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VOLUME IX.

THE ATLANTIC OCEAN, 1914-1915,  
INCLUDING THE BATTLES OF CORONEL  
AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

(Short Title—ATLANTIC I. & II.)

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*October, 1923.*

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THE ATLANTIC OCEAN, 1914.<sup>1</sup>

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## THE ATLANTIC OCEAN

from the Battle of the Falklands to May 1915.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Slightly abridged from Monograph 26 (C.B. 956A).



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## THE ATLANTIC OCEAN, 1914.

### Introduction.

The war opened with an anticipation on our part that Germany would, by some means or other, despatch a large number of fast armed liners to prey on our shipping on the trade routes. The following narrative will show to what extent that anticipation was realised and will indicate the difficulties and results of the German operations against our Atlantic trade.

The potential force of the Grand Fleet, interposed between Germany and the open sea, deterred the enemy from any systematic attempt at increasing her armed forces in the Atlantic by detaching ships from home; the result being that she could employ in commerce destruction only such vessels as were in position when war broke out. On the other hand, we were able to supply from home a continuous succession of reinforcements, even to the extent of battle cruisers. Consequently by the end of the first six months Germany abandoned hope of any effective war on our commerce except in our home waters, and it was left to the two armed vessels remaining in the Atlantic to do what they could before they too should be forced to take refuge in neutral ports.

For fear of making this monograph too long, however, the battle of the Falklands has been chosen as a suitable termination; and the book, therefore, ends with 1914.

An appendix of important telegrams is given. An index of ships' names is added, which, it is hoped, will enable the reader to pick up any of the threads in this complex story which he may have dropped.

### Note on Sources.

The telegrams dealing with events in the Atlantic during 1914 have been bound; but, so far, the written correspondence, with some exceptions, remains in its original dockets.

The bound volumes used for this monograph are as below:—

H.S. 3. Escort of the first Canadian Convoy. A collection of telegrams and dockets bearing on this subject.

H.S. 21, 22, 23. This is a valuable collection made in the Trade Division of correspondence concerning the capture of British merchant vessels abroad. It contains many original letters from owners of ships and copies of all the depositions made by masters.



- H.S. 25. Area D; telegrams to October 12.  
 H.S. 26. South-East Coast of America; telegrams to October 14.  
 H.S. 36. Area I; telegrams to October 14.  
 H.S. 37. North America and West Indies; telegrams to October 14.  
 H.S. 42. North America and West Indies; telegrams 15 October to 12 December, 1914.  
 H.S. 43. South-East Coast of America; telegrams 15 October to 12 December, 1914.  
 H.S. 44. Areas D and I; telegrams 15 October to 12 December, 1914.

I.D.H.S. volumes contain those archives of the Intelligence Division which deal with operations. In volumes 508 and 509 will be found collections of contemporary documents dealing with the German commerce raiders.

All the Admiralty papers that appeared to bear on the subjects treated have been scrutinised; the more important are referred to in the footnotes.

The German Official History of operations in the Atlantic had not been published when this monograph was written. A volume, *Kreuzerkrieg, Band II*, has recently appeared and gives an account of the *Karlsruhe's* movements, by which what is written has been carefully checked. The information in our Intelligence Division proves to be so complete that few alterations and additions have been necessary.

Of the French Official History only one volume is at present available. This is *La Guerre des Croiseurs*, Vol. I. From 4 August to 1 October, 1914; P. Chack, Capitaine de Frégate. (Paris, 1922.)

"Seaborne Trade," by C. E. Fayle, is taken as the authority for the disturbances to the shipping industry caused by the German operations.

The times given are local.

## THE ATLANTIC OCEAN, 1914.

### CHAPTER I.

#### THE SCHEME OF TRADE DEFENCE.

1. **Standing Orders.**—The life of the British nation is at once in jeopardy should even a temporary stop be put to the stream of vessels bringing to us food and raw materials; and in a long war export has a corresponding importance, since without exports we cannot purchase imports. North America is our chief source of supply, both for food and raw materials, and the South American trade is of particular importance to the food supply of the country. The traffic on the Atlantic routes comprises, in addition to the trade of West and South Africa, a large part of the Australian trade. Further, the valuable trade with the Mediterranean and the East traverses Atlantic waters between Gibraltar and home ports.<sup>1</sup> Thus it is that the protection of the Atlantic trade routes from enemy interference is one of the principal anxieties of the Admiralty. With Germany as a foe, the Grand Fleet stationed in the North Sea could be trusted, in 1914, to prevent the escape into the Atlantic of any large, organised force of war vessels; the passage of the Channel could be made too dangerous for the enemy by the presence of submarines and mines; but there was no guarantee that our Grand Fleet and its outlying patrols would not be evaded by individual ships. There was also the possibility that the enemy might have made arrangements for arming those of her liners that a sudden outbreak of war would find at sea or in overseas ports; these, acting either alone or in company with such of her cruisers as might be abroad, could attack our vital trade routes with serious results.

Naturally, various methods had been proposed for solving the problems of the effective protection of the Atlantic trade routes. The Admiralty finally adopted the principle that the surest way of affording protection to trade was to make a prompt attack on the enemy's fighting ships, the destruction of which was the primary object in a maritime war.<sup>2</sup> Secondary to this came the capture of enemy merchant ships and the stoppage of contraband destined for

<sup>1</sup> *Seaborne Trade*, I, pp. 100-104, 121, 154-161, 242.

<sup>2</sup> M. 01035/14.



the enemy's use; this last work should not interfere with operations aimed at the destruction of his ships. In carrying out the general ideas of the protection of trade in war, the patrolling of areas or routes on the chance of meeting an enemy on them, was not one favoured by the Admiralty, nor was the dotting of single vessels along the routes a disposition considered likely to meet with success. From the enemy's point of view, the most profitable places at which to attack our commerce would be the focal points where several trade routes meet; and these, if in certain wireless touch with British stations, would be the best position in which our cruisers could work. The rights of neutrals were to be scrupulously respected, especially in regard to the use of their territorial waters; and even should an enemy war vessel abuse territorial waters by an unduly prolonged stay, force was only to be adopted when all other means for stopping this abuse had failed.

**2. Atlantic Cruiser Forces.**—The Admiralty divided the Atlantic into areas designated by letters, arranged as follows: Area H extended from the North American coast to the meridian of 40° W., which longitudinally bisects the North Atlantic and cuts the coast of Brazil a little west of Cape San Roque; it thus included half the total length of the North American trade routes. Area E covered the home end of the North American trade routes, east of 40° W.; its southern boundary was a line running W.S.W. from the Scillies, and it thus took in the home end of the trade route from the Gulf of Mexico. Area I lay due south of Area E, extending to latitude 30° N. just north of the Canaries; it covered the home ends of the trade routes from India and the Far East, from South America and from the Cape. Area D, south again of Area I, was an oblong between 30° N. and 10° S., and between 40° W. and 10° W.; it included Pernambuco and the Canaries and Cape Verde Islands, which are ports of call of South American trade.

To each of these areas a "cruiser force" was assigned, either from the Second or Third Fleets. The actual vessels composing these forces varied from time to time, according to the circumstances of the moment. One force, however, was already in place; this was the 4th Cruiser Squadron, which was to operate on North American waters. Before 1904 the North American and West Indies Station had always been served by a squadron of some strength; but in accordance with the Admiralty policy announced in Parliament on 6 December, 1904, the older vessels were withdrawn and laid up; a new Particular Service Squadron (4th Cruiser Squadron) of modern ships was constituted as a training squadron for cadets and boys and placed under the Commander-in-Chief, North America and West Indies. The new squadron was based on home ports and made three cruises a year to provide for the regular policing of the North America and West Indies Station;

two other cruisers were stationed permanently in the area, one to oversee the Newfoundland fisheries and one based on the West Indies. In 1908 the latter was joined by a protected cruiser.

This addition to the West Indies Station inaugurated a gradual reversion to the older policy of a permanent squadron; and in 1913, when the unsettled state of Mexico called for special attention, the 4th Cruiser Squadron had dropped its particular training character and had acquired that of a regular foreign station squadron. In that character it made several visits to ports in the Gulf of Mexico and in 1914 it was there engaged when the political situation in Europe became threatening in view of Austria's ultimatum to Serbia.

For some years the French had maintained one old light cruiser, the *Descartes*, to show the flag in the North American and West Indian waters. When the Mexican troubles became serious they decided to send out a cruiser of rather more modern type. The ship selected was the *Condé*, and both these vessels were in Mexican waters in the middle of July.<sup>1</sup> Another light cruiser, the *Friant*, was guarding French interests in the Newfoundland fishery district.

**3. Orders for Force H.**—The Orders for the Officer Commanding Cruiser Force H defined his station as lying between the meridian of 40° W. and the American coast; they refrained from laying down the positions which his squadron should watch in a period of strained relations, but left this matter to his judgment, with the suggestion that he should divide his force into two squadrons—a northern one based on Halifax and a southern one based on Jamaica. The former, being generally of the greatest importance, should be his special personal care. The duty for which he would be held responsible was the protection of the trade on passage between the British Isles and the North American Atlantic ports and of the trade in the West Indies. These orders were despatched from the Admiralty on 11 July, 1914, and were to be followed by more detailed orders as soon as they could be got ready.

**4. Orders for South-East Coast of America and West Coast of Africa.**—Apart from the 4th Cruiser Squadron in the West Indies and the Cape of Good Hope Squadron, the only men-of-war we had in the Atlantic were the light cruiser *Glasgow* (Captain J. Luce) on the south-east coast of America and the gunboat *Dwarf* (Commander F. E. K. Strong) on the west coast

<sup>1</sup> *Descartes*, 3,970 tons, 17½ knots, 4—6·5, and 10—3·9 in. guns, 1892.  
*Condé*, 10,233 tons, 19¼ knots, 2—7·6, 8—6·5, 6—3·9 in. guns, 1898.



of Africa. The orders sent to the *Glasgow* in March 1913<sup>1</sup> stated that her principal duty was the protection of British trade south of Abrolhos Rocks in 18° S. (off the coast of Brazil), particularly the wheat and meat traffic from the River Plate. On the outbreak of war she would be assisted by a cruiser of the *Diadem* class, which would be sent out with all despatch as soon as possible after mobilising. The orders for this vessel were that, in conjunction with a ship from the 4th Cruiser Squadron, she was to patrol the South American trade route between the Cape de Verde Islands and Abrolhos Rocks.<sup>2</sup> This arrangement was contained in the old orders of the 4th Cruiser Squadron and would no longer be operative after the new orders were received by Force H; in these the protection of that part of the South American trade route came under the Rear-Admiral Commanding Force D.

The *Dwarf*, on receipt of a pre-arranged telegram warning her of a probable outbreak of war, was to proceed to Rio if she was on the south-east coast of America; if she should happen to be on the West Coast of Africa she was to go to Sierra Leone and superintend the enforcement of the traffic regulations, acting as Senior Naval Officer, West Coast of Africa.<sup>3</sup>

**5. Orders for Forces D and I.**—Cruiser Force D was to be one of the squadrons of the Second Fleet and could therefore be expected to be ready for sea within 24 hours of the issue of the order to mobilise. But since for Area I only a Third Fleet Squadron was available, the Rear-Admiral Commanding Force D was at the outset to endeavour to hold both his own station and that of Cruiser Force I as well. In his orders his duty at the commencement of the war was laid down as the protection of the trade route from the south and south-west, especially near home. Should the political situation at the time allow it, vessels of the Mediterranean squadron would safeguard the area between the Straits of Gibraltar and Cape St. Vincent, and his main station was to be on the trade route off Cape Finisterre. He was, however, to send two of his ships at once to the Cape Verde Islands. When relieved at Finisterre by Force I he was to proceed to his own station, where his primary coaling bases would be Sierra Leone and Ascension. The orders pointed out that our most important interests were on the trade route from South America, along which our food-carrying ships proceed, and he was accordingly instructed to send one of his fastest ships to join and work with the *Glasgow* on the southern part of the trade route.

Cruiser Force I, as soon as the Naval Reserves were mobilised, was to receive its balance crews and assemble at Plymouth.

<sup>1</sup> M. 0029.

<sup>2</sup> M. 0071.

<sup>3</sup> M. 0477 of 1908.

From there it was to proceed to relieve Force D and then take up its main stations, defined as off Ushant and Finisterre. The coaling base of this squadron was to be Plymouth.

**6. Forces E and G.**—Cruiser Force E, for the home end of the North Atlantic routes, was also a Third Fleet Squadron. It was to be based on Queenstown and was to be joined by the Cunard liners *Mauretania*, *Lusitania* and *Aquitania* as soon as they could be got ready; a further reinforcement would be provided later. The main station of Force E was to be off the Fastnet, with some vessels guarding the northern entrance to the Irish Sea. Berehaven and Lough Swilly were to be its main coaling bases. Across the entrance to the English Channel was to be stationed another squadron, Cruiser Force G, also composed of Third Fleet ships. In the event of an alliance with France this would act in co-operation with a French squadron based on Brest or Cherbourg.

**7. The Neutral Powers.**—In a war with France as an ally and Germany as the enemy, the principal neutral nations in the East Atlantic would be Spain and Portugal. The attitude of Spain would probably be more correct than friendly, but from Portugal, as an old ally of Great Britain, might be hoped a favourable interpretation of neutrality. The negro republic of Liberia, on the Guinea coast, was chiefly of importance through its cable landing and wireless station at Monrovia. Both these belonged to a German company.

In the West Atlantic, the United States was the overshadowing power. It was in her Atlantic ports that the finest German merchant vessels were to be found; for that and many other reasons the interpretation she put on neutrality in the event of war was of urgent importance to us. The Central and South American republics were also recipients of German trade, and in their harbours German vessels might be expected to take refuge. Most of these republics could be reckoned on as friendly. The West Indies, apart from those large islands with small republics of their own, were mainly British and French. One Danish island, St. Thomas, claimed special attention as being the West Indian headquarters of the Hamburg-Amerika Line.

**8. Intelligence Arrangements.**—In the system of Naval Intelligence in force in July 1914, the Atlantic was divided between the Intelligence Officers in London, Jamaica, Gibraltar, St. Vincent, Pernambuco, Monte Video and Cape Town. An Intelligence Officer, besides his duty of keeping the Admiralty and the British men-of-war in his area fully informed of matters likely to affect their operations, had to give such warning, information and advice to British merchant vessels as would enable them to avoid capture and molestation by the enemy.



He was kept informed of the movements of foreign men-of-war and enemy or suspicious vessels in his area by Reporting Officers in the ports concerned. These Reporting Officers were all Consuls and were each provided with a code for the purpose. Besides these Reporting Officers, who were nearly all salaried officials, the remaining unsalaried Consuls were expected to report movements of foreign men-of-war, though not of enemy merchant vessels.<sup>1</sup>

The area under the Intelligence Officer, Cape Town, extended along the coast of Africa to Monrovia; Pernambuco was the Intelligence centre for the whole of Brazil and as far as St. Paul Rocks on the trade route to the Cape Verde Islands. Jamaica was the centre for the West Indies and the coast of America between Charleston and Georgetown, British Guiana.

The meridian of 40° W. divided the Jamaica area from the area of the Intelligence Officer, St. Vincent, Cape Verde. Gibraltar was the centre for intelligence from the Azores, Madeira, the coasts of Morocco, Spain, Portugal and France as far north as Bordeaux. The Canary Islands were divided between the Intelligence centres of St. Vincent and Gibraltar. The whole of the North Atlantic trade routes and North American ports as far south as Charleston were looked after by London.<sup>2</sup>

**9. Communications.**—Our communications across and along the shores of the Atlantic seemed to be, in general, good. There were several British cables from Great Britain to Canada and thence to the United States. South America was in touch with London by a line through Madeira and the Cape Verde Islands to Pernambuco; this cable had branches *via* Ascension to the River Plate and *via* Bathurst to the British African coast. The French owned a cable from Brest to Boston and another to Dakar in Senegal, whence it crossed the Atlantic to Pernambuco.

Germany also had a fair service of cables. There were five main lines from Borkum. One ran to Brest; another to Vigo; two went to New York by way of the Azores; and the fifth, after landing at Tenerife, went on to Monrovia in Liberia. From Monrovia one branch proceeded to Togoland and the Cameroons while another longer line crossed the Atlantic to Pernambuco.<sup>3</sup>


Wireless communication with the different areas varied in completeness. By the Hague Convention, wireless stations in neutral territory could not be used for passing to warships any orders or intelligence, and we had to rely on such arrangements as had been completed. The wireless stations in Great Britain could not reach ships on the American coast; but a long-distance station was in process of erection at Glacé Bay, Newfoundland, for the northern half of Area H. The stations at Bermuda and

<sup>1</sup> I.D. 940, 941.

<sup>2</sup> I.D. 941.

<sup>3</sup> See Map at p. 54.

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at Bowden in Jamaica were only of low power ; but these, with the low power stations on other West Indian islands, had to suffice for that part of the West Atlantic.

Gibraltar, by its North Front station, could reach nearly the whole of Area I,<sup>1</sup> but for communication with ships in Area D we should have to rely on Dakar, the French station in Senegal.

German wireless stations were few but powerful. In Togoland there was Kamina, a long-distance station capable of reaching Germany and probably the whole of the tropical belt of the Atlantic. The home stations of Nauen (near Berlin) and Hanover were in constant touch with Sayville and Tuckerton, two powerful stations in the United States, but these two stations were on neutral territory. In the interior of German South-West Africa was another high-power station, Windhoek, which had been endeavouring for some time to communicate direct with Nauen, but, so far as we know, without success. Kamina was, however, a wireless link between Germany and South-West Africa. Berlin, in July 1914, had no difficulty in keeping her overseas squadrons and colonies completely informed of the trend of affairs.

## CHAPTER II.

### JULY 27 TO AUGUST 4. MOVEMENTS BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.

10. **The Cape Squadron, "Glasgow" and "Dwarf."**--By 27 July, 1914, the European political situation due to the tension between Austria and Russia was so threatening that the Admiralty warned all Senior Naval Officers abroad that as war between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente Powers was by no means impossible they were to be prepared to shadow hostile men-of-war. Among the recipients of this telegram were the Commander-in-Chief, Cape, the Rear-Admiral Commanding the 4th Cruiser Squadron and the Commanding Officers of the *Glasgow* and *Dwarf*.

The Cape Squadron was then approaching Zanzibar in the course of a cruise on the East Coast of Africa. The principal danger on this station appeared to be the *Königsberg*, a German light cruiser based on Dar-es-Salaam, the capital of German East Africa. She was at sea, and though an attempt was made

<sup>1</sup> During the day, signals from North Front could not be read in the western Azores, and at Madeira they were not reliable. H.S. 43, p. 111.



to shadow her she easily outpaced the slow old cruisers of the squadron and disappeared. The Commander-in-Chief, Rear-Admiral H. G. King-Hall, decided to proceed in his flagship, the *Hyacinth*, to Cape Town, leaving the *Astraea* and *Pegasus* to deal with the situation on the east coast. At Cape Town there was the German gunboat *Eber* engaged in a six weeks' refit. The Admiral endeavoured to have her detained; but war had not been declared and she left on July 30. There was no ship to shadow her and she also was lost.<sup>1</sup>

Captain Luce of the *Glasgow*, which was at Rio, decided to remain there as it was a good central position.<sup>2</sup> The *Dwarf* was at Las Palmas; she left on the 30th for Sierra Leone.

11. **Admiral Cradock in the West Indies.**—The precautionary telegram of July 27 found Admiral Cradock in the Gulf of Mexico at Vera Cruz, with all his squadron<sup>3</sup> except the *Lancaster*, then in dockyard hands at Bermuda. As the telegram warned him to be prepared to shadow hostile vessels he inquired for their latest positions and was told by the Admiralty that the *Dresden* had arrived at Port-au-Prince, Hayti, on July 25, and the *Karlsruhe* had left there on the 26th.<sup>4</sup>

This news decided Admiral Cradock to send the *Berwick*, on the 29th, from Vera Cruz to Jamaica. The *Essex* he sent to Bermuda to coal and prepare to join the *Lancaster* in patrolling the North American trade routes, but he himself remained behind at Vera Cruz with the *Suffolk* and *Bristol* to wait for the "Warning Telegram," on receipt of which he intended to proceed with the *Suffolk*, *Bristol* and *Berwick* to shadow the *Dresden* and *Karlsruhe*, the latter of which had been located by this time at Havana. The *Berwick* left Vera Cruz in advance at 9.30 a.m., July 29, to look for the *Karlsruhe*.

That evening the "Warning Telegram" was issued by the Admiralty. Admiral Cradock had already made his dispositions. The *Essex* and *Lancaster* were to have charge of the North American trade routes; the *Berwick* had been detached to shadow the *Karlsruhe*; the flagship *Suffolk* proceeded for Jamaica, leaving the *Bristol* behind at Vera Cruz as a wireless link till midnight July 30-31, when she was to leave for Jamaica to join him there.

<sup>1</sup> For a detailed account of the proceedings of the Cape Squadron, see Monograph 20. *The Cape of Good Hope Squadron 1914*, (C.B. 917c).

<sup>2</sup> The *Glasgow's* operations are described in Monographs 1 and 3, *Coronel* and *Falklands*, (C.B. 917).

<sup>3</sup> *Suffolk*, Capt. B. J. D. Yelverton; *Berwick*, Capt. L. Clinton Baker; *Lancaster*, Capt. W. H. D'Oyly; *Essex*, Capt. H. D. R. Watson, C.B., M.V.O.; all 9,800 tons, 23 knots, 14—6 in. guns, 1900; and *Bristol*, Capt. B. H. Fanshawe, 4,800 tons, 25 knots, 2—6 in., 10—4 in. guns, 1909.

<sup>4</sup> *Dresden*, Captain von Lüdecke; 3,592 tons, 22½ knots, 10—4.1 in. guns, 1907. *Karlsruhe*, Captain Erich Köhler; 4,820 tons; 24½ knots, 12—4.1 in. guns, 1912.

By the orders he had, he was to send a fast ship to act with one to be supplied from England in patrolling the route from Abrolhos Rocks to the Cape Verde Islands. He had intended to detail the *Bristol*, his fastest ship, for this service; but on July 30 the Admiralty telegraphed to him that fresh orders should soon reach him and that they limited the area of his operations to North America and the West Indies. Accordingly, he would not be required to detach any ship to the south-east coast of America.<sup>1</sup>

The French Ministry of Marine had by this time decided, as it was still uncertain whether Great Britain would intervene in the war, to recall the *Condé* and *Descartes*. They now gave them orders to come home from Mexico, calling in at Bermuda,<sup>2</sup> and at the same time recalled the *Friant* from Newfoundland to Brest.

12. **Attempt to Shadow the "Karlsruhe."**—Some belated intelligence of movements of German ships came in; the Admiralty heard that the *Dresden* had left Port-au-Prince on the 28th and this was repeated to Admiral Cradock. He himself learned through his Intelligence Officer that the *Karlsruhe* had visited and left Havana and he signalled the news on to the *Berwick* at 9 p.m. That ship left Vera Cruz at 9.20 a.m. on the 29th for Havana, at 12 knots, which was gradually worked up by midnight to 16½, and during the following morning to 18 knots. Her designed speed was 22, but her boilers were dirty and she had only American coal; to get even 18 knots she had to send 32 upper-deck hands down below to trim coal. On hearing that the *Karlsruhe* had left Havana, Captain Clinton-Baker eased down, fuzed his lyddite shell, fitted his torpedoes with warheads and pistols, and got them ready in the tubes. The *Berwick* reached Havana at noon on July 31, coaled and prepared for war. The Admiralty, on learning that Admiral Cradock had sent her to Havana to shadow the *Karlsruhe*, telegraphed instructions that she was not to remain in that port, but to keep touch from the nearest point outside territorial waters.<sup>3</sup> This telegram was sent off some six hours before it was known that the *Karlsruhe* had left Havana and does not seem to have had immediate effect on the *Berwick's* stay. She remained at Havana till 11.30 p.m., August 2, when, in accordance with orders from Admiral Cradock, she proceeded to sea in the hope of gaining intelligence of the *Karlsruhe*, having previously ascertained by cable from our Consul at St. Thomas that the *Dresden*, which had arrived there on August 1, had left that port.<sup>4</sup> Captain Clinton-Baker had no indication of the

<sup>1</sup> Appendix, A 1. The orders, M. 0065, reached the *Suffolk* on August 27. Admiral Cradock was not then in her and it is doubtful whether he ever received them. <sup>2</sup> H.S. 37, p. 30. <sup>3</sup> Appendix A 2.

<sup>4</sup> Our Consul at St. Thomas apparently did not report the *Dresden's* departure on August 1 to the Admiralty, who, so late as August 3, were not aware that she had left. See note on H.S. 37, p. 78.



route of the *Karlsruhe*, but he proceeded for the Florida Strait, after having steered a false course till he was out of sight of Havana.<sup>1</sup>

13. **Intelligence Received up to August 4.**—On August 1 Germany declared war on Russia, a step which made it practically certain that France and Great Britain would also be involved. In North American waters, besides the *Dresden* and *Karlsruhe*, there was a large number of North German Lloyd and Hamburg-Amerika liners at New York or neighbouring ports; at least 14 of them were on our list as fitted for conversion into cruisers or transports. There were four more at St. Thomas, but a statement that the ships there were being armed was contradicted by our Consul.

Reports of the presence of hostile ships in various parts of the station began to come in with confusing rapidity. On August 3 two cruisers were reported on high authority to be off Heart's Content in Newfoundland, the terminus of one of the Atlantic cables, where there was also a wireless station. On the strength of this, the Admiralty ordered the Senior Naval Officer, Bermuda, to send either the *Essex* or *Lancaster* to search for the enemy and protect the cable and wireless there. Frequent reports of cruisers off New York were being received; moreover the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* and *Vaterland*, convertible liners, were said to have left New York on August 3, armed and carrying 10,000 reservists. This news the Admiralty passed to Bermuda and to Admiral Cradock, with information that these ships were to be searched for and shadowed.<sup>2</sup>

By this time it had been discovered that the wireless stations at Sayville and Tuckerton were owned and controlled by emissaries of the German Government. Code messages signed "Government, Berlin," and believed to be addressed to the *Dresden* and *Karlsruhe*, had been intercepted.<sup>3</sup> As it was clear that these stations would be able to render considerable assistance to German vessels attacking trade, the Admiralty urged the Foreign Office to endeavour to secure some reduction of their power.<sup>4</sup>

Further reports of cruisers off New York came in, and at 4.40 p.m., August 4, the Admiralty informed Admiral Cradock that their appreciation of the situation implied that the neighbourhood of that port was the danger point in his area; British trade had been advised not to sail until some of his cruisers could arrive there.<sup>5</sup> He had already ordered the *Bristol* to New York, and at 6 p.m. on August 4 he left Jamaica and followed her for Nantucket in the *Suffolk*, ordering the *Essex*

<sup>1</sup> *Berwick*, "Journal of Events," M. 02094/14.

<sup>2</sup> A 8, 9, 10. <sup>3</sup> H.S. 37, p. 63.

<sup>4</sup> Papers titled *Foreign Office*, 2 August, 1914.

<sup>5</sup> A 11.

also to Sandy Hook.<sup>1</sup> In the evening of August 4 the French repeated their instructions for the *Condé* and *Descartes* to come home.<sup>2</sup> The effect of all these orders would be to leave nothing in the West Indies except the *Berwick* cruising in Florida Strait for news of the *Karlsruhe*.

Admiral Cradock was still without his new orders. The Admiralty had, however, telegraphed to him a summary which explained that he was to operate to the west of 40° W. longitude. It also outlined the general scheme of cruiser areas, so that he was aware of the names and titles of the Admirals in adjoining stations,<sup>3</sup> though he knew nothing of their movements.

14. **Movements of Force D (Admiral Stoddart).**—For Area D the 5th Cruiser Squadron of the Second Fleet had been detailed. This squadron on July 27 had consisted of the *Carnarvon*, *Liverpool*, and *Falmouth*, under Rear-Admiral A. P. Stoddart, who flew his flag in the *Carnarvon*. The *Liverpool* was patrolling the east coast of Ireland, which was in an excited state in anticipation of an attempt to land arms and ammunition for the forces of the rebellion then in progress.<sup>4</sup> On the 28th she was ordered to her manning port to complete her crew. She was then to join her own squadron, which was to assemble at Portland;<sup>5</sup> but next day both she and the *Falmouth* were detached from the 5th Cruiser Squadron and transferred to the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron,<sup>6</sup> and the 5th Cruiser Squadron was reconstituted of the *Carnarvon* (Flag), *Cornwall*, *Cumberland* and *Monmouth*.<sup>7</sup> Of these the *Monmouth*, which had some short time before been detailed as flagship of Force I, was to have undergone a long refit; but this was now postponed, and instead she received only the necessary repairs. The *Cornwall* and *Cumberland* were training cruisers, and therefore ready for service after disembarking the cadets, unrigging the special school fittings, and taking on board the few hands necessary to complete the crew on a war footing. The *Carnarvon* was ready by July 30 and was at once ordered along the trade route towards Madeira to give warning of the state of affairs to the liners on their way home from South America and the Cape; if war had not broken out by the time she reached the parallel of Cape St. Vincent she was to go in to Gibraltar and coal. The *Cornwall*, *Cumberland* and *Monmouth*, when complete with full crews, were to follow her to Gibraltar as they became

<sup>1</sup> 4th Cruiser Squadron, Proceedings. M. 01453/14.

<sup>2</sup> A 13.

<sup>3</sup> A 6.

<sup>4</sup> Tel. from Vice-Admiral, Queenstown. H.S. 50, p. 57.

<sup>5</sup> H.S. 50, pp. 79, 102.

<sup>6</sup> H.S. 50, pp. 373, 374.

<sup>7</sup> *Carnarvon*, Captain H. L. d'E. Skipworth; 1902, 10,850 tons, trial speed 23 knots, 4—7.5 in., 6—6 in. *Cornwall*, Captain W. M. Ellerton; *Cumberland*, Captain C. T. M. Fuller; and *Monmouth*, Captain F. Brandt; 1900, 9,800 tons, trial speed 23½ knots, 14—6 in. For deck-plan of *Cornwall*, see p. 316.



ready.<sup>1</sup> The *Carnarvon* left in the forenoon of July 31, the *Cumberland* next morning and the *Cornwall* at 2.40 p.m., August 2. The *Monmouth* was not due for completion until August 6.

In the East Atlantic, as in the West, reports of enemy movements began to multiply. Here, it was at Las Palmas that they became most definite, and when the Admiralty on August 3 learned that two German cruisers had been seen off the Canaries they ordered Admiral Stoddart, who had just arrived at Gibraltar, to continue on the trade route to search for them.<sup>2</sup> He had succeeded in meeting all but one of the vessels he had been told to warn and, having coaled, he left Gibraltar at 5.40 a.m., August 4; the *Cumberland* came in to Gibraltar that morning, coaled, and proceeded in the evening to join the *Carnarvon* on her voyage south.

**15. Preparation of Forces I and E.**—The mobilisation of Naval Reserves on August 2 enabled the Third Fleet Cruiser Forces to be manned. The 9th Cruiser Squadron had been detailed to Area I and on August 1 Rear-Admiral J. M. de Robeck was appointed to command it. His force consisted of three cruisers and three light cruisers, all old vessels.<sup>3</sup> The *Europa* was to be his flagship, but she was in dockyard hands and could not get to sea for some weeks. His most ready ship was the *Vindictive*, and, shifting his flag to her on August 3, he proceeded from Portsmouth to Plymouth, where he was to assemble all his available ships and leave for his station next day. The *Challenger* also was ready; but she was sent by the Admiralty to the Bristol Channel to prevent minelaying or attack on Cardiff. Admiral de Robeck sailed at 1.15 p.m., August 4, with the *Vindictive* and *Highflyer*; the other ships of his squadron were to follow as they became ready.

Area E, the home end of the North Atlantic trade routes, to which the *Challenger* had been detached, was to be occupied by the five *Juno's*: *Doris*, *Juno*, *Isis*, *Venus*, *Minerva*,<sup>4</sup> to be reinforced as soon as possible by the Cunard liners *Mauretania*, *Lusitania*, *Aquitania*,<sup>5</sup> armed as cruisers; Rear-Admiral Phipps Hornby was appointed to command the force with his flag in the *Doris*. None of these ships could be expected to be ready till August 4 at the earliest. The area they would have to guard was not only that part of the Atlantic nearest to Germany and easiest reached by any commerce-raiders the enemy might send out from Wilhelmshaven, but it was also that in which the food ships from America would be most thickly congregated.

<sup>1</sup> A 3, 4.

<sup>2</sup> A 5, 7.

<sup>3</sup> *Europa*, Captain G. W. Vivian; *Argonaut*, Captain R. A. Nugent; *Amphitrite*, Captain H. Grant-Dalton; 1896, 11,000 tons, 21 knots, 16—6 in. *Highflyer*, Captain H. T. Buller, M.V.O., *Vindictive*; Captain C. R. Payne; 1896, 5,700 tons, 20 knots, 10—6 in., and *Challenger*, Captain C. P. Beaty-Pownall, 1900, 5,880 tons, 21 knots, 11—6 in. guns.

<sup>4</sup> 1894, 5,600 tons, 20 knots, 11—6 in. guns.

<sup>5</sup> *Mauretania* and *Lusitania*, 30,000 tons; *Aquitania*, 45,600 tons.

**16. "Drake" and "Leviathan" on North American Route.**—Thirty-nine of our most important merchant vessels had since 1913 been armed with a couple of 4.7 in. guns mounted aft. Their ammunition, however, in order to avoid delays in foreign ports, was at home; and only ships leaving England could embark it. As these would be on the trade routes they should afford it some protection against vessels no stronger than armed liners. But these defensively armed merchant vessels were mostly employed in the refrigerated meat trade to South America and Australasia,<sup>1</sup> and the North Atlantic routes were comparatively unprotected. In view of this, the Admiralty on July 31 ordered the *Drake* and *Leviathan*,<sup>2</sup> of the 6th Cruiser Squadron, to proceed along the New York route from the Fastnet. The Cunard liner *Carmania*, on her way towards Liverpool, would have proved a great prize, and Rear-Admiral W. L. Grant, C.B., whose flag was in the *Drake*, was ordered to escort her home with one of his cruisers, sending the other as far as 500 miles along the route, from which point she was to return to coal at Queenstown.<sup>3</sup> The two cruisers left Portsmouth that afternoon on this service. It appears to have been the intention of the Chief of the Admiralty War Staff<sup>4</sup> for the *Good Hope*, the only remaining ready ship of the 6th Cruiser Squadron, to operate off the Fastnet also; but the wording of the telegrams containing the orders for this left the matter in doubt, and the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, sent her to Scapa round the West of Ireland.<sup>5</sup>

**17. Armed Merchant Cruisers.**—Although Cruiser Force E was the only squadron to which the War Orders definitely assigned armed merchant cruisers, arrangements had been in progress for taking up a certain number of fast liners for conversion into cruisers, which would then be used to reinforce the squadrons on the trade routes. On August 1 the *Aquitania* and *Caronia* of the Cunard Line, and the P. and O. steamer *Macedonia* were taken up; and next day the P. and O. *Marmora*, the Union Castle liner *Armada Castle*, the White Star *Oceanic* and the Cunarders *Lusitania* and *Mauretania* were engaged. Two days later, when war was inevitable, the *Carmania*, *Kinfauns Castle*, *Empress of Britain*, *Alsatian*, *Otranto*, *Mantua*, and *Victorian* were added, making a total of 15 armed merchant cruisers. Of these, the *Oceanic*, *Alsatian* and *Mantua* were assigned to the Northern Patrol between the Shetlands and Norway; the *Lusitania*, *Mauretania*, *Aquitania* and *Caronia* to Force E; *Carmania* to Force H; *Kinfauns Castle* and *Armada Castle* to the Cape; *Otranto* and *Empress of Britain* to South-

<sup>1</sup> Technical History and Index, Vol. II, Part 13.

<sup>2</sup> 1899, 14,100 tons, 23 knots, 2—9.2 in., 16—6 in.

<sup>3</sup> H.S. 50, p. 455.

<sup>4</sup> Vice-Admiral Sir F. C. D. Sturdee, K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G.

<sup>5</sup> H.S. 51, pp. 312, 336, 342, 350.



East America; *Macedonia* and *Victorian* to Force D; *Marmora* to Force I.<sup>1</sup>

While these movements and arrangements were taking place the political situation rapidly became worse. We were compelled to send an ultimatum to Germany; but there was little chance that its terms would be accepted, and at 3 p.m. on August 4 a general warning was despatched to all Senior Naval Officers that the War Telegram would be issued that night. This, the order to commence hostilities forthwith against Germany, was despatched at 11 p.m. G.M.T.

### CHAPTER III.

#### AUGUST 4-6. TAKING UP POSITION.

18. **German Cruisers and Merchant Vessels.**—The outbreak of war at 11 p.m. G.M.T., August 4, found our Atlantic cruisers taking up their stations. The ships of Force H were hurrying from the West Indies to what was considered to be the danger point off New York. Force D was bound for the Canaries in the hopes of meeting cruisers supposed to be there. Of Force I only three vessels were at sea; one of these had been diverted to the Bristol Channel and the remaining two had only just left England. Force G, which was to guard the Channel entrance, had sailed, but had not yet met the French squadron with which it was to carry out a combined patrol. As Force E for the home end of the Atlantic trade routes was not ready, the *Drake* and *Leviathan*, of the 6th Cruiser Squadron, had been patrolling these outwards and were now on their way home.

None of the German cruisers in the Atlantic had been definitely located, except the *Strassburg*, which had been seen off the Lizard by the *Carnarvon* at night on July 31, and was now safe in Germany. The *Dresden* was considered in the Admiralty to be off New York. The *Karlsruhe* and *Eber* had disappeared.

German merchant shipping all over the world was making for neutral ports, and those vessels already in harbour showed little intention of moving. This, it appeared later, was in strict accord with the handbook of procedure in case of war carried by German merchant vessels, or at any rate by those belonging to Hamburg shipowners.<sup>2</sup> This handbook, which had been issued in 1912 after the Agadir crisis, laid down that immediately on receiving reliable news of the outbreak of war against Germany, the master of a ship must endeavour to reach a neutral harbour. "As a war with such powers as Holland,

<sup>1</sup> Papers titled *Admiralty, 1 August, 1914, Armed Merchant Cruisers.*

<sup>2</sup> A translation of the covering circular is in I.D.H.S., Vol. 513, p. 596.

Belgium, Spain and Portugal need not be taken into consideration the harbours of these countries and their colonies come especially under the heading of neutral harbours."<sup>1</sup> In the Atlantic, the Canaries, Azores and Cape Verde Islands were regarded as especially suitable.<sup>2</sup> Care was to be taken to avoid the usual steamer routes, to reach port at night, and to approach it from the open sea. The funnel markings were to be painted over.

As a result of these instructions nearly all the German liners were in harbour. Those that had left American ports during the period of strained relations had in most cases put back again and many others were sheltering in island and continental harbours of Portugal and Spain. Of the vessels thought by our Intelligence Department to be fitted for conversion into cruisers or transports only nine were at sea and most of these were homeward bound, completing what might well be a normal voyage. The most suspicious was the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, which left New York on the night of August 3-4 and had been reported as armed. Certain others were outward bound from Germany, but most of these were soon located in home or neutral ports. From August 4-7 the Grand Fleet executed a sweep across to Norway in the hope of stopping any vessels that might be making for the trade routes; none were sighted, and for the moment it appeared that the peril from armed liners was less than that from the German cruisers at sea.

Though as yet the enemy had made no demonstration in the North-West Atlantic, the numerous reports of the presence of cruisers off various ports in Canada and the States were not without their effect on shipowners. It was the Admiralty's policy that trade should proceed with as little interruption as possible, and therefore it was essential that shipping should have full confidence. To secure this, the Admiralty decided to send Admiral Cradock some temporary reinforcements; and having ascertained that the *Good Hope* could reach Canada without coaling, ordered her, at 6.40 p.m. on August 5, to Halifax, under the impression that our trade south of Newfoundland from the St. Lawrence was being threatened by one German cruiser and some armed merchantmen.<sup>3</sup> This order they followed by instructions to the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, to complete the old battleship *Glory* to her full complement of coal; she also was to go to Halifax to convoy the trade from Canada to England.<sup>4</sup> By this time the *Lancaster* had been completed at Bermuda and was able to leave there at 6 p.m. on August 5 in order to patrol Cabot Strait, the southern entrance of the Gulf of St. Lawrence.

<sup>1</sup> This reference to Belgium is interesting, as is also the instruction for ships in Australian waters to make for Sydney in certain circumstances. T.S.D.D.

<sup>2</sup> The circular captured was one issued by the German Australian line and refers only to ports on that route. It is probable that each line issued a corresponding one dealing with its own route.

<sup>3</sup> A 17, 23.

<sup>4</sup> A 24.



Of the numerous reports of the *Dresden's* presence at various places on both sides of the North Atlantic, those placing her on the American coast were at last accepted by the Admiralty, and they telegraphed at 6.50 a.m., on the 5th, to Admiral Cradock that the *Dresden* was off New York.<sup>1</sup> From this port the *Lusitania* sailed that evening, while the *Olympic*, the largest British ship afloat, was due to arrive on the 6th. The *Lusitania's* departure started a fresh crop of rumours. Long Island reported the sound of firing; the captain of a steamer on arrival at New York announced the receipt of a message from the *Lusitania* to the effect that two German cruisers had chased her and had been sunk by British warships; and finally our Intelligence Officer at Pernambuco stated, on the authority of the Western Telegraph Company, that the *Strassburg*, *Dresden* and *Karlsruhe* had attacked the *Lusitania*, but had been beaten off by the *Suffolk* and *Essex*.<sup>2</sup>

All these rumours soon proved to be unfounded and can have received little credence; but they served to deepen the Admiralty's anxiety. When Admiral Cradock reported that the disposition of his cruisers would be such that homeward bound merchant vessels should be able to leave New York on August 7, they ordered him to arrange to protect the southern entrance of the Gulf of St. Lawrence as well as the approach to New York.<sup>3</sup>

20. The "**Karlsruhe**" in the West Indies.<sup>4</sup>—Most of the rumours of German cruisers so far received had concerned the *Dresden*; the *Karlsruhe* hardly figured in them at all. This may be due to the fact that she was new to the station. The *Dresden*, then under the command of Captain Erich Köhler, relieved the *Bremen* on the East American Station in January 1914. The *Dresden* was not intended to remain on the station, as the proper relief of the *Bremen* was the *Karlsruhe*, but the last-named ship was not ready to leave Kiel till 14 June, 1914, when she came out to the West Indies under Captain Lüdecke. She was to take over from the *Dresden*, the two ships exchanging captains, and the *Dresden* was to return to Germany on July 25. They met at Port au Prince, Haiti; Captain Köhler changed over to the *Karlsruhe*, taking with him his Staff-Officer Aust; Captain Lüdecke moved to the *Dresden*. At 4 p.m. July 26 the *Karlsruhe* sailed westward for Havana; two days later the *Dresden* turned eastward for St. Thomas and home. While Captain Köhler was at Havana in the *Karlsruhe* he received

<sup>1</sup> A 16.

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 37, pp. 113, 125, 131, 163, 167, 176, 177b, 192, 198, 202.

<sup>3</sup> A 26.

<sup>4</sup> Apart from *Kreuzerkrieg* Band II, the chief authority for the *Karlsruhe's* movements is the diary of her Adjutant, Lieut.-Commander Aust, published under the title of "Die Kriegsfahrten S.M.S. Karlsruhe." A translation of this and other German documents about the *Karlsruhe* are in I.D.H.S., Vol. 509. Another book on the *Karlsruhe*, not in I.D.H.S., Vol. 509, is "S.M.S. Karlsruhe," by her First Officer (Studt), numbered Ca 599 in the Admiralty library.

word of the tension existing between the Triple Entente and the Central Powers. The situation seemed so grave that when he left at 10 a.m. on July 30, he decided to remain at sea near Havana, in communication with the shore wireless stations. Meanwhile he prepared for action and carried out battle practice. The spot he chose for this was Cay Sal Bank, between Cuba and Florida, where he remained from the morning of July 31 to the afternoon of August 2<sup>1</sup>. Sayville wireless station sent out Press news twice a day, which kept him advised of the progress of events; he was also in frequent communication with the wireless stations in Florida and the nearer islands. On July 31 he received the telegram "War Imminent"; next day the order "Mobilisation." The declarations of war on Russia and France came on August 2 and 3. This deepened his conviction that war between Germany and England was inevitable; he passed through Florida Strait and proceeded eastward for a rendezvous off the Bahamas, where he was to meet and arm a liner coming from New York.

Captain Clinton-Baker, in the *Berwick*, left Havana on a false course at 11 p.m., August 3, and then steered for the Florida Channel. The strength of the *Karlsruhe's* signals, which he was constantly intercepting, led him to suppose her near him and he kept wireless silence for fear he should frighten her away. On August 4, however, he received instructions from Admiral Cradock to jamb her signals. This he did; but he could not prevent Captain Köhler from receiving that afternoon orders to commence hostilities against England and to open his war orders. These gave him full powers to act as he thought requisite and denoted his station as the Middle Atlantic,<sup>2</sup> that is, the tropical portion of that ocean, most of which was in the area for which Admiral Stoddart was responsible. The order to commence hostilities against Germany did not reach Captain Clinton-Baker till 11.10 p.m., some four hours after it had been in force. At 1.28 p.m., August 5, he observed three vessels steering northward in the bright moonlight; they proved to be the *Condé* and *Descartes*, escorting a French oil-tank steamer and proceeding for Bermuda and home. They were not in possession of the Allied Fleet Signal Book, but he managed to inform them in French that war had been declared and gave them such intelligence, all untrue, as he had received. Then, having been recalled to Jamaica by Admiral Cradock, he steered along the north coast of the Bahama group for Jamaica, heading unconsciously for the *Karlsruhe*. At 7.45 p.m., when off Cat Island in 24° 20' N., 75° 30' W. he heard her signalling with strength R.8 to a ship with the peace call sign of S.S. *Friedrich der Grosse*. Shortly afterwards he turned south between the islands for Jamaica.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Kreuzerkrieg* II, p. 231.

<sup>2</sup> Aust. <sup>3</sup> Studt, p. 22.

<sup>4</sup> *Berwick*, Letter of Proceedings. M. 02049/14.



The signal he had just heard was one made by the *Karlsruhe* to the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, the liner she was expecting.<sup>1</sup> At 7 a.m., August 5, Captain Köhler stopped a steamer, but she was the Italian *Mondibello* for Galveston, and he allowed her to go on. He knew that the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was at sea and making for the Bahamas; he had also received instructions to fit her out as an auxiliary cruiser. He signalled a rendezvous to her and got ready the two 3·4 in. guns and the 290 rounds of ammunition he carried for the purpose of arming auxiliary cruisers; in addition he provided a machine gun and small arms, and ordered the kit bags of the guns' crews to be packed. The motor pinnace and gig were also to be handed over. His call to the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* appears to have been unexpected by that ship and diverted her out of her course.<sup>2</sup> She met the *Karlsruhe* at 7 a.m., August 6, and went alongside to transfer coal and provisions to the cruiser and to receive her guns and her new captain, Lieutenant-Commander Paul Thierfelder, late navigating officer of the *Karlsruhe*.

The work was in full swing when at 10.15 a.m. the look-out reported smoke to the southward. Very soon this was seen to come from a British cruiser which all decided must be the *Berwick*. The officers and men to be transferred hurried across to their new ship, the hawsers were cast off, and the two ships separated, the cruiser steering to the northward, the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* to N.N.E. with the *Karlsruhe's* two boats still fast astern.<sup>3</sup>

**21. The "Suffolk" and "Bristol" encounter the "Karlsruhe."**<sup>4</sup>—The ship which had caused this sudden disruption was, of course, the *Suffolk*, on her way from Jamaica to New York. The position to which the two German ships had drifted was 25° 12' N., 72.40 W. Signalling this to his squadron, Admiral Cradock ordered the *Bristol*, then in about 31° 30' N., 73° W., to intercept the *Karlsruhe*, while he followed up in the *Suffolk*. The *Kronprinz Wilhelm* he took for a simple collier and he made no attempt to chase her.<sup>5</sup> Thirty miles to the westward of the *Bristol* were the *Condé* and *Descartes*; but they were not in communication with our ships and they continued their voyage to Bermuda in ignorance of the encounter.<sup>6</sup> Until 5 p.m. the *Suffolk* kept touch with the *Karlsruhe*, which was then in

<sup>1</sup> On the outbreak of war, all the call signs of German men-of-war and merchant vessels were changed.

<sup>2</sup> *Kreuzerkrieg* II, p. 238. The authorities for movements of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, which are not given in *Kreuzerkrieg* II, are various letters and newspaper articles by members of her crew, collected in I.D.H.S. 508.

<sup>3</sup> I.D. 1034 and 1134.

<sup>4</sup> A good plan of this encounter is in Corbett's *Naval Operations*, I. 51.

<sup>5</sup> The Admiralty informed him she had two guns mounted when she left New York. *Suffolk* W/T Log, Deptford, No. 20501, August 4.

<sup>6</sup> Chack: *La Guerre des Croiseurs*, I, pp. 97, 98.

27.33 N., 72.54 W., steering N. 3° W. at 22 knots. By sunset she was out of sight. Accordingly, when the Admiral learned that the *Bristol's* 8 p.m. position would be 28.33 N., 73.2 W., he ordered her to steer S.W. by W. for 40 miles and then join the *Berwick* at a rendezvous to the southward in 23° N., 72° 20' W. Just as Captain Fanshawe received this signal, that is at 8.15 p.m., he sighted the *Karlsruhe* under the moon 3½ points on the port bow, at a distance estimated in the moonlight at six miles. He at once altered course seven points to port so as to bring his starboard guns to bear and to cut off the enemy from proceeding northwards. The range diminished rapidly to 7,000 yards, whereupon he opened fire with all starboard guns, a sighting shot having brought him to think the range fairly accurate. This forced the *Karlsruhe* round to an easterly course. She replied to the *Bristol's* fire and edged round more to starboard till she was on the *Bristol's* bow. Having drawn somewhat ahead through her superior speed she made an attempt to get away northward; but seeing the *Bristol* conform, she abandoned the move in a few minutes and, turning back to S.E., gained steadily on her pursuer. Though the *Bristol's* trial speed was 26 knots, in this chase it dropped rapidly till finally it fell to 18 knots.<sup>1</sup> Admiral Cradock ordered her to show a searchlight and fire rockets. He was about 60 miles to the south-westward, steering (like the *Bristol*) south-easterly, with the *Karlsruhe* between them when last seen. By 10.30 p.m. the *Bristol* had lost sight of the enemy; and though she continued on a south-easterly course, that of the *Karlsruhe* when last seen, in the hopes of picking her up again, at sunrise nothing was in sight.

The news that the enemy was lost brought about a change in Admiral Cradock's plans. The orders under which the *Bristol* was acting before the *Karlsruhe* had been sighted were that she was to patrol eastward from Nantucket along the track of inward bound steamers, informing them that a British cruiser was off New York.<sup>2</sup> He now ordered her to continue steering south-eastward to St. Lucia and coal there. The *Berwick*, which, when off the eastern end of Cuba, heard that the *Karlsruhe* had been sighted and was hurrying to the rendezvous north-east of Mariguana Island, was now ordered to continue steering eastward and then return to Jamaica for coal. The *Suffolk* was to go to Bermuda and, after coaling there, to take charge of the northern trade routes<sup>3</sup> where the *Essex* was already in position, while the *Lancaster* would patrol off Newfoundland.

**22. German Cruisers Reported at Las Palmas.**—On the other side of the Atlantic, our Intelligence agents had reported much enemy activity. The British Consul at Las Palmas, when asked

<sup>1</sup> *Bristol's* Letter of Proceedings, M. 02094/14. No reason is given there or in the Rear-Admiral's Letter (M. 01453/14) for the failure to maintain speed.

<sup>2</sup> *Bristol's* W/T Log, A.C., 4th Cruiser Squadron to *Bristol*, 2.50 a.m., August 6.

<sup>3</sup> *Suffolk* W/T Log, 7 a.m., August 7.



to furnish particulars of the German cruisers off his port, replied that they were generally believed to be the *Berlin* and *Panther*, and this report, though viewed with some scepticism by the Admiralty, was repeated to Admiral Stoddart. From Bilbao came further intelligence that two German cruisers were off that port searching for our cables there; upon which the Admiralty, in the afternoon of August 5, instructed Admiral de Robeck to send a cruiser on at once and sweep with the rest of his squadron to try and cut them off. This order they addressed to R.A. *Amphitrite*, under the impression that that was his flagship; 51 hours later that ship reported she had been unable to pass it on to the Rear-Admiral, who was in the *Vindictive*, and it is probable it did not reach him in time for any useful action.<sup>1</sup> In any case he could hardly have obeyed it, since at 3 p.m., August 5, when the order was despatched, the only ships he had at sea were the *Vindictive* and *Highflyer*, and the latter he had sent back to Plymouth with a Dutch liner he had met, carrying gold for the London branch of the Deutsche Bank.<sup>2</sup>

**23. Escort of French Morocco Troops.**—These rumours of German cruisers at Las Palmas and on the coast of Spain had their effect also on the French, whose troops in Morocco were about to sail from Casablanca, some for Bordeaux and the rest for the Mediterranean, to be replaced in Morocco by territorial battalions. On August 5 they called on us to provide a cruiser at Casablanca, another off Bordeaux, and to protect the transport route between Casablanca and the Straits of Gibraltar; they offered us some French cruisers from the Mediterranean Squadron presumably for this purpose.<sup>3</sup> The supposed presence of hostile cruisers off Bilbao, though not well confirmed, brought about a change of plan; the same afternoon the French abandoned the idea of bringing their troops to Bordeaux and decided to send them all by Gibraltar and the Mediterranean, asking us to concentrate in Moroccan waters the cruisers we intended to detail. So far no orders had been sent out, but now the Admiralty ordered the *Cornwall* (Captain Ellerton) to shape course for Casablanca and cover the passage of the French transports. Captain Ellerton went in to Gibraltar at 11 a.m., August 6; off Cadiz he had captured the German steamer *Syra* and sent her in with a prize crew. He proceeded later in the day to Casablanca. Finding there that the transports would not be ready for nearly a week, he reported this home and was ordered back to Gibraltar to complete with coal.<sup>4</sup> By the time the transports were ready the escort duty was taken over by French cruisers specially sent

<sup>1</sup> A 20, 33. See also H.S. 36, pp. 71, 75, 78, 80, 82.

<sup>2</sup> This was the *Tubantia*. For Boarding Report see papers titled B 400/1915.

<sup>3</sup> A 18. By the Convention signed the following day, it was arranged that France should have the supreme command in the Mediterranean, while Britain held it everywhere else. This request and offer may have been in anticipation of the Convention.

<sup>4</sup> A 21, 22, 27, 31.

from Bizerta. These were the *Bruix*, *Latouche-Tréville* and *Amiral Charner*, to which the *Cassard* and *Cosmao*, of the Morocco Division, gave occasional assistance. The first convoy left Casablanca on August 13 with the *Bruix* and *Amiral Charner*.<sup>1</sup>

**24. Admiral de Robeck and German Communications.**—The presence of these French cruisers relieved Admiral de Robeck of any direct responsibility as regards the safety of the French transports. It was as well; for he had much other work on his hands. Proceeding southwards along the trade route, on August 6 he captured the North German Lloyd liner *Schlesien* and sent her to Plymouth with a prize crew from the *Vindictive*. He also stopped two Austrian vessels, one laden with grain consigned to Germany; he directed them to report themselves at Falmouth, and passed on. In the afternoon of August 7 he arrived off Vigo in the *Vindictive*. In port were known to be six German merchant vessels, three of them suspicious; these were the North German Lloyd *Goeben*, supposed to be fitted for conversion, the cable ship *Stephan*, suspected of designs on our cables, and another vessel called *Colonia*, whose wireless it was thought had been heard. On Admiral de Robeck's representations the wireless installations were removed from the *Stephan* and *Goeben*; the *Colonia* proved to be a harmless coaster without wireless. Next day he was joined by the *Amphitrite*; leaving her patrolling off Vigo, he passed on for Lisbon.<sup>2</sup>

The importance of denying the use of wireless to Germany can readily be seen when it is realised that this was her only certain means of communicating orders and intelligence. Curiously enough, the first act of war affecting the Atlantic had been performed, not by the Army or Navy, but by the General Post Office. Immediately on the declaration of war a cable ship had proceeded to cut all the five German cables running from Borkum down the Channel, and thenceforth Berlin had to rely on her long distance wireless stations for communicating with nations or ships overseas.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, by means of British cables and the wireless stations in British and Allied territory we could reach nearly all those parts of the world in which operations were likely to take place and we could dispense with the use of neutral wireless stations; consequently, our aim was to secure the denial of these to all belligerents alike and thereby isolate Germany from the rest of the world. In international law every State was fully entitled to regulate as it pleased the use of wireless telegraphy in its own territory and territorial waters; thus, action rested with the States themselves. The Republic of Cuba was the first to act; on August 4

<sup>1</sup> Chack: *La Guerre de Croiseurs*, I. 91.

<sup>2</sup> De Robeck, Letter of Proceedings, M. 7060/14.

<sup>3</sup> Papers titled *Telegram*, 5 August, 1914. The arrangements for this operation and its effect are discussed in papers titled *Admiralty*, 14 March, 1913.



her Government stations refused to accept messages for transmission. Two days later the United States Government issued an executive order prohibiting all wireless stations in their jurisdiction from transmitting or receiving for delivery messages of an unneutral nature; naval officers were detailed to act as censors in the stations.<sup>1</sup> The Portuguese Government on August 5 sounded the German Minister in Lisbon on the subject of prohibiting the use of wireless; he strongly objected, and in view of his truculent attitude they asked our advice. We guaranteed to stand by Portugal should Germany consider the exercise of this right sufficient for a declaration of war, and accordingly, on August 7, an Order in Council was issued from Lisbon for the immediate dismantling of wireless apparatus in foreign merchant vessels in Portuguese waters at home and abroad.<sup>2</sup> Spain was not so prompt, though, as a rule, she agreed to dismantle the apparatus of any ship proved to have used it in her ports. As will be seen later, we had considerable trouble with the German ships in Spain and the Canary Islands.

#### CHAPTER IV.

##### AUGUST 6-16. TRADE RECOVERS CONFIDENCE.

###### 25. Admiral Cradock proceeds to the Northern Trade Routes.

—In spite of the *Karlsruhe's* attempt to get past the *Bristol* on August 6, Admiral Cradock considered that her destination was undoubtedly the West Indies.<sup>3</sup> In the evening of August 7 the *Berwick* intercepted a signal from the *Karlsruhe* with strength R.12, showing that she could not have gone north. Altogether Admiral Cradock had no hesitation in telegraphing at 2 a.m. August 8, to our Consul-General, New York, "Assure British ships they are safe to leave for England. Known position British and German warships are now such as to warrant this. Send ships to sea."<sup>4</sup>

In this telegram he seems to ignore the possibility that the *Dresden* was off New York. It appears from the *Suffolk's* wireless log that he had not received the Admiralty's definite statement that she was there, and their previous warning that the danger point was off New York was so garbled in transmission that it can have made little impression. As received by him, the first sentence read: "As far as situation already gone, the concentrating point of trade in your allotted area appears to be in neighbourhood of New

<sup>1</sup> A 32.

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 37/88, 216; H.S. 36/104, 125.

<sup>3</sup> H.S. 37, p. 230, "Destination of *Karlsruhe* is undoubtedly West Indies."

<sup>4</sup> *Suffolk* W/T Log, p. 23.

York,"<sup>1</sup> a statement which was an obvious truism. The code in force, apparently not a good one, does not seem to have been skilfully used; mistakes were undoubtedly made in transmission; and the miscomprehensions that arose from these causes were as frequent in Admiral Cradock's case as in that of any other officer.<sup>2</sup> The only report he had received of the *Dresden's* presence off New York was one coupling her with the *Karlsruhe*, which, of course, he now disbelieved, especially as he had heard in the West Indies a wireless note thought to be the *Dresden's*. Convinced that both the German cruisers were to the southward of him he proceeded for Bermuda.

At 4 a.m. on the 8th he picked up the German oil-tanker *Leda* and took her with him in to Bermuda next day.<sup>3</sup> In view of the necessity of getting to New York he did not coal, but left after a stay of only one hour. In port were the *Condé* and *Descartes*, which had arrived on the 8th, knowing nothing of the encounter with the *Karlsruhe*. In view of the small number of cruisers at Admiral Cradock's disposal the Admiralty, on August 5, asked the Ministry of Marine to put the two ships temporarily under his orders, offering to replace them in the 2nd Light Squadron at home, to which they belonged, by British cruisers, if necessary.<sup>4</sup> The request was readily granted and they were placed under Admiral Cradock, who ordered the *Condé* (Captain Grout) to patrol the Florida Strait and Providence Channel with Jamaica as her base, while the *Descartes* (Commander Lafrogne) reconnoitred the Caribbean Islands, operating from St. Lucia.<sup>5</sup> These two ships with the *Berwick* and *Bristol* formed a respectable force for the West Indies, and should be enough to deal with the *Karlsruhe*.

26. The "Karlsruhe" Coals.—That ship, as Admiral Cradock had foreseen, did not go to New York. The *Bristol's* salvoes, though they came close ahead and astern, did not reach the *Karlsruhe*, and Captain Köhler, as soon as he had shaken off pursuit, once more steered north-easterly. But the high speed he had been obliged to use had reduced his coal supply so much that he decided to turn south again and replenish at St. Thomas, for which at 10 p.m., August 6, he steered at 16 knots. Even that was too costly and he reduced it still further to 12 knots, his economical speed. August 7 was an anxious day for him. British wireless signals were frequently heard. At 7 a.m. he was convinced from their increasing loudness that a British cruiser was on a converging course. By 10 a.m. they were so strong that everyone expected to see the ship come up over the

<sup>1</sup> *Suffolk* W/T Log, p. 4. Compare Appendix A 11.

<sup>2</sup> Bermuda complained that many groups in the *Suffolk's* signals were unintelligible. *Suffolk* W/T Log, pp. 28 and 41.

<sup>3</sup> The *Leda* was subsequently released. See Fayle: *Seaborne Trade*, I, p. 107.

<sup>4</sup> Chack: I, p. 95.

<sup>5</sup> Cradock, Letter of Proceedings. M. 01453/14.



horizon. But the signals died away and the crew of the *Karlsruhe*, who had fully expected their end, breathed again.<sup>1</sup> Even after this relief there was bad news from the engine room, for the Engineer Officer announced that there was not coal enough to take the ship to St. Thomas, and Captain Köhler decided on San Juan, Porto Rico, the nearest port, in the hope that he might get some coal there. He arrived at daybreak on August 9, with only 12 tons left in the bunkers.<sup>2</sup> The *Bristol* was then about 100 miles to the eastward; but knowing nothing of this, she continued on her course for St. Lucia.

Porto Rico was a possession of the United States. Consequently, Captain Köhler was permitted only enough coal to take him to the nearest non-American neutral harbour, St. Thomas. Moreover, his stay was limited to 24 hours. In San Juan harbour was the *Odenwald*, of the Hamburg-Amerika Line; she had no coal but supplied a few reservists, and her crew helped the *Karlsruhe's* men to take in 550 tons obtained from an American owner in the port. On the other side of the island was lying the *Patagonia*, a 3,000-ton steamer of the Hamburg-Amerika Line. Her captain came over and offered his services. He was instructed by Captain Köhler to go to St. Thomas, coal from the German stock, and then join the *Karlsruhe* at a rendezvous off Barbadoes. The *Karlsruhe* left again soon after 7 p.m., at first steering as if for St. Thomas; but at the eastern point of the island Captain Köhler took the dangerous passage to the southward. He had no intention of going to St. Thomas, which, as a suspected harbour, he felt sure would be watched by our cruisers.<sup>3</sup>

**27. Admiral Cradock off New York.**—The news of the *Karlsruhe's* arrival at San Juan reached Admiral Cradock at 8.49 p.m., August 9; it had been reported by the French Vice-Consul there to the French Consul at Bermuda. The Admiral had remained at Bermuda only from 4 to 5 a.m. on the 9th and was now at sea again. This report showed him the necessity of organising a better intelligence service; he ordered the Senior Naval Officer, Bermuda, to constitute a Naval Intelligence centre there at once, and asked Captain Grout of the *Condé* to instruct the French Consuls in the West Indies to telegraph information as to the enemy direct to our Intelligence Officer at Jamaica.<sup>4</sup> This was for the benefit of the squadron in the West Indies, which he had put under Captain Clinton-Baker in the *Berwick*.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Aust. The approaching cruiser was probably the *Suffolk*.

<sup>2</sup> Studd, pp. 44, 45.

<sup>3</sup> Aust. Studd, *Kreuzerkrig* II.

<sup>4</sup> *Suffolk* W/T Log, pp. 42, 43.

<sup>5</sup> The interchange of information between British and French Competent Authorities was not officially approved by the French Government till December, 1914. See papers titled *Foreign Office*, 25 August, 1914.

The Admiral himself was carrying out the spirit of his orders and proceeding to take personal charge of the North American trade routes. The *Lancaster* was patrolling near Cabot Strait in accordance with his orders and the *Essex* should have been off New York, but had been sent to Hearts Content by direct orders from the Admiralty. The *Mauretania* was on passage to New York and, hearing what appeared to be authentic reports of German cruisers lying in wait near the entrance to that port, the *Essex* diverted the *Mauretania* to Halifax and proceeded there herself to coal. Leaving again on the 7th, she was in course of searching another Canadian harbour for hostile vessels reported there, when she was ordered by the *Lancaster* to return to New York. These disturbances of his dispositions brought about by the numerous rumours then prevalent compelled the Admiral to order the *Essex* and *Lancaster* not to leave their patrolling grounds on the trade routes except for chasing enemy's ships whose position was authenticated.<sup>1</sup> He arranged a rendezvous off Nantucket with the *Essex*, and at 1.53 a.m., on the 10th, telegraphed through her to the Consul-General, New York, that as he would be with two British cruisers off Nantucket it was safe for merchant ships to proceed to sea from New York and Halifax.<sup>2</sup> He arrived off Sandy Hook at 10 a.m. on the 11th, to inspire confidence in shipping, and then proceeded eastward to meet the *Essex*. After communicating at 6 p.m. he sent her eastward along the westbound track and took the *Suffolk* in to Halifax to coal. His appearance off New York had the desired effect and shipping, which till then had lain inactive in North American ports, began to move again.

**28. The "Karlsruhe" at Curacao.**—His opinion that the *Karlsruhe* would remain in the West Indies was soon confirmed. Her next appearance was at Curaçao. Arriving there in the early dawn of August 12, she was received with mixed feelings by the Dutch Governor, who had had no news from home for several days and was in some doubt whether Germany and Holland were not at war. However, Captain Köhler was able to overcome his objections and the *Karlsruhe* received 1,200 tons of coal. The amount appeared to the Admiralty as excessive and representations were made to the Dutch Government. Their reply was that it was not more than sufficient to enable her to reach the nearest port of her home country and we allowed the matter to drop.<sup>3</sup> A small German steamer, the *Stadt Schleswig*, entered while the *Karlsruhe* was at Curaçao; Captain Köhler gave her orders to follow him with coal and appointed a rendezvous. Then at 8 p.m. he put to sea. Never again did the *Karlsruhe* come into

<sup>1</sup> *Suffolk* W/T Log, pp. 36, 44-46.

<sup>2</sup> *Suffolk* W/T Log, pp. 44, 48, 52.

<sup>3</sup> Papers titled *Foreign Office*, 1 September 1914, and A 104.



any port.<sup>1</sup> She proceeded slowly eastward along the coast of Venezuela hoping to fall in with some British vessels.

The *Berwick* was the only ship anywhere near Curaçao. She had left Kingston, Jamaica, at 10 a.m. on August 12 and was off the east point of Jamaica at 6.30 p.m., when Captain Clinton-Baker received two pieces of intelligence. One was that the *Karlsruhe* had arrived at Curaçao; the other that the German merchant ship *Bavaria* was coaling and provisioning at Havana and likely to sail at any moment. As the *Karlsruhe* was 600 miles away and would in all probability be lost again before he could get to Curaçao he adhered to his original intention of visiting Cozumel Island, near Yucatan Channel, which Admiral Cradock had suggested might be a coaling station. There he thought he would have a chance of finding the *Dresden* coaling from the *Bavaria*. The *Karlsruhe's* appearance at Curaçao he looked upon as a trap to draw us south away from the Yucatan Channel and leave a clear field for the *Dresden* there.<sup>2</sup>

29. **Intelligence of the "Dresden."**—The news of the *Karlsruhe's* arrival at Curaçao did not reach Admiral Cradock till the 13th. It had been preceded by authentic intelligence showing that the *Dresden* was also to the southward, and nowhere near the Yucatan Channel. After leaving St. Thomas on July 31, fully coaled and provisioned, the *Dresden* headed for home *viâ* the Azores; but three hours later she received through Porto Rico wireless station an order not to return home, but to carry on cruiser warfare in the Atlantic. Captain Lüdecke replied that he would operate off the coast of south-east America. His intention was to coal in the lee of Rocas Reef, and then proceed to the River Plate.<sup>3</sup> On August 6 he was off the Amazon, and in 1.10 N., 45.5 W., stopped the *Drumcliffe*, a steamer bound for Trinidad from Buenos Aires in ballast. The master of this ship had his wife and child on board, and the *Dresden* released the vessel after destroying the wireless and exacting a written pledge from the master and crew that they would not engage in hostilities against Germany. About an hour later another steamer, the *Hostilius*, on passage to Barbados, came up in company with a third, the *Lynton Grange*. The *Lynton Grange* also was released as soon as the officers and men had signed a similar declaration to that exacted from the *Drumcliffe*. But in the case of the *Hostilius* the master, Mr. James Jones, did not belie the fighting name of his ship. He refused to sign the declaration and was supported by every member of his crew, though they were clearly informed by the German boarding officer that if they did not they would be taken to the *Dresden*

<sup>1</sup> Aust. Also Studt, p. 66.

<sup>2</sup> *Berwick*, Letter of Proceedings. M. 02094/14.

<sup>3</sup> The main authority for the *Dresden's* movements is the German Official History, *Der Krieg zur See, Kreuzerrieg I.*

as prisoners and their ship sunk. Captain Lüdecke, however, did not carry out his threat, and to the surprise of every one on board signalled that the ship was to be released. The boarding officer made a note in her log: "Let go because her destruction did not seem worth while."<sup>1</sup> These incidents merit special notice as showing German procedure in the first cases of ships captured by those German cruisers which were on foreign stations at the outbreak of war.

The masters of the three ships, in two cases doubtless oppressed by the weight of the pledge they had signed, made no effort to make an immediate report of the occurrence to the Admiralty. They had all left port before August 4 and had no knowledge of the outbreak of war or instructions what to do. They proceeded quietly on their normal voyage and it was not till they arrived in port that this most urgent piece of intelligence became known. The *Drumcliffe* reached Trinidad on the 11th; the Customs Officer there, on learning the news, immediately reported it to the Admiralty, whom it reached at 3.55 a.m. on the 12th.<sup>2</sup> He gave the position correctly as 1.10 N., 45.5 W., but confusion was introduced by the Censor, Trinidad, who early on the 12th telegraphed that the position was 350 miles N.E. of Cayenne, adding: "the report of yesterday was wrong or referred to another cruiser."<sup>3</sup> This position is 540 miles N.N.W. of the true one. Either the *Hostilius* or the *Lynton Grange* gave information at Barbados. The local reporting officer telegraphed this to the Admiralty, his telegram arriving at 5.21 a.m. on the 11th, in the form: "From Barbados. German one *Dresden* arrived (stop). Cruiser North 5.0 p.m. Lat. 10.2 N., Long. 45.1 W. 18 knots." This is presumably a copy of the entry made by one or other of the ships on Form "C.O.," the printed form supplied to British merchant ships for reporting intelligence.<sup>4</sup> Two important items—the date and the name of the ship molested—are omitted. Nor is there any mention of the fact that the ship was captured and released. The words "arrived (stop)" have crept in; the latter appears to have been added by some member of the Staff, who seemed to think it meant that the *Dresden* had arrived at Barbados at 5 p.m. that day.<sup>5</sup> The position given—10° 2' N., 45° 1' W.—is again wrong; presumably 10.2 is a mistake for 1.2.

The result of all this and other confusing intelligence was

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 23, pp. 271–273. The cargo of the *Hostilius* was neutral owned.

<sup>2</sup> A 38.

<sup>3</sup> A 39.

<sup>4</sup> A copy of Form "C.O." is in I.D. 972. Its columns read: Nationality, Number, Name, Description, Course of Vessel sighted, Date and Time, Position, Estimated speed of vessel sighted, Remarks.

<sup>5</sup> See H.S. 37, pp. 292 and 304; also A 37.



that the Admiralty sent to Admiral Cradock the following telegram :—

154. German cruisers are reported to be in West Indies. They are being coaled at sea by German steamers who have embarked coal St. Thomas, W.I., for this purpose. They have been reported as follows: *Karlsruhe* at Curaçao 12.8.14, German cruiser off Guadeloupe, 12.8.14. German cruiser coaled in mouth of Para River, 8.8.14 and was off coast near Para, 10.8.14. French steamer seized near Curaçao on 7.8.14. They are apparently operating against West Indian trade. Believed some British ships have been captured.

(Sent 3.50 p.m., 14.8.14.)

It will be noticed that the encounter of the *Dresden* with the *Drumcliffe*, *Lynton Grange* and *Hostilius* is not mentioned. The statement that colliers were leaving St. Thomas appears to rest on a French report that a German merchant vessel named *Netherlands*, at anchor at St. Thomas, had coaled on August 6.<sup>1</sup> The German cruiser off Guadeloupe grew out of a report that a warship of unknown nationality had been seen off that port at night.<sup>2</sup> The authority for the "French steamer seized near Curaçao" has not been found, and in fact none had been molested on that date.

Admiral Cradock had already received these reports and also that of the *Drumcliffe*, though here again the position was wrongly given to him as Long. 40° 5' W., 300 miles to the eastward of the true spot.<sup>3</sup> But this made no difference to his appreciation. Sorting the wheat from the chaff, he interpreted the intelligence he had received as indicating a movement of the *Dresden* to the south away from his station.

30. **Movements of the West Indies Squadron.**—The *Karlsruhe's* appearance at Curaçao baffled him; of her he said "present whereabouts or objective not apparent." In order to hamper her activities, however, he requested the Admiralty that, as she had now coaled twice in neutral ports since the outbreak of war, representations should be made to all American states and republics to prevent her from coaling again in any neutral port.<sup>4</sup> Nothing could be done on this proposal, since each state limited its action to the prevention of unneutral acts in its own territory; moreover, to have induced the neutral states to accede to his proposal would have embarrassed our own ships in their operations in certain parts of the world.

Since we had four cruisers in the West Indies Squadron it might be expected that the *Karlsruhe* ran some risk. But their movements were in other directions. Captain Clinton-Baker in the *Berwick* continued his cruise to Yucatan Channel and

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 37, p. 222. The *Patagonia* left St. Thomas on August 12, after filling up with coal there, but no report of her departure can be traced in Admiralty records up to August 15.

<sup>2</sup> A 37.

<sup>3</sup> *Suffolk W/T Log*, p. 56.

<sup>4</sup> A 52.

Florida Strait, and returned to Jamaica on August 20, passing north of the Bahamas. The *Bristol* coaled at St. Lucia on the 10th, and after patrolling the entrance that night to prevent attempts at blocking or mining it, proceeded next evening by orders of Captain Clinton-Baker towards San Juan, Porto Rico. An oiler for the fleet was due there on the 16th and the *Bristol* was ordered to escort her to Jamaica. The *Condé*, after leaving Bermuda on the 11th, patrolled Providence and Florida channels, communicating with British ships. On the 16th she and the *Berwick* met in Yucatan channel and after a few more days in that neighbourhood the *Condé* proceeded to her base at Martinique to complete her crew and stores. The *Descartes* proceeded south from Bermuda and visiting each port in the Caribbean Islands arrived at St. Lucia to coal on the 17th. She also intended to call at Fort de France for stores. Thus none of the four cruisers in the West Indies Squadron came near either the *Karlsruhe* or the *Dresden*.<sup>1</sup>

31. **War with Austria. United States Regulations as to Neutrality.**—On August 13 an order to commence hostilities against Austria was issued by the Admiralty. This made very little difference to the Atlantic squadrons, since we concluded an agreement with the Austrian Government whereby certain "days of grace" were allowed in which Austrian vessels were exempt from capture. They were thus able to take refuge in neutral ports. As far as the Atlantic was concerned, the only addition to the hostile forces brought about by the declaration of war on Austria was the presence of three liners considered convertible into cruisers—the *Martha Washington* at New York, the *Laura* and the *Alice* at Bahia.

German merchant shipping had run to port for shelter, and altogether 54 German and Austrian vessels were at anchor in the harbours on the Atlantic coast of America. The port of New York contained nine large German liners,<sup>2</sup> all of which our intelligence led us to believe were specially fitted for conversion. Activity in connection with these vessels was reported on August 6 by our Reporting Officer at New York; in particular the *Barbarossa* and *Vaterland* were taking enormous quantities of coal, while large numbers of reservists were held on the spot.<sup>3</sup> However, instructions had been issued by the United States Government that without a special reference to Washington clearance was not to be allowed to vessels either loading abnormal quantities of coal, or painted a war colour, or whose passengers were men only. The unpacking of guns or other warlike preparations were to be considered conclusive evidence of warlike intentions, but the inclusion of reservists in the ordinary

<sup>1</sup> Letter of Proceedings. M. 02094/14.

<sup>2</sup> *Barbarossa*, *Friedrich der Grosse*, *George Washington*, *Grosse Kurfürst*, *Kaiser Wilhelm II*, *Pennsylvania*, *President Grant*, *President Lincoln*, and *Vaterland*.

<sup>3</sup> The *Barbarossa* was intended for a supply ship, but she never sailed. *Kreuzerkrieg II*, p. 224.



passenger lists was held not to be sufficient ground for the detention of a vessel. Our Ambassador was even able to secure the issue of an order preventing the clearance of all outgoing foreign vessels without both a detailed manifest and a visit from an inspector, to see that no warlike preparations had been made.<sup>1</sup>

**32. Admiral Cradock Sails for the West Indies.**—The *Good Hope* (Captain Yelverton) arrived at Halifax on August 14. She had been intended as only a temporary reinforcement, but Admiral Cradock now obtained permission to keep her, particularly as Captain Yelverton was high enough on the list to relieve him as Senior Officer in the north in case, as seemed probable, the Admiral's presence was required to the southward. The Admiralty were also of opinion that the West Indies was now in need of some reinforcement. The *Good Hope* was the only suitable ship to send, as none of the others had speed enough to cope with the *Karlsruhe*; and the Admiralty accepted Admiral Cradock's suggestion that she should go. The *Suffolk* and the *Good Hope* met on the 15th at a sea rendezvous; the Admiral, his staff, and Captain Francklin of the *Suffolk* shifted over to the *Good Hope*. Captain Yelverton came to the *Suffolk* and the Admiral, now in the *Good Hope*, sailed for Bermuda. His absence, he felt, would be brief, for he was convinced that the *Karlsruhe* had followed the *Dresden* off his station.<sup>2</sup> His operations in the north, together with the effect of the State Insurance scheme, had fully restored the confidence of the trading world; on August 15 the Admiralty were able to state "the passage across the Atlantic is quite safe. British trade is running as usual."<sup>3</sup>

**33. South American Trade.**—A similar feeling of security was showing itself on the South American trade routes. It was not to the interests of any of the South American States that there should be any interruption in the free passage of British shipping to and from their ports. All the German mercantile vessels in South American ports had come to a standstill and refused to complete their voyages, even to discharge their cargoes. Thus, unless British shipping moved freely, Brazil could not export her coffee and rubber, nor Argentine and Uruguay their wheat, maize and meat; nor, as seemed to them at the moment more serious, could they receive British coal, of which they annually imported some 6,000,000 tons. German trade with the South American republics in the years before the war was nearly as great as our own. But in August 1914 this came to a full stop, and unless British trade and British shipping were freely available South American prosperity was dangerously threatened.<sup>4</sup> The coal

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 37, pp. 181, 183, 185.

<sup>2</sup> *Suffolk* W/T Log, p. 71.

<sup>3</sup> A 53.

<sup>4</sup> See Fayle: *Seaborne Trade* I, Chapter IX.

situation immediately became serious. As early as July 31 Brazil threatened to refuse all supply of coal to belligerents. Directly war between England and Germany broke out Brazil, Argentine, Uruguay and Chile prohibited the shipment by any vessel in their ports of more coal than would carry her to her next port of call in South America. It had been reported to these Governments that Great Britain had prohibited the export of coal, and in any case the colliers and ports of South Wales were all taken up with Admiralty requirements. Though the coal merchants of the Tyne were endeavouring to arrange export from there, they were still somewhat afraid of the passage through the North Sea; and until the coal actually arrived, the republics were not inclined to deplete their scanty stocks. This was hardly to be expected. On the 7th our Minister at Rio telegraphed that coal was at famine prices and that the financial position of the Government and private firms was grave in the extreme. It was in vain that we made official protest against these coal restrictions, which would put a more effectual stop to our food supplies than the activities of a score of German raiders. We even approached the United States Government to urge them to use their good offices on our behalf. They, however, refused to do anything in the matter, on the plea that the South Americans resented outside advice. A specific assurance from us that only the best steam coal was reserved for Admiralty use and that no restrictions would be placed on the free export of other kinds was required before any relaxation of the South American embargo could be obtained. By that time United States coal was arriving in British ships.<sup>1</sup>

**34. Neutrality Regulations in South America.**—Their anxiety to maintain the free passage of shipping led the republics to make early declarations of neutrality, in each case based on the Hague Convention of 1907. Brazil, in addition, put forward a tentative proposal that the whole of the Atlantic south of Lisbon should be neutralised, and offered, if the British and French Governments agreed to the suggestion, to enforce it on Germany. In view of the practical difficulties in the way of the scheme we discouraged the suggestion and the matter was reluctantly abandoned by Brazil.<sup>2</sup> From our point of view the most urgent necessity of the moment was to prevent the egress from South American ports of the German liners we considered suitable for conversion into armed merchant cruisers. There were two of these. One, the *Blücher*, had broken off her voyage homeward and put in to Pernambuco; the other, the *Cap Trafalgar*, was at Buenos Aires. We drew the attention of the countries concerned to their duty of preventing such vessels from leaving if these could reasonably be considered as intended

<sup>1</sup> See F.O. telegrams in H.S. 26, first 130 pages. Also papers titled *Case 439* and *F.O. 2/9/14, Uruguay Neutrality*.

<sup>2</sup> F.O. telegrams, H.S. 26, pp. 147, 162, 184.



to be employed for warlike purposes; we also pointed out to them that the use of wireless telegraphy by merchant vessels in harbour lends itself to the abuse of neutrality. As a result of these representations the republics generally adopted the United States rules. Both the *Blücher* and *Cap Trafalgar* were frequently visited and searched, without any specially warlike preparations being noticed.<sup>1</sup>

**35. Movements of "Glasgow."**—Captain Luce, in the *Glasgow*, the only cruiser in the South Atlantic on the outbreak of war, could, of course, operate on only a small part of his enormous station, and he remained at first near Rio. His orders gave Abrolhos Rocks as the northern limit of his station and led him to expect a reinforcement from Admiral Cradock's squadron, for the Admiralty, when informing Admiral Cradock that he need not send a cruiser to the south-east coast of America, had omitted to tell Captain Luce of the change of plan, and even by August 10 he was unaware of it.<sup>2</sup> He had been moving about off Rio, giving to passing steamers the Admiralty's instructions as to precautions they should take, and incidentally inspiring confidence in trade. Hearing that two German vessels, the *Asuncion* and *Crefeld*, were preparing for sea at Santos and Rio respectively, Captain Luce showed himself in the neighbourhood, hoping to be reported and thus deter them from putting out.<sup>3</sup> They both, however, left, the *Asuncion* on August 9 at 7 p.m., and the *Crefeld*, also from Santos, during the night of August 12/13. Two other German vessels, the *Santa Isabel* and *Pontos*, left the River Plate on the 6th and 8th respectively. A large Hamburg-America steamer, the *Baden*, got out of Pernambuco at 8 p.m. on August 11; she had only recently arrived from Barry, and was full of Cardiff coal.<sup>4</sup> Another Hamburg Süd-Amerika vessel, the *Rio Negro*, fitted with wireless apparatus, left Para on the 9th filled with food and Cardiff coal.<sup>5</sup> None of these vessels was likely to be intended as an armed raider; they were more probably carrying stores to the cruisers at sea.

The Admiralty, on August 13, informed Captain Luce what they thought to be the positions of *Karlsruhe* and *Dresden*, and that both appeared to be working to the southward towards his station; they also told him that the *Monmouth* was at St. Vincent, Cape Verde, on the way to join him.<sup>6</sup> He was then cruising near Abrolhos Rocks, where, on the 14th, he captured a Hamburg Süd-Amerika liner, the *Santa Catherina*. She had left New York on July 27 for the South American ports, and, having no wireless, was unaware that war had been declared.

<sup>1</sup> For Brazilian action *re Blücher*, see papers titled *Foreign Office*, 16 September, 1914; for Argentine action *re Cap Trafalgar*, see *Foreign Office*, 3 October, 1914.

<sup>2</sup> See H.S. 26, p. 104.

<sup>3</sup> *Glasgow*, Letter of Proceedings. M. 01745/14.

<sup>4</sup> Log of Intelligence Division, Section E 2, Nos. 381, 437, 530, 600, 626.

<sup>5</sup> H.S. 26, p. 119, and N.L. 20482/14.

<sup>6</sup> Telegram 49 to *Glasgow*. H.S. 26, p. 128.

Removing her crew, he sent her with a small guard on board to anchor off Abrolhos Rocks, outside territorial waters; the German crew he sent by a British ship to Buenos Aires, and the mails to Rio. Her cargo was all consigned to merchants in Brazil, and he proposed to send her to Rio to discharge it, so long as this course did not prejudice his possession of the prize. To this the Brazilian Government agreed. The Admiralty, however, assuming that the suggestion was being carried out, did not definitely inform Captain Luce that his proposal was approved, with the result that the prize was left at Abrolhos Rocks with her cargo undischarged. In October her coal spontaneously ignited and she was sunk.<sup>1</sup>

By August 14 the reports of German activity against shipping on our Atlantic trade routes were reassuring rather than otherwise. The expected armed liners had not made an appearance. The *Karlsruhe* had not yet stopped a British ship, and the three which had met the *Dresden* had suffered little from the encounter. Though the French ships in South American ports were sometimes held up by rumours of the near neighbourhood of German cruisers, we were able on the 15th to assure the Brazilian Government that British merchant vessels were prepared to take cargo outward and homeward across the Atlantic, which was practically secure for trade.<sup>2</sup>

**36. Movements of Forces E and I.**—At the home end of the Atlantic routes Force E was fully occupied in close proximity to the coast in covering the route of the transports of the British Expeditionary Force to France. The Admiralty had now decided not to employ the *Lusitania* and *Mauretania* as armed merchant cruisers. This needed some adjustment with the Cunard Company, from whom, on August 3, they had been definitely requisitioned. The *Lusitania* was at Liverpool; the *Mauretania* at Halifax had sent all her passengers overland to New York, and had commenced preparing for her new service; Captain V. H. G. Bernard had been appointed to command the *Lusitania*, and Captain C. C. Fowler the *Mauretania*. All these arrangements were now cancelled, and the Cunard Company were indemnified by the payment of one month's hire, £40,000, of one of the ships.<sup>3</sup>

Further down the trade route Admiral de Robeck with his force of three cruisers managed to keep watch off Lisbon and Vigo, and to show the flag in most of the ports on the Atlantic coast of Spain and Portugal. South of Gibraltar French cruisers were passing up and down the coast of Morocco. In addition to detailing the armoured cruisers *Bruix*, *Latouche-Tréville*, and *Amiral Charner* to escort their troops from Casablanca, the French ordered two old light cruisers, the *Cassard*

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 26, p. 248, and papers titled *Case 816*.

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 26, pp. 154, 157.

<sup>3</sup> S. 0420/1914.



and *Cosmao*, to patrol the coast of Morocco, where the tribes were in a somewhat excited state. During the night of August 9 Lloyd's Signal Station at Cape Spartel, near Tangier, was attacked. The attack was repulsed, but the station was abandoned, and some anxiety was felt for the Eastern Telegraph Company's cable landing at Tangier. Immediately they heard of the incident, the French diverted to Tangier the *Amiral Charner*, then on passage outwards. The Admiralty considered that sufficient protection would be afforded either by a Gibraltar torpedo boat or one of the smaller cruisers, and eventually the *Cassard* was detailed for this duty. However, our representatives at Tangier, unwilling to offend the Spanish, who resented any advance by the French in Northern Morocco, suggested no protection was necessary, since the signal station was permanently closed, and the cable was almost impossible to find. The Admiralty concurred in this. Nevertheless, the *Cassard* went to Tangier, and on the 20th removed the German Chargé d'Affaires and staff, disembarking them at Palermo. The French also proposed to send troops to Tangier, but, as this would undoubtedly provoke difficulties with Spain, the troops were diverted to Casablanca. They passed the Straits of Gibraltar westward on the 22nd. The *Cassard* and *Cosmao* remained patrolling the coast of Morocco.<sup>1</sup>

On August 11 the *Amphitrite* stopped the Austrian steamer *Daksa*. Finding that she was bound for the Elbe with grain "for orders," Captain Grant-Dalton decided that her cargo, though conditional contraband, became absolute through its destination; and putting a prize crew on board he sent her to Gibraltar.<sup>2</sup>

On August 13 Admiral de Robeck was joined by the *Argonaut* and *Sutlej*.<sup>3</sup> This latter ship had not been apportioned to Force I in the War Plan, but seems to have been intended as a reinforcement for Force E. When, however, she was reported as ready at Devonport, on August 6, she was ordered to join Admiral de Robeck, though only temporarily. On August 16 the *Challenger* was at last relieved of her duty in home waters, and also proceeded to join Force I; off Finisterre she relieved the *Sutlej* to go into Gibraltar to coal. Beyond the suspicion attaching to the liners and other German ships in Spanish and Portuguese harbours there seemed to be no evidence of an attack on commerce in the waters of Area I.

**37. Movements of Force D.**—Nor had our merchant shipping on the African and European coasts as yet suffered from the enemy. On August 6 Admiral Stoddart was told that one of

<sup>1</sup> See H.S. 36 and A 35, 55.

<sup>2</sup> *Amphitrite*, Proceedings. M. 7060/14.

<sup>3</sup> *Sutlej*, Captain C. Lynes, 1902, 2,000 tons, trial speed 21.7 knots; 2—9.2 in., 12—6 in.

his squadron must press on to St. Vincent, Cape Verde, leaving one cruiser to deal with the enemy off Las Palmas. He had so far only the *Carnarvon* and *Cumberland* under his direct orders. On the 8th, however, the Admiralty ordered the *Cornwall* to proceed from Gibraltar to join him, examining Madeira on the way.<sup>1</sup> His fourth ship, the *Monmouth*, was now ready to sail from home. By his War Orders he had to send one ship to South America to join the *Glasgow*; at his suggestion she was detailed for this service, and she therefore sailed direct for Pernambuco, *viâ* St. Vincent, Cape Verde, and did not join his squadron at all. She reached St. Vincent on the 13th, coaled, and proceeded for Pernambuco. Next day she met the German steamer *Hochfeld*, bound for Madeira from Monte Video, which she had left before the outbreak of war. The prize had only enough coal to take her to Madeira, and Admiral Stoddart ordered her to be released, as she was hampering the *Monmouth*.<sup>2</sup> The *Hochfeld* arrived duly at Madeira and remained there.

During the first few days of the war a succession of German and Austrian merchant vessels took refuge at the ports in the East Atlantic between Bilbao and the Cape Verde Islands, at Madeira, and at the harbours in the Azores and Canaries, till the total reached more than a hundred. One, the *Bethania*, left Tenerife on August 3 without a bill of health, for an unknown destination. This was suspicious. It was also noted that the German steamers *Ingo* and *Aruca*s at Las Palmas were taking more coal from the German depôt than was necessary for their own requirements. The stock of German coal was, however, only 1,500 tons. The British and French Consuls protested to the Governor, who upheld the protests, and the steamers were made to discharge their coal again. The *Carnarvon* and *Cumberland* arrived in the islands on August 7. At Tenerife was the French liner *Formosa*, prevented from sailing by fear of the German cruisers supposed to be off the islands. Admiral Stoddart offered to escort her out of harbour, but she made no reply, and he went on to Las Palmas, sending the *Cumberland* in to coal, while he himself waited outside. Though German wireless had been frequently heard, it ceased entirely after his arrival. The attitude of the Spanish authorities at Las Palmas was most friendly; amongst other things they had taken down the aeri-als of German ships in harbour, and had sealed their wireless rooms. No trace of German men-of-war could be found in the Canary Group, nor had they been seen at a base reported to be situated between two of the smaller islands. There had been no case of interference with any British ship. The Admiral determined to push on to St. Vincent. He sailed on August 8, leaving the patrol of the Canaries to Captain Fuller in the *Cumberland*, who

<sup>1</sup> A 28, 34. No particular intelligence concerning the Cape Verde Islands had come in, beyond the arrival of a few German merchant vessels.

<sup>2</sup> Stoddart, Letter of Proceedings. M. 02074/14.



was to take the *Cornwall* under his orders on her arrival.<sup>1</sup> The latter left Gibraltar on August 8; proceeding *viâ* Madeira and the Salvages, she joined the *Cumberland* on the 12th at a rendezvous south of Grand Canary. Between them the two ships made a close examination of all the harbours in the Canary Islands. From time to time they heard the Tenerife wireless station calling the *Blücher*, and on one occasion, by giving the *Blücher's* reply signal, the *Cornwall* received two messages addressed to the German ship, but they were in code. At night the two ships closed in, the one near Santa Cruz de Tenerife, the other near Las Palmas.

38. The "Re Vittorio."—At this period German reservists were making their way to Germany in large numbers, and many vessels from America to neutral ports contained these as passengers. Among such vessels was the *Re Vittorio*, an Italian mail steamer, which had left Buenos Aires before war was declared. She was reported to have 80 reservists on board, and on August 14 the Senior Naval Officer, Gibraltar, telegraphed to that effect to the *Cornwall* (Captain Ellerton), then cruising near Las Palmas. Next morning Captain Ellerton sighted the *Re Vittorio*, and sent a boarding party to examine her. They found 21 declared reservists, and proceeded to remove them to the *Cornwall*. Captain Ellerton, however, considering he had no accommodation for prisoners of war, sent them back. He put a prize crew of four officers and 15 men on board; and after obtaining permission from the *Cumberland*, his immediate senior officer, proceeded to escort the vessel to Gibraltar. Meanwhile, Admiral Stoddart in the *Carnarvon*, at the Cape Verde Islands, wishing to coal at Sierra Leone, ordered the *Cumberland* to come and relieve him south of the islands, and this order reached Captain Fuller in the *Cumberland* a few hours after he had sent the *Cornwall* off to coal at Gibraltar on arrival with the *Re Vittorio*. By Admiral Stoddart's orders he now recalled the *Cornwall* to watch off Las Palmas, while the *Cumberland* proceeded down the trade route. The *Re Vittorio* continued to Gibraltar in charge of the prize crew. On nearing port the officer in charge of the prize crew hoisted the British flag in place of the Italian, whereupon the master threatened to abandon the command of the ship. As a result of his protest, the Italian flag was hoisted at the stern, though the British flag hung at the fore. At Gibraltar 54 passengers were removed, the original 21, and 33 more discovered since to be reservists, and the *Re Vittorio* was released. The Italian Government protested both against the capture of the ship and the removal of the German passengers. The Foreign Office proposed to express regret, and to assure the Italian Government that unjustifiable interference with Italian shipping would be avoided in future; but

<sup>1</sup> Stoddart, Letter of Proceedings, M. 7056/14; H.S. 25, pp. 83, 136, 150.

before agreeing to this course, the Admiralty, on 19 September, 1914, called on Captain Ellerton for a full report, with reasons for his action. Owing to the course of events, this demand did not reach him till July 1915.<sup>1</sup> He pointed out that the *Re Vittorio* was undoubtedly performing unneutral service in that she had reservists on board, and had not landed them at St. Vincent after the declaration of war;<sup>2</sup> when he captured her he had no immediate prospect of being able to take her to a British port himself, and though the ship must pass the Straits of Gibraltar, there was a possibility that she might evade the patrol. In the circumstances he took the only course which would certainly prevent the reservists from joining the enemy's forces, and he submitted this justified his action. The Admiralty were not quite sure of this; but since by the time Captain Ellerton's reply came in Italy had joined the Entente, they felt it unnecessary to make a formal answer to her complaint, and the matter dropped.<sup>3</sup>

The *Cornwall* was not back in position off Las Palmas again till the forenoon of August 17. Since the Canaries were a long way from Sierra Leone, the coaling base, and Dakar was reported to have the plague, Admiral Stoddart asked the Admiralty, should it still be considered necessary to keep a cruiser at the Canaries, that she might coal at Gibraltar, which was not one of the coaling bases allotted to him in his War Orders. This message, timed 1400 on the 16th, was to be passed by the *Cumberland*; but, owing probably to interference, it could not get through till 11 p.m. on the 18th, when the *Cumberland* passed it *viâ* Dakar. The chief source of interference seemed to be the *Leviathan*.<sup>4</sup>

This ship, of the 6th Cruiser Squadron, had been sent down from Queenstown to examine the Azores for German cruisers and colliers. The *Dresden* had been reported near the islands, and though they lay in Area I, for which Admiral de Robeck was responsible, his few cruisers had been too busily occupied on the European coast to be able to investigate the rumour. The *Leviathan* went first to Flores and obtained no news there. She then went on to Horta, the principal port of the Azores, arriving on the 14th. There she induced the authorities to intern a German oil tanker and to remove the wireless apparatus from two Hamburg-America liners in port. Though there were no enemy cruisers in the Azores, the *Leviathan* proposed to remain

<sup>1</sup> The Admiralty letter was addressed to R.A., *Good Hope*, under whom Captain Ellerton was then serving. It never reached Admiral Cradock, and was returned to the Admiralty in March 1915.

<sup>2</sup> This refers to Article 43 of the Prize Manual: "A neutral ship should be detained if to the knowledge of the charterer, the master, or the owner, she is transporting a military detachment of the enemy."

<sup>3</sup> Papers titled N. 553/15. Over 90 reservists were removed from the Italian S.S. *Caserta* from New York to Naples when she passed Gibraltar on August 23. See H.S. 36, pp. 431, 440.

<sup>4</sup> This paragraph is based on *Cumberland* W/T Log, 23046.



10 days in the group and then coal at Gibraltar. She had evidently not received an order from the Admiralty sent *via* Gibraltar, North Front, on the 12th, ordering her to the Cape to escort homeward-bound troops. This order was repeated on the 15th to the Consul, Horta, and at 11 a.m. on the 16th she shaped course southward for St. Vincent, Cape Verde.<sup>1</sup>

## CHAPTER V.

### AUGUST 16-26.—THE KAISER WILHELM DER GROSSE.

39. Appearance of the "Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse."—The situation as regards the attack and defence of trade on the Atlantic trade routes, after a fortnight of war, was so generally in favour of the defence that the confidence of shipowners and merchants in the efficacy of naval protection steadily increased. The chief cause of the paralysis which struck the shipping industry on the outbreak of war was financial rather than the fear of capture; and though trade was still stagnant, by the middle of August it was beginning to be resumed.<sup>2</sup> It was at this stage that the first German armed liner made her brief appearance in the Atlantic.

The *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, a 14,000-ton vessel of the North German Lloyd Line, dated from 1897, and had a speed of 22½ knots.<sup>3</sup> Before the war she was known to be fitted for conversion into an armed auxiliary.<sup>4</sup> She was lying in the Weser when the German Government issued the Warning Telegram, which apparently contained orders to fit her out as an armed merchant cruiser. She was painted black all over, and on August 3 received her guns and naval crew, with Captain Reymann in command.<sup>5</sup> On August 4 she passed through the lock into the German Bight, where the telegram for war against England reached her. Her orders were to carry on war against commerce in the Atlantic; and to reach her station she had, of course, to get out of the North Sea. Our Northern Patrol was not then in position,<sup>6</sup> but the Germans expected a

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 36, pp. 228, 256, 276, 281; *Leviathan*, Letter of Proceedings. M. 02184/14 and *Leviathan's* Log.

<sup>2</sup> See Fayle, *Seaborne Trade*, pp. 109, 171, etc.

<sup>3</sup> The incidents summarised in this section are described in detail in papers titled *Misc. Office*, 24 August, 1914. The German versions are in *Kreuzerjagd im Ozean*, by Kap-Lt. Aye, translated in I.D. 1170, and the diary of J. Peters, translated in I.D. 1035; both of these are in I.D.H.S. 551.

<sup>4</sup> Particulars and Movements of German and Austrian Mercantile Steam Vessels.

<sup>5</sup> Presumably at Wilhelmshaven. Our Consul Bremerhaven reported that she left his port on August 2. H.S. 51, p. 442.

<sup>6</sup> See Monograph 19, *10th Cruiser Squadron*, C.B. 917E.

more or less close blockade, and Captain Reymann thought he could escape only by hugging the Norwegian coast and making a wide detour to Iceland. By August 7 he was west of Iceland and made his first capture, a steam trawler, the *Tubal Cain*, which he sank, taking her crew on board. From there he apparently made straight for the route of trade homeward bound from the south. On August 12 the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* crossed the Azores-American route and soon sighted a ship. She turned out to be an Italian, the *Il Piemonte*, bound for New York; she was consequently a neutral vessel, and having no contraband had to be released.<sup>1</sup> Proceeding southward, the German raider was off the southernmost of the Canaries on August 15. Here she took in many wireless signals *en clair*; these were mostly from steamers ordering coal in Tenerife, and as they all gave their names it was possible, by consulting Lloyds Register, to discover a great many particulars about them. One of the messages came from the *Galician*; it was addressed to the British Consul, Tenerife, and signed "Captain Day"; he ordered coal to be ready next evening and asked: "Is the track clear?" From the distinctness of the wireless message, Captain Reymann judged the *Galician* was close, and, sending a reassuring answer, prepared to act as soon as she appeared.<sup>2</sup> He had not long to wait. At 2.45 p.m. August 15, in 27.30 N., 18.0 W., he overhauled her. The position is about 60 miles to the westward of the usual track, showing that Captain Day was carrying out the Admiralty's instructions to diverge. At first Captain Reymann ordered the *Galician* to stop and lower her aerial, so that she could not communicate by wireless; but before he had sent a boat, he sighted on the opposite side of him another steamer, and, going in chase of the new prey, he ordered the *Galician* to follow at full speed. The second steamer turned out to be the German collier *Duala*, disguised as an English ship, full of coal and supplies. This was a good find, for the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse's* long voyage had nearly exhausted her fuel and she was high out of the water. Ordering the *Duala* to a rendezvous on the African coast, Captain Reymann returned to the *Galician*. He intended to bring all her passengers and crew to his own ship, but, as there were women and children among them and the transfer would take many hours, he decided to wait till morning.

