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(HISTORICAL).

FLEET ISSUE.

VOL. VIII.

THE MEDITERRANEAN 1914-1915.

March, 1923.

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NAVAL STAFF MONOGRAPHS
(HISTORICAL).

FLEET ISSUE.

VOLUME VIII.

Monograph 21.—THE MEDITERRANEAN 1914-1915.

NAVAL STAFF,
TRAINING AND STAFF DUTIES DIVISION,
March, 1923.

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THE MEDITERRANEAN, 1914-1915.

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LIST OF NAVAL STAFF MONOGRAPHS ISSUED TO FLEET.

THE MEDITERRANEAN, 1914-1915.

Introduction.

This Monograph deals with the history of the Mediterranean Station from the period of strained relations at the end of July, 1914, to January 1, 1916, when fresh measures were put in operation to deal with the enemy submarine campaign which at that date comprised the principal problem with which the Allied commanders had to deal. The operations at the Dardanelles and Salonika are not included, and they are described only in so far as their progress affected the rest of the Mediterranean. The protection of the transport routes, however, though largely necessitated by the exigencies of those expeditions, is dealt with in detail, since it was the main preoccupation of most of the Allied commanders outside the Dardanelles and Salonika areas.

Monograph No. 4, "Operations in the Mediterranean, August 4-10, 1914" (C.B. 917 pp. 176-217) is hereby superseded.

Note on Times.

All times given in the narrative are local times. Central European time (1 hour fast on G.M.T.) was kept over the entire Mediterranean, with the exception of the Egyptian Station. Egyptian time (2 hours fast on G.M.T.) was kept at Port Said and Suez, on the Egyptian Coast Patrol, and by the ships on the Syrian coast and the Northern Red Sea Patrol. On the Southern Red Sea Patrol, south of Port Sudan, ships kept Aden time (3 hours fast on G.M.T.). Ships on escort duty up the Red Sea appear generally to have put back their clocks in three increments of 20 minutes each between Aden and Suez. Ships of the Northern Red Sea Patrol entering the area of the Southern Red Sea Patrol, or *vice versa*, seem to have put back their clocks 60 minutes on passing Port Sudan.

All times given in the text of signals are local unless otherwise stated. Times of receipt and despatch are given in the local time of the place where the signal originated or was received. Code times are invariably in G.M.T. The above procedure is in accordance with standing orders.

Example.

From C.-in-C., Meditn., Sent 8 p.m. (S.M.T.) August 4.
To Admiralty. Recd. 7.58 p.m. (G.M.T.),
August 4.

398. *Indomitable* and *Indefatigable* lost sight of *Goeben* and *Breslau* in 38° N., 10° 1' E. at 5 p.m. (S.M.T.) (1814 [G.M.T.].)

Note on Sources.

The principal sources from which this Monograph has been compiled comprise (a) Telegrams, (b) Papers, (c) Logs of ships, (d) Printed works, both confidential and otherwise.

(a) Admiralty Telegrams

These have been bound by the Committee of Imperial Defence (Hist. Sectn.) in the following series: Mediterranean General, Egypt, Dardanelles (including Salonika).

Relevant telegrams of other Departments, e.g., Foreign Office, War Office, and India Office, to which frequent reference is made in this Monograph, are bound in the volumes of Admiralty Telegrams.

(b) Papers.

The Admiralty papers have been arranged in the following series: *Goeben* and *Breslau*, Mediterranean, Egypt, Adriatic, Dardanelles, Salonika, Sir J. Maxwell's Despatches, Submarine Encounters. Their titles sufficiently indicate their contents.

The records of *Taranto Base* have been consulted in order to supplement the information contained in the *Adriatic* papers. They are at present (January, 1923) in 14 packs, the contents of which are arranged in rough chronological order, and the following will be found useful: No. 8. Reports of Proceedings. No. 9. Records of Submarines in the Adriatic. No. 11. Intelligence.

Letters of Proceedings were sent regularly by Admiral Thursby from the date of the formation of the British Adriatic Squadron. Admiral Peirse's letters from Egypt commence on November 2, 1915, in accordance with A.L. M.07566/15 ordering British Naval Commanders abroad to furnish regular reports.

Transport Papers, 1914, have been bound by the Transport Department. Those marked T.6683/1914 and T.14340/1914 deal with the despatch from India of the Indian Expeditionary Force. Weekly statements of troops' movements will be found in Vols. H.S. 41, 49.

(c) Logs.

The ships' logs of the majority of the vessels employed in the Mediterranean, 1914-15, have been examined and they are invariably considered to be the best authority for movements of ships. The signal and W/T logs of *Rinella* and of all ships (except a few destroyers) of the British Mediterranean Squadron, July 28-August 10, 1914, have been examined in connection with Chapters I and II.

(d) Printed Works.

The following have been consulted or examined:—

- (1) I.D. 1215. Handbook of Syria (including Palestine).
- (2) I.D. 1221. Handbook of Greece, Vol. I.
- (3) I.D. 1129. Handbook of Turkey in Europe.

- (4) "Inside Constantinople during the Dardanelles Expedition," Lewis Einstein (Lond., J. Murray, 1917). Apparently a sincere reflection of current opinion as known to the author.
- (5) "The Flight of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*." Admiral Sir Berkeley Milne (London, E. Nash, 1921).
- (6) "Die Fahrten der *Goeben* und der *Breslau*," Emil Ludwig (S. Fischer, Berlin). A journalistic narrative, and not considered trustworthy.
- (7) "Fünf Jahre Türkei," General der Kavallerie Liman von Sanders (Berlin, Aug. Scherl, 1920).
- (8) "Deux Années de Guerre Navale," René la Bruyère (Paris, 1916). This work is considered to possess considerable accuracy, but it is a mere sketch.
- (9) "Nos Marins à la Guerre," Commandant Vedel (Paris, 1916). This and the following work are of little value.
- (10) "L'Action Maritime pendant la Guerre anti-Germanique," Daveluy (Paris, 1920).
- (11) "Souvenirs de Guerre d'un Amiral, 1914-1916," Vice-Amiral Dartige du Fournet (Paris, ? 1920). Describes briefly the work of the Syrian Squadron.

For political events, "History of the Great War, Principal Events" (London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1922) compiled by the Committee of Imperial Defence has been taken as authority.

The French Official History dealing with the Mediterranean and Adriatic has not yet appeared. A good deal of information regarding the work of the French ships in the Mediterranean has been obtained from British sources; but for operations in the Adriatic the published works enumerated above are the principal sources of information. Certain statistics have been extracted from a French Parliamentary Paper "Le Bilan des Pertes faites sur Mer par les Nations belligérantes," quoted in this Monograph as "Chambre des Députés," 1920, No. 634.

Pending the publication of the section of the German Official History dealing with the work of enemy submarines in the Mediterranean, considerable reliance has been placed on A. Gayer's "Die Deutschen U Boote in ihrer Kriegführung, 1914-18" (Berlin, 1920). So far as it can be checked from the records this work has been found accurate, but it is lacking in details. The Admiralty (I.D.) compiled monthly a report of the activities of the enemy submarines as far as they could be ascertained from the available information; and these have been consulted. Those dealing with the period covered by this Monograph are numbered I.D. 1039, 1039*a*, 1039*b*, 1078(1), 1078(2). The returns of British vessels captured or destroyed by the enemy have also been consulted ("Merchant Shipping-Losses," Adty., Aug., 1919; London, H.M. Stationery Office).

Other works are referred to in the footnotes to the text.

THE MEDITERRANEAN, 1914-1915.

CHAPTER I.

PRE-WAR SITUATION AND MOVEMENTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

1. **Situation, July 30, 1914.**—The evening of July 27, 1914, when a telegram was despatched from the Admiralty to all British Naval Commanders-in-Chief and senior officers abroad, warning them that the European political situation rendered war between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente Powers by no means impossible,¹ found the naval forces of the Entente Powers not altogether favourably situated in the Mediterranean. The closure of the Dardanelles to vessels of war ruled out any prospect of support by the Russian Black Sea Fleet in the immediate future; and on paper the naval strength of the Triple Alliance preponderated largely over the French fleet, by whose side Sir Berkeley Milne, the British Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, was warned that he might find himself committed to action. The British fleet still lacked one of the four battle cruisers which were to form its main strength, and a second, the *Indomitable*, was four months overdue for refit and with her steaming powers consequently reduced. Of the two French dreadnoughts with the fleet, one, the *Jean Bart*, had been away in the Baltic conveying the President and the Minister for Foreign Affairs on a visit to the Czar of Russia, and was now hurrying back to the Mediterranean.² But, most important of all, the French, whose main naval strength was concentrated in the Mediterranean, were as yet without any assurance that they might rely upon Great Britain to protect their Channel and Atlantic coasts, and they were consequently unable to determine the dispositions of their fleet.

2. **British Naval Forces.**—The British naval forces in the Mediterranean at the outbreak of war consisted of a squadron each of battle cruisers, armoured cruisers, and light cruisers, and a destroyer flotilla.

¹ A. 1.

² She left Dunkirk for Toulon July 29 ("Positions and Movements of Foreign Men-of-War," August 1, 1914. No. 159).

2ND BATTLE CRUISER SQUADRON.¹

*Inflexible*² (Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir Archibald Berkeley Milne, Bt., G.C.V.O., K.C.B.).

Indomitable (Captain F. W. Kennedy).

Indefatigable (Captain C. F. Sowerby).

LIGHT CRUISERS.³

Chatham (Captain S. R. Drury-Lowe).

Dublin (Captain John D. Kelly).

Gloucester (Captain William A. Howard Kelly).

Weymouth (Captain W. D. Church).

1ST CRUISER SQUADRON.⁴

*Defence*⁵ (Flagship of Rear-Admiral Ernest C. T. Troubridge, C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O.).

Black Prince (Captain F. D. Gilpin-Brown).

Duke of Edinburgh (Captain H. Blackett).

Warrior (Captain G. H. Borrett).

5TH DESTROYER FLOTILLA.⁶

Depôt ship *Blenheim* (Captain C. P. R. Coode).⁷

1st Division.

Wolverine.

Scorpion.

Renard.

Scourge.

2nd Division.

Foxhound.

Mosquito.

Racoon.

Basilisk.

3rd Division.

Beagle.

Bulldog.

Harpy.

Grasshopper.

4th Division.

Savage.

Grampus.

Pincher.

Rattlesnake.

3. The French Fleet.—The main French naval forces were concentrated in the Mediterranean. The French at this time had in commission two dreadnought battleships, the *Courbet*, Flagship of Vice-Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère, Commander-in-Chief, and the *Jean Bart*, which was hurrying back from the Baltic. Two more of the class, the *France* and *Paris*, were almost ready and were expected to join the fleet shortly; the former of

¹ 8—12 in., 16—4 in. Maximum speed 24 knots. (See A. 69.)

² Chief of Staff, Captain R. F. Phillimore. Flag Captain, A. N. Loxley.

³ 8—6 in., 1—3 in. A.A. (*Gloucester*, 2—6 in., 10—4 in.). Maximum speed 25 knots. (See A. 69.)

⁴ *Defence*, 4—9.2 in., 10—7.5 in., 16—12 pdr.; *Black Prince* and *Duke of Edinburgh*, 6—9.2 in., 10—6 in. Maximum speed 21½ knots. (See A. 69.) *Warrior*, 6—9.2 in., 4—7.5 in. Maximum speed 17 knots on Full Power Trial, July 31.

⁵ Captain Fawcett Wray.

⁶ 27 knots. 1—4 in., 3—12 pdr., 2 T.

⁷ In *Wolverine*. Carried out duties of Captain (D).

the two had accompanied the *Jean Bart* to the Baltic, and was now returning to Brest.¹ Their pre-dreadnought battleships were organised in two squadrons, the first comprising six *Lord Nelson* type vessels of the *Danton* class, and the second consisting of five battleships. Four older battleships constituted a Complementary (Reserve) Division.

The six armoured cruisers with the First Fleet were organised in two divisions. There were some 40 T.B.D.s in the Mediterranean, 12 of which were from 750 to 800 tons and the remainder from 350 to 550 tons, certain of them being fitted as minelayers or minesweepers. Some 24 of them were attached to the First Fleet.

The principal French Mediterranean bases were Toulon and Bizerta, on each of which a submarine flotilla was based. The local defence of each of these bases comprised a great number of torpedo boats, 1st class, in addition to one or more coast defence battleships. The French possessed also defended harbours at Algiers, Oran and Ajaccio, the two latter being each the headquarters of a destroyer flotilla.

ORGANISATION OF FRENCH FIRST FLEET.

FLEET FLAGSHIP AND ATTACHED SHIPS.

*Courbet*² (Fleet Flagship).

Jean Bart.²

*Jurien de la Gravière*³ (Cruiser).

Foudre (Special Vessel and Seaplane Carrier).

1ST SQUADRON.

*Diderot*⁴ (Flagship of Vice-Admiral Cocheprat).

Danton.

Vergniaud.

Voltaire (Flagship of Rear-Admiral Lacaze).

Condorcet.

Mirabeau.⁵

2ND SQUADRON.

*Vérité*⁶ (Flagship of Vice-Admiral Le Bris).

République.⁷

Patrie.⁷

*Justice*⁶ (Flagship of Rear-Admiral Tracou).

Démocratie.⁶

¹ Presumably to complete for service.

² 12—12 in., 22—5.5 in.

³ Completed 1903. 5,600 tons. 19.2 knots. 8—6.5 in.

⁴ All ships of squadron: 4—12 in., 12—9.4 in., 16—14 pdr.

⁵ Detained at Toulon for examination of turbine.

⁶ 4—12 in., 10—7.6 in.

⁷ 4—12 in., 18—6.5 in.

COMPLEMENTARY DIVISION.

*Suffren*¹ (Flagship of Rear-Admiral Guépratte).*St. Louis*.²*Bouvet*.³*Gaulois*.²1ST CRUISER SQUADRON.⁴

1st Division.

*Jules Michelet*⁵ (Flagship of Rear-Admiral Sugny).*Ernest Renan*.⁵*Edgar Quinet*.⁶

2nd Division.

*Léon Gambetta*⁷ (Flagship of Rear-Admiral Senès).*Victor Hugo*.⁷*Jules Ferry*.⁷

4. **The Fleets of the Triple Alliance.**—The Austrian Active Squadron was based on Pola, the only first-class naval base which that Power possessed. Its main strength consisted in three dreadnoughts and three *Lord Nelson* type battleships, with two fast light cruisers and six large modern destroyers.

But it seems that the Austrian fleet was in a state of unreadiness for war, which would require several days to remedy, though this was apparently unknown to the Admiralty and Sir Berkeley Milne. So late as August 5 the Austrian Commander-in-Chief informed the German Naval Staff that the fleet was unable to render any assistance to Germany.⁸

AUSTRIAN ACTIVE SQUADRON.

1ST DIVISION.

*Tegetthoff*⁹ (Flagship of Rear-Admiral Franz Löffler, Commander-in-Chief).*Viribus Unitis*.⁹*Prinz Eugen*.⁹

2ND DIVISION.

*Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand*¹⁰ (Flagship of Rear-Admiral Anton Willenik).*Radetzky*.¹⁰*Zrinyi*.¹⁰¹ 4—12 in., 10—6·5 in.² 4—12 in., 10—5·5 in., 8—3·9 in.³ 2—12 in., 2—10·8 in., 8—5·5 in., 8—3·9 in.⁴ 14—7·6 in.⁵ 4—7·6 in., 16—6·5 in.⁶ Von Tirpitz "My Memoirs"

II. p. 350 (Trs. Hurst & Blackett, Ltd.)

⁷ 12—12 in., 12—5·9 in.⁸ 4—12 in., 8—9·4 in., 20—3·9 in.⁹ Speed, 20—22 knots.¹⁰ 4—7·6 in., 12—6·5 in.

CRUISER DIVISION.

*Sankt Georg*¹ (Flagship of Rear-Admiral Karl Seidensacher).

Light Cruisers.

Saida.² *Admiral Spaun*.³

Destroyers.

Triglav. *Orjen*.*Lika*. *Csepel*.*Balaton*. *Tatra*.

and 12 older boats.

The German squadron in the Mediterranean included two war vessels only, the battle cruiser *Goeben*,⁴ Flagship of Rear-Admiral Souchon, which had just spent a month at Pola and was now at Pirano,⁵ near Trieste, though Sir Berkeley Milne was unaware that she had left Pola⁶; and the light cruiser *Breslau*,⁷ which was at Durazzo. The *Strassburg*, sister ship to the *Breslau*, was at Horta in the Azores, and though at one time it was reported that she was making for the Mediterranean, she returned to Germany without exercising any direct influence on that area, passing Rear-Admiral Stoddart in the *Carnarvon* on his way down Channel on July 31.⁸ There were no other German naval forces in or near the area, but in various Mediterranean ports there were many merchant ships capable of acting as auxiliaries; and the German intention in war, openly avowed in the writings of statesmen and naval experts during recent years, was to arm fast liners and merchant vessels for service on the trade routes against the shipping of her opponents.

It was Italy whose naval strength had power to turn the scales in the Mediterranean in favour of the Triple Alliance. The main Italian fleet was organised in two squadrons, the first consisting of three dreadnoughts, each mounting thirteen 12 in. guns as their primary armament, with four older battleships,⁹ four cruisers, four old and one modern light cruiser and three destroyer flotillas (16 boats). The Second Squadron comprised four battleships mounting two 12 in. and twelve 8 in. guns, four armoured cruisers of the *Defence* type, two light cruisers, and two flotillas of destroyers (12 boats). The strategical disposition

¹ 7,183 tons. 19 knots. 2—9·4 in., 5—7·5 in., 4—5·9 in.² 24·9—27 knots. 8—3·9 in.³ 26·4 knots. 7—3·9 in.⁴ Kapitän z. S. Ackermann. 10—11 in., 12—5·9 in., 12—22 pdr. Full speed 27 knots (*c.f.* A 69), though apparently she was not at first credited by the British Commander-in-Chief with more than 25 knots. Admiral Souchon states, however, that at the outbreak of war the *Goeben* could only maintain 18 knots, with 23—24 knots for a short distance.⁵ "Positions and Movements of Foreign Men-of-War," No. 154. It seems that the *Goeben's* boilers needed retubing, but the work had not been completed when she left Pola.⁶ Diary of Events by Commander-in-Chief. M. 01548.⁷ Fregatten-Kapitän Kettner. 24—27·2 knots. 12—4·1 in.⁸ A. 8.⁹ Two of these mounted 4—10 in. guns as primary armament, the other two 4—12 in. and 4—8 in. They were known as the Training Division.

of the First and Second Squadrons was at Taranto and Gaeta (near Naples) respectively,¹ though three of the armoured cruisers of the First Squadron were at Venice.

Thus under circumstances where the state of preparation for war of the Austrian fleet was apparently unknown to the French and British Naval Commanders, and Italy had to be reckoned a possible antagonist, the Triple Entente were faced with the prospect of finding themselves in inferior naval force in the Mediterranean.

5. Concentration of the British Fleet at Malta.—The disposition of the British fleet in the Mediterranean on July 27 was as follows: the *Inflexible* and *Indefatigable*, with the *Warrior* and *Black Prince*, the four light cruisers and thirteen of the destroyers, were at Alexandria in accordance with the programme of the cruise of the fleet. At Malta, the *Indomitable* had just commenced her overdue refit, taking the place of the *Duke of Edinburgh*, which had just completed her annual refit; the *Blenheim* was drawing stores for the flotilla, and the *Foxhound* was undergoing her half-yearly docking. The *Defence* and *Racoon* were at Durazzo with the International Squadron of which Rear-Admiral Troubridge was in command, which was watching the situation in Albania, where an attempt was in progress to turn the German Prince of Albania out of the country. As regards the remainder of the International Squadron, the Russian cruiser *Teretz* sailed from Durazzo at 8.24 a.m. on July 27, leaving there the *Edgar Quinet*, *San Marco*, *Breslau*, *Admiral Spaun*,² and the two British ships. The *Grampus* left Malta on the morning of July 27 to relieve the *Racoon* at Durazzo.³

The Admiralty telegram of July 27, informing Sir Berkeley Milne of the European political situation, contained orders for him to return at ordinary speed to Malta next day, in accordance with the published programme of the cruise, and to concentrate his entire fleet there and complete with coal and stores. For the time being the *Defence* was to remain at Durazzo, but Admiral Troubridge was to be warned to be ready to rejoin the fleet with despatch.⁴

The fleet left Alexandria at 7 a.m. on July 28 and steamed at 15 knots to Malta, where they arrived at 11 a.m. next day, and proceeded to prepare in every respect for service. The warning telegram was despatched by the Admiralty that night (July 29) and Admiral Troubridge was ordered to join the Commander-in-Chief forthwith at Malta.⁵

¹ A.S., Malta, to Admiralty, via Horsea, 963, 2.8.14.

² Also a few T.B.s and gunboats.

³ *Defence's* signal log.

⁴ A. 1.

⁵ A. 2, 4.

6. Strategical Considerations.—Sir Berkeley Milne had framed his plans with regard to an understanding which had been arrived at between Great Britain and France in 1912.¹ Couched in the most guarded language of diplomacy, this document made provision for joint action by France and Britain in the event of an unprovoked attack by a third power or a threat to the general peace.

A book of signals, etc., had been prepared and issued for the purpose of communication between the Allied ships in the event of war; but intercommunication by W/T between the British and French fleets had not been practised in peace time.²

The situation in which the French and British fleets in the Mediterranean might expect to find themselves opposed to the combined and superior strength of the Triple Alliance did not remain long in being. The Alliance contained no clause which could compel Italy to take action on the side of Germany, or of her hereditary enemy Austria, in the event of war caused by the aggressive action of those Powers; and already there were signs that she was unlikely to go beyond the strict letter of the alliance. Admiral Milne was informed on the evening of July 30 of the probability that Italy would remain neutral, and he was also given to understand that Greece, whose navy Admiral Kerr was even now reorganising, would probably become an ally—this by virtue of a defensive treaty which existed between Greece and Serbia. On the part of Spain, friendly neutrality or possibly even action on the side of the Entente was not considered too much to count upon.³

As yet, however, Italy had not officially declared her attitude, and if war should break out the Commander-in-Chief was warned that it was important that his squadron should not become seriously engaged with Austrian ships until the Italian decision was known. "Your first task," he was informed, "should be to aid the French in the transportation of their African Army, by covering, and, if possible, bringing to action individual fast German ships, particularly *Goeben*, who may interfere with that transportation."

¹ Appendix C.

² By inference. The signal book (Secret Package A) was found to be of little practical use for W/T cypher communication. The following is a fair specimen of an early attempt at direct intercommunication between the French and British Fleets in the code provided: "Enemy's ship signalled off Cape de Fer at 7 a.m. August 4. French C.-in-C. befell Algiers all be very strict French better Philippeville Oran." The *Dublin* decyphered this as "Enemy's cruiser *Goeben* signalled de Fir Dimensions are you in quarantine August fact C.-in-C. befall (or befell) Algiers all be very strict French men (or French colours) better Philippeville Oran." (Signal logs of *Inflexible* and *Dublin*.)

³ A. 5.

The French African troops referred to were the XIX Corps, some 40,000 men, to be conveyed from Algiers to Marseilles, Cette, and Toulon. For this purpose the Commander-in-Chief would be notified in due course when he might consult with the French Commander-in-Chief. He was warned not to be brought to action at this stage against superior forces, except in combination with the French, as part of a general battle; the Admiralty hoped to be able to reinforce the Mediterranean later, and meanwhile Admiral Milne was instructed to husband his forces.

Bearing these orders in mind, Sir Berkeley Milne replied that in face of the superior strength of the Austrian and Italian Fleets he considered it necessary to keep his fleet concentrated,¹ although this entailed abandoning one of his most important duties, namely, the protection of the eastern Mediterranean trade routes. He could not afford, he stated, to risk the loss of isolated cruisers or light cruisers detached to protect the routes. He proposed, however, to send a light cruiser to watch the southern entrance of the Straits of Messina; though in the event this was not immediately put into effect. These dispositions met with the approval of the Admiralty.²

By the afternoon of August 1, the British fleet in the Mediterranean was coaled and in every respect ready for service, though the *Defence*, which returned from Durazzo on night of July 30-31 and proceeded into dock at Malta at 8 a.m., August 1, did not undock until the following morning. The *Indomitable*, her refit cancelled, had undocked on the morning of July 31.

The supply of coal for the British fleet was, however, far from satisfactory. There was a considerable shortage of colliers; no Admiralty cargoes were due nor were suitable vessels available at Malta to carry coal; and it was some days before Admiral Milne was able to overcome the difficulty by stopping cargoes bound for the East and taking up ships in ballast and loading them from the stocks at Malta.

7. French Fleet leaves Toulon, August 3.—On August 1 the French general mobilisation began. The *Edgar Quinet* had already left Durazzo at 2.20 a.m. on July 29 to join the fleet at Toulon, and the *Jean Bart* left Dunkirk that day, also for Toulon. By the evening of August 1 the French fleet was ready in every respect for action,³ though it does not appear that this information was forwarded to Admiral Milne, who, pending Admiralty permission to open communication with the French Commander-in-Chief, was without knowledge of the movements of the French fleet. On the following morning the British Government gave to the French an assurance that if the German

¹ A 9.

² See H.S. 19, p. 56.

³ A 11.

fleet entered the English Channel or came through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping, the British fleet would give every protection in its power;¹ and the French were thus assured of the security necessary to enable them to settle the dispositions of their fleet in the Mediterranean.

The first duty of the French fleet was to cover the passage of the XIX Corps from Algiers to France. It seems that the pre-war plan envisaged the passage of the transports at high speed, without escort, whilst the fleet took up a covering position off the mouth of the Adriatic to keep the enemy at a distance. The presence of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* and the fear of armed merchant raiders necessitated a change of plan. It was arranged that the troops should embark at three ports, Philippeville, Algiers, and Oran; and to cover the routes to France the French fleet was divided into three groups. The 1st Squadron, with a division of the 1st Cruiser Squadron and 12 destroyers, was to proceed to Philippeville; the second group, consisting of the *Courbet* and 2nd Squadron, similarly attended by a division of the 1st Cruiser Squadron and 12 destroyers, was detailed to protect the convoys from Algiers; while the Complementary Division covered the route from Oran. The proximity of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, which were reported on August 1 to be coaling at Brindisi, rendered hazardous the sailing of the transports until the arrival of the fleet on the African coast, and orders were given to delay their departure.²

It was not until 5 a.m. on August 3 that Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère sailed from Toulon for the coast of Africa. The delay is variously accounted for, but it seems probable that it was due to the uncertainty as to the attitude of Italy, and to the fact that it was not until after a Cabinet meeting which was held on August 2, that Sir Edward Grey gave to M. Cambon the assurance which permitted the French to make their dispositions in the Mediterranean with the knowledge that their northern coasts would be protected from aggression. On the way southward the three groups of the fleet separated, and pursued their way independently at 12 to 13 knots³ towards the African coast.

8. Admiral Milne Ordered to Shadow "Goeben," August 2.—Admiral Milne's telegram of July 31, informing the Admiralty of the necessity which he felt of keeping his force concentrated, had made no more direct reference to the *Goeben* and *Breslau* than to remind the Admiralty that the eastern Mediterranean trade routes would thereby be left unprotected. The *Goeben*

¹ A. 18.

² A. 45, and Cap. de Vaisseau Voitoux, "L'évasion du *Goeben* et du *Breslau*" (Revue Politique et Parlementaire, March 10, 1919).

³ Voitoux, *op. cit.* But actually the main body of the fleet only made good about 8 knots.

had moved from Pirano to Trieste on July 29.¹ In the event of war, Admiral Souchon had apparently no intention of allowing himself to be hemmed in the Adriatic, for having just spent a month at Pola he had doubtless his own information as to the state of unreadiness of the Austrian fleet. He proceeded to sea on July 30 and steamed south, and on August 1,² off Brindisi, he met the *Breslau*.³ The latter had left her station in the Bojana River, Albania, on July 30, obeying an order from Admiral von Souchon to proceed immediately to Brindisi.⁴ Proceeding at full speed she reached Brindisi early next day⁵ and proceeded to coal. Information was now telegraphed to her of the strained relations between the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, and she returned to Albania to evacuate the German Legation Guard at Durazzo.⁶ The weather was bad, and it was not until 1 p.m. on August 1 that she returned to Brindisi and fell in with the *Goeben* off the port. The two ships entered, and the *Goeben* proceeded to coal from German colliers in the harbour.⁷

The news that the *Goeben* and *Breslau* were coaling at Brindisi reached the Admiralty at 1.20 a.m. on August 2, and 12 hours later definite orders as to the action he was to take were despatched to Sir Berkeley Milne. He himself was to remain near Malta, while his other two battle cruisers were to shadow the *Goeben*. The approach to the Adriatic was to be watched by cruisers and destroyers; it was believed that Italy would remain neutral, though this could not absolutely be counted upon.⁸

Admiral Milne detailed the *Dublin* and *Weymouth* to remain with his flag at Malta together with the *Blenheim* and four destroyers, while Admiral Troubridge with the 1st Cruiser Squadron, *Indomitable*, *Indefatigable*, *Gloucester*, and the 1st and 2nd Divisions of destroyers were ordered to leave at 9 p.m. on the 2nd for the Adriatic. The *Black Prince* had been despatched to Marseilles on August 1 in pursuance of an Admiralty telegram ordering an armoured cruiser to embark Lord Kitchener, the Sirdar, and eight officers who were returning to Egypt,⁹ but she was recalled next day when it was decided that Lord Kitchener should join the Cabinet as Secretary of State for War.¹⁰ She

¹ "Positions and Movements of Foreign Men-of-War," July 30, 1914.

² Or possibly July 31. Distance, Trieste-Brindisi, 372 miles.

³ Otto von Gottberg, in the "Stettiner Abendpost," 6.5.15.

⁴ Emil Ludwig, "Die Fahrten der *Goeben* und der *Breslau*," p. 21.

⁵ The copy which has been examined of the telegram (A. 12) announcing her arrival "early to-day" is dated August 1, but examination of the times of despatch and receipt leads to the conclusion that it was despatched on July 31.

⁶ Emil Ludwig states that she received the information while on passage to Brindisi, and he does not mention her entry and coaling there on July 31, nor, so far as can be ascertained, is it mentioned by any writer. But it is believed that the *Breslau* arrived at Brindisi on July 31, and examination of the available information supports this.

⁷ A. 13, 14.

⁸ A. 16.

⁹ A. 7.

¹⁰ A. 15.

returned to Malta at 7.30 a.m. on August 3, and that evening after coaling she proceeded to the mouth of the Adriatic to join Rear-Admiral Troubridge, with whom she effected junction at 10.50 a.m. next day.¹ The *Chatham* was despatched at once (5.12 p.m.) to watch the Straits of Messina and the south coast of Italy, and rejoin the Rear-Admiral; and the remaining four destroyers were sent to watch the Malta Channel. In reply to a query whether the watch on the Adriatic was to be maintained by the ships not engaged in shadowing the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, should the latter pass out of the Adriatic, the Admiralty at 12.50 a.m. on August 3 informed Sir Berkeley Milne that though the watch on the mouth of the Adriatic was to be maintained the *Goeben* was his objective, and she was to be followed and shadowed wherever she went. The Commander-in-Chief was further warned to be ready to act on a declaration of war, which appeared probable and imminent.² He had been authorised on the previous day to enter into communication with the French Commander-in-Chief, but had not yet succeeded in doing so.³

9. **The Rear-Admiral's Orders.**⁴—The orders given by Sir Berkeley Milne to the Rear-Admiral were as follows:—

Being in all respects ready for sea, you are to take the following ships under your orders and leave Malta to-day to carry out the orders contained in Admiralty telegram No. 196:—

Defence
Indomitable
Indefatigable
Warrior
Duke of Edinburgh
Gloucester
 1st and 2nd Division of Destroyers.

Chatham will leave harbour earlier in accordance with orders of which a copy is attached hereto,⁵ but will act under your orders as to her subsequent movements.

2. The Admiralty have informed me that, should we become engaged in war, it will be important at first to husband the naval force in the Mediterranean and, in the earlier stages, I am to avoid being brought to action against superior force. You are to be guided by this should war be declared.

3. The destroyers are to be pushed forward each night to watch the entrance to the Adriatic between Cape S. Maria di Leuca and Fano Island. During the day they are to be sent into any convenient port on the Greek coast or in the Ionian Islands in order to save coal and give rest to the crews.

4. During the daytime the watch must be maintained by the two cruisers and the two light cruisers, the two battle cruisers remaining such distance in rear as will enable them to concentrate and give support.

5. The battle cruisers, cruisers and light cruisers are not to approach within 40 miles of the line Cape S. Maria di Leuca—Fano Island at night.

¹ *Defence*, signal log.

² A. 19, 22.

³ A. 20, 21.

⁴ M.01653/14.

⁵ These orders are not forthcoming.

6. As much economy in the coal consumption of destroyers as the service admits is necessary. By latest information about 150 tons of steaming coal only were available at Corfu.

7. By the latest information the *Goeben* was coaling at Brindisi on 1st August. Any further information received will be sent to you by wireless telegraph. Should the *Goeben* be sighted you are to cause her to be shadowed by the two battle cruisers, a light cruiser being detailed to assist; but, so far as is practicable, ships detailed are to avoid letting the *Goeben* observe that she is shadowed.

Breslau, by latest report, left Brindisi after coaling on 1st August; it was reported she was proceeding to Albania.

8. Should war be declared by Great Britain, it is desirable that as large a number of enemy merchant vessels, unprovided with passes, as possible should be temporarily detained and brought into port immediately on the outbreak of war.

9. You are to keep me fully informed by wireless telegraph of your movements and of all vessels of war and Austro-Hungarian and German merchant vessels sighted, giving their approximate course and speed.

In accordance with his sailing orders Admiral Troubridge left Malta at 9 p.m. on August 2 with the Detached Squadron, receiving shortly after a message from the Commander-in-Chief that the situation was very critical and directing him to be prepared to meet surprise attack, concentrating his force while on passage.

10. Search for the "Goeben," August 3.—Shortly after midnight on August 2 the Commander-in-Chief received intelligence that the *Goeben* and *Breslau* had left Brindisi and arrived at Messina at 1 p.m. that day, and early in the morning of August 3 he received from the Admiralty the reply to his inquiry as to what his action should be in the contingency which had actually arisen.¹

The news of the arrival of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* at Messina was at once telegraphed by Sir Berkeley Milne to the Rear-Admiral, who inquired whether in these circumstances the watch on the Adriatic was to be maintained,² to which Sir Berkeley Milne replied in the affirmative, warning him, however, that the *Goeben* was his primary objective, and ordering him to send the *Chatham* right through the Straits to the other side, in order to ascertain if the enemy had gone north.³ About 5 a.m. Admiral Troubridge further inquired of the Commander-in-Chief whether he should send the battle cruisers south about to the westward of Sicily, but was told he had better wait until he got authentic news of the *Goeben*.⁴

The *Chatham* passed through the Straits of Messina about 7.30 a.m. on August 3 and immediately reported that there were no signs of the *Goeben*, *Breslau*, or any warship at Messina;⁵

¹ See para. 8.

² B. 1, 2.

³ B. 3.

⁴ B. 4.

⁵ B. 6. No time of despatch is given, but the signal was received by *Defence* at 7.52 a.m.

whereupon the Commander-in-Chief ordered her to go west and endeavour to locate the *Goeben*.¹

It appeared to Sir Berkeley Milne probable that the German cruisers had gone westward,² since the *Chatham* had been watching the southern exit from the Straits of Messina during the night. In addition, therefore, to sending the *Chatham* westward to search, the Commander-in-Chief, as a preliminary measure, recalled the battle cruisers to pass westward along the south coast of Sicily, accompanied by the armoured cruisers; while the *Gloucester* and the destroyers were left to watch the Adriatic, using the Ionian Islands as a base.³

This disposition of the armoured cruisers, however, contravened the orders of the Admiralty, as transmitted to Sir Berkeley Milne on the previous day.⁴ Realising this later, the Commander-in-Chief at 1.30 p.m. on 3rd sent orders to Admiral Troubridge that the 1st Cruiser Squadron was to return and support the destroyers watching the Adriatic approaches. The squadron would be joined by the *Black Prince*, which was due to leave Malta about 7 p.m.; and it was at first intended by the Commander-in-Chief that the 3rd Division of destroyers should sail with her, to reinforce the squadron at the mouth of the Adriatic, but this was cancelled before sailing owing to the impossibility of ensuring their coal supply, and the *Beagle*, *Harpy*, *Grasshopper* and *Bulldog* remained at Malta for the present.⁵

More definite orders were also sent for the *Indomitable* and *Indefatigable*: they were to shape course at 14 knots to pass within 20 miles north-east of Valetta, reporting their time of arrival to the Commander-in-Chief, who moved out of Malta harbour at 6.32 p.m. into the Malta Channel in the *Inflexible*, with the *Weymouth*, *Hussar*⁶ and three destroyers⁷ of the 4th Division, remaining in visual communication with the Castille Signal Station, in readiness to assist where required. Further orders would be sent to the two battle cruisers, who were to continue to search westward after passing Malta. Sir Berkeley Milne also requested the Senior Naval Officer, Gibraltar,⁸ to keep a close look-out in case the German ships should try to leave the Mediterranean.⁹

11. Attempts to Communicate with French Commander-in-Chief. "Dublin" despatched to Bizerta.—In making his dispositions Admiral Milne had borne in mind the necessity for protecting the French transports sailing between the coast of

¹ B. 7.

² B. 8.

³ Commander-in-Chief's Diary of Events, M.01548/14.

⁴ A. 16.

⁵ A. 28, 29. B. 9.

⁶ Gunboat, 1—4.7 in., 2—6 pdrs. Speed about 15 knots.

⁷ *Pincher*, *Rattlesnake*, and apparently *Scorpion*.

⁸ Vice-Admiral Frederic E. E. Brock, C.B.

⁹ Commander-in-Chief's Diary of Events.

Africa and France. As yet, however, he had no knowledge whether the movement had already begun, for war had not yet been declared between France and Germany, nor had Sir Berkeley Milne been able to get into communication with the French Commander-in-Chief, as he had been authorised to do by the Admiralty at 7 o'clock on the previous evening (August 2).¹ All attempts to establish communication with the French W/T station at Bizerta had proved ineffectual, and in view of the orders of the Admiralty that the protection of the Algerian transports was his first duty, it was important for Sir Berkeley Milne to gain information on the subject. Accordingly at 5.40 p.m. on 3rd he despatched the *Dublin* to Bizerta at 18 knots, with a letter for the French Admiral.

At this time the French fleet was 12 hours steaming from Toulon en route for Algeria.

12. Two Battle Cruisers Ordered to Gibraltar, 9 p.m., August 3.—The news that the *Goeben* and *Breslau* were not at Messina was received by the Admiralty at 9.5 a.m. on August 3,² and as the day wore on without any report from Sir Berkeley Milne that the German cruisers had been located the Admiralty came to the conclusion that Admiral Souchon might be making for the unprotected Atlantic trade routes. In view of this possibility, at 2.45 p.m. Admiral Brock at Gibraltar was ordered to patrol the Straits and keep a careful watch for the enemy,³ and at 6.30 p.m. orders were sent to Sir Berkeley Milne that the two battle cruisers *Indomitable* and *Indefatigable* were to proceed to the Straits of Gibraltar at high speed, ready to prevent the *Goeben* from escaping on to the trade routes.⁴ The order was transmitted to the two battle cruisers at 9 p.m., and the two ships increased speed to 21 knots; and at the same time the *Chatham*, who had reported at 6.40 p.m. that search along the northern coast of Sicily had discovered no sign of the *Goeben*, was ordered by the Commander-in-Chief to rejoin the flagship off Malta by 6 a.m. next day.

13. Movements of the German Ships.—At Messina, the *Goeben* and *Breslau* had been joined by the *General*, a large vessel of the Deutsch-Ost-Afrika Line which was on her way, stored and provisioned, to East Africa for the Jubilee celebrations of the Colony. She was requisitioned by Admiral Souchon,⁵ and ordered to remain for the time being at Messina.

Admiral Souchon had been kept informed by Berlin of the political situation. He knew of the outbreak of hostilities between Russia and Germany, that war with France was certain and would probably begin on August 3, that Italy would take

¹ A. 20, 21.

² A. 24.

³ A. 26.

⁴ A. 30.

⁵ She was afterwards armed and converted into an auxiliary cruiser (date not known).

no part, but Great Britain must be reckoned with as a probable enemy. News of the preparation for service of the British fleet at Malta was duly transmitted to him on the afternoon of August 2.

The immediate result of the Italian attitude was seen when the German cruisers arrived at Messina; for by order of the Italian Government they were refused coal or provisions in any Italian port,¹ though permission was eventually granted for the ships to coal from the *General* and other German ships in the port. From 7 p.m. to 11 p.m. on 2nd the two cruisers coaled, and then Admiral Souchon ordered the evolution to cease and the two cruisers were told to be ready for sea in two hours' time.²

Before the arrival of the *Chatham* at 7.45 a.m. on August 3 the German cruisers had left Messina and proceeded to the westward. Admiral Souchon duly learned of the outbreak of war between France and during the night August 3-4 he was told that an alliance had been concluded with Turkey and that the *Goeben* and *Breslau* were to proceed at once to Constantinople.³

14. The attitude of Turkey.—In the gradual degeneration of the political situation which had occurred during the past week no great measure of attention appears to have been focussed by Great Britain on Turkey. Great Britain was the old time friend and champion of Turkey whose fleet was even now under the command of a British Admiral,⁴ and the only complication which was likely to occur was such as might be caused by St. Petersburg. But the Russian Government had early made known their intention of refraining from raising the question of the Dardanelles,⁵ and so secure did the British Government feel the position to be, that the protests of the Porte against the pre-emption of two battleships building in Great Britain for Turkey⁶ seem to have been regarded with little more concern than the cries of a spoilt child, to be silenced by the promise of liberal compensation.

In the general rushing to arms which was taking place in Europe the Turkish mobilisation apparently attracted little attention.

Great Britain and France had to a great extent lost face in Turkey during the recent Balkan wars and the settlements arising out of them, whereas Germany, by skilful diplomacy,

¹ This was in accordance with the Hague Convention, for the German ships had coaled at Brindisi on the previous day.

² Emil Ludwig, p. 25.

³ Von Tirpitz "My Memoirs" II., 349 says the instructions were "given by August 3rd."

