort the "Appam" to the neighbourhood of Las Palmas. Admiral de Robeck was to detail either the "Minerva" or the "Challenger" to relieve the "Europa," and then proceed, calling at the West Coast ports to the Cameroon River, where the ship selected would be employed in the subsequent operations. It

\* Appendix No. 22.

† Appendix No. 23.

‡ Appendix No. 24.

was hoped that the French from Dakar, escorted by the cruiser "Bruix," would join at Sierra Leone.

The advantage of this reinforcement was that the cruiser, being of lighter draught than the "Cumberland," would be able to proceed up the river and attack Duala with direct fire. On August 31st Admiral de Robeck reported that the "Challenger" (Capt. C. P. Beatty-Pownall) had been detailed for this service, and on the same day the "Appam," with General Dobell, left Liverpool on her voyage to Sierra Leone.

### CHAPTER III.

#### OPERATIONS OFF CAMEROON COAST TO ESTABLISHMENT OF SUELLABA BASE, SEPTEMBER 10TH.

18. *The "Cumberland's" Reconnaissance.* — The "Cumberland," accompanied by the "Dwarf," arrived at Lagos August 29th, on the way to reconnoitre Fernando Po and Duala in order to prepare the way for the proposed expedition. On arrival at Lagos Captain Fuller received a telegram from the Admiralty containing the information that the "Appam" was sailing on August 31st with General Dobell, the "Cumberland" being ordered to co-operate with him on his arrival. In the meanwhile the British cruiser was to gain intelligence and prepare for a direct attack by light draught vessels on Duala.\*

A conference was held at Lagos between the naval commanding officers and the Colonial authorities, as a result of which Captain Fuller was given complete control of the flotilla of small vessels which composed the Nigerian Marine, and the Government workshops were placed at his disposal. The detailed arrangements made will be described later, but the work of fitting small craft for mine-sweeping was commenced at once.†

Having settled this important matter, the "Cumberland" left Lagos in the evening (August 29th) and proceeded to Fernando Po, arriving off that island on the morning of August 31st. The anchorages in Carlos and

\* Appendix No. 25.

† At Lagos "King Bell," brother of the chief hanged by the Germans at Duala, was embarked with other local natives to act as spies and pilots.

Isabel Bays were examined, but no signs of enemy activity were discovered, and the "Cumberland" proceeded to the mouth of the Cameroon estuary and drove in a merchant vessel which was patrolling off the entrance; owing to the possibility of the bar being mined a closer examination could not be carried out. In the evening an interview with the Spanish Governor of Fernando Po satisfied Captain Fuller that he had maintained strict neutrality; it was further learnt that the "Eber" was the last German man-of-war sighted, and she had left as long ago as May. The wireless station at Duala was at this time completely jamming communication with Lagos, and, in order to inform the Admiralty as to the result of his cruise Captain Fuller decided to proceed to Calabar River, the nearest Nigerian port, in order to communicate by land wire, arriving there on September 1st.\*

The intelligence gained had rendered it fairly certain that no German warships were in the vicinity, but there were constant reports of mining, and it seemed probable that extensive sweeping operations might be necessary.

19. *The Nigerian Flotilla.*—During his first visit to Lagos on August 29th Captain Fuller had arranged for five of the Colonial vessels to be fitted for mine-sweeping,† and the necessary gear was prepared in the Government dockyard with great expedition.

The vessels in question were—

"Ivy" -	-	Government yacht, one 12-pdr., two 3-pdr.‡
"Balbus" -	-	} Steam-tugs.
"Walrus" -	-	
"Alligator" -	-	Large motor-launch (100 feet long).
"Crocodile" -	-	Large motor-launch (100 feet long).

In addition, two 80-foot steam-launches, the "Vampire" and "Vigilant," were each armed with a 3-pdr. and a Maxim for service with the expedition, while two large tugs, the "Remus" (screw) and the "Porpoise" (paddle), were ordered to be fitted with steel protection to the bridge, &c., preparatory to being armed with 12-pdrs. from the "Cumberland."

\* Appendix No. 26.

† Appendix No. 27.

‡ This armament was only mounted gradually.

These vessels were manned and commanded by the Nigerian Marine, a Service under the Colonial Office, but most of the officers had served in the Royal Naval Reserve, and the Superintendent, Captain Child, was a retired officer of the Royal Navy.

The flotilla performed much useful service during the guerrilla warfare among the swamps and creeks of the Cameroon River which ensued.

20. *Description of Duala Neighbourhood.*—Before commencing to describe the operations which led to the capture of Duala it will be as well to give a general outline of the local topography, though no description can replace a close study of the chart.\*

The seaward limit of the so-called Cameroon River is defined by Cape Cameroon on the north, and the long narrow Suellaba Point on the south. These capes are 5 miles apart, but the navigable channel is reduced by shoals off Suellaba Point, while about 7 miles to seaward is a bar with only 4 fathoms at low water. The average rise of tide is about 6 feet, with little difference between springs and neaps.

The expanse of water within the points is in reality more an extensive estuary or basin than a river, as it is formed by the junction of a number of streams, of which the Lungasi, the Duala, and the Mungo are the principal. The main axis of this estuary may be said to run north-east, and coincides with the direction of the Duala River until the latter divides into the Abo and Wuri branches, 30 miles from the sea.

The country surrounding the Cameroon River is low-lying and intersected with innumerable creeks, which wind deviously among mangrove swamps and mudflats and connect the main streams of the various rivers. The estuary itself consists of a central pool, with depths of from 5 to 13 fathoms, gradually shoaling towards the Duala River, and three large bays, all much obstructed by mudflats.

Manoka Bay is on the eastern side, and forms the approach to the Lungasi River, only accessible by small craft. This river runs in a generally north-easterly direction through dense mangrove swamps, and at Yapoma, about 12 miles from the mouth, is crossed by the Midland Railway from Duala to Edea. A narrow

\* Several place-names, however, are not shown on chart at end. For these see Sketch Map.

creek, called Prisu a Loba, or Doctor, connects the Lungasi River with the Duala, 2 miles below the town; but the whole country between the rivers is seamed with creeks, one of which, Olga Creek, also gives a direct passage. The Kwa Kwa Creek in the south connects with the Sanaga River. Navigation in the main stream of the Duala River is much impeded by sandbanks, but there is a channel up to the town with a least depth of 15 feet at low water. Duala itself is situated 16 miles from Suellaba Point, and the river is about a mile wide abreast the town, while on the opposite shore is situated Bona-Beri, the terminus of the Northern Railway, a short distance above Mungo Creek, which communicates with the River Mungo.

On the western side of the estuary are Modeaka and Mokushu Bays, the former being the most northerly and providing an outlet for the Mungo River; both bays also communicate by means of a maze of creeks with the Bimbia River, which falls into the sea 12 miles west of Cape Cameroon, and may be considered as the boundary of the water-logged region. These creeks are of sufficient depth to permit of small steamers navigating them,\* and, in common with those to the eastward, form a valuable means of communication extensively used by the Germans. The Bimbia River itself is a considerable stream as far as Tiko, 10 miles inland, but its approach from the sea is blocked by a bar with only 2 fathoms on it.

To the westward of the Bimbia River the character of the country changes, as the spurs of the Cameroon mountains approach the coast, which is steep and fringed with rocky islands, while there are numerous settlements near the sea-shore. Of these, the most considerable is Victoria, in Amba Bay, with a landing pier and a light railway to Buea, while Bota, a similar small port, adjoins it to the westward. It is important to realise the diverse character of the surroundings of Victoria and Duala, the two towns being thirty miles apart in a direct line.

21. *Proposed Base in Amba Bay.*—The original plan of operations as designed by General Dobell had been to avoid a direct attack on the defences of Duala by

\* The depth in the creeks varies greatly with the season. In the rainy season (June to October) most of them are navigable, but soon become impassable in the dry season.

landing at Victoria in Amba Bay and marching overland by way of Buea, which, it was estimated, would take six days. Later intelligence had shown that this plan would probably be impracticable, owing to the country being impassable in the wet season, and on September 2nd the Admiralty informed Captain Fuller that a direct attack on Duala would be necessary. He was ordered to prepare to arm launches, which, in fact, he had already done.\* This information was sent to Captain Fuller at Calabar, but the "Cumberland" had sailed for Fernando Po and the message was not received until September 10th; her Captain, however, had already decided that the occupation of Victoria was desirable for naval reasons. The end of the rainy season on the West African coast is accompanied by tornadoes, off-shore squalls of short duration but extreme violence and dangerous to small craft such as the Nigerian flotilla was composed of. As the defences at the entrance to the River Cameroon were of unknown strength it was considered essential to establish a preliminary base in Amba Bay, and a request was made that Victoria, which was believed to have been evacuated, should be occupied by troops.† On September 4th this request was negatived by the Colonial Office pending the arrival of General Dobell and his forces.‡

22. *Operations in Amba Bay.*—Meanwhile, on September 3rd, the "Cumberland" coaled at Fernando Po, and was joined by the "Dwarf" in the evening. The empty collier was sent back to Calabar with telegrams describing Captain Fuller's intention of sweeping Amba Bay for mines on September 4th, with a view to forming a base for the flotilla, which was shortly expected to join.§

The sweeping was carried out on September 4th by the "Cumberland's" picket-boats, and the small islands in the bay were also examined without discovering anything suspicious. By noon it was realised that the bay was clear, and the "Dwarf" was sent in to deliver an ultimatum to the Governor, stating that if any opposition was made to a landing the town would be bombarded; the reply to this was that no resistance would be offered. On receipt of this news a party of 50 marines and 25 seamen from the "Cumberland,"

\* Appendix No. 29.  
‡ Appendix No. 28.

† Appendix No. 27.  
§ Appendix No. 30.

which had been prepared in readiness, was at once disembarked, with orders to gain intelligence and endeavour to remove any large quantities of food, of which there was believed to be a shortage in the Colony.

The landing party found that nearly all stores had been removed inland about two days previously, after the first appearance of the "Cumberland" off the coast, and that, though there were no troops actually in the neighbourhood, all the roads out of the town were entrenched. After destroying the local telephone exchange the force was withdrawn, but was landed again at 9 p.m. as a considerable stock of food was reported by the "Dwarf" at Bota, a couple of miles to the westward. The landing party remained ashore all night, and it was intended to remove the stores in the morning, but the work had hardly commenced at daylight when it was discovered that the bush surrounding the settlements was full of native troops brought from Duala and Buea, and about 8 a.m., September 5th, their German commander sent in a flag of truce demanding immediate evacuation. This was promptly carried out as our small force occupied no defensive position, and, after giving due warning, the "Cumberland" demolished the store-sheds at Bota by shell fire. It appears that the entire cocoa crop of the Colony was destroyed on this occasion.

The result of these operations was to show that Victoria was untenable as a shore base owing to the bush and high ground which surrounds it, while the bay itself was open to a heavy swell. The fact that troops from Duala had been brought up in nine hours by means of the creeks and rivers, whereas we had estimated it to be a six-day journey by land, showed the importance of the water communications in the Cameroon estuary, and it became evident that it would be necessary to make a direct attack on the estuary and establish control over the creeks surrounding it prior to the arrival of the expeditionary force.\*

23. *Base Established off Suellaba.*—The "Cumberland" and "Dwarf" remained off Ambas Bay till dark on September 5th, when they left for a rendezvous 5 miles south of Ambas Island, and there met the first contingent of the Nigerian flotilla consisting of the "Ivy" (yacht), "Walrus" (tug), and "Vampire"

\* Appendix No. 31.

(steam-launch), with the steam-lifeboat "Moseley." The "Walrus" was towing a lighter filled with explosives, improvised mines, and other useful stores from Lagos.\* It had been reported at Victoria that the gunboats "Eber" and "Panther" were in Bimbia Creek, and on September 6th the "Dwarf" reconnoitred the bar, while Captain Fuller arranged an operation for the following night. Four useful lighters had been noticed alongside Victoria pier, and it was decided that the first task of the Nigerian vessels should be to cut them out, which was executed with complete success on the night of the 6th–7th September by the "Walrus" and "Vampire." The enemy apparently expected a landing, and manned their entrenchments, but offered no opposition to the removal of the lighters.

On September 7th the whole force proceeded to the charted position of the Cameroon Fairway buoy, 11.7 miles S. 40° W. of Suellaba Point, and found that, in common with all the other navigational buoys, it had been removed; in the vicinity, however, secure anchorage was found even in the prevailing bad weather, and preparations were made to commence mine-sweeping the following day. This was essential before any further move could be undertaken, as it had been reported in Victoria that the bar was mined, while it was necessary to survey the channel and lay buoys to mark the Hundskopfe (Dog's Head) Shoal before the "Cumberland" could pass the bar.