Forcing the *Galician* to follow him on a triangular course, Captain Reymann thought out what he should do with her. The difficulty of feeding 250 extra persons, should he transfer them to his own ship, and the consumption of valuable time in getting them across, weighed heavily with him. He had to coal within 24 hours and had appointed a rendezvous off the

<sup>1</sup> Peters gives August 11 as the date of this. On arrival at New York nine days later the *Il Piemonte* reported having been stopped on August 12 in 39 N. 35 W., about 180 miles West of Flores. H.S. 25, p. 353.

<sup>2</sup> The above particulars are from *Kreuzerjagd im Ozean*, I.D. 1170.



African coast for his colliers.<sup>1</sup> Ultimately he decided to release the ship, and at 5 a.m., August 16, when in 25.35 N., 17.20 W., made a signal to that effect, and the *Galician* proceeded with much relief on her voyage to Tenerife.

Two hours later another steamer came up to the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*. This was the *Kaipara*, carrying nearly 4,000 tons of meat from New Zealand. As she had no passengers, Captain Reymann signalled to the boarding officer: "Transfer crew to *Kaiser*, sink the ship and lose no time." The last part was added because the wireless of British cruisers had been heard, among them the *Carnarvon*. The *Kaipara* was sunk by explosive charges combined with 53 shells, and Captain Reymann, about midday, shaped course for his coaling base on the African coast. But he was in an area where shipping is thick and it was not long before he came across another vessel. In reply to his signals, one of which was that she was to throw overboard her wireless apparatus with which she had been calling for help, he learned that she was the *Arlanza*, a Royal Mail liner, homeward bound from South America. Having left Buenos Aires before the outbreak of war she had had no special instructions and was directly on the track for Las Palmas. "How many passengers have you on board?" asked the German. "Fifteen hundred," came the reply. "You are released," said Captain Reymann, and made off at high speed.<sup>2</sup> Before he could get clear, however, another steamer was sighted. It was now half-past four, and as she proved to be a cargo steamer, the *Nyanga* of the Elder Line, with African produce, he made short work of her, and after transferring her crew to his own ship continued his voyage to meet the *Duala*.

40. **Action taken on the "Arlanza's" Report.**—The first report of the presence of the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* on the trade route was made by the *Arlanza*, which arrived at Las Palmas at 7 a.m. on the 17th. Her master informed the British Consul, who proceeded to warn through the Tenerife Wireless Station all the British ships he knew to be near.<sup>3</sup> Leaving again at noon, the *Arlanza* met the *Cornwall* just outside, to whom her master repeated the information. The position of the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, as given by the *Arlanza*, was 24.40 N., 17.14 W., at 1 p.m. August 16. As the *Cumberland* was near there,<sup>4</sup> Captain Ellerton telegraphed it to her and proceeded himself to the southward of the Canaries. Bad atmospheric conditions prevented him from communicating either with Gibraltar<sup>5</sup> or the *Carnarvon*, which was then at St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, and

<sup>1</sup> *Kreuzerjagd*.

<sup>2</sup> These signals are not recorded by the *Arlanza*, but may be a free paraphrase by Kap.-Lt. Aye.

<sup>3</sup> See *Cornwall's* W/T Log.

<sup>4</sup> *Cumberland's* noon position, August 17, was 25.41 N. 18.19 W.

<sup>5</sup> H.S. 25, p. 402.

the *Cumberland*, when she received the news at 1.35 p.m., was about 130 miles south of Ferro, steaming south-westward along the trade route towards St. Vincent in accordance with her orders. Before, however, Captain Fuller had arranged any measures for dealing with the raider, he received new orders which took him right away from the area in which she was operating.

41. **"Cumberland" ordered to Fernando Po.**—One of the first steps taken at home after the outbreak of war was the appointment of a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence to consider suitable objectives for overseas attack. One of these was the important wireless station at Kamina in Togoland; and another, in close geographical connection with it, was the German Cameroons colony, with its important harbour of Duala. The ubiquitous *Dresden* was reported on August 9 to be expected at Duala, where 32 German merchant vessels had taken refuge; the wireless station at Fernando Po, a Spanish island not far from Duala, was stated to be under German control; by the 13th German cruisers had been reported near Duala; and the Admiralty considered a ship should be sent to gain intelligence, as the expedition for the seizure of the port was nearly ready to start. At 8.35 p.m. on the 13th they telegraphed to Admiral Stoddart at St. Vincent that he was to send one cruiser to Fernando Po to gain intelligence, leaving one ship near St. Vincent to guard trade. The order did not reach him and it was repeated at 12.20 a.m. on the 15th, being sent *viâ* Pembroke and Dakar. Even then he appears not to have received it till 1 a.m. on the 17th. After ascertaining the amount of coal on board the *Cumberland*, he ordered her at 10.50 p.m. to proceed as fast as fuel allowed to Sierra Leone and on to Fernando Po. At 1 a.m. on the 18th she shaped course for Sierra Leone and took no further part in any operations against the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*.<sup>1</sup>

42. **Ships passing through Area D.**—Besides the *Cornwall* and *Cumberland* there were several men-of-war approaching the scene of the raid by the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*. One of these was the *Kinfauns Castle* (Captain D. B. Crampton), now an armed merchant cruiser, with orders to proceed in the first instance to St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, and probably from there to the Cape Station.<sup>2</sup> She had left Southampton at 4 p.m. August 15, and on the 18th intercepted a message to the *Amphitrite* to the effect that the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* had captured the *Galician*. The *Kinfauns Castle* was then some 300 miles north of Madeira; she was a slower ship than the German, but in case they should meet, Captain Crampton had

<sup>1</sup> *Cumberland* W/T Log and A 43.

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 25, p. 223.



his ship's funnels painted red to look like a Union Castle liner, in the hope of attracting the enemy within range.<sup>1</sup> She was not the only ship that was coming out from England along the trade route. The liners which had been armed as merchant cruisers were becoming ready. The *Armada Castle* on her way out to the Cape was two days ahead of the *Kinfauns Castle*; she passed west of the Canaries about noon on the 19th, followed half a day later by the *Otranto* on the way to the south-east coast of America. Both these ships made St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, their first port of call. But nearer than either of these was the *Macedonia*, which passed west of the Canaries between the 17th and 18th. Her log shows that she continued straight on to a rendezvous off St. Vincent, where, at noon on the 20th, she met Admiral Stoddart.<sup>2</sup> He sent her to patrol 200 miles northward from St. Vincent while he remained to the southward of the group.

43. "Highflyer" detached from Area I to Area D.—The Admiralty took action by sending the *Highflyer* to join Admiral Stoddart. She was on the way to Madeira from Gibraltar. He ordered her to operate on the trade route near the Canaries, relieving the *Cornwall* to come down to St. Vincent and take the *Carnarvon's* place while she went in to Sierra Leone to coal.<sup>3</sup> The *Highflyer's* place in Force I was taken by the *Minerva* from Force E.<sup>4</sup> At this time the first divisions of our Expeditionary Force were crossing from Southampton to Havre, and the part played by Force E in the protection of the transports was to occupy a line from Queenstown to the Scillies. It was from this line that the *Minerva* came and she left for her new station on the 20th, before the transport of the Expeditionary Force was complete.

44. Battleship Supports at Focal Points of Trade.—Another step taken by the Admiralty at this period was their decision to distribute the *Canopus* class battleship of the 7th Battle Squadron at focal points on the trade routes. The *Glory* had already gone to North America and was now ordered to cruise off New York. The *Ocean* was ordered to Queenstown to act with Force E; the *Albion* to Gibraltar for Force I; the *Canopus* to St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, for Admiral Stoddart.<sup>5</sup> The function of these battleships was to form supports for the cruiser forces in case of raids by hostile battle cruisers,<sup>6</sup> though this was

<sup>1</sup> Letter of Proceedings. M. 01947/14.

<sup>2</sup> See plan at p. 48.

<sup>3</sup> Letter of Proceedings. M. 02074/14.

<sup>4</sup> A 56, 58, 59, 62. She was the only ship of that squadron that could proceed at once without coaling. H.S. 36, p. 333.

<sup>5</sup> A 63, 64. *Ocean* (Captain Hayes-Sadler), *Albion* (Rear-Admiral H. L. Tottenham, Captain A. W. Heneage, M.V.O.), *Canopus* (Captain Heathcoat S. Grant), all 12,950 tons; 4—12 in., 12—6 in.; 18 knots; dating from 1900.

<sup>6</sup> A 81.

not definitely laid down in the orders to the ships themselves; these orders spoke only of "generally protecting trade" and "generally supporting cruisers in protecting trade."<sup>1</sup>

They were also to carry a large number of extra ratings to distribute among the cruisers for prize crews. In some cases it had been the practice for the Atlantic cruisers to escort into port any prize or suspicious ship they had met. The Admiralty now issued general instructions that since for cruisers the main object was to destroy the enemy's armed ships, they were not to be diverted from that object by prizes. Prize crews must be put on board, and if that were not possible and the cargo were mostly enemy, the crew should be removed and the ship sunk; if the cargo were neutral the captain would have to decide what to do.<sup>2</sup>

45. "Dresden" makes Two Captures.—It will be noticed that the focal points at which the battleships were stationed were all large ports. There was another place from which thickly populated and important trade routes radiate in many directions. This was Cape San Roque, at the north-eastern corner of Brazil. Here diverge the routes from the Plate ports to the Canaries and Cape Verde Islands on the one hand, and to the Gulf ports and New York on the other. The South American republics carry on a large trade with the United States and most of this trade was carried in British ships. North-east of Cape San Roque the track of coffee to Europe joined the main route of foodstuffs from the Plate. Hence the area for some hundred miles round Pernambuco afforded one of the richest of the distant fields open to an enemy raider. It was here that the *Dresden* made her reappearance.

Since August 12, when the arrival of the three ships stopped by the *Dresden* had revealed her position, though incorrectly, six days before that date, a good deal of intelligence which might relate to her had been received. The French Intelligence Division at Dakar stated on the 12th that probably two or three German warships were between the Canaries and Togoland. The *Dresden* herself was reported near Para on the 14th; and the French Consul at Rio stated she had coaled near Bahia on the 16th. On the strength of this, though the vessel in question was variously reported as the *Dresden* or *Bremen*, which latter had gone home before the war, he asked for a British cruiser to escort out of Pernambuco harbour a French liner containing hundreds of French reservists, a request which could not at the time be granted. Next, our Minister at Rio stated that the *Dresden* was off Maranhão on the 17th, interfering with the telegraph cables. It was not till August 20 that she was definitely located. On that day there came in to Rio the *Prussia*, a Hamburg-America liner which had left Pernambuco on

<sup>1</sup> See A 65.

<sup>2</sup> A 57, 60.



August 4, ostensibly for Santos. On board the *Prussia* when she arrived at Rio were the master and crew of the Houston steamer *Hyades*, which the *Dresden* had sunk on August 15 in 6° S., 32° 46' W., about half way between Pernambuco and Fernando Noronha. Shortly after the arrival of the *Prussia* there came into Rio the British steamer *Siamese Prince*, which reported that she had been stopped by the *Dresden* on the 16th in 10° S. 32° W., but allowed to proceed.

After releasing the *Drumcliffe*, *Hostilius*, and *Lynton Grange* on August 6 the *Dresden* had continued her course for Rocas Reef. The weather had become bad and it was doubtful whether her coal would last. Captain Lüdecke thought it advisable to call to him one of the steamers he knew to be in the ports near and he signalled to the *Corrientes*, then lying at Maranham. In calling to her he gave his own ship's name as *Sierra Salvada*, and the master of the *Corrientes* suspected the call to be a trap. But he had served on board the *Dresden* and knew many of her officers, and by referring to them Captain Lüdecke was able to calm his suspicions. The *Corrientes* left Maranham at 6 a.m. on August 8 and met the *Dresden* that afternoon.<sup>1</sup>

By the advice of the master of the *Corrientes* the *Dresden* coaled on August 9 and 10 at Jericoacoara, an unfrequented harbour on the north coast of Brazil in 3° S., 40° W. She took in 570 tons.<sup>2</sup> Leaving at noon August 10, the two ships passed north of Rocas Reef on the 12th and went on towards Fernando Noronha, hoping to find some British vessels on the trade route. Captain Lüdecke was now in touch with the *Baden*, which, arriving at Pernambuco on August 7, with 12,000 tons of coal, had reported her presence to the *Dresden* through the Olinda Wireless Station, and had been ordered to the position 3° S. 35° W. near Rocas Island. Captain Lüdecke thereupon sent the *Corrientes* to Pernambuco, where she arrived on August 14. During the 13th the *Dresden* tried to coal from the *Baden* under such a lee as the reef afforded;<sup>3</sup> and some damage was done to the cruiser by the bumping in the swell. Meanwhile, two more German auxiliaries had joined: the *Prussia*, which had left Bahia on the 10th, and the *Persia* from Ceara. The lighthouse keeper on Rocas Reef became curious to know what was the reason of this assembly of ships near his station and was told the *Dresden* was a Swede, the *Fylgia*, repairing her damaged engines. The little squadron remained only till the 14th. Captain Lüdecke sent the *Persia* off to Parahyba with his sick, and at 9 p.m. started off southward with the *Baden* and *Prussia*. During his stay near Rocas Reef and Fernando Noronha he had seen no shipping, a fact which he interpreted as showing that we were diverting our steamers to another route. This he

<sup>1</sup> Her departure does not seem to have been reported. The *Sierra Salvada* was really at sea; she came in to Rio on August 14.

<sup>2</sup> Notebook of J. Zeus, one of the *Dresden's* crew. I.D.H.S. 115.

<sup>3</sup> 254 tons were taken in, according to Zeus.

considered might be *viâ* Trinidad, a small island in 20° S., 30° W., for which he now steered direct. While on the way the *Dresden* fell in with the *Hyades*, and captured her. The *Hyades* was bound for Rotterdam with a cargo largely German owned; nevertheless Captain Lüdecke, thinking it had little chance of reaching any destination other than a British port, sank the ship and transferred her crew to the *Prussia*. In sinking the ship he expended 42 rounds. Next day, August 16, he overtook the *Siamese Prince* bound for the River Plate. Her cargo was neutral and he released her. He then sent off the *Prussia*<sup>1</sup> to discharge her prisoners at the nearest port, presumably Pernambuco; but hearing British warship wireless<sup>2</sup> the *Prussia* diverged and arrived at Rio almost simultaneously with the *Siamese Prince*.<sup>3</sup>

The *Hyades* was the first vessel known to have been sunk by German cruisers in the Atlantic; for though the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* had destroyed two ships off the African coast, the fact was not yet known, as their crews were still in the raider. At first there was some feeling of alarm at the ports of South America, and the arrival of ships at sea was eagerly awaited. As one by one these came safely into port the uneasiness subsided and the incident "had no appreciable effect upon the confidence of traders or shipowners. The contrast between the comparative immunity enjoyed by shipping and the heavy percentage of losses which had been anticipated was so marked that isolated captures could well be disregarded, especially in view of the assistance given by the State Insurance Scheme."<sup>4</sup> As a measure of precaution, however, since no men-of-war would be available for the protection of shipping in the neighbourhood till the end of the month, the Consul at Pernambuco advised British vessels not to proceed north of his port till then.<sup>5</sup>

**46. Movements of the South-east Coast of America Squadron.**—The position, 180 miles north-east of Pernambuco, in which the *Hyades* had been sunk, was within the area for which Admiral Stoddart was responsible. His small force, however, had been so tied to the Canary and Cape Verde Islands by the Admiralty's orders<sup>6</sup> that he had been unable to send any ship to the south-western corner of his station. Nor did he now detail one to go there. The *Monmouth* had passed down the trade route, leaving St. Vincent, Cape Verde, on the 14th. She arrived at Pernambuco on the 20th, when the news of the loss of the *Hyades* came in; but she was not part of Force D, and as her

<sup>1</sup> She had only 200 tons of coal aboard.

<sup>2</sup> Possibly H.M.S. *Monmouth*, which was at Pernambuco on August 20. T.S.D.D.

<sup>3</sup> Deposition of Master of *Hyades*. M. 16613/14.

<sup>4</sup> Fayle: *Seaborne Trade* I, p. 192.

<sup>5</sup> H.S. 36, p. 247.

<sup>6</sup> A 28, 43.



station was to the southward she left next day to join the *Glasgow*, according to her orders. Captain Luce, as soon as the *Monmouth*, had joined him, asked if he could act to the northward of his station; the Admiralty replied, "If you have certain information *Dresden* is your objective. Station limits are only a general guide."<sup>1</sup>

#### 47. Admiral Cradock ordered to search the Brazilian Coast.—

The Admiralty did not disturb Admiral Stoddart, whose force was on the lookout for the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*; but, instead, they ordered Admiral Cradock to search the northern coast of Brazil for bases of the German cruisers, continuing his voyage as far as Pernambuco.<sup>2</sup> He arrived at St. Lucia on August 23 with the *Good Hope* and *Bristol*, and coaled. Outside the port, which was without defences, were nine British steamers awaiting orders. Considering them unnecessarily exposed, should the *Karlsruhe* choose to attack them, he advised them to go to Martinique, which, though French, was a defended anchorage. Over 60 merchant ships had visited St. Lucia since the outbreak of war. It was an important coaling station and the Admiral suggested it should have two 6 in. or 4.7 in. guns "if hostilities are likely to last."<sup>3</sup> Nothing, however, was done and the Admiralty appeared to acquiesce in the suggestion that British ships should seek shelter in the French port. The Admiral landed a 12 pdr. and a Maxim from the *Berwick*, which had joined him, and, stationing the *Descartes* as guard ship off the port, he proceeded for Trinidad.

The *Bristol* and *Berwick* he sent on in advance to show themselves off St. Vincent and Grenada. The *Good Hope* went south-westward to the coast of Venezuela and then worked eastward to Trinidad; the western half of the coast of Venezuela had been visited by the *Condé*, which the Admiral now directed to patrol off St. Thomas. The three British ships arrived separately at Trinidad on August 26, and left next day to commence a search of the north coast of Brazil.<sup>4</sup> The order on which he was operating contained the words, "coaling if necessary at Pernambuco." These appear to have been decoded by him as "coal outside Pernambuco"; to do this in the August weather seemed so difficult to him that in the course of reporting his proposed movements he asked for further instructions. His telegram did not make clear on what point he was requesting instructions, and the reply he received merely ordered him to hunt the *Dresden* and her colliers.<sup>5</sup>

48. The "Brandenburg's" Escape.—Just before reaching Trinidad he heard through the *Bristol* that a large German merchant vessel had sailed from Philadelphia with 9,000 tons

<sup>1</sup> A 75.

<sup>2</sup> A 73.

<sup>3</sup> A 83.

<sup>4</sup> Letter of Proceedings, M. 02094/24.

<sup>5</sup> A 76, 77.

of coal, nominally for Norway, but, of course, suspected to be for the German cruisers at sea.<sup>1</sup> This added another report to the numerous and persistent rumours of sailings of German ships with supplies for cruisers in the Gulf of Mexico. He accordingly telegraphed to our Consuls at New York and Galveston to give publicity to a false statement that three British men-of-war were rushing to the Gulf of Mexico to protect the oil and cotton traffic and that two German supply ships had been captured. This message ultimately reached our Minister at Rio, who pointed out that to publish rumours officially would discredit genuine news. The Admiralty agreed with this view and informed Admiral Cradock that he should communicate only with Ministers and not Consuls, except in matters of extreme urgency.<sup>2</sup>

The vessel which had caused this correspondence was the *Brandenburg*, 7,500 tons, of the North German Lloyd Line, which had put in to Philadelphia in the early days of the war. Her speed was only 12½ knots, and she was not on our list of ships convertible into armed merchant cruisers.<sup>3</sup> On August 19 she took in a large quantity of provisions and began to coal. This information was duly reported to the Admiralty by our Consul at Philadelphia, who also warned the local United States authorities. When he heard next day that she had taken 5,000 tons of coal he asked that she might be refused clearance. However, she gave Bergen as her destination and the United States authorities did not detain her. She sailed at 5 p.m. August 21, the Consul's report of this being received in the Admiralty at 4.54 a.m. on the 22nd, but it was not till 1.30 p.m. on the 23rd that the Admiralty, which was the Intelligence Office for that area, sent out the information to the *Suffolk*, adding that the German ship was probably taking coal to enemy cruisers in American waters.<sup>4</sup> Captain Yelverton had learned from the New York papers that the *Brandenburg* seemed about to sail, and on the 21st, at 7.25 p.m., sent a warning to the *Essex* that the liner might be leaving Philadelphia that day with coal for German cruisers. The *Essex* was then, by Admiral Cradock's orders, showing herself off the Chesapeake; she went, indeed, so close that she received a salute from a United States battleship at anchor in the roadstead.<sup>5</sup> At 8 p.m. she proceeded northward at 12 knots, reaching the southern shore of the Delaware estuary at noon, August 22, by which time the

<sup>1</sup> *Bristol* W/T Log 18259, August 25. This was a telegram despatched from Admiralty to I.O. Jamaica, 1.10 a.m., 24.8.14.

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 37, pp. 535, 571.

<sup>3</sup> This list can be found in "Disposition of German, Italian and Austrian Ships," a daily return issued by the Intelligence Division. It first appears on p. 7 of the issue of 8 August, 1914.

<sup>4</sup> H.S. 37, pp. 441, 450, 455, 473.

<sup>5</sup> *Essex* Deck Log.



*Brandenburg* had been gone some 18 hours.<sup>1</sup> Captain Yelverton received the Admiralty's telegram through the *Glory* two days after the *Brandenburg* had sailed.<sup>2</sup>

49. **Movements in Area D, August 20-26.**—In spite of the passage of the armed merchant cruisers between the Canaries and Cape Verde Islands, they obtained no intelligence of the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*. The *Armada Castle* and *Leviathan* left St. Vincent southward on the 22nd, the *Otranto* on the 23rd, the *Kinfauns Castle* on the 24th. Two days before reaching St. Vincent, the *Kinfauns Castle* captured a German barque, the *Werner Vinnen*, with 4,325 tons of Welsh coal; she had left England before the outbreak of war. Captain Crampton put a prize crew of two lieutenants, one midshipman and 29 ratings on board and sent her to Sierra Leone.<sup>3</sup> The Admiral himself, in the *Carnarvon*, remained near St. Vincent, patrolling till the 23rd, when he started for Sierra Leone to coal. At 2 p.m. he came across a German steamer, the *Professor Woermann*. This ship, one of the Woermann Line, left Hamburg on July 25 on her ordinary voyage to the Cameroons. She reached Tenerife on August 1 and, instead of continuing for Conakry, the next regular port of call, she proceeded to Las Palmas, where the English and French passengers were advised to land. Taking in 600 tons of coal and the German reservists from ships in port, she sailed at 10 p.m. August 2, having spread a rumour that she was making for Madeira. Our cruisers had been on the lookout for her ever since their arrival at the Canaries.<sup>4</sup> She was, however, captured in 15.35 $\frac{1}{2}$  N., 24.35 W., near Brava Island, and had apparently been waiting some time there on a rendezvous. The *Carnarvon* did not put a prize crew on board but gave the German captain written instructions to accompany the *Carnarvon* to Sierra Leone, informing him that his ship would be sunk without further notice should any attempt to escape be made.<sup>5</sup> The two arrived on August 26 at Sierra Leone, where the *Professor Woermann* was condemned in the Prize Court. The Admiral had not waited for relief by the *Cornwall* before leaving St. Vincent; she did not arrive till the 26th. The *Macedonia*, however, since meeting the Admiral, had been patrolling the trade route northwards for some 200 miles. Neither the cruisers of Force D nor the other ships passing through the station learned any more of the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*; it was reserved for a newcomer to run her to earth. On August 24 our Consul at Las Palmas was informed by a passenger in a Cadiz


<sup>1</sup> The *Brandenburg* had been despatched by the New York supply centre to a rendezvous near Newfoundland; failing to meet any ship there she continued to Trondhjem, arriving August 31. *Kreuzerkrieg II*, p. 223.

<sup>2</sup> *Suffolk W/T Log.*

<sup>3</sup> Letter of Proceedings, M. 01947/14.

<sup>4</sup> *Cumberland W/T Log.*

<sup>5</sup> A 79. Papers titled X 3356/14, and Colonial Office, 2 January, 1915.

DISPOSITION 20<sup>th</sup> August, 1914.



schooner that the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* had arrived at Rio de Oro, in Spanish West Africa, with the *Duala*, at daybreak, August 17. She had coaled from the *Duala* and had remained 48 hours at anchor, ignoring the Spanish authorities. The *Highflyer* had just reached Las Palmas when the news came in, and on receipt of the intelligence proceeded at 5.30 a.m., August 25, at 8½ knots, to investigate the Rio de Oro, on the chance that something might still be there. The news was now a week old, but the Admiralty, thinking that the *Cornwall*, if she had received it within 24 hours of the arrival of the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, ought to have been in time to catch her, asked Captain Ellerton when he "received intelligence of the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* and what steps he took." He received this inquiry at St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands. The new intelligence had not reached him, and as the Admiralty's telegram did not specify what intelligence they meant, he assumed it to be that received on the arrival of the *Arlanza* and replied accordingly.<sup>1</sup>

The next piece of intelligence concerning the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* was furnished by the German Consul at Tenerife, who announced on the 26th, without further particulars, that the raider had sunk the *Kaipara* and *Nyanga*.<sup>2</sup> This news showed that Captain Lüdecke of the *Dresden* was not the only German officer who was sinking prizes, and it increased the Admiralty's desire to get rid of the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*. They ordered Admiral de Robeck to detach from his force the armed merchant cruiser *Marmora*,<sup>3</sup> from Madeira, to work with the *Highflyer*.<sup>4</sup>

50. **Area I, August 16-26.**—Admiral de Robeck was maintaining watch off Lisbon to prevent the escape of the German liners. The Portuguese prohibited the departure of vessels at night and stationed three cruisers and three torpedo boats in the harbour; but two vessels, one Dutch and one Italian, escaped, and thenceforward a Customs official was posted in each merchant ship every night. Besides watching Vigo and the Tagus, he had endeavoured to station a cruiser off Madeira. The *Highflyer*, which he had sent there on the 16th, had been absorbed into Force D; and the same fate had attended the *Marmora*, which, joining him on the Portuguese coast on the 21st, he had at once ordered down the trade route. The *Challenger* joined his squadron on the 17th and was stationed off Finisterre to relieve the *Sutlej* for coaling. The *Vindictive*, after a week in dockyard hands at Plymouth, rejoined him on the 22nd and was added to the Tagus division. The *Minerva*<sup>5</sup> left Queenstown on the 20th; he sent her in to Bilbao to find out the proceedings of a

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 25, pp. 287, 392, 395, 402. M. 17398/14.

<sup>2</sup> A 82.

<sup>3</sup> Captain J. U. Farie. R.N.; 8—4·7 in. guns.

<sup>4</sup> A 84.

<sup>5</sup> Captain P. H. Warleigh, R.N.



German ship, the *Frankenwald*, which had been reported as interfering with our cables landed there.<sup>1</sup> Captain Warleigh found that her wireless had been dismantled by the Spanish authorities in answer to French representations; he now urged that she should be sent to sea or searched for submarine cable gear. None was found in her and the *Frankenwald* remained in port. The *Minerva* then returned to her station off Finisterre, relieving the *Challenger* to proceed to Madeira. At Funchal the *Challenger* found four German steamers all with their wireless apparatus dismantled by the Portuguese authorities, who were very friendly; permission was obtained for any British man-of-war to remain more than 24 hours, to take more coal than was necessary to reach Gibraltar and even to return in a few days to coal again.<sup>2</sup> The *Albion* arrived off the Tagus on the 25th and continued on to Gibraltar to coal. Thus, on August 26 Admiral de Robeck had off the Tagus the *Amphitrite* (flag) and *Vindictive*; at Finisterre, the *Minerva*; off Cape St. Vincent, the *Sutlej*; at Gibraltar, the *Albion* and *Argonaut* coaling; near Madeira the *Challenger* and *Marmora*.<sup>3</sup> It was, therefore, no serious strain on him to send the *Marmora* to work with the *Highflyer*. At the same time the Admiralty ordered the *Macedonia* to work with the *Cornwall*, both pairs of ships to hunt down the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*.<sup>4</sup> This is the first definite order for merchant cruisers to work with cruisers and not alone; a principle that later became a rule.<sup>5</sup> But even before this order was dispatched the immediate cause which had given rise to it had been removed.

**51. Action between "Highflyer" and "Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse."**—The *Highflyer* (Captain Buller) reached the Rio de Oro in the afternoon of the 26th and was rewarded by finding four German steamers. One, the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* herself, was coaling off the entrance from two steamers, one on each side of her, while a third was standing off stopped. Captain Buller reports<sup>6</sup>: "I closed and signalled 'I call on you to surrender.' She replied: 'German warships do not surrender. I request you to observe Spanish neutrality.' I then signalled to her that if that was her plea I considered she had been violating neutrality by using the Rio de Oro as a base, and that I should fire on her unless she surrendered, requesting her to warn her colliers to leave her. After giving her another opportunity to surrender, she replied she had nothing more to say. Having given her an hour and a-half to surrender or proceed to sea, at 3.10 p.m. I fired a shot well to her right and she immediately opened fire on me. I had by this time manœuvred my ship to the northward

<sup>1</sup> A 72.

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 36, p. 488.

<sup>3</sup> De Robeck. Letter of Proceedings. M. 7060/14.

<sup>4</sup> A 84, 85.

<sup>5</sup> See section 75.

<sup>6</sup> *Highflyer's* Report. M. 01831/14.

and there was a clear range of five miles on the line of fire between her and the shore. Fire was returned and continued until she ceased firing at 4.25 p.m. It was observed that boats were being lowered and the crew taken on shore. I signalled: "Am unwilling to cause unnecessary loss of life," and "If you will haul down your ensigns I will send boats and medical assistance." Boats were lowered from *Highflyer*, but before they reached the vessel she sank at 5.10 p.m. in shallow water. Our boats then approached the shore, flying the Red Cross flag; and as they did so the survivors who had landed took up an aggressive position behind the sand dunes along the coast and the boats were therefore recalled. During the engagement the three steamers of the enemy had escaped to the southward. Their names were not ascertained; it is, however, believed that two of them were the *Magdeburg* and *Arucas*, that left Las Palmas on the night of the 23rd with oil, coal and stores on board and reported to be joining the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*."

**52. Proceedings of "Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse at Rio de Oro."**—After sinking the *Nyanga* the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* had continued her voyage to the rendezvous, arriving off the coast of Rio de Oro that night. Next morning the *Duala* came up, and reported that there was another collier waiting at a rendezvous 60 miles off. The *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* steamed out to find this vessel, but hearing British cruisers in the neighbourhood returned again to the *Duala* to begin coaling from her. A Spanish officer boarded the ship and was told that she was from Bremen for Cape Verde, put in to repair her engines which had broken down.<sup>1</sup> He saw no signs that she was armed, and observing the ribbon of the Norddeutscher Lloyd on the seamen's caps, had no suspicion that she was anything but an ordinary merchantman. By August 20 she had obtained enough from the *Duala* to increase her supply of coal to 1,300 tons; but since at half speed she consumed 250 tons a day, this was not much help to her. The *Duala* then sailed for Las Palmas, which she reached on the 22nd.

Four days later the *Magdeburg* joined the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* with 1,400 tons of coal and provisions. Her papers, when examined by the Spanish officials, showed that she had cleared from Las Palmas for Cape Town with provisions. On the 25th two more colliers arrived; these were the *Bethania* and *Arucas*. There was now enough coal to take the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* to South America, which is stated to have been her destination;<sup>2</sup> but when the *Highflyer* came up Captain Reymann was still coaling his ship. Seeing an action to be inevitable he transferred the crews of the captured British ships to the *Arucas* before casting her off. The *Magdeburg* and *Bethania* disappeared, but the *Arucas* proceeded to Las Palmas;

<sup>1</sup> The Spanish version of the incidents in the Rio de Oro is in M. 04118/14.

<sup>2</sup> Peters.



arriving on the 28th she was at once interned by the Spanish authorities. Captain Reymann, nine other officers, and 72 of the crew of the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, having reached the shore in safety, walked to the Spanish fort, where the Governor took charge of them. There were insufficient resources in the Spanish colony to keep the refugees from the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* at the Rio de Oro, and they were consequently sent by a Spanish steamer to Las Palmas, where they were interned on board three of the German steamers sheltering there.<sup>1</sup>

Thus ended the brief career of the only armed liner sent out from Germany to destroy British commerce. The value of the vessels and cargoes she had destroyed was under £400,000—"a poor return for the loss of so fine a ship—and the indirect effect of her operations was trifling."<sup>2</sup> One of these effects was that at Casablanca, where at this period there were always half a dozen French transports at anchor, one of the escorting French cruisers had always to be present, and the *Friant* was ordered to join the Morocco Division.<sup>3</sup>

**53. Spanish Protest against Violation of Neutrality.**—Immediately on arrival at the Spanish port Captain Reymann handed in a written protest against the *Highflyer's* action. It was in this protest that the Spanish first were officially informed that the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* was an armed merchantman. The protest became the basis of a Spanish complaint that we had violated her neutrality in that the *Highflyer* had taken matters into her own hands instead of leaving the authorities on the spot to deal with them. The Admiralty's reply was that Captain Buller did not know that the place in question was inhabited and that "as there was no prospect of the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* being interned in accordance with International Law, H.M.S. *Highflyer* was in duty bound to take the only effective steps in her power." This, coupled with an expression of sincere regret that operations of war had taken place in Spanish waters, satisfied the Spanish Government and no more was heard from them of the matter.<sup>4</sup>

## CHAPTER VI.

### AUGUST 26 TO SEPTEMBER 3—RE-DISTRIBUTION OF THE ATLANTIC SQUADRONS.

**54. The Monrovia Cables.**—The episode of the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* again drew attention to the Canary Islands and the question of German communications. Tenerife was still connected to Monrovia and thence to Pernambuco by a German-owned cable, which could be fed at Monrovia by a German wireless station. Though the direct cable from Germany to

Tenerife had been cut on the outbreak of war, it had still been possible for Germany to pass messages *viâ* the Berlin wireless to Kamina in Togoland, and thence by the Monrovia wireless and cable station to the Canaries and Pernambuco. The question of cutting these cables at Monrovia had been considered before the war by a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, which had finally recommended no interference with the Monrovia-Pernambuco cable, since it was thought that Brazil would resent such action, and might retaliate by restrictive measures on the working of our own cables. Soon after the outbreak of war the Postmaster-General, nevertheless, proposed to transfer the German cables from Monrovia to Sierra Leone, a proceeding which would take only three days, and would not interfere with their use by Brazil except for the time of transfer. The *Colonia*, a cable ship of the Eastern Telegraph Company, was at Sierra Leone. Accordingly, on August 14, the Admiralty asked the Postmaster-General to carry out the proposed transfer, and instructed the *Dwarf* to cover the operation. She, however, reported that there was not enough cable on the spot for the transfer, which must consequently be delayed till a sufficient length could be obtained. Moreover, the expedition for the seizure of Togoland and its wireless station at Kamina was nearly ready; with this station in our hands the chain of German communications would be broken, and the cables could be worked by ourselves. It was therefore decided at the Admiralty, on August 16, not to cut the cable, every effort being concentrated instead on the capture of Kamina—a step which would have the advantage of not annoying Brazil. The Postmaster-General was informed of the change of plan, and the *Dwarf* was used to escort the transports for Lome instead of the cable ship. Meanwhile, the Foreign Office was asked to urge the Liberian Government to check the exchange of messages dealing with matters not private or commercial.

This was the situation when the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* made her raid off the west coast of Africa. The French at once asked the Liberian Government to close the Monrovia wireless station, but this was refused as an unneutral action. The French then asked for a military censorship.<sup>1</sup> The effectiveness of a Liberian censorship was a doubtful quantity, and the Admiralty urged the Foreign Office to make a combined Franco-British effort directed towards the substitution of Allied operators for the Germans at the cable and wireless stations. The President of Liberia issued a proclamation of neutrality on August 10, and four days later our Consul-General at Monrovia reported that the German cable was not being worked. Nevertheless, it was clear that use was being made of it, since the German Minister at Rio continually issued war news received by him from the German Ambassador at Madrid, the only line of

<sup>1</sup> M. 04118/14.

<sup>2</sup> Fayle: *Seaborne Trade* I, 82.

<sup>3</sup> Chack: p. 195.

<sup>4</sup> M. 04118, 04824/14.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 12, Treaty, Paris to Foreign Office.



communication being by the Spanish cable from Cadiz to Tenerife and thence by the Monrovia cable to Pernambuco. Presumably the German Ambassador at Madrid was in touch with his own Government by some clandestine channel. The capture and destruction of the Kamina high-power station during the night of August 24-25 deprived Monrovia of most of its dangers,<sup>1</sup> and finally, on September 3, the Liberian Government closed both the French and German wireless stations. A joint meeting of representatives of all the British Government departments concerned, held on August 31, had in the meantime decided that there was no reason for cutting the cable, and it was left intact.<sup>2</sup>

**55. Movements of German Colliers.**—The activity of the Germans at the various ports abroad did not, of course, escape notice. The Canaries in particular attracted special attention. The *Walhalla*, for example, on arrival at Las Palmas from Cardiff on August 1, had commenced disembarking her cargo, but speedily reloaded it, and, taking in provisions, left early on August 2. We know now what was her object. She returned to Las Palmas on August 26, having given her coal to the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* near San Miguel, Azores, and taken from that ship 40 old, unsuitable members of the crew.<sup>3</sup> The *Duala* also had cleared from Las Palmas on August 2, ostensibly for New York.<sup>4</sup> The *Bethania* left Tenerife on August 3, and was now known to have been with the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* at Rio de Oro.<sup>5</sup> She was still at large.

The *Slawentzitz*, a collier from Barry with 5,000 tons of Welsh coal, put in to Las Palmas late on August 10, and left again next night with all lights out.<sup>6</sup> Finally, the *Aruacas* and *Magdeburg* disappeared from Las Palmas on the 22nd. The *Aruacas* returned to Las Palmas five days later with the crews of the ships captured by the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, and from them it was learned that the *Magdeburg* also had attended that ship. She did not come back to Las Palmas, where there were still twelve German steamers in port.

In North American ports there were similar movements of coal. It was discovered that the Hamburg-America Line had been chartering neutral steamers to sail from Atlantic ports with large cargoes of coal and provisions. They generally carried a German supercargo, and cleared for distant ports. The following were known: *Thor*, Norwegian, left Newport News August 4; *Heina*, Norwegian, left Philadelphia August 7;

<sup>1</sup> See Monograph 5, *Cameroons*, (C.B. 317(A)), and Corbett: *Naval Operations I*, for a description of the land operations in Togoland.


<sup>2</sup> This section is based on papers titled *Telegram, 5th August, 1914*, and *Post Office, 20th August, 1914*.

<sup>3</sup> H.S. 25, pp. 47, 53, 403, 433.

<sup>4</sup> M. 04118/14.

<sup>5</sup> H.S. 25, pp. 62, 440. M. 17398/14.

<sup>6</sup> Papers titled *Case 585*.





*Nepos*, Norwegian, left Philadelphia August 23; *Berwind*, United States ship, left New York August 6; *Lorenzo*, also United States, left New York August 6. The *Johann Ludwig Mowinkel*, Norwegian, left Philadelphia September 3, and the *Pathfinder*, another suspected American ship, was at Cay Barien, Cuba.<sup>1</sup> Besides these, the *Graecia*, of the Hamburg-Amerika Line, left New York on August 27 with over 4,000 tons of coal cleared for Cadiz, and three days later the Hamburg-Amerika *Macedonia* cleared from New Orleans for Cadiz with coal and provisions. A report came in from Baltimore that Newport News, the big American coaling port, was undoubtedly being used as a supply base for the Germans.<sup>2</sup> Further south a small German steamer, the *Präsident*, was moving about in the West Indies, and German activity at St. Thomas was again reported. The *Präsident* was assumed to be serving the *Karlsruhe*.<sup>3</sup>

The *Graecia*, in leaving New York, ran some chance of capture. Captain Yelverton, in the *Suffolk*, at the time was proceeding from Halifax for the Delaware River, not knowing whether the *Brandenburg*, of whose approaching departure he had read in the "New York Herald," had sailed or not. He had also received information that a steamer named *Ruby* was about to leave Philadelphia with gold supposed to be taken from one of the German liners. He met the *Essex* at 9 p.m., August 26, in 41.32 N., 65.25 W.; the *Essex* then went on to Halifax and the *Suffolk* to Delaware Bay. Our Consul's report that the *Graecia* was about to sail was not received in the Admiralty till 5.22 a.m. on the 28th; it had been repeated to Halifax, Jamaica, and Bermuda by the Consul. His further report that the *Graecia* had passed out of Ambrose Channel at 10.30 p.m., August 27, was received in the Admiralty at 5.36 p.m. on the 28th, but the *Suffolk* did not get the news till 1.50 a.m. on the 29th, 27 hours after the German vessel had sailed.<sup>4</sup>

The vessel watching off New York during the night of August 27-28 was the *Glory*, which had left Halifax on the 23rd for that patrol. Had she known of the *Graecia's* departure in time, there seems to have been some possibility of her capturing the German ship, as can be seen in the accompanying plan.<sup>5</sup> Captain Yelverton ordered the *Glory* to leave New York at 6 a.m., August 28, and proceed to Halifax, showing herself off Boston in daylight;<sup>6</sup> he himself came north from the Delaware River at sunset on the 28th, and patrolled off New York till

<sup>1</sup> A 91, 92. This organisation had been reported to the Admiralty on August 8 by Cayzer, Irvine & Co., of Glasgow.

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 37, pp. 534, 547.

<sup>3</sup> H.S. 37, p. 554.


<sup>4</sup> *Suffolk* W/T Log, pp. 102, 107, 110, 111, 122. H.S. 37, pp. 534, 540.

<sup>5</sup> See next page. In the plan the *Glory's* track is from her log. The *Graecia's* track is assumed; she was capable of 11½ knots.

<sup>6</sup> *Suffolk* W/T Log, August 27, 11.25 p.m.



September 2, when he proceeded for Halifax. There was therefore no chance of stopping the *Johann Ludwig Mowinckel*. The *Essex* remained at Halifax, repairing some small defects, from August 27 to September 2. She then left for the New York patrol.



56. **Movements of Force I, August 26 to September 3.**—Some of the supply ships from the American coast were bound for the East Atlantic. The *Graecia*, for instance, had been ordered to the rendezvous near San Miguel, possibly to take the place lately occupied by the *Walhalta*; the *Macedonia's* station was near Ferrol.<sup>1</sup> This, of course, we did not know at the time; the *Graecia* had given Cadiz as her destination, and this information was telegraphed by the Admiralty to the Atlantic Admirals.<sup>2</sup> The officer apparently most concerned was Admiral de Robeck, Commanding Force I. The watch on the Tagus, where so many German ships were sheltering, absorbed two of his cruisers, of which one, his flagship, was always close in, while the other cruised to westward. Another cruiser took the Finisterre district; a fourth the neighbourhood of Cape St. Vincent. He had now enough ships to enable him to spare one or two for Madeira. Generally there was at least one of his ships coaling at Gibraltar. It had been his practice to shift his flag whenever his flagship had to coal, so that he might always be present off

<sup>1</sup> I.D.H.S. 1414, No. 25; and papers titled *Cap K*, 25.1915.

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 25, p. 461.

the Tagus; but on the 28th he proceeded from there for Madeira in the *Argonaut*, which had just coaled at Gibraltar, feeling satisfied that the Portuguese measures for dealing with the German ships were good enough to make it safe for him to leave the guard of that district to Captain Lynes in the *Sutlej*. This was the first time he had left the neighbourhood of Lisbon.

A new duty now devolved on the cruisers of Force I—that of escorting troopships. The War Office had decided to bring home the British garrisons in the Mediterranean and replace them by territorial battalions. A Union-Castle liner, the *Edinburgh Castle*, was on her way home from the Cape; by Admiralty orders Admiral de Robeck ordered her to Gibraltar to embark the 1,000 troops there. When, on August 31, she left Gibraltar, the Admiral, in accordance with further Admiralty instructions, detailed the *Sutlej* to escort her as far as Finisterre, whence the *Minerva*, his most northerly cruiser, would escort her homeward until relieved by a cruiser from home waters. A few hours after taking over the *Edinburgh Castle*, the *Minerva*, Captain P. H. Warleigh, met coming towards them a steamer which hoisted Austrian colours and did not stop when ordered to do so. Her movements and course caused Captain Warleigh to consider her suspicious, and he brought her to by firing two rounds of blank.

On examination she was found to be the *Bathori*, of the Austrian Lloyd Line, bound for Vigo in ballast from Havre. She carried a French pass countersigned by the British and American Consuls-General at Havre, the latter representing the Austrian Government; but her position 35 miles due west of Vigo was so far from the track to her destination that suspicion was roused that she was not complying with the terms of her pass. The Admiralty had been informed that she was sailing with a French pass, but her port of destination was then given as Rotterdam, and all ships that would meet her on such a voyage were ordered to allow her to pass<sup>1</sup>; her change of destination to Vigo was not reported to the Admiralty by the British Consul-General at Havre, and consequently the *Minerva* had received no instructions about her. The Admiralty issued an Interim Order on August 29, instructing all ships to respect French, Russian and Belgian passes if properly authenticated, but this order had not yet reached the *Minerva*. Captain Warleigh had therefore no option but to treat her as suspicious. She had only sufficient coal to take her to Vigo, where a prize crew would probably be interned; he had the *Edinburgh Castle* under his charge; he therefore felt compelled to remove the *Bathori's* crew and papers, and sink her by gunfire, which was accordingly done. As the whole incident was due to misunder-

<sup>1</sup> A 80.



standing, H.M. Government expressed its regret to the French Government, agreed to consider the question of compensation to Austria on the resumption of friendly relations, and repatriated the crew *via* Flushing on 20 March, 1915.<sup>1</sup>

The *Minerva*, having disposed of the *Bathori*, continued her course northward, and was ordered by the Admiralty to carry on as far as 100 miles from Ushant, or until French cruisers were met. She sighted none, and arranged with the *Charybdis*, of Force G, to be relieved by her near Ushant at midnight, September 2-3, going on herself to Plymouth to coal.

**57. The French Patrol their own Coast.**—That part of Area I between Ushant and Finisterre which his general orders had indicated to Admiral de Robeck as his main station had practically been unvisited except by ships on passage to and from home; the menace of the German liners had kept his cruisers off the coast of Portugal, and his tendency had been to stretch southward to Madeira rather than northward to Ushant.

In actual fact the Ushant area was now more important than ever. The unfavourable results of the first collisions with the German army had brought about a wholesale retreat of the French, and it seemed not improbable that the French Channel ports might have to be relinquished to the enemy. Havre, as a base for our army in the field, was considered insecure, and the important decision was made to abandon it and use instead St. Nazaire, at the mouth of the Loire, for landing troops and stores. The change of route brought new responsibilities to the Atlantic cruisers. The voyage from Southampton to Havre took only a few hours and was well protected; the Dover-Calais entrance to the Channel was patrolled by a flotilla of destroyers and submarines; the western entrance by an Anglo-French cruiser squadron; in the Channel itself were the pre-Dreadnought battle squadrons based on Portland.<sup>2</sup> Transports on the new route, however, as soon as they passed Ushant would be without cruiser protection other than could be afforded by Admiral de Robeck. It was obvious that he could do little unless he denuded the rest of his station of cruisers, and accordingly the Admiralty, on August 31, asked the French to take over the Ushant-Finisterre part of Admiral de Robeck's station, using some of the cruisers of their 2nd Light Squadron for the purpose. The French readily agreed, and sent a division of armoured cruisers, under Admiral le Cannellier of the *Gloire*, to cruise between Ushant and Finisterre, and thus relieved Admiral de Robeck of the charge of that area.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Papers titled *Case 1029*.

<sup>2</sup> The arrangements for protecting the Southampton-Havre routes are fully described in Monograph 6, "Passage of the British Expeditionary Force," (C.B. 1585).

<sup>3</sup> A 94, 97; H.S. 36, pp. 542, 557, 561.

**58. Movements of Force D, August 27 to September 3.**—After sinking the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* the *Highflyer* returned to the Canary Islands. Her damages were insignificant, and though the Admiralty gave permission for her to proceed at once to Gibraltar to dock and replenish, Admiral Stoddart kept her till he could come up from Sierra Leone in the *Carnarvon* to relieve her. The *Cornwall* and *Macedonia* kept watch on the trade routes south of St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands. There, on August 30, the *Cornwall* removed 69 German reservists from the Dutch steamer *Hollandia*, and lodged them in the *Macedonia*, which, being a big P. and O. liner, had ample accommodation. Next day the *Empress of Britain* arrived at St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, on the way to South America to join the *Glasgow*. She proved to be a greedy consumer of water; the capacity of her evaporator was insufficient, and she required 1,200 tons a month in addition. The south-east coast of America was thus an unsuitable station for her, and the Admiralty therefore ordered the *Macedonia* to join Captain Luce, the *Empress of Britain* to remain with Admiral Stoddart in her place.<sup>1</sup> This order, sent on September 1, was some time in taking effect. It was not till September 4 that Admiral Stoddart ordered the German prisoners in the *Macedonia* to be transferred to the *Empress of Britain*,<sup>2</sup> and it was not till the morning of September 8 that the *Macedonia* arrived at Pernambuco.

The Admiral himself, in the *Carnarvon*, left Sierra Leone on August 29. He, like other authorities, thought it desirable to cut the cables at Monrovia, and proposed to escort the cable ship *Transmitter*, then at Sierra Leone, for the purpose. As explained above, the Admiralty did not then approve the project.<sup>3</sup> He searched the African coast as far as the River de Oro. There he found the wreck of the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* almost submerged, the part above water being gutted and burnt out. At noon on September 3 he met the *Highflyer* and his reinforcements, the *Canopus* and the armed merchant cruiser *Victorian*, at a rendezvous off Grand Canary. The *Canopus* had been at the Canaries since September 1. The supernumerary ratings brought by her were distributed among the ships present, and the *Highflyer* went off to Gibraltar to dock.

The *Victorian*<sup>4</sup> had commissioned at Liverpool on August 21. Her officers, except Captain Somerville in command and one lieutenant from the emergency list, were all from the Royal Naval Reserve, her former master acting as first lieutenant. She sailed on August 23. Three days later, when south of the Fastnet, she captured the German barque *Excelsior* from New Orleans, which had been 40 days at sea. Next morning Captain Somerville turned his prize over to the *Isis* of Force E, and continued his course southward. He reached the Canaries on

<sup>1</sup> A 96.

<sup>2</sup> Stoddart, Letter of Proceedings. M. 02075/14.

<sup>3</sup> H.S. 25, pp. 434, 438. <sup>4</sup> Captain H. B. T. Somerville, R.N. 8—4.7 in. guns.



September 1. At Palma, the westernmost island, he saw no German ships, but at Santa Cruz de Tenerife there were six.<sup>1</sup> At Las Palmas, which he visited after meeting the *Highflyer* on September 2, he found 14 German steamers and two Austrian.<sup>2</sup> There was also a Spanish cruiser in port.<sup>3</sup>

59. **The "Cap Trafalgar" leaves the River Plate, August 23.**—

One of the German liners on our list of vessels which Germany could probably convert into cruisers was the Hamburg-Süd-Amerika vessel, *Cap Trafalgar*, an almost new ship of 18,710 tons and 17½ knots. She arrived at Buenos Aires shortly before the outbreak of war, and immediately became suspect. Reports were received that she had guns on board, and was even distributing them by night to the *Santa Isabel*, *Pontos*, *Gotha*, and *Sierra Cordoba*, German ships lying close to her in the port. The *Pontos* left on August 6, with San Francisco as her ostensible destination; she put in to Monte Video two days later, and left again at 5 p.m. The *Santa Isabel* sailed from Buenos Aires on the 8th. The Argentine Government made a search of the *Cap Trafalgar*, and could find no evidence that she carried anything of a warlike nature. Her bunker capacity was 4,000 tons, and she still had 2,100 tons on board. British colliers had been discharging coal to the German Coal Company at Buenos Aires, but this was soon stopped by the British Consul-General. The *Cap Trafalgar* discharged all her cargo, and sailed on August 17 at 5 p.m., the general impression being that she carried guns, had embarked 3,500 tons of coal, and taken on board large baulks of timber for the support of gun positions either in herself or other vessels. She re-appeared, however, at Monte Video, and was again thoroughly searched by two British-born officials of the Uruguay Government. They found no guns, baulks of timber, or warlike preparations; she had no cargo, and only the original 2,100 tons of coal.<sup>4</sup> She asked for more coal, giving out that her destination was Europe *viâ* Las Palmas. By this time the coal situation in South America had eased considerably. The South American Governments were sufficiently reassured by the arrangements for supply to permit all merchant vessels to load such bunker coal as they required. Accordingly, the *Cap Trafalgar* received 1,600 tons, and sailed from Monte Video on August 23.<sup>5</sup> The Admiralty had been kept fully informed of her movements and the suspicions about her, but her departure does not seem to have been reported by the

<sup>1</sup> *Cap Ortegá, Prinz Regent, Kurt Woermann, Irma Woermann, Usumbara, Telde.*

<sup>2</sup> German: *Ingo, Lulu Bohlen, Thekla Bohlen, Illyria, Assuan, Emmi Arp, Elizabeth Brock, Elhab, Teneriffa, Irma Fried, Menes, Walhalla, Arucas, Duxia.* Austrian: *Onda, Columba.*

<sup>3</sup> *Victorian*: Report of Proceedings. M. 01006/15.

<sup>4</sup> Papers titled *F.O.*, 3/10/14, *Cap Trafalgar*.

<sup>5</sup> We now know that her orders were to proceed early in August to one of the German cruiser equipment stations to meet the *Eber*, which sailed from Lüderitzbucht on August 5 for the same station.

Intelligence Officer to the Admiralty. The Minister, however, informed the Foreign Office.<sup>1</sup>

60. **Movements of the South-East Coast Division.**—In spite of all this German activity in the River Plate, the Senior Naval Officer on the south-east coast of America, Captain Luce in the *Glasgow*, had been unable to give any attention to that district. During the first week of the war he had been near Abrolhos Rocks, waiting to meet the cruiser from the North American Squadron, which the Admiralty had not told him was not coming. After the *Monmouth* joined him he had taken her to Abrolhos to coal on the 23rd. The two then proceeded northward in company in the hope of meeting the *Dresden*. In fact, on the same day as the *Cap Trafalgar* was leaving the River Plate, the Admiralty instructed Captain Luce that, if he had certain information, the *Dresden* was to be his objective.<sup>2</sup> He knew for certain that the *Dresden* had sunk the *Hyades* in the Pernambuco district, and thus when he left Abrolhos it was to the northward and not towards the River Plate that he sailed. The *Glasgow* and *Monmouth* searched the Brazilian coast from Cape San Roque to Macau during daylight of August 27, and Rocas Reef early on the 28th. The *Otranto* joined them there, and the three ships, widely spread, then proceeded southward to Abrolhos to coal again.

61. **Reinforcement of the Atlantic Squadrons.**—The principal shipping companies whose vessels passed through the waters in which the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* had operated had of necessity been perturbed by the incident. The vessels and cargoes belonging to these companies were of great value; some of those from South America were worth half a million, and the meat they carried was of prime importance. So, too, was the grain brought by many tramp steamers on the route. It was realised in the Admiralty that Force D must be reinforced if it was to keep all possible enemy bases in that area under continual supervision, and also watch the trade routes. The nights were lengthening, and cruisers from Germany would have an increasingly better chance of evading our patrols in the North Sea. Moreover, the *Karlsruhe* and *Dresden* might appear on the East Atlantic routes, either driven there by the relatively stronger squadrons in the West Atlantic or attracted by the large coal supplies available in the Canaries. On September 3, therefore, the Admiralty decided to fit out four more armed merchant cruisers—the *Teutonic*, *Orama*, *Edinburgh Castle*, and *Calgarian*. Their armament was to be eight 6 in. guns.<sup>3</sup>

62. **Search for "Cap Trafalgar."**—Besides the *Karlsruhe* and *Dresden*, and any other cruisers which might have got away

<sup>1</sup> See his telegram in H.S. 26, p. 227, where the news is tacked on to a repetition of an earlier message, and seems to have escaped notice.

<sup>2</sup> A 75. <sup>3</sup> M. 01750/14; H.S. 25, pp. 466 to 468.



from Germany, there were the possible armed merchant cruisers to be dealt with. Of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* the information was vague. Some of her crew had arrived at Las Palmas in the *Walhalla*. In that ship were also six British seamen, but our Consul had been refused permission to interview them,<sup>1</sup> so that it was not definitely known whether or not the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was armed. At any rate, no captures were known to have been made by her. The other German merchant vessels not in port were more likely to be supply ships than mercantile cruisers, except the *Cap Trafalgar*. On August 29 a telephone message was received at the Admiralty from Lloyds, which was understood to mean that she had left Rio unarmed the previous day for Africa. This was at once telegraphed to the Commander-in-Chief, Cape, Admirals Stoddart and de Robeck, and Captain Luce.<sup>2</sup> To most of them it appears to be the first news of her on which they could act. Admiral Stoddart ordered the *Cornwall* down the trade route; she was then patrolling south of the Cape Verde Islands, and at 8 a.m. on August 30 she set her course for St. Paul Rocks, distant S. by W. 850 miles.

Admiral Cradock, though not informed by the Admiralty of this last report, seems to have known something of the *Cap Trafalgar's* movements. He left Trinidad on August 27, and was now sweeping along the north coast of Brazil with his three ships, *Good Hope*, *Berwick* and *Bristol*, widely spread in line abreast. The *Carmania* was following from Bermuda with 4,000 tons of coal. On the 29th he received information that there was reason to believe that the *Cap Trafalgar* was making for St. Paul Rocks, and decided to go there himself in the *Good Hope*, leaving the *Berwick* and *Bristol* to continue the search of the coast.<sup>3</sup> The *Good Hope* reached St. Paul Rocks at 9.30 a.m., September 2. Nothing was there except innumerable sea birds flying over the rock, which rises some 50 ft. above the water; and the Admiral altered course for Fernando Noronha. As the search of the Brazilian coast also proved fruitless, he ordered the *Bristol* back to Para to coal, and the *Berwick* to return to Trinidad, while he himself intended to call at Pernambuco for orders before returning to Trinidad, where he meant to concentrate his squadron.<sup>4</sup>

**63. Movements of "Dresden," August 15-30.**—The main object of Admiral Cradock's sweep along the Brazilian coast, and even of his visit to St. Paul Rocks, had been to find the *Dresden*, which he, as well as all the principal authorities, had assumed to be operating off the north-east corner of Brazil.

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 25, p. 448.

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 26, p. 263. The report was a mistake; the *Cap Trafalgar* never went near Rio.

<sup>3</sup> According to Surgeon Verteuil on board *Good Hope* "it was the Governor of Demerara who informed the Admiral that they picked up something by wireless about St. Paul Rocks, and he came to the conclusion that it was the rendezvous of the colliers coaling the *Dresden*." (Verteuil's Diary, M. 03598/15.)

<sup>4</sup> H.S. 37, p. 579.

The Intelligence Officer, Pernambuco, suspected Rocas Island as her base; but Captain Luce had found nothing there, and was now steaming south to coal at Abrolhos.

Before he could arrive, news was received that German cruisers were at work to the southward of him. On August 30 there came into Rio the steamer *Katherine Park*, bringing the crew of the British collier *Holmwood*, sunk by the *Dresden* not far from the estuary of the River Plate.

On releasing the *Siamese Prince*, the *Dresden*, on August 16, steered at first a false course for Rio, to which port she dismissed the *Prussia* with the crew of the *Hyades*. At dusk, however, Captain Lüdecke resumed his course for Trinidad. During the night of the 18th-19th, when close to the island, he came in touch with a German vessel, the *Steiermark*, which had come from Lüderitzbucht, in South-West Africa, in company with the *Eber*. Captain Lüdecke knew from signals which had been passing that the *Eber* was waiting close to the island, and he ordered the *Steiermark*, which during the night had lost the *Eber*, to follow him. Next morning at the island he met the steamers *Santa Lucia* and *Eleonore Woermann*, which had been called up by the *Eber*. Anchoring under an obelisk on the west side of the island, the *Dresden* took provisions from the *Santa Lucia* and coal from the *Baden*. In the afternoon there arrived the *Santa Isabel* from the River Plate; she had 3,100 tons of coal, 1,800 tons of drinking water, provisions and live stock, and had fitted up a wireless set she had taken over at Buenos Aires from the *Sevilla*, another German steamer there. Captain Lüdecke appropriated her for the *Dresden's* use. The *Eber* appeared on the 20th; the two captains conferred and agreed that if the *Cap Trafalgar*, which they expected, failed to appear, the armament of the *Eber*, a vessel useless for commerce destruction, should be mounted in the *Eleonore Woermann*. The *Dresden* transferred to the *Eber* 42 shells in exchange for a like number of her old ones, and the *Eber* went off with the *Eleonore Woermann* and *Santa Lucia* for the rendezvous, to wait for the *Cap Trafalgar*. On September 22 the *Dresden* started for the River Plate in company with the *Baden* and *Santa Isabel*. The latter proved unable to keep up 12 knots, and was sent to a rendezvous to the southward. The *Dresden* had thus only the *Baden* with her when, on August 26, she came across the British collier *Holmwood* in 31.30 S., 49.6 W., off the southern boundary of Brazil. This ship she sank, after transferring her crew to the *Baden*. A few hours later another British steamer, the *Katherine Park*, came in sight. She was on her way to New York from the Plate with a cargo owned in the United States, and Captain Lüdecke decided to release her. Transferring the crew of the *Holmwood* to her, he allowed her to continue her voyage to Rio, where she arrived on August 30.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This paragraph is based on the German official history, *Kreuzerriegel I*, Chapter VI.



The *Holmwood* carried 6,000 tons of coal for the British-owned Buenos Aires and Pacific Railway Company. Her loss, following so soon after that of the *Hyades*, for a short time shook the confidence of shipping circles to the extent of delaying departures from the River Plate, and added difficulty to the coal situation, already serious. It was still thought by the local authorities that both the *Dresden* and *Bremen* were in South American waters, and the only British cruiser they knew to be on the station was the *Glasgow*. Our representative at Buenos Aires, in reporting the occurrence added: "It would help trade if a few more of the 25 British cruisers in the Atlantic could be spared for protection of the southern routes, and if there were some sign that the promised convoy was being afforded to colliers."<sup>1</sup>

**64. Formation of a South-East Coast Squadron.**—This telegram seems to have convinced the Admiralty that a redistribution of the Atlantic squadrons was necessary. They replied promptly that they had detailed five cruisers and four armed merchant cruisers to South American waters, each cruiser able to engage the German light cruisers successfully; and that it was under consideration to send further reinforcements when the movements of troops on foreign stations were completed.<sup>2</sup>

Admiral Cradock was chosen to command the new squadron. On arrival at Fernando Noronha at 4 p.m., September 3, he sent ashore some telegrams, one to the Admiralty announcing his arrival, and another to the British Consul at Pernambuco. The latter immediately sent on a code message received from the Admiralty. This latter, when decoded, read:—

200. You are to remain and take charge of S.E. Coast of America Station. Ships under your orders: *Good Hope*, *Berwick*, *Bristol*, *Glasgow*, *Monmouth*, *Carmania*, *Otranto*, *Victorian*. Communicate with *Glasgow*.<sup>3</sup>

Next day the composition of the squadron was slightly modified. The *Victorian*, like the *Empress of Britain*, needed a copious water supply, and was left with Admiral Stoddart. The *Cornwall*, however, which on her way south had been in wireless touch with Admiral Cradock, and was now on passage to Sierra Leone for coal, the Admiralty transferred to the South-East Coast Squadron; and the *Canopus* they ordered to Abrolhos to guard Admiral Cradock's colliers and supply ships. On the other hand, it was found necessary to send the *Berwick* back to the West Indies.

<sup>1</sup> Tel. 29, Buenos Aires to F.O., recd. 5 a.m., 3.9.14.

<sup>2</sup> Letter M. to F.O., 3.9.14. Copy in H.S. 26, p. 285.

<sup>3</sup> Or rather, this is how the draft reads. See H.S. 37, p. 585. In view of its urgency and importance the Admiralty sent it to the British Consul, Pernambuco, with instructions to repeat it to Ceara, Maranhã, and Para, to await the Admiral's arrival. It was also sent to the Governor, British Guiana, for *Good Hope*.

**65. Reappearance of "Karlsruhe."**—In fact, although the South American trade route had managed to secure so much attention that the West Indies division had been drawn to it, the former area of that division was not free from danger. On September 2, the night before the Admiralty had given Admiral Cradock charge of his new station, they received information that the *Karlsruhe* had sunk a British vessel, the *Bowes Castle*, 186 miles east of Barbados, on August 18. This was the first location of the *Karlsruhe* since she left Curaçao. The *Bowes Castle*, which carried nitrates and ore from Chili for New York, had been some time overdue, but this was the first definite news of her fate; it was brought by her crew, who had been transferred to the *Stadt Schleswig*, from which ship they had been landed at Maranhã.<sup>1</sup>

Since leaving Curaçao, on August 12,<sup>2</sup> the *Karlsruhe* had steamed eastward. At early dawn of August 18 she was joined by the *Patagonia*, and the two proceeded southward for the coaling rendezvous, a quiet bay in the delta of the Amazon. That afternoon the *Bowes Castle* was sighted and sunk, her crew being transferred to the *Patagonia*. The *Karlsruhe*, with the *Patagonia* in company, reached the Amazon rendezvous, and coaled there on August 21 from her; the coaling was slow, and she did not leave again till the 24th. Next day the *Stadt Schleswig* appeared with 800 tons of coal from Curaçao. The three ships went in to the Sao Joao Islands (Long. 45° W.), and the *Karlsruhe* took from the *Stadt Schleswig* all the coal she could stow, the remainder being transhipped to the *Patagonia*. The crew of the *Bowes Castle* were then ordered to embark in the empty *Stadt Schleswig*, which Captain Köhler sent to Maranhã, where she arrived on September 2.<sup>3</sup>

She had run some chance of being caught by the *Bristol*. That ship in the course of her search of the Brazilian coast left Para on September 1, and, proceeding eastward, examined the Sao Joao Islands, and put in to Maranhã about noon September 3. The Vice Consul came off to the ship and from him it was learned that the *Karlsruhe* had coaled at Maraca Island in the mouth of the Amazon on August 21, and at the Sao Joao Islands from August 25 to 28 from the *Patagonia* and *Stadt Schleswig*. This news the *Bristol* signalled to Admiral Cradock on September 4 and received from him orders to coal at Para and then come on to Abrolhos Rocks. It was not, however, till September 11 that this important intelligence was

<sup>1</sup> A 100. The position given is wrong; it should be 9.54 N., 53.7 W., or 450 miles S. 62 E. (true) of Barbados. H.S. 22/202/19. *Kreuzerkrieg* II, p. 257, says 9.54 N., 55.7 W.

<sup>2</sup> See Section 28.

<sup>3</sup> Deposition of first officer of *Bowes Castle*, M. 17306/14; Aust.; there are also some unreliable statements made by officers of the *Bowes Castle* seven months after the event in M. 02119/15.



received in the Admiralty, and even then it conveyed the impression that the *Karlsruhe* had been coaling N.E. of Fernando Noronha on August 25 to 28.<sup>1</sup>

The Admiralty still assumed that the *Karlsruhe*, and possibly the *Dresden*, were being supplied from St. Thomas; they accordingly ordered Captain Yelverton, Senior Naval Officer, North America, to send the nearest of his cruisers to St. Thomas. The ship he sent was to operate in the West Indies against the *Karlsruhe* and her colliers.<sup>2</sup>

The North American division would not be reduced in numbers by this move, since the cruiser *Niobe*, which the Canadian Government had placed at our disposal on the outbreak of war, was at last manned and ready; she left Halifax on September 3 to take up patrol. The *Suffolk* was short of fuel, but the *Essex* had just coaled at Halifax; accordingly Captain Yelverton sent her to the West Indies in response to the Admiralty orders. This left the care of the whole North American Atlantic coast to four ships, the *Suffolk*, *Niobe*, *Glory* and *Lancaster*, although so many vessels in American ports were strongly suspected as part of the German supply system. Indeed, one of these, the Norwegian *Johan Ludwig Mowinckel*, known to be chartered by the Hamburg-Amerika Line, left Philadelphia at 3 p.m. on September 3 with coal; the Admiralty received news of her intending departure from the British Consul 24 hours before she sailed, but did not repeat it to Captain Yelverton.

**66. Admiral Phipps Hornby to command Force H.**—The Admiralty did not intend the North America and West Indies station to remain long without an Admiral in command, and the appointment of Admiral Cradock gave rise to a general redistribution. Admiral Hornby, from Cruiser Force E on the Irish coast, was ordered to go over to America in the armed Cunarder *Caronia*, and take command of the North America and West Indies station; his place in Force E was taken by Admiral Tottenham, formerly in the *Albion*, who was now ordered to come home in the *Sutlej*, the *Albion* going on to St. Vincent to take the place of the *Canopus*, and the *Ocean* from Queenstown coming down to Gibraltar.<sup>3</sup>

Up to this time Cruiser Force E had been guarding the home ends of the trade routes north and south of Ireland. The general idea was to maintain constant patrols at the Fastnet and near Tory Island. As a rule the cruisers remained near home, but occasionally they pushed out as far as 200 miles towards America and back. The squadron, originally the *Doris*,

<sup>1</sup> *Bristol W/T Log* 18259. H.S. 37, p. 686. Disposition of German, Italian and Austrian ships, 11 September, 1914, p. 18.

<sup>2</sup> A 105.

<sup>3</sup> A 106, 108.

*Isis*, *Juno*, *Venus*, *Minerva*, was reinforced by the Cunarders *Aquitania* on August 8 and *Caronia* on August 10. The *Challenger* of Force I on the outbreak of war was sent to patrol the Bristol Channel and later the North Channel between Ireland and Scotland; she was relieved by one of the Force E cruisers on August 13, and proceeded to join Admiral de Robeck. From August 9 onwards the Bristol Channel was patrolled by the *Pelorus*, a P-class cruiser belonging to the Channel Fleet. The Admiralty had intended to add the *Lusitania* and *Mauretania* to Force E, but, as has been explained, this engagement was cancelled. The *Aquitania* had the bad luck to be seriously damaged on August 22 by colliding with another steamer. After a report on the injury suffered by the *Aquitania* the Admiralty, on August 28, decided to terminate that arrangement also. The place of the Cunarders was taken to some extent by the *Tara* and *Scotia*, fast Irish mail boats, which were requisitioned and armed. The *Scotia* joined up in the Bristol Channel on August 19, the *Tara* some time later. The *Ocean* guarded the trade focus at the Fastnet. The operations of the squadron took place in the close proximity of home, and will not be described here. Admiral Hornby sailed from Berehaven in the *Caronia* on September 5.

## CHAPTER VII.

### SEPTEMBER 3-20.—BREAKING UP THE GERMAN SUPPLY SYSTEM.

**67. The German Supply System for her Commerce Raiders.**—At the time we had no definite information as to the method by which Germany hoped to supply her cruisers at sea; but with the publication of the German Official History it is now clear. At various ports she had Etappen Centres, called in this monograph, Supply Centres; in the Atlantic the principal were New York, Havana, Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires and Las Palmas, with smaller centres at St. Thomas, Para, Bahia, Santos, Pernambuco, Monte Video, Punta Arenas, Tenerife, Madeira, Horta, and Lome in Togoland. Fregatten Kapitän Boy-Ed, of the German Embassy at Washington, took supreme charge of them all.

Each supply officer had to maintain colliers on certain rendezvous in his area. The cruisers carried a Cruiser Handbook, in which these rendezvous were given; they, therefore, knew where they might find coal, and were freed from the necessity of making signals to the shore. Apart from such arrangements as might be made on the spot by the supply officers, the Hamburg-Amerika Line had contracted, in the event of war with England,



to deliver up to 75,000 tons of coal monthly to German cruisers in the Atlantic. This soon proved impossible, owing to lack of credits, shortage of ships, and the firm attitude of the United States Government. Nevertheless, Captain Boy-Ed managed to despatch 15 ships from his area and had four more in reserve. The supply officer at Las Palmas after August 9 was Korvetten Kapitän Leonhardi, who had been on his way to take command of the *Eber*. His activities caused us considerable trouble; but even before his arrival the Las Palmas centre had got the *Walhalla*, *Professor Woermann*, and *Bethania* in position on their rendezvous. The Havana centre lost most of its ships before they had been of use to the cruisers at sea. The centres in South America had more to do with the later operations.<sup>1</sup>

Communications between all these centres and Berlin seems to have been carried on without much difficulty. Up to August 13 Nauen continued to signal to the cable ship *Stephan* at Vigo and the *Frankenwald* at Bilbao, in spite of the steps taken by the Spanish authorities;<sup>2</sup> the messages they took in were to be passed to the German Embassy at Madrid, whence by the Spanish Cadiz-Tenerife cable they were to be sent to Las Palmas, Pernambuco and Buenos Aires. At least one message was made from Nauen to Kamina to be passed to Pernambuco *via* Monrovia, but that route broke down with the capture of Kamina on August 25.

Besides the rendezvous at which colliers could be expected, there were others where liners were to be fitted out as armed merchant cruisers. A list of these was also in the Cruiser Handbook. One of these equipment stations was near the Bahamas, and it was there that the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* had been fitted out. Another was at or near the island of Trinidad, some 600 miles east of Rio; and a third, destined never to be used, was somewhere on the Argentine coast. These three are the only stations definitely mentioned as such in the documents we have, but there were possibly many others.<sup>3</sup>

**68. The North America Division, September 3-20.**—One of the means by which the Admiralty had hoped to meet the attacks of hostile commerce destroyers was the defensive arming of ordinary trading vessels. In addition to those fitted with two 4.7 in. guns before the outbreak of war, 10 more were chosen on August 8 to be armed with four 6 in. guns. Most of these 10 ships were employed on the North Atlantic trade route, and some of them called at United States ports. The South American States, after some protest, accepted the principle that in war time defensive armament did not change a trading

<sup>1</sup> *Kreuzerrieg I*, pp. 222-9, gives details of the work of the Supply Centres.

<sup>2</sup> On August 11 the Captain of the Port of Vigo reported to our Vice-Consul that all the wireless gear of the German ships in port was landed, and the engines deprived of essential parts. Log of Section E.2 of the Intelligence Division, No. 565.

<sup>3</sup> In *Kreuzerrieg I*, pp. 19 and 20, the qualifications of such stations are discussed. At none of them were any guns stored.

vessel into a warship; but the United States Government "pressed the argument that it would be impossible for them, on the one hand, to detain German vessels capable of being equipped as armed auxiliary cruisers and, on the other, to give rights of free ingress and egress to their ports to British merchant vessels armed for self-defence." The Admiralty did not accept this reasoning. To them it seemed easy to distinguish between the offensive and defensive nature of the armament; if the vessel carrying arms was engaged in ordinary commerce and embarked passengers in the usual way, she was clearly a peaceful trader. But in view of the action of the United States Government in taking steps to detain the convertible German liners, and to prevent their using American ports for arming, the Cabinet on September 3 decided to give way under protest, and the Admiralty issued instructions for the disarming of all defensively armed vessels which might use United States ports.<sup>1</sup> Some apprehension was felt that the South American States might again raise objections to the visits of trading vessels carrying guns; but luckily the question did not arise, and Admiral Cradock on his new station was not troubled with the matter.

On his departure southward from Pernambuco, Admiral Cradock, as he would be out of wireless touch, gave Captain Yelverton authority to act independently on the northern trade routes.<sup>2</sup> His chief duties were to patrol the St. Lawrence estuary and to keep watch off New York. The *Lancaster* was in the north, the idea being for the *Niobe* to work with her. The *Essex* was patrolling off New York, when on the 5th she was sent down to the West Indies, her place to be taken by the *Glory*, which left Halifax southward that same morning. Off Nantucket the *Glory* came across two ships reported previously as suspicious; one was the *Ruby*, with bullion on board, and the other the Spanish liner *Montserrat*, in which were found a number of German reservists. The *Ruby's* gold proved to be Spanish property, and she was allowed to proceed, but the *Glory* took the *Montserrat* to Halifax with her. Thus from September 7 to 11 there was nothing off New York, and the *Magdeburg*, the German collier which operated from Las Palmas, and had been with the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, was able to make a safe entry into New York at noon, September 8. That same day the *Glory* turned the *Montserrat* over to the Prize Marshal at Halifax, and started again for the New York patrol, followed on the morning of the 9th by the *Suffolk*. The watch was re-instituted by these two from the 11th, and it seemed more necessary than ever. While on passage southward Captain Yelverton received information that all the North German Lloyd and Hamburg-Amerika

<sup>1</sup> M. 01787/14 reprinted in C.B. 1515/13. Also H.S. 37, pp. 580, 598, 614 and papers titled *Case 441*, Vol. 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Suffolk W/T Log*, 20501, 5 September, 1914.



vessels at New York had been ordered to be ready for sea at three hours' notice.<sup>1</sup> This information had been duly reported by the Consul-General, New York, to his Intelligence Officer in London, through whom it reached Captain Yelverton some 15 hours later, with the addition that a careful watch must be maintained.

To the officers on the spot it seemed a cumbrous system that information, for instance, that a ship was leaving New York could reach the cruisers watching off that port only through the Intelligence Department in London, and Captain Yelverton, after the *Brandenburg* incident, telegraphed to the British Consul-General, New York, asking him to instruct all the Consuls on the Atlantic coast to report to Bermuda and Halifax the sailing of German and Austrian warships and merchant vessels immediately they were known.<sup>2</sup> To this arrangement the Foreign Office raised objections, and Captain Yelverton had to be told to cancel his telegram, although the Consul-General, New York, pointed out that if he reported suspicious movements to London only, there would be loss of time, which might have serious results. Nevertheless, the original arrangements had to stand. The situation, unsatisfactory as it was at the moment, was about to be improved by the establishment of a new Intelligence Centre on the North Atlantic coast.<sup>3</sup>

Just then there seemed to be a marked increase of activity among the German liners in New York. They were reported each to have 5,000 to 7,000 tons of coal aboard, but the Consul-General, who was watching the situation, announced that he would have 24 hours' notice of the departure of any of them, and that a dash to sea was impossible,<sup>4</sup> probably on account of the precautions taken by the United States authorities. On September 13 the Admiralty ordered the cruiser patrolling off the St. Lawrence to be transferred to the New York patrol; two ships were to be permanently stationed there to prevent the German liners escaping.<sup>5</sup> The only cruiser engaged on the St. Lawrence patrol was the *Lancaster*, since the *Niobe*, which had been intended to take watch and watch with her, had now gone to Bermuda, escorting a transport with Canadian militia to relieve the British troops of the garrison there. The original garrison was to be escorted back to Halifax, and then join a large contingent raised in Canada for service in Europe. The *Niobe* was thus not available for patrol work till much later, and the St. Lawrence had to be left without a guard. The *Lancaster* reached New York on September 15, relieving the *Glory* to return to Halifax; and for the next few days the *Suffolk* and *Lancaster* remained stopped off New York within a few miles of Ambrose light vessel. On the 18th three of the large German liners

<sup>1</sup> From Ambassador, Washington, to Senior Naval Officer, Halifax. *Suffolk* W/T Log, September 10, 1.25 a.m.

<sup>2</sup> *Suffolk*, W/T Log, August 25.

<sup>3</sup> H.S. 37, pp. 623, 650, 688.

<sup>4</sup> H.S. 37, pp. 676, 706, 716, 717, 724, 745.

<sup>5</sup> A 113.

moved out into the harbour, and were expected to leave, but there was a United States destroyer present, and they made no attempt to escape.<sup>1</sup> The very close watch we were keeping was utilised by the anti-British party in the States to stir up public feeling, and when it was discovered that the *Suffolk* on a previous occasion had made a wireless signal to our agent in New York for a supply of beef and newspapers to be sent out to her off Ambrose light vessel, an agitation was started which resulted in a protest from the United States Government and the closing of the Marconi station which had delivered the message.<sup>2</sup>

On September 19 the United States Government issued a set of regulations for dealing with merchant vessels suspected of carrying supplies to belligerent warships. According to one paragraph a belligerent warship or supply ship could not receive supplies twice from United States ports in the course of any three consecutive months; another paragraph disclaimed any liability on the part of the United States to prevent the dispatch of supplies to another neutral port, even if that port were notoriously a base of supplies to a belligerent.<sup>3</sup>

Admiral Hornby in the *Caronia* reached Halifax on September 14. He had been delayed some little time by a Dutch steamer, the *Noordam*, which had been reported as bringing reservists from the United States. When challenged she endeavoured to escape, and was brought to only after a three hours' chase, and two shots had been fired. Admiral Hornby then escorted her eastward till he met one of the cruisers of Force E, to whom he turned her over, having lost nearly two days by the incident.<sup>4</sup> At Halifax he found that the Nova Scotian Government proposed to reduce the garrison of that naval base to a peace footing. His objection to this course was upheld by the Admiralty, and the reduction was not carried out.<sup>5</sup> The *Caronia* took in 3,300 tons of coal and 2,900 of water at Halifax. Admiral Hornby transferred his flag to the *Glory* on the 19th, and in the afternoon the *Caronia* proceeded for the New York patrol to assist in keeping guard in case the liners should break out.

**69. Five German Supply Ships captured by West Indies Division, September 7-13.**—In addition to the liners, whose chief potential danger was that they might convert themselves into cruisers, there were vessels of the supply ship type whose movements were attracting the attention of our whole cruiser system. From North America, particularly Philadelphia, Norwegian

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 37, pp. 774, 779.

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 37, pp. 819, 826, 844.

<sup>3</sup> Full text is in papers titled *F.O.*, 14 October, 1914; *U.S.A. Regulations*, M. 02660/14.

<sup>4</sup> *Caronia's* Deck Log, September 7 and 8.

<sup>5</sup> M. 02028/14.



colliers had been sailing, or were preparing to sail, for no other purpose than to supply German cruisers. One, the *Unita*, left on September 9 for Cadiz with a cargo of flour, provisions, and coal. Another which had left much earlier, the *Heina*, arrived at La Guayra on September 5, being 30 days out from Philadelphia.<sup>1</sup> She sailed four days later for St. Thomas, by which time it had been discovered that her coal was for the Hamburg-Amerika depôt there. St. Thomas was a suspected port and we were maintaining a more or less continuous watch off the island. The *Condé* had been there since September 1, and she it was who captured the *Heina* about noon, September 13. The *Essex*, on her way to Jamaica, had similar good fortune. At daylight on September 7, when in 30.20 N., 73.50 W., she sighted a suspicious ship, and gave chase. After half an hour the vessel stopped, and when boarded was found to be the German *Bethania*, one of the Las Palmas supply ships which had been ordered by the German Consul, Tenerife, to join the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* with 6,000 tons of coal. She had been present when the *Highflyer* came up; she managed to take on board 400 of the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse's* crew, and then escape. At first Captain Watson transferred the *Bethania's* crew to the *Essex*, and put a prize crew on board, but after a few hours sent the *Bethania's* crew back again, and took her in tow, with orders to go at her best speed. He cast her off again on September 10, just before reaching Kingston, Jamaica. The *Essex*, after coaling at Jamaica, proceeded on the 12th for St. Thomas. It seemed still necessary to maintain the patrol of the island, since not only had it been a source of supply to the Germans, but also the vessels there were using their wireless. Diplomatic representations to Denmark failed to secure the prevention of this.<sup>2</sup> The *Essex*, therefore, took over the patrol from the *Condé* on September 14, and the French cruiser and her prize, the *Heina*, proceeded for Martinique.<sup>3</sup>

Another important capture was made at this time by the West Indies Division. Captain Clinton-Baker, now senior officer of the division, in the *Berwick*, left Trinidad on September 5, and coaled at St. Lucia, where the *Descartes* was acting as guard ship and conducting the examination service. While in the harbour Captain Clinton-Baker received information that firing had been heard to the eastward of Tobago. Accordingly the *Berwick* and *Descartes* proceeded to investigate the firing. They found nothing, and the *Descartes* returned to her guard at St. Lucia.<sup>4</sup> The *Berwick*, however, steamed eastward towards a position in 10° 30' N., 57° W., near which a suspicious ship had been seen on two occasions, and found there at 3.30 p.m., September 9, the *Thor*, a Norwegian vessel, previously reported

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 37, p. 663, 678, 685.

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 37, p. 692, 746, M. 01990/14.

<sup>3</sup> Two other Norwegian ships, the *Fram* and *Sommerstad*, were ready to sail from Philadelphia with coal and supplies; but, hearing of the capture of the *Heina*, their masters refused to sail. *Kreuzerkrieg II*, p. 224.

<sup>4</sup> H.S. 37, pp. 641, 643, 687.

by the Consul-General, New York, as chartered by the Hamburg-Amerika Line to supply German cruisers. The boarding officer found this to be perfectly correct. The vessel was 36 days out from Newport News, and had a cargo of 1,980 tons of coal and 30 tons of provisions; her log showed that she had steamed a long way out of her course, and had been stopped on two occasions for a considerable time, one of the positions being 23.20 N., 72.30 W. There was a German supercargo on board, through whom the master received orders from a German vessel, the *Spreewald*. The evidence was enough for Captain Clinton-Baker; as the master agreed to navigate the ship into port, a prize crew was sent over, and the *Thor* was ordered to St. Lucia, the *Berwick* keeping touch during the night. Captain Clinton-Baker, seeing that he had hit upon a rendezvous for supply ships, turned back so as to reach the spot again about dawn; nothing was then in sight, but he remained in hopes that something more might come. At noon a steamer was sighted, but she was British, and was allowed to proceed; at 2.20 p.m. another came up. This proved to be another vessel, the *Lorenzo*, also on the New York Consul-General's list of supply ships. The boarding officer found a similar state of affairs to that in the *Thor*. She had a cargo of 3,977 tons of coal and 150 tons of provisions, and her log showed she had stopped at two rendezvous for considerable times. Her orders had been received from the *Präsident*; the *Neckar* had been in company, and the *Spreewald*, *Thor*, *Neckar*, and *Lorenzo* were expecting the *Dresden* at the rendezvous.

While the examination was in progress another ship was seen. She proved to be the *Spreewald*, apparently the commodore of the supply squadron in that district. She was captured without delay, but unfortunately not before she had been able to warn the *Neckar* by wireless. Captain Clinton-Baker "therefore judged it expedient to escort these two valuable prizes into port, considering that the *Neckar* would undoubtedly leave the vicinity."<sup>1</sup> He brought them in to St. Lucia on September 12, and left again for a cruise towards Tobago. This *Neckar* was a North German Lloyd steamer fitted for conversion into a cruiser; she had left Havana at 3 a.m., August 5, after coaling and watering, and though reported to have been seen off Cuba, had not since arrived at any port. The *Neckar* seems to have received the warning; she put in to Baltimore on September 20, and remained there.

**70. Movements on the South American Coast, September 5-13.**—On the South American coast, also, there were German movements. The *Eber*, which had disappeared since leaving Cape Town on July 30, turned up again at Bahia on September 5, flying the merchant flag. The German Consul gave the captain of

<sup>1</sup> Papers titled *Treasury*, 28 October, 1914, *Captures by Essex and Berwick*.



the port his written word of honour that she had been dismantled at Lüderitzbucht (German South-West Africa), and had no armament on board; and on the strength of this she was not treated as a warship. On the previous day a Hamburg-Amerika ship, the *Santa Lucia*, which had sailed from Bahia on August 10 with large quantities of stores and supplies, returned there with her funnel painted black, and under the false name of *Lucia*, New York. Our Minister made representations to the Brazilian Government about both these ships, and was able to secure the internment of the *Eber*.<sup>1</sup>

Pernambuco was also the scene of a supply ship episode. Admiral Cradock visited the port in the *Good Hope* on September 5, leaving in the evening for Abrolhos. Next morning there came in the *Patagonia*, having discharged her coal to the *Karlsruhe*. Little seems to have been known about her at the time, and the fact that she had left St. Thomas on August 12 was not reported to the Admiralty.<sup>2</sup> Still, there were sufficient doubtful circumstances about her to enable our Minister to express to the Brazilian Government his suspicions that she intended to supply German cruisers at sea. Possibly as the result of these representations, the Brazilian Government on September 9 issued a decree that no merchant vessel was to leave a Brazilian port without declaring her destination, and giving an assurance that her purpose in leaving was purely commercial; if on her return to a Brazilian port it could be proved she had not proceeded direct to her declared destination, she would be considered part of the naval forces of her nation, and treated accordingly.<sup>3</sup>

Besides this regulation, which might prevent her return but not her escape, there was a British naval force on the spot. On the 8th the *Macedonia* called at Pernambuco on the way to join the South-East Coast Squadron; the *Bristol* passed outside, but in sight of land, at noon on the 10th; and on the 11th the *Cornwall*, also on passage south, put in. The *Patagonia* had moved to another position in the harbour, and the Brazilian Government stationed a destroyer in the outer roadstead to prevent her leaving. Throughout the night of the 11th and the forenoon of the 12th the *Cornwall*, in conjunction with the *Carmania*, also on passage to join Admiral Cradock, patrolled just outside. At this point the captain of the *Patagonia* gave his word not to sail; whereupon the *Cornwall* and *Carmania* continued their voyage southward, and the Brazilian destroyer returned to harbour. Nevertheless, at dawn of September 13 the *Patagonia* disappeared. The Brazilian Government,

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 26, p. 338.

<sup>2</sup> It appears first in the "Disposition of German, Austrian and Italian Ships" of September 18.

<sup>3</sup> H.S. 26, p. 362.

incensed at this flouting of their authority, addressed a strong letter to the German Minister, and removed the captain of the port.<sup>1</sup>

Further south, at Rio, the *Prussia*, which had brought the crew of the *Hyades*, and therefore was undoubtedly connected with German cruisers, sailed on September 5 with the *Eberburg*,<sup>2</sup> a Hansa liner which had been in harbour since the early days of the war. The *Glasgow* was no longer within touch of Rio. Having intercepted a message from the *Good Hope* on August 30 to the effect that the *Holmwood* had been sunk by the *Dresden* in Latitude 31° S., Captain Luce decided to proceed southward as soon as he had coaled.<sup>3</sup> He left Abrolhos for the River Plate with the *Monmouth* on September 2, followed two days later by the *Otranto*. Even if he had been off Rio he could not have been informed of the departure of the *Prussia* and *Eberburg*, since Brazilian coast wireless stations from that date refused to handle code messages.<sup>4</sup>

The result of these German movements on the coast of Brazil was that on September 17 the Brazilian Government issued a new regulation. By this, belligerent merchant vessels which had taken refuge in Brazilian ports, and vessels which gave *force majeure* as a reason for discontinuing their normal voyage, were to be prevented from leaving except by special permission of the captain of the port; after 48 hours in port their aerials were to be removed by the captain of the port, who was also to take any other measures to prevent them from using wireless telegraphy.<sup>5</sup>

Captain Luce's appearance at the River Plate on September 8, with the *Glasgow* and *Monmouth*, did much to restore confidence; and shipping, in response to an improvement in the financial situation, began to move again.<sup>6</sup>

The *Bristol*, after passing Pernambuco, met a Dutch vessel, the *Kelbergen*, on September 11, in the latitude of Bahia. She was on passage from Norfolk, Virginia, to Rio with coal, but as her Bill of Lading was made out to "order" Captain Fanshawe decided to take her to Abrolhos for further examination. The Admiralty sent the collier for adjudication to Rio, where her innocence was established and she was released.<sup>7</sup>

**71. Supply Ship captured in Azores, September 8.**—A capture was also made at this period in the East Atlantic. German warship wireless was heard on August 29 about 400 miles north of the Azores. The news of this did not reach Admiral de Robeck

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 26, pp. 334a, 377, 386, 400; M. 17749/14, and papers titled *F.O.* 14 September, 1914 (M. 01943/14, etc.).

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 26, p. 496.

<sup>3</sup> *Glasgow Telegraph* Log No. 20110.

<sup>4</sup> H.S. 26, pp. 305, 319, 326.

<sup>5</sup> H.S. 26, pp. 409, 451.

<sup>6</sup> *Fayle: Seaborne Trade* I, 176.

<sup>7</sup> Papers titled *F.O.*, 4 December, 1914.



till September 1, as he was about to return in the *Argonaut* from Madeira to the Tagus. He left two ships behind at Funchal, the *Challenger* and *Vindictive*; and as the *Challenger* was reserved for convoy duty, he ordered the *Vindictive* (Captain C. R. Payne) to search the Azores. She reached Santa Maria, the easternmost island of the group, on September 3, and proceeded to visit all the islands in turn. On September 8, while searching northward of Fayal, she sighted a steamer which immediately altered course and made for the shore. Captain Payne steered at full speed so as to cut her off, and found her to be the German collier *Slawentzitz*, apparently all ready for discharging coal. She appeared to have no wireless installation. The position was then 39.17 N., 28.50 W., north of Fayal. Having ascertained that the German captain consented to steam his ship to Gibraltar with his own crew, Captain Payne put an armed guard on board, with orders to hand her over to the Senior Naval Officer, Gibraltar. He then steamed off in the direction in which the *Slawentzitz* was first heading, but, finding nothing, returned to complete his search of the islands, remaining till September 19.<sup>1</sup>

**72. The First Atlantic Convoys, September 4-15.**—The *Challenger*, having been in Area I since August 17, had at first patrolled the trade routes near Vigo. She had then come to Madeira, and was now to proceed to Las Palmas to meet the *Europa* from England with a transport called the *Appam*, in which were the General and Staff for the Cameroons Expedition.<sup>2</sup> The Portuguese were most friendly, and gave permission for the *Challenger* to stay at Madeira as long as she liked, and to take as much coal as she wanted.<sup>3</sup> The *Europa* was due at Las Palmas early on September 7, and accordingly the *Challenger* left Madeira on September 4. The two met off Las Palmas at daylight, September 7; the *Challenger* proceeded with the *Appam* to Sierra Leone and Duala, where she remained.

The *Appam* was the first transport to leave home for a foreign station, but the movement to replace the British garrisons abroad by territorial battalions was about to commence. Most of the Gibraltar garrison had gone home in the *Edinburgh Castle*, escorted by the *Minerva*; the Malta garrison, in the *Ultonia* and *Gloucester Castle*, left Gibraltar on the 10th, escorted by the *Sutlej*, which had been waiting for them there.

Five transports containing the Territorial battalions to relieve these left Southampton on September 4, and were picked up by the *Amphitrite* from Devonport. In the latitude of Vigo the Admiral in the *Argonaut* met them at 3 p.m., September 7. As the *Argonaut* had some defects, he transferred his flag to

<sup>1</sup> *Vindictive*, Proceedings, M. 02671/14.  
<sup>2</sup> H.S. 36, pp. 578, 580.

<sup>3</sup> A 102.

the *Amphitrite*, sent the *Argonaut* to Devonport, and took charge of the convoy, which he conducted to Gibraltar.<sup>1</sup>

A still larger convoy from home was the East Lancashire Division, which in 14 transports left Southampton for Egypt and India on September 10. The *Minerva* was retained at Devonport till this convoy was ready, and was joined by the *Ocean* from Queenstown, which was to take the *Albion's* place off Cape St. Vincent. These two joined the convoy at a rendezvous and brought them to Gibraltar. Admiral de Robeck, in the *Amphitrite*, met them on the 15th and accompanied them till they turned eastward for Gibraltar. From there the Admiralty wished them escorted as far as Malta; Admiral de Robeck selected the *Minerva* for this service and she proceeded with them. Her absence from the Atlantic on this duty was intended by the Admiralty to be temporary; but owing to the development of the situation in the Mediterranean, she was absorbed into the squadron there, and never returned to Force I. Admiral de Robeck ordered the *Ocean* to Madeira and the Azores, but this the Admiralty countermanded. The Atlantic was not the only part of the sea where convoys were passing. Large movements of troops from India were in progress, and the demands for escort were so great that the *Ocean* had to be taken for work in the East Indies.<sup>2</sup>

**73. Passage of the Cape Convoy, September 11-19.**—Admiral de Robeck had been told the *Europa* was to join him when relieved by the *Challenger*, and he sent her orders to return to Madeira; but the Admiralty informed Admiral Stoddart that she might be used to relieve the *Hyacinth*, which, with the *Leviathan*, was escorting homewards six transports containing the Cape garrison. This convoy was due at St. Vincent, Cape Verde, on the 10th.<sup>3</sup> He therefore overrode Admiral de Robeck's orders, and sent her southward to join the *Leviathan*. She met the convoy on the 11th in 22.6 N., 20° W., about half way between the Canaries and Cape Verde Islands, and there relieved the *Hyacinth* to return to the Cape. But from the 8th onward the *Leviathan* developed defects in her port engine to such an extent that Admiral Stoddart was obliged to relieve her to go to Gibraltar for repairs.<sup>4</sup> The only ship he had available was his flagship, the *Carnarvon*, in which accordingly he took charge of the convoy at 10 a.m., September 13, in 29.35 N., 9.17 W., requesting the Admiralty to arrange for his relief as soon as he reached the limit of his station. The Admiralty ordered Admiral de Robeck to arrange this. He had the *Vindictive* at Madeira, the *Argonaut* at Devonport, and his

<sup>1</sup> De Robeck: Proceedings, M. 02480/14.

<sup>2</sup> A 110, 120, 121. See Monograph 17; *The East Indies Squadron*, (C B. 917(c)) for details.

<sup>3</sup> A 102.

<sup>4</sup> *Leviathan*: Proceedings, M. 02184/14.



flagship, the *Amphitrite*. At the moment he was investigating a report received from the French, who had intercepted a message implying that the German cruiser *Stettin* was off Cadiz; he had thus left his usual station at the Tagus for Cadiz, and was obliged to reply that he had no cruiser available to relieve the *Carnarvon*. The Admiralty, who had at first intended the convoy to be escorted as far as Finisterre by two British cruisers, now ordered the *Carnarvon* to return as soon as the latitude of Lisbon was reached,<sup>1</sup> and asked the French cruisers guarding the Bay of Biscay to look after the convoy for the remainder of the voyage. The *Stettin* rumour was investigated at the same time by the French Commodore in the *Cassard*, but no sign of German cruisers was found, nor were there indications of abnormal activity.<sup>2</sup> The French sent the *Dupetit Thouars* from L'Orient to join the convoy; she and the *Gueydon* met it at dawn on the 18th, by which time it was almost in the latitude of Ushant. These cruisers returned as soon as the English Channel was reached. The *Europa* arrived at Portsmouth at 8 a.m. on the 19th, and the convoy went on to Southampton.<sup>3</sup>

Admiral Stoddart's temporary absence from his station happened to occur at a period of special anxiety. On September 6 a wireless message from Las Palmas addressed to the *Karlsruhe* had been intercepted; it was worded so as to appear to refer to some commercial transaction, but was more probably in code. A censorship was in force; but this was an abuse of it, and the Foreign Office made representations to the Spanish Government.<sup>4</sup> On the 8th the *Nepos*, one of the suspected Norwegian colliers, arrived at Tenerife from Philadelphia.<sup>5</sup> The Admiralty ordered Admiral Stoddart to have her searched as soon as she left Spanish waters. The *Empress of Britain* was patrolling the trade route south of the Canaries at the time; he ordered her to keep watch south of Tenerife, and stationed the *Victorian*, which had joined his flag on the 3rd, to the northward of the port. The Consul at Las Palmas thought the *Nepos* unlikely to sail, and on the 11th the Admiralty gave Admiral Stoddart discretion about continuing to watch her.<sup>6</sup> He left the *Victorian* to patrol the Canaries, and sent the *Empress of Britain* slowly down the trade route towards St. Vincent, where the *Albion* was now patrolling. The *Marmora* had to coal at Sierra Leone, and was thus away from patrol between the 12th and 20th.

Another factor in the situation was that the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, of which nothing had been heard since the arrival of

<sup>1</sup> A 115, 117.    <sup>2</sup> H.S. 36, pp. 734, 738, 750, 783.    <sup>3</sup> *Europa* Deck Log.

<sup>4</sup> H.S. 25, pp. 528, 559, and papers titled *F.O.*, 31 October, 1914, *W/T* in *Canary Islands*.

<sup>5</sup> It subsequently transpired that she had been to the Rio de Oro; finding that the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, whom she was to coal, had been sunk, she came in Las Palmas for further orders (M. 01006/15, para. 10).

<sup>6</sup> H.S. 25, pp. 563, 569, 576, 588.

the *Walhalla* at Las Palmas, had boarded and released a Russian sailing vessel, the *Pittan*, on August 27, about half way between the Cape Verde Islands and Flores in the Azores. This came to light on September 10, the news being brought by a British steamer which had spoken the Russian.<sup>1</sup> Admiral Stoddart was at the time at Tenerife arranging for the watch on the *Nepos*, and investigating a rumour that two German steamers there were using their wireless. He came to the conclusion that this was not possible, though they could doubtless take in messages.<sup>2</sup>

74. "Cap Trafalgar" Sunk by "Carmania," September 14.<sup>3</sup>—On September 14 the new South-East Coast of America Squadron was in two distinct halves. The *Good Hope*, *Glasgow*, *Monmouth*, and *Otranto* met that day at Santa Catherina after a widespread sweep of the coast. Admiral Cradock intended to take them with him and search the Magellan Straits. The *Bristol*, *Macedonia*, and *Cornwall* were together at Abrolhos Rocks. To them he allotted the coast patrol; the *Bristol* between Monte Video and Santa Catherina; the *Macedonia* between Santa Catherina and Abrolhos; the *Cornwall*, Rio to Cape San Roque.<sup>4</sup> The *Carmania* (Captain Noel Grant, R.N.) was to take the southernmost section from Monte Video southward to Port Desire, but before starting her patrol the Admiral ordered her to inspect the island of Trinidad or Trinidadá, which lies about 500 miles east of Abrolhos Rocks. She sighted the island soon after dawn, September 14; by 11 a.m. she could make out three steamers, one a large liner, the others apparently colliers. Before she had raised their hulls they were making off in different directions. The liner, however, after a little while turned towards the *Carmania*. At 8,500 yards Captain Noel Grant fired a shot across the bows of the liner, which at once replied. The firing thereupon became general and the liner closed to machine-gun range. Both ships were soon on fire; in the *Carmania* the cabin under the forebridge was so fiercely ablaze that the ship had to be conned from aft; but an hour and a half from the firing of the first shot the enemy capsized to starboard, and went down bows first with colours flying. She had been making wireless signals, and since to the northward smoke was visible in which an imaginative signalman thought he saw a cruiser's funnels, Captain Grant went off full speed to the southward, altering course at dusk for Abrolhos Rocks, calling up the ships there for assistance. There were 304 holes in the ship made by 79 projectiles. All communications inside the ship and all the navigational instruments had been destroyed by the fire, and

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 25, pp. 577, 735.

<sup>2</sup> Stoddart: Proceedings, M. 02075/14.

<sup>3</sup> The description of the action is based on Captain Grant's Report (M. 02473/14) and entries in *Carmania's* Deck Log.