⁴ Rear-Admiral Limpus.

⁵ Mr. Beaumont to Sir E. Grey, 469, 2.8.14.

⁶ See Section 45.

had strengthened her position. Moreover, the policy of the British Government had been to ignore the existence of the Young Turk Party, while Berlin, with greater prescience and less scruple, had been engaged during the last year or more in successful intrigue with Enver Pasha. It was, unfortunately, only too easy for Berlin to make capital out of the occupation of Egypt and the ancient, inbred hatred of Turk for Russian. In the work of propaganda Admiral Souchon had played an important rôle; and the activities of the *Goeben* and the German military mission to Turkey had more than counterbalanced the presence of the British Naval Mission under Rear-Admiral Limpus which was reorganising the Turkish navy.

The British Government were warned on August 3 that efforts were being made by Germany to bring Turkey into the war on her side;¹ but in the assurance of the notorious Ottoman supineness it was no doubt realised that some time would elapse before any active steps were taken by Turkey, if indeed they would ever be taken at all. But the results of German intrigue and the potential effect of the *Goeben* on the situation were insufficiently appreciated at the time.

15. Bombardment of Bona and Philippeville, August 4.—When Admiral Souchon received the order to proceed to Constantinople the two German cruisers were to the southward of Sardinia. Distant from them only some three or four hours' steaming lay the coast of Africa, where the German Admiral might expect the embarkation of the French Algerian Corps to be proceeding. On receipt of the news of the outbreak of war with France he decided upon striking a blow at the French transports,² ordering his movements so as to arrive off the coast at daylight on August 4, and this intention, in spite of the urgency of the order he had just received, he decided to prosecute. At about 5.30 a.m. to 7 a.m. on 4th the *Goeben* appeared off Philippeville and the *Breslau* off Bona, and the two German ships carried out a short bombardment of the ports. But fortunately for the French, Bona had not been contemplated as a port of embarkation, while at Philippeville, on the news of the presence of the *Goeben* at Messina, the embarkation of the troops had been postponed until the fleet should have arrived.³ Little material damage and but few casualties were caused by the enemy's bombardment.

At this time, about 7 a.m. on August 4, the main body of the French fleet was in the latitude of the Balearic Islands, the various divisions steaming for the ports of embarkation of the Algerian Corps.

¹ Mr. Beaumont to F.O., 468, 3.8.14.

² Emil Ludwig, p. 32.

³ Admiral Dartige du Fournet states ("Souvenirs de Guerre d'un Amiral," p. 4) that there were several transports in Philippeville Harbour, though apparently the troops had not yet embarked.

The bombardment completed, the *Breslau* steered westward to rejoin the *Goeben*. Admiral Souchon's orders were to go to Constantinople; but first he needed coal, for at Messina he had not been able to complete to full stowage. Citing as his justification the time lost in obtaining permission to coal on August 2, he informed the German Ambassador at Rome that he intended to complete his coaling at Messina on 5th, and asked that his demand should receive the support of the Ambassador. He was, however, 440 miles from Messina, and, as he perhaps argued, since he could not save daylight it would be well to employ his spare hours to put the enemy on a false scent. He could afford to do this, and yet reach Messina at as early an hour as he might expect to be able to obtain coal.

Accordingly he steered for Gibraltar,¹ and was rewarded by intercepting a French signal reporting that he had gone west.² Then he turned east for Messina at high speed; but when some 45 miles north of Bona, he was met by the *Indomitable* and *Indefatigable*, steering for Gibraltar at 22 knots.

16. Sighting of the "Goeben" and "Breslau," 10.30 a.m. August 4.—The first of the two ships to be sighted by the *Indomitable* was the *Breslau*, at 10.32 a.m., on the starboard bow. Two minutes later the *Goeben* came in sight, on the port bow, 17,000 yards off, steaming about 20 knots. She altered course to port as though to cross the *Indomitable's* bows, but if this was her intention it was frustrated by Captain Kennedy, who altered to starboard; and the *Goeben* resumed her easterly course. The German vessels were cleared for action, with guns trained fore and aft. On board the British battle cruisers the guns were loaded and the crews at their action stations awaiting the order to train the turrets. As the ships drew together, it was seen that no Admiral's flag was flying in the *Goeben*, and the *Indomitable* consequently refrained from the salute which might have precipitated hostilities. In silence and at great speed the ships passed one another, 8,000 yards apart; and then Captain Kennedy led the *Indefatigable* round to port and the two battle cruisers settled down to shadow the *Goeben*.

17. Effect of the News.—The sighting of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* was reported by the *Indomitable* at 10.40 a.m.³ The signal gave the position and course of the enemy; but it was not received by the Commander-in-Chief. The first intimation which Sir Berkeley Milne had of the meeting was when the *Indomitable* a few minutes later sent a second signal reporting that with the *Indefatigable* she was shadowing the *Goeben* and *Breslau* in latitude 37° 44' N., longitude 7° 56' E., but giving neither course nor speed.⁴ Apparently the presumption that

¹ Emil Ludwig, p. 36.

² *Ibid.*, p. 37.


³ B. 16.

⁴ B. 17.


the German ships were making for the west was so strong that Sir Berkeley Milne refrained immediately from inquiring what course they were steering, nor was the omission queried at the Admiralty when at 10.58 a.m. his report was received.¹ The Commander-in-Chief's signal was followed a few minutes later by a report of a German collier waiting at Palma, Majorca, for the *Goeben*.² This apparently strengthened the impression that the German cruisers intended to attack the transports of the French Algerian Corps, which were due to begin crossing that day. Despatching a preliminary message to Sir Berkeley Milne and the battle cruisers that war was imminent and the *Goeben* was to be held, the Admiralty asked the Foreign Office for an immediate decision as to whether, in the event of the *Goeben* attacking the French transports, the British ships might engage her; and this course was decided upon, subject to fair warning being given to the German ships.³ The message, however, did not reach Sir Berkeley Milne until 5 p.m. As a matter of fact, the anxiety of the Admiralty for the safety of the French transports was groundless, as they learnt at 5 p.m. when a message was received from the British Military Attaché in Paris that the sailing of the transports had been postponed owing to the presence of the German ships.⁴ This information does not appear to have been communicated to Sir Berkeley Milne.

The *Dublin* had reached Bizerta and anchored at 9.43 a.m. on 4th, and was now preparing to coal. At 11.15 a.m., however, she received orders from Admiral Milne to raise steam for full speed and proceed immediately to reinforce the *Indomitable*, while the *Chatham* would be sent from Malta to take her place at Bizerta.⁵ By some mistake the *Indomitable* was reporting the *Goeben's* course as north,⁶ but before leaving harbour at 12.5 p.m. the *Dublin* took the precaution of asking for the course of the German vessels, and received the reply, as she steamed out of harbour, that they were steering to the eastward. Soon after 11.30 a.m. Sir Berkeley Milne at length also inquired for the course of the enemy, and learnt that the chase was sweeping, not west as he had no doubt supposed, but east.⁷

18. Movements of French Fleet, August 4.—Admiral Milne at this time was waiting off Malta with his flagship in order to keep touch with the Admiralty. At 8.50 a.m. he received through the Eastern Telegraph Company an unofficial report of the bombardment of Bona or Oran, though the official intimation, from Vice-Admiral Dartige du Fournet at Bizerta, did not reach him until 3.30 p.m., when he received his first communication from the French. The transmission was delayed for over an hour, and this, in conjunction no doubt with the time occupied by Captain John Kelly in delivering his letter to the French Admiral at Bizerta and receiving a reply, accounts for the fact



¹ A. 34. ² A. 35. ³ A. 36, 37, 38. ⁴ A. 43.
⁵ B. 18. ⁶ B. 20, 21. ⁷ B. 22, 23.



that it was not until 3.30 p.m. that he knew the French fleet had left Toulon for the Algerian coast.¹ Even now, however, he was without intelligence as to the organisation and distribution of the fleet.

Between the hour of the bombardment of Philippeville and the time of sighting of the German cruisers by the British battle cruisers, Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère had sighted the masts of the *Goeben* some 25 to 30 miles off.² The *Courbet* at this time was in company with part of the battlefleet, and it is reasonable to suppose that on learning of the bombardment the Commander-in-Chief increased speed and steered with his fastest ships to encounter the *Goeben* which was reported steering west.³ At the time of sighting⁴ by the *Courbet* the *Goeben* had turned and was steering to the eastward. The French Commander-in-Chief decided that with his slower ships it was useless to attempt to close the enemy, and he accordingly took measures to ensure the fulfilment of the important objective, namely, the protection of the Algerian transports. To this end, he disposed his whole fleet *en échelon* in the narrow waters between the southern extremity of Sardinia and the northern coast of Africa in such wise that the *Goeben*, had she endeavoured to break to the westward, must have been brought to action by some portion of his fleet. He had little apprehension that she would attempt to pass north of Corsica or through the Straits of Bonifacio; from the former passage she would be deterred by fear of French cruisers, and from the latter by fear of submarines. Of these dispositions, however, Admiral Milne, who had not yet succeeded in getting into communication with the French Commander-in-Chief, had no intelligence.

By 6 p.m. there was still no sign of the German ships, and being unaware of the chase which was proceeding eastwards, the French Commander-in-Chief took the *Courbet*, *Vergniaud*, and *Condorcet* to search the Balearic Isles, where it was reported there was a collier waiting for the *Goeben*.⁵ This latter item of intelligence, which had been reported by the *Dublin* to Sir Berkeley Milne during the forenoon as coming from Paris, was possibly true, for Admiral Souchon, who it will be remembered did not receive orders to go to Constantinople until 24 hours after leaving Messina for the west, may have made arrangements to secure his coal supply to the westward.⁶

¹ B. 28. The signal which is timed 1145, August 4, says: "French Fleet . . . just left for Algerian Coast"; but the French Ministry of Marine reported they left Toulon at 5 a.m., August 3.

² Evidence by Admiral Troubridge at his court-martial.

³ Emil Ludwig, p. 37, says the *Goeben* intercepted a French signal *en clair* reporting that after attacking Philippeville she continued to the westward at full speed.

⁴ It does not appear that the *Goeben* sighted the French ships.

⁵ Cdt. Vedel, p. 37.

⁶ It is not, however, mentioned by Emil Ludwig, whose book "Die Fahrten der *Goeben* und der *Breslau*" gives a good deal of miscellaneous information, nor does it seem to have been verified by Admiral Sir Berkeley Milne.

19. **Shadowing of the "Goeben," August 4.**—The day was misty to the eastward, with varying visibility. The *Breslau* was occasionally lost sight of by the British battle cruisers, which were forced at times to close to within 6,500 yards in order to keep the *Goeben* in sight. About noon the latter altered speed very considerably, and the *Indomitable* at 11.52 a.m. eased to 8 knots. About 3 p.m. the *Dublin* joined up from Bizerta, and was ordered to form on the starboard beam of the *Goeben*, keeping out of gun range. During the early afternoon the *Goeben* increased speed and by 3 o'clock the battle cruisers were nine miles astern.¹ About 4 p.m. the *Goeben* increased to full speed and the battle cruisers soon experienced difficulty in keeping her in sight in spite of working seamen in the bunkers.² The *Indomitable*, overdue for refit, was only getting 249 revolutions at 3.45 p.m., and had dropped to 240 at 4 p.m.³ The *Indefatigable* was in slightly better case,⁴ and at 3.40 p.m. Captain Kennedy ordered her to increase speed and keep the *Goeben* in sight. At 4.25 p.m. the *Indefatigable* could only just perceive one of the enemy ships on her starboard bow; and at 5.3 p.m., the *Dublin* proceeding at her utmost speed,⁵ signalled that the *Goeben* and *Breslau* were going 2 knots faster.⁶ A few minutes later the battle cruisers lost sight of the German ships, though at 5 p.m. the *Dublin* reported they were both in sight steering east.⁷ The Germans had made several alterations of course, about 4.5 p.m. to the southward⁸ and then gradually round to port until at 4.45 p.m. they separated for a time, the *Goeben* steering to the northward and the *Breslau* to the south-east. To prevent the escape of the enemy to the northward, the battle cruisers conformed to this northerly movement of the *Goeben*. At 5.50 p.m. the *Dublin's* position was 38° 1' N., 10° 23' E., with the *Goeben* about 15 miles on her port bow, steering E.N.E., and the *Breslau* about the same distance. The *Indomitable* was about 15 miles on the *Dublin's* port quarter.⁹

20. **The Chase Abandoned.**—At 6.10 p.m. the *Dublin* was still in touch, and reported the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, wide and fine respectively on the port bow, steering E. by S., both ships being almost out of sight. The *Dublin* did not expect to be able to hold them much longer, and in the event of losing them Captain John Kelly requested instructions.¹⁰

In making his dispositions at this juncture it seemed to Admiral Milne that the main contingency against which he had to provide was the probability that the German cruisers would attempt to break westward again during the night. The entrance to the Adriatic was barred by Admiral Troubridge's

¹ B. 36.

² B. 39.

³ She averaged 268 revolutions during 6 hours F.P. trial on May 18, 1914.

⁴ *Indefatigable's* log gives 4 p.m., 276 revolutions; 5 p.m., 276 revolutions; 6 p.m., 278 revolutions; 7 p.m., 272 revolutions. 276 revolutions gave her about 24½ knots. Admiral Souchon's statement that the *Goeben* could only do 23 to 24 knots for a short period cannot be correct.

⁵ 25 knots.

⁶ *Indomitable's* signal log.

⁷ B. 41.

⁸ *Indomitable's* signal log.

⁹ B. 46, 47.

¹⁰ B. 48, 49.

squadron of armoured cruisers near Cephalonia,¹ but Sir Berkeley Milne had no knowledge that the passage to the westward was barred by the French fleet. The only news of the latter which he had received as yet was the signal from the *Dublin* at Bizerta, timed 12.45 p.m. on 4th, reporting that the French fleet had "just left" some place not named for the Algerian coast, whereas in point of fact they had left Toulon at 5 a.m. on the previous day. In his mind, consequently, the necessity for protecting the French transports was as urgent as ever.

In expectation, therefore, of a westward break to Majorca on the part of the *Goeben* in order to reach her collier, the Commander-in-Chief directed the *Indomitable* and *Indefatigable* to steer at slow speed for Majorca, while the *Dublin* was to continue to keep touch with the *Goeben* as long as possible.² To bar the passage south of Sicily, the *Chatham* and *Weymouth* were directed to proceed at high speed from their stations in the Malta Channel and patrol between Ras-el-Mirh³—Pantellaria and Pantellaria—Graham's Shoal⁴ respectively, shadowing the *Breslau* if seen.⁵

21. **Italy Declares Neutrality.**—These dispositions left one passage unwatched, namely, the southern exit of the Straits of Messina. Admiral Milne had just received from the Admiralty a signal stating that the Italian Government had declared neutrality, and ordering him to respect this neutrality rigidly, and not to allow any of his ships to approach within 6 miles of the Italian coast.⁶ This order, which conforms to no clause of the Hague Convention, was issued in the desire to avoid causing any possible irritation to the third member of the Triple Alliance,⁷ and its effect was to bar the passage of the Straits of Messina to the British ships. Coming as it did at this moment, it is possible that it strengthened Sir Berkeley Milne's belief that the *Goeben* would probably break west.

¹ At his court-martial Admiral Troubridge based his defence largely on the point that the 1st Cruiser Squadron was an inferior force to the *Goeben*, and that under the Admiralty orders to avoid being brought to action by superior force his squadron should not attack her except (1) at night, (2) in half light, (3) in navigation waters. The proceedings of the court-martial seem to make it clear that there was a misunderstanding between the two Admirals and that Sir Berkeley Milne expected the Rear-Admiral to engage the *Goeben*, under any circumstances, if she attempted to enter the Adriatic. In employing the phrase "superior force" the Admiralty probably had in mind, not the *Goeben*, but the Austrian Fleet, and this seems to have been the meaning which Admiral Milne read in it.

² B. 51, 52. It is believed that some unofficial criticism has been directed at Sir B. Milne for failing to send the three "B" Class submarines of the Malta local defence (B. 9, 10 and 11) to bar the Straits of Gibraltar. Apart, however, from the impotence of these vessels until war should have been actually declared, the Admiralty orders for them were that they were not to be withdrawn without the permission of the fortress Commander or the Admiralty (M. 0056/13. See M Letter Book).

³ 15 miles south of Cape Bon.

⁴ Between Pantellaria and coast of Sicily.

⁵ B. 50.

⁶ A. 39.

⁷ Adty. Letter 4 August 1914 (see M. Letter Book No. 472 Miscellaneous, p. 650).

CHAPTER II.

ESCAPE OF THE "GOEBEN" AND "BRESLAU."

22. **Great Britain Declares War: Concentration of Battle Cruisers West of Sicily.**—While the signals conveying their new orders to the battle cruisers and light cruisers were still going out the Commander-in-Chief received from the Admiralty a warning that the British ultimatum to Germany would expire at midnight, at which time the Admiralty would despatch the telegram ordering hostilities to be commenced. He was instructed to commit no act of war before that hour, and the authorisation for the battle cruisers to engage the *Goeben* should she attack the French transports was now expressly cancelled.¹

Even now Sir Berkeley Milne was without intelligence of the French dispositions, and in order to protect the Algerian transports he decided to concentrate his battle cruisers in a position to the westward of Sicily from which the *Goeben* could be cut off if she came west. The 4th Division of destroyers, less the *Grampus*, which was having some small repairs done at Malta, were to accompany the *Inflexible* when she left to join the *Indomitable* and *Indefatigable*; and Admiral Milne arranged to pick up the *Chatham* and *Weymouth* on the way.² Admiral Troubridge was ordered to detach the *Gloucester* or some other vessel to watch the southern entrance to the Straits of Messina, and the Commander-in-Chief cautioned him once more against becoming seriously engaged with superior forces during his watch on the entrance to the Adriatic with the armoured cruisers.³ The 1st and 2nd Divisions of destroyers, which had been ordered to Malta from the mouth of the Adriatic to coal at 2 p.m., owing to the impossibility of coaling them off the Greek coast, were recalled and ordered to Santa Maura to await the arrival of colliers which the Commander-in-Chief was arranging to have sent there.⁴

The long expected order to commence hostilities against Germany reached Sir Berkeley Milne at 1.15 a.m. on August 5. Signalling to the *Indomitable* and *Indefatigable*, which had altered course to the westward at 10 knots at 7.5 p.m., to steer for Cape Bon and then Pantellaria at 15 knots,⁵ the Commander-in-Chief left the Malta Channel and shaped course to effect concentration with his two battle cruisers. The *Dublin*, which had lost sight of the *Goeben* about 7.30 p.m.,⁶ was ordered to rejoin the *Indomitable* before dawn.⁷

¹ A. 40.² A. 50.³ B. 37.⁴ A. 43, B. 29, 54.⁵ B. 67.⁶ B. 50a.⁷ B. 58.

Sir Berkeley Milne effected his concentration with the *Indomitable* and *Indefatigable* off Pantellaria about 11 a.m. on August 5, and proceeded towards Bizerta. Arriving off Bizerta about 5.30 p.m., the *Indomitable*, *Savage* and *Rattlesnake* were sent in to complete with coal and gain intelligence as to the French dispositions, and the *Dublin* was ordered to Malta to coal with all despatch and proceed with two of the five destroyers there to reinforce Admiral Troubridge. Although the *Goeben* and *Breslau* had been anchored in Messina harbour for some hours, the Commander-in-Chief was still without the intelligence. Under the system in force the information should have been reported to the Intelligence Officer at Malta by the British Consul at Messina,¹ but it was nearly 24 hours before it was received at Malta.² From Malta, the Commander-in-Chief had just learnt that our Consul at Reggio reported a man-of-war at Messina, and the information was signalled by the Commander-in-Chief to the Rear-Admiral and the *Gloucester*.³

The *Gloucester*, which arrived off the southern entrance of the Straits of Messina about 8 a.m. on 5th, had just reported that it appeared from the strength of her signals that the *Goeben* was in the Straits; and the *Dublin*, on leaving Malta, was told to shape course first for Zante.⁴

23. **The Rear-Admiral's Movements, August 3-5.**—Admiral Troubridge meanwhile had been maintaining an uneventful watch on the Adriatic since parting from the battle cruisers off Cape Passero at 3.18 p.m. on August 3. Owing to the doubtful attitude of Italy and the necessity of respecting her neutrality, the patrol had been shifted from the line Cape S. Maria di Leuca—Fano Island, originally ordered, to the latitude of Cephalonia.⁵ The principal anxiety had been the question of fuel for the destroyers of the 1st and 2nd Divisions, and Admiral Troubridge had made all arrangements to coal them from his cruisers, when they were ordered back to Malta at high speed, to coal, by the Commander-in-Chief on the afternoon of August 4.⁶ Six hours

¹ The Consul at Messina reported to the Ambassador at Rome (time not known) the arrival of the *Breslau* at Messina (A. 59a). This information was repeated by Sir R. Rodd to the Admiralty, where it arrived at 3.30 a.m. on 6th. The Consul similarly reported the arrival of the *Goeben* (A. 60b), but he also reported it direct to the Admiralty (A. 60a) and it reached them at 9.5 a.m. August 6. The signal was timed 6.45, but whether a.m. or p.m. August 5 is meant, cannot be ascertained. From the fact that the signals reporting the two ships were sent separately, it may be inferred that they were despatched immediately upon the arrival of the respective enemy warships and that the delay occurred in transmission of the telegrams by the Italian Postal Authorities.

² This is based on the assumption that the I.O., Malta, sent out the information to the fleet directly it was received, as he would naturally do. Time of receipt by I.O. cannot be ascertained, but the I.O. telephoned the signal (B. 85) to Rinella for transmission at 4.41 a.m. on 6th.

³ Signal B. 75a has code time 1556, whereas the Commander-in-Chief's signal to the R.A. (B. 77) repeating the intelligence has code time 1529, i.e., 27 minutes earlier. From the internal evidence of *Inflexible's* log, however, there is little doubt that the code time should have been 1629.

⁴ B. 78.⁵ B. 14, 27.⁶ B. 29.

later this order was countermanded, as the news of the ultimatum was known and colliers were becoming available at Malta.¹ The destroyers accordingly returned to Santa Maura Island on the morning of August 5, where a collier had been ordered to proceed from Malta, their bunkers being now the emptier for the run. At 12.30 p.m. on August 5 the Rear-Admiral received a report that the Austrian fleet was at sea cruising outside Pola,² but hostilities had not yet commenced with that Power.

During the afternoon of August 5, Admiral Troubridge concluded from wireless indications that the *Goeben* was in the neighbourhood, and he informed the Commander-in-Chief that he intended to keep within 30 miles of Santa Maura Island in the hope of drawing the *Goeben* into narrow waters, should she be encountered.³

Late in the same afternoon (August 5) the Rear-Admiral received from the *Gloucester* and the Commander-in-Chief intelligence that strengthened his belief that the *Goeben* was in the Straits of Messina.⁴ Bearing in mind his dual mission to watch for the exit of the Austrian fleet from the Adriatic and to prevent the German ships from entering, and being convinced that the *Goeben* intended to attempt to enter, he stood across towards Cape Colonne, on the direct route from Messina to the entrance to the Adriatic, and formed the squadron in a position to meet the *Goeben* during the night.⁵ It was a bright moonlight night, and the Rear-Admiral hoped to engage the enemy down the moon, should Admiral Souchon attempt to enter the Adriatic. At the same time, the destroyers were instructed to come out from Santa Maura for the same purpose, if they had sufficient coal⁶; and six of them left at 7.30 p.m. for Cape Santa Maria di Leuca.⁷

At 7.19 p.m. on 5th, however, a signal was received by the Rear-Admiral from the Commander-in-Chief, instructing him to use his destroyers for night work⁸; and as the *Goeben* had not been reported leaving Messina before sunset and Italian destroyers were in the vicinity, at 9.50 p.m. Admiral Troubridge altered course to the south-east and reduced speed, and withdrew to the southward, as usual, for the night.⁹ The destroyers at

¹ B. 54, 72, 74, 75.

² Report of Proceedings by R.-A., 1st Cruiser Squadron, 26 Aug., 1914. (M. 01811/14). The signal cannot be traced in *Defence's* log. It was despatched by Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, at 9.30 a.m. (G.M.T.) on 5th (A. 55).

³ B. 73. See also R. A. Troubridge's Report.

⁴ B. 76, 77.

⁵ In his Explanation of Movements on August 6-7, dated August 26 (M. 01989/14), Admiral Troubridge, who seems on August 5 to have been aware that the French fleet was guarding the approaches to the Western Mediterranean, states that he "confidently anticipated" the return of the battle cruisers, whose presence, in his opinion, was necessary in order to deal with the *Goeben*.

⁶ B. 79, 80.

⁷ B. 81.

⁸ B. 73.

⁹ *Defence's* "A" signal log and deck log.

the same time were ordered to return to Santa Maura.¹ Two colliers had been ordered by the Commander-in-Chief to Port Vathi, Ithaca, but the first of them would not be ready to sail from Malta until August 6.²

24. Battle Cruiser Patrol West of Sicily, August 6.—During the night of August 5-6 the Commander-in-Chief in the *Inflexible*, with the *Indefatigable*, *Chatham*, *Weymouth* and *Pincher*,³ patrolled along the meridian of 10° E. At 7.12 p.m. on 5th, there had been a false alarm when the *Gloucester* reported sighting two men-of-war believed to be the *Goeben* and *Breslau* off Taormina, steering E. by S. The Commander-in-Chief immediately ordered the battle cruisers and the *Dublin*, *Weymouth* and *Chatham* to close him, but ordered them to resume their former movements when he learnt 20 minutes later that the ships which the *Gloucester* had sighted were Italian. At 5 a.m. on 6th Sir Berkeley Milne received from Malta definite intelligence that the *Goeben* and *Breslau* were at Messina,⁴ and at 7.30 a.m. he altered course to sweep towards Cape San Vito, the north-west point of Sicily, at 8 to 10 knots; "my intention," he wrote in his despatch, "being to continue as far as the longitude of Cape Vito, arriving there about 6 p.m., at which hour *Goeben* could have been sighted if she had left Messina." From the *Indomitable* at Bizerta he learned during the night that the French were keeping no watch between Cape Corso, the northernmost point of Sardinia, and the coast of Italy,⁵ though it was not apparently considered necessary to take any steps on this intelligence. During the 6th, too, he gleaned certain further items of information regarding the French dispositions, namely, that the transport of the Algerian Corps had begun and the French fleet would be occupied until August 10, and that a squadron of four battleships and three armoured cruisers left Philippeville at 8 a.m. on 6th for Ajaccio, where they were due to arrive on the afternoon of 7th. He learnt, too, that there were 16 Austrian warships at Pola and that the *Goeben* and *Breslau* at Messina were coaling.⁶ Sir Rennell Rodd, our Ambassador at Rome, had learnt during the forenoon of 5th that the German ships were attempting to obtain coal from a British collier in the port and had telegraphed to our Consul instructing him to warn the captain of the collier to supply no coal to the enemy vessels.⁷

In the opinion then prevailing, the German ships had two obvious courses open to them: to proceed to join the Austrians in the Adriatic, or to break westward once more. That they might

¹ B. 82.

² B. 74, 75.

³ The *Pincher* went into Bizerta at 7.10 a.m., August 6, to coal, taking in two German prizes, the *Kawak* and *Kalymnos*.

⁴ B. 85.

⁵ B. 84.

⁶ B. 86, 89, 92.

⁷ Sir R. Rodd to F.O., 175, 5.8.14.

proceed to Constantinople was entirely unanticipated: such a course, though it would save them from destruction, would put an end completely to any further activity on their part. It was realised at home that relations with Turkey were strained on account of the requisitioning of her two Dreadnoughts. It was known that she was mobilising, that the German Military Mission was taking charge of her army, and that the Dardanelles were being mined. But none of this intelligence appears to have been communicated to Admiral Milne, except the fact of mine-laying, which by itself merely indicated an intention to bar the passage to belligerent vessels. At 4.30 p.m. on 6th, Sir Berkeley Milne informed the French Admiral that he would turn to the westward at 6 p.m. that day, and if the German ships sailed but were not sighted by 7 a.m. on 7th he would assume they had gone northward either through the Straits of Bonifacio or round Cape Corso.¹

How little cognisant was Sir Berkeley Milne of the true situation of the French is shown by his offer of two battle cruisers and a light cruiser to assist on the transport routes. The message was taken by Captain Kennedy to the French Admiral at Bizerta. "Does not your Admiral know that we have all our fleet with the transports?" asked the latter. "They are quite safe."² And, far from requiring the services of the battle cruisers, Admiral Boué de Lapeyrere himself offered to Sir Berkeley Milne the cruisers *Bruix*, *Latouche Tréville*, *Amiral Charner* and *Jurien de la Gravière*, which had been brought up to full complement at Bizerta, for which the French Commander-in-Chief had no use while he was transporting the Algerian Corps.

However, by 6 o'clock Sir Berkeley Milne had changed his mind, and as there was no news that the *Goeben* had left Messina, he determined to close the northern entrance to the Straits and risk the chance of the enemy having already gone northward.³ In accordance with this new decision the *Chatham* was sent off at 20 knots to patrol off Milazzo Point, at the north-east corner of Sicily; the *Weymouth* was told to take station 18 miles ahead of the battle cruisers; and a rendezvous was appointed for 1.30 a.m. in 38° 20' N., 14° 30' E. (near the Lipari Islands). By now the Commander-in-Chief was in wireless communication with Bizerta, and he signalled at 6.15 p.m. to the French Admiral acquainting him of his new decision.⁴

Exactly one minute later a report was received from the *Gloucester* that the *Goeben* was proceeding eastward out of the Straits of Messina.⁵

¹ B. 94.

² Narrative by an officer of *Indomitable*, "Naval Review," Vol. III, p. 120.

³ Admiral Milne's Diary of Events.

⁴ B. 95.

⁵ B. 97.

25. Movements of the Enemy.—The *Goeben* had entered Messina harbour early in the morning of August 5. If she was to reach the Dardanelles she must coal. The Italian authorities refused her coal; but apparently Admiral Souchon's argument was successful that this must be regarded merely as a resumption of his previous incomplete coaling on August 2.

It seems that the *General* had not a sufficient supply on board, but the German cruisers were permitted to complete from colliers in the port. The true history of the episode is yet to be written; but the fact remains that Admiral Souchon obtained the coal he needed.

During the afternoon of 5th he was warned from Berlin that for political reasons he could not yet proceed to Constantinople.¹

Whether this or the exhaustion of his crews prompted the German Admiral to spend 36 hours at Messina is uncertain; but it seems that he successfully claimed from the Italian authorities permission to reckon the commencement of the 24 hours of grace allowed him from the hour on the evening of 5th, when the Italian neutrality was officially notified to him by an Italian destroyer officer.² He had been informed of Admiral Troubridge's presence in the Adriatic, and he now learnt that no help was to be had from the Austrian fleet. By the evening of 6th, however, he had either to leave Messina or to be interned, and with a heartening message from the Kaiser he shortly proceeded out of harbour.

Apparently Admiral Souchon believed that he had to reckon with concentrations to the north and south of him, and he was not sanguine as to his chances of breaking through. He issued orders for the *Goeben* to leave at 5 p.m., at 17 knots, the *Breslau* following five miles astern and closing up at nightfall. The *General* was to sail two hours later, and, keeping along the coast of Sicily, was to make for Santorin, one of the islands in the southern Greek Archipelago. It was the Admiral's intention to steer a false course until nightfall, to give the impression that he was making for the Adriatic, and then to alter course for Cape Matapan.

26. Sighting of the "Goeben" and "Breslau," 6 p.m., August 6.—The *Gloucester* had been patrolling off the Straits of Messina since 5 a.m. on August 5. At 6 p.m. on 6th she was

¹ Admiral von Tirpitz states in his Memoirs, II. 350, that on the evening of 5th, on the receipt of information in Berlin that the Austrian fleet was unready and unable to help, Souchon was given the choice of breaking through to east or west, as seemed best to him, and chose the former alternative.

² The 2nd and 3rd Italian destroyer flotillas had been sent to Messina on August 4, doubtless to enforce Italy's neutrality.

about 14 miles south-west of Cape dell Armi, steaming in towards the Straits at 12 knots, when she sighted the *Goeben* under the land, coming out of the Straits; and seven minutes later the *Breslau* was seen about a mile astern of the *Goeben*. The enemy ships rounded Cape dell' Armi and steered to the eastward, following the coast line, the *Gloucester* keeping abeam of the *Goeben*, from 16,000 to 18,000 yards off.¹

27. Disposition of British Fleet, 6 p.m., August 6.—The positions of the British ships at this time were as follows:—

The Commander-in-Chief with the *Inflexible* and *Indefatigable* was about 35 miles N.N.E. of Marittimo, steering towards the northern entrance to the Straits of Messina in accordance with his decision to close the Straits. The *Chatham*, detached but in his neighbourhood, was steering for her patrol position off Milazzo Point; and the *Weymouth* was taking station 18 miles ahead of the battle cruisers.

The *Indomitable* was at Bizerta. She had finished coaling and was anchored outside, waiting for orders from the Commander-in-Chief to proceed. The *Savage* and *Rattlesnake* had completed with coal and left to join the Commander-in-Chief during the forenoon of 6th, and the *Pincher* had arrived at 7.10 a.m. to coal.

The *Dublin* had completed with coal and left Malta at 2 p.m. with the *Bulldog* and *Beagle* in company to join Admiral Troubridge, and was now about 35 miles south-east of Cape Passero, steering for Zante.

Admiral Troubridge, with the 1st Cruiser Squadron, was about 25 miles west of Cephalonia, making a southerly stretch in an endeavour to capture the German collier *Waltraute* which was reported as coming from Alexandria to Brindisi. The 1st and 2nd Divisions of destroyers, which by now were very short of coal, were off the Greek coast near Santa Maura awaiting the arrival of a collier from Malta.

28. Movements of the Commander-in-Chief, Night 6-7 August.

—At this juncture, the orders and instructions by which Sir Berkeley Milne was guided were as follows:—

- (a) The *Goeben* and *Breslau* were to be prevented from interfering with the transport of French troops.²
- (b) They were to be prevented from leaving the Mediterranean by the Straits of Gibraltar.³
- (c) They were to be prevented from entering the Adriatic, and the Austrian fleet was to be watched if it moved out of the Adriatic.⁴

¹ B. 98-102.

² Admiralty telegram No. 183 of July 30 (A. 5).

³ Admiralty telegram No. 208 of August 3 (A. 30).

⁴ Admiralty telegrams Nos. 196, 204, and 222 of August 2, 3 and 5 (A. 16, 22, 54).

- (d) Trade in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean was to be protected.
- (e) Italy might join Austria and Germany¹—this was less likely now that Italy had declared neutrality, which neutrality was to be rigidly respected and no ship to be allowed to approach within 6 miles of the Italian coast.²

The intentions of Admiral Souchon were still hidden from Sir Berkeley Milne. In his present state of knowledge of the political situation, however, it appeared that there were two probable courses open to the German Admiral, namely, to enter the Adriatic and effect junction with the Austrian fleet, or to evade the *Gloucester* and turn westward under cover of darkness to attack the French transports; for the *Indomitable's* reports of the movements of the French fleet do not seem to have made it clear to the Commander-in-Chief that Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère had amply secured the safety of the Algerian transports.³ The French Commander-in-Chief apparently took no steps to inform Sir Berkeley Milne of his dispositions or to co-operate with him. Whichever of the two courses Admiral Souchon intended to pursue, the Commander-in-Chief was favourably situated to counter him; for at the entrance to the Adriatic he would be met and turned westward by the Rear-Admiral with the 1st Cruiser Squadron, and if he attempted to come west he would find his path blocked by the Commander-in-Chief himself with his three battle cruisers. To follow the *Goeben* himself with his battle cruisers was impossible in view of the Admiralty orders forbidding him to pass through the Straits of Messina. The possibility that the Rear-Admiral might interpret his orders to avoid action with superior force as an injunction to refrain from bringing the *Goeben* to action, does not seem to have occurred to Sir Berkeley Milne.⁴ After recalling the *Chatham*, therefore, at 6.19 p.m., the Commander-in-Chief at 6.25 p.m. set a course at 10 knots round the western side of Sicily, ordering the *Chatham* to take station 8 miles astern of the flagship and stationing the *Weymouth* 8 miles ahead. At 7.13 p.m. course was altered to S. 28 W. and at 12.45 a.m. on 7th, being clear of the south-western corner of Sicily, the flagship altered course to port for the run past Graham's Shoal to Malta. The *Pincher*, which had just finished coaling, was ordered to return to Bizerta, and the *Savage* and *Rattlesnake* had been ordered about an hour previously to return there with a German prize captured by the former. At 7.45 p.m. (G.M.T.) on 6th the Admiralty, apparently believing the

¹ Admiralty telegrams Nos. 183 of July 30 and 196 of August 2 (A. 5, 16).

² Admiralty telegram No. 215 of August 4 (A. 39).

³ See M. 01601/14.

⁴ The evidence given by Sir A. B. Milne at Admiral Troubridge's court-martial, his Letters of Proceedings, and Signal 0721 of August 7 to Rear-Admiral, 1st Cruiser Squadron, all tend to confirm this view.

Commander-in-Chief to be steering eastward along the north coast of Sicily,¹ and being ignorant as yet that the *Goeben* had left Messina, telegraphed that if she should go south from there Sir Berkeley Milne was to follow through the Straits irrespective of territorial waters.² This was a reversal of the order forbidding ships to approach within 6 miles of the coast, but unfortunately, by the time the Commander-in-Chief received the telegram, at 10.54 p.m., he was already committed to the movement round the west of Sicily.

29. "Indomitable" proceeds to Malta.—The *Indomitable* at Bizerta finished coaling at 2.40 p.m. on 6th, proceeded from her buoy, and anchored outside the harbour. On her arrival at 6 o'clock the previous evening to coal she found only briquettes of poor quality available, although Sir Berkeley Milne had warned the French Admiral at Bizerta of her coming and had been promised by the latter that she should be supplied with steam coal.³ The *Indomitable* commenced to take in briquettes, when at 8.43 p.m. the collier *Ganges*⁴ arrived with 5,300 tons of steam coal consigned to a firm at Jidda and Basra. At 1.30 a.m. on 7th, having obtained permission from the Commander-in-Chief to take coal from the *Ganges*, Captain Kennedy got her alongside and commenced coaling from her. His experience of the facilities at Bizerta was so unsatisfactory that he arranged for two 100-ton lighters to be kept filled with coal for destroyers, and also to leave bags and shovels behind for any British ships which might come in to coal. At 6.12 p.m. on 6th, the *Indomitable* having reported that she was ready to proceed, Admiral Milne gave her the rendezvous he had appointed for 1.30 a.m. on 7th near the Lipari Islands and ordered her to proceed there at 15 knots. The news of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* leaving Messina arrived before the *Indomitable* had weighed, and she proceeded at 7.55 p.m. to join up with the Commander-in-Chief at Malta.

30. The "Dublin" Ordered to Attack.—The *Dublin*, which had left Malta for Zante with the *Bulldog* and *Beagle* at 2 p.m. on 6th, intercepted the *Gloucester's* signals of the sighting of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, while about 35 miles south-east of Cape Passero. At 8.30 p.m. Captain John Kelly received orders from the Commander-in-Chief to obtain from the *Gloucester* the course and speed of the *Goeben* and to sink her during the night if possible⁵; and accordingly the *Dublin*, which by now had worked up to full speed, altered course at 8.46 p.m. to intercept the enemy. By now it was clear that the *Goeben* was making

¹ The latest information of his movements at the Admiralty was a signal sent at 11.46 a.m., G.M.T., August 6, giving his position 38° 40' N., 10° 46' E., course S. 72 E., 10 knots.

² A. 65.

³ *Inflexible's* "A" Log.

⁴ Mercantile Steamship Company

⁵ B. 103.

for the Adriatic and Captain Kelly realised that even at his utmost speed he could not intercept her until after daylight, and whilst informing the Commander-in-Chief of his alteration of course in accordance with orders, he took the precaution of acquainting him with that fact.¹

About half-an-hour after the Commander-in-Chief's order went out to the *Dublin*, the *Inflexible* intercepted a signal from the Rear-Admiral ordering the *Dublin*, if she could reach the Zante Channel by 4 a.m., to proceed there at full speed with the *Bulldog* and *Beagle*.² The *Dublin* received this signal at 8.55 p.m., nine minutes after she had altered course in accordance with Sir Berkeley Milne's order, and realising no doubt that a further signal would shortly be forthcoming from the Commander-in-Chief to make it clear which course of action he was to pursue, Captain Kelly continued his northerly course. Half-an-hour later the signal arrived: he was to follow the Rear-Admiral's orders³; and accordingly at 9.56 p.m. he altered course once more for the Zante Channel, informing Admiral Troubridge of the fact and asking whether this was in accordance with his wishes. The reply was received a few minutes later, and it clearly indicated to Captain Kelly that he was to attack the *Goeben* during the night if possible⁴; and at 10.4 p.m. the *Dublin* once more altered course to the northward and steered at full speed to intercept the *Goeben*.

31. The "Goeben" turns Eastward.—The *Gloucester*, meanwhile, had been shadowing the *Goeben* with great skill, reporting every alteration of course and speed in spite of W/T jamming by the enemy. By 7 p.m., in the fading light, it had become difficult to make out the enemy ships against the land, and before they reached Cape Spartivento, soon after 7.30 p.m., they were lost to sight. The *Gloucester*, however, was visible to the enemy in the full moon which had just risen, and fearing lest they should double back under the land and so shake him off, Captain Howard Kelly at 7.40 p.m. increased speed to 26 knots and altered course 8 points towards the enemy and the land. The manœuvre was successful. At 8 p.m. the enemy was again sighted in the moonlight, and the *Gloucester* took up a position on their port quarter, with the land as a background to her smoke. The speed was now about 18 knots. At 9.10 p.m. the *Breslau* began to haul off to port, and after a struggle, for fear of losing the *Goeben*, Captain Howard Kelly was compelled through lack of sea room to yield to the *Breslau* the landward position and to alter course into the wake of the *Goeben* and increase speed to catch up.

About 9.30 p.m. the *Breslau* was seen to be standing to cross the *Gloucester's* bows to the eastward, and in order to

¹ B. 109.

² B. 105.

³ B. 111.