24. On September 8th the "Balbus," "Walrus," "Alligator," and "Crocodile" commenced the sweeping operations under Lieut.-Commander R. Sneyd, the torpedo officer of the "Cumberland," and were somewhat hampered in their work by the heavy swell and strong tides. In spite of these handicaps they were able to report a considerable area clear and the "Cumberland" was able to cross the shallowest part of the bar and anchor within 6 miles of Suellaba Point before dark. There had as yet been no sign of mines, and on the next day it was decided to investigate Cape Cameroon and Suellaba Point to ascertain whether the enemy had erected batteries on these headlands, which command the entrance.

It was arranged that, while the mine-sweepers continued their work, the "Cumberland" should fire a

\* The remainder of the flotilla appear to have arrived during the day (6th). *Naval Review*, Vol. III., p. 310.

few rounds at the possible enemy positions, following which bombardment the "Dwarf" should land 25 marines on Suellaba, while the yacht "Ivy" landed a similar detachment on Cape Cameroon.

These operations were carried out on September 9th as planned. Cape Cameroon was found to be so swampy that landing was only effected with difficulty, and it was obvious that it would be impossible to erect defences there; but on Suellaba Point a German signal station was seized, the three Germans manning it being taken prisoners. As no other signs of enemy activity were observed the detachments were withdrawn. The sweepers had now established the fact that there were no mines in the vicinity of the outer bar, so the "Dwarf" was ordered to enter the estuary and reconnoitre. After rounding Suellaba Point she saw in Manoka Bay a large steamer aground and apparently abandoned; this was the Hamburg-Amerika ss. "Kamerun," 3,659 tons, which had been stationed off the entrance as a look-out. Her first orders had been to sink herself in the fairway if a large enemy vessel appeared, and attempt to ram a small one, a task her crew appeared to have regarded with little enthusiasm. These orders were cancelled later, and in the event her Captain ran her aground undamaged on September 8th, her crew escaping in the boats by the Kwa Kwa Creek to Edea.\* The "Dwarf" then proceeded to follow the sweepers up the estuary and sighted an obstruction of sunken ships and lighters off Rugged Point. Patrolling near them was the German Government yacht "Herzogin Elizabeth,"† on which vessel the "Dwarf" opened fire at 6,000 yards, apparently hitting her. The enemy withdrew at full speed and rounded the southern end of the obstruction, showing that there was a clear channel. The "Dwarf" was unable to pursue her as sweeping operations had not proceeded further, and so returned. Early next morning the "Cumberland" entered the estuary, anchoring north-east of Suellaba, and the first step towards establishing a secure base was completed.‡

\* She was re-occupied as a W/T station on September 9th, but abandoned again before 11th, when we occupied her (Nothnagel's and Schumacher's diaries).

† This yacht had been hovering about observing our sweepers on September 8th and 9th, but did not fire at them. *Naval Review*, Vol. III., pp. 506, 507.

‡ Appendix No. 32.

## CHAPTER IV.

### OPERATIONS AGAINST DUALA PRIOR TO ARRIVAL OF EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

25. *Situation on September 10th.*—The Germans in Duala appear to have been by no means so well prepared to defend their capital as might have been anticipated. In 1913 the cruiser "Bremen" visited the estuary and her captain drew up a report emphasising its value and proposing that an elaborate defence scheme should be adopted; but nothing had been done to carry out these suggestions, and there were neither mines nor coast defence artillery.

After the outbreak of war a battery of field guns was placed on Joss\* (Yoss) Point, commanding the channel to Duala, which was further defended by an obstruction of sunken ships and lighters off Rugged Point; but the battery could not cover the barrage with its fire. After the arrival of our forces in the river the enemy hastily improvised mines from the local resources, but they did not prove very formidable weapons, and the only casualties caused by them were four Germans killed by an accidental explosion while they were being laid. The only armed vessel was the steamer "Nachtigal," of 250 tons (register), with two small guns; but, as will be seen, the enemy endeavoured to construct spar-torpedoes to be used from small launches.

It may be observed that there seems to have been a very general impression among even the official classes at Duala that German cruisers would visit the port; the "Dresden" and "Eber" were especially mentioned, but in point of fact no enemy vessels made any movement in this direction. The enemy had a special inducement to prevent Duala falling into our hands, as it had been used as a refuge for all the German merchant vessels in that neighbourhood. There were eight Woermann liners and one Hamburg-Amerika steamer, of an aggregate tonnage of 30,000, besides the "Kamerun" already mentioned. They had assembled at Duala under orders from home, as insurance against

\* Always described in reports as Joss Point, but now marked on chart as Yoss.

war risks was impossible in Germany, and remained there in accordance with these orders, though it would have been easy to escape to Brazil in the early days of August. Their crews, amounting to 300 white men, were organised for service ashore, though there were not enough rifles in reserve to arm all of them.

The natives in the Duala neighbourhood were extremely disaffected towards the German authority, and expressed British sympathies, as a result of which the Germans hung the two principal chiefs in the early part of August.

To maintain order in the surrounding country a policy of terrorism was resorted to; numbers of native villages were burnt, and these burnings were accompanied by wholesale executions. The effect of this deliberate ruthlessness was to accentuate the sympathy of the natives for the British cause, and on the arrival of the "Cumberland" there were no lack of pilots and spies ready to give us assistance.

26. Captain Fuller's task was to prepare the way for the military expedition and in this connection the importance of the Lungasi River was evident, as it passed in rear of Duala; the Midland Railway, one of the main lines of retreat open to the enemy, crossed it by the Yapoma Bridge, and it was apparent that the threat of a landing in this direction would seriously embarrass the enemy.

A thorough reconnaissance of the numerous creeks which flanked the estuary would also be necessary before there could be complete security from the attacks of armed enemy ships, while these operations would also tend to hamper the enemy in using the invaluable water communications.

27. *Preliminary Operations to September 12th.*—The "Cumberland" entered the estuary on September 10th, and, previous to doing so, Captain Fuller arranged that steamboats should examine the Lungasi River and especially investigate the Prisu a Loba or Doctor Creek, which provided a back way to the Duala River, avoiding the obstruction.\* Meanwhile, the "Balbus" and "Walrus," covered by the "Dwarf," were to sweep

\* The chart in use in August, 1914, showed Doctor Creek as a direct communication to the Duala River, and did not show Olga Creek clearly.

up the main stream to ascertain if there was a clear channel with a depth of 12 feet past the wrecks.

The steamboats which had been sent up the Lungasi River proceeded as far as Piti, which commands the bend of the river about 7 miles from the mouth. Here hard ground forms the river bank, which is elsewhere shrouded by thick mangroves, and the Germans had taken advantage of this fact to throw up entrenchments, connected by telephone with other posts. On their way up the river our boats succeeded in sinking a large steam-launch, the crew of which escaped into the bush, but failed to discover the entrance of Doctor Creek, and on arriving off Piti were met with rifle fire from the enemy trenches. A short bombardment from the picket boats' 3-pdr. having displaced the enemy, a landing party destroyed the telephone without suffering casualties, after which exploit the boats returned.

The "Dwarf," with the "Balbus" and "Walrus," had passed the obstruction successfully, and the channel had been swept to within 6 miles of Duala without discovering any mines.

On this day—September 10th—Captain Fuller received the Admiralty message of September 2nd, which informed him that a direct attack on Duala would be necessary, and the "Challenger" was coming to assist.\* This introduced a new factor into the situation, and it became evident that a channel would have to be cleared through the sunken ships in order to permit her to carry out an effective bombardment. On that morning the Germans had sunk two more steamers, and at night the "Dwarf" anchored near the barrage to prevent the enemy making further additions.

28. On September 11th the sweeping continued as on the previous day, and the channel was swept as far as Doctor Point, three miles below Duala. While supporting the sweepers the "Dwarf" sighted a lighter being towed by a launch from Mungo Creek to Duala and opened fire at them; the fire was returned by the field battery on Joss Point which had not been discovered hitherto, and the "Dwarf" was hit under the bridge. No structural damage was caused, but five men were wounded† and, as the force of the battery was unknown, it was considered advisable to withdraw. The "Dwarf" replied in the direction of the enemy position,

\* Appendix No. 29.

† One died, the only death up to the occupation of Duala.

which was difficult to distinguish, and apparently caused a fire in the vicinity; but no certain results could be observed and the sweeping ceased, the channel being clear up to a buoy north-west of Doctor Point.

The "Dwarf" remained near the barrage for the night, and the Germans intended to carry out an attack with spar torpedoes on her, but the night was too bright, and the attempt was abandoned for the moment. Next day the "Ivy," which had been armed with 3-pdrs. from the "Cumberland," relieved the "Dwarf" as guardship on the barrage.\*

At slack water on the 11th the "Cumberland's" divers had carried out a preliminary examination of the sunken vessels, and next day (September 12th) the arduous task of clearing a passage for the "Challenger" through the barrage was commenced under conditions of great difficulty, the divers being much impeded by the strong currents.

29. *The "Nachtigal" Episode.*—On the night of September 12th† the yacht "Ivy" anchored off the barrage as guardship, was attacked by an unknown vessel, which fired several shots at her from the direction of Modeaka Bay in the complete darkness which prevailed, nothing being seen except the flash of the gun. The attack was not pressed home, and no damage was done, but the incident showed that an armed vessel of some description was probably using the western creeks, which had not yet been reconnoitred. Information received indicated that the vessel in question was the "Nachtigal," and on September 14th the "Cumberland's" picket-boat‡ and the "Vigilant" were sent with orders to proceed *viâ* Modeaka Bay and examine Mikanye Creek, taking care not to be seriously engaged with the "Nachtigal" should she be met with.

The boats passed through Modeaka Bay and Mboka Creek without incident, but on emerging into Mikanye Creek sighted an enemy steam-launch, which proceeded to the northwards at high speed, chased by the picket-boat until she turned into an unnamed creek§ on the

\* Nothnagel's diary.

† Capt. Fuller's Report says 13th, but Report of "Ivy" says 12th, and so does *Naval Review*, Vol. III., p. 512.

‡ Lieut. F. Dalrymple Hamilton, R.N., in command. *Naval Review* says 13th, but Orders and Reports give 14th.

§ Later described as Nachtigal Creek.

western side of Mikanye Creek. Rounding the point which concealed this channel the picket-boat came upon the "Nachtigal," just getting under way, who at once opened fire and proceeded to chase. There was a brisk interchange of shots between the two vessels, but our boats succeeded in escaping without damage and returned to the base. On receipt of the news the "Ivy" was at once sent to search for the "Nachtigal," but, owing to the state of the tide, could not reach the Bimbia River, into which the enemy appeared to have withdrawn.

30. *The Attack on the "Dwarf."*—During these occurrences on September 14th the "Dwarf" had been covering the demolition work at the barrage, and remained at anchor off Modeaka Bay during the night. About 11 p.m. a steam-launch was seen to be approaching from the shore and fire was opened, after which it disappeared. In the morning a large steam-launch was observed aground and deserted, while a German was on one of the sunken vessels making signals of distress. He was captured, and, the launch being subsequently salvaged intact, it was discovered that a remarkably enterprising attempt to sink the "Dwarf" had been made. Two large gas cylinders, filled with 200 lbs. of dynamite each and fitted with detonators, were attached to the bow below the water-line in such a way as to be exploded on striking any solid object. The man who had been selected for the desperate task of steering the boat was to leap overboard at the last minute, but apparently overestimated his resolution, for when the "Dwarf" opened fire he jumped overboard, leaving helm on the boat, which ran harmlessly aground, much to the disgust of Lieut. Phoelig, the Assistant Harbour Master, who had devised the scheme.\*

31. *Sinking of the "Nachtigal."*—The investigation of the western creeks had been hampered by the activity of the "Nachtigal," and it was now decided to make a reconnaissance in force.

On September 16th the "Dwarf" was ordered to proceed to the Bimbia River and examine the German settlement of Tiko, to ascertain if it was defended by batteries. If possible, the "Nachtigal," which was believed to be in this vicinity, was to be brought to action.

\* He was a retired Naval Officer, the only one in the Colony.



The "Dwarf" duly proceeded over the flats of Mokushu Bay, piloted by the captured launch and, passing through the Mikanye and Matumal Creeks, reached the Bimbia River in the afternoon. Here Commander Strong turned to seaward to examine the bays in the direction of King William's Town, but, discovering no signs of enemy activity, he steamed inland again to proceed towards Tiko, and about 5 miles north of Schiess Island the "Dwarf" anchored for the night at 5.30 p.m., the ship being darkened, cable ready for slipping and guns manned.