<sup>4</sup> H.S. 26, p. 394.



the navigation and conning of the ship were difficult and uncertain. The *Bristol* got away at midnight, and picked up the *Carmania* at 5 p.m.; the *Cornwall* joined at 9.30 p.m., whereupon the *Bristol* parted company to search Trinidad Island. There was nothing there when she reached it at 9 a.m. on the 17th. The *Cornwall* brought the *Carmania* to Abrolhos. On the 17th the damaged vessel started for Gibraltar under escort of the *Macedonia*, putting in to Pernambuco for an hour or so on September 20 to report the action. This she had been unable to do by wireless, owing to the Brazilian regulations. The *Cornwall* remained at Abrolhos to guard the colliers there till the *Canopus* arrived on the 22nd to take over that special duty. The *Macedonia* was to escort the *Carmania* as far as St. Vincent, Cape Verde, and then return to the south-east coast; from St. Vincent to Gibraltar the damaged liner was escorted by the *Marmora*, told off by Admiral Stoddart.

At first there was some doubt what vessel it had been which the *Carmania* had sunk. Captain Noel Grant thought it either the *Cap Trafalgar*, *Cap Finisterre*, or *Berlin*; Admiral Stoddart suggested the *Blücher*.<sup>1</sup> Although the *Blücher* had remained steadily at anchor in Pernambuco harbour, there were frequent reports that she had left; sometimes it was stated she was armed. The latest information Admiral Stoddart had about her was an Admiralty telegram dated September 16, saying she was acting as wireless agent to the *Dresden*.<sup>2</sup> All doubt on the matter was cleared up on the 24th, when a German steamer, the *Eleonore Woermann*, arrived at Buenos Aires with 292 survivors of the *Cap Trafalgar*.

It is now clear that the *Cap Trafalgar*, after leaving the River Plate, proceeded to the "fitting-out" station indicated to her, and there met the *Eber*, which had come over from Lüderitzbucht, accompanied by a collier, the *Steiermark*, to transfer her own armament to the liner. The arming appears to have taken place on September 1. The *Cap Trafalgar* received from the *Eber* two 10.5 cm. (4 in.) guns and six 3.7 cm. (1.4 in.) machine guns; and, as she carried none herself, these formed her sole armament.<sup>3</sup> The German liner then cruised for a fortnight to capture British merchantmen. In this she had no success. The frequently heard wireless of the British cruisers passing along the trade routes compelled her to keep away from the places where she was most likely to find vessels; and her career was brought to an end before she had made a single capture. After the ship had sunk, the *Eleonore Woermann* picked up the survivors; 15 had been killed, among them Commander Wirth, who was the Commanding Officer.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 26, p. 434, 468. The *Cap Finisterre* was at Hamburg.

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 25, p. 652. <sup>3</sup> *Kreuzerkrieg I*, p. 177. The *Carmania* had eight 4.7 in.

<sup>4</sup> The chief authority for the career of the *Cap Trafalgar* is a letter from a surgeon of the *Eber*, printed in the *Weser Zeitung*; a translation of this and other letters is in I.D.H.S. 509.

Presumably one of the colliers seen by Captain Grant as he approached the island of Trinidad was the *Eleonore Woermann*. This ship was last reported at Lagos on July 29; she may have gone to Duala and been sent over from there. The other collier was either the *Pontos* or the *Berwind*, one of the ships reported as chartered by the Hamburg-Amerika Line. The *Berwind*, owned in the United States, left New York on August 6 with stores for Buenos Aires; she arrived at Rio on September 18, empty. From a West African on board the *Eleonore Woermann* it was learned that both the *Pontos* and *Berwind* had been in attendance on the *Cap Trafalgar* at Trinidad.<sup>1</sup>

The destruction of the *Cap Trafalgar*, combined with the capture and detention of so many of their colliers, seem to have discouraged the German Admiralty. On September 20 a long telegram was sent out from Norddeich, one of the long-distance wireless stations in Germany, addressed to the *Prinz Heinrich*, one of the liners at Lisbon which they presumably thought was still acting as a receiving station. It contained a statement that all the coaling rendezvous were compromised, except, perhaps, the position in which the *Eber* had met the *Cap Trafalgar*.<sup>2</sup> This same information was sent out by Nauen, and was presumably taken in by the German cruisers at sea, with the result that they now knew they had to avoid the rendezvous, and could no longer obtain fuel except by their own efforts. Thus our cruisers, though their operations had in the main been confined to watching ports, and not hunting for the enemy, had in the course of moving from place to place succeeded in breaking up the system which Germany had elaborated for the supply of her commerce destroyers in war time.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### OPERATIONS BETWEEN SEPTEMBER 20 AND OCTOBER 3.

75. **The Functions of Armed Merchant Cruisers.**—The action between the *Carmania* and *Cap Trafalgar* has special interest in that it is the first engagement between two armed merchant cruisers. Strangely enough, it had taken place against the wishes of the Admiralty. The day before it was fought they issued a general telegram to the following effect:—

"The original purpose of our armed merchant cruisers was to capture or sink the armed merchant cruisers of the enemy.

There does not now appear to be as many armed merchant cruisers as was anticipated.

Each of our armed merchant cruisers should, as far as possible, work in conjunction with a cruiser.

<sup>1</sup> M. 20882/14. After this episode the *Berwind* reverted to ordinary commerce (papers titled *F.O.*, 20 October, 1914, *Berwind* and *Indrani*).

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 36, p. 865, and I.D. information



So far the Admirals of the Atlantic squadrons had disposed their armed merchant cruisers independently, as if they were cruisers. For instance, Admiral Stoddart, who had three of them in his squadron, had them at the moment disposed—*Empress of Britain* on the trade route north of St. Vincent, Cape Verde; *Marmora* proceeding to Sierra Leone for fuel; *Victorian* patrolling the Canary Islands. His two cruisers were nowhere near; the *Highflyer* was at Gibraltar refitting after her action with the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, and the *Carnarvon* had just taken charge of the Cape convoy.

Of the enemy's merchant cruisers two had been sunk and only one remained of those known to be armed. This was the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, of which there was a rumour that she had recently visited the Rio de Oro.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, as the *Highflyer* was ready for sea by September 16, Admiral Stoddart who had gone to Madeira after leaving the convoy, arranged with her a combined search of the African coast. The *Highflyer* was to meet him off Cape Juby in the morning of the 19th; on her way south she was to search the coast and look in at Agadir. The two ships would then continue to search in company.

#### 76. Co-operation with the French on the Coast of Morocco.—

His departure from Madeira just prevented him from receiving an order to co-operate with the French on the African coast. For some time past, in order to make trouble in Morocco, the Germans had been spreading a report that England had declared war on France. The result was so much unrest among the tribesmen that immediate steps were necessary to counteract the insidious propaganda. To the French Government it seemed that the most effective means would be a joint naval demonstration along the disturbed coast. They therefore proposed on August 31 that a British cruiser should act with a French cruiser for about a week on the south coast of Morocco. At first the Admiralty refused to send a cruiser and suggested on September 14 that the same result could be secured more economically if British and French military officers were seen together in Morocco.<sup>2</sup> But this idea was not considered sufficient by the French, who, on the 15th, asked through the Foreign Office for a British cruiser to support the *Cosmao*, then operating south of Agadir. Upon this the Admiralty promised one of the armed liners,<sup>3</sup> and on September 16 instructed Admiral Stoddart to give orders accordingly. The telegram, however, just missed him at Madeira, and though it was repeated on the 18th and

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 25, pp. 622, 629, 635, 652.

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 36, pp. 549, 747.

<sup>3</sup> Papers titled *F.O.*, 15 September, 1914, M. 01979/14. The disposition of the French Morocco Division on the evening of September 18 was: *Cassard* (Captain Simon, senior officer) at Casablanca; *Latouche-Tréville* at Gibraltar; *Amiral Charner* at Mehediyah; *Bruix* at Lagos, ready to escort the French transports to Duala; *Cosmao* at Agadir; *Friant* at Rochefort, with orders to join the Morocco Division (H.S. 36, p. 850).

20th, it still failed to reach him. His search was quite blank, and on the 20th the *Carnarvon* and *Highflyer* parted company, the Admiral proceeding by way of St. Vincent and Sierra Leone for fuel, and the *Highflyer* to join the *Victorian* in watching the Canaries.

Meanwhile the French Government, unable to understand why our promise had not been fulfilled, represented on September 22 that the *Highflyer's* one-hour visit to Agadir could have no effect in impressing the tribesmen with the solidarity of the Anglo-French Alliance. Next day the original order reached Admiral Stoddart a week after it was despatched;<sup>1</sup> he immediately ordered the *Victorian* away from the Canaries. She had on the 18th taken in 1,400 tons of coal and 1,500 of water at Tenerife by permission of the Spanish authorities, and, having since been generally lying stopped or at slow speed, was able to undertake a long voyage. On September 26, near Agadir, she met the *Cassard*, which had relieved the *Cosmao*, and in company they proceeded down the coast as far as Cape Juby, the French cruiser occasionally bombarding the villages as they passed. The effect seems to have been all the French desired and the tribal unrest died down.

The passage of French troops to and from Morocco had been in progress since August 13. The last transport left Casablanca on September 28 escorted by the *Amiral Charner*, and her voyage brought the escort service to an end; 29,000 troops had been transported from Morocco and 12,000 Territorials taken there.<sup>2</sup>

It was intended for the *Victorian* to make a second parade with the *Cassard* back to Agadir; but more German supply ships had been arriving at the Canaries and the *Victorian* had to be recalled to resume watch. She was back at Tenerife on September 29.<sup>3</sup>

#### 77. German Movements in the Canary Islands.—

Although the Admiralty had no exact information as to the German system, it was clear that the Canary Islands formed one of the German bases for supplies and intelligence. Moreover, there was a rumour, traced to the German Vice-Consul at Las Palmas, that the German Asiatic Squadron under Admiral von Spee was approaching the islands with a view to interrupting trade. According to the Admiralty's intelligence, the German Admiral had been off Samoa on September 14 with the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*; the *Nürnberg* and *Leipzig* were both in the Pacific; the *Dresden* seemed to have gone south. Only the *Karlsruhe* was thought to be in the North Atlantic and nothing had been heard of her since August 28. Accordingly the Admiralty

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 25, p. 724.

<sup>2</sup> Chack I, 244, 245.

<sup>3</sup> *Victorian*: Proceedings, M. 01006/15.



considered the Las Palmas report improbable and on September 24 told Admiral Stoddart so.<sup>1</sup> Apart from this, another of the Norwegian steamers chartered by the Hamburg-Amerika Line, the *Johann Ludwig Mowinckel*, arrived at Santa Cruz de Tenerife on the 26th for orders; the *Highflyer*, which was patrolling the group, happened to be at Palma Island at the time and missed her. Also the German steamer *Telde*, which had been at Santa Cruz since the early days of the war, began to take in coal from the German depôt and from a British contractor who communicated with the Admiralty.<sup>2</sup> The *Victorian*, before leaving for Agadir, had been able to board and send back a Spanish ketch named *Express* which was believed to have German naval officers aboard and to be intended for communication with German warships.<sup>3</sup>

Besides this movement of supply ships there were signs that unneutral messages were being sent by wireless. Between September 21 and 28 the *Victorian* intercepted 13 messages in code sent by the Austrian Consul at Las Palmas via Tenerife W/T Station to Madrid. The Norddeich station in Germany was signalling to Madrid in cypher and there were indications that the German Government was in touch through Madrid with Tenerife, the messages being no doubt connected with German ships. Wireless telegraphy in Spain was a monopoly of the Spanish Government, which, on our protest against the German use of it, offered to put its military wireless station at Madrid at our disposal for official communications in the same way as Germany. The Italian Ambassador was communicating through it with Rome. Spain was in charge of the interests in enemy countries of most of the belligerents and the Spanish Government seemed to think the Germans were using wireless only for messages between Berlin and Madrid on this subject; they had indeed refused to forward messages from the German Ambassador, Madrid, to Tenerife. Though we were convinced that this was not the true explanation of the numerous cypher messages passing and that the use of the Spanish stations went a long way towards nullifying our efforts to cut Germany's communications, we had to content ourselves with suggesting that Spain should institute a censorship on the lines of that enforced by the United States at Sayville.<sup>4</sup>

**78. South America. Movements of Supply Ships and News of the "Kronprinz Wilhelm."**—On September 24 the *Patagonia* arrived at Bahia Blanca saying she could not get to Buenos Aires on account of English cruisers. The same day the *Navarra*, a Hamburg-Amerika liner fitted with wireless, put in

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 25, pp. 667, 717-720, 726.      <sup>2</sup> H.S. 25, pp. 737, 771, and 774.

<sup>3</sup> H.S. 25, pp. 706, 723, 733. Log of *Victorian*.

<sup>4</sup> See F.O. telegrams between pp. 888 and 1,111 of H.S. 36.

to Pernambuco, being 18 days out from Pensacola. She left next day with Buenos Aires as her declared destination. The *Patagonia* at Bahia Blanca went in to dry dock; she was leaking from damage received evidently while lying alongside some other vessel either at sea or in an unsheltered roadstead.<sup>1</sup>

Two other supply ships, the *Prussia* and *Ebernborg*, reappeared, the *Prussia* at Santos on September 24 and the *Ebernborg* at Rio on September 25. The latter must have had a narrow escape from the *Cornwall*, which left Rio at 8 o'clock that morning to have another look at Trinidad Island. The *Cornwall* had been keeping guard at Abrolhos for a week until relieved on the 22nd by the *Canopus* in the duty of protecting the colliers and prizes at Abrolhos. The *Prussia* and *Ebernborg* had each on board half the crew of a British ship, the *Indian Prince*, sunk by the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* in 7° S., 27° 17' W. on September 9. In accordance with the latest Brazilian rules they were both detained and were lost to Germany as supply ships.

The *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, after spending four days in taking over 2,500 tons of coal from the *Walhalla* near the Azores, steamed out into mid-ocean and then steered almost due south at low speed to economise fuel.<sup>2</sup> The Russian barque *Pittan*, whom she boarded on August 27, was released, as she had started before the outbreak of war and knew nothing about it. On September 2 the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* crossed the line. Next morning she met a German steamer, the *Asuncion*, and the day was spent taking in provisions.

The *Asuncion* had been in attendance on the *Karlsruhe*, which, though near and in wireless touch, did not come up.<sup>3</sup> The position appears to be somewhere near Rocas Reef. Continuing south from there, the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was in 7° S., 31° 30' W., about 200 miles east of Pernambuco, at 10 p.m. on September 4, when she heard wireless signals very close and soon afterwards sighted a steamer. This ship she speedily forced to stop and found to be the *Indian Prince*, two days out from Bahia. In accordance with the Admiralty instructions her master was keeping well away from the trade route, and it was by an unfortunate accident that he met the German vessel. He was forced to steer S.S.E., his captor following close astern. Next morning he was boarded, but the south-easterly course continued till the 8th, where in 18° S., 27° 30' W., 200 miles north east of Trinidad, the work of transferring passengers, coal and stores to the cruiser commenced. At 9 a.m. on the 9th the *Indian Prince* was sunk.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> M. 6776/14.

<sup>2</sup> The chief sources for the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* are letters by Schneller and Mahlstedt. These and other papers are in I.D.H.S. 508.

<sup>3</sup> Aust. The *Karlsruhe* took in the *Kronprinz Wilhelm's* signals but did not reply owing to the proximity of British cruisers.

<sup>4</sup> Master's Deposition and Letter. M. 18129/14, 21674/14.



At this time the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* had no other vessel with her, but on September 11 or 12 she was joined by the *Eberburg* with supplies and South American newspapers, which contained information of large meat contracts between England and the Argentine; this news suggested the neighbourhood of the Plate River as a good area for commerce destruction. Next day the *Pontos* met them; and a few days later arrived the *Prussia*. These last two were auxiliaries for the *Cap Trafalgar*. It was while she was coaling from these that the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* learned by wireless that the *Cap Trafalgar* was engaging the *Carmania* scarcely 150 miles away.

As soon as the *Eberburg* was cleared Captain Thierfelder sent half the crew of the *Indian Prince* over to her, and on the 17th despatched her to Brazil. The remainder of the captured crew left, also for Brazil, in the *Prussia* on the 19th. The coaling of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* at sea must have been a lengthy process, occupying possibly the whole time from the arrival of the first to the departure of the last of the colliers, that is from the 11th to the 19th. During this time the cruiser was probably stopped at the rendezvous 150 miles from Trinidad, very near to the position given by the master of the *Indian Prince* as that in which his ship was sunk.<sup>1</sup> The nearest approach to this spot was that of the *Bristol*, which on September 17 visited Trinidad and Martin Vaz islands; but she turned back at that point and proceeded to Monte Video.

**79. Movements of Force I September 20 to October 3.**—All the three supply ships had come from South American ports. Those from the United States seemed generally to go to rendezvous in the North Atlantic. Only one of the suspected Norwegian colliers, the *Unita* from Philadelphia, was now at sea; and she arrived at Cadiz on September 25. The Consul reported that she had a German naval officer on board and had been cruising about to supply German warships.<sup>2</sup> There was no cruiser of Force I near Cadiz. In fact, that force was reduced to a low ebb. The *Minerva* was in the Mediterranean and on that date was definitely detached from Admiral de Robeck's command. He was, as usual, off the Tagus, his flag being in the *Argonaut*. The *Amphitrite* had taken home a convoy and was at Devonport putting right defects. The *Vindictive*, after visiting Madeira, was approaching Gibraltar also with defects. In the circumstances, there was no ship of Force I to station off Cadiz to prevent the *Unita* putting out again, and the Senior Officer, Gibraltar, was compelled to send the *Proserpine*, a light cruiser which had been despatched from home to Gibraltar, to assist in the Straits Patrol.<sup>3</sup> At other ports besides Cadiz movements were expected.

<sup>1</sup> The track given in I.D. 1165, *Commerce Raiders*, is certainly wrong at this period.

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 36, p. 923.

<sup>3</sup> H.S. 36, pp. 719, 723, 929.

The French received information that the *Frankenwald* at Bilbao was about to escape for home, but our Consul there stated that she was too carefully watched to be likely to leave. However, in view of the anti-German attitude of Portugal, the Admiralty thought it best to warn Admiral de Robeck that the ships in Portuguese ports might try to escape into Spain.<sup>1</sup> The weakness of the squadron was to be redressed by the addition of the *Donegal*, *Calgarian*, and *Diana*; the *Donegal*, cruiser, was to be newly commissioned; the *Calgarian*, armed merchant cruiser, left Liverpool on September 25; the *Diana* was engaged on convoy work and could join when this was finished.<sup>2</sup>

At this period the *Edinburgh Castle*,<sup>3</sup> which had commissioned at Tilbury on September 12 and had been armed with eight 6 in. guns, passed through the station, escorting a transport conveying Territorial troops for the garrison at Gibraltar. The *Edinburgh Castle* was making a round voyage to Gibraltar, St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, Abrolhos, Bermuda, Halifax, and Devonport with 400 boys whom she was to distribute among the men-of-war she should meet, receiving in exchange seamen for gunnery and torpedo courses at home. She was, however, to take her part in the protection of trade and would come under the orders of the Flag Officers through whose stations she passed.<sup>4</sup> On September 23 she was off the Tagus and spoke the *Argonaut* there. She was off St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, on October 3, and discharged a proportion of her boys to the *Albion* and *Empress of Britain* which were present. She left next day for Sierra Leone.

No man-of-war had visited Lisbon since the revolution in Portugal, but in view of the very friendly attitude of the Portuguese Government, Admiral de Robeck was now instructed to send a ship there if circumstances permitted. He went in himself in the *Argonaut* on September 28, and had a most enthusiastic reception. Coming out again in the evening he turned over the Tagus patrol to the *Calgarian*, which had just joined him there, and proceeded for fuel to Gibraltar, now by Admiralty order his principal coaling base, and to repair the *Argonaut's* thrust collars, which would be a week's work. No sooner had he arrived than a message was received from our Minister at Lisbon stating that six of the German merchant steamers in the port were raising steam. The *Argonaut* could not leave; but the *Vindictive* was ready and she proceeded with despatch, at 2.30 p.m., October 2, to join the *Calgarian* outside the Tagus.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 36, pp. 877, 878, 951, 917.

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 36, p. 920.

<sup>3</sup> Captain W. R. Napier, R.N.

<sup>4</sup> Sailing Orders in papers titled *Admiralty*, 1 August, 1914; *Armed Merchant Cruisers*. Copy in H.S. 25, p. 625.

<sup>5</sup> De Robeck. Letter of Proceedings, M. 02671/14.



80. The "Karlsruhe" reported by "Ascaro," September 28. **Movements of Force D.**—Nothing had been heard of the *Karlsruhe* since September 11, when she was reported to have coaled at the Sao Joao Islands a week previously. So far she was known to have sunk only one ship, the *Bowes Castle*. She had consequently attracted the Admiralty's attention less than the *Dresden*, although that ship was in fact making her way rapidly out of the Atlantic and was taking captures on the trade routes only as it were by accident. On September 28 the Italian steamer *Ascaro* came in to St. Vincent and reported that she had been boarded by the *Karlsruhe* on September 22 in 0.50 S., 31.30 W., between Fernando Noronha and St. Paul Rocks. The *Karlsruhe* had a deck cargo of coal and was accompanied by two steamers, one a small German passenger ship, the other a collier, possibly British. While the *Ascaro* was being boarded two other ships were sighted to the westward; whereupon the *Karlsruhe* recalled her boats and gave chase to these, leaving the *Ascaro* free to proceed.<sup>1</sup>

The news might be taken to imply that the *Karlsruhe* had left the West Indies and was now operating on the South American trade route, within Admiral Stoddart's area. At the moment his cruisers were nowhere near the spot. The *Carnarvon* was at Sierra Leone with the *Macedonia*, and the *Empress of Britain* was on her way from there to St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, where the *Albion* was patrolling; the *Victorian* was still with the French Commodore; the *Marmora* had just reached Gibraltar with the *Carmania*; the *Highflyer* was at the Canaries, but had to go that day to Madeira for coal. The *Orama*, on her way south to join Admiral Cradock, had taken in 731 tons of coal at St. Vincent and had left at noon, September 27. She did not go down the trade route, however, but proceeded nearly to Sierra Leone, meeting the *Macedonia* at noon on the 30th in 8.30 N., 17° W. The two then steamed in company towards Pernambuco, but the detour to Sierra Leone took them wide of the place where the *Ascaro* had met the *Karlsruhe*. At the South American end of the trade route our ships were likewise a long distance from the spot. Admiral Cradock, with the *Good Hope*, *Glasgow*, *Monmouth* and *Otranto*, had gone down to the Patagonian islands. The *Canopus* was at Abrolhos Rocks guarding the supply squadron; the *Cornwall* was examining Trinidad and the *Bristol* was on the way from Monte Video to Abrolhos.

The news seems to have had little effect. Admiral Stoddart made no change in his dispositions. The *Albion* and *Empress of Britain* remained at St. Vincent and when the *Carnarvon* left Sierra Leone she joined them; the *Highflyer*, *Victorian* and *Marmora* watched the ports in the Canary Islands, chiefly to prevent the escape of the *Telde*.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 25, pp. 753, 767.

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 25, pp. 775, 782.

Should the *Karlsruhe* choose the trade route between Fernando Noronha and St. Paul Rocks for a field of operations, it seemed likely that she would have it to herself for some time.

81. **North America. Establishment of a new Intelligence Centre.**—The main pre-occupation of the North America Division was to prevent the escape of the liners in New York. Shortly after the *Caronia's* arrival on patrol there was another report that three of the big liners were ready to sail with guns in their holds and that there was no United States man-of-war to prevent them from leaving. As before, our Ambassador made representations to the United States Government, who ordered a search for guns to be made. The Consul-General at New York, however, thought the reports much exaggerated; and apprehensions that the vessels were on the point of leaving died down, though there was no relaxation in the stringency of our watch off the port.<sup>1</sup>

By October 1 the new Intelligence Centre was established at St. John's, Newfoundland, to serve the area north of the latitude of Charleston and east of 40° W. To Admiral Hornby the situation of the new centre seemed unfortunate; at first he suggested New York for it, but this was debarred by fear of complications with the United States. Up till then, Halifax had been acting as Intelligence Centre for his squadron and he had made good arrangements for transmission of news from there; he therefore urged that Halifax should continue to act as centre, with St. John's as a subsidiary service. A few days later he quoted examples of the delays which had occurred through using St. John's; but all arrangements were complete and no change was made.<sup>2</sup> He proposed, however, that the wireless stations at Bermuda and Jamaica should be given a day range of 500 miles, and this was accepted.<sup>3</sup> The necessity for learning the enemy's movements with the least possible delay was at the beginning of October even more urgent than ever. The Canadian contingent for service in Europe was on the point of leaving the St. Lawrence; and it was only to be expected that attempts would be made to interfere with its transport.

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 37, pp. 870, 878, 883, 889, 898.

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 37 pp. 909-923.

<sup>3</sup> Papers titled *Qa* 173/1915. The new stations took six months to erect.



## CHAPTER IX.

OCTOBER 3-14.

PASSAGE OF THE CANADIAN CONVOY.<sup>1</sup>

82. **The Canadian Expeditionary Force.**—As soon as war appeared to be threatening the Canadian Government began to consider the most effective means of rendering every possible aid; they were confident that a considerable force of men would be available for service abroad. By the terms of the Canada Militia Act, the active militia could be placed on active service outside Canada only for the defence of Canada itself; but on August 2 the Canadian Government suggested that they should raise regiments as Imperial troops, undertaking all financial responsibility for maintenance and equipment. This offer was gratefully accepted and they were asked to send an Expeditionary Force of one division to England as soon as possible. Not content with this, the Canadian Government on August 8 offered, in addition to a full division of 22,000 men, various cavalry, artillery and infantry units, which also were gratefully accepted. A fortnight later it was announced that the contingent would be ready to embark early in September.<sup>2</sup>

From the first of the volunteers was formed a regiment called the Princess Patricia's Light Infantry; 80 per cent. of this were ex-regular soldiers, most of whom had seen service, and the Canadian Minister of Militia and Defence<sup>3</sup> telegraphed "There is nowhere a better regiment." In view of the adverse situation in France and Belgium he was anxious to put it at the disposal of the War Office; and on August 26, the day after the retreat from Mons, reported that it was leaving Montreal at dawn on August 29.<sup>4</sup> He had consulted with Captain Yelverton in the *Suffolk*, who considered he could spare the *Lancaster* to escort the transport as far as 40° W. on this occasion, though he could not arrange escorts for single transports in future. He pointed out to Colonel Hughes that opportunity should be taken to send as many transports as possible when a cruiser was available.<sup>5</sup> The Admiralty, however, could not agree to provide escort across the Atlantic for a single regiment, nor would they consent to allow troops to cross unescorted; the departure of Princess Patricia's Regiment, had, therefore, to be delayed. The Canadian Government made another attempt to get this regiment away in advance of the rest of the contingent when the question of escorting home the 2nd Battalion of the Lincolnshire Regiment from Bermuda arose. This was

<sup>1</sup> Telegrams and papers concerning the convoy are bound in volume H.S. 3; the arrangements made by the Transport Department are in T. 8126/1914.

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 3, pp. 8, 18, 22, 25, 26, 27, 31.

<sup>3</sup> Colonel Sam Hughes.

<sup>4</sup> H.S. 3, p. 32.

<sup>5</sup> *Suffolk* W/T Log 20501, August 7, 1215, 1510.

to be relieved by the Royal Canadian Regiment, escorted from Halifax by the *Niobe*, and the Dominion Government proposed that if the *Niobe* escorted the British troops home from Bermuda she should be joined at a suitable rendezvous by Princess Patricia's Light Infantry in the transport *Royal George*. This again the Admiralty would not permit, and the *Niobe* escorted the Lincolnshire Regiment back to Halifax, there to await the assembling of the whole Canadian Expeditionary Force and to make the journey across with it.

The horses, 7,000 head, were to be embarked in slower ships, and the Dominion Government wished to send these on in advance without escort; but the War Office informed the Minister of Defence that none of the vessels of the Expeditionary Force was to leave unconvoyed.<sup>1</sup>

83. **First Arrangements for Escort.**—On September 10, the Canadian Government proposed that the port of embarkation should be Quebec, where the whole force was encamped, and asked whether an escort would be available between September 22 and 27. This the Admiralty considered possible if 10 days' notice were given, but they decided to give no definite orders till the Dominion Government could announce the exact date and port of sailing. In order to be ready, however, when the information came they settled that the escort should be provided by the 12th Cruiser Squadron, that is, the *Charybdis*, *Talbot*, *Eclipse* and *Diana*, under Rear-Admiral Wemyss, who, with the French 2nd Light Squadron had been maintaining the Western Channel Patrol. During his absence on escort duty his place was to be taken by four battleships from the Channel Fleet under Vice-Admiral the Hon. Sir A. E. Bethell, K.C.B. K.C.M.G. On September 10, therefore, Admiral Wemyss was ordered, as soon as he was relieved by Admiral Bethell, to get his squadron coaled and proceed to Canada to bring back the convoy, which would consist of about 14 transports. He turned over the Western Patrol to Admiral Bethell on the 11th and went in to Plymouth. There, on the 12th, he received his sailing orders. He was to proceed to Halifax with three cruisers, the *Diana*, which needed some small repairs, to follow as soon as ready; he was to spread his squadron when crossing the Atlantic and he was warned that German liners detained in New York were ready for sea and might sail at any moment.<sup>2</sup> He sailed with the *Charybdis*, *Talbot* and *Eclipse* that afternoon, the *Diana* following two days later.

After he had sailed it was learned from Canada that the Expeditionary Force would not be ready to embark at Quebec till September 27. The Admiralty had suggested that the horse boats should sail separately, escorted by the *Niobe*; but only four out of the 10 were expected to be ready before the 27th, and the

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 3, pp. 39, 40e, 41, 43, 49, 50, 55, 57.

<sup>2</sup> A 109, 111.



idea of a separate escort for them was abandoned. The *Niobe*, after bringing the Lincolnshire Regiment to Halifax, was to remain in Canadian waters.

**84. The Escort increased.**—On September 16 the Minister of Militia asked the strength of the escort, an inquiry which determined the Admiralty to increase it. They ordered Admiral Hornby to shift his flag from the *Glory* to the *Lancaster* and put the *Glory* and *Niobe* under Admiral Wemyss; and at the same time detached a battleship from Admiral Bethell to meet the convoy at a rendezvous in 49.30 N., 30 W. They were thus able to reply that the escort would be four cruisers besides the *Glory* and *Niobe*, reinforced midway by a second battleship, while the Grand Fleet covered the escort from attack by any large force of the enemy. An additional factor of safety was provided in that the route chosen was that used in winter by shipping between the St. Lawrence and England; at the period when the convoy would cross the Atlantic, Canadian traffic would be using the Belle Isle route, far to the northward, and there was therefore little chance of the convoy being sighted by ordinary merchant ships till it was nearing home.<sup>1</sup>

The second half of its passage was expected to be that in which it was more likely to suffer attack; the possibility that a battle cruiser might evade the Grand Fleet had to be recognised. Accordingly, on September 21 the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets, was ordered to send either the *Queen Mary* or *Princess Royal* to be at the rendezvous in 49.30 N., 30 W., on October 2, and accompany the convoy as far as the Fastnet.

The removal of the *Glory* and *Niobe* from his command for escort duties left Admiral Hornby very weak. He pointed out that a cruiser in the St. Lawrence and two off New York were all he could maintain, so that Philadelphia, whence so many suspicious vessels came, had to go unwatched. The Admiralty met his wishes by giving him back the *Niobe*, as the escort would be sufficient without her, and, moreover, she would most probably develop defects on the long voyage.<sup>2</sup>

Admiral Wemyss with his three cruisers reached Halifax on September 22; the *Diana* went to Sydney, Cape Breton Island, arriving on the 23rd. They had all been delayed by headwinds, which had reduced their speed across the Atlantic to 10 knots. All details as to rendezvous and date of sailing had been left to Admiral Wemyss, and he accordingly went up to Quebec by train to make arrangements with the Minister of Militia. In spite of the slow speed at which he had made the passage, he found he was in plenty of time for the convoy, since the Canadian Government had now decided to send the whole force at Quebec, numbering 31,200 of all ranks and 7,500 horses.

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 3, pp. 85, 87c and g, 91; A 119.    <sup>2</sup> H.S. 37, p. 839 and A 127.

These they hoped to embark in the course of the week.<sup>1</sup> They would occupy 31 transports and would not be ready till October 1. The delay enabled another contingent, that from Newfoundland, to join up; it had at first been reported as not ready till October 7, but the Newfoundland Government was urged to hurry on the preparations so that the transport containing the troops could join the large convoy.

**85. The Convoy Orders.**—The convoy when complete would thus consist of 32 ships carrying 32,178 troops, 6,767 horses and 23 motor lorries.<sup>2</sup> Admiral Wemyss divided them into three columns, and put a cruiser at the head of each, with one astern of the middle line. His flagship was to lead the southern column. The columns were to be 15 cables apart, the ships separated by four cables. In the event of an enemy being sighted all the transports were to turn 8 or 16 points together; the three leading cruisers would engage the enemy and the rear cruiser would take charge of the convoy, the transports endeavouring to preserve their fleet formation in all circumstances.<sup>3</sup>

Admiral Wemyss arranged with the Minister of Militia that the transports, as soon as they had embarked their troops at Quebec, should proceed down the St. Lawrence and assemble at Gaspé Bay, where each on arrival would be anchored at its proper place in one or other of the columns. Owing to the liners<sup>4</sup> at New York and Boston, he thought it essential that the place of assembly and time of departure should be kept secret and arranged for censors to be stationed at Gaspé and outlying villages; by this means no information regarding the movements of the transports reached the public and the general impression seems to have been that each vessel had sailed straight for England from Quebec. Admiral Wemyss left Halifax September 26 with the *Charybdis*, *Eclipse* and *Talbot*, bringing with them the transport *Canada* in which the 2nd Lincolnshire had come from Bermuda. At sea he was joined by the *Diana*, which had coaled at Sydney, Cape Breton Island. The squadron was in Gaspé Bay by the 28th and coaled. The Admiral instituted a patrol of the entrance to the harbour. One of his cruisers took the duty at night, and in the daylight hours it was performed by a Canadian Government vessel which had been placed at his disposal. It had been hoped that the transports would arrive from Quebec with some regularity; but owing to some hitch in the orders they came in batches, three on September 29, none on September 30, 13 on October 1, 12 during daylight of October 2, and two during that night.

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 3, p. 102c.

<sup>2</sup> These appear to be the numbers actually carried by the convoy. See H.S. 3, p. 274. Some of the horses came on later in unescorted ships.

<sup>3</sup> These orders, pp. 256–275 in H.S. 3, though dated September 23, do not mention the *Glory*.

<sup>4</sup> Admiral Wemyss speaks of them as "armed German merchantmen." See his letter, H.S. 3, p. 249.



This rendered the task of berthing them, each in its special billet, more troublesome than had been anticipated; but by the forenoon of October 3 all was ready for the start.

It was found that the ships were not particularly well fitted out for transports, nor had the room on board been fully utilised, owing to the lack of experience on the part of the Dominion officials. The Assistant Director of Transports (Colonel Sam Hughes being Director of Transports as well as Minister of Militia and Defence) had been till the outbreak of war a merchant in Quebec, with no special knowledge of shipping. Admiral Wemyss, in remarking on the rapidity with which everything in connection with the troops and convoy had been conjured up as it were from nothing by totally inexperienced persons, observes, "I am inclined to think that this very want of knowledge, perhaps, gave them courage to embark on the undertaking with a lighter heart than they might otherwise have done."<sup>1</sup>

**86. The Canadian Government doubt the Adequacy of the Escort.**—The Minister of Militia visited Gaspé on October 2, and finding only four cruisers in port telegraphed to his Prime Minister, "Escort is altogether inadequate: its strength should be increased." This report, with an inquiry from the Governor-General<sup>2</sup> whether the Admiralty were thoroughly assured as to the adequacy of the escort, reached the Colonial Office early on October 3. The Admiralty had already explained that two battleships would join the convoy on passage and that the Grand Fleet was covering it from attack by any large force of the enemy. They replied to the Colonial Office at once: "My Lords are satisfied that every reasonable precaution has been taken and the escort is considered safe. They do not, therefore, intend to increase the number of ships accompanying the expedition across the Atlantic, being satisfied as to the adequacy of the arrangements made to protect it. The cancelling of their sailing on the grounds of inadequate escort will rest, therefore, with the Canadian Government."<sup>3</sup> It will be noticed that in this reply no mention is made of the *Princess Royal*, the most important vessel of the escort. Possibly desiring to keep secret the detachment of so powerful a unit from the Grand Fleet, the Admiralty had informed no one, not even Admiral Wemyss, that a battle cruiser would guard the convoy from half way across. Moreover, in addition to the vessels definitely charged with escort duty, Admiral Hornby in the *Lancaster* had arranged to leave Halifax on October 3 and cover the convoy to the southward as far as the limit of his station; two other cruisers were keeping close watch off New York against the German liners.

Besides these liners which the Admiralty had specially mentioned to Admiral Wemyss,<sup>4</sup> the only German vessels known to be in the Atlantic were the *Karlsruhe*, *Dresden* and *Kronprinz Wilhelm*.

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 3, p. 252.

<sup>3</sup> H.S. 3, p. 132f.

<sup>2</sup> The Duke of Connaught.

<sup>4</sup> A 111.

The *Karlsruhe* was last reported as near Fernando Noronha on September 22, the *Dresden* had not been definitely seen since August 26, when she was off the southern part of Brazil, though there were several reports showing that a German cruiser was operating near Cape Horn; the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was known to have been near Trinidad Island on September 9. This intelligence was all fairly old; in fact, the Intelligence Department confessed on October 5 "There are no recent reports of the German cruisers in the Atlantic which allow a conclusion as to their present likely positions."<sup>1</sup> Whether or not any of these ships were aware of the preparations of the convoy it is hard to judge; but the German agents ashore must have known a good deal, although the news of the sailing of the convoy did not reach the German Admiralty until October 8.<sup>2</sup> Every effort was made in England to keep secret all the material facts about the departure of the Expeditionary Force, but the Canadian Government were not so careful. The Minister of Militia on October 3 telegraphed to the War Office *en clair* all the details regarding the personnel, etc., in each transport, and in reply to a remonstrance from home stated that the strength of the contingent and the names of the transports had already been published<sup>3</sup>.

**87. Passage of the Convoy, October 3-14.**—Strangely enough, Admiral Wemyss, either in his telegrams or his two reports on the escort of the Canadian Expeditionary Force,<sup>4</sup> does not mention Colonel Hughes' visit to Gaspé or his opinion that the escort was insufficient. Whatever doubts the Canadian Government may have had, these seem to have been dispersed without difficulty, for at 2.30 p.m. on October 3 the convoy commenced to move out of Gaspé Bay and was soon in its three columns. The southern or X line was headed by the *Charybdis*, the middle or Y column by the *Diana*, and the northern or Z column by the *Eclipse*, while the *Talbot* cruised in rear.<sup>5</sup> Proceeding through Cabot Strait the convoy was joined off St. Pierre Island by the *Glory*, which had left Halifax on the 3rd to join them. She took station seven miles on the starboard beam of the southern line. Admiral Hornby, in the *Lancaster*, left Halifax at the same time as the *Glory*; he proceeded first up to Cape Race and then steered so as to cut the convoy's track at dawn on the 6th. From that time he kept about 30 miles south of it till the 8th, when, as 40° W. had been reached, he was to turn back. He first steered

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 37, p. 948.

<sup>2</sup> German Official History "Der Krieg zur See, 1914-1918; Nordsee, Bd. II.," p. 153.

<sup>3</sup> H.S. 3, pp. 134, 135, 137, 139, 140.

<sup>4</sup> M. 02692 and 02693, both in H.S. 3.

<sup>5</sup> X Line: *Charybdis*, *Scotian*, *Arcadian*, *Zealand*, *Corinthian*, *Virginian*, *Andania*, *Saxonia*, *Grampian*, *Lakonia*, *Montreal*, *Royal George*.

Y Line: *Diana*, *Caribbean*, *Athenia*, *Royal Edward*, *Franconia*, *Canada*, *Monmouth*, *Manitou*, *Tyrolia*, *Tunisian*, *Laurentic*.

Z Line: *Eclipse*, *Megantic*, *Ruthenia*, *Bermudian*, *Alaunia*, *Ivernia*, *Scandinavian*, *Sicilian*, *Montezuma*, *Lapland*, *Cassandra*. *Florizel*, with Newfoundland contingent, joined Z line off Cape Race.



so as to sight the convoy; and passing along the whole length of the southern line shaped course for Halifax.

The *Princess Royal* left Scapa early on October 3 and was at the rendezvous in 49.30 N., 30 W., by 10 p.m. October 7. The *Majestic*, which was the battleship detached from Admiral Bethell's force, had been waiting for orders at Devonport since September 23. She sailed on October 1 and reached the rendezvous at 8 p.m. on the 6th.

Neither Admiral Wemyss nor any of the naval authorities in Canada reported the sailing of the convoy, and by October 6 the Admiralty were uncertain whether or not Colonel Hughes' opinion as to the inadequacy of the escort had held it up. When the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets, on October 5, asked if it had sailed, they telegraphed to Admiral Wemyss through Cape Race Wireless Station: "Report what is the position of the convoy. Have you assembled and started."<sup>1</sup> It was not till the afternoon of the 6th that they received the reply, timed 0600, "Convoy assembled and left Gaspé Bay October 3. Present position 45.30 N., 52° W. Speed 9 knots."<sup>2</sup> Colonel Hughes had informed the War Office that the transports and escort had sailed from the rendezvous; but his telegram, dated 4 October, did not reach the Admiralty till two days later.<sup>3</sup> Thus the convoy had been three days at sea before the Admiralty were aware that it had sailed.

The *Princess Royal* and *Majestic* had to wait at the rendezvous for 2½ days. Their movements had been timed on the assumption that the convoy would leave on October 1 at 10 knots, as signalled by Admiral Wemyss,<sup>4</sup> whereas it left on the 3rd and could maintain only 9 knots. Admiral Wemyss was in wireless touch with them by the 7th, and at 6 a.m. on the 10th joined them at the rendezvous. As he was now about to approach home waters, attack was in future more likely from the north. He, therefore, stationed the *Princess Royal* seven miles on the port beam of the northern column and the *Majestic* seven miles ahead of the centre line.

**88. The Question of the Disembarkation Port.**—Southampton had at the outbreak of war been almost entirely closed to commercial traffic and was used by the War Office as their port for all military embarkations and for the disembarkation of the garrisons from abroad. But by the end of September German submarines began to be reported in the Channel and, in order to avert the possibility of accident to the convoy, the question of disembarking it at some port on the west coast was considered. A conference between the principal Admiralty and War Office officials was held; they considered that the general conditions of Liverpool would hamper transport work, while the depth of water at Heysham, Holyhead and Fishguard, and the quay space at Pembroke, were insufficient for the large

<sup>1</sup> Sent 11.35 p.m., 5.10.14.

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 3, pp. 147, 148, 152, 153.

<sup>3</sup> H.S. 3, pp. 149, 150.

<sup>4</sup> H.S. 3, pp. 99, 105, 111.

vessels in the convoy. It was undesirable to use Avonmouth, as it was now one of the principal ports for the importation of food stuffs. In view of these conditions, the Conference decided that the Canadian convoy should disembark at Devonport Dockyard; and the Divisional Naval Transport Officer, Southampton, was ordered to supply the Commander-in-Chief, Devonport, with such appliances for disembarkation as might be required. However, two military members of the Southampton Embarkation Staff who visited Plymouth to make arrangements reported so adversely on the conditions at Plymouth that the War Office, on October 6, pressed for a reconsideration of the question, as a result of which the Admiralty agreed to the use of Southampton and informed Admiral Wemyss.<sup>1</sup>

He accordingly arranged that as soon as the longitude of the Fastnet was reached the eight fastest transports should proceed to Southampton at 16 knots without escort; 15 more, at 12 knots, should be escorted by the *Charybdis*, *Diana* and *Eclipse*; and the nine slowest at 9½ knots with the *Diana* and *Majestic*. This programme had to be modified, since certain camp equipment, without which the troops could not be dealt with on shore, was stowed in the *Montreal*, 12 knots, and *Alaunia*, 14 knots. It was essential that these two should be unloaded first. The most convenient method for disembarkation was for 12 of the fastest infantry ships to arrive on the first day, nine infantry and three horse ships to arrive 20 hours later, and seven horse ships and one slow infantry ship 24 hours after that. If this could be managed the disembarkation would take only three days. Accordingly, Admiral Wemyss was ordered on the 11th to send on the *Montreal* and *Alaunia* at once with one of his cruisers. At the longitude of the Fastnet (9° 40' W.) the convoy was split up into three batches. The *Glory* was to proceed to Queenstown to coal; the *Princess Royal* to be detached to Plymouth or Queenstown as convenient. The first batch of fast ships<sup>2</sup> was to go on with one cruiser, the second batch,<sup>3</sup> with two cruisers, to proceed at 10 knots, and the third,<sup>4</sup> of slow ships, at 8 knots. No escort for the third batch is specifically mentioned in the order,<sup>5</sup> but the *Majestic* was still available. She and the cruisers were not to go further than the Eddystone, where pilots were to be taken on board the transports; the men-of-war were to go in to Plymouth to coal, while the transports went on to Southampton. For their passage between the Eddystone and the Needles they were to be escorted by the local

<sup>1</sup> T. 8126/1914, and H.S. 3, pp. 170, 172.

<sup>2</sup> *Royal George*, *Bermudian*, *Megantic*, *Franconia*, *Royal Edward*, *Laurentic*, *Virginian*, *Tunisian*, *Lapland*, *Canada*—lowest speed 15 knots.

<sup>3</sup> *Scandinavian*, *Arcadian*, *Zealand*, *Cassandra*, *Ivernia*, *Scotian*, *Manitou*, *Andania*, *Caribbean*, *Grampian*, *Saxonia*, *Florizel*—lowest speed 13 knots.

<sup>4</sup> *Montezuma*, *Ruthenia*, *Monmouth*, *Corinthian*, *Sicilian*, *Athenia*, *Tyrolia*, *Lakonia*—lowest speed 12 knots.

<sup>5</sup> Telegrams 42 and 43 to R.A. *Charybdis*. H.S. 3, pp. 181–186.



defence flotillas of Devonport and Portland.<sup>1</sup> They were to enter by the Needles channel on the nights of the 13th, 14th and 15th.<sup>2</sup>

89. **The Convoy Diverted on account of Submarines.**—The *Montreal* and *Alaunia*, escorted by the *Diana*, parted company with the rest of the convoy 570 miles west of Scilly at 6.30 p.m. October 11. As the rest of the convoy approached the longitude of the Fastnet the escorting cruisers heard what appeared to be strong German wireless calls and Admiral Wemyss decided not to break up the convoy and to keep the *Princess Royal* and *Glory*.<sup>3</sup> At the longitude of the Fastnet, he passed the *Sutlej* and *Isis* of Force E. These with the *Venus* had come down from their usual stations and were now forming a sort of outer Channel guard along the transport route. But at this moment occurred an event which upset all the plans. On the 12th the French had sighted a submarine off Cape Gris Nez and had established a patrol from Cherbourg to the Owers Light Vessel east of Portsmouth; in spite of this a submarine was sighted and attacked by one of the torpedo boats of Portsmouth Extended Defence at 4.30 p.m. on the 13th, just off Culver Cliff at the east end of the Isle of Wight.<sup>4</sup>

The presence of this submarine so near Southampton made that port dangerous for the disembarkation, and the Admiralty immediately ordered the convoy to take shelter in Plymouth Sound till the road to the Needles could be cleared. The same orders were sent to the *Diana*. Her two transports arrived at Devonport at dawn October 14. At the same time Admiral Wemyss, who had reached Scilly, broke up the convoy and sent the first batch to Plymouth, following with the other batches. All arrived safely during October 14. Meanwhile, at the suggestion of the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, orders had been given for the transports not to wait, but for them to carry on disembarking at Plymouth till the submarine in the Channel could be disposed of, and Disembarkation Officers were sent from Southampton to assist. The submarine situation did not improve and the disembarkation at Plymouth, having once started, continued till the whole convoy had landed at Devonport.

The submarines sighted on the 12th and 13th in the approaches to Southampton had, in fact, been dispatched from Germany with the special mission of attacking the convoy. The German Admiralty on October 8 learned from their New York agents that 24 transports, escorted by eight warships, had left Quebec on October 2, a report which, so far, was very nearly accurate. Boulogne was assumed to be the destination of the

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 3, pp. 188, 192, 200, 203.

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 67, p. 934.

<sup>3</sup> 26 from S.O. Force G., timed 13.10.14, 0800. See H.S. 3, p. 204.

<sup>4</sup> H.S. 67, p. 999, and H.S. 68, p. 176.

force, the date of arrival to be between October 10 and 12, and as the troops were thought to be sufficiently trained to take the field at once, the military authorities wished to have this convoy attacked. Accordingly *U.8* and *U.20* were despatched on October 10 to operate off Boulogne against it. It was *U.8* that was seen off Cape Gris Nez and *U.20* was met off Culver Cliffs; but neither submarine seems to have come so far west as Plymouth, and thus the convoy escaped a very real danger.<sup>1</sup>

The Canadian Expeditionary Force were the first Dominion troops to arrive in England; the enthusiasm and driving power of the Canadian Government had succeeded in landing 30,000 fine soldiers in England ten weeks from the outbreak of war.

## CHAPTER X.

### OCTOBER 3-14. MOVEMENTS DURING THE PASSAGE OF THE CANADIAN CONVOY.

90. **North America, October 3-14.**—The German cruisers in the Atlantic made no sign of any attempt to interfere with the Canadian convoy. By October 6 the *Dresden* was considered to be on the west coast of America, and throughout the whole passage no intelligence of the *Karlsruhe* or *Kronprinz Wilhelm* came to light. Nor was any special activity noticed among the various convertible liners at ports within reach of the convoy route. The Hamburg-Amerika Company at New York engaged two pilots, but they cancelled the order on the day the convoy sailed. Two Norwegian colliers left Philadelphia on October 3 and were naturally assumed to be part of the German supply organisation. Apart from these the principal event of the period was a complaint from the United States authorities that our cruisers watching New York were too close in; their presence so near harbour and their stopping neutral vessels close to New York to take off reservists was causing adverse comment. The Admiralty instructed Admiral Hornby to prevent a repetition of such incidents, to which he replied that his ships had never been inside territorial waters since he had taken over the command, and that he had now given stringent orders for them not to approach within three miles of the pecked line joining Ambrose Lightship to the shore on Chart 2491.<sup>2</sup>

The watch on New York had been maintained by the *Suffolk* and *Caronia* from October 3-7; and by the *Caronia* and *Niobe* from October 7-13. On October 13 the *Suffolk* came back from Halifax and that same evening stopped and

<sup>1</sup> G.O.H. Nordsee II, pp. 153 *et seq.*

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 37, pp. 925, 940, 953, 955, 964, 969.



put a prize crew on board an oil tanker, the *Brindilla*, about six miles from Ambrose Light. This vessel was one of four German ships owned by the Standard Oil Company which had been transferred to the American flag under new names; Admiral Hornby proposed to send them in if met, since they were registered as belonging to the Deutsch-Amerika Petroleum Company of Hamburg.<sup>1</sup> The *Caronia*, which had been watching off New York since September 20, was due for coaling and she took the prize with her to Halifax. The *Lancaster*, with Admiral Hornby on board, was in port; he had arrived on October 12. As soon as the *Caronia* was again ready for sea on October 18, he transferred his flag to her.

**91. Reservists no longer to be taken from Ships. Introduction of Green Clearance Labels.**—Up till this time one of the duties of our cruisers had been the removal of German and Austrian reservists from vessels met at sea; and many other ships, besides those already mentioned, had had reservists taken from them. This procedure was causing a good deal of ill-feeling amongst certain neutrals whose good opinion it was essential for political reasons to preserve. A concession was made to Italy and on September 21 the Senior Officers in the Mediterranean and East Atlantic were instructed that parties of less than 50 enemy reservists in an Italian ship were to be allowed to proceed in the ship. A fortnight later the practice of removing reservists was entirely abandoned and on October 7 the Admiralty issued an order that they were no longer to be arrested in neutral ships. By a curious coincidence, the German Government had just come to the conclusion that it was no longer advisable to send home reservists from America, as British and French cruisers always removed them from neutral ships; in future, the return to Germany of conscripts was left to the individual judgment of each man himself.

As regards the stoppage of contraband, the cruisers were relieved of some part of their duty of search by a system of green clearance labels issued by the Customs to innocent vessels. These vessels were handed on by signal through the different commands. The system came into force on October 5, when an order to that effect was sent to Cruiser Forces E, I and D in the East Atlantic.<sup>2</sup>

**92. The West Indies. September 14 to October 14.**—Since the capture of the *Spreewald* and the supply ships on September 11 the movements of the West Indian Division produced no noteworthy results. The *Essex* relieved the *Condé* of the guard at St. Thomas from September 14–17 and then coaled at St. Lucia. The *Berwick*, *Essex* and *Condé* began an independent

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 37, p. 1015. She was released later. For effect of her capture, and the question of her transfer see Faile: *Seaborne Trade* I, 293, 294.

<sup>2</sup> A 128.

search of the islands round to the Bahamas; in the course of this the boilers of the *Essex* developed defects on the 25th and she had to spend from September 27 to October 12 in dockyard hands at Bermuda. The other two cruisers continued their cruise and arrived at Kingston, Jamaica, on September 27. They left again on the 30th for a week's cruise in the Western Caribbean, the *Berwick* examining St. Andrew Island (13° N., 82° W.) and Cartagena on the mainland, both of which were suspected as scenes of German activity.<sup>1</sup> Nothing suspicious was observed at either place. After coaling at Jamaica on October 7, the *Berwick* returned to St. Lucia *via* St. Christopher. The *Descartes*, which had been acting as guard ship at St. Lucia, was run into by a steamer on September 25 and somewhat damaged.<sup>2</sup> She had to go to Martinique for repairs, leaving only the *Berwick* and *Condé* fit for service. The latter proceeded also to Martinique.

St. Thomas, as before, continued to be a subject of suspicion. The *Präsident*, the small steamer which seemed to be acting as a German messenger in the West Indies, appeared at Havana on September 15, her departure from St. Thomas not having been reported by the Consul, an unsalaried official. Our Naval Attaché at Washington<sup>3</sup> had been sent to report on the state of affairs at St. Thomas; he learned that two German vessels in harbour had been using wireless, but the Danish Governor, who was much under German influence, at first refused to stop this on the ground that we owned and operated a British cable station on the island. However, on September 20 the wireless rooms of the German ships were sealed with the seal of the colony and the ships were thenceforward kept under observation daily.<sup>4</sup> As a result of his report on the island a salaried Consul was appointed.<sup>5</sup> The arrival of the *Präsident* at Havana drew attention to Cuba, and when it was discovered that she had visited the island on two previous occasions since the outbreak of war, returning after widely different intervals, we pointed out to the Cuban Government that she had probably been supplying German cruisers and urged that she should not again be allowed to leave unless it was certain she was engaged in nothing more than ordinary trading.<sup>6</sup>

**93. Movements of Force I, October 3–14.**<sup>7</sup>—When the Canadian convoy started from Gaspé, the only ships of Force I actually at sea were the *Calgarian* and *Vindictive*, keeping watch off the Tagus. The *Amphitrite* was ready to leave Devonport

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 37, pp. 841, 843.

<sup>2</sup> Papers titled *Colonial Office*, 27 September, 1914: *Damage to Descartes*.

<sup>3</sup> Captain Guy F. Gaunt, R.N.

<sup>4</sup> H.S. 37, p. 994.

<sup>5</sup> Papers titled *F.O.*, 16 September, 1914, and *F.O.*, 20 October, 1914: *Proceedings at St. Thomas*. H.S. 37, p. 998.

<sup>6</sup> H.S. 37, pp. 974, 993.

<sup>7</sup> De Robeck: Letter of Proceedings. M. 02930/14.



by the afternoon of October 3 and was ordered by Admiral de Robeck to relieve the *Vindictive*, on her way south visiting Coruna, Villagarcia and Vigo, where German ships and agents were reported to be showing activity. The Admiral himself got away from Gibraltar on the 5th, in the *Argonaut*, and proceeded as usual to the Tagus. There he was joined on the 7th by the *Amphitrite*. She had found at Coruna a large Telefunken wireless station in process of erection under German auspices, while at Villagarcia and Vigo were German ships with their aerials still in place. Her arrival off the Tagus brought the number of ships there up to four—the whole available strength of Force I. Its presence appeared to have put a stop to the activity of the German ships at Lisbon, and the Admiral redistributed his force. He sent the *Vindictive* to Madeira; left the *Amphitrite* at the Tagus; and with the *Argonaut* and *Calgarian* started for the Azores, the flagship shaping course for Fayal and the armed merchant cruiser for Flores. His move resulted in another capture. At 12.45 p.m. on October 10, in 38.31 N., 25.44 W., about 35 miles north of San Miguel, the *Argonaut* boarded a ship flying Norwegian colours and calling herself the *Bjorgoin* of Bergen. Her general appearance agreed with the name she carried, but on investigation she turned out to be the *Graecia*, of the Hamburg-Amerika Line. Her remaining papers showed that after leaving New York she had come straight over to the Azores and had been hovering in the vicinity of those islands from September 7 to the date of her capture. Her wireless operator's log showed that on September 6, 7 and 8 she had been calling up German warships but had received no reply. She was made a prize and sent with a prize crew to Gibraltar, where she arrived on the 15th. The *Argonaut* and *Calgarian* remained cruising in the Azores; on the 13th the *Calgarian* had to go to Gibraltar for coal and to repair defects. The Tagus guard was kept by the *Amphitrite*. It had been Admiral de Robeck's intention to relieve her by the *Europa*, but that ship, though her completion was long overdue, had had unsatisfactory steam trials and could not leave Devonport. The old cruisers of the *Europa* class were notorious for breakdowns, and the Admiralty, wishing to give Admiral de Robeck a good ship, on October 8 ordered the *Donegal*, then preparing to commission in England, to join Force I when ready;<sup>1</sup> but when, after various delays, she actually sailed, the situation had changed and she went to the south-east coast of America instead.

Admiral de Robeck's visit to the Azores and capture of the *Graecia* brought to light the fact that the Portuguese authorities gave free use of their wireless stations to ships at sea; accordingly German colliers kept about 50 miles off the islands, maintaining touch by wireless. Several officials were strongly pro-German. To sever German communications with New York, the Admiral

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 36, p. 1049.

suggested that the Fayal-New York cable should be cut;<sup>1</sup> and to improve on our own, recommended the erection of a high-power station in the Azores to form a connecting link between England and ships in the south-west Atlantic.

**94. Convoys in the East Atlantic.**—During the Admiral's visit to the Azores an important convoy left home; this was the 1st Wessex Division for India, in nine transports, accompanied by three empty vessels.<sup>2</sup> This was the first of the long series of transport moves necessitated by the substitution of Territorial battalions for the Indian Army, most of which was now on its way home or to France. The provision of escorts from the small number of cruisers available for the various convoys moving in all parts of the world was a matter for nice adjustment, and forms an important part of the history of all foreign stations during 1914.

With the departure of the 1st Wessex Division was inaugurated a new system. The dates of arrival and departure from intermediate ports of the various convoys at sea were fixed so that an escort which had taken an outward convoy could bring back a homeward-bound one; and the sections of the whole voyage were arranged so that the escort could be provided from the stations through which the convoy passed. It was at first hoped to manage fortnightly sailings from home and from India; but this necessitated a higher speed than some of the transports could obtain, and a programme based on sailings at 16-day intervals was drawn up and issued on October 1. The outward Atlantic escort was to drop its convoy at Gibraltar and return with the homeward-bound convoy which should be ready there.<sup>3</sup> So far, escorts in the section between Gibraltar and home had been provided by Admiral de Robeck, but with the new programme two cruisers, the *Bacchante* and *Euryalus*, were specially attached to the Western Channel Patrol for this particular duty. These cruisers had been operating in the southern part of the North Sea with the rest of their class; but after the torpedoing of the *Cressy*, *Hogue* and *Aboukir*, on September 22, the *Bacchante* and *Euryalus* were kept in harbour at Sheerness till October 7, when they proceeded to Portsmouth to pick up the convoy they were to take to Gibraltar. This left punctually on October 9, and after an uneventful voyage reached Gibraltar on the 14th; from there it proceeded unescorted as far as Malta.<sup>4</sup>

The Senior Officer, Gibraltar, however, suggested that it was impossible for both the cruisers to accompany all the convoys. He proposed to send one of them back to England with a convoy leaving Gibraltar on the 16th; she could then

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 36, p. 1089.

<sup>2</sup> *Alnwick Castle*, *Assam*, *Braemar Castle*, *Cawdor Castle*, *Dunluce Castle*, *Galeka*, *Kenilworth Castle*, *Nevasa*, *Ultonia*. The empty vessels were *Ingoma*, *Kelvingrove*, *Thongwa*.

<sup>3</sup> See H.S. 36, pp. 979–981.

<sup>4</sup> For its further progress see Monographs 22: *Mediterranean* (C.B. 917F), and 17: *East Indies* (C.B. 917(C)).



bring the next batch of outward-bound transports due to leave Southampton on October 25. The second cruiser he suggested should wait at Gibraltar till October 19; she would then take home another convoy and leave England again on November 10. Thenceforward the two cruisers could work alternate convoys, resting nine days at Gibraltar and 13 days in England. His proposals were not countermanded and, in fact, that was what was done, in spite of the Admiralty's evident intention for the convoys to have an escort of two cruisers between Gibraltar and home.<sup>1</sup>

The Wessex Division, on its way south, passed a small homeward-bound convoy. The *Leviathan* had been in dockyard hands at Gibraltar since September 17, and as it was now decided she should join the Grand Fleet, the opportunity of her passage was taken to bring home the remainder of the Army of Occupation of Egypt in four transports.<sup>2</sup> They left Gibraltar on October 11 for Southampton, but on October 14, when they were still 200 miles south of Ushant, they were diverted to Liverpool, as Southampton was considered dangerous on account of the submarine. The *Leviathan* accompanied them as far as St. George's Channel; there she parted company and proceeded in to Queenstown for repair. The four transports reached Liverpool safely on October 16.<sup>3</sup>

95. **The French Patrol in the Bay of Biscay.**—The passage of these and future convoys made a patrol of the Ushant-Finisterre section of Admiral de Robeck's original station more necessary than ever. This was in charge of the French, who, possibly not knowing of the impending programme of convoys, suggested on October 7 that the division of the 2nd Light Squadron watching between Finisterre and the Loire should go back to the Western Channel Patrol. Admiral Wemyss was away with the Canadian convoy and the suggestion was natural. The Admiralty, however, asked that three cruisers should maintain a patrol between Ushant and Finisterre and thus serve the double purpose of protecting the transport route and covering the Loire. The *Guichen* of the French squadron had been cruising off Bilbao; she was now recalled to take her place in the squadron.<sup>4</sup> She had been waiting off Bilbao to intercept two German ships expected to put in there under neutral flags.<sup>5</sup> These had not appeared.

96. **Area D, October 3-14.**—The *Unita* at Cadiz was not of much use to the Germans. Though she had 4,000 tons of coal on board, the master of the ship refused to obey the German

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 36, pp. 1083, 1094. It is not known why both cruisers could not accompany all convoys according to the Admiralty programme.

<sup>2</sup> *Californian, Corsican, Deseado, Indian*; see A 127.

<sup>3</sup> H.S. 3, pp. 210, 224, 228; H.S. 68, p. 339; M. 7072/14; T. 9527/15, 7463/15.

<sup>4</sup> A 129.

<sup>5</sup> H.S. 36, p. 1041.

supercargo and the German Admiralty were forced to send instructions for the coal in her to be sold. All the colliers from New York for the East Atlantic zone had now been dispatched; but as they believed the rendezvous to be compromised the German Admiralty ordered all those ready laden at Las Palmas to wait further orders, the *Telde* included.

This information was not at the time known to the cruisers of Force D, who were continuing their patrol of the Canaries and expecting at any moment that the *Telde* would depart. On this station, as elsewhere, the communications had proved not quick enough, and Admiral Stoddart was ordered to supply the Consul at St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, with apparatus for a temporary wireless station. The Portuguese Government had no objection to this, nor to the construction of a permanent station on the island, though this they wished to take over after the war. The temporary set was fitted up by the *Carnarvon* when she went in to St. Vincent on October 9.<sup>1</sup> She had left Sierra Leone on the 3rd and had met the *Edinburgh Castle* on the way across. Force D was now entirely occupied in watching the Atlantic islands. At the Cape Verde group were the *Carnarvon*, *Albion* and *Empress of Britain*; while at the Canaries were the *Highflyer*, *Marmora* and *Victorian*. The last went off to coal at Gibraltar on October 9. On her return it was Admiral Stoddart's intention for the *Marmora* to come south to work with the *Carnarvon*, so that his squadron would then be in pairs.<sup>2</sup>

Before this scheme was in working order, Admiral Stoddart had come to the conclusion that the southern part of his station needed some attention. The patrol of the coast of Brazil itself was under the charge of the *Cornwall*, *Bristol* and *Macedonia*, based on Abrolhos Rocks. The *Cornwall* and *Bristol* left the Rocks on October 2 and proceeded northward to sweep the coast, the *Bristol* inshore and the *Cornwall* about 100 miles to seaward of her. The *Bristol* visited Bahia on October 3 and Pernambuco on the 5th. There she picked up the *Macedonia* and *Orama* to aid in the sweep. The two armed merchant cruisers took the middle position, the *Macedonia* making for Fernando Noronha, the *Orama* for Rocas. At Rocas the *Orama* turned back to coal at Abrolhos; at Fernando Noronha the *Macedonia* turned west to conform to the movements of the two cruisers, continuing as far as 40° W. at about 100 miles off shore. The *Bristol* inshore went as far as the Sao Joao Islands, off which a foreign ship had been seen cruising on October 5.<sup>3</sup> Turning there, she followed the coastline at some 30 miles distance and, calling at Pernambuco on the 11th, was back at Abrolhos on October 14.

The *Cornwall* passed through the spot where the *Ascaro* had sighted the *Karlsruhe* and, visiting Pernambuco on the 10th,

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 25, pp. 704, 742, 773. M. 02118/14, 03718/14.

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 25, p. 806.

<sup>3</sup> *Bristol* W/T Log 18259.



returned on the 13th to Abrolhos, where she remained till the end of the month. The sweep seemed to have produced no visible result and no enemy vessels were sighted.

Admiral Cradock was far away with the *Good Hope*, *Glasgow*, *Monmouth* and *Otranto*. The Falkland Islands was now his base and he ordered the *Canopus* there from Abrolhos. On October 8 he asked further that the *Essex* might relieve the *Cornwall* to join him also. This telegram reached the Admiralty on October 12, by which time they had ordered the *Kent*,<sup>1</sup> newly commissioned, to the south-east coast of America, and they, therefore, left the *Essex* in the West Indies. The German Cruiser Squadron under Admiral von Spee was known to be coming eastward towards South America and could reach the River Plate by about October 18. Admiral Cradock therefore announced that he would concentrate his squadron and suggested that there should be enough force on the south-east coast of America to bring the enemy to action should he evade the *Good Hope* squadron in the Pacific. It may have been merely a coincidence that Admiral Stoddart now proposed to take the *Carnarvon*, *Albion*, *Marmora* and *Empress of Britain*, with a collier, and sweep towards St. Paul Rocks, Fernando Noronha, Rocas Island, and thence to the southern limit of his station, so long as coal lasted.<sup>2</sup> This proposal of his reached the Admiralty on October 12, while they were deciding what to do in face of the situation which would arise if Admiral von Spee, with his modern 8 in. gun cruisers *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, more powerful ships than any in our cruiser forces, should arrive in the Atlantic. The Cape Squadron was particularly weak; it had only the *Hyacinth* and *Astraea*, old vessels with nothing better than 6 in. guns, and the *Astraea* was nearing Sierra Leone with two transports,<sup>3</sup> containing the remainder of the Cape garrison on passage from home. As a first step they ordered the *Albion* from St. Vincent to Ascension preparatory to sending her out to the Cape.<sup>4</sup> She left on October 14.

97. **Formation of a Second South American Squadron.**—The Admiralty's decision was to adopt Admiral Cradock's suggestion of a second squadron to oppose Admiral von Spee should he evade the *Good Hope* squadron in the Pacific and come round into the Atlantic.

On a previous occasion, early in September, when nothing had been heard of the German Cruiser Squadron for a month and it was thought it would shortly appear to the east of Cape Horn, the *Defence*, a modern cruiser with four 9·2 in. and ten 7·5 in. guns, was ordered from the Dardanelles to the south-east

<sup>1</sup> 1900, 9,800 tons, fourteen 6 in., Captain John D. Allen, R.N.

<sup>2</sup> A 133. Admiral Stoddart's letters of proceedings (M. 03718/14), covering the period between September 15 and October 21, consist of only three pages with wide margins and do not even mention this proposal.

<sup>3</sup> *Dover Castle*, *Garth Castle*.

<sup>4</sup> A 132.

coast of America to join Admiral Cradock, but a few days later the German squadron was sighted off Samoa and the departure of the *Defence* was countermanded.<sup>1</sup> She remained at the Dardanelles as flagship till October 6, when she was ordered home. Now, once again, she was ordered to Monte Video. Her captain was required at home for an important inquiry; at Gibraltar he exchanged with Captain Leatham of the *Euryalus*, who left Gibraltar in the *Defence* on October 15, to join the new squadron.<sup>2</sup> The Admiralty gave the command of this new squadron to Admiral Stoddart, sending him orders as follows:—

101. Proceed down the trade route to Montevideo, calling at Pernambuco and Rio on the way. *Defence* is following you down from Gibraltar. While you are there, *Cornwall*, *Bristol*, *Macedonia* and *Orama* will be under your orders.

Keep sufficient force ready to concentrate in case German squadron from Pacific escape past Cradock, who has *Good Hope*, *Canopus*, *Monmouth*, *Bristol*<sup>3</sup> and *Otranto*.

*Empress of Britain* and *Marmora* to return when you think fit, to operate in the vicinity of Cape Verde, under *Highflyer*.

There is coal at Abrolhos Rocks.

Communicate when you can with Cradock, through Montevideo. He is now in the vicinity of the Falkland Islands.

(Sent 1.15 p.m., 14/10/14, via Dakar Radio. Repeated to St. Vincent by cable.)

## CHAPTER XI.

### OCTOBER 14 TO NOVEMBER 4. THE "KARLSRUHE'S" ACTIVITIES REVEALED.

98. **The Canary Islands, October 14–22.**—The order that he was to sail for Monte Video reached Admiral Stoddart in the afternoon of October 14 as he was patrolling in the *Carnarvon* off St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands. Next morning he went in, coaled and made arrangements for the conduct of the station during his absence. Captain Buller, in the *Highflyer*, was the senior Captain and Admiral Stoddart ordered him to come from the Canaries to St. Vincent with the *Marmora*. The Admiral had been given the option of taking the *Empress of Britain* and *Marmora* with him, possibly to sweep for the *Karlsruhe* in accordance with his latest proposal;<sup>4</sup> but they were expecting the arrival of a storeship, now somewhat overdue, and he decided

<sup>1</sup> C.B. 917, p. 37, Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8.

<sup>2</sup> A 134.

<sup>3</sup> Evidently a slip of the pen for *Glasgow*. For original see H.S. 25, p. 837.

<sup>4</sup> A 133.



to leave them behind, the *Empress of Britain* to be in charge at St. Vincent till the *Highflyer* and *Marmorata* arrived. The *Victorian*, on leaving Gibraltar, was to look after the Canaries.<sup>1</sup> These arrangements completed, he left St. Vincent at 9 p.m. on the 15th to take charge of the south-east coast of America.

Just as he was leaving he received an order to escort the *Astraea's* convoy across his station. As he had only the three armed liners and the *Highflyer* at his disposal he replied that he had no cruiser to send. As it happened, this order, though it did not reach him till the 15th, had been sent six days before; and as no reply had come from him the Admiralty had sent instructions direct to the *Highflyer* that she was to take over the convoy at St. Vincent and escort it homeward until relieved by one of the cruisers of Force I. After coaling at Madeira the *Highflyer* came south to St. Vincent, arriving there on the 22nd; the *Marmorata* left the Canaries on the 19th and joined the *Highflyer* on the 23rd. Thus three out of the four vessels of Force D were stationed in the Cape Verde Islands, although it had been clear for some time that the Canaries group was one of the centres of German activity and the anchorage of many German and strongly suspected neutral ships.

On leaving the Canaries, Captain Buller gave the Admiralty a resumé of the situation there. He reported that the *Telde* had embarked 1,400 tons of coal and the *Nepos* and *Mowinkel*, though their machinery had been disabled by the Spanish authorities, were loaded with naval stores; there was a rumour abroad that the *Cap Ortegale*, of 13½ knots and fitted with wireless, was about to escape from Santa Cruz de Tenerife; and circumstances indicated that the Canary Islands had been used again and again as a base for enemy ships.<sup>2</sup>

The number of these was increased by the *Macedonia*, a Hamburg-America liner which had left New Orleans on August 30 and had not since been heard of. She came in to Santa Cruz de la Palma on October 17. At that time the *Highflyer* was examining the Salvages on her way to Madeira and the *Marmorata* was patrolling the southern approach to Tenerife; the German vessel, therefore, ran little risk of capture. A previous arrival, the *Walhalla*, at Las Palmas, was now reported by the French to be about to receive a supply of coal from Bilbao, and she moved from Las Palmas to Tenerife, presumably to get into a more advantageous position.<sup>3</sup>

The *Kent* was passing the islands on her way to the south-east coast of America and the Admiralty signalled to her *via* Gibraltar North Front Wireless Station that she was to remain

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 44, pp. 11, 18, 21.

<sup>2</sup> Sent 7.30 p.m., 18th, received 12.11 p.m. 19th, *via* Horsea. See H.S. 44, p. 91.

<sup>3</sup> H.S. 44, pp. 39, 129, 132, 144.

in the vicinity of the Canaries for the time, putting herself under the orders of Captain Buller in the *Highflyer*, who was now Senior Officer on the station, and searching for coaling bases in the islands.<sup>1</sup> The order does not seem to have reached the *Kent*, for she continued to St. Vincent, arriving on the 19th, by which time her orders were again changed.

The *Astraea*, with the two transports *Dover Castle* and *Garth Castle*, containing the remainder of the Cape Garrison, left Sierra Leone on the 17th, and next day the Admiralty gave Captain Buller the option of using either the *Kent* or *Highflyer* to escort the transports across Area D. He ordered the *Kent* to take this duty and she started northward with them on the 19th. Admiral de Robeck, who had been instructed to relieve the *Kent* with one of his cruisers, selected the *Vindictive*, as she was in need of some dockyard repair. She was then at Madeira, testing the range of a new Poulsen wireless installation with which she had been fitted before leaving home.<sup>2</sup> The Admiralty ordered Admiral de Robeck to send her to search the islands while waiting for the *Highflyer* and her convoy.<sup>3</sup> This order, like most of those for the East Atlantic ships, failed to arrive in time and the *Vindictive* remained off Funchal till noon on the 22nd, when she proceeded direct for the rendezvous north of Palma Island at which she was to relieve the *Highflyer* of the Cape convoy. The relief took place on October 23, in latitude 30° N., and the *Kent* returned to the Canaries. The convoy arrived at Southampton on October 30, the *Vindictive* by Admiralty orders having parted company at the position half-way between Ushant and the Eddystone;<sup>4</sup> she went in to Devonport and remained there refitting for three weeks.

The *Victorian* could not get away from Gibraltar till early on October 19, having been delayed several days by strikes of Spanish workmen in the dockyard. During her two days' voyage we had no cruiser at the Canaries at all. On arrival at the islands she went to Palma to interview our Consul on the subject of the *Macedonia*. From him it was learned that signal lights had been seen off the south end of Palma Island and rumours were current that the *Karlsruhe* was in the neighbourhood. The *Kent*, with her convoy, was passing near and the *Victorian* proceeded to the south-west of Hierro Island to warn her.<sup>5</sup>

99. Reports of the "Karlsruhe." October 16 to 22.—The latest authentic reports of the *Karlsruhe* had been furnished by a Spanish vessel which came in to Las Palmas on October 16. A week before she had been stopped by that cruiser in 0° 20' S., 29° 40' W., about 60 miles south of St. Paul Rocks. The

<sup>1</sup> A 139.

<sup>2</sup> A 140, 141.

<sup>3</sup> A 142.

<sup>4</sup> *Vindictive*, Letter of Proceedings. M. 03207/14.

<sup>5</sup> *Victorian*, Letter of Proceedings. M. 01006/15.



*Carnarvon* had left St. Vincent and Admiral Stoddart did not learn this intelligence. He steamed straight down the trade route well to the westward of this position; and, as British merchant vessels were keeping wide of the route, he sighted only neutral steamers. On arrival at Pernambuco on October 21 he was informed by our Intelligence Officer that the *Karlsruhe* was seen at 10 a.m., October 20, at Lavandeira Reef (5° S., 36° 8' W.), taking in stores from another vessel. Unable to investigate the report himself, as he had to proceed to the southward, he ordered the *Bristol* and *Edinburgh Castle* to examine the place, the liner then to continue her round voyage.<sup>1</sup> Various neutral steamers arriving at Las Palmas reported on October 20 that she was operating near the Equator and had sunk 12 merchant vessels,<sup>2</sup> whose names they did not know. Vague though the information was, it was not unlikely to be true since seven steamers on the South American route were overdue; and all doubt was cleared up on October 22.

While the *Victorian* was off Hierro Island trying to inform the *Kent* that the *Karlsruhe* might be near, there came into Tenerife a German ship, the *Crefeld*, which the *Glasgow* had tried to keep in port but which had sailed from Santos on August 12. Since then the vessel had not been reported. On arrival at Tenerife she was found to have on board 419 people, the crews and passengers of 13 ships<sup>3</sup> captured and believed to have been sunk by the *Karlsruhe* in the area between St. Paul Rocks and Rocas Reef.

#### 100. "Karlsruhe's" Movements, August 26 to October 1.<sup>4</sup>—

On dismissing the *Stadt Schleswig*, Captain Köhler of the *Karlsruhe* decided to attack trade at the north-east shoulder of Brazil. He coaled again on August 30 at a secluded spot and continued his voyage to the eastward. Next morning he picked up the *Asuncion* and *Crefeld* and was proceeding in single line ahead with them and the *Patagonia*, when at 4 p.m., in 3.35 S., 34.35 W., about 50 miles W.N.W. of Rocas Reef, another steamer was sighted. This was at first thought to be the *Rio Negro*, with which the *Karlsruhe* was in wireless touch; but seeing that the newcomer was a stranger, Captain Köhler sent the *Asuncion* and *Crefeld* to wait for him at the reef, keeping

<sup>1</sup> A 146; H.S. 44, p. 37; H.S. 43, pp. 91, 115, 117. <sup>2</sup> H.S. 44, p. 125.

<sup>3</sup> *Strathroy*, Norfolk (Va.) for Rio; *Maple Branch*, Liverpool for Punta Arenas; *Highland Hope*, U.K. for Buenos Ayres; *Cornish City*, Cardiff for Rio; *Rio Iguassu*, St. Vincent, C.V., for Rio; *Pruth*, Monte Video for St. Vincent, C.V.; *Indrani*, Norfolk (Va.) for Rio. These seven vessels constituted the overdue list.

*Farn*, Barry for Monte Video; *Cervantes*, Rio for Liverpool; *Condor*, Philadelphia for Valparaiso; *Lynrowan*, Buenos Aires for Liverpool; *Niceto de Larrinaga*, Buenos Aires for Liverpool; *Maria* (Dutch), Punta Arenas for Dublin.

The number of British vessels passing through the area in which the *Karlsruhe* was reported to be acting was about 16 daily (H.S. 22, p. 173).

<sup>4</sup> Based mainly on Aust. See plan at p. 152. The *Karlsruhe's* track is taken from *Kreuzerkrieg II*, Karte 5.

the *Patagonia* with him, while he examined the stranger. She proved to be the British collier *Strathroy*, with 5,600 tons of coal from Norfolk, Virginia, for Brazil,<sup>1</sup> more than was carried by the four tenders of the cruiser. Ordering her to follow, Captain Köhler continued his course to Rocas Reef, and was there by 8 a.m., September 1. There the European crew of the *Strathroy* were transferred to the *Asuncion*, the original Chinese crew remaining in the ship, and Captain Köhler sent his mails to the *Patagonia* for delivery at Pernambuco. This completed the operations at Rocas Reef. The *Patagonia* conducted the *Strathroy* to a secluded harbour on the coast of Brazil<sup>2</sup> and then passed on for Pernambuco, arriving on September 6. The *Karlsruhe* steamed northward with the *Crefeld* in company for a point which Captain Köhler thought suitable for the interception of steamers. The *Rio Negro* was to coal from the *Strathroy* at Lavandeira and then relieve the *Asuncion* at Rocas Reef for the same purpose.

It will be remembered that the *Glasgow* and *Monmouth* searched the Brazilian coast as far as Macau on August 27 and were joined by the *Otranto* at Rocas Reef on August 28.<sup>3</sup> Had Captain Luce's sweep taken place a few days later he would have come upon the German squadron, consisting of the *Karlsruhe*, *Patagonia*, *Rio Negro*, *Crefeld* and *Strathroy*, anchored in the swell off Rocas Reef.

Captain Köhler had not long to wait. In the early morning of September 3 the *Maple Branch* from Liverpool came upon them in 2° S., 32.10 W. She was stopped, and her crew, mostly Chinamen, were transferred to the *Crefeld*. On board, besides general cargo for South America, was a number of prize animals intended for exhibition in the Argentine; these provided the Germans with a supply of fresh meat of the finest quality. At nightfall the *Maple Branch* was sunk.<sup>4</sup>

About this time wireless signals from the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* were heard, but the *Karlsruhe* did not communicate as she had been intercepting signals from 11 different British warships, and did not want to reveal her own position.<sup>5</sup> The *Kronprinz Wilhelm* joined the *Asuncion*, took provisions from her and went on southward.<sup>6</sup> The *Asuncion* rejoined the *Karlsruhe* in the afternoon of September 5 and next day transferred the crew of the *Strathroy* to the *Crefeld*; the *Karlsruhe* then made off at 14 knots for Lavandeira Reef where the *Strathroy* was waiting with her load of coal. Just at this time the *Macedonia* was passing about 30 miles to westward. The coaling lasted for two days,

<sup>1</sup> Deposition of Chief Engineer of *Strathroy*. M. 20570/14.

<sup>2</sup> This was Lavandeira Reef in 5° S., 36° W. On arrival at Pernambuco the *Patagonia* became a supply ship for Von Spee.

<sup>3</sup> See Section 60.

<sup>4</sup> Deposition of master of *Maple Branch*. M. 19408/14.

<sup>5</sup> Two of these were the *Good Hope* and *Cornwall*, who, during September 2 and 3, passed 60 miles to eastward.

<sup>6</sup> See Section 78.



specially anxious ones for the cruiser. "These coaling days were always the most dangerous for us, if not, indeed, the only dangerous ones," says Aust. The coaling place was at Lavandeira Reef and there was some chance of the German squadron being sighted by the *Bristol*, then on passage from Para to Pernambuco. She was about 35 miles north of Macau at noon, September 9, and continued towards Cape San Roque, keeping some 30 miles off and out of sight of the shore, which in this neighbourhood is dangerous and edged with shoals. Thus she missed what seems to have been a good chance of catching the *Karlsruhe* coaling.

By September 10 the *Karlsruhe* was back in position, but somewhat to the northward of her former station, with the *Crefeld* to the west of her, the *Rio Negro* to the east, serving as scouts to warn her of the approach of enemy or prey. Her engines were stopped to economise coal, but she always kept steam up ready for full speed if necessary. Nothing was seen till the early hours of September 14, when the lights of a steamer were sighted. Keeping touch, the *Karlsruhe* at dawn found this to be the *Highland Hope*, bound to the Argentine for meat. In this position, 1.3 S., 31.45 W., she was stopped and captured.<sup>1</sup> While the prize was in process of being dealt with, a Spanish liner on the way to Monte Video passed, and seeing a cruiser and three merchant vessels stopped in mid-ocean, inquired what they were. The *Karlsruhe* replied by wireless, "Convoy British ships." The question and answer were taken in by the *Canopus*, then on passage to Pernambuco escorting an oiler. Her suspicions raised, she inquired and obtained the position of the Spanish vessel, and found it to be 18 miles on the starboard beam; however, she did not close the Spaniard, but continued her cruise for Pernambuco, having, in fact, had the *Karlsruhe*, *Highland Hope*, *Rio Negro* and *Crefeld* 20 miles on her starboard beam a few hours before.<sup>2</sup> The incident seems to have been a narrow escape for the *Karlsruhe*, and has particular interest in that the *Canopus*, of all ships, might have ended the German cruiser's career, which Admiral Cradock considered would undoubtedly continue till she should meet a ship with more than her own 26 knots.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Deposition of master of *Highland Hope*. M. 18852/14.

<sup>2</sup> The W/T Log of *Canopus*, No. 31331, has the following on September 14:— 9.50 a.m. Message in unknown cypher. (This we now know to be the *Karlsruhe* calling the *Rio Negro* to the position 1° S., 31° 40' W.)

1.19 p.m. *Reina Victoria Eugenia* to all ships: "What are those four ships abeam?"

1.30 p.m. To *Reina Victoria Eugenia*: "Convoy British ships."


2.53 p.m. *R. V. Eugenia* to M X E (fictitious call sign given by *Canopus*). Lat. 1° 23' S., 31° 48' W.

Extract from Deck Log of *Canopus*: "September 14, noon position, 0.53 S., 31.21 W. Course 8.30 a.m. to 1 p.m. S. 38 W., variation 19° W. Average speed 8 knots. Course 1 p.m. to noon September 15, S. 35 W., unchanged. Average speed 8 knots."

<sup>3</sup> Compare Cradock's telegram 325 in A 154.

The encounter with the Spanish liner, however, and her conversation with the British man-of-war, which had been overheard in the *Karlsruhe*, decided Captain Köhler to move

#### KARLSRUHE'S escape of 14<sup>th</sup> September.



away for a time and try his luck on the North American route, which was north-westward from Cape San Roque. On the 15th he sighted two Norwegian sailing vessels and on the 17th another British collier on passage to South America with Virginian coal. This was the *Indrani*, and was speedily captured in 3° S., 35.40 W. As she had 7,000 tons of coal on board<sup>1</sup> and was fitted with wireless, which the master had neglected to destroy, she was looked upon as a valuable addition to the squadron and was not destroyed. Her British officers were transferred to the *Crefeld*, but her original Chinese crew were left on board to work the ship and cargo under German control; and she was renamed *Hoffnung*. The *Karlsruhe* went off in company with the *Asuncion*, which had come up to rejoin, and coaled once more.

Captain Köhler now decided to return to the European track. Revisiting the rendezvous where the *Indrani* and *Crefeld* were waiting, he took along with him the *Rio Negro* and *Crefeld* to act as scouts, and by September 21 was once again in the neighbourhood of the spot where he had captured the *Highland Hope*. Here, during that day, he sank two steamers. The first of these was a Dutch ship, the *Maria*, which had been

<sup>1</sup> Deposition of master of *Indrani*. M. 18797/14. Her coal was bought by the German Supply Officer at Pernambuco a week after her capture, of which he was not aware. *Kreuzerkrieg* II, p. 295.



boarded by the *Canopus* two days before ; she was sunk because carrying wheat from Portland, Oregon, to Ireland. The legality of Captain Köhler's action is questionable ; in the minds of those in the *Karlsruhe* there was no suggestion other than that the wheat was for the civil population,<sup>1</sup> but the Supreme Prize Court of Berlin justified what was done on the assertion that Dublin was a military base.<sup>2</sup>

The second prize of that day was another British collier, the *Cornish City*, with 5,500 tons of coal from Barry for Rio. Her coal was of poor quality and Captain Köhler decided to get rid of her, as she was an old, worn-out vessel with no wireless, and he could not spare another crew for her. Moreover, the *Indrani* alone would keep him supplied for some time. Accordingly she was blown up that afternoon in the position 1.55 S., 32.5 W.<sup>3</sup>

Meanwhile, strong signals had been heard from a vessel thought to be the *Amazon*, of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company. The *Karlsruhe* chased northward and at 10 p.m. sighted lights, but decided not to hold up the vessel till daylight as she probably had passengers on board. Keeping the lights in view, at daybreak she sighted the steamer ; but to the general disappointment it was not the *Amazon*, but the Italian *Ascaro*, which had to be released and whose report at St. Vincent six days later was the first definite information as to the *Karlsruhe's* whereabouts. But in the afternoon the failure to catch the *Amazon* was compensated for by the capture of still another collier, the *Rio Iguassu*, with 4,800 tons from Newcastle for Rio.<sup>4</sup> As her coal, like that of the *Cornish City*, was poor and the ship was old, she shared the same fate. Captain Köhler had at first intended to take in some coal from her but abandoned the attempt on account of the swell. She was blown up by two charges, one in the shaft tunnel and one forward in the collision bulkhead ; and was the first steamer the men of the *Karlsruhe* had seen sunk by daylight.

By this time the cruiser was in need of some overhauling and repair on account of the continuous steaming and the damage caused by the frequent coalings. She did not venture to go into harbour for this, but moved off westward to 1.10 S., 33.30 W., in mid-ocean, where she spent from September 25 to 27 on the work.<sup>5</sup> She then proceeded to her coaling base, meeting on the way the *Asuncion*, which had sunk the *Strathroy* after removing all her remaining coal. On October 1, with her bunkers full and with coal a yard deep on the upper deck, except round the guns, the *Karlsruhe* started for another raid.

<sup>1</sup> Aust says "This cargo would provide the entire City of London with bread for a fortnight."

<sup>2</sup> See Fayle : *Seaborne Trade* I, 256.

<sup>3</sup> Deposition of master of *Cornish City*. M. 18852/14.

<sup>4</sup> Deposition of master of *Rio Iguassu*. M. 19624/14.

<sup>5</sup> *Kreuzerkrieg* II, p. 283.

101. "**Karlsruhe's**" **Movements, October 1-13.**<sup>1</sup>—On October 2 the *Asuncion* rejoined with a series of important telegrams. From these Captain Köhler learned that the *Cap Trafalgar* had been sunk ; that von Spee was on the way to South America, and the *Good Hope*, *Monmouth* and *Glasgow* were proceeding southward, and that there was so serious a shortage of coal throughout Brazil that some railways had stopped running and the electric light supply was much reduced.

For two days no vessels came in sight ; but on October 6 the *Crefeld*, which was scouting to eastward of the cruiser, reported a steamer. After two hours' chase this was captured in 0.46 S., 30.50 W., and proved to be the *Farn*, from Barry for Monte Video with 5,810 tons of Welsh coal and coke.<sup>2</sup> As the *Strathroy* had been scuttled, Captain Köhler had now a spare crew ; these he put on board the *Farn* under a Reserve Officer, Lieutenant-Commander Lubinus, and he then sent her off to join the *Asuncion* and take from her the *Strathroy's* Chinese crew. The *Karlsruhe* remained with the *Crefeld* and *Rio Negro*. As evening drew on the wireless calls of a British man-of-war were heard ; the signals increased so much in strength that Captain Köhler decided to move off to the eastward.

The ship he heard was the *Cornwall*, which in the course of a sweep with the *Bristol* and *Macedonia*<sup>3</sup> was steering direct for the spot where the *Farn* had been captured. Just short of it she turned at noon on the 7th to westward for the sweep of the north coast of Brazil. By that time Captain Köhler's move to eastward had brought him luck. In the afternoon of October 6 the *Rio Negro* reported a steamer, the *Niceto de Larrinaga*, British, from Buenos Aires for London. She was sunk that night in 0.35 S., 29.48 W.<sup>4</sup> Next morning the *Lynrowan*, which had left Buenos Aires at the same time as the *Niceto de Larrinaga*, was captured in 0.25 S., 29.54 W.<sup>5</sup> After transferring her crew to the *Crefeld*, Captain Köhler had her blown up at 3 p.m. The nearest British cruiser to this incident was the *Cornwall*, which at noon, October 7, was in 1.40 S., 31.4 W.<sup>6</sup> A third steamer was taken next morning, the *Cervantes*, from Rio for Liverpool, and at midnight another, the *Pruth*, from Monte Video with nitrate. Both were sunk.<sup>7</sup>

This fine haul of vessels at 40 miles distance from the usual track was due to the mischance that, while the vessels were obeying Admiralty instructions to keep wide of the route, the

<sup>1</sup> Based upon Aust.

<sup>2</sup> Deposition of master of *Farn*. H.S. 22/210/4.

<sup>3</sup> See Section 96.

<sup>4</sup> Deposition of master of *Niceto de Larrinaga*. M. 18797/14.

<sup>5</sup> Deposition of master of *Lynrowan*. M. 18915/14. Aust says gunnery practice was carried out on her hull, but it seems the *Maple Branch* and not the *Lynrowan* was the ship used as a target. *Kreuzerkrieg* II, pp. 268, 288.

<sup>6</sup> Corbett's *Naval Operations*, Map 12, wrongly shows *Cornwall's* noon latitude as 0° 40' S.

<sup>7</sup> Depositions of masters of *Pruth* and *Cervantes*. M. 18926/14, 19119/14.



*Karlsruhe*, which had been waiting more or less on the route itself, had been frightened away from it by the wireless of the cruisers sweeping for her. It would have been advantageous to stay in so good a spot but coal was getting low. At noon, October 9, she met and released the Spanish mail steamer *Cadiz* and Captain Köhler realised that he must soon move, as his position would undoubtedly be reported on the ship's arrival at Las Palmas. He waited another day, in which he held up and released a Norwegian steamer. Then, steering across the trade route, he arrived next day at the rendezvous where the *Asuncion* and *Farn* were awaiting him, and there he found that they were in conversation with another British steamer, the *Condor*, bound from New York for Chile. The master had taken a widely circuitous route which had brought him to this unfrequented spot, 2° S., 34° W.,<sup>1</sup> that is, 165 miles clear of the track he would follow in peace time and 125 miles from the Brazil-St. Vincent route. The *Condor* was captured and proved a valuable prize. She had in her cargo lubricating oil which the *Karlsruhe* could use for fuel; provisions, which were welcome; and dynamite cartridges, of which the cruiser had run out. Unloading this prize occupied the whole of October 12 and 13.

The *Crefeld* was now full of unwilling passengers, the crews of the captured ships, and the feeding of them was a serious drain on the stock of provisions. Already Captain Köhler had decided to send her to Tenerife to land her prisoners; he now detached her for the voyage, with orders not to arrive before October 22. She parted company at 4 p.m., October 13, while the men of the cruiser were still engaged in clearing the *Condor*.<sup>2</sup>

By the *Crefeld* Captain Köhler sent a letter in which he reported that he was not in touch with the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* and did not know where she was; he was in communication with Pernambuco through the *Holger*, a vessel of the Roland line, which had been at that port since the beginning of the war; and that he knew the rendezvous line between Rocas Reef and Trinidad to be compromised.<sup>3</sup> The *Holger* seems to have signalled to him the movements of merchant ships and war vessels.<sup>4</sup> In addition to the intelligence given him by the *Holger*, the newspapers in the captured vessels supplied much useful information. The frequent calls of our cruisers at South American ports were all recorded and enabled him to place many of our ships. For

<sup>1</sup> Deposition of the master of *Condor*. M. 18798/14.

<sup>2</sup> This section and the previous one are taken almost entirely from Aust.: *Die Kriegsfahrten S.M.S. Karlsruhe*. This little book, based evidently on a contemporary diary, is corroborated by the statements of the crews of the captured ships given in M. 02377/14, 03281/14, 18626/14, 18715/14, 18809/14, 03383/14, 03403/14.

<sup>3</sup> This Trinidad is probably Trinidad, T.S.D.D.

<sup>4</sup> It was possibly to take in these messages which were not likely to be made on high power that the *Asuncion* went off from time to time. T.S.D.D.

instance, the *Lynrowan's* papers told him that the *Good Hope*, *Monmouth* and *Glasgow* had been at Monte Video.

Punctually on the date fixed by Captain Köhler the *Crefeld* steamed in to Tenerife, and soon the report that she had on board 400 men from 13 sunken ships began to spread. It reached the Admiralty at 5.58 p.m. on October 22, and was followed next morning by a list of the names of the ships.<sup>1</sup> The effect of the news on shipping was slight; in fact, it disturbed trade less than the sinking of the *Hyades* and *Holmwood* by the *Dresden*, and the effect of the *Karlsruhe's* operations was hardly appreciable even on the trade of the route which she attacked.<sup>2</sup>

The Consul's endeavours to inform the *Victorian* by wireless of the *Crefeld's* arrival were to a certain extent frustrated by the Spanish operators at the Marconi station, who withheld his message from despatch until 4 a.m., October 23. On receipt of it the *Victorian* went full speed to Santa Cruz de Tenerife, arriving at midday. The Spanish refused to intern the *Crefeld*; she thus made the fourth vessel to be blockaded at Tenerife alone, and Captain Somerville of the *Victorian* suggested that torpedo boats were required to make the blockade effective. He interviewed all the masters of the captured ships and telegraphed to the Admiralty a précis of the information obtained from them.<sup>3</sup>

According to these masters the *Karlsruhe* had over 12,000 tons of coal, mostly Welsh, oil fuel and a large quantity of provisions taken from captured ships; she operated in line abreast with her scouts at 80 miles distant on each beam; and she obtained exact information from the United States and Brazil of the dates of departure and destination of steamers.<sup>4</sup>

102. **Searching the Brazilian Coast for the "Karlsruhe."**—No special steps were taken by the Admiralty to send any ships to the area in which the *Karlsruhe* had been operating. What was done was rather to look for her bases. Admiral Stoddart's information that she had been coaling in 5° S., 36° 8' W. (Lavandiera Reef) on October 20 was later than that brought by the *Crefeld*, and he ordered the *Kent* to look in there on her way south and to inform the *Defence*,<sup>5</sup> which had left St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, in the forenoon of the 21st for Pernambuco. The *Defence*, however, did not visit Lavandiera Reef; keeping well out of the trade route she examined Rocas Reef in the early morning of October 25 and, visiting Pernambuco for a few hours on the 26th, proceeded for Abrolhos.

<sup>1</sup> A 145.

<sup>2</sup> Fayle: *Seaborne Trade* I, 266, where the reasons for this are discussed; also pp. 333-4.

<sup>3</sup> *Victorian*, Letter of Proceedings. M. 01006/15.

<sup>4</sup> Telegram from *Victorian* received October 26, 1.14 a.m. H.S. 44, p. 234. The statements of the masters were not all correct. See Section 126.

<sup>5</sup> H.S. 44, p. 185.



Admiral Stoddart, as can be seen by his instructions to the *Kent*, thought she was to join him in accordance with her sailing orders. When ordering her to remain with the *Highflyer* the Admiralty had not informed him of the change, but they now explained to him that the *Defence* was not additional to, but instead of, the *Kent* in his squadron. They instructed him not to proceed further south till there was more definite news of von Spee's squadron; a cruiser working with an armed liner was to operate within 300 miles of Cape San Roque, while another ship was to guard the supplies and colliers at Abrolhos; the *Edinburgh Castle* was not to continue her round voyage as he had ordered, but to remain on the station for the time. Besides giving him these definite instructions, they pointed out that there were two focal points to be guarded and patrolled by him, one near Cape San Roque, the other between Rio and Abrolhos.<sup>1</sup>

On October 26 a still later report of the *Karlsruhe* was brought by a Swedish ship, the *Annie Johnson*, which came into Pernambuco with the news that she had been stopped by the *Karlsruhe* at night on October 23, 100 miles north of Fernando Noronha. The *Edinburgh Castle*, which had looked in at Pernambuco on the 23rd and examined Lavandeira Reef on the 24th, was then cruising round about Fernando Noronha and Rocas Reef. The *Bristol*, with Captain Fanshawe, Senior Officer of the Cape San Roque division, was on her way up from Abrolhos, keeping 100 miles to seaward while the *Macedonia* followed close in shore. Calling the *Edinburgh Castle* to him, Captain Fanshawe met her at midnight in 5.20 S., 33.20 W., whereupon he sent her to patrol along the trade route 100 miles north of Fernando Noronha, while he himself proceeded for Lavandeira *viâ* Rocas Reef.

Off Rocas, at noon on the 27th, he was joined by the *Macedonia* and he sent her to patrol the meridian of 34° W., between 2.30 S., and 4.30 S. None of the three vessels saw or heard anything of the *Karlsruhe* or her colliers, except some faint Telefunken, unreadable through atmospherics.<sup>2</sup>

### 103. Searching the Coast of Africa for the "Karlsruhe."

The Admiralty, on the other hand, were investigating a totally different area. They had come to the conclusion that when a hostile cruiser made her presence known by sending the crews of captured vessels in to port she was unlikely to remain on the same route,<sup>3</sup> and when a report came in from Dakar on the 24th that the *Karlsruhe* was at anchor near the Bissagos or Bijouga Islands (11° N., 16° W.), they gave it sufficient credence to order the *Highflyer* there from St. Vincent.<sup>4</sup> She accordingly proceeded on the 25th, leaving the *Empress of Britain* alone off St. Vincent. The *Marmora* was on her way to Sierra Leone,

<sup>1</sup> A 146, 147.  
<sup>2</sup> A 137.

<sup>2</sup> *Bristol W/T Log*, 18259. October 27.  
<sup>3</sup> A 148, 150.

escorting the store ship. Admiral de Robeck had already suggested that he should send a vessel to assist in the patrol of the Canaries when ships were short there, and the Admiralty now asked him to send a cruiser and the *Calgarian* to relieve the *Kent* and *Victorian* at the Canaries, so that they could go down the inshore trade route towards Cape Verde to look out for the *Karlsruhe*.<sup>1</sup> He was now in the *Amphitrite*. He had left the Azores in the *Argonaut* on October 14, and after coaling at Madeira on the 17th met the *Amphitrite* at the Tagus and transferred his flag to her on the 20th. The *Argonaut* he sent to Devonport with orders to look in at Vigo on the way. The *Europa* joined him at last next day, and leaving her to guard the Tagus he proceeded to Gibraltar. Soon after leaving Gibraltar again he received the Admiralty's telegram requiring him to send a cruiser to the Canaries. His flagship was the only vessel available,<sup>2</sup> and as the *Calgarian* was not out of dockyard hands he suggested that the *Bacchante*, then waiting at Gibraltar for a convoy, should join him at the Canaries. This the Admiralty would not allow<sup>3</sup> and the *Amphitrite* proceeded alone.

Meanwhile the *Highflyer* had received explicit information that the *Karlsruhe* was cruising near Bissagos Islands; on this, the *Kent* was instructed to proceed towards Cape Verde as soon as Admiral de Robeck's cruiser approached the Canaries. As Captain Buller (*Highflyer*) asked that if the *Kent* could be spared she should be sent to join him, and a definite report was received from the French Admiralty that the *Karlsruhe* had been seen at anchor on the 23rd in the suspected spot,<sup>4</sup> the Admiralty sent the *Kent* orders direct to join the *Highflyer*, using all despatch.<sup>5</sup> The French also instructed their cruiser *Pothuan*, then en route for the Cameroons, to search the district as she passed.<sup>6</sup>

Without waiting for the *Amphitrite*, the *Kent* shaped course at 2 a.m. on the 26th for the Bissagos Islands; and, coaling at Dakar on the 28th, joined the *Highflyer* at the suspected spot on the 30th. They remained patrolling the African coast till November 4, when they both went in to Sierra Leone, the *Kent* to coal and the *Highflyer* to refit. Neither found any trace of the *Karlsruhe* or any supply ship.