⁴ B. 112.

obtain the most advantageous position for engaging, with regard to the moon, the *Gloucester* increased to full speed and altered course towards the *Breslau*. The two ships passed one another starboard to starboard at 3,000 to 4,000 yards. On board the *Gloucester*, the ship's company were at their quarters and everything was in readiness for engaging. But the *Breslau* withheld her fire, and the service of shadowing the *Goeben* was considered by Captain Kelly to be of too great an importance to justify him in engaging the *Breslau* unless the latter should attack. At 24 knots the *Breslau* passed without opening fire and was shortly lost to sight to the eastward¹ as the *Gloucester* turned northward once more to follow the *Goeben's* wake.

At 10.46 p.m.² the *Goeben* was seen to be altering course to the southward. The *Gloucester* followed her round to a course S. 75 E., and finally, just after midnight, the enemy settled down on S. 54 E., the course for Cape Matapan.

32. The "Dublin's" Attempt to Attack.—The enemy meanwhile had been jamming the *Gloucester's* W/T signals consistently, but without preventing her from getting them through, though not always without delay. On turning for Cape Matapan, however, a redoubled effort seems to have been made to prevent the *Gloucester* from reporting the alteration of course.³ By shifting her wavelength, however, the latter succeeded, after very little delay, in getting the signal through; and it was duly intercepted by the *Dublin*.

The alteration of course on the part of the enemy placed the *Dublin* in a more favourable position for intercepting the *Goeben*. Before leaving Malta Captain John Kelly had arranged with Commander Godfrey of the *Beagle* the method of attack if the enemy should be met; and he stationed the two destroyers in line ahead close to his starboard quarter. Both boats were flaming considerably at the funnels, but a reduction of 1 knot in speed made no perceptible difference, and Captain Kelly held on at 24 to 25 knots. To have reduced further would have entailed risk of missing the enemy. At 12.50 a.m. on 7th a tube blew out in the *Beagle* and she was reduced to four boilers, but in spite of this, both destroyers kept up well and preserved excellent station throughout the attack.

The signals he had been intercepting indicated to Captain John Kelly that the *Breslau* was steering to rejoin the *Goeben*, and he considered that junction would be made before he met

¹ B. 122.

² *Gloucester's* report (M. 02056/14) says 10.50 p.m., but signal (B. 121) announcing the alteration of course was made at 2146 (G.M.T.).

³ In Ludwig, p. 60, a highly coloured account of the episode may be found.

them, which he expected to do about 1 a.m.¹ At 12.45 a.m. on 7th the *Dublin* went to action stations, and at 1 a.m. the *Breslau* was sighted on the port bow. Course was altered and the *Dublin* attempted to cross ahead of the enemy, which was apparently recognised to be the *Breslau*. Finding it impossible to cross her bows, Captain Kelly manoeuvred to reduce the disadvantage of position which he was in with regard to the moon and settled down to chase the enemy, thinking apparently that the *Goeben* was in close proximity, out of sight. The possible track of a torpedo fired from the *Breslau* was seen about 30 yards on the port hand at 2.20 a.m.

By 2.30 a.m. it had become clear that the *Dublin* was chasing a single ship, the *Breslau*, which experience had shown could easily outdistance the *Dublin*. The expected concentration had evidently not taken place. Reckoning that he must be well ahead of the *Goeben*, and the latter being his objective, at 2.42 a.m. Captain John Kelly altered course to the northward to get into position to run down and attack the *Goeben* from ahead, on her port side, thus placing the German battle cruiser in the moon.² At 3.10 a.m. course was altered for the run down to attack the *Goeben*. The torpedo tubes were trained to port, and the port guns were on the alert, and it was expected that the *Goeben* would be sighted about 3.30 a.m.

But no opportunity to attack occurred. At 3.38 a.m. the *Dublin* signalled to the destroyers by visual, "Am afraid we have missed her."³ Captain Kelly ran on for a few minutes longer, to make certain that the enemy's speed had not been over-estimated; and at 3.45 a.m. he abandoned the attack, turned eight points to starboard, reduced speed to 15 knots, and steered for Fano Island in accordance with the Rear-Admiral's orders.

¹ B. 127. The following was the latest information of the enemy which had been received by *Dublin* when she made B. 127:—

Goeben, 11.56 p.m., 38° 20' N., 17° 21' E., course S. 54 E., speed 22 knots.

Breslau, 9.50 p.m., 38° 15' N., 16° 34' E., course E.S.E., speed 20 knots.

On the above information the *Goeben* would have been approximately in the position given by *Dublin* (37° 55' N., 18° 14' E.) at 2 a.m., and the *Breslau* at 1 a.m. The *Goeben* was the *Dublin's* objective, but it is clear from a signal made by visual at 12.10 a.m. on 7th to *Beagle* and *Bulldog* that Captain Kelly was aware he might sight the *Breslau* first.

It should be noted that when the *Dublin* made B. 127 she had not intercepted *Gloucester's* B. 126 giving midnight position of the *Goeben* 10' (of longitude) further east than at 11.56 p.m. She intercepted it 20 minutes later, but read the latitude 17° 49' E., i.e., 28' (of longitude) further east than at 11.56 p.m. and almost an hour's steaming further east than *Goeben* actually was.

With regard to the *Breslau's* speed, *Dublin* does not log *Gloucester's* B. 122 giving speed 24 instead of 20 knots. The speed of advance of the *Breslau* between 9.50 p.m. on 6th and 1 a.m. on 7th was actually a fraction under 23 knots.

It may be noted that on the *Dublin's* track chart the position marked "*Goeben* 11 p.m. (G.M.T.)" should be "*Goeben* 10 p.m. (G.M.T.)." Possibly Captain John Kelly made a mistake here.

² The *Dublin's* track chart shows her passing to port of the *Goeben*, as Captain Kelly intended. But examination of the evidence, and careful plotting, support the belief that the *Dublin* actually passed to southward of the *Goeben* as shown in Plan II.

³ Neither *Beagle* nor *Bulldog* log this.

In his report, Captain John Kelly attributed his failure to intercept the *Goeben* to the probability that the *Breslau* had warned her consort of the *Dublin's* presence and enabled Admiral Souchon to avoid the danger by a small alteration of course to the northward.¹ It is possible, too, that the flaming of the destroyers' funnels betrayed their presence prematurely, and alternatively that the *Dublin* was not sufficiently far to the northward when she turned to port at 3.10 a.m. to run down to attack. No alteration of course on the part of the *Goeben* was reported by the *Gloucester* between 3 a.m. and 4 a.m., but it is significant that whereas the average speed of advance of the *Goeben* between midnight and 3 a.m. was 18 knots, for the two hours 3 a.m. to 5 a.m. it was only 15½, indicating a possible alteration to the northward which passed unnoticed or unreported by the *Gloucester*.²

That the *Goeben* passed to the northward, *i.e.*, to starboard, while all hands were looking out to port, is established without possibility of doubt. Whether she was actually sighted (as stated by one officer eye-witness) is less certain. Captain Kelly in his report stated that at 3.35 a.m. distant smoke was sighted abaft the starboard beam, which was considered to be either the *Gloucester* or the *Goeben*. If the *Goeben* was actually sighted by the *Dublin* there can be little doubt that she either passed too quickly and unexpectedly to enable an attack to be carried out, or else in the moonlight she was not recognised in sufficient time. "Regret we missed them," signalled Captain Kelly to the destroyers at 3.54 a.m., "but they passed 6,000 yards on our starboard hand instead of port as I had hoped."³

33. Movements of the Rear-Admiral and Destroyers, Night, August 6-7.—Even now, at 3.45 a.m. on 7th, when the *Dublin* abandoned the attack, there still remained a chance that the *Goeben* might be intercepted and brought to action by the Rear-Admiral.

At 6.13 p.m. on 6th, when Admiral Troubridge received the news that the *Goeben* had left Messina steering east, the 1st Cruiser Squadron was about 25 miles west of Cephalonia, steering south to intercept the reported German collier *Waltraute*. It

¹ An impression is known to exist that the failure of the *Dublin* to intercept the *Goeben* was in some way connected with confusion between G.M.T. and S.M.T. in text of signals. There is no evidence to substantiate this belief. In any case, at 2.57 a.m. on 7th, when the *Dublin* received the *Gloucester's* signal (B. 137) "By your 2 a.m. position you must have *Breslau* ahead we are 24 miles N. 28 W. from you with *Goeben* (0141)," any confusion which may possibly have existed should have been cleared up. It may be noted, however, that on August 8 Admiral Troubridge suggested to the Commander-in-Chief that owing to confusion which had occurred all ships should keep G.M.T. This was not approved, but the Commander-in-Chief, on August 7, ordered all times given in position signals to be G.M.T. (A. 170, 180a).

² No 4 a.m. position of the enemy was made by the *Gloucester*. The *Gloucester* ran 15 miles between 3 and 4 a.m., and 14 miles between 4 and 5 a.m.

³ Not logged by *Bulldog*.

soon became evident that the enemy were making for the Adriatic, and the Rear-Admiral, who had turned north on receipt of the *Gloucester's* sighting of the enemy signal, issued to the 1st Cruiser Squadron his battle instructions as follows:—

"It would appear that *Goeben* and possibly *Breslau* are making for the Adriatic. Unless further information is received I propose to arrive off Fano Island at daylight. I do not propose to engage him in the middle of the Straits, my instructions being against it. If *Goeben* wishes to fight I shall endeavour to make use of short (? shoal) waters off Fano Island to choose my own range. (2125.)"

At 6.40 p.m. the Rear-Admiral sent orders to the 1st and 2nd Divisions of destroyers near Santa Maura Island to be under way concealed in Vasiliko Bay, in the south-western corner of the Island, by midnight, with steam for full speed.¹ At 9 p.m., when the news reached the Rear-Admiral that the *Breslau* had parted company from the *Goeben*, his impression was that the enemy had decoded his orders to the destroyers,² and that the *Breslau* was proceeding to attack them, and he warned Captain (D) that the enemy might consequently be in the vicinity of Vasiliko Bay at daylight. The destroyers were by now so short of coal that the Rear-Admiral hoped little from them. But he signalled to Captain Coode, "Do your best"; and as the various reports came in of the alterations of course and speed by the enemy, he kept the *Wolverine* informed.³

The news that the *Goeben* was altering course to the southward was received by the Rear-Admiral at 11.8 p.m. on 6th. Admiral Troubridge considered this to be merely a feint, or an endeavour to shake off the *Gloucester*, for from the absence of any report of her coaling at Messina,⁴ and the fact that coal was at Brindisi for her, little doubt existed in his mind as to her destination being the Adriatic. "I could not in fact conceive of any mission she could have in the Eastern Mediterranean," he wrote in his report. By midnight, however, it became clear that the *Goeben's* northerly course had been a feint, and that she was in fact bound for the Eastern Mediterranean; and the Rear-Admiral, then in position 39° 8' N., 19° 55' E., immediately turned south and steered at full speed to intercept her.

At 1.57 a.m. he signalled to the *Wolverine* to bring out the destroyers to join him; and Captain Coode led out the 1st and 2nd Divisions at high speed, reporting that he expected to meet the Rear-Admiral a little before 4 o'clock.⁵ The shortage of coal

¹ B 104.

² The signal at 6.40 p.m. (B 104) was sent in Transposed Alphabet, which was suspected of having been compromised.

³ B 118, 119, 120.

⁴ Telegram A 59 does not appear to have been communicated to Rear-Admiral Troubridge.

⁵ B 134, 135. *Wolverine's* deck log says the flotilla proceeded at 1.55 a.m., though signal log states the order to proceed was not received from Rear-Admiral until 2.15 a.m. But probably the times were incorrectly logged.

in the flotilla was acute, and the *Scourge*, who had only 36 tons left in her bunkers, had to be sent back to her anchorage an hour later.¹

"The problem of fighting the *Goeben* with the 1st Cruiser Squadron had been most exhaustively gone into by me," wrote Admiral Troubridge in his report, "and I had come to the conclusion that the only circumstances in which I could engage her successfully with the squadron would be (i) by night, (ii) in half light, or (iii) in navigation waters." Daylight was about 5 a.m.² and the stretch northward had lost him so much ground that he could not hope to intercept the *Goeben* before 6 a.m.,³ when the visibility in the fine clear weather would be 25 to 30 miles.

The speed of his squadron he considered to be a doubtful 19 knots⁴ and the *Goeben* was reported to be going 22 at this time. Nevertheless, despite his orders to avoid action with superior force, for the honour of the Mediterranean the Rear-Admiral decided to offer battle to the *Goeben* under conditions in which he personally considered the German battle cruiser to be a superior force to his squadron.⁵

But as the hours of the night went by, Admiral Troubridge began to view his decision from a different angle. The French were relying on us to hold the Austrian fleet.⁶ The orders which Sir Berkeley Milne had given him admitted of no loose interpretation: he was to watch the approach to the Adriatic with his cruisers, and he was to avoid being brought to action by superior force. In broad daylight in the open sea, 30 or 40 miles from land, the *Goeben* could steam around his squadron and pick off his ships at a range beyond reach of the latter's guns. The gratification of his personal ambition to engage the enemy whatever the conditions might be, appeared to the Rear-Admiral at length in its true light, as a betrayal of the trust imposed

¹ At 10 p.m., whilst proceeding to Vasiliko Bay, the destroyers had the following amounts of coal remaining:—

<i>Wolverine</i> , 73 tons.	<i>Foxhound</i> , 70 tons.
<i>Scorpion</i> , 99 tons.	<i>Mosquito</i> , 66 tons.
<i>Renard</i> , 82 tons.	<i>Racoon</i> , 86 tons.
<i>Scourge</i> , 51 tons.	<i>Basilisk</i> , 76 tons.

The *Scourge* apparently burnt 15 tons between 9.45 p.m. and 3.12 a.m. (From *Wolverine's* signal log.)

² Admiral Troubridge in his Report states that daylight was at 4 a.m., but the various ships appear at this date in this area to have secured night action stations and exercised action stations a few minutes before 5 a.m.

³ This was Admiral Troubridge's estimate, but examination of Plan II, together with the intelligence of the *Goeben's* course and speed as known to him at different times during the night, make it clear that by an alteration of course a few points to starboard he could have met the *Goeben* earlier, though perhaps not much before daylight.

⁴ Actually, however, they averaged 19.2 knots between midnight 6/7th and 3.47 a.m. on August 7.

⁵ Court-martial evidence.

⁶ Admiral Troubridge stated in his Report that the signal reporting that the Austrian fleet was leaving Pola for an unknown destination (B 142) was received at 1 a.m. on 7th, but log shows it to have been received at 4.42 a.m., i.e., after the Rear-Admiral turned away from the *Goeben*.

in him. At 3.47 a.m. he signalled to his squadron "Course S. 30 E." and reported to the Commander-in-Chief that he had abandoned the chase. Even now he seems to have hoped that Sir Berkeley Milne would order him to continue the chase,¹ and as the *Goeben*, since 2 a.m., had been reported going only 17 knots, there was still time for the enemy to be intercepted.² But no word came from Admiral Milne³; and ordering the 1st and 2nd Divisions of destroyers to retire behind Zante, the Rear-Admiral proceeded to anchor with his force in Zante Bay.⁴ It was not until 8.30 a.m. that he had the mortification of learning that in Sir Berkeley Milne's opinion the decision to which he had so hardly come was after all the wrong one. "Why did you not continue to cut off *Goeben*?" asked the Commander-in-Chief. "She (was) only going 17 knots; and so important to bring her to action."⁵ But it was too late now.

34. The "Gloucester" abandons the Chase, 5 p.m., August 7.

—In this night of misunderstandings and ill-luck there is one brilliant feat to chronicle, namely, the shadowing of the *Goeben* by the *Gloucester*. Throughout the hours of the night the *Gloucester* continued to maintain station on the *Goeben* at a distance of 4 to 7 miles astern. Bold alterations of speed were necessary to keep the enemy's smoke in sight. Just before daylight on August 7 the *Gloucester* dropped back to the limit of visibility and continued at a distance of 9 to 15 miles astern. She had reported at midnight 6th–7th that she had 700 tons of coal remaining, sufficient at her present speed for 48 hours' steaming. But as her supply grew lower, the necessity for transferring coal from the reserve bunkers would prevent her from developing her full speed; and at 5.33 a.m. on 7th the Commander-in-Chief signalled her to drop astern gradually to avoid capture.⁶ Captain Howard Kelly was convinced,

¹ Court-martial evidence.

² The course and speed the Rear-Admiral was steering (south, 19 knots) before he abandoned the chase would have brought the 1st Cruiser Squadron on to the *Goeben's* line of advance about 6.15 a.m., in a position some 35 miles ahead of the German ship. Admiral Troubridge received from the *Gloucester* the *Goeben's* 2 a.m. and 3 a.m. positions, and her new speed of 17 knots, but he made no alteration of course to the westward in order to intercept the *Goeben* at an earlier hour in the morning, under conditions of light less disadvantageous to himself.

³ Admiral Troubridge's signal (B 143) was not sent until 4.49 a.m., i.e., an hour after he abandoned the chase. It must be remembered that in some ships the organisation of coding was in a somewhat rudimentary state at this date, and much delay frequently occurred in the despatch of coded signals.

⁴ The destroyers abandoned the chase and steered for Zante at 4.5 a.m. The following entry appears in the *Wolverine's* log: "4.30 (a.m.) sighted S.M.S. *Goeben* ahead a/c N. 60 E." The *Goeben* was exactly 60 miles distant at the time.

⁵ B 150, 151.

⁶ Sir Berkeley Milne stated (M.01601/14), in reply to a question by the Admiralty as to why he did not relieve the *Gloucester* on the duty of shadowing the *Goeben* by the *Dublin*, which was in the neighbourhood, full of coal, that in view of a telegram received at 12.24 a.m. on 7th from the S.N.O., Malta, to the effect that the Italian Press reported the Austrian fleet about to leave Pola for an unknown destination, he did not consider it advisable to deprive the Rear-Admiral of his only fast ship available for the important duty of watching the Adriatic.

however, that the *Breslau* was ahead of the *Goeben*, so that he ran little risk of being caught between the two enemy ships; and as it was essential to discover whether they were bound for Egypt or the Aegean Sea he held on. The correctness of his surmise regarding the *Breslau* was proved at 10.30 a.m., when the latter appeared coming from the southward, from well ahead, and took station astern of the *Goeben*.

It soon became evident that Admiral Souchon had ordered the *Breslau* to keep the *Gloucester* at a distance from him, as far as could be done with impunity, in order to give him an opportunity to get ahead out of sight, either to alter course unmarked by the *Gloucester* or to lie in wait for her under the lee of a promontory,¹ for the *Goeben's* boilers were giving continued trouble and after leaving Messina on August 6 she rarely exceeded 18 knots.² By 1 p.m. on 7th, when between Sapienza and Matapan, the *Breslau* had dropped back so far astern of the *Goeben* that it was essential to make her close up or the *Goeben* to drop back, otherwise the latter would soon have been out of sight. With this object in view, at 1.35 p.m. the *Gloucester* opened fire with her fore 6 in. gun at a range of 11,500 yards at the *Breslau*, then bearing two points on the port bow of the *Gloucester*. The *Breslau* replied at once with two ranging guns and then went into salvo firing with her starboard battery. The *Gloucester* thereupon increased to full speed and altered course 10 points to port, bringing the *Breslau* on her starboard quarter, closing the range at first to about 10,000 yards, then opening rapidly, as it was found that the shooting of the *Breslau* was excellent. On fire being opened the *Goeben* had altered course 16 points to support her consort, and opened fire, but was far out of range. At 1.50 p.m. both the *Breslau* and the *Gloucester*, which had been engaging with her starboard battery and both 6 in., ceased fire, as the range was too great; and after passing close to the track of a torpedo and through a dozen floating objects which may have been mines dropped by the *Breslau*, the *Gloucester* resumed her original course. Her attack had succeeded, for the enemy were now close together; and Captain Kelly refrained from pressing the attack, for on account of the importance of the service upon which he was engaged he considered that all his efforts must be directed to preserving the faculties of his ship intact. Though the *Gloucester* herself suffered no damage it was subsequently ascertained that the *Breslau* sustained several casualties.

At 1.47 p.m. orders were received from the Commander-in-Chief that the *Gloucester* was not to go further east than Cape Matapan, and at 4.40 p.m.,³ having watched the enemy pass

¹ Ludwig says this was his intention.

² Admiral Souchon's statement.

³ *Gloucester's* log. Captain Howard Kelly's Report says 5 p.m.



PLAN II
ESCAPE OF THE GOEBEN & BRESLAU
FROM MESSINA
 6th. - 7th. August 1914



Bearing of full moon at time of Dublin's attack.

NOTE:- In plotting track of Dublin between 1 a.m. and 3.45 a.m. 7th., her positions as signalled at 0100 and 0310 have been neglected. Track is based on ship's log, position at 12.28 a.m. G.M.T. as given in Dublin's track chart (in M 01548/14), and report of sighting smoke believed to be Goeben or Gloucester at 2.35 a.m. G.M.T. abaft starboard beam. Between 1 a.m. and 1.28 a.m. many alterations of course occurred which cannot be shown.

through the Cervi Channel to the eastward, Captain Kelly altered course to rejoin the Rear-Admiral, who had anchored in Zante Bay with the 1st and 2nd Divisions of destroyers at 10.10 a.m. that day.

35. Dispositions Ordered by Commander-in-Chief, p.m., August 7.—Admiral Souchon evidently reported to Berlin during the forenoon that he had made good his escape, and received in reply an intimation that it was important that he should arrive in Constantinople at the earliest possible moment, in order, doubtless, to influence Turkish opinion in favour of Germany. But no hint of this possibility reached Sir Berkeley Milne, nor does he seem even to have received a report, made by the *Dublin* about 1 p.m. on 7th, that the *Goeben* had been heard signalling to Constantinople.¹ “*Goeben* and *Breslau*,” he reported to the Admiralty at 6.52 a.m. on 7th, “evidently going to Eastern Mediterranean”²; nor did he see reason to modify his belief. “Although I anticipated the possibility of the German ships going to Salonika to interfere with Servian supplies through that port,” states Sir Berkeley Milne, “the idea that belligerent ships would proceed into a neutral port and there be sold did not enter into my calculations, and, I submit, could not reasonably have been guarded against.”³

Sir Berkeley Milne's efforts were now directed towards ensuring that the enemy did not come west again.⁴ During the afternoon of the 7th the three destroyers at Malta, viz., the *Harpy* and *Grasshopper* of the 3rd Division and the *Grampus* of the 4th Division, were sent to watch the southern end of the Straits of Messina. The *Chatham* had already, at 1.36 a.m., been ordered to leave the flag and proceed to a position off Milazzo to watch if the enemy came back,⁵ and also in case any German merchant ships at Naples might attempt to leave the port armed.⁶ Admiral Troubridge was warned that the *Dublin* would be required to relieve her on 8th. The *Gloucester* was to coal at the first opportunity when she rejoined the Rear-Admiral, who was now making arrangements to give the destroyers of the 1st and 2nd Divisions sufficient coal from his armoured cruisers to enable them to reach Malta in case of necessity.⁷ The *Pincher*, *Savage* and *Rattlesnake* were ordered to Malta from Bizerta, and the *Inflexible*, *Indefatigable* and *Weymouth* on arrival at Malta about noon proceeded to complete with coal preparatory to leaving with the *Indomitable*, which arrived about 1.30 p.m., to take up the search for the *Goeben* and *Breslau* in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Rear-Admiral was ordered

¹ B 164.² A 67.³ M.01601/14.⁴ *Ibid.*⁵ B 128.

⁶ This was not mentioned in the signal to the *Chatham*, but it is evident that it was in the Commander-in-Chief's mind. (See M.01548/14, para. 28, of Commander-in-Chief's Diary of Events.)

⁷ B 152, 153, 159, 160, 161 and 162. They required an average of 25 tons each to enable them to reach Malta. (See *Defence's* signal log.)

to maintain the watch on the Adriatic,¹ and Sir Berkeley Milne informed him of the arrangements he had made for despatching colliers to Port Vathi, Ithaca, and stated that he was leaving at midnight 7th–8th with the three battle cruisers and the *Weymouth*, steering for Sapienza Light² at 14 knots. "Opinion," he told Admiral Troubridge, "seems war between Austria and Italy."³

Sir Berkeley Milne left Malta at 12.35 a.m. on August 8 with the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron and *Weymouth* to follow the enemy to the Aegean, steaming at an average speed of 15 knots. At 1.58 p.m.,⁴ when nearly half-way to Cape Matapan, he received from the Admiralty a signal ordering him to commence hostilities at once against Austria.⁵ The signal had been sent out in error,⁶ but of this the Commander-in-Chief was of course unaware; and he abandoned the pursuit of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* and altered course to the northward to effect a concentration with the Rear-Admiral for the support of the latter in view of impending hostilities. The 1st Cruiser Squadron, *Gloucester*, 1st and 2nd Divisions of destroyers, and the *Beagle* and *Bulldog* were ordered to join the Commander-in-Chief, who gave his position at 2.30 p.m. as 36° 16' N., 18° 42' E., steering N. 16 E. at 16 knots.⁷

At 1.45 p.m. on 8th the premature despatch of the signal ordering hostilities to be commenced against Austria was discovered and a signal went out from the Admiralty to cancel it. Sir Berkeley Milne received this second signal at 3.50 p.m., and as the manner in which it was coded was somewhat peculiar,⁸ he asked the Admiralty for confirmation, which he received with the further intelligence that the situation with Austria was critical. Upon this, he decided to continue his concentrating movement.⁹ However, while continuing his way north with the battle cruisers he signalled to the Rear-Admiral, who was now approximately in the latitude of the north of Cephalonia steering S. 28 E., cancelling his previous orders. The 1st Cruiser Squadron, *Gloucester*, and the destroyers were to stop where they were, while the *Dublin* was to watch the mouth of the Adriatic.¹⁰ The orders for the 1st Cruiser Squadron were amplified a few minutes later, and the Rear-Admiral was told to await orders off Cape Dukato.¹¹

¹ B 158.

² 36° 46' N., 21° 43' E.

³ B 169, 171, 174.

⁴ *Inflexible's* signal log. But Sir A. B. Milne's *Diary of Events* says 1.4 p.m., G.M.T.

⁵ A 71.

⁶ It was a draft copy which had been written out beforehand in readiness for despatch as soon as war should be declared on Austria.

⁷ B 185, 187.

⁸ The signal ran, "Negative 371 hostilities against Austria," the last three words only being in cypher. (Sir A. B. Milne's "Diary of Events." The signal, A 72, is not logged in *Inflexible's* log.)

⁹ A 75.

¹⁰ B 191.

¹¹ B 192.

36. **The Destroyers Immobilised through want of Coal.**—In cancelling the orders to the Rear-Admiral to come south to effect junction with him, Sir Berkeley Milne was no doubt influenced by the shortage of coal in the destroyers. At 4.16 p.m. the *Gloucester* had reported from Zaverda, where she was with the 1st and 2nd Divisions of destroyers and the *Bulldog* and *Beagle* awaiting the arrival of a collier, that the 2nd Division destroyers had only 24 to 40 tons of coal apiece, and could not leave the neighbourhood of the Greek coast without coaling.¹ Up to this moment the Commander-in-Chief had been under the impression that the collier *Vesuvio*, which left Malta at 3 p.m. on August 6, had already arrived at Port Vathi.² On receiving the *Gloucester's* signal, and concluding that the *Vesuvio* had met with an accident or had been captured,³ the Commander-in-Chief ordered the *Gloucester* to retain sufficient coal in her bunkers to enable her to return to Malta at 15 knots and to give the remainder to the destroyers.⁴ To the Rear-Admiral he signalled that, unless the collier was already in sight, he was to arrange to coal the destroyers from his own ships. In the event of war being declared against Austria the armoured cruisers were to be prepared to take each a destroyer in tow, while such of the remaining boats as had coaled were to accompany the Rear-Admiral to Malta under their own steam.⁵

Meanwhile, at 8.45 that morning (August 8) Admiral Troubridge had ordered the *Black Prince* to proceed and search as far as 60 miles west of Cape Dukato for the collier.⁶ The Rear-Admiral was under the impression that the colliers from Malta had been ordered to Vathi Vali Bay on the west side of Zaverda Bay, for the signal which had been received from the Commander-in-Chief about two hours ago merely stated that the colliers were ordered to Port Vathi.⁷ There were no less than three places of that name on this part of the Greek coast; and the Rear-Admiral had no doubt been led to conclude that Vathi Vali Bay was meant, from the fact that the Admiral Superintendent, Malta, in his signal of August 5 had appointed a rendezvous for the colliers 10 miles west of Cape Dukato. The altered arrangement made by the Commander-in-Chief later in the same day, by which the colliers were ordered to Port Vathi, Ithaca,⁸ and also the signal from the Admiral Superintendent, Malta, on August 7 to the same effect,⁷ though received by the *Defence*, seem to have escaped the notice of the Rear-Admiral's staff; and it was owing to this omission that the *Gloucester* and destroyers had been ordered to Zaverda Bay, near Vathi Vali Bay. At 9.31 a.m. on 8th the Rear-Admiral received a

¹ B 190.

² This is evidenced by Signal B 187.

³ Sir A. B. Milne's *Diary of Events*.

⁴ B 194. ⁵ B 193, 196.

⁶ B 176.

⁷ B 169.

⁸ B 74.

signal from the *Gloucester* asking whether she should proceed to Port Vathi, Ithaca being evidently intended, from her anchorage at Zaverda where she had been ordered to await the collier, in view of the fact that the latter had been ordered to Port Vathi.¹ Even now Admiral Troubridge does not seem to have grasped the fact that the *Black Prince* was searching some 30 miles to the northward of the route which the collier would take, for he merely sent her a supplementary order to proceed to the rendezvous 10 miles off Cape Dukato and direct the collier to Zaverda.² At length, at 11.21 a.m., the mistake was discovered on board the *Defence*, and fresh orders were despatched to the *Black Prince* to proceed to the south of Cephalonia to find the collier, which was due off Cape Skinara, the northernmost point of Zante Island, about noon.³

About 2 p.m. the *Defence* received the signal from the Admiralty ordering hostilities to be commenced against Austria, and the Rear-Admiral immediately recalled the *Black Prince*. In acknowledging the signal the latter reported that she had sighted the collier.⁴ The news was signalled by the Rear-Admiral to Sir Berkeley Milne at 5.43 p.m.,⁵ and the Commander-in-Chief, knowing that the collier was a small one with sufficient coal for the destroyers only, thereupon ordered the *Gloucester* to proceed to Malta to coal as fast as her remaining fuel would allow, and he reported to Admiral Troubridge that he would reinforce him with the *Weymouth* in her stead, if necessary.⁶

Meanwhile, the *Black Prince* had reported her 4.30 p.m. position, adding "cannot see anything of collier,"⁷ and it was discovered that a mistake had been made on board the *Defence* in decoding her previous signal, and that in place of "have sighted collier" she had signalled at 3.30 p.m. "have not sighted collier."⁸ At 6.26 p.m. the *Black Prince* came within visual signalling distance and reported that in view of the Rear-Admiral's signal to her at 3.35 p.m., to rejoin him at high speed, she had not been able to look into Port Vathi.⁹ Thereupon Admiral Troubridge ordered a signal to be made to the *Gloucester* to go or send a destroyer to look into Port Vathi to see if the collier was there.¹⁰ Coincidentally with the *Black Prince's* visual signal, the *Defence* had received Sir Berkeley Milne's wireless signal, addressed both to the Rear-Admiral, 1st Cruiser Squadron and *Gloucester*, ordering the latter to proceed to Malta as fast as possible,¹¹ but apparently the Rear-Admiral

¹ B 178.² B 179.³ B 182.⁴ B 188.⁵ B 198.⁶ B 202.⁷ B 197.

⁸ Evidence by Rear-Admiral Troubridge at court-martial. This evidence must not be relied upon for statements of fact as to the incident of failing to find the collier, as it is at variance with the evidence of signal logs, etc. The data on which the R.-A. based his evidence was probably imperfect.

⁹ B 200.¹⁰ B 206.¹¹ B 202.

had not yet seen it.¹ The *Gloucester*, when she received the Rear-Admiral's signal, was already off Cape Dukato, on her way to Malta. Five minutes later she intercepted a signal from Sir Berkeley Milne ordering the 1st Cruiser Squadron and destroyers to proceed to Malta, and this was the reason, no doubt, why Captain Howard Kelly neither took any steps himself to carry out the Rear-Admiral's order to look into Port Vathi nor reported to Admiral Troubridge the fact that he was taking no action.

37. The Collier Located—Destroyers Sent to Port Vathi.—At 7.35 p.m. on 8th Sir Berkeley Milne received the Rear-Admiral's signal explaining the mistake in reporting the sighting of the collier, and, as stated above, he at once ordered the 1st Cruiser Squadron to proceed to Malta without delay with the destroyers, towing as requisite. He ordered the Rear-Admiral to keep him informed of his position so that the battle cruisers could get to the northward of the 1st Cruiser Squadron for its support.²

It was known by now that the Austrian ships were at sea. Montenegro had declared war on Austria on 5th, and an Austrian squadron had been sent south from Pola to act against the Montenegrin coast. The naval squadron at Cattaro, which had been operating against Montenegro, left on 7th and steamed northward. During the forenoon of 8th Antivari was bombarded by an Austrian squadron consisting of the *Szigetvar* and another cruiser and two destroyers, and the railway buildings and W/T station were destroyed; two large men-of-war and two small cruisers were seen in Cattaro Bay, and two other cruisers were observed by the Montenegrins steaming southward outside the bay. At 2 a.m. on 9th the Rear-Admiral learnt that the Austrian squadron had left Cattaro and soon afterwards the *Dublin*, then about 70 miles N.E. of Dukato, reported flaming funnels in sight. Apprehending an attack on his destroyers and bearing in mind their acute shortage of coal, Admiral Troubridge directed them to make for the southern end of Zante.

The destroyers had been out of wireless touch since the early afternoon of 8th, when the *Wolverine* reported she was chasing a foreign two-funnelled destroyer; and on learning that Admiral Troubridge was trying to collect them at Zante, where he intended

¹ In his court-martial evidence Admiral Troubridge stated: "I had a good deal of difficulty in getting my signal through to her (the *Gloucester*); however, she got it, and I never heard any more of it, but it appeared she had not got it correctly." This statement is not borne out by the evidence of the signal and W/T logs. The *Defence* received the Commander-in-Chief's signal ordering the *Gloucester* to Malta at 6.27 p.m. (S.M.T.), but the Rear-Admiral's signal to *Gloucester* to look or send into Port Vathi has code time 1755, i.e., 6.55 p.m. (S.M.T.) (half an hour later), though it is true that there was delay in sending it, and it was not despatched until 8.13 p.m. Possibly the Commander-in-Chief's signal had not yet been decoded and shown to the Rear-Admiral, though 28 minutes elapsed between its receipt and the drafting of the Rear-Admiral's signal to the *Gloucester*. The *Gloucester* received the Rear-Admiral's signal correctly at 8.17 p.m.

² B 209.

to take them in tow, Sir Berkeley Milne suggested that if it were easier and quicker, as the wind was too high for towing, they might be given coal by the armoured cruisers, to enable them to reach Malta under their own steam¹; and it was arranged that on arrival at Zante the ships of the 1st Cruiser Squadron should each get up 60 tons of coal for the destroyers.² Admiral Troubridge was warned not to sail from Zante until further orders,³ the Commander-in-Chief hoping no doubt that the *Weymouth*, which had been detached from his flag at 7 p.m. on 8th to join the Rear-Admiral, searching off Cape Dukato and in Port Vathi *en route*, would locate the collier.⁴

The 1st Cruiser Squadron arrived at Zante at 4.30 a.m. on 9th and the destroyers proceeded to take sufficient coal from them to enable them to reach Malta. At 10 a.m. Admiral Troubridge reported the coaling completed and he was ordered to send the destroyers under easy steam to Port Vathi to await the colliers which were being sent from Malta.⁵

At 11.15 a.m. the *Weymouth* discovered and reported the missing collier *Vesuvio* anchored in Port Vathi, Ithaca,⁶ and the destroyers were ordered to proceed there at once to fill up.⁷ The *Vesuvio* had left Malta at 3 p.m. on 6th and proceeded at her speed of 7 knots to Port Vathi, Ithaca, in accordance with her sailing orders; and she had anchored there about 2 p.m. on 8th, nearly 24 hours ago. She had only 960 tons of coal, and the armoured cruisers were all more than 1,200 tons short, with their speed reduced on account of the difficulty of trimming⁸; but fortunately, about 2 p.m., the battle cruisers sighted a second collier, the *Trewyn*, and Sir Berkeley Milne signalled to the Rear-Admiral to coal the ships of his squadron from her, one at a time, at Port Vathi.⁹ He had asked permission of the Admiralty early that morning (August 9) to use this port and the neighbouring anchorages as bases for the ships watching the Adriatic, and was told that they might be used, the neutrality of Greece being respected as far as possible.¹⁰

38. The Commander-in-Chief resumes Search for the "Goeben," 3.30 p.m., August 9.—Sir Berkeley Milne had moved north-eastward during the night of 8th–9th and had been patrolling during 9th at slow speed about 30 miles off Cephalonia and Zante. At 12.30 p.m. on 9th he reported his position to the Admiralty as 37° 45' N., 19° 51' E., steering S.48 E. at 10 knots, and the Admiralty now suddenly realised that the Commander-in-Chief had not altered his decision not to follow the *Goeben*,

¹ B 201, 211, 213. ² B 214. ³ B 216. ⁴ B 212, 215.
⁵ B 219, 220. ⁶ B 221, 224. ⁷ B 222.
⁸ B 218. ⁹ B 227. ¹⁰ A 79.

in spite of the signal announcing the cancellation of hostilities against Austria.¹ They hastily ordered him to continue the chase of the *Goeben*²; and the Commander-in-Chief, recalling the *Weymouth* and signalling to the Rear-Admiral to take charge of the patrol of the Adriatic, continued on his way eastward at 10 knots.³

CHAPTER III.

SITUATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, AUGUST 10, 1914. FRENCH FLEET MOVES TO THE ADRIATIC.

39. General Situation, August 9.—At the expiration of five days after the declaration of war by Great Britain upon Germany the first duty of the British naval forces in the Mediterranean, namely, the destruction or capture of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, still lacked fulfilment. On August 9 the French Ministry of Marine proposed to the Admiralty a plan to meet the situation, which the latter accepted. Admiral Milne, with his three battle cruisers, was to continue the search for the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, and his armoured cruisers and other vessels, which were unsuitable for this purpose, were to join up with the French Fleet in the blockade of the Adriatic.⁴

The situation was not without one feature, at least, of satisfaction, for the passage of the French XIX Corps from Algeria and Tunisia to France had been completed without mishap,⁵ and the French fleet was now concentrating and coaling at Bizerta prior to moving to Malta, which was to form the base of operations of the Allied fleets in the blockade of the Adriatic.⁶ The British Admiralty had impressed upon the French Ministry of Marine the urgency of concentrating the fleet at Malta to oppose the Austrians, for the Russian Government was apprehensive lest an attempt should be made to send the Austrian fleet into the Black Sea with the connivance of Turkey, whose attitude, in their opinion, was "most ambiguous." The French Foreign Minister even believed that Turkey had concluded a convention with Germany for the entrance of German and Austrian ships through the Dardanelles

¹ Sir A. B. Milne's signal reporting that he was not following the *Goeben* (A 75) was sent at 6.20 p.m., one minute after the receipt of the intelligence that the Austrian situation was critical (A 74), but from its wording the Admiralty would naturally assume that on receipt of their signal cancelling the order to commence hostilities (A 72) the Commander-in-Chief would resume his original course eastward. The Admiralty received no intelligence of the movements of the Commander-in-Chief, other than signal A 75, between noon 8th and noon 9th.
² A 80. ³ B 228. ⁴ A 85.

⁵ During August, 48,762 troops were transported to France and 16,187 to Algeria and Tunisia. (Chambre des Députés, 1900. No. 634.)
⁶ A 70, 76, 83, 89, 99.

into the Black Sea.¹ The Austrian fleet, possibly reinforced by the Turkish fleet and by the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, if they succeeded in making junction, would have numerical superiority over the Russian fleet. The position of Russia was complicated by the fact that any defensive measures she might take in the neighbourhood of the Bosphorus would assume the character of hostility to Turkey, which must be avoided until the latter definitely declared herself hostile. On the evening of August 9 Sir Edward Grey instructed our Representative at Constantinople to join with his French and Russian colleagues in urgently representing to the Porte that no vessels of war should be allowed to enter the Straits.²

An Austrian success in the Black Sea might decide the attitude of Rumania, until now uncertain; and if the Turks were to obtain command of the Black Sea an impetus would be given to the Austrophile movement in Bulgaria.³ The British and French Governments had refrained from a declaration of war against Austria until the French fleet should be in a position to oppose the Austrians⁴; but by the time the French fleet completed its concentration and moved to Malta, the rupture of relations with the Dual Monarchy was sufficiently pronounced to enable the French Commander-in-Chief to attack if he should meet the Austrians during his passage to the Adriatic.⁵

Rear-Admiral Troubridge, with the 1st Cruiser Squadron, the *Dublin*, *Blenheim*, 1st and 2nd Divisions of Destroyers, and the *Bulldog* and *Beagle*, was watching the mouth of the Adriatic from his station off Cephalonia, where Admiral Milne had posted him on August 9, taking advantage of the shelter of bays and harbours of the Ionian Islands for coaling.⁶

40. The "Goeben" and "Breslau" Escape to Turkey, August 10.—Throughout August 9 and 10 Sir Berkeley Milne continued the search for the *Goeben* in the Eastern Mediterranean with the three battle cruisers and the *Weymouth*. The *Chatham* was to join him after escorting the *Blenheim* from Malta to join the Rear-Admiral, and the *Gloucester* after completing with coal at Malta. At 7.15 p.m. on 9th the Commander-in-Chief increased speed from 10 to 14 knots. Cape Matapan was passed at 1.23 a.m. on 10th, and at 5.18 a.m. he sighted Belo Pulo Light (approximately 36° 55' N., 23° 30' E.) about

¹ Sir F. Bertie to F.O., 195K, 10.8.14.

² F.O. to Mr. Beaumont, No. 360, 9.8.14.

³ M. 01339/14.

⁴ A 91, 93. The French fleet left Bizerta on August 11.

⁵ Tel. 197 from Sir F. Bertie to F.O., 10.8.14. The French Ambassador was recalled on August 10.