The exact position of the "Nachtigal" at this time is uncertain. She seems to have been lying somewhere to the eastward of the Bimbia River and to have received intelligence that the "Dwarf" was going towards Tiko, but her captain considered that he could get ahead of her, and he intended to conceal his ship in a creek and ram the "Dwarf" when she appeared next day. He, therefore, after dark, proceeded up the Bimbia River, not realising that he was actually following the "Dwarf."\*

At 8.50 p.m. the "Dwarf" sighted a light approaching from the port bow, the ship then being swung across the river heading about N.N.W.

The searchlight was promptly switched on, and revealed the "Nachtigal" approaching. The latter appears to have been taken by surprise, but at once increased to full speed and endeavoured to ram. The British gunboat opened a destructive fire and, slipping her cable, was just turning under the influence of the engines when the two ships came in contact. The shock was considerable, but was partially glancing, and the vessels separated; the "Nachtigal," a blazing wreck, drifting round a point of land, where she blew up, while the "Dwarf" was placed alongside the right bank of the river in shallow water.

The damage proved to be moderately severe, one compartment being flooded; but it was considered that temporary repairs could be effected, and the "Dwarf" returned next day, September 17th, to the "Cumberland."

Four Germans and 10 natives who had leapt overboard were picked up and made prisoners, but the

\* Narrative of Lt. Wendling, *Uberall*, June 1917.

remainder of the "Nachtigal's" crew, including eight Germans, perished with their ship.

32. *Further Reconnaissances.*—The destruction of the "Nachtigal" enabled our small craft to continue their investigation of the various inland waterways. On September 17th the "Cumberland's" picket boat, which had been despatched to the "Dwarf's" assistance, examined the seaward entrance of the Bimbia River and sank an enemy motor-launch in Dikulu Bay.

The investigation concluded with an incident typical of guerilla warfare. On the way to Dikulu Bay several Germans had been observed in the neighbourhood of a farm on Klippens Point, but as they were apparently unarmed and harmless they were not molested in any way; on the return journey, when most of the picket boat's crew were sheltering from a downpour of rain, a heavy fire was opened at short range from the bush surrounding the farm. Fortunately there were no casualties, and a few rounds from the 3-pdr. silenced the enemy, besides setting fire to the house; but the episode showed the necessity for treating every German sighted as an active enemy.

The Lungasi River running in rear of Duala had already been reconnoitred (*see* para. 26), and it was now considered desirable to examine the Mango Creek with a view to attacking Bonaberi, the terminus of the Northern Railway. To accomplish this, the picket boat was sent, on September 18th, with orders to survey a channel to the Mango Creek, endeavouring to avoid being sighted; but this attempt was not successful, the boat striking a submerged tree in Möwe Lake and damaging her propeller. Next day, however (19th), the steam-pinnace, under Lieut. Adams, achieved the desired end and reached the Mungo Creek, incidentally killing a German on the way; and on her return journey ran into two launches, which were sunk, two Germans and three natives being captured. One of these launches was fitted with a spar-torpedo similar to that used in the previous attempt, and among the captives was its inventor, Lieut. Phoelig, who had determined to make the attack in person.\*

\* From a sketch map in H.S. 31 it would appear that Lieut. Adams had already visited these creeks on 15th-16th, but there is no mention of this elsewhere.

On the next day (20th) Lieut.-Commander Sneyd, in the picket boat, again reconnoitred the Lungasi River and succeeded in passing through Olga Creek to the main channel of the Duala. That night he took the picket boat nearly up to Duala, and swept back with an explosive creep, but did not pick up any mines.

On September 22nd the picket boat was again sent to the Mungo Creek, but the enemy had thrown up entrenchments at Boadibo and forced our boat to retire, Lieut. Adams and a seaman being wounded.

33. *Clearing the Channel.*—Meanwhile the work of making a channel through the obstruction for the "Challenger" had been pressed on, though constantly impeded by bad weather and strong tides. On September 18th the survey and buoyage of the main channel being completed, the actual demolition commenced, and by September 22nd the sunken lighters had been sufficiently destroyed to permit a vessel of 19 feet draught to pass.

The battery at Joss Point, however, was still unaccounted for, and the experience gained on September 11th showed that it was not advisable to expose the "Dwarf" and mine-sweepers to its fire. This fact was taken advantage of by the enemy, who laid about 40 of their improvised mines between Joss and Doctor Points; but their proceedings were not unsuspected by us, owing to the appearance of small flag buoys laid by the enemy on September 19th and subsequent days.

On September 16th the large screw-tug "Remus" arrived from Lagos, and was armed with three of the "Cumberland's" 12-pdr. 12-cwt. guns, and on September 22nd the paddle-tug "Porpoise" arrived to be similarly equipped.

Besides the reconnaissances described in the previous paragraph the small craft were constantly engaged in patrolling and miscellaneous services unnecessary to describe in detail.

On September 17th a patrol had been established outside the estuary, presumably in accordance with the Admiralty telegram of September 11th, which suggested that, in view of enemy cruisers in Atlantic being unlocated, one cruiser should be kept outside the bar.\*

\* App. 34.

The "Kamerun" was salvaged undamaged on the 18th, and was soon in running order as an accommodation ship for prisoners. Another useful task was performed by the cable ship "Transmitter," which arrived on September 17th and picked up the cable which ran from Duala to Bonny (Nigeria), so that by the 19th it was possible to communicate with London by land wire. The interference of Duala wireless station had been very largely overcome and Captain Fuller had sent frequent reports to the Admiralty of his proceedings,\* but, in view of the expected arrival of the expeditionary force, it was satisfactory to have a more reliable channel of communication.

Thus, by the evening of September 22nd the results of the operations conducted by Captain Fuller since September 10th were that the various creeks had been thoroughly reconnoitred, the only armed German vessel sunk, a secure base established for the flotilla and transports, and a 19-foot channel cleared and buoyed to within 6,000 yards of Duala. All the work had been accomplished with slight casualties; but before describing the arrival of the expeditionary force it will be as well to describe briefly the operations undertaken by the West African Frontier Force in the Nigerian Hinterland.

34. *Military Operations on Nigerian Frontier.*—It will be remembered that Colonel Carter, the Commandant of the Nigerian forces, had throughout been anxious to invade the Cameroons by land, but the Home authorities did not wish to commence an offensive before General Dobell arrived. On August 14th permission had been given to reconnoitre the frontier, subject to the troops not being involved in serious hostilities; and in pursuance of this, about August 24th, headquarters at Lagos apparently ordered an immediate advance. The northern column was to seize Mora, the Yola column was to occupy Garua, while the Cross River column advanced up the river to Nsana-Kang, 5 miles across the frontier.

For various reasons, which it is unnecessary to discuss here, the operations thus initiated proved very unfortunate. The northern column was at first successful, but on August 27th had to fall back, with the loss of a machine gun; while, two days previously the attack of

\* App. 32, 33, 35, 36 and 37.

the French from Fort Lamy on Kuseri, the principal German post in those regions, had failed after severe fighting. The Yola column, after achieving a preliminary success in a night attack on Garua, was counter-attacked at dawn and driven back with heavy loss, including the commander of the column. The native troops were so considerably shaken by their first experience of machine guns and artillery that it was necessary to reinforce the column from the north and adopt a strict defensive.

On September 2nd the Governor-General, Sir Frederick Lugard, arrived at Lagos from England, and, after visiting military headquarters, sent a report home, as a result of which Colonel Carter was recalled, being relieved by Colonel Cunliffe, then reorganising the Yola column. Colonel Cunliffe had been originally intended to command the British contingent of the Cameroons Expeditionary Force; as a result of this change General Dobell appointed Colonel Gorges, of the West African Regiment, to the post.

Still worse news was to come. On September 6th the force holding Nsana Kang on the Cross River, consisting of about 320 men with two guns and five machine guns, was heavily attacked by very superior German forces, many of which had been brought up from Duala two days previously. After a desperate resistance the British garrison was nearly wiped out, the total casualties being over 200, of whom more than half were killed, while all the artillery was lost, though most of it was disabled before falling into the hands of the enemy.

This defeat was serious, as the victorious German force was in a position to threaten Calabar and the mouth of the Niger; in order to restore the situation troops had to be detached from the forces collected for the Cameroons expedition, and a defensive attitude adopted along the whole frontier.

It would appear that these operations, which were so uniformly unsuccessful, were not in accordance with the intentions of the Colonial Office and were premature, but they undoubtedly caused the enemy to weaken his forces in the Duala neighbourhood.

## CHAPTER V.

## THE ARRIVAL OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE AND THE OCCUPATION OF DUALA.

35. *The Concentration of the Military Forces.*—The "Appam," with General Dobell and his staff on board, left Liverpool on August 31st and arrived at Sierra Leone, escorted by the "Challenger," on September 12th, at which port the French expedition from Dakar, with the cruiser "Bruix,"\* had been waiting in five transports since the 10th. After embarking the contingent from Sierra Leone the "Appam" left on the 13th and proceeded to Lagos, calling at Lome (Togoland) on the way, where a transport with the Gold Coast force was picked up on September 16th. Lagos was reached next day and the main body of the Expeditionary Force from Nigeria, in four transports, having joined General Dobell, left for Duala on September 20th, there being six transports† under escort of the "Challenger." The French had proceeded independently, and, after calling at Lagos on the 18th, proceeded to the Calabar River to obtain supplies of food and water.

The total strength of the British Expeditionary Force was 154 officers, 81 white N.C.O.s, 2,360 native rank and file, with 3,653 carriers and 10 guns (man-transported), all under Colonel Gorges, West African Regiment. The French contingent, commanded by Colonel Meyer, consisted of 54 white officers, 354 other Europeans, 1,859 native rank and file, six guns and 1,000 carriers. In addition there were 200 horses and mules for transport purposes, which proved troublesome under conditions which involved frequent embarkations.‡

36. *The Expeditionary Force Arrives.*—The "Challenger" with her convoy arrived at the Suellaba anchorage at 9 a.m. on September 23rd, and General Dobell received from Captain Fuller a report of the progress made in preparing the way for an attack on

\* Capitaine de Vaisseau Tirard; 2-7.6", 6-5.5", 4-9-pdrs., 6-1-pdr.

† "Appam," 4,761 tons; "Elmina," 2,997 tons; "Boulama," 1,625 tons; "Boma," 1,720 tons; "Lokoja," 576 tons; "Niger," 606 tons.

‡ French transports: "Admiral Fourichon," 3,186 tons; "Niémen," 3,050 tons; "Ancobra," 1,642 tons; "Gen. Dodds," 1,241 tons; "Aur. Scholl," 1,000 tons.


Duala. Mine-sweeping had been resumed that morning under cover of the "Dwarf" and the channel was found to be clear for 2 miles above the barrage, while the "Ivy" surveyed and marked a channel for the "Challenger." During these operations the Joss Point battery remained silent, and the enemy made no attempt to interfere with our movements, though it had been hoped that the position of the defences would be revealed. On the arrival of the "Challenger" steps had at once been taken to lighten the ship in order to reduce her draft, and General Dobell decided not to attempt a landing until it was definitely ascertained that she could proceed within effective range of Duala, but determined to carry out a military reconnaissance of the Lungasi River next day with a view to selecting a site for disembarkation.

This reconnaissance was undertaken on the 24th by the picket boat under the command of Lieut.-Commander Sneyd, accompanied by an officer of the headquarters staff. The enemy post at Piti was found to be strongly held, and a certain amount of sniping took place from Yansoki, but no casualties were caused; the result of the investigation showed that the north bank of the river was unsuitable for landing large bodies of men, but that small parties might be able to scramble ashore through the mangroves near Mbenge.\*

37. *An Ultimatum Despatched.*—On the 24th September, while the Lungasi River was being examined, another mile of the channel above the wrecks was swept and surveyed, and the "Dwarf" anchored for the night near Doctor Point, this position being now described as the "advanced base." The same evening the "Challenger" reported her draught as being 19 feet 7 inches, and next morning (25th) she was sent up to the advanced base, where she anchored. Meanwhile the sweepers had discovered the enemy minefield and commenced clearing it.

The French force arrived on the morning of the 25th, and, after a conference, General Dobell decided to send an ultimatum to the German Governor warning him that, if the Kamerun Colony was not surrendered unconditionally, Duala would be bombarded from the sea. In the afternoon the British General with Captain Fuller went on board the "Challenger," and this ultimatum was sent to Duala in the "Cumberland's" picket boat,


\* Sneyd's Report of September 24th.



# SKETCH MAP OF CAMEROON ESTUARY

## REFERENCE

- High Water Line.....
- 3 Fathom Line.....
- Railway.....
- Sunken Ships.....