104. **Admiral de Robeck at the Canary Islands.**—The *Amphitrite* reached Las Palmas at 9 a.m. October 28, and from the Consul and from Captain Somerville of the *Victorian* Admiral de Robeck learned full details of the unsatisfactory state of affairs. He immediately addressed a letter to the Civil Governor of the Canaries, suggesting that, since the Spanish Government had

<sup>1</sup> A 144, 151. The *Kent's* convoy had been taken over on the 23rd by the *Vindictive*.

<sup>2</sup> De Robeck, Letter of Proceedings. M. 03850/14.

<sup>3</sup> A 151.

<sup>4</sup> H.S. 44, pp. 198, 212, 225, 227.

<sup>5</sup> A 152.

<sup>6</sup> H.S. 44, p. 236.



stopped the departure of German merchant ships from ports of Spain by disabling their engines, the *Arucas*, *Macedonia* and *Walhalla* should be similarly treated. As regards the use of wireless, he urged the Governor to take immediate action for the strict and impartial enforcement of neutrality, which appeared at the time to be infringed in that, while the British Consul at Las Palmas was forbidden to transmit wireless messages in cypher, the German and Austrian Consuls in the Islands were reporting the movements of ships by cypher messages to their Embassies at Madrid. Some of these messages were intercepted by the *Victorian*; they had been sent from Las Palmas to Tenerife (a distance of 56 miles) from a high-power station with a range of 1,500 to 2,000 miles, on the 600 metre wave-length; then from Tenerife, also a high-power station, on the 2,500 metre wave-length; and from Cadiz, another high-power station, on a third wave-length; thus offering three chances of interception to a listening ship.<sup>1</sup> As Admiral de Robeck pointed out to the Governor, these reports were without doubt read by all German vessels within 1,000 miles.<sup>2</sup> In the middle of his correspondence with the Governor came an order from Madrid permitting cypher messages to be sent by all nations alike; he at once protested that such a privilege was of no use to us, but had the effect of converting the Canary Islands into a base for the distribution of German intelligence. Besides addressing the Governor he urged the Admiralty to take up the matter.<sup>3</sup>

Not content with writing to the Governor of the province, he sent the *Victorian* to Palma Island to demand the internment of the *Macedonia* by the local officials. The request was immediately complied with as a provisional measure; sanction for the steps taken was received from Madrid, and at 10 a.m. on October 31 the Consul was able to inform the *Victorian* that the vessel was absolutely and officially interned by order of the supreme authority. The reason for her internment is not given. Some five months later it was discovered that she had been waiting for four weeks at her rendezvous west of Hierro Island. While there she came across a German sailing ship, the *Pamir*, whose master, an old friend of the *Macedonia's* captain, did not know of the outbreak of war. The two arranged that the *Pamir* should go in to Santa Cruz de la Palma, her master coming out in his boat once a week to keep the *Macedonia* posted with news. At the end of four weeks at the rendezvous the *Macedonia*

<sup>1</sup> Letter from *Victorian*, M. 04500/14, in papers titled *F.O.*, 31.10.14. Between October 10 and November 11, 25 messages were intercepted. They were addressed in Spanish to the German Embassy, Madrid, and signed *Mittelstrasse*, who was the Austrian Consul.

<sup>2</sup> Although he did not mention it to the Governor, there was no need to use wireless, since the cable to Cadiz was available.

<sup>3</sup> This paragraph is based on papers titled *Foreign Office*, 31 October, 1914, *W/T in Canary Islands*; and de Robeck: Letter of Proceedings. M. 03850/14.

decided to go into Palma Island, and found on arrival that there was an order for her to that effect.<sup>1</sup> Although these facts were not then known, some inkling of them was gathered from a letter of one of the *Pamir's* crew intercepted by us about this time,<sup>2</sup> and even without this evidence the Spanish Government considered the *Macedonia* sufficiently dangerous to intern.

At Las Palmas, however, we were unable to secure the internment of the *Duala* and *Arucas*, which were definitely known to have coaled the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*; some half-promises were received and the two ships were ordered into harbour; they were "not to be allowed to leave," but were not officially interned.<sup>3</sup> The situation seemed so unsatisfactory that Admiral de Robeck decided to remain in the Canaries, although his own station was occupied only by the *Europa* off the Tagus, since the *Argonaut* and *Vindictive* were in dockyard hands at Devonport.

It will be remembered that one of the duties of the Atlantic cruisers had been the sending in of neutral steamers carrying reservists. This had been stopped on October 7;<sup>4</sup> but on October 27 the Admiralty reinstated the practice.<sup>5</sup> The reservists had by that time found that they were no longer arrested, and in the Italian *Principe di Udine* the *Victorian* discovered 50 of them. She sent the vessel into Gibraltar to be dealt with there.<sup>6</sup>

After the end of October the number of cruisers at sea began to increase. The *Argonaut* left Devonport on November 3; the *Donegal* got finally away the same day with orders from Admiral de Robeck to call at Madeira and then join him at the Canaries;<sup>7</sup> and the *Calgarian* left Gibraltar November 1 for the same purpose.

**105. Another Outward Convoy.**—The convoy on account of which the *Bacchante* had been prevented from coming to the Canaries during the refitting of the *Calgarian* was the Home Counties Division of Territorial troops for India. According to the programme it should have left England on October 25.<sup>8</sup>

The *Euryalus* was not to bring out the convoy, since she was taken by Admiral Wemyss for the flagship of the Western Channel Patrol; it was to be taken by the *Diana* only. As far as Finisterre the French armoured cruisers would help to cover it, and the *Bacchante* on the 27th was ordered to join it off Finisterre and come on to Gibraltar with it.<sup>9</sup> Accordingly, the

<sup>1</sup> Papers titled Cap. K 25/1915, *Proceedings of Macedonia*.

<sup>2</sup> Admiralty to I.O., Gibraltar, 20.10.14.

<sup>3</sup> *Victorian*, Letter of Proceedings. M. 01006/14.

<sup>4</sup> See Section 91. <sup>5</sup> H.S. 44, p. 254.

<sup>6</sup> *Victorian*, Letter of Proceedings, M. 01006/15. They were released, as they had been shipped before the last order; see H.S. 44, p. 517.

<sup>7</sup> H.S. 44, p. 363. <sup>8</sup> See paragraph 94. <sup>9</sup> A 153.



*Bacchante*, which had been lying at Gibraltar since October 14, proceeded at 8 p.m. on the 27th and was off Finisterre by the 29th. There she endeavoured to get into touch with the *Diana* by wireless. All attempts failed, and, concluding that by this time the convoy must have passed, the *Bacchante* proposed to go back to Gibraltar. It was not till then that the Admiralty informed her that the *Diana* and convoy were only now about to sail and that she must remain off Finisterre to pick them up.<sup>1</sup> Even so, it was not till the morning of the 30th that the *Diana* met the convoy off the Eddystone; and since, on account of French reports of submarines, the route of the convoy was put 30 miles west of the usual track, the *Bacchante* had to wait off Cape Finisterre till November 1 before she could join it. She arrived at Gibraltar with it on the 4th, the *Diana* having parted company at Cape Tarifa, where she took charge of three transports from China,<sup>2</sup> which had been brought from Gibraltar so far by the *Proserpine*.

106. **More Captures by the "Karlsruhe."**—By the end of October the *Highflyer* and *Kent* had found no confirmation of the rumour that the *Karlsruhe* had been on the coast of Africa, and Captain Buller proposed to return to St. Vincent with the *Highflyer* and *Marmora*, the *Kent* to work with the *Empress of Britain* on the coast from Sierra Leone; this arrangement would agree with the Admiralty's latest order that the cruisers were each to have an armed merchant cruiser attached to them, and the *Empress of Britain's* boilers required three weeks' cleaning.<sup>3</sup>

A few days later it was further made clear that the German cruiser had certainly been nowhere near Bissagos at the time reported. On November 2 the *Asuncion* steamed in to Para, bringing the passengers and crews of three more British steamers—the *Glanton*, *Hurstdale* and *Vandyck*. These three ships had been captured by the *Karlsruhe* on October 18, 23 and 26 respectively, the first two in the neighbourhood of 1° 20' S., 31° 30' W., and the *Vandyck*, which was a liner on passage from the River Plate for New York, in 1.14 S., 40.42 W., an entirely new area for the *Karlsruhe's* operations,<sup>4</sup> which had so far been confined to Area D, whose western limit was the meridian of 40° W. The *Glanton* and *Hurstdale* had been seen to sink, but the *Vandyck* was still afloat when the *Asuncion* parted company. She was a fast ship of 10,000 tons, fitted with wireless, which had not been damaged, and to the Consul-General, Buenos Aires, it seemed probable that the German would arm her and use as cruiser. Another British liner of similar qualifications, *La Correntina*, was nearly a month overdue, and she too, he thought, might have been captured and armed.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 44, pp. 307, 309.

<sup>3</sup> A 157; H.S. 44, pp. 334, 341, 355, 369.

<sup>4</sup> H.S. 43, pp. 241, 243, 245.

<sup>2</sup> *Arcadia, Nile, Carnarvonshire.*

<sup>5</sup> H.S. 43, pp. 258.

It was now three weeks since the *Karlsruhe* had been reported and she had then last been seen taking stores from the *Condor*. This occupied the cruiser till 10 p.m. on October 13, by which time the *Condor's* oil had been brought on board.<sup>1</sup> Leaving the *Rio Negro* to make certain that the *Condor* sank, the *Karlsruhe* went off with the *Farn* to coal. She was joined on the 17th by the *Rio Negro* and *Asuncion*, the latter, as usual, with news. Next day, Captain Köhler was back at his station on the trade route north of Fernando Noronha and almost immediately captured the *Glanton*. Although this ship was carrying Cardiff coal to Monte Video, he had quite enough fuel, and not being able to spare a crew for her, decided to sink her. Just as she was going down, another steamer was sighted; it proved to be the *Zaanland* of Amsterdam, and had to be released. An Italian ship later in the evening was also let go. As the *Karlsruhe* was exactly on the trade route, he had little chance of catching British vessels; indeed, the *Glanton's* presence there was accidental, for her master was at the time crossing the trade route from west to east.<sup>2</sup> For three days during which the *Karlsruhe* and her consorts remained drifting no vessel was seen, though one ship had passed whose presence would have been unwelcome. This was the *Carnarvon* on her way to Pernambuco from St. Vincent; at 3 a.m. she was in 1.20 S., 31.40 W., practically the position in which the *Glanton* had been captured. She saw nothing of the *Karlsruhe* squadron, nor did they see her. In fact they sighted no ship till at 10 p.m. on the 22nd the Swedish S.S. *Atlant* was hailed and let go.

On the 23rd the *Hurstdale*, whose master was keeping only 20 miles from the track, was brought to and sunk; while she was still half-submerged and sinking, the *Annie Johnson* passed to carry the news to Pernambuco. By this time Captain Köhler was aware that his methods and the field of his operations must have been revealed by the British seamen in the *Crefeld*. On October 25, therefore, he collected his auxiliaries, the *Rio Negro*, *Asuncion*, *Farn* and *Indrani*, gave them detailed orders for the next few weeks and, accompanied by the *Farn* as collier, proceeded away to the north-west.

When leaving the West Indies he had been considering plans for attacking the British and French West Indian possessions, in particular Martinique and Barbados. At the time his coal supply was too uncertain for him to risk the attempt; but now that he had the *Farn* and *Indrani*, that difficulty was no longer present, and it was for a surprise attack on Barbados that he had temporarily abandoned the ordinary methods of commerce destruction. He did not expect to find any steamers on his present course and it was, therefore, a welcome surprise to him when his lookouts reported the *Vandyck*, which

<sup>1</sup> From here to the end of this section is based upon Aust.

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 22, p. 216.



proved to be the " choicest morsel that had fallen into our laps . . . She had been warned of our presence by the *Bristol*. Her master had exercised the greatest caution, had darkened the lights at night, and had not used his wireless for six days. He was all the more surprised, therefore, when the Prize Officer solemnly informed him that we had really expected him yesterday."<sup>1</sup> The 210 passengers and the crew of the *Vandyck*, and the crews of the *Glanton* and *Hurstdale*, were transferred to the *Asuncion*, which was to carry them to land. Captain Fritsch of the *Asuncion* wanted to stay, and assured Captain Köhler that he would much rather share the fortunes of the *Karlsruhe*. Luckily for him Captain Köhler did not give way and the *Asuncion* departed for Para with orders not to arrive before November 1.

Although, of course, the crews of the captured steamers knew nothing of Captain Köhler's plans for attacking the West Indies, the position in which the *Vandyck* had been sunk was in Area H, and Admiral Hornby, who until then had been occupied mainly with watching New York, now inquired what was the extreme southern limit of his station. It is not clear that any answer was sent.<sup>2</sup>

**107. North America and West Indies, October 15 to November 4.**—The possibility of an attack in the West Indies had presented itself to Admiral Hornby, who reviewed with some concern the accumulation of coal at St. Lucia, an entirely undefended island. By October 23 there were 10,000 tons ashore and 5,000 more on the way; on his representation that he could not keep a cruiser permanently there as guard ship the Admiralty diverted to Jamaica a collier then on its way and arranged to send no more coal to St. Lucia unless the Admiral requisitioned it.<sup>3</sup> The *Descartes* had resumed the duty of guardship at St. Lucia on October 13. The other cruisers of the West Indies Division, the *Berwick*, *Essex* and *Condé*, made cruises to examine the various German rendezvous, but failed to catch any more supply ships.

In the north Admiral Hornby maintained the watch on New York with the *Lancaster*, *Suffolk*, *Niobe* and *Caronia*, till the *Niobe*'s condensers gave out and she had to go to Halifax for four weeks' repairs. From time to time circumstantial reports that the German liners were ready to sail were received,<sup>4</sup> but nothing particular occurred. The *Glory* rejoined from Queens-town on November 2 and Admiral Hornby re-hoisted his flag in her at Halifax.

The neutral ships chartered by the Hamburg-Amerika Line to supply German cruisers continued to give trouble. On October 21 the Admiralty gave the Intelligence Officers at Kingston and St. John's an outline of the system so far as known to them. In this, they stated that the headquarters of the

<sup>1</sup> Aust.

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 42, pp. 94, 108.

<sup>3</sup> See H.S. 42, p. 236.

<sup>4</sup> H.S. 42, pp. 122, 146, 163.

system appeared to be Philadelphia and that the agents were Grandfield and Co., the New York and Porto Rico S.S. Company, and Ganz; any colliers or supply ships chartered by any of these firms were to be detained. It was Grandfield who had chartered the *Heina*, *Nepos*, *Mowinckel*, and *Unita*; and five other Norwegian colliers were thought to be operating. It had been reported that vessels chartered as supply ships for the Caribbean were instructed, if they did not find the German cruisers at the rendezvous given them, to go to St. Thomas and turn their cargoes over to the German Consul.<sup>1</sup> Our Ambassador at Washington handed in a formal protest asking that steps should be taken to prevent United States ports being made a base for hostilities; but the reply he received was only to the effect that United States Consuls would make inquiries. As regards St. Thomas, the Danish Governor published an emphatic denial that the island was a base for German supplies. This was confirmed by the new British Consul, who reported that the wireless telegraphy rooms of the German ships were sealed and the general feeling in the place was anti-German. A new suspicious ship was the *Uller*, Norwegian, chartered by the Hamburg-Amerika Line, which, arriving at Savannah from New York on October 19, began loading cotton for Gothenburg, a port which had never yet taken any of that article. As her agent was Ganz, and she left a week later with 80 tons of ice, besides meat and tinned goods, she was looked upon as suspicious.<sup>2</sup> Another suspected vessel was the *Evelyn*, American, which left Philadelphia on October 21 for Norfolk, Virginia, to load coal; she had taken in at Philadelphia 11 railway car loads of provisions. She returned to Baltimore on November 6 and there seemed nothing to confirm our suspicions about her.<sup>3</sup>

On November 2 an agent reported that the German cruiser squadron from the Pacific, under Admiral von Spee, intended to strike before long in the North Atlantic,<sup>4</sup> and as it was known he was making for South America there can have been nothing improbable in the notion. But unless he came through the Panama Canal he would have to deal first with Admirals Cradock and Stoddart.

**108. Movements on the South American Coast in the latter half of October.**—Admiral Cradock left the Falkland Islands on October 22 to join the *Glasgow*, *Monmouth* and *Otranto*, which were then off the coast of Chile. He had seen definite traces of the *Dresden* at Orange Bay, near Cape Horn, where on a beacon had been found written the words "S.M.S. *Dresden*," and the dates September 9, 10, 11. This was the first indication of her presence since she had sunk the *Holmwood* on August 26.

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 42, pp. 70, 201, 224.

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 42, pp. 16, 60, 103, 130. *Uller* is not mentioned in *Kreuzerriegel* 11 as a supply ship.

<sup>3</sup> H.S. 42, pp. 17, 62, 78, 84, 273. *Evelyn* was a reserve supply ship, but was not used.

<sup>4</sup> H.S. 42, p. 216.



After dispatching the *Katherine Park* with the *Holmwood's* crew, the *Dresden* attempted to coal by means of boats from the *Santa Isabel*; but a storm came on, and as the cruiser had been damaged by previous coalings so much that her seaworthiness was doubtful, Captain Lüdecke felt obliged to leave his excellent cruising ground off the River Plate and seek shelter for coaling and repairs. After trying two or three anchorages, all of which proved impracticable in the north-westerly gale, he finally reached Gill Bay in 45° S., about 800 miles from the River Plate, where he coaled on August 31 and September 1. The place was unsuitable for the repairs to the hull and the opening up of the machinery necessary before the *Dresden* could carry on her work, and Captain Lüdecke decided to seek a more secluded spot in the lonely archipelago which ends in Cape Horn. Leaving Gill Bay on September 2 he followed the trade route southward. The *Santa Isabel* he sent in advance to Punta Arenas to report his presence in South American waters and to procure warm clothing and materials for repairing the engines. The steamer reached Punta Arenas on September 4 and communicated with the supply centres of Buenos Aires and Valparaiso. She was also able to get a message through to Berlin on September 7, and received on the 9th a reply recommending the *Dresden* to operate with the *Leipzig*, which had just reported herself at Guaymas in the Gulf of California. A similar message was sent from Berlin to the *Leipzig*; she immediately left for the southward to meet the *Dresden*; and Captain Lüdecke disappeared for a time from the Atlantic.<sup>1</sup>

Admiral Cradock coaled his squadron on the coast of Chile, intending to proceed northward, and on November 1 a message was received from him that telegrams for him should be sent to Coronel, a port 240 miles south of Valparaiso, up to November 4, after that to Valparaiso. He was evidently likely to meet enemy forces, since on November 1 an armed merchant cruiser, the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, considered to be with von Spee, put in to Valparaiso for a couple of hours; and on the 2nd the agent of the Pacific Line, Valparaiso, reported to his Liverpool headquarters that three German cruisers and five transports were off his port on November 1. On the 3rd there came in further intelligence from Valparaiso; first, that the *Nürnberg* and two other German cruisers had been examining ships about 150 miles south of Valparaiso; next, that active preparations were proceeding in that port for coaling and provisioning German warships and that, on November 1, two large German warships and three smaller ones had been 200 miles south of Valparaiso steaming towards Coronel. Finally, at 5.6 p.m. on November 3 a telegram came from the Consul-General at Valparaiso announcing that three German warships were approaching Valparaiso Bay.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This paragraph is from *Kreuzerkrieg I*, pp. 379, 380.

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 43, pp. 227, 239, 255, 262. A 158. The Consul-General, Valparaiso, some two hours later, gave the names of the three ships as *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Nürnberg*, but the exact time of the receipt of this intelligence is not known.

These reports definitely located the German squadron. The arrangement in force was that Admiral Stoddart on the east coast of South America should have the *Defence* to enable him to bring von Spee to action should he come round the Horn unreported. But now that the more likely event was that the first collision would be with Admiral Cradock, the Admiralty decided to add the *Defence* to the *Good Hope* squadron, and at 6.20 p.m. they ordered her to join Admiral Cradock on the west coast of America with all possible dispatch.<sup>1</sup> At the same time he was told to use the *Glasgow* to keep touch with the enemy, concentrating the rest of his squadron, including the *Canopus*, and effecting a junction with the *Defence* at the earliest possible moment, though without losing touch with the *Glasgow*. The *Defence* had just arrived at Monte Video with the *Orama* and was coaling when she received the order. She replied that she would sail at noon November 4; but as the distance from Monte Video to Valparaiso is nearly 3,000 miles it would be some time before she could be expected to join Admiral Cradock.

Even before she was ready to sail it was learned she would be too late; at 1.29 a.m. on November 4 came a telegram from Valparaiso announcing that an action had taken place outside Coronel on November 1 leaving the German Admiral victorious. The *Monmouth* had sunk; the *Good Hope* was believed to have blown up and gone down too; only the *Glasgow* and *Otranto* had escaped in the darkness.<sup>2</sup>

## CHAPTER XII.

### NOVEMBER 4 TO DECEMBER 9. THE END OF THE GERMAN CRUISER SQUADRON.

#### 109. Arrangements to Counter the German Cruiser Squadron.<sup>3</sup>

—The news of the defeat and dispersal of Admiral Cradock's squadron off Coronel reached England while the nerves of the nation were still tingling from the effects of the bombardment of Gorleston by German battle cruisers the day before. The Admiralty immediately decided to concentrate at Monte Video the whole force in South American waters so as to bar the way of the victorious German Admiral in his passage to the South American trade routes, which appeared to be his most profitable and therefore most probable objective. Orders to this effect were sent out at once, and the *Kent* at Sierra Leone was instructed

<sup>1</sup> A 159. Lord Fisher had been First Sea Lord since October 30; the order is initialled by him and the First Lord.

<sup>2</sup> A 160. For the account of the Battle of Coronel, see pp. 224 to 235 of this volume.

<sup>3</sup> This period has been treated in detail in Monograph 3, C.B. 917, *Operations leading up to the Battle of the Falkland Islands*. Only the main points will be recapitulated here, but new matter will receive fuller treatment.



to join Admiral Stoddart.<sup>1</sup> The concentration when effected would give Admiral Stoddart a more powerful force than had been allotted to Admiral Cradock, since it included the *Defence* in place of the *Good Hope*; but, not content with this, the Admiralty decided to make the destruction of von Spee absolutely certain, and ordered the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets, to detach the battle cruisers *Invincible* and *Inflexible* from the Grand Fleet at once for this purpose.<sup>2</sup> A new command, the South Atlantic and South Pacific Station, was constituted out of the area between the Australian and Cape stations as far north as 5° N.,<sup>3</sup> thus including the whole of South America except the Caribbean coast. Vice-Admiral Sturdee, who, as Chief of the War Staff, had a complete knowledge of all the circumstances which had brought about the present situation, was given command of the new station, his flag to be flown in the *Invincible*.

Besides making an attack on the South American trade routes, von Spee might endeavour to interfere with the operations for the capture of German South-West Africa then in progress and to stimulate a rebellion which had just broken out. The only ship of any force in the Cape squadron was the *Albion*. But orders were sent to the *Minotaur*, sister ship to the *Defence*, to leave the convoy of Australian troops she was escorting and proceed to South Africa, where she and two light cruisers from East Africa were to concentrate on the *Albion*.

To protect West Africa endeavours were made to form an Anglo-French squadron of armoured cruisers from the Mediterranean with a French Admiral in command; but the objection of the French Commander-in-Chief to parting with any of his ships could not be overcome, and the squadron was not formed in that manner.

Although the Admiralty expected von Spee to make his next appearance in the South Atlantic, they did not lose sight of the possibility that he might operate in the Pacific or come through the Panama Canal into the West Indies area. By arrangements with the Japanese any probable movement of the German Cruiser Squadron back to Australian waters was countered; and the battle cruiser *Australia* of the Australian Navy was ordered from Suva in Fiji to Honolulu ready to proceed to the North American coast. A combined squadron consisting of the *Newcastle* and three Japanese vessels was already on the Pacific side of North America; it was ordered to a rendezvous near the Canal, and on November 12 Admiral Patey, in the *Australia*, was instructed to join this squadron. It was understood that he might not be in time to stop von Spee should he have decided to go through the Canal, and if he had done so the

<sup>1</sup> A 162, 163, 165.

<sup>2</sup> A 164, 168.

<sup>3</sup> The 50° N. in O.U. 6038, para. 14, is a misprint.

*Australia* was to follow him and bring him to action in the Caribbean Sea.<sup>1</sup>

In the meantime, before the *Australia's* arrival, steps had to be taken to deal with the menace to the West Indies. On the 8th the Admiralty ordered Admiral Hornby to send two cruisers to watch the Canal from the 12th onwards, ignoring all other interests except the guard over the liners at New York. They felt that if the German Cruiser Squadron came anywhere near, these liners would certainly attempt to break out. To add to the general anxiety, there were reports from trustworthy agents that Germany intended to send a battle cruiser out from home.<sup>2</sup> They met this new danger by dispatching the *Princess Royal* to operate off New York.

**110. The Concentration at Monte Video and Move to Abrolhos ; destruction of the "Navarra."**—By November 11 all the cruisers on the south-east coast of America were concentrated off Monte Video except the *Bristol* and *Macedonia* operating off Cape San Roque in search of the *Karlsruhe*. The *Canopus*, with serious engine defects, was useless with the squadron and was ordered by the Admiralty to organise defences at the Falkland Islands in case von Spee should arrive with the intention of destroying the wireless station and capturing the coal there.

Admiral Stoddart sent the *Otranto* to Rio for mails, water and other necessaries, to join him as soon as possible at Abrolhos. The *Orama* also was sent on in advance to meet and send back two colliers and an oiler which were on their way to Monte Video. The rest of the squadron sailed immediately the *Glasgow*, which had just joined, finished coaling.

Shortly after leaving the squadron the *Orama* sighted a steamer and altered course towards her. The steamer immediately made the wireless signal, "*Navarra* being chased by English cruiser," and smoke was seen to be coming from her fore-castle. The *Orama*, Captain Segrave, rapidly approached, and finding that the ship was really on fire and that her crew had taken to the boats, he hailed them alongside and took them into his ship; he did not board the burning vessel, whose name *Navarra* could be read on her stern, since his information was that she was carrying ammunition, but he sank her by gunfire.

From the prisoners it was discovered that she had embarked ammunition in Germany on July 5 for the German Cruiser Squadron and arrived at New York on July 21; going on to

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 46 to Vice-Admiral Commanding, *Australia*, sent 7 p.m., 12.11.1914.

<sup>2</sup> On November 6 the Captain of the *Von der Tann* sent in an official memorandum proposing the use of the battle cruisers for commerce destruction in the Atlantic. The speed with which this came to our knowledge is given by the German historian as an example of the efficiency of our intelligence system. *Kreuzerkrieg I*, 258 fn.



Galveston she loaded provisions, later taking in 6,000 tons of coal at Pensacola. From Pensacola she went to a rendezvous in 25° N., 55 W., arriving there on September 16, and proceeded at once to Pernambuco *viâ* Fernando Noronha, which she seems to have passed on September 23-24. After a short visit to Pernambuco on the 25th she steered straight for 29° S., 3½ W.; whence on September 30 she changed course for Punta Arenas. At that port she embarked a considerable quantity of provisions on October 9, intending, according to her captain, to go to the west coast of America. But, frightened by the proximity of our cruisers, he had kept out to sea, hoping eventually to approach the River Plate. A track chart found on the captain suggests that he steamed up and down what may be rendezvous lines from 40° S., 35° W. to 30° S., 30.30 W.; and from the latter position to 40° S., 40° W. between October 21 and November 1. He seems to have been making for the River Plate when captured, and his chief officer stated that they expected to meet the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* there.<sup>1</sup>

The *Glasgow* finished coaling at dawn on the 12th and proceeded for Rio to effect repairs to the damage she had received in the action. The *Defence*, *Carnarvon*, and *Cornwall* weighed at the same time, and, spread within signalling range, kept to seaward of her. At Rio the *Glasgow* was permitted to dock and make a five-days' repair; the Brazilian Government acted with great generosity, allowing her every facility, and at the conclusion of her stay refused to make any charge for docking. Her repairs were most effectually carried out, and in fact she left Rio in better condition than she was in at the outbreak of war.<sup>2</sup>

Admiral Stoddart arrived at Abrolhos on the 17th and found the *Edinburgh Castle* guarding the supply ships; the *Kent* also had just arrived. On the way up he ordered the *Otranto*, after communicating with the squadron off Cape Frio, to go with the *Orama* and investigate Trinidad Island, both to return to Abrolhos; but this order was soon modified, as the *Otranto* had steamed 16,000 miles continuously, and when the two merchant cruisers reached Trinidad on the 19th he sent the *Otranto* on to Sierra Leone for a rest. The *Orama* returned to Abrolhos and rejoined the squadron waiting for Admiral Sturdee.

111. **Admiral Sturdee's Movements November 11-26.**—There was some delay in getting the battle cruisers away; after their arrival at Devonport from Cromarty it was found they would have to remain at least four days before being ready to leave, but the Admiralty felt the urgency to be so pressing that they

<sup>1</sup> Report of destruction of *Navarra* titled *Qa. 49/1914*. The track chart gives a position for September 31 and is probably not very reliable.

<sup>2</sup> M. 04863/14.

ordered the Commander-in-Chief, Devonport, to send the dockyard men, if they could not finish their work in time, away in the ships to be returned as opportunity offered.<sup>1</sup>

Admiral Sturdee's orders, dated November 9,<sup>2</sup> were that he was to proceed to St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, and thence to South American waters; unless on the voyage he was instructed to go to the West Indies, should information be received that the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* were coming north up the west American coast with the possible intention of passing through the Panama Canal. His main duty was to search for the German armoured cruisers and bring them to action. If he went to South America, Abrolhos Rocks would be the best place to meet Admiral Stoddart; and on the way he was to withdraw the *Bristol* and *Macedonia* from the search for the *Karlsruhe* and employ them in operations against the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*. The *Vindictive*, at the conclusion of her refit, would leave Devonport for Ascension to act as a wireless linking ship with home.

The two battle cruisers left Devonport at 4.45 a.m. on November 11, still with some civilian workmen and officials on board; on the 17th they arrived and coaled at St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands. There Admiral Sturdee learned that the German Admiral appeared to be still off the coast of Chile. Frequent intelligence reports came in from Consul-General Maclean of Valparaiso, who not only cabled every piece of likely information but also hired small Chilean steamers to visit the harbours near in quest of news of the cruisers or their supply ships. Nothing definite was discovered; but he telegraphed a likely rumour that 10 German ships were off Valparaiso at dawn on the 13th; eight of them went off N.W., while the remaining two, the *Leipzig* and *Dresden*, came into port. These left next morning without having obtained any coal. Apart from this, the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* had come to Valparaiso on November 4, when she received 1,500 tons of coal.

Besides these reports placing Admiral von Spee off the coast of Chile there was a crop of rumours that the enemy had gone or intended to go north. It was even stated by a secret agent at Tacoma, who got his information from the German Consulate at that port, that the German fleet was coming north with Victoria, British Columbia, as objective.<sup>3</sup>

On the 15th further information from Valparaiso reached Admiral Sturdee to the effect that the German squadron had been seen off Valparaiso Bay at dawn on the 14th, and with this last item of intelligence he left St. Vincent on the 18th for Abrolhos to join the South-East Coast Squadron.

While waiting for the arrival of Admiral Sturdee the collection of intelligence was Admiral Stoddart's chief concern. He made

<sup>1</sup> Telegram to C.-in-C., Devonport, 12.5 a.m., November 10.

<sup>2</sup> M. 0080.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram from Esquimalt received 8.8 p.m., 6.11.14.



arrangements with our Brazilian Minister by wireless that Bahia should be his chief intelligence centre, receiving news from Rio, Pernambuco and Monte Video. He sent at intervals a ship to Bahia to collect the reports and pass them on to him by wireless.<sup>1</sup> Of von Spee and the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau* and *Nürnberg* nothing later than November 4 was definitely known, and it seemed probable that Admiral Sturdee and his battle cruisers, which should pass Rocas Reef on the 23rd, would arrive in time to combine with Admiral Stoddart's squadron before the Germans had struck a blow. As soon as the junction was effected, the *Defence* was to leave to join the Cape Squadron, turning her Poulsen wireless installation over to the *Invincible*, which by its means could keep touch with the *Vindictive*, similarly fitted, when she reached Ascension.<sup>2</sup>

The meeting of the two Admirals and the concentration of the South Atlantic and Pacific Squadron took place on the 26th, when the two battle cruisers arrived at Abrolhos and Admiral Sturdee took command of all the ships present. They included the *Bristol*, which, after a search of the north coast of Brazil for the *Karlsruhe's* bases, had come to Abrolhos, looking in at Ceara, Pernambuco and Bahia on the way. The *Macedonia* had participated in the first part of this search, but on the 15th started for Sierra Leone to clean her boilers. New orders had arrived for Admiral Sturdee; it was now certain that the *Scharnhorst* squadron was at Mas-a-fuera, near Juan Fernandez, on the 15th, and an intercepted wireless message pointed to their presence in the Gulf of Penas, Chile, on the 21st. He was, therefore, to take the whole squadron south and proceed to the Chilean coast after coaling at the Falkland Islands.

**112. Movements of von Spee, November 1-18.**<sup>3</sup>—The information that the whole German squadron was at Mas-a-fuera on November 15 was obtained from the crew of a captured ship brought into Valparaiso on the 20th by the *Sacramento*, a collier that had been serving the German Cruiser Squadron. The news could not be doubted and it showed that the German Admiral had not followed up his victory by an immediate attack on the South American trade routes as had been anticipated.

From the reports of his ships after the battle he learned during the night of November 1 that the *Monmouth* was undoubtedly sunk, but the fate of the *Good Hope* was not so certain. She was seen in flames, and a violent explosion was observed in the darkness from her direction, but by none of the German ships had she been seen to sink. He therefore decided to go into Valparaiso, his centre of supply and intelligence, with the threefold object of inspiring confidence in German power, of obtaining information and supplies, and of securing

<sup>1</sup> M. 0134/15.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 128 to Admiral Stoddart, 3 a.m., 22.11.14.

<sup>3</sup> Based on *Kreuzerkrieg*, except where other references are given.

the internment of the *Good Hope* should she have taken refuge in a Chilean harbour. As only three ships of any one belligerent were allowed to enter a Chilean port together he detached the *Dresden* to take the important collier *Sacramento* to Mas-a-fuera, and the *Leipzig* to bring his other colliers from the rendezvous 150 miles west of Valparaiso also to Mas-a-fuera, where he intended to coal his whole squadron before undertaking further operations. During the morning before the battle a Norwegian sailing vessel, the *Helicon*, with a British-owned cargo of 2,600 tons of Cardiff coal, was captured by one of his attendant auxiliaries, the *Titania*, and eventually towed to Mas-a-fuera by the *Baden*.<sup>1</sup> The *Leipzig*, whose compasses had taken on a new deviation through the firing and the diminution of her ammunition, had some difficulty in making the rendezvous, but at length found the supply ships *Baden*, *Santa Isabel* and *Amasis* on the 3rd. Shortly afterwards she captured a French sailing vessel, the *Valentine*, also with coal to the amount of 3,500 tons. She was towed to Mas-a-fuera by the *Amasis*,<sup>2</sup> the two sailing ships providing an unexpected, but none the less welcome, addition to the squadron's fuel supply.

Going in to Valparaiso with the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau* and *Nürnberg*, Admiral von Spee telegraphed to Berlin a short report on the action and embarked 127 volunteers from the German merchant vessels in harbour. His report reached the German Admiralty on the 6th. He left at 11 a.m., November 4, for Mas-a-fuera, arriving two days later. The *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* went in to Valparaiso on the 4th for coal and provisions; on the way she made an attempt to capture a Pacific liner, but was foiled by the liner keeping in territorial waters, which were being patrolled by Chilean destroyers. After leaving Valparaiso she also joined the squadron at Mas-a-fuera. The absence of the *Dresden* and *Leipzig* when the Admiral went in to Valparaiso had started a rumour that they had been sunk in the battle; partly to refute this and more especially to get further intelligence and orders, he sent them in with a second report on the 13th. At midnight November 13-14 the *Leipzig* and *Dresden*, at high speed and with all lights out, left for a rendezvous in 42.30 S., 79.45 W. On the way there they met one of Admiral Cradock's colliers, the *North Wales*, which had been recalled from Juan Fernandez to the Falkland Islands and in accordance with the general instructions was keeping well wide of all steamer tracks. She had only 700 tons of coal left, and the *Dresden* therefore sank her, after transferring her crew to the *Rhakotis*, a Kosmos liner which had come up out of Valparaiso on the 12th and had been overtaken by them. The concentration took place at the appointed spot on the 18th.

Von Spee, on leaving Mas-a-fuera on the 15th, left the captured sailing vessels and the *Titania* and *Sacramento* with the *Prinz*

<sup>1</sup> Statement of master of *Helicon*, M. 16612/15. <sup>2</sup> Glasgow W/T Log 46988.



*Eitel Friedrich*, as their lack of speed would hamper him in his future movements. The *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* was to clear them of coal, release the *Helicon*, sink the *Titania* and *Valentine*, and send the crew of the latter on board the *Sacramento* to Valparaiso.<sup>1</sup> With the aid of the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* he meant to hide his movement south and he gave her orders to remain off Valparaiso, making and answering signals and showing searchlights so as to give the impression that the whole squadron was still in the neighbourhood; after the first week in December she was free to come also into the Atlantic. Thus, when the concentration of the squadron took place there were, besides the five cruisers, only the *Baden*, *Amasis* and *Santa Isabel*. The whole squadron continued southward for San Quintin Bay in 46.49 S., 74.21 W., and arrived there on November 21.

At this anchorage, one of the best harbours on the coast,<sup>2</sup> they found waiting the *Seydlitz* and *Ramses*, supply vessels which had been sent from the Valparaiso base on October 20 and 12 respectively. The *Seydlitz* had 4,150 tons of coal, the *Ramses* 2,000, besides provisions and stores. At the same time as the squadron came in the *Memphis*, which had left Punta Arenas on the night of November 19 with 2,400 tons of coal; and on the 23rd arrived the *Luxor* from Coronel with 3,600 tons more. These smaller, slower vessels were not to accompany the squadron and all the coal and stores in them were transferred to the *Seydlitz*, *Baden* and *Santa Isabel*, which then carried between them 17,000 tons. The *Rhakotis*, with the crew of the *North Wales* on board, was to wait till the squadron was clear away and then go to Callao. The *Amasis* was to arrive at Punta Arenas on December 6 and fill up from the American steamer *Minnesotan*, which was waiting there with 7,300 tons of coal; she was then to go to the position 40° S., 50° W., and get in touch with the squadron by wireless. The *Memphis* and *Luxor* were to return to west coast ports.

With regard to the future programme of the squadron an interchange of telegrams with Berlin had taken place by means of the *Dresden's* visit to Valparaiso. The German Admiralty had already reached the conclusion that cruiser warfare in the Atlantic was only possible if the German ships acted in groups. The Staff were convinced that all their supply rendezvous were discovered or could not be maintained on account of the strong watch we kept on the trade routes; and the intention was for von Spee to make his way home, being joined by the *Karlsruhe* en route.<sup>3</sup> The *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, on account of her large coal

<sup>1</sup> The deposition of the master of the *Valentine* is in papers titled F.O. 9.2.15, *Ships Chartered*.

<sup>2</sup> *South America Pilot*, Part II, p. 377.

<sup>3</sup> It seems that attempts were made to order the *Emden*, then in the midst of her career of commerce destruction in the Indian Ocean, also to join von Spee, but communication with her could not be obtained. *Von Pohl's Diary*, November 11. Translated in *Monthly Intelligence Report*, July 1920.

consumption and little fighting value, was to be laid up in a neutral port. The Admiralty Staff had already informed the supply and intelligence officers who might be able to reach von Spee that the best thing he could do was to concentrate all forces and endeavour to break through the blockade to home, and during his personal visit to Valparaiso the Admiral received instructions to that effect.<sup>1</sup> It seems that he waited to be sure of coal supplies before definitely replying, on November 16, "Decided to break through for home."<sup>2</sup>

**113. Von Spee's Atlantic Coal Supply.**—The German Admiral had been informed that the coal supply was guaranteed. He therefore ordered the Buenos Aires and New York supply centres to have 10,000 tons of coal by December 5 at Puerto Santa Elena, an uninhabited anchorage in 44.31 S., 65.22 W., some 600' south of the River Plate, where was to be his next coaling rendezvous. He further ordered 20,000 tons by January 1, 5,000 of this to be on call at Pernambuco, and an additional 15,000 tons to be ready at New York by January 20.

He had, however, been misinformed. The coal supply was by no means guaranteed, and a letter fully explaining the situation was sent by the Buenos Aires Supply Officer to await the Admiral at Puerto Santa Elena. From October onwards colliers in Brazilian ports were not allowed to leave if there was the slightest suspicion that they were to supply German cruisers. The attitude of Argentine was no more accommodating, for vessels were not permitted to load more coal than their customary bunkers would hold. In December a further rule was made that the masters of colliers belonging to belligerent nations, before leaving, had to state all their ports of call, and both Argentine and Uruguay required a consular guarantee that the intended voyage was purely commercial. In Chile, where British objections to the departure of *Seydlitz* had been successfully overcome by the German representatives,<sup>3</sup> the attitude of the Government became increasingly unfriendly after the departure of the *Luxor* and *Memphis* without clearance and the squadron had made so long a stay at Mas-a-fuera. Altogether the difficulties of the supply officers in South America were almost insuperable.

As regards the 20,000 tons ordered at New York great difficulty was anticipated owing to what the Germans considered to be the pro-British attitude of the authorities. In spite of this, however, even by the end of November it was hoped to get the colliers away when required, though that they could be German vessels, as specially requested by von Spee, was more

<sup>1</sup> Letter of October 10 from German Admiralty to von Spee, which was an amplification of a letter of September 29. *Kreuzerkrieg* I, 234-7.

<sup>2</sup> *Durchbruch des Kreuzergeschwaders in die Heimat ist beabsichtigt. Kreuzerkrieg* I, 238.

<sup>3</sup> For our Minister's action see M. 15518/15.



than doubtful. This hope dwindled as December went on and the departure of a fully prepared supply ship from San Francisco had also to be delayed.

The most favourable centre for supply seemed to be the Canary Islands, where, at the end of October, there were 3,000 tons at Las Palmas, 4,000 at Palma and 6,000 at Tenerife. On November 6 this was increased by the arrival of the *Alwina*, one of two Dutch colliers chartered by the Berlin Admiralty for a voyage to Pernambuco. However, the secret of the *Alwina*'s mission leaked out; it was considered too dangerous for her to continue the projected voyage and her cargo was disposed of locally.<sup>1</sup>

Unaware of these difficulties and supposing all arrangements complete for coaling the squadron in the future, von Spee sailed on November 26 with his five cruisers and three supply ships for his adventurous voyage homeward round the Horn.

**114. The Canary Islands and East Atlantic.**—The German-owned coal in Canary Islands ports had long been carefully watched by our Consuls and its escape retarded by the cruiser patrols maintained by Admirals Stoddart and de Robeck. The German Supply Officer thought, nevertheless, he could get it away if the cruiser squadron made an unexpected attack on our patrol. So far, he seems to have been able to communicate with South America with some ease; but after the middle of November this became more difficult when, by Admiralty direction, the Tenerife-Monrovia cable was cut and he was deprived of a line of cable controlled by Germans.<sup>2</sup>

The watch on the steamers at the Canary Islands, carried out so continuously by our cruisers, was interrupted for a few days when Admiral de Robeck received a French report that the *Karlsruhe* was off the African coast. He was then (November 11) at Madeira in the *Amphitrite*, coaling preparatory to a return to the Tagus; the *Donegal*, fresh out from home, had just joined him. He called up the *Victorian* and *Calgarian*, which were on guard at the Canaries, and proceeded to sweep southward along the trade route, but found no confirmation of the report. At the conclusion of the sweep, which extended as far as 23.30 N., the Admiral intercepted an Admiralty signal to the *Highflyer* ordering her to join him at Sierra Leone by the 20th. He knew nothing of the arrangements implied by this telegram and had been carrying out the usual patrols; but now he decided to go to Madeira for news, leaving the Canaries patrol to the *Donegal* and *Calgarian*. The *Victorian* he sent by Admiralty orders to join the *Highflyer*. At Funchal, which he reached at 10 p.m. on November 14, he received orders, sent two days before, that

<sup>1</sup> The other Dutch collier was named *Josephina*.

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 44, pp. 425, 438, 503, 660.

he was to turn over the command of Force I to his Senior Captain and hoist his flag in the *Warrior*, to take charge of a squadron composed of the *Warrior*, *Black Prince*, *Donegal*, *Highflyer*, *Cumberland* and *Challenger*, which was to concentrate at Sierra Leone and oppose von Spee should he come to West Africa. It was, in fact, a substitute for the squadron of British and French ships for which the Admiralty had failed to obtain our ally's concurrence. After turning over the command to Captain Grant-Dalton of the *Argonaut* at Madeira, the Admiral proceeded to Gibraltar and hoisted his flag in the *Warrior* on the 17th. In the meantime, the Valparaiso telegram of the 14th had been received, with its implication that von Spee was still on the Chilean coast, and the Admiralty now decided to give up the projected West African Squadron. Admiral de Robeck was told to re-hoist his flag in the *Amphitrite*, while the *Warrior*, *Black Prince* and *Donegal* were to join the Grand Fleet.<sup>1</sup>

The *Victorian* left St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, on the 19th for Sierra Leone to join the *Highflyer*, which had with her the *Marmora* and *Empress of Britain*. On the way she sighted a vessel named *Liberia*, flying British colours but carrying Telefunken wireless gear in charge of a German-American operator. She was bound for Sierra Leone, but to make sure of her Captain Somerville put a prize crew on board and escorted her in.<sup>2</sup> Her speed was only 7½ knots and he thus did not join the *Highflyer* till the 23rd. He was senior to Captain Buller of the *Highflyer*, under whose orders he had been put; but all difficulties which might arise from this circumstance were averted by an order from the Admiralty, received on the 25th, that the *Victorian* was to rejoin Force I.<sup>3</sup>

This latest order was due to a request from Admiral de Robeck for one more cruiser when he learned that the *Vindictive*, which passed the Tagus on November 22, was to go direct to Ascension and was not to rejoin him. He also asked for a re-statement of the limits of his command, and was now told that it extended from 44° N. to 26° N. and as far westward as 40° W.; it thus included Cape Finisterre, the Azores and the Canaries. All the various danger points of this station, except the Tagus, where the *Europa* was still on guard, had been left unpatrolled during the concentrations of the past few days. Force D was at Sierra Leone; but little danger was apprehended from St. Vincent, where the German ships were segregated under the guard of a Portuguese cruiser. The Canaries were again patrolled by the *Argonaut* from November 18 to 24; the *Donegal* showed herself at the Islands on November 27 and 28, on her way home from Sierra Leone where she had coaled, and on December 1 Admiral de Robeck himself appeared with the *Amphitrite* and

<sup>1</sup> de Robeck, Letter of Proceedings. M. 03957, 03959, 04705/14.

<sup>2</sup> The *Liberia* was released by the Prize Court, but her wireless installation was confiscated. M. 086/15.

<sup>3</sup> *Victorian*, Letter of Proceedings. M. 01006/15.



*Argonaut*. He called on the Civil Governor at Tenerife and found that the *Nepos* and *J. L. Mowinkel* at Santa Cruz were refused permission to coal or tranship any cargo. A few days later the Admiralty learned that the Norwegian owners of these ships knew nothing of their connection with the German supply system and that the masters of the vessels, as soon as they realised the character of their voyage, had altered course, put in to Tenerife and refused to sail. Their owners ordered the cargo to be discharged at Tenerife, and they were therefore quite useless to the German supply officers.<sup>1</sup>

The German steamer *Macedonia* had been moved to Las Palmas and was moored inside the breakwater. She had been immobilised by the removal of her cylinder cover, and a search made by Spanish naval officers revealed nothing but coal in her holds.<sup>2</sup> The *Duala* and *Aruca*s were definitely interned on December 2.<sup>3</sup> From the Canaries the Admiral proceeded to Madeira, to be followed by the *Victorian*, which visited Tenerife on December 3 on her way from Sierra Leone to Gibraltar, where she was to clean her boilers. The *Argonaut* went also to Gibraltar for small defects, but in her place the *Calgarian* joined the Admiral on the 4th.

At Madeira he found the newly-established wireless station in working order. This would improve communications. By the arrangements in force the Intelligence Officer at St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, did not pass information to Admiral de Robeck, who therefore did not know that two Portuguese cruisers would be meeting some Portuguese transports off Las Palmas on December 5. The searchlights of these were reported to him by the *Calgarian*, which was then at the Canaries, and the Admiral, thinking the occurrence suspicious, came from Madeira to search; the matter was cleared up by a telegram from the Admiralty to him and he returned to Madeira, leaving the Canaries to be watched by the *Calgarian*.<sup>4</sup> The departure of the Portuguese cruisers on convoy duty left the Cape Verde Islands without any naval force and the Consul suggested that a British man-of-war should be within call in case Portugal decided to join the Allies.<sup>5</sup> Accordingly the Admiralty ordered the *Highflyer* to proceed to and remain at St. Vincent, until relieved by the battleship *Vengeance*, which was refitting at Gibraltar. The latter's duty was to guard the colliers while continuing work on her defects and she was to keep steam for ordinary speeds at four hours' notice.<sup>6</sup>

**115. Admiral Sturdee sails from Abrolhos.**—Just as von Spee was leaving his last anchorage in the Pacific, Admiral Sturdee and the two battle cruisers anchored at Abrolhos. The transfer

<sup>1</sup> M. 20793/14.

<sup>2</sup> de Robeck: *Neutrality of Canary Islands*. M. 04461/14.

<sup>3</sup> Tel. Madrid to F.O. H.S. 44, p. 798.

<sup>4</sup> de Robeck, Letter of Proceedings. M. 04877/14.

<sup>5</sup> M. 04858/14.

<sup>6</sup> Tel. 921 to Senior Naval Officer, Gibraltar, 4.12.14.

of the *Defence's* Poulsen gear to the *Invincible* took only a few hours and she sailed at 1.50 p.m. for St. Helena. The battle cruisers coaled as rapidly as the conditions of Abrolhos would allow and the squadron was ready to leave early on the 28th. The Commander-in-Chief gave the master of the collier *Priestfield* charge as Senior Officer at Abrolhos, with instructions to inform the *Otranto* and *Macedonia*, which he had ordered to come from Sierra Leone, that they were to proceed to the Falklands, keeping 300 miles from the coast. Eight fuel ships under the escort of the *Orama* were to follow the squadron, keeping well to eastward of the Admiral and in wireless touch with him. The *Bristol* he sent to Rio to carry mails and obtain intelligence, and on the 28th at 10 a.m. he started with the rest of the squadron for the Falklands, having ordered the *Bristol* to rejoin him on passage. The area in which the *Karlsruhe* had lately been so active was thus entirely deprived of cruiser patrols.

**116. Rumours of the "Karlsruhe."**—No definite intelligence of the *Karlsruhe* was received after the arrival of the crew of the *Vandyck*, though she had made another capture. Shortly after the *Vandyck* was sunk the *Karlsruhe* stopped the British *Royal Sceptre*, from Brazil for North America, but her master succeeded in persuading Captain Köhler that his cargo was neutral and his ship was released, though, in point of fact, he was carrying a valuable cargo of coffee for Canada. The *Royal Sceptre* called at St. Lucia on November 4, but the incident appears to have been unknown to the Admiralty at the time.<sup>1</sup>

Apart from rumours that Jacmel in Haiti and various places in Honduras and Venezuela were being used by the *Karlsruhe* as bases for intelligence and supplies, no intelligence which could locate her was received till the 19th, when a vessel reported having seen a four-funnelled cruiser off the Bahamas a week before. Captain Clinton-Baker, Senior Naval Officer in the West Indies, thereupon proposed to make a sweep north of the Bahamas with the *Berwick*, *Lancaster* and *Condé*, but this did not suit the Admiralty's plan of watching the Canal for von Spee and they ordered either the *Lancaster* or *Berwick* to remain near Jamaica as a wireless link with the *Australia* and the Japanese squadron in the Eastern Pacific which were approaching the Panama Canal. The *Berwick* went to Mosquito Gulf, Costa Rica, using the *Lancaster* as link with Jamaica; even by November 24 she was not in touch with any of the ships in the Pacific.<sup>2</sup>

On that date our New York Consul-General learned that the *Karlsruhe* intended to decoy and attack the *Lusitania* due at New York in a few days. The *Princess Royal* had reached Halifax on the 20th and the Admiralty directed her to shadow the *Lusitania* in to New York, keeping out of sight.<sup>3</sup> The Cunarder arrived safely; the *Karlsruhe* had not appeared and some idea

<sup>1</sup> See H.S. 22/219.

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 43, pp. 290, 439, 451, 463, 533.

<sup>3</sup> H.S. 43, pp. 518, 519.



that she had sunk was started by the discovery at Grenada of some wreckage and a boat bearing her name. This needed investigation. The *Descartes*, so long the guard ship at St. Lucia, could not go as she had a serious collision on the 24th and would be unfit for sea for some months; but the *Edinburgh Castle*, which arrived at St. Lucia on the 28th in the course of her round voyage, was ordered to make a report. She found no bodies and no evidence that the *Karlsruhe* had sunk, since the supposed wreckage could all be reasonably considered as articles dropped overboard in the process of transshipping stores at sea.<sup>1</sup>

**117. Movements of the "Kronprinz Wilhelm."**—Though nothing was seen of the *Karlsruhe*, the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, of which the latest news was that she had been near Trinidad on September 19,<sup>2</sup> again revealed her activities by sending one of her supply ships into port. On November 22 the *Sierra Cordoba* arrived at Monte Video and was soon found to have on board the crews of vessels captured by the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*.

The *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, after dismissing the crew of the *Indian Prince* on September 19, apparently remained near Trinidad till the end of the month and then proceeded towards the River Plate to intercept meat ships. There, on October 7, about 260° E.N.E. of Lobos Island in the estuary and directly on the line between Trinidad and the mouth of the river, she met a large steamer, *La Correntina*, of the Houlder Line, armed with two 4.7 in. guns aft. This was the very situation for which our merchant vessels had been defensively armed, and the circumstances should have been in our favour since the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* had only two 3 in. guns. The German observed *La Correntina* very carefully and did not close till after she had got well ahead; she then came rushing up at full speed, closing ultimately to 50 yards when she found that the liner was calling by wireless for help. The disposition of the ships seemed ideal for the defensively armed vessel to open fire; but, unfortunately, although her guns were on board the ammunition for them was at Liverpool.

*La Correntina* had been armed in 1913. She left Liverpool on July 26, just before the outbreak of war, and in accordance with the peace regulations carried no ammunition. As soon as war broke out, arrangements were made for another vessel of the same line to carry it out to her, but owing to the financial dislocation of the meat trade dates became disarranged and finally the ammunition was left behind under the impression that *La Correntina* would be back before the other vessel could meet her. She was therefore unable to offer any resistance and was easily taken by the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 42, pp. 590, 595, 596, 638.

<sup>3</sup> H.S. 23/302.

<sup>2</sup> See Section 78.

The cargo of meat she carried proved very welcome to the captors, who were running short of food and water and other provisions. Putting a prize crew on board, Captain Thierfelder of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* made *La Correntina* accompany him as he cruised about eastward, on fine days transshipping from her enough meat to last till the middle of March, 1915, besides coal, water and other necessaries. Finally, on October 14, the prize was sunk.

A week later the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was joined by the *Sierra Cordoba*, one of the vessels which had been at Buenos Aires since August. She left there on October 16 and, joining the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* on the 20th, proceeded eastward into calmer sea where she gave up the coal and stores with which she was laden; they included clothes, vegetables, soap and cigars. By October 22 the sea was calm enough to allow the two vessels to be alongside each other, and the crew and passengers from *La Correntina* were sent across from the cruiser to the collier. Leaving her at this rendezvous the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* steamed off westward.

Coal was the raider's most serious need at the moment, as the supply from the capture and the *Sierra Cordoba* would not last long. It was, therefore, a piece of luck that the next vessel she met should be a collier. This was the French sailing ship *Union*, bound for the Plate with 3,100 tons of Cardiff coal, met on October 28 in 34° S., 52° W. She was towed back to the *Sierra Cordoba* and the crew sent across. Another supply ship was expected, but as she did not arrive it was considered she must have been caught by us.<sup>1</sup> Finally, on November 15, the *Sierra Cordoba* was sent to Monte Video to land the prisoners, leaving the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* still coaling from the *Union*. The *Sierra Cordoba* arrived on November 22 and the news of the loss of *La Correntina* reached Admiral Sturdee before he left Abrolhos.

**118. Sweep from Abrolhos to the Falklands, November 28–December 7.**—The latest position of the raider as given to him was 300 miles east of Santos; he therefore swept through the suspected area with his squadron spread on a course of S. 6° E., and, finding nothing, continued on that course, intending to maintain it as far as Latitude 27° S.; but he was diverted by a message from Rio reporting the German squadron to have been 400 miles off Monte Video on November 26. This rumour reached our Legation through private sources and was not at all improbable; to bring the Plate trade to a standstill would have been a natural object for the German Admiral, and in the interval since he was last seen he could have made the voyage. Admiral Sturdee accordingly steered for the reported position till the *Bristol* rejoined on December 1 and informed him that the rumour was

<sup>1</sup> Possibly this was the *Navarra*, from whose crew it was learned she was intended for the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*.



unconfirmed; he then directed his course for the Falklands with his squadron spread as before. By December 4, when he was passing close to the spot where *La Correntina* had been captured, he had received no evidence that the enemy was north of him.

A hint of von Spee's intentions was given by the captain of the *Helicon*, which came into Antofagasta on November 27. From conversations he had overheard he concluded that the German Admiral intended to make for the Atlantic round the Horn.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, there were the rumours to which the operations of the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* gave rise. By the time Admiral Sturdee reached the Falkland Islands the information which he had received brought him to the conclusion that the enemy were still off Valparaiso on December 4 and, as his orders were to proceed to the Chilean coast as soon as possible, he refrained from detaching any ships to scout in the neighbouring waters, but took the whole fleet in to Port Stanley in the forenoon of December 7 to commence coaling at once.<sup>2</sup>

**119. New York and the West Indies.**—The further possibility that von Spee would come through the Panama Canal received some support on November 29 when our Consul at Iquique reported two cruisers and an auxiliary off his port steering northerly.<sup>3</sup> In view of this the *Princess Royal* was ordered to Jamaica by the Admiralty, who now adopted Admiral Hornby's view of using her against von Spee instead of keeping her to stave off attacks on the New York Patrol.<sup>4</sup> The number of ships available for patrol duties was reduced by the discovery, on December 1, that the *Caronia*, which then arrived at Halifax from New York, had serious boiler defects and would require six weeks' dockyard repair, and Admiral Hornby asked for another ship to replace her.

As has already been made clear, the chief problem for the New York patrol was one of communications; for although the arrangements for collecting news as to the movements of German ships in the harbour were excellent, the transmission of intelligence to the watching cruisers was not so efficient. The wireless station at Cape Sable could not transmit so far as New York (420 miles), nor could Halifax reach New York by day.<sup>5</sup> A merchant ship was therefore chartered to act as wireless link with Cape Sable. Efforts were also made to arrange for another merchant ship in New York harbour to slip out and telegraph to our cruisers as soon as any movement was discerned; but this scheme had to be abandoned for fear of conflict with the United States authorities, who sealed the wireless apparatus of the *Winchester*, the ship engaged.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 43, p. 804.

<sup>2</sup> M. 0517/15.

<sup>3</sup> This false rumour was specially spread by the Germans. *Kreuzerkrieg*.

<sup>4</sup> A 174, 175.

<sup>5</sup> H.S. 42, pp. 305, 310, 313, 314.

<sup>6</sup> Papers titled *Foreign Office, 7th November, 1914. German Liners.*

The *Princess Royal* (Captain Osmond de B. Brock, R.N.) reached Jamaica on December 6 and Captain Brock took over the duties of Senior Naval Officer, West Indies. The *Karlsruhe* had not yet revealed her presence and the only enemy movement reported was that of the *Präsident*, which left Havana on December 2 nominally for Norfolk, Virginia. She reappeared 10 days later at San Juan, Porto Rico. On November 10 our Panama Consul stated that, as regards the probability of von Spee's arrival there was a report that 10,000 tons of coal had been bought in New York to wait at a Venezuelan port.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, the Colombian wireless station at Carthagena, which for some time had been suspected to be at the disposal of the Germans, was definitely closed on December 8 in response to repeated diplomatic protests.<sup>2</sup> This should make it more difficult for von Spee to get into touch with any ship coming out from Germany. There was a rumour afloat that the battle cruiser *Von der Tann* had evaded our patrols and was now in the Atlantic,<sup>3</sup> and the Admiralty on the 9th, in their anxiety to be sure of touch with the *Australia*, ordered either the *Berwick* or *Lancaster* through the Canal as a wireless link between her and the West Indies squadron.<sup>4</sup> But an hour or two after the despatch of this telegram all anxiety about the German Cruiser Squadron came to an end.

**120. Von Spee's Last Voyage.**<sup>5</sup>—When von Spee left San Quintin Bay on November 26 the most definite intelligence of British movements furnished him was that on November 7 the *Defence*, *Cornwall*, *Carnarvon*, *Bristol*, *Glasgow* and *Canopus* were probably concentrated at the Falklands. He had also heard a rumour that all except the *Canopus* had gone to South Africa to help in quelling the rebellion there; but this he disbelieved. The departure of our two battle cruisers from home had been so successfully kept secret that the Admiralty staff in Berlin did not learn it till the two ships revealed themselves at Abrolhos; and though the Buenos Aires supply centre was informed on November 24 that the *Invincible*, *Defence* and *Carnarvon* were at Abrolhos, no attempt was made to inform the German Admiral by wireless, with the result that he remained in ignorance of this essential piece of intelligence till too late. Instead of having to meet British battle cruisers, it would seem he was expecting rather to be supported by a battle cruiser sweep out from Germany and the reply from Berlin that this was impossible did not reach him. The hazards of such a voyage as he contemplated, great enough even with a perfect supply and intelligence system, were rendered all the greater by the inefficiency of that at his disposal.

Soon after leaving San Quintin Bay for Puerto Santa Elena, which he intended to be his next port of call, the squadron

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 42, p. 312.

<sup>2</sup> M. 10058/15.

<sup>3</sup> H.S. 42, p. 703.

<sup>4</sup> A 178.

<sup>5</sup> Based on *Kreuzerkrieg*.



encountered a full Cape Horn gale and a strong south-westerly sea. The light cruisers with their deckloads of coal lurched so badly that they had to jettison part of the precious cargo, till the *Dresden*, a turbine-driven vessel, reported she could not reach Puerto Santa Elena without coaling again. To economise fuel, the squadron, instead of passing 100 miles south of Cape Horn, came within 30 miles of it, and there sighted a British sailing vessel. She was brought in by the *Leipzig* and proved to be the *Drummuir* with a cargo of coal. It was too valuable to be sunk, and the whole squadron accompanied the prize to Picton Island, east of the Horn, where three days were consumed in transferring the *Drummuir's* coal to the *Baden* and *Santa Isabel*, while the cruisers filled up from the *Seydlitz*.<sup>1</sup> Before sailing at noon on the 6th the Admiral called all his captains to the flagship, and announced his next move.

The rumour that our squadron had gone over to South Africa had been repeated from various sources, with the added detail that the coal stocks at the Falklands were blazing, and it had suggested a new operation. The Admiral now explained to his assembled officers that on the way to Santa Elena he would attack the Falkland Islands, destroy the wireless station, and, above all, take the Governor prisoner as a reprisal for the alleged ill-treatment by us of the Governor of Samoa. The actual operation was to be carried out by the *Gneisenau* and *Nürnberg*, who were instructed to avoid action with such an overwhelming opponent as the *Canopus*. The rumour was again partly confirmed the night after the cruiser squadron left Picton Island by a telegram from Punta Arenas, passed on by the *Amasis*, that the departure of the British squadron to South Africa was very probable. It was therefore with the fixed determination of raiding the Falklands that the German Admiral set his course towards them as soon as he passed Staten Island and entered the Atlantic Ocean.

During December 7, the *Gneisenau* and *Nürnberg* completed their preparations for mine-sweeping and landing; and early next morning they were detached for their mission, the rest of the squadron following at a lower speed. By 8.30 a.m. on December 8 the wireless mast could be seen by the watchers in the *Gneisenau*. A pall of smoke hung over the harbour and, thinking this to be from the coal and oil stores on fire, the advancing German cruisers found in it confirmation of the absence of British forces. But from 9 a.m. onwards the funnels of warships could be seen, and the captain of the *Gneisenau* signalled to his chief that the *Canopus*, two of the *Kent* class and two *Glasgows* were in the harbour. When two ships thought to be the *Kent* and *Macedonia* were seen slowly steaming out the *Gneisenau* proposed to attack them; but just then four shell from an unseen ship which they guessed to be the *Canopus* fell into the sea

<sup>1</sup> Statements by officers of *Drummuir* are in M. 17105/15.

over a mile short, and the German Admiral recalled his two advanced cruisers. Even then he did not expect to have to encounter a more powerful ship than the *Defence*, and it was not till 10 o'clock that the tripod masts were sighted and von Spee knew that he must fight against overwhelming odds.

## CHAPTER XIII.

### THE POSITION AT THE END OF 1914.

121. **The Destruction of the German Cruiser Squadron. Escape of the "Dresden" and "Seydlitz."**—The course of approach of the German cruisers, parallel to the land, enabled the look-out established by the *Canopus* to give early warning to our squadron coaling within the harbour; the *Gneisenau* was in sight for two hours before she turned away to rejoin her flagship. In the interval our ships had all weighed and when they reached the mouth of the harbour the five German cruisers could be clearly seen. They had made no attempt to scatter—in fact, it was not till well after 1 o'clock that von Spee detached the light cruisers from his flag. In such circumstances the result of the battle could hardly be in doubt.<sup>1</sup> The *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* were sunk by the battle cruisers; the *Leipzig* and *Nürnberg* by our lighter forces; the *Dresden*, which proved to have the highest speed, escaped southward. Unfortunately, the *Bristol*, our fastest ship, had both engines opened up when the enemy was first sighted and, being unable to get away till 11, was ordered to deal with the supply ships, which at the time were thought to be transports. She found and sank the *Baden* and *Santa Isabel*, but the *Seydlitz* could not be seen.

The *Seydlitz*, which at first was following the German squadron with the temporary rating of hospital ship, was ordered by von Spee at noon to proceed to a rendezvous in 54° S., 57° N. At 3.17 p.m. she learned that the *Baden* and *Santa Isabel* were being chased, and at 3.43, by which time she was out of sight of the action, she was ordered by von Spee back to the "former anchorage." By an intercepted British signal she learned at 6.20: "*Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau* sunk, *Leipzig* on fire." Steering steadily southward, the *Seydlitz* repeatedly called up the *Dresden* and also the *Nürnberg*, of whose destruction she was unaware. Uncertain what anchorage von Spee had meant by his last signal, since in the circumstances Picton Island was an unlikely rendezvous, her captain decided to act on his general orders, which instructed vessels driven away from the squadron to seek a neutral harbour if no longer able to reckon on its protection. He therefore went in to San José Bay<sup>2</sup> and

<sup>1</sup> The Battle of the Falklands is described on pp. 236 to 263 of this volume.

<sup>2</sup> Possibly the San José in 42° 30' S., 62° 30' S., not far north of Puerto Santa Elena.



spent the night of December 14 in signalling on his highest power to the *Dresden* and the *Rhodopis*, a Kosmos steamer in Corral which served as a wireless station. Two days later he intercepted a signal to the *Eleonore Woermann*, *Mera* and *Patagonia*, ordering them to some harbour whose name was unfortunately jammed; he thereupon decided to anchor at Port San Antonio, 80 miles further north, where he landed the crew of the *Drummuir* who were still on board. He remained in the port until interned in January by the Argentine authorities.<sup>1</sup>

The *Dresden*, with whom he had failed to get in touch, was in hiding. She appeared at Punta Arenas on December 12 and disappeared again; the hunt for her was the sole occupation of several ships for three months and she was not encountered till March 1915.

The *Eleonore Woermann*, *Mera* and *Patagonia* were three of the supply ships which the Buenos Aires Supply Centre had despatched to Puerto Santa Elena for the use of the Cruiser Squadron. The *Eleonore Woermann*, which on September 14 had brought to Buenos Aires the survivors of the *Cap Trafalgar*, remained in port under deep suspicion, particularly in mid-October, when, as a result of diplomatic pressure, she was made to discharge 800 tons of coal she was carrying in excess of her bunkers. She managed to get out at night on December 1, cleared ostensibly for South-West Africa with a full cargo of provisions,<sup>2</sup> and made for the rendezvous line near Puerto Santa Elena. The *Mera* of the Kosmos Line had been at Monte Video throughout the war; she left on December 3 with a small amount of coal and much provisions, cleared for Hamburg. She also went to the rendezvous line. The *Patagonia*, which had arrived at Monte Video from Bahia Blanca on November 22, proceeded at 2 a.m. December 3, ostensibly for Chile, and soon found her way to the same rendezvous. Boiler trouble developed and she had to put into the harbour, where on December 5 she and the *Eleonore Woermann* were seen by a passing steamer, which next day reported their presence to the British Consul at Port Madryn. Meanwhile an Argentine warship found her and ordered her either to leave Argentine waters or proceed to a regular port. The *Patagonia* put to sea again but went in to a lonely harbour, where on December 14 she was discovered by an Argentine cruiser, and brought back in custody to Santa Elena Bay. She and her guard were seen there on December 17 by the *Carnarvon*. She was eventually taken to Bahia Blanca and interned.<sup>3</sup> On December 9, the day of the battle, however, she was still within call of the rendezvous, where, by the addition of the Dutch *Josephina*, which had arrived with 1,500 tons, there was a total coal supply of 7,000 tons.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Seydlitz: Report in *Kreuzerkrieg* I, 316-318. Also papers titled F.O., 18.1.15, *Suspected Infringement of Chilean Neutrality by Seydlitz*.

<sup>2</sup> Papers titled *Case 439*. <sup>3</sup> M. 0330/15, M. 15604/15.

<sup>4</sup> *Kreuzerkrieg* I, 240.

122. **The Effect on the South American Trade Route.**—The destruction of von Spee's squadron removed the most visible menace to South American trade and relieved the anxiety with which the shipping had been awaiting events. On the west coast, especially in Chile, shipping had been at a standstill from the arrival of the *Scharnhorst* at Valparaiso, on November 4, till the 26th. It was then officially released on condition that neutral waters should be fully utilised and every precaution taken to avoid capture. Even so, one of the first steamers to move, the *Charcas*, belonging to Lamport and Holt, and on passage from Corral to Panama, was captured and sunk on December 3 by the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* some 50 miles south of Valparaiso. The capture was made known on December 6 when the crew of the *Charcas* were landed at Papudo, a short distance north of Valparaiso.

At the River Plate, shipping had been hardly at all disturbed, "in fact, the volume of traffic both ways was practically as great during November as it was in October, before Admiral Cradock's defeat."<sup>1</sup> Even in December the rumours that the German squadron was off Monte Video and that the *Von der Tann* was on the way out were disregarded by all but one or two vessels. But the situation was an anxious one for the Argentine Government, who had to dispose of the next harvest. The defeat of von Spee was therefore received in South America with feelings of great relief, openly expressed in the public newspapers.

It would appear, however, from what is known of Admiral von Spee's ideas, that he had no intention of making systematic war on Atlantic trade. Like all German sea officers he would rather achieve military success than devote his forces to commerce destruction. At Mas-a-fuera he had refused a request from the captain of the *Leipzig* to be allowed to raid the sailing-ship routes, and it is, therefore, unlikely that in the Atlantic he would have reduced his fighting strength by detaching any of his five cruisers from his flag.<sup>2</sup> But, whatever may have been his plans, Admiral Sturdee's victory prevented their fruition, and the influence von Spee's entry into the Atlantic had been exerting on all parts of that ocean came to an end.

123. **Recall of the Heavy Cruisers from the Atlantic.**<sup>3</sup>—The battle of the Falkland Islands reduced the enemy vessels with which we thought we had still to reckon to the light cruisers *Karlsruhe* and *Dresden*, and the armed liners *Kronprinz Wilhelm* and *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*. Heavy ships were no longer necessary

<sup>1</sup> Fayle: *Seaborne Trade* I, 345.

<sup>2</sup> *Kreuzerkrieg* I, p. 244.

<sup>3</sup> This is treated in greater detail in the next volume, where full references are given.



in the Atlantic and the Admiralty ordered Admiral Sturdee to come home with the battle cruisers, turning over to Admiral Stoddart the command of all the remaining vessels on the south-east coast of America. The *Invincible* left the Falklands on December 16 for home; but the *Inflexible*, which was searching for the *Dresden* on the west coast, had to be recalled and did not proceed from the Falklands for home till the 24th. The *Defence* and *Minotaur* sailed from South-West Africa on December 11 and were home soon after the New Year. The *Dartmouth*, of the Cape Squadron, was ordered across to Abrolhos to join Admiral Stoddart.

The return of the *Princess Royal*, which had been called home within a few hours of the receipt of the news of the Falklands victory,<sup>1</sup> was delayed on account of a report received on December 12 that the *Karlsruhe* was off the Bahamas. Freed from the necessity of taking into consideration the possible movements of the German Cruiser Squadron, the Admiralty took vigorous action. The *Berwick*, *Condé* and *Edinburgh Castle* started from Jamaica to sweep the spot, and the Admiralty instructed the *Princess Royal* to co-operate with them. At the same time they diverted the *Dartmouth* to Pernambuco and later to Demerara; the *Newcastle* they ordered through the Canal to join Admiral Hornby; and the *Melbourne*, which on December 9 had been instructed to go from Gibraltar to visit the Azores, was now ordered to proceed as fast as possible to Bermuda.

Next day, however, the *Dresden's* departure from Punta Arenas became known and the *Newcastle* and *Australia* were both ordered south to assist the Japanese in searching for the *Dresden*, *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* and their colliers. On the 16th the *Princess Royal* was definitely ordered to Scapa Flow with all convenient despatch.

**124. Intelligence of the Enemy and Disposition of Forces, 31st December, 1914.**<sup>2</sup>—Thus, at the end of the year, by which time the adjustments to the new conditions had taken place, we had—

*Off South America.*—The *Carnarvon* (flag of Admiral Stoddart) and *Cornwall* searching the eastern exit of the Straits of Magellan; *Kent*, *Bristol*, *Glasgow* and *Orama* on the coast of Chile; *Canopus* guarding Abrolhos; *Otranto* guarding Port Stanley. The *Macedonia* was on the way home with German prisoners; the *Australia* was passing through the Straits of Magellan on the way home, and the *Newcastle* returning north again from Valparaiso. There were also two Japanese cruisers watching the coast of Ecuador.

<sup>1</sup> A 179.

<sup>2</sup> Taken from *Daily Return of Enemy, British and Allied Ships Abroad*.

The *Dresden*, after leaving Punta Arenas on December 13, was not again located, though it was locally believed she was in hiding among the archipelago south of the Magellan Straits. The *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* was reported, but vaguely, from various Chilean ports, and the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* had last been seen 300 miles from Santos.

There were 35 German merchant vessels taking refuge in Chilean ports, among them at Valparaiso the *Yorck*, specially suspicious because convertible into a cruiser. In Argentine ports there were 11 German and seven Austrian steamers. Brazil, however, was sheltering more than any other South American State; she was the unwilling host of 46 German and four Austrian merchant ships.

*On the Cape Station.*—Here were the two old battleships *Albion* and *Goliath*, the light cruisers *Hyacinth* and *Astraea*, and the armed merchant cruiser *Armada Castle*. Off East Africa were the *Fox*, *Chatham*, *Weymouth* and *Kinfauns Castle* keeping watch over the blockaded *Königsberg*. On this station there were only 10 German steamers; four in German East African ports and six in Portuguese harbours.

*In the East Atlantic.*—Admiral de Robeck had still the *Amphitrite*, *Argonaut* and *Europa*, *Victorian* and *Calgarian*. The *Carmania*, after repair at Gibraltar, took the Tagus guard, in which assistance was provided by another old battleship, the *Prince George*, which arrived on the 29th with orders to lie off the Tagus while carrying on her own refit. The *Vindictive* was at Ascension as wireless link with the South American Squadron, and the *Vengeance* was guarding the colliers at St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands. The *Highflyer*, *Marmora* and *Empress of Britain* patrolled between those islands and Sierra Leone. There were four French cruisers on the Morocco patrol; and operating against the Cameroons were the *Challenger*, *Dwarf* and *Pothau*.

Though no German cruisers were thought to be in the East Atlantic, there were 120 enemy merchant vessels in the various ports—three at the Azores, 26 at the Canaries, four at Madeira, eight at the Cape Verde Islands; in Spanish Atlantic ports there were 37 and at the Tagus and other Portuguese harbours 38. The remaining four were in ports on the coast of West Africa.

*On the North American and West Indies Station.*—Watching New York and cruising for the protection of North Atlantic trade were the *Glory*, *Suffolk*, *Niobe*, *Essex* and *Caronia*. In the West Indies we had the *Berwick*, *Condé*, *Lancaster*, *Melbourne* and *Dartmouth*, with the *Sydney* on the way across from the Azores. The *Descartes* was still under repair at Martinique, and the *Edinburgh Castle* had proceeded for home to complete her voyage.



Here there were 91 German and Austrian merchant ships to keep in port; 76 of them, including nine potential cruisers at New York, were in United States ports. There were no late reports of the *Karlsruhe* which would serve to locate her; from Para, which was the port to which she had sent the crew of her latest capture, came the rumour that she intended to attack trade in the North Atlantic; various places were mentioned as her probable rendezvous, and searchlights had been seen near San Domingo. But we now know that all these rumours of her position were false.

125. **The End of the "Karlsruhe."**—When towards the end of October the German Admiralty realised that von Spee intended to come into the Atlantic with the Cruiser Squadron, they endeavoured to order the *Karlsruhe* to join him. Whether or not he received this order, Captain Köhler's decision, taken about that time, to attack Barbados shows that he had no immediate intention of going south to meet von Spee. But he was destined to see neither von Spee, nor Barbados, nor home again. Just after sunset on November 4, when he was still about 300 miles short of his objective, a terrific explosion cut the *Karlsruhe* in half. The fore part, with Captain Köhler and most of the crew, went down at once; the after part floated for 20 minutes, just long enough for the survivors to get on board the *Indrani* and *Rio Negro* which were in company. As Captain Köhler was gone, the senior officer saved, Lieutenant-Commander Studdt, after a short consultation, decided that he would try to reach Germany in the *Rio Negro*; he knew how many of our cruisers the *Karlsruhe* had kept employed, and in order to prevent us from knowing that she was no longer in existence he ruled out a suggestion that he should make for a neutral port. Accordingly, after clearing the *Indrani*, he sank her and started for home. No effort was made to inform the *Farn* of the new conditions; she wandered about for two months and eventually put in to San Juan, Porto Rico. For safety's sake the *Rio Negro* made a wide detour to northward, where in the icy latitudes the survivors of the *Karlsruhe*, in their scanty clothing, suffered a great deal from the cold. Although the vessel was fitted with wireless they made no signals and even so late as November 27 the German Admiralty sent out from Nauen a signal to Captain Köhler conveying the Kaiser's permission for him to return home. This was taken in by the *Rio Negro* and must have been read with strange feelings by the officers and men, for they had loved and admired their dead commander. Two days later the *Rio Negro*, hardly believing she could have run the blockade of the North Sea successfully, put in to Aalesund in Norway.<sup>1</sup> She reached Germany about a week later.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> At the time when she passed the North Sea was entirely destitute of patrols. See Monograph 19, *The Tenth Cruiser Squadron* (C.B. 917E), p. 30.

<sup>2</sup> This paragraph is based on Aus.

126. **Remarks on the "Karlsruhe's" Career.**—The *Karlsruhe* held up altogether 25 ships, British and neutral. She sank 16 British ships and one Dutch, of a total tonnage of 72,216 British registered tons.

Except for those ships taken while the *Karlsruhe* was proceeding to or from her chosen field of operations, all these were captured in an area little more than 120 miles square, through which British cruisers frequently passed on their way to the south-east coast of America. The narrow escapes of the raider have been detailed; they were fortuitous, for no organised sweep for her was set in motion till after she had left the area in which she had been so destructive. The operations set on foot by the reports of her captures were mostly of the nature of searches of the coast for her coaling bases, the situation of which was never, during the war, satisfactorily discovered. Although after August 30 she used only Lavandeira Reef, and was there on August 30, September 9, 18 and 30, and October 15, none of our ships passed while she was at the Reef or went sufficiently close to discover her waiting colliers.

Captain Köhler wisely refrained from using wireless telegraphy while at work, except in emergencies, and kept his scouts within flag-signalling distance, a hoist of three flags being the signal that a ship was in sight.<sup>1</sup> Thus, even when three ships were with him the frontage of his squadron was limited, a fact which, in addition to his absences for coaling, may account for the blank days he experienced on that busy trade route.

The insured value of the ships and cargoes she destroyed was £1,500,000. Included in the cargoes were 33,400 tons of coal, more than half being of sufficiently good quality for cruiser use. Like the *Emden*, she did not depend upon the efforts of the German supply officers, since she captured more than enough coal for her needs.

A comparison naturally suggests itself between the proceedings and achievements of Captain Köhler of the *Karlsruhe* and Captain von Müller of the *Emden*.<sup>2</sup> Owing to the fame of the latter it may be thought that the destruction of shipping by Captain Köhler was on a smaller scale. But this is not the case. Indeed, Captain Köhler sank as many ships as his rival in the Indian Ocean, and the value of hulls and cargoes destroyed by him has been estimated at well over £1,000,000.<sup>3</sup> The fact appears to be that, operating in the open sea where wide divergence from the normal track was possible, he gave vessels opportunity for evading him; and owing to the lapse of time before his prison ships came in to port the news they brought was merely a confirmation of opinions already formed by the

<sup>1</sup> *Kreuzerkrieg* II, p. 288. The statements of the masters of captured ships, quoted at the end of Section 101, are considered incorrect. T.S.D.D.

<sup>2</sup> For the history of the *Emden's* career see Monograph 16, *China and Emden* (C.B. 917C).


<sup>3</sup> Fayle: *Seaborne Trade* I, 331.



shipping community and gave little indication of his position at the moment. Hence his operations attracted comparatively little attention, either from the Admiralty or the trading public, and had scarcely any effect in interrupting the passage of shipping on the routes he attacked. On the contrary, what made the effect of the *Emden's* captures so great was that the released prisoners had to report her as being very recently in a position so near Calcutta or Colombo that the risks to ships going in or out were very serious. There is nothing in the *Karlsruhe's* career to compare with the *Emden's* raids at Madras and Penang, though Captain Köhler's intended attack on Barbados harbour would undoubtedly have created a great sensation, especially if it had been carried out on November 5. Faith in the navy would certainly have been shaken by the publication on three successive days of the news of a bombardment of a British coast town, the defeat of a British squadron off Chile, and the destruction of shipping in a British West Indian harbour. Luckily for us the *Karlsruhe's* spontaneous explosion saved us from that; and the next naval news of importance to be published was that of the destruction of the *Emden* and the victory at the Falkland Islands.

Thus by the end of 1914 the Atlantic was cleared of the German cruisers which had been in it at the outbreak of war. Moreover, the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, which had entered it from the north, was lying on her side on the sandy shore of Spanish West Africa; and the Cruiser Squadron which had endeavoured to reach it from the south had, with its commander, Admiral Graf von Spee, come to an heroic end. The only German armed vessels afloat outside the confines of Heligoland Bight and the Black Sea were the *Dresden* and the armed liners *Kronprinz Wilhelm* and *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*.


To face Page 152.





# OPERATIONS OF S.M.S. KARLSRUHE.

- Course from 30 August to 7<sup>th</sup> September.
- - - " " 8 September - 18<sup>th</sup> September.
- . - . " " 19 September - 30<sup>th</sup> September.
- - - " " 1 October - 15<sup>th</sup> October.
- . - . " " 16 October - 25<sup>th</sup> October.



18 Aug	4 <sup>40</sup> PM	British	Bowes Castle	7 <sup>35</sup> Sunk
31 "	4 PM	"	" Strathroy	25. IX Sunk
3 Sept	5 AM	"	" Maple Branch	6 <sup>45</sup> PM Sunk
14 "	5 <sup>30</sup> AM	"	" Highland Hope	11 <sup>45</sup> AM Sunk
15 "	10 AM	Norw.	Sörforeren	Released
17 "	Noon	British	Indrani	9 XI Sunk
21 "	9 AM	Dutch	Maria	Noon sunk
21 "	2 <sup>45</sup> PM	British	Cornish City	7 <sup>30</sup> PM Sunk
22 "	6 AM	Ital.	Ascaro	Released
22 "	6 <sup>40</sup> AM	British	Rio Iguassu	4 PM Sunk
22 "	7 AM	Swed.	Princ Ingeborg	Released
5 Oct.	5 PM	British	Farn	1215 arr. S. Juan
6 "	3 PM	"	Nicotode Larrinaga	7X. 1 <sup>30</sup> AM Sunk
7 "	8 AM	"	Lynrowan	3 PM Sunk
8 "	7 AM	"	Cervantes	12 <sup>30</sup> PM Sunk
8/9 "	Midnt.	"	Pruth	9X. 10 AM Sunk
9 "	3 PM	Span.	Caquiz	Released
10 "	3 AM	Norw.	Bergenhus	"
11 "	4 PM	British	Condor	14X 2 AM Sunk.
18 "	11 AM	"	Glanton	5 <sup>25</sup> PM Sunk.
22 "	10 <sup>30</sup> PM	Swed.	Atland	Released
23 "	5 PM	British	Hurstdale	9 PM Sunk
23 "	6 <sup>45</sup> PM	Swed.	Annie Jonnson	Released
26 "	11 AM	British	Van Dyck	28 X 6 AM Sunk.
27 "	11 <sup>30</sup> PM	"	Royal Sceptre	Released



## THE ATLANTIC OCEAN

from the Battle of the Falklands to May 1915.

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### Introduction.

This monograph, following on that titled "Atlantic Ocean, 1914," completes the study of the operations in the Atlantic for the protection of trade against attack by commerce destroyers of normal type. The period covered is that between the arrival of the German Cruiser Squadron in the Atlantic, in December 1914, and the internment of the last of the armed merchant vessels in April 1915. From this time forward Atlantic trade was immune from any organised attack by surface vessels, except for the few disguised raiders who, at long intervals, made brief appearances on the trade routes; and German effort became devoted to the use of submarines based on their own home ports, rather than to the employment of armed surface vessels equipped for cruiser warfare in distant seas. One of the reasons for this policy, as the following narrative will show, was undoubtedly the extreme difficulty of ensuring supplies to ships abroad, a difficulty to which the Germans themselves contributed by a certain disregard of the susceptibilities of neutral powers, who, in their own defence, were forced to make and uphold regulations of considerable stringency. Crippled by these, and hampered by the careful watch carried on by our squadrons, the German supply officers were unable to maintain their cruisers; and Germany's attack on our trade in its first phase—that is, by surface vessels—died from lack of support.

### Note on Sources.

The principal sources for the movements of British ships are their deck, signal and wireless logs, now kept at Deptford Victualling Yard.

The following volumes of Admiralty telegrams have been used:—

- H.S. 134. North America and West Indies. Telegrams. 13 December 1914 to 30 April 1915.
- H.S. 135. Mid-Atlantic. Telegrams. 16 December 1914 to 30 April 1915.
- H.S. 136. West and South-East Coasts of America. Telegrams. 13 December 1914 to 31 January 1915.



H.S. 137. West and South-East Coasts of America. Telegrams. 1 February 1915 to 30 April 1915.

Another useful volume is H.S. 23, which contains papers collected in the Trade Division concerning the commerce-raiding activities of the *Dresden*, *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, and *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*.

Important telegrams are reproduced in Appendix A.

Admiralty papers dealing with this period are not yet bound. They are quoted in the footnotes by their registered numbers or Record Office titles.

The War Records of the Intelligence Division are quoted by the letters I.D.H.S. (Intelligence Division Historical Section) and the number of the volume in that series. The footnotes explain which volumes have been used.

German and French printed authorities are scarce. The most valuable is—

*Kreuzerkrieg, Vol. I.*—This is that section of the German official history which treats of the cruise of Admiral von Spee. It also contains the career of the *Dresden*.

Apart from this, the chief information published in Germany is contained in scattered articles and letters, collected in certain volumes of the Intelligence Division Historical Section Series.

Until the second volume of *Kreuzerkrieg* is published our knowledge of the movements and intentions of the German armed merchant cruisers will be incomplete. It is not thought desirable to delay the issue of this monograph till the appearance of *Kreuzerkrieg, Vol. II*.

The times given are those in the original documents. Neither the deck logs nor signal logs contain any provision for indicating the standard time being kept on board; but it has been assumed to be that of the zone in which the ship happens to be. Unless it appeared important, no attempt has been made in this monograph to verify this assumption.

## THE ATLANTIC OCEAN

from the Battle of the Falklands to May 1915.

### CHAPTER I.

#### THE SEARCH FOR THE *DRESDEN*, 9 DECEMBER 1914 TO 4 JANUARY 1915.

1. **Movements immediately after the Battle of the Falkland Islands.**—By the evening of December 8 the Battle of the Falkland Islands was over. The *Scharnhorst* sank with all hands at 4.17 p.m.; the *Gneisenau* at 6 p.m. in 52.45 S, 56.5 W. The two ships had kept together when the German squadron scattered at 1.25 p.m., and had been followed by the *Invincible* (flag of Vice-Admiral Sturdee), *Inflexible* and *Carnarvon*; these remained on the spot till all possible efforts had been made to save the survivors of the *Gneisenau*,<sup>1</sup> and then at 7.40 p.m. started to sweep south-westward in the direction of the German light cruisers. About the same time the *Bristol*, which had captured the supply ships *Baden* and *Santa Isabel* in 52.30 S, 57 W, entrusted the final stages of their destruction to the *Macedonia*, and proceeded eastward to join Admiral Sturdee. The Admiral regarded the *Carnarvon* (Rear-Admiral Stoddart) as of little use in a sweep for the German light cruisers, on account of her slow speed,<sup>2</sup> and at 9.15 p.m. detached her to find and escort the *Orama*, which was making her way to the Falklands from Abrolhos with eight colliers. The *Bristol* joined him a little later and swept south-westward with the *Invincible* and *Inflexible*. By 9.40 p.m. he knew that the *Leipzig* had been sunk in 54.9 N, 56.2 W by the *Glasgow* and *Cornwall*; but there was no news of the *Kent*, *Nürnberg*, or *Dresden*, except that the last two had escaped to the south-eastward when the *Glasgow* engaged the *Leipzig*, and that the *Kent* was chasing the *Nürnberg*. The Admiral, therefore, at 11.16 p.m., ordered the *Glasgow* to proceed to prevent the enemy entering Magellan Strait; but learning that both the *Glasgow* and *Cornwall* had fired nearly all their ammunition, and that the *Cornwall* had only 250 tons

<sup>1</sup> Admiral Sturdee sent a sympathetic message to the senior officer saved and received his thanks for their kind reception. See Appendix A 181.

<sup>2</sup> "Of the ships available to follow the *Dresden*, the *Carnarvon* and *Macedonia* were of no use." Admiral Sturdee, Report on Search for *Dresden*. (M. 0408/15.)



of coal available, he sent both ships to Port Stanley. Early next morning the *Glasgow* reported that according to the prisoners rescued from the *Leipzig* the German supplies of coal on the west coast were completely exhausted, and that Admiral von Spee's last order to the light cruisers was that they were to make for the east coast of South America. Nothing had been heard of the *Kent* for a long time. She was very short of coal; and fearing that she, like the *Cornwall* and *Invincible*, had been damaged under water, and might be in need of assistance, Admiral Sturdee determined to make a search for her. The *Macedonia* had brought the crews of the *Baden* and *Santa Isabel* to Port Stanley and had just finished coaling there. She was his only available ship, and at 12.55 p.m. December 9 he ordered her to proceed at once to search for the *Kent* at high economical speed, returning in 36 hours.<sup>1</sup> Just as the *Macedonia* was leaving harbour she sighted the *Kent* coming in, and was able to inform the Admiral that Captain Allen had managed to keep up with and destroy the *Nürnberg*. This news reached the flagship simultaneously with further statements from the *Glasgow's* prisoners that a third collier, the *Seydlitz*, had been with the German squadron. This vessel and the *Dresden* were thus the only survivors of von Spee's force.

Our own squadron was complete, and all either at, or making for Port Stanley. The Admiral himself turned back at noon December 9, when 50 miles east of Staten Island, and swept back to Port Stanley, detaching the *Bristol* to search the numerous harbours of the Falkland Islands for German supply ships. The two battle cruisers were back at Port Stanley by 7 p.m., December 11, and found the whole squadron at anchor, except the *Orama*, which had not yet arrived.

The *Glasgow*, *Cornwall*, *Macedonia* and *Kent* had been coaling and making repairs since the 9th. The *Bristol*, having found no signs of the enemy in the Western Falklands, came in early on the 11th. The *Carnarvon* arrived a short time before the battle cruisers. She had obtained wireless touch with the *Orama*, and arranged a rendezvous with her for daybreak, December 10. There the two ships met, but to Admiral Stoddart's surprise the *Orama* was alone. It appeared that at midnight the beam sea was so heavy that the colliers, which by this time were considerably scattered, were unable to carry on. Captain Segrave, of the *Orama*, reported this to Admiral Stoddart, but the latter did not understand the message; consequently, when the *Orama* signalled that she was proceeding as ordered to the rendezvous the Admiral did not realise that she was leaving behind the colliers they were both supposed to be

<sup>1</sup> The actual signal reads as if he intended the *Glasgow* to accompany *Macedonia*, and Captain Luce altered course accordingly. At 2.25 p.m., however, the Admiral ordered the *Glasgow* back to Port Stanley. See Signal Logs 16369 and 16371, on which this section is based.

escorting.<sup>1</sup> Luckily, no enemy ship was near and all arrived safely. By the evening of December 11 the whole squadron was assembled at the Falkland Islands.

2. **The Scheme of Search and News of the "Dresden."**—On the way back to the Falkland Islands Admiral Sturdee decided on his next step. He intended to divide his squadron into three divisions and carry out an organised search of the east coast of South America. Admiral Stoddart, in the *Carnarvon*, was to take the *Bristol* under his orders and form one division for the coast of Patagonia; Captain Phillimore, of the *Inflexible*, would have charge of the *Glasgow* and *Cornwall* and search the Tierra del Fuegian Archipelago; while the remaining ships, when ready, were to proceed off the coast of Brazil.<sup>2</sup> The search was to begin at 4 p.m., December 13, by which time the *Inflexible* would be ready. He had no intention of sending his ships to the west coast of Chile; and he suggested to the Admiralty that the German armed liners there should be dealt with by the Anglo-Japanese squadron then off the coast of Ecuador.<sup>3</sup> This view the Admiralty shared; indeed, as soon as they heard of the victory at the Falklands, they ordered the *Newcastle* to proceed south with the Japanese ships and search for the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, last reported off Valparaiso, and any German supply vessels. Admiral Sturdee was to detach the *Kent* and one armed merchant cruiser and send them to work northward up the west coast to meet the *Newcastle*, the *Kent's* place in the South-East Coast Squadron being taken by the *Dartmouth* from the Cape Squadron.<sup>4</sup>

As only light German ships were left in the Atlantic, the Admiralty wished our heavier vessels at home as soon as possible. The *Princess Royal* was called home from Jamaica, and the *Minotaur* and *Defence* from the Cape. On the 12th Admiral Sturdee was ordered to transfer the command of all vessels, except the battle cruisers, to Admiral Stoddart, and come home with the *Invincible* and *Inflexible*.

But before this order reached him he had received intelligence of the *Dresden*, which to some extent modified all the plans. At 3 a.m. on the 13th he learned that the *Dresden* had put in to Punta Arenas during the afternoon of December 11. Admiral Sturdee at once ordered his three fast ships, *Inflexible*, *Glasgow* and *Bristol*, to raise steam for 16 knots and follow her. The *Bristol*, as she could be ready for 16 knots by 4.45 a.m., he ordered to Punta Arenas to communicate with the Consul and

<sup>1</sup> *Orama* Signal Log 19496. December 10, 8.3 a.m.

<sup>2</sup> See Signals 3.28 p.m. December 10 and 6.25 p.m. December 12 in *Invincible's* Signal Log 16358; also A 183.

<sup>3</sup> The squadron consisted of *Australia*, battle cruiser, flag of Vice-Admiral Patey; *Newcastle*, light cruiser; *Hizen*, Japanese battleship; *Idzumo* and *Asama*, Japanese cruisers.

<sup>4</sup> A 182, 185.



get the latest information; she sailed at 5.35 a.m. and thus took the *Cornwall's* place in Captain Phillimore's division. The *Inflexible* and *Glasgow* got away between 8 and 9 a.m.

Admiral Stoddart sailed at 4 p.m. in the *Carnarvon* for Port Madryn on the east coast in 43° S, to work down the coast from there and meet the *Dresden* in case she should double back. He was followed next morning by the *Cornwall*, which had been coaling and was now put under his orders in place of the *Bristol*.

Captain Phillimore intended, should the *Bristol* fail in getting information at Punta Arenas of the position of the *Dresden*, that she should continue searching Magellan Strait, while he, with the *Glasgow* and *Inflexible*, examined Picton Island and the harbours south of Tierra del Fuego; the three ships would rendezvous off Cape Pillar, the western exit of the Strait. Both he and Captain Luce considered the *Dresden's* hiding place more likely to be on the east coast than the west, and they intended to wait at Cape Virgins, the eastern entrance to the Strait, for the *Bristol's* report before proceeding further west. At 6.30 p.m., December 13, when they were not more than 100 miles from the Falklands, the *Glasgow* intercepted a wireless message in Spanish to the effect that the *Dresden* was interned at Punta Arenas. It was necessary to verify the news. Admiral Sturdee, who by this time knew that the battle cruisers were wanted at home, issued orders that, if it were true, the *Inflexible* should return at once to Port Stanley, while the *Glasgow* and *Bristol* coaled at Port Stanley preparatory to beginning a search for the *Karlsruhe*. While waiting for the *Bristol's* report the *Glasgow* looked in at Port Gallegos, the first inlet north of the entrance to the Straits, where a vessel was reported to be ashore. Nothing was seen there; and as the Commander-in-Chief wished both *Bristol* and *Glasgow* to be at Punta Arenas in case the *Dresden* should come out again, Captain Phillimore put the *Bristol* under the orders of Captain Luce, of the *Glasgow*, and sent him on at full speed. At 3.29 a.m. on the 14th the *Bristol's* report was received. It was to the effect that the *Dresden* was not interned; she had coaled at Punta Arenas and left five hours before the *Bristol's* arrival, steering westward.<sup>1</sup>

3. "Dresden" at Punta Arenas, 13 December 1914.<sup>2</sup>—In the thick weather prevailing in the afternoon of December 8, during the later phases of the battle of the Falkland Islands, the *Dresden* managed to escape from the British cruisers pursuing her. Her commanding officer, Captain Lüdecke, at first intended to make for Picton Island, which he understood to be the rendezvous signalled by Admiral von Spee soon after the commencement of the battle; but when he failed to get replies

<sup>1</sup> This section is based on *Inflexible's* Signal Log 32220. By westward is probably meant southward, since from Punta Arenas, where the Strait runs north and south, ships making for the Pacific steer southward.

<sup>2</sup> Based on the German official history, *Kreuzerkrieg* I, 386-9.

to his calls to the supply ships, which he knew were being chased, he concluded that they had been captured; and he determined to try to get into touch with Punta Arenas, where he hoped to be able to arrange for supplies. The idea of going to Puerto Santa Elena, where 7,000 tons of coal was waiting the arrival of von Spee, does not seem to have occurred to him. Thinking the entrances to Magellan Strait and Beagle Channel would certainly be watched by the British cruisers, he gave them a wide berth, choosing instead the difficult passage of Cockburn Channel, which he negotiated on December 10; that day at 4 p.m. he anchored in Sholl Bay, 60 miles due south of Punta Arenas. As there was only 160 tons of coal on board, Captain Lüdecke sent men ashore to cut down trees and bring off water. That night he was boarded by officers from the Chilean destroyer *Almirante Condell*, who told him he must not stay more than 24 hours. It was not, however, till 10 a.m. on the 12th that he left for Punta Arenas, where he hoped to get a good supply of fuel from the *Minnesotan*, an American collier especially chartered by the German Government. In this he was disappointed, for the master of the ship refused to coal a man-of-war, although the local authorities, who were unaware that the *Dresden* had recently coaled in Chilean waters, gave permission for her to be supplied with 850 tons. She ultimately had to be content with 750 tons of briquettes from the Roland liner *Turpin*, which had been at Punta Arenas throughout the war. To get this amount on board took the *Dresden* till the evening of December 13. The Chilean Admiral allowed Captain Lüdecke a stay of 51 hours in his port, this being the length of time allowed to the *Otranto* when she entered Punta Arenas on October 1. Nevertheless, it was too dangerous to stop long, and at 10 p.m. on the 13th, 32 hours after anchoring, the *Dresden* departed southward.<sup>1</sup>

This incident was reported by our Consul at Punta Arenas<sup>2</sup> to the Admiralty and to his Minister at Santiago<sup>3</sup>; but owing to the slowness of communication it was not till December 17 that our Minister protested to the Chilean Government against this, the second known coaling of the *Dresden* in Chilean territory during the months of November and December. It appears that the Chilean Government were waiting for an official report of the events at Mas-a-fuera before issuing definite instructions to the port authorities in this matter; their telegrams, despatched to Punta Arenas as soon as they knew the *Dresden* was there, took so long to reach their destination *viâ* Buenos Aires, the only route, that Captain Lüdecke had departed with his briquettes before it was known that he was forbidden to have them.<sup>4</sup>

4. Chilean Decree of 1 January 1915, as to Coaling.—The Chilean Government, incensed at the *Dresden's* violation of their neutrality, on December 15 issued a decree to become operative

<sup>1</sup> Based on *Kreuzerkrieg*.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. C. A. Milward.

<sup>3</sup> Mr. F. Stronge.

<sup>4</sup> Papers Titled Z 22/1915.



on 1 January 1915, to the effect that, in continuation of Article 19 of the XIIIth Hague Convention, which allows belligerent men-of-war to take sufficient fuel for a voyage to their nearest home port and to coal a second time after three months' interval, in future Chile—

- (1) Would permit belligerent warships to take coal only enough for a voyage to the nearest coaling port of a neighbouring country ;
- (2) Would withhold coal from ships of any mercantile company a steamer of which broke the rules ;
- (3) Would concentrate and watch merchant ships either interned or showing no signs of moving before the end of the war.