⁶ *Defence* coaled in Vasiliko Bay, Zante, August 11-12. *Warrior* and *Duke of Edinburgh* coaled at Port Platea (38° 29' N., 21° 5' E.) on 10th-11th and 11th-12th respectively.

the time that the *Goeben*, 120 miles to the eastward, finished coaling at Denusa, a sparsely inhabited rocky islet east of Naxos.

It is not certain why the *Goeben*, after rounding Cape Matapan, delayed to proceed to Constantinople. It must be concluded that some hitch occurred in the negotiations on foot between Berlin and the Porte, and that the German Admiral made use of the period of enforced delay on 8th and 9th to coal at Denusa from the collier which had been awaiting him off Cape Matapan. On the afternoon of the 10th, Admiral Souchon, who had moved eastward during the day, received and acknowledged a signal from Nauen: "Proceed to Constantinople immediately," and at once proceeded to obey.¹ The *General* had successfully escaped from Messina, and was now in company with the German Admiral.

After entering the Aegean on the night of August 9-10, Admiral Milne cruised in the area south of the Gulf of Athens on the 10th, using the *Weymouth* to search outlying harbours. The battle cruisers were disposed at first on the line Zea-Thermia-Serpho, three islands running south-east from the Gulf of Athens.² The *Inflexible* off Cape Dimitri, the south point of Thermia Island, the *Indomitable* off Cape Tamelos (Zea), the *Indefatigable* off Cyclops Head (Serpho), while the *Weymouth* was despatched to examine Milo, then proceed through Siphano Channel (between Serpho and Siphano) to Syra. These orders were issued at 9 a.m., and the Flagship remained in this vicinity during the day.³ In the forenoon, at 11.30 a.m., it was thought that the *Goeben* was "somewhere near," and the *Weymouth* was ordered to close with despatch. At 5.20 p.m. she was told to look into San Gengio (about 15 miles south of Cape Colonna), then go to Syra, then go slowly through the Mykoni Channel (between Mykoni and Tinos), and wait off the northern entrance till further orders.

During the night the Commander-in-Chief moved to the eastward, and the next morning at 4 a.m. was off Cape Korax, the north point of Paros, and took up a position between Mykoni and Nikaria, an island lying about 10 miles west of Samos. The *Weymouth* was sent west to Khios to examine the Gulf of Smyrna, and the *Chatham*, which was approaching on her way from Malta, was ordered to go through the Straits of Samos.

The uncertainty as to the whereabouts of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* was solved on August 11, for at 9.47 a.m. that day a telegram was received by the Admiralty to the effect that two German cruisers had arrived at the Dardanelles at 8.30 on the

¹ Minutes and letters by Admiral von Pohl (M.I.R., April, 1920).

² See Plan XIII.

³ *Inflexible's* noon position, August 10: 36° 59' N., 23° 53' E.

previous evening.¹ The result of this intelligence was to give effect to the provisions of a Convention made on August 6 between the British Admiralty and the French Naval General Staff.

41. The Command of the Mediterranean : Convention of August 6, 1914.²—Up to date the British and French Commanders-in-Chief had been acting independently, though in co-operation with one another. In accordance with the Convention of August 6, the general direction of operations in the Mediterranean was in the hands of the French; but as soon as the destruction or capture of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* was completed, the three British battle cruisers and two or three of the armoured cruisers were to be released for general service, except in the event of Italy abandoning the neutrality which she had declared on August 4. The battle cruisers were needed at home, and two of the armoured cruisers were to be employed in the Indian Ocean as escorts for the troops which were to reinforce and relieve the Army of Occupation in Egypt. The remaining armoured cruisers, light cruisers, destroyers, and the torpedo craft forming the local defences of Malta and Gibraltar would come under the orders of the French Commander-in-Chief, for whose fleet Malta and Gibraltar would serve as bases. Rear-Admiral Carden, Admiral Superintendent at Malta, had been ordered to be ready to render to the French fleet any assistance which might be expected.³ In all other waters, except the English Channel, for which special arrangements were in force, the general direction of naval operations was in the hands of the British Admiralty. To the French fleet was assigned the duty of protecting British and French commerce throughout the Mediterranean; and the French were to be responsible for guarding the exit of the Suez Canal and the Straits of Gibraltar to prevent the entry into the Mediterranean of enemy cruisers or auxiliary cruisers. It was agreed that the French fleet should guard the Adriatic in any eventuality, and should operate against the Austrian fleet if that country entered the war. To make up for its lack of modern light cruisers, Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère would have the assistance of the *Chatham*, *Dublin*, *Gloucester* and *Weymouth*; numerically, the task of opposing the Austrian fleet would thus be a simple one.

To withdraw the whole of the battle cruisers was not, however, feasible in the uncertainty as to whether the Turks were able to prevent the emergence of the German cruisers if the latter should insist upon the freedom of action in defiance of the Hague Convention, of which, in waging the war, they had already given evidence.

¹ A 98.

² For text of Convention see Appendix D I.

³ A 70.

42. Watch on the Dardanelles Instituted.—Admiral Milne received the news of the entry of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* into the Dardanelles shortly before noon on August 11, while in 37° 51' N., 25° 42' E., 20 miles north of the Mykoni-Nikaria Gap. All four of the light cruisers were now in company with him, for the *Chatham* and *Gloucester* had joined up, and Admiral Troubridge had despatched the *Dublin* at 6.15 on the previous evening, on receipt of an Admiralty telegram ordering two more light cruisers to be sent to join the Commander-in-Chief for the paramount duty of searching for the *Goeben*.¹ Sending the *Weymouth* on at full speed to the Dardanelles, with orders, if nothing was seen of the enemy cruisers at the entrance, to pass up to Chanak, Sir Berkeley Milne followed with the battle cruisers, receiving on the way instructions from the Admiralty to blockade the Straits, altered—upon his querying the wording of the signal—to an order to institute a careful watch of the entrance.²

The *Weymouth* arrived at the Dardanelles at 5 p.m., and was met at the entrance to the Straits by strings of signal flags which definitely proved little beyond the inefficiency of the Turkish signalling or the inadequacy of the International Signal Code to meet the emergency; but there was no mistaking the menace of the blank guns which were fired whenever she attempted to creep closer in. The guns of the forts on both sides of the entrance were trained on her, and she was given to understand that the Straits were mined. Sir Berkeley Milne ordered her to take station two miles from the entrance, with the *Gloucester* two to three miles further out, while the battle cruisers, when they arrived at about 10 p.m., patrolled N.N.E. to S.S.W. for 17 miles up to 17 miles south-west from Ponente Point, Tenedos. The *Chatham*, on arrival about midnight, was stationed 5 miles east from Cape Kephalo. At 8 a.m. on the following day (August 12) personal communication was at length established with the Turks, who sent an officer on board the *Weymouth* with the information that the *Goeben* and *Breslau* had been bought by the Turkish Government, re-named the *Sultan Osman* and *Mideleh* respectively, and that they were now at Constantinople.³

The arrangements for the command of the Mediterranean and the withdrawal of the armoured ships were communicated to Sir Berkeley Milne at 12.45 a.m. on August 13. The battle cruisers and a light cruiser were to be left at Besika Bay to watch the Dardanelles, and as Admiral Milne was senior to the

¹ A 95.

² A 98.

³ *Weymouth's* Report, Encl. 3 to M.01548/14 ("Diary of Events," by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, 20.8.14). The *Goeben* was re-named *Sultan Selim* (Varouz), not *Sultan Osman* ("War Vessels and Aircraft," Part II, January, 1915). There is reason to believe, however, that no actual transfer of the ships took place until October, 1918 (C.B. 1550, "Report of Dardanelles Committee," p. 21).

French Commander-in-Chief, he was to return home in the *Inflexible* with one light cruiser, leaving the *Indomitable*, *Indefatigable* and a light cruiser under the command of the Senior Captain. One light cruiser was to proceed to Port Said to complete with coal and await orders, the intention of the Admiralty being to hold her in readiness to proceed to Indian waters and search for the *Königsberg*. Admiral Troubridge and Admiral Carden, who was Admiral Superintendent at Malta, were to come under the orders of the French Commander-in-Chief.¹ Sir Berkeley Milne detailed the *Gloucester* to remain at the Dardanelles with the *Indomitable* and *Indefatigable*, under Captain Francis W. Kennedy of the *Indomitable*, and the *Chatham* to proceed to Port Said. No orders had been given by the Admiralty for the fourth light cruiser, and Admiral Milne took both the *Weymouth* and *Dublin* with him when he left Besika Bay at 3 a.m. on August 13 for Malta.

43. "Black Prince" and "Duke of Edinburgh" withdrawn from the Adriatic, August 10 and 12.—The withdrawal of the British armoured cruisers from the Mediterranean, which was provided for in the Convention of August 6 on the destruction or capture of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, had begun before the German cruisers were located. On August 10 Admiral Troubridge was ordered to despatch the *Black Prince* or *Duke of Edinburgh* through the Suez Canal to search the Red Sea for armed merchant cruisers and clear the way for the troops which India was sending to reinforce Egypt, reporting her arrival at Aden to the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, who would give her further orders.² The advanced details of the Indian troops were expected to leave on 15th of the month.³ On 12th the Admiralty gave Lord Kitchener the assurance that they would undertake the escort of the troops from 15th, provided all the transports sailed together⁴; and in order to provide escorts up the Red Sea, Admiral Troubridge was now ordered to send the *Duke of Edinburgh* to Aden in addition to the *Black Prince*, which had left his flag just before midnight on 10th.⁵ The *Duke of Edinburgh* received her orders at 2.30 p.m. on 12th, while off Santa Maura Island, and she at once altered course for Aden.

44. War declared on Austria, Midnight, August 12 : Blockade of the Adriatic Instituted.—The main portion of the French fleet had concentrated at Bizerta by August 10. The complementary division was still engaged in escorting a convoy from Algiers, and, by agreement with Admiral Milne, the French Commander-in-Chief had established a patrol between Cape Bon and Maritimo on the west coast of Sicily. The news of the escape of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* was communicated to the French

¹ A 104.² H.S. 12, p. 115.³ A 94.⁴ M. 01346/14.⁵ A 101a.

Ministry of Marine, who reported to the British Admiralty at 1.20 p.m. (G.M.T.) on 11th that the Commander-in-Chief had been ordered to assemble his fleet immediately and to proceed to Malta. The 1st Squadron and cruisers were already on their way thither, and the 2nd Squadron followed shortly afterwards. The fleet arrived at Malta on 12th and coaled. At midnight Great Britain and France declared war against Austria,¹ and at 2 p.m. on 13th Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère sailed for the entrance to the Adriatic with the 1st Squadron and one division of cruisers, the remainder of the fleet following him at 6 a.m. next day.² His intention was to make Malta his base, with an advanced base nearer the Adriatic,³ Valona being the port in his mind,⁴ and he fixed a rendezvous with Admiral Troubridge, who was to come under his orders, for 7 a.m. on 15th, 5 miles south of Fano Point (Corfu).

The meeting took place in a dense fog, and it was not till 2.30 p.m. that Admiral Troubridge fell in with the *Courbet* and went aboard to meet the French Commander-in-Chief. To his assembled Admirals Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère explained his intention of making a sweep of the Adriatic immediately for the purpose of raising the blockade of the coast of Montenegro which had been notified by the Austrians from noon on August 10,⁵ destroying any Austrian ships engaged on that service, and making known at the earliest possible moment the presence of the Allied fleet in the Adriatic.

Information as to the disposition of the Austrian fleet was meagre and unreliable. On August 5 our Consul at Venice reported that it was at Pola, and the last Englishman to leave Pola on the outbreak of war reported that all the Austrian ships were ready for war on August 6, none of them being absent from the fleet in dock.⁶ At 8 a.m. on August 8 an Austrian squadron composed of the *Szigatvar* and another light cruiser, with two T.B.D.s, bombarded Antivari and destroyed the railway buildings and W/T station, withdrawing after three hours in the direction of Cattaro.

Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère's plan was to strike at once. Leaving with his battle fleet and destroyers at 6 p.m. this day (August 15), he intended to rendezvous at Otranto and then to proceed up the Italian coast, strike across at the latitude of Cattaro, make the coast of Montenegro, and sweep south. The French cruisers, with the *Defence*, *Warrior* and the British destroyers, three divisions of which were now present, were

¹ A 106.² 6 T.B.D.s, 6 S/ms and 2 minelayers remained at Malta.³ Admiral Carden's Report.⁴ R.-A. Troubridge's Report, No. 41/019, 16.8.14.⁵ Montenegro declared war on Austria, August 9.⁶ Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty, 221, 5.8.14, and French Naval Attaché to Marine, Paris, 5.15 p.m., 14.8.14.

to proceed at 1 a.m. on 16th up the Albanian coast to meet the battle fleet, the cruisers being ordered to keep in deep water owing to the possible presence of minefields. A rendezvous was fixed for 9 a.m. on 16th north of Antivari Bay for the battle fleet, the cruisers to be south of the Bay.¹

The sweep proceeded according to plan, but it was not until the morning of 16th, as the forces were approaching the rendezvous, that any enemy vessels were encountered. At 7.40 a.m. the cruisers were 18 miles south-west of Antivari when they sighted two or three Austrian light cruisers or destroyers inshore steaming rapidly northward. In their endeavour to escape from the cruisers these were steering straight towards the French battle fleet coming down from the north, whose smoke was even now visible in the far distance. The enemy had already been sighted by the battle fleet, and at 7.45 a.m. the Commander-in-Chief detached six destroyers to cut the enemy off to the southward.

At 7.51 a.m. the *Courbet* fired a gun. Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère's evident intention was to give the Austrian vessels an opportunity to surrender, for he did not fire again for 12 minutes. At 8.3 a.m. the *Courbet* opened fire on the nearest Austrian ship, which could now be clearly distinguished as a light cruiser of the *Aspern* type—afterwards ascertained to be the *Zenta*. A minute later the leading ship of the French battle fleet joined in, the cruisers at the same time taking up various positions to cut off the Austrian retreat; and by 8.15 a.m. the whole of the leading French division of battleships was in action. The unequal engagement was soon over. A few minutes sufficed to set the *Zenta* on fire; at 8.25 a.m. an explosion occurred on board her, and ten minutes later she began to settle, and sank slowly by the stern at 8.39 a.m. The *Defence* was at this time eight miles distant,² but Admiral Troubridge was unable to send his destroyers³ to pick up survivors as he was right astern of the French 2nd Cruiser Division, and the French northernmost division was still engaged.⁴ Meanwhile, the 2nd Division of the French battle fleet had turned northward to engage the other Austrian ships, which, however, made good their escape. They now re-joined, and the whole fleet re-formed and swept southward at full speed, searching the Montenegrin coast.

Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère had not expected any great military result from this sweep, as it was unlikely that the blockade of Antivari would be maintained in any strength. He was chiefly desirous of making his presence felt in the Adriatic, and particularly of assisting the Montenegrins with a view to obtaining their military co-operation in the investment of the

¹ Admiral Troubridge's Report.

² *Defence's* position: 10 miles N. 78 E. from Antivari.

³ Apparently all four divisions were now in company with him.

⁴ Admiral Troubridge's Report.

Cattaro forts, which, however, he did not intend to attack with his ships. He hoped that Italian ports would soon be open to him and thus obviate the necessity of retiring every night from the Adriatic, in order to avoid the danger of torpedo attack; and he had asked authority from his Government to use Valona as a base, but as yet had received no reply.

45. Effect of the Arrival of the "Goeben" and "Breslau" in Turkey.—While the sweep of the combined fleets in the Adriatic was in progress, the British Admiralty found it necessary to make fresh dispositions to meet the situation which had arisen in Turkey since the arrival of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* at Constantinople. From the commencement of the war the Turks had been resentful of the action of the British Government in pre-empting two battleships, the *Sultan Osman I* and *Reshadieh*,¹ which were building for Turkey in private yards in England. The offer of payment in full by the British Government and the return of the ships at the conclusion of the war, as well as additional and generous compensation, had done nothing to heal the bitterness of the Turks, who wanted the battleships in order to assert their claim to certain islands in the Aegean which had been acquired by Greece as the result of the first Balkan war.² The money for these ships had been raised in Turkey at a great sacrifice and largely by public subscription. Up to date nearly £3,600,000 had been paid, the last £700,000 only a few days before the outbreak of war.³

The *Reshadieh* was still uncompleted, but a Turkish crew for the *Sultan Osman I* was already in England and was on the point of taking over the ship when both vessels were pre-empted by the British Government. Public opinion in Turkey was excited by a violent Press campaign which was conducted against Great Britain for this action, and on August 15 Admiral Limpus and the British Naval Mission were suddenly withdrawn from the Turkish fleet, of which up to now the British Admiral had been in command, and ordered, if they remained in Turkey, to continue their work at the Ministry of Marine. On the arrival of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* the Turks perceived their opportunity of making good to some extent the loss of their two battleships; and they paid no attention to the demands of the British Government that they should dismiss or intern the German crews, but allowed the latter to remain on board their ships. To what extent the fighting efficiency of the two vessels had been affected during their escape from Sir Berkeley Milne's forces was

¹ Afterwards taken into the British service as the *Agincourt* and *Erin* respectively.

² See para. 86 for list of the islands belonging to Greece and Turkey respectively.

³ M. 01597/14. The Turkish Government had sustained a loss of nearly £1,000,000 in issuing bonds for subscription at £15 per cent. in order to pay for the building of the ships, the total indebtedness for which, taking this loss into account, approached £6,900,000.

uncertain; but they were reported to have defects requiring dockyard labour of 200 men, their boilers burned out, and the *Breslau* was stated to have been damaged by the fire of the *Gloucester* and to have landed some wounded on arrival at Constantinople.

The situation, with the German crews still on board their ships, was so unsatisfactory that during the afternoon of August 15 the Admiralty sent orders that the *Defence*, *Blenheim* and all the destroyers were to proceed immediately to the Dardanelles. Admiral Troubridge was to shift his flag temporarily to one of the battle cruisers *Indomitable* or *Indefatigable*, which, with the *Gloucester*, had been watching the Straits since Sir Berkeley Milne left on August 13, and was to establish a close watch for enemy ships off the Dardanelles. The light cruisers were to remain at the disposal of the French Commander-in-Chief for the present, and also the *Warrior*.¹ Sir Berkeley Milne, who had arrived at Malta on the afternoon of the 14th in the *Inflexible* with the *Dublin* and *Weymouth*, was ordered to return to Plymouth in his flagship²; he left shortly before noon of the 18th, and Rear-Admiral Carden assumed the duties of Senior (British) Naval Officer, Mediterranean. On the following day, however, the Admiralty sent orders to Admirals Carden and Troubridge delimiting the areas of their respective commands. Rear-Admiral Carden was to continue in charge of all Naval Establishments and torpedo craft for local defence at Malta, but was not to exercise command over any sea-going vessels on the station, which were left in charge of Rear-Admiral Troubridge. Both these officers were to act under the orders of the French Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean.³

The orders of the Admiralty were acted upon by Admiral Troubridge on his return from the Allied sweep in the Adriatic on the forenoon of August 16. The destroyers were sent to Lefkimo Bay, Corfu, to coal, where the *Defence* joined them early on 17th. The *Blenheim* and *Osiris*⁴ arrived shortly after, and before noon the entire force had left for the Dardanelles with the exception of one division of destroyers which was not yet complete with coal.

On 16th the Admiralty had sent orders for the *Warrior* to proceed to Port Said,⁵ and she parted from Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère's flag that night. Thus the last of the armoured cruisers was withdrawn from the Allied fleet, and only the *Dublin* and *Weymouth* remained at the French Commander-in-Chief's disposal, and these he instructed to remain at Malta to await orders.⁶

¹ A 107, 108.

² A 109.

³ A 120.

⁴ Small P. and O. steamer requisitioned on August 5 as an auxiliary cruiser and armed at Malta with 2—12 pdr. 12 cwt. Q.F., 2—6 pdr. Hotchkiss.

⁵ A 117.

⁶ A 114.

CHAPTER IV.

EGYPT AND THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, AUGUST, 1914.

46. The Situation in Egypt, August, 1914.—The despatch of the *Warrior* to Port Said was necessitated by the situation in Egypt,¹ where the public was much excited by the presence of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* at Constantinople. The Turkish army was mobilising and Turkish troops in Syria were moving towards Egypt. Germany was reported to have announced that she would not consider Egypt neutral territory in the present circumstances,² and the authorities were manifesting lack of confidence in our ability to protect the country from attack, although Mr. Cheetham, our representative in Cairo, was authorised by the Foreign Office to assure the Egyptian Government that the British and French navies had complete control of the Mediterranean and could ensure the absolute freedom of Egypt from attack by sea.³ The Khedive was in Constantinople, and the British Government did not intend to allow him to return⁴ in view of the Turkish aggression which was reported to be projected against the country. Under German auspices a Turkish movement had for some time been working against Great Britain in Egypt, the intention being to take advantage of any opportunity offered by the present war to attack the country from Syria⁵; and on August 16 it was reported that an insurrection in the country was planned to take place in a fortnight's time.

47. Reinforcements Ordered from India, August 5.—Already on August 5 the Cabinet had decided to give early effect to a pre-war plan of reinforcing our Army of Occupation in Egypt by one Indian Division,⁶ and on 7th they informed the British resident at Cairo of this decision, and that he might use the information to check the growth of unrest and inspire confidence in the authorities.⁷ On the same day (August 7) the force was increased and the Viceroy was ordered to despatch two divisions and a cavalry brigade to Egypt with the least possible delay.⁸ Major-General Byng, the G.O.C. Egypt, considered that the

¹ Resident, Cairo, to F.O., 90, 15.8.14.

² Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, 168R, 7.8.14.

³ Sir E. Grey to Mr. Cheetham (Cairo), 97R, 14.8.14.

⁴ F.O. to Mr. Beaumont, Constantinople, 348, 9.8.14.

⁵ Resident (Cairo) to F.O., 9.8.14.

⁶ A 92.

⁷ F.O. to Mr. Cheetham, Cairo, 73, 7.8.14.

⁸ I.O. to Viceroy, 367, 7.8.14.

arrival of even a small reinforcement from India or Malta would prove to the Turks and Egyptians that we held the command of the sea and that Egypt was not isolated from the rest of the world.¹ The ultimate employment of these troops in Europe was, however, kept in view, though the force, which was eventually designated Indian Expeditionary Force "A," was subjected to certain modifications in its organisation in order to enable it to operate in Egypt if necessary while there. Orders were given to the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies,² to provide an escort for the troop transports,³ the advanced details of which were expected to leave India on August 15⁴; and it was in order to clear the way for the passage of the transports that the *Black Prince* and *Duke of Edinburgh* were sent to search the Red Sea for hostile armed merchant cruisers.

On August 15 the *Black Prince*, having received intelligence that two German ships had left Massowa Channel (Red Sea),⁵ proposed to steam south to intercept them; but on the following day the Commander-in-Chief⁶ telegraphed to the Admiralty that he had ordered her to remain at Suez, where she was due that night with two German prizes, the Hamburg-America liners *Istria* and *Sudmark*, which she had captured in the Red Sea. The Port Authorities there were apprehensive of a combined attack by the Turkish and German ships in port or arriving from Jidda and Aqaba (Akaba),⁷ and the British Resident, Cairo, was urging that a warship should be in close touch with, or stationed at, Port Said and Suez until the arrival of the troops from India, in view of the report that Turkish transports were embarking troops at Jidda with the intention of taking them through the Canal.⁸

At Port Said there were some ten German ships, containing a number of reservists, which had sought refuge and had been detained for unneutral acts with their W/T⁹; there were three German and one Austrian vessels at Suez; and eight German and two Austrian merchant vessels in the Red Sea had assembled at Massowa.¹⁰

¹ Mr. Cheetham to F.O., 76, 9.8.14.

² Rear-Admiral Richard H. Peirse.

³ Adty. to C.-in-C., E.I., 113, 9.8.14.

⁴ C.I.G.S. to G.O.C., Egypt, 79/5453, 9.8.14.

⁵ See Plan XI.

⁶ Sir Berkeley Milne, who was at Malta making preparations to hand over the records of the Station to R. A. Carden, prior to returning to England.

⁷ Resident, Cairo, to F.O., 16.8.14.

⁸ A 111, and Resident, Cairo, to F.O., 90, 15.8.14.

⁹ Resident, Cairo, to F.O., 92, 15.8.14. During October, 1914, the enemy ships in the Canal ports, having refused to leave in spite of the offer of free passes, and not being permitted by the convention of Constantinople to regard these ports as neutral harbours offering asylum for the period of the war, were expelled by the Egyptian Authorities at the instigation of the British, and were "captured" outside the 3-mile limit by the *Warrior* and *Black Prince* and taken to Alexandria, where a Prize Court was set up which condemned them.

¹⁰ *Chatham's Report*, 22.8.14, M. 01988/14.

The Admiralty replied, through the Foreign Office, that they considered the *Chatham* to be sufficient protection, especially as the *Black Prince* and *Duke of Edinburgh* had so recently passed through the Canal¹; but they despatched the *Warrior* to Port Said, where she was to remain to show the flag during 12 hours of daylight, afterwards taking station at Alexandria pending further developments,² and the *Chatham* was ordered from Port Said to Suez, where she could delay any Turkish transports under her guns on some pretext while the situation was critical.³ Both the *Black Prince* and *Duke of Edinburgh* were required to escort the first convoy of Indian troops, and the Admiralty cancelled Sir Berkeley Milne's disposition for the former, and ordered her to proceed to Aden in readiness to pick up the convoy. On arrival at Aden both ships were to coal. The first ship which was ready was to proceed to Bombay, get in touch with Admiral Peirse, and act under his orders for convoying transports to Aden. The second ship was to remain at or near Aden and take the convoy on up the Red Sea to Suez.⁴

The forecast of August 15 as the date of departure of the advance details of the reinforcements from India proved to be unduly optimistic, for by August 13 it was known at the Admiralty that the first convoy would not be ready until about the 20th. Meanwhile, the effective strength of the Army of Occupation in Egypt had been reduced by detachments guarding important points, such as Port Said, Suez, the cable landing stations, and W/T station; and until the arrival of the Indian troops the Commander-in-Chief was relying upon the Navy to protect the Suez Canal. The possibility of a Turkish landing in Egypt to support local risings had to be foreseen. The Red Sea end of the Canal was protected by the presence of the *Chatham* at Suez, for the Turks had only gunboats and small craft at Suez and in the Red Sea; but it did not appear to General Byng that we had any practical means, while Turkey was nominally at peace with us, of preventing Turkish transports in transit through the Canal from landing troops to promote insurrection in Egypt.⁵ To meet this danger the Admiralty, on August 18, ordered Admiral Troubridge to detach a division of destroyers to Port Said,⁶ while the *Chatham*, which had arrived at Suez on 17th, was ordered to remain there to deal with any situation which might arise.⁷ The intention with which on August 12 the Admiralty had detached her from Sir Berkeley Milne's force, namely, to search for the *Königsberg*, was relegated to the background for the time being in face of the present emergency.

¹ On August 13 and 15 respectively.

² A 117.

³ Adty. to F.O., 18.8.14.

⁴ A 105, 110.

⁵ Resident, Cairo, to F.O., 99, 17.8.14.

⁶ A 121. He despatched the 2nd Division—*Foxhound*, *Mosquito*, *Racoon*, *Basilisk*.

⁷ A 118, 119.

48. Force "A" leaves India, August 24-25.—Since the arrival of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* at Constantinople the Anglo-phobe elements in the Turkish Cabinet had been gaining ground against Djemal Pasha, Minister of Marine, and other members friendly disposed towards Great Britain. The ambiguous attitude of Turkey decided the authorities at home that the loyal Indian Army must be shown taking the place of the British garrison in Egypt. India was fitting out three expeditionary forces, of which "A" was for Egypt, "B" an offensive expedition against Dar-es-Salaam, and "C" a smaller defensive force for British East Africa.¹ The first of the three now took precedence, and the other two were delayed indefinitely.² The troops detailed for force "A" were the III (Lahore) and VII (Meerut) Divisions and the 9th (Secunderabad) Cavalry Brigade. The first echelon consisted of four groups, two of which, comprising part of the Lahore Division, left Bombay and Karachi on August 24³ and 25⁴ respectively. Both groups united and proceeded as one convoy, being escorted on the first stage of the voyage by the *Swiftsure* and the Royal Indian Marine ships *Hardinge*, *Dufferin*, and *Minto*.⁵

The *Duke of Edinburgh* arrived at Aden on August 20 to take on the convoy, having on the way captured a German merchant ship, the *Altair*, and taken her to Port Sudan. She was a day ahead of the *Black Prince*, which had been delayed by having to return to Suez with two prizes, the *Istria* and *Südmark*, which she had captured in the Gulf of Suez. Leaving Aden on August 24 she picked up the convoy on the morning of the 30th at the rendezvous off Ghubbet-ar-rahib Bay in the Khorya Morya Islands, as arranged by Admiral Peirse; and the *Dufferin* and *Minto* quitted the convoy and returned to India for the two remaining groups of the first echelon. The *Duke of Edinburgh* went in to Aden to coal on September 1 where she met the *Black Prince*. The latter had left Aden on August 25 with a detachment of 20 men and two field guns to reinforce the guard at Perim. After landing them she patrolled between Socotra and Somaliland, across the trade routes, during the 29th and 30th, and then returned to Aden to coal preparatory to meeting the *Swiftsure's* convoy. On September 3 the two armoured cruisers met the convoy off Aden and took over the duty of escort up the Red Sea, while the *Swiftsure* after coaling at Aden returned to Bombay. The *Chatham* also was in the Red Sea, for on August 24 she left Suez for Aden with the transports *Dongola* and *Somali* which left Southampton

¹ Later a fourth, Force "D," was added for the campaign in Mesopotamia. (See Monograph No. 15, "Mesopotamia, 1914-1916.")

² Sec. of State to Viceroy, 507, 17.8.14.

³ Group "A," *Assaye*, *Nurani*, *Baroda*, *Sumatra*, *Taiyabi*, *Bharata*, *Barpeta*, *Bangala*, *Purnea*.

⁴ Group "B," *Ambala*, *Upava*, *Itola*, *Kirkfield*, *City of Glasgow*, *Ellenga*. For details of troops see T.7636/14.

⁵ See Monograph No. 17, "East Indies" (C.B. 917(C)).

unescorted on the night of August 11 with officers and officials returning to India from home leave.¹ At Aden the Admiralty gave her further orders to escort the *Dongola* and *Somali* to the longitude of Cape Gardafui.² She parted company from them on the morning of September 1 off Socotra,³ and turned back to pick up the *Swiftsure* and her convoy, while the *Dongola* and *Somali* proceeded independently to Bombay.

49. Protection of the Malta-Port Said Trade Route.—Now that the *Goeben* and *Breslau* were immobilised, commerce had little to fear on the main Mediterranean trade route from the East, except from any German vessels which should convert themselves into armed merchant cruisers and from raiders that might escape the vigilance of the French fleet guarding the Adriatic or Admiral Troubridge at the Dardanelles. Germany claimed the right to convert merchant vessels on the high seas; and in this connection British diplomatic representatives abroad had been ordered on August 10 to call the immediate attention of the Governments to which they were accredited to the rules of international law embodied in Hague Convention No. 13 of 1907, by which neutral Governments were bound to prevent the fitting out, arming, or departure from their jurisdiction of any merchant vessel intended to be employed for warlike purposes.

In the early days of the war, before hostilities were declared against Austria and the French fleet moved to the mouth of the Adriatic, the Admiralty had fully expected that attempts would be made by German liners to convert themselves in neutral ports or on the high seas into auxiliary cruisers and operate on the Mediterranean trade routes, as occurred in other parts of the world. Two such ships, the *Moltke* and *König Albert*, had been reported on August 6 preparing to leave Genoa, but the Italians, at the request of our Ambassador, had interned them. Another, the *Derfflinger*, was immobilised by the Egyptian authorities on August 7. Two more, the *Corcovado* and the *General*, were at present at Constantinople. The former had been reported on August 8 at Galata with many reservists on board, and the *General* was stated on August 11 to be armed or arming. The uninterrupted continuance of our trade was of vital importance to Great Britain, and the policy of the Admiralty had been to encourage the masters of merchant ships in the continuance of their voyages, even during the period when the *Goeben* and *Breslau* were at large. In their capacity as Naval Reporting Officers the British Consuls-General at Alexandria and Port Said received information direct from the Intelligence centres at Malta, Colombo and London, and passed on to masters of merchant vessels information as to the safest routes.

¹ A 126.

² A 133.

³ 15° 58' N., 53° 40' E.

The safety of the trade routes was of the first importance, not only on account of the great value of our Eastern trade, but also because there would shortly take place extensive movements of troop transports in the Mediterranean. India was sending to the United Kingdom some British battalions in addition to Force "A" whose possible employment in Europe had not been lost sight of; three battalions were to be withdrawn from the Far East; the Army of Occupation in Egypt was urgently required for service in France, and was to be relieved by Territorials from the United Kingdom; and the garrisons of regulars at Malta, Gibraltar, and Cyprus were also to be brought home to form part of the new 6th Division for France.

By the terms of the Convention of August 6 the French were to undertake throughout the Mediterranean the protection of British and French commerce. But on August 22 the French Admiral informed Rear-Admiral Carden that the British Navy should undertake to watch the trade routes from Malta to Port Said, for which purpose he placed the *Weymouth* and *Dublin* under the Admiral Superintendent's orders. The latter proposed to send the *Dublin* to Port Said to be under the orders of Admiral Troubridge, retaining the *Weymouth* near Malta.¹

In the view of the Admiralty the trade route was reasonably safe, and they wished to employ the two light cruisers which had become available, to hunt out the *Königsberg* which was a threat to our transports in the Indian Ocean; and while informing Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère of this, they took the opportunity of asking him to ensure that no Austrian raiders should escape from the Adriatic.² Near Malta, the trade route was protected by the known presence of the French fleet, and Admiral Carden's disposition for the *Weymouth* was altered and she was ordered to guard the route south of Crete, using Port Said or Malta as her coaling base.³ On the following day (August 23), however, these orders were supplemented, and she was told to proceed along the trade route to Port Said instead of remaining south of Crete⁴; and Admiral Carden was ordered to commission the gunboat *Hussar* for Malta and trade route defence. The *Dublin* was ordered to take the same route as the *Weymouth* to Port Said, where she was to coal and proceed at once to show the flag at Jaffa, where Russian subjects were reported to be suffering from acts of the Turks.⁵ Christians at Smyrna were said to be in danger from the Turks, but our Ambassador at Constantinople had warned Admiral Troubridge, who was watching the Dardanelles with his flag hoisted in the *Indefatigable*, that it was unsafe for a warship to proceed to the port for fear of reprisals. Admiral Troubridge's force had been reduced by the withdrawal of the *Indomitable*, for on August 19

¹ A 124.² A 128.³ A 125.⁴ A 127.⁵ A 125. The *Dublin* left this service to join Admiral Troubridge at the Dardanelles on August 30.

the Admiralty had ordered him to send one of his two battle cruisers to Gibraltar via Malta, taking due precautions against any discovery by the Turks of the weakening of his squadron.¹ Leaving the Dardanelles on August 20 the *Indomitable* arrived at Gibraltar on 26th, after being delayed at Malta for 12 hours by a defect. The ship, which had been refitting at Malta when war broke out, had a heavy defect list; but although it seemed that for the moment the Admiralty did not require her to move from Gibraltar they ordered her to keep steam at 48 hours' notice, and meanwhile her more urgent defects were taken in hand.²

50. Relief of the Garrisons of Malta and Gibraltar.—The first of the Mediterranean garrisons of regular troops to be withdrawn for service in France was the 2nd Wiltshire Regiment at Gibraltar, which sailed for the United Kingdom at 8 a.m. on August 31 in the *Edinburgh Castle*, escorted by the *Sutlej* of the 9th Cruiser Squadron (Cruiser Force I), which, under Rear-Admiral de Robeck, was patrolling in the Atlantic on the west coasts of Portugal and Morocco, and the Azores.³ The Malta garrison, consisting of the 2nd Royal Warwickshire Regiment, 1st Royal Welch Fusiliers, with R.E. and R.G.A., and 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers from Gibraltar, left in the *Ultonia* and *Gloucester Castle* on September 3, and were taken on from Gibraltar by the *Sutlej* on 10th, arriving at Southampton on September 15.⁴

The first intention had been to relieve them by troops from the first echelon of force "A" from India; but the call for troops for France was so urgent that when it was decided to employ the Indian troops in Europe the decision was made to replace the Mediterranean garrisons by Territorials. Five battalions of the latter⁵ left Southampton on September 4,⁶ and were picked up by the *Amphitrite* off Plymouth on the following morning. At 3 p.m. on 7th the *Argonaut*, Admiral de Robeck's flagship, met the *Amphitrite* 50 miles north-west of Vigo and took over the convoy. The Admiral had no orders concerning the transports, but he decided to take them on to Gibraltar, which was reached on the morning of September 10. Here the troops for the defence of the Rock disembarked, and the remainder went on independently to Malta, arriving on September 13-15 to augment the local forces which had constituted the garrison since the withdrawal of the regular troops.

51. Arrival of the Indian Troops in Egypt, September 9.—On August 24-25, when the first echelon of force "A" sailed from India, its ultimate destination and employment were still

¹ A 123.² A 135-138.³ T.7542/15.⁴ Transport papers.⁵ I, II, III, IV London Regt. and VII Middlesex Regt.⁶ Transports *Gloucester Castle*, *Galician* (*Glenart Castle*), *Galeka*, *Nevasa*, *Kelwingrove*, *Chevington*.

uncertain. It had originally been intended that the troops should disembark in Egypt to reinforce and relieve the garrison, though without prejudice to their future employment in Europe if required. On August 28, however, the Viceroy was informed that the whole of the force was to proceed direct to Marseilles with the exception of the Bikanir Camel Corps, which formed part of a cavalry brigade composed of Imperial Service Troops destined for Egypt¹; and the Admiralty warned Admiral Troubridge that the *Warrior* and *Weymouth* would be required to escort the force from Port Said to Malta, the sufficiency of the *Weymouth* alone beyond Malta to depend upon conditions at the moment.² On September 1 the War Office reversed their decision and the first contingent of Indian troops, which was now nearing Aden, was ordered to stop at Suez for the present and remain on board the transports pending further orders.³ Two days later Lord Kitchener informed General Byng that the whole of the Lahore division was to remain in Egypt for a time.

"For the present," he wrote, "make as much use of them as you can and say as little as possible as to what is to be done with them in the future. The situation has to be carefully watched from day to day; so keep them in readiness to embark at Alexandria, if ordered, without undue delay. Although it cannot be laid down for certain, I hope they will not leave before the next division from India is near Aden. Your Territorial Division leaves here to-morrow."⁴

The Territorial Division to which Lord Kitchener referred was the East Lancashire Division; but it did not leave England until September 10. Even now, however, the port of disembarkation of the Lahore Division was undecided, for Suez was forbidden under Article 5 of the Suez Canal Convention; and the War Office suggested to General Byng that the disembarkation should take place at Alexandria, the necessary troops only for the defence of Egypt being retained and the remainder going on to Marseilles.⁵ But it was highly desirable that the landing should take place in the neighbourhood of Suez, where Turkish gunboats were watching our movements and would be considerably impressed by the spectacle⁶; and the legal objection to Suez was surmounted by selecting Port Ibrahim, in the immediate neighbourhood, to which, since it was not a port of access, Article 5 of the Suez Canal Convention did not apply. Accordingly, when on September 9 the Lahore Division arrived at Suez, it disembarked at Port Ibrahim, the disembarkation being completed by September 14, and railed to Cairo, the transports being sent on through the Suez Canal to Alexandria in readiness to take the troops on later to Marseilles, which was to be their base.

¹ 692 to Viceroy, 28.8.14.

² Adty. to R.A., *Indefatigable*, 17, 1.9.14.

³ W.O. to G.O.C., Egypt, 790, 1.9.14.

⁴ No. 817, 3.9.14 (T/8088/14).

⁵ W.O. to G.O.C., 879, 5.9.14.

⁶ G.O.C., Egypt, to W.O., 556E, 6.9.14.

CHAPTER V.

THE MEDITERRANEAN CONVOYS.

52. **Initial Arrangements for Escort.**¹—It had been arranged that on arrival of the first Indian contingent in Egypt the withdrawal of the British Army of Occupation, urgently needed in Europe, should commence; and the transports *Perugia* and *Osmanieh* with the first troops for the United Kingdom, and possibly the *Assaye* with officers and advance details from India for Marseilles, were expected to be ready to leave on September 10 or 11. The General Officer Commanding, Egypt, did not consider the protection afforded by the *Warrior* and *Weymouth* to be sufficient in the event of the *Goeben* breaking out of the Dardanelles.² Activity was manifest at this time in the Turkish fleet. The Turks were withdrawing their gunboats from the Red Sea to the Dardanelles, and on September 11 the *Indefatigable* was ordered to stop all colliers passing in with Cardiff coal for the Turkish Government.³ German naval ratings had arrived at Constantinople towards the end of August. Turkish ships and a seaplane with Germans on board made frequent reconnaissances of Admiral Troubridge's squadron, and it was rumoured that the *Goeben* and *Breslau* might make a raid to entice our ships to sea in order that mines might be laid in the anchorage in their absence. Already mines had floated down from the Dardanelles, whether set loose by intention or otherwise, and there was a possibility that the *Indefatigable* might be disabled by the favourite Turkish device. On September 6 Admiral Carden telegraphed that all his information pointed to the probability of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* coming out, particularly if Turkey remained finally neutral, and he urged that a strong French escort should be provided for the Indian troops when they went on from Egypt to Marseilles.⁴ The Admiralty had already ordered the *Indomitable* to leave Gibraltar on September 8 and proceed to Port Said via Malta, in readiness to escort the Indian troops, of whose departure, however, nothing was as yet definitely arranged.⁵ She would be on the route Malta-Egypt between September 11 and 12, and they decided that the *Perugia*, *Osmanieh*, and *Assaye* might safely sail without other escort than the *Weymouth*. The *Warrior* was no longer available, for on September 10 she was ordered to the Dardanelles to take the place of the *Defence*, which was ordered to Gibraltar to fill

¹ Sailing Orders, August 17, 1914, to April 16, 1915, are in M. 03564/15.

² A.S., Malta, to Adty., 569, 7.9.14.

³ Adty. to A.S., Malta, for *Indefatigable*, 385, 11.9.14.