NOTE:- The topography is diagrammatic and the map is only roughly to scale. From Suellaba Pt. to Duala is 16 miles. Only principal creeks used by our flotilla are shown. For full details see Admiralty Chart N<sup>o</sup> 1456.

which was met on the way by a German emissary under the white flag. After some negotiations a reply was received couched in evasive terms, but it was then too late to commence operations, and it was decided that the "Challenger" should open fire next morning.\*

38. *The Attack on Duala.*—After the reconnaissance on the 24th, General Dobell had decided that in spite of the unfavourable conditions reported the method of attack on Duala would be a turning movement advancing from the Lungasi River on the Midland Railway, thus cutting off the enemy's retreat, while the "Challenger" distracted their attention by a bombardment from the river.

In order to execute this plan it was arranged that the armed tugs "Porpoise" and "Remus," with one company of the West African Frontier Force, should proceed up the Lungasi at daylight on the 26th, acting as an advance guard to the remainder, and, after driving the enemy out of their position at Piti and cutting the telephone wire, reconnoitre the Yapoma bridge to prevent trains passing from Duala. The remainder of the forces detailed as covering party, consisting of 56 Europeans, 683 rank and file, with 309 carriers and two machine guns, were to embark in lighters and motor-launches and disembark on the north bank in the neighbourhood of Mbenge. Two small transports with the remainder of the force—approximately equal in numbers—were to await off the entrance of the river until the covering party made good their landing.

The "Challenger" opened fire at daylight and fired a few 6-inch shells into the town, causing some damage to property; but in view of the anticipated success of the military operations it was not considered desirable to injure the town too much, so the bombardment was not persisted in. Unfortunately the Lungasi landing proved a complete failure. The "Remus" and "Porpoise" advanced to Piti, where they met with strong opposition. This was soon silenced by a bombardment and, after searching the neighbourhood with shell fire for 45 minutes, the two tugs closed on Piti unmolested, and sent in a party to destroy the telephone instruments; on

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\* For an interesting account of these negotiations by an eye-witness, see *Naval Review*, Vol. III., p. 524. He states that, owing to no German interpreter being present, the enemy reply had to be signalled to the "Cumberland" for translation, which caused delay.

nearing the shore, however, the boat was received with violent rifle and machine-gun fire from the concealed enemy and forced to return. A boom had been constructed across the river, which forbade approach to the Yapoma railway bridge, and, as landing at Piti was impossible, the British vessels retreated, being sniped from both banks on the way down stream. Their total casualties were 12 men wounded, some severely, as at the close range bullets had penetrated the improvised armour of the tugs. Meanwhile the troops had been landed at Mbenge as arranged, but the country proved to be quite impassable, and the two companies detached to occupy Yansoki failed to reach their objective. After many difficulties, caused by the transports and lighters running aground, the whole force was withdrawn and returned to the Suellaba base in the evening.

39. *Surrender of Duala, September 27th.*—The operations in the Lungasi on the 26th showed that a direct attack would have to be made on Duala, and early on September 27th the Allied Senior Officers proceeded in the "Ivy" to an anchorage off Bwape Sand in order to examine Joss Point and decide on its suitability for landing troops. While there, at about 9.30 a.m., they observed the mast of the wireless station fall, followed by several loud explosions and the hoisting of a white flag on the principal flagstaff in the town. At 11 a.m. a representative of the German Government arrived on board the "Ivy" and agreed to surrender Duala and Bona-beri unconditionally, and in the afternoon the General landed at Duala, which was occupied by the "Challenger's" marines, while a detachment of blue-jackets garrisoned Bona-beri.

There seems to be little doubt that the German authorities never intended to defend Duala seriously, but to retire inland and wait for the anticipated German victory in Europe. As early as September 10th the Post Office stores were loaded on a train ready for evacuation,\* the Governor left on the 25th, the Commandant on the 26th with all the native troops, and the reply to our ultimatum was no doubt evasive in order to gain time. Nearly all the rolling stock of the railways had been removed, the wireless station completely destroyed, and all stores, provisions, and armament transported to the interior.

\* Nothnagel's Diary.

The prisoners included a detachment of 70 armed Germans, who had been left in charge of the town, and four field guns, which had originally formed the Joss Point Battery, were also taken.

40. *Situation after Surrender of Duala.*—The terms of the capitulation only included the actual towns of Duala and Bona-beri and their immediate vicinity, so it was evident that there could be no security for a shore base until the surrounding country had been cleared of the enemy, whose strength was still uncertain.

On September 28th the troops took over the duty of garrisoning the occupied territory, and the naval authorities took stock of their captured acquisitions. There were nine large steamers, with full crews and valuable cargoes on board, lying above Bona-beri, besides several smaller steamers, some of which had been sunk; between 20 and 30 steam and motor launches; and numerous lighters—all of which proved of use. A shallow draught stern-wheel gunboat, which had been disarmed, was captured with steam up, and promptly supplied with a Maxim and commissioned as the "Sokoto."\*

The "Porpoise" meanwhile, with a detachment of 25 troops, proceeded up the Lungasi River with instructions to reconnoitre Piti, and, if not attacked, pass up the river to the Yapoma bridge, which was to be simultaneously examined by a patrol from Duala. Piti was found to be evacuated, with many dead bodies remaining as relics of the action of the 26th, and the "Porpoise" passed the boom which had been sighted on that date without difficulty. A little further on a more formidable obstruction, consisting of 3½-inch wires defended by entrenchments ashore, was encountered; but the enemy position was unoccupied, and on the 29th the "Porpoise" was able to force a passage and sight the Yapoma railway bridge, two spans of which had been destroyed. The enemy were found to be in force on the opposite bank and engaged with our patrols, but as the tug was stopped by shoal water she withdrew, after shelling the German position. On the same day two companies of the French contingent were sent from Duala to endeavour to seize the railway bridge and cover repair operations.

\* She was at first called the "Fuller." The fact that more had not been done to destroy the shipping is possibly owing to the fact that the only naval officer in the Colony had been already captured. See par. 30.

From information received at this time it appeared to General Dobell that the enemy's main forces had retired in two portions, one to Jabassi on the Wuri and one to Edea on the Sanaga, with small detachments scattered about the creeks of the Cameroon estuary.

41. *Operations to secure Duala.*—The disembarkation of the troops had proceeded rapidly on the 28th, 29th, and 30th, absorbing the energies of most of the small craft, but on September 30th two amphibious reconnaissances were ordered. As it was reported that there were 100 enemy troops at Tiko and large stores of provisions both there and at Missellelle Plantation, north of Möwe Lake, it was decided to seize these, as there was great food shortage among the native population of Duala, and to effect this two flotillas were organised for October 1st.

The "Remus," "Alligator," "Vigilant," and picket boat, with 150 troops, proceeded to Tiko, and, after a short struggle, dislodged the enemy, who retired, leaving the body of a German officer. No provisions were found, and after destroying the telephone, our force withdrew without casualties.

A similar force of troops, supported by the "Porpoise," "Crocodile," "Walrus," and steam-pinnace, seized Missellelle Plantation without resistance, taking 13 Germans prisoners and securing a large stock of provisions, while troops from Bona-beri commenced to advance along the Northern Railway towards Maka; another reconnaissance being carried out by Commander Strong, of the "Dwarf," up the Abo River, which was found to be obstructed by trees felled across the channel.

Meanwhile the last of the enemy mines had been swept up, the Germans having pointed out their position, thus facilitating the disembarkation of the troops; but in the direction of the Yapoma railway bridge the French met with strong resistance, and had to be reinforced on the 1st.

41. *Clearance of Duala Neighbourhood.*—During the first days of October the country was examined in all directions to ascertain the distribution of the enemy's forces, but in view of ensuing operations the most important reconnaissances were those made up the Wuri River towards Jabassi and along the Midland Railway towards the Yapoma bridge on the way to Edea.

Commander Strong was responsible for the scouting to the northward, and for this purpose he used the captured stern-wheel gunboat, which had been named "Sokoto." On October 3rd and 4th he proceeded as far as Jabassi on the Wuri, about 50 miles from Duala, where he reconnoitred the positions which the enemy were holding in force, and gained much valuable information. He investigated the Abo, the other branch of the Duala River, on the 5th, and reached as far as Miang, 20 miles from Duala; but the enemy did not appear to be concentrating in this direction, and, after destroying telegraphic and telephone communications, he returned to Duala.

On the 3rd, Mango Creek had been thoroughly searched without discovering any trace of German activity, except two obstructions, which were removed; but on the 5th the "Cumberland's" steamboats, proceeding up the Mango River, found the enemy strongly entrenched at Bunyo (13 miles from Duala), and retired after a short engagement.

The French force detailed to cross the Lungasi at the Yapoma bridge found their progress arrested on October 1st by considerable enemy forces, which forbade the passage of the river; next day an attempt was made by a party of marines and engineers landed from the "Remus" at Piti to cut the railway in rear of the Germans, but without success, as a path could not be found through the bush, which was occupied by the enemy. The "Remus" remained in the river for the night, and next day (3rd) an attempt was made to get in touch with the French on the right bank, but again the country proved to be impassable, and the "Remus" withdrew with two marines wounded by snipers.

A more elaborate operation was next planned. The "Cumberland's" and "Challenger's" field guns had been sent up to assist the French artillery ashore, which was of very light calibre, and it was intended to combine a direct crossing with a strong turning movement. Accordingly, on October 5th, 360 French native troops with 80 carriers were landed at Piti from the "Remus," "Porpoise," and three launches, while the "Vigilant" towed up nine surf boats in order to transport the main body across when ready. The turning movement failed, as in the previous cases, owing to the troops being unable to find a practicable path through the swamps; but the direct attack on the morning of October 6th was



more successful. After a heavy bombardment—in which the naval field guns and the “Vigilant” played a useful part—had reduced the hostile fire, some Senegalese troops swarmed over the broken girders of the bridge, while the remainder, crossing in boats, cleared the enemy’s position. This achievement secured Duala from possible attacks from the eastward.

Investigations further afield were undertaken by the yacht “Ivy.” On October 1st she appeared off Victoria, and her Captain found that no enemy troops were in the neighbourhood. The inhabitants did not offer resistance, but as no force was available to occupy the town, they were admitted to parole, and the “Ivy” then proceeded to Fernando Po, to inform the Governor of the fall of Duala. This mission accomplished, the yacht proceeded to the mouth of the Sanaga River and landed a party, which found that two German there had fled on their arrival. The natives were very friendly, and reported that there was plenty of water at present in the river for light draught vessels, and with this and other information Commander Hughes returned to Duala on November 6th.

## CHAPTER VI.

### NAVAL CO-OPERATION SUBSEQUENT TO OCCUPATION OF DUALA.

42. *The Plan of Attack against Jabassi.*—All the information received by General Dobell from various sources went to show that there were two main concentrations of the enemy’s troops, one being at Jabassi, some 50 miles up the Wuri, the other at Edea, where the Midland Railway crossed the Sanaga. It was apparent that, before our occupation of Duala could be considered in any way secure, it would be necessary to defeat or drive back these forces, and dispositions were made to accomplish these ends. Though Jabassi and Edea are approximately the same distance from Duala, an offensive against the former was very much easier than against the latter, as the Wuri River provides good water communication, while the road to Edea runs through thick bush and across difficult country.

There was an additional inducement to expedite the attack on Jabassi in the fact that the rainy season was drawing to its close, when the river would fall and render navigation impossible, except for the smallest launches. It thus happened that on October 6th, when the French had with difficulty stormed the Yapoma railway bridge only 7 miles from Duala, an expedition was ready to commence operations having as their object the capture of Jabassi.

The military side of the expedition was entrusted to eight companies of native infantry, with a landing party of 100 bluejackets and the “Challenger’s” field gun and crew, all under the command of Colonel Gorges. To transport and co-operate with this force a large flotilla was organised, under the orders of Commander the Honourable B. T. C. O. Freeman-Mitford of H.M.S. “Challenger.” The majority of the craft employed consisted of launches and lighters, many of them captured, similar to those employed in the preceding operations, but among the new arrivals were two vessels worthy of more particular notice.

Before it was certain that the “Challenger” would join the expedition Captain Fuller had arranged with the Nigerian marine authorities that a large dredger, the “Mole,” and a steel lighter\* should be strengthened to carry a 6-inch gun in each; if no light draught cruiser had arrived it was intended to use these improvised monitors against Duala. They arrived on October 2nd, received their armament from the “Challenger,” and were at once detailed for the up-river expedition.