Chile, moreover, at a Conference of all the American States, held at Washington on 8 January 1915, urged the general adoption of these rules.<sup>1</sup>

5. Search for the "Dresden," December 14–20.—The region in which the *Dresden* now found herself is remarkable for the number of places in which a ship can hide herself. Magellan Strait itself extends in an elongated zigzag from longitude 68° W to 75° W. From the eastern entrance as far as the approach to Punta Arenas, the only town on its shores, the general trend of the channel is westward ; but from about 10 miles north of the port it turns suddenly southward for 50 miles. Then, narrowing considerably, it continues between high and forbidding cliffs in the general direction of north-west. Its eastern half is bounded to the southward by the large island of Tierra del Fuego ; two other large islands, Clarence Island and Santa Ines, complete the southern wall. Mountainous and rocky, intersected by deep and tortuous fiords of a complexity unsurpassed elsewhere, the Magellanic area has a climate more continuously tempestuous than any other part of the world. The scenery is magnificently stern, and glaciers extend in many places from the barren mountains as far as the level of the sea.<sup>2</sup> The fiord-like character of the coast continues from Magellan Strait northward up the coast of Chile for 600 miles. Everywhere there are deep gulfs and crooked straits completely screened by high mountains. Such was the archipelago which Captain Phillimore was detailed to search.

On learning that the *Dresden* had left Punta Arenas, Captain Phillimore decided to investigate Picton Island and Orange Bay, on the south coast of Tierra del Fuego, but he did not intend to take the *Inflexible* further west than that, as he had heard from

<sup>1</sup> Alvarez : *La Grande Guerre Européenne et la Neutralité du Chili* (Admiralty Library, Xa 324) ; also Papers titled : *F.O.*, 9 February 1915, containing M. 0330/15. The Hague Convention is given in the Prize Manual.

<sup>2</sup> *South America Pilot*, Part II.

Admiral Sturdee that the battle cruisers were wanted at home. The Admiralty, however, when they knew of the *Dresden's* arrival at Punta Arenas, gave Admiral Sturdee discretion as to his immediate action to catch her, and impressed upon him that they preferred her destruction to her internment.<sup>1</sup> In the circumstances Admiral Sturdee considered he might employ the *Inflexible* in the hunt for a fortnight, though he intended to return home in the *Invincible* as soon as she was ready. He sent Captain Phillimore orders to continue to search for the *Dresden* till December 29 ; if the enemy was not destroyed by that date the three ships were to return to the Falklands, whence the *Inflexible* would proceed for home, the *Glasgow* and *Bristol* joining Admiral Stoddart in the search for the *Karlsruhe*. In his instructions he explained to Captain Phillimore that the *Orama* and *Kent* would leave Port Stanley on December 15 to assist in the search for the *Dresden*, and that the *Newcastle* and two Japanese cruisers were coming south on the same mission ; the *Australia* also, which it was now discovered could not use the Panama Canal, would make her passage by Magellan Straits in three weeks' time.

On receipt of this order Captain Phillimore revised his plans. He had been considering the *Dresden's* probable course of action. He thought she would, while at Punta Arenas, have made arrangements for a coal supply, most probably from Valparaiso ; Mas-a-fuera seemed a likely rendezvous for these colliers, and he determined to make straight for that island, after examining which he intended to visit Juan Fernandez and Valparaiso, and then thoroughly investigate the inlets on the Chilean coast with his three ships as they made their way south for the Falklands. He accepted a suggestion from Captain Luce that the *Glasgow* and *Bristol* should search the inshore channels on the way north, and carried out this programme till he was in the latitude of San Quintin Sound (47° S). He then called the two ships to him and at 9.50 p.m., December 17, proceeded in line abreast for Mas-a-fuera. Early next morning, however, the *Inflexible* intercepted a signal from the *Australia* to the effect that the *Newcastle* would visit Mas-a-fuera on the 21st. It was therefore useless for him to go also to the island, and he detached the *Glasgow* and *Bristol* to continue searching the inlets north of San Quintin Sound, while the *Inflexible* proceeded for Coronel, to get news.

Meanwhile the Admiralty had delayed the *Invincible's* departure from Port Stanley till the 17th ; they then ordered Admiral Sturdee to come home at once with the battle cruisers, leaving to Admiral Stoddart the task of pursuing the *Dresden*.<sup>2</sup> The order to return reached Captain Phillimore at 8.50 p.m., December 18 ; he turned over the command of his division to

<sup>1</sup> A 190.

<sup>2</sup> A 190, 196, 198.



Captain Luce and altered course for Port Stanley. When he reached the entrance to the Straits the weather was so thick that he thought it safer to go round the Horn.<sup>1</sup> The *Orama* and *Kent* were then just coming out; they proceeded up the coast outside the islands. So far, none of the vessels on the west coast had discovered any clue to the whereabouts of the *Dresden*.

Admiral Stoddart's own division on the east coast had been scarcely more fortunate. The *Carnarvon* examined Port Madryn (43° S) on the 16th; the *Cornwall* joined in the course of the day and the two ships looked into every likely anchorage on their way south to the Straits of Magellan. On the 17th, in Puerto Santa Elena, the *Carnarvon* observed the German supply ship *Patagonia* at anchor, guarded by an Argentine cruiser; proceeding southward she arrived at Punta Arenas on December 20.

**6. Admiral Sturdee Returns Home.**—Admiral Sturdee failed to receive in time the Admiralty's telegram of the 16th ordering him to remain at the Falklands<sup>2</sup>; he left the islands at 2 p.m. that day for Monte Video. The *Canopus* left two days later to act as guardship at Abrolhos, and the *Macedonia*, with the German survivors, proceeded for home on the 14th, in company with an empty store ship.

On arrival at Monte Video on December 20 the Admiral learned that there was strong evidence of the presence of the *Von der Tann* and two other German battle cruisers within wireless range of the port. The probability of the truth of this seemed so great that he proposed to suspend his voyage home and return to Port Stanley, ordering also the *Canopus* back again. But the Admiralty knew for certain that the German battle cruisers were in their own home waters, and the *Invincible* continued her voyage to England.<sup>3</sup>

The *Inflexible* was back at the Falklands by December 23, and proceeded for home next day.

**7. Movements of German Supply Ships in South America.**—The colliers dismissed by von Spee when he left the west coast of America found their way as ordered to west coast ports. The *Memphis* reached Coronel on November 29; as she had left Punta Arenas, another Chilean port, without clearance, the Chilean authorities at first detained and finally interned her. The *Luxor* put in to Callao (Peru) on December 10, and was interned as a fleet auxiliary the next day. The *Rhakotis* also chose Callao, putting in there on December 13; although she had the master and crew of the *North Wales* on board, the master was unable to give evidence sufficient to prove the *Rhakotis* guilty

<sup>1</sup> Phillimore, Letter of Proceedings. M. 0649/15.   <sup>2</sup> A 196.   <sup>3</sup> A 198.

of unneutral service, and the Peruvian Government did not intern her.<sup>1</sup> She remained at Callao.

The *Eleonore Woermann*, *Mera*, *Patagonia*, and *Josephina*, waiting for the German Cruiser Squadron at the rendezvous near Puerto Santa Elena on the east coast of Argentine, dispersed when they found it useless to remain longer. The *Patagonia* was arrested by an Argentine warship for breach of Argentine's neutrality. The *Mera* put back to Monte Video, and was interned on December 26. The *Josephina* also went to Monte Video on the 23rd. No proof could be given that she had acted as a fleet auxiliary, and she was allowed to leave again on the 30th, nominally for the west coast on a purely commercial voyage, but really to join the *Dresden*.<sup>2</sup> The *Eleonore Woermann* did not go into port again.

A suspicious Danish ship, the *Nordpol*, put in to Rio on December 24 with 2,000 tons of American coal, consigned to Buenos Aires; she was considered by us to be intended to serve the *Karlsruhe*, and a watch was kept on her. In fact, though our suspicions were based on inferences, they were justified. She was one of the colliers intended for von Spee; but there seems to have been some hitch in the arrangements, and when she sailed from Rio on January 5 it was to deliver her coal to the German depot at Buenos Aires and not to the *Dresden*.<sup>3</sup>

The *Josephina* also failed to reach the anxious cruiser. As Admiral Stoddart in the *Carnarvon* came out of the Straits of Magellan on January 6 he met the *Josephina* coming in, and as her papers were unsatisfactory, he took her with him to Port Stanley, where he arrived on the 9th.

The *Sierra Cordoba*, which had been lying at Monte Video since November 22, departed once more on December 18, with Callao as her ostensible destination and commerce as her declared object. In the light of her former career, both were open to doubt.

**8. Operations on the West Coast in December 1914.**—While the South Atlantic Squadron was making its way back to the Falkland Islands after the action, Admiral Patey, with the *Australia*, *Newcastle*, and the three Japanese ships *Hizen*, *Idzumo* and *Asama*, was assembling his force in a bay near the entrance to the Panama Canal. As soon as it was known that the *Dresden* had left Punta Arenas, his whole force was ordered south to search for her and for the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, and any supply vessels. The *Australia* herself was intended for the West Indies, where Admiral Patey was to take charge;<sup>4</sup> she could not use the canal on account of her length, and, consequently, would have to make the passage by Magellan Strait.

<sup>1</sup> M. 21407/14, 22307/14, 15304/15, 17366/15.   <sup>2</sup> I.D.H.S. 1480/42.

<sup>3</sup> I.D.H.S. 1480/42.

<sup>4</sup> A 84, 191, 193, 194.



The *Hizen* was ordered back to Japan, and the other four ships swept southward together as far as the parallel of Callao (12° S). Here the British ships parted company from the Japanese, who remained north of Callao; while the *Newcastle*, which had been ordered by the Admiralty to search the coast of Chile, went on in advance by way of St. Felix and Juan Fernandez, islands on the 80th meridian. The *Australia* steamed along inshore as far as Iquique, and on December 24 also examined St. Felix before calling at Valparaiso. On December 29, off Corcovada Gulf (42° S), she passed the *Orama* and *Kent*.<sup>1</sup>

These two ships, with Captain Segrave, of the *Orama*, as senior officer, left the Falkland Islands on December 15 with orders to proceed to the Pacific for the purpose of intercepting the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* and other ships that might be interfering with British trade in these waters. They were off Punta Arenas on the 18th. The *Orama* went in to the port and heard that the *Dresden's* departure had been against the advice of the German Consul, who had strongly urged Captain Lüdecke to intern his ship. The *Orama* and *Kent*, with their two colliers, proceeded through the Strait, searching the coast, and reached Vallenar Roads (46° S) on the 22nd, where, a few hours later, the *Glasgow* and *Bristol* joined them. Captain Luce, of the *Glasgow*, being senior to Captain Segrave, took charge till he was recalled by Admiral Stoddart, leaving Captain Segrave to carry out his original orders of searching for the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*. All the intelligence received, vague as it was, implied that she was to the northward. On December 9 firing had been heard off Corral (40° S); on the 11th a searchlight was seen in 35° S, and signals passed between the German ships at Pisagua (20° S) and an unknown vessel off the harbour.<sup>2</sup> This was practically all the intelligence available; and on the strength of it Captain Segrave proceeded northward on the 29th. He visited Valparaiso on January 2, and found that the Chilean Government, in accordance with their recent decree, had decided to intern the vessels of the Kosmos Line, to which the *Luxor*, *Memphis*, *Rhakotis* and *Amasis* all belonged. After leaving Valparaiso, Captain Segrave made a careful search of the coast and adjacent waters up to Callao (12° S), but failed to find any trace of the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* or *Dresden*.<sup>3</sup>

**9. Admiral Stoddart's Operations, 21 December 1914 to 4 January 1915.**—When Admiral Sturdee sailed for Monte Video for home, the command of the vessels engaged in searching for the *Dresden* devolved upon Admiral Stoddart, who, on that date, December 21, had just left Punta Arenas in the *Carnarvon*. The *Glasgow* and *Bristol*, after an examination of the channels

<sup>1</sup> Track Chart in Patey, L. of P. M. 0517/15.

<sup>2</sup> Daily Return of Enemy, British, and Allied Ships Abroad.

<sup>3</sup> Segrave, L. of P. M. 02341/15.

on the west coast, were on their way to Vallenar, where they were to coal from the colliers brought by the *Kent* and *Orama*, which were patrolling the Gulf of Penas. His intention was for the *Carnarvon* and *Cornwall* to search the eastern portion of the Straits of Magellan and Tierra del Fuego, with Punta Arenas as their telegraphic headquarters, while the four other ships examined the western bays and inlets as far as Chiloe Island; the *Otranto*, which arrived at Port Stanley on the 16th, was to search the Falkland group.<sup>1</sup> To the Admiralty it seemed dangerous for the *Otranto* to be alone, and they instructed him to keep her within supporting distance of a man-of-war; this requirement he met by sending the *Cornwall* to the Falklands, and both ships remained at anchor at Port Stanley.

The *Cornwall* stayed only a few days. On the 27th the Admiralty ordered her to St. Helena. For some months the shipment of gold from South Africa had been in abeyance; but now that the menace from von Spee had been removed the accumulation was to be brought home, and to convey it was the *Cornwall's* new service.<sup>2</sup>

Admiral Stoddart had left Punta Arenas on the 21st and returned on the 23rd. In the interval there came in the *Amasis*, the German collier which had been serving von Spee. She was promptly detained by the Chilean Government, and remained at Punta Arenas.

After coaling, the Admiral proceeded westward to meet the *Glasgow* and *Bristol*, which he had called down from the west coast. He passed Punta Arenas at 11 a.m., December 26, a few hours after the *Sierra Cordoba*, which had left Monte Video, ostensibly for Callao, on December 18. We had objected mildly to her re-fuelling at Monte Video preparatory to departure, for she was known to have served the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*; but at the Admiralty's request the objection was not pressed, as we were afraid that Uruguay might stop our wireless communication in cypher with Port Stanley if we insisted too much on her neutrality.<sup>3</sup> Seeing the *Carnarvon* follow so closely on the *Sierra Cordoba*, the authorities at Punta Arenas despatched the Chilean destroyer *Almirante Condell* to ensure that their neutrality was not violated.<sup>4</sup> A few hours later the *Carnarvon* came upon the *Sierra Cordoba* anchored in Snug Bay, 53.50 S., 71.25 W. "She was boarded, and stated she was bound for Callao, with no cargo, and had put in for engine repairs. In view of the fact that she was anchored in an inhabited harbour she was not further interfered with."<sup>5</sup> Next day the *Carnarvon*, *Glasgow* and *Bristol* met in Tamar Bay, at the western end of the Straits; after searching that vicinity for a couple of days the

<sup>1</sup> Tel. 64 from R.A., *Carnarvon*, 21.12.14.

<sup>2</sup> A 202, and M. 0137/15.

<sup>3</sup> M. 04352/14.

<sup>4</sup> Alvarez., p. 167.

<sup>5</sup> Stoddart, L. of P. M. 01964/15.



three ships came eastward, the flagship calling at Punta Arenas on January 2 for intelligence. The three ships coaled in Possession Bay, east of Punta Arenas, and on January 6 the Admiral proceeded to the Falklands, leaving the *Glasgow* in charge of the search.

So far, the Strait itself and most of the bays and channels opening out of it had been carefully examined. Beagle Channel, between Tierra del Fuego and the islands fringing its southern coast, had been visited by the *Glasgow* and *Bristol* before they joined the flagship in Possession Bay. The chief places not yet searched were certain large fiords in the northern shores, Barbara Channel between the two largest islands west of Tierra del Fuego, and the archipelago of small islands which extend from Cape Horn to the western entrance of the Strait. These were imperfectly charted, and the navigation of them would be a matter of some danger.

The *Australia* passed through Magellan Strait on December 31, and coaled at the Falklands. Leaving again at daybreak, January 5, she sighted a steamer in the afternoon of January 6, and, as the position was entirely outside any legitimate steamer track, she gave chase. The steamer immediately ran away. The *Australia* had damaged one of her propellers, and did not put on a high speed; consequently, at sunset, the steamer, which had originally been sighted on the sky line, was still 10 miles off. To bring her to, the *Australia* fired a 12 in. round from the foremost turret, and this had the effect of stopping the chase. The steamer proved to be the *Eleonore Woermann*, doubtless on her way to join the *Dresden*. Admiral Patey had heard from Admiral Stoddart that the *Eleonore Woermann* was a supply ship; she had no papers for her cargo, although it included 1,800 tons of coal, which must not reach the German cruiser. The *Australia* could not spare a prize crew, and, moreover, German warships were at large in the Atlantic. Feeling that the *Australia* could not afford the time to escort her to a British port or to wait for the arrival of another cruiser to take over the prize, the Admiral gave orders that she was to be sunk.<sup>1</sup> Thus, out of all the German supply ships made ready for von Spee's squadron, only the *Sierra Cordoba* had any chance of serving the *Dresden*.

<sup>1</sup> Patey, L. of P. M. 0817/15.

## CHAPTER II.

### THE KRONPRINZ WILHELM'S CAPTURES IN DECEMBER 1914.

10. **Movements of "Kronprinz Wilhelm," November 21 to December 21.**—Nothing had been heard of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* since the report that she was 300 miles east of Santos in mid-November. An unreadable wireless message addressed to her from Olinda Station, near Pernambuco, had been intercepted on December 16, but that gave little hint as to her position. There was another movement which might possibly be connected with her. A Hamburg-Amerika steamer, the *Otavi*, had been lying quiet at Pernambuco since August 17; on the German Consul's declaration that her mission was commercial, she was allowed to put to sea on December 4 with the ostensible destination of Fernando Po. A month later, on January 4, she arrived at Las Palmas, bringing the crews of three ships sunk by the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, the position (3° S, 29° W) of the last showing that the raider had moved northward, and was now at work in much the same area as that chosen by the *Karlsruhe*.

For a week after sending off the *Sierra Cordoba* the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* continued her endeavour to clear her last capture, the French barque *Union*, of her coal; in the process the German liner suffered a good deal of damage, and, finally, the *Union* capsized, still with 800 tons on board. Just before this, on November 21, another French sailing vessel was captured, the *Anne de Bretagne*, bound for Melbourne with Scandinavian wood. This prize was difficult to get rid of; she was rammed, three bombs were exploded inside her, and 25 rounds were fired at her. Finally she sank in 27° S, 32° W. Having now sufficient coal, and perhaps disheartened by his experiences with sailing vessels, Captain Thierfelder now made for the steamer route north-east of Cape San Roque, where the *Karlsruhe* had had her successes.<sup>1</sup> Here he made two captures on December 4. The first was the *Bellevue*, a British collier bound for Monte Video with 5,400 tons of coal and general cargo. Her master was keeping away from the trade route in accordance with the Admiralty instructions, and his capture in 3° S, 29° 9' W was

<sup>1</sup> The chief German authorities for the operations of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* are diaries and letters of members of her crew, now bound in I.D.H.S. 551. One of these, Mahlstedt, says she moved north because she was being actively searched for (I.D.H.S. 551, p. 175). This was not the case.



considered by the Admiralty to be due to pure mischance.<sup>1</sup> While the *Kronprinz Wilhelm's* crew were busy with the prize, another vessel came up, the *Mont Agel*, a French steamer in ballast, bound for South America. She was of no use to the raider, and she was sunk by ramming.<sup>2</sup> The *Bellevue* was, however, of great value. Not only had she coal; her general cargo supplied many needs, and the captors noted with pleasure that she carried toilet soap, cigars, chocolate, sweets, and whisky. Taking her well away to the north-westward, the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* spent from December 8 to 20 in transshipping from the prize everything of value, and then, opening the sea-cocks, allowed her to sink. The master of the *Bellevue*, though without any nautical instruments, estimated the courses and distances of the raider since the capture of his ship, and, allowing for the current, judged the position to be 6° N, 40° W.

Meanwhile, on December 12, the *Otavi* had joined from Pernambuco. After the provisions and equipment brought by her had been put aboard the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, the prisoners from the captures were sent over to the *Otavi*, and on December 21 she parted company for Las Palmas, leaving the raider in 4° 8' N, 37° 50' W. As the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was full of stores, and even luxuries, Captain Thierfelder seems to have decided to continue commerce raiding, instead of accepting the German Admiralty's suggestions that he should lay his ship up in a neutral port. At any rate, no light on his future intentions could be thrown by the *Otavi* on arrival at Las Palmas on January 4.<sup>3</sup>

11. **Area I, December 1914.**—The *Otavi* reached Las Palmas at a period when the watch so continuously kept by Admiral de Robeck happened to be relaxing. At the time of the battle of the Falklands the Admiral, in the *Amphitrite*, was in the neighbourhood of Madeira, now his centre of communications. The *Argonaut* was attending to defects at Gibraltar, and his third cruiser, the *Europa*, was patrolling off the Tagus. Of his three armed merchant cruisers, the *Calgarian* was with him at Madeira, and the *Carmania* and *Victorian* were both at Gibraltar, in dockyard hands. The *Carmania* got away on the 11th, and took over the Tagus patrol from the *Europa*, which was to proceed home with a convoy and be fitted with Poulsen wireless apparatus. She left Gibraltar on December 16 with the *Assaye* and eight other transports,<sup>4</sup> and did not join Force I again for some months.

The Canaries were, however, visited by the Admiral, who took the *Calgarian* with him in the middle of December. That Germans were still at work there was indicated by the fact that

<sup>1</sup> M. 15679/15.

<sup>2</sup> Letter from Master of *Bellevue* to his owners. H.S. 23/303/13.

<sup>3</sup> I.D.H.S. 1414, No. 196; 1479, No. 383.

<sup>4</sup> *Europa*, L. of P. M. 04917/14.

some of the coal in the *Alwina*, a Dutch collier suspected of belonging to the German supply system, had been bought by a local Spaniard, who was to supply it to the *Cap Ortegale*, one of the convertible liners in the Canaries. We registered a protest against this transaction, and it was cancelled, the coal being disposed of to a reputable British merchant.<sup>1</sup> When Admiral de Robeck arrived, the situation seemed quite satisfactory, except that the German auxiliaries *Walhalla* and *Crefeld* had not yet been officially interned. The cargoes of the three highly suspicious Dutch colliers *Nepos*, *J. L. Mowinkel*, and *Alwina* were on sale, and the general opinion was that the wireless stations were no longer being used, even surreptitiously, by the German agents.<sup>2</sup> Admiral de Robeck therefore returned to Madeira, where, on the 20th, he shifted his flag to the *Argonaut*, sending the *Amphitrite* to Gibraltar to look after her usual defects. The *Calgarian* also had to go to Gibraltar, her place with the flagship being taken by the *Victorian*. The *Carmania*, on the Tagus patrol, should have gone to Gibraltar to coal on the 23rd, but Admiral de Robeck could not relieve her; neither at first could the Admiralty, whose neatly arranged convoy programme had by this time been completely disorganised by circumstances. Instead of the 16-day intervals laid down in October, convoys were leaving and arriving almost weekly. On the 19th the *Talbot*, from the Western Channel Patrol, arrived at Gibraltar with the *Aragon* and five other transports; she departed again on the 24th with three home-ward-bound transports. On the 28th the *Eclipse*, also of the Western Channel Patrol, reached Gibraltar with a convoy, and returned a week later with the *Alaunia* and seven other transports. With such a programme the Admiralty could not spare a cruiser; but they arranged that the old battleship *Prince George*, from the Channel Fleet, should work up her drills and refit her boilers while lying off the Tagus; accordingly she relieved the *Carmania* there on the 29th.

The Canaries were again visited by the Admiral on the 25th. The condition of affairs continued to be satisfactory; the Germans seemed anxious to dispose of their cargoes, and their ships showed no desire to proceed to sea, though in the absence of official internment there was nothing to prevent the *Walhalla* and *Crefeld* from escaping at night.<sup>3</sup> He returned four days later to Madeira, leaving the *Victorian* behind to resume her long vigil over the islands. She was at Las Palmas on January 1 and at Tenerife on January 3; at 6.45 p.m., after a visit from the Vice-Consul, the *Victorian* proceeded northward from Tenerife to meet the *Argonaut* near the Salvages, and to return with her to Las Palmas. The two ships anchored at Las Palmas on the

<sup>1</sup> Papers titled *F.O., December 16 1914. Unneutral Service.*

<sup>2</sup> De Robeck, L. of P. M. 04877/14.

<sup>3</sup> Admiral de Robeck to Admiralty, 30.12.14, in Papers titled X.3927/14.



morning of the 5th, and the Admiral found that the *Otavi* had arrived the previous day and had landed the crews of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm's* captures. He took immediate steps to have the *Otavi* interned. But this had been done provisionally, before the Admiral's protest reached the Governor; her internment was definitely confirmed by orders from Madrid on January 7.<sup>1</sup>

12. **North America and West Indies.**—When the *Otavi* left Pernambuco on December 4 it was at first thought she had gone to join the *Karlsruhe* at some pre-arranged rendezvous, for the destruction of the *Karlsruhe* and *Indrani* was so well concealed that for several months searches and operations were conducted with the idea of finding them or their bases. On December 24 it was reported that Caicara, at the foot of Lavandeira Reef in 5° S, 36° W, was being used by German cruisers, one having been seen there early in December; a Foreign Office official went across from Macau to examine it. The Consul at Para, however, considered the *Karlsruhe* was using Maraca Island in the mouth of the Amazon and St. Anna Channel near Maranhão, and he was authorised to send a small steamer to search those places.<sup>2</sup> The Admiralty ordered the *Melbourne* to coal at St. Lucia and then search the coast of Brazil from Trinidad to Para, while the *Dartmouth*, which reached Pernambuco on December 16, examined the remainder of the coast from Cape San Roque westward. As far as the *Melbourne* was concerned this was not carried out; she did not reach Bermuda from Madeira till the 20th and arrived at St. Lucia only on December 26, whereupon she was ordered by the Admiralty to search westward from Trinidad as far as the Panama Canal.<sup>3</sup> The *Dartmouth* by that time was at Trinidad. She had seen nothing at Lavandeira Reef, which she visited on December 20, nor at Maraca Island or Santa Anna Channel. The last two places she found dangerous through the unreliability of the charts and she considered as false the rumours that they were being used as bases. She was now ordered to come home, visiting ports on the coast as far as Para and coaling at Maranhão; if on arrival at Maranhão no news of the *Karlsruhe* had come to hand she was to return home *viâ* St. Vincent, Cape Verde.<sup>4</sup> Further instructions were given her that should she find an enemy ship in an unfrequented river or bay inside territorial waters the enemy was to be sunk; but if the vessel were lying in an inhabited and properly constituted port it was to be blockaded.<sup>5</sup> In ordering these movements the Admiralty had telegraphed direct to the ships and Admiral Hornby asked if they were under him or not. In reply he was

<sup>1</sup> Admiral de Robeck to Admiralty, 21 January 1915, in Papers titled X.8840/15; and L. of P. M. 0946/15.

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 134, pp. 33, 38, 40, 74.

<sup>3</sup> A 199, 201.

<sup>4</sup> A 201.

<sup>5</sup> A 203.

told that the *Dartmouth* was coming home and that the *Melbourne* would be under his orders till the arrival of Admiral Patey.

13. **Reorganisation of the North America and West Indies Stations. December 28, 1914.**—The Admiralty had now decided to separate the West Indies from the North America command, the parallel of 28° N to be the limit between the two; Rear-Admiral Hornby was to retain command of the North American half, and Admiral Patey on arrival would become Vice-Admiral Commanding the West Indies Station.<sup>1</sup> The *Lancaster* and *Berwick* in the West Indies were to come home on relief by the *Melbourne* and *Sydney*, and as the *Melbourne* was already on the station the *Lancaster* was to start as soon as possible. She left Bermuda finally for Plymouth on January 16. The *Sydney* was due at Bermuda on January 6.

14. **Reports of German Supply Ships from North America in December 1914.**—None of the operations in the West Indies revealed any trace of the *Karlsruhe*, and, indeed, there was a press report that she had reached Germany on December 26. Nothing reliable had been heard of her for a long time and the idea arose that she might have foundered in a storm, but this was dispelled when it was learned from Barbadoes that for two months there had been no weather danger to shipping.<sup>2</sup> But there were movements of possible supply ships which might be intended for her. One, the Danish vessel *Fanny*, suspected since October 30, sailed on December 13 from Norfolk, Virginia, with 1,800 tons of coal consigned to Buenos Aires. She arrived there on January 26, but seems to have escaped the notice of our agents; it is not known what happened to her coal. The German liner *Neckar*, which had been quiescent at Baltimore, began to coal, but though expected to make a rush for sea she did not move.

The most suspicious of all was the *Gladstone*, a Norwegian vessel which, since her arrival at Norfolk, Virginia, in November, was very strongly suspected. She was reported to have a German captain and to be intended to serve German cruisers. While at Newport News she fitted up a wireless installation, and endeavoured to change her flag to that of Chile. After a month's delay she sailed from Newport News on December 15 with the name of *Mariana Quesada*, and under the flag of Costa Rica, having obtained permission to fly it from the Costa Rican representative in the port. The long delay and suspicious nature of her proceedings at Newport News enabled all our authorities to be warned about her should she stray from her course. She, however, proceeded straight to Port Limón, in Costa Rica, which had been declared her first port of call. But there she was unfortunate; the Costa Rican Government

<sup>1</sup> A 204, 210.

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 134, pp. 182, 193.



definitely repudiated her change of flag, and ordered her detention as a supply ship. She disappeared, however, from the port early on January 1, without papers or flag.<sup>1</sup>

**15. Departure of the "Holger" from Pernambuco, 1 January 1915.**—Another probable supply ship left port on January 1. At Pernambuco was lying the *Holger*, a Roland liner, which on December 2 had been detected reporting by wireless the departures and cargoes of British ships, and had been the subject of a Foreign Office protest at the Admiralty's instigation. On January 1 she slipped out secretly without clearance papers. Her double violation of their neutrality led the Brazilian Government to decide on the removal of the essential parts of the wireless apparatus of all ships at Pernambuco and of any ship in their ports found communicating, as had been requested by us on December 7. They also decided to refuse permission to leave to all ships of a company, any one of whose vessels had escaped in violation of Brazilian regulations. The captains of the port and guardship were dismissed; Fernando Noronha wireless station was closed; and a vigorous search was made for clandestine wireless stations ashore.<sup>2</sup> Although the movements of the *Holger* were then unknown, she presumably steamed northward and the *Inflexible* had some chance of overtaking her. The battle cruiser passed outside Pernambuco at 15 knots during the morning of January 2 and continued on the direct route for St. Vincent. Possibly the *Holger* made a wide detour to eastward, for she was not seen by any of our ships, and succeeded in joining the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*.

**16. Movements of "Kronprinz Wilhelm," 21 December 1914 to 7 January 1915.**—Captain Thierfelder, in the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, had now come back to the station east of the trade route where he had made his two previous prizes. There, in 4.20 S, 29.25 W, he captured another British vessel, the *Hemisphere*, on December 28, at 6 p.m. She was carrying coal from Hull for the Central Argentine Railway, and was too good a prize to be summarily despatched. Putting an armed crew on board he steamed off with her eastward till dawn on the 30th, when, feeling he was safe from the chance of an encounter, he commenced to digest his prize.<sup>3</sup>

Since November 27, when the *Macedonia*, on her way south from Sierra Leone to join Admiral Sturdee, called at Fernando Noronha for telegrams,<sup>4</sup> the area in which the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was at work had been almost unvisited by our cruisers. The patrol and search near Cape San Roque, in which the *Bristol* and *Macedonia* had been employed, came to an end when Admiral


<sup>1</sup> H.S. 134, pp. 176, 228.

<sup>2</sup> Papers titled F.O., 22.12.14; *Attempt by Germany to get in touch with Karlsruhe*. M. 15483/15.

<sup>3</sup> Depositions of Master of *Hemisphere*. H.S. 23/304/3.

<sup>4</sup> Deck Log *Macedonia*.

Sturdee absorbed them into his squadron; and since then no organised scheme had been re-instituted. The only armed vessels the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* had a chance of meeting were the cruisers on passage to and from other stations, but these steered mostly across and not along the trade route. For example, the *Otranto*, on her voyage from Sierra Leone to the Falklands, passed by way of the island of Trinidada, which she examined on December 9. The *Dartmouth*, leaving St. Helena on December 10, at first steered for Trinidada, but on the 13th altered course for Pernambuco, from which port she coasted the northern shores of Brazil on her way to join the West Indies Squadron. Thus neither of these ships went near the usual trade route from St. Vincent to Rio. The only armed vessel which followed the route even approximately was the *Celtic*, a newly commissioned armed merchant cruiser taken up for a new purpose. Two months' experience of the actual conditions of war showed the weakness of the squadron supply system; the slow supply ships in use had great difficulty in reaching the vessels for which they





carried stores, owing to the constant re-distribution of the cruisers on foreign stations, and their unarmed condition made them a source of anxiety in special moments of stress. Accordingly, on October 19 it was decided to take up and arm two vessels of good cargo capacity, large radius of action, and a speed of 15 to 16 knots, to take the place of the slower, unarmed, unconvoyed fleet auxiliaries. The vessels selected were the *Celtic* (White Star Line) and *Laconia* (Cunard Line); they were each armed with eight 6 in. guns and were commissioned at Liverpool on November 24. The *Celtic* left Devonport on December 10 to serve the squadron on the south-east coast of America; the *Laconia* on the 17th for the squadrons in the East Atlantic and on the Cape Station.<sup>1</sup> By December 22 the *Celtic* was approaching the area of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm's* activities. She passed near the position of the capture of the *Hemisphere*, but, unfortunately, three days too soon. The *Macedonia*, on the way home with the German survivors from the *Gneisenau*, was about 180 miles to the eastward of it the previous day. The *Invincible* left Pernambuco on the 29th, and, after a look at Lavandeira Reef, steered for St. Vincent; the *Inflexible* was following her three days astern. It was as well, therefore, for Captain Thierfelder that he, unlike Captain Köhler of the *Karlsruhe*, decided to move safe away from the trade route before commencing to clear his prize.

The process occupied him till January 7. On the previous day the *Holger* joined. She turned over her stores to the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* and took on board the crew of the *Hemisphere*. Captain Thierfelder then returned to his station east of the trade route.

<sup>1</sup> Papers titled *Admiralty, 17 October 1914. Squadron Supply Ships for Atlantic*; and *Admiralty, 8 December 1914. Sailing Orders. Celtic.*

### CHAPTER III.

#### SWEEPING FOR THE *KRONPRINZ WILHELM*, JANUARY AND EARLY FEBRUARY 1915.

17. The "*Kronprinz Wilhelm*" moves away Southward.— Soon after returning to the trade route, Captain Thierfelder took two prizes. On January 10 he captured the British steamer *Potaro* in 5.48 N, 25.58 W, and sent her off with a prize crew. Coming southward, on January 14, in 2.46 N, 26° W, 160 miles east of the most easterly steamer routes, he was lucky enough to take the *Highland Brae*, a vessel with general cargo and passengers for Buenos Aires, which was keeping so far out in hopes of safety. Before he had moved away with the *Highland Brae* another vessel met him, the *Wilfred M.*, a small sailing ship of Canadian register bound from Nova Scotia with dried fish for Bahia. The Germans had no use for this cargo, and, after the crew of the *Wilfred M.* had been taken off, the little vessel was rammed and cut in half by the big liner, which then steamed off eastward and southward with the *Highland Brae* in company to meet the *Holger*. The four ships, *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, *Highland Brae*, *Holger*, and *Potaro*, steamed southward for a week, more or less in company, the cruiser taking stores of all kinds from the latest prize during the daylight hours, and continuing her southerly course at night. Finally, at the end of January, after everything of any value had been removed from the *Highland Brae*, she was sunk by opening her sea-cocks, in a position estimated by her master, who was aboard the cruiser, to be some hundred miles to the south-eastward of Trinidad.<sup>1</sup> This was far from all steamer tracks, but within reach of the sailing-ship route from the Horn. Before long, on February 3, a barque was sighted, which proved to be the *Semantha*, a Norwegian bound for the Channel with wheat. This cargo Captain Thierfelder decided to keep from delivery in England, and he sank the *Semantha* in 26° 30' S, 27° W. Then, calling up the *Potaro*, he systematically ransacked her, sinking her also on February 6.<sup>2</sup> Six days later the *Holger*, with all the crews of the captures on board, was sent off to Buenos Aires.

<sup>1</sup> Deposition and letters from Master of *Highland Brae*. H.S. 23/306.

<sup>2</sup> Deposition of Master of *Potaro* in H.S. 23, p. 305. Fayle's statement (*Seaborne Trade I*, 377, line 3) that the *Semantha* was captured in much the same position as the *Highland Brae* is due to a misunderstanding of a mutilated telegram. See A 223. The same mistake is to be found in Corbett, *Naval Operations II*, p. 253.




18. **The "Highflyer's" Two Sweeps.**—Captain Thierfelder had acted wisely in leaving the trade route after sinking the *Wilfred M.* Had he stayed where he was to loot his prize in the manner of his predecessor, Captain Köhler, he would have been in some danger, for a hunting squadron was out after him. The information given by the British and French crews released from the *Otavi* on January 4 placed the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* in 3° S, 29° W on December 4, a month before; it was not much clue to her position in January. But on January 9 an intercepted telegram revealed that a steamer, presumably the *Holger*, had been despatched from Pernambuco to meet the raider on January 6 in 1° N, 20° W. The Admiralty at once passed the information to all the Intelligence Officers in the Atlantic; at the same time they ordered Cruiser Force D from St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, to sweep for the raider, and the *Dartmouth*, from the coast of Brazil, to examine Rocas Reef and Fernando Noronha on the way to St. Vincent.<sup>1</sup>

Cruiser Force D was now assembled at or near St. Vincent in company with the *Vengeance*, which had arrived on December 15. The *Marmora*, which had been patrolling near Sierra Leone, left the coast of Africa on December 20, and joined the *Highflyer* and *Empress of Britain* at St. Vincent. Thus the whole squadron—*Highflyer*, *Empress of Britain*, *Marmora*—was ready assembled at St. Vincent when the order to search arrived; and they sailed on January 11, leaving the guard of the colliers to the *Vengeance*. The three ships reached the indicated spot on January 14. Nothing was there. They continued as far west as 25½° W, and, passing close to the spot where the *Highland Brae* had been captured three days before, on the 17th they turned back for Sierra Leone to coal. Their search had revealed no trace of the raider.

The *Dartmouth* left Para on January 9. Skirting the coast, she reached Maranham on the 11th, but, finding it an unsatisfactory harbour for coaling, proceeded to the Sao João Islands, where she completed with coal. From there she steamed direct to Rocas Reef and Fernando Noronha. No definite news of the *Karlsruhe* had been obtained, and, in accordance with her orders,<sup>2</sup> the *Dartmouth* headed for St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands.

Of all our ships, the only one to find a trace of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was the *Canopus*, which, on January 14, was relieved as guardship at Abrolhos by the *Vindictive* from Ascension, and proceeded for the Mediterranean. On the 19th she received from the steamer *Demerara* a signal stating that on January 18, when in 1° N, 24°–27° W, she had heard German signalling between five vessels, three of which had Telefunken wireless.<sup>3</sup> This area the *Canopus* reached on January 21, and commenced




N.377. C. W. 16820. P. 4063. 450. 1922 J. W. L. F.

<sup>1</sup> A 208, 209.

<sup>2</sup> A 209.

<sup>3</sup> *Canopus* W/T Log 31335.







to sweep. Just after sunset her lookouts, warned by a very fishy smell, sighted something awash in 2.40 N, 25.50 W. It was the waterlogged wreck of the *Wilfrid M.* Not connecting this in any way with the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, and thinking the derelict a danger to navigation, Captain Heathcoat Grant attempted to sink it by ramming.<sup>1</sup> Although the *Canopus* was a battleship specially fitted for this operation, she was unable to defeat the *Wilfrid M.*, a portion of whose fore part still remained afloat when Captain Grant resumed his course. Unknowingly, he must next day have steamed up the route down which the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* had come a week before, and at 6 p.m., January 22, he passed about 30 miles east of the spot where the *Potaro* had been captured.<sup>2</sup>

On January 28 the *Highflyer*, *Marmora*, and *Empress of Britain*, having coaled at Sierra Leone after their first sweep of the mid-Atlantic area, proceeded again for a second sweep. They were to be back by February 9, for amongst other reasons the engine-room complements of the two armed merchant cruisers were clamouring to go home; by the terms of their agreement disciplinary powers over them ceased in the *Marmora* on February 9 and in the *Empress of Britain* on February 18, on which days they demanded relief. In any case, the *Empress of Britain* required docking, as her speed was much reduced. The three ships, spread over a front of about 60 miles, searched along the parallel of 4° N from 17° 45' to 23° W; thence they proceeded to St. Paul Rocks, returning east along the parallel of 1° 20' S as far as 20° W. They were back at Sierra Leone by February 12, having seen nothing and heard no German wireless signals. Next day the *Marmora* left for Gibraltar, the *Empress of Britain* following her on the 15th, while the *Highflyer*, by Admiralty orders, remained at Sierra Leone.<sup>3</sup>

**19. The West Indies. The "Bavaria" and the "Farn."**—Active sweeping for the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* could be undertaken only by ships on the mid-Atlantic area; the contribution towards her destruction by the other squadrons had to be limited to keeping in port any possible supply ships. At Havana was lying the Hamburg-Amerika liner *Bavaria*, which had been there since the outbreak of war. Soon after arrival she took in large supplies of coal and provisions, and was expected to sail at any moment; but no definite movement was apparent till the end of December 1914, when a German agent endeavoured to buy coal at any price from the Havana Coal Company. The manager of this firm was British. He refused the offer, and reported the matter; whereupon attention was drawn to the *Bavaria*, which was the only chance the Germans had of getting coal away from

<sup>1</sup> *Canopus* Deck Log.

<sup>2</sup> The wreck of the *Wilfrid M.* finally drifted ashore at Grenada on April 28. H.S. 23/307/6.

<sup>3</sup> H.S. 135, pp. 499, 692, 715.



Havana. She had 1,700 tons on board, and was ready to leave at any moment.<sup>1</sup> As, moreover, her name appeared in two separate German telegrams we had intercepted,<sup>2</sup> the suspicion that she would move was strong enough for the Admiralty to order the Senior Officer, West Indies (Captain Clinton Baker, in the *Berwick*), to watch her, as she might be intended for the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*.<sup>3</sup> The only ship he had available was his own; the *Condé* was at Martinique. The *Berwick* accordingly proceeded to Havana, to remain off the port till she could be relieved by the *Melbourne* on January 17. On the way the *Berwick* examined the shores of Haiti, where St. Nicholas Mole, a deserted port, was rumoured to be a base for the *Karlsruhe*; but she saw nothing suspicious there. The latest orders were that the *Berwick* should return home as soon as the *Sydney* arrived on the station. That ship reached Bermuda on January 6; but since the *Australia*, having damaged her propeller, would be later than was expected in arrival on the West Indies Station, Admiral Hornby was allowed to retain the *Berwick* temporarily. The standing order that a cruiser should be detailed for the particular duty of maintaining wireless touch with the Japanese cruisers on the other side of the Panama Canal was at the same time relaxed; in future, arrangements were to be made for passing messages at fixed intervals.<sup>4</sup> From this time onwards till June the Havana Patrol was continued, entailing the loss of two ships from the West Indies Squadron for general duties.<sup>5</sup>

San Juan, Porto Rico, attracted attention again when, on January 12, there came in a vessel flying the German flag, and with the name *K.D.3* on her stern. It was soon discovered that this was really the *Farn*, a British collier known to have been captured by the *Karlsruhe*; she was now in charge of a German prize crew. By Admiral Hornby's orders the *Sydney* left Jamaica on the 13th to watch off San Juan, whence a plentiful crop of reports were coming in. The French Consul stated on the 14th that the *Farn* and the *Präsident*, a small vessel known to have been acting for the German supply service, were both ready for sea. The *Farn* had on board the Chinese of her original crew. Efforts were made by the German captain to tranship these to the *Odenwald*, another German steamer in port; but difficulties arose from the United States immigration laws, which would not allow the Chinamen to leave their ship. The presence of the *Farn* gave rise to the rumour that the *Karlsruhe* was coming to San Juan; the cruiser was actually reported as off the port on January 21. These rumours died away after January 25, when the United States authorities interned the *Farn* on the grounds that she was an Admiralty collier, captured

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 134, p. 137.

<sup>2</sup> I.D.H.S. 1338, Nos. 258, 268.

<sup>3</sup> Tel. 11 to Senior Naval Officer, West Indies, 7.1.15.

<sup>4</sup> A 207.

<sup>5</sup> M. 04818/15.

and converted into a tender of the German Navy.<sup>1</sup> The Admiralty protested that the vessel was not an Admiralty vessel, and at the time of capture was carrying commercial cargo to the River Plate; but the United States refused to hand over the ship to her owners, and she remained at San Juan.<sup>2</sup> Her internment released the *Sydney*, and that ship proceeded to Martinique.

No definite location of the *Karlsruhe* had, of course, taken place since November; but towards the end of January there were vague rumours that she had returned to Germany. However, on February 5, Grand Admiral von Koesler, President of the German Navy League, in the course of a lecture at Kiel, stated that the *Karlsruhe* was continuing her activities in American waters with success, which seemed to dispose of the stories that she was at Wilhelmshaven,<sup>3</sup> and the possibility that she might turn up in the West Indies had still to be taken into consideration. Barbados had only the local volunteers and their rifles for defence, but St. Lucia had now four French 5 in. B.L. guns mounted, and temporary crews were arranged for, so that the island was to some extent protected in case of a raid.<sup>4</sup>

**20. North America. The Second Canadian Convoy. 1915 to February 18.**—The principal duty of the North American Squadron remained as before, to prevent the escape of the convertible liners at New York and Boston. Communication with our cruisers off New York had been maintained by means of a merchant ship with wireless to act as a link with the Intelligence Centre at St. John's, and by this method the average time of transmission of intelligence was nine hours. But the severe conditions of the winter weather caused defects to develop in each of the linking ships engaged, and Admiral Hornby, early in January, discharged them, preferring to trust to direct communication between Cape Sable and the New York Patrol for the month which must elapse before the new medium power station erecting there would be ready.<sup>5</sup>

The ships of the squadron—*Glory* (flag), *Suffolk*, *Essex*, *Niobe*, *Caronia*—were all more or less in need of dockyard attention. Indeed, so defective was their condition that Admiral Hornby obtained permission to use for the New York patrol between January 6 and 13 the *Charybdis*, which had come over from the Western Channel Patrol to escort home a second Canadian contingent. This, however, was not yet ready to sail and the *Charybdis* was available. Unfortunately, she collided on January 9 with the United States s.s. *Bayato* in the approach

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 134, pp. 401, 410, 421.

<sup>2</sup> Papers titled *Foreign Office*, 6.2.15, containing M. 01216/15.

<sup>3</sup> H.S. 134, pp. 393, 506, 563.

<sup>4</sup> Papers titled *Colonial Office*, 25.2.15, *Barbados*; and H.S. 134, p. 497.

<sup>5</sup> H.S. 134, pp. 59, 70, 199.



to New York, broke her own stem and badly damaged her deck plates. She had to go at once to Bermuda. There it was discovered that her repairs would monopolise the whole staff of the dockyard for at least eight weeks; in view of the state of his squadron, the Admiral considered this undesirable, and she was paid off, her repairs to be carried out in the intervals of refitting the other ships.<sup>1</sup>

On January 12 the North American Squadron was disposed as follows: the *Suffolk* and *Caronia* off New York, with the *Essex* at Bermuda with orders to relieve the *Suffolk*. The *Niobe* was at Halifax waiting for the departure of a transport conveying a draft of 500 men for the First Canadian contingent; she was to escort it as far as 40° W, the limit of the North American Station.<sup>2</sup> The *Glory* had just left Halifax for the Chesapeake. The watch on New York had been so close and continuous that at length, on December 23, our Ambassador was privately informed by the United States Foreign Office that a continuance of the practice might be construed into an act of unfriendliness requiring some action on the part of the United States Government. Admiral Hornby immediately issued orders that his ships were not to approach nearer than six miles from Ambrose Lightship; this action was reinforced by instructions given from the Admiralty, who also, on January 25, re-defined his duties. In future, he need not stop ships for the removal of contraband or reservists, as this could be better arranged in the United Kingdom or at Gibraltar; his attention was to be primarily devoted to the stoppage of enemy vessels, or neutrals whose actions gave reasonable ground for suspicion; above all, he was to see that no act was committed liable to cause the Americans unnecessary irritation.<sup>3</sup> A special case was that of the *Dacia*, a Hamburg-Amerika liner bought by an American for the purpose of carrying cotton from Galveston to Rotterdam. We refused to recognise the change of flag, but for political reasons Admiral Hornby was instructed not to interfere with or board her, leaving all action against her to be taken in home waters.<sup>4</sup>

The *Charybdis* being unavailable, some other arrangement had to be made for the escort of the Second Canadian contingent. It was finally decided on January 25, that the *Essex*, which was in need of a considerable refit, should bring the transports home and join the 6th Cruiser Squadron of the Grand Fleet after refitting, while the *Berwick* came up from the West Indies to take her place in the North American Squadron.<sup>5</sup> The *Berwick*

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 134, pp. 275, 323, 333, 339, 432.

<sup>2</sup> When the transport actually sailed, on January 20, the *Niobe* was not ready, and it went without escort (H.S. 134, pp. 326, 364, 372).

<sup>3</sup> H.S. 134, pp. 130, 233, 237; Papers titled *F.O.*, 24.9.14; and A 211.

<sup>4</sup> Tel. to Admiral Hornby, 17.1.15, and Papers titled *F.O.*, 7 January, 1915, *Dacia*.

<sup>5</sup> M. 0698/15.

left Jamaica on February 11 for Bermuda and thenceforward operated under Admiral Hornby, leaving Captain Silver of the *Melbourne* as Senior Officer in the West Indies until Admiral Patey should arrive. The *Essex* sailed from Halifax on February 23 with three transports<sup>1</sup> containing the 1,000 troops of the Second Canadian contingent.

21. **Area I. Departure of Admiral de Robeck.**—The sweeps for the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* had been undertaken as a result of deciphering an intercepted telegram in which her rendezvous was mentioned. Another intercepted message indicated that the German collier *Macedonia* at Las Palmas might try to coal the raider, and on January 7 Admiral de Robeck was instructed to keep a watch on this vessel.<sup>2</sup> His force was to be lessened by the transfer of the *Calgarian*, then at Gibraltar, to the North American Squadron; but her place in Force I would soon be filled by the arrival of the *Edinburgh Castle*, which, after taking ammunition and escorting some colliers to St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, would return to join Force I. In the interval, however, Admiral de Robeck would have no ship to watch the Canaries while the *Victorian* coaled, and when he represented this he was allowed to keep the *Calgarian* till the arrival of the *Edinburgh Castle*.<sup>3</sup>

A few days later, however, the Cabinet decided to prepare for an expedition to capture the Dardanelles. For this, the older battleships would be required; the *Canopus* was recalled from Abrolhos as soon as she could be relieved by the *Vindictive*, and the *Vengeance* was to come from St. Vincent. It was decided that the *Edinburgh Castle*, which reached Gibraltar on January 13, should take the place of the *Vengeance* as guardship at St. Vincent till she could be relieved, Admiral de Robeck retaining the *Calgarian* until he was joined by the *Edinburgh Castle*.<sup>4</sup> On the 18th the Admiralty repeated their instructions for the Canaries to be watched, as they knew a collier was to be despatched to the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* from there if possible.<sup>5</sup>

To Admiral de Robeck, who had not been told the source of the Admiralty's information, this anxiety that the enemy might utilise certain steamers at the Canaries seemed unnecessary. On January 21 he wrote reassuringly that there was nothing locally to lead one to suppose that any German ships would then leave the Canary Islands with coal for the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*. The chief authority in the Islands, His Excellency José Centano, Civil Governor of Tenerife, was determined to enforce strict neutrality and had interned the *Otavi* 24 hours after her arrival, before Admiral de Robeck's application

<sup>1</sup> *Missanabie*, *Megantic*, *Vaderland*.

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 135, pp. 301.

<sup>3</sup> H.S. 135, pp. 234, 254, 275, 279; M. 095/15, 03686/15.

<sup>4</sup> H.S. 135, pp. 401, 459.

<sup>5</sup> Tel. 117 to S.N.O., Gibraltar.



reached the Governor of Las Palmas. So convinced was the Admiral that the Spanish authorities in the Islands intended to uphold their neutrality, that, to avoid hurting their susceptibilities, his policy was to patrol across the trade routes to the southward of the Canaries rather than to keep ships actually lying off the ports. Information of any movement of the German vessels in port would quickly reach the watching cruisers, the news being cabled from the Islands to Madeira and passed thence by the new wireless station. There seemed little chance of any vessel moving; the most likely vessel for employment as a fleet auxiliary was the *Cap Ortegál*, and she had very little coal, the German stock of which was small. Altogether he thought it more probable that supplies for the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* would come either from Wales or the United States in neutral steamers.<sup>1</sup>

This letter was not received at the Admiralty till February 3. In the meantime Admiral de Robeck had been given another, and, as events proved, most important appointment. On January 22 he was ordered to turn over his present command to his senior captain, hoist his flag in the *Vengeance* at Gibraltar, and proceed to Malta to join the Vice-Admiral, Eastern Mediterranean Squadron as his second-in-command. The approaching Dardanelles operations had robbed the Atlantic squadrons of their battleship supports and now they took away Admiral de Robeck. On January 30 he transferred the command of Force I to Captain Grant-Dalton of the *Amphitrite*, then at Madeira,<sup>2</sup> and hoisted his flag in the *Vengeance* at Gibraltar.

#### CHAPTER IV.

##### THE DRESDEN IN HIDING.<sup>3</sup>

22. **The "Dresden" in Hewett Bay.**—By the end of 1914 our cruisers in Magellan Strait had not succeeded in finding the *Dresden*. Nor had any supply ships been found in the Patagonian channels. The *Amasis*, now safely detained at Punta Arenas, was not at the time associated by our cruisers with the *Dresden*; but she had, unknown to us, been able to render her important service. After leaving von Spee, the *Amasis* went to Fox Bay, about 45 miles SSE of Punta Arenas and from there communicated by boat with the port, landing an officer, Lieutenant zur Helle, specially sent by von Spee

<sup>1</sup> de Robeck to Admiralty, 21 January 1915, in Papers titled X. 8840/15.

<sup>2</sup> Grant-Dalton, Letter of Proceedings. M. 01561/15.

<sup>3</sup> Taken from *Kreuzerkrieg*, unless otherwise stated.

to arrange coal supplies. The presence of a ship at Fox Bay was learned by our Consul at Punta Arenas, but though at first he reported this as a German transport, he corrected this later by saying "Steamer in Fox Bay was *Alaska* of New York; sailed towards Atlantic, December 6, after sending steam launch twice to this port."<sup>1</sup> This may have been the *Amasis*; but it was not in the Atlantic that she next appeared. When at Punta Arenas the *Dresden*, which had not succeeded in obtaining coal from the *Minnesotan*, arranged with Lieutenant zur Helle that efforts should be made to get this coal transferred to the *Amasis*; when he left Punta Arenas, Captain Lüdecke (*Dresden*) went to Hewett Bay, at the southern end of Barbara Channel, in which the *Amasis* was anchored. While there, he was kept informed from Punta Arenas of the movements of our ships, and on the 19th learned that the *Sierra Cordoba* was coming to join him with 1,600 tons of coal. Next day, he had to send the *Amasis*, which was short of coal, to Punta Arenas to get a supply from the *Minnesotan*, only to find that the transfer was forbidden. Moreover, the Chilean authorities made an attempt to remove the cylinder covers of the *Amasis* to immobilise her; but the German Consul protested so energetically that she was merely detained. The *Sierra Cordoba* also was prevented by the activities of our searching cruisers from making her way to the *Dresden*, which had to cut down timber ashore and bring off water in order to conserve what remained of coal on board.

23. **The "Dresden" Discovered.**—In this predicament she was found on December 26 by a motor sailing boat named *Galileo*, owned by a French hunter. The *Dresden's* crew gave evasive answers to the Frenchman's questions, but Captain Lüdecke, feeling that his resting place was discovered, and that some of the hunting cruisers would soon visit his bay, searched for a more secluded place in which to hide till his supplies could reach him. With his steam pinnace sounding ahead he ultimately made his way into Christmas Bay, an arm of the sea shown on the charts in his possession as solid land.

Captain Lüdecke was right in his surmise. The French hunter, on arrival at Punta Arenas on January 3, went straight to the British Consul, who, on January 4, telegraphed to the Intelligence Officer, Monte Video, and to the Admiralty—

"To day I have received information that she (*Dresden*) was seen on December 22 in harbour with two transports near Isabella Island, south of Ines Island, north of Furies."

This intelligence was received by the *Glasgow* at 4.30 a.m., January 6, in an intercepted message from Cerrito to Port Stanley.<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately, it did not reach the Admiralty, nor

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 43, pp. 974, 1006.

<sup>2</sup> N.I.D. 6933/15 and *Glasgow* Signal Log 20112.



was it repeated by the Intelligence Officer ; and the Consul's subsequent references to it were misunderstood.<sup>1</sup>

But even if it had been received, there are discrepancies to be explained. The date, December 22, given in the telegram and repeated three months later by the French hunter, does not agree with the December 26 which the German official history states was the day of the encounter.<sup>2</sup> The transports mentioned by the hunter are difficult to identify. According to him one had two masts and two funnels, the other two masts and one funnel. From the German history we know that Captain Lüdecke sent the *Amasis* away on December 20, and she was certainly at Punta Arenas on December 22 ; the *Sierra Cordoba* was searched in Snug Bay on December 26 by the *Carnarvon*, and did not join the *Dresden* till much later. While at Hewett Bay, however, the *Dresden* kept up communications with Punta Arenas by means of motor boats or tugs from the port, and it may have been one of these that was with her when the French hunter came upon her.

**24. Search of Magellanic Area, January 1915.**—Captain Luce, of the *Glasgow*, who was now in charge of the search, went to Punta Arenas on January 7. He learned that the German pilot who left Punta Arenas in the *Dresden* had returned in a boat. He looked upon the Consul's information as nothing more than rumours, unreliable and indefinite at that ; he accordingly made no attempt to examine the suspected spot, but arranged to watch the eastern and western entrances to the Straits. The *Glasgow* took the eastern entrance and the *Bristol* the western. On the west coast the *Kent* and *Orama* watched the Gulf of Penas.<sup>3</sup>

On the 12th the Admiral ordered the *Glasgow* to Punta Arenas to send some telegrams which he passed to her by wireless. These the *Glasgow* had some difficulty in dispatching. By a Chilean decree issued on January 5 Consuls were no longer allowed to use cypher, but Captain Luce managed to persuade the Chilean Admiral to countersign his messages and they were accepted by the telegraph office. Even so, there was some delay, for the land line had broken down ; but they reached London on the 18th.<sup>4</sup>

The *Glasgow* then returned to watch the eastern exit, and at Captain Luce's suggestion the *Bristol* joined him in Possession Bay on the 15th. The Admiral arrived that day with the *Carnarvon* and *Celtic* ; the latter, after transferring stores to the *Glasgow* and *Bristol*, proceeded to the west coast to meet the *Kent* and *Orama*. The Admiral now sent the *Glasgow* to search the south-east coast of America as far north as Monte Video,

<sup>1</sup> See War Registry Copy of Telegrams from Consul, Punta Arenas, recd. 6.30 p.m., 7.2.15, and 10.10 p.m., 7.2.15 ; and A 235.

<sup>2</sup> *Kreuzerkrieg* I, 391, and *Anlage* 4.

<sup>3</sup> A 206.

<sup>4</sup> *Glasgow* Signal Log 20112 and H.S. 136, pp. 483, 485.







while the *Carnarvon* and *Bristol* took up the patrol of the Straits. He went to Punta Arenas on the 20th and 24th and interviewed various pilots, one of whom, a man suspected by the Consul of being in German pay, assured the Admiral that there were no good bays where a ship could lie in the neighbourhood of the place stated by the Consul to be the *Dresden's* hiding place.<sup>1</sup> The southern coasts of the Patagonian Islands have not been completely surveyed, and the neighbourhood is naturally dangerous for ships, but Barbara Channel, at the southern end of which lies Hewett Bay, has a good chart.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, the Admiral preferred to keep to the eastward, using Sholl Bay in Magdalen Sound as his base, and searching Cockburn Channel at frequent intervals with the *Carnarvon* and *Bristol*. His presence there had the effect of preventing the *Sierra Cordoba* from immediately joining the *Dresden*; after leaving Snug Bay she appears to have found a hiding place in Magdalen Sound, and could not escape from it until our cruisers had gone elsewhere.<sup>3</sup> During these searches, the nearest approach of our ships to the *Dresden's* reported hiding place was on January 26, when the *Bristol* proceeded as far as Magill Islands (longitude 72.10). Next day the *Carnarvon* came as far as Kirke Rocks (longitude 71.45). In this search the cruisers were accompanied by a local tug, the *Eduardo*, chartered for the purpose, and she was sent on to Kempe Island (longitude 72.30), but instead of proceeding further to Isabella Island in longitude 73° and searching the district indicated by the Consul, they all turned back, the men-of-war going to Dawson Island, while the tug was sent by the Admiral to examine Beagle Channel to the southward.<sup>4</sup>

**25. Distrust of our Consul at Punta Arenas.**—The Admiral was half inclined to think that the Consul's intelligence was untrustworthy. The Consul, Mr. Milward, himself was to a certain extent suspected by the British residents at Punta Arenas, since he had a German partner in his firm; so much did they doubt his good faith that in October they had petitioned for a salaried Consul to be appointed in his place.<sup>5</sup> Mr. Milward naturally at once tendered his resignation; but as he could not at the time be relieved of his duties he continued to act as Consul.<sup>6</sup> In these circumstances, the Admiral thought the statement that the *Dresden* was in such a difficult area might be a trap to entangle his ships in unnavigable waters while she made her escape. Moreover, a German signal had been intercepted, which, though partly unreadable, brought him strongly to the opinion that she had moved out of her hiding place in the southern channels at the end of January and probably intended

<sup>1</sup> N.I.D. 6933/15.

<sup>2</sup> No. 1306, with Hewett Bay as inset.

<sup>3</sup> *Kreuzerkrieg I*, 390.

<sup>4</sup> N.I.D. 6933/15. See plan at p. 33.

<sup>5</sup> Papers titled *F.O.*, 23 November 1914.

<sup>6</sup> N.I.D. 6933/15.



to work in the Atlantic. He therefore determined to examine the coast of Argentine once more as far as Monte Video and Abrolhos.<sup>1</sup>

On the 29th a telegram from our Naval Attaché at Rio was received, to the effect that the *Dresden* was reported in a harbour called Kempe, anchored, with her torpedo tubes trained to command the entrance.<sup>2</sup> The source of this report was local Punta Arenas gossip brought to the Naval Attaché by a steamer calling at Rio,<sup>3</sup> though he did not say so in his telegram. The ships had just examined Kempe Island and had found nothing there. There was, however, a Kempe harbour on the north side of Clarence Island. This the *Bristol* visited on January 30 without result.

Next day the *Glasgow* joined in the entrance to the Strait, and Admiral Stoddart, turning over the guard of the southern channels to Captain Luce, proceeded with the *Carnarvon* and *Bristol* to coal at the Falklands preparatory to their voyage up the east coast. Consul Milward, however, was still convinced that the *Dresden* was hiding in the same place; none of our ships had seen the *Esplorador*, a small Chilean steamer chartered by the Austrian Consul, which had left Punta Arenas with four casks of sausages and other provisions, for the second time, on January 29, and this confirmed him in his belief that she had gone down Barbara Channel to join the *Dresden*.<sup>4</sup> In point of fact the *Esplorador* first went south-eastward to Admiralty Sound to embark bullocks. She was met by a British warship, probably the *Carnarvon*, on the 31st, just as she passed Magdalen Sound,<sup>5</sup> and that evening she joined the *Dresden* at her hiding place in the recesses of Stokes Bay.

**26. The "Dresden" decides on Commerce Warfare.**—Since January 19 the *Sierra Cordoba* had been with the *Dresden*, and her arrival gave Captain Lüdecke some freedom of movement. The German Admiralty staff had long ago abandoned all hope of successful commerce warfare, and recommended him to come home by the sailing-ship route in the middle of the Atlantic. But the prospect of such a voyage was not inviting. The rendezvous, Lavandeira Reef, at which the Admiralstab<sup>6</sup> guaranteed to provide colliers, was too far for the *Dresden* to reach with one coaling, and the engines of the ship were in so bad a state that he must refit and overhaul them at some safe place en route. Such a place was not to be found in the Atlantic, since Santa

<sup>1</sup> Stoddart, Letter of Proceedings. M. 01965/15.

<sup>2</sup> *Glasgow* W/T War Log 20112.

<sup>3</sup> N.A. Rio, Report 6. M. 01577/15.

<sup>4</sup> Enclosure 7 in N.I.D. 6933/15.

<sup>5</sup> Enclosure 5 in N.I.D. 6933/15. The meeting is not recorded in the logs of either *Carnarvon* or *Bristol*.

<sup>6</sup> This German title will occasionally be used to distinguish the German Admiralty Staff from our own.

Elena, Trinidad, and Rocas were all compromised. He therefore rejected the idea of making for home and decided instead that he would operate to the westward as far as the East Indies. He even asked for a collier to be sent to the Dutch Indies by the middle of April.<sup>1</sup> To this the Admiralstab replied—

“Further coal supply for Pacific and Indian Oceans is impossible. Voyage home by sailing ship route recommended. Collier awaits you in 5° S, 36° W.”<sup>2</sup>

On January 28 the *Dresden* was found once more, this time by a German otter-hunter, who had, however, some natives among his crew. A few days later arrived the *Esplorador* with a German pilot on board. Our Consul at Punta Arenas had persuaded the Customs House to send one of their minor officials in her, but he was put ashore at a farm and bribed to stay there till the *Esplorador's* return.<sup>3</sup> After her stores had been transhipped, Captain Lüdecke sent her to find another safe hiding place for him and the *Sierra Cordoba*; then, sending her back to Punta Arenas, he left his second harbour of refuge for his third. This, like the second, was shown as solid land on the chart; it was behind William Island, south of Santa Ines, and even more secluded than Christmas Bay. Here he anchored on February 5. His position was daily becoming more difficult. His hiding place might be discovered at any time and the possibility of coal reaching him seemed very slight. The only chance of getting fuel appeared to be to capture it, and Captain Lüdecke determined to go out once more for cruiser warfare, though, in view of the reply of the Admiralstab, he had abandoned his idea of operating in the East Indies. Before leaving, he sent a letter to Punta Arenas asking for coal to be sent, if possible, to a rendezvous in 37° S, 80° W, by March 5. Then at 5.30 p.m., February 14, the *Dresden* left her anchorage and, steaming west to about 200 miles off the Chilean coast, lay in wait on the sailing-ship route, the *Sierra Cordoba* looking out about 100 miles to the north of her.<sup>4</sup>

**27. Our Cruisers ordered away from the Strait.**—Captain Luce, on taking over duty in the Straits of Magellan, proceeded to Punta Arenas. On arrival on February 1, he was assured by Consul Milward that the most likely place in which to find the *Dresden* was Puerto Lobero, a small bay in 54.5 S, 72.40 W, not marked on the charts but opening out of Stokes Bay; the Consul suggested that a tug he had hired for searching purposes should be sent there.<sup>5</sup> Captain Luce, however, remained in

<sup>1</sup> Telegram dated February 3 from *Dresden*; reached Berlin February 9. See *Kreuzerkrieg* I, p. 393.

<sup>2</sup> This telegram reached Punta Arenas February 10. *Kreuzerkrieg*, p. 393.

<sup>3</sup> N.I.D. 6933/15.

<sup>4</sup> From *Kreuzerkrieg*.

<sup>5</sup> N.I.D. 6933/15.



the eastern entrance till the 9th, when he called again at Punta Arenas before going to the Falkland Islands to coal. He was back at Punta Arenas on the 13th, and arranged for the tug to accompany him in a search of the southern channels. But before he could start he received orders from home which diverted the search to a distant and unexpected quarter.


The Admiralty at home had been informed privately that the *Dresden* was in Last Hope Inlet, the innermost recess of a series of fjords, the only entrance to which is a rocky channel, Kirke Narrows, half a mile wide and ten miles long, opening into the mountains just north of the Magellan Strait. That the hiding cruiser should embottle herself in such a *cul de sac* did not at the time seem improbable to the Admiralty, especially as they had been informed that the German Consul at Punta Arenas had at the foot of the mountains a farm said to be connected by telephone to Punta Arenas.

On the 10th, therefore, they sent orders for the *Glasgow* to watch the passage into the chain of fjords if the inlet had not so far been examined, the *Kent* or *Orama* to go into Valparaiso for charts and search it if it should prove navigable. Captain Luce replied on the 12th that Last Hope had not yet been searched; he was in touch with an Englishman, the manager of the company owning all land round it, who had just come back to Punta Arenas from there; nothing had been seen by the end of January, and he had made arrangements to be informed of any arrival of ships. Before this telegram arrived, the Admiralty had issued further orders. Consul Milward's definite statement that the *Dresden* was south of Santa Inez Island was unknown to them, and when our minister at Monte Video reported that the Consul knew where she was, they asked him to find out whether or not it was Last Hope. The *Bristol* arrived at Monte Video on February 11. Captain Fanshawe told the minister that the only place mentioned by the Consul still unvisited was the Pleiades; adding that the Consul's information had hitherto proved untrustworthy, and he had not mentioned Last Hope.<sup>1</sup> Though we know now that this was not quite an accurate representation of the facts, for the Consul was complaining that our ships would not go to the one place he indicated,<sup>2</sup> it was accepted by the Admiralty.

They now repeated their order for the *Glasgow* to watch the passage into Last Hope until the *Kent* arrived with the large-scale charts from Valparaiso, when the two were to combine for action against the *Dresden*. In view of the German cruiser's abuse of Chilean neutrality, she was to be attacked and sunk if found in desolate waters such as Last Hope, whether inside or

<sup>1</sup> A 214-217, 220.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram from Consul, Punta Arenas, to Admiralty received February 7: "Tug returned without having been to place indicated in my telegram of January 4."





outside territorial waters. Not content with sending the *Glasgow* and *Kent*, they ordered also the *Bristol* from Monte Video to search Last Hope, warning her captain not to trust Consul Milward.<sup>1</sup> Even when Captain Luce's announcement that he had made arrangements to be informed of the arrival of ships in Last Hope reached the Admiralty, it had been so mutilated on its passage from Port Stanley to the Colonial Office that it was unintelligible<sup>2</sup> and made no difference to the decision to send our cruisers out of Magellan Strait.

Thus, just as the *Dresden* made her way along the southern shores of Santa Ines Island into the open ocean, the *Glasgow* passed along the northern shore to spend the next ten days in Union Sound and Port Condell. The *Bristol* joined her on the 20th and the two waited for the arrival of the *Kent* with charts before venturing further into the unknown waters which terminated in the aptly named Last Hope.

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## CHAPTER V.

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### FEBRUARY 15 TO MARCH 4.—SEARCHING FOR THE *KRONPRINZ WILHELM* AND *DRESDEN*.

28. **The German Rendezvous at Lavandeira Reef.**—Before the end of 1914 a copy of one of the German codes had come into our possession and by its means certain intercepted telegrams were deciphered. The enemy became aware of this<sup>3</sup> and changed the key from time to time; but German ships abroad still used the code, a few copies of which had been distributed to our cruisers when Admiral Sturdee came out to the Falklands. On January 16 the Cerrito wireless station near Monte Video made a signal addressed to the *Von der Tann*; it was in this code, and, though partly mutilated, was sufficiently intelligible for Admiral Stoddart to conclude that it was meant for the *Dresden* and that she intended to work in the Atlantic. It was not, however, till after February 5 that the message as intercepted reached the Admiralty. There it was found that it specifically mentioned Lavandeira Reef in 5° S, 36° W, as a place in which a collier would be waiting for the *Dresden* on February 20. It gave the name of the collier as *Gladstone* or *Bangor*,<sup>4</sup> and implied that the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* might also be near the rendezvous.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A 218, 219, 221.

<sup>2</sup> See A 220.

<sup>3</sup> As early as 5 November 1914 the German Admiralty were aware that we had that particular code. I.D.H.S. 1414, No. 86.

<sup>4</sup> The Admiralty thought the *Huron* was also mentioned, but this was a misreading of a corrupt group.

<sup>5</sup> See A 213, 222.



We knew that the *Gladstone* was by this time unavailable. She had arrived at Pernambuco on January 23, and in view of her suspicious behaviour was detained by the Brazilian Government, who eventually disabled her machinery lest she should escape.<sup>1</sup>

The *Bangor*, of the same Norwegian line as the *Gladstone*, had been suspected by us since the end of November, when it was reported that she had been bought by an agent of Herr Ballin, the shipowner of Hamburg. She fitted up with wireless apparatus at New York, and at the end of January went to Baltimore to load 9,000 tons of coal. On February 4 she sailed, nominally for Buenos Aires, so that she could easily reach Lavandeira Reef by the 20th.

**29. Orders for the Watch of Lavandeira Reef.**—Although a month had elapsed since the signal was made there was still time to act. On February 15 the Admiralty ordered the *Sydney* from St. Lucia to Lavandeira to be met by the *Edinburgh Castle*, which was to come from St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, with two colliers fitted with wireless apparatus. The guard at St. Vincent was to be taken over by the *Macedonia*, due there from Liverpool next day. The latter was now better able to cope with an attacker since she had been fitted with 6 in. guns in place of the 4.7 she had formerly carried; her orders on leaving home were that she was to join the South-East Coast Squadron.<sup>2</sup>

Admiral Stoddart was to come up from Abrolhos Rocks in the *Carnarvon* to direct the operations, with orders to sink the *Dresden* or other German vessels if they were found in unfrequented waters. All ships engaged in the search were to keep wireless silence in order not to frighten the Germans they hoped to find.<sup>3</sup>

**30. The "Highflyer" sent to the Congo.**—Further study of the intercepted signal brought to light another rendezvous, written simply as Hewett. Some member of the Naval Staff suggested this might be Hewett Creek in the Congo, and thither the *Highflyer* was sent to search for the *Dresden*, *Bangor* or *Gladstone*.<sup>4</sup>

The *Highflyer* got away from Sierra Leone on February 18. She found no trace of the suspected ships in the Congo River and after a month's cruise in the neighbourhood went back to Sierra Leone.

<sup>1</sup> Tel. 23, Treaty Rio to F.O., 26.2.15. H.S. 137, p. 277. The German History says she was detained because of a mutiny. *Kreuzerkrieg I*, 392.

<sup>2</sup> M. 01024/15. <sup>3</sup> A 222.

<sup>4</sup> Tel. 15 to *Highflyer*, 17.2.15.

**31. Arrival of the "Holger" at Buenos Aires. February 17.**—Admiral Stoddart, in the *Carnarvon*, reached Monte Video during the morning of February 16, and proceeded again at 1.14 p.m. to take charge of the operations at Lavandeira Reef. Even before the new movements were under way more light was thrown on the activities of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*. On February 17, at 4 p.m., a German ship came in to Buenos Aires; it was the *Holger*, with the crews of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm's* captures. She had passed within sight of Monte Video at 9.30 a.m.<sup>1</sup> while the *Carnarvon* was at anchor there; but Admiral Stoddart did not know in time and she continued unmolested to Buenos Aires, 110 miles to the westward.

At Buenos Aires, however, the Argentine Government decided that the *Holger* was an auxiliary of the German Fleet, liable to be interned after 24 hours' stay. The Admiralty sent orders for the *Celtic*, which was at Port Stanley, to cruise off the River Plate if the *Holger* showed signs of leaving; but this movement proved unnecessary, for though there was once a report that the German vessel had got away, on March 2 we were officially informed that she was interned till the end of the war.<sup>2</sup> The *Holger* had been so long in port before she escaped from Pernambuco that her bottom was very foul; she was incapable of more than seven or eight knots, and in the five days between leaving the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* and reaching Buenos Aires cannot have steamed a thousand miles. The *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, therefore, if she had proceeded direct to Lavandeira Reef would still have some 1,500 miles to go; but this she could easily do before February 20.

**32. Operations off the Brazilian Coast.**—After having missed the *Holger*, Admiral Stoddart had further ill-luck. He coaled at Abrolhos,<sup>3</sup> and with 1,600 tons on board started at 5.30 p.m., February 22 for Bahia. Half an hour later the *Carnarvon* struck a rock; two stokeholds became flooded and it was clear she was seriously damaged. The *Vindictive* was at anchor at Abrolhos Rocks acting as guardship for the colliers; shifting his flag to her while the *Carnarvon* was beached close to the lighthouse at Abrolhos, Admiral Stoddart decided to remain at the Rocks. He seems to have been unaware that the *Dartmouth* had left the station and he accordingly signalled to the *Sydney* that the *Dartmouth* was to take charge of the operations, sending the *Edinburgh Castle* to Abrolhos Rocks as soon as she could be spared. A fresh German message had been intercepted which, though badly mutilated, seemed to imply that the *Karlsruhe*, *Dresden*, *Kronprinz Wilhelm* and a steamer *Bolivar* were to meet on February 23 at some rendezvous, unfortunately unreadable; this news he also passed for the *Dartmouth* and

<sup>1</sup> From I.O., Monte Video. Sent 3.40 p.m., 16.2.15.

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 137, pp. 208, 214, 321, and M. 02412/15.

<sup>3</sup> From the *Buresh*, an Admiralty collier which had been captured and used by the *Emden*, recaptured by the *Sydney*, and was again in Government service.



*Sydney*.<sup>1</sup> Even so late as February 27 he was still sending orders for the *Dartmouth*, and on the 28th the *Sydney* signalled to the *Dartmouth* for instructions.<sup>2</sup>

On examination the *Carnarvon* was found to have a rent 95 ft. long extending over two boiler rooms. Temporary repairs were effected, and she left Abrolhos at 6.35 p.m. March 4 for Rio, at 6¼ knots. She arrived on March 7 and commenced repairs in the dry dock.

The first to arrive at Lavandeira Reef was the *Sydney* (Captain J. C. T. Glossop, C.B., R.N.). She left St. Lucia in the afternoon on February 15, and proceeding at 17½ knots, was at the Reef by 10 a.m. February 20. No ships were in sight. The *Sydney* did not wait at the Reef, but continuing on to Pernambuco, picked up off the port the mail steamer *Alcantara* and escorted her out. The reason for this proceeding appears to be that the Intelligence Officer, Pernambuco, had heard a rumour that the Germans intended to capture the *Alcantara* in 7° S, 34° W; the Admiralty were aware of this rumour but sent no special instructions beyond the general orders for merchant vessels to take precautions to avoid capture.<sup>3</sup> At 10 p.m. on February 21, while the *Sydney* still had the *Alcantara* under escort, she passed the *Bangor*, one of the ships she had been warned to expect. They were then near the place where attack was expected, and the *Sydney* made no attempt to stop the *Bangor*, allowing her to continue her voyage in safety.<sup>4</sup> As soon as the *Alcantara* was clear of the supposed danger area the *Sydney* steered again for Lavandeira Reef. From 1.52 p.m. February 22 till noon February 26 she remained at anchor on the west side of the Reef, waiting for something to appear. No German ship showed itself, though she took in a number of German signals which, having no copy of the code, she was unable to decipher.

The *Edinburgh Castle*, after relief by the *Macedonia*, left St. Vincent at daybreak February 17, having sent the wireless-fitted colliers *Thornhill* and *Fullerton* on ahead the previous day; she arrived at the Reef during the forenoon of February 25. Just before she anchored she bumped on the bottom slightly but distinctly. As she seemed to have suffered no damage, she anchored in company with the *Sydney*. It was now a week since the date of the rendezvous, and nothing had been seen at it. Captain Glossop decided to sweep towards the trade route. At noon on the 26th the *Sydney*, *Edinburgh Castle*, and the colliers *Fullerton* and *Thornhill* left Lavandeira Reef and steered eastward in line abreast, 20 miles apart, altering to line ahead at sunset. They passed Rocas Reef before dawn on the 27th and Fernando Noronha in the afternoon, and continued their easterly course. But at midnight the sphere of operations was altered.

<sup>1</sup> A 226.

<sup>2</sup> *Carnarvon* W/T Log 26626.


<sup>3</sup> H.S. 137, pp. 157, 159, 171.

<sup>4</sup> *Sydney* Deck Log, and Stoddart, Letter of Proceedings. M. 03073/15.

Admiral Stoddart, at Abrolhos, was informed by one of his colliers, the *Manchester Civilian*, that she had been chased by a German man-of-war at 11 a.m., February 26, in 15.20 S, 38.45 W, about 180 miles north of Abrolhos itself. He at once ordered Captain Glossop, if he had no reliable information of the enemy, to sweep south from Rocas Reef to Abrolhos with his squadron. This order he addressed also to the *Dartmouth*, for he still did not know she was in the Mediterranean.<sup>1</sup>

Captain Glossop received this order when 60 miles east of Fernando Noronha. At midnight March 1-2 he turned and commenced to sweep southward towards Abrolhos, which he reached in the afternoon of March 4, having seen nothing of the enemy. The damaged *Carnarvon* was by then sufficiently repaired to proceed under her own steam to Rio for further repairs, and on the 6th, after the *Sydney* had coaled and provisioned, Admiral Stoddart shifted his flag from the *Vindictive* to the Australian cruiser.

<sup>1</sup> A 50.



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**33. Attack on Colliers at St. Vincent expected.**—A repetition of Admiral Stoddart's message that the *Karlsruhe*, *Dresden*, *Kronprinz Wilhelm* and *Bolivar* would meet together on February 23 reached the Admiralty via the *Macedonia* at St. Vincent. In telegraphing it she did not make it clear that she herself had not intercepted it, and as she added that German code with strength 6 had been heard in lat. 12° N, and that the colliers at St. Vincent were ready in case of attack,<sup>1</sup> the Admiralty thought they should have more force at St. Vincent to resist what might be a concerted raid by the combined German squadron. As can be seen, the Admiralty had always been sensitive where St. Vincent was concerned. Now, within a few hours of receiving the intelligence, they ordered the *Otranto*, which had proceeded for home on the 23rd, to be recalled to St. Vincent, a cruiser from Force I to go there at once with despatch, and the *Laurentic*, an armed merchant cruiser which had left Gibraltar on February 21 for the Cameroons, to proceed at full speed to the Cape Verde Islands.<sup>2</sup>

Cruiser Force I was now under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir Archibald G. H. W. Moore, K.C.B., C.V.O.,<sup>3</sup> with his flag on board the *Europa*, which left Portsmouth at last on February 13. He took over the squadron from Captain Grant-Dalton at Funchal on the 19th. When he received the Admiralty's order to despatch a ship to the Cape Verde Islands the disposition of his squadron was as follows: *Europa* patrolling off Madeira, *Argonaut* at the Azores, *Amphitrite* off the African coast near Cape Juby, *Calgarian* on the Canaries Patrol, *Victorian* off the Tagus, *Carmania* at Gibraltar. Admiral Moore accordingly ordered the *Amphitrite* to St. Vincent Island, and proceeded himself to the Canaries to relieve the *Calgarian*, which then took over the Tagus Patrol from the *Victorian*, to enable her to coal at Gibraltar before returning to the Tagus. The *Calgarian* was then to go to Halifax to join Force H.<sup>4</sup>

By March 2 no attack on St. Vincent had occurred, and the Admiralty dispersed the squadron assembled there. The civilian crew of the *Otranto* had let it be known that as their agreement expired on February 11 they would certainly refuse duty if ordered to sea except for the purpose of proceeding to England.<sup>5</sup> She received orders to come home to Liverpool. The *Laurentic* was sent on to the Cameroons, and the guard of St. Vincent was left to the *Amphitrite* and *Macedonia*.<sup>6</sup>

**34. "Liverpool" and "Gloucester" detached from the Grand Fleet to South America.**—With the *Carnarvon* and *Bristol*

<sup>1</sup> A 226.                   <sup>2</sup> A 227.

<sup>3</sup> Appointed February 8. M. 01096/15.

<sup>4</sup> Moore, Letter of Proceedings. M. 02033/15.

<sup>5</sup> H.S. 135, p. 861.

<sup>6</sup> A 231. The Consul, St. Vincent, in his dispatch covering this period (M. 02445/15), does not mention any expected attack.

both damaged, and the armed merchant cruisers demanding to return home, the squadrons searching for the *Dresden* and *Kronprinz Wilhelm* were in such a weakened state that the Admiralty decided to detach the *Liverpool* and *Gloucester*<sup>1</sup> from the Grand Fleet to assist in the operations. The two ships were at Scapa Flow. The order detaching them left the Admiralty at 8 p.m. February 27,<sup>2</sup> and they were away before dawn next morning. On March 5 they left Gibraltar for St. Vincent.

**35. The Search of Last Hope, February 20-24.**—Meanwhile, although the intercepted telegram of January 16 implied the presence of the *Dresden* at Lavandeira Reef on February 20, the Admiralty did not lose sight of the possibility that she might still be hiding among the archipelago of south-west Chile. They therefore made no change in their orders to Captain Luce, who, having obtained from the Chilean Government charts of Last Hope Inlet, and found that it was navigable, passed Kirke Narrows with the *Glasgow* and *Bristol* on February 20, and began to make a thorough search of the fjords inside, anchoring at nightfall in what appeared to be secure positions. The first night, however, the *Glasgow* found a 19-foot sounding alongside her, and had to shift billet. The *Bristol* was more unfortunate; in Last Hope itself, on February 22, she touched a shoal heavily, and seriously damaged her rudder. Luckily this accident occurred at the end of the search. All the bays and inlets had been examined without revealing any trace of the *Dresden*, and on the 24th the two ships again negotiated Kirke Narrows, and emerged into the comparatively open waters of Union Sound.

While this operation was in progress, Consul Milward at Punta Arenas had been visited on February 19 by another informant, who brought the news that he had seen the *Dresden* on the 14th at the southern end of Barbara Channel. The Consul immediately telegraphed to the Admiralty and to his Intelligence Officer at Monte Video, asking him to send a man-of-war at once. This request reached Captain Luce in Last Hope Inlet<sup>3</sup> on the 21st as he was starting his search.

The Admiralty received Consul Milward's telegram at 10.30 a.m. February 20. It merely said: "Have news of whereabouts *Dresden* seen February 14," with no details of the position.<sup>4</sup> Shortly afterwards Captain Segrave (*Orama*) telegraphed from Valparaiso that the Chilean Admiral believed the *Dresden* and *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* were together in the Pacific.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Bristol* Class, 2-6 in., 10-4 in.; 26 knots trial speed. *Liverpool* Captain E. Reeves; *Gloucester*, Captain W. A. Howard Kelly, M.V.O.

<sup>2</sup> A 228.

<sup>3</sup> It was sent to Port Stanley by the Intelligence Officer and thence made by wireless.

<sup>4</sup> A 224.

<sup>5</sup> H.S. 137, p. 220.



The information about Last Hope, however, seemed to the Admiralty so reliable that they felt nothing else should be undertaken until it was established for certain that the *Dresden* was not in that inlet. They ordered the *Orama* to Punta Arenas to maintain communication between the telegraph there and the squadron at Last Hope, warned Captain Segrave not to trust Consul Milward, and as by this time it had occurred to them that the "Hewett" of the intercept of January 16 might be Hewett Bay in Barbara Channel, they ordered that bay to be searched should nothing be found in Last Hope.<sup>1</sup>

**36. Attempt to act on Consul Milward's Information.**—A repetition of Consul Milward's message, "I have news of *Dresden*; send ship-of-war as soon as possible," reached Captain Luce on the 24th, as he was approaching Kirke Narrows on his return from Last Hope. His search there had achieved nothing except the damage to the *Bristol*, and he decided to go to Punta Arenas himself to investigate the Consul's report. He knew that the *Kent* was coming to join him, and he ordered her to get in touch with and meet the *Bristol* at Port Tamar, in the western entrance to Magellan Strait.<sup>2</sup>

At Punta Arenas, on the 25th, the Consul engaged the *Galileo* and an experienced Chilean pilot who knew the Patagonian channels to search for the *Dresden* in her last reported position, Puerto Lobero, an uncharted inlet on the southern shores of Stokes Bay, in 54.6 S, 72.40 W.<sup>3</sup> Captain Luce did not at once proceed in search. He had to coal before running the chance of meeting the *Dresden*, and his collier was in Union Sound. On the way there he was stopped at noon, February 26, by a tug with the news that the *Dresden* had been seen in Last Hope Inlet that day. The *Kent* was near; ordering her to watch Kirke Narrows, he hurried there himself, calling up the *Bristol* from Port Tamar to join him. That evening the three British cruisers were again in Union Sound. By the 28th Captain Luce was convinced that they were on a false scent; he determined to give Consul Milward's information a chance, and proceeded with the *Glasgow* and *Kent* for Sholl Bay in Magdalen Sound, which was the rendezvous appointed for the *Galileo*. The *Bristol* he sent to Fortescue Bay at the northern exit of Barbara Channel, and the *Orama* he ordered to join the *Bristol*. Thus both the *Kent* and *Orama* were absorbed into the search for the *Dresden* in the Magellanic area, although they had been sent to the west coast to look for the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*.

**37. Intelligence of the "Prinz Eitel Friedrich," February 26.**—Throughout January and the greater part of February the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* was considered to be north of Callao,

<sup>1</sup> A 225.<sup>2</sup> *Glasgow W/T Log* 46989.<sup>3</sup> N.I.D. 6933.

though no definite intelligence of her presence there was forthcoming beyond the fact that on January 15 and 19 the *Orama*, in lat. 15° S, took in German wireless calls. A few days later the *Orama* and *Kent* were recalled to patrol south of Valparaiso and get their stores from the *Celtic*. Captain Segrave considered it most probable that the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* was still to the northward in equatorial latitudes; it seemed to him unlikely that she would come south of Valparaiso.<sup>1</sup> The *Orama* and *Kent*, in moving south to Valparaiso, changed places with the *Newcastle*, which, on January 20, was ordered to the coast of Mexico, it being considered necessary that we should have a light cruiser on the coast of North America.<sup>2</sup> The Japanese cruisers also moved northward. Off San Bartolomé, in Lower California, the *Asama* ran aground on February 4, and seemed likely to be a total wreck. The *Idzumo* was in need of dockyard attention, and the Japanese Admiralty decided to replace the *Asama* and *Idzumo* by two other cruisers, the *Tokiwa* and *Chitose*, which left Japan February 20 under Vice-Admiral Tochinai.<sup>3</sup>

The idea that the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* had been off Equatorial and North America was dispelled on February 26, when there came in to Coronel a British vessel with news of her. This ship, the *Skerries*, when passing Easter Island, which lies 2,000 miles out into the Pacific from Valparaiso, noticed a party ashore signalling, and put in to investigate. She found they were the crews of two sailing vessels, the *Jean* and *Kildalton*. These vessels had been captured by the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, who had landed the men on Easter Island early in January. The *Skerries* offered to bring away the marooned party, but they refused to embark.<sup>4</sup>

Before the arrival of the *Skerries* at Coronel the latest definite location of the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* was when the crew of the *Charcas* were landed by her near Valparaiso on December 6. The instructions given to Captain Thierichens when von Spee left him behind were that he was to remain off the Chilean coast till the early part of December, in order to lead us to think the German cruiser squadron was still there. The time was now up, but just as he was preparing to come round into the Atlantic, he intercepted, on December 10, wireless messages between Monte Video and Port Stanley, from which he guessed the fate of the squadron; a few days later he took in a message from the "Daily Mail," asking the Bishop of the Falkland Islands for details of the sinking of the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau* and *Leipzig*.<sup>5</sup> This news made it obvious that the Southern Atlantic was occupied by a strong British force, and he decided to remain

<sup>1</sup> *Orama*, Letter of Proceedings. M. 02341/15.<sup>2</sup> H.S. 136, p. 439.<sup>3</sup> H.S. 137, p. 211.<sup>4</sup> A 229. M. 21034/15.<sup>5</sup> Interview with Thierichens, *Weser Zeitung*, 14.4.15; Translation in N.I.D. 6816/15.



for a time in the Pacific. On December 11, in 44.50 S, 81.40 W, about 300 miles from the Chilean coast, he came across and captured the French barque *Jean*, with 3,500 tons of Welsh coal, a most valuable prize. He determined to move away with her in order to clear her, and, taking her in tow, steered for Easter Island. Next day, while the *Jean* was still in tow, he met another barque, the *Kildalton*, of Glasgow, in 44.24 S, 82.35 W. This vessel had a general cargo and was sunk after anything useful had been removed. The *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* was at Easter Island from December 23 to January 2, most of the time being occupied in transferring the *Jean's* coal to the liner's bunkers. When she departed, the crews of the *Jean* and *Kildalton* left behind on shore had no idea where she was going.

Easter Island was too remote, and the present position of the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* too uncertain for the intelligence to make necessary any change in the operations in progress. It did not affect either Admiral Stoddart's movements on the east coast or the search of the Patagonian channels for which Captain Luce had gone to Magellan Strait.

38. **Hewett Bay searched for the "Dresden," March 3.**—By March 1 the *Glasgow* and *Kent* were both at Sholl Bay, and Captain Luce arranged the programme of movements. Proceeding through Cockburn Channel and Adelaide Passage, the two ships were to search Hewett Bay and all the inlets in the southern part of Barbara Channel, while the *Bristol* and *Orama* examined the other half of the channel. This programme was carried out on March 3. The previous day the *Glasgow* took in an order from the Admiralty to search Last Hope again, where the *Dresden* was definitely located. Captain Luce considered that the supposed *Dresden* was really the *Glasgow*, since the information agreed in time and place with his own movements; consequently, he proposed to continue searching Santa Inez Island.<sup>1</sup> But on March 3 the Admiralty telegraphed that, subsequently to February 27, the *Dresden* had been seen in Worsley Sound, and that the *Glasgow*, *Bristol* and *Orama* were to go and dispose of her; the *Kent* was to wait in 37° S, 80° W, about 200 miles south of Mas-a-fuera, for the collier *Gotha*, which had left Monte Video during the night of February 20 and, according to an intercepted telegram, was to be at the rendezvous given from March 5 to 30.<sup>2</sup>

Captain Luce had no alternative. On March 4 he relinquished his operations in the southern channels and proceeded once more to Last Hope with the *Glasgow* and *Orama*. The

<sup>1</sup> *Glasgow* W/T Log 46989.

<sup>2</sup> A 232. The German Chargé d'Affaires gave a declaration that the *Gotha*, on leaving Monte Video, "would proceed immediately on her voyage, her destination being reserved on account of the state of war," and this declaration was accepted by the Uruguayan authorities, who permitted her departure. Papers titled *F.O.*, 26 February 1915, *Action of Uruguayan Government*.

*Bristol*, after visiting Punta Arenas, remained in Port Tamar; she was unable to steer at higher speeds than 10 knots. Captain Luce endeavoured to persuade the pilot in the *Galileo* to come to Last Hope, but this he refused to do, being certain that the *Dresden* was not there. At length, Captain Luce ordered him to search the south of Santa Inez Island and then go back to Punta Arenas. Thus, two months after Consul Milward had located the German cruiser, the spot he indicated was examined. It was too long an interval; the *Galileo* found evidence of her presence, trees felled, water chutes cut, and even pieces of bread floating;<sup>1</sup> but, as we know, the nest was empty and the *Dresden* was away in the open sea. There remained only the chance that she might be found at the rendezvous given to the *Gotha*.

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## CHAPTER VI.

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### FINDING AND SINKING THE *DRESDEN*.

39. **The "Dresden" sighted by the "Kent," March 8.**—The *Kent* (Captain Allen), which had been ordered to wait on the *Gotha's* rendezvous in 37° S, 80° W, reached the spot just before daylight on March 7. The *Gotha* was not there; nevertheless she might arrive at any time, and Captain Allen decided to stay as long as he had enough coal. Next morning broke misty with drizzling rain, but towards afternoon the visibility improved till at 2.15 p.m. it was clear enough for a ship to be seen about nine miles to westward. It was not the *Gotha* but the *Dresden* herself. The *Kent* was stopped, but Captain Allen put the engine-room telegraphs over to full speed ahead and steered for the German, who made off westward, and a hot chase developed. In a short time the *Dresden* began to draw ahead, although the engine-room department of the *Kent*, remembering their success in the battle of the Falklands, did their utmost to catch up. At times the supports and casings at the back and sides of the economisers in the boilers were practically red hot; but the *Kent's* bottom was foul, and though by running the fans at 600 revolutions nearly 6,000 more horse power was developed than at the contractor's trial, only a speed of 21½ knots was obtained. The *Dresden* seemed to have two more knots and to be able to maintain the speed. At nightfall she was only just in sight, and after dark Captain Allen turned back, thinking the best course to be to return to the rendezvous. Although the

<sup>1</sup> N.I.D. 6933.



*Dresden's* escape was a bitter disappointment to all, the Admiralty were so impressed by the fine performance of the *Kent's* engines and staff that they expressed their appreciation of it to the engine-room department of the *Kent*, and wrote to Messrs. Hawthorn, Leslie and Co., of Newcastle, the builders of the engines, congratulating them on the excellent work they had turned out.<sup>1</sup>

The *Kent* remained on the rendezvous till the afternoon of the 9th, when, as she had less than 200 tons of coal left, Captain Allen proceeded to Coronel to coal.

40. **Movements of "Dresden," February 14 to March 8.**<sup>2</sup>—Since leaving her hiding place on February 14 the *Dresden* had been lying to, approximately in the position 37° S, 80° W, with the *Sierra Cordoba* 200 miles to northward of her, both ships on the look out for sailing vessels, which, in this neighbourhood, keep 200 miles from the coast. For nearly a fortnight they saw nothing, but on February 27 the *Dresden* sighted a British full-rigged ship, the *Conway Castle*, from Valparaiso for Australia with barley. Captain Lüdecke sank this vessel in 37° 21' S, 81.58° W,<sup>3</sup> taking her crew on board and transferring them a week later to a Peruvian barque which happened to pass. By this time the *Sierra Cordoba's* coal was running short, and though the *Dresden* several times gave her some coal by means of her own boats, the auxiliary had to be detached to Valparaiso. Arriving on March 3, the *Sierra Cordoba* took in 1,200 tons, and was allowed to sail again on the 7th with the nominal destination of Callao. Not only the German supply centre at Valparaiso, but those at Monte Video and San Francisco made efforts to get supplies to the *Dresden*. From Monte Video the *Gotha* had been sent. The supply officer at San Francisco endeavoured to arrange for the dispatch from Honolulu of one or other of the German ships there, using as his agent the Commander of the *Geier*, Korvettenkapitän Carl Grasshof, interned in the island.<sup>4</sup> Luckily, only Japanese or Australian coal was arriving at Honolulu, the shippers in both cases forbidding the sale of it to Germans or their agents. The only German coal was in the *Holsatia*, of the Hamburg-Amerika Line, and the local authorities forbade her departure with any coal cargo. Honolulu as a supply centre was therefore useless.

On March 7 the *Dresden* got into wireless communication with the *Gotha* and *Sierra Cordoba*. It was while she was awaiting their arrival that the *Kent* suddenly appeared out of the mist.

<sup>1</sup> *Kent*, Letter of Proceedings. M. 02864/15.

<sup>2</sup> Based on *Kreuzerkrieg*.

<sup>3</sup> The deposition of the master of the *Conway Castle* gives 57° 20' S, 81.45 W, but the casualty return says 37.20, 81.40 (M. 19294/15). The position given by *Kreuzerkrieg* is not likely to be incorrect.

<sup>4</sup> Although interned, he seemed to have no difficulty in communicating with San Francisco, presumably in cypher. See *Kreuzerkrieg* I, p. 396.

The *Dresden* had steam for 14 knots and immediately moved off westward; getting up steam in all boilers she gradually drew away, and, when darkness fell, the *Kent* was hull down on the eastern horizon.

41. **Movements of "Glasgow" and "Orama."**—While the *Kent* was chasing the *Dresden*, the *Glasgow* was in Worsley Sound, part of the Last Hope labyrinth, which she had been investigating for the past five days. Captain Luce had already come to the conclusion that the Admiralty information was quite unreliable, and he submitted that in future he should be permitted to investigate reports before being given definite orders based on them.<sup>1</sup> He was alone. The *Bristol*, with her damaged rudder, was at Port Tamar, and as she could steer only with her screws he ordered her to Abrolhos to await Admiralty instructions. The *Orama* was at Punta Arenas.

The news that the *Dresden* had been seen was received by the *Glasgow* at 10.10 p.m., Chilean time, March 8. Captain Luce at once ordered the *Orama* to send colliers to Vallenar and come to assist in the chase of the *Dresden*. He himself was bottled up in Last Hope. The passage of Kirke Narrows is only possible for ships in the daytime and during the short period of slack water; there was no chance of his crossing till nine the next morning. When at length he was able to pass the Narrows he shaped course out of the archipelago for the *Gotha* rendezvous. The *Orama* joined him in the afternoon of the 12th and they were on the rendezvous just before dawn on the 13th. Captain Luce's intention, should nothing be found there, was to leave the *Orama* in position till the *Kent* arrived on the 14th, proceeding himself to Mas-a-fuera and Juan Fernandez, where he thought it likely the *Dresden* or her colliers would be found.<sup>2</sup>

The *Bristol* could not join in the operations, and Captain Luce ordered her to look out for the *Bangor*, about which he had just received two messages—one that she left Monte Video on the 7th for Valparaiso, and the other that our Minister at Monte Video considered her proceedings sufficiently suspicious to warrant her capture.<sup>3</sup> He was also aware from the German intercept of January 16 that she was intended for the *Dresden*.<sup>4</sup> Another piece of intelligence received by him at this time was that the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* was off Iquique on March 7, communicating by signal at night with a German ship in harbour, and from this he thought the *Dresden* would not make for Magellan Strait, but would be more likely to remain in the Pacific and possibly join the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 137, p. 423.

<sup>2</sup> Luce: Report. M. 03155/15.

<sup>3</sup> *Glasgow* W/T Log 46989.

<sup>4</sup> See A. 213. In *Glasgow* W/T Log 46988, p. 28, the groups "Send name can put to sea" read "Bangor can put to sea."

<sup>5</sup> *Glasgow* W/T Log 46989.



42. **The "Dresden's" Resting Place discovered, March 13.**—The *Kent*, arriving at Coronel with 43 tons of coal, took in 1,300 tons, and at 8 a.m. on the 13th left again for the *Gotha* rendezvous. While chasing the *Dresden* she had taken in two signals made by the German cruiser, and these she had passed to the *Glasgow*, where there was a copy of the German code. The signals were at first unreadable, but, by working at them, Lieutenant C. G. Stuart, of the *Glasgow*, early on March 13 discovered the key to the cypher and found the signals to be orders for some unknown ship to go to Juan Fernandez.<sup>1</sup>

This definite clue confirmed Captain Luce's surmise that Mas-a-fuera or Juan Fernandez would be the next rendezvous of the *Dresden*. He ordered all three ships there, the *Glasgow* and *Orama* to approach Cumberland Bay, the principal anchorage in the island, from the west, the *Kent* from the east, if possible at the same time.