⁴ A.S., Malta, to Adty., 557, 6.9.14.

⁵ A 140.

up with coal preparatory to proceeding to the south-east coast of America to join Admiral Cradock's squadron and destroy the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, which were believed to be near Magellan Straits.¹

The *Indomitable* left Gibraltar for Port Said on September 8 to pick up the convoy of Indian troops, and on that very day a complication was introduced into the situation with regard to escorts, for the Commander-in-Chief of the French fleet, apprised of the General Officer Commanding Egypt's apprehensions for the safety of the transports, and influenced perhaps by the apparently unprotected state of the Mediterranean trade routes, telegraphed that he was moving south that afternoon after coaling with his force, and would ensure the safe passage of the transports in the Mediterranean. He asked that sailings should be delayed until 11th to enable the Cruiser Division, which he was sending on ahead, to reach Port Said,² and the Admiral Superintendent, Malta, asked the Admiralty for instructions as to what action should be taken.³ The French Admiral was under the impression that the three transports leaving Egypt on September 10 or 11, for which the *Weymouth* had been detailed as escort, constituted the main Indian convoy, and he sent instructions that the *Weymouth* should leave Alexandria with the transports at 5 a.m. on September 11, and join the convoy from Port Said on the following day.

From the wording of Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère's signal it appeared that he was withdrawing his battle fleet from the watch on the Adriatic, leaving his cruisers unsupported in face of the Austrian fleet. The Admiralty telegraphed to the Ministry of Marine that they considered it essential that the French fleet should remain to operate in the Adriatic, and that they had already made adequate arrangements for the escort of the transports.⁴ They also told the Senior Naval Officer, Malta, to explain to Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère the misapprehension he was under regarding the two convoys.⁵ The French Admiralty, on receipt of the explanation from Whitehall, telegraphed to the Commander-in-Chief to recall the Cruiser Division which he had sent to Port Said, and not to delay the sailing of the transports. It was evident to them, however, that their knowledge of the transport movements in the Mediterranean was incomplete, for Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère was asking them for the *Bruix* division of old cruisers and the *Jauréguiberry* division of battleships to escort the transports going from Egypt⁶ to Gibraltar and Marseilles respectively. This was the first intimation which the French Ministry of Marine had of transports going to Gibraltar, nor did they apparently

¹ A 152.

² By inference: this was not given as his reason.

³ A 151.

⁴ A 156.

⁵ A 154.

⁶ In the telegram Bizerta is named, but this should evidently be Egypt.

understand that these transports carried British troops for the United Kingdom.¹ The Admiralty explained the matter, and told the French Ministry of Marine that in their view the Western Mediterranean was sufficiently safe at present for transports to proceed west of Malta unescorted, and that consequently they would content themselves with covering them.² To avoid further misunderstandings the Admiralty informed the Admiral Superintendent, Malta, that he was to make no further convoy arrangements, which would all be made by them.³

53. The First Indian Convoy leaves Egypt.—The third group of the first echelon of Force "A" left Karachi on August 29 in seven transports,⁴ escorted by the *Northbrook*, and arrived at Suez on September 12, being taken over near Aden and escorted up the Red Sea by the *Chatham*. The Red Sea was now, for all practical purposes, part of the East Indies Command, for on September 4 the *Duke of Edinburgh*, *Black Prince*, and *Chatham*, which were carrying out escort duties in the Red Sea, had been placed temporarily under the orders of Admiral Peirse.⁵ The fourth group of the echelon, which was to have sailed from Bombay on August 28 with the *Dartmouth*, was not ready, and left with the next convoy on September 3. The disembarkation of the Lahore Division at Port Ibrahim was complete on September 14, and as the transports were urgently required back in India, Lieut.-General Sir John Maxwell, who had succeeded Major-General Byng in the Egyptian Command on September 8, was told on the day following the disembarkation to cable when he considered the military situation would allow of the Indian Division, or part of it, going on to Marseilles. The General Officer Commanding replied that the Lahore Division could leave as soon as escort was available, and next day (September 16) he was ordered to send it on at once; the *Indomitable* was to act as escort, and the *Weymouth* was to accompany her.⁶ The 3rd Mountain Artillery Brigade and the 9th Infantry Brigade were retained for the defence of Egypt, the latter pending the arrival of the East Lancashire Territorial Division from England in a few days' time; and the remainder of the Division left Alexandria for Marseilles on September 19. The convoy was joined by the four transports carrying a portion of the 9th (Secunderabad) Cavalry Brigade and the Meerut Division. These had left India on September 3, escorted by the *Dartmouth*, being taken on from Aden to Suez on September 11 by the *Northbrook*, whose convoy had been taken over at Aden by the *Chatham* on September 7; the presence of the *Black Prince*, *Duke of Edinburgh* and *Chatham* in the Red Sea served to cover them, and they were joined by the *Black Prince*

¹ A 155.

² A 156.

³ A 148.

⁴ *Castalia*, *Sangola*, *Teesta*, *Tahada*, *Akbar*, *Edavana*, *Itaura* (T.7636/14).

⁵ A 139.

⁶ A 156.

on 14th, three days before arriving at Suez. The *Thongwa*, with the Sherwood Foresters for England, which had formed part of the convoy leaving India on September 3, accompanied the transports from Egypt as far as Malta, the entire convoy mustering 21 transports.¹

54. The French asked to Provide Convoy Escorts, September 19.—During the next three months important movements of troops would be taking place in the Mediterranean. The remainder of the Army of Occupation and the 9th Indian Infantry Brigade, which had been retained for the defence of Egypt, were due to leave Egypt in a few days' time, when the East Lancashire Territorial Division should arrive, which had left England on September 10 in 15 transports,² escorted by the *Ocean* and *Minerva*, being met and relieved on the morning of 15th by the *Argonaut*, while the *Minerva* pushed on to Gibraltar and took on the convoy again from there on 17th.

It had been decided that the British battalions in India, of which one formed part of each Brigade of the Indian Army, were to be withdrawn, and their places taken by Territorials from England. The Wessex Division, Territorial Force, was due to leave England for India early in October. A large convoy carrying the remainder of the Lahore and Meerut Divisions and 9th Cavalry Brigade and some British battalions left Bombay on September 20 and Karachi on 21st,³ their departure having been postponed from 18th, as the excessive rain delayed some of the transports in being got ready to sail. These transports would be passing through the Mediterranean during October, some bound for Marseilles, others for the United Kingdom, and they would be followed by the British battalions employed on garrison duty which were being withdrawn from Egypt. Three British battalions were coming to Europe from the Far East, and, later, the contingents which Australia and New Zealand were sending to assist Great Britain would pass through.

¹ *Perugia, Nurani, Taiyabi, Ambala, Upada, Itola, Kirkfield, City of Glasgow, Ellenga, Castalia, Sangola, Teesta, Takada, Akbar, Edavana, Itaura* with Lahore Division, *Barala* with Pioneers of Meerut Division, *Ula, Urlana, Fultala* with 9th Cavalry Brigade, *Thongwa* with Sherwood Foresters (T.15171/14), *Elysia* and *Mongara* with (? troops).

² *Aragon, Atlantian, Avon, Caledonia, Californian, Chevington, Corsican, Deseado, Grantully Castle, Indian, Ionian, Mesaba, Neurulia, Norseman, Saturnia.*

³ Bombay convoy: *Bankura, Bamora, Havildar, Thistura, Subadar, Knight Companion, Taraba* with Lahore Division, *Tovilla, Ancora, Arankola, Manola, Euryalus, City of Sparta, Sofala, Chakrata* with Meerut Division, *City of Exeter, Risaldar, Egra, Ellora, Ranee, Rajah, Tactician, City of Birmingham* with 9th Cavalry Brigade, *Somali* with Rifle Brigade, *Dongola* with Berks Regiment, *Hedjaz* with supplies. With them sailed *Bandra, Begum, and Umfuli* with Force "C" for Mombasa. Karachi Convoy: *Ekna, City of Lahore, Erinpura, Elephant, City of Poona, Coconada, Pundua, Aronda, Devanha* with Meerut Division, *Dilwara* with Lancashire Fusiliers for Aden, *Braunfels* (German prize) with supplies. Total, 40 ships. Escort: Egyptian Convoy, *Swiftsure, Hardinge, Dufferin*. Mombasa Convoy: *Dartmouth, Fox.*

To ensure the safe passage of all these troops the Admiralty had at their disposal in the Mediterranean only the *Indomitable* and *Weymouth*, which left Alexandria on September 19 with the first Indian convoy, and the *Minerva*. The latter belonged to Cruiser Force I. She left England on September 11 and joined the *Ocean*, the two ships escorting the East Lancashire Territorial Division for Egypt. The *Minerva* carried a crew for the destroyer *Wear*, which was refitting at Gibraltar, for the Admiralty had ordered the Senior Naval Officer, Gibraltar,¹ to commission her for local service in the Straits.² Up to date the Gibraltar Straits Patrol had consisted of the small torpedo boats of the local defence. To these the *Wear* and the *Proserpine*,³ attached cruiser of the 7th Battle Squadron, Channel Fleet, were to be added; the latter arrived at Gibraltar on September 17.

On September 19, therefore, the Admiralty asked the French Ministry of Marine to safeguard the convoys sailing between Port Said and Marseilles. They suggested that old battleships of the *Bowet* class should be employed for the purpose. Two would be sufficient escort for each convoy, though it would be desirable to add a small cruiser, of which the French possessed a certain number of old vessels.⁴ A further request was made of the French next day, when the Admiralty asked them to reinforce Admiral Carden's squadron at the Dardanelles by two battleships of the *Democratie* type,⁵ for the entire Turkish fleet, being now under the absolute control⁶ of, and to a great extent manned by, Germans, the military value of the two battleships *Barbarousse Hairedine* and *Torgood Reis*,⁷ bought from the German Government by Turkey before the war, had increased so that it was necessary to cover them by a superior force.⁸ The Sultan had reviewed the Turkish fleet on September 17, when the *Goeben* and *Breslau* were present, flying the Turkish flag, with their German crews on board wearing the fez.⁹ In order further to strengthen the squadron of the Dardanelles the Admiralty ordered the *Indomitable* to leave her convoy in the longitude of the western end of Crete, provided there were no indications of any enemy ships in the vicinity, and proceed direct to join the *Indefatigable* at the Dardanelles.¹⁰ The *Defence*, too, which had stopped at Malta on September 14, and was having certain defects taken in hand, was ordered to return to the Dardanelles at midnight on September 20, by which time Admiral Carden reported that her defects would be made good,

¹ V.-A. Frederic E. E. Brock, C.B.

² A 141.

³ *Proserpine*, 2,135 tons, 17 knots, 8—4 in., 8—3 pdr.

⁴ A 159.

⁵ The *Suffren* and *Vérité* were sent.

⁶ R.-A. von Souchon (*Goeben*) was appointed Commander-in-Chief, Turkish Navy, about September 17.

⁷ Armament (each) 6—11 in., 8—4.1 in., 8—15 pdr. guns.

⁸ A 161.

⁹ Liman von Sanders, "Fünf Jahre Türkei," p. 45.

¹⁰ A 162.

for the rumour that the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* were near Magellan Straits¹ had been disproved by their appearance a few days later off Samoa. At the last moment Rear-Admiral Carden, who had been promoted Vice-Admiral on August 27, was ordered to hoist his flag in the *Defence* and assume command of the squadron in the Eastern Mediterranean,² for on September 10 Admiral Troubridge had left the Dardanelles in the *Rattlesnake* to return to England, where a Court of Inquiry was to be held on the circumstances attending the escape of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* from Messina,³ since which time the squadron had been under the command of Captain C. F. Sowerby, of the *Indefatigable*. Admiral Carden's place as Admiral Superintendent, Malta, was taken by Admiral Limpus, whom, with the British Naval Mission to Turkey, German intrigue had succeeded in getting withdrawn from Constantinople on September 16, the promotion of Rear-Admiral Limpus to Vice-Admiral being dated September 14.

At the very moment while these dispositions were being made (September 20) the *Königsberg* suddenly appeared off Zanzibar and sank the *Pegasus* lying at anchor in the harbour. The Admiralty at once ordered the *Chatham* to Zanzibar, and on the following day orders were sent to the Admiral Superintendent, Malta, that the *Minerva* and *Weymouth* were to exchange convoys, the *Weymouth* to bring the Territorial Division to Egypt and then proceed at once via the Suez Canal to join in the search for the *Königsberg*.⁴ To replace the *Chatham* on escort duty, and the *Dartmouth* of the East Indies Squadron, which was also withdrawn for the search for the *Königsberg*, the Admiralty were sending out the *Ocean* and *Goliath*.⁵ The former, which had left England with the *Minerva* and the East Lancashire Territorials, arrived at Malta on September 21, on which day the *Goliath* was off Finisterre.

The India Office were faced at this date with the possibility of having to despatch a force to the Persian Gulf at short notice in order to impress the population of Arabia, and Lord Crewe⁶ was anxious that the *Weymouth* should be used to escort the force from Bombay. She could have arrived there by October 5 or 6, whereas the Admiralty had stated that they could not provide any escort earlier than 10th. The Admiralty had no objection to the *Minerva* being used for this work, but they refused to divert the faster *Weymouth* from the *Königsberg* hunt.⁷

¹ See para. 52. The *Defence* was ordered home on October 6, but at Gibraltar was ordered to join Admiral Stoddart on the south-east coast of America.

² A 157, 160, 163.

³ A 145, 146. A court-martial was held on Admiral Troubridge on board the *Bulwark*, November 5-9, 1914, in this connection, and he was fully and honourably acquitted of the charge of failing to bring the *Goeben* to action.

⁴ A 164, 167, 168.

⁵ Adty. to C.-in-C., E.I. 177, 21.9.14.

⁶ Secretary of State for India.

⁷ Letter from Lord Crewe to Mr. Winston Churchill, October 1, 1914, and Adty. Minutes.

The *Indomitable* parted company from the *Weymouth* and convoy at 4.45 a.m. on September 21, and on the afternoon of the following day the *Weymouth* and *Minerva* met one another about 75 miles east of Malta and exchanged convoys, the *Weymouth* returning to Alexandria with the Territorial Division for Egypt and the *Minerva* taking on the Indian troops to Marseilles. On completion of this duty the *Minerva* was to proceed, via Port Said, to Aden and place herself under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, to replace the *Black Prince* on escort duty in the Red Sea, both this armoured cruiser and the *Duke of Edinburgh* being required at home for service with the Grand Fleet. The intention of the Admiralty was to relieve the *Duke of Edinburgh* later on by the *Vengeance*, when the latter could be spared from the Channel Fleet.¹

55. French Escort Arrangements.—The French Ministry of Marine replied to the request of the British Admiralty for convoy escorts from Port Said to Marseilles by detailing two groups of escorts. The first consisted of the *Jauréguiberry* and *Bouvet*,² with the torpedo vessel *La Hire*, and the second comprised the *Charlemagne* and *Saint Louis*³ and the minelayer *Cassini*,⁴ and they ordered Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère to send the latter group from Bizerta to Port Said immediately.⁵

The remainder of the Army of Occupation in Egypt was urgently required at home, and it was arranged that it should leave as soon as the East Lancashire Territorial Division had disembarked, which arrived at Alexandria on September 25, escorted by the *Weymouth*, the empty transports being sent on to India between September 26 and 28. The 9th Brigade of the Lahore Division was also still in Egypt awaiting orders from Lord Kitchener to proceed to Marseilles. Each of these forces would require about four transports, and the British troops, when ready, were to leave under the escort of one of the two French battleships which Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère had sent to Port Said for convoy duty, the remaining French warships escorting the Indian troops.⁶ The four transports⁷ with the Egyptian Garrison on board were ready to sail on September 27, on which day the Territorials completed their disembarkation, but at the last moment they were retained owing to the military situation in Egypt, and they left Alexandria at dawn on 30th, by which time the leading ships of the large convoy carrying the remainder of the Lahore and Meerut Divisions and

¹ A 172, 173.

² Each 2—12 in., 2—10·8 in., 8—5·5 in.

³ Each 4—12 in., 10—5·5 in., 8—3·9 in.

⁴ 36 from Marine, Bordeaux, to French Naval Attaché, 22.9.14, speaks of the "destroyer" *Cassini*; but this would seem to be an error in translation, as the *Cassini* is stated in "War Vessels and Aircraft" to be a minelayer of 966 tons.

⁵ A 165, 170, 174.

⁶ A 175.

⁷ *Deseado, Corsican, Californian, Indian.*

the 9th Cavalry Brigade, which left India on September 20 and 21, were only two days steaming from Suez.¹ With the Egyptian Garrison left also the 9th Brigade of the Lahore Division. The troops from Egypt were bound for the United Kingdom, but the escorting French warships *Charlemagne*, *Saint-Louis*, and *Cassini* convoyed the whole of the transports to Marseilles in error, where they arrived on October 6, instead of allowing those carrying the Egyptian Garrison to proceed to Gibraltar. The Admiralty consequently sent orders that in future homeward bound transports should be dropped by their escort at Malta, whence they were to proceed independently to Gibraltar, where an escort would meet and take them on unless the Naval situation in the Western Mediterranean necessitated an escort.²

After some discussion as to whether the troops of the Egyptian Garrison should be sent overland from Marseilles to a French channel port, or should be brought to England by sea, it was decided that the latter would be the more expeditious.³ They left Marseilles unescorted on October 8, and were taken on from Gibraltar on 11th by the *Leviathan*, arriving at Liverpool on 16th.

56. Arrangements for Return Voyages of Transports.—On September 26 the transports which left Egypt on 19th with the first Indian contingent arrived at Marseilles. Disembarkation of the troops began at once. The transports were urgently required in India for further troops⁴; it had been decided that they should not be escorted on the return voyage,⁵ and they commenced to leave Marseilles independently as soon as they were empty; and at 8 a.m. on 29th the last transport left Marseilles. For the purpose of making coaling, watering, and other arrangements and to superintend the embarkation and disembarkation of troops in Egypt Rear-Admiral (retired) Henry R. Robinson, Director-General of the Egyptian Ports and Lights Administration, was appointed Naval Transport Officer for military sea transport duties in Egypt, relieving the Navy Agent of the transport work which he had hitherto carried out.⁶ At Suez there was a Royal Indian Marine Transport Officer, who was placed under his general control; and Admiral Robinson received his instructions from the Director of Transports at the Admiralty and the Senior Naval Officer, Egypt, Captain George H. Borrett of the *Warrior*, who had just been ordered to proceed with despatch to Port Said to consult the G.O.C., Egypt, as to the defensive measures to be taken in

¹ W.O. to G.O.C., Egypt, 1222, Cypher, 27.9.14 and 1230, 28.9.14.

² A 179.

³ T.9527/14.

⁴ Great difficulty was experienced in India in obtaining sufficient transports. The rates of hire demanded by Shipping Companies were unreasonable, and to avoid unnecessary expenditure and delay special legislation was introduced by the Governor-General early in August to enable the Government of India to impress vessels. (T.10114/14.)

⁵ Adty. (T) to Divl. Transport Officer, Marseilles, 26.9.14.

⁶ Papers titled Treasury, 21.10.14.

Egypt.¹ As a rule transports going to England were to coal at Port Said or Malta on the outward voyage, but those whose terminal port was Marseilles would not ordinarily require coal until the return voyage; and it was arranged that the transports which conveyed the first Indian contingent to Marseilles should coal from Admiralty stocks at Port Said on their return, but that subsequently all empty transports returning to India should coal at Malta.²

57. The Second Indian Convoy leaves Egypt.—The great 4th Indian Convoy of 35 ships³ which left India on September 20 and 21 with the remainder of the two Indian divisions and the cavalry brigade that comprised force "A," as originally constituted, commenced to arrive at Suez on October 2 under the escort of the *Black Prince* and *Northbrook* which took over this duty at Aden from the *Swiftsure*, *Hardinge* and *Dufferin*; and by noon on 4th the whole convoy had arrived. The mountain batteries were ordered to be disembarked for the defence of Egypt,⁴ and the remainder of the convoy, after passing through the Canal, left Port Said for Marseilles in two groups on October 6 and 7, escorted by the *Jauréguiberry* and *Bouvet*,⁵ a day's delay in sailing having been entailed by the precautionary closing of the Canal on the night of the 4th–5th. They reached Marseilles on October 12–14 and the *Bouvet* went in to Toulon, while the *Jauréguiberry* proceeded as support to the 3rd Flotilla of French torpedo boats which were cruising in the Western Mediterranean to stop ships carrying German Reservists from Barcelona to Genoa. The War Office sent orders that the empty transports were to return to India directly disembarkation was completed.⁶ The arrangement that all empty transports returning to India after the first convoy should coal at Malta does not seem to have been adhered to, for three only of the transports coaled at Malta, the remainder not filling their bunkers until they reached Port Said.⁷

On October 3 the 1st Suffolk Regiment, which was being withdrawn from Khartoum to the United Kingdom on relief by Territorials, left Port Sudan in the *Grantully Castle*, escorted as far as Suez by the destroyer *Mosquito*. She was too late to join the convoy of Indian troops which left Egypt on October 6–7, and the *Warrior* detailed the *Racoon* to escort her from Alexandria to Malta on 9th. From Malta she proceeded unescorted to Gibraltar in accordance with the Admiralty decision that escorts were not necessary between Malta and

¹ A 176.

² T.9117/14 and A 186.

³ The transports conveying Force "C" to Mombasa, which left with this convoy, parted company on September 23.

⁴ W.O. to G.O.C., Egypt, 1238 Cypher, 28.9.14.

⁵ *Jauréguiberry* and *Bouvet* arrived Port Said October 1.

⁶ W.O. to I.G.C., France, 1625 Cypher, Q.M.G.2, 14.10.14.

⁷ A.S., Malta to Adty., 1009, 15.10.14, and 25 of 17.10.14.

Gibraltar.¹ She joined up here with the *Dongola*, *Somali* and *Dilwara*, which had left India in the convoy of September 20 and 21 with British troops for the United Kingdom; and the four transports left Gibraltar on October 16 escorted by the *Euryalus*, which, with the *Bacchante*, had just arrived from England conveying the Wessex Division, Territorial Force, for India.

58. Convoy Programme and its Working.—On October 1 the Admiralty drew up a programme of convoy sailings,² arranging for departures at 16 days' interval from the United Kingdom and India respectively.³ The extremities of the Suez Canal (midway between Southampton and Bombay) were the passing points of the outward and homeward convoys. The general principles were that French escorts from Port Said to Malta would await the arrival of a convoy from Malta to Port Said. The Admiralty did not consider escorts to be necessary from Malta to Marseilles, and they told the French Admiralty that it would be sufficient if Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère would detach ships necessary for protection of the convoys from Malta to Marseilles or Gibraltar if he thought their security was in danger.⁴ For escort duty in the Atlantic the *Bacchante* and *Euryalus* of Cruiser Force G had been detailed. The outward Atlantic escort was to drop its convoy at Gibraltar and return with a homeward one. Should a complete convoy and escort be ready to sail from any port in advance of the scheduled dates they were not to wait, as unforeseen delays might occur later and the sailings were already behind scheduled time; and convoys starting behind time were to endeavour to make it up *en route* so as not to delay the sailings of subsequent convoys requiring the same escort.

The first sailing from the United Kingdom under the new convoy programme was that of the Wessex Division, Territorial Force, for India, which had been postponed on October 2. The division left England on October 10⁵ in nine transports,⁶ escorted by the *Bacchante* and *Euryalus*. From Gibraltar the transports proceeded independently to Malta, arriving there during the night of October 17–18. They were delayed some hours until

¹ A 184.

² Referred to in telegrams as P.C.S.

³ Proposed programme of Troopship Sailings from India to Marseilles and Home (H.S. 33, p. 248):—

INDIA TO MARSEILLES.		HOME TO INDIA.	
Arrive Suez.	Arrive Marseilles.	Leave Southampton.	Port Said.
October 6.	October 15.	October 9.	October 24.
" 26.	November 4.	" 25.	November 9.
November 11.	" 20.	November 10.	" 25.
" 27.	December 6.	" 26.	December 11.
December 13.	" 22.	" 12.	" 27.
" 29.	January 7.	December 28.	January 12.
January 14.	" 23.		

⁴ A 182, 185.

⁵ Adty. to C-in-C., E.I. 240, 24.10.14.

⁶ *Kenilworth Castle*, *Alnwick Castle*, *Dunluce Castle*, *Braemar Castle*, *Cawdor Castle*, *Galeka*, *Assaye*, *Nevasa*, *Ultonia*, *Thongwa*, *Ingoma*, *Kelvingrove* (last three empty).

the French escort arrived,¹ and they left at 1 p.m. on 18th with the *Saint Louis*, *Charlemagne* and *Cassini*, arriving at Suez on October 27, whence the French cruiser *Dupleix*,² which was working under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, took them on down the Red Sea. The *Dupleix* had recently arrived at Suez with the three transports *Arcadia*, *Nile* and *Carnarvonshire*, bringing the British garrisons from China, and the *Cordillère* and *El Kantara* with French guns and ammunition; the five ships passed Aden on the morning of October 17, and were taken on through the Mediterranean by the *Cassini*, arriving at Malta on October 28. They proceeded without escort to Gibraltar, where the *Proserpine* took them out at 2 p.m. on November 3 and handed them over to the *Diana* two hours later for escort to the United Kingdom.

The second convoy from Southampton, carrying the Home Counties Territorial Division for India and a battalion of the Brecknockshires for Aden, was due to leave on October 25, but did not start until 29th.³ The division made up time *en route* and began to arrive at Port Said on November 9, where it was delayed a few days until the arrival of the next Indian convoy owing to the fear of a Turkish attack on Egypt. One contingent of troops from India had but recently passed through the Canal. This was the fifth Indian convoy of 40 transports, which left India in two groups in company with transports for East Africa and Mauritius, Group "H" from Bombay on October 16, and Group "I" from Karachi on the following day.⁴ The convoy reached Suez on October 30, escorted by the *Minerva* and *Northbrook*, and left Egypt on November 1 and 2.⁵ The transports carrying Indian troops arrived at Marseilles November 7–10, while those with British regiments went on to England, escorted by the *Bacchante*, and arrived at Plymouth on 16th, this port being chosen instead of Southampton on account of the danger from enemy submarines in the English Channel. The *Minerva* had arrived at Suez on October 6. Meanwhile, however, on October 2 the Admiralty had telegraphed that she was no longer required to remain at Suez and she was to proceed south for escort duties under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.⁶ She went to Aden, calling at Jidda on October 9 to investigate a rumour that the *Königsberg* had been coaling there; and she remained at Aden until 16th, leaving on the evening of that day to meet the convoy.

¹ A 191, 192.

² *Dupleix*, 7,432 tons, 8—6.5 in., 4—3.9 in., 2—9 pdr., 10—3 pdr.

³ Ten transports: *Deseado*, *Corsican*, *Indian*, *Californian*, *Royal George*, *Dilwara*, *Alaunia*, *Dongola*, *Somali*, *Grantully Castle*.

⁴ Group "H" (31 ships): *Aragon*, *Aratoon-Apcar*, *Avon*, *Ballarat*, *Bangala*, *Caledonia*, *Clan Macfarlane*, *Clan Macphee*, *Chilka*, *City of Baroda*, *Dewa*, *Dunera*, *Franz Ferdinand*, *Glen Cluny*, *Gregory-Apcar*, *Ionian*, *Ismailia*, *Itonus*, *Itria*, *Laomedon*, *Locksley Hall*, *Mashobra*, *Neuralia*, *Ormara*, *Pundit*, *Rajput*, *Saturnia*, *Seang Bee*, *Seang Choon*, *Swada*, *Veturia*. Group "I" (9 ships): *City of Calcutta*, *Chanda*, *Glenlee*, *Islanda*, *Leicestershire*, *Onda*, *Sealda*, *Tara*, *Ujina*.

⁵ Less the *Franz Ferdinand*, which broke down before reaching Aden.

⁶ A 178.

59. **Precautions against Minelaying in Red Sea.**—On October 24, as this large convoy was approaching Aden, the Admiralty telegraphed to the Senior Naval Officer, Port Said, that continual reports showed that the Turks, instigated by the Germans, evidently intended to lay mines to prevent the passage of troops through the Canal. The Senior Naval Officer was directed to fit two destroyers with sweeps and to take up and fit similarly two tugs to sweep ahead of the transports from the entrance of the Gulf of Suez. Captain Borrett of the *Warrior*, who was Senior Naval Officer, considered that this was impracticable, as it would require no less than 10 days to pass the 39 ships¹ of the convoy from Shadwan Island (at the entrance to the Gulf of Suez) to Suez. Accordingly, the Admiralty sent orders that the Gulf should be patrolled similarly to the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba (Akaba), the principal direction from which danger might be expected, where the *Foxhound*, one of the four destroyers which on August 18 the Admiralty had ordered Admiral Troubridge to despatch to Port Said for the protection of the Canal, had been patrolling since October 23. If there was any suspicion of mines having been laid in the narrow parts of the Gulf sweeping was to be resorted to, but it was very undesirable to delay the transports unless this was unavoidable.² In consequence of these orders, on October 25 Captain Borrett ordered the *Racoon* and *Basilisk* down from Port Said to patrol the Gulf of Suez, and on the following day the Admiralty telegraphed to the Vice-Admiral at the Dardanelles to send two destroyers at once to Port Said, for two destroyers were required to be stationed at Aqaba to keep in W/T touch with Suez, communication by land being impossible.³ Admiral Carden despatched the *Savage* and *Scourge*, which arrived at Port Said on October 29 and sailed at once for Aqaba.

On September 27 and 28 several steamers bound up the Dardanelles were turned back from Cape Helles by the Turkish authorities and informed that the Straits were permanently blocked. From October 1 all colliers bound up the Dardanelles and coal likely to reach the German ships was stopped. Relations with Turkey were very strained, and on October 28 the Admiralty sent orders that four Turkish gunboats which were said to have left Alexandretta for the Red Sea were to be stopped outside the three-mile limit at Port Said, and were not to be allowed to enter the Canal, for there were reports that German officers and mines were being sent south by rail to meet them.⁴ During September the Turks had been withdrawing their gunboats from the Red Sea to Constantinople, Captain Sowerby being warned to place no hindrance in the way of their entering the Dardanelles, in order to avoid any action likely further to strain the situation.⁵

¹ The *Franz Ferdinand* had broken down and quitted the convoy off the Khorya Morya Islands. She reached Marseilles on November 17.

² A 194, 195, 196.

⁴ A 199, 200.

³ A 197, 198.

⁵ A 153.

60. **Arrival of the First Australasian Contingent.**—The sixth Indian convoy of troops for the defence of Egypt and for Marseilles, pending whose arrival the Home Counties Territorial Division was being detained in Egypt, left India on November 2 and 3.¹ A term had at length been set to Great Britain's forbearance, and hostilities had been commenced against Turkey on October 31. The convoy reached Suez on November 16 escorted by the *Swiftsure*, *Duke of Edinburgh* and *Northbrook*, having carried out on the way the reduction of the fort at Sheikh Sa'id on the Arabian coast opposite Perim, which was garrisoned by Turkish troops.² Seven ships³ of the convoy were sent on to Marseilles on November 18, escorted by the *Duke of Edinburgh* which was returning to England, and the remainder left independently a few days later. The 9th Indian Brigade, which had formed part of the first echelon of Force "A" and had been detained in Egypt since September 9, sailed from Egypt for Marseilles on November 23.⁴ The Home Counties Territorial Division left Suez for India on November 18, escorted by the *Minerva*, the delay of two days being occasioned by the necessity of waiting until the *Minerva*, which was the Senior Naval Officer's ship at Port Said, was relieved by the *Swiftsure*.⁵

The Australian and New Zealand contingents, 30,000 men, left Colombo on November 17 in 37 transports,⁶ escorted by the *Hampshire* and the Japanese cruiser *Ibuki*. From Aden they were taken on up the Red Sea by the *Hampshire* alone, and the main body arrived at Suez on December 1, the *Orviato* and *Maunganui* with the headquarters staffs having gone on ahead so as to arrive on the previous day. It was difficult to find accommodation for these troops in England while completing their training, and on November 21 orders were sent to disembark them in Egypt.⁷ Accordingly, the transports went on through the Canal, and the troops disembarked at Alexandria

¹ Group "O" from Bombay on November 2, 27 ships: *Akbar*, *Amiral Olry* (French), *Atlantian*, *Bandra*, *Barala*, *Begum*, *Castalia*, *Circassia*, *City of Glasgow*, *Craftsman*, *Elysia*, *Fultala*, *Glenetive*, *Gloucester Castle*, *Itaura*, *Itinda*, *Itola*, *Magellan* (French), *Mongara*, *Monteagle*, *Norseman*, *Polynésien* (French), *Sardinia*, *Ula*, *Umballa*, *Upada*, *Worcestershire*. Group "P" from Karachi on November 3, 10 ships: *City of Manchester*, *City of Nagpur*, *Edavanha*, *Ellenga*, *Freienfels*, *Mulah*, *Nurani*, *Sutlej*, *Takada*, *Teesta*.

² For description of this action see section 65.

³ *City of Glasgow*, *City of Nagpur*, *Atlantian*, *Norseman*, *Itinda*, *Itaura*, *Fultala*.

⁴ Transports *Takada*, *Sardinia*, *Freienfels*, *Monteagle*, *City of Manchester*.

⁵ A 231, 232, 236, 239.

⁶ *Afric*, *Anglo-Egyptian*, *Argyllshire*, *Armada*, *Benalla*, *Clan MacCorquodale*, *Euripides*, *Geelong*, *Hovorata*, *Hymettas*, *Karoo*, *Katuna*, *Marere*, *Miltiades*, *Omrak*, *Orviato*, *Pera*, *Port Lincoln*, *Rangatira*, *Saldanha*, *Shropshire*, *Southern*, *Star of England*, *Star of Victoria*, *Suffolk*, *Wiltshire*, *Ascanius*, *Medic* with Australian Contingent. *Manganui*, *Orari*, *Star of India*, *Limerick*, *Tahiti*, *Arawa*, *Athenic*, *Hawke's Bay*, *Ruapehu*, *Waimana* with New Zealand Contingent. One transport must have quitted the convoy before reaching Colombo for 37 only arrived at Colombo; its name has not been ascertained.

⁷ H.S. 2, p. 252, and W.O. Archives, 121/Overseas/161, 25.11.14.

to assist in the defence of Egypt and to complete their training, after which they would go direct to the front.¹

On December 2-3 the seventh Indian convoy of 33 transports² containing British troops for the United Kingdom, Indian troops for Marseilles, and troops for the defence of Egypt, arrived at Suez escorted by the *Northbrook*. The convoy had left India in the two customary groups on November 19 and 20. The 28th Indian Infantry Brigade disembarked for the defence of Egypt, and the French cruiser *Foudre* took the remainder of the convoy on to Malta on December 7.

During the two months since the issue of the Convoy Programme many events had taken place. The chief problem of the Eastern Mediterranean, from being one of escorting transports, now became that of the defence of Egypt against Turkish invasion.

CHAPTER VI.

TURKEY ENTERS THE WAR—ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DEFENCE OF EGYPT.

61. Hostilities commenced against Turkey, October 31.—Throughout October, Turkey, who had delivered herself completely into the hands of Germany, continued her preparations for war. On October 29, under German direction, Turkish warships with the *Goeben* and *Breslau* bombarded Odessa, Sevastopol, and Theodosia; on the following day the Entente Ambassadors at Constantinople demanded their passports, British ships were advised not to visit Turkish ports any longer, and Great Britain presented an ultimatum to Turkey to dismiss from her service all German officers; failing compliance within 12 hours hostilities would be commenced.³ The gunboat *Hussar*, which had been guarding the important cable centre at Syra since September 27, when she relieved of this duty a destroyer detached from the Dardanelles, was ordered on October 31 to proceed at once to Dedeagatch to embark the British Ambassador,⁴ and during the afternoon of that day, the ultimatum not having been complied with, orders were sent to the Senior Naval Officers in the Mediterranean to commence hostilities at once against Turkey.⁵

¹ Tel. Col. Office to Australasian Governors, 20.11.14.

² Group "Q" from Bombay, November 19, 25 ships: *Alnwick Castle*, *Assaye*, *Bankura*, *Braemar Castle*, *City of Birmingham*, *City of Exeter*, *City of Lahore*, *City of Poona*, *Craftsman*, *Dunluce Castle*, *Euryalus*, *Gloucester Castle*, *Havildar*, *Huntsman*, *Ingoma*, *Kelvingrove*, *Kenilworth Castle*, *Malda*, *Manora*, *Rajah*, *Ranee*, *Risaldar*, *Tactician*, *Ultonia*, *Urlana*, *Sumatra* (for Mombasa). Group "R" from Karachi, November 20, 7 ships: *Arankola*, *Baroda*, *Barpeta*, *Coconada*, *Devanha*, *Galeka*, *Nevasa*.

³ A 202, 205.

⁴ A 166, 208.

⁵ A 210.

Immediately the defence of Egypt¹ and the Suez Canal² assumed great importance. The vital importance to Great Britain of the security of the Canal does not need to be emphasised. The internal situation in Egypt was not without its dangers. To the discontent due to taxation and difficulties over the disposal of the cotton crop, for which there were no buyers, was added the demoralising effect of German intrigue.³

For weeks all the signs had pointed to the fact that Turkey contemplated the invasion of Egypt.⁴ On October 29 it was reported that the Mosul Army Corps had arrived at Aleppo, on the road to Egypt, and a division of the 8th Corps had left home for the Egyptian frontier⁵; and there were various reports of the preparations which Turkey was making for an Egyptian campaign. It was said that she would make her principal effort here rather than against Russia.⁶

There were three routes of advance open to the Turks for an expedition against the Suez Canal: (a) along the Syrian coast, (b) the centre route via Nablus and Beersheba, (c) via the Hedjaz railway to Maan, and thence across the Sinai Peninsula. Between the railway and the coast runs the backbone of the Lebanon and Palestine mountains. Branches of the

¹ Egypt was a vassal state of Turkey in military occupation by and under the control of Great Britain.

² The status of the Suez Canal had been fixed by the Convention of Constantinople, October 29, 1888, to which Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Spain, Russia, and Turkey were signatories. The Convention comprised 17 articles, the gist of the more important ones being as follows:—

The Canal is open in time of peace as well as war to merchantmen and men-of-war of all nations. No attempt is to be made to restrict this free use either in peace or war. The Canal is not to be blockaded (Art. I). In time of war, even if Turkey is a belligerent, no act of hostility is allowed either inside the Canal itself or within 3 miles from its ports. Men-of-war of the belligerents are to pass through the Canal without delaying. They are not to stay longer than 24 hours, except in case of absolute necessity, in Port Said or Suez harbours, and 24 hours must intervene between the departure from these harbours of a belligerent man-of-war and an enemy vessel. Troops, munitions, and other war material may neither be shipped nor unshipped within the Canal and its harbours. All rules regarding the men-of-war of belligerents are likewise valid for their prizes (Arts. 4, 5, 6). No men-of-war are allowed to be stationed inside the Canal, but each Power may station two in the harbours of Port Said and Suez. Belligerents, however, are not allowed to station men-of-war in these harbours (Art. 7). No permanent fortifications are allowed in the Canal (Art. 2) (L. Oppenheim, "International Law," Vol. I, London, 1920).

³ Sir J. Maxwell to Lord Kitchener, 24.10.14.

⁴ General Liman von Sanders states ("Fünf Jahre Türkei," pp. 37-8) that during the latter part of August Enver held a council of war with his General Staff and the principal German officials and officers in Turkey, to discuss whether, in the event of Turkey going to war, an expedition against the Suez Canal was recommended. All were in favour of it except von Sanders himself, who advised a landing between Odessa and Akkerman after the destruction of the Russian Black Sea fleet, which should be easily accomplished with the aid of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*. On October 10 the German Naval Staff drew up a memorandum in which one of the lines of policy was an attempt to persuade Turkey to declare war against Russia and to undertake an expedition against Egypt with the design to close the Suez Canal.

⁵ Sir F. Elliott (Athens) to Sir E. Grey.

⁶ Sir G. Buchanan to Foreign Office, 599, 3.11.14.

railway run to Beirut and Haifa, and there was communication by road between Beisan on the Haifa branch of the railway, along the Jordan and via Jerusalem to Gaza. The coast road was within range of the guns of warships operating off the coast.

The defence of the Suez Canal was not without factors advantageous to us. Holding the command of the sea we could reinforce Egypt from India, the Colonies, or the United Kingdom; the railways along the Canal would enable troops to be rushed to threatened points; and warships could co-operate in the defence with their heavy guns. The outbreak of hostilities with Turkey rendered it now possible to take steps for the protection of the Canal, such as putting patrols into Sinai and supporting our posts in the peninsula, which had not been feasible at a time when it was necessary to avoid any act which might have been construed as provocative.

On November 5 Great Britain and France declared war against Turkey,¹ Cyprus was formally annexed, martial law was proclaimed in Egypt; and the G.O.C. was entitled to take such measures in the Suez Canal or in the Ports of Access as might be necessary to protect it against Turkish attack.²

62. Measures to Safeguard the Canal.³—The Admiralty detailed stringent measures to be taken to prevent the entry of ships which intended mischief in the Canal, such as sinking themselves in order to block the channel, and to prevent a similar occurrence through mines or attack by the enemy.⁴ All ships were to be examined at Port Said or Suez, and they were to be accompanied through the Canal by an armed guard with orders to shoot the captain if any attempt was made to wreck the ship. Pilots were to be watched continuously while carrying out their duties. The Canal between Port Said and Kantara, and from Miles 77 to Port Tewfik⁵, where the banks were low, was to be patrolled by the Company's tugs, armed with light guns; and at points where the banks commanded the waterway mobile military detachments were stationed in order to prevent attempts to snipe ships as they passed. No craft were allowed to secure to the eastern bank in any part of the Canal. No crossings by ferry were allowed at night, and no boat traffic was permitted on the lakes, other than the Canal Company's craft. The caravan routes were to be patrolled by the Camel Corps, and the Canal itself was to be patrolled by torpedo boats. Six of the latter shortly became available, for on November 1 the Admiralty approved a suggestion by Admiral Limpus at Malta that the Malta local defence torpedo boats should be

¹ "Whereas owing to hostile acts committed by Turkish forces under German officers a state of war exists between us and the Sultan of Turkey." Russia declared war on Turkey November 2, 1914.

² F.O. to Mr. Cheetham, Cairo, 327, 5.11.14.