43. *The Attack on Jabassi, October 8th.*—At daylight on October 7th the flotilla left Duala and proceeded up the Wuri River. The order of sailing was intended to be in single line, with an advance guard consisting of the “Cumberland’s” picket boat, steam-pinnace, and the “Mole,” with headquarters on board, towing two lighters; the main body was composed of 12 steam and motor-launches and 11 lighters, the rear being brought up by the “Balbus,” towing the 6-inch gun lighter, which had been semi-officially christened “Dreadnought.” The original order of advance was considerably disordered owing to the strong current which impeded many of the heavily burdened tugs, but the advance guard maintained their position until they arrived off

\* Drawing 9 ft. and 7 ft. of water respectively

the German post of Nsake at 4 p.m., and were met by rifle shots. The position had been previously reported as entrenched and occupied by the enemy, so was subjected to a brief bombardment and then occupied by the troops without resistance. The whole flotilla was concentrated and remained at Nsake for the night, before commencing the final advance on Jabassi, 10 miles up stream.

It had been arranged by the military authorities that the troops should be disembarked on the right bank of the stream a few miles below Jabassi and then advance on the town, which was believed to be occupied by the enemy. The left bank of the Wuri was reported to be impassable, and so no troops were detailed to cover the advance of the flotilla on that side. The country in this region is very much dryer than near the coast, but is covered with banana plantations and dense forests, which render movements and observation difficult.

At 6.15 a.m., October 8th, the flotilla weighed, after being somewhat delayed by a dense mist, and two hours later the troops commenced to disembark at a point 3 miles below Jabassi. The landing was carried out in an orderly manner, without disturbance from the enemy, and at 9.15 a.m. the "Mole," picket boat, and steam-pinnace, with the "Dreadnought" towed by the "Balbus," proceeded towards Jabassi, which was now clearly visible in the tropical sunshine which had succeeded the morning mist. At 9.20 a.m. the two 6-inch guns opened fire on the town with visible effect, and continued a deliberate bombardment until the military headquarters requested them to cease fire in order to permit the main attack to develop. The vessels then moved up to within about 1,200 yards of the town and anchored at 11.20 a.m., no enemy having been seen.

Ten minutes later a fierce fire was opened from rifles and machine guns situated on the left bank of the stream. The river is here hardly 80 yards wide, and it is remarkable that at this close range the exposed *personnel* of the boats were not almost wiped out.\*

\* It seems probable, from the accounts of eye-witnesses, that in this as in other cases the extemporised gunshields and armour were very effective in reducing the casualties. The enemy's native troops appear to have been supplied with lead bullets, not nickel-coated, which flattened on the steel plates. The casualties were one killed and four wounded.

The enemy's fire was replied to with every gun that would bear, but as the enemy was quite invisible no effect could be observed, and at noon the flotilla were ordered to drop down stream in order to avoid the fire. At 2 p.m. the "Balbus" unfortunately ran aground on a small island and had to be abandoned.

Meanwhile the troops had met with an unfortunate check in their advance. On reaching a row of corrugated iron sheds which formed the outskirts of Jabassi they encountered a cross-fire from machine guns concealed on both banks of the river and, after suffering considerable casualties, had to fall back without engaging the enemy at close quarters.

It was now about 2 p.m., and both natives and Europeans were suffering from the heat, which was abnormal. The naval gun's crew who had been landed in heavy marching order after dragging their gun to the top of an eminence near Jabassi were completely prostrated, and, in view of all the circumstances, Colonel Gorges decided to retire on the flotilla. The military losses were one white officer and two European N.C.O.'s killed and 32 native soldiers killed, wounded and missing.

44. *The Retreat from Jabassi.*—The troops commenced re-embarkation at 5.15 p.m. under circumstances of great difficulty: night was rapidly approaching, the men were exhausted and in some disorder, and an attack by the enemy from either bank might be anticipated at any moment. In order to ensure an orderly embarkation time was essential, but it could not be spared as the Naval Commander had decided that it was most inadvisable to remain so close to Jabassi during the night unless both banks of the river were occupied—a task the military were unable to undertake. The troops were therefore placed on board the vessels as rapidly as possible without regard to organisation and the flotilla started in the darkness for Nsake, which was safely reached with only one collision, after an exciting journey in which the strong current, uncharted shoals, and a tornado played parts.

At Nsake it was intended to land the troops and reorganise the expedition for another attempt, but on October 10th it was reported by the native pilots that the final fall of the river had begun, making it urgently necessary to get the larger vessels down stream. The whole force, therefore, returned to Duala on October 11th.

45. *The Second Attack on Jabassi, October 14th.*—No time was lost at Duala in organising a fresh force, consisting of troops which had not been engaged in the previous enterprise, and, as it was found that the level of the river had not fallen so rapidly as was anticipated, the new expedition started up stream on the 12th.

The flotilla was very similar to that used on the previous occasion, but great emphasis was laid in the orders on the care requisite to avoid being cut off inland owing to the river becoming too shallow for the heavier draught vessels to pass. The current was running down very strongly, and it was not till the night of October 13th that the expedition halted for the night at Nsake, which was found to be deserted by the enemy.

For the advance next day on Jabassi, troops were landed on both banks and advanced cautiously accompanied by the armed vessels of the flotilla. This method of attack proved completely successful; the enemy only offered slight resistance, and by 4 p.m. the British flag was flying over the Government buildings of Jabassi, our losses being only one white N.C.O. dead from sunstroke and two native soldiers wounded. The night passed quietly without a counter-attack, and it appeared that the enemy had retired inland with their forces, except a dozen Germans taken prisoner. The operation being successfully completed the flotilla withdrew, after establishing a garrison to hold the place.

From information received later it appeared that the first attack, although apparently a complete failure, had important results. The effect of our 6-inch high explosive shells on the *morale* of the enemy's black troops was considerable, and was the principal cause of the German withdrawal. It does not seem, however, that the hostile forces were handled with much enterprise or they might have rendered our retreat from the first expedition a disaster.

46. *The Plan for attacking Edea.*—While the attacks against Jabassi were in progress preparations were being made to commence operations in other areas. On October 7th the "Bruix" sailed for Libreville (French Congo) with orders to join the gunboat "Surprise"\*

\* On September 21st the "Surprise" had taken part in operations conducted from Libreville against a German force entrenched at Coco Beach, Corisco Bay. These were successful and two armed German steamers were sunk by the "Surprise," which had an officer and two men killed.

there, and then return with her to Duala, on the way reconnoitring the southern coast as far as the entrance to the Nyong River; she was further ordered to attack and disperse as far as possible any enemy concentrations in those regions.

The "Ivy" also, after investigating the German settlements near Rio del Rey, on the Nigerian frontier, was sent to survey the mouth of the Sanaga River, arriving there on the 12th and being met by the "Bruix" and "Surprise," who had bombarded several German posts in their progress along the coast, but without effecting a landing. The French ships returned to Duala, while the "Ivy," after surveying the Sanaga bar, proceeded to the mouth of the Nyong and carried out a similar examination.

The result of these surveys was to show that, though the Germans had apparently not used these rivers to any extent, the bars were quite practicable for small steamers, and in view of this knowledge an elaborate scheme of operations against Edea was planned.

This plan was designed to take full advantage of the water communications and of our now considerable flotilla. The main military force, which was to be provided by the French was to proceed to the River Nyong and thence in small steamers up the river to Dehane, about 25 miles from the sea, where the troops were to disembark and march upon Edea. It was not anticipated that the enemy would expect an attack from the direction of the Nyong, and it was hoped that other operations up the Sanaga would distract their attention. The Sanaga force was to consist of a small force of troops with the two 6-inch gun vessels and some river craft. It was intended that the troops and small craft should proceed from the Cameroon estuary through the devious Kwa Kwa Creek to the Sanaga, driving the enemy out of their fortified post of Lobethal,\* and joining there the larger vessels which would enter the river from seaward. The united flotilla would then advance up the Sanaga on Edea, establishing communication with the Nyong force on the way.

While these encircling operations were in progress the French troops from the Yapoma bridge were to conduct an offensive along the Midland Railway towards

\* At junction of Kwa Kwa Creek and Sanaga. See Chart No. 1357.

Edea, which would thus be attacked from three directions.

47. *Composition of Forces.* — The French force detailed for the Nyong River consisted of 238 Europeans, 770 native tirailleurs, 960 carriers, with four mountain and two machine guns; 150 British native troops were also attached to the expedition, which was commanded by Colonel Meyer. These were to be embarked in six transports each towing a lighter, most of them small coasting vessels,\* and convoyed during the 50 miles open sea journey by the "Cumberland," "Dwarf," and "Surprise." An advance force, consisting of the "Ivy," three tugs, three launches, and a lighter, would be ready at the bar to disembark the troops from the larger vessels and convey them up the river.

The Sanaga River expedition, as has already been explained, was to proceed by two separate routes. The gunboat "Sokoto," the armed launch "Vampire,"† with two more launches and 130 British native troops were to proceed by the Kwa-Kwa Creek against Lobetal, where they would meet the "Remus," "Porpoise," "Mole," and a tug towing the "Dreadnought," which would have proceeded by sea and crossed the bar.

The only naval help which could be given to the advance from Yapoma was the mounting of a 12-pdr. 12-cwt. gun on an armoured truck, and the despatch of the "Challenger's" field gun.

48. *Execution of the Attack on Edea.*—All the various detachments sailed from Duala on the evening of October 20th towards their various objectives. The transports for the Nyong River, proceeding in line ahead astern of the "Cumberland" and screened to seawards by the "Dwarf" and "Surprise," arrived off the bar of the Nyong at daylight on October 21st and found the "Ivy" and small craft awaiting them. There was a heavy swell running on the bar, which impeded the operations and caused an unfortunate accident, a boat being capsized with the loss of three valuable lives.‡

\* "Boma," 1,720 tons; "Hausa," 199 tons; "Fullah," 177 tons; Niémen, 3,050 tons; "Forcades," 191 tons; "Lagos," (?).

† "Sokoto," 2 Maxims; "Vampire," 1—3-pdr.

‡ Capt. Childs, Superintendent Nigerian Marine; Commander Gray, R.N.R., Naval Transport Officer, and a French Staff Officer. Capt. Fuller was in the boat, and was awarded the Humane Society's Medal for his gallantry on this occasion.

In spite of all difficulties, the advance guard of the troops was transferred to the river craft and proceeded up stream, while next day (22nd) the main body were able to cross the bar in the smaller transports, and Dehane was occupied in the evening without resistance.

Both portions of the Sanaga force had been delayed and did not effect their junction at Lobetal till the 24th. The Kwa-Kwa Creek party met with considerable resistance on the 21st, the midshipman in charge of the "Vampire" being wounded, together with four casualties among the native troops, and the vessels returned to Duala. Renewing the attempt next day, the enemy was found to have evacuated his positions, and on October 23rd Lobetal was occupied without resistance.

The gun-vessels which had proceeded by sea had experienced difficulty in crossing the bar on the 21st. Only the "Mole" succeeded in entering the river that day, the other vessels remaining outside. Next day the "Remus," "Porpoise," and "Trojan" (store ship) were able to enter, but the tug towing the "Dreadnought" grounded and became a total wreck. The lighter drifted out to sea, but was picked up by the "Dwarf," on her way back from the Nyong, and towed to Duala. The remainder of the flotilla advanced up river, and on October 24th joined the Kwa Kwa contingent at Lobetal.

Next day the advance up the Sanaga commenced, troops being landed on both banks whenever possible, to avoid the possibility of an ambush, and suspicious points bombarded; but little opposition was met with. On October 26th news was received that the French, under Colonel Meyer, had occupied Edea, and the flotilla then proceeded and anchored off the town for that night. At first our Allies had met with considerable opposition in their advance from Dehane, which they left on the 23rd, but from reports received subsequently it appears that the enemy were alarmed at the news of heavy guns being brought up the Sanaga,\* and decided to evacuate Edea rather than expose native troops to their fire.

The evacuation of Edea enabled the troops from Yapoma, which had only been able to make slow progress along the railway, to join Colonel Meyer on the 28th, and the operation was successfully concluded.

\* They heard the noise of the 6" fired near Lobetal.

49. *Occupation of Tiko, Victoria and Buea.*—No attempt can be made in this monograph to deal with the details of the innumerable combined naval and military operations which were carried out prior to the occupation of the whole Colony in March 1916. In all this work the Navy played an important, though auxiliary, part, and had to carry out such diverse duties as blockade, transport, and providing artillery to assist the land operations; they resembled the operations previously described, except that the military interest gradually predominated. Here only one more campaign will be described; the movements which resulting in the occupation of Buea and Victoria completed the task originally assigned to General Dobell.\*

The plan adopted to attain these objects consisted of three separate parts: firstly, a feint of landing in Bibundi Bay, intended to draw troops from Buea to the north-west; secondly, a landing at Victoria, to occupy the neighbourhood; thirdly, the seizure of Tiko by a combined force and an advance thence by land to Buea.

The whole scheme was carried out without much difficulty. On November 13th the "Dwarf" and a transport appeared off Bibundi and made a demonstration of landing, the "Dwarf" remaining and burning searchlights during the night.