The *Dresden* had run full speed all through the night after losing sight of the *Kent*, but the utmost efforts of her engine-room staff could obtain only 20 knots from her worn-out engines. At 8.30 a.m., March 9, she was anchored in Cumberland Bay with only 80 tons of coal on board. That night she received a wireless message: "His Majesty the Kaiser sets you free to lay yourself up." Captain Lüdecke was informed by the principal Chilean official in the island that he must leave within 24 hours or be interned, but he determined to wait till a Chilean warship, expected in a week, should arrive before accepting internment, his plea for putting off the evil day being that, by Article 17 of the Hague Convention, he was entitled to make his ship seaworthy without incurring the penalty of internment. To avoid being surprised he kept up a daily patrol of the harbour entrance by his steamboat. On the 12th he sent away six officers in a sailing ship so that they should avoid internment. There was, therefore, no idea in his mind that the *Dresden* was interned when, early on March 14, his patrol boat returned with the news that a British cruiser was approaching. He made preparations to fight and got up steam in a second boiler to work the auxiliary machinery. Nevertheless, he thought it unlikely he would be attacked, as he was anchored within 400 metres of the shore.<sup>2</sup>

43. **Sinking of the "Dresden," March 14.**<sup>3</sup>—The ship sighted was the *Glasgow*, which, with the *Orama*, was approaching from the westward. The *Kent* at the same time closed from the east. Smoke was issuing from the *Dresden's* funnels, and to Captain Luce it appeared she was preparing to get under weigh. He determined to attack her, but, anxious to avoid doing damage to

<sup>1</sup> *Glasgow* W/T Log 46988.

<sup>2</sup> *Kreuzerkrieg* I, pp. 397-399.

<sup>3</sup> Based on Luce: Report. M. 03155/15.

the few scattered houses on shore, he spent half an hour manœuvring to get into a position from which no possible harm could result to the inhabitants. The *Dresden* was flying the German ensign and jack, and as soon as he was in position Captain Luce opened fire, the *Dresden* replying at once. The *Orama* and *Kent* joined in. After a few minutes the German cruiser hoisted a white flag, and as her national colours had disappeared our squadron ceased fire and closed in towards the anchorage. She was on fire aft, and her crew could be seen swimming towards the shore. Captain Luce lowered a boat and sent his commander and staff surgeon to board the *Dresden*, but before they reached her a German officer came alongside the *Glasgow* and explained that he had been sent by his Captain to state that the *Dresden* was interned.<sup>1</sup> Captain Luce replied that he must have unconditional surrender, and asked what the white flag meant. This, it appeared, was hoisted merely because Captain Lüdecke wished to open negotiations, and, these having failed, the German officer returned to the *Dresden*, which re-hoisted her ensign, and after a little time blew up and sank, still flying the white flag. While she was sinking, her crew lined up on shore and, led by their captain, sang "Deutschland, Deutschland, über alles."

Captain Luce had meanwhile made a general signal for all the doctors to go ashore and assist the wounded, for whom the resources of the island were quite insufficient. The severe cases were removed, with Captain Lüdecke's consent, to the *Orama* and taken by her to Valparaiso.

It appeared that the local official, styled the Maritime Governor, and serving as lighthouse keeper, had started off in a boat to board the *Glasgow* as soon as she appeared. Unfortunately, he had forgotten to hoist any flag, and being close to the *Dresden*, was unnoticed by our ships. His boat had a lucky escape from our shells, the splashes from which soaked the crew, who from fright completely lost control of their oars.<sup>2</sup> Having got safely ashore, the Maritime Governor, as soon as the fighting was over, put off again with a flag and protested to Captain Luce that he had notified the Captain of the *Dresden* that his ship was interned; she should, therefore, have been immune from attack. Captain Luce, in reply, expressed his regret for the incident, explaining that there was no means of telling that she was interned, since she was flying German colours and had her guns trained on our ships. He deemed it politic to give ample payment without too close inquiry, for all the claims for damage done; amongst others to a schooner owner, who received 10,000 pesos for alleged damage to his boat and the death of a thousand lobsters caused by the firing.

<sup>1</sup> The German Government later officially informed the Chilean Government that Captain Lüdecke refused to accept internment. *Alvarez*, p. 233.

<sup>2</sup> Letter from A. Arancibia in Z 22/1915.



The Chilean Government, on learning of the affair, protested both to ourselves and to Germany against the various violations of their territory involved in the incident. Our Foreign Office, after consultation with the Admiralty, accepted the Chilean version of the squadron's proceedings, which agreed with Captain Luce's telegraphed report,<sup>1</sup> and at once offered a full and ample apology. A useful point to bring to the notice of the Chilean Government was afforded by the arrival of the crew of the *Conway Castle* at Valparaiso on March 11; this was conclusive proof that the *Dresden*, after two months' stay in Chilean harbours, had recommenced her attacks on merchant shipping, and led to the presumption that if she had not been dealt with at Juan Fernandez she would have repeated this programme. Our prompt apology was accepted, and the affair passed off to the satisfaction of everybody but the Germans.<sup>2</sup>

On our side there were no casualties and no damage was suffered. The *Dresden* lost seven killed, 15 severely and 14 slightly wounded; one was missing. The 15 severely wounded were taken by the *Orama* to the German hospital at Valparaiso, and the remainder of the *Dresden's* crew, including Captain Lüdecke, were brought to Valparaiso by a Chilean warship, and interned on an island in Valparaiso harbour.

It was clear from the conversation and diaries of the wounded in the *Orama*<sup>3</sup> that the *Dresden* had never been to Last Hope, but had spent her resting time in the Patagonian channels, more or less in the position which Consul Milward had so often urged our ships to investigate. An officer, Commander Speranza, R.N.R., specially sent out to relieve him, reported most favourably on his *bona fides* throughout the war;<sup>4</sup> and the Admiralty, feeling that Mr. Milward had been greatly maligned, ultimately presented him with a gold watch.

**44. Remarks on the "Dresden's" Career.**—The career of the *Dresden* as a commerce destroyer was not markedly successful. On the outbreak of war the ship was on her way home to refit, after what had been intended as only a few months' cruise in the West Indies, and Captain Lüdecke seemed to think it unwise to begin attacking commerce till his engines had been put in as good order as could be achieved by the personnel of the ship. As the middle part of the South American trade route had been chosen by the *Karlsruhe* as her field of operations, Captain Lüdecke took the neighbourhood of the Rio de la Plata for his zone. In his search for a secure harbour in which to

<sup>1</sup> A 243.

<sup>2</sup> Papers titled Z 22/1915. The letters exchanged between the Chilean and German Governments are given in *Alvarez*.

<sup>3</sup> The diary of a warrant officer, J. Zeus, is especially valuable. The original is now I.D.H.S. 115.

<sup>4</sup> N.I.D. 6933.

carry out repairs he went as far as Cape Horn, sinking two ships, the *Hyades* and *Holmwood*, on the way. It was while refitting in the harbour he had chosen on the coast of Patagonia that Captain Lüdecke heard of the approach of von Spee, and shortly afterwards was ordered to join him. Thus he was never able to carry out an organised attack on the Plate trade. The next ship he sank, the *North Wales*, was met while he was acting with the German Cruiser Squadron, and his only success when he was again alone was the sailing vessel *Conway Castle*. These four vessels were all that Captain Lüdecke could account for in the eight months of his career. One reason for what, in comparison with the other German commanders, appears to be Captain Lüdecke's lack of enterprise was that he considered the arrangements for supply and refitting in the La Plata zone to be inadequate and unsuitable, so much so that the Pacific looked to be the better field for operations, and it was while he was in this mood of indecision that he was ordered to work under von Spee.<sup>1</sup>

His one success in hindering British trade was made when he sent in the crew of the *Holmwood*, whose arrival had the effect of disturbing shippers to such an extent that for a short time there was some risk of a general interruption of services.<sup>2</sup> Apart from this, his operations passed almost unnoticed by shipowners. In the later stages his presence was a great embarrassment to Chile; and all classes in that country hailed with relief the news that the *Dresden's* existence had been brought to an end.

**45. Movements of "Kent," "Orama" and "Glasgow" after the Sinking of the "Dresden."**—The *Kent* remained in the neighbourhood of Juan Fernandez in the hope of catching the German auxiliaries ordered there by the *Dresden*. Captain Lüdecke, however, seems to have succeeded in warning them, for nothing appeared at either rendezvous. The *Sierra Cordoba* arrived at Callao on March 17, and the *Gotha* at Valparaiso on March 20. A third ship, the *Alda*, which had been signalling to the *Dresden* for instructions, had left Valparaiso on the 10th with provisions; she reappeared at Antofagasta on the 15th.<sup>3</sup> The fourth collier known to be connected with the *Dresden*, the *Bangor*, passed Punta Arenas on the 13th. In the afternoon of the 14th she was coming out of Magellan Strait when she was stopped by the *Bristol*, which had got under weigh half an hour earlier for the purpose of capturing her. A prize crew was put on board, and next day she was sent off to Port Stanley to be tried in the Prize Court, the *Bristol* remaining at anchor to continue the repair of her rudder.

<sup>1</sup> Taken from *Kreuzerkrieg I*.

<sup>2</sup> Fayle: *Seaborne Trade*, I, 175.

<sup>3</sup> A 238. The German history says that the attempt to make the *Alda* available for the *Dresden* was not successful (*Kreuzerkrieg I*, 392). The Chilean Government apparently insisted on one of their officials taking passage in her for Antofagasta, her declared destination (*Glasgow W/T Log* 46988, p. 30).



The *Orama* rejoined the *Kent* from Valparaiso on the 19th at the *Gotha* rendezvous. Thenceforward the two ships remained on the west coast, as in their original orders, to operate against supply ships.

The *Glasgow* had to coal. Captain Luce then proposed to return to the east coast, and this the Admiralty approved, as it was now known that the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* was no longer on the west coast.

## CHAPTER VII.

### ACTIVE SEARCH FOR THE *KRONPRINZ WILHELM*, MARCH 1915.

46. **Arrival of the "Prinz Eitel Friedrich" at Newport News, March 10.**—Until March 10 the last report of the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* was the statement that she had been seen off Iquique on March 7. The Admiralty and all other British authorities naturally assumed her to be off the coast of Peru, and it was therefore a great surprise to find that a steamer which anchored at Newport News in the morning of March 10 was none other than the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* herself.<sup>1</sup>

After leaving Easter Island, on January 6, Captain Thierichens, of the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, seems to have decided to make his way into the Atlantic with the idea of running the blockade and reaching Germany.<sup>2</sup> He passed well south of the Horn and, keeping wide of the South American coast, steamed northward up the Atlantic sailing-ship route. On January 26, 27, 28 he made four captures—the Russian barque *Isobel Browne*, two French barques named *Pierre Loti* and *Jacobsen*, and a four-masted American ship, the *William P. Frye*. These were all taken in the neighbourhood of 30° S, 29° W, some 800 miles from the coast of Brazil.<sup>3</sup> The three Allied ships were speedily sunk, but Captain Thierichens hesitated a little in regard to the *William P. Frye*. She was carrying a cargo of wheat from Seattle, consigned to Queenstown, which he determined to get rid of. At first, attempts were made to throw the cargo overboard in order that the vessel might be released, but this proved

<sup>1</sup> A 236.

<sup>2</sup> Unless otherwise stated, this section is based on an interview with the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich's* officers, published in the *Weser Zeitung*, 14 April 1915. A translation of this is in N.I.D. 6721, 6816/15.

<sup>3</sup> Position and dates from N.I.D. 15305/17.

so slow a method that he determined to sink the ship and leave other authorities to settle the question of compensation. She was accordingly sunk on January 28. Just about this time the Admiralstab were sending out messages from their Berlin wireless stations to the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* suggesting that she should lie up in a Spanish or an American port.<sup>1</sup> Probably Captain Thierichens considered the suggestion applied to him also, for at this point he abandoned his first idea of reaching Germany. For a fortnight he cruised about and was only 200 miles further northward when on February 12 he captured and sank his first British ship in the Atlantic, the barque *Invercoe*, with wheat from Portland, Oregon, for Great Britain.<sup>2</sup>

Continuing his course northward he soon arrived on the South American steamer route, and there he took three vessels. The first, the *Mary Ada Short*, of Sunderland, from Rosario, he captured early on February 18 in 5.49 S, 28.36 W, well away from the normal peace track. The *Mary Ada Short* had no coal to give him, and spending only a few hours over her, he sank her at 11 a.m., and continued his course northward. It was perhaps fortunate for him that she was of no value as a prize, since the *Otranto*, coming homeward with the German survivors from the Falklands battle, was approaching. In fact she passed within sight of the spot next morning.<sup>3</sup>

But by that time the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* was well away, engaged in sinking the *Floride*, a French liner, in 2.28 S, 31.10 W. On February 20 Captain Thierichens took the third of his South American ships, the *Willerby*, of Stockton, bound for the Plate; but she was in water ballast and useless to him. None of the three ships had any coal to give him, and he concluded that he had no chance of getting away. He does not seem to have communicated with any of the German supply officers; throughout his career in the Atlantic he cut himself off from the shore and relied entirely on himself. The coal on board was now insufficient for a voyage to Germany; his boilers and engines began to break down; his prisoners were as many as his crew. In the circumstances he decided to run for a neutral harbour, choosing Newport News. Sinking his last prize, the *Willerby*, at 3 p.m., February 20, in 1.18 S, 29.54 W, he set his course for Virginia, more than 3,000 miles away.

Apart from the *Otranto*, whose presence was accidental, there were at the moment no British warships in the neighbourhood of Fernando Noronha, but the *Edinburgh Castle*, with two colliers fitted with wireless, was on her way from St. Vincent to Lavandeira Reef, and it is probable that her course and that of the raider crossed between February 21 and 22.<sup>3</sup> A few

<sup>1</sup> I.D.H.S. 1338, No. 287.

<sup>2</sup> Position 26° 31' S, 26° 15' W, as given by her Chief Officer. H.S. 23/323/3.

<sup>3</sup> See Plan at p. 193.



days later the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* entered the area for which Admiral Hornby was responsible.

47. **The North America Division.**—Admiral Hornby was not long to remain in command, for on March 6 the Admiralty reconsidered their plan of separating the West Indies from the North America command, and appointed Admiral Patey as Vice-Admiral Commanding the North America and West Indies Station, with Rear-Admiral Hornby as his second in command. The *Australia* was not to be the flagship; she was to remain at home in the Battle Cruiser Squadron, and Admiral Patey was to fly his flag in the *Leviathan*,<sup>1</sup> which was to leave home for Halifax as soon as possible. On the arrival of the *Leviathan* the *Berwick* was to return to the West Indies.<sup>2</sup> His arrival would not thus increase the number of ships in the North America Division.

The watch on New York involved the maintenance of two cruisers off the port, and the fact that Halifax and Bermuda are 650 and 740 miles respectively from New York by the routes taken, combined with the age and bad state of repair of the ships available for the service, necessitated three cruisers and one armed merchant cruiser, or five cruisers, being detailed for this duty alone, especially in the winter, with its severe weather and heavy seas. Hence little attention could, as a rule, be paid to the Chesapeake, Delaware or approaches to Boston.<sup>3</sup> The week before the arrival of the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* was a specially anxious one. Since the destruction of von Spee's squadron the rumour-mongers at New York had been comparatively quiet, but on March 7 these started again. It was reported to our Canadian authorities that the German ships in New York were ready to start at any moment, a report that was the more disquieting in that there was no United States man-of-war at New York to enforce the regulations. Moreover, the State Department appeared to hold that, even if the vessels had guns on board, they were simply armed merchantmen, and there was no reason to detain them. As a result of our Ambassador's representations to the United States Government, they sent an ancient gunboat, the *Dolphin*, carrying two 4 in. guns, to New York. The President assured the Ambassador that "we are doing everything that is practically possible to prevent any miscarriage in our precautions against rigid and effective neutrality"; but the Ambassador believed that the supposed search of the ships for guns was a farce. Another United States ship was ordered to Boston to watch that harbour. But the Ambassador, thinking the arrival of the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* at Newport News was intended to draw away our cruisers from

<sup>1</sup> *Leviathan*—14,100 tons; 2—9.2 in., 16—6 in.; designed speed, 23 knots; Captain Marcus R. Hill.

<sup>2</sup> M. 01659/15.

<sup>3</sup> Admiral Hornby to Admiralty. M. 04818/15, p. 5.

New York, urged that there should be no relaxation in the vigilance of our guard.<sup>1</sup>

Admiral Hornby had the *Caronia* and *Niobe* off New York. The *Suffolk* was on her way to Halifax to relieve one of them when the Admiral received the news of the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich's* arrival. He accordingly ordered her on to the Chesapeake to prevent the escape of the armed liner. She worked up to 15 knots, and by 9.30 a.m. March 12 was in position at the entrance.

48. **Intelligence of "Kronprinz Wilhelm" brought by the "Chasehill," March 12.**—On this same date more intelligence of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was received. Search of the two rendezvous mentioned in the German intercepted telegrams—Lavandeira Reef and the position in 1° N, 20° W—having had no result, the Admiralty ordered Admiral Stoddart to make sweeps for the raider with the *Sydney*, *Edinburgh Castle*, and the two wireless colliers, taking care not to leave the colliers at Abrolhos unguarded.<sup>2</sup> In accordance with this order, he proceeded on March 6 with the squadron for a sweep northward in the vicinity of Abrolhos, leaving the *Vindictive* behind. Soon after starting he took in a signal from a merchant vessel saying she was being chased by a suspicious ship about 250 miles south of Abrolhos. On this, he directed the sweep towards the spot, but found nothing there. At daylight, March 9, he sent the remainder back to Abrolhos, and proceeded with the *Sydney* to search Trinidad, anchoring once more at Abrolhos on March 13.<sup>3</sup> On his return he learned that the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* had been far away to the northward, for on March 12 the British ship *Chasehill* came into Pernambuco with the passengers and crew of the French liner *Guadeloupe*, sunk by the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, which had last been seen at 7 p.m., March 9, in 7° S, 26° W.<sup>4</sup>

49. **Movements of "Kronprinz Wilhelm," February 12 to March 10.**—After his excursion southward, which resulted in the capture of the *Semantha*, Captain Thierfelder returned to the South American trade route north of Pernambuco, taking station, as before, a long way east of the peace-time track. At midnight, February 20–21, he was in 10° S, 28° W,<sup>5</sup> and it is therefore probable that he did not go near Lavandeira Reef, which, in any case, was a rendezvous for the *Dresden's* colliers, and not for the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*. Some days elapsed before he made a capture; but on February 22, in 6.15 S, 28° 10' W, he met and took possession of the *Chasehill*, with 2,860 tons of coal from South Wales for the River Plate. Here again the collier was over 250 miles to the east of the usual track from

<sup>1</sup> F.O. Telegrams in H.S. 134, pp. 677–745.

<sup>2</sup> A 233.

<sup>3</sup> Stoddart: Letter of Proceedings. M. 03073/15.

<sup>4</sup> A 237.

<sup>5</sup> Glasgow W/T Log 46988, p. 36.



St. Vincent to Brazilian ports, and her capture was pure mischance, though an undoubted piece of luck for the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, for whom the supply of coal from the shore was becoming almost hopeless. Captain Thierfelder remained on the spot, and soon afterwards captured a French mail steamer, the *Guadeloupe*, from Rio for Bordeaux. Amongst other items this vessel contained grey cloth intended for the French army; this was a welcome find, and soon was converted into uniforms for the *Kronprinz Wilhelm's* crew. The *Guadeloupe* was sunk, but Captain Thierfelder kept the *Chasehill* in company for a fortnight while her coal was transferred to the German cruiser. Besides a crew of 151, the *Guadeloupe* had carried 143 passengers, including women and children. These had to be got rid of, and Captain Thierfelder was compelled to forgo his prize. On March 9 all these people, together with the original crew of the collier, were sent back to the *Chasehill*, which was then discharged to Pernambuco. The position in which he left the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was given by the master of the *Chasehill* as 6.57 S, 26.5 W.<sup>1</sup> Next day the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* stopped and released the Belgian steamer *Anvers* in 3.40 S, 29.9 W<sup>2</sup>; this is 300 miles from the position given by the master of the *Chasehill* for 7 p.m. March 9, and it is improbable that they can both be right.

During these operations the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* ran little danger of molestation. The *Macedonia*, on her way out to the south-east coast again, in the morning of March 10 passed close to the spot where the *Chasehill* and *Guadeloupe* had been captured. The *Sydney* and *Edinburgh Castle*, in their sweep eastward from Lavandeira Reef, might have come into the *Kronprinz Wilhelm's* neighbourhood if they had not been diverted southwards by the report from the *Manchester Civilian* that the enemy was near Abrolhos.<sup>3</sup>

**50. Orders based on the "Chasehill's" Report.**—Admiral Stoddart sent off the *Edinburgh Castle* to Bahia with telegrams informing the Admiralty that his next move would be another sweep to the southward, to be joined by the *Liverpool* and *Gloucester* after they had coaled at Abrolhos. He does not seem to have been informed that the Admiralty on the 10th had ordered them to Sierra Leone with their two wireless colliers, sweeping from there down the Cape trade route to 3° N, and thence across to Pernambuco.<sup>4</sup>

Before sailing he received the reports from the *Chasehill* which implied that the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was more likely to be found to the northward. He therefore decided to sweep to the north instead of to southward, and asked that the

<sup>1</sup> A 237, and Papers titled *Board of Trade*, 13.3.15.

<sup>2</sup> This was not reported till March 20 on her arrival at Las Palmas.

<sup>3</sup> See Section 32.

<sup>4</sup> A 241, 234.

*Liverpool* and *Gloucester* might be directed to sweep towards Rocas to meet him.<sup>1</sup>

The *Chasehill's* information also modified the Admiralty's orders to the *Liverpool* division. They were now instructed to sweep the areas in which the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* had been making her captures, and to which it appeared she took them to tranship their cargoes. This latest order they repeated to Admiral Stoddart, to let him know what the two ships were doing, and told him to carry out his original intention of sweeping south from Abrolhos, adding the armed merchant cruisers *Macedonia* and *Celtic* to his squadron.<sup>2</sup>

**51. The German Supply Ship "Macedonia" escapes from Las Palmas, March 15.**—Among the German ships interned<sup>3</sup> in the Canary Islands was the Hamburg-Amerika liner *Macedonia*. This vessel had arrived at Santa Cruz de la Palma on October 17, having left New York on 30 August 1914. It was clear she had been waiting at some rendezvous to get in touch with German cruisers, and the Spanish authorities moved her to Las Palmas, where they interned her and, to prevent her escape, removed a cylinder cover. She seemed perfectly secure. Nevertheless, at 1.30 a.m. on March 15 she quietly steamed out of the harbour and disappeared.

It appears that the ingenious supply officer at Las Palmas had a spare cylinder cover ready as soon as she reached his port; even from November 12 onwards she had been ready to sail. Accordingly, when the German coal supply in the *Nepos* and other steamers was sold, that in the *Macedonia* was retained on board, and on March 4 the supply officer was instructed to have her ready to run out for the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*.<sup>4</sup>

**52. Area I.**—For some time no close watch had been kept on the Canary Island ports, in order to avoid hurting Spanish susceptibilities, and Admiral de Robeck had left the station under the impression that strict neutrality was being enforced. His policy was continued by his successor, Admiral Moore. At the time of the *Macedonia's* escape the nearest vessel to Las Palmas was the flagship *Europa*, about 60 miles SSW of Gran Canaria, endeavouring to intercept a Portuguese ship with 11 enemy subjects on board; this was successfully accomplished at 5 a.m. March 15, and the *Europa* then steered for the east side of Gran Canaria, so that if the *Macedonia* had gone south or south-west from Las Palmas she would almost certainly have been seen. In spite of the chain of communications in force, it was not till 7.16 p.m. March 15, that is,

<sup>1</sup> Stoddart: Search for *Kronprinz Wilhelm*. M. 03067/15.

<sup>2</sup> A 242.

<sup>3</sup> The *Walhalla* was interned on February 14. M. 09428/15.

<sup>4</sup> I.D.H.S. 1414, Nos. 130, 175, 275.



17 hours after the event, that Admiral Moore received the news, through Madeira wireless station, that the *Macedonia* had escaped, a later repetition adding that she had gone eastward.<sup>1</sup> He searched the east side of the Canaries and the coast of Africa from Cape Juby to Cape Bojador, ordering the *Argonaut*, which was coaling at Funchal, to Las Palmas to inquire into the exact circumstances of the vessel's escape, and what measures the Spanish authorities were taking to prevent other interned steamers from getting away.<sup>2</sup>

There was only one other ship of Force I available—the *Carmania*, on the Tagus Patrol. The *Calgarian* was gone; she left Gibraltar on March 13 for Halifax. The *Amphitrite* was guarding the colliers at St. Vincent; but on the 18th the Admiralty ordered the *Highflyer* from Sierra Leone to relieve her, so that she might again be available to keep guard over the ports containing German supply ships.

The *Victorian* by this time had gone home to pay off. The intention was to relieve her by the *Ophir*, of the Orient line, but this vessel did not commission till March 2, and was not ready to leave England till the 19th. Meanwhile the agreement signed by the mercantile crew of the *Victorian* expired on February 21, while she was on patrol off the Tagus, and when she came to Gibraltar to coal the firemen announced that they wished to leave the ship and live on shore till sent home, considering themselves as civilians in respect of discipline and the granting of leave. Moreover, they informed Captain Somerville, quite respectfully, but firmly, that they would take the *Victorian* direct to England, but did not intend to go again on patrol. There was no surprise in this attitude of theirs; Captain Somerville, early in January, had ascertained that this was what they would do, and had at once informed the Admiralty, whose delay in providing relief put him in the humiliating position of being obliged to submit to the dictates of these men as to whether they would or would not continue at their work. A ship over which discipline could not be maintained, and whose crew refused duty, was useless at Gibraltar, and on March 5 the Senior Naval Officer obtained permission to send the *Victorian* home to pay off without relief.<sup>3</sup>

**53. The West Indies.**—The escape of the German *Macedonia* from Las Palmas had been quite unexpected, and no preventive measures had been possible. The *Bavaria*, however, at Havana, which had been mentioned in a German telegram, was being carefully watched, the *Melbourne* and *Condé*, the only cruisers in the West Indies, relieving each other on guard outside the port. The West Indies force was brought up to three in number

<sup>1</sup> See A 244.

<sup>2</sup> Papers titled X 8840/15.

<sup>3</sup> Papers titled X 8999/15.

on March 13, when the *Descartes* completed her repair at Fort de France and left for Jamaica. On March 19 the *Odenwald*, a German ship which had been sheltering at San Juan, Porto Rico, since the beginning of the war, suddenly showed signs of activity, and on March 22 tried to escape from the port. She was fired on by the port authorities and made to return, but the incident caused the *Melbourne* to be stationed off San Juan from March 24 till the *Odenwald* was interned on March 29, while the *Condé* and *Descartes* shared the watch over the *Bavaria* at Havana.<sup>1</sup>

**54. Another Rendezvous discovered, March 18.**—By March 18 it was known that the supply ship *Macedonia* was probably making for a rendezvous with the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* in long. 33° W on the equator, and this information was passed to the *Liverpool*, which had reached Sierra Leone on the 16th. The two wireless colliers which, with the *Gloucester*, formed the division, proved to be capable of only 7.2 knots instead of 9 to 10½, and two days' delay at Sierra Leone was necessary for them to clear their boilers.<sup>2</sup> On the 19th, in the afternoon, they started, proceeding in accordance with the Admiralty orders of the 13th in the direction of the area in which the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* dealt with her captures. But on the 20th the Admiralty ordered them direct to 0°, 33° W, and then to search NW from that position for 80 miles till April 9, after which they were to begin sweeping the *Kronprinz Wilhelm's* areas.<sup>3</sup> This order the *Liverpool* received about 9 a.m. on the 21st.

By noon on the 27th they were at the rendezvous, and began steaming off and on for 80 miles NW as ordered. Next day at noon, the *Gloucester* (Captain W. A. Howard Kelly) sighted a steamer with the name *Hendrick*, flying Dutch colours. The steamer was steering SE when sighted, but she immediately altered course to north, only to be overhauled by the *Gloucester* and boarded. The boarding party soon discovered her to be the runaway *Macedonia*, and made prize of her. Captain Howard Kelly removed the German crew to his own ship, and manned the prize from the *Gloucester*,<sup>4</sup> and she was kept with the squadron on the rendezvous in the hope that the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* would appear. The *Liverpool*, on March 20, went off to coal under the lee of Rocas Reef, but was back at the rendezvous on April 2, relieving the *Gloucester* to coal at Lavandeira Reef. She returned to the rendezvous on April 7, and remained there till later information showed it to be useless to stay longer.

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 134, pp. 781-835.

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 135, pp. 1026, 1038.

<sup>3</sup> A 245, 246. The information was obtained by decoding messages from the high-power station at Nauen in Germany; see I.D.H.S. 1501.

<sup>4</sup> The *Macedonia's* own chief engineer, four warrant officers, and eight hands volunteered to work in her. They received the same wages as they had been paid by the German company. Papers titled *Cap. K 9/1915*.



55. **Movements of the "Kronprinz Wilhelm" after March 10.**—For the fortnight after releasing the *Anvers* on March 10, the *Kronprinz Wilhelm's* movements are at present unknown. She may have remained as before to the east of the trade route, and possibly a stationary mail steamer sighted at 2 a.m., March 21, in 1.15 S, 26.40 W, by the French liner *Meuse*, was the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*.<sup>1</sup> What was probably the same vessel was seen by the Italian *Italia* on the 23rd in 1° S, 29° 30' W.<sup>2</sup>

Captain Thierfelder made no further captures till March 24, when he stopped the *Tamar* with nearly 4,000 tons of coffee from Santos for Le Havre.<sup>3</sup> Taking the crew on board, he sank the vessel and waited for another. Next day one was sighted, but she proved to be the Italian *Ascaro*, and was released.<sup>4</sup> On the 26th another Italian, the *Fede*, was met. The *Fede* passed on southward, warning the next British steamer she met.<sup>5</sup> After these two Italians it was a relief to Captain Thierfelder to meet next day the *Coleby*, a British steamer with 5,500 tons of wheat from South America. He set her on fire and fired 12 shots into her to sink her.<sup>6</sup>

His coal supply was now much reduced. He seems to have gone to the *Macedonia's* rendezvous and actually to have seen her there with the *Liverpool*. The unwelcome sight decided him to act on the discretion he had been given. Food was scarce, and many of his crew were down with scurvy or beriberi; he gave up the hope of further commerce destruction, and began to steer northward to lay up his vessel in a neutral port.<sup>7</sup>

The orders from the Admiralstab gave another spot in 3° N, 37° W, as a rendezvous for the *Macedonia* after April 9,<sup>8</sup> but this was now useless, and without waiting there he pressed on for his chosen port of refuge.

<sup>1</sup> Reported by *Meuse*, March 28, at St. Vincent. See H.S. 135, p. 1135.

<sup>2</sup> Reported April 3. H.S. 137, p. 727.

<sup>3</sup> Position 14 miles N. 20 E. (True) from 2° 6' S, 28° 50' W. Master's deposition. M. 21265/15.

<sup>4</sup> She reported the encounter on arrival at Dakar. The position as given by I.O., Monte Video, is 2.16 S, 27.20 W; the Ministry of Marine, Paris, gave the longitude as 25.29 W, which seems improbable. H.S. 137, pp. 727, 729.

<sup>5</sup> Position given by *Fede* is 1° S, 30° W, obviously an approximation. H.S. 137, p. 765.

<sup>6</sup> Position 1° 58' S, 30° W. Deposition of master. M. 21265/15.

<sup>7</sup> In a statement published in the *Weser Zeitung*, 8 May 1915, he says: "We had hoped to meet German supply ships, but, unfortunately, none put in an appearance. Once only we saw a collier which we had expected, followed by two British cruisers, and it was lucky they did not catch sight of us." The master of the *Tamar* on board the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* learned one afternoon that a British cruiser was in sight. H.S. 23/309/3.

<sup>8</sup> I.D.H.S. 1484, March 19.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### THE END OF THE *PRINZ EITEL FRIEDRICH* AND *KRONPRINZ WILHELM*.

56. **The "Prinz Eitel Friedrich" at Newport News.**<sup>1</sup>—Captain Thierichens, of the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, managed to spread the impression that he had no intention of interning his ship if permitted to repair her. Although her machinery was reported to be "all to pieces," and to need at least three weeks' refit, she came out of dock on March 14, and by March 18 was rumoured to be in such condition that she could proceed to sea at any moment. Our Naval Attaché at Washington went down to Newport News and learned that her armament consisted of four 4 in. guns, six 12 pdr. and 10 pom-poms. Amongst other repairs the vessel had her bottom re-coated with anti-fouling composition. To this our Ambassador protested on the grounds that it was an undue increase of speed; the same view was taken by Admiral Patey, who arrived at Bermuda on March 26 in the *Leviathan*, and took charge of the North America and West Indies Station. His first step was to telegraph to the Ambassador, of whose protest he was unaware, that the re-coating was against the Hague Convention, and that the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* should be interned. By Foreign Office instructions the Ambassador renewed his protest, and received from Washington the reply that a foul bottom was damage experienced from the sea, and, therefore, to clean it was an allowable repair.

The United States Government on March 26 passed a decree that she must not leave port less than 24 hours after an Allied merchant vessel, a pronouncement which Admiral Patey heard with some dismay, as the frequency of the departures of Allied merchant ships virtually constituted a blockade of the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, and the retention of his cruisers at the Chesapeake seemed likely to become indefinite. He tried to arrange that the sailings should be suspended as soon as the German cruiser's repairs were complete, in order to force her either to intern or proceed to sea;<sup>2</sup> and with this the United States Government were so far in agreement that they announced that clearance was to be withheld from such merchant vessels for 24 hours before the expiration of the time allowed to the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* for repairs. This date was, of course, not imparted

<sup>1</sup> Based mainly on Papers titled *F.O.*, 25.3.15, *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, and the *F.O.* telegrams in H.S. 134.

<sup>2</sup> Patey, Letters of Proceeding. M. 02972/15.



to us, but on April 3 it was reported as April 6. It was further arranged that she must leave United States waters direct, or be interned at the expiration of the time limit, though she might move within the three-mile limit up to that time, a United States cruiser being detailed to watch her should she do so.

She landed all her prisoners, and some feeling was aroused in America when among them were found the crew of the *William P. Frye*, the United States sailing vessel carrying wheat from Seattle, which Captain Thierichens had sunk on January 28. For this he offered to make reparation, but the United States Government would not dismiss the matter so lightly, and there ensued with Germany a warm controversy which came to no definite conclusion during the war.

#### 57. The Watch on New York. March and Early April.—

As soon as the Admiralty learned that the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* had arrived at Newport News they ordered the *Calgarian* from Gibraltar to Halifax with dispatch, and directed the *Cumberland*,<sup>1</sup> which they had intended for Force I, also to Halifax. She was to proceed with all convenient dispatch from Scapa.<sup>2</sup> The *Calgarian* they considered specially suitable for the North American Station; her armament, speed and coal capacity rendered her of more use for maintaining position off port than any cruiser they could afford to send.<sup>3</sup> The *Cumberland* arrived at Halifax on March 20 and the *Calgarian* on the 21st; both proceeded to the Chesapeake when ready.

However, the Admiralty did not intend the major part of the North America Division to be concentrated on the guard of the Chesapeake. As usual, rumours began to run to the effect that the New York liners were about to escape. For instance, the *Pisa*, one of the liners, coaled, and was reported as ready to put to sea on March 28.<sup>4</sup> In addition, there were rumours that large cruisers were about to break out from Germany to drive away our squadrons; and to meet this contingency Admiral Patey issued special orders. If sure intelligence of a break away in force of cruisers from Germany was received his squadron was to concentrate at Bermuda, except for the armed merchant cruisers, which were to stay in position as long as possible and then run for Halifax, or, in the last resort, into neutral waters.<sup>5</sup>

There was a blizzard on April 2 in which it was at first thought the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* had escaped. All communications with Newport News were wrecked by the storm, and some time

<sup>1</sup> *Cumberland*, Captain C. T. M. Fuller, 9,800 tons, 14—6 in. The C.-in-C., Home Fleets, was informed on March 6 that she was to join Force I (M. 01659/15).

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 134, pp. 715, 727, 731.

<sup>3</sup> M. 0859/15.

<sup>4</sup> H.S. 134, pp. 853, 862, 867, 872. She was intended to go out with coal and provisions (*Kreuzerkrieg II*, p. 224).

<sup>5</sup> A 248. The actual orders for concentration are dated April 1; Memo. 014C in M.02972/15.

elapsed before the Admiral knew that the German raider was still in port. On April 5 she was taking in stores and conveying the impression that she would soon sail. Admiral Patey had four of his ships off the Chesapeake—the *Calgarian*, *Cumberland*, *Glory* and *Niobe*—and only the *Caronia* off New York. The *Berwick* since March 28 was refitting; the *Suffolk* was coaling; and the *Leviathan*, with Admiral Patey on board, was still at Bermuda.

The disposition of so much force at the Chesapeake to look out for one German ship, while the 30 New York liners were watched by only one armed merchant cruiser, was in accordance with the Admiral's opinion that little credence was due to the usual rumours about great activity at New York, and the probability of a break away from that port, although these were specially prevalent during April 2.<sup>1</sup> The Admiralty, however, did not share his opinion. On April 5 they ordered him to watch the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* with only one ship, using all the others for the New York patrol; they thought the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* would eventually be interned, but considered the enemy were using her to induce us to weaken our force off New York.<sup>2</sup>

In accordance with this Admiral Patey ordered the *Glory* and *Calgarian* from the Chesapeake to New York. The *Cumberland* should have gone too, but had to remain to recover an anchor.

58. The "Prinz Eitel Friedrich" Interned.—The Admiral had arranged that Allied ships should sail from Chesapeake ports only in the forenoons, in order that the 24 hours allowed to the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* should not give her the advantage of darkness in leaving. At 1.30 a.m. on April 6 he heard from Norfolk that the Customs had instructed the local pilots not to take out any Allied ships until further orders; and from Washington that no clearances would be issued to Allied ships till noon April 6. This intelligence appeared to fix the expiration of the German cruiser's time limit at noon, April 6, and the Admiral, therefore, directed the *Cumberland* to remain with the *Niobe*. The *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* was reported to have taken a pilot on board, and the suspense was kept up until 3 a.m., April 8, when the Admiral received from his Intelligence Officer the news that the German liner was interned. This was confirmed by our Ambassador,<sup>3</sup> and the Admiral sent the *Cumberland* off to coal at Halifax. He relieved the *Niobe* by the *Suffolk*, thinking he ought still to keep a cruiser off the Chesapeake to intercept the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* should she be driven by Admiral Stoddart's squadron to seek refuge in the bay.<sup>4</sup>

59. Further Sweeps for the "Kronprinz Wilhelm."—The *Kronprinz Wilhelm's* second rendezvous with the supply ship *Macedonia* was discovered in the Admiralty late on April 3. The

<sup>1</sup> Patey, Letter of Proceedings. M. 03205/15.

<sup>2</sup> A 251.

<sup>3</sup> A 252.

<sup>4</sup> Patey, Letter of Proceedings. M. 03205/15.



position, 3° N, 37° W, was nearly 500 miles north of Lavandeira Reef; here the *Macedonia* was to have waited for the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* from April 9 to 23. The intelligence was sent to Admiral Stoddart, and the *Laurentic* was ordered across from Sierra Leone to join in the search, afterwards proceeding to Pernambuco for orders.<sup>1</sup>

Admiral Stoddart, it will be remembered, had been ordered by the Admiralty to carry out his intention of sweeping southward with all his ships, except the *Liverpool* and *Gloucester*. He went as far as Monte Video himself in the *Sydney*, sending the *Macedonia* and *Edinburgh Castle* on to look at 43° S, 52° W, where the *Eleonore Woermann* had been met by the *Australia*. The *Celtic* was with him for part of the sweep, but he sent her back to Abrolhos to be available to store the *Carnarvon*, which left Rio on April 2 with her repairs completed. The *Glasgow* joined him on April 7. The operation did not produce any particular result; indeed, during it the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* had been making her last captures 2,000 miles to the northward.

On April 8 Admiral Stoddart started a new sweep to the *Macedonia's* second rendezvous. The arrival of the *Carnarvon* at Abrolhos freed the *Vindictive*, which had been so long at anchor, for a cruise; she was sent on ahead the day before the rest of the squadron left. The *Sydney* and *Glasgow*, with the armed merchant cruisers *Macedonia* and *Edinburgh Castle*, steamed in line abreast, 10 miles apart, for 3° N, 37° W, whence they were to sweep westward, returning, when necessary to coal, to Rocas Reef, where the *Celtic* awaited them with two wireless colliers. On the 12th they passed the *Liverpool*, *Gloucester*, and their two wireless colliers proceeding to Lavandeira Reef to coal.<sup>2</sup>

The *Laurentic* left Sierra Leone on receipt of her orders. She was at the *Macedonia* rendezvous on April 9 and remained there patrolling.

Admiral Patey in the north, being freed from much of his anxiety by the internment of the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, on April 8 proposed to take part in the operations against the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*. He thought that as the time was approaching when she must go into port for docking and repairs she might possibly come up the trade route from Cape San Roque into the Gulf of Mexico. He ordered the *Melbourne* to patrol the passage between Grenada and Trinidad, and obtained Admiralty approval to proceed to Jamaica in the *Leviathan*, leaving Admiral Hornby in command in the north, and the *Suffolk* on guard off the Chesapeake.<sup>3</sup>

But all these sweeps and arrangements were in vain; on April 11, at 5 a.m., the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* quietly steamed into

<sup>1</sup> A. 249, 250.      <sup>2</sup> Stoddart, Letter of Proceedings. M.03384/15.  
<sup>3</sup> Tels. 23 from and 20 to Admiral Patey, April 8 and 9.

Newport News, having successfully eluded the *Suffolk* patrolling outside the bay.<sup>1</sup>

**60. Movements resulting from the Arrival of the "Kronprinz Wilhelm" at Newport News.**—According to the statements of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm's* officers they were aware that the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* had preceded them at Newport News. They also knew through British wireless telegrams that she was interned, and noticing that, immediately afterwards, the conversations between British men-of-war ceased, Captain Thierfelder concluded that all our ships except one had dispersed, and that it would be safe to risk entering Chesapeake Bay.<sup>2</sup>

The *Suffolk*, which throughout the night of April 10–11 was stopped near No. 2 C B buoy at the entrance to the channel into the bay, heard from a passing steamer that the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* had arrived, and telegraphed the news to Admiral Patey. He was about to start for Jamaica, but as soon as the report was confirmed he proceeded in the *Leviathan* for Chesapeake Bay and ordered the *Melbourne* to join him there after coaling at Bermuda. He asked the Admiralty to send up a vessel from South America to take the *Melbourne's* place temporarily, and in view of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm's* speed asked that the *Sydney* and another fast ship from the South Atlantic should join him to watch off the Chesapeake.<sup>3</sup>

The fact that the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was in a United States port relieved the South American station of much of its work, and the Admiralty on the 13th ordered Admiral Stoddart to shift his flag from the *Sydney* to the *Liverpool* and come home with her and the *Gloucester*, while the *Sydney* went back to her former station in the West Indies; the *Carnarvon* was ordered from Abrolhos to Bermuda.<sup>4</sup>

The transfer of flag took place on April 16 at 9.15 a.m., off Rocas Reef, where the whole South American Squadron was assembled: *Sydney*, *Glasgow*, *Liverpool*, *Gloucester*, *Vindictive*, *Macedonia*, *Edinburgh Castle*, *Celtic*, and, in addition, the *Laurentic* from Sierra Leone. Captain Luce, of the *Glasgow*, became once more Senior Naval Officer, South-East Coast of America, having in the interval served under Admirals Cradock, Sturdee, and Stoddart. The *Liverpool*, *Gloucester* and the prize *Macedonia* proceeded for St. Vincent; the *Laurentic* returned to Sierra Leone; and the South-East Coast Squadron, consisting of the *Glasgow*, *Celtic*, *Vindictive*, *Edinburgh Castle* and *Macedonia*, returned to Abrolhos.

**61. The Watch on New York to End of April 1915.**—The arrival of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* synchronised with a revival of

<sup>1</sup> A. 253.      <sup>2</sup> *Weser Zeitung*, 8 May 1915.  
<sup>3</sup> Tel. 32 from Admiral Patey. Recd. 6.47 a.m., 12.4.15.      <sup>4</sup> A. 254.



the rumour that German cruisers were approaching New York to drive off our watching squadron. The *Von der Tann* and *Karlsruhe* were mentioned as being among them, but the *Von der Tann* was known to be in German waters, and as for the *Karlsruhe*, the Admiralty had publicly announced on March 20 that she had been sunk off the West Indies at the beginning of November, a statement that was corroborated by the Berlin correspondent of a Danish newspaper.<sup>1</sup> The rumour, therefore, obtained no credence either in London or with Admiral Patey, who, moreover, was confident that should any German ships be off the coast the fishermen would at once give information in view of their anger at Germany's treatment of the *William P. Frye*. Communications as usual were unsatisfactory. Admiral Hornby complained that he was getting no intelligence, and as messages dated April 11 were still being passed from Cape Sable on April 14, Admiral Patey sent the *Cumberland* north to act as linking ship between Cape Sable and New York, until the new high-power station at Barrington should be working, its anticipated date being the 17th.<sup>2</sup>

Early in April the United States Government objected that our cruisers off New York were in the line of fire of ordnance tests being carried out from Sandy Hook; they affirmed their intention not to relax their vigilance in maintaining neutrality, and orders were sent by the Admiralty for our cruisers to keep out of the line, thus increasing their distance from the port to 13 miles.<sup>3</sup>

62. **Escort of the Second Canadian Contingent.**—The Admiralty's main object in sending out the *Cumberland* was that she should escort home the second contingent of Canadian troops, which should reach England about May 1. Certain details and remounts in single ships had come across unescorted,<sup>4</sup> but it had been decided that the second contingent, instead of coming, like the first, in one large convoy, should be sent in groups, each of which must be escorted. Three transports were to be ready at Halifax on April 18, but as only one escort was available, the War Office sent instructions to Canada that these and the second group should both sail together on the 23rd, the Admiralty telling Admiral Patey to escort them with the *Cumberland*. But after the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* was interned, the War Office agreed to the sailing of the first group of the contingent on the 18th in two transports, the *Northland* and *Grampian*, and informed the Canadian Government that the Admiralty would provide escort. This agreement appears

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 134, pp. 806-994, 1062.

<sup>2</sup> Patey, Letter of Proceedings. M. 03373/15; also Papers titled *Qa* 181 and 190/1915.

<sup>3</sup> M. 20560/15.

<sup>4</sup> *Dominion*, February 5; *Mongolian*, February 17; *Montreal*, March 6; *Orduna*, March 20; *Missanabie*, March 28; *Monmouth*, April 1; *Metagama*, April 10; *Missanabie*, April 24.

not to have been communicated to Admiral Patey, who, on that date, had the *Cumberland* off New York. That night he sent her to Halifax to coal in order to be ready for the convoy leaving, as he thought, on the 23rd. Next morning, to his astonishment, he received a message: "Barrington to Commander in Chief, via *Cumberland*. *Grampian* and *Northland* sailed with troops. St. John's, Admiralty, have been informed." There was nothing to show from whom the telegram originated, nor from what port the transports had sailed. It was not till the Admiralty inquired whether the *Cumberland* had sailed with the transports that he realised that this was the voyage she should be escorting. He sent out urgent inquiries whether they were going to England direct or to some other Canadian port, and gave instructions that if they had sailed direct for England without Admiralty authority they were to be recalled. Rear-Admiral Hornby succeeded in stopping them at Cape Race, and learned that the second group was not sailing that month. The *Cumberland*, after a hurried coaling at Halifax, overtook them on the 21st, and proceeded with them to England. It appears that the order for them to sail was given by the Canadian Militia Department.<sup>1</sup>

63. **The "Kronprinz Wilhelm" interned.**—Meanwhile the Admiral had visited the Chesapeake, where the *Leviathan* joined the *Suffolk* on April 14. Four days later the *Melbourne* relieved the *Suffolk* to coal at Halifax. The Admiral learned that Captain Thierfelder had asked for three weeks in which to repair the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, including the damage to her plates caused by her ramming the *Wilfred M.*; he complained to our Ambassador that this was not a repair which, by the Hague Convention, should be allowed, and obtained from him a reply that the United States authorities would not permit the repair of any damage not caused by the sea. On the 19th she went into dry dock, and Admiral Patey seized the opportunity to visit the New York Patrol. After examining the arrangements for the conduct of the patrol, and finding them satisfactory, he returned to the Chesapeake, arriving at 7 a.m. on the 23rd, 16 hours after the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* had undocked. She, like the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, had her bottom coated, but Admiral Patey, in view of the United States attitude on this subject, withheld what he considered a reasonable protest. Her bow was not repaired, nor were the plates in her side which had been damaged by coaling at sea.

On the 24th he heard from the Ambassador that the 24 hours' grace to the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* would date from midnight, April 29-30. This enabled him to coal the *Leviathan* at Bermuda and be back in time. He proceeded at once, ordering

<sup>1</sup> Patey, Letter of Proceedings. M. 03787/15. The telegrams received by the Admiralty on the subject of the convoy are in A 255.



the *Calgarian* from New York to join the *Suffolk* at the Chesapeake. He reached Bermuda on the 26th. That same day the German commenced coaling. An opinion was current in Newport News that Captain Thierfelder intended to make a dash out before his time limit expired, and trust to his speed to escape, but Admiral Patey was quite sure that the United States authorities would not acquiesce in such a proceeding. In addition, the *Neckar*, which had so long been quiescent in Baltimore, was reported to have her crew on board and to be ready with 2,000 tons of coal; possibly both might try to escape together.<sup>1</sup>

On April 27, however, the Admiral heard at 2 a.m. from his Intelligence Officer that the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* had been interned. By 5 p.m., the latest time at which it was possible to get away from Bermuda, no confirmation from our Ambassador had been received, and the Admiral put to sea to return to the Chesapeake. Early next morning the Ambassador's confirmation arrived, and as all was now arranged, for nothing further was heard of the *Neckar*, he returned to Bermuda in the *Leviathan*, sent the *Calgarian* back to New York, the *Melbourne* to follow when coaled. Only the *Suffolk* was left behind to patrol off the Chesapeake.<sup>2</sup>

**64. The Atlantic Forces at the end of May 1915.**—Although German armed vessels had completely disappeared from the trade routes, there were still numbers of potential cruisers in various Atlantic ports, and the Admiralty, even by the end of May, made little reduction in the strength of the cruiser forces.

Off West America the *Rainbow*,<sup>3</sup> *Newcastle, Kent*, and *Orama* still operated in conjunction with the Japanese cruisers, and the *Otranto*, after a refit, left Liverpool to join them.

On the South-East Coast of America the *Glasgow* remained in charge with the three armed merchant cruisers *Celtic, Edinburgh Castle*, and *Macedonia*; the *Vindictive* continued to keep guard and wireless watch at Abrolhos.

The East Atlantic forces were somewhat reduced. The *Highflyer* remained near St. Vincent, while to the northward of her operated the *Amphitrite, Argonaut, Marmora*, and *Ophir*, the last named a newly commissioned armed merchant cruiser.

In the North America Squadron the *Glory* was under orders to proceed to the Dardanelles. The other vessels—*Leviathan, Suffolk, Niobe, Berwick, Carnarvon, Melbourne*, and *Calgarian*—were chiefly occupied in the watch off New York. In the West

<sup>1</sup> The *Neckar* had been ready since the beginning of March, and the German Admiralty hoped to get her away if the *Macedonia* had failed to escape from Las Palmas (I.D.H.S. 1479/B.240).

<sup>2</sup> This section is based on Patey's Letter of Proceedings. M. 03373/15, 03787/15, 03987/15.

<sup>3</sup> A light cruiser of the Royal Canadian Navy.

Indies the *Sydney* patrolled in conjunction with the *Condé* and *Descartes*. The *Cumberland*, having safely escorted her convoy, coaled at Queenstown and returned to North America. She was now in dockyard hands at Bermuda.

A noticeable distribution of this distribution of force, in comparison with the scheme of commerce protection outlined in the War Plan, is that the south and west coasts of America, for which the *Glasgow* and one other cruiser had been considered sufficient, were now to be patrolled by at least 11 ships. The actual course of the war had been such that the South American Station had been the scene of the most important engagements overseas, and of the most sustained attacks on trade.

The *Karlsruhe* had made 18 captures, the *Dresden* 9, the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* 15, and the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* 11, a total of 53 ships, of which 7 were released for various reasons. All of these were taken off the coast of South America.

But there was now no enemy abroad in the Atlantic. With the internment of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* and the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* Germany's first attempt, half-hearted as it was, to interfere with our overseas trade by recognised methods, came to a tame conclusion, and for many months merchant vessels, except in home waters, proceeded on their voyages secure from any but the ordinary perils of the sea.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Until the issue of the German official history dealing with the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* and *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, any detailed criticism of their careers seems to be futile and is not attempted here.



## THE BATTLE OF CORONEL.

1 November, 1914.

### Introduction and Note on Sources.

This narrative is concerned only with the battle itself; the events leading up and subsequent to it are described in Monographs 1 and 3, "Coronel" and "Falklands," in the previous pages of this volume.

The principal source of information on the British side is the "Report from Commanding Officer, H.M.S. *Glasgow*" (M. 04711/14); this includes reports by individual ship's officers and copies of the *Glasgow's* signal and W/T logs. The *Otranto's* report and notes on the action are M. 04712/14, "Report on action fought on Sunday, November 1, off Coronel, between the squadron under Rear-Admiral Sir C. Cradock, K.C.V.O., C.B., and a German Squadron." On 14 April, 1915, the *Otranto* also forwarded a further letter of "Proceedings on Occasion of the Naval Action off the Chilean Coast" (M. 02900/15). The letter of proceedings of H.M.S. *Canopus* is numbered M. 0523/15, and, in addition, the *Canopus* forwarded on 15 December, 1914, an "Explanation of Absence from Engagement off Chilean Coast, 1 November, 1914" (M. 0962/15). No logs were recovered from the *Good Hope* or *Monmouth*, and of the officers and men on board the two ships, who took part in the action, none were saved.

The German account of the action in "Der Krieg zur See 1914-1918—Kreuzerkrieg I," is based on Vice-Admiral Graf v. Spee's short despatch (printed as Appendix A to the German volume), and is elaborated in considerable detail. Von Spee's despatch agrees closely with the *Glasgow's* report.

The times given in this account of the action are Chilean zone time, viz., 5 hours slow on G.M.T. The British ships were keeping Port Stanley time (4½ hours slow on G.M.T.) and allowance has been made for this.

## THE BATTLE OF CORONEL

1 November, 1914.

1. **Sighting of the German Squadron.**—Admiral Cradock in the *Good Hope*, with the *Monmouth* and the *Otranto*, had appointed a rendezvous with the *Glasgow* 50 miles west of Coronel in 36° 56' S, 74° 13' W, at 11.30 a.m., on 1 November. The junction took place soon after 1 p.m. in 36° 47' S, 74° 10' W.<sup>1</sup> There was a strong wind and too much sea for boat-work, so that the *Glasgow* had to put the telegrams and despatches she had brought from Coronel into a cask and tow it across the flagship's bows to be picked up. While this operation was in progress German wireless was heard clearly to the northward, and Admiral Cradock ordered the squadron to spread NE by E 15 miles apart, and sweep NW by N to locate the enemy.<sup>2</sup>

At 1556 the *Monmouth* had just turned to the course NW by N<sup>3</sup> and reduced to 10 knots, when the *Otranto*, steering for her screening position, sighted smoke broad on the starboard bow, and called the attention of the *Glasgow*, then two miles to the eastward.<sup>4</sup> The *Glasgow* turned to the eastward to investigate; in a few minutes she sighted vessels, apparently warships, and soon made them out to be enemy cruisers. Hoisting the warning signal "Enemy's armoured cruisers in sight," Captain Luce turned 16 points, and steered for the position of the *Good Hope*, followed by the *Monmouth* and *Otranto*.<sup>5</sup>

It was not until 1617, six minutes after the British ships had turned to a southerly course, that von Spee sighted them. His squadron at the time was steering south at 14 knots, covering a front of some seven or eight miles, the *Nürnberg* being detached about 10 miles off the Chilean coast to prevent the escape of the *Glasgow*, intelligence of whose presence at Coronel on the previous evening had reached the German Admiral.<sup>6</sup> The meeting was not unexpected, for British W/T signalling had been heard for some time. The three British ships were recognised as the *Monmouth*, *Glasgow* and *Otranto*; and, altering course to starboard, von Spee ordered his ships to concentrate and clear for action

<sup>1</sup> Position based on *Glasgow's* Log No. 19896.

<sup>2</sup> Appendix of Signals. B 1-3.

<sup>3</sup> M. 02900/15. "Otranto, proceedings on occasion of the naval action off the Chilean coast."

<sup>4</sup> B 4. The bearing, NE, is apparently incorrect. The log of *Otranto* appears to be unreliable and has been neglected in plotting her track. A report by a ship's officer (M. 04712/14. "Report on action fought on Sunday, 1 November, 1914, off Coronel") says the *Otranto* was about two miles west of the other ships when she sighted the enemy's smoke, and her position has been fixed from this statement.

<sup>5</sup> B 6. Captain Luce's Report (M. 04711/14. "Report of an action fought off Coronel on 1 November, 1914") says smoke was sighted and course altered at 4.20 p.m. (1550), but *Glasgow's* log and her navigating officer's report give the time as 4.30 p.m. (1600).

<sup>6</sup> Vice-Admiral von Spee's report.



as he held away in chase at full speed against the wind and sea.<sup>1</sup> He kept our ships about four points on his starboard bow, to avoid being forced into a lee position and to prevent them from escaping to the coast.

In spite of jamming by the German ships, by methods practised in peace time, the *Glasgow*, as she ran towards the *Good Hope*, succeeded in keeping Admiral Cradock informed of the course and composition of the enemy, of which only the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau* and *Leipzig* were as yet in sight, the *Dresden* and *Nürnberg* being further to the eastward.<sup>2</sup> The *Glasgow* sighted the *Good Hope* approaching at 1630, and at 1717 the squadron took station in line ahead, ships two cables apart, the flagship leading the *Monmouth*, *Glasgow* and *Otranto* ESE at 12 knots.<sup>3</sup>

By 1735 von Spee's flagship had gained considerably on the remainder of his squadron, and was little more than 10 miles to the eastward of the British line. Admiral Cradock had just altered course four points to port together and was closing the enemy rapidly. But von Spee had decided not to accept action until the setting of the sun rendered the conditions of light favourable for his own force, and, altering course two points to port, he decreased speed and waited for his other ships to come up.<sup>4</sup>

**2. Relative Strengths of the Two Squadrons.**—It now wanted less than an hour to sunset, and at present, with the sun setting immediately behind the British ships, all the advantage of light was with Admiral Cradock, who had made up his mind to engage the enemy, despite the inferiority of his squadron.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Glasgow's* log gives wind at 3.30 p.m. S by E, force 5-6, swell 4.

<sup>2</sup> B 6-11, 13.

<sup>3</sup> B 18, 19 and *Glasgow's* report.

<sup>4</sup> "Kreuzerkrieg" I states (p. 202, f.n. 1), that it is not certain whether von Spee noticed Admiral Cradock's turn to port, though probably his rangefinders would discover it. The *Glasgow's* report says von Spee turned away immediately the British squadron turned towards him, and the German plan shows him doing so.

<sup>5</sup> *British Squadron* :—

*Good Hope*—14,100 tons, 2—9.2 in., 16—6 in. Designed speed, 23 knots. Trial speed, 23.05 knots.

*Monmouth*—9,800 tons, 14—6 in. Designed speed, 23 knots. Trial speed, 22.4 knots.

*Glasgow*—4,800 tons, 2—6 in., 10—4 in. Designed speed, 25 knots. Trial speed, 25.3 knots.

*Otranto*—4—4.7 in. Speed, 17 knots.

*German Squadron* :—

*Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*—11,420 tons, 8—8.2 in., 6—5.9 in., 18—22-pdr., 22.5—23.8 knots.

*Dresden*—3,592 tons, 10—4.1 in., 24—24.5 knots.

*Nürnberg*—3,400 tons, 10—4.1 in., 23 knots.

*Leipzig*—3,200 tons, 10—4.1 in., 22—23.3 knots.

The speeds of the German ships are from "Kreuzerkrieg" I, and are higher by some 2 knots than those given in war vessels and aircraft. The first speed given is the designed speed, at the second the mean speed on trial of the fastest ships of the class. "Kreuzerkrieg" I credits the *Good Hope*, *Monmouth* and *Glasgow* with 24.1, 24.7 and 26.8 knots respectively.

The only guns in the British squadron which would penetrate armour at ranges over 6,000 yards were the two 9.2 in. guns of the *Good Hope*. Against these two guns each of the two German armoured cruisers mounted eight 8.2 in. The *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* also carried six 5.9 in. guns apiece, whilst the *Good Hope* mounted 16 6 in., and the *Monmouth* 14 6 in. The armour-piercing shell which the *Good Hope* and *Monmouth* carried for their 6 in. were obsolescent. The fuzes of the 6 in. and 4 in. common lyddite throughout the squadron were obsolescent.<sup>1</sup> The German cruisers were better protected on the water line and gun casemates, particularly in comparison with the *Monmouth*.

Both the *Good Hope* and *Monmouth* carried some of their 6 in. guns on the main deck, and in a heavy sea it was impossible to fight them. The German 8.2 in. guns were mounted high up and were not affected by weather conditions.

Both the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* had changed half their crews in June, 1914, but the remainder of the ships' companies had been for three years in commission on a foreign station, where circumstances were particularly favourable for gunnery practice, and they had attained a high degree of efficiency.<sup>2</sup> The *Good Hope* and *Monmouth* were manned largely by men of the R.N.R., Coastguard and R.F.R.; each was older than the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* by five years. The *Glasgow*, though more heavily armed than the German light cruisers, laboured like the *Good Hope* under the difficulty of controlling two different natures of guns in action.

**3. Opening of the Action.**—At 1738 Admiral Cradock once more brought his squadron into line ahead, turning four points to starboard together, that is, away from the enemy. Twelve minutes later, ordering all ships to observe his movements attentively,<sup>3</sup> he made an alteration of course without signal of approximately 1½ points to port, thus placing the enemy on the port bow on an almost parallel course.<sup>4</sup>

At 1757 the Admiral signalled to the *Canopus* his intention to attack the enemy; the signal was repeated at 1815, but the enemy were jamming all W/T signals, and all that got through to the *Canopus* was the position of the *Good Hope*, 37° 30' S, 74° 0' W.<sup>5</sup> At the time, the *Canopus* was some 285 miles to the southward, escorting two colliers from Vallenar Roads (45° 24' S, 74° 18' W) to St. Felix Island (26° 19' S, 80° 10' W). Captain Heathcoat Grant had intercepted several of the W/T reports of the enemy made by the *Glasgow* from 1617 onwards, but he

<sup>1</sup> Paper titled Foreign Office, 16.11.1914, "Natures of shell carried by *Good Hope*, *Monmouth* and *Glasgow*."

<sup>2</sup> "Kreuzerkrieg," I, 207 f.n.

<sup>3</sup> B 27.

<sup>4</sup> "Kreuzerkrieg," I, 202. Admiral Cradock made no course signals after 1538, nor is the alteration of course at 1550 mentioned by the *Glasgow* or *Otranto*.

<sup>5</sup> B 30.



could obtain no information as to her position or that of the flagship.<sup>1</sup> Raising steam for full speed (14 knots) he steered for the probable position of the *Glasgow*.<sup>2</sup> Eventually, at 1800, the position of the *Good Hope* was received, but Admiral Cradock's attempt to inform the *Canopus* that he was on the point of attacking the enemy was unsuccessful. Unable to obtain any further information Captain Grant reduced speed to 10 knots and continued to steer northward in the expectation of receiving orders.<sup>3</sup>

On forming line ahead at 1717 Admiral Cradock had reduced speed to 12 knots. A few minutes later (1724) the squadron increased to 15 knots, and at 1748 the Admiral called for 17 knots and at 1754 for utmost speed. The ships were steaming into a heavy head sea, and the *Otranto*, though doing the revolutions for full speed, began to fall astern, and at 1824 the speed of the squadron was reduced to 16 knots, by signal from the *Good Hope*.<sup>4</sup> This was the last signal made by Admiral Cradock, and all further attempts to get into communication with the flagship by visual or W/T signalling were unsuccessful. About five minutes later the Admiral reduced speed without signal and for an hour the average speed of the squadron was some 13 knots.<sup>5</sup>

The range at 1820 was 13,508 yards, and the courses of the two squadrons, with von Spee still standing away to port, nearly parallel. The *Scharnhorst* was approximately abeam of the *Good Hope*. The *Gneisenau* had now closed up and was three cables astern of the German flagship, the *Leipzig* five cables astern of the *Gneisenau*, and the *Dresden* seven cables astern of the *Leipzig*,<sup>6</sup> but coming up fast.<sup>7</sup>

The *Nürnberg*, steering the shortest course to join von Spee, was still out of sight from the British ships. In spite of jamming by the *Good Hope* and *Glasgow*, the *Scharnhorst* got all her W/T signals through to the squadron.

The sun now, at 1820, had just begun to dip below the horizon. Turning one point towards the British line to close the range and lessen the smoke interference, von Spee increased speed to 16 knots. Five minutes later the sun set, leaving the German ships shrouded in gloom and rain clouds to the east, while the British vessels were sharply outlined against the afterglow and formed excellent targets. The moon, nearly full, rose about 6 p.m., but the eastern horizon was heavily clouded, and it gave little light.

The favourable conditions for which von Spee had been

<sup>1</sup> B 8-10, 12-13, 15, 17.

<sup>2</sup> *Canopus*, Letter of Proceedings, 1-8 November, 1914. (M. 0523/14) and "Explanation of absence from engagement off Chilian coast, 1 November, 1914." (M. 0962/14.)

<sup>3</sup> B 30, 31, 33.

<sup>4</sup> B 19, 21, 25, 26, 28, 29, 29a, 32.

<sup>5</sup> *Glasgow* Navigating Officer's Report. (M. 04711/14.)

<sup>6</sup> M. 04711/14. Lieutenant Stuart's Report.

<sup>7</sup> Von Spee in his report says the *Dresden* was about a mile astern at 6.7 p.m., and "Kreuzerkrieg" I, p. 208, says she had closed up by 6.34 p.m., when the action began.

waiting were now fulfilled, and at 1833, when the range was down to 11,400 yards, he gave the order to open fire. The *Scharnhorst* opened first, followed immediately by the *Gneisenau* and *Leipzig*, each ship engaging her opposite number, the *Dresden* joining in against the *Otranto* three minutes later.<sup>1</sup> In succession, the *Good Hope*, *Monmouth* and *Glasgow* at once replied, the latter with her 6 in. guns only, the range of the *Leipzig*, 12,000 yards, being too great for the 4 in. The *Otranto*, coming up on the *Glasgow* now that Admiral Cradock had reduced speed without signal, had drawn out of line on to Captain Luce's starboard quarter. Admiral Cradock had just signalled to her "There is danger, proceed at your utmost speed."<sup>2</sup> "Do you wish me to keep out of range?" asked Captain Edwards, but without getting any reply.<sup>3</sup> His guns would not reach the target and his ship, having great freeboard and being free from smoke, formed a good ranging mark; accordingly he took station about half a mile outside the line.<sup>4</sup>

4. **Sinking of the "Good Hope."**—The German ships were pitching and rolling heavily, but the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* were able to fire their lower 5.9 in. guns, though the guns' crews had at times to work in water up to their knees. The main deck 6 in. guns of the *Good Hope* and *Monmouth* were mounted lower than those of the enemy, and it is doubtful whether, in the absence of the director, they could be fired at all.<sup>5</sup> In the *Glasgow* the object glasses of the telescopes were continually covered by spray, adding to the difficulty of laying the guns on an enemy almost lost in the gloom.

The *Scharnhorst* ranged with high explosive. Her first two salvos fell short, but with her third the German flagship found the target, and caused a heavy burst of flames between the fore turret and conning tower of the *Good Hope*.<sup>6</sup> The *Good Hope* in a few minutes managed to get the fire under control, when she was hit again nearly in the same place; some cordite charges in the 6 in. battery apparently caught fire, and from that moment she never seems to have succeeded in getting the fire under. On

<sup>1</sup> The *Glasgow's* report says the *Dresden* joined in against her from the beginning, but "Kreuzerkrieg" I, p. 212, says the *Dresden* fired at the *Otranto* until the latter escaped to starboard at 1900.

<sup>2</sup> The time is not given in *Otranto's* signal or W/T logs, but from her report the signal appears to have been made just after Admiral Cradock's orders to observe attentively the flagship's movements.

<sup>3</sup> B 34.

<sup>4</sup> *Otranto's* report. A few minutes earlier the *Otranto* had received a fragment of a signal from the *Glasgow*: "Leaving *Otranto*" (B 33a), which aided his belief that the Admiral wished him to keep out of range.

<sup>5</sup> "Kreuzerkrieg" I, p. 209, says the *Good Hope* at first used her heavy guns only, firing salvos at intervals of 50 seconds. The secondary armament then joined in, but she fired no full salvos during the action. This is confirmed by the *Glasgow's* report.

<sup>6</sup> The Germans thought this hit almost at the opening of the engagement may have impaired her fighting efficiency. (*op. cit.*, p. 220.) It seems probable that her fore turret was now put out of action.



finding the range both the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* fired principally armour-piercing shell from their main armament, and high explosive from the 5.9 in. guns. Von Spee's flagship was firing salvos at intervals of 15 seconds, the crews of the 22-pdr. guns assisting in the 8.2 in. casemates and in the ammunition supply. The German shells fell well together; from the third salvo the *Good Hope* was almost continuously straddled.<sup>1</sup> She soon began to suffer gravely. In an attempt, apparently, to close the enemy, Admiral Cradock turned some two points to port about five minutes after opening fire, and made a further turn towards the enemy about 1907.<sup>2</sup> The range began to close rapidly, and by 1853 it was down to 6,600 yards, but by altering course to port himself Admiral von Spee kept it from falling much below 5,000 yards, for the moon was now showing up his ship at intervals, and he believed that Admiral Cradock was trying to close to torpedo range.<sup>3</sup>

The *Monmouth* also was suffering severely. Her fire at first was very rapid and concentrated, but she began almost immediately to be hit badly, and her firing soon became ragged.<sup>4</sup> The *Gneisenau* found the range after a few salvos, and a shell burst on the fore-castle of the *Monmouth*, apparently igniting the charges of the fore-turret, for the turret blew overboard, and fire broke out in the fore-part of the ship. It was possibly in order to get this fire under that the *Monmouth* yawed out to starboard a few minutes after the commencement of the action; or perhaps Captain Brandt did not notice the flagship's turn to port.<sup>5</sup> She dropped back on to the starboard bow of the *Glasgow*, and Captain Luce had to reduce speed to avoid masking her fire and entering the zone of shot fired at her. The *Monmouth* never quite got back into line astern of the flagship, and lost distance considerably during the greater part of the remainder of the action.

Captain Luce decided to steer a midway course between the *Good Hope* and *Monmouth*. The *Glasgow* had gone into controlled independent firing almost from the commencement of the action; her fire was of necessity slow in the circumstances, but the rolling of the ship and difficulties of sighting would have rendered salvo firing even slower. Her 4 in. guns had joined in eight minutes after the action commenced, when the range was down to 10,000 yards. By 1700 both the *Leipzig* and *Dresden* were engaging her, for the *Otranto* had drawn well out on the disengaged side soon

<sup>1</sup> "Kreuzerkrieg" I, p. 209.

<sup>2</sup> The German plan of the action shows the following turns by the *Good Hope*: 1832—2 points to port, 1842—2 points to port, 1851—2 points to starboard, 1901—1 point to port, 1908—2 points to port.

<sup>3</sup> "Kreuzerkrieg" I, p. 212. The range of the torpedoes of the British ships were as follows: *Good Hope* and *Monmouth*, 1,750 yards, *Glasgow*, 4,000 yards.

<sup>4</sup> "Kreuzerkrieg" I, p. 209.

<sup>5</sup> "Kreuzerkrieg" I says she hauled out of line at 6.50 p.m., but *Glasgow's* report says she yawed out before 6.44 p.m.

after commencement of the action, and was now out of range.<sup>1</sup> Like the *Glasgow*, the German light cruisers were experiencing considerable difficulties. From their amidship guns nothing could be seen of the *Glasgow*, except an occasional sight of her bows as she pitched heavily.<sup>2</sup> For the first eight minutes the *Leipzig's* shots were all short, due, no doubt, to the great range, but it was not long before the *Glasgow* began to be straddled.<sup>3</sup> So small, however, was the danger space that she received very few hits; the angle of descent was so steep that there were no ricochets from short shots. Spotting was practically impossible, the fall of shot being distinguishable only when very short.<sup>4</sup> Darkness came on rapidly after sunset, and although the moon, rising behind the clouds, showed up the *Leipzig* at times as a faint smudge against the horizon, for the most part the gunlayers had to fire at the flash of her guns. Shortly after 1900 the *Leipzig* ceased fire and turned to port, on an order by W/T being incorrectly reported to the Captain as "Turn eight points to port." The mistake was discovered almost immediately, and she increased speed and resumed her station; but she did not open fire again, as it was now quite dark, and she did not wish to expend ammunition in finding the range.<sup>5</sup> Meanwhile, the *Dresden* continued to fire at the *Glasgow*, being herself disengaged, for on losing sight of the *Leipzig* when she turned away, the *Glasgow* shifted to the *Gneisenau*.

Both the *Good Hope* and *Monmouth* had by now received very severe punishment, though they were still in action. Since the commencement of the engagement one or other of them had been constantly on fire, and had apparently some guns out of action.<sup>6</sup> Over 400 rounds of 8.2 in. and 200 of 5.9 in. had been fired at Admiral Cradock's flagship.<sup>7</sup> Whether intentionally or otherwise she had now closed to some 4,000 yards from the *Scharnhorst*. About 1920 a tremendous explosion occurred on board the *Good Hope*, nearly amidships, silencing all except two of her after guns, which fired a few more rounds.<sup>8</sup> It was clear to the observers in

<sup>1</sup> The Germans thought she hauled out of line on being hit, but this is incorrect. The *Otranto* was not hit. It appears that she came up on the starboard quarter of the *Glasgow* 3 or 4 minutes before the action began, and hauled further out of line to starboard a few minutes after the enemy opened fire, as shells were falling round her. (M. 04712/14 and 02900/15.)

<sup>2</sup> "Kreuzerkrieg" I, p. 208. This seems to indicate that the German light cruisers were not provided with the director.

<sup>3</sup> *Glasgow's* report of Gunnery Officer (M. 04711/14). This report gives the following ranges of the *Leipzig*: 1830—12,300 yards; 1835—11,200 yards; 1845—9,700 yards; 1850—9,000 yards; 1855—8,200 yards; 1900—7,500 yards.

<sup>4</sup> *Glasgow's* report.

<sup>5</sup> Von Spee could have had little or no hope of being able to replenish ammunition.

<sup>6</sup> *Glasgow's* report.

<sup>7</sup> "Kreuzerkrieg" I, p. 219, gives the following expenditure of ammunition by the *Scharnhorst*: 8.2 in. H.E.—188, 8.2 in. A.P.—234, 5.9 in. H.E.—148, 5.9 in. A.P.—67. Most of this was fired at the *Good Hope*.

<sup>8</sup> "Kreuzerkrieg" I, p. 211.



the *Glasgow* that the ship could not recover from the shock. Flames shot up and debris was thrown to a great height; then the fires died down, and the *Scharnhorst* ceased firing on her; and as the British and German lines drew past her to starboard and port the blackened hull was lost to sight in the darkness.<sup>1</sup>

5. **Sinking of the "Monmouth."**—The *Monmouth*, too, whose firing had been growing slower and slower, was now silent, and for two or three minutes before the explosion put the *Good Hope* out of action, the *Gneisenau* had joined the *Scharnhorst* in engaging Admiral Cradock's flagship. Both the German armoured cruisers now shifted their fire to the *Glasgow*, who was consequently engaged by three ships. It was clear to Captain Luce that, like his own gunlayers, the enemy were firing at the flashes of his guns as he engaged the *Gneisenau*, and at 1935 he ceased fire.<sup>2</sup> To von Spee ammunition was very precious, and the German armoured cruisers had ceased fire at 1926, unable to see anything of their opponents except the gun flashes and the fires on board. The *Dresden*, however, fired for a few minutes longer.<sup>3</sup> The *Monmouth* had apparently succeeded in getting her fires under, and when the *Glasgow* ceased firing the two ships were lost to the enemy's sight.<sup>4</sup> The *Otranto* was some distance astern, and had long been out of sight of the enemy. The condition of the *Monmouth* was now desperate. The *Gneisenau* had fired at her nearly 250 rounds of 8.2 in. armour-piercing shell and 200 rounds of 5.9 in. high explosive.<sup>5</sup> She was holed and making water badly forward, and was down by the bows. About 1935 she turned away to starboard, coming round through west to north-west in an attempt to get her stern to the sea. The *Glasgow* followed her round, signalling to her to steer to the westward, but she continued to turn to starboard, until she was steering nearly north-east.<sup>6</sup>

By 1950 the enemy were once more sighted from the *Glasgow*, following up astern. While continuing southward himself to get the enemy in the moon, von Spee had ordered his light cruisers, by W/T, between 1930 and 1937, to make a torpedo attack. The *Dresden* and *Leipzig* turned 16 points to starboard, and the former soon (2000) sighted the *Glasgow*, and gave chase.

The moon was now well above the clouds, and it was evident to Captain Luce that the *Monmouth* and *Glasgow* must quickly be discovered. "Can you steer north-west?" he asked Captain Brandt; "The enemy are following us astern." He could get no

<sup>1</sup> It seems from the reports of eye-witnesses that the explosion blew the ship in two, and that the after part continued to float.

<sup>2</sup> Report of the *Glasgow's* Gunnery Officer. (M. 04711/14.)

<sup>3</sup> Extract from the log of *Dresden* ("Naval Review," III, 415) gives her expenditure of ammunition at the battle of Coronel as 102 rounds.

<sup>4</sup> "Kreuzerkrieg" I gives 1930 as the time when the British were lost to sight, but the *Glasgow's* report gives 1935 as the time of ceasing fire, and consequently of being lost to sight by the German squadron.

<sup>5</sup> The exact figures given in "Kreuzerkrieg" I are 244 and 198 respectively.

<sup>6</sup> B 35-37 and *Glasgow's* report.

reply, and, as the only chance of escaping destruction, at 2005 Captain Luce reluctantly turned away to the north-westward, and, increasing to full speed, soon threw off the pursuit.

The *Leipzig*, on receiving the order to attack with torpedoes at 1948, turned and steered towards a dimly visible glare, which she correctly took to be the *Good Hope*. When she reached the spot, however, about 1958, there was nothing to be seen from the bridge, though the ship was passing at the time through wreckage and corpses, which marked the place where the *Good Hope* had just gone down. It was not until four days later, however, that the crew reported this to the Captain, and the loss of the *Good Hope* was confirmed.<sup>1</sup>

Half an hour later (about 2030) the *Leipzig* sighted a cruiser, apparently escaping to the north-westward, and reported it to the *Scharnhorst*. The cruiser was shortly joined by a second, whilst a third was sighted to the westward. Signalling to the flagship that she was between three enemy cruisers, the *Leipzig* turned to a south-westerly course and steered to meet von Spee, who turned to the northward at 2050.

The three cruisers sighted by the *Leipzig* were the *Monmouth*, *Nürnberg*, and *Dresden*. Proceeding at high speed the *Nürnberg* had come in sight of the main body at 1730, and had watched the flashes of the action as she approached from the north-eastward. At 2024 the flagship sent a position signal, and reported "Both British cruisers severely damaged. One light cruiser apparently fairly intact," and ordered her to chase and attack the enemy with torpedo.<sup>2</sup>

Steering towards the position where gunfire had last been observed, the *Nürnberg*, at 2005, sighted a column of smoke, and altered course five points to starboard towards it. It was the *Glasgow*, and she soon drew out of sight. Meanwhile, the *Nürnberg* had sighted a three-funnelled cruiser to starboard, which made no reply to her challenge. This was the *Monmouth*, and at 2025, the *Glasgow* being out of sight, the *Nürnberg* turned back to attack. Switching on his searchlight to identify her, Captain von Schönberg recognised the *Monmouth*, with her flag still flying. Her fore turret was missing, and as he watched she listed badly to port, but her engines were still running, and she manœuvred up to the end.

Running past at 2050 the *Nürnberg* opened fire at the *Monmouth* at 1,000 to 600 yards range, firing also a torpedo, which, however, probably missed under, owing to the roll of the ship. There was no reply to the fire, but the *Monmouth's* flag continued to fly. Her officers were heard calling the men to the guns<sup>3</sup>, but her list was so heavy that she could no longer fire them.<sup>4</sup> She turned towards the *Nürnberg* as if to ram or bring her starboard

<sup>1</sup> "Kreuzerkrieg" I, p. 215.

<sup>2</sup> "Kreuzerkrieg" I, p. 214.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 217.

<sup>4</sup> Sub-Lieutenant Graf Otto von Spee, S.M.S. *Nürnberg* (see *Naval Notes*, 6 May, 1915).



guns to bear, and turning to starboard, astern of her, Captain von Schönberg opened fire again with his starboard guns.

Her deck and the unprotected parts of her hull were torn open by the *Nürnberg's* fire, but it needed no less than 135 rounds of high explosive shell to sink her.<sup>1</sup> Gradually she heeled over further and further, and at 2058 she capsized and went down with her flag flying.

It was impossible to lower a boat in the high sea that was running, and no rescue work could be carried out.<sup>2</sup> Columns of smoke from approaching ships had just come in sight, and in the uncertainty whether they were British or German the *Nürnberg* steered southward towards them. She eventually found they were her own squadron, and made junction with them; and about 2200 von Spee spread his light cruisers, and proceeded NNE at 10 knots along the coast. The sinking of Admiral Cradock's flagship was still unknown to him, and of the officers and men of the *Good Hope* and *Monmouth* which took part in the action not one was saved. An officer and four men had been landed from the *Good Hope* on Auchili Island, and they eventually joined the *Canopus*.<sup>3</sup>

The *Scharnhorst* had been hit only twice,<sup>4</sup> apparently by 4 in. shells from the *Glasgow*. Neither of these two shells burst, and there were no casualties. The *Gneisenau* was hit four times, and had two men slightly wounded. A shell, entering the starboard side of the ship above the armour belt, burst and caused a fire, the head of the shell passing out through the port side. A second shell hit the foremast, and a third the armour of a casemate, without doing any serious damage. One of the *Monmouth's* 6 in. shells struck the after 8.2 in. turret and burst between the barbette and the gun shield, jamming the turret for a short time.

**6. Escape of the "Glasgow" and "Otranto."**—Sixteen miles away to the westward Captain Luce saw the gunfire which marked the sinking of the *Monmouth*. The *Glasgow* had been engaged by light cruisers for nearly an hour at ranges of 8,000 to 6,000 yards, and for a few minutes by the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*. Over 500 rounds had been fired at her, but she had been hit only five times, and had four men slightly wounded.<sup>5</sup> Though three of the hits were on the water line, only one of them caused any


<sup>1</sup> Table in "Kreuzerkrieg" I., p. 219.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 217. The state of the sea on 1 November was as follows:—*Glasgow's* log, 11.30 a.m., swell 5; 3.30 p.m., swell 4; 7.30 p.m., swell 5; 11.30 p.m., swell 3. *Otranto's* log, 11.30 a.m. 5; 3.30 p.m., 7.30 p.m., 11.30 p.m., 4.

<sup>3</sup> M. 0518/15. Letter of Proceedings of H.M.S. *Canopus*.

<sup>4</sup> "Kreuzerkrieg" I., p. 218. But in addition to these two hits the *Scharnhorst* had her side dented in three places by splinters and her W/T aerial cut.

<sup>5</sup> The *Leipzig* fired 407 rounds of 4.1 in. H.E., and the *Dresden* 102, most of the latter being fired at the *Glasgow*. The *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* each fired a few rounds at her.






# THE BATTLE OF CORONEL.

1<sup>ST</sup> NOVEMBER, 1914.

Note:— Times given are Chilean zone time, viz.:— 5 hours slow on G.M.T.

Good Hope ———  
 Monmouth ———  
 Glasgow ———  
 Otranto ———

Scharnhorst ———  
 Gneisenau ———  
 Dresden ———  
 Nürnberg ———  
 Leipzig ———





anxiety. As the *Glasgow* worked round to a south-westerly course to escape, she drove full speed into a head sea, but the bulkheads enclosing the damaged space held firm.

At 7.35 p.m., as she turned to starboard to follow the *Monmouth* out of action, Captain Luce ordered a signal to be sent to the *Canopus* to inform her of the loss of the *Good Hope* and dispersal of the squadron.<sup>1</sup> Part of the signal got through the *Scharnhorst's* jamming, and was sufficient to tell the *Canopus* that a disaster had occurred. Signalling his position to the *Glasgow*, Captain Grant held on N 10 W at 14 knots.<sup>2</sup> At 1 a.m. on 2 November he learnt that the *Glasgow*, steering SW at 20 knots, was 150 miles to the northward of him. Altering course to N 74 W to intercept the colliers he had been escorting, Captain Grant gave the *Glasgow* a rendezvous in 39° 18' S, 78° 20' W, at 8.30 a.m. that day. The colliers were met at 4.0 a.m. and, ordering the *Glasgow* to overhaul him, Captain Grant turned eight points to port and steered for the Magellan Straits to reach the Falklands.<sup>3</sup>

There was no news as yet of the *Otranto*. At 1955, after seeing the *Good Hope* blow up, Captain Edwards had altered course to the westward to make good his escape. The *Glasgow* crossed his track astern of him, from port to starboard, a few minutes later, and was soon lost to sight. An attempt was made to communicate to the *Canopus* the result of the action, but though the signal was received at 5.33 p.m. on November 2, no call signs were heard, and the message was believed by the *Canopus* to be from the *Glasgow*.<sup>4</sup> Hauling round gradually to the southward Captain Edwards steered round the Horn, expecting to be cut off if he attempted to pass through the Straits of Magellan; and he proceeded to Monte Video to join Admiral Stoddart, in the *Carnarvon*.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> B 38.

<sup>2</sup> M. 0962/14. The signal is not logged by *Canopus* or *Glasgow*.

<sup>3</sup> B 39.

<sup>4</sup> B 40.

<sup>5</sup> M. 02900/15. *Otranto*, Proceedings on occasion of the naval action off the Chilian Coast.



## THE BATTLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

8 December, 1914.

### Introduction.

This narrative deals only with the battle itself. The events leading to it are described in Monographs 3 and 22;<sup>1</sup> and the movements after it in Monograph 26.<sup>2</sup>

An Appendix of Signals is added and two plans of the action are attached.

The times given in this narrative are local (Port Stanley) time, viz., 4½ hours slow on G.M.T.

### Notes on Sources.

The principal sources for the narrative are as follows :

- (a) The official report of Admiral Sturdee. This, with certain other papers, is bound in a volume titled H.S. 304, "Falklands." His report includes as appendices the reports of—

Captain P. T. H. Beamish, *Invincible*.  
 Captain R. F. Phillimore, *Inflexible*.  
 Captain Heathcoat S. Grant, *Canopus*.  
 Rear-Admiral A. P. Stoddart, *Carnarvon*.  
 Captain J. Luce, *Glasgow*.  
 Captain W. M. Ellerton, *Cornwall*.  
 Captain J. D. Allen, *Kent*.  
 Captain Bertram S. Evans, *Macedonia*.

It also includes a track chart by Lieutenant-Commander Shore, *Invincible*, which is the main source for the movements of the battle cruisers and German cruisers in the action.

- (b) Signal logs and deck logs of the ships engaged.
- (c) Verner : Letter to his Father. First published in the "Naval Review," Vol. IV, pp. 71 to 76. Reprinted in "The Battle Cruisers at the Falklands" (Lond. 1920). Lieutenant-Commander R. H. C. Verner was gunnery officer of the *Inflexible*. His letter has the appearance of having been written from notes taken at the time, and has been accepted as of value in helping to decide doubtful points, notably the events from 4 p.m. onwards.

<sup>1</sup> Monograph 3: C.B. 917. Operations leading up to the Battle of the Falkland Islands.

Monograph 22: C.B. 917G. The Atlantic Ocean, 1914.

<sup>2</sup> Monograph 26: C.B. 917G. The Atlantic Ocean from the Battle of the Falkland Islands to May, 1915.

- (d) Notebook of Leutnant z. S. Freiherr Grote, *Gneisenau* (enclosed with letter No. A 1/4, 18 December, 1914, H.M.S. *Invincible*.—See H.S. 304, p. 436). This book, taken from him after his rescue, contains a record from minute to minute, of ranges, hits and incidents. This is the only contemporary German document, and it is considered to be of the first order of value. A translation of it is in H.S. 304.
- (e) The German Official History, "Kreuzerkrieg," Vol. I. The account given here, where it differs from that in Corbett's "Naval Operations," can be based only on the memories of the few German survivors. For this battle, therefore, Grote's Notebook (item (d) above) is considered more reliable.

### Notes on Plans.

1. **The Main Action.**—Courses of the *Invincible* are taken from plan of action prepared by the navigating officer of the *Invincible* (Lieutenant-Commander Shore) and enclosed in Admiral Sturdee's despatch. The courses of the other British ships and of the enemy are based mainly on the *Invincible's* track.

Speeds from *Invincible's* engine-room register.

The ranges shown on *Invincible's* navigating officer's plan of action were apparently taken from the repeat range transmitter in the conning tower, and have been accepted with caution, except when the *Invincible* was actually firing. Considerable reliance has been placed upon the ranges in the notebook kept by Sub-Lieutenant Grote, of the *Gneisenau*.

Speed of enemy :—22 knots has been allowed from 1154 to 1500, when the *Scharnhorst* fell out of line to starboard temporarily with her steering gear damaged.

The *Invincible's* navigating officer's plan shows the ship on a course S 69½ E at 1125, but this course has been plotted E by S, vide Signal C.65. The *Invincible's* plan further shows the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* turning to starboard at 1530; the German Official History states, however, that the Germans turned to port, and this statement is considered correct.

2. **Chase of the Light Cruisers.**—The *Glasgow*, *Cornwall*—*Leipzig* action is based on *Glasgow's* track. This has been plotted from her navigating officer's notebook, of which, however, a copy only has been seen; the original is not forthcoming.

The *Kent*—*Nürnberg* action is based on plan prepared on board H.M.S. *Kent* and enclosed in her report. The highest speed allowed to the *Kent* is 24 knots; her statement that she steamed 25 knots is not concurred in. It was doubtless based in part on the belief that the *Nürnberg* was steaming her full speed of 25 knots after 1700, whereas she burst several boiler tubes during the chase, and her speed was considerably reduced.



## THE BATTLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

8 December, 1914.

1. **The Defences of the Harbour.**—The east coast of the Falkland Islands is deeply indented by narrow fjords, affording excellent harbours. One of these, Port William, runs inland for some 10 miles between two parallel ranges of hills, whose trend is east and west. In the southern wall of Port William, seven miles from the sea, is an opening into an otherwise completely land-locked inner harbour, called Stanley. On its south shore is the town, above which rises a ridge, culminating in Sappers Hill, 450 ft. high, from the top of which the ocean from south-east to east is open to view. It was in Port William that Admiral Sturdee's squadron was anchored, to the eastward of the opening into Stanley Harbour.

Apart from the temporary protection afforded by these ships, the harbour was to some extent defended by the works improvised by Captain Heathcoat Grant, of the *Canopus*, in conjunction with the local defence force. Six 12-pdr. guns were mounted in pairs at three commanding points, and six mines of 200 lb. each had been manufactured and laid across the entrance; in the absence of other ships these and the *Canopus* herself were all the defences the island possessed. On Sappers Hill, which rises between the harbour and the south coast of the island, he had organised a signal station, with orders to report the approach of any vessel, day or night, and all the batteries and the *Canopus* herself were in telephonic communication with the signal station.<sup>1</sup> A few days before the arrival of Admiral Sturdee, Captain Grant grounded the *Canopus* on the soft mud, so that she should provide a fixed platform, and set up observation stations on shore. These had only just been completed.<sup>2</sup>

2. **Arrival and Coaling of Admiral Sturdee's Squadron.**—Piloted through the gap in the minefield, Admiral Sturdee's squadron arrived shortly before noon, 7 December. In order to get round the Horn before the enemy, which all his most reliable intelligence placed still on the Chilean coast, could come east into the Atlantic, he arranged to complete with coal and leave again as soon as possible. The *Bristol*, which needed engine repairs, was to go in to Port Stanley and open up her machinery there. The squadron was to make every endeavour to repair engine room defects, keeping steam for 12 knots at two hours' notice, except the guardship, which was to have steam for 14

<sup>1</sup> Captain Grant's orders to the batteries and signal station are in H.S., 304, pp. 286-291.

<sup>2</sup> M. 0518/15. *Canopus*. Letter of Proceedings.

knots at half an hour's notice, and 80 per cent. boiler power in two hours.<sup>1</sup>

The *Carnarvon*, *Bristol* and *Glasgow* were to coal first, the battle cruisers following them, so that these five ships would be ready to sail on the afternoon of 8 December. The *Cornwall* and *Kent*, the latter having permission to put one engine out of action for six hours after anchoring, were to coal last, and would follow the other ships when ready. The patrol of the entrance during the night was to be kept by the *Macedonia*, which was to come in at daylight; the ships at anchor need not man their guns or searchlights at night, and leave for officers was given during the day.<sup>2</sup>

The larger cruisers anchored west of the line of mines; but the *Glasgow* and *Bristol* went into Port Stanley, and they and the *Carnarvon* commenced coaling at once. The coal in the *Bristol's* collier was soon found to be of bad quality, and the Admiral ordered her to cease taking it, waiting for the *Glasgow's* collier when she had finished. Thus the *Bristol* did not commence coaling till 2.20 a.m., 8 December. The *Carnarvon* finished at 4 a.m., and the *Invincible* and *Inflexible* commenced at 6 and 7.20 a.m. respectively. Both the *Cornwall* and *Bristol* opened up their engines for repairs.

Meanwhile the *Macedonia*, which had been patrolling the entrance during the night, came in at dawn and anchored. The *Kent*, guardship for the day, remained at anchor just north of the entrance to Port Stanley, with steam at half an hour's notice.

The Admiral called his captains on board and explained to them his intentions should he meet the enemy. Each captain was furnished with a copy of his "Papers on Naval Subjects," which contained his views on cruiser work, and had been circulated by the Admiralty in a booklet.<sup>3</sup> His formation in battle would be such that the two battle cruisers would be in the middle, with the cruisers ahead and astern, and he intended the battle cruisers to engage the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*; his cruisers would avoid action with the heavy German ships and engage the smaller vessels.<sup>4</sup> He laid great stress on the difference between orders and instructions, pointing out the freedom of action allowed to the recipient of instructions.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Invincible*. Signal Log 16358. Flag to General, 5.3 p.m., 6 December.

<sup>2</sup> *Kent*. Signal Log 20462. 7 December, 6.40 a.m., 12.29 p.m., 12.32 p.m., 7.17 p.m.

<sup>3</sup> O.D. No. 6 of May 1913.

<sup>4</sup> H.S. 304, p. 609.

<sup>5</sup> The relevant paragraph in O.D. No. 6 is para. 4 on p. 114: "On a signal being received by a cruiser out of sight of the Senior Officer—such as a course to be steered, etc.—the signal is to be considered as an indication of the Senior Officer's wishes. Circumstances on the spot may show that his general idea may be better met by not complying absolutely with the signal received. In such cases the cruiser Captain is to exercise his discretion, informing the Senior Officer of any serious departure from the order given."



3. **The Enemy in Sight.**—As explained above, Admiral Sturdee was convinced that von Spee's squadron was still in the Pacific, and it had been his intention to begin his search for them by leaving the Falklands in the evening of 8 December. Through an exceedingly lucky chance, the delays forced on von Spee by the necessity of completing the arrangements for his coal supply had prevented him from making his raid before 7 December and yet had not been sufficient to postpone it till 9 December. The date resulting from the course of events happened to be the one day when his objective was occupied by the whole of the South Atlantic and Pacific Squadron. The configuration of the shores of the harbour in which our ships were at anchor resembles an open-mouthed crocodile with one eye looking out to sea; by further good luck the line of approach of the raiding ships was along the belly of the crocodile, instead of straight into his open mouth, and the watching eye on Sappers Hill was aware of them some hours before their quiet progress would bring them to the end of the lower jaw.

As early as 7.40 a.m. Sappers Hill lookout station reported smoke to the southward, which, after 10 minutes, was observed to be coming from two cruisers, one with four funnels and one with three.<sup>1</sup>

The news that two enemy ships were in sight reached Admiral Sturdee at 8 a.m. He at once ordered the *Kent* to weigh and proceed, all ships to prepare to weigh, the *Cornwall* and *Glasgow* to raise steam for full speed, and the two battle cruisers to cast off their colliers and raise steam in all boilers.<sup>2</sup> By the time these orders had been issued, more smoke had been sighted to southward, which by 8.47, was seen to be from some more ships, about 20 miles off. A few minutes later the first two ships came clearly in view of the *Canopus*. The absence of the *Canopus* at the battle of Coronel had been a bitter memory to all her crew, and Captain Heathcoat Grant, seeing now what might be his only chance of damaging the enemy, obtained from Admiral Sturdee permission to open fire as soon as the German ships were in range.<sup>3</sup> The *Glasgow*, with no less desire to avenge Admiral Cradock, could also see them, but Captain Luce had only 6 in. guns. The approaching ships were now seen to be training their guns on the wireless station, though they were still too far off to fire; the Admiral recalled the *Macedonia* from the entrance, where the *Kent* was now in place watching the approach of the enemy. He had ordered both the *Inflexible* and *Carnarvon* to be ready to engage them as they rounded the corner of the harbour.<sup>4</sup>

At this point, the *Canopus*, which had been watching the approaching two vessels, saw them slow down; and as the observation station reported their range from the station as 11,000 yards, Captain Heathcoat Grant opened fire over the land with

<sup>1</sup> C 1, 2.

<sup>4</sup> C 16-24.

<sup>2</sup> C 4-12.

<sup>3</sup> C 13-15.

two guns. Both shots fell short; but a second salvo of three guns at extreme elevation seemed more successful, and it was reported by some of those watching that the larger of the two cruisers had been hit.<sup>1</sup>

4. **Von Spee moves off.**—Captain Heathcoat Grant claims that the fire of the *Canopus* prevented the enemy from ascertaining the strength of the squadron in harbour, and from attempting to bombard our ships before they were clear of the port.<sup>2</sup> At any rate, the actual result was that the shell, which fell a mile or more short, put a stop to the operation which was bringing the German squadron to Port Stanley. The plan was that the *Gneisenau* and *Nürnberg* were to proceed to a spot about three miles outside the entrance, reconnoitre the harbour, and if it were clear of warships, to go in to embark stores and demolish property. Fifteen miles astern of them were the other three cruisers intending to act as lookouts and supports during the demolition proceedings. The *Gneisenau* had already reached a spot whence the top of the funnels of warships could be seen in the harbour, and this was reported to Admiral von Spee, who was coming up astern. When the *Kent* moved out to the entrance the Germans watched her masts and about 9 a.m. the two leading cruisers increased speed to intercept her as she came out; but before they had gone far the salvo from the *Canopus* fell into the sea and they immediately turned eight points away, so rapidly in fact that the second salvo was fired as they turned. After some minutes, the Captain of the *Gneisenau*, possibly as he was no longer under fire, decided to continue his project of attacking the *Kent*; but this was negatived by his Admiral, who signalled "Do not accept action; concentrate on course E by N; proceed at high speed." "Raise steam in all boilers."<sup>3</sup> Von Spee had not been brought to this decision by any knowledge that battle cruisers were in Port Stanley, for though officers of the *Gneisenau* thought they had seen tripod masts, the Captain of that ship had disbelieved this and had reported only vessels of the *Canopus*, *Kent* and *Glasgow* classes. The idea of raiding the Falkland Islands seems to have been chiefly backed by the German Admiral's Chief of Staff. The only ship's Commander who approved of it was the Captain of the *Nürnberg*; Captain Maerker, of the *Gneisenau*, thought it strategically correct to avoid the Falklands altogether; in spite of which he had been put in charge of the operation, with the duty of drawing up the scheme. In any case, the raid on the Falkland

<sup>1</sup> Captain Grant's Report, H.S. 304, p. 79, speaks of this ship correctly as *Gneisenau*, but the signal station was reporting it as *Scharnhorst*.

<sup>2</sup> Grant: Report H.S. 304, p. 82.

<sup>3</sup> Wireless signals were being intercepted by the *Glasgow*. At the time these could not be read, but we now know they were: "Cruiser with three funnels coming out." "*Canopus, Cornwall.*" "Do not engage, full speed, course East." The times of interception as given by the *Glasgow* in her signal log 46988, p. 26, are 12.45, 1.12, 1.20 p.m. G.M.T., which would make the last signal to be at 0850 Port Stanley time. The information in the text is taken from "Kreuzerkrieg."



Islands was intended to be carried out only if they were defenceless; and now that he knew there were at least six ships in port the German Admiral's main idea was to get away from the danger spot, probably to continue the voyage homeward. But before their eastward course had taken them out of sight of the harbour, the German officers saw ships with tripod masts emerging, and knew that a fresh decision must be made.

5. **The British Squadron gives Chase.**—When the *Canopus* fired, at 0919, the *Kent*, oldest and slowest, was the only cruiser of the squadron actually under way. The *Bristol*, with the highest speed of all, could not be ready till 1100. The *Glasgow* weighed at 0930, and was ordered at 0945 to join the *Kent* and observe the enemy.<sup>1</sup> The *Cornwall*, by dint of great exertions in the engine room, where one engine was opened up at six hours' notice, was ready at 0945, and the *Carnarvon* five minutes earlier. The two battle cruisers were not ready till 10 o'clock, 40 minutes after the *Canopus* had fired, and they would take half an hour to reach the open sea. The *Glasgow* was already out with the *Kent* and could see the enemy steering SE at full speed. At 0958 the Admiral ordered the *Carnarvon* to proceed and take charge of the look-out squadron. The *Cornwall* also weighed. At 10 the two battle cruisers also proceeded, the *Inflexible* leading.<sup>2</sup>

Before he was clear of Port William, the Admiral, who had taken up his station in the director tower in the foretop of the *Invincible*, at 1020 hoisted the signal "General chase."<sup>3</sup> The only ships free to obey the signal were the *Kent* and *Glasgow* on watch at the entrance; Captain Luce had just decided to give chase at full speed, thus anticipating the Admiral's order.<sup>4</sup> The two cruisers at once started off, the *Glasgow* soon outstripping her slower consort. The heavier vessels passed Seal Rock, the end of the southern wall of the harbour, shortly after 1030, in the order *Carnarvon*, *Inflexible*, *Invincible*, *Cornwall*.<sup>5</sup> By this time the *Gneisenau* was hull down to the south-eastward, and the smoke of the others could be seen to the right of her.