³ Papers titled S^a. 357/1915, and H.S. 97, pp. 51-4.

⁴ H.S. 97, pp. 51-2.

⁵ See Plan IV.

detached to the Suez Canal for defence purposes, thus relieving some of the destroyers for other duties. The French Commander-in-Chief had detailed six submarines for local defence at Malta on September 9.¹

The ships available to co-operate in the defence of Egypt comprised the *Warrior* (Senior Officer), which on September 27 the Admiralty had ordered to proceed to Port Said to consult with the G.O.C., Egypt, as to the measures to be taken for the defence of the country.² With her at Port Said was the *Black Prince*, ordered by the Admiralty on October 19 to remain in company³; and the two French battleships *Saint Louis* and *Charlemagne*, which were engaged on escort duty between Port Said and Malta, were requested to co-operate. The destroyers, now six in number,⁴ were employed as necessary in the Canal and Red Sea.

63. Institution of the Egyptian Station, November 3.—The *Minerva* arrived at Suez on the morning of October 30. She was required at Aqaba, where the *Savage* and *Scourge* were awaiting her arrival before taking action. The Admiralty ordered her to proceed with despatch after coaling.⁵ She was 800 tons short. Commencing at 9.45 a.m. on 30th with native labour, she did not finish coaling until 3.15 p.m. next day; and she left at 6 p.m. for Aqaba. Her orders were telegraphed by the Admiralty on November 1. On arrival at Aqaba she was to bombard and demolish the fort which was reported to be held by 60 men, including some Germans, and all military storehouses, inflicting the greatest possible damage on the Turks without wasting ammunition. This she accomplished without suffering any casualties on November 2, and the Turks evacuated the place. For the rest, her principal duty was to prevent Turkish forces from advancing on Egypt from Aqaba.⁶ The Mediterranean coast road from El Arish was to be commanded by the *Warrior*, whom the Admiralty on November 1 ordered to proceed off that place and prevent by her gun-fire the advance of the Turkish troops; and the *Black Prince* was sent to Alexandria to watch and protect British interests,⁷ where she arrived on November 3. On this day a new command was instituted; the *Warrior* had returned to Port Said and Captain Borrett was appointed Senior Naval Officer of the Egyptian station, including the Gulf of Aqaba. Under his orders the Admiralty placed the *Black Prince*, *Minerva*, six destroyers, six T.B.s from Malta, and the *Proserpine*, which was ordered up from Gibraltar on November 9 without waiting for the arrival of the *Pelorus*, her sister ship, of Cruiser Force "E," which was then on the way out to relieve her.⁸

¹ A 211. The T.B.s were 043, 044, 046, 063, 064, 070. They arrived in Egypt during November, 1914.

² A 176.

³ A 193.

⁴ *Savage*, *Scourge*, *Foxhound*, *Mosquito*, *Raccoon* and *Basilisk*.

⁵ A 204.

⁶ A 212.

⁷ A 213.

⁸ A 215, 227.

The *Proserpine* and the destroyer *Wear* were the only vessels larger than the torpedo boats of the local defence on the Gibraltar Straits Patrol, and were invaluable during these winter months when the torpedo boats were at times unable to keep the sea. The patrol examined about 1,000 ships a month, and on November 10 Admiral Brock urged that two more destroyers should be sent him.¹ Eventually (in January, 1915) the vessels *York*, *Richard Welford* and *Grangemouth* were taken up, fitted as armed boarding steamers, and added to the patrol.

But this disposition of the ships on the Egyptian station was of short duration, for the *Black Prince* and *Warrior* were required at home, where the Admiralty were recalling from foreign waters such armoured cruisers as could best be spared, to take the place of the two battle cruisers which, consequent upon the battle of Coronel, were being sent to South America to destroy von Spee's squadron. They were ordered to be withdrawn on November 6,² and by arrangement with the French, pending the arrival of other British ships, their places were to be taken up by the old cruiser *Amiral Charner*³ and the battleship *Bouvet*, for which latter, however, the *Requin*⁴ was afterwards substituted, the *Bouvet* being kept back to cruise off Barcelona, where several enemy ships loaded with mines were reported. At the same time a request was preferred to the French Ministry of Marine for three armoured cruisers to assist in the work of hunting for the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, in which case the Admiralty offered to place the *Black Prince* and *Warrior* under the orders of a French Admiral if one should be sent in command of the armoured cruisers. The offer of such a squadron had already, some weeks before this date, been advised by the Etat-Major Général, but in vain; and the Admiralty's request for a squadron of three armoured cruisers was also refused by the Minister of Marine.⁵

On the departure of the *Black Prince* and *Warrior* the Admiralty ordered Captain Percival H. Warleigh, of the *Minerva*, to carry out the duties of Senior Naval Officer, Egypt.⁶ They lost no time in despatching substitutes for the ships which had been withdrawn, for on November 7 they ordered the Rear-Admiral Commanding, 11th Cruiser Squadron (Cruiser Force "E"), to despatch the *Doris* to Gibraltar to coal and proceed to Alexandria⁷; and at 2.30 a.m. (G.M.T.) on 11th on receipt by the Admiralty of a serious report on the situation in Egypt, where there was for the time being a shortage of troops, the

¹ M. 03788/14.

² A 219-221.

³ 4,702 tons, built 1899, 2—7·6 in., 6—5·5 in., 4—9 pdr., 4—3 pdr.

⁴ French guardship at Bizerta.

⁵ It is significant that early in the following month Vice-Admiral Pivet quitted his appointment as Chef d'Etat-Major Général as the result of a rupture with the Minister of Marine (M. 04698/14).

⁶ A 223.

⁷ A 224a.

Swiftsure, then on the way to Suez with the sixth Indian convoy, was ordered to leave the convoy and push on with despatch to Suez; for the present she was to remain in Egypt,¹ where she would be Senior Officer's ship. The ships available for convoy duty were to be still further reduced, for the *Duke of Edinburgh* was to be withdrawn from the Red Sea for Home Waters.² The *Emden* was at this time the only enemy cruiser known to be within striking distance of the Indian convoys, and she had been located and was being searched for by numerous cruisers.

64. British Policy in the Red Sea.—The main artery of British trade with the East and the transport route from India and Australia passed through the Red Sea, approaching closely at a number of points the coast of Arabia with its Turkish ports and garrisons.

On November 2 the Admiralty sent orders to the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, that the *Minto*, which Admiral Peirse had placed at the disposal of the Political Resident at Aden at the end of September, was to proceed up the Red Sea to destroy every Turkish steamer she could find, in order to prevent raids and minelaying by the latter, after which she was to deal with the dhows, sinking the Turkish dhows and collecting the Arab vessels into suitable harbours where they could be detained.³ The *Minto* left Aden on 3rd and proceeded first to Mocha. Finding no Turkish shipping there she went on to Hodeida, where she arrived at sunset on November 4 and immediately sent away an armed boat's crew to cut out a large Turkish dhow.

It was difficult to distinguish between Turkish and Arab dhows, for the latter frequently flew the Turkish flag. It was, however, of the utmost importance to avoid irritating the Arabs, for the policy of H.M. Government was to encourage the Pan-Arab movement and assist the Arabs to realise their plans for obtaining autonomy and throwing off the Turkish yoke. Certain Arab Shaikhs were already inclined to side with us against the Turks, and it was important to keep on friendly terms with them. Warned by the Resident at Aden of the service upon which the *Minto* had been despatched, the India Office represented to the Admiralty that the instructions they had given to Admiral Peirse were imperilling the policy of the Government, of conciliating Moslem sentiment and securing the support of the Arabs; and they asked that the Resident at Aden, who was in charge of the negotiations with the Arab Shaikhs, might be consulted before any measures were taken against shipping in the Red Sea.⁴ But the Admiralty had already realised that the effect of their orders

¹ A 231, 232.

² A 221.

³ A 214.

⁴ M. 03282/14. On the outbreak of war with Turkey the Governments of India, France, and Russia published proclamations that the Holy Places of Arabia, including the port of Jidda, would be immune from attack so long as there was no interference with pilgrims from India.

for the *Minto* was inconsistent with their policy of refraining from action against the Red Sea ports¹ and had cancelled them,² acquainting the Senior Naval Officer, Egypt, at the same time of the importance of keeping on friendly terms with the Arab Shaikhs.³

65. **Action at Sheikh Sa'id, November 10.**⁴—One of the points where the trade and transport routes closely approached the hostile coast was at the southern entrance to the Red Sea. On the Arabian coast, opposite Perim, close to the boundary line between Turkish territory and the Aden Protectorate, was the little bay of Sheikh Sa'id, defended by Fort Turba, on the rocky heights to the eastward of Cape Bab-el-Mandeb and held by a garrison of Turkish troops. There was telegraphic communication with Perim and the interior, and the peninsula occupied an important strategic position, though it contained no harbour capable of sheltering any but the very smallest vessels. From its position it was a menace to our station at Perim and to our trade which at this narrow strait must pass within a few miles of it. The Government of India had received persistent rumours of the despatch thither of Turkish reinforcements and guns, and in order to prevent the bombardment of the British telegraph station on Perim Island they wished to destroy the Turkish works, armament and wells at Sheikh Sa'id. The passage of the 6th Indian convoy with its powerful naval escort prompted the Government of India to ask Admiral Peirse for naval assistance in reducing the place. Without waiting for the concurrence of the Admiralty the Admiral acceded to the request, and allotted the task to the *Duke of Edinburgh*.

The Sheikh Sa'id peninsula consists of a group of rocky heights joined to the mainland by a low sandy plain, the greater part of which is covered at high water by a shallow lagoon.⁵ The guns of the fort commanded the isthmus connecting the peninsula with the mainland.

The operations were under the command of Brigadier-General H. V. Cox, C.B., C.S.I., with the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade in the transports *Edavana*, *City of Manchester* and *Nurani*. At daybreak on November 10 the *Duke of Edinburgh* disabled Turba Fort by gun-fire at a range of 4,000 to 5,000 yards, and under cover of fire, which she opened at 9.15 a.m., the landing of troops commenced at 10 a.m.⁶ in face of opposition by artillery and infantry well concealed in the hills. After

¹ M.02919/14.

² A 217. As there was no means of communicating with the *Minto* a vessel had to be sent out from Aden to find her. It was not till November 9 that the *Minto* received her revised orders.

³ A 216.

⁴ M.04989 and India Office M.6644.

⁵ See Plan III.

⁶ *Duke of Edinburgh's* Report, Gen. Cox's despatch says 10.25 a.m.



a battalion and a half had been landed, the enemy's positions were attacked, and as soon as the hills commanding Manhali were occupied, about 2.30 p.m., the enemy's opposition weakened. Owing to the wind and surf setting on the beach the landing had to be carried out on the north-west side of the peninsula instead of on the eastern side,¹ which was the original scheme, and promised the better chance of decisive results. Great difficulty was experienced in getting the troops ashore on the beach fringed by a reef of rocks. The men were inexperienced, and the transports' boats leaked so badly that their use had to be abandoned and reliance finally placed on the *Duke of Edinburgh's* boats, which worked all night assisted by three tugs. It took 19½ hours to land 3,000 men. Half the garrison of 400 men escaped by the isthmus and in boats, the remainder being killed, wounded or captured. The troops occupied the forts and captured six field guns. Next day the *Duke of Edinburgh* landed a demolition party under Lieutenant E. G. Morris, who destroyed the fort, guns,² rifles and ammunition. The force then re-embarked and proceeded, permanent occupation at the time being considered unnecessary after the means of offence of the place had been rendered useless. The casualties amongst the troops amounted to 20 officers and men. There were no naval casualties.

In addition to the action which he had initiated at Sheikh Sa'id, the Viceroy of India was in favour of asserting the British claim to three of the Farsan Islands, near Hodeida, which were of importance as a potential coaling station, and owing to the possible existence of oil in the neighbourhood; and he wished the ships to land parties and hoist the British flag over the islands. In this the Foreign Office concurred, and also in the proposal of the India Office for the blockade of Hodeida in order to cut off Turkish food supplies.³ The Admiralty, however, took swift steps to ensure that no further action which ran counter to their policy would be carried out without their knowledge, for on November 12 they instructed the Senior Naval Officers at Aden and Port Said that no vessel was to engage in an attack on any Turkish port in the Red Sea without orders,⁴ and four days later Admiral Peirse was warned that he was not authorised to direct any operations in the Red Sea; these operations would be directed by the Senior Naval Officer, Egypt.⁵

66. Admiral Peirse ordered to Egypt.—The situation in the Red Sea was not altogether simple to deal with. The exercise of a little initiative on the part of the Turks would enable them

¹ Gen. Cox's despatch says the "south-western coast," but plan in *Duke of Edinburgh's* report shows the landing place as originally proposed to have been on the eastern side of the peninsula. See Plan III.

² Two bronze Krupp B.L. 15 cm. and two old Krupp field guns. They were all more or less damaged by the *Duke of Edinburgh's* fire.

³ M.03564/14.

⁴ A 235.

⁵ A 238.

to drop floating mines in the narrow passages of the Red Sea; and we had various isolated garrisons, as at Port Sudan and Suakin, which must be protected against raids. On November 10 the Senior Naval Officer, Egypt, despatched the *Foxhound* and *Mosquito* to operate from Port Sudan. It was desirable to prevent supplies from reaching the Turkish garrisons by sea, but equally desirable that the coastal trade of the Arabs should not be interfered with.¹ At Jidda there were several thousand pilgrims from India who were visiting the holy places, and policy required that they should receive supplies while in Arabia and be eventually conveyed safely home to India, which latter operation was completed by November 28. The situation required to be examined and handled carefully with regard to the religious and political sentiments of the Arabs; and the Admiralty decided to despatch a Flag Officer to take charge of the Egyptian Station. For several reasons the choice fell upon Admiral Peirse.

Admiral Peirse's duties as Commander-in-Chief of the East Indies had gradually been lightened by the appointment of Senior Naval Officers in Egypt, the Persian Gulf, and East Africa, and the transfer of the Bay of Bengal to the Commander-in-Chief, China,² himself stationed at Singapore. Most of Admiral Peirse's ships had been ordered to other stations, escorts for the transports in the Indian Ocean were no longer necessary, and there remained little for the Commander-in-Chief to do. On the other hand, operations in Egypt were assuming considerable importance. On November 16 the Admiralty telegraphed to Admiral Peirse to take charge of naval operations in Egypt as soon as possible, proceeding from Bombay by the quickest route and hoisting his flag in the *Swiftsure*. In concert with the General Officer Commanding he was also to conduct all naval operations in the Red Sea, his orders, as also those of the General Officer Commanding, being transmitted to him by the British Government, which would consult the Government of India before any important step was taken in the Red Sea, having especial regard to anything which might affect Moslem sentiment in India. The Government of India would, as at present, remain primarily responsible east of Strait Bab-el-Mandeb. The Admiralty wished Admiral Peirse to retain command of the East Indies Station while employed in Egypt, and he anticipated no difficulty with regard to those duties, which at this date comprised little more than the control of the convoys through the Red Sea.³

67. Naval Arrangements for the Defence of the Canal.— Every available ship was now required from the East for Egypt, the Dardanelles, and the Syrian coast to operate against the

¹ A 216.

² Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas H. M. Jerram, K.C.B.

³ A 240, 242, 244, and M.03770/14. (See M Letter Book, 277/92.)

Turks.¹ The *Swiftsure* arrived at Port Said at 2.30 a.m. on November 17 and relieved the *Minerva*, who then left for Aden with the Home Counties Territorial Division, after which she was to return to Egypt. The *Doris* had arrived at Malta from England on November 16, and left for Egypt two days later, arriving at Alexandria on 21st.² The *Proserpine* left Malta for Port Said on November 16, and the *Philomel* left Singapore for Egypt on the same day, convoying three French transports. On November 18 the Russian Government was asked to send the cruiser *Askold*,³ which had been placed at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief, China, shortly after the outbreak of war, to operate against the Turks on the Syrian coast, and she arrived at Aden on December 1. Wireless communication between Egypt and Sevastopol was carried out from the Imperial Chain Station at Abu Zabal, near Cairo, which had just been completed.⁴ The Admiralty on November 19 informed the French that, in order to provide against the possible attack of Egypt by Turkey, against risings in the country which the Turks were reported to be organising, and against massacres of the Christian population of the Ottoman Empire, they considered it necessary to concentrate an important naval force in the Levant. The *Dupleix* or her successor, which was no longer required for escort duty in the Indian Ocean, would be detached to Egypt, and the French Admiralty were asked to allow the armoured cruiser *Montcalm*⁵ to proceed to Egypt on completion of the mission to Tahiti, on which she was engaged, for the Japanese had now placed at the disposal of the Admiralty in the Pacific a considerable number of ships, and the *Montcalm* was consequently not required for the duty of escorting the New Zealand convoy for which she had been earmarked.⁶

On November 17 they ordered the Commander-in-Chief, China, to send all his River class destroyers, of which he had seven,⁷ to Egypt.⁸ They were required to take the place of the more modern boats in Egypt, for more destroyers were urgently required in Home waters, and Admiral Carden at the Dardanelles had been ordered to send home eight of his boats, to replace which he was to recall the six destroyers which had been sent to Egypt.⁹ The *Racoon*, *Basilisk*, *Savage*, and *Scourge* left Port Said for Tenedos on the afternoon of November 19, and the *Foxhound* and *Mosquito* two days later. To work the Red Sea convoys in conjunction with the Royal Indian

¹ A 250.

² *Doris*' log for this period is not forthcoming. *Swiftsure*'s log states *Doris* arrived at Port Said 6.30 a.m. on November 25.

³ *Askold*, 5,905 tons, 23.4 knots, 12—6 in.

⁴ Abu Zabal W/T station was operated by the G.P.O. under the control of the G.O.C., Egypt.

⁵ *Montcalm*, 9,177 tons, 21 knots, 2—7.6 in., 8—6.5 in.

⁶ A 248.

⁷ *Colne*, *Jed*, *Chelmer*, *Welland*, *Kennet*, *Ribble*, *Usk*.

⁸ A 243.

⁹ A 245.

Marine ships the Commander-in-Chief, China, was told that his armed *Empress* liners, of which he had three, namely, the *Empress of Russia*, *Empress of Asia*, *Empress of Japan*, and the P. and O. *Himalaya*, were needed; for, with the *Königsberg* blockaded and the *Emden* destroyed, our ships in the Indian Ocean could more profitably be employed elsewhere; and the requirements of the China Station were to be met by the Japanese.¹

The Admiralty also intended that the *Ocean* should proceed to Egypt as soon as she could be spared from the Persian Gulf, where she had been employed in connection with the combined operations up the Shatt-al-'Arab²; but she would not be available until the middle of December.

In view of the possibility that the ships co-operating in the defence of the Canal might have to engage Turkish troops, the Senior Naval Officer was ordered to extemporise fighting tops in which to mount light guns. The Admiralty ordered him to give consideration to methods for directing the laying of the heavy guns from aloft, so that they could be used to fire over the Canal banks. The Canal authorities were to be asked to allow tugs, launches, and other suitable vessels to be armed; guns could be obtained from Malta, but the guns' crews would have to be supplied from the warships in Egyptian waters,³ though a few officers and ratings were obtained from the transports bringing the first Australasian Contingent, which arrived at Suez on December 1.

Reports were coming in of the progress of the Turkish advance against the Canal. On November 18 our Ambassador at Petrograd reported to the Foreign Office that the Russian General Staff had received information that the Turkish Expeditionary Force concentrated in Palestine and Northern Arabia for operations against the Suez Canal had already crossed the Egyptian frontier and was hurrying westward on the Mediterranean coast road, and on the following day the Senior Naval Officer, Egypt, telegraphed that reports were received of Turkish troops occupying El Arish, and of a mixed force of Turks and Bedouins occupying a post 50 miles west of that place.⁴ The Admiralty sent orders that these forces were to be bombarded if the General Officer Commanding desired it, and the *Proserpine*, which arrived at Port Said on the afternoon of 19th, left on the same evening, after coaling, for El Arish, to make a reconnaissance. They also detailed arrangements to be made in order to enable the *Minerva*, in the Red Sea, to quit her convoy and return to Suez.⁵ The *Goeben* was reported to have been seriously disabled in action with the Russian Black Sea fleet on November 18, and the battleship

escorts for transports were no longer necessary. On November 22 the French ordered the old cruiser *Desaix*,¹ and later the coast defence vessel *Requin*, to Suez, to place themselves under the orders of the Senior Naval Officer, Egypt. The *Dupleix* was leaving shortly for France, and the two French battleships *Saint Louis* and *Charlemagne* would not be available for the defence of the Canal, as they were being sent by the French to the Dardanelles to replace the *Indomitable*, which the Admiralty on November 21 ordered to be sent to Malta to carry out her overdue refit on receipt of the news that the *Goeben* had been damaged in action with the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and the withdrawal of the *Indomitable* left only the *Indefatigable* and *Dublin* to watch the Dardanelles. The Admiralty at first intended to withdraw the *Indefatigable* also, and to hand over to the French the blockade of the Dardanelles; but the arrangement was altered on the representations of the French Ministry of Marine that the step should be delayed until it was certain to what extent the *Goeben* was damaged,² though battleship escorts for the transports were now dispensed with.

68. Military Defensive Measures.—On November 25 the Turkish advanced troops were apparently at Katia, 25 miles east of El Kantara, where they had a post. There had been a small affair of outposts between the enemy and the Bikanir Camel Corps. Hostile forces were also reported to be assembling at Aqaba, and the *Minerva*, which returned to Suez during the night of November 25–26, left on the 28th to investigate. On 30th the G.O.C. reported that the Canal defences were satisfactory.³ The Canal had been cut at Port Said and the country eastward inundated to near Kantara. Port Said was now safe from any attack, but there were no signs of the enemy. The line of the Suez Canal had been adopted for the defence of the country,⁴ and the defences were under Major-General Alexander Wilson, C.B., with three Indian brigades, the 28th (Major-General Sir George Younghusband, K.C.I.E., C.B.) at Ismailia, the 29th (Brigadier-General H. V. Cox, C.B., C.S.I.) at Kantara, and the 30th (Major-General C. I. Melliss, V.C., C.B.) at Suez, and there were several unbrigaded battalions in the country. The Australian and New Zealand contingents, 30,000 men, arrived at Suez on December 1 and released fully trained troops from garrison duty for active operations. The War Office considered they had sufficient troops in Egypt for all requirements.⁵

¹ Sister ship to *Dupleix*.

² A.255–258.

³ Tel. No. 338 E.

⁴ "Les Anglais," wrote Admiral Dartige du Fournet on viewing the scheme of defence, "ne défendent pas le canal; ils se font défendre par lui. N'ayant pas encore les moyens de s'établir solidement sur la rive Asie et au delà de la portée du canon, ils restent campés sur la rive Afrique; le canal leur sert de fossé." ("Souvenirs de Guerre d'un Amiral," p. 20.)

⁵ H.S. 97, p. 385.

¹ A 250, 253. ² See Monograph No. 15, "Mesopotamia, 1914–16" (C.B. 917B).

³ A 241.

⁴ A 251.

⁵ A 252.

CHAPTER VII.

THE FRENCH IN THE ADRIATIC.

69. **Blockade of the Straits of Otranto.**—The proposal made by the Admiralty on November 21 to the French, that they should undertake the blockade of the Dardanelles, was rendered reasonable through the quiescence of the Austrian fleet in the Adriatic, the blockade of which had constituted the duty of the French main fleet in the Mediterranean since the entry of Austria in the war. The Austrians had mined the Adriatic, and Italian torpedo boats were constantly picking up their mines. The Austrian fleet, over which Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère had an overwhelming numerical preponderance, consistently refused action and remained within the shelter of the islands and waterways of the Dalmatian archipelago, at the upper end of which the Austrians possessed the fine harbour of Pola, and at the lower end the protected anchorage of Cattaro.

The blockade of the Straits of Otranto was carried out by the 1st and 2nd Battle Squadrons, the 1st and 2nd Divisions of armoured cruisers, and destroyers. The French Commander-in-Chief was hampered through lack of a base in close proximity to the blockade line. The nearest French base was Bizerta, and although the British Admiralty had placed Malta and all its resources at his entire disposal, so that it became "a veritable branch of the Toulon dockyard,"¹ its distance from the blockade line was very great, and the French ships were forced to be continually at sea. It is true that opportunity was taken of coaling under the lee of the Greek islands, a procedure to which the Greek Government was benevolently blind, only requesting, when a protest was made by Austria, that the Allied ships should come a few at a time, use unfrequented spots, and refrain as far as possible from advertising their presence.² The Anglophile M. Venizelos was in power at this time, and on September 2, when Admiral Kondouriotis went on leave, Rear-Admiral Kerr, head of the British Mission, assumed command of the Greek fleet. The possibility of seizing one of the islands of the Dalmatian archipelago had been considered by the French; but no single island offered a sufficiently large anchorage. The best was Lissa, somewhat isolated from the remainder, and it was used for a time during September.³ But the supplying of such a base entailed the lower Adriatic being full of shipping exposed to Austrian submarines, which, working from Sebenico, could threaten the French communications with the island.

¹ René la Bruyère.

² M. 02197/14.

³ Positions of French ships, 19.9.14.

70. **French Patrols in the Western Mediterranean.**—A patrol was instituted between the north coast of Corsica and Italy to stop ships carrying German reservists from Barcelona to Genoa. It was maintained at first by the old battleships *Jauréguiberry* and *Bouvet* and the cruiser *Pothuau*, which were transferred to this duty from the patrol of the east coast of Spain early in September. Off Cape Bon was another patrol, maintained by the old battleships *Suffren*, *Saint Louis*, *Gaulois*, and *Charlemagne*.¹ On September 19 the British Admiralty asked the French to safeguard the transport convoys sailing between Port Said and Marseilles, followed next day by the request that two battleships might be sent to reinforce the Dardanelles squadron; and the patrols were broken up and the majority of the ships were detailed for these new duties.² Within a fortnight, however, the British Admiralty decided that escorts might be dispensed with in the Western Mediterranean, and the *Jauréguiberry* and *Bouvet* were withdrawn and took up the Genoa patrol once more. The patrol now seems to have been drawn closer to Genoa and an additional patrol of three torpedo boats instituted off the north of Corsica; and torpedo boats also took the place of the battleships on the Cape Bon patrol.³ One or more ships were also employed in watching the Straits of Messina.

A blockade of Cattaro was maintained by French submarines working from Malta. Leaving Malta they proceeded to the island of Paxos, close to Corfu, where they filled up with fuel. From here they proceeded to communicate with the vessels forming the line of blockade of the Adriatic, which was established between Otranto and the Albanian coast; and from thence the passage to Otranto was made, arriving during the night. After a day spent at Cattaro the return journey to Malta was commenced. The relative shortness of their stay, compared with the length of time occupied on passage, necessitated the employment of a comparatively large number of submarines.⁴ Eventually, a base for the submarines watching the Dalmatian coast, including Sebenico and Pola, was established in Plateali Bay⁵ (Plataea), the old battleship *Marceau* being used as parent ship, and the submarines were generally towed to the entrance of the Adriatic in order to save fuel and time and to spare the crews; but the use of such a base enabled the Austrians, by espionage, to learn the movements of the French boats. Three French submarines and three destroyers were working under Admiral Carden at the Dardanelles.

On December 23 the French submarine *Curie*⁶ attempted to follow an Austrian torpedo boat into Pola, and got caught in

¹ Positions of French ships, September 8 and 19, 1914.

² Positions of French ships, September 29, 1914.

³ Positions of French ships, October 30, 1914.

⁴ M. 03338/14.

⁵ 38° 28' N., 21° 6' E.

⁶ Lieut. O'Byrne.

the nets. After being entangled for 24 hours she came to the surface and was sunk by the fire of the Austrian batteries, her crew being taken prisoners. The *Curie* was afterwards salvaged and repaired by the Austrians and was taken into their service.

71. The Affair at Mt. Lovchen.—During August and September small French detachments were despatched to Montenegro, and after a prolonged bombardment of the Cattaro defences by French gunboats, which, however, proved ineffective, on September 14 a small detachment of artillery and bluejackets under Capitaine de Frégate Grellier landed at Antivari and occupied Mt. Lovchen, where they mounted four 6 in. and four 4 in. guns. The position was known as Kuk, on the Lovchen Mountain above Cetinje, where two Montenegrin mortar batteries had already been established; and it overhung the Bocche (Gulf) di Cattaro at a height of some 5,000 ft. On the right flank, 2,000 ft. lower, was the Montenegrin position of Krstac, near the road from Cattaro to Njesushi, the Montenegrin frontier village, where a mortar battery and three howitzers of about 6 in. calibre were placed.

The Austrian positions which it was proposed to attack lay roughly in a straight line from the base of the Lovchen along the mountain dividing the innermost arm of the Bocche from the Bay of Teodo, the middle basin of the Cattaro Gulf, where the Austrian naval station was established, and comprised a number of forts and batteries rising one above the other on the heights.

The precise object of the operation is not evident.¹ The French opened fire in the middle of October and at first attained some success. The casemates of the Austrian main fort at Vrmac, opposite the Krstac position, were repeatedly struck and some damage was done. But on October 21 and 22 the Austrians brought the battleship *Radetzky* into the Bocche, despite the French submarines watching the port, and opened a destructive fire on the Franco-Montenegrin positions. In the course of the 24th some half of the French guns were put out of action, and after severe loss had been incurred the batteries were abandoned.

The revictualling of Montenegro was carried out by convoys which were escorted by destroyers to Antivari and St. Giovanni di Medua. On 24th February the French destroyer *Dague*, escorting the steamship *Whitehead* to Antivari, was blown up by a mine in the roadstead, with the loss of 38 of her crew.

¹ It was possibly inspired by the King of Montenegro. Report by H.M. Minister at Cetinje, 1.11.14. M.03993/14.

72. Sweeps of the Adriatic by Heavy Ships Abandoned.—The danger from which heavy ships operating in narrow submarine infested waters were exposed remained unappreciated by the French during the first five months of the war; and periodic sweeps and patrols were carried out in the Adriatic by the fleet, which had now been augmented by the completion of the *Paris* and *France*. On November 3 the armoured cruiser *Waldeck Rousseau* was unsuccessfully attacked by an Austrian submarine off Cattaro; but it was not until December 21, when the *Jean Bart*, flagship of the Commander-in-Chief, was torpedoed in the Straits of Otranto, though fortunately without sustaining serious damage, that sweeps or patrols by the heavy ships in the Adriatic were abandoned.¹ The blockade was maintained from this time by the armoured cruisers organised in two independent divisions, each under a Rear-Admiral, and a flotilla of destroyers. Little use appears, however, to have been made of the light forces; and it was the evident opinion of the Admiralty that a more forward policy was needed, for on 27th the First Lord wrote to the Minister of Marine:—

“We are very much impressed with the great advantages to the general political situation in the south-east of Europe which would undoubtedly follow if a more pronounced offensive were found possible in the Adriatic.”²

But if the French ships found little active employment in the Adriatic they were kept busy in other parts of the Mediterranean, for the French had vessels working under Admiral Carden at the Dardanelles and on the Egyptian station, where Admiral Peirse had just taken over the command.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE ATTACK ON THE SUEZ CANAL.

73. Admiral Peirse assumes Command of the Egyptian Station, December 1.—Admiral Peirse arrived at Port Said on December 1 by P. and O. from India and hoisted his flag on board the *Swiftsure*. In the Red Sea a patrol had been instituted for the purpose of stopping supplies to the Turkish garrisons and ports, which latter, however, were of little commercial importance. Arrangements were being made to take over the Turkish lighthouses on the islands Teir, Zukur and Zebayir, in the southern portion of the Red Sea, which was carried out by the Egyptian vessel *Aida* assisted by the *Empress of Russia*,

¹ René la Bruyère.

² M. 010035/15.

the first of the Empress liners from China to arrive in Egypt. The *Desaix* on arrival on the station left for Hodeida to embark the British and French Consuls who had been arrested by the Turks, but she had no more success than attended the *Minto* which had been sent on a similar errand on November 15; and it was not until February, 1915, after representations by the Italian Government¹ and the despatch of an Italian warship to the port, that they were released. After carrying out these duties the *Empress of Russia* and *Desaix* were ordered to patrol the Red Sea to the southward and northward of Jidda respectively. Destroyers and other cruisers were to be added to the patrol as they became available.² Sheikh Sa'id had been re-occupied again by Turkish troops by December 5, on which day the *Minto's* cutter, which was inspecting dhows in the harbour, was fired upon and three native ratings were wounded. In consequence of this the *Philomel* was sent to Sheikh Sa'id temporarily on her way from Aden to Suez to refit on December 8; but our occupation of the place was postponed in accordance with the cautious and conciliatory policy towards the Arabs which the Government of India wished to pursue in the Red Sea.³ There was little danger to be apprehended from the Turkish occupation of Sheikh Sa'id, except from heavy guns in fixed defences, and it was not considered that such guns could be transported overland, while the naval patrols could prevent their importation by sea and also prevent any boat attack on Perim.⁴

In addition to the cruiser patrols, Admiral Peirse had instituted separate destroyer patrols based on Port Sudan for the protection of that place, Suakin, and the neighbouring coast.⁵ The objects of the various patrols were to stop supplies going to the Turkish garrisons and purely Turkish ports such as Hodeida, Moka, and Loheija; to prevent minelaying; to prevent troops or agents being sent across to Egypt or the Sudan coast; and to reassure and get in touch with the Arab Shaikhs in Arabia. But this was a duty which could be carried out by local armed vessels, and when Admiral Peirse informed the Admiralty of the patrol, they at once ordered him to send the destroyers from China to the Dardanelles when they arrived, in order to permit of the whole of the Mediterranean flotilla returning to England.⁶

¹ The British Vice-Consul was forcibly arrested in the Italian Consulate, the destruction of a dhow by the *Minto* being the ostensible reason; and the Italian Government took charge of our interests in the matter.

² C.-in-C., E.I., to Adty., 338, 9.12.14.

³ M.04237/14. "Occupation . . . might not only be misunderstood but might provoke attack by Arabs and stultify our whole policy of conciliation and efforts to secure Arab co-operation in this quarter." (Tel. 311 from Mr. Cheetham to F.O., December 7, 1914, forwarding views of Government of India.)

⁴ F.O. to Mr. Cheetham, 407, 9.12.14.

⁵ C.-in-C., E.I., to Adty., 338, 9.12.14.

⁶ A 265. The *Welland*, *Kennet*, *Jed*, *Colne* and *Chelmer* arrived at Suez on December 28 and were ordered to Malta for docking. The *Usk* and *Ribble* arrived at Port Said on January 11, 1915.

74. The Syrian Coast Patrol, November and December, 1914.

—During November frequent reconnaissances had been carried out by the warships of El Arish and the Mediterranean coast road along which it was expected that the Turkish advance through Syria would be made. The base of such an expedition would probably be Gaza, and the advance from Gaza could be commanded all the way by the warships' guns. The reconnaissances established that as yet there was no sign of a Turkish advance along this route. The Turks were much irritated by the destruction on November 1 in Vourla harbour by the *Wolverine* and *Scorpion*, two of Admiral Carden's destroyers, of the armed yacht *Beyrout*, believed to be a minelayer; and they threatened reprisals in the event of the bombardment of any open town on the Syrian or Asia Minor coasts. The position of Christian Allied subjects was not a happy one, but the United States, whose cruisers *North Carolina* and *Tennessee* were on the coast, were protecting non-combatants as far as possible.¹

On December 11 the Admiralty telegraphed to Admiral Peirse to consider the question of watching the Syrian ports, especially Alexandretta, Beirut, and Haifa, with the force at his disposal, at such times as the attack on the Canal was not imminent. The importance of Alexandretta lay in the fact that the railway here approached within range of the ships' guns, and could be cut. The stoppage of supplies to the Hedjaz railway might have considerable effect.² Of the vessels suitable for the work which were under Admiral Peirse's command at this time, the *Minerva* was at Aqaba carrying out a reconnaissance with the hydroplanes brought by the *Foudre* on November 30, and the *Philomel* and *Empress of Russia* were engaged on various duties in the Red Sea. The remaining three Empress liners from China had not yet arrived. Of the French ships, the *Amiral Charner* and *Dupleix* had left to rejoin the French Commander-in-Chief, the *Foudre* left on 7th with the Indian transports, the *Desaix* had gone to Hodeida, and the *Montcalm* would not join until after docking at Singapore.³ Admiral Peirse had already arranged for the *Askold*,⁴ which arrived at Port Said on December 8, to reconnoitre the Syrian coast as far as Beirut, and he now extended her reconnaissance to Alexandretta. The only other ship available was the *Doris*, at present engaged on a reconnaissance of El Arish.⁵

75. Mediterranean Escorts no longer necessary, December 26.

—Syria was only a part of the long Turkish Mediterranean coast which required to be watched. It was important to

¹ M. 03470/14.

² A 267.

³ Marine, Paris, to Adty, 216, 12.12.14.

⁴ Captain S. A. Ivanoff.

⁵ The *Proserpine* was not mentioned. She was lying at Port Said, and after being stationed at Alexandria for some time, she left Port Said on January 10 for Alexandretta.

prevent supplies from reaching the Turkish army through Dedeagatch and the Aegean ports from the Dardanelles to the Gulf of Kos; and on being satisfied by Admiral Peirse's telegram that he could watch the Syrian coast, but no more, the Admiralty asked the French Ministry of Marine whether their Navy could undertake a share of the watch of Dedeagatch and the Aegean coast. Armed merchant cruisers would do for this work, as the French lacked light cruisers, but the British Navy had practically reached the limit as regards taking up armed vessels, on account of the difficulty of manning them. The French responded by detaching the *Foudre* temporarily to Dedeagatch,¹ Admiral Carden despatching a destroyer until the French Commander-in-Chief could spare a large ship, and the *Amiral Charner* was sent to watch the approaches to Smyrna. The cruiser *D'Entrecasteaux*² was ordered to the Syrian coast, and a battleship would be sent as soon as possible.

The detaching of the *Foudre* to Dedeagatch left no French ship to escort to Malta the Indian convoy³ which arrived at Suez on December 22, accompanied by the *Northbrook*. In reply to Admiral Peirse's request for instructions as to who was to provide escorts for this and future Mediterranean convoys, the Admiralty ordered the *Philomel* to take the convoy to Malta, where she was to refit, for her defects had reduced her steaming capacity to 12 knots, and the resources of Suez were unable to deal with them.⁴ The *Philomel* at this time was at Tor Harbour, in the Gulf of Suez, investigating a report of a threatened Arab raid from Niukhl. She found all quiet, returned to Port Said on December 24, and left on Christmas Day with the convoy.⁵

But the fortuitous employment of the *Philomel* on this occasion was no solution to the problem of providing escorts for the transports in the Mediterranean. This was, properly speaking, the duty of the French, who had, however, already placed several of their ships at the disposal of Admiral Peirse and Admiral Carden at the Dardanelles. Moreover, the question would shortly become acute once more, for at the end of the month the Russian volunteer ship *Penza*, bringing mines to the United Kingdom, was due to arrive at Port Said, and also the transport *Delta*, carrying the South Wales Borderers, who were urgently wanted for the 9th Division. On December 26, however, the Admiralty settled the matter by deciding that escorts through the Mediterranean were no longer necessary.⁶

¹ She arrived December 21.

² *D'Entrecasteaux*, 7,995 tons, 2—9·4 in., 12—5·5 in., 12—3 pdr.

³ *Dongola*, *Somali*, *Alaunia*, *Corsican*, *Dilwara*, *Grantully Castle*, *Royal George* for the United Kingdom; *Deseado*, *Indian*, *Californian*, *Cawdor Castle* for Marseilles.

⁴ C-in-C., E.I., to Adty., 375, 22.12.14 and A 273, 275.

⁵ Less the *Dongola*, which proceeded independently.

⁶ A 277a.

76. The "Doris" at Alexandretta.¹—The *Doris*² on her return to Port Said from El Arish left again on the early morning of December 14 for a further reconnaissance of El Arish and patrol of the Syrian coast, with a seaplane on board.³ During the afternoon she bombarded and landed a party to take possession of a small entrenched camp 4 miles south of Askelon,⁴ which was probably one of a system of coast patrol ports. She worked up the coast, the seaplane making reconnaissances, without discovering any signs of a Turkish advance. The *Askold* was met on the evening of 17th north of Haifa. On the following day a party was landed 4 miles south of Sidon⁵ and destroyed 2 miles of telegraph wires between Tyre and Sidon unmolested. She arrived off Beirut the same afternoon and found the United States ship *North Carolina* and the Italian light cruiser *Calabria*. In St. George's Bay a large German steamship, the *Ella Rickmers*, was found to have been sunk, with every precaution to enable her to be raised. The *Doris* worked up the coast next day, and proceeded up the Gulf of Alexandretta after dark on 19th. She anchored at 11.5 p.m. and landed a party under Lieutenant Hulme Goodier, R.N.R., which cut the telegraph wires along the railway and took up a length of line and replaced it a little out of the true. At 2.30 a.m. on 20th a train came along and fell unsuspectingly into the trap; several trucks were derailed and capsized, blocking the line. At 6 a.m. the *Doris* opened fire on the wreckage, on the railway bridge, and on other bridges within range. A large concentration of Turkish troops and war material had been reported at Alexandretta, which was further reported as being fortified and heavy guns mounted; and an ultimatum was delivered to the Governor to surrender all the war material in the town. The Governor proved defiant, and threatened reprisals on the British subjects if the town were bombarded—the usual Turkish attitude in face of a crisis of this nature, and one which they had adopted during November, when they threatened that if Syrian open towns were bombarded they would kill three subjects of the belligerents for every Mussulman killed. To this threat Captain Larken sent a reply that due punishment would be exacted from the Turkish officials responsible at the end of the war, and he gave the Governor until 9 a.m. on 22nd to comply with the ultimatum. Meanwhile, on 21st a party under Commander Kenneth Brounger was landed in face of hostile fire, covered by the *Doris*' gun-fire, and another railway bridge was demolished by gun-cotton. On 22nd the reply to Captain Larken's ultimatum was received. It was moderate in tone, due possibly to the influence of the German Consul, who pointed out to the

¹ *Doris*' Letter of Proceedings, 27.12.14, M. 03564/14.

² Captain Frank Larken.

³ Sailing Orders dated December 13, 1914, in M. 03564/15.

⁴ 25 miles south of Jaffa.

⁵ 25 miles south of Beirut.