On the same day the "Bruix" bombarded Victoria, which was occupied by the enemy, who soon evacuated the town, and the Marine detachments of the "Cumberland" and "Challenger" landing at Bota seized the buildings and placed them in a state of defence.

Meanwhile a flotilla had proceeded up the Bimbia River to Tiko, being supported by the "Dreadnought" lighter; no resistance was offered, and the troops, after some desultory fighting, occupied Buea on November 15th, being assisted in their advance by the naval field guns.

As a result of these operations the neighbourhood of Duala and the coastal region were rendered secure, and the enemy were only able to maintain a precarious hold of certain districts in the hinterland.

\* App. 22.

## CHAPTER VII.

### THE ADMIRALTY AND THE GENERAL SITUATION.

49. *Proposal to withdraw a Cruiser.*—The principal objective of the Cameroon expedition from the standpoint of naval strategy was the seizure of a possible base for hostile operations against our commerce, while the destruction of the wireless station would hamper enemy communications.\* These ends were attained by the occupation of Duala on September 27th, and the Admiralty, who had hitherto allowed Captain Fuller a very free hand, at once asked him when the "Cumberland" would be ready to return to her normal station on the trade routes.† That the Admiralty should wish to withdraw her was natural, as the shortage of cruisers in the Atlantic was causing great anxiety; the "Karlsruhe" was at the zenith of her success; the "Dresden" was unlocated, and a variety of circumstances had drawn Admiral Cradock's squadron down to the neighbourhood of Magellan Straits and the West Coast of South America.‡

The situation at Duala, which was surrounded on all sides by the enemy, rendered it quite impossible to give a definite date when the "Cumberland" could leave, and the Admiralty was informed to this effect on September 28th.§ Next day, at a meeting of the Overseas Attack Sub-Committee, a decision was arrived at which greatly enlarged the scope of the expedition. The initial objective assigned to General Dobell was the capture of Victoria, Buea, and Duala; it was now agreed that the ultimate aim of the force should be the complete reduction of the German Colony, and on September 30th the General was asked for his views on the subject.|| General Dobell's reply, dated October 2nd, indicated that he was still occupied in clearing the immediate neighbourhood of the surrendered territory preparatory to advancing against the enemy's main forces at Edea and Jabassi, and did not intend for the present to occupy such outlying points as Victoria and Buea.¶

\* App. 5.

† App. 38.

‡ See O.U. 6031, "Operations leading up to Coronel."

§ App. 39.

|| App. 40.

¶ App. 41.

This left it still uncertain when the cruisers could be spared, and on October 5th the Admiralty learnt that the German armoured cruisers were crossing the Pacific. Their arrival in Atlantic waters would certainly increase the shortage of men-of-war on the trade routes, and Captain Fuller was warned that one cruiser must be detached very shortly, the vessel selected escorting the captured ships to Sierra Leone.\*

50. *Cruisers allowed to remain during October.*—On October 9th Captain Fuller sent his reply to the Admiralty proposals, which was to the effect that neither the "Cumberland" nor the "Challenger" could be spared until after the fall of Edea. It will be remembered that in these operations the "Cumberland" escorted the French troops to the Nyong River, leaving the "Challenger" as guardship at Duala. A further complication was due to the fact that the Captain of the "Bruix" was senior to Captain Beaty-Pownall of the "Challenger," and for many reasons it was judged undesirable to have a French officer as S.N.O.

Captain Fuller, therefore, suggested that, after the fall of Edea, either the "Challenger" should sail with the prizes, though two of her 6-inch guns were in the "Mole" and the "Dreadnought," leaving the "Cumberland" to continue the operations, or else Captain Fuller should remain as S.N.O. with the "Challenger," while the "Cumberland" proceeded in charge of her Commander.†

The Admiralty approved of the cruisers staying for the present, but requested that a further appreciation of the situation should be sent before the end of the month.‡

51. *The Functions Performed by the Cruisers.*—The Admiralty were naturally impatient of valuable sea-going ships being tied to land operations indefinitely, but it hardly seems as if it was realised at home how necessary such ships are to the success of combined expeditions, especially when undertaken with native forces. The cruisers provided an invaluable reserve of Europeans, formed an armoury for the river craft, and could at any moment land field guns to support the efforts of the military; they were, in fact, under the

\* App. 42.

† App. 43.

‡ App. 44.

circumstances, irreplaceable, as can be seen from General Dobell's telegram sent in the early days of November.\*

The large numbers of captured launches threw a heavy additional strain on the ships' companies, as the Nigerian Marine had few skilled European ratings, while the steamboats were in constant use on detached service. In this connection it is interesting to notice that the boats of the French ships proved to be quite unsuited for the work required, not being able to mount guns, and the crews showed marked disinclination to undertake service away from their ships.

In view of these considerations Captain Fuller could only report, after the capture of Edea, that there was no immediate prospect of reducing the Allied naval force, and emphasised the fact that the Nigerian flotilla would find difficulty in working under a French S.N.O.†

52. *The Question of the Command.*—The question as to whether the S.N.O. was to be British or French became acute when it was known at the beginning of November that the French Admiralty intended sending the armoured cruiser "Pothuau"‡ to relieve the "Bruix" in the Cameroons. Commandant Cheron, the "Pothuau's" Captain, would be senior to Captain Fuller, and the Admiralty decided that he should take over the duties of S.N.O. on his arrival about November 13th. This would free the "Cumberland" at once for other duties, and it was also intended to withdraw the "Challenger" shortly, orders to this effect being sent on November 3rd, the day before the news of Coronel reached the Admiralty.§

These definite instructions, which would involve turning over the multifarious duties of Senior Naval Officer to a French officer who would be totally strange to the peculiar local conditions caused consternation at Duala, and General Dobell, who had previously expressed his wish that Captain Fuller should remain in charge, sent to the Colonial Office a reasoned statement as to why, in his opinion, it was undesirable either to withdraw a British cruiser or give the naval command to our Allies.|| In this telegram he pointed out that no less than 20 guns from the two ships were mounted in various small craft, that 220 ratings were permanently employed in the flotilla, apart from landing parties, and

\* App. 47.

† App. 45.

‡ "Pothuau," 2—7·6", 10—5·5", 10—3-pdrs.

§ App. 46.

|| App. 47.

that the essential means of communication in the Cameroons were waterways.

Any reduction in the number of armed craft, it was considered, would involve a withdrawal from our advanced posts, which would be most undesirable, and even imperil our hold on Duala, the main objective of the expedition from the naval standpoint.


With regard to the question of the S.N.O., it was pointed out that all the men on the spot, including the captain of the "Bruix," considered a change undesirable, and the General finally asked for an assurance that under no circumstances should the "Cumberland" be withdrawn before Victoria and Buea were occupied.

These strong representations had their effect. In spite of the critical situation in the Atlantic following Admiral Cradock's reverse, the Admiralty arranged that the "Cumberland" and Captain Fuller should remain till the end of the month, while the "Pothuau" cruised off the West Coast within supporting distance. The possibility had now to be considered of the German Asiatic squadron attempting to attack the expedition, and for this reason it was decided that only light-draught vessels which could pass the inner bar and anchor off Duala should remain in the vicinity, if nothing more was heard of the enemy's armoured cruisers.\*


53. *The Final Arrangements.*—In accordance with the Admiralty instructions both cruisers remained at Duala during the month of November, but on the 27th, when the position in the South Atlantic was less acute owing to von Spee lingering in Chilian waters and the progress of Admiral Sturdee's force, it was decided to bring the "Cumberland" home. The armed liner "Laurentic" was proceeding out with stores and men, and it was arranged that she should take out reliefs to fill the places of those officers and men of the "Cumberland" who were employed on detached service. Guns and boats which were being used in the operations were to be left and replaced on arrival in England, while the captains of the "Cumberland" and "Challenger" were to change ships. Thus Captain Fuller remained S.N.O. with a number of experienced officers and men under him, and there was no break in the continuity of the naval work.

The "Cumberland" sailed on December 4th to meet the "Laurentic" at Sierra Leone.

\* App. 48.



# NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE CAMEROONS 1914.





## APPENDIX.\*

## TEXT OF TELEGRAMS, MEMORANDA, &amp;C.

- 1 *From* Deputy Governor-General, August 5th.  
Nigeria. Received, 9.43 p.m.  
*To* Colonial Office.

It is proposed by Commandant to invade Cameroons if circumstances favourable with Duala objective. Reported that French have 2,000 men at Fort Lamy. Lately returned from interview. Inclined to think that Commandant more impressed with the offensive part of the scheme than the defensive. BOYLE.

- 2 *From* Colonial Office. August 6th.  
*To* Deputy Governor-General, Sent, 4 p.m.  
Nigeria.

The general policy for the present is that no offensive action is to be taken without instructions from the Secretary of State. HARCOURT.

- 3 *From* Deputy Governor-General, August 8th.  
Nigeria. Received 8.50 p.m.  
*To* Colonial Office.

With reference to your telegram of August 6th, no offensive action. In my previous telegram I was concerned principally with danger of internal disturbances and attack on important ports and consequent shortage of supplies if these large bodies of troops were massed on the Eastern frontier, necessitating the withdrawal of the usual garrisons in the southern provinces. . . . . On receipt of your telegram decided that concentration of troops Eastern Frontier, war stage defence scheme unnecessary purely for defence. Commandant was instructed to confine movements of troops as far as possible to those in precautionary stage. He replied that he was unable to consent to alterations from disposition laid down for war stage. In view of disturbance just reported from Abeokuta and recent unrest in certain portions of Southern Provinces, would ask for Governor-General to be consulted and approval given to modification of dispositions which were originally laid down in anticipation of immediate offensive. BOYLE.

- 4 *From* Colonial Office August 9th.  
*To* Deputy Governor-General, Sent, 3.30 p.m.  
Nigeria.

Does Commandant consider that an attack on Duala without Naval co-operation holds out reasonable chances of success, and, if so, what force does he recommend for the purpose? What troops do you consider, after consultation with him, can with safety be employed from Nigeria for this

\* All telegrams circulated by the Colonial Office are paraphrases of the original.

object? Ascertain what are the views of the Governor-General of French West Africa at Dakar with regard to co-operation. French Government is being asked whether French troops can co-operate. HARCOURT.

- 5 Naval Notes on attack on Cameroons. August 9th.

Co-operation in an attack on Duala between a joint naval and military force by sea and the local Nigerian military force acting from the interior would be practically impossible owing to the lack of communication between them and the difficult and only partly-known country in the interior through which the latter would have to pass. An attack from the sea would probably be the quickest means of capturing the town of Duala. This might be preceded by military action in the interior to induce the coast towns to reduce their defences as much as possible. The object would be to capture Duala with its Government offices, wireless station and dock, which form a base from which German naval operations can now be conducted against our trade. Unless a local and *trustworthy* pilot can be obtained for the Naval expedition, who knows the inner waters of the river and who could take the vessels of the expedition to one of the creeks in rear of the town in which the attacking force could be disembarked, a direct attack by the escorting cruiser on the town would be necessary.

The defences are not likely to be formidable and the gun-boat stationed on the West Coast, "Dwarf," would probably suffice if no armed German vessels were in the river. If the Naval situation permits, the "Dwarf," with a transport for the attacking force, would proceed direct to Duala from Sierra Leone, five days' passage, and attack the town. The detailed arrangements would be left to the Senior Naval and Military representatives. It is probable the "Dwarf" can be spared for this service at once. H. B. JACKSON, Admiral.

- 6 Remarks on Situation. August 10th.

"Dwarf" is boiler cleaning and will not be ready till August 14th. As her co-operation is essential in an attack on Duala by troops from Sierra Leone, immediate action as regards sailing cannot be taken. The expedition could, however, be prepared and organised ready to start at short notice. It is probable the Naval situation will be clearer in a few days. We have a considerable cruiser force off the West Coast, on the trade routes and only await information as to their movements. This is difficult to get from them at sea owing to the absence of W/T at Cape Verde Islands. The proposed expedition from Nigeria through the hinterland need not be affected in any way. The situation will be watched and a further appreciation sent before the expedition can start. H. B. J.

- 7 From Lagos. August 9th.  
To Admiralty. Received, 7.42 p.m.

Master British SS. "Sokoto" arrived from ports in Kamerun reports as follows: Great fear exists in Kamerun

of native rising, food very scarce and expensive, all controlled by Governor. Martial law proclaimed and Germans have taken control of W/T station, FernandoPo. German cruiser "Dresden" expected momentarily at Duala.

- 8 From Foreign Office. August 10th.  
To British Ambassador, Paris. Sent, 10.35 a.m.