The general course of the *Gneisenau* and *Nürnberg* was SE, and it was soon clear that we were closing them. The two German ships continued this course till 11 a.m., by which time they had succeeded in getting ahead of the rest of the German squadron, which were coming up at 18 knots and raising steam for full speed. Admiral von Spee ordered the *Gneisenau* and *Nürnberg* to remain ahead, and, gradually increasing speed, edged round on to a south-easterly course.

In our own squadron it was soon found that the order for general chase must be modified. The smoke from the oil-burning battle cruisers was so great a nuisance that the Admiral at 1050

<sup>1</sup> C 32.

<sup>2</sup> C 38-41.

<sup>3</sup> C 48.

<sup>4</sup> C 47.

<sup>5</sup> *Inflexible* Deck Log states: "1032 Seal Rocks S.5 cables." Admiral Stoddart says: *Carnarvon* was clear of the harbour by 1033. *Cornwall* Deck Log says: "1035 Seal Rocks abeam, shaped course East."

reduced to 24 knots and annulled the general chase by stationing the *Inflexible* on his starboard quarter and the *Glasgow* three miles ahead of him. At 1053 he reduced the squadron's speed to 20 knots. The *Carnarvon* and *Cornwall* had fallen astern, and learning that the *Carnarvon*'s maximum was only 20 knots he stationed the *Cornwall* on her starboard quarter.<sup>1</sup>

At 1115 he reduced speed still further to 19 knots, to enable his other cruisers to get into station. The rear division of the German squadron had now closed up on the *Gneisenau* and *Nürnberg*, and von Spee altered course to starboard, gradually coming round to an East-South-easterly course. Captain Luce, steaming for his station ahead of the Flagship, noticed and reported the enemy's alteration of course, and Admiral Sturdee, increasing to 20 knots once more, wore round to starboard on to a convergent S.E. by E. course.<sup>2</sup>

The enemy were not yet within range, but Admiral Sturdee was confident that he could overtake them whenever he thought fit; the weather was such that his advantage in guns could be fully utilised; and he decided not to press the action at once. The ships' companies of the cruisers which had been coaling were cleaning ship and washing; he now signalled "Ship's company have time for the next meal." After dinner he intended to open fire.

By 1220 Admiral Sturdee considered the time had come to press the action. The enemy, on the starboard bow, were still some 10 miles off; they were no longer in any fixed formation, for Admiral von Spee, in order to give his ships every chance of increasing speed, had signalled that they need not keep in line ahead, and they were now roughly in line abreast. According to British observers in the *Invincible* the order from left to right was *Gneisenau*, *Nürnberg*, *Scharnhorst*, *Dresden*, *Leipzig*, covering a front of two miles. The *Invincible* had the *Inflexible* on her starboard quarter, the *Kent* on her port beam and the *Glasgow* four or five miles on the port bow.<sup>3</sup> The *Carnarvon* could not keep up, and was six miles astern with the *Cornwall*. It was clear to Admiral Sturdee that to get within range he must increase speed, with the result that the *Carnarvon* must be left behind; for she had reached her utmost limit. The *Cornwall*, however, could get four more knots, and she was ordered to come on as fast as she could. Deciding to attack with the battle cruisers and *Glasgow* only, for the *Kent* and *Cornwall* could not be relied upon to keep up, he increased gradually to his full speed of 26 knots, ordering the *Inflexible* to open out to five cables and to open fire as soon as she came within range.<sup>4</sup>

Just at this time one of the German light cruisers was observed

<sup>1</sup> C 55, 58-62.

<sup>2</sup> C 63-65, 68 and 69. The time of the turn to E by S is taken from the plan of Lieutenant-Commander Shore, navigator of the *Invincible*.

<sup>3</sup> Diagram on p. 51 of H.S. 304.

<sup>4</sup> C 71, 75, 79, 81-84, 86.



to be moving across to port. Admiral Sturdee, thinking she might be intending to get ahead of him either to drop mines or make a torpedo attack, altered course a point away. The German, however, soon turned back. It was the *Dresden*, which had the highest speed, and was taking station on the port side of the *Gneisenau*.<sup>1</sup> The German squadron had by now worked up to 22 knots, except the *Leipzig*, which at this speed was gradually dropping astern.

**6. Fire Opened ; the Light Cruisers make away.** At 1255 Captain Phillimore, in the *Inflexible*, opened fire on the *Leipzig* with his guns on the stops,<sup>2</sup> expending 12 rounds of 12 in. The *Invincible* opened fire two minutes later, also on the *Leipzig*, at ranges from 16,500 to 15,000 yards. Although this was nearly double the normal battle practice range of those days, the *Leipzig* was straddled ; indeed, one shot fell so close to her bows that she had to alter course to avoid the splash. In the course of this firing, Admiral Sturdee turned two points to starboard towards the enemy and signalled for increased speed. By 1315 it was clear to von Spee that he could no longer leave the *Leipzig* to bear the brunt of the firing. He signalled to her to part company and she hauled out to starboard. He now resolved to save what he could of his force. At 1320 he signalled to his light cruisers : "Part company ; endeavour to escape," and, calling to the *Gneisenau* to follow him, he turned to ENE across the track of the advancing British force, while the light cruisers all steered to the southward.<sup>3</sup> Thus, four hours after the *Canopus* fired her first shot and 3½ hours after von Spee was aware that he had eight ships to deal with, he began to divide his squadron, though even then the scattering was incomplete, for the two armoured cruisers remained in company, while the three light cruisers kept more or less together on their southerly course.

Admiral Sturdee observed the *Leipzig's* alteration of course and at once (1320) signalled to the *Kent* to cross his stern and engage her.<sup>4</sup>

For the last hour the flagship had been increasing to 26 knots, and the *Kent*, whose designed full speed was only 23, had fallen some two miles astern. She began to turn at once, and crossed under the stern of the *Inflexible* and ahead of the *Cornwall*. As he emerged clear of the battle cruiser's smoke, Captain Allen, of the *Kent*, saw that the *Dresden* and *Nürnberg* had also turned away. He signalled to Captain Ellerton of the *Cornwall* "Are you going to starboard to take on the light cruisers, as they appear

<sup>1</sup> "Kreuzerkrieg."

<sup>2</sup> The time of *Inflexible* opening fire is given as follows : *Invincible* Signal Log and Deck Log, 1255. *Inflexible* Deck Log, 1257. *Carnarvon* Deck Log, 1257. *Cornwall* Signal Log 22416, 1256. *Glasgow* Signal and Deck Log, 1251. *Kent* Signal and Deck Log, 1300. From this and other evidence it appears that the *Glasgow's* clock was 4 minutes slow and *Kent* 5 minutes fast on *Invincible*.

<sup>3</sup> The actual turns were some 5 minutes later.

<sup>4</sup> C 95.

to be altering to starboard?"<sup>1</sup> Captain Ellerton had seen the move and was preparing to follow, in the spirit of Admiral Sturdee's instructions at the conference of captains. From his position on the flagship's port bow it was some minutes before Captain Luce, in the *Glasgow*, observed the breakaway of the German light cruisers, but at 1333 he also turned to follow them. Thus, without any special signals, the intentions of Admiral Sturdee were carried out, our cruisers following the German lighter vessels, while the battle cruisers engaged the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*.

**7. The Battle Cruiser Action.—The First Phase, 1325 to 1400.**—Immediately he perceived von Spee's alteration of course, Admiral Sturdee conformed to his enemy's motions, turning his two battle cruisers together to port seven points between 1328 and 1334.<sup>2</sup> This brought the *Invincible* directly ahead of the *Inflexible* and abreast of the *Scharnhorst*. Von Spee's manoeuvre was well calculated to take advantage of the weather conditions. There was a light north-westerly breeze which carried the thick funnel smoke of the battle cruisers between them and the Germans, who, engaging to windward were unhampered by their own smoke. Nevertheless, the smoke helped to screen our ships and prevented accurate laying or rangefinding from the enemy, who at times could barely see even the hulls of his opponents.

As soon as he was on a steady course at 1330 von Spee opened fire on our battle cruisers, which were still turning. The first shots fell 1,000 yards short ;<sup>3</sup> and von Spee, making a turn of four points, closed the range by over a mile and then resumed his former course with all his port guns in action.<sup>4</sup> Admiral Sturdee partially conformed by turning away a point at 1338. The range fell by von Spee's manoeuvre to 12,000 yards, and as it diminished the enemy's shots came dangerously near. At 1344 the Germans made their first hit, when a shell struck the *Invincible* on the armour, causing a severe tremor all over the ship. Seeing that the enemy had found his range Admiral Sturdee turned another point outwards at 1344,<sup>5</sup> reducing speed to 22 knots, and the two lines gradually drew apart till at 2 p.m. the range had increased to 16,450, the maximum to which our sights were graduated. Firing ceased on both sides and Admiral Sturdee led round four points to starboard to get once more into effective range.

Each of the four ships considered she had made hits on her

<sup>1</sup> Time of signal 1335 in both *Kent* and *Cornwall's* Signal Logs.

<sup>2</sup> C 96, 98, 99.

<sup>3</sup> In the German History it is stated that the 8·2 in. casemate guns had a range of only 13,400 yards and the 5·9 in. of 14,800, and therefore, as the range was 16,500 yards, only the 8·2 in. turret guns were brought into action. This estimated range seems excessive. Grote, in the *Gneisenau*, gives ranges as follows :—1332, 13,670 ; 1336, 12,577 ; 1339, 12,905 ; 1342, 13,452. These agree in substance with the ranges given in our reports. The arrangement of guns in the British and German ships is shown in diagram, p. 316.

<sup>4</sup> "Kreuzerkrieg," p. 282.

<sup>5</sup> He made no signals, but the turns are shown on Shore's plan.



adversary. While the turn at 1328 was in progress both our battle cruisers engaged the *Scharnhorst*, the *Inflexible* claiming two hits on her; but when parallel courses were reached the *Inflexible* shifted to the *Gneisenau*, her opposite number, and claims three hits on her.<sup>1</sup>

The damage done to the *Scharnhorst* is not known. At any rate it was not serious, or discernible from either the *Gneisenau* or our own ships. The *Gneisenau* had been hit by three shells. The first exploded on the after part of the third funnel and put the starboard after 8.2 in. gun temporarily out of action; a second, falling amidships, damaged the port side of the boat deck and wrecked the gunroom and wardroom;<sup>2</sup> the third, bursting on the water close to the port side aft sent splinters into the 22-pdr. magazine<sup>3</sup> and caused it to be abandoned. These three hits were the result of 210 rounds of 12 in.<sup>4</sup>

Beyond the hit on the *Invincible's* armour our own ships had not suffered,<sup>5</sup> and no casualties are recorded for this first phase.

At the cessation of fire about 1403, the *Carnarvon*, by now some 10 miles astern of the battle cruisers, saw the enemy turn to the southward, for von Spee, seeing that the range had now opened to 17,000 yards, had seized the opportunity to turn sharply away.<sup>6</sup> The battle cruisers, enveloped in their own smoke, seemed to be continuing their easterly course; and thinking they might not have observed the enemy's move Admiral Stoddart signalled by wireless "Enemy's cruisers have altered course SE." The signal was not received in the flagship till 1410.<sup>7</sup> By that time the turn had been seen and the two battle cruisers were again in chase at their utmost speed. Von Spee's manoeuvre had put our ships directly astern of him; and Admiral Sturdee had to continue diverging in order to get once more into his fighting position on the enemy's quarter, thereby losing a certain amount of distance.

#### 8. The Battle Cruiser Action.—The Second Phase, 1450 to 1530.

—After half-an-hour's chase Admiral Sturdee, now on the leeward side, had closed sufficiently to make it worth while reopening action. At 1447 he turned two points to port to bring the broadsides to bear; the *Invincible* engaged the *Scharnhorst*, and the

<sup>1</sup> Phillimore's Report.

<sup>2</sup> This may be Grote's "1322 foremost funnel, cutter-davit grazed by shell."

<sup>3</sup> Grote at 1326 has "hit in No. XII hold. Shell bursts. Splinters strike main mast. Both helm indicators foul"; and at 1400 "ship is making water slowly between Frames 27 and 31½."

<sup>4</sup> Rudolph Verner: "The Battle Cruisers at the Falklands."

<sup>5</sup> Our reports do not include any schedule of ranges and hits comparable to Grote's; and it is impossible to find out what damage was done by individual hits.

<sup>6</sup> Shore's plan shows *Invincible* turning first and von Spee conforming gradually. The version in the text above is that of "Kreuzerkrieg," which is confirmed by Admiral Stoddart's action in signalling.

<sup>7</sup> C 105.

*Inflexible* the *Gneisenau*, the ranges in both cases being about 15,000 yards.<sup>1</sup> For some minutes von Spee did not reply; but leading round to the east-north-eastward (1453) as though to cross Admiral Sturdee's line, he once more opened fire. Perceiving the manoeuvre, Admiral Sturdee turned four points and then two more points to port so that the two flagships abreast of one another were converging.<sup>2</sup> By 1500 the range was down to 12,000 yards and still diminishing. The firing conditions were in favour of the Germans, who could now bring their 5.9 in. guns into action,<sup>3</sup> and the *Invincible* was hit several times. The enemy were also suffering. A blaze was seen forward in the *Scharnhorst* and her fire slackened perceptibly. Her steering gear was damaged and she suddenly sheered outwards. The *Gneisenau* did not at once alter course, but after a few minutes turned away to starboard and resumed her station astern of the *Scharnhorst*, which had settled on to a south-easterly course,<sup>4</sup> so that by 1512 the range had opened by nearly a mile. Grote chronicles three hits on the *Gneisenau*, in addition to the loss of her foremost funnel guys; one of those hits was below the water line and two boiler rooms filled; her speed fell to 18 knots and she took on so much list that her 5.9 in. guns could no longer reach the *Inflexible*.<sup>5</sup>

On our own side, more loss of gunnery efficiency was being caused by the funnel smoke than by the fire of the enemy; so much inconvenience was experienced from this cause by the after turrets of the flagship and by the *Inflexible* that to get clear of the nuisance Admiral Sturdee at 1515 began a 16 point turn together to port, away from the smoke and the enemy.<sup>6</sup>

It was some minutes before von Spee made any answer to the turn. This time he made no effort to escape; indeed, such an attempt was hopeless, for his speed was falling.<sup>7</sup> He continued for some minutes on his course till 1523, when the range was such

<sup>1</sup> The evidence is as follows:—

Sturdee—1445. Battle cruisers opened fire.

Beamish—1448. *Invincible* opened fire on *Scharnhorst*, 15,000 yards.

Stoddart—1449. Battle cruisers opened fire.

Grote—1450. *Gneisenau* engaged. Course 150. Target right astern.

"Kreuzerkrieg" I.—1450. Battle cruisers opened fire at 17,000 yards.

Phillimore—1451. *Inflexible* engaged *Gneisenau*, 15,200 yards.

*Invincible* Signal Log 16358—1449. *Invincible* opened fire. 1450. *Inflexible* opened fire.

*Carnarvon* Deck Log—1449. *Inflexible* opened fire. 1450. *Invincible* opened fire. The other deck and signal logs do not mention the reopening of fire.

<sup>2</sup> Grote gives the range at 1455 as 14,436 to 14,655; at 1459 as 12,686 yards; at 1502 as 11,046.

<sup>3</sup> "Kreuzerkrieg" says Sturdee kept the range at 13,000 and frustrated von Spee's effort to bring his secondary armament into action. This does not agree with Grote's entries "1459. Medium guns commence," and "1501 faster the 5.9 in. guns!"

<sup>4</sup> "Kreuzerkrieg," p. 285, and Anlage 9.

<sup>5</sup> "Kreuzerkrieg" and Grote.

<sup>6</sup> C 116, 117.

<sup>7</sup> At 1530 it was 17 knots. (Grote.)



that he could no longer reply effectively to Sturdee's 12 in. guns; he then turned 16 points to port in succession to reach a more favourable distance. As the two German ships turned it could be seen from the *Gneisenau* that the *Scharnhorst* had two bad holes in her, one forward on the port side and the other on her starboard quarter; she was down about 3 ft. below her water line; she was burning fiercely in several places, and her third funnel had been shot away. Through their own smoke it appeared to our ships that von Spee had turned to starboard, but it was really to port that he led round<sup>1</sup>, and by 1530 he was steering his battered and burning flagship once more towards the British line. Admiral Sturdee, after clearing the smoke, turned four more points to port, and the two antagonists closed on courses that converged almost at right angles.

#### 9. The Battle Cruiser Action.—Third Phase, 1530 to 1600.—

The precise details of what occurred during the next half-hour are difficult to ascertain from the reports<sup>2</sup> we have. The control officer in the *Inflexible* states<sup>3</sup> that after the 16-point turn the *Scharnhorst* engaged and was engaged by the *Inflexible*, which, as our own 16-point turn had been together, was now leading; he implies that only the *Inflexible* engaged the *Scharnhorst* during the half-hour from 1530 to 1600. This is repeated by Captain Phillimore in his report on the proceedings of the *Inflexible*. The German Official History, on the authority of survivors, gives the *Inflexible* as leading, and engaging the *Scharnhorst* at this period, while the *Invincible* engaged the *Gneisenau*. On the other hand, Captain Beamish claims that the fire of the *Invincible* was directed on the *Scharnhorst* from 1530 to 1600, and Admiral Sturdee reports that the *Inflexible* after 1530 took station astern of the *Invincible*. He certainly made a series of course signals to the *Inflexible* from 1525 to 1630; but as one only of these was logged by the latter it is possible that the *Inflexible's* smoke hid the flagship's signals from view during almost the whole

<sup>1</sup> The German historian is emphatic on this point, and his view is confirmed by ranges and remarks in Grote's diary, which was not at the disposal of the German historian.

<sup>2</sup> The official evidence of this part of the action is as follows:—

- (a) Phillimore:—1531. *Scharnhorst* a/c 16 points to starboard and after passing behind *Gneisenau*, opened accurate and rapid fire on *Inflexible*. Shifted target to *Scharnhorst* and engaged her for half an hour, 13,000 yards.
- (b) Beamish:—3.30 p.m. *Invincible's* fire was again directed on *Scharnhorst*, who showed clear signs that she was receiving serious injuries, with one funnel shot away . . . (after she sank) fire was at once directed on *Gneisenau*.
- (c) Sturdee:—At 3.30 p.m. a turn of 2 points together to port was ordered, and the *Inflexible* then gradually led in and took station astern of the *Invincible*.
- (d) Signal Logs:—From 1530 to 1557 the flag made seven course signals not recorded by *Inflexible*, whose track chart shows a straight course in that interval.

<sup>3</sup> Rudolf Verner.

of this period.<sup>1</sup> This is borne out by the navigator of the *Inflexible*, whose track chart shows a straight course after the 16-point turn. Moreover, though both battle cruisers claim to have engaged the *Scharnhorst* only, the *Gneisenau* was undoubtedly hit at 1532, 1536, 1548, when three hits were made, 1549 and 1605.<sup>2</sup> The weight of evidence, therefore, inclines to the view that the *Inflexible*, when once she had the lead and was clear of the flagship's smoke, engaged the *Scharnhorst*, maintaining a steady course; while the *Invincible* took the rear ship and curved round through 16 points.

At 1600 the *Scharnhorst*, which had been keeping up a steady succession of salvos, suddenly ceased fire. Von Spee had made another resolve, as inevitable and as bold as his move to save his light cruisers. Signalling to the *Gneisenau* "endeavour to escape," he turned once more towards his adversaries, doubtless to use his torpedoes before his end, and in the hope of relieving the pressure on his consort.

#### 10. The Battle Cruiser Action.—The Last Phase, 1600 to 1800.—

Von Spee's flag was still flying. His flagship's funnels were lying at all angles; she was ablaze fore and aft. Her bows were already so much down in the water that the sea came up to the lower casemates, and she had an increasing list. She was not firing and it was clear that she was a doomed ship. But she was achieving some part of von Spee's purpose, since from the *Invincible* the *Gneisenau* was hidden for some minutes by the *Scharnhorst*. The *Carnarvon*, which had not followed the numerous small alterations of course and wide turns of her flagship, had cut some of the corners and at last was near enough to have a chance of using her guns. At 1615 she opened fire with her 7.5 in. guns on the *Scharnhorst* at 11,000 yards. But the German flagship was already settling; she remained afloat for only two minutes longer, and at 1617 with her flag flying she sank.

When von Spee turned in to make his last desperate attempt, Captain Maerker in the *Gneisenau* began to follow his flagship; but receiving the order that he was to endeavour to escape, he swung back, and passing astern of his Admiral, made off to southward. But he soon made up his mind that it was useless to attempt to escape, for the best speed he could get was 18 knots; and he turned in to starboard to bring into play his 5.9 in. and casemate guns with their low angle of elevation. His antagonist for the moment was the *Inflexible* only, for Captain Phillimore, seeing the *Scharnhorst* turn in towards the *Invincible*, had ceased fire on her, engaging the *Gneisenau* at 1603 as she came out behind the German flagship. By 1610, according to Verner, "smoke was drawing near to the line of bearing, and since a turn to port would have closed the range to less than it had ever been (10,000 to 11,000 yards) and made our own smoke more foul, and would, moreover, foul *Invincible*, which was coming up on our port quarter, we altered course to starboard under the

<sup>1</sup> C 119-126.

<sup>2</sup> Grote.



impression that she would follow us round and so across the *Gneisenau's* wake." The *Inflexible's* turn was followed at 1615 by the flagship, which, as soon as the *Gneisenau* emerged from behind von Spee, had been engaging her; and the two battle cruisers headed NE on an opposite course to the remaining German ship, with the *Inflexible* leading and the *Carnarvon* between them, about 2,000 yards outside the line. At 1630 the Admiral led round to starboard, and continuing the turn till he was on a westerly course, he ordered the *Inflexible* and *Carnarvon* to follow him. In spite of a greatly reduced speed the funnel smoke once more asserted itself. Admiral Stoddart in the *Carnarvon*, who had two battle cruisers to smother him, records that at 1644 he could catch only occasional glimpses of the *Gneisenau*, on which he then opened fire at 11,000 yards.<sup>1</sup>

The *Inflexible* was also in the *Invincible's* smoke. To Captain Phillimore, after having been free of interference for more than half-an-hour, the position was such that he felt impelled to improve it. According to Verner "The *Gneisenau* was now firing at *Invincible* (she could not have seen us) and our gunlayers were firing at the flashes of the enemy's guns seen through *Invincible's* smoke . . . conversation between top and conning tower led to the Captain endeavouring to place the ship on the

<sup>1</sup> The evidence for this paragraph, apart from Shore's plan, is as follows :

- (a) Stoddart :—At 4.17 *Invincible* turned about 8 points to port directly for *Gneisenau*. *Carnarvon* and *Inflexible* did the same, and at 4.24 all three ships were on a north-easterly course steering in an opposite direction to the enemy, *Carnarvon* being between the two battle cruisers but 2,000 yards outside. At 4.30 flag a/c to southward and hoisted "A" flag. At 4.44 ships were in line ahead in the order *Invincible*, *Inflexible*, *Carnarvon*.
- (b) Deck Log *Carnarvon* :—1613 a/c S 45 E. 1620 a/c South. 1627 a/c N 56 E. 1636 a/c S 30 E. [1645 *Gneisenau*, 11,400 yards. a/c S 67 W.
- (c) Phillimore :—1610, observed *Scharnhorst* to sink. a/c 16 points to starboard. Firing on *Gneisenau* ranges 12,000 to 11,000 yards. 1630. Commander-in-Chief made the signal for single line ahead "in sequence in which ships now are." *Carnarvon* joined *Inflexible*. *Inflexible* a/c to take station astern of *Invincible*.
- (d) Beamish :—At 4.20 p.m. a turn of 16 points to starboard together made the *Inflexible* leader on the opposite course to the *Gneisenau*. At 4.30 p.m. *Invincible* led round to starboard 16 points and a signal was made to form single line ahead with *Invincible* leading.
- (e) Sturdee :—At 4.20 p.m. a turn of 16 points to starboard was ordered. This brought the *Inflexible* a little on the *Invincible's* starboard bow and the former led past the *Gneisenau* on the opposite course until 4.30 p.m., when, the smoke still being serious, the *Invincible* was ordered to turn away to starboard and the signal was made to "form single line in sequence in which ships are now."
- (f) Signals recorded :—4.6 Flag to *Carnarvon*. Take station astern of *Invincible*; 4.30 Flag to General, alter course in succession 2 points to starboard; 4.44 Flag to General, form single line ahead in sequence in which ships now are.

starboard or weather bow of *Invincible*; but since she was still steaming fast,<sup>1</sup> it soon became evident that this would keep us out of action for a long time and would probably result in our masking *Invincible* with our smoke. So the attempt was abandoned." It had been seen, however, by Admiral Sturdee, who at 1644 made the signal "Form single line ahead in sequence in which ships now are"—this sequence being presumably *Inflexible*, *Invincible*, *Carnarvon*.<sup>2</sup>

Captain Phillimore, however, determined to break away from the flagship altogether. He turned 14 points out of the line<sup>3</sup> and passing through the *Invincible's* smoke cloud, engaged the *Gneisenau* on the opposite course. In reporting this Admiral Sturdee puts on record his opinion that "under the circumstances, the independent action taken by the *Inflexible* was quite justifiable."<sup>4</sup>

Seeing his colleague disappear in the smoke screen astern the Admiral increased speed and turned to port to head off the *Gneisenau* and finish the long-drawn action. For the first time in the battle all three British ships could see their target clearly, and the *Gneisenau* was soon under fire from three different angles. Captain Phillimore, who at this period claims many hits, turned back and re-engaged. Soon after 1700 the *Gneisenau's* foremost funnel was seen to topple over on to the second funnel; she was in serious straits and her fire was slackening, but she continued to fire well timed but poorly spotted salvos.<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, at 1715 she scored a hit on the *Invincible's* armoured belt forward.

Her case was hopeless, but she was tough to kill. For nearly 4½ hours she had been under 12 in. gunfire and she was still fighting. The weather, so fine at first, had altered for the worse, and a drizzling rain was falling, through which the target was growing faint. Admiral Sturdee determined to make an end. The *Inflexible*, since Captain Phillimore's independent action, had been invisible; he now called to her by wireless "Where are you?—I wish you to join me at once,"<sup>6</sup> and turned towards the *Gneisenau*. She turned away. She had a heavy list to starboard, and it appeared she was not under control. In a quarter of an hour she turned back towards the flagship and stopped; steam, fire and smoke were pouring from her everywhere. The Admiral ordered the signal "Cease fire," but before it could be hoisted she opened fire again, continuing to fire from time to time with a

<sup>1</sup> *Invincible* engine room register speeds :—4.33, 16 knots; 4.34, 15 knots; 4.35, 12 knots; 4.42, 15 knots; 4.43, full; 4.44, 15 knots; 4.47, 18 knots; 4.50, full.

<sup>2</sup> Sturdee in his report says, *Inflexible* "ran ahead on the starboard side. *Invincible* was directed to form astern of her."

<sup>3</sup> To port, according to Verner, Phillimore, and Stoddart; to starboard according to Sturdee.

<sup>4</sup> Sturdee's Report, para. 16.

<sup>5</sup> Grote's last entry is 1638. "No. 3 spotting station starboard out of action."

<sup>6</sup> C 132.



single gun and receiving the concentrated fire of our three ships. At 1745 her colours were no longer to be seen, and it seemed that she had struck, whereupon Admiral Sturdee ceased firing.

But there was no thought of surrendering the ship in Captain Maerker's mind. All the ammunition that could be got at had been fired and the forward ammunition hoist was damaged. The chief engineer reported that there was no more steam in the boilers; the pumps were no longer working. Captain Maerker ordered all his men on deck, and fired his starboard torpedo so that the torpedo tube could be left open to flood the ship. He then gave the order "Blow up the ship," but it would appear she turned over on to her beam ends before this order could be carried out.<sup>1</sup> From our watching ships men could be seen scrambling on to her upturned hull, and then a few minutes after 1800 she was gone and all that was left of her company were struggling in the icy water.

Admiral Sturdee had been unable to rescue any of the survivors of the *Scharnhorst*, as she had sunk in the middle of the action when the *Gneisenau* was still actively engaging.<sup>2</sup> The *Invincible*, *Inflexible*, and *Carnarvon* concentrated on saving the survivors from the *Gneisenau*. The *Invincible* picked up 7 officers, 84 living and 20 dead men; the *Inflexible*, 8 officers and 55 men; the *Carnarvon*, 2 officers and 31 men.<sup>3</sup> The dead were buried at sea next day with full military honours. From the *Scharnhorst* there were no survivors at all.

11. The "Bristol" Sinks Two German Colliers.—Having disposed of the two armoured cruisers, Admiral Sturdee at 1810 made a general signal by wireless "*Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau* sunk. Where are the remainder?" From the time when the German light cruisers broke away to southward with our own cruisers in chase he had heard nothing of how that action was progressing.


There was a third enterprise in hand. Just as our squadron was emerging from Port-William in general chase, the Governor of the Falklands received a telephone message that three German ships, probably colliers or transports, were standing off Pleasant Point, about 20 miles to the south-westward.<sup>4</sup> Reporting this at 1046 to the *Canopus*, with which he was in telephonic communication, he suggested the *Bristol* might capture them. She was now

<sup>1</sup> According to a chief stoker saved no valves were opened before she sank. (H.S. 304, p. 195.)

<sup>2</sup> The German historian comments: "Nothing will remove the reproach that no attempt was made to rescue the *Scharnhorst's* crew . . . the British cannot seriously maintain that the battle cruisers needed or obtained the *Carnarvon's* assistance against the *Gneisenau*." "Kreuzerkrieg," p. 333.

<sup>3</sup> *Invincible*: Signal Log 16358.

<sup>4</sup> The information was telephoned from a house at the Point by a lady, Mrs. Roy Felton, who was alone in the settlement with two female servants. She and her servants were presented with pieces of plate by the Admiralty. M. 17193/15.







# BATTLE OF FALKLAND IS.

8<sup>TH</sup> DECEMBER 1914  
THE MAIN ACTION

Invisible	—	Scharnhorst	—
Inflexible	- - -	Gneisenau	- - -
Cornarvon	· · ·	Dresden	· · ·
Cornwall	· · ·	Nürnberg	· · ·
Kent	· · ·	Leipzig	· · ·
Glasgow	· · ·	Baden	· · ·
Bristol	· · ·	Sta. Isabel	· · ·
Macedonia	- - -		





ready ; she had weighed some 10 minutes before and was proceeding to take part in the general action.

Captain Fanshawe of the *Bristol*, in reporting to the Commander-in-Chief the presence of these three German ships, repeated the statement that they were colliers or transports. Admiral Sturdee had received from time to time more or less credible reports that the German reservists in Chile were being embarked ; and that morning his intelligence officer at Montevideo reported two transports near Punta Arenas on the 6th.<sup>1</sup> It might possibly be that he had here to deal with an expeditionary force, and he signalled to Captain Fanshawe to take the *Macedonia* under his orders and destroy the transports.<sup>2</sup>

Captain Bertram Evans of the *Macedonia*, left behind at the Falklands, was chafing at his inability to take part in the action,<sup>3</sup> when the report of the supposed transports reached him. Admiral Sturdee, before leaving, had given him instructions to be ready to weigh immediately should an armed liner appear, and he now (1145) proceeded outside. Consequently, when at 1212 the *Bristol* ordered him to close, he was soon in station. The two ships steered southward, spread about five miles apart, Captain Fanshawe not having adopted his colleague's suggestion that the *Macedonia* should diverge on a south-easterly course. By 1355 nothing had been seen ; but shortly after 2 p.m. smoke was sighted to the south-eastward by the *Bristol* and she altered course in that direction to investigate. It proved to come from two German ships, the *Baden* and *Santa Isabel*, two of von Spee's store and coal carriers. They had been coming up astern of the squadron and were now making for a rendezvous in 54° S 57° W, given to them by wireless soon after noon. As soon as they realised they were chased they began to diverge. Captain Fanshawe took the right hand one and at 1535 forced her to stop by firing two rounds. She was the *Santa Isabel*. Hoisting the signal "Abandon your ship," he prepared to sink her. At this point Captain Evans of the *Macedonia*, who had brought the other ship to, asked whether he should put prize crews on board and bring both captured ships into Port Stanley ; but to this Captain Fanshawe replied "My orders are positive : destroy enemy transports."<sup>4</sup> He had reported by wireless to the flagship "*Bristol* has captured two of the enemy colliers ;"<sup>5</sup> and without boarding the ships or waiting for a reply he opened fire on the *Santa Isabel*.<sup>6</sup>

The second merchant ship, now brought to by the *Macedonia*, was the *Baden*. After her crew had abandoned ship the *Macedonia*

<sup>1</sup> Glasgow War Log 20111.

<sup>2</sup> C 70.

<sup>3</sup> *Macedonia* to *Bristol* (then proceeding to sea), 11.5 :—" Good luck ; how I envy you."

<sup>4</sup> *Bristol* : Signal Log 18253.

<sup>5</sup> C 128.

<sup>6</sup> The signal to the flag was made at 1550. There is no report from Captain Fanshawe, and neither his log nor signal log state when he opened fire, but it was presumably before 4.50 when he signalled to *Macedonia* : " Am bringing prisoners to you now."



fired 15 rounds at her water line,<sup>1</sup> and then took on board the prisoners from the two ships.<sup>2</sup>

At 1826 Captain Fanshawe reported by wireless to the flagship "Have sent crews of German colliers on board *Macedonia* to Port Stanley. Request orders for *Bristol*. My position now is 52.27 S, 57.4 W. What course shall I steer? 2200." This was the first indication to Admiral Sturdee that his orders to "destroy the transports" had been literally interpreted, although the ships destroyed were not transports, but colliers; moreover, Captain Fanshawe's message was so worded that he could only conclude the prizes had been sunk. And yet, had he known it, it was not too late to save them, for both ships were still afloat. At 1850 Captain Fanshawe ordered the *Macedonia* to finish off the *Baden*, and 10 minutes later proceeded eastward to find the rest of the squadron, no answer having come to his request for orders.<sup>3</sup> About 1930 the *Baden* sank, and the *Macedonia* then put 10 more rounds into the *Santa Isabel* to hurry her despatch. It was not till after 2100 that she sank and the *Macedonia* could return to Port Stanley with the German crews.<sup>4</sup>

Meanwhile Captain Fanshawe continued eastward at 15 knots, hoping to receive orders or information which would enable him to take part in the action with the light cruisers.

**12. The Light Cruiser Action.—First Phase, 1320 to 1620.**—When Admiral von Spee at 1320 signalled to his light cruisers "Part company, endeavour to escape," they all turned to the southward, away from the British line. The *Leipzig* had already begun to move. At the moment they were roughly on a line of bearing SE from the *Leipzig*, the *Dresden* being the easternmost. By the time the manoeuvre had been observed and our cruisers were in chase, the Germans had a lead of about 12 miles. They made no serious attempt to scatter, the *Nürnberg* and *Leipzig* remaining in company on a course about SSE, the *Dresden* steering to cut across their bows with the intention of making the South American coast. Of our own ships the *Glasgow* at 24½ knots was soon ahead and closing the *Leipzig*.<sup>5</sup>

By 1415 Captain Luce in the *Glasgow* was so far ahead that he thought it advisable to slow down a little to enable the other two cruisers to come up in support. The *Cornwall* was getting 22¾ knots and closing the *Leipzig* slowly; the *Kent* also was coming along well, but she was an old ship designed for 23 knots, and it

<sup>1</sup> Time given as 5.40 in *Macedonia's* deck log, the times of which are about 20 minutes fast on the flagship.

<sup>2</sup> The third German supply ship *Seydlitz* had disappeared and nothing was heard of her by our squadron till after the action. For her proceedings, see Monograph 26, "Atlantic," II.

<sup>3</sup> The latter part of his signal did not get through. See C 138.

<sup>4</sup> The sinking of the colliers, after investigation had disclosed their real character, met with Admiralty disapproval. H.S. 304, p. 392.

<sup>5</sup> The *Leipzig* had to reduce to 21 knots to avoid a breakdown. "Kreuzerkrieg," p. 297.

was doubtful whether she could maintain that speed. Captain Luce, therefore, decided to open fire, hoping thereby to make the Germans manoeuvre and lose distance. He closed gradually and about half-an-hour later opened a slow fire<sup>1</sup> from his foremost 6 in. gun at 12,000 yards on the *Leipzig*. The *Dresden* turned sharply to starboard in an attempt to divert the *Glasgow's* attention from the *Leipzig*. In this she was partially successful; Captain Luce turned eight points and steamed full speed for eight minutes, apparently to shepherd her back.<sup>2</sup> At any rate the *Dresden* turned back to the course of the other light cruisers and Captain Luce once more closed the *Leipzig*. Captain Haun of the *Leipzig* had turned slightly to starboard to bring his battery to bear, and as soon as the range was down to 11,000 opened fire with his 4.1 in. guns, whose range, it now appeared, was nearly equal to that of the *Glasgow's* 6 in. After half-an-hour's firing Captain Luce secured his first hit. One of his 6 in. shell hit the *Leipzig's* superstructure before the third funnel, and passing through the upper deck interfered with the forced draught in two boiler rooms. Captain Haun of the *Leipzig*, who had so far been edging to starboard with the idea of reaching the Patagonian coast, now turned back a little to confuse the *Glasgow's* aim; but after the damage had been temporarily repaired he brought the *Glasgow* on to his starboard quarter to bring all five broadside guns to bear and reopened fire. To this move Captain Luce conformed, hoping to keep a distance where his 6 in. guns would outrange the *Leipzig's*; but at one time his foretop was hit and some casualties were caused. The *Leipzig* had a fire aft and was unable to get it under.

At 1527 Captain Luce turned away a little and reduced speed to increase the range. In the pause in the action which resulted from this Captain Haun, in consultation with his chief engineer, agreed to reduce speed to 20 knots. This lower speed increased the chance that the *Cornwall* and *Kent* would be able to come up. At 1520 the *Cornwall* was within 16,000 yards and gaining; the *Kent* was on her port beam, and it seemed they would before long be in action. The two lines were thus:—*Dresden*, *Leipzig*, *Nürnberg*, with the *Leipzig* well astern: *Glasgow*, *Cornwall*, *Kent*, with the *Glasgow* well ahead. Captain Ellerton of the *Cornwall* arranged with Captain Allen of the *Kent* that the *Kent* should take the left-hand ship, that is, the *Nürnberg*, while the *Cornwall* took the centre one, the *Leipzig*.

By 1600 the chase had so far advanced that the three British cruisers were nearly in line. The *Kent* had edged slightly to eastward after the *Nürnberg*, about seven miles ahead of her;

<sup>1</sup> The times given for opening of fire by the *Glasgow* are:—*Glasgow's* Deck Log, 3.0; *Glasgow's* Signal Log, 2.53; Luce's Report, 2.50; *Cornwall's* Deck Log, 2.47; *Cornwall's* Signal Log, 3.0; Ellerton's Report, 2.47; *Kent's* Signal Log, 2.59; "Kreuzerkrieg," 2.40. For arrangement of guns in the British and German cruisers, see diagram, p. 316.

<sup>2</sup> Authority for this is "Kreuzerkrieg" and "Courses and Distances run by H.M.S. *Glasgow*."



the *Cornwall* was almost dead astern of the *Leipzig*; which had the *Glasgow* on her starboard quarter. From the *Leipzig* the range of all the British ships was the same, about 12,000 yards; and she now opened fire on the *Kent* with her port after gun, using the starboard after and two quarter deck guns to reply to the *Glasgow*.<sup>1</sup> One shot came within 100 yards of the *Kent's* bow. Captain Allen's guns were not sighted beyond 11,000 yards, but from 1609 onwards he tried a few ranging shots, all of which were short. A few minutes later the *Cornwall* also opened fire. The *Glasgow* had closed sufficiently to bring her 4 in. guns within range, and by 1617 all the British ships were firing on the *Leipzig*. The *Cornwall* soon found the target.<sup>2</sup>

This seems to have decided the German cruisers to scatter. The *Dresden* made no further attempt to save her consorts, but continued her southerly course at her utmost speed; and the *Nürnberg*, which was on the *Kent's* port bow, diverged still further. The *Kent* gave chase to the *Nürnberg* at her full speed and was soon out of sight of the rest of the action.

Captain Luce now decided to concentrate with the *Cornwall* on the *Leipzig* and leave unfollowed the *Dresden*, which was not yet out of sight.<sup>3</sup> He turned 16 points, engaging the *Leipzig* with his starboard guns on the opposite course as long as she was within range, and curving round came up on the *Cornwall's* port quarter. As he crossed the wake of the *Leipzig* he had been obliged to thread his way among some drifting drums which it was thought might be mines.<sup>4</sup> His object in making this turn was that both ships should engage on the same side of the enemy and attain the maximum effect of fire; but it was some time before he recommenced action, and for an hour the *Cornwall* only was firing.

**13. Sinking of the "Leipzig."**—Since 4 o'clock the weather conditions had changed for the worse. The wind was now southerly and a wet mist was rising, with occasional squalls of rain. In one of these the *Dresden* claims that she managed to shake off pursuit and make good her escape. But she had never been pursued; the *Glasgow*, the only ship fast enough to catch her, had been and was still engaging the *Leipzig*.

Captain Haun of the *Leipzig*, seeing the *Glasgow* turn back, made another effort to steer for the South American coast, now open to him, and he was soon on a SSW course. It was a stern chase for the *Cornwall*; but she was still within range, and

<sup>1</sup> "Kreuzerkrieg," p. 300, says that it was the *Cornwall* she was engaging on her starboard quarter and does not specify the ship she was firing at to port.

<sup>2</sup> "Kreuzerkrieg," p. 300, here confuses the *Cornwall* with the *Kent*, which fired only eight rounds altogether at the *Leipzig*.

<sup>3</sup> He does not mention the *Dresden* after 2 p.m. The German History states that she did not lose sight of our cruisers till 5 p.m.

<sup>4</sup> They were really light wooden cases in which cartridges were brought from the magazines. In the German report the suggestion that the *Leipzig* would lay mines is called a malicious invention (übelwollende Erfindung).

Captain Ellerton, realising that he had the speed, began to manoeuvre to get more guns into action.<sup>1</sup> His method was that at 9,000 yards he turned a few points outwards to bring his broadside to bear and when the range had opened to 10,500 he turned in again, repeating the manoeuvre as soon as he had again reached 9000. By this means he avoided the floating drums which were thought in the *Cornwall* also to be possibly mines. One easily visible hit carried away the *Leipzig's* fore topmast, but many other hits were made.

Captain Luce, by 1720, was near enough to reopen fire with his 6 in. guns. By 1806 the *Cornwall* was firing at 8,000 yards, and Captain Ellerton gave the order to use lyddite.

By this time the ammunition of the *Leipzig's* after guns was nearly exhausted, and there was only the weather to rely on for escape. Captain Haun had hoped to get into position for firing a torpedo; but the speed of our ships rendered this improbable, and fires which had broken out on the fore-castle prevented him from steering into the eye of the wind. He steered for a rain storm coming up from starboard in the hope of using it as a screen and making good his escape in it; but he failed in this endeavour and nothing remained but to fight his ship to the end. Amid the clamour of frequent hits which made it impossible to transmit orders by word of mouth, he received the report that the ammunition remaining consisted of little more than 200 rounds, which would have to be fuzed and carried from forward to the after guns. It was transported mainly by officers, and enabled the *Leipzig* to continue in action for some time longer. But by 7 p.m. that too was exhausted, and the gunnery officer could find no more shell in the ship. There were three torpedoes; these were fired from the starboard tube, Captain Haun turning in to starboard for each shot as far as the fire in the bows permitted. But all three missed, and having expended his last weapon he gave the order at 7.20 to sink the ship. In obedience to this order the seacocks were opened, the condenser doors removed and the torpedo tube left unclosed. All hands were piped on deck; they were mainly the technical personnel, with some from the guns' crews and magazine hands. The whole after part of the ship was one huge flame, which softened the foot of the mainmast so that it bent and toppled over. The only open space was the after part of the fore-castle, and there the survivors and the still living among the wounded, all dyed yellow with the lyddite fumes, waited for the end.

<sup>1</sup> The *Cornwall's* track (Plan II) is based on that of the *Glasgow*, supplemented by Captain Ellerton's report, logs of ships engaged, etc. In "The Battle of the Falkland Islands," by Commander H. Spencer-Cooper (Navigating Officer of the *Cornwall*) (London, 1919), there is a plan giving the track of the *Cornwall*. It shows the *Leipzig* running 31 miles during the 40 minutes, 2.40 p.m. to 3.20 p.m., i.e., a speed of 46½ knots, and puts the *Leipzig* less than 5,000 yards from the *Cornwall* when the latter opened fire at 4.17 p.m. The plan has not been used in plotting the *Cornwall's* track in Plan II of this monograph.



But before it came there was to be a tragic episode. The *Glasgow* and *Cornwall*, seeing that she had ceased firing, checked fire and closed from their range of four miles near enough to see whether or not she had struck. She had not, for her flag was still flying; Captain Haun had no intention of surrender and, according to the German History, the dying had been comforted by the assurance that the flag would be kept flying till the ship sank. The *Glasgow* made a signal "Do you surrender?" but it was not understood in the *Leipzig* and no answer was made.<sup>1</sup> Captains Luce and Ellerton hesitated a little what to do next. No other ships were in sight, and they did not know where they had gone. The *Leipzig* was afloat and, for all they knew, was able to fire her torpedoes. She had not struck her flag and there was the possibility that she might recover control and get away. After consultation, they decided to sink her by gunfire,<sup>2</sup> and at 7.50 both ships reopened fire at close range. The shells did terrible execution, not only on the hull and superstructure, but among the closely packed mass of men on the fore-castle, who, seeing the two ships close were hoping that they had come to rescue them.<sup>3</sup> After firing for a quarter of an hour the two ships ceased; two green lights had been seen in the *Leipzig*, and Captain Luce willingly accepted these as a sign of surrender.<sup>4</sup> Coming up again, though still wary of torpedoes, he signalled "I am anxious to save life; what can I do?" There was no reply; and closing still nearer he signalled again "I am sending boats to you." It was now 9 p.m. and quite dark. Captain Haun ordered the 24 surviving men to jump overboard, but refused to leave himself while the ship remained afloat. While the rescues were still proceeding, she turned over to port, and at 9.23 sank bows first,<sup>5</sup> carrying her captain with her. Of him Captain Ellerton writes, "I deeply regret that so gallant an officer was not saved. In my opinion no finer spirit is recorded in history."<sup>6</sup>

The survivors, four officers, five warrant officers, two petty officers and seven men, were brought on board our cruisers in an exhausted and pitiable state. The others had succumbed to the intense cold of the water.

14. **The Action of the "Kent" and "Nürnberg."**—Meanwhile the *Kent*, as arranged between Captains Ellerton and Allen, was giving her full attention to the *Nürnberg*. Of what followed we

<sup>1</sup> The making of this signal is not recorded by either the *Glasgow* or *Cornwall*; the authority for it is the German History.

<sup>2</sup> C 157 to 160.

<sup>3</sup> For some reason the Germans consider Captain Luce's action in reopening fire to be lacking in chivalry (ermangelt der Ritterlichkeit); it would almost seem that they wished to have the honour of "no surrender" without its accompanying disadvantages. ("Kreuzerkrieg," p. 334.)

<sup>4</sup> The *Leipzig's* report denies the showing of these green lights. The only authority for them is a writer in the "Naval Review," Vol. IV., p. 66.

<sup>5</sup> The position is doubtful. *Cornwall* gives it as 53.55 S, 55.11 W; *Glasgow* as 54.8.6 S, 56.2 W (*Glasgow* Signal Log 20107).

<sup>6</sup> Capt. Ellerton's Report.

have only one report, that of Captain Allen; from the German side there is nothing detailed. Captain Allen states:—"The officers and men of the engine room department now made a most determined effort to overtake the enemy. All available wood, such as accommodation ladders, hen coops, wooden lockers, capstan bars, etc., were broken up and passed down into the stokeholds to be used in the furnaces. The stokers responded magnificently to my order for "more speed." The maximum horse-power of the ship was exceeded by 5,000 horse-power, and the speed must have been at least 25 knots, an exceedingly creditable performance on the part of Engineer-Commander George E. Andrew and the officers and men in the engine rooms and stokeholds.

Shortly after this the distance of the *Nürnberg* appeared to be decreasing, and at 5 p.m. she opened fire on *Kent* with her two stern guns and port after gun, firing salvos of three guns. I replied with a shot from the fore turret at extreme elevation, but the shot appeared to fall short. The first few shots from the *Nürnberg* went over the *Kent* and dropped astern, but the *Nürnberg* quickly found the range, about 12,000 yards, and from then onwards her shooting was remarkably accurate, her projectiles falling into the sea all round and quite close to the *Kent*. Several shots dropped into the sea just ahead and on either bow only a few yards from the ship, and one shot hit the *Kent* on the starboard side aft, bursting on the upper deck.

I fired two guns every few minutes at extreme elevation to try and reach her, and altered course slightly to port so as to bring the two foremost starboard guns to bear as well as the fore turret.

The distance gradually decreased until she got within range of my guns, 5.9 p.m., and I then fired salvos continuously from the fore turret and two foremost starboard guns.

We now gradually closed<sup>1</sup> until the range dropped to 7,000 yards, when the *Nürnberg* altered course eight points to port, bringing the whole of her port broadside to bear. I altered course to port too, but not so much as she did, so the two ships were now steering on slightly converging courses with the range steadily decreasing. I succeeded in getting into a position on her beam by the time the range had dropped to 6,000 yards, and after this I never, except whilst turning, got abaft her beam until the end of the action, so as not to give her a chance of hitting me with a torpedo.

I opened fire with all the starboard guns as soon as they would bear.

We both steered for about a quarter of an hour on nearly parallel but slightly converging courses, until the range decreased to 3,000 yards. During this period of the action the fire from

<sup>1</sup> At 5.45 the *Nürnberg's* speed had dropped to 18 knots on account of burst boiler tubes. ("Kreuzerkrieg.")



my guns was very effective, the *Kent's* shooting was excellent and our shells were bursting all over the *Nürnberg*. At 6.2 p.m. she altered course to starboard (away from me) and I altered course to starboard too, but not so much as she did, and the range gradually increased from 3,000 to 4,000 yards. She was now on fire forward and her speed had decreased. At 6.13 p.m. she turned to port (towards me) and I crossed her bow at a distance of 3,450 yards, bringing all the starboard guns to bear on her when she was end on. When I had crossed her bow I continued turning to starboard, and we were both steering for a short time on almost parallel and opposite courses. When she was about two points before my starboard beam I put my helm hard a starboard and got into a position on her starboard bow with all my port guns bearing on her. We then steered on almost parallel courses until she was well abaft my beam. I then put the helm hard a port and turned 16 points to starboard. She was now on my starboard bow and practically stopped. At 6.35 p.m. she ceased firing.<sup>1</sup> On observing this I ordered "cease firing" and turned towards her. Her fore part was evidently on fire. I steamed towards her, keeping well before her beam with all guns trained on her. I wanted to close her to make sure whether her colours were still flying, as the light was getting bad and it was difficult to see.


When I had closed her to 3,350 yards I could see quite clearly that she was still flying her colours, and as she did not appear to be sinking I again opened fire with all guns at 3,300 yards. Five minutes later she lowered her colours.<sup>2</sup> I immediately ceased firing and stopped. She now, 6.59 p.m., appeared to be in a sinking condition as she was well down by the stern and had a list to starboard.

I ordered all available boats to be got ready at once and ropes' ends, lifebuoys and life belts prepared for saving the survivors. At 7.26 p.m. she heeled right over to starboard, and at 7.27 p.m. she slowly sank. As she sank I observed a small group of men on her quarterdeck waving a German ensign attached to a staff. I then steamed slowly towards the spot where she had sunk and did my utmost to save as many men as possible. My only three boats were all holed in many places by fragments of shell and splinters; so the carpenters were immediately ordered to repair the least damaged boats, viz., a cutter and a gig, which were temporarily repaired and lowered after about 20 minutes.

Altogether 12 men were picked up, some from the ship and some by the boats, but of the 12 men picked up only seven survived, the remainder being dead when brought on board or dying shortly afterwards. The water was very cold and there

<sup>1</sup> Captain von Schönberg of the *Nürnberg* gave the order to blow up the ship at 6.30 p.m. "Kreuzerkrieg," p. 312.

<sup>2</sup> This is denied by the Germans. Her colours at the peak had been shot away; but another flag was hoisted at the starboard after cutter's davits, as there was no halliard on the main mast. "Kreuzerkrieg," pp. 312, 313.






# BATTLE OF FALKLAND IS.

8<sup>TH</sup> DECEMBER 1914

## CHASE OF THE LIGHT CRUISERS.

Glasgow ----- Dresden -----  
Cornwall ----- Nürnberg -----  
Kent ----- Leipzig -----





was a slight sea which made it very difficult for them to keep themselves afloat.

I remained in the vicinity till 9 p.m., when it was nearly dark, then hoisted the boats and proceeded towards Port William, Falkland Islands, at 10 knots. I had now only 200 tons of coal left and estimated that I was 150 miles from Port William. I was unable to make any signals by wireless telegraphy as a shell had passed through the wireless telegraphy office and damaged the transmitting instruments.

I arrived and anchored at Port William at 3.30 p.m. on 9 December.

I regret to report that during the action four men were killed and 12 men wounded. Ten of these casualties occurred in A.3 casemate, caused by a shell which apparently struck the gun port and burst outside the casemate. Two of the men in the casemate were instantly killed and the other eight all terribly burnt. Of these eight, two have since died.

The *Kent* was struck altogether 38 times by the enemy's shell during the action, and the majority of them appear to have burst. There is no serious damage to the ship, except a few holes above the waterline which can be repaired by the ships' artificers in a few days.

The total number of rounds fired altogether, including eight rounds fired at the *Leipzig*, was 646, of which 442 were pointed common shell and 204 lyddite . . . . ."

**15. Ammunition Expended. Damages and Casualties.**—The Battle of the Falkland Islands was the second occasion on which British ships fired 12 in. guns against an enemy vessel; and one of the surprises of the action was the large quantity of ammunition expended before the German ships sank.<sup>1</sup>

The *Invincible* fired 513 rounds of 12 in., made up as follows :—128 A.P.C., 259 C.P., 126 H.E.<sup>2</sup> The left gun of her fore turret fired 109 rounds without a hitch. This unprecedented number of rounds was the more remarkable in that the turret machinery had only recently been altered from electric to hydraulic power. At the end of the action she had only 257 rounds of 12 in. left.<sup>3</sup>

The *Inflexible* fired 661 rounds,<sup>4</sup> leaving a remainder of 210 rounds of 12 in. ammunition.<sup>5</sup> The two battle cruisers between them fired, therefore, 1174 rounds. The *Carnarvon* expended

<sup>1</sup> In the battle of Heligoland Bight, 28.8.14, *New Zealand* fired 82 rounds of 12 in. and *Invincible* 18 rounds.

<sup>2</sup> Information supplied by Armament Supply Department, Admiralty.

<sup>3</sup> Beamish : Report, H.S. 304, p. 162, states remainders as A turret, 12; X, 29; P, 112; Q, 104—total 257. This is 110 short of what should be left if the full outfit, 110 rounds per gun, had been carried.

<sup>4</sup> Made up of 157 A.P.C., 343 C.P., 161 H.E. (Information from Armament Supply Department.)

<sup>5</sup> Signal made 2353 8 December in *Invincible's* W/T Log 16371.



85 rounds of 7.5 in. and 60 rounds of 6 in. ammunition, mostly on the *Gneisenau*. The number of hits on the *Scharnhorst* is not known; by survivors of the *Gneisenau* it was reckoned that that ship had been hit 35 times,<sup>1</sup> though she had been more or less continuously under fire for five hours. It is at least open to doubt whether either German ship was sunk entirely by gunfire.

The small percentage of hits was due to the conditions under which the firing took place. "Owing to the long ranges, smoke from funnels, and frequent changes of course" reports Captain Phillimore "the practice was not uniformly accurate, and sometimes was even wild, especially for direction; but whenever a steady course was maintained for any length of time, the effect of the fire on the enemy was evident."<sup>2</sup> Captain Beamish remarks "Rangetaking was impossible during the greater part of the action, due to funnel smoke, gun smoke, etc."<sup>3</sup>

Admiral Sturdee on his way south from Abrolhos had decided, after consultation with the gunnery officer of his flagship,<sup>4</sup> that he would not engage the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* at less than 12,000 yards, that being the minimum range at which their 8 in. projectiles would not penetrate his armour. This was a greater range than had ever been used for battle practice, and that the guns' crews might obtain some experience at this, till then, unprecedented range he ordered the two battle cruisers to do some target practice at 12,000 yards on the way south. This firing was carried out on 30 November. When, however, the action began it was seen that the 8 in. gun was dangerous even at that range.

The *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, after the battle of Coronel, equalised their ammunition, and each carried for their 8.2 in. guns 445 shell and 200 solid shot. In addition, each had 1,100 5.9 in. rounds.<sup>5</sup>

The *Inflexible*, hidden for long periods in the flagship's smoke, was hit by three shells. The worst damage was done by a shell which destroyed the head of the main derrick. One man was killed by a splinter and three others were wounded.

The *Invincible*, whose fore part had always been visible for spotting and ranging on, was hit 22 times.<sup>6</sup> One shell burst inside the starboard strut of the tripod mast, the blast unshipping the Dumaresq and rendering useless the rate transmitter in the control top; the shell severed the strut, and the consequent shaking of the control position made fire control extremely difficult. The other main damage to the hull was the cracking

<sup>1</sup> H.S. 304, p. 247. Grote chronicles 23 hits up to 4.38 p.m.

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 304, p. 62.

<sup>3</sup> H.S. 304, p. 160.

<sup>4</sup> Lieutenant-Commander H. E. Dannreuther, who supplied the information in this paragraph.

<sup>5</sup> "Kreuzerkrieg," p. 330.

<sup>6</sup> Beamish's report of damage to *Invincible* (H.S. 304, p. 127), is in 22 paragraphs. It is assumed that each paragraph represents the damage done by one hit, but it is doubtful whether they are in chronological order.

and buckling of the armour at the bow whereby two bow compartments were flooded, and a large hole made by an 8.2 in. shell penetrating the ship's side below the armour and flooding a bunker. In spite of these 22 hits, the *Invincible* had only one slight casualty.

The *Carnarvon* was not hit.

In the light cruiser action the *Cornwall* fired 1,090 rounds of 6 in., the *Glasgow* 316 of 6 in. and 889 of 4 in., all at the *Leipzig*. This one unarmoured light cruiser required, therefore, in addition to eight rounds of 6 in. from the *Kent* and an unknown number of 12 in. rounds from the battle cruisers, 2,295 rounds from the two ships directly engaging her before her captain thought her sufficiently damaged for him to give the order to sink her. She carried 1,860 rounds of 4.1 in.; with this she succeeded in inflicting considerable damage, especially on the *Cornwall*, which during most of the action was, to some extent, screening the *Glasgow*. The latter was hit only twice; one shell struck the foretop, killed one man and wounded four more; the second shell damaged one boiler and reduced the *Glasgow's* speed to 23½ knots. She had no other hits or casualties. The *Cornwall* was hit 18 times, but, remarkably enough, had no casualties. Several of the shells striking her did not burst. The most serious hits were two on the under water armour; it was not penetrated, but there were bulges inwards, with consequent leaks, and two bunkers on the port side became full, producing a considerable list.

In the *Kent*—*Nürnberg* action, the *Kent* fired 434 common and 204 lyddite shells. The *Nürnberg*, like the other German light cruisers, carried 1,860 rounds of 4.1 in.; with this she made 38 hits on the *Kent*, but caused no serious damage to her hull, except a few holes above waterline which were speedily repaired. One shell, however, wrecked the transmitting instruments in the wireless office, with the result that, though the *Kent* could hear the signals calling for information about her, she could not reply. What might have been a dangerous hit was that on A.3 casemate, which ignited the cordite in it, sent a flash of flame down the hoist and might have blown up the ship had it not been for the presence of mind of Sergeant C. Mayes, R.M.L.I., in the ammunition passage.<sup>1</sup>

The *Dresden* did not open fire at all in this battle, nor was she fired at. Her movements after making her escape and the operations of our ships after the enemy squadron had been sunk and scattered are described in Monograph 26: "The Atlantic Ocean from the Battle of the Falklands to May 1915."

<sup>1</sup> He received the Conspicuous Gallantry Medal.



## APPENDIX A.

## TELEGRAMS DEALING WITH THE ATLANTIC SQUADRONS.

- A 1.** Adty. to R.A.C., 4th C.S. 30.7.14.  
Sent 1240.  
121 New orders should reach you shortly by mail. These do not provide any reinforcement for squadron and limit the area of your operations to North America and West Atlantic so that you will not be required to detach any ships to south-east coast of America.
- A 2.** Adty. to R.A.C., 4th C.S. 30.7.14.  
Sent 4.30 p.m.  
122 *Berwick* must not remain in Havana but keep touch from nearest point outside territorial waters.
- A 3.** Adty. to Admiral, Devonport. 30.7. 4.  
Sent 8.50 p.m.  
*Carnarvon* is to sail at once to Gibraltar to coal there and await orders. *Cornwall*, *Cumberland*, *Monmouth*, are to complete with men, coal and stores and proceed Gibraltar and wait orders.
- A 4.** Adty. to C.-in-C., Devonport. 31.7.14.  
Sent 10.50 a.m.  
*Carnarvon* is to proceed along the route towards Madeira and is to get into wireless communication with *Asturias*, *Drina*, *Alcantara* now returning from South America and *Kinfauns Castle* from the Cape. In the event of hostilities to prevent any interference with these vessels. If peace still continues on arriving on the parallel of Cape St. Vincent *Carnarvon* to proceed to Gibraltar and complete with coal.
- A 5.** Adty. to *Carnarvon*. 3.8.14.  
1 Proceed on trade route to St. Vincent and complete with coal immediately on arrival.
- A 6.** Adty. to R.A.C., 4th C.S. 3.8.14.  
Sent 10.40 a.m.  
128 New orders provide for you to operate only to west of 40° W. longitude for protection of trade in North America and West Indies. Primary bases Halifax and Jamaica. Your command is called in new order Cruiser Force H and another Cruiser Force E with bases Berehaven and Lough Swilly under R.A. Hornby in *Doris* will operate on North American trade route to east of 40° W. longitude.  
Another Cruiser Force D with primary bases Sierra Leone and Ascension under R.A. Stoddart in *Carnarvon* will operate between latitudes 30° N. and 10° S. and longitude 40° W. and 10° W.  
Another Cruiser Force I with primary base Plymouth under R.-A. de Robeck in *Europa* will operate off Ushant and Finisterre with northern limit line W.S.W. true from Scilly Isles and southern limit latitude 30° N.
- A 7.** Adty. to *Carnarvon*. 3.8.14.  
Sent 3.35 p.m.  
2 Two German cruisers reported off Las Palmas on August 2. Continue on trade route to search for them.

- A 8.** Adty. to S.N.O., Bermuda. 3.8.14.  
Sent 7 p.m.  
From reliable information. Two German cruisers are reported in the neighbourhood of Heart's Content, Newfoundland. One ship is to at once proceed to search for them and to protect cable and wireless station. Inform *Essex* and *Lancaster*.
- A 9.** Adty. to *Lancaster*, Bermuda. 4.8.14.  
R.A.C., 4th C.S. Sent 10.58 p.m.  
German cruisers reported off New York to escort two German liners *Kronprinz Wilhelm* and *Vaterland* painted grey probably armed with 10000 reservists on board. They are to be searched for and shadowed. Inform *Essex*.
- A 10.** Adty. to *Lancaster* and *Essex* via Bermuda. 4.8.14.  
Sent 3.30 p.m.  
Report present position. Trade immediately threatened in the vicinity of New York. Despatch is necessary.
- A 11.** Adty. to R.A.C., 4th C.S. 4.8.14.  
Sent 4.40 p.m.  
131 On appreciation of situation it appears that the danger point to trade in your allotted area appears to be in the neighbourhood of New York. British trade is being advised not to sail until some of your cruisers arrive.
- A 12.** Adty. to all Ships. 4.8.14.  
Sent 6.45 p.m.  
Advise all British shipping with which you may be in touch to abandon regular tracks, complete voyages without bunkering if possible. reduce brilliancy of lights. On arrival in United Kingdom call early for orders. Pass to all ships.
- A 13.** Ambassador, Paris, to Foreign Office. 4.8.14.  
Recd. 9 p.m.  
French Government ask whether as a favour the following message could be sent to French Consular Agent at Bermuda. Begins. War declared between France and Germany only. Inform Commanders of *Condé* and *Descartes* and instruct them to return to Brest, capturing any German vessels they may meet. Ends.
- A 14.** Adty. to Intelligence Officer, Jamaica. 5.8.14.  
Sent 1.45 a.m.  
Have *Suffolk* and *Bristol* sailed? Inform Admiral that the trade from New York and the St. Lawrence is seriously threatened.
- A 15.** R.A.C., 5th C.S., to Adty. 5.8.14.  
Recd. 3.38 a.m.  
Submitted that *Monmouth* be ordered to proceed down trade route St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, to coal and then proceed Brazil and take orders from *Glasgow*.
- A 16.** Adty. to S.N.O., Bermuda. 5.8.14.  
Sent 6.50 a.m.  
German cruiser *Dresden* is off New York.
- A 17.** Adty. to *Good Hope*. 5.8.14.  
Sent 9 a.m.  
How much coal have you on board? Can you proceed to Halifax at 13 knots without coaling?  
Reply:—1,850 tons. Can proceed Halifax at 13 knots without coaling.



- A 18.** Ministry of Marine, Paris, to French Embassy. 5.8.14.  
10.45 a.m.  
Prière dire Attaché Naval demander immédiatement à l'Amirauté envoyer si possible un croiseur à Casablanca, un croiseur devant entrée Gironde, et assurer sécurité transport troupes entre Casablanca et détroit Gibraltar. Quelques croiseurs français Méditerranée pourraient être mis à la disposition du Commandant Supérieur anglais sur sa demande.
- A 19.** Adty. to *Carnarvon, Cumberland.* 5.8.14.  
Sent 2.29 p.m.  
German cruisers off Las Palmas are believed to be *Berlin* and *Panther*.
- A 20.** Adty. to C.-in-C., Devonport, and R.A., *Amphitrite.* 5.8.14.  
Sent 3.21 p.m.  
Two German cruisers reported off Bilbao trying to cut our cables. Send a cruiser on at once and sweep with squadron to try and cut them off.
- A 21.** Ministry of Marine, Paris, to French Embassy. 5.8.14.  
4.30 p.m.  
La présence des croiseurs allemands que vous nous avez signalés sur les côtes Ouest du Maroc et de l'Espagne nous a conduits à faire passer désormais les transports des troupes du Maroc par Gibraltar et la Méditerranée. L'Amirauté peut-elle faire concentrer dans les eaux marocaines les croiseurs qu'elle a affectés à la protection de ces transports. Prévenez quand cet ordre de concentration sera donné et quand il sera exécuté.
- A 22.** Adty. to *Cornwall.* 5.8.14.  
Sent 5.26 p.m.  
Shape course for Casablanca and cover passage of French transports from Casablanca. Inform *Carnarvon*.
- A 23.** Adty. to *Good Hope* and *Drake.* 5.8.14.  
Sent 6.40 p.m.  
Our trade south of Newfoundland from the St. Lawrence is being threatened by one German cruiser and some armed merchantmen. *Good Hope* is to proceed forthwith at 13 knots or faster if coal will permit to cover trade, completing with coal at Halifax.
- A 24.** Adty. to C.-in-C., Portsmouth. 5.8.14.  
Sent 11.9 p.m.  
*Glory* is required to leave for Halifax without delay; she is to be completed to full war complement of coal. Report when she will be ready to sail. *Glory* will be used to convoy the trade from Canada to England.
- A 25.** Minister, Lisbon, to Foreign Office. 6.8.14.  
Recd. 12.40 a.m.  
32 Portuguese Government are fully prepared to act up to Alliance and will be guided by H.M. Government in any action (groups omitted) them to take. They place their land and sea forces such as they are unreservedly at the disposal of H.M. Government.
- A 26.** Adty. to R.A.C., 4th C.S. 6.8.14.  
Sent noon.  
136 *Condé* and *Descartes* have been placed under your orders. The southern entrance to the Gulf of St. Lawrence is threatened. Arrange to protect it as well as off New York.  
(Received in *Suffolk* 5.52 a.m. 8th.)
- A 27.** *Cornwall* to Adty. 6.8.14.  
Arrived Casablanca and have consulted French authorities, who informed me three transports will be ready to sail for Marseilles or Bordeaux 11th August. Propose to sail then and request instructions as to which route it is best to take.

- A 28.** Adty. to R.A.C., 5th C.S. 6.8.14.  
Sent 6.45 p.m.  
4 Important for one of your squadron to press on to St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, leaving one cruiser to deal with cruisers off Las Palmas.
- A 29.** Adty. to C.-in-C., Devonport. 7.8.14.  
Sent 12.55 a.m.  
*Sutlej* is to proceed on the trade route to Finisterre and temporarily join Cruiser Force I under Rear-Admiral de Robeck, who is to be informed.
- A 30.** Adty. to R.A.C., 6th C.S. 7.8.14.  
Sent 1.10 p.m.  
When coaled *Leviathan* is to proceed to the Azores economising coal as much as possible. Search Islands for German cruisers and colliers; get in touch with Consul if possible. If not possible to coal at the Azores fall back on Gibraltar. You are to try and keep in wireless touch . . .
- A 31.** Adty. to *Cornwall.* 7.8.14.  
Sent 1.30 p.m.  
*Cornwall* to return to Gibraltar. Complete with coal.
- A 32.** Embassy, Washington, to Foreign Office. 7.8.14.  
Recd. 5.25 p.m.  
Executive order issued last night prohibits "all wireless stations in jurisdiction of United States from transmitting or receiving for delivery messages of an unneutral nature, and from in any way rendering to any one of the belligerents any unneutral service during continuance of hostilities." Naval Officers have been detailed as censors.
- A 33.** *Amphitrite* to Adty. 7.8.14.  
Recd. 6.12 p.m.  
Admiralty message to *Amphitrite* not delivered to R.A., as he is on board *Vindictive*, and I am not yet in touch with her . . .
- A 34.** Adty. to *Cornwall* and R.A.C., 5th C.S. 8.8.14.  
Sent 7.47 p.m.  
*Cornwall* to sail from Gibraltar as soon as ready. Shape course for Madeira, get on the trade route and place herself under the orders of R.A., *Carnarvon*.
- A 35.** Ministry of Marine, Paris, to Adty. 10.8.14.  
Recd. 6.15 p.m.  
*Cassard, Cosmao* have received orders to patrol the coast of Morocco where the military transports are now protected. Thanks to *Cornwall*. Admiralty may now dispose of her as may be desired.
- A 36.** Adty. to R.A.C., 5th C.S. 11.8.14.  
Sent 8.49 p.m.  
*Macedonia* sails daylight 12th for St. Vincent to join your force. Admiral *Vindictive* informed.
- A 37.** British Consul, Guadeloupe, to Adty. 12.8.14.  
Sent 12.45 a.m. Recd. 1.38 a.m.  
Warships nationality unknown seen last night Lemoule.  
Staff Note.—Le Moule is in Guadeloupe.  
This ship is probably *Dresden*, which was reported at Barbados on 10th August.
- A 38.** Customs, Trinidad, to Adty. 12.8.14.  
Recd. 3.55 a.m.  
*Drumcliffe* reports as follows: German *Dresden* arrived E.S.E. August 6, 1.30 p.m. lat. 1.10 N. long. 45.5 W. Boarded me. Destroyed wireless.



**A 39.** Censor, Port of Spain, to Chief Censor, War Office. 12.8.14. 8.5. a.m.  
In a telegram numbered 28 Port of Spain reports that steamer *Drumcliffe* was stopped on 6th August by cruiser *Dresden* 350 miles to the north-east of Cayenne and had her wireless apparatus destroyed. The report of yesterday was wrong or referred to another cruiser.

**A 40.** Adty. to *Leviathan*. 12.8.14. Sent 12.10 p.m.  
*Leviathan* after examining Azores for enemy cruisers proceed to St. Vincent, Cape Verde, to coal and then at once to the Cape for escort of troops . . .

**A 41.** Liverpool to Adty. 12.8.14. Recd. 5.54 p.m.  
Our steamer *Drumcliffe* left Buenos Ayres 24th July for New York in ballast arrived Trinidad for bunkers and reports her wireless destroyed by German cruiser 6th August. Joseph Chadwick and Sons, Shipowners.

**A 42.** Adty. to *Challenger* and R.A., *Vindictive*. 13.8.14. Sent 4.30 p.m.  
*Challenger* to proceed to Queenstown, complete with coal and act under orders of R.A., *Vindictive*.

**A 43.** Adty. to R.A.C., 5th C.S. 13.8.14. Sent 8.35 p.m.  
22 German cruisers reported near Duala, Cameroon River. Send one cruiser to Fernando Po to search for them and gain intelligence leaving one in vicinity of St. Vincent to guard trade.

**A 44.** Adty. to R.A.C., 4th C.S. 13.8.14. Sent 11 p.m.  
148 *Carmania* armed merchant ship with eight 4.7 guns leaves 15th August for your station. She will come to Halifax unless you wire for her to go anywhere else. *Good Hope* and *Glory* to coal on arrival and wait orders to return to England.

**A 45.** Adty. to R.A.C., 9th C.S. 13/14.8.14. Midnight.  
15 Armed merchant ship *Marmora* will sail from Tilbury in a day or two under your orders. She carries eight 4.7 in. guns.

**A 46.** R.A.C., 4th C.S., to Adty. 14.8.14. Recd. 12.21 a.m.  
248 . . . No aggressive acts have been reported nor is there any definite information of presence of hostile vessels on this side North Atlantic ocean trade routes. German agents are obviously sending false reports of their movements . . .

**A 47.** Adty. to R.A.C., 4th C.S. 14.8.14. Sent 3.50 p.m.  
154 German cruisers are reported to be in West Indies. They are being coaled at sea by German steamers who have embarked coal at St. Thomas for this purpose. They have been reported as follows: *Karlsruhe* at Curaçao 12.8.14; a German cruiser off Guadaloupe 12.8.14; German cruiser coaled in mouth of Para River 8.8.14, and was off the coast near Para 10.8.14; French steamer seized near Curaçao 7.8.14. They are apparently operating against West Indian trade. Believed some British ships have been captured.

**A 48.** Adty. to *Dwarf*, Sierra Leone. 14.8.14.  
21 Eastern Company cable steamer ordered transfer three German cables from off Monrovia to Sierra Leone. Accompany cable steamer and cover the operation. (Sent 6.6 p.m., 14.8.14.)  
24 With reference to Admiralty telegram 21.—The transfer of German cables from Monrovia to Sierra Leone will not be carried out. (Sent 2.35 p.m., 16.8.14.)

**A 49.** Adty. to R.A.C., 4th C.S. 14.8.14. Sent 7.30 p.m.  
155 My 154. Can you reinforce West Indies from the north ?

*Reply.*  
258 Your 155. Yes, if may send *Good Hope*, her speed most essential.  
*Admiralty reply.*  
161 Your 258. Approved to send *Good Hope* to West Indies. (Sent 10.45 a.m. 15.8.14.)

**A 50.** R.A., 4th C.S., to Adty. 14.8.14. Recd. 8.55 p.m.  
255 If feasible may *Good Hope* remain on station to permit Captain Yelverton being Senior Officer in the north, and relieving me if necessary to go south.

*Reply.*  
157 Your 255. *Good Hope* can remain for the present and (be) used as proposed.

**A 51.** Panama to Foreign Office. 15.8.14.  
Panama Canal successfully inaugurated to-day by the passage ship Atlantic to Pacific Ocean.

**A 52.** R.A.C., 4th C.S., to Adty. 15.8.14. Recd. 8.32 a.m.  
259 Your 154. As regards the German cruisers, an analysis of all the reliable information shows following are their probable movements. *Dresden*, 6th August, steering E.S.E., boarded S.S. *Drumcliffe* lat. 1° 10' N., long. 40° S., destroying wireless and allowing her to proceed; this received from ship's log by Governor, Trinidad. 8th August reported coaling Para. 10th August reported by Pernambuco seen between Para and Camocin. These movements apparently indicate *Dresden* proceeding south.

*Karlsruhe* arrived San Juan, Porto Rico, 9th August coaled and sailed. Arrived Curaçao Island 12th August coaled. Present position or objective not apparent. Have no information of capture of British ships. *Karlsruhe* having coaled twice in neutral ports request representations be made to all American States and Republics to prevent any further coaling in any neutral port. Imaginary and false information of movements of German cruisers being reported.

**A 53.** British Adty. to French Minister of Marine. 15.8.14. Sent 9.20 p.m.  
The passage across the Atlantic quite safe. British trade running as usual.

**A 54.** Adty. to R.A.C., 4th C.S. 16.8.14. Sent 6.5 p.m.  
169 *Carmania* sailed *viâ* Rockall on 15th for Halifax. Will not be recalled, but if not out of wireless touch could be deflected to Bermuda . . .



**A 55.** Ministry of Marine, Paris, to Adty. Recd. 0.35 a.m.  
(Translation.) In view of the present situation Morocco *Cassard* and *Cosmao* are to remain appropriated till further orders for good watch over coast of Morocco.

**A 56.** S.N.O., Gib., to Adty. Recd. 3.14 p.m.  
744 Union Castle liner *Galician* reports from Tenerife she was captured by *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* and released 5 a.m., 16th August, in 25.35 N., 17.20 W. . . . *Carnarvon*, *Cumberland*, *Cornwall*, *Leviathan* informed.

**A 57.** Adty. to R.A.s, 4th, 5th, 9th, 11th C.S. Sent 4.15 p.m.  
Great care is to be taken in the diversion of neutral ships with neutral cargo. It is of prime importance to keep the United States of America as a friendly neutral. Diversion of doubtful ships should be reported to Admiralty.

**A 58.** Adty. to R.A.C., 9th C.S., No. 20. 17.8.14.  
R.A.C., 11th C.S., No. 17. Sent 9 p.m.  
*Highflyer* is to be sent on to St. Vincent under orders of R.A., *Carnarvon*. One of the cruisers from Cruiser Force E is to be sent to join Cruiser Force I, name to be reported. *Juno* and *Isis* can be taken away from their present duties.

**A 59.** Adty. to R.A.C., 5th C.S. 17.8.14.  
25 *Highflyer* is being sent to join your squadron. Sent 9 p.m.

**A 60.** Adty. to all Ships. 17.8.14.  
Sent 9.37 p.m.  
General instructions. The main object of cruisers being to destroy the enemy's armed ships, when prizes are taken cruisers are not to leave their stations or be diverted from their object. Prize crews should be put on board. Any necessary prisoners removed. If this is not possible and the cargo is mostly enemy, the crew should be removed and the ship sunk. If the cargo is neutral the captain must use his discretion for securing the prize.

**A 61.** Adty. to R.A.C., 5th C.S., *Cumberland*, 18.8.14.  
*Cornwall*, *Macedonia*. Sent 12.40 a.m.  
*Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* stopped *Arlanza* 16th, 1 p.m., lat. 24.40 N., long. 17.14 W.; destroyed wireless and released ship.

**A 62.** Adty. to R.A.C., 9th C.S. 18.8.14.  
21 *Minerva* is being sent to join your Cruiser Force I. Sent 4.10 p.m.

**A 63.** Adty. to R.A.C., 4th C.S. 19.8.14.  
180 *Glory* when coaled is to be ordered to cruise off New York, and thus relieve a cruiser and give an impression of power, Halifax being used as a coaling base . . . Sent 2.10 p.m.

**A 64.** Adty. to V.A., 7th B.S. 19.8.14.  
Sent 4.35 p.m.  
Three battleships of your squadron are required for the defence of trade at three focal points. *Canopus* at St. Vincent, Cape Verde; *Albion* with Rear-Admiral at Gibraltar; *Ocean* at Queenstown. Report when these ships will be complete with coal. Special orders will be sent to them.

**A 65.** Adty. to V.A., 7th B.S. 20.8.14.  
Sent 1.55 a.m.  
*Albion* and *Canopus* can sail in company for Gibraltar to-morrow when charts have been received. Ships to be spread en route for extra protection of trade route. Proceed at economical speed.

*Albion*, after coaling, to cruise off Cape St. Vincent, using Gibraltar as a base, and generally support cruisers of Cruiser Force I in protecting trade south of Lisbon. Opportunity to be taken to carry out firing when south of Ushant, warning ships beforehand within hearing by W/T.

*Canopus*, after coaling, to proceed to Cape de Verde, passing *viâ* Madeira and Canary Islands. *Canopus* is to place herself under orders of R.A., Cruiser Force D, and en route is to try and destroy any German cruisers, obtaining information of enemy from cruisers en route. On arrival at Cape de Verde to generally protect trade in those waters, using Sierra Leone, Dakar and Cape de Verde for coaling.

**A 66.** Adty. to V.A., 7th B.S. 20.8.14.  
Sent 2.15 p.m.  
Extra ratings to enable cruisers to provide prize crews will be sent to Portland for *Canopus* and *Albion* to embark and transfer to each cruiser . . .

**A 67.** Consul, Rio de Janeiro, to Adty. 20.8.14.  
Recd. 7.41 p.m.  
British ship *Hyades*, owners Houston Line, bound from Rosario to Rotterdam, with maize was sunk by *Dresden* 16th August, about 180 miles east of Pernambuco. Officers and crew brought to Rio by German ship *Prussia*. *Dresden* had *Baden* and *Pernambuco* as tenders and *Blücher* as wireless telegraphy intelligence agent. I have informed Brazilian Government.

**A 68.** Adty. to *Leviathan*, St. Vincent, Cape Verde Is. 20.8.14.  
Sent 8.20 p.m.  
To await arrival. *Leviathan*, when coaled, to leave at once and proceed towards the Cape *viâ* Ascension and St. Helena, to meet transports under convoy of C-in-C., Cape, and return with them. Transports leave Cape 26th August.

**A 69.** Consul, Philadelphia, to Adty. 20.8.14.  
Recd. 9.58 p.m.  
German *Brandenburg* at this port last night took large quantities of provisions and is now coaling. She has not yet applied to Customs for clearance and may attempt to leave secretly. I have warned United States authorities here.

22.8.14.  
Recd. 4.54 a.m.  
*Brandenburg* sailed ostensibly for Bergen at about 5 or 6 this evening (21st). German steamships *Prinz Oskar* and *Rhaetia* are also apparently preparing for loading coal.

**A 70.** Knott, Newcastle-on-Tyne, to Adty. 21.8.14.  
Recd. 12.3 p.m.  
Our Rio Janeiro agents cable that British Consul there reports steamer *Siamese Prince* was stopped by German warship *Dresden*, 16th August, off Pernambuco, but was allowed to proceed with cargo to neutral port . . .

**A 71.** Consul, Pernambuco, to Adty. 21.8.14.  
Recd. 5.45 p.m.  
Suspect vicinity of Rocas Island being used as base by German cruiser *Dresden*.



**A 72.** Adty. to R.A.C., 9th C.S. Sent 6.20 p.m.  
27 Reliable report from Bilbao states that the German ship *Frankenwald* was off Bilbao interfering with submarine cables. Send a ship to deal with her.

**A 73.** Adty. to R.A.C., 4th C.S. Sent 10.45 p.m.  
188 *Good Hope* after coaling at St. Lucia is to proceed along the north coast of South America from Trinidad to Pernambuco searching for enemy's coaling base and cruiser *Dresden*. Off Para is a possible base. Coaling if necessary at Pernambuco, reporting arrival and wait further orders.

**A 74.** Adty. to R.A.C., 4th C.S. Sent 4 p.m.  
189 *Niobe* will be ready for sea on 1st September and will join your cruiser squadron. Give the necessary orders.

**A 75.** Adty. to *Glasgow*. Sent 4.21 p.m.  
If you have certain information *Dresden* is your objective. Station limits are only a general guide.

**A 76.** R.A.C., 4th C.S., St. Lucia, to Adty. Recd. 6.22 p.m.  
374 Your 188. Arrived with *Good Hope*, *Bristol*, and now coaling. *Berwick* arrives 25th August. Have planned to proceed to north coast of South America with *Berwick*, *Bristol* and make thorough search and clear up in those waters. Collier *Adamson* due at St. Lucia 28th August to follow to Para, also *Carmania* later on with cargo of coal from Bermuda. Coaling outside Pernambuco most improbable in August. *Good Hope* cannot leave before 24th August St. Lucia Island. Therefore request further instructions. *Condé* searching coast of Venezuela, afterwards St. Thomas Island touching at Martinique. *Descartes* later on guard ship St. Lucia Island.

**A 77.** Adty. to R.A.C., 4th C.S. Sent 10.35 p.m.  
191 Your 374. Your proposal approved. Hunt the *Dresden* and her colliers.

**A 78.** Las Palmas to Adty. Recd. 1.48 a.m.  
Reliable information German *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, armed merchant vessel, and German *Duala*, merchant vessel, arrived Rio de Oro, Spanish West Africa, daybreak, 17th August. Both in port 48 hours. Ignored Spanish authority. Transhipped coal from *Duala* to *Kaiser*.

**A 79.** R.A.C., 5th C.S., to Adty. Recd. 10.45 a.m.  
*Carnarvon* has captured German steamer *Professor Woermann*, who has waited to north of Brava Island some days apparently for German cruisers. She is being taken by *Carnarvon* to Sierra Leone . . .

**A 80.** Adty. to all Ships. Sent 11.35 p.m.  
Any properly authenticated French safe conduct for Austrian ship is to be respected. S.S. *Bathori* leaves Havre for Rotterdam shortly with such a pass.

**A 81.** Adty. to C-in-C., Home Fleets. Sent 3.45 p.m.  
579 . . . *Albion*, *Glory*, *Canopus* and *Ocean* have been detached to form supports at focal points on trade route in anticipation of any raids by hostile battle cruisers . . .

**A 82.** S.N.O., Gib., to Adty. 26.8.14.  
Recd. 7.33 p.m.  
816 German Consul at Tenerife states that armed mercantile cruiser *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* sank British merchant vessels *Nyanga* and *Kaipara*; refuses to give details. *Nyanga* sailed from Calabar for continental ports 28th July; *Kaipara* sailed from Monte Video for England 1st August . . .

**A 83.** R.A.C., 4th C.S., to Adty. 26.8.14.  
Recd. 7.42 p.m.  
279 If hostilities are likely to last it would be certainly advantageous if two 6-in. or 4.7 guns, with personnel, could be sent to Castries, St. Lucia Island, considering its importance as a coaling base and centre for merchant shipping. Over 60 British ships have visited the island since outbreak of war.

**A 84.** Adty. to R.A.C., 9th C.S. 27.8.14.  
Sent 0005.  
28 Detach *Marmora* to the Canaries to work in conjunction with *Highflyer* under the orders of R.A. Stoddart.

**A 85.** Adty. to R.A.C., 5th C.S. 27.8.14.  
Sent 0.45 a.m.  
33 It is important that the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* should be captured or sunk as soon as you can. *Marmora* has been ordered from Cruiser Force I to join your command. It is suggested that *Highflyer* and *Marmora* should work together, *Macedonia* and *Cornwall* doing the same, but this arrangement is subject to your discretion. You have as much intelligence on the spot as Admiralty have.

**A 86.** *Highflyer* to Adty. 27.8.14.  
Recd. 1.25 p.m.  
Have sunk *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* off Ouro. Survivors landed in their own boats before sinking. 2135.

**A 87.** Adty. to C-in-C., Portsmouth. 28.8.14.  
Sent 8.35 p.m.  
*Europa* is to escort transport *Appam* to west coast of Africa . . . They are to call at Dakar . . . at Bathurst . . . and at Sierra Leone.

**A 88.** Consul, Las Palmas, to Foreign Office. 29.8.14.  
Recd. 1.30 a.m.  
. . . At present remaining here still 13 German ships, two Austro-Hungarian. It is certain that this port is being used for obtaining steam coal and stores and supplies for transhipment to armed German ships elsewhere . . .

**A 89.** Consul, Tenerife, to Foreign Office. 29.8.14.  
Recd. 2.30 a.m.  
. . . Governor of this Province has telegraphed to Las Palmas instructing them to exercise strict vigilance over movements and requirements of all shipping using port of Las Palmas. Governor assured me that the matter would receive special attention. I received no report on this matter until to-day.

**A 90.** Adty. to R.A.C., 9th C.S. 29.8.14.  
Sent 11.40 p.m.  
34 *Europa* is coming out from Portsmouth 1st September, convoying transport *Appam*. Arrange to relieve *Europa* off Las Palmas by either *Challenger* or *Minerva* about 6th September. Ship selected will be employed in West Africa under *Cumberland* and must be lighter draught than *Europa*. *Europa* subsequently joins your orders. Ship selected to be filled up with coal at Las Palmas by 6th September.

*Reply.*  
*Challenger* will be about Las Palmas 5th September to relieve *Europa*.



**A 91.** Adty. to Intelligence Officer, Jamaica. 30.8.14. Sent 11.15 p.m.  
1 Report received from Consul-General, Baltimore, that Norwegian vessel *Molina* has gone to Norfolk and is probably not intending to coal German warship, but that Norwegian steamship *Hermion*, now at Newport News, will be used for that purpose. Report adds that Newport News is being used as base for supply of coal and stores to German ships.

Another report from Consul-General, New York, as follows :—Begins. Hamburg-Amerika Line have been chartering numerous neutral steamers which sail from Atlantic ports with large cargoes of coal and provisions carrying generally a German supercargo. They clear for very distant ports, but they are undoubtedly used to supply German cruisers. I have frequently approached local authorities, but they urge great difficulty finding legal cause for their detention.

Following names known. *Thor*, Norwegian, sailed 4th August, Newport News for Fray Bentos; *Nepos*, Norwegian, sailed 23rd August, Philadelphia for Tenerife; *Heine*, Norwegian Government, sailed 7th August, Philadelphia for La Guayra; *Berwind*, American, sailed 5th August, New York for Buenos Aires; *Lorenzo*, American, sailed 6th August, New York for Buenos Aires; *Johan Ludwig Mowinkel*, Norwegian, now at New York; *Pathfinder*, American, now at Caibarien.

**A 92.** Adty. to R.A.C., 5th C.S., No. 44. 30.8.14. Sent 11.15 p.m.  
R.A.C., 9th C.S.  
S.N.O., Gib., No. 541.

Hamburg-Amerika Line have been chartering numerous neutral steamers which sail from Atlantic ports with large cargoes of coal and provisions, carrying generally a German supercargo. They clear for very distant ports, but they are undoubtedly used to supply German cruisers.

**A 93.** Adty. to R.A., *Albion*. 31.8.14. Sent 12.20 p.m.  
Proceed to Gibraltar and remain there till further orders.

**A 94.** Naval Attaché to Ministry of Marine, Paris. 31.8.14. Sent 4.30 p.m.  
291 As base of British Expeditionary Force has been changed to St. Nazaire, the Admiralty would be obliged if one division of armoured cruisers of the 2nd Light Squadron were sent at once to patrol and cover the route from Ushant to Finisterre. This would allow the British cruisers watching this route to spread further south.

At present there is no sign of enemy ships in the Bay of Biscay, but when it is known that the base has been changed it is possible that a raid may be made on the transports.

The other division of armoured cruisers should be kept at Cherbourg ready to relieve the first or go to the east(ward), as may be required.

*Reply.*

73 French division *Gloire* weighed anchor last night for cruise between Ushant and Finisterre as requested in your telegram 291. (Recd. 11.50 a.m. 1.9.14.)

**A 95.** Ministry of Marine, Paris, to Naval Attaché, Adty. 31.8.14. Recd. 10.43 p.m.

64 (*Translation.*) Some Moroccan tribes are spreading the report that England and France are at war. It appears to us useful for a British cruiser to go temporarily with one of our cruisers on the south coast of Morocco. If the Admiralty accepts this suggestion, the appointed cruiser might concert directly with General Lyautey at Rabat for duty not exceeding one week, which might consist of an appearance off the south coast simultaneously with French cruiser.

**A 96.** Adty. to R.A.C., 5th C.S. 1.9.14. Sent 2.15 p.m.  
46 *Macedonia* is to proceed to south-east coast of America under orders of *Glasgow*. *Empress of Britain* to remain under your orders in Cruiser Force D.

**A 97.** Adty. to R.A.C., 9th C.S. 1.9.14. Sent 3.45 p.m.  
37 A division of French armoured cruisers are proceeding now to guard the trade route from Ushant to Finisterre and thus relieves you of this area.

**A 98.** Adty. to C-in-C., Devonport. 2.9.14. Sent 1.29 p.m.  
*Amphitrite* is not to sail till further orders. Probably will be required to sail on Friday (5th September) for convoy duty.

**A 99.** Adty to *Minerva*. 2.9.14.  
(a) Escort *Edinburgh Castle* to 100 miles from Ushant or until the French armoured cruisers are met. 1445.  
(b) Proceed with *Edinburgh Castle* till near Plymouth, and then proceed to Plymouth, coal, and wait orders ready to convoy troops out to Gibraltar. R.A. *Argonaut* informed. 2348.

**A 100.** Vice-Consul, Pernambuco, to Adty. 2.9.14. Recd. 10.53 p.m.  
British ship *Bowes Castle* sunk by *Karlsruhe* 186 miles east of Barbados, 18th August. Officers and men were brought by German ship to Maranham to-day . . .

**A 101.** Adty. to R.A.C., 9th C.S. 2.9.14. Sent 11.56 p.m.  
39 *Amphitrite* is going to convoy a transport to Gibraltar, sailing probably Friday (4th September). *Minerva* is going into Plymouth to coal and will convoy out another transport; date will be communicated.

**A 102.** Adty. to R.A.C., 5th C.S. 3.9.14. Sent 10.55 a.m.  
*Europa* now conveying transport *Appam* out to Las Palmas, due there about 7th where she will be relieved by *Challenger*. A cruiser is required to relieve *Hyacinth* who is conveying homeward six transports in company with *Leviathan* and is due St. Vincent, Cape Verde, about the 10th. Report cruiser you propose for this service. *Europa* is available.

**A 103.** Adty. to R.A.C., 4th C.S. 3.9.14. Sent 5 p.m.  
200 You are to remain and take charge of S.E. Coast of America Station. Ships under your orders, *Good Hope*, *Berwick*, *Bristol*, *Glasgow*, *Monmouth*, *Carmania*, *Otranto*, *Victorian*; communicate with *Glasgow*.

**A 104.** Ministry of Marine, Paris, to Naval Attaché, Adty. 3.9.14. Recd. 10.5 p.m.

88 (*Translation.*) I transmit to you following cablegram passing *via* P Q (?) Willemstad, Curaçao, on the 31st for Pleybe, Minister of Colonies, The Hague. Begins.

*Karlsruhe* arrived 12th, 7 o'clock, there being a rumour Holland also was in war, agreed before with Division Commander that if foreign warship came on (in) officer would go with pilot on board. Division Commander went himself on board asking Commander *Karlsruhe* if he knew rumour was true. Commander assured he convinced Holland still in peace, he requested to (may) enter for coaling, being entirely without coal. He was allowed bunker 1,200 tons. This quantity was considered to be for *Karlsruhe* not larger than neutrality proclamation permitted to give, that is, quantity to reach next harbour of its own country. *Karlsruhe* departed 7.30 p.m. Governor Nuyens.



3.9.14.

**A 105.** Adty. to S.N.O., Halifax.

Sent 11.40 p.m.

Following for *Suffolk*. Begins. *Suffolk* or one of your A cruisers that may be nearer is to proceed to St. Thomas, from whence it is reported that supplies of coal, food and ammunition are being sent to German cruisers, probably *Karlsruhe* and possibly *Dresden*. The vessel sent should remain in West Indies and operate there. It is urgent that the German cruiser and the colliers should be sunk. Report dispositions and orders given to *Niobe*.

4.9.14.

**A 106.** Adty. to R.A., *Doris*.

Sent 2 p.m.

30 As soon as convenient you are to transfer your flag to *Caronia* and proceed to North America. You will there transfer your flag to the *Glory*, and remain in charge of the North America and West Indies Station. *Caronia* is to remain under your orders . . .

4.9.14.

**A 107.** Adty. to R.A., *Carnarvon* (via Dakar W/T).

Sent 2.15 p.m.

48 On arrival of *Canopus* at St. Vincent she is to complete with coal and proceed to the Abrolhos Rocks, where she is to remain and guard the flying base that is to be formed there of colliers and supply ships. *Albion* is coming to take the *Canopus's* place at St. Vincent, Cape Verde. R.-A. Cradock in *Good Hope* is taking command S.E. Coast America. *Cornwall* to be under his orders. *Glasgow*, *Monmouth* and *Otranto* have gone on to Magellan Straits. Retain *Victorian* under your orders.

(Acknowledged in 13 from R.A.C., 5th C.S. Sent 4.30 p.m. 5.9.14.)

4.9.14.

**A 108.** Adty. to R.-A. Tottenham, *Albion*.

Sent 2.32 p.m.

You are to transfer your flag to *Sutlej* and return in her to take command of Cruiser Force E. *Sutlej* is to convoy the transports which are being got ready, including *Ultonia* from Malta. Probable date 9th at Gibraltar.

*Albion* is to complete with coal and proceed to St. Vincent, Cape Verde, under the orders of R.-A. Stoddart.

*Ocean* is being sent out to replace *Albion*. She will be under the orders of R.-A. de Robeck and stationed off Cape St. Vincent . . .

10.9.14.

**A 109.** Adty. to R.A., *Charybdis*.

Sent 4.45 p.m.

32 You and your squadron are going to be temporarily replaced by V.-A. Bethell and four battleships. As soon as V.-A. Bethell has relieved you, you are to get your squadron coaled and proceed to Canada, fill up with coal there and bring back a convoy of about 14 transports of Canadian troops. They expect to be ready to sail about 24th. Further details will be sent to you . . .

11.9.14.

**A 110.** Adty. to A.C., 9th C.S.

Sent 12.55 p.m.

46 *Ocean* and *Minerva* sail to-day with convoy of about 14 transports for Gibraltar. On arrival *Ocean* is to remain under your orders. Some of the transports are going on to Malta and are to be convoyed by *Minerva* or one other ship selected by you.

12.9.14.

**A 111.** Adty. to C.-in-C., Devonport.

Sent 9.30 a.m.

The following are orders for R.-A. Wemyss :—

Proceed with your three cruisers as soon as ready to Halifax. *Diana* to follow as soon as ready. Your squadron is to fill up with coal at Halifax and be ready to start back as soon as transports are ready. Further details on this subject will be sent to Halifax. Cruisers should be spread when going across and usual captures made with prize crews put on board.

There is a large number of German liners at present detained in New York, but they are ready for sea and we can't be sure they won't sail at any moment. Information will be sent by wireless as far as possible, both from England as well as via Cape Race and Halifax. R.-A. Hornby will be found in *Glory*, with *Lancaster*, *Suffolk*, *Niobe*, and *Caronia*, in the northern part of the station. *Berwick* and *Essex* are in West Indies. R.-A. Cradock has gone to south-east coast of America.

12.9.14.

**A 112.** Adty. to S.N.O., Gib.

Sent 11.12 p.m.

591 *Proserpine* is being sent out to act under your orders. The principal duty is to assist in the patrol of the Straits of Gibraltar.

13.9.14.

**A 113.** Adty. to S.N.O., Halifax.

Sent 12.20 p.m.

. . . For the present cruiser watching St. Lawrence is to at once proceed off New York to prevent German ships escaping. Two ships are to be permanently left off New York.

13.9.14.

**A 114.** Adty. to General.

Sent 12.35 p.m.

The original purpose of our armed merchant cruisers was to capture or sink the armed merchant cruisers of the enemy.

There does not now appear to be as many armed merchant cruisers of the enemy as was anticipated. Each of our armed merchant cruisers should as far as possible work in conjunction with a cruiser.

If an armed merchant cruiser meets an enemy's cruiser, whose force in the Captain's opinion is so superior that she cannot engage her with good prospect of success, she should shadow her, keeping in touch by wireless with any of our cruisers near, and should not let her escape if possible.

14.9.14.

**A 115.** Adty. to R.-A., *Carnarvon*, *Amphitrite*.

Timed 1140.

*Amphitrite* is to arrange to relieve *Carnarvon* with *Europa* and convoy as far as latitude of Finisterre, after which *Europa* can continue alone. French cruisers are guarding the Bay and will be informed. *Carnarvon* can then return to her station.

Reply from R.A. de Robeck.

There is at present no ship available (to) relieve *Carnarvon* with convoy.

14.9.14.

**A 116.** Adty. to all Ships (via Cleethorpes).

Sent 2.25 p.m.

You have full authority to send into British ports neutral vessels which hamper your operations. Your own discretion will show you importance of not appearing to maltreat flag of a small neutral.

14.9.14.

**A 117.** Adty. to R.A., *Carnarvon*, *Amphitrite*.

Sent 8.45 p.m.

*Carnarvon* can return to her station when the latitude of Lisbon is reached. *Ocean* and *Minerva* escorting troops outward are off the coast; *Europa* to convoy transports to England.



**A 118.** Adty. to R.A., *Carnarvon*. 16.9.14.  
Sent 12.35 p.m.

65 It is necessary that you should give temporary support to French cruiser *Cosmao* south of Agadir by an armed liner. Give orders accordingly. Acknowledge.

**A 119.** Adty. to S.N.O., Halifax. 17.9.14.  
Sent 9.16 p.m.

For R.-A. Hornby. 4 *Glory* is required for convoy duty. You are to shift your flag to either *Caronia*, *Suffolk* or *Lancaster* as you think fit. *Glory* and *Niobe* are to be put under orders of R.-A. Wemyss and the whole convoy is to proceed when ready by route 9 blue shown on North Atlantic Route Chart. Convoy will be met by another battleship from England at a rendezvous lat. 49.30 N., long. 30 W. *Glory* will leave convoy when in longitude of Fastnet and proceed to Queenstown to coal and return to Halifax. Inform R.-A. Wemyss as soon as you are in touch with him.

**A 120.** R.-A. de Robeck to Adty. 19.9.14.  
Recd. 4.53 a.m.  
Rear-Admiral's flag hoisted *Argonaut*. *Amphitrite* will take over charge of convoy at St. Vincent on 19th September, escorting it to the Channel. *Ocean* is proceeding to Madeira and afterwards to Azores. 1718.

**A 121.** Adty. to R.A., *Argonaut*. 19.9.14.  
Sent 11.45 a.m.  
Approved for *Amphitrite* to convoy transports to England. *Ocean* to proceed to Port Said, coaling at Malta on the way. *Europa* is coming out to rejoin Cruiser Force I.

**A 122.** Adty. to S.N.O., Halifax. 22.9.14.  
Sent 2.35 p.m.  
12 Following for R.A. and all ships.

You are on no account to telegraph in to New York for supplies or newspapers. United States Government have called attention to this in a friendly way at present.

**A 123.** Adty. to R.A. North America and W. Indies. 25.9.14.  
Sent 12.30 a.m.  
20 *Niobe* to be retained under orders of R.-A. Hornby instead of escort under R.-A. Wemyss. Inform both Admirals.