Governor that the ultimatum was in accordance with the usage of war and the Hague Convention,¹ but influenced more probably by the fact that by now the Turks had succeeded in evacuating most of the war material, camel caravans having been seen leaving the town continuously since the arrival of the *Doris*. Two locomotives which the Turks had been prevented, by the blocking of the railway line, from removing, were blown up with typical Oriental mixture of procrastination and circumstance, for the Turks insisted that they should be allowed to destroy this surrendered material themselves, though they had not the least notion how to set about it; and, having finally demolished the railway bridge with her gun-fire and isolated the Beilan Pass² from traffic from the north, on 23rd the *Doris* left Alexandretta. The main military considerations had been achieved by the destruction of the railway; and the surrender of the two locomotives was sufficient submission to Captain Larken's ultimatum to save his face, for there were urgent humane and political reasons why the threat of bombardment should not be put into effect.

77. Situation, January, 1915.—The *Doris* was back at Alexandretta on January 7, 1915, having carried out a patrol and various small operations down the coast. The Turks had made no apparent effort to repair the damage effected at her previous visit, but in landing to destroy a bridge on the road approaching the town from the north she had one man killed and another wounded. Great military importance was attached to a continuous watch on Alexandretta to prevent the passage of troops and war material destined for the invasion of Egypt, and to the *Doris* was assigned this duty for the present.³

The *Askold* was detailed for the coast patrol between Alexandretta and Port Said, and Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère proposed that the French ships *Amiral Charner* and *D'Entrecasteaux*, which were not under Admiral Peirse's command, should supervise the coast between Alexandretta and Smyra, where Admiral Carden's authority commenced. But Admiral Peirse wished to include Alexandretta in his station, and he informed the French Commander-in-Chief that he considered that the limit of his own responsibility should be Mersina⁴; the coast west of Mersina was no concern of Egypt, with whose safety he was specially charged; but the coast as far as that place should, he thought, be affiliated with Egypt.⁵ The

¹ Adty. to Marine, Paris, 1206, 22.12.14.

² The Beilan Pass gave communication to Egypt and the East. The Turks were, however, constructing a new inland route through Bagache, Islandie, and Raju to Aleppo, fit for heavy transport; so that the Beilan Pass would cease to be a necessary link of communication to Egypt.

³ A 280. The *Doris* was relieved at Alexandretta by the *Requin* on January 16.

⁴ 85 miles west of Alexandretta.

⁵ A 280.

Germans were preparing to defend Mersina against attack, though the inhabitants were openly hostile to them, considering them to be the cause of the present war.¹

78. Expedition to Alexandretta proposed.—A large part of the population of Syria and Palestine would at this time have welcomed the advent of a British force, provided there was no danger of such a force being withdrawn and their being left at the mercy of the Turks.² The Greek Government was secretly furnishing arms and munitions to the Maronite Christians of Lebanon, the district between Beirut and Damascus, for defence against Turkish incursions³; and on January 2, after reaching an agreement with the French on the subject, the Admiralty instructed Admiral Peirse that no obstruction was to be put in the way of the import of these arms, though he need take no active steps to further it.⁴ The arms were sent by steamer to Cyprus and thence by small sailing boats to the Syrian coast. It was reported that the Turks also were buying arms in Italy, which were being landed on the Egyptian coast near Marsa Matruh and delivered to the Arabs by the steamship *Nora*, a former Austrian vessel sailing under the British flag, and the Admiralty sent orders for her capture.⁵ The Intelligence Department in Egypt reported that Alexandretta appeared to be the point where a decisive stroke could most effectively be dealt at the Turkish lines of communication. The place possessed importance both as a port for the Bagdad Railway and as a possible naval base commanding the Eastern Mediterranean and the entrance to the Suez Canal. The commodious bay on which it is situated affords safe anchorage at all times of the year, without artificial protection in the nature of breakwaters; and it is remarkably free from outlying dangers, fogs and heavy swells. In a memorandum written in March, 1915,⁶ Sir Henry Jackson advanced strong military reasons for our occupation of Alexandretta and its hinterland. Its possession would enable us to protect our interests in Persia from attack by land down the Euphrates Valley. Alexandretta is so situated as to be able to command the lines of communication to the Euphrates Valley from the south and west, as well as the lines from Asia Minor to Syria, Egypt, and Arabia. The junction of these three main routes on the Bagdad Railway lay but a short distance outside the town. Sir Henry Jackson envisaged a permanent occupation of Alexandretta, which he considered to be commercially a profitable proposition. On January 9 the Admiralty telegraphed to Admiral Peirse that operations at Alexandretta were under consideration, using troops now in

¹ M.21562.

² Mr. Cheetham to F.O., 10, 7.1.15.

³ M.19818/14, 05108/14, 0144/15, 15598/15, etc.

⁴ Adty. to C.-in-C., E.I., No. 1, 2.1.15.

⁵ Adty. to C.-in-C., E.I., 374, 27.12.14.

⁶ M.010096/15.

Egypt, and covered by his squadron; and he was ordered to furnish information as to local facilities for landing.¹

The disposition of the ships on the Egyptian station on January 15 was as follows²:—

The *Doris*, *Proserpine*, *Askold*, and *Requin* were on the Syrian coast, and the *Amiral Charner* and *D'Entrecasteaux* were watching the approaches to Smyrna, though they were not under Admiral Peirse's orders. The *Swiftsure* and *Clio* and the hydroplane carriers *Trifels* and *Aenne Rickmers* were at Port Said; the six Malta torpedo boats were in the Canal; and the *Philomel* was refitting at Malta, whence she was due to return at the end of January. The *Himalaya* had arrived at Suez, having relieved the *Northbrook* on the northern Red Sea patrol early in January, when the latter returned to Bombay to take the Viceroy on a visit of inspection to the Persian Gulf. The *Ocean* was on her way to Suez from the Persian Gulf, the successful conclusion of the operations for the capture of Qurna having set her free.³ She was detained at Aden for four days pending a decision by the Admiralty of the question of a second bombardment of Sheikh Sa'id, and she left for Suez on Christmas Day.⁴ On January 14 the Commander-in-Chief, China, had been ordered to send the *Triumph* to Port Said with all convenient despatch,⁵ though by the time she arrived her presence was required elsewhere in the Mediterranean. The *Hardinge* was at Aden, *en route* for the Northern Red Sea Patrol; and on January 10 the Admiralty approved a suggestion by Admiral Peirse that the *Dufferin* should be withdrawn from Goa to the Red Sea, for the available information was to the effect that the enemy merchant vessels which she had been watching had no intention of moving.⁶ The Southern Red Sea Patrol was being carried out by the *Empress of Russia* (which arrived at Aden on January 5), *Empress of Asia*, and *Minto*, with the Egyptian gunboat *Abdel Monaim*.⁷ Another Egyptian gunboat, the *Nurel Bar*, was at Suez, the *Minerva* was at Aqaba, and the *Desaix* at Hodeida.

79. Events in the Red Sea, January to February, 1915.—

On January 19 Admiral Peirse telegraphed to the Admiralty that, in consequence of a report from the Political Officer at Tor Harbour of a strong Turkish raiding party 19 miles away, he had despatched the *Minerva* to that place. She returned

¹ A 281. It seems that the possibility of landing at Alexandretta at some future date had been contemplated in November, 1914, for on 30th of that month the Admiralty inquired of the French Ministry of Marine whether they had any horse-boats in the Mediterranean fitted for disembarkation on a beach, in view of operations which might be necessary in the Levant. (1114 to Marine, Bordeaux, 30.11.14.)

² C.-in-C., East Indies, to Admiralty, 43, 15.1.15.

³ See Monograph No. 15, "Mesopotamia, 1914-1916."

⁴ A 272, 276, 277.

⁵ A 282.

⁶ A 278.

⁷ The status of the *Abdel Monaim* and *Nurel Bar* at this date is not known. During April they were lent by the Egyptian Authorities and were taken over by the British Admiralty. See H.S. 156, p. 551.

to the Canal to take part in the defence; and on February 11, having embarked a force of 400 of the 7th Gurkha Rifles under Lieut.-Colonel Haldane, she left once more for Tor, where the small garrison of Egyptian troops was being invested by the enemy.¹ Assisted by the *Dufferin*, the troops were landed under cover of darkness in the ship's boats, and the force, accompanied by 100 of the Egyptian garrison, at once struck inland to get in rear of the enemy by means of a night march. The expedition was a complete success, the enemy were surprised from the rear at dawn, their retreat was cut off, and though they put up a fine resistance, losing some 60 in killed alone, they were practically all rounded up, over 100 prisoners being taken. Two casualties only were suffered by Colonel Haldane's force, and having re-embarked it and the prisoners, the *Minerva* left for Suez at 10.30 p.m. on February 12.

In the southern section of the Red Sea our patrols had gradually produced a general impression of hostile intentions on our part; restrictions had been placed on trade, which was now consequently at a standstill; while dhows had been destroyed, in some cases even when beached in harbour. On January 24 the High Commissioner reported to the Foreign Office that communication with the Arabs along the littoral had become extremely difficult and that he proposed to arrange with the Senior Naval Officer for the removal of unnecessary trade restrictions.² One or two incidents had occurred. On January 13 the Political Officer was fired on by the natives at Diba when attempting to land from the *Himalaya*,³ and on 31st of the month Arab forces belonging to the Shaikh of the Idrisi occupied the Farsan Islands.⁴ But our policy of conciliation towards the Turkish Arabs in this region had not on the whole been a failure,⁵ and the Admiralty on January 25 warned Admiral Peirse that it was not desired to change this policy unless forced to do so by the Arabs.⁶ At Sir H. McMahon's suggestion the Red Sea was now divided into two sections, the northern being under his political control and the southern under that of the Resident at Aden, who would be instructed from India⁷; and on February 13 the Admiralty informed Admiral Peirse that he should be guided by the instructions issued to the High Commissioner; no action should be taken by H.M. Ships in the southern section of the Red Sea, except with the concurrence of the Political Officers accompanying them, who would receive instructions from the Resident at Aden alone.⁸

¹ See *Minerva's* L. of P., M.01889/15.

² Sir H. McMahon to F.O., 22, 24.1.15.

³ C.-in-C., E.I., to Adty., 35, 13.1.15.

⁴ We concluded a treaty with the Shaikh three months later.

⁵ M.0385/15.

⁶ A 284.

⁷ Papers titled India Office, February 5, 1915, with M.01026/15.

⁸ Adty. to C.-in-C., E.I., 87, 13.2.15.

80. **Turkish Preparations for Advance.**—By the end of the year 1914 the Turkish strategic intention had become fairly clear. Fighting was in progress in the Caucasus,¹ where the Turks apparently intended merely to hold their own; and the attempt to turn us out of Mesopotamia, where the British forces had occupied Basra on November 22 and Qurna on December 9, was also to be deferred, though it was reported that 25,000 of the troops in Syria were moving on Mesopotamia. But they evidently intended to make their main effort against Egypt, over which Great Britain had proclaimed a Protectorate on December 18, 1914. And as a diversion a simultaneous operation against Aden by the 37,000 troops with 108 guns in the Red Sea littoral was considered possible.²

On January 3, 1915, Admiral Peirse telegraphed to the Admiralty that the intelligence pointed to energetic preparations and a determination on the part of the Turks to reach the Canal.³ The season was in their favour, and there had been a heavier rainfall in Sinai than for years past. The forces for the operations against Egypt comprised 120,000 Turkish troops,⁴ exclusive of Arabs, with many guns. Their plan evidently was to prepare water and food supplies well ahead of the advance, with small guards, keeping the main body of the army at the more forward centres of large supply until all was ready for the forward move. The cutting of the railway at Alexandretta by the *Doris* necessitated a long and tiresome detour by the Turks round by the gaps in the Taurus and Amanus mountains before they could strike the railway at Aleppo. Great energy was being shown in completing the route from Hebron to Beersheba in small sections with relays of camels; there was an intention to bring the railway to supplement the route, and much railway material was collected at Haifa.⁵ It was thought that the 4th Turkish Corps would probably be moved along the coast route to protect the sea flank of the advance. There were supplies of grain and forage at Gaza. The new inland route through Bagache, Islandie, and Raju to Aleppo was now nearly ready for heavy transport.⁶ Both the Germans and Turks realised that delay imperilled the success of the enterprise by discontent and desertions amongst the troops and exhaustion of the camel transport. Some, if not all, of the Turkish regiments had some higher German officers.

81. **Scheme of Naval Defence of the Canal.**⁷—The vessels detailed to co-operate with the military authorities in the

¹ Battle of Sarykamish, 29.12.14—2.1.15. Battle of Kara Urgan, 8.1.15—13.1.15.

² Appreciation of the Turkish situation, 31.12.14, H.S. 97.

³ Port Said to Adty., 7. 3.1.15.

⁴ This number evidently includes the 37,000 troops in the Red Sea littoral which it was thought might be used for a diversion against Aden.

⁵ Port Said to Adty., 395, 28.12.14.

⁶ M.01892/15.

⁷ Papers titled S^a. 357/1915.

defence of the Suez Canal comprised all the available warships, three torpedo boats, eight armed tugs,¹ and three Canal Company's hoppers provided with searchlights mounted on special platforms about 35 ft. high. The crews for the tugs² were provided from the ships under Admiral Peirse's orders, and the hoppers were manned by volunteer civilian crews to which were added two officers, one P.O., four A.B.s, and a signalman each, furnished from the warships.

The *Requin* was stationed at Ismailia, and the warships in the canal as necessary. The torpedo boats patrolled the Bitter Lakes. The military defences were divided into three sections as follows, to each of which a hopper with searchlight was attached:—

Section I.—From Suez (Port Tewfik) to northern end of Great Bitter Lake (Geneffe).

Section II.—From northern end of Great Bitter Lake (Deversoir) to El Ferdan.

Section III.—From El Ferdan (exclusive) to Port Said.

Two armed tugs were attached to each hopper, and the two tugs with 12 pdr. guns were kept in reserve for use in the Bitter Lakes.

The defensive scheme consisted of a system of entrenched posts on the east bank, except where the lakes and the inundations rendered the crossing of the Canal impracticable for the enemy. The posts covered the more important ferries and provided facilities for counter-attack; and they were reinforced by posts on the west bank, which were connected by the railway line. Headquarters and general reserve were at Ismailia.

About January 15 it became clear that hostile forces of some strength had entered Sinai, and on 20th the Canal defence troops (*see* section 68) were reinforced from Cairo by two brigades of artillery from the East Lancashire Division T.F.

On January 26 minor attacks were made on our outposts at Kantara, which were easily beaten off. For two months past French seaplanes, under Lieutenant de Vaisseau de L'Escaille, in co-operation with the military aeroplanes, had been making extended reconnaissances over the enemy's country from Aqaba and from the neighbourhood of Port Said. It was evident that the long expected attack was imminent, and the warships were accordingly ordered to their stations in the Canal. The *Ocean* was sent to cover El Shatt on 25th, and next morning the *Swiftsure* and *Clio*³ proceeded to Kantara and the *Himalaya* took up a position near Shalluf. The *D'Entrecasteaux* had been

¹ *Mansura*, armament, 2—12 pdr.; *Mainstay*, 1—12 pdr., 1 Maxim; *Fanny*, *Virginia*, *Lubeck*, *Sylphe*, *Robuste*, each 1—3 pdr., 1 Maxim; *Prompt*, 1 Maxim.

² 1 P.O., 1 Sto. P.O., 4 A.B.s, 1 Sto.

³ Admiral Peirse's report says *Odin*, but this is a mistake. The *Odin* was at Bombay having her rudder repaired, which had been damaged in Mesopotamia.

placed at Admiral Peirse's disposal, and she entered Lake Timsah on January 27, where the *Requin* was already stationed. On the same day the *Minerva*, which left Tor (where she had been sent on January 19 in consequence of the approach of a Turkish raiding force) at 7 p.m. on 24th to visit Aqaba, entered Little Bitter Lake and secured at Mile 73 at the southern end. The *Proserpine* was sent round from Alexandria to Port Said for local defence, where she arrived on January 28; and the *Hardinge* left Tor for Suez on the arrival of the *Dufferin* on 29th, and took up a position at Kilo 84, just south of Lake Timsah on February 2. On receipt of Admiral Peirse's telegram that the attack on the Canal was imminent¹ the Admiralty on January 27 ordered the Rear-Admiral Commanding, Cruiser Force "G" (the Western Channel Patrol), to despatch the *Bacchante* or *Euryalus* to reinforce Admiral Peirse's squadron with all convenient despatch²; for the necessity of maintaining cruisers on the Anglo-French Channel Patrol was of less importance now that there was little likelihood of attack by enemy vessels of similar calibre; and since German submarines were the principal adversaries the work could better be performed by armed boarding steamers. The *Bacchante* left Devonport on January 29, and next day the Admiralty ordered the *Euryalus* also to follow her to Port Said.³

During the 27th and 28th the enemy was further reinforced and established himself in an entrenched position about five miles east of Kantara, astride the El Arish road. On the morning of 27th attacks were made on the Baluchistan and El Kubri posts in No. 1 section, and in the early hours of January 28 a further attack was made on Kantara by a few hundred of the enemy, who were again repulsed. The *Swiftsure* opened fire at daylight with 7.5 in. lyddite at long range and dispersed a body of the enemy.

Now that the Turks were within striking distance, the Canal was closed to shipping at night as a precaution against sniping of ships' officers, which might result in vessels grounding and blocking the fairway.⁴ The second Australasian contingent passed through the Canal on January 30 and 31 and disembarked in Egypt.

82. The Attack on the Canal, February 3, 1915.⁵—On January 29 the enemy began closing towards the Canal, his main concentration being opposite the centre section of the defence. A desultory action with his advanced troops from Ismailia occurred on February 2, and at 3.20 a.m. on 3rd the enemy launched his assault, simultaneous attacks being delivered at several points along the Canal.

¹ C.-in-C., E.I. to Adty., 87, 26.1.15. ² A 285. ³ H.S. 88, p. 265.
⁴ A 287. ⁵ Despatches, and papers entitled S^a. 351/1915.

The main attack was directed against Tussoum, where the banks 50 ft. high, and the darkness of the night, concealed the approach of the enemy. A determined attempt was made here to cross the Canal in boats which had been dragged on wheels across the desert. The boats had been constructed in Constantinople; they were of galvanised steel, length 24 ft., beam 5 ft., depth 2 ft. 9 in., and were capable of holding about 30 men each. The enemy were seen in the moonlight as they topped the bank, and were met with a heavy fire from the west bank; and they took cover, abandoning their boats at the water's edge. One only succeeded in reaching the west bank, and all its occupants were killed. T.B. No. 043,¹ which was lying at Deversoir, and the armed tug *Mansoura*² were ordered to proceed and destroy the enemy boats. This they accomplished by gun-fire and explosives, under the fire of the enemy on the east bank. The necessity for care in the expenditure of ammunition and the fact that some of the boats had been abandoned in positions where they could not be shelled, necessitated landing to destroy them by gun-cotton. It was while engaged on one of these expeditions that Lieutenant-Commander Palmes of T.B. No. 043 fell into one of our disused trenches, which was full of Turkish soldiers. In the mutual astonishment of both parties Lieutenant-Commander Palmes and Sub-Lieutenant Claude V. Cardinall, R.N.V.R., and torpedo-gunner's mate Francis who accompanied them, made good their escape and regained their ship unhit, under a heavy rifle fire. The torpedo boat's 3 pdr. gun was then turned on to the trench, and while engaged in shelling it both the officers were wounded.

Three miles further north, at about 7 a.m., the *Hardinge*³ had come under the enemy's shell fire. She was unable to locate the Turkish guns, but took advantage of occasional opportunities which offered of shelling the enemy's infantry. At about 8.30 a.m. she was hit by three shells from a heavy gun⁴; her foremost funnel was wrecked, the fore stokehold rendered untenable, and the fore steering gear damaged; and she sustained a number of casualties. At the long range from which she was being attacked her guns were ineffective, and as the enemy had got her range accurately and there was danger of her being sunk, she retired into Lake Timsah. The enemy gun was immediately turned on to the *Requin*, which was at the southern end of the Lake. For some time the French vessel was unable to locate it, but after she had been straddled for about half-an-hour, during which time she marvellously escaped without suffering much material damage, she fortunately found and silenced it. A battery of light guns which had been firing over the lake was silenced by her later in the afternoon.

¹ Lieutenant-Commander George B. Palmes.

² Lieutenant Henry W. B. Livesay, R.I.M.

³ Lieutenant-Commander Thomas J. Linberry.

⁴ Apparently a 6 in. howitzer which the Turks had managed to drag across the desert. After their repulse they either removed or buried it.

The only other ship which came under the enemy's shell fire was the *Clio* at El Ferdan, which was hit twice by two 11 pounder guns firing on the station; and these she silenced.

The work of the *Swiftsure* and *D'Entrecasteaux* was confined to shelling and scattering bodies of Turkish infantry. Every attack of the enemy was repulsed with considerable loss to them, and the night of February 3 passed quietly. Some Turks, however, remained in the trenches on the east bank, and at daylight on February 4 the *Swiftsure*, which had exchanged positions with the *Hardinge* on the previous afternoon, proceeded down the Canal south of Tussoum and shelled the trenches, which were afterwards cleared by our soldiers, assisted by the *Mansoura* with Lieutenant E. H. Daughlish in command, after a treacherous abuse by the Turks of the White Flag.

The naval casualties during the two day's fighting comprised 2 men killed¹ and 2 officers, 10 men, and a pilot wounded, 11 of the casualties occurring on board the *Hardinge*. The military casualties were about 150 killed and wounded. The enemy left 238 killed behind; 716, prisoners, including 149 wounded, were brought in, and in addition a large number of the enemy were drowned in the Canal and many of the killed were buried by the Turks themselves.² The strength of the attacking forces was estimated at 12,000 with six batteries.³ A number of pontoons constructed of kerosine tins cased in wood, which were to have been brought up subsequently for bridging purposes, were found to have been abandoned about a mile to the eastward of the Canal by the Turks, who were now retreating on all their lines to the Sinai Peninsula, subsequent intelligence showing that the retirement was stopped at Beersheba. The retreat was, however, conducted in good order, being undisturbed by pursuit⁴ or flank attack from the sea; and the Turks got all their guns safely away.

¹ Includes one died of wounds.


² Sir J. Maxwell to Lord Kitchener, 15.2.15.

³ C-in-C., East Indies, to Admiralty, 116, 4.2.15. Telegram from Sir G. Barclay (Bucharest), 67, 27.2.15, says the Rumanian Military Attaché at Constantinople reported the Egyptian Expedition consisted of 8th and 12th Army Corps (less 1 division) and 10th division of 4th Army Corps. Total, 51 battalions, 23 batteries, 1 howitzer battery. Attached to Suez Expedition, 40,000 Bedouins, of whom 20,000 only had rifles.

⁴ No specific reason has been found for the failure to harass the retiring Turks, but examination of Sir J. Maxwell's Hq. Diary (War Office records) shows that there was difficulty in ascertaining the extent of the enemy force opposed to him, nor had he at his disposal a very large number of highly trained troops.

PLAN IV

THE SUEZ CANAL



CHAPTER IX.

FRENCH ADMIRAL APPOINTED TO THE SYRIAN
COAST COMMAND.

83. **Inception of the Dardanelles Expedition.**—Admiral Peirse had now been in command of the Egyptian station for two months, but as yet the limits of his responsibility had not been fixed. There were at this time three independent sea-going Flag Officers in the Mediterranean. Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère was Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean, Admiral Peirse in Egypt, and Admiral Carden was Senior Naval Officer near the Dardanelles.

The Dardanelles command had recently assumed considerable prospective importance, for on January 13, 1915, the War Council resolved that the Admiralty should prepare for a naval expedition in February against the Dardanelles, and on 28th of the month the British Government definitely decided upon the expedition. It was hoped that the expedition would ease the situation in the Caucasus, where the Turks were organising an enveloping movement which was causing the Russian Commander-in-Chief grave anxiety; and it might well be that a somewhat showy feat of arms such as the forcing of the Straits would have a good effect in the Balkans.¹

Admiral Carden had not been idle during the three months since hostilities were ordered to be commenced against Turkey. The order had been followed on November 3 by a bombardment of the forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles by the ships of his squadron. The principal reason for the bombardment was to test the range of the Turkish guns, but the fire of the ships caused more damage than we were at the time aware, and the forts at Seddul Bahr were completely destroyed by the explosion of a magazine.² Both the British and French submarines working under his command had been active in penetrating through the Straits. On December 13, 1914, *B.11* (Lieutenant Norman D. Holbrook) proceeded up the Dardanelles and sank the Turkish battleship *Messoudieh* off Chanak,³ and on January 17, 1915, the French submarine *Saphir*, in trying to avoid a Turkish minefield in the Dardanelles, ran ashore and was wrecked.

¹ Corbett, "Naval Operations," II. The Dardanelles was the point where naval force could best be brought to bear in conjunction with the military forces. Success in the operations would no doubt influence Italy and the Balkan States. It would open up a line of communication with Russia and her western allies, enable her to draw munitions from the U.S.A. and Europe and the 1914 harvest to be exported. It would free the Russian forces locked up in the Caucasus and the British and Indian troops in Egypt and Mesopotamia, and would enable the Allied Fleet at the Dardanelles to be withdrawn. It would open a line of communications up the Danube for possible operations against Hungary, and would end once for all the "Drang nach dem Osten." (See Note by War Office, May 28, 1915.)

² C.B. 1550, "Report of Dardanelles Committee," p. 24. The damage was made good by the enemy before the attack in March, 1915.

³ Lieutenant Holbrook was awarded the V.C. for this act.

84. **Admiral Dartige du Fournet Appointed to the Syrian Coast Command, February 2, 1915.**—To the French Commander-in-Chief's proposal of January 8, that the limit of his station should be Alexandretta, Admiral Peirse had replied with the proposal that his authority should extend to Mersina.¹ The matter had rested there for the time being without any decision on the subject being given; and Admiral Peirse's ships continued to patrol and reconnoitre the Syrian coast as far as Mersina, which was visited on January 5 by the *Doris* in order to destroy the military bridge three miles to the eastward of the place. Her attempt to steal in under cover of darkness was discovered; the landing of a demolition party from boats was frustrated by the enemy's fire, and Captain Larken was compelled to have recourse to bombardment of the railway bridge, with very good effect, as was discovered later.² Admiral Peirse had insufficient ships available for an effective blockade, and on December 21, after a complaint by the Italian Government that their trade in the Levant was being interfered with,³ and again on January 6, the Admiralty warned him that, pending the declaration of a blockade, legitimate neutral trade must not be interfered with.⁴

Throughout January patrols of the Syrian coast as far as Mersina were maintained by the *Doris*, *Proserpine*, *Requin* and *Askold* under Admiral Peirse's orders, and by the *Amiral Charner* and *D'Entrecasteaux* under the command of the French Commander-in-Chief. The work of the ships consisted mainly in distributing proclamations of a propagandist nature, damaging rail and road communications, and destroying blockhouses and entrenchments.⁵ The *Philomel* (Captain P. H. Hall Thompson) relieved the *Doris* off Alexandretta on February 5, and on that day an armed party which was landed from the ship to investigate some trains of pack animals moving along the road was ambushed by a greatly superior body of the enemy, losing three men killed (including two died of wounds) and three wounded. The intelligence was to the effect that the Turkish troops along the littoral were badly trained, ill fed and equipped, and dispirited. The Ottoman Government was locally unpopular, and the civilian population was eager for a change of administration. The printed proclamations distributed by our ships on the coast had not been without influence upon the civilian population. If the occupation of Alexandretta was still contemplated by the British Government, the intelligence pointed to the desirability of carrying out the operation without delay.⁶

¹ See section 77.

² *Doris*' L. of P., 17.1.15 (M. 0951/15) and 15.3.15 (M. 02650/15).

³ By French torpedo craft near Smyrna.

⁴ A 271, 279.

⁵ Much good work was done by Lieutenant H. Pirie-Gordon, R.N.V.R., who possessed special qualifications; he was usually accommodated in the ship working off Alexandretta.

⁶ M. 01892/15.

The arrangement by which British and French ships under Admiral Peirse and Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère patrolled side by side on the Syrian coast seems to have worked well in the harmonious relations existing between the British and French commanders, the latter being apparently contented to carry out any requests made of them by Admiral Peirse.

But to the French Ministry of Marine the situation evidently appeared unsatisfactory. France had considerable interests in Syria, and it was felt by the French Government that the Syrian coast should be within their sphere of operations. French opinion was most sensitive regarding Syria, for the annexation of which there was an agitation on foot in Egypt.¹ The attitude of the inhabitants of Syria affected very sensibly the problem of the defence of Egypt, and on this account the First Lord pointed out to the French Minister of Marine the desirability that any measures other than those of emergency which the French squadron might be ordered to undertake on the Syrian coast should be the subject of previous consultation between the two Governments.²

The sensitiveness of French opinion where action in Syria was concerned is evidenced by telegrams which passed between the Ministry of Marine and the Admiralty on February 19 and 20. It had been arranged early in the war that the Naval Attaché in London should keep the French Ministry of Marine posted as to occurrences in the British sphere of action in the Mediterranean which might otherwise escape their notice; and such news was usually sent in the form of a transposition of telegrams received by the Admiralty from the British Senior Naval Officers in those waters. Admiral Peirse was not apparently informed as to the present intentions of the Admiralty with regard to the proposed expedition to Syria of which he had been acquainted on January 9.³ On February 18 he forwarded a *précis* of a wireless report from the *Bacchante* at Alexandretta,⁴ who relieved the *Philomel* off that place on 16th. The report stated that the defences of Beilan were becoming formidable, and Admiral Peirse telegraphed that he considered, if the occupation of Alexandretta was intended, it should be carried out without delay. A transposition of this telegram was despatched by the French Naval Attaché to the Ministry of Marine in Paris as a matter of routine.⁵ The latter at once sent a reply which revealed their apprehension that the Admiralty had intentions regarding the Syrian expedition, of which the French had not been informed.⁶ In a letter to M. Augagneur, the Minister of Marine,

¹ On March 17 the French Government lodged a claim with the British Government to Syria and Cilicia.

² M. 010035/15.

³ See section 78.

⁴ C.-in-C., E.I., to Adty., 174, 18.2.15.

⁵ A 299.

⁶ A 300.

on January 27,¹ the First Lord had mentioned that owing to the renewed Turkish pressure on Egypt the capture of Alexandretta was not contemplated in the immediate future. But that was nearly a month ago; and moreover the force of Mr. Churchill's statement was weakened by the reservation made further on in his letter, to the effect that if the operations at Alexandretta should take place we would wish the actual disembarkation of British troops to be conducted by our own vessels, though we should not interfere with the French command. On February 17, in connection with the agitation in Egypt for the annexation of Syria, Lord Crewe had made it clear to the High Commissioner of Egypt that we had promised to associate with the French if we undertook any serious military operations in that region²; and the Admiralty now definitely assured the French Ministry of Marine that they had not approved of the operations.³

Despite the disadvantages inseparable from the division of control entailed by the appointment of a French Admiral to the command of the Syrian coast, interposing between British spheres of action and influence in Egypt and the Dardanelles, which would render it virtually impossible for the operations in Syria to be undertaken by troops from Egypt, political considerations rendered it necessary that we should acquiesce in the wishes of the French Government. It was, however, made clear to them that we desired to retain the command at the Dardanelles, where serious operations were now imminent; though the co-operation of the French squadron at present there, in the work of bombardment, was invited.

On February 2 Vice-Admiral L. R. C. M. Dartige du Fournet was appointed to the command of the 3rd Squadron of the French fleet which was detached to the Syrian coast to prevent the supply by sea of the Turks attacking Egypt. Admiral Dartige du Fournet's squadron was a very mixed one, comprising the battleship *Saint Louis*, the old *Jauréguiberry*, the second class battleship *Henri IV*,⁴ and the armoured cruiser *D'Entrecasteaux*; and the French Ministry of Marine asked the Admiralty what ships they, for their part, would contribute towards the squadron.⁵ The attack on the Suez Canal was now proceeding, and the only ship on the Syrian coast was the *Doris*, whom the *Philomel* was on her way to relieve on patrol. The *Doris* was already earmarked for the Dardanelles operations, and the Admiralty consequently replied that though no ships could be spared for the moment, any vessels which might be detached later, when the present emergency was passed, would automatically be placed under the

¹ The copy which has been examined has no marking to show that it was despatched, but from other evidence contained in M. 010035/15 there is no doubt that this was done.

² Tele. No. 91.

³ A 303.

⁴ 8,806 tons, 2—10·8 in., 7—5·5 in., 12—3 pdr.

⁵ A 288.

orders of Admiral Dartige du Fournet; and they mentioned that the *Henri IV*, if available, would be of the greatest use in the Canal as all her light guns were under armour.¹

The first intimation received by Admiral Peirse of the proposed transfer of the Syrian coast to the French was a telegram from the Admiral, *St. Louis*,² at Bizerta on February 15. The French Admiral informed him that he (Admiral, *St. Louis*) had been appointed in command of the Allied squadron in Syria and requested him to send the *D'Entrecasteaux* to Bizerta as soon as possible.³ Admiral Peirse telegraphed home for instructions, but received no reply⁴; and on arrival at Port Said from the Syrian coast on the afternoon of the 16th the *D'Entrecasteaux* left again at once for Bizerta. It was not until February 24, the day after Admiral Dartige du Fournet took up his command and left for the Syrian coast, that the Admiralty informed Admiral Peirse of the new arrangement, and that the eastern limit of his command was in future to be fixed by the frontier between Egypt and Syria.⁵

85. Transfer of Ships from Egypt to the Dardanelles.—With the repulse of the attack on the Suez Canal and the retreat of the Turks on all their lines the tension in Egypt relaxed, and on February 9 Admiral Peirse telegraphed⁶ to the Admiralty that traffic through the Canal was proceeding as usual by day. Night traffic was resumed on the night February 11—12.

The storm centre was now moving towards the Dardanelles. On January 16 Admiral Peirse had been ordered to ascertain and report how many small vessels suitable for minesweeping he could obtain; and though no intimation of their employment was given, he was told that they must be capable of making a sea passage in the Mediterranean.⁷ On February 6 the Admiralty informed him that the *Swiftsure*, *Ocean* and *Doris* would be required towards the end of the month for operations under Admiral Carden. The latter had been directed to inform Admiral Peirse when he required the ships, which were to remain in Egypt until the last possible moment.⁸ In view, however, of the *Doris*' valuable local knowledge of Alexandretta the *Minerva* was substituted for her by permission of the Admiralty,⁹ and she left Port Said for Tenedos on February 24, calling at Famagusta *en route*. The *Ocean* had left on the previous day, and the *Swiftsure* followed on February 25. The *Bacchante* left Gibraltar on February 2 to join Admiral Peirse, as ordered by the Admiralty when the attack on the Canal was imminent, and arrived at Port Said on 9th. After shelling the fort at

¹ A 289.

² Apparently Admiral Dartige du Fournet.

³ A 294.

⁴ A 306.

⁵ A 283.

⁶ A 305.

⁷ No. 130.

⁸ A 291.

⁹ A 292. Admiral Peirse was still ignorant of the appointment of a French Admiral on the Syrian coast and transfer of Alexandretta to the latter's command.

El Arish on February 10 she returned to Port Said, and left again on 13th for the Syrian coast to relieve the *Philomel*. She was still there when Admiral Dartige du Fournet took over the command, and the Admiralty consequently placed her under the orders of the latter, in conformity with the arrangement which they had made with the French. The *Euryalus*, also of Cruiser Force "G," was being sent out to Egypt to replace one of the ships which were being withdrawn; she arrived at Port Said on February 21, and on 25th, when the *Swiftsure* left for the Dardanelles, Admiral Peirse transferred his flag to her. The old French cruiser *Bruix*¹ arrived at Port Said on February 5 and entered the Canal, and the *Henri IV* arrived four days later. The *Philomel*, which was at this time on the Syrian coast, was to be relieved by the *Fox* as soon as the latter completed her refit, and was to proceed to the Persian Gulf where German intrigues were causing unrest.² On February 18 the Admiralty asked Admiral Peirse if he could spare the *Clio*, and on his replying in the affirmative he was told to send her also to the Persian Gulf: she was required for operations in Mesopotamia, where the Turks were concentrating reinforcements to drive us out of the country³; and she left Port Said on February 21. The *Askold* also was to be withdrawn from Egypt, for at the special request of the Russian Government she was to take part in the Dardanelles operations under Admiral Carden.⁴

86. Concentration of Troops at Lemnos.—The operation which Admiral Carden was about to undertake consisted in forcing the Dardanelles without military assistance. Warships were following one another out from England to the Dardanelles in quick succession. They were mainly of the older type, but included also the newly completed *Queen Elizabeth* which was to try the effect of her 15 in. guns on the Turkish fortifications. If the operation proved successful it would be followed up by troops which would be held ready within striking distance of the Dardanelles. The force which was being held ready comprised a naval division (8,500 men) under General Paris, Royal Marines, two Australian divisions from Egypt (about 30,000 men) under General Birdwood, and a French division (18,000 men) under General D'Amade; and possibly the 29th (Regular) Division of 18,000 men would be sent from England. It was arranged that 10,000 of these troops should be held ready, part in Egypt and part in Lemnos, for unexpected contingencies, in case the naval operations should proceed more rapidly than was contemplated.⁵

On February 20 the Admiralty ordered Admiral Robinson, Director of Transport in Egypt, to arrange for as many transports

¹ 4,735 tons, 2—7·6 in., 6—5·5 in., 4—9 pdr., 4—3 pdr.

² A 293.

³ A 295, 296.

⁴ M. 010035/15.

⁵ First Lord to Admiral Carden, 69, *Secret and Personal*. Sent via A.S., Malta, No. 324, 24.2.15.

as possible to be ready in a week's time for the conveyance of the Australasian troops of General Birdwood's command from Egypt to Lemnos,¹ and he at once set about it, emptying of their troops the transports which were still arriving from India with reinforcements for Marseilles, holding the Indian troops up temporarily, and requisitioning enemy prizes. For this short voyage 50 per cent. more men than usual were allowed to be accommodated.

On March 2 and 3 the first 5,000 Australian troops left for Lemnos in five transports.² The War Office were making all their preparations in the expectation that the Dardanelles would have been forced by March 18, and it was considered that the entire military force should be on the spot immediately available for disembarkation by that date.³

The occupation of Lemnos by British troops took place on March 7. The intervention of Greece in support of Serbia was being sought by the Entente Powers at this date, and on March 5 M. Venizelos, the Greek Premier, offered the Greek fleet and troops for the attack on Gallipoli. The refusal of the King of Greece to support this policy led to the resignation on the following day of M. Venizelos, but meanwhile all preparations had been made for the occupation of the island, which was carried out next day. The island of Lemnos was one of several which had been acquired by Greece as the result of the First Balkan War, the others being Thasos, Samothrace, Hagios Strati, Mitylene, Psara, Chios, Samos, Nikaria, and the Fourni Group. Three others, namely Imbros, Tenedos, and Castellorizzo, though still in Greek occupation, were eventually to be restored to Turkey. There still remained to Turkey 13 of the Sporades, viz., Rhodes, Cos, Calymnos, Leros, Patmos, Nicaria, Stampalia, Nissiras, Tilos, Symi, Halki, Casos, and Scarpantos. These islands had been or were still in occupation by Italian troops, their status being similar to that of Egypt or any other portion of the Ottoman Empire in foreign military occupation.

The fall of M. Venizelos was followed by the entry of the Anglophobe M. Gounaris to power and the request for an explanation of our action in occupying Lemnos, from which M. Venizelos had withdrawn the Greek garrison with the significant intimation that the batteries would be left undismantled, for the British troops to look after. The withdrawal of the Greek garrison provided a sufficient justification for the occupation by us of an island which Turkey had never recognised as belonging to any power except herself; and the British Government pleaded military necessity and gave to the government of M. Gounaris a secret guarantee of the eventual session of the island to Greece by Turkey. A further attempt was

¹ A 301.

² *Suffolk, Devanha, Nizam, Ionian, Malda*.

³ Adty. to Marine, Paris, 1459, 5.3.15.

made on April 12 to induce Greece to take action against Turkey by the offer of Smyrna and the hinterland, but, like our former proposals of concessions in Asia Minor, this too was rejected.

On March 6 the Admiralty sent orders to the Intelligence Officer at Colombo and the Senior Naval Officer, Aden, to expedite certain transports which were on their way to Suez,¹ as they were required for the conveyance of the remainder of the Australian contingent from Egypt.² By March 9 Admiral Robinson telegraphed to the Admiralty that ships were available in Egypt to convey to Lemnos all except 11,000 men and 2,500 horses of the Australian contingent, for the transport of which he was requisitioning prize ships. On the same day a Mountain Artillery Brigade was added to the contingent, being despatched to Lemnos from Egypt, and Admiral Robinson arranged for its conveyance by 11th.³ The concentration of troops at Lemnos was now nearly complete. Besides the Naval Division which left Avonmouth on February 28 in eight transports,⁴ the first convoy of 8,500 French troops had arrived on 15th, and a Brigade⁵ of General Birdwood's "Anzacs" had gone from Egypt. It appeared to General Maxwell that the force now at Lemnos was more than sufficient for the immediate requirements of the Admiral.⁶ There was a great shortage of water in the island, and owing to the absence of embarking and disembarking facilities, and to avoid congestion of Mudros Harbour, the remainder of the Australians would have to remain on board their transports, which would have to anchor in some other harbour.⁷ General Maxwell's suggestion was that a camp should be formed at Alexandria, but he reported on 16th that transports were provided and the remainder of the Australian force was being held in readiness at Alexandria to embark directly the order should be given.⁸

General Sir Ian Hamilton, commanding the Allied troops, arrived at Tenedos on the afternoon of March 17 in the newly completed light cruiser *Phaeton*, which was sent round from Gibraltar⁹ on March 12 to convey him and his staff from Marseilles. Sir Ian immediately investigated the question of the disposal of the troops. He found that the closeness of

¹ Adty. to I.O., Colombo, 17, and S.N.O., Aden, 6.3.15.

² By inference.

³ Robinson, Cairo, to Adty., 11.3.15.

⁴ *Franconia*, *Ayrshire*, *Grantully Castle*, *Gloucester Castle*, *Royal George*, *Alnwick Castle*, *Somali*, *Transport*.

⁵ With Bde. Ammunition Column, 1 Field Coy., 1 Coy. Divl. Train., 1 Field Amb., 1 Clearing Hospital, and 1 Stationary Hospital. On March 11 also 1 Divl. Ammunition Column, 1 Small-arm Ammunition Column and 1 Supply Column left Egypt for Mudros.

⁶ G.O.C., Egypt, to W.O., 725 E, 12.3.15.

⁷ V.-A. Carden to Adty., 218, 13.3.15.

⁸ G.O.C., Egypt, to W.O., 752 E, 16.3.15.

⁹ The *Phaeton* had arrived at Gibraltar from England on March 4. The Admiralty ordered her to return home to join the Home Fleet on March 31. (A 333.)

Lemnos to the Dardanelles, as implying the rapid transport of troops, was illusory. Moreover, the animals must be disembarked very soon, for already some were dying; and he suggested that the Naval division should be sent to Alexandria, the French division to Port Said, leaving the Australian brigade at Lemnos to meet any sudden call for infantry which Admiral de Robeck might make, the base for the whole force being moved from Lemnos to Alexandria.¹ Rear-Admiral John M. de Robeck had succeeded Admiral Carden on the latter being placed on the sick list on March 16, Rear-Admiral Rosslyn Wemyss waiving his seniority and volunteering to serve under de Robeck.²

The necessity for employing the transports bringing Indian troops for Europe had entailed holding up some of the latter in Egypt. In the event this proved to be not inopportune, for on March 3 the British Expeditionary Force in Mesopotamia sustained a reverse at Ahwaz, and owing to the massing of the Turks for an attack on Basra grave anxiety was felt at Simla for the position of our force. On March 5 the Cabinet ordered the Government of India to despatch reinforcements to Mesopotamia, and as part thereof an Indian brigade was to be sent from Egypt. Consequently, on March 9 Admiral Robinson had to provide transports for some 55 officers, 3,500 men and 1,050 animals for Basra.³ Four transports were required, and they left Port Said on March 20 and 22.⁴

87. Admiral Dartige du Fournet arrives on the Syrian Coast, February 28.—The first of Admiral Dartige du Fournet's squadron to arrive in Egypt was the *Jauréguiberry*, which reached Port Said on February 24, flying the flag of the Rear-Admiral Darrieus, and left for the Syrian coast two days later. The Admiralty had arranged that the *Bacchante* should be under the French Vice-Admiral's orders while the *Henri IV* was employed in the Suez Canal under Admiral Peirse.⁵ All was now quiet in the Canal, and consequently the peculiar fighting capabilities of the *Henri IV* were no longer required there; and she left Port Said for the Syrian coast on February 27 when the *Bacchante* returned to Port Said from Alexandretta on relief by the *Doris*.

The *Doris* was placed by Admiral Peirse under the orders of Admiral Dartige du Fournet on February 25 whilst on passage to relieve the *Bacchante* at Alexandretta. The *D'Entrecasteaux*, flying the flag of the French Vice-Admiral, arrived at Alexandretta on 28th, and Captain Larken reported on board. At 6 a.m. on the following day the *Askold* also arrived. On February 28 Admiral Peirse had placed her at Admiral Dartige du Fournet's

¹ General Hamilton to Earl Kitchener, No. M.F.5, 18.3.15.

² See Dardanelles telegrams of date, H.S. 109.

³ Adty. (T) to Admiral Robinson, *Urgent*, 9.3.15. Sent 5.30 p.m.

⁴ *Kelvingrove*, *Colenso*, March 20; *Soldier Prince*, *Chika*, March 22.

⁵ A 306, 307.

disposal, being evidently unaware that at the special request of the Russian Government that she should co-operate in the Dardanelles operations the Admiralty had placed her under Admiral Carden's orders three days previously.¹ On March 1, after inspection of the *Doris*' ship's company by the French Vice-Admiral Captain Larken and Captain Ivanoff of the *Askold* went on board the *D'Entrecasteaux* for a conference with Admiral Dartige du Fournet. Reconnaissance at Beersheba estimated that there were still 30,000 Turkish troops at Beersheba and 4,000 at El Arish with anti-aircraft guns which they used against our reconnoitring seaplanes. It was rumoured that the campaign against Egypt was only undertaken in order to detain British troops.² Heavy artillery was essential for the attack and required a railway for its transport. It was probable that the Germans were the instigators of the expedition, which was unpopular with the Turks. The Turkish officers were having difficulty in dealing with the desertions among their men.

Admiral Dartige du Fournet divided the coasts of Syria and Palestine into three sections.³ The first extended from Mersina to Ruad Island (between Tripolis and Latakia), the second from Ruad Island to Beirut, and the third from Beirut to the Egyptian frontier. For the present the first section was divided into two parts: the *Askold* was to work from Mersina to a point at the north-eastern corner of the Gulf of Alexandretta, while the *Doris* took the southern half of the section, though this arrangement was altered during the afternoon, the *Askold* being sent to Vourlah and the *Doris* being given the entire section temporarily. The French Vice-Admiral wished the enemy to be harassed by every means in the power of the ships. Port Said was to be used as the base for the squadron. Wireless communication with the Syrian squadron and also with the ships at the Dardanelles was ensured by organising Abu Zabal station for that purpose.⁴ Admiral Dartige du Fournet's squadron was reduced on March 22 by the departure of the *Jauréguiberry* and *Henri IV* for the Dardanelles; but on 16th the *D'Estrées*⁵ arrived at Port Said for the Syrian coast, and the *Latouche-Tréville*⁶ joined on March 31 from Morocco.⁷

¹ A 318. The sailing orders given her by Admiral Peirse were dated February 27, 1915, and are in M. 03564/15.

² Athens to Foreign Office, 98, 26.2.15.

³ *Doris*' Letter of Proceedings, M. 02650/15.

⁴ A 308.

⁵ *D'Estrées*, light cruiser, built 1899, 18.3 knots, 2—5.5 in., 4—3.9 in., 1—9 pdr., 8—3 pdr.

⁶ *Latouche-Tréville*, 4,683 tons, 17.5 knots, 2—7.6 in., 6—5.5 in., 4—9-pdr., 4—3-pdr.

⁷ Dartige du Fournet, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

CHAPTER X.

THE BOMBARDMENT OF SMYRNA, MARCH 5-9, 1915.

88. **Precautions against Submarines.**—The Allied naval attack on the Dardanelles commenced on February 19 with the bombardment of the outer forts, and its immediate effect on the Mediterranean was to render increased vigilance necessary against any interruption of the operations by enemy submarines.¹ It had been reported as long ago as December, 1914, that German submarines had been sent to Pola in sections and were being put together there; and now on the opening day of the attack the Admiralty warned Admiral Brock that a most vigilant watch was to be kept for submarines entering the Mediterranean through the Straits of Gibraltar.² To prevent this was no simple matter. The Straits were too deep to be netted, and they were, moreover, an international highway. At the same time, the length of the defile was insufficient to compel a submarine on passage through to come to the surface within the area of the patrols, which were maintained this time by the *Pelorus*³ and *Wear*, 11 torpedo boats,⁴ submarines *B.6*, *B.7* and *B.8*, and the armed boarding steamers *York*, *Richard Welford* and *Grangemouth*.⁵

A strict examination of merchant ships in the Straits of Gibraltar was being carried out by the patrol, similar to that of trade passing into the English Channel or North Sea. This and the pressure exercised by the British and French fleets in the Mediterranean was designed amongst other things to compel the Italian Government to suppress the transit traffic of goods through Italy to Germany and Austria. In the early days of the war this traffic became such a scandal that even the Italian newspapers protested. An energetic propaganda was undoubtedly being conducted from the German consulates in Italy, whose staffs had been augmented for the purpose, with a view to maintaining Germany's commercial position in Italy. By the pressure which the Allies were able to bear through the command of the sea the Italian Government was induced to co-operate in limiting this traffic.⁶

On February 19 the Admiralty also reminded the French Ministry of Marine of the importance of exercising the greatest

¹ Gayer, "Die deutschen U-Boote," Vol. II, p. 12, says that the German Naval authorities decided upon a submarine campaign in the Mediterranean independently of the Dardanelles operations. The rich trade was tempting, and they did not expect to find counter-measures in operation in those waters.

² A 297.

³ Light cruiser, built 1897, 2,135 tons, 17 knots, 8—4 in., 8—3-pdr.

⁴ Nos. 83 and 88-97.

⁵ It is not certain whether all the three boarding steamers were ready at this date.

⁶ See Fayle, "Seaborne Trade."

vigilance in order to prevent Austrian submarines or supply ships of the Turkish Army from leaving Austrian or neutral ports during the Dardanelles operations. The British Consuls in Italy had been instructed to watch carefully the loading of any suspected ships, and the Admiralty suggested that similar instructions should be given to the French Consuls.¹ The Naval Transport Officer at Marseilles had been ordered by the Admiralty on February 7 to warn all transports of the possibility of submarine attack in the Mediterranean. High speed and frequent alterations of course were recommended, and a neutral flag was to be flown, preferably American.²

89. **Watch on the "Fangturm."**—Since it was not possible to ensure that German submarines would be prevented from entering the Mediterranean, their maintenance in those waters must be rendered as difficult as possible. On February 21 it was reported from Gibraltar that a small vessel at the Balearic Islands flying British colours was suspected of being a supply ship for enemy submarines.³ On March 13 the Admiralty received information that the German steamer *Fangturm* was at Palma with 83,000 boxes of petrol on board, and was believed to be destined for use as a submarine supply ship. The French had been watching her since March 3 with an auxiliary cruiser,⁴ and the Admiralty now ordered the Senior Naval Officer, Gibraltar, to despatch the *Pelorus* to keep a continuous watch on her from outside territorial waters.⁵ The departure of the *Pelorus* was, however, delayed owing to boiler defects, and she did not leave until March 22.⁶ Meanwhile, the Spanish Government wished to transfer the *Fangturm* to Port Mahon under escort of one of their warships. But this was opposed by the Admiralty, for in the open bay of Palma a watch could be kept on the suspected vessel which was not possible in the land-locked bay of Port Mahon, at which latter place, moreover, we had no consul.

90. **First Reports of Submarines.**—It was not long before the apprehensions of the Admiralty regarding submarines intending to enter the Mediterranean began to be justified by reports. On February 25 a submarine of unknown nationality was reported off Bilbao, where it was believed that she replenished, and two days later one, presumed to be the same, was reported off Gijon. It appeared from these reports that the submarine was working her way towards the Straits of Gibraltar, and on March 1 the Admiralty warned the Senior Naval Officer, Gibraltar, and told him to take measures to counter her or bring about her destruction. Since her effective radius of action while submerged was reckoned as 80 miles, this entailed covering a very considerable area with the few and comparatively slow

¹ A 298. ² Admiralty to D.N.T.O., Marseilles, 55, 7.2.15. ³ A 302.
⁴ A 319. ⁵ A 323, 324. ⁶ Gibraltar to Adty., 543, 22.3.15.

vessels of the Gibraltar Patrol.¹ At 9 p.m. on the same day the Algeciras-Tangier packet boat *Gibel Dersa* reported sighting a submarine in Tetuan Bay, which, after scrutinising her through a periscope, proceeded in a south-easterly direction at slow speed.²

The defile of the Straits of Gibraltar was not the only way by which the Germans might attempt to send their submarines into the Mediterranean. On March 2 Sir Rennell Rodd, our Ambassador in Rome, telegraphed that he had information from a trustworthy source that three German submarines had been sent overland to Pola in sections to be put together as rapidly as possible for action against the Allied fleets in the Mediterranean; and the Admiralty took the opportunity once again of impressing upon the French the vital importance of preventing the emergence of enemy submarines from the Adriatic. The French Commander-in-Chief, for his part, had information that several Austrian submarines with the *Admiral Spaun* had left Cattaro³ for the Ionian Islands and the Greek coasts, and he sent a warning to the *Waldeck-Rousseau*, the flagship of Rear-Admiral De Gueydon, commanding the 1st Division of the French 1st Cruiser Squadron, which had been carrying out the patrol of the Straits of Otranto since the torpedoing of the *Jean-Bart* and withdrawal of the battleships.⁴ The Austrians at this time probably possessed six submarines, in addition to the French *Curie*, which had now been salvaged. The Austrian fleet had recently evinced renewed activity in the Adriatic, for on March 1 five warships entered the port of Antivari and bombarded the town, sinking the Royal yacht and doing other damage. In view of the submarine menace all ships making Malta were warned to approach at high speed on a zigzag course. On February 26 Admiral Limpus had asked the Admiralty for another small vessel to assist the *Imogene* in watching the small bays and islets of Malta and Gozo, the sea-keeping qualities of the torpedo boats being insufficient for the purpose; and the Admiralty were sending out the gunboat *Harrier*.⁵ They now permitted the Admiral Superintendent to retain for the present the *Triad*, a yacht which had been taken up and armed and was under orders to join the patrols in Home Waters.⁶ On March 2 the Admiralty urged upon the French Ministry of Marine the vital importance of maintaining an effective anti-submarine watch on the mouth of the Adriatic.⁷ At the Dardanelles, Admiral Carden was taking his own precautions.

¹ A 309, 310.

² S.N.O., Gibraltar, to Adty., 424, 2.3.16. The s/m, if any, was not German.

³ No place is mentioned, but by inference the French Commander-in-Chief intended Cattaro.

⁴ A 315.

⁵ She arrived at Malta March 30.

⁶ A.S., Malta, to Adty., 561, 2.3.15, and reply 391, 4.3.15.

⁷ A 313.

91. **The Bombardment of Smyrna.**¹—On the flank of the lines of communication with Mudros and within striking distance of the Dardanelles operations lay Smyrna, a possible base for the operations of hostile submarines against the Allied squadron. In order to prevent it being put to this use by the enemy the Admiralty determined to destroy the forts by bombardment, so that it might become possible to blockade the port closely.

On March 22 they ordered Admiral Peirse to take charge of the bombardment. He was to proceed with despatch in the *Euryalus*, in which he had hoisted his flag on February 25 when the *Swiftsure* left his command to join Admiral Carden at the Dardanelles. The latter was to detach two battleships to join him at a rendezvous in 38.50 N. 26.35 E. (south of Mitylene). The replenishment of the magazines and shell rooms of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean was no light matter, and the Admiralty ordered Admiral Peirse to bombard deliberately, making use of the superior range of his guns and to destroy the batteries without injuring the town. No landing was contemplated, and on the conclusion of the operation the ships were to disperse and return to their respective commands.²

Information as to the defences of Smyrna³ was supplemented by reports from the *Sapphire* and *Doris*, obtained while working on the coast; and in addition the Admiralty telegraphed such information as was in their possession. The main defence was said to consist of Fort Hamidieh or Yenikale, situated on a low-lying spit of land on the southern shore of the Gulf of Smyrna, 6½ miles from the town, where seven short 10 in. guns were mounted, and possibly some light Q.F. and field guns. At Paleo Tabia the Admiralty reported that there were four 6 in. guns with a range of 12,000 yards⁴; and from the *Doris*' report of March 4 Admiral Peirse might expect to be opposed by four more 6 in. guns about a mile inland on the southern shore. The Admiralty warned him against two minefields, the outer situated abreast Y⁵ and B batteries, and the inner between Fort Hamidieh and Sanjak Spit.

Admiral Peirse left Port Said at 3.30 p.m. on March 3 and arrived at the rendezvous at 9 a.m.⁶ on 5th. Here he met the *Swiftsure* and *Triumph*,⁷ which Admiral Carden detached for the operation, together with five minesweeping trawlers⁸; and the force left at 11 a.m. for the Gulf of Smyrna.

¹ Report of Proceedings by C.-in-C., E.I. (M. 02645/15 and M. 02646/15), and logs of vessels engaged.

² A 311, 311a.

³ See Plan V.

⁴ It was discovered during the bombardment that only two guns were mounted here.

⁵ The Adty. telegram says "abreast batteries A and B," but battery A is that referred to by Admiral Peirse as Y, and is so named on Plan V.

⁶ Report of Proceedings. But *Euryalus*' log gives time as 6.37 a.m., and states that *Swiftsure*, *Triumph*, and trawlers arrived at 8.30 a.m.

⁷ Each 4—10 in., 14—7.5 in., 14—14 pdr., 2—12 pdr., 4—6 pdr.

⁸ Nos. 285, 293, 308, 632, 1043.

The approach was made close to the western shore of the Gulf in order to keep out of range of guns which the *Sapphire* reported were mounted on Dava Burnu, at the eastern entrance to the Gulf.¹ If any guns were mounted there, which appeared to Admiral Peirse unlikely, they remained silent; and the squadron stood in to within 14,000 yards of Yenikale and then turned to engage the fort. The *Euryalus* opened fire at 1.48 p.m., but after about an hour, during which time nine hits were observed, as none of the reported batteries had replied, she closed to 10,000 yards from Yenikale² in order to bring a more accurate fire to bear. She opened fire again at 3.30 p.m. and continued for another hour with better apparent results, though the batteries still refrained from disclosing themselves, nor could they be located. As the light was now failing, the ships were withdrawn for the night to an anchorage close to Long Island, a large island in the centre of the Gulf. The existence of the searchlights which had been reported along the southern shore was disclosed when night fell.

Admiral Peirse gave orders that on the following morning the *Triumph* was to weigh and proceed at 6 o'clock to the position taken up during the second phase of the previous day, accompanied by the minesweepers. She was to fire a few rounds at the fort, and the minesweepers were then to sweep three times through the minefield, up to 3,000 yards of the fort, followed the third time by the *Triumph*, who would be supported by the *Euryalus* and *Swiftsure*.

The *Triumph* fired a few rounds at the fort as ordered at 7.35 a.m., and ten minutes later the minesweepers began to get their sweeps out. But suddenly the programme was upset, for before sweeping could begin several batteries of small guns opened a heavy fire on the minesweepers from various points along the south shore, while the 6 in. battery at Paleo Tabia disclosed itself at the same time, together with two other batteries in the hills which all opened a brisk fire on the *Triumph*. The minesweepers were at once ordered out of range, and the ships proceeded to engage the batteries. The *Triumph* and *Euryalus* were each hit six times before the Paleo Tabia battery ceased firing at 8.45 a.m. Battery B continued to fire until 9.20 a.m., though apparently without making any hits. Fort Hamidieh was only observed to fire one round. Soon after 10 a.m. the ships ceased firing and withdrew out of range. The *Euryalus* had six men wounded, and the *Triumph* had one officer killed³ and one slightly wounded. The ships suffered no serious damage.

By 2 p.m. the ships were back again in their bombarding positions between Pelican Spit and the southern shore. The light

¹ See Chart 1645.

² Position BB on Plan V.

³ Prob. Mid. John S. Griffiths, R.N.R.

was now better and Battery X (four 6 in.), Y (five 4.7 in.), and B (three field guns)¹ were definitely located. Battery Z, mounting guns of about 4.7 in. calibre, high up in the hills, could not be accurately located, nor could the batteries of light guns along the shore be discovered, though they had been firing during the forenoon.

The *Euryalus* opened fire at 1.50 p.m.² on battery X at Paleo Tabia, at the same time sending two minesweepers towards the minefield in order to draw the fire of the other two batteries. They were fired on from Battery Y, after advancing about a mile beyond the squadron, and they immediately withdrew out of range, while the ships opened a general fire on the batteries which had been located. As soon as the minesweepers were out of range fire was checked, and was then continued deliberately until 3.30 p.m., when the ships ceased firing and withdrew. In contradistinction to their policy of the forenoon, the Turks refrained from firing on the ships during the whole of the afternoon and contented themselves with firing on the minesweepers when the latter approached closely enough. In spite of the accuracy of the fire of the batteries at ranges under 5,000 yards, the minesweepers escaped damage. The enemy again burned searchlights on shore during the night.

At 8.30 a.m. next day (March 7) the squadron proceeded to the bombarding position 8,000 yards west of Paleo Tabia point, arriving at 10.15 a.m. The *Swiftsure*, which had located the position of Battery Z, opened deliberate fire on it and battery B at 11.15 a.m., continuing until 12.30 p.m., when the ships withdrew. The *Aenne Rickmers*, a captured German merchant ship, now used as a seaplane carrier, had arrived at 3 p.m. on 6th with two French seaplanes on board. Engine trouble and the rising wind prevented one of the seaplanes, which attempted a flight, from carrying out any useful observations. In the afternoon the first decisive result against the batteries was achieved, for the *Triumph* stood in close to Battery B, which was sited near the shore, and completely destroyed the field guns in it, blowing up two bomb-proof shelters and what appeared to be a searchlight. The shore batteries remained silent throughout the day.

The operations up to date had made it clear to Admiral Peirse that the destruction of the shore batteries would be a prolonged and difficult task. Although some of the guns of the batteries in the hills could be seen in certain conditions of light, it was by no means clear that they were not dummies. Owing to the undulating nature of the country and the absence of conspicuous marks to lay on, it was impossible to ensure the destruction of the batteries unless the ships approached to within short range.

¹ 299 from C.-in-C., E.I., to Adty. (via A.S., Malta, 618, 7.3.15), and Admiral Peirse's Report, para. 28, says battery B contained three field guns; but para. 39 of the Report says there were four field guns.

² Log. But Admiral Peirse's Report give the time as 2.40 p.m.

With the exception, however, of Battery B, which the *Triumph* had destroyed, none of the batteries could be approached sufficiently closely for this purpose on account of the minefield. As experience had proved that sweeping by day exposed the minesweepers to unjustifiable risks, Admiral Peirse decided to attempt to destroy or prevent the use of the searchlights by gun-fire at night; afterwards to sweep a sufficiently broad channel through the minefield to permit any ship that entered to turn round and withdraw; and finally to complete the destruction of the batteries by fire from the ships at short range.

With this object, the *Triumph* anchored after dark that night (March 7) in a position about two miles S.W. from Pelican Spit, and fired at the searchlights whenever one was switched on. The result was that the Turks never turned the lights for more than five seconds at a time, and although the *Triumph* did not succeed in hitting any of them, the period of illumination was too short to enable the enemy guns to fire. No sweeping was carried out that night owing to a misapprehension on the part of the sweepers; and the *Triumph* had to retire about midnight, before the moon rose.

Conditions on the following day (March 8) were unsuitable for seaplane reconnaissance. The light was bad, but the ships carried out a bombardment of Fort Hamidieh for over an hour, at a range of 10,000 yards,¹ 54 hits being observed.² It was seen that the Turks had mounted another field gun in Battery B in place of those destroyed by the *Triumph*. During the bombardment the *Askold* had been observed firing at Vourla, where she reported that she had been fired on by a battery near Vourla Skala.³ Accordingly, in the afternoon, the *Euryalus* investigated Vourla, but although apparent gun emplacements could be seen no guns were observed, nor was fire opened. While the *Euryalus* was thus engaged, the *Triumph* and *Swiftsure* proceeded to bombard batteries X and Y at 8,000 yards range. The former scored a hit on one of the guns in battery X, whereupon batteries X, Y and Z opened a heavy fire on the ships, hitting the *Triumph* twice, though without causing material damage or casualties, and continued for half an hour. The ships continued a deliberate bombardment for a further half-hour and then withdrew.

Sweeping was successfully carried out after dark, covered by the *Triumph* and *Swiftsure*, which fired at the searchlights as on the previous night. The minesweepers, led by Lieutenant Whitehouse, R.N.R., were apparently not perceived by the enemy, nor were they fired at. Unfortunately, after the channel had been swept, minesweeper No. 285 struck a mine near Pelican Spit Buoy and sank almost immediately, with loss of 10 lives.

¹ *Euryalus*' log gives the range as 8,000 yards.

² Seaplane reconnaissance on 9th reported that of the seven guns in the Fort, the three facing north appeared to have been destroyed.

³ Position of battery as given by *Askold* 38° 21' 7" N., 26° 47' 4" E.

On March 7 Admiral Peirse had received from the American Consul-General at Smyrna a message¹ that the Turks claimed that we were bombarding unfortified villages, and consequently the Military Governor of the place was proceeding to arrest all male belligerent subjects, who were to be placed at unfortified points bombarded by our ships. The Admiralty had informed Admiral Peirse on the previous day that the Vali of Smyrna had recently shown friendliness to British and French subjects, and instructed him, as soon as he had destroyed the forts, to get in touch with the Vali and try to come to a friendly understanding with him, instructions which they repeated on 10th when the difficulties of the operation were found to be greater than at first anticipated.² Accordingly, Admiral Peirse, while denying the charge that unfortified villages were being bombarded, sent an intimation to the American Consul-General at Smyrna that he had a communication to make to the Vali, and named the hour of noon on March 9 as the time at which he would expect an envoy to be sent out.

At daylight on 9th the Turks were observed to be sinking two steamers in the narrows off Fort Hamidieh. At 10 a.m. the *Triumph* and *Swiftsure* proceeded to their bombardment positions, displaying white flags, and awaited the expected envoy from the Vali. Noon passed, but no envoy arrived. Instead, at 12.15 p.m. Battery X opened fire on the *Triumph*. Both ships hauled down their white flags and replied, and after a few minutes, no damage having been done and the battery having ceased fire, they withdrew out of range. At 3 p.m. they returned to their bombarding positions and opened deliberate fire: the *Triumph* at Battery X, and the *Swiftsure* at a battery west of Chiflik village,³ which had opened fire for the first time this afternoon at a seaplane from the *Aenne Rickmers* which was making a reconnaissance. Three-quarters of an hour later a small boat was observed approaching from Vourla, flying a white flag. The ships ceased firing, the envoy, who was accompanied by the United States Consul-General,⁴ came aboard and Admiral Peirse handed to the envoy the following communication:—

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to inform you that, having reduced your forts to silence, it is my duty to demand:—

- (a) The unconditional surrender and destruction of all forts and batteries on the shores of the Gulf of Smyrna.
- (b) That a channel into the harbour of Smyrna be cleared of mines so as to admit of free entry.

¹ Sent via Malta on March 6, as the Consul-General had no means of communicating with Admiral Peirse direct.


² A 316.

³ See Plan V.


⁴ Mr. George Horton.

PLAN . V .

OPERATIONS AGAINST SMYRNA
 MARCH 1915
 FROM ADMLT. CHART N° 1645 AND
 M.O. 2645/15 AND CB. 1101.



AA. TURKISH BUOYS THRO' MINEFIELD
 BB. USUAL POSITIONS OF BOMBARDING SHIPS



2. I may, however, assure Your Excellency that the Allied Governments are animated by the humane desire to avoid further bloodshed and to spare your city and vilayet of Smyrna from the horrors of war. They therefore hope that Your Excellency's well-known humanity and personal goodwill will induce the acceptance of these demands without forcing me to the unpleasant duty of continuing military operations, in whatever direction I may deem necessary to enforce compliance.

3. By this time Your Excellency must be fully aware of the deplorable situation in which Turkey has been plunged by Enver Pasha and his following, at the self-seeking instigation of Germany, in which friendship for Turkey has no part.

4. By accepting the advice of false friends, Turkey has estranged herself from Great Britain and her Allies, thus rupturing the friendly relations that have existed for generations with the former.

5. The result has been disastrous for Turkey. The Russian forces are advancing after decisive victories in the Caucasus. The attempted invasion of Egypt has utterly failed. Constantinople itself is about to fall into the hands of the Allies.

6. It must, therefore, be apparent to Your Excellency that the ultimate victory will lie with the Allies, who all the world over have always shown themselves the true friends of Islam.

7. I wish you to understand that the Allied Governments bear Your Excellency no ill-will, and that, having accepted my terms stated above, further negotiations might possibly be to Your Excellency's advantage.

8. It is no part of the policy of the Allies to make war upon innocent populations, and should the people of your city and vilayet be in want or distress as a result of the ravages of war, I would acquaint Your Excellency that considerable means are at my disposal which might conceivably be used for alleviating that distress.

9. I must request Your Excellency to grant me an answer in English or French to the above demands by 10 a.m. tomorrow, Wednesday, March 10.

10. Assuring Your Excellency of my most distinguished consideration. I have the honour to be,

Your Excellency's obedient Servant,

(Signed) R. H. PEIRSE,

Vice-Admiral.

Admiral Peirse gave a verbal guarantee that if his terms were accepted he would neither occupy nor do harm to the city of Smyrna, nor would he interfere with the civil government; but the Turks must undertake to make no further use of Smyrna as a naval or military base. A truce was arranged until 10 a.m. on March 11, by which time a reply was promised to Admiral Peirse's communication.

The next day (March 10) was spent by the ships at anchor with the white flag flying. At 2 a.m. on the 11th the sound of an explosion was heard, and immediately afterwards the *Aenne Rickmers* reported she had been torpedoed. It was a pitch dark night, but an officer and a signalman on board the

Euryalus descried the flame from a steamboat's funnel going away from the torpedoed ship.¹

The ships were ordered to weigh and retire, and the wounded from the *Aenne Rickmers* were taken on board the *Euryalus*, most of her Greek crew also pulling over in the ship's boats. When daylight came it was discovered that the foremost hold only of the *Aenne Rickmers* was flooded, and after the bulkhead had been shored up and a collision mat rigged she was sent under convoy of the *Swiftsure* to Mudros. An unfortunate sequel to the affair was that in endeavouring to recover one of the aeroplane carrier's boats which had drifted ashore during the night, the *Swiftsure's* picket boat was fired on from the shore, and the sub-lieutenant² was dangerously, and a petty officer and an able seaman were slightly wounded. Admiral Peirse did not consider the attack on the *Aenne Rickmers* to be a violation of the truce, since the enemy craft by which it was made, having been hidden among the islands near Vourla, was unlikely to know of the arrangement. The enemy were observed at daylight busy sinking another large steamer in the narrows off Fort Hamidieh, and the channel, already encumbered with wrecks, was now considered to be completely blocked.

The Vali's reply to Admiral Peirse's letter arrived during the morning. It was somewhat uncompromising; but Admiral Peirse had reason to believe that by proposing to continue the negotiations he might obtain better terms than the military situation warranted; and he accordingly proposed a truce. The negotiations were conducted by an officer on the General Staff³ who was personally known to the officials at Smyrna, Admiral Peirse modifying somewhat his original terms in the hope of effecting his purpose. But it was found that the Vali was merely temporising. The principal object of the bombardment had been achieved, in that it caused the enemy to block the port by sinking ships, and as no advantage was to be gained by any further demonstration, which would merely result in loss of prestige unless followed up in earnest by a large force,⁴ Admiral Peirse terminated the truce at 9 a.m. on March 14, and the squadron left the port at 11.30 a.m. The *Swiftsure* had not returned from Mudros after convoying there the *Aenne Rickmers*. Both she and the *Triumph* were required again by Admiral Carden; the *Triumph* parted company on 15th, and at 6 a.m. on the following day Admiral Peirse at sea off the Gulf of Smyrna received orders from the Admiralty to return to Egypt.⁵

¹ It was subsequently ascertained that on March 9 one of the trawlers saw a "torpedo boat" come from out behind Long Island and retreat again behind the island on sighting the British Squadron. Admiral Peirse considered the *Aenne Rickmers* was probably damaged by a towed mine.

² Sub-Lieutenant Archie A. S. Murray.

³ Captain Deedes. He arrived in the *Dublin* at 4 p.m., March 11.

⁴ C.-in-C., E.I., to Adty., 247, 14.3.15. Sent 13.3.15.

⁵ A 320.

CHAPTER XI.

TURKISH PRESSURE ON EGYPT RENEWED.
ALLIED FORCES LAND AT THE DARDANELLES,
APRIL 25, 1915.

92. **The Red Sea Patrols, March to May, 1915.**—Admiral Peirse returned to Port Said in the *Euryalus* on March 18. His squadron had been augmented by the French cruiser *Montcalm*,¹ which arrived at Suez from China on 13th of the month, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral A. L. M. Huguet, commanding the French ships on the China station, and was placed under Admiral Peirse's orders by the French Admiralty on 15th.² On the same day the Admiralty inquired of the Senior Naval Officer, Egypt,³ whether there were any vessels in Egyptian waters suitable for employment as fleet sweepers; for the attack on the Narrows at the Dardanelles was imminent, and it was necessary, when the Allied fleet reached the Sea of Marmora, that it should be accompanied by faster minesweepers than the trawlers which Admiral Carden was now using.⁴ One vessel only, the yacht *Ceylon*, was available,⁵ and she was requisitioned on March 23 and left Port Said for Mudros on April 1. Meanwhile, on March 15, the Admiralty sent orders that the Malta torpedo boats in the Suez Canal were to be sent to the Dardanelles,⁶ and they left in charge of the *Doris* on 17th.⁷

The Red Sea patrols were now being carried out by the Empress liners assisted by French and R.I.M. ships. The French cruiser *Desaix*⁸ arrived at Suez on March 3 and left on 10th for the Red Sea, where she was Senior Officer's ship, Northern Section, until the arrival of the *Montcalm*.⁹ Another addition to the Northern Patrol was the Egyptian gunboat *Nurelbahr*, which was detailed for the patrol during March. At the end of February a small force of Egyptian troops was placed at Abu Zenima to protect the mining interests from raids. On 4th the *Bruix* and *Dufferin* left Suez for the Northern Patrol, and on 7th and 8th the latter reported the discovery of eight floating mines washed up on the beach on the north side of Tiran Island, at the

¹ 9,177 tons. 2—7.6 in., 8—6.5 in., 4—3 pdr.(?), 2—9 pdr., 16—3 pdr.

² A 322.

³ Apparently Captain P. H. Hall Thompson of the *Philomel*.

⁴ Adty. to Marine, Paris, 1579, 15.3.15.

⁵ S.N.O., Port Said, to Adty., 16.3.15.

⁶ A 321.

⁷ *Philomel's* log. *Doris's* log for this date is not extant.

⁸ 7,547 tons. 8—6.5 in., 4—3.9 in., 2—9 pdr., 10—3 pdr.

⁹ The *Montcalm* probably arrived about March 24; her sailing orders were dated March 22.

entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba.¹ The *Dufferin* was off Mowila² on March 21, and in landing the Political Officer³ under a flag of truce the boat was heavily fired on by enemy concealed in the trees. The *Dufferin* opened fire with her 4·7 in. guns and silenced the enemy's fire, but not before heavy loss had been sustained by the boat's crew. Two men were killed⁴ and the officer in charge of the boat⁵ and ten men were wounded. In consequence of this outrage Admiral Peirse ordered the *Desaix* to destroy the fort at Mowila and any military works, without damaging the town.⁶ The ships of the Northern Patrol were regarded by Admiral Peirse as part of the Suez Canal defensive force, and were liable to be ordered up to the Canal at short notice.⁷

The three Empress liners⁸ were employed mainly in the southern part of the Red Sea, the patrol being reinforced on March 20 by the *Northbrook* which returned from Bombay. On April 15 Admiral Peirse telegraphed home that experience had proved these liners to be too large for the Red Sea patrol. They had a big coal consumption and were expensive to run, and it would be advantageous to replace them by smaller vessels of less draught, though he advocated the retention of one Empress liner, to be used to impress the natives by her bulk. Admiral Peirse suggested that three gunboats of the *Britomart* class should be used for watching the Turkish ports; and for the Southern Patrol two or three small armed merchant cruisers about the size of the *Osiris*, a fast little P. and O. boat of some 1,700 tons employed in the Mediterranean in peace time, which had been commissioned at Malta on August 5, 1914, as an auxiliary cruiser, and employed for a time on despatch and similar duties. The *Osiris* was not available, nor could the Admiralty send from England any vessels except trawlers, whose speed was insufficient for the work of patrolling in the Red Sea; and they suggested to Admiral Peirse that he should take up, man, and arm locally suitable steamers in place of one Empress class, and arrange with Hong Kong for a gunboat⁹ in place of the *Empress of Russia*, which had left on March 25 to refit at Hong Kong, this promising to be quicker than sending her to Colombo.¹⁰ But it was doubtful whether an old China gunboat would be of much service in the Red Sea, where at certain seasons she would have strong head-winds to contend with, and moreover it would be some time before she

¹ *Dufferin's* L. of P., 27.3.15 (M. 03106/15).

² 27° 40' N., 35° 29' E. See Plan XI.

³ Captain R. G. Anderson.

⁴ Includes one died of wounds.

⁵ Lieutenant Charles H. Corser, R.I.M.

⁶ M. 02837/15 C.C.E.I., L. of P.

⁷ Sailing orders for *Montcalm*, March 22.

⁸ The *Himalaya* was employed on the Northern Patrol.

⁹ The telegram reads "gunboats."

¹⁰ A 326. 338.

could arrive, and the Admiralty on April 17 ordered Admiral Peirse to suspend action as regards the turning over of the crew of the *Empress of Russia*, about which he had already telegraphed to China.¹ After a month, however, of fruitless endeavour to obtain suitable steamers Admiral Peirse telegraphed home that they were practically impossible to obtain locally. The only guns available to arm them would be the 4·7 in. guns mounted in the Empress steamers, and moreover there was also the difficulty of manning them, for the discharge of the Empress steamers from Admiralty charter would release only a small proportion of their personnel for other services. Admiral Peirse repeated his request that trawlers should be sent to him. Armed with two 12 pdr. guns or one 12 pdr. and one 3 pdr. they would be suitable for inshore work, their speed being generally sufficient to deal with dhows; and if six of them were sent him he could send home two Empress steamers and the *Himalaya*.²

The low state of the Turkish funds had caused the subsidies to some of the Arab chiefs to be in arrears; and the work of our Political Officers in the Hedjaz and Yemen, aided by the economic pressure exerted by the patrolling ships, had gradually wrung at least lip service from the Arabs, who were shrewd enough to understand, despite the organised circulation of false news by the notorious Agence Ottomane and other means, that the advantage in this area lay with Great Britain over the Turks, and that it was due to the latter that they were suffering the discomforts of the food blockade. At ports where policy demanded it the blockade was, therefore, suspended.³ A treaty was concluded with the powerful Shaikh Idrisi by the British Government on April 28.

93. **The Philomel off Somaliland.**⁴—In Somaliland trouble had once more arisen with the Mullah, Muhammad ibn Abdulla Hassan. In 1914 he moved up from Tale and established himself at Medishi and Jidali, 125 miles north of Tale and 25 miles from the sea at the Gulf of Aden. On February 1, 1915, a force was despatched from Burao⁵ which destroyed the Mullah's stronghold at Sheimber Berris in the Burdab hills. On April 5 Mr. G. F. Archer, the Commissioner for Somaliland, who was then in England, drew attention to the serious situation created by the presence of the Mullah's stronghold at Jidali; it was arranged that a force of 600 native infantry from Aden and 400 local Camel Corps should be formed to deal with the situation; and on April 16 the Admiralty informed Admiral Peirse that the expedition would be despatched on the arrival of the Commissioner in the P. and O. steamer *Egypt*. The *Philomel*

¹ C.-in-C., E.I., to Adty., 358, 16.4.15, and A 344.

² C.-in-C., E.I., to Adty., 472, 14.5.15.

³ A complete description of the state of affairs in this region is outside the scope of this monograph. Some notes are in M. 03457/15 and M. 04841/15.

⁴ Papers titled S.A. 359/15.

⁵ About 100 miles S.S.E. of Berbera.

was to co-operate with the military force, taking on board two 12 pdr. guns, for which she was to provide crews and a small escort when landed.

The *Philomel* at this time was on the point of leaving Port Said with two sternwheel river gunboats, the *Sakhara* and *Cynthia*, which the Egyptian Government had offered for employment in Mesopotamia, where there was a great shortage of river craft for the operations. She left on 18th, towing one gunboat, while a collier, the *Silverwings*, had the other in tow. At Aden the *Philomel* was to leave her gunboat, and arrangements were to be made for another ship to take it on.¹ In the event, however, both gunboats failed to withstand the weather and sank on the voyage down the Red Sea. The *Philomel* went on to Aden, which she reached on April 28. The Commissioner arrived on May 2. By now, however, difficulties had arisen in the hinterland of Aden, which was practically invested on the land side by the Turks. Consequently, troops for Somaliland could not be spared from Aden, and it was decided to postpone the expedition. Meanwhile the Commissioner embarked on board the *Philomel* on the evening of May 5, and a reconnaissance was carried out on the Makhir coast. The presence of the warship exerted considerable moral effect on the natives, and also on the forces of the Mullah; and on May 10 information was received that the latter had practically all quitted Jidali for the Haroun. The *Philomel* remained off the Somali coast until May 18, on which evening she left for Aden, the Admiralty having directed that she was to await orders in the vicinity of that port.²

94. Concentration of Troops in Egypt for Dardanelles Operations.—The naval attack on the Narrows at the Dardanelles took place on March 18 and resulted in the repulse of the Allied squadron, with the loss of the *Ocean*, *Irresistible*, and *Bouvet*, and serious damage to the *Inflexible* and *Gaulois*. There was no weakening, however, of the determination of the British Government to force the passage, and preparations were at once made for a renewal of the attempt with the assistance of the army.

Steps were taken to replace the lost and damaged ships. The French Ministry of Marine ordered the *Henri IV.*, of the Syrian squadron, to be transferred from the Syrian coast to the Dardanelles,³ and she left Port Said on March 22. The Admiralty were sending out the *Queen* and *Implacable* to the Dardanelles, and they now ordered the *Prince of Wales* and *London* to follow them.⁴ On 24th, too, the Commander-in-Chief at the Cape⁵ was ordered to transfer his flag from the *Goliath* to the *Hyacinth*, for the former was to proceed to Suez, where she would be held

¹ A 342.

² A 364.

³ A 325.

⁴ Adty. to Vice-Admiral de Robeck, 120, 20.3.15. The *Prince of Wales* flew the flag of Rear-Admiral Stuart Nicholson.

⁵ Rear-Admiral H. G. King-Hall, C.V.O., C.B., D.S.O.

in reserve for the Dardanelles operations.¹ Both the Naval and Military commanders were convinced that to enable the Fleet effectively to force the Straits the co-operation of the entire military force detailed would be necessary²; and it was decided, owing to the lack of water and landing facilities at Lemnos, to form a base at Alexandria and to concentrate and rearrange the troops there in readiness for action. The Naval Division was now withdrawn to Port Said, while the 29th Division, which was on its way out from England,³ and the French division under General D'Amade, were sent to Alexandria, the only troops left at Lemnos being the brigade of A.N.Z.A.C.s which had been despatched from Egypt. By the end of March the Naval Division was concentrated at Port Said, and the French division and the first group of the 29th Division had reached Alexandria.

95. Turkish Pressure on Egypt Renewed.—Indications now began to appear of a renewal of Turkish pressure on Egypt. Continuous activity was reported on the advance section of the railway from Syria to Egypt; the embankment was said to be complete as far as Beersheba, where