H.M. Government proposes to send an expedition against Duala (German Kamerun). It is believed that there are distributed throughout the Colony 170 German white troops, 1,350 native troops, 700 police, 9 field guns and 17 machine guns. Ask French Government whether co-operation could be expected, and, if so, to what extent.

- 9 From British Ambassador, August 10th.  
Paris. Received, 11.10 p.m.  
To Foreign Office.

Ministry Foreign Affairs inform me that French Naval co-operation will be afforded to His Majesty's Government in measures to be taken to occupy Duala and any other ports in Kamerun against which operations may be taken. Simultaneously, Kamerun will be invaded from north-east (Ubangi-Chad) by French troops. I am promised later information as to numbers, &c.

- 10 From Deputy Governor-General, August 10th.  
Nigeria. Received, 10.22 p.m.  
To Colonial Office.

With reference to your telegram of August 9th, offensive operations against Cameroons. Commandant considers Naval co-operation would be required for an attack on Duala. Forces required and available from Nigeria, 2,000 infantry, 10 guns. Impossible for French co-operation by land owing to distance, therefore have not communicated with Governor-General, Dakar. Commandant anxious to advance on Garua at once so as to clear north before any advance made in southern portion, with a view to free certain troops for main objective, Duala. On Bornu frontier present war dispositions are: Maidguri Column: 1 company infantry, 1 company mounted infantry. Nafada Column: 2 companies infantry. Yola Column: 4 companies infantry, 1 company mounted infantry, 2 guns. According to intelligence considered reliable, strength of German garrison at Kuseri, 16 men; Mora, 30; Garua, 170. . . . Following main points of suggested operations: one or two columns by land combined with strong attack from the sea to be made by landing parties found from 2,000 men above mentioned, provided that Admiralty will ensure their safe passage to and up the Cameroon River. It is absolutely essential to make preliminary reconnaissance frontier in connection with operations. Steps will be taken to avoid serious hostilities. Would ask for reply by telegraph *re* Garua and reconnaissance as soon as possible,

- 11 From Colonial Office. August 14th.  
To Deputy Governor-General, Sent, 4.5 p.m.  
Nigeria.

With reference to your telegram of August 12th, instruct Commandant to ascertain and report if any definite movement of German forces is in progress. He is authorised to conduct reconnaissances on the lines indicated in the latter part of your telegram. He must ensure keeping touch with his troops and being able to recall them at short notice.  
HARCOURT.

- 12 From Admiralty. Sent, August 13th.  
To R.A., "Carnarvon." Repeated August 15th.

- 22 German cruisers reported near Duala, Cameroon River. Send one cruiser to Fernando Po to search for them and gain intelligence, leaving one in vicinity of St. Vincent to guard trade. Report name of ship. It is reported that there are 32 German merchant ships at Duala.

- 13 From Admiralty. August 17th.  
To S.N.O., Gibraltar. Sent, 2.0 a.m.

- 493 Transmit following to "Cornwall" for "Cumberland"  
Begins: Has "Cumberland" received order to proceed immediately to Duala, Cameroons? If not, pass to her. German cruisers reported near Duala. Proceed to Fernando Po to search for them and gain intelligence. There are mines off the entrance to Duala. Thirty merchant ships reported taken refuge there, one entrance blocked. An expedition is ready to proceed Duala, waiting your report. Keep Admiralty informed of your movements and position through Sierra Leone. Acknowledge.

- 14 Memorandum of a Conference held at the Admiralty,  
11.0 a.m. to 12.30 p.m., August 15th.  
Prepared by Sir H. B. Jackson.

The co-operation of the French from Dakar against Duala was discussed as directed with the French Staff Officers and French Naval Attaché. General Dobell, Inspector-General, West African Frontier Force, being present, and the most recent information being considered, from which it is evident the Germans are defending the river to Duala from sea attack. It is recommended to send cruisers to Fernando Po to blockade the Cameroons. They should arrive in one week. The "Dwarf" and French gunboat "Surprise" to proceed in company to Lagos, to collect information and await orders. The actual base of operations will meanwhile be considered—either Fernando Po, Calabar River, or Lagos. Small steam-launches should be requisitioned and armed with 3-pdrs and machine guns and wire sweeps for mines by the cruisers. It is possible the blockade will give the Germans warning that sea attack is contemplated and give them time to collect more troops at Duala.

unless they surrender previously. Thus the expedition should not be unduly delayed. The French will organise their expeditionary force at Dakar—about 2,000 men, with 6 field guns, horse and mule transport; and Sierra Leone will be able to spare 600 if required, and Nigeria about 1,700, with 10—2.95" Q.F. guns, man-transported. It was agreed that the landing would probably be best effected at Victoria, about six days from Duala by land. The troops from Dakar (ready in three weeks) and Sierra Leone (ready shortly) will require British escort to the Cameroons. The Nigerian troops (ready very shortly) are close at hand, but will also require transporting. It is suggested to wait for more definite information before moving the troops. In the meantime, everything will be prepared. 3,500 troops with artillery are considered a sufficient force for the operations. The light draught gunboats and launches will be necessary for the river work, and the latter must be obtained and organised locally. The question of the officer to command the military forces is one to be settled between the two Governments. H. B. J.

- 15 From R.A., "Carnarvon." August 17th.  
To Admiralty. Received, 3.48 p.m.

- 4 Your telegram 22 received. "Cumberland" proceeding Fernando Po, coaling at Sierra Leone *en route*. . . . .

- 16 From Admiralty. August 17th.  
To "Dwarf," Sierra Leone. Sent, 7.24 p.m.

- 26 "Cumberland" has been ordered from Canaries to Duala, passing close to Sierra Leone. "Dwarf" is to be ready to escort to Lome the reinforcements ordered to Togoland and to follow "Cumberland," and then to proceed to Lagos and await orders. "Cumberland" may be passing Sierra Leone 18th or 19th. Get in wireless touch with her and repeat these orders. "Cumberland," in the event of meeting enemy, is to consider it part of her duty to cover and protect "Dwarf" and transport from interference.

- 17 From Admiralty. August 19th.  
To Captain, "Cumberland," Sent, 5.40 p.m.  
c/o "Dwarf," Sierra Leone.

Most secret. Blockade of Cameroons followed by combined operations from sea by British and French forces contemplated unless provinces on sea coast surrender on your arrival. Main object is destruction of W/T station and Naval base at Duala. Preparations are being made at Dakar, Sierra Leone and Nigeria. Two companies from Freetown will be sent to Lome in readiness, leaving with you and they are to be escorted as far as their speed permits by "Dwarf" and French gunboat "Surprise." These will use Lagos as a base and act under your orders. Inform them accordingly. Obtain latest intelligence at Lagos reporting your arrival. Arrange means of communication with you

at Cameroons. Main entrance to Duala reported blocked by sunken vessels and possibly mined, but probably another channel is known to local merchant captains. Town defended by light batteries and native troops, with a few Europeans. Be ready to act in co-operation with local military forces from Nigeria and Sierra Leone. Further instructions as to summons to German colony to surrender will be sent. Acknowledge.

- 18 *From* "Cumberland," Sierra Leone. August 22nd.  
*To* Admiralty. Received, 1.36 a.m.

"Cumberland" arrived, complete with coal by afternoon of August 22nd. Request instructions "Cumberland's" further proceedings, first to proceed to Fernando Po and Cameroon River as directed by Admiralty telegram of August 17th, or second to escort "Dwarf" and troops to Lome and then proceed to Fernando Po and Duala. "Dwarf" proceeds to Lagos for latest intelligence. General Officer Commanding tells me the two companies and carriers from Sierra Leone will be ready to leave Lome immediately transport is available. He thinks he can probably get Elder Dempster boat by August 24th.

- 19 Note attached to foregoing telegram. August 22nd.  
Secret to C.O.S.

I have discussed this with General Dobell in connection with the orders already issued to C.O.S., Sierra Leone, and also to "Cumberland," and consider the orders already issued on August 19th to "Cumberland" should stand, *i.e.*, to proceed with two companies from Freetown to Lome, starting with "Dwarf" and "Surprise," then reconnoitre the Cameroons for about two days. If no other cruiser escort for the troops from Dakar and Sierra Leone can be found, "Cumberland" must return to escort them, and the operations would begin about September 18th. H. B. J.

- 20 *From* Admiralty. August 22nd.  
*To* S.N.O., Sierra Leone. Sent, 12.10 p.m.

Reply to your telegram of August 22nd. Orders issued on August 19th to be carried out, *viz.*: "Cumberland" is to proceed with the two companies to Lome, also "Dwarf" and "Surprise" to Lagos. If preferred, "Dwarf" can use Calabar instead of Lagos. Further instruction will be sent after your report on situation in Cameroons is received.

- 21 *From* "Cumberland." August 23rd.  
*To* Admiralty. Sent, 4.5 p.m.  
Received, 5.26 p.m.

"Cumberland" left Sierra Leone 4 p.m., August 23rd, for Lome with "Dwarf" in tow and as escort to "Akabo" with native troops for Togoland. Expect to arrive at Lome morning of August 27th. . . . French gunboat "Surprise" has not arrived at Sierra Leone.

- 22 Instructions to Brigadier-General Dobell.

At a meeting of the Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence on August 27th, 1914, it was agreed to inform General Dobell:—

(a) That he had been selected by H.M. Government, with the concurrence of the French Government, to command the joint British and French expedition which was being got ready to operate in the Cameroons.

(b) That the initial objective of the expedition was to be the capture of Victoria, Buea and Duala, and particularly the wireless station at the latter place.

(c) That he was to make no formal proclamation of the annexation of any territory that might be occupied, and that he was to use his discretion as to the hoisting of the Allied flags to denote the occupation of territory and as to the necessary measures for the provisional administration of such territory.

(d) That he had authority to call upon the Governors of the British Colonies and Protectorates in West Africa for reinforcements, munitions of war, supplies or any other requirements.

(e) That he was to use his own discretion as to summoning the German garrison in the Cameroons to surrender before the actual initiation of an attack.

(f) That he was to inform the Senior British and French Naval and Military officers of his orders, and that, if necessary, he was to show his instructions to these officers.

(g) That he was to keep the Secretary of State for the Colonies informed of the progress of the operations, and keep the Governor-General, Nigeria, informed of any political developments.

(h) That he was to arrange for an interchange of British and French officers on the staffs of the senior officers of the joint expedition.

- 23 *From* French Naval Attaché. August 29th.  
*To* Marine, Paris. Sent, 9.30 p.m.

285 Latest information being that the land road from Victoria to Duala will not be practicable for troops before two months on account of the rainy season, it has now been decided, in order not to postpone the expedition, that an attack in force shall be made on Duala by gunboats and a British cruiser of the "Challenger" type, of small draught, able to cross bar, with armed small vessels (barges), which will be prepared. The troops co-operate and occupy Duala, Victoria and Buea. The British cruiser "Europa" will escort "Appam" to Sierra Leone, arriving there about September 10th. It would be desirable for the "Bruix" with French transports to leave Dakar in time to reach Freetown by this date and undertake the escort of the convoy.

- 24 *From Admiralty.* August 29th.  
*To Rear-Admiral, "Argonaut."* Sent, 11.40 p.m.  
"Europa" is coming out from Portsmouth on September 1st, conveying transport "Appam." Arrange to relieve "Europa" off Las Palmas by either "Challenger" or "Minerva" about September 6th. Ship selected will be employed in West Africa under "Cumberland," and must be of lighter draught than "Europa." "Europa" subsequently rejoins your orders. Ship selected to be filled up with coal at Las Palmas by September 6th. Acknowledge and report name of ship.
- 25 *From Admiralty.* August 28th.  
*To Captain, "Cumberland,"* Sent, 7.40 p.m.  
Lagos.  
Most secret. Transport "Appam," escorted by "Europa," leaves on Monday p.m. for Sierra Leone with Brigadier-General Dobell, who is to command the British and French troops for operations in the Cameroons. You are to co-operate with him and he will show you his orders. Summons to surrender will be left to his discretion. Your duties are to gain intelligence and prepare to assist by attack with light-draught vessels on Duala. "Surprise" delayed by boiler defects for a week. "Appam" expected to arrive Sierra Leone, September 11th. Expected the French troops will be in company. Communicate your intelligence to Admiralty and Sierra Leone from time to time. Acknowledge.
- 26 *From "Cumberland."* September 1st.  
Calabar. Received 10.42 p.m.  
*To Admiralty.*  
Owing to Duala being blocked (? blocking) "Cumberland" arrived Calabar noon September 1st to communicate by land wire. No German ships in Carlos and Isabel Bays, Fernando Po, Amba Bay or entrance to Duala River. Merchant steamer patrolling mouth of Duala, and entrance is reported fortified. Expect Lagos tugs for removing obstructions at Duala River, and "Dwarf" September 4th. It is reported that no men-of-war are at Duala. Governor of Fernando Po is strictly neutral as regards wireless and food supplies. He states that "Eber" was the last man-of-war in these waters. She left during May. It is reported that King Mangobell and all chiefs have been hung and 500 to 800 Europeans (?). Duala is short of food.
- 27 *From Governor-General,* September 3rd.  
Nigeria. Received, 4.20 a.m.  
*To Colonial Office.*  
On 27th August [*sic*] H.M.S. "Cumberland" arrived here and proceeded to reconnoitre round Duala and Fernando Po. Commanding Officer has arranged for five marine craft, including the "Ivy," to be fitted for mine-sweeping, base mouth of Cameroon River, Amba Bay. Three proceeding

- to rendezvous, Amba Island, to-day; remainder follow. All arrangements in regard to marine flotilla are being left by me to Naval Officer . . . . . considers it essential to have base at Amba Bay, therefore request that Victoria should be occupied at earliest date by troops. Victoria reported to have been evacuated.
- 28 *From Colonial Office.* September 4th.  
*To Governor-General, Nigeria.* Sent, 6.45 p.m.  
No attempt should be made to occupy Victoria pending arrival in Nigerian waters of Dobell and forces which have been told off to act under his command. . . . .  
HARCOURT.
- 29 *From Admiralty.* September 2nd.  
*To "Cumberland,"* Sent, 4.40 p.m.  
Calabar. Received, September 10th.  
Most secret. A French cruiser, probably "Bruix," and British cruiser "Challenger" will join transports at Sierra Leone and proceed to join you in Amba Bay or rendezvous given by you. They are expected at Sierra Leone on September 10th. Discuss scheme of operations personally with General Dobell and French S.O. before taking action. Military operations overland from Victoria to Duala probably impracticable and direct attack on Duala from the river necessary. Endeavour to find safe passage over the bar for "Challenger." Prepare to arm launches or light draught steamers obtainable in locality. British force will have some field guns available.
- 30 *From Calabar.* September 4/5th.  
*To Admiralty.* Received midnight.  
Provisions of all descriptions are required for "Cumberland" by September 20th. . . . . Have examined whole of coast along Fernando Po and found no enemy. "Cumberland," Fernando Po, September 3rd.  
"Dwarf" arrived. "Cumberland" completing with coal to-day. Sweeping Amba Bay for mines, September 4th, with a view to forming a base for Southern Nigerian tugs. Expect "Ivy" and two tugs will be fit for sweeping September 5th, and four more tugs September 6th. I have been partly successful in overcoming Duala's interference with my wireless communication with Lagos. Collier "Sterndale" proceeding to Calabar to-night with telegrams and awaits my orders there. "Cumberland," Fernando Po, September 3rd.
- 31 *From "Cumberland," via* September 8th.  
Calabar. Received 12.10 a.m.  
*To Admiralty.*  
Have found no mines in Amba Bay. Victoria strongly entrenched against landing party. Successive lines of entrenchments across the roads to King William's Town, Tiko and Buea, also Sopo Railway. Troops can reach Victoria from Duala in nine hours. Several troops arrived last night from local districts and Duala, surrounding Victoria

this morning. Have destroyed large shed of provisions at Bota. Englishman saw "Eber" and "Panther" off Victoria, August 25th. Natives report these gunboats in Bimbau Creek. It is reported Duala has five to six months' provisions, and about 1,000 Europeans. European women and children, also native troops, at Buea. "Cumberland," September 6th.

- 32 From "Cumberland," *via* September 11th.  
Lagos. Received, 3.33 a.m.  
To Admiralty.

I have penetrated to north side of Suellaba Point, and I have anchored "Cumberland" there as base for flotilla to work from. European prisoners report no enemy warship in Duala district. September 9th\* (0820).

- 33 From "Cumberland," *via* September 11th.  
Lagos. Received, 5.45 a.m.  
To Admiralty.

Your message of September 2nd received. Channel is clear up to eight sunken vessels placed in channel south of Rugged Point. I am surveying and buoying main channel with a view to obtaining a passage past sunken vessels. Also survey Sungasi (*sic*? Lungasi) River. "Dwarf" engaged "Herzogin Elisabeth," September 9th, but latter escaped to Duala. (0155) September 11th.

- 34 From Admiralty. September 11th.  
To "Cumberland." Sent, 5.20 p.m.

Your message of September 11th received. Preparations made, approved and appreciated. Presume you have informed Dobell at Sierra Leone of situation. As position of some enemy cruisers in Atlantic is unknown, suggest one of your cruisers remain outside the bar till attack has been made. "Cumberland" will have to leave after main attack, so be ready to turn over duties of S.N.O. to officer next in seniority.

- 35 From "Cumberland," *via* September 12th.  
Lagos. Received, 2.47 a.m.  
To Admiralty.

"Dwarf" drew fire Joss Point Battery to-day. Apparently two large, one small guns. "Dwarf" not damaged, but has one severe casualty. Apparently no guns at Rugged and Old Head Points. "Cumberland," September 11th.

- 36 From "Cumberland," *via* September 15th.  
Lagos. Received, 8.53 a.m.  
To Admiralty.

Have cleared and buoyed the channel to sunken vessel seven and half miles from Duala. Will proceed to survey channel to Duala when sunken vessels have been counter mined. I have (?) outposts encountered enemy, who are reported to be shooting down Duala natives at sight. Expect first tug from Kennedy Island September 15th.

\* (September 10th must be intended).

- 37 From "Cumberland," *via* September 18th.  
Lagos. Sent, 10 p.m.  
To Admiralty. September 19th.  
Reed., 10.43 a.m.

..... Attempt to sink "Dwarf" with infernal machine on bow by German steamboat failed night of 14th. Enemy loss: 1 prisoner, 1 good steamboat. "Dwarf" purposely rammed by "Nachtigal" night of September 16th. "Dwarf" slightly damaged, no casualties. "Nachtigal" completely destroyed. Enemy losses: 4 white men, 10 coloured prisoners; 8 white men, 14 coloured men missing. First armoured tug arriving September 16th, expects to complete her armament September 19th. Am clearing channel at sunken wrecks or vessel with mine. Am in communication with General Dobell, date of arrival of troops not decided. Big explosion Duala to-day, cause unknown.

- 38 From Admiralty. September 27th.  
To S.N.O., "Cumberland." Sent, 4.45 p.m.

Admiralty congratulate all engaged in operations on their successful termination by occupation of Duala. When can you safely leave Cameroons in charge of next senior officer to return to trade routes *via* Sierra Leone? Report proposals and name of S.N.O. left in charge.

- 39 From "Cumberland." September 28th.  
To Admiralty. Sent, 1.0 p.m.  
Received, 5.43 p.m.

Although Duala has surrendered, enemy is still in force on all sides. Am unable to give probable date at the present time when "Cumberland" could safely leave. Captain Tirard, "Bruix," is next senior officer. "Cumberland," 28th September.

- 40 From Colonial Office. September 30th.  
To Brigadier-General Dobell. Sent, 5.45 p.m.

Assuming that ultimate object of H.M. Government is the complete reduction of the Cameroons, please telegraph your views and proposals as to your next operations, having regard to the strength of your own and the enemy's forces. You will understand that I do not expect you to do more than you consider safe with your present force. HARCOURT.

- 41 From Brigadier-General Dobell. October 3rd.  
To Colonial Office. Received, 8.25 p.m.

October 2nd. With reference to your telegram of September 30th. The situation is that small parties of Germans are in vicinity of Duala and Bona-beri on all sides. I am engaged in driving them back. My information indicates that the enemy are in strength at Edea and Jabassi, smaller numbers at N'kong Samba railhead. Country is very dense bush in all directions. For the present, I do not intend to occupy Buea and Victoria, as it would entail serious dissemination of my forces.

42 *From* Admiralty. October 6th.  
*To* "Cumberland." Sent, 2.15 p.m.

Report when "Cumberland" or "Challenger" can be spared from operations in Cameroons to escort prizes captured as far as Sierra Leone, as one cruiser must be detached very shortly.

43 *From* "Cumberland." October 10th.  
*To* Admiralty. Sent, 2.55 p.m.  
Received, 11.35 p.m.

Your message October 6th . . . . . Both "Cumberland" and "Challenger" required here until Edea has fallen, which it is hoped will take place before October 30th, after which a small reduction of armed craft should be possible. Until colony capitulates, a cruiser guardship off Duala and an armoured cruiser, also two gunboats, are required for protection of Duala and patrolling coast. Military officers, "Challenger" and self consider it highly undesirable that "Bruix," who is senior to "Challenger," should be S.N.O. Consequently, submit two alternatives after fall of Edea. (1) "Bruix" to relieve "Challenger" as guardship, "Cumberland" providing necessary guns and crew for small craft, "Bruix" guns being unsuitable, "Challenger" convoying prizes; or (2) "Challenger" to remain as guardship and provide necessary guns and crews for small craft, "Cumberland" escorting prizes, leaving myself as S.N.O. and giving Commander Braithwaite acting rank of Captain till I can rejoin after capitulation of colony. (October 9th.)

44 *From* Admiralty. October 11th.  
*To* S.N.O., "Cumberland." Sent, 6.50 p.m.

With reference to your report on situation dated 9th, it is approved for ships engaged in the operations to remain with you for the present, but a further appreciation of the situation should be sent in before the end of the month. It is considered desirable to utilise the French ships to fullest extent in view of possible ultimate settlement of the African colonies. . . . .

45 *From* "Cumberland." October 29th.  
*To* Admiralty. Sent, 7.15 a.m.  
Received, 11.45 a.m.

Edea occupied by French forces aided by co-operation of British Naval and Military forces, 26th. Owing to enemy's operations against Nigerian frontier and necessary surveillance of coast and rivers Cameroon colony, consider that strength of Allied Naval force cannot be reduced at present. . . . . Owing to co-operation of Nigerian newly-commissioned forces, consider it very undesirable, apart from other reasons, for French officer to be S.N.O.

46 *From* Admiralty. November 3rd.  
*To* "Cumberland." Sent, 4.15 p.m.

Admiralty have decided that you are to turn over your duties of S.N.O., Cameroons, to Commandant Cheron on his

arrival in "Pothuau" about November 13th. "Cumberland" will then proceed to Sierra Leone for further orders. "Challenger" and "Dwarf" remain for the present at Duala, and are to co-operate with military forces as before. Give directions accordingly. "Challenger" will be withdrawn shortly.

47 *From* General, Cameroons. November 5th.  
Expeditionary Force. Received, 5.33 p.m.  
*To* Colonial Office.

November 5th. I am doubtful on consideration whether one British cruiser will be sufficient for the successful prosecution of our operations. There are at present 20 guns, including two 6" guns from H.M.S. "Challenger," mounted on light draught craft. Exclusive of landing parties and field-gun crews, the average number of Naval ratings employed away from the two ships is 220. These ratings cannot be replaced by native soldiers. The French have found it possible to provide only 3—1-pdr. guns with crews, and neither the guns nor the crews have proved satisfactory. In this country communication is practically provided by water, and operations are, in the truest sense, Naval and Military. Armed craft are necessary to safeguard our convoys; if the former are withdrawn, it will be dangerous to continue holding some of our present posts, while to withdraw from them will be fatal. When Duala fell, the chief object of the expedition, especially from the Admiralty's point of view, was achieved; but in order to hold Duala it is necessary to clear the surrounding country, and this, in the absence of efficient British Naval co-operation, is impossible. The enemy is in close proximity to all our posts and has shown particular activity. As regards the question of the S.N.O., both the Superintendent of the Nigerian Marine and the Captain of the "Bruix" agree with me in thinking that a change is undesirable. I hope that in no circumstances will H.M.S. "Cumberland" be withdrawn till after the completion of the operation, which I hope to undertake next week.  
DOBELL.

48 *From* Admiralty. November 27th.  
*To* S.N.O., "Cumberland." Sent, 4.30 p.m.

"Cumberland" and "Challenger" are to exchange captains to permit of Captain Fuller remaining in charge of operations and "Cumberland" returning to England. Guns landed from "Cumberland" can be retained, and also steamboats; they will be replaced on arrival home. The minimum number of "Cumberland's" officers and men necessary for the Naval operations are to be retained and borne in "Challenger." "Laurentic" sailing to-morrow will take a draft out to replace officers and men retained. Ranks and ratings will be telegraphed later. "Laurentic" calls at Sierra Leone, and, if possible, "Cumberland" should meet her there.





# NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE CAMEROONS 1914.



NOTE  
The buoy are shifted  
at the annual change

Dries in parts at  
Low Water

Bimbia Flat  
(very heavy rollers)

Longitude East from Greenwich