**A 124.** Adty. to A.C., 9th C.S. 28.9.14.  
Sent 6.50 p.m.  
56 *Minerva* has been sent on to East Indies. *Calgarian* and *Donegal* are being sent to you as soon as ready. *Diana* also will be sent on return of Canadian convoy.

**A 125.** Adty. to R.A., *Argonaut*. 30.9.14.  
Sent 1.40 a.m.  
59 Gibraltar should be the principal coaling base for ships of your squadron, unless there are any other reasons for sending them to Plymouth. This especially applies to *Calgarian* on account of coaling from alongside.

**A 126.** Adty. to S.N.O., Halifax. 1.10.14.  
Sent 9.45 p.m.  
61 Intelligence centre, under Abraham, has been established at St. Johns, Newfoundland . . . Foreign Office considers New York unsuitable as an Intelligence Centre.

**A 127.** Adty. to S.N.O., Gibraltar. 2.10.14.  
Sent 7.14 p.m.

665. *Leviathan*, when ready for sea, is to await the arrival of four transports, *California*, *Corsican*, *Deseado* and *India*, due at Gibraltar about the 8th. *Leviathan* is to escort them to England and will then join the Sixth Cruiser Squadron with the Grand Fleet.

**A 128.** Adty. to R.A., *Argonaut*, *Sutlej*, etc. 5.10.14.  
Sent 8.50 p.m.  
Merchant vessels having green clearance labels issued by Customs may proceed to port named thereon without further examination. They should be handed on by signal through the different commands . . .

**A 129.** French Ministry of Marine to Naval Attaché. 7.10.14.  
5703 . . . I have given orders for *Guichen* to cease cruising off Bilbao and to return to Cherbourg. Please let me know if Admiralty considers it desirable that a division of the 2nd Light Squadron should keep up a watch between Ushant and mouth of Loire, or whether they prefer these ships should be employed in Western Channel Patrol.

*Reply.*  
Admiralty would be glad if you would maintain a patrol between Ushant and Cape Finisterre for the purpose of protecting the route for transports between England and Gibraltar as well as covering the mouth of the Loire. Three cruisers seem to be sufficient for the purpose.

**A 130.** Adty. to S.N.O., Gibraltar. 9.10.14.  
Sent 12.45 p.m.  
685 *Bacchante* and *Euryalus* leave to-day for Gibraltar with convoy of territorials for India. These may proceed to Malta unescorted unless naval situation in Western Mediterranean necessitates protection. Similarly transports from Malta can proceed to Gibraltar unescorted. *Euryalus* and *Bacchante* are to escort transports home from Gibraltar and will work to and from home every 16 days, according to programme now on its way to you. Give directions accordingly.

**A 131.** Adty. to R.A., *Carnarvon*. 9.10.14.  
Sent 9.15 p.m.  
89 *Astraea*, with two transports under convoy, sailed from St. Helena, 11 p.m., 8th. She was ordered to go to Sierra Leone. Arrange to convoy the transports across your station. *Astraea* can come as far as St. Vincent, Cape Verde, if necessary, but she is required back at the Cape as soon as possible. Report arrangements made.

**A 132.** Adty. to I.O., St. Vincent. 12.10.14.  
Sent 3 p.m.  
For *Carnarvon* and *Albion*. *Albion* is to complete with coal, proceed to Ascension, await further orders, probably will proceed then to Cape Station.

**A 133.** R.A., *Carnarvon*, to Adty. (via Dakar W/T). 12.10.14.  
Recd. 4.59 p.m.  
As soon as my ships have taken stores from *Baron Ardrossan*, in the vicinity of St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, I propose taking *Carnarvon*, *Albion*, *Marmora*, *Empress of Britain* and collier to sweep southwards to St. Paul Rocks, Fernando Noronha Island, and Rocas Island, and thence to south limit of my station, remaining between St. Paul Rocks and latitude 10° S. while coal lasts . . .



**A 134.** Adty. to S.N.O., Gib.

14.10.14.  
Sent 12.15 p.m.

703 *Defence*, on arrival, is to complete with coal and stores and proceed at highest possible speed to Monte Video, calling at St. Vincent, Cape Verde, and Pernambuco. The Captain and navigating officer of the *Defence* and *Euryalus* are to exchange ships. The *Euryalus* is to take home the Admiral's staff, retinue, baggage, and all necessary documents and is to take charge of the first homeward convoy. The *Defence* will be under the orders of R.-A. Stoddart in the *Carnarvon*, now on her way to Monte Video from St. Vincent, Cape Verde. Inform *Defence* and *Euryalus*.

**A 135.** Adty. to R.A., *Carnarvon*.

14.10.14.  
Sent 1.15 p.m.

101 Proceed down the trade route to Monte Video, calling at Pernambuco and Rio on the way. *Defence* is following you down from Gibraltar. While you are there, *Cornwall*, *Bristol*, *Macedonia* and *Orama* will be under your orders. Keep sufficient force ready to concentrate in case German squadron from Pacific escape past Cradock, who has *Good Hope*, *Canopus*, *Monmouth*, *Bristol* and *Otranto*; *Empress of Britain* and *Marmora* to return when you think fit, to operate in the vicinity of Cape Verde under *Highflyer*. . . .

**A 136.** Adty. to *Highflyer*.

15.10.14.  
Sent 6.50 p.m.

*Astraea* is bringing a homeward convoy of two transports up to the vicinity of St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, where you are to take them on till relieved by a cruiser from Cruiser Force I.

**A 137.** Adty. to all Intelligence Officers.

16.10.14.  
Sent 2.45 p.m.

The following has been sent to H.B.M. representatives in all principal countries, to all self-governing colonies and Dominions, and to all important Crown Colonies. Begins:—

Experience of the first two months of war shows that no increase in loss of merchant shipping will be incurred by always keeping trade routes open. When hostile cruiser makes her presence known by sending crews of prizes into port she is unlikely to remain on same route, and short of closing all routes for indefinite time, there is no remedy, as next point of attack is matter of conjecture. At same time detention of insured vessels in port is extremely costly to owners and merchants and, if continued, defeats object of Government Insurance Scheme. Vessels sailing after dark and making good offing with dim lights, run little chance of capture. Any detention of shipping should be reported at once by cable. Admiralty considers it essential that trade should not be stopped.

**A 138.** S.N.O., Gib., to Adty.

16.10.14.  
Sent 9.50 p.m.

156 Spanish merchant vessel which arrived Las Palmas to-day reports she was stopped by *Karlsruhe*, October 9th, 0.20 S., 29.40 W. *Karlsruhe* accompanied by two merchant vessels. R.A., 5th C.S., and all ships informed.

**A 139.** Adty. to *Kent* (via North Front).

17.10.14.  
Sent 11.55 p.m.

*Kent* to remain in the vicinity of the Canaries for the present. Search for coaling bases in the neighbourhood. Communicate with *Highflyer* and place yourself under his orders.

**A 140.** Adty. to R.A., 9th C.S.

18.10.14.  
Sent 12.20 p.m.

76 Cruiser required for homeward convoy of two transports now due at St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands. To be convoyed by *Highflyer* across his station until taken charge of by you. Arrange with *Highflyer* and report action taken. You should convoy as far as latitude of Finisterre.

**A 141.** Adty. to *Highflyer*.

18.10.14.  
Sent 1.50 p.m.

1 It is at your discretion whether *Kent* takes *Astraea's* convoy instead of *Highflyer*.

**A 142.** Adty. to *Amphitrite*.

20.10.14.  
Sent 10.35 p.m.

78 Whilst *Vindictive* is waiting for convoy let her proceed to search the Canary Islands.

**A 143.** A.C., 9th C.S., to Adty.

21.10.14.

Submit I may be informed when *Donegal* and *Diana* will join 9th Cruiser Squadron. 1021.

Reply.

79 *Donegal* is due to leave Plymouth on 23rd instant. *Diana* not coming for the present. 1735.

**A 144.** R.A.C., 9th C.S., to Adty.

22.10.14.

11 Request permission to direct any of my ships occasionally to visit Canary Islands whilst 5th Cruiser Squadron is short of ships in that area.

Reply.

80 Your 11 approved. *Highflyer* is now senior officer of Cruiser Force D. *Kent* is under his orders. Keep in touch with them.

**A 145.** Consul, Tenerife, to Adty.

(a) *Crefeld*, German merchant vessel, entering from south, said has 319 Britishers aboard, particulars later. (Sent 22nd October, 4.10 p.m.; recd. 5.58 p.m.)

(b) German merchant vessel *Crefeld* arrived Santa Cruz to-day with 419 crews and passengers belonging to undermentioned ships captured and believed sunk by *Karlsruhe* between equator and 4° S., 29.40 and 34.35 W. 70 Chinese obtained by Germans for working coal. *Strathroy*, *Maple Branch*, *Highland Hope*, *Indrani*, *Maria*, *Cornish City*, *Rio Iguassu*, *Farn*, *Niceto de Lavinaga*, *Lynrowan*, *Cervantes*, *Pruth*, *Condor*. (Sent 22nd October, 5.45 p.m.; recd. 23rd October, 3 a.m.)

(c) German ship *Karlsruhe* when left on 13th October was taking fuel oil stores from *Condor*. She had in company two hospital ships, the *Rio Negro* and the *Asuncion*, and captured ships *Farn* and *Indrani* (latter name changed to *Hoffnung*), both with coal and cargoes. (Recd. 23rd October, 8 p.m.)

(d) Rocas Island and some bays on north coast of Brazil, eastward of Ceara, have been used by *Karlsruhe*. (Recd. 23rd October, 8.6 p.m.)

**A 146.** *Edinburgh Castle*, Pernambuco, to Adty.

23.10.14.  
Recd. 8.16 p.m.

Following by wireless from *Carnarvon*, 22nd October, 1900, begins:—

*Bristol*, with *Edinburgh Castle* and *Kent*, are to search for German cruiser *Karlsruhe*, reported at anchor 20th October, 5° S., 36.8 W., with collier. *Karlsruhe's* beat may be between this position and Fernando Noronha Island. If *Karlsruhe* is not found by 30th October, *Kent* and *Bristol* are to return to Abrolhos Rocks and coal; *Edinburgh Castle* to proceed on her voyage . . . ends 1400.



24.10.14.

**A 147.** Adty. to R.A., *Carnarvon*.

Sent 6.55 p.m.

109 You need not proceed to the south for the present, until there is more definite news of *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*. *Kent* remains with *Highflyer*. *Defence* is instead of *Kent*.

A cruiser with an armed auxiliary must be maintained within about 300 miles of Cape San Roque. A ship must be near Abrolhos to guard supplies and colliers.

General principle of cruisers working with armed auxiliaries and patrolling in the vicinity of focal points should be continued.

With reference to your orders to Intelligence Officer, Pernambuco, he has been told that *Defence* is to take the place of *Kent*, and that *Edinburgh Castle* is to remain on the station for the present.

Distribution is left to your discretion, but there appear to be two focal points to be guarded and patrolled; they are the vicinity of Cape San Roque and a position between the Abrolhos and Rio. This latter includes looking out for any supplies and colliers at Abrolhos.

24.10.14.

**A 148.** Consul, Dakar, to Adty.

Recd. 8.26 p.m.

German war vessel *Karlsruhe* reported at anchor between Bissagos Island and Cassini River.

24.10.14.

**A 149.** Adty. to I.O., Pernambuco.

Sent 10.40 p.m.

*Karlsruhe* reported to be coaling near Dakar. This may or may not be true. Keep Admiralty fully informed of all you know and of all movements of ships.

25.10.14.

**A 150.** Adty. to *Highflyer*.

Sent 3 a.m.

Search vicinity of Bissagos.

25.10.14.

**A 151.** Adty. to R.A., *Amphitrite*.

Sent 1 p.m.

81 Can you detach a cruiser and *Calgarian* to look after the locality of Canaries at once. *Kent* and *Victorian* can then proceed further south on the trade route to look out for *Karlsruhe*. Report action taken.

*Reply.*

Now proceeding in *Amphitrite* to Canary Islands. *Calgarian* cannot be ready till 30th. Suggest *Bacchante*, now at Gibraltar, be directed to join me at Canary Islands. No other cruisers available. *Argonaut* at Devonport. *Vindictive* conveying transport convoy. *Europa* off River Tagus. (Recd. 25th October, 7.10 p.m.)

*Reply.*

*Donegal* will be ready for sea midnight 28th. *Bacchante* not available to join you, required for escort duty. (Sent 25th October, 9.25 p.m.)

26.10.14.

**A 152.** Adty. to *Kent* and *Highflyer*.

Sent 0015.

*Kent* to join *Highflyer* off Bissagos Island, Portuguese Guinea, using all despatch.

27.10.14.

**A 153.** Adty. to S.N.O., Gib.

Sent 12 15 a.m.

741 *Bacchante* to proceed towards Cape Finisterre, get in touch with and join outward convoy under *Diana*; both ships proceeding to Gibraltar with transports.

27.10.14.

**A 154.** R.A., 5th C.S., Rio, to Adty.

Recd. 11.41 p.m.

46 I have received orders from Admiral Cradock to send *Defence* to Monte Video to coal, obtain chart, and to await further orders.

Submit I may be given two fast cruisers in place of *Defence*, as I do not consider force at my disposal sufficient to ensure capture of *Karlsruhe* as well as carrying out orders in Admiralty telegram 109, and leave *Orama* in Rio de la Plate, where I consider it necessary to keep ship.

26.10.14.

Admiral Cradock to Adty.

325 With reference to orders contained in Admiralty telegram received 7th October to search for enemy, and our great desire for early success, consider it impracticable on account of *Canopus* slow speed to find and destroy enemy squadron. Consequently, I have ordered *Defence* to join me after coaling at Monte Video for orders. *Canopus* will be employed on necessary convoying colliers.

From experience 6th August most respectfully submit my opinion is depredations of *Karlsruhe* may continue until she meets with a vessel of superior speed.<sup>1</sup>

28.10.14.

**A 155.** R.A., *Carnarvon*, Rio, to Adty.

Recd. 4.3 a.m.

45 In order to comply with your telegram 109 following will be disposition of ships under my orders.

*Bristol*, *Macedonia*, *Edinburgh Castle*, vicinity of north coast of Brazil, sweeping for the *Karlsruhe*.

*Cornwall* will leave Abrolhos when *Defence* arrives, and proceed to patrol San Roque, Rocas, Fernando Noronha area.

*Carnarvon* and *Defence* patrol Rio de Janeiro to Abrolhos Rocks.

*Orama* remaining River Plate until further orders or until relieved by Admiral Cradock's ship. Cradock informed.

*Reply.*

111 Your 45. Concur in your dispositions. Cradock has been informed that *Defence* is not to leave your command. (Sent 28th October, 4 p.m.)

30.10.14.

**A 156.** Adty. to S.N.O., Gib.

Sent 11.15 a.m.

759 Three transports from Malta to England, *Carnarvonshire*, *Arcadia* and *Nile*, due at Gibraltar, 3rd November, should await escort of *Diana*. Seven other transports from India due at Gibraltar 11th November, should be escorted by *Bacchante*. Arrange accordingly.

31.10.14.

**A 157.** Adty. to *Highflyer*.

Sent 11.55 p.m.

8 Arrange so that *Highflyer* and *Kent* each have an armed liner to work with. *Empress of Britain* requires to go to Sierra Leone for cleaning boilers shortly . . .

3.11.14.

**A 158.** Consul-General, Valparaiso, to Adty.

(a) Three German warships approaching Valparaiso Bay. (Sent 10.35 a.m.; recd. 5.6 p.m.)

(b) *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Nürnberg* arrived. (Sent 12.30 p.m.; time of receipt not known.)

<sup>1</sup> This is the version in *Glasgow's Telegraph Log* No. 20110. The second paragraph as received at the Admiralty was decoded as—

"From experience 6 August most respectfully submit *not to oppose* depredation of *Karlsruhe*. *May it continue* until she meets vessel of superior speed."



**A 159.** Adty. to *Defence*, Monte Video, and R.A.,  
*Carnarvon* (No. 112). 3.11.14. Sent 6.20 p.m.

*Defence* to proceed with all possible despatch to join Admiral Cradock on west coast of America.

**A 160.** Consul-General, Valparaiso, to Adty. 4.11.14. Recd. 1.29 a.m.  
Chilian Admiral just informed me that German Admiral states his ships met *Good Hope*, *Monmouth*, *Glasgow*, *Otranto* at sunset on Sunday, north of Coronel, in thick and wicked weather. Fight ensued. After about one hour's action *Monmouth* turned over and sank. *Good Hope*, *Glasgow*, and *Otranto* drew off into the darkness. *Good Hope* on fire. An explosion was heard. It is believed she sank. German ships engaged included *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Nürnberg*. (Sent 3rd November, 6.10 p.m.)

**A 161.** Consul-General, Valparaiso, to Adty. 4.11.14. Recd. 7.48 a.m.  
German warships buying quantity of warm clothing and considerable telegraphing with Rio de Janeiro is proceeding.

**A 162.** Adty. to I.O., Monte Video. 4.11.14. Sent 11.45 a.m.  
*Defence* is to remain in the vicinity of Monte Video till *Carnarvon* and *Cornwall* join her.

**A 163.** Adty. to *Kent*. 4.11.14. Sent 12.30 p.m.  
Proceed to the Abrolhos Rocks with all despatch and communicate *via* Rio. It is intended you shall join Admiral Stoddart's squadron.

**A 164.** Adty. to C.-in-C., Home Fleets. 4.11.14. Sent 12.40 p.m.  
171 Order *Invincible* and *Inflexible* to fill up with coal at once and proceed to Berehaven with all despatch. They are urgently needed for foreign service . . .

**A 165.** Adty. to British Minister, Rio. 4.11.14. Sent 1.25 p.m.  
Following for *Carnarvon* begins :—

114 In view of reported sinking of *Good Hope* and *Monmouth* by *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* off Coronel, 1st November, armoured ships on south-east coast of America must concentrate at once.

*Carnarvon*, *Cornwall*, should join *Defence* off Monte Video. *Canopus*, *Glasgow*, *Otranto* have been ordered if possible to join you there. *Kent*, from Sierra Leone, also has been ordered to join your flag *via* Abrolhos. Endeavour to get into communication with them. Enemy will most likely come on to the Rio trade route.

Reinforcements will meet you shortly from England.

**A 166.** Consul-General, Valparaiso, to Adty. 4.11.14. Recd. 5.33 p.m.  
*Gneisenau*, *Scharnhorst*, *Nürnberg* left. (Sent 11.20 a.m.)

**A 167.** Consul-General, Valparaiso, to Adty. 4.11.14. Recd. 10.33 p.m.  
Arrival of . . . German armed merchant vessel *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*. (Sent 4 or 4.35 p.m.)

**A 168.** Adty. to C.-in-C., Home Fleets. 5.11.14. Sent 12.15 a.m.  
178 Secret and personal. From all reports received through German sources we fear Cradock has let himself be caught, or has engaged recklessly with only *Monmouth* and *Good Hope* armoured ships against *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*. Probably both British vessels sunk. Position of *Canopus* critical, and fate of *Glasgow* and *Otranto* uncertain. Proximity of concentrated German squadron of five good ships will threaten gravely main trade route Rio to London; essential recover control. First Sea Lord requires *Invincible* and *Inflexible* for this purpose. Sturdee goes C.-in-C., South Atlantic and Pacific; Oliver, Chief of Staff; Bartolemé, Naval Secretary. W.S.C.

**A 169.** Adty. to V.A., Channel Fleet. 5.11.14. Sent 7.10 p.m.  
*Vengeance* is to proceed to Gibraltar at ordinary speed, complete with coal and await orders.

**A 170.** Adty. to R.A. Stoddart. 11.11.14. Sent 11.10 a.m.  
121 *Inflexible* and *Invincible*, with Admiral Sturdee, are leaving Devonport to-morrow *via* St. Vincent for Abrolhos Rocks. *Kent* left Sierra Leone on 5th. *Warrior* and *Black Prince*, with possibly three French armoured cruisers, leave Gibraltar for west coast Africa about 14th.

**A 171.** Adty. to Admiral Hornby. 15.11.14. Sent 5.35 p.m.  
90 *Scharnhorst* squadron were still in neighbourhood of Valparaiso on 14th. After coaling at Halifax *Princess Royal* should operate off New York in case the German liners there break out, and to provide for contingency of powerful cruiser getting out of North Sea and driving off our ships. *Glory* should proceed to Jamaica.

91 (Sent 12.30 a.m., 16.11.14.) *Glory* is not to go to Jamaica for the present.

**A 172.** Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 18.11.14. Sent 7.15 p.m.  
845 *Black Prince* is to join C.-in-C., Grand Fleet, proceeding to Devonport to coal. *Amphitrite* should remain at Gibraltar, as owing to movements of *Scharnhorst's* squadron, West Coast Squadron is being reconsidered, and Admiral de Robeck may have to transfer back to *Amphitrite*. Inform R.A.

**A 173.** Adty. to R.A. de Robeck. 20.11.14. Sent 11.50 a.m.  
*Highflyer*, with her three armed liners *Victorian*, *Marmora*, and *Empress of Britain*, is to remain Senior Officer of Cruiser Force D, and to continue to guard the trade routes in the vicinity of the Cape Verde Islands, based on Sierra Leone.

**A 174.** Adty. to Admiral Hornby. 30.11.14. Sent 11.45 a.m.  
110 *Princess Royal* is to proceed to Jamaica at once. (Repeated 11.35 p.m. to S.N.O., Halifax.)

**A 175.** Adty. to Admiral Hornby. 3.12.14. Sent 12.40 p.m.  
114 *Princess Royal* should be directed to provide for one cruiser maintaining wireless touch between Jamaica and Australia in the Pacific. In the event of *Scharnhorst's* squadron being reported in Panama Canal, the cruiser should at once fall back on Jamaica.



**A 176.** I.O., Monte Video, to Adty. 9.12.14.  
Sent 10.30 a.m.  
Recd. 4.43 p.m.

26 Received from Port Stanley (begins) Enemy squadron apparently *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Dresden*, *Leipzig*, *Nürnberg*, sighted at 8.30 ship time, morning, 8th December, and are in action with V.A. Sturdee's whole fleet, who were at Port Stanley coaling. *Canopus*.

**A 177.** I.O., Monte Video, to Adty. 9.12.14.  
Sent 10.50 a.m.  
Recd. 5.3 p.m.

27 The following message received from Stanley Port begins:—  
18 *Gneisenau*, *Scharnhorst*, and *Leipzig* sunk; two colliers captured. All cruisers now searching for *Dresden* and *Nürnberg*, who spread and escaped during action. Our casualties very small. Some survivors saved from *Gneisenau* and *Leipzig*. Further report following. C.-in-C., *Invincible*.

**A 178.** Adty. to S.N.O., West Indies. 9.12.14.  
Sent 5.5 p.m.  
5 Send *Berwick* or *Lancaster* through Panama Canal to act as W/T linking ship between Jamaica and *Australia*. Another cruiser is if necessary to act as linking ship off Colon . . . (Cancelled 11.10 a.m., 10.12.14.)

**A 179.** Adty. to S.N.O., Jamaica. 9.12.14.  
Sent 7.55 p.m.  
6 *Princess Royal* is to proceed to Scapa Flow with all convenient despatch.

**A 180.** I.O., Monte Video, to Adty. 10.12.14.  
Sent 9.35 a.m.  
Recd. 3.20 p.m.  
28 Received from Port Stanley. 17 Arrived 7th December forenoon with *Invincible*, *Inflexible*, *Carnarvon*, *Kent*, *Cornwall*, *Glasgow*, *Bristol*, *Macedonia*, leaving for Chilean coast p.m., 8th December, after coaling. No news of enemy cruisers, but two armed mercantile cruisers reported off Valparaiso 2nd and 4th December. *Orama* and collier due 11th December. *Crown of Galicia* cleared and leaving for England, 8th December.

**A 181.** Flag to *Inflexible*. 8.12.14.  
10.30 p.m.  
Please convey to Commander of *Gneisenau*. The C.-in-C. is very gratified that your life has been spared and we all feel that the *Gneisenau* fought in a most plucky manner to the end. We much admire the good gunnery of both ships; we sympathise with you in the loss of your Admiral and so many officers and men. Unfortunately, the two countries are at war; the officers of both navies who can count friends in the other have to carry out their country's duty which your Admiral, Captain and officers worthily maintained to the end.

Commander *Gneisenau* to Admiral.

In the name of all officers and men saved I thank Your Excellency very much for your kind words. We regret as you do the cause of our fight, as we have personally learned to know during peace time the English Navy and her officers. We are all most thankful for our good reception.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Inflexible* Signal Log 32219. 8.12.14, 10.30 p.m., and 9.12.14, 3.55 a.m.

**A 182.** Adty to I.O., Monte Video, 38. 11.12.14.  
Sent 2.5 a.m.  
Pass to V.A. *Invincible*.—14 *Newcastle*, *Idzumo* and *Asama* are proceeding south from Galapagos Islands to search for armed liner *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* and other German supply vessels on Chilean coast. When possible send *Kent* and one armed merchant cruiser to west coast to search bays and inlets and to work to northward to meet *Newcastle*. They should take colliers sufficient for their own requirements. *Canopus* should proceed to Abrolhos from St. Helena. A search for *Karlsruhe* and *Kronprinz Wilhelm* will be the next operation. *Carnarvon*, *Glasgow* and two armed merchant cruisers will remain on South-East Coast Station. Destination of other ships after *Karlsruhe* operation will be telegraphed shortly.

**A 183.** V.A. Sturdee to Adty. 11.12.14.  
Sent 10 a.m. Recd. 5.20 p.m.  
21 Search has been made for *Dresden* to 51 miles to the east of Staten Island, wide sweep round Falklands for possible sea rendezvous. All the inlets in the Falkland Islands examined. Ships returning to Port Stanley to coal and repair damage. Dividing force into three squadrons; one to search all round Tierra del Fuego; the second, coast of Patagonia to Monte Video; third, when ready, to proceed north and get off coast of Brazil. Suggest that armed merchant cruisers on the west coast may be dealt with by the force now in the Pacific Ocean . . .

**A 184.** Adty. to S.N.O., Halifax. 12.12.14.  
Sent 12.20 a.m.  
122 *Australia*, *Sydney* and *Melbourne* will be stationed in West Indies under Vice-Admiral Patey. As soon as he arrives at Jamaica *Berwick* and *Lancaster* will return to England . . . *Caronia* should refit at Halifax. *Edinburgh Castle* will be sent out again to join your flag. *Essex* will remain under your orders.

**A 185.** Adty. to I.O., Monte Video, 46. 12.12.14.  
Sent 8.30 p.m.  
Pass to *Invincible*, 17. It is desired to get battle cruisers home as soon as possible. Send *Kent* and one armed liner to Pacific coast as indicated in my telegram 38 and transfer command of all vessels, except battle cruisers, to Admiral Stoddart.

After searching for *Dresden*, Stoddart is to work to northward in search of *Karlsruhe* and *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, taking *Dartmouth* under his orders.

*Australia* cannot use Panama Canal and will arrive at Falklands in about three weeks' time. Leave a collier at Port Stanley with 3,000 tons coal or send one from Abrolhos Rocks.

**A 186.** Adty. to *Vindictive*, Ascension. 13.12.14.  
Sent 9 a.m.  
Pass to *Dartmouth* by W/T. *Karlsruhe* reported at Bahamas. Proceed to Pernambuco as fast as possible, coal and wait orders.

**A 187.** Adty. to *Melbourne*. 13.12.14.  
Sent 9.10 a.m.  
*Karlsruhe* has been reported at Tongue of Ocean, Bahamas. Proceed as fast as possible to Bermuda for orders.

**A 188.** Adty. to I.O., Jamaica. 13.12.14.  
Sent 9.15 a.m.  
65 Send *Newcastle* through Canal if it is possible to do so and order her to get in touch with Jamaica by W/T and follow Admiral Hornby's orders.



**A 189.** Adty. to Glacé Bay Radio Station. 13.12.14.  
Sent noon.  
Make the following signal to British warship *Princess Royal*. Begins: *Princess Royal* is to proceed to New Providence to search for *Karlsruhe*, reported to be at Tongue of Ocean, Bahamas, on 11th. *Berwick*, *Condé* and *Edinburgh Castle* are co-operating.

**A 190.** Adty. to I.O., Monte Video, 50, 51. 13.12.14.  
Sent 4.45 p.m.  
For Admiral, *Invincible*. Begins: 19. We want your battle cruisers home as soon as possible, but use your discretion as to immediate action to catch *Dresden*.

20 (Sent 8.10 p.m.) Object is destruction and not internment of *Dresden*. Press your chase.

**A 191.** Adty. to I.O., Jamaica, 71. 14.12.14.  
Sent 10.45 a.m.  
Pass to *Australia*. *Newcastle* is to proceed south as fast as possible. *Dresden* has apparently escaped and is going into Pacific. She was coaling at Punta Arenas, Magellan Straits, on 13th December.

**A 192.** British Consul, Punta Arenas, to Adty. 14.12.14.  
Sent 9 a.m. Recd. 8.8 p.m.  
*Dresden* left southward 10 p.m.

**A 193.** Adty. to I.O., Jamaica, 72. 15.12.14.  
Sent 1.40 a.m.  
Pass to *Australia*. *Dresden* escaped *Sturdee* and left Punta Arenas on 13th possibly for Pacific coast. Proceed south and assist *Idzumo*, *Asama* and *Newcastle* to search for *Dresden*, *Prinz Eitel* and German supply vessels.

**A 194.** Adty. to Consul-General, Panama. 15.12.14.  
Sent 6.30 a.m.  
Inform *Newcastle* that he is to proceed to coast of Chile and search for *Dresden*, which escaped from Punta Arenas on 13th December, *Newcastle* is not to go through Canal and is to leave Panama at once.

**A 195.** Adty. to *Dartmouth*, Pernambuco. 15.12.14.  
Sent 1.50 p.m.  
After coaling proceed to Demerara.

**A 196.** Adty. to I.O., Monte Video, 56. 16.12.14.  
Sent 12.20 a.m.  
Pass to V.A., *Invincible*. 22 Remain at Falkland Islands for the present.

**A 197.** Adty. to S.N.O., Halifax. 16.12.14.  
Sent 7.12 p.m.  
129 Direct *Princess Royal* to proceed to Scapa Flow when coaled and to report where she intends to coal en route. She should use all convenient despatch.

**A 198.** Adty. to I.O., Monte Video. 17.12.14.  
Sent 5.30 p.m.  
For V.A., *Invincible*. 24 Return home at once with the two battle cruisers, replenishing with ammunition at St. Vincent, C.V., leaving to Admiral Stoddart the task of pursuing *Dresden*.

**A 199.** Adty. to C.-in-C., North America and West Indies. 18.12.14.  
Sent 2.45 p.m.

133 *Dartmouth* left Pernambuco yesterday for Demerara and is to search north coast Brazil for *Karlsruhe* en route. Report has been received from Para yesterday that *Karlsruhe* was rumoured to be in neighbourhood of River Amazon and Maranham.

Send *Melbourne* to St. Lucia to coal and then proceed along north coast of South America searching for *Karlsruhe* en route to Para. Give *Melbourne* a set of West Indian charts for *Dartmouth*.

**A 200.** Adty. to I.O., Monte Video, 78. 25.12.14.  
Sent 2.20 p.m.  
Pass to Falkland Islands for R.A., *Carnarvon*. Begins: 130 *Dresden* should be sunk if found in an unfrequented river or bay inside territorial waters. When attacking beware of mines.

She should not be attacked if lying in an inhabited and properly constituted port, but should be blockaded.

**A 201.** Adty. to S.N.O., West Indies. 26.12.14.  
Sent 9.20 p.m.  
Following has been sent to *Melbourne*. Begins: *Melbourne* is to make a thorough search of South American coast from Trinidad to Colon. Ends.

And following to *Dartmouth*. Begins: *Dartmouth* is to search coast from Trinidad to the eastward, visiting ports in British, Dutch, and French Guiana, and is to visit Para and communicate with British Consul. Collier ordered from Jamaica to Demerara on 20th December should be taken on to Maranham. *Dartmouth* should coal at Maranham.

If definite news of *Karlsruhe* is not received *Dartmouth* will proceed from Maranham to St. Vincent, Cape Verde, and thence to England. Ends.

**A 202.** Adty. to I.O., Monte Video, 80. 27.12.14.  
Pass to R.A., *Carnarvon*. *Cornwall* is to proceed to St. Helena. Admiralty and C.-in-C., Cape, being informed of date she will arrive.

**A 203.** Adty. to *Dartmouth*. 27.12.14.  
8.30 p.m.  
. . . *Karlsruhe* or any other enemy's ships should be sunk if found in an unfrequented river or bay inside territorial waters. When attacking beware of mines.

They should not be attacked if lying in an inhabited and properly constituted port, but should be blockaded.

**A 204.** Adty. to R.A., Cruiser Force H and I.O., Monte Video. 28.12.14.  
Sent 3.42 p.m.

Following for V.A., *Australia*. Begins: Following will be limits of North American Station and West Indian Station.

North American Station on the east, longitude 40° W; on the west, North American coast; on the south, latitude 28° N. West Indian Station on the north, latitude 28° N, but the whole of the Gulf of Mexico is included; on the east, longitude 40° W; on the west, coast of Central America; on the south, coast of South America as far as longitude 40° W.

Rear-Admiral Hornby will be in charge of North American Station, and Vice-Admiral Patey of West Indian Station.



4.1.15.

**A 205.** Las Palmas to Adty. Sent noon. Recd. 4.8 p.m.

*Otavi* arrived from S W. Has aboard full crews *Bellevue* (British), *Mont Agel* (French), *Anne de Bretagne* (French), Captain, Chief Officer, and one man *Union* (French) sunk by *Kronprinz Wilhelm*. French Consul and myself taking charge of crews.

*Bellevue* captured 4th December, lat. 3 S, long. 29 W. Steamed west with *Kronprinz Wilhelm* 600 miles, when all cargo, coal and general, and provisions were transhipped to *Kronprinz Wilhelm*. *Bellevue* sunk 20th December. *Kronprinz Wilhelm* transhipped coal, cargo and provisions from *Union*, provisions from *Anne de Bretagne*. *Otavi* joined *Kronprinz Wilhelm* 12th December; transhipped coal, provisions, water, to *Kronprinz Wilhelm*; left 21st December, proceeding here.

9.1.15.

**A 206.** Glasgow to Carnarvon. Sent 3.5 a.m.

German pilot who left Punta Arenas with *Dresden* has returned in boat. Rumours as to her movements appear to be unreliable and indefinite, but it is probable she was in waters of Tierra del Fuego up to about 10 days ago. Propose to watch entrances to Magellan Straits and Gulf of Penas as previously arranged. (From *Glasgow* Signal Log 20112.)

9.1.15.

**A 207.** S.N.O., Halifax, to Adty. Recd. 8.5 a.m.

11 *Berwick* reports she is proceeding to Havana in compliance with Admiralty orders, arriving 12th January. *Condé*, now at Fort de France, will be used for intercepting *Bavaria* if necessary. Have now ordered *Melbourne* to leave Jamaica 13th January to relieve *Berwick*. Information is requested whether orders for *Berwick's* proceeding to England are now modified. Is it necessary to maintain wireless touch between Jamaica and Japanese ships in Pacific Ocean?

Reply 12 to S.N.O., Halifax. Sent 7.35 p.m., 10.1.15. Your 11. Retain *Berwick* for the present as *Australia* will not arrive in West Indies as soon as expected.

It is not necessary to maintain continuous wireless touch between Jamaica and Japanese ships, but times should be arranged every two or three days for passing messages.

9.1.15.

**A 208.** Adty. to Intelligence Officers, Atlantic Ocean. Sent 7.55 p.m.

We have certain information that *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was to be in lat. 1° N, long. 20° W, on 6th January, and that a supply steamer from Pernambuco was to meet her there. Inform H.M. ships.

To *Highflyer*, St. Vincent, C.V. (sent 8 p.m.). We have certain information that *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was in lat. 1° N, 20° W, on 6th January to meet a supply ship from Pernambuco. *Highflyer* and armed merchant cruisers are to proceed to search for her. *Dartmouth* is at Para and is coming to Maranham and St. Vincent, C.V.

9.1.15.

**A 209.** Adty. to Consul, Para. Sent 8.50 p.m.

Following for *Dartmouth* in Naval Code. Begins: We have certain information that *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was in lat. 1° N, long. 20° W, on 6th inst., to meet a supply ship from Pernambuco.

*Highflyer*, *Marmora* and *Empress of Britain* have been ordered from St. Vincent to search for her.

After leaving Maranham proceed to Rocas and Fernando Noronha and search them en route to St. Vincent.

(Repeated 12.40 p.m., 10.1.15, to Consul, Maranham.)

12.1.15.

**A 210.** Adty. to Naval, Ottawa. Sent 5.30 p.m.

12 Rear-Admiral Hornby will be in charge of North American waters as far as long. 40° W and lat. 28° N, and will be styled R.A.C., North American Station. Vice-Admiral Patey will take charge of waters south of lat. 28° N as V.A.C., West Indies Station.

25.1.15.

**A 211.** Adty. to R.A., North America and West Indies. Sent 9.15 p.m.  
30 The overhauling and boarding of neutral vessels whose identity is well established should be avoided, unless the vessel is performing some unneutral service or behaving in an obviously suspicious manner. Stoppages for removal of contraband or reservists are as a rule unnecessary, as this can be better arranged at a United Kingdom port or at Gibraltar.

Your attention should be primarily devoted to the stoppage of enemy vessels or neutrals whose actions give reasonable ground for suspicion. It is most important that no act should be committed liable to irritate the Americans unnecessarily, and this should be impressed on all H.M. ships under your command.

26.1.15.

**A 212.** Adty. to I.O., Monte Video. Sent 1.40 a.m.

34 Pass to *Carnarvon*. 7 If *Dresden* is on south-east coast America she is probably hidden in some creek or river. The coast from River Plate northward should be thoroughly searched bit by bit, making sure before leaving southern waters that *Dresden* is not hidden in Patagonia.

*Carnarvon*, *Bristol* and *Glasgow* should each be allotted to a different area. One collier should be left at Port Stanley for contingencies and the remainder taken to Abrolhos Rocks and left in charge of *Vindictive*. A small vessel should be engaged to maintain regular communication between the cable at Bahia and *Vindictive*, and full use made of her long distance wireless. One armed liner should patrol off River Plate to provide against *Kronprinz Wilhelm*. Acknowledge, and report your proposed arrangements for search of coast and keep Admiralty informed as frequently as possible of your dispositions.

**A 213.** I.O., Monte Video, to Adty.

5.2.15.

26 Following message received from Port Stanley. Begins: Following is interpretation of wireless message sent from Cerrito on 16th January ostensibly to *Von der Tann*, probably intercepted Port Stanley. Begins: For *Dresden* (group omitted) sent 7th January 2 groups sent 7th January (2 groups omitted) St. Thomas. Has *Dresden* orders for *Gladstone* then inform a trustworthy person Pernambuco. Send name can put to sea from Norfolk 25th January for *Dresden*. Port Huron (group omitted) altered fittings (group omitted) fathoms (group omitted) at springtide 3 (group omitted) reef 36° W, 5° S (mutilated group probably representing late date in January) according to wishes *Dresden*. Ends.

10.2.15.

**A 214.** Minister, Monte Video, to Foreign Office. Recd. 5 p.m.

6 A messenger whom I sent to Punta Arenas with war code reports that British Consul informed him that he knows exactly where *Dresden* is, and he told Admiral, who considers it too risky to take a ship of war into place. He says that she is being provisioned from Punta Arenas.

10.2.15.

**A 215.** Adty. to I.O., Monte Video. Sent 7.20 p.m.

Ascertain and report at once whether Last Hope Inlet, Magellan Straits, lat. 51.35 S, long. 72.45 W, has been examined by our ships. If it has not been examined tell *Glasgow* to watch the passage into it.

Reply.

Captain of *Bristol* states that Last Hope Inlet has not been examined. Your telegram sent to Port Stanley last night, also to Punta Arenas.

(C3614)

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**A 216.** Adty. to Consul-General, Valparaiso. 10.2.15.  
Sent 8.20 p.m.  
Pass following to British warship *Kent* or *Orama*. Begins: Urgent.  
Obtain charts of Last Hope Inlet, Magellan Straits, lat. 51.25 S, long.  
72.45 W, in Valparaiso, and search it should it be navigable.

**A 217.** Adty. to British Consul, Monte Video. 11.2.15.  
Sent 12.10 p.m.  
Your telegram 6 to Foreign Office respecting whereabouts of *Dresden*.  
Please communicate with Rear-Admiral *Carnarvon* and ascertain if he was  
told by British Consul, Punta Arenas, of whereabouts of *Dresden*. Direct  
him to report fully to Admiralty whether this is the case or not, and if so,  
whether the place is Last Hope Inlet.

*Reply.*

*Bristol* just arrived and Captain informs me that the only place mentioned  
by Consul which had not been visited is Pleiades. Captain states that  
Consul's information has hitherto proved untrustworthy, though he gives  
it with much confidence. Consul did not mention Last Hope Inlet.

**A 218.** Adty. to *Glasgow*, Punta Arenas. 12.2.15.  
Sent 12.5 a.m.  
We have good information that *Dresden* is in Last Hope Inlet anchored near  
Port Consuelo, where German Consul, Punta Arenas, owns an estancia  
which is connected by telephone with Punta Arenas. Milward, British  
Consul at Punta Arenas, is not trustworthy; be careful of him.

*Glasgow* is to watch the passage to Last Hope Inlet without fail, until  
*Kent* arrives with large scale chart from Valparaiso. Action is then  
to be taken against *Dresden*.

**A 219.** Adty. to I.O., Monte Video. 12.2.15.  
Sent 11 a.m.  
53 Send *Bristol* at once to assist *Glasgow* to search Last Hope Inlet.  
*Dresden* is believed to be anchored near Port Consuelo, where German  
Consul, Punta Arenas, owns an estancia which is connected by telephone  
with Punta Arenas. *Bristol* should be secret and not trust Consul Milward.  
Acknowledge.

*Reply.*

*Bristol* acknowledges receipt of your telegram 53. *Bristol* sailed at  
9 a.m. (Sent 12.2.15, 12.10 p.m.)

**A 220.** *Glasgow* to Port Stanley. 12.2.15.  
Sent 2.50 p.m.  
For Admiralty. Begins: *Glasgow* has not examined Last Hope Inlet,  
but English manager of company owning all land in the vicinity, who  
returned to Punta Arenas from there in January, informs me nothing  
had been seen there then and that he will arrange any arrival to be reported  
to Captain of *Glasgow*.<sup>1</sup>

*Note.*—As received by the Admiralty at 8.40 a.m., 13.2.15, this was made  
to read: *Glasgow* has not examined Last Hope Inlet, but English  
manager of committee composed of owners of all land in vicinity who returns  
to Punta Arenas from them in Italian vessel informs me has everything ready  
to carry on. See my telegram 13th thereon and that he will arrange for any  
(corrupt group). Request permission to carry out gunlayers' test.

**A 221.** Adty. to *Bristol*. 14.2.15.  
Sent 7.50 p.m.  
Abuse of Chilean neutrality by *Dresden* justifies British ships in attacking  
her if found in Last Hope or any similar desolate waters out of the effective  
control of Chilean Government, whether inside or outside territorial  
waters. She is to be attacked and sunk accordingly when found.

<sup>1</sup> From *Glasgow* W/T Log 20137.

**A 222.** Adty. to R.A., *Carnarvon*. 15.2.15.  
Sent 5.20 p.m.  
A German supply ship probably named *Gladstone* or *Huron* or *Bangor*  
may be at Lavandeira Reef in 5° S, 36° W, on 20th February, to meet  
*Dresden*, and *Kronprinz Wilhelm* may also be in the vicinity. *Sydney*  
from St. Lucia should arrive at Lavandeira Reef about 20th February,  
and armed merchant cruiser *Edinburgh Castle* in company with two colliers  
fitted with W/T should sail to-morrow for the same destination from  
St. Vincent, C.V. Speed of colliers is about 10 knots. Ships have been  
warned not to frighten German vessel with W/T.

*Carnarvon* should proceed north to direct operations.

I.O., Pernambuco, is to warn *Vindictive* to be on the look-out and not  
to expose her colliers to attack.

*Dresden* or the German vessels are to be sunk if found in unfrequented  
territorial waters.

(Sent to R.A., *Carnarvon*, through I.O., Monte Video, and I.O.,  
Pernambuco.)

**A 223.** Consul-General, Buenos Aires, to Foreign 19.2.15.  
Office. Recd. 3.30 p.m.

32 Following ships captured by *Kronprinz Wilhelm*. *Hemisphere*, of  
Liverpool, 28th December, lat. 4.20 S, long. 29.25 W; *Potaro*, of Belfast,  
10th January, lat. 5.48 N, long. 25.58 W; *Highland Brae*, of London,  
14th January, British sailing vessel *Wilfred*, 4th January, both lat. 2.46 N,  
long. W (group undecypherable); *Bonan*, of Gafle, 3rd February, lat.  
26.30 S, long. 27° W. Passengers and crew landed here. (Sent 5.20 p.m.,  
18th February.)

39 My telegram 32. Groups are lat. 2.46 N, long. 25.55 W. *Semantha*.  
(Sent 6.40 p.m., 23rd February.)

**A 224.** Consul, Punta Arenas, to Adty. 20.2.15.  
Recd. 10.30 a.m.  
Have news of whereabouts *Dresden*, seen 14th February.

**A 225.** Adty. to British Consul, Coronel. 21.2.15.  
Sent 12.20 p.m.  
Following for *Orama*. Begins: *Kent* has been ordered to assist *Bristol* and  
*Glasgow* to search Last Hope Inlet. Before anything else is undertaken  
it must be established for certain that *Dresden* is not hidden there. *Orama*  
should proceed to Punta Arenas, and maintain communication between  
squadron off Last Hope Inlet and telegraph cable, going backwards and  
forwards as necessary.

Consul Milward telegraphed on 19th February that he knew where-  
abouts of *Dresden* on 14th February, but neglected to state where she was.  
Interrogate Milward, but do not trust him, we think he misleads us.  
Consult Mr. Cameron, of firm of Duncan Fox, who is reliable.

Should Last Hope Inlet prove blank, search Hewett Bay, Barbara  
Channel.

**A 226.** *Macedonia*, St. Vincent, to Adty. 24.2.15.  
Recd. 6.42 p.m.  
Following wireless signal was intercepted by *Orama*, 23rd February,  
4 a.m., passed from *Carnarvon* to *Glasgow* for *Sydney*. (Begins.)

*Carnarvon* has struck rock, and therefore will not join you. R.A. will  
shift flag to *Vindictive* and remain for the present at Abrolhos Rocks.  
*Dartmouth* is to take charge of operations and send *Edinburgh Castle* to  
Abrolhos Rocks when she can be spared. Intercepted German W/T  
message states that the *Karlsruhe*, *Dresden*, *Kronprinz Wilhelm* and  
steamer *Bolivar* will meet together 23rd February, but position is  
unintelligible.



*Otranto* heard German code strength (? 6) lat. 12° N. Collier has steam up and instructions in case of attack. (Sent 3.15 p.m., 24th.)

From Admiralty to *Macedonia*, 24.2.15. Sent 8.35 p.m.: Your telegram to-day. Telegraph German message in original.

From Admiralty to I.O., St. Vincent, 25.2.15. Sent 1.55 p.m.:—Following for *Macedonia*. Begins: Your telegram sent 3.15 p.m., 24th, is not intelligible. *Orama* is in Pacific south of Coronel. *Dartmouth* has been in Mediterranean for some weeks. *Edinburgh Castle* with two colliers should be at Lavandeira Reef. *Glasgow* is in Magellan Straits. Can you give any further information?

Note.—No reply from *Macedonia* can be traced in the Admiralty, T.S.D.D.

**A 227.** Adty. 24.2.15.

To *Laurentic*. (Sent 8.40 p.m.): Proceed full speed to St. Vincent, Cape Verde.

To R.A., *Europa*. (Sent 8.45 p.m.): Urgent. Send *Amphitrite* or ship of same class to St. Vincent, Cape Verde, with despatch.

To I.O., St. Vincent. (Sent 10.50 p.m.): 53 *Otranto* is to remain at St. Vincent until further orders; recall her by wireless if she has sailed.

26.2.15.

**A 228.** Adty. to C-in-C., Home Fleets. Sent 8 p.m.

Very secret. *Carnarvon* has run on shore at Abrolhos Rocks, and there is little prospect of salvaging her. *Bristol* has been badly on shore in Magellan Strait, rudder damaged and must be docked. *Dresden*, *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, and two supply vessels are operating off S.E. coast of America, and have sunk four vessels.

Send *Liverpool* and *Gloucester* to Gibraltar en route to S.E. Coast.

26.2.15.

**A 229.** Consul, Coronel, to Adty. Recd. 11.50 p.m.

British vessel *Sherries* which called off Easter Island in attention to signal reports found crews of ships *Jean* and *Kildalton* sunk by *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* in December, former ship sunk less than a mile off shore, after transshipment of all coal. Crews landed by *Prinz Eitel* commencement of January on Easter Island.

Continuation: *Sherries* reports offered to bring away both crews and land them here, but they refused to come.

27.2.15.

**A 230.** R.A., 5th C.S. to *Sydney* and *Dartmouth*. Sent 10.38 p.m.

Collier *Manchester Civilian* reports man-of-war chased her in 15° 20' S, 38° 45' W, at 11 a.m., 26th February, and then went in an easterly direction. Unless you have other orders or have reliable information as to whereabouts of enemy, collect all ships you can, including all colliers fitted with wireless, and sweep south from Rocas Island to Abrolhos. Inform Admiralty by telegraph and I.O., Pernambuco. R.A., 5th C.S. 1700-27. (From *Carnarvon* W/T Log 26626.)

2.3.15.

**A 231.** Adty. to S.N.O., St. Vincent. Sent 1.25 p.m.

*Otranto* is to proceed to *Liverpool*, passing 50 miles west of Scilly Islands and proceeding up Irish Channel at night and arriving at *Liverpool* about daylight. Full speed should be maintained from lat. 50° N to *Liverpool*. *Laurentic* is to proceed to Duala. *Amphitrite* and *Macedonia* are to remain at St. Vincent for the present.

3.3.15.

**A 232.** Adty. to *Kent*, *Orama*, *Glasgow*, *Bristol*. Sent 5.20 p.m.

Resulting from their search subsequent to 27th February, *Duncan Fox* have reported exact position of *Dresden* in Worsley Sound to Consul-General, Valparaiso. *Glasgow*, *Bristol* and *Orama* are to deal with *Dresden* and ensure exit being stopped until she is disposed of.

From another source we know Germans intended *Dresden* to rendezvous with collier *Gotha* on 5th March in 37° S, 80° W, and that *Gotha* would wait near rendezvous until end of March. *Kent* is to proceed to rendezvous and deal with *Gotha*.

Wireless signal by which *Dresden* and *Gotha* will get in touch is any three letters with X in the middle or MUS.

4.3.15.

**A 233.** Adty. to R.A. Stoddart. Sent 7.10 p.m.

24 *Dartmouth* proceeded to Mediterranean on January 13. *Sydney*, *Edinburgh Castle*, and her two colliers fitted with wireless should be used for sweeps to find *Kronprinz Wilhelm*. Colliers at Abrolhos must not be left unguarded. *Holger* and *Patagonia* are both interned. *Dresden* is still believed to be about Magellan Strait, and was located in Worsley Sound, Last Hope Inlet, in latter part of February, by an expedition initiated by Admiralty, and *Glasgow*, *Bristol* and *Orama* have been ordered to deal with her. *Kent* is going to vicinity of Valparaiso to intercept German supply ship *Gotha*.

*Liverpool* and *Gloucester* are proceeding to S.E. Coast to assist in search for *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, accompanied by two wireless colliers.

10.3.15.

**A 234.** Adty. to S.N.O., *Amphitrite*, St. Vincent. Sent 1.25 a.m.

*Liverpool* is to take *Gloucester* and wireless colliers *Djerissa* and *Gisella* under her orders and proceed in company to Sierra Leone. After coaling at Sierra Leone the squadron is to sweep down the steamship track towards Cape of Good Hope as far as 3° N.

Squadron is then to sweep across Atlantic to Pernambuco. One vessel is to enter and communicate and remainder are to be out of sight of land. After communicating at Pernambuco squadron is to proceed to Abrolhos Rocks.

*Kronprinz Wilhelm* or German supply ships are the objective.

*Amphitrite* is to remain at St. Vincent.

From *Amphitrite*. Recd. 9.20 p.m., 10.3.15: *Liverpool*, *Gloucester*, colliers 231, 232, have sailed.

10.3.15.

**A 235.** Consul Punta Arenas to Adty. Recd. 1.42 p.m.

*Dresden* still as reported 4th January. Exact position Puerto Loberto Lexeno, N.W. of Stokes Bay, entrance eastern end, other foul. News 10 days old. Port Gallant full of spies. (Sent 1.50 p.m., 6.3.15.)

To Consul, Punta Arenas, 18.3.15: The only telegram received from you on 4th January was one reporting that *Carnarvon* had sailed. It appears that you sent another telegram on 4th January which never reached the Admiralty, due possibly to the work of German agents. Repeat your telegram of 4th January now.

10.3.15.

**A 236.** Consul, Norfolk, Va., to Adty. Recd. 6.12 p.m.

German auxiliary cruiser *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* arrived this morning, and is anchored off Old Point territorial waters.



**A 237.** I.O., Pernambuco, to Adty. 12.3.15.

127 (Sent 11.45 a.m. Recd. 4.18 p.m.) Urgent. British ship *Chasehill* arrived to-day with passengers and crew of French ship *Guadeloupe*. The former captured by *Kronprinz Wilhelm* 22nd February in 6° S, 28° W, and the latter on 23rd February approximately same position. *Kronprinz* then steamed in north-easterly direction until she arrived in 9° S, 21° W, where she stopped one week and transferred coal, etc., from British ship. *Kronprinz* last seen 7 p.m., 9th March, in 7° S, 26° W. All centres and R.A.C., 5th C.S. informed.

128 (Sent 2.30 p.m. Recd. 7 p.m., 12.3.15.) Captain *Chasehill* informs me that from information he has picked up on board *Kronprinz*, he is thoroughly convinced *Kronprinz* patrols between equator and 7° S, and between 25° to 33° W, and takes captured vessels into the area between equator and 2° S, and between 20° and 24° W, as this area is off the track and weather conditions favourable for transferring cargo.

R.A., 5th C.S., and St. Vincent have been informed.

**A 238.** Consul-General, Valparaiso, to Adty. 12.3.15.

(Sent 1.0 p.m.) British sailing vessel *Conway Castle* sunk by *Dresden* 37.50 S, 27th February. Crew arrived at Valparaiso. (Recd. 8.50 p.m., 12.3.15.)

(Sent 4.20 p.m.) My telegram to-day. Crew *Conway Castle* landed from Peruvian sailing vessel. Captain reports left *Dresden* 7th March, position 37.20 by 79.16. *Dresden* short of coal and provisions. German steamer *Alda* expected to leave Valparaiso to night. Have repeated above to *Kent*. (Recd. 10.47 p.m.)

(Sent 5.25 p.m.) *Dresden* said to have been awaiting *Sierra Cordoba* or other merchant vessel intending coaling by boats calculated can take 350 tons per day. (Recd. 1.26 a.m., 13.3.15.)

(Sent 10.40 p.m.) German steamer *Alda* left 9.30 p.m. (Recd. 5.18 a.m., 13.3.15.)

**A 239.** Adty. to *Laurentic*.

13.3.15.  
Sent 2 p.m.

Proceed to lat. 3° N, long. 11° W, and patrol the Cape steamship track to the northward as far as Cape Verde. Continue this patrol until further orders, using *Sierra Leone* for coaling. When within range of *Sierra Leone* or *Dakar* report your position by wireless to Admiralty occasionally, so that further orders may be sent you. *Kronprinz Wilhelm* may be off *Sierra Leone* on the trade route about 20th March. Except as above directed use wireless only when absolutely necessary, as it scares German commerce raiders . . .

**A 240.** Adty. to S.N.O., *Sierra Leone*.

13.3.15.  
Sent 2.25 p.m.

For *Liverpool*. *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was last seen in 7° S, 26° W, on 9th March. *Kronprinz* operates in the following area, between equator and 7° S and the meridians of 25° W and 33° W. Captures made here appear to be taken to eastward to an area between equator and 2° S, and between 20° W and 24° W. Proceed direct with *Gloucester* and the two colliers and patrol and sweep these two areas. You can coal at *Rocas* or behind *Lavandeira Reef* to north-west of *Cape San Roque*. If you use wireless you will destroy all chance of a capture. This cancels previous orders.

*Sierra Leone* to Adty. (Recd. 2 a.m., 14.3.15): With reference to Admiralty message to *Liverpool* referring to acting with *Gloucester*, there is no information as to whereabouts of these vessels. Request instructions.

Reply.

Keep message till ships arrive.

**A 241.** R.A. Stoddart to Adty.

37 12th March. Request all Admiralty telegrams may in future bear date of origin.

*Sydney* arrived *Abrolhos*, 13th March. After completing with stores, *Sydney*, *Edinburgh Castle*, and two W/T colliers will sweep south after *Kronprinz Wilhelm*. After *Liverpool* and *Gloucester* complete with coal at *Abrolhos* they, with their colliers and *Celtic*, will sweep south joining me. (Recd. at Admiralty 12.17 a.m., 15.3.15.)

**A 242.** Adty. to I.O., Pernambuco, 84.

15.3.15.  
Sent 3 p.m.

Pass following to R.A., *Vindictive*. 30 Following telegram has been sent to H.M.S. *Liverpool*: *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was last seen in lat. 7° S, long. 26° W, on 9th March. *Kronprinz* operates in the following area: between equator and 7° S lat. and the meridians of 25° W and 33° W. Captures made here appear to be taken to eastward to an area between the equator and lat. 2° S and between long. 20° W and 24° W. Proceed direct with *Gloucester* and the two colliers and patrol and sweep these two areas. You can coal at *Rocas* or behind *Lavandeira Reef* to N.W. of *Cape San Roque*. If you use wireless you will destroy all chance of a capture. This cancels previous orders. Acknowledge. (Ends.)

Arrangements have also been made for Cape trade route from *Cape Verde* to lat. 30° N to be patrolled in case *Kronprinz Wilhelm* crosses to it as she did on a previous occasion. *Liverpool*, *Gloucester* and their colliers should work as ordered above, the southern sweep which you propose being carried out with remaining ships. Use *Celtic* and *Macedonia* also, as the arrangements for obtaining the rifles which *Celtic* was to bring home have not matured.

*Bristol* is being sent to *Abrolhos Rocks* by S.N.O., *Glasgow*. *Bristol* has a damaged rudder and should dock at *Rio Janeiro*. (Sent 15th March.)

**A 243.** I.O., *Monte Video*, to Adty.

15.3.15.  
Recd. 4.52 p.m.

58 Following received from Captain of *Glasgow*. Begins: *Glasgow*, *Orama* and *Kent* found *Dresden* at anchor in *Cumberland Bay*, *Juan Fernandez Island*, at 9 a.m., on 14th March. After engagement lasting five minutes *Dresden* hoisted white flag and hauled down her colours. She was much damaged and her crew were leaving her. An officer was sent from *Dresden* to negotiate, but was told that unconditional surrender only could be accepted. *Dresden's* crew set her on fire and after an explosion she sank at 11.37 a.m., local time. Crew are all on shore, with exception of 15 engineer officers,<sup>1</sup> badly wounded, who have been temporarily sheltered in *Orama* for treatment. *Dresden's* captain claimed had already interned, but there was nothing to show this when we approached. Have sent all available medical assistance. No British casualties or damage. *Orama* proceeding to-night to *Valparaiso* to land German wounded. *Glasgow* proceeding to-morrow to *Vallenar* to coal and afterwards to east coast, calling at *Punta Arenas*. *Kent* remains in vicinity of *Juan Fernandez* to watch for German auxiliary. *Dresden* lay apart 20 and drowned.<sup>2</sup> 14th March.

Reply.

Admiralty to *Glasgow*, 16.3.15. *Kent* and *Orama* will remain on Pacific coast to catch German supply ships or merchant ships. Approved for *Glasgow* to proceed to east coast. *Bristol* will repair at *Rio de Janeiro*, when *Carnarvon* comes out of dock. Admiralty congratulates the squadron on the successful result of the operations.

<sup>1</sup> The words "engineer officers" were not signalled by *Glasgow*. See her W/T Log 46989.  
<sup>2</sup> This sentence should have read "Twenty German killed and wounded." *Glasgow* W/T Log 46989. A correct version of this same telegram was received from *Valparaiso*, 16.3.15, at 8.30 p.m.



**A 244.** Las Palmas to Adty. 15.3.15.  
(Sent 9.25 p.m. Recd. 12.7 p.m.) *Macedonia* left going east midnight 14th March.

Admiralty to Governor, Sierra Leone. (Sent 16.3.15, 11.45 a.m.) :—  
Please inform any of H.M. ships within wireless range that German steamer *Macedonia*, which was interned at Las Palmas, escaped on 14th instant.

**A 245.** Adty. to *Liverpool*, Sierra Leone. 18.3.15.  
Sent 7 p.m.  
. . . Lat. 0, long. 33° W has been reported as a rendezvous where *Kronprinz Wilhelm* meets supply ships. When searching, one cruiser should keep within supporting distance of the colliers when they are spread, and the other cruiser should make use of her speed to cover a wider extent of ground. (Pink.)

**A 246.** Adty. to *Liverpool*. 20.3.15.  
Sent 4.50 p.m.  
Proceed with *Gloucester* and colliers direct to lat. 0°, long. 33° W, and then search N.W. from that position for 80 miles. Continue to sweep N.W. and S.E. on that line till 9th April, then follow the orders already given.

**A 247.** Adty. to *Highflyer*. 31.3.15.  
Sent 1.15 p.m.  
32 *Highflyer* and *Marmora*, one ship should cruise and the other remain at St. Vincent as guardship, relieving each other as necessary.

**A 248.** V.A., North America and West Indies to Adty. 2.4.15.  
Recd. 1.5 a.m.

14 In the event of sure intelligence being received of breaking away in force of German cruisers from Germany, I have given orders to my squadron to concentrate immediately at Bermuda, except armed auxiliaries which are to remain at their stations as long as possible, retiring to Halifax or in the last resort to neutral waters.

**A 249.** Adty. to Governor, Sierra Leone. 4.4.15.  
Sent 12.40 a.m.  
Pass following to *Laurentic* by W/T. Begins: Proceed to lat. 3° N, 37° W, and search a circle of 80 miles radius from this position. We have information that *Kronprinz Wilhelm* will meet *Macedonia* within this circle on some date between 9th and 23rd April. Continue search until 23rd April. Ships from South American Station are also being ordered to search here. Do not advertise your presence to German ships by using wireless.

After 23rd April proceed to Pernambuco for orders. (Pink.)

**A 250.** Adty. to I.O., Pernambuco, 97. 4.4.15.  
D.O., Monte Video, 101. 1.50 a.m.  
N.A., Rio.

Pass to H.M. ships at once for transmission to Rear-Admiral. We have good information that *Macedonia* and *Kronprinz Wilhelm* will try and meet between 9th and 23rd April at 3° N, 37° W, or within a circle of 80 miles radius from this position.

*Laurentic* has been ordered to proceed there from Sierra Leone to assist. Ships are not to alarm German vessels by using W/T. (Pink.)

**A 251.** Adty. to V.A., North America. 5.4.15.  
Sent 2.32 p.m.

16 One ship should watch *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* and all other available ships should watch New York. We think *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* will eventually be interned, but the Germans mean to make use of her to induce us to weaken the force off New York if possible in the meantime.

**A 252.** I.O., St. Johns, to Adty. 8.4.15.  
Recd. 5.55 a.m.

77 Vice-Consul, Norfolk, telegraphs. Begins: Collector of Customs informs me that German cruiser is interned. Ends. Sent to Halifax, Bermuda.

Washington to F.O. 7th April. German cruiser interned at Newport News. (Recd. at F.O., 9.45 a.m., 8th April.)

**A 253.** Washington to Foreign Office. 11.4.15.  
332 Vice-Consul at Norfolk reports that German armed cruiser *Wilhelm der Grosse* arrived at Newport News at 5 this morning. (Recd. at Foreign Office, 6.40 p.m.)

333 My immediately preceding telegram. Vice-Consul at Norfolk reports that German ship anchored at 11.30 in Newport News. Collector of Customs at Norfolk has left for Newport News and will give information. (? United States Government) stated that ship sank 12 British ships. Names unknown as yet. (Recd. at Foreign Office, 9.10 p.m.)

334 My immediately preceding telegram. I now hear that German ship is *Crown Prince Wilhelm*. (Recd. at Foreign Office, 8.45 p.m.)

**A. 254.** Adty. to I.O., Pernambuco. 13.4.15.  
Sent 2.5 p.m.

Pass to Rear-Admiral. In consequence of *Kronprinz Wilhelm* having arrived at Chesapeake Bay following arrangements are to be carried out :—

Rear-Admiral to transfer command of station to Captain Luce of *Glasgow*, and return to England in *Gloucester* or *Liverpool*. *Laurentic* to return to Sierra Leone. *Gloucester* and *Liverpool* to return to England. *Sydney* to proceed immediately to St. Lucia. *Carnarvon* to proceed to Bermuda.

**A 255.**  
(a) Gen. Hughes, Minister of Militia, Canada, to Earl Kitchener, 10.3.15 :—  
Second Overseas Contingent. Do you wish them to cross in one large flotilla or in groups of 3,000 or 4,000 each. About what time should we prepare to send them . . .

(Admiralty Staff Note : Groups of 5,000. As late as possible when trained, direct to France. H.B.J., 11.3.15.)

(b) Earl Kitchener to Gen. Hughes, 11.3.15 :—

The second contingent should preferably come in groups of about 5,000, for which cruiser escort can be provided. They should be prepared to arrive about 1st May . . .

(c) Ad. Patey to Adty., 31.3.15 :—

13 Ottawa states three transports ready to leave Halifax on 18th April and asks if escort is available. I have replied that a cruiser will be available after *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* is dealt with, to escort transports to 40° W. At the limit of my station my cruiser should be relieved by a cruiser from another squadron.

(d) Adty. to Ad. Patey, 1.4.15 :—

9 *Cumberland* should be used for escort and should accompany the convoy the whole way. She was sent out with this object in view.

(e) Adty. to Ad. Patey, 6.4.15 :—

17 Your 13 and my 9. War Office report that a further contingent will be ready to sail on 23rd April. War Office has been informed that contingent ready on 18th April must wait for that ready on 23rd April and both sail together under convoy of *Cumberland*.



(f) Minister of Militia to War Office, 6.4.15 :—

Only two steamers are available and the number of troops has to be correspondingly reduced. Can you receive them about 2nd May . . .

(g) Minister of Militia to War Office, 7.4.15 :—

*Northland* and *Grampian* are already engaged to take the first group which sails on 18th April. Cancelling this arrangement would mean much inconvenience and profitless expenditure. In the circumstances, may the arrangement already made for the first group hold good, and may the second group if possible sail in two ships on 23rd April as was originally intended.

(h) War Office to Minister of Militia, 8.4.15 :—

As we previously informed you, the first and second groups should sail together under one escort, and 23rd April should be adhered to as the date of departure of both groups since the second group will be ready on that date . . .

(i) Minister of Militia to War Office, 9.4.15 :—

Will you please reconsider your decision as arrangements have already been closed for the *Grampian* and *Northland* to sail with the first group on 18th April . . .

(j) War Office to Minister of Militia, 9.4.15 :—

The despatch of first group of Second Contingent in the *Northland* and *Grampian* on 18th April is agreed to, and an escort for them is being arranged for that date by the Admiralty. It is not possible to say when the escort for the second group will be available at present.

(k) Dockyard, Halifax, to Adty., 19.4.15 :—

*Grampian* and *Northland* sailed with troops.

(l) Adty. to Dockyard, Halifax, 19.4.15 :—

Did *Cumberland* sail with *Grampian* and *Northland*.

(m) R.A. Hornby to Adty., 21.4.15 :—

*Cumberland* will leave 11 p.m., 20th April, overtaking transports on track 20 miles north of blue 10 and convoying them to England.

## APPENDIX B.

## THE BATTLE OF CORONEL, APPENDIX OF SIGNALS.

Note.—All times are local, viz., five hours slow on G.M.T.

## 1 November.

- B 1.** *Good Hope* to all ships. By visual 1.20 p.m.  
There is apparently by W/T strength 10 a German man-of-war or merchantman to the northward. When M.K. is made squadron will spread NE by E from flag, 15 miles apart, in following order from *Good Hope*—*Monmouth*, *Otranto*, *Glasgow*. Flag's course and speed NW by N (mag.), 10 knots. Work up as necessary to spread at 15 knots, turning to NW by N 10 knots when in station.
- B 2.** *Good Hope* to all ships. By visual 2.6 p.m.  
Proceed in execution of previous orders. *Glasgow* bank fires in boilers not required for 10 knots.  
Note.—The latter half of this signal was cancelled at 2.30 p.m.
- B 3.** *Good Hope* to *Glasgow*. By visual 2.9 p.m.  
Add to flag signal *re steam*. Keep a reserve for 18 knots.
- B 4.** *Otranto* to *Glasgow*. By visual 4.3 p.m.  
Smoke observed NE. Recd. 3.56 p.m.  
Note.—*Glasgow* read this "Smoke in sight N 50 E."
- B 5.** *Otranto* to *Glasgow*. Recd. 4.10 p.m.  
There appears to be two cruisers.  
Note.—Not logged by *Glasgow*.
- B 6.** *Glasgow* to all ships. By visual 4.11 p.m.  
Enemy in sight. Armoured cruisers.
- B 7.** *Glasgow* to *Good Hope*. By W/T 4.15 p.m.  
Enemy's protected cruisers in sight steering between SE and S.
- B 8.** *Glasgow* to *Good Hope*. Intercepted *Canopus* 4.20 p.m.  
One four-funnelled and one three-funnelled cruiser.  
By W/T 4.17 p.m.
- B 9.** *Glasgow* to *Good Hope*. Intercepted *Canopus* 4.25 p.m.  
Enemy's ships appear to be armoured cruisers. (2120.)  
By W/T 4.23 p.m.
- B 10.** *Glasgow* to *Good Hope*. Intercepted *Canopus* 4.26 p.m.  
I am being chased. (2122.)  
By W/T 4.24 p.m.
- B 11.** *Glasgow* to *Good Hope*. By W/T 4.35 p.m.  
My course S 65 W. (2130.)  
Note in *Glasgow's* W/T log: "Jammed."
- B 12.** *Canopus* to *Glasgow*. By W/T 4.40 p.m.  
Indicate your position.  
Note.—From *Canopus's* report. Not logged.
- B 13.** *Good Hope* to all ships. Intercepted *Canopus* 4.51 p.m.  
Raise steam for full speed concentrate on *Glasgow*.  
By W/T 4.40 p.m.



- B 14.** *Good Hope* to *Glasgow*. By W/T 4.50 p.m.  
Give course of enemy.  
*Reply.*  
Two armoured cruisers one light cruiser steering west.  
*Note.*—*Glasgow's* report says this reply was made twice on Q wave and twice on S wave, between 4.54 p.m. and 5.5 p.m., when it was acknowledged by the *Good Hope*; *Glasgow's* W/T log says "D received by *Glasgow* at 5.35, but probably made before."
- B 15.** *Canopus* to *Glasgow*. By W/T 5.3 p.m.  
My position 10.0 p.m. G.M.T. 41° 20' S, 76° 20' W, course N 10 E, speed 14 knots. What is your position.  
*Note.*—From *Canopus's* report. Not logged by *Canopus* or *Glasgow*.
- B 16.** *Good Hope* to all ships. By visual 5.5 p.m.  
Assume first organisation.<sup>1</sup>
- B 17.** *Canopus* to *Good Hope*. By W/T 5.28 p.m.  
What is position of *Glasgow*.  
*Note.*—From *Canopus's* report. Not logged.
- B 18.** *Good Hope* to *Glasgow*. By W/T 5.38 p.m.  
What was enemy's course.  
*Reply.*  
Course west.
- B 19.** *Good Hope* to all ships. By visual 5.17 p.m.  
Form single line ahead. Speed 12 knots. *Glasgow* open.  
*Note.*—*Otranto* logs speed 10 knots.
- B 20.** *Monmouth* to *Glasgow*. By visual 5.24 p.m.  
What was last course.  
*Reply.*  
None.
- B 21.** *Good Hope* to all ships. By visual 5.24 p.m.  
Speed 15 knots.
- B 22.** *Good Hope* to all ships. By visual 5.28 p.m.  
Alter course in succession to south. *Otranto* 5.31 p.m.
- B 23.** *Good Hope* to all ships. By visual 5.34 p.m.  
Alter course together four points to port.
- B 24.** *Good Hope* to all ships. By visual 5.38 p.m.  
Alter course together four points to starboard. *Otranto* 5.45 p.m.
- B 25.** Flag to General. By flags 5.39 p.m.  
*Otranto* take up appointed station.
- B 26.** *Good Hope* to all ships. By visual 5.48 p.m.  
Speed 17 knots. *Otranto* 5.50 p.m.
- B 27.** *Good Hope* to all ships. By visual 5.50 p.m.  
Observe very attentively the Admiral's movements. *Otranto* 5.55 p.m.
- B 28.** *Good Hope* to all ships. By W/T 5.54 p.m.  
Proceed at your utmost speed.  
*Note.*—*Glasgow's* report says recd. 5.47 p.m.

<sup>1</sup> *Good Hope, Monmouth, Glasgow, Otranto.*

- B 29.** Flag to *Otranto*.  
There is danger: proceed at your utmost speed.  
By flags 5.56 p.m.  
Repeated 6.10 p.m.
- B 29a.** Flag to *Otranto*.  
*Otranto* increase speed of engines. By visual 6.15 p.m.  
*Reply.*  
I am proceeding at my utmost speed but the head sea keeps me back.
- B 30.** *Good Hope* to *Canopus*. By W/T 5.57 p.m.  
Recd. 6.0 p.m.  
(I am going to attack the enemy now) position 37° 30' S, 74° 0' W.  
*Note.*—Repeated 6.15 p.m. Words in brackets not received by *Canopus*.
- B 31.** *Good Hope* to *Canopus*. By W/T 6.0 p.m.  
Indicate your position, course and speed now.  
*Reply.* 6.7 p.m. Intercepted *Glasgow* 6.3 p.m.  
My position now 41° 10' S, 76° 20' W. Course N 10 W. Speed 10 knots.  
*Note.*—Not acknowledged by *Good Hope*. Passed to *Good Hope* by *Glasgow* 6.25 p.m., but not acknowledged. From *Canopus's* report. Not logged.
- B 32.** *Good Hope* to all ships. By visual 6.24 p.m.  
Speed 16 knots.
- B 33.** *Canopus* to *Good Hope*. By W/T 6.30 p.m. to 7.55 p.m.  
Request orders.  
*Note.*—As *Good Hope* did not acknowledge this *Glasgow* passed it to her, but received no reply.
- B 33a.** *Glasgow* to *Otranto*. (?By W/T) 6.45 p.m.  
Leaving *Otranto* (unfinished).  
via *Glasgow* 6.53 p.m.  
Intercepted *Glasgow* 6.56 p.m.  
Intercepted *Canopus* 6.56 p.m.
- B 34.** *Otranto* to *Good Hope*.  
Do you wish me to keep out of range at present?  
*Note.*—No reply was made.
- B 35.** *Glasgow* to *Monmouth*. By visual 7.40 p.m.  
Course west.
- B 36.** *Glasgow* to *Monmouth*. By visual 7.46 p.m.  
Are you all right.  
*Reply.*  
I want to get stern to sea. I am making water badly forward.
- B 37.** *Glasgow* to *Monmouth*. By visual 7.50 p.m.  
Can your steer north-west. The enemy are following us astern.  
*Note.*—No reply. Not acknowledged.
- B 38.** *Glasgow* to *Canopus*. By W/T 7.35 p.m.  
Recd. 8.40 p.m.  
(Have been engaged with enemy 11.30 p.m. G.M.T.) fear *Good Hope* lost our squadron scattering. (2330).  
*Note.*—Words in brackets not received until 1.22 a.m., November 2nd, by *Canopus*, who read "scattered."



## 2 November.

**B 39.** *Glasgow to Canopus.*

Recd. 12.40 a.m.

I am proceeding south. Shall I rendezvous Falklands? (0430.)

*Further signal.*

My position now 37° 20' S, 75° 55' W, course SW, speed 20 knots. (0500.)

*Reply.*

Recd. 1.20 a.m.

Continue the same course and speed. Will rendezvous with you at 39° 18' S, 78° 20' W, at 1.30 p.m. G.M.T. (0615.)

*Further signal.*

Recd. 4.55 a.m.

My position course and speed at 8.30 a.m. G.M.T., was 39° 40' S, 76° 35' W, S 2 W, 11 knots. Am going to Falkland Islands overhaul me, give your position at noon. What was strength of enemy. (0930.)

**B 40.** *Otranto to Canopus.*

5.33 p.m.

I am afraid *Good Hope* was sunk by shell fire. My position at 10 p.m. G.M.T. 39° 36' S, 79° 10' W. Steering south 10 west 17 knots. (2120.)*Note.*—No call signs were used, and *Canopus* assumed this signal to have been made by the *Glasgow*.

## APPENDIX C.

## SIGNALS DURING THE BATTLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

8 December, 1914.

*Note.*—Times given are local (4½ hours slow on G.M.T.), except certain code times which are G.M.T.

- C 1.** W/T Station to *Canopus*. Recd. 0740.  
Smoke in sight to the southward.
- C 2.** Sappers Hill to *Canopus*. Recd. 0750.  
There is a four-funnelled and two-funnelled man-of-war coming from the southward.  
*Note.*—Passed to flag by searchlight 0753. Received by flag 0800.
- C 3.** Flag to *Glasgow*. 0803.  
Where is Sappers Hill.  
*Reply.*  
Sappers Hill is shore signal station above the town.
- C 4.** Flag to *Kent*. By visual 0804.  
Weigh and proceed.
- C 5.** Flag to *Cornwall, Glasgow*. By flags 0807.  
Raise steam for full speed and report when ready to proceed. Prepare to weigh.
- C 6.** Flag to *Inflexible, Invincible*. By visual 0814.  
Prepare to cast off colliers. Raise steam in all boilers. Report when ready to proceed. (0810.)
- C 7.** Flag to General. By flags 0814.  
Prepare to weigh.
- C 8.** Flag to General. By flags 0814.  
Raise steam for full speed and report when ready to proceed.
- C 9.** Flag to *Kent*. By visual 0820.  
*Kent* weigh and proceed as soon as possible leave boats behind. Two enemy cruisers reported from behind the town one four-funnelled and one two-funnelled cruiser the squadron will follow. (0816.)
- C 10.** Flag to General. By visual 0830.  
Strange men-of-war reported approaching from southward. *Bristol* cast off collier and weigh. *Glasgow* weigh. Immediately ships are to report when they have steam for 14 knots. (0820.)
- C 11.** Flag to *Bristol*. By flags 0832.  
Weigh.
- C 12.** Flag to General. By visual 0835.  
Ships are to report by Q.R. when they have steam for 12 knots. (0825.)
- C 13.** Lighthouse to Flag. By visual 0835.  
Another column of smoke reported from southward.  
*Note.*—Repeated at 0850.



- C 14.** *Canopus* to Flag.  
0845.—First two quite plain. Sighting top of five others in sight.  
0850.—Another ship in sight. Total eight ships.  
0852.—Propose opening fire as soon as enemy is in range. (0857.)

Received by *Invincible* as below by visual 0857.  
Seven ships quite plain. Fighting tops of other five just in sight, propose opening fire as soon as enemy is in range. (0852.)

*Reply.*  
Approved.

- C 15.** *Canopus* to Flag. By visual 0847.  
First two ships eight miles off. Smoke reported at 8.20 looks to be smoke of two ships about 20 miles off.

- C 16.** Flag to Sappers Hill. By visual 0848.  
Report each quarter of an hour state of affairs.

- C 17.** *Inflexible* to Flag. By visual 0900.  
Signal boatswain aloft reports two large ships south leading ship has now altered course to NE.

- C 18.** *Kent* to Flag. By S.L. 0902.  
Enemy appear to be steering N 40 E.

- C 19.** Flag to *Carnarvon, Macedonia*. By flags 0910.  
Weigh.

- C 20.** Signal Station to Flag. By visual 0910.  
Ships are *Scharnhorst* and *Dresden* and they are training their guns on W/T station.

- C 21.** *Glasgow* to Flag. By S.L. 0910.  
We can see cruisers apparently from masthead about eight miles off.

- C 22.** Flag to *Inflexible*. By visual 0911.  
Be ready to open fire any moment. (0906.) Received 0922.

- C 23.** Flag to *Carnarvon*. By visual 0914.  
Clear for action. Engage enemy as they come round the corner.

- C 24.** Flag to *Macedonia*. By flags 0915.  
Weigh and proceed into harbour.

- C 25.** *Kent* to Flag. By S.L. 0930.  
Enemy appear to be steering N 30 E. (0914.)

- C 26.** *Kent* to Flag. By S.L. 0930.  
Enemy steering N 80 E. Logged as 0922 by *Invincible*.

- C 27.** *Kent* to Flag. By S.L. 0935.  
*Scharnhorst* and *Nürnberg* steering S.

- C 28.** Flag to *Kent*. By flags 0937.  
Close. Logged *Carnarvon* 0935.

- C 29.** *Glasgow* to Flag. By S.L. Recd. 0943.  
There are three more cruisers in sight to southward. (0937.)

- C 30.** Flag to *Kent*. By S.L. 0945.  
*Kent* observe and report enemy's motions by searchlight keeping out of range.

- C 31.** *Canopus* to Flag. By W/T Recd. 0945  
*Scharnhorst, Dresden*, steering N 28 E nine miles off. (0930.)  
*Note.*—Sender logged by *Invincible* as "unknown."

- C 32.** Flag to *Glasgow*. Recd. *Glasgow* 0945.  
Join *Kent* and observe enemy's movements.

- C 33.** *Kent* to Flag. S.L. 0947.  
Two cruisers bearing S 50 E, steering ESE.

- C 34.** Signal Station to Flag. By visual recd. 0947.  
Three more cruisers coming this way apparently at full speed.

- C 35.** *Canopus* to Flag. Recd. 0947.  
*Scharnhorst, Dresden* steering S 53 E 12 miles, other cruisers steaming towards them. (1000.)  
*Note.*—*Invincible* logs sender as "unknown." Code time appears to be the sender's mistake for 0940.

- C 36.** *Inflexible* to Flag. By visual recd. 0952.  
Foretop reports enemy making off as fast as they can.

- C 37.** *Kent* to Flag. By S.L. 0955.  
Three cruisers bearing south steering to close the other two. Recd. 0950.

- C 38.** Signal Station to Flag. Recd. 0955.  
*Scharnhorst* and *Dresden* have altered course out to sea and stopped apparently waiting for the others.

- C 39.** Flag to *Carnarvon*. Recd. 0958.  
*Carnarvon* proceed out of harbour and take charge of lookout squadron.

- C 40.** Flag to *Inflexible*. By flags 0958.  
*Inflexible* lead out of port.

- C 41.** *Kent* to Flag. By S.L. 1003.  
The two easternmost cruisers are steering SE.

- C 42.** Flag to *Carnarvon*. 1003.  
*Carnarvon* lead out of port.

- C 43.** *Kent* to Flag. By S.L. 1005.  
The three westernmost cruisers are steering to close the other two and one of the three is dropping astern.

- C 44.** ? *Canopus* to Flag. By W/T recd. 1005.  
Two nearest *Gneisenau* and *Nürnberg* three ships farthest out apparently *Scharnhorst* and *Dresden Leipzig* two first apparently waiting for others coming up. (1005.)

- C 45.** *Glasgow* to Flag. By S.L. recd. 1010.  
Enemy appears to be steering to the SE at full speed. (1000.)

- C 46.** Flag to *Cornwall*. 1012.  
Follow flagship out of harbour.

- C 47.** *Glasgow* to *Kent*. Recd. 1016.  
I am going full speed to keep touch.

- By flags 1020.  
*Cornwall* 1030.  
Recd. *Inflexible* 1028 ? 1020.  
" *Glasgow* 1015.  
" *Kent* 1025.

- C 48.** Flag to General.  
Chase.

(C3614)

x 2



- C 49.** *Carnarvon* to Flag. 1026.  
Enemy have altered course to port.
- C 50.** *Glasgow* to Flag. 1027.  
Enemy have altered course to eastward and are concentrating nearest ship of enemy, 17 miles off.
- C 51.** *Carnarvon* to Flag. By S.L. recd. 1028.  
Nearest ship of enemy 17 miles off.
- C 52.** *Kent* to Flag. By S.L. 1030.  
The two easternmost cruisers have altered course to NE.
- C 53.** *Kent* to Flag. By S.L. recd. 1040.  
Enemy appears to be steering NE.
- C 54.** *Glasgow* to Flag. By S.L. recd. 1048.  
Enemy bears S 30 E distance 12 miles. (1035.)  
By visual 1050.  
Recd. *Inflexible* 1050.
- C 55.** Flag to *Inflexible*.  
I have eased to 24, to lessen smoke.
- C 56.** *Glasgow* to Flag. By S.L. recd. 1053.  
Speed of enemy about 15 knots. (1045.)
- C 57.** *Kent* to Flag. By S.L. recd. 1040.  
Enemy appears to be steering NE.
- C 58.** Flag to *Glasgow*. By S.L. 1053.  
Keep three miles ahead of flagship. Recd. 1050.
- C 59.** Flag to General. 1053.  
Speed 20 knots.  
*Note.*—Not logged by *Invincible*.
- C 60.** Flag to *Inflexible*. By S.L. 1057.  
Gradually get on flagship's starboard quarter and keep clear of smoke. Recd. *Inflexible* 1055.
- C 61.** Flag to *Carnarvon*, *Cornwall*. By flags and S.L. 1107.  
How many knots can you steam with present fires alight.  
*Reply.*  
*Cornwall*, 22, *Carnarvon*, 20.
- C 62.** Flag to *Cornwall*. By S.L. 1110.  
Take station on starboard quarter of *Carnarvon*. Recd. *Cornwall* 1124.
- C 63.** Flag to *Inflexible*. Sent 1115.  
My course N 77 E 19 knots. Recd. 1118.
- C 64.** *Glasgow* to Flag. By S.L. 1117.  
Enemy altering course to starboard. (*Kent's* time 1130.)  
By flags 1120.  
*Inflexible* 1127.  
*Kent* 1130.  
*Carnarvon* 1122.  
*Cornwall* 1125.  
*Glasgow* 1120.
- C 65.** Flag to General.  
Alter course together to E by S.
- C 66.** Flag to *Carnarvon*. By S.L. 1120.  
*Cornwall* take station on starboard quarter of *Carnarvon*.

- C 67.** Flag to *Carnarvon*. Recd. *Carnarvon* 1121.  
*Carnarvon* take station on starboard quarter of *Inflexible*.
- C 68.** Flag to *Inflexible*. 1126.  
Proceed at 20 knots.  
By flags 1130.  
Recd. *Glasgow* 1127.  
Recd. *Inflexible* 1130.
- C 69.** Flag to General.  
Turn together two points to starboard.  
By W/T 1132.  
Recd. 1145.
- C 70.** Flag to *Bristol*.  
Take *Macedonia* under your orders and destroy transports. (1522.)  
*Note.*—Signal log says made at 1130. *Bristol* has code time 1525.
- C 71.** Flag to *Kent*. By S.L. 1139.  
Proceed at your utmost speed.
- C 72.** Flag to *Inflexible*. 1141.  
Speed 20 knots.  
*Note.*—Not logged by *Invincible*.  
By flags 1143.  
*Glasgow* 1143.
- C 73.** Flag to General.  
Turn together six points to starboard.  
*Note.*—*Carnarvon* has "Alter course together to NE."  
By flag 1146.  
*Glasgow* 1142.
- C 74.** Flag to General.  
Negative turn together six points to starboard.  
By S.L. 1153.  
Recd. noon.
- C 75.** Flag to *Carnarvon*.  
Can *Carnarvon* go any faster if not I shall have to go on without you.  
Can *Cornwall* go any faster. (1150.)  
*Reply.*  
*Carnarvon* is going as fast as she can. *Cornwall* can go another 4 knots.  
By S.L. 1200.  
Recd. 1155.
- C 76.** Flag to *Glasgow*.  
Don't get more than two miles from flag.  
By flags 1213.  
Recd. *Inflexible* 1211.  
Recd. *Glasgow* 1206.
- C 77.** Flag to General.  
Alter course together half a point to port.  
Recd. *Inflexible* 1214.  
*Glasgow* 1212.
- C 78.** Flag to General.  
Turn together half a point to port.  
*Note.*—Not logged by *Invincible*.  
By S.L. 1210.  
Recd. 1215.
- C 79.** *Carnarvon* to Flag.  
Am going as fast as I can have told *Cornwall* to pass me.  
By S.L. 1217.  
Recd. 1215.
- C 80.** Flag to *Glasgow*.  
Flagship is steering N 75 E (*sic*).  
By S.L. 1220.
- C 81.** Flag to *Cornwall*.  
Proceed at your utmost speed.  
By flags and S.L. 1220.  
Recd. *Carnarvon* 1226.  
*Cornwall* 1225.  
*Glasgow* 1220.
- C 82.** Flag to General.  
Speed 22 knots.  
*Note.*—Not logged by *Inflexible*.



- C 83.** Flag to *Inflexible*.  
Open out to five cables go 22 knots.
- By visual 1221.  
Recd. *Inflexible* 1225.
- By flags 1227.  
*Glasgow* 1223.  
*Inflexible* 1229.  
*Carnarvon* 1230.  
*Cornwall* 1228.
- C 84.** Flag to General.  
The Admiral intends to proceed at 24 knots.
- By flags 1230.  
Recd. *Inflexible* 1233.  
*Carnarvon* 1234.  
*Cornwall* 1234.  
*Glasgow* 1228.
- C 85.** Flag to General.  
Turn together one point to port.
- By visual 1230.  
Recd. 1231
- C 86.** Flag to *Inflexible*.  
Open fire as soon as you are in range.
- By visual 1247.
- By flags 1253.  
*Glasgow* 1248.  
*Carnarvon* 1255.  
*Cornwall* 1255.
- C 88.** Flag to General.  
The Admiral intends to proceed at 25 knots.
- By visual and S.L. 1256.  
*Glasgow* 1245.
- C 89.** Flag to General.  
If a light cruiser comes down to fire a torpedo look out and turn away in time.
- By flags 1258.  
Recd. *Inflexible* 1259.  
(Not logged by *Glasgow*.)
- By Flags 1247.  
Recd. *Carnarvon* 1302.  
*Cornwall* 1302.
- C 91.** Flag to General.  
Open fire and engage the enemy.
- By flags 1303.  
Recd. *Inflexible* 1304.  
*Glasgow* 1259.
- C 92.** Flag to General.  
Turn together one point to starboard.
- By W/T 1306.  
Recd. 1307.
- C 93.** Flag to *Bristol*.  
Report proceedings.
- By visual 1306.  
Recd. *Inflexible* 1307.
- C 94.** Flag to *Inflexible*.  
Can you go any faster.  
*Reply.*  
Yes.  
*Further reply.*  
1307 Increase speed.
- Recd. *Inflexible* 1309.
- C 95.** Flag to *Kent*.  
Cross my stern and engage light cruisers.
- By S.L. 1320.
- By flags 1328.  
Recd. *Inflexible* 1330.  
*Glasgow* 1323.
- C 96.** Flag to General.  
Turn together four points to port.

- By W/T 1315.  
Recd. part 1355.  
part 1357.
- C 97.** *Bristol* to Flag.  
No sign of colliers or transports. Am now steering south with *Macedonia*.  
My position S 56 E 14 miles from Pleasant Point.
- C 98.** Flag to General.  
Alter course together two points to port.
- By flags 1332.
- C 99.** Flag to General.  
Alter course together one point to port.
- By flags 1334.
- C 100.** *Kent* to *Cornwall*.  
Are you going to starboard and take (on the) light cruisers (as they appear to be altering to starboard).  
*Reply.*  
Yes.  
*Note.*—Words in brackets not logged by *Cornwall*.
- By S.L. 1335.
- By flags 1343.  
**C 101.** Flag to General. Recd. *Inflexible* 1340 as "24 knots."  
Admiral intends to proceed at 24 knots.
- C 102.** Flag to General. 1355.  
Speed 22 knots.
- C 103.** C-in-C. to *Carnarvon*.  
Give *Bristol* and *Macedonia* instructions.
- By W/T 1358.
- C 104.** Flag to General.  
Turn together four points to starboard. Speed 24 knots.  
*Note.*—*Inflexible* does not log speed.
- By flags 1405.  
Recd. 1407.
- C 105.** *Carnarvon* to Flag.  
Enemy's cruisers have altered course SE. (1805.)
- By W/T 1410.
- C 106.** Flag to General.  
Turn together one point to starboard. Proceed at your utmost speed.
- By flags 1412.
- C 107.** Flag to General.  
Turn together two points to starboard.  
Not logged by *Inflexible*.
- By flags 1420.
- C 108.**  
Turn together to SSE  $\frac{1}{2}$  E.
- By flags. Recd. by  
*Inflexible.*  
1423. 1422.
- C 109.**  
Turn together to S by E  $\frac{1}{2}$  E.
1426. 1425.
- C 110.**  
Turn together one point to starboard.
1436. 1436.
- C 111.**  
Turn together one point to starboard.
1443. 1443.
- C 112.**  
Turn together two points to port.
1445. 1447.
- C 113.**  
Turn together four points to port.
1454. 1453.
- C 114.**  
Turn together two points to port.
1500. 1500.



- C 115.** Turn together two points to port. By flags. 1510. Recd. by *Inflexible*. Not logged.
- C 116.** Turn together 12 points to port. 1515. 1512.
- C 117.** Turn together four points to port. 1520. 1517.
- C 118.** Turn together four points to port. 1525. Not logged.
- C 119.** Turn together two points to port. 1530. Not logged.
- C 120.** Alter course in succession two points to port. 1546. Not logged.
- C 121.** Alter course together two points to port. 1552. Not logged.
- C 122.** Alter course in succession two points to port. 1555. Not logged.
- C 123.** Alter course in succession two points to port. 1557.
- C 124.** Turn together three points to port. 1600. Not logged.
- C 125.** Turn together three points to port. 1605. Not logged.
- C 126.** Alter course in succession two points to starboard. 1630. Not logged.
- C 127.** *Glasgow to Cornwall.* Recd. 1520 by S.L.  
Are you gaining on the enemy. (1515.)  
*Reply.*  
Yes. Range now 16,000. (1525.)
- C 128.** *Bristol to Flag.* By W/T 1550.  
*Bristol* has captured two of the enemy colliers.
- C 129.** Flag to R.A., *Carnarvon.* By W/T 1605.  
Form astern of *Invincible*. (1953.) Recd. *Carnarvon* 1604.  
*Note.*—Also sent by flags 1606.
- C 130.** Flag to General. 1629.  
Alter course in succession two points to starboard.  
*Note.*—Logged by *Carnarvon* only.
- By flags 1644.  
Recd. *Inflexible* 1630.
- C 131.** Flag to General. Not logged by *Carnarvon*.  
Form single line ahead in sequence in which ships now are.
- C 132.** Flag to *Inflexible*. By W/T 1724.  
Where are you. I wish you to join me at once. (2116.)  
*Note.*—Not received. *Invincible's* W/T aerial was found to be fouled.
- C 133.** Flag to *Carnarvon*. By flags 1730.  
Open fire and engage the enemy.
- C 134.** Flag to *Inflexible*. By visual 1735.  
Get ahead and lead round.  
*Note.*—Not logged by *Inflexible*.

- C 135.** Flag to General. By flags  
Cease firing. 1750.  
Negative cease firing. 1751.  
Cease firing. 1753.  
*Note.*—Not logged by *Inflexible*.
- C 136.** Flag to General. By visual 1810.  
*Scharnhorst Gneisenau* are sunk where are the remainder.
- C 137.** Flag to *Carnarvon*. By visual 1817.  
Lower all your boats at once. Repeated 1821.
- C 138.** *Bristol to Flag.* By W/T 1826.  
(Submit) have sent crews of German colliers (on board) *Macedonia* (to) Port Stanley. Request orders for *Bristol*. (My position now is 52° 27' S. 57° 4' W. What course shall I steer.) (2200.)  
*Note.*—Words in brackets not recd. by *Invincible*.
- C 139.** Flag to *Carnarvon*. By visual 1850.  
What signal did you make to us as you were coming up.  
*Reply.*  
We made "Enemy appears to have hauled down her ensign."
- C 140.** Flag to *Bristol, Cornwall, Kent, Glasgow.* By W/T 1920.  
Inform Commander-in-Chief and *Bristol* where the light cruisers are as we want to chase them. (2245.)
- C 141.** *Glasgow to Flag.* By W/T 1908.  
*Glasgow* and *Cornwall* are chasing *Leipzig* and are now in action. (2215.)  
*Note.*—Word *Glasgow* not taken in by *Invincible*.
- C 142.** *Glasgow to C.-in-C.* By W/T 1935.  
Light cruiser probably *Leipzig* is on fire fore and aft. (2225.)  
*Reply.*  
2003 Can you report position of other enemy's cruisers. Where last seen and course. (2315.)  
*Further Reply.*  
No. They escaped to the SE when we engaged *Leipzig*. (0030.)
- C 143.** Flag to General. By flags 1940.  
Course SW by W. The Admiral intends to proceed at 15 knots.
- C 144.** C.-in-C. to *Carnarvon*. By S.L. 2030.  
Return at 15 knots and pick up *Orama* and colliers and escort them into Port Stanley they are approaching Port Stanley on a course S 30 W true at a speed of 8 knots they are due Port Stanley December 10th. They should be some 250 miles off. (2020.)
- C 145.** *Cornwall to C.-in-C.* By W/T 2105.  
*Leipzig* has just sunk. Boats are away searching for survivors. (0140.)
- C 146.** C.-in-C. to *Cornwall*. By W/T 2230.  
Where is *Kent Nürnberg* and *Dresden*. (2225.)  
*Reply.*  
2311 *Kent* when last seen about 4.30 was chasing *Nürnberg* to SE. *Dresden* hull down steering to south. (0302.)
- C 147.** Flag to *Kent*. By W/T.  
What is your position. Have you anything to report. (0330.)  
*Note.*—Not logged by *Kent*.



## LIGHT CRUISER ACTION.

**C 149.** *Kent to Cornwall.* By S.L. 1335.  
Are you going to starboard and take (on the) light cruisers (as they appear to be altering to starboard).

*Reply.*

Yes.

*Note.*—Words in brackets not logged by *Cornwall*.

**C 150.** *Glasgow to Kent.* By S.L. 1530.  
Are you gaining on the enemy. (1515.) Recd. 1520.

*Reply.*

Yes, range is now 16,000. (1525.)

**C 151.** *Cornwall to Kent.* Recd. 1536.  
I will take the centre target if you will take the left-hand one as we appear to be gaining on them. (1535.) Recd. 1540.

*Reply.*

I am afraid I am only gaining very slowly on the left-hand one.

**C 152.** *Glasgow to Kent.* By S.L. 1555.  
What is the range now. Recd. 1605.

*Reply.*

I cannot take it with rangefinder now but estimate it about 14000 your shells are falling about 1000 yards short.

**C 153.** *Glasgow to Cornwall.* By S.L. 1720.  
Close enemy as quickly as you can. Recd. 1730.

**C 154.** *Glasgow to Cornwall.* By S.L.  
You had better close the range. Recd. 1750.

**C 155.** *Glasgow to Cornwall.* By S.L. 1825.  
I think you had better close a bit.

**C 156.** *Cornwall to Glasgow.* By S.L. 1944.  
Captain to Captain. Are you going to leave the enemy. Recd. 1941.

*Reply.*

No as I do not know where to go.

*Further Reply.*

I think we had better go on or he may get away.

*Reply.*

So do I.

**C 157.** *Glasgow to Cornwall.* By S.L. 1947.  
Look out for torpedoes.

**C 158.** *Glasgow to Cornwall.* By S.L. 1949.  
Captain to Captain. Do you think we had better open fire on her again. Recd. 1950.

*Reply.*

Yes I think so until she strikes her colours.

**C 159.** *Glasgow to Cornwall.* By flags 2015.  
Stop engines. Recd. 2010.

**C 160.** *Cornwall to Glasgow.* By S.L. 2018.  
Do you think I had better close and fire a torpedo.

*Reply.*

Recd. 2020. His own torpedoes are probably alright for the present and it is hardly worth the risk.

**C 161.** *Glasgow to Cornwall.* 2244.  
Course N 67 W proceed at 15 knots. Recd. 2300.

*Note.*—*Cornwall* does not log speed.

**C 162.** *Flag to Glasgow.* By W/T. 1111.  
Proceed to prevent enemy entering Magellan Straits. *Invincible* and Recd. 0310.<sup>1</sup>  
*Inflexible* are steering for Staten Island with *Bristol*. Keep me fully informed.

**C 163.** *Glasgow to C.-in-C.* W/T 0335.<sup>1</sup>  
*Glasgow* and *Cornwall* have fired nearly all their ammunition. *Cornwall* Recd. 1116.  
has only 250 tons of coal available. *Glasgow* has one man killed one dangerously wounded three severely wounded one slightly wounded. Five officers and 11 men have been picked up from *Leipzig*. Shall I proceed to Port Stanley with *Cornwall* or endeavour to join you. (0255.)

*Reply.*

Recd. 0435. Proceed in company with *Cornwall* into Port Stanley  
*Cornwall* complete with coal at once turn prisoners over to *Canopus*. (0415.)


**C 164.** *Kent to Macedonia.* 1435 Dec. 9.  
Sunk *Nürnberg*. Regret to report four men killed and 12 wounded. Picked up seven survivors. My W/T is disabled please inform Admiral.

*Reply.*


Recd. 1440. I was just coming out to look for you. I am sending your message through now.

<sup>1</sup> The time kept in *Glasgow's* W/T office seems to have been 4 hours fast on local time.






ARMAMENT.	ARMOUR
8-8.2 (21 cm) L/40 Guns	Main Belt Amidships 7", Ends 3.1"
6-5.5 (15 cm) L/40	Citadel Above Belt 5.9", Bulkheads at ends 4.7"
	Lower Battery " Citadel 5.9", " " " 4.7"
	Upper Battery 5.9" Transverse Bulkheads at ends 5.9"
	Turrets 6.7"
	Armoured Deck 1.5" on flat 2.2" on slopes




ARMAMENT	ARMOUR
8-12" L/45 Guns	Belt Amidships 7", At ends 5"
16-4" L/45	Protective Deck 3"
	Turrets 10"



ARMAMENT.	ARMOUR
10-4" (10.5 cm) L/40 Guns	Armoured Deck 3/4" on Flat 1 1/2" on Slopes



ARMAMENT.	ARMOUR
2-6" L/50 Guns	Protective Deck 1" on Flat 2" on Slopes
10-4" L/50	



ARMAMENT	ARMOUR
14-6" L/45 Guns	Belt 4" and 3" at ends
	Barbettes 4"
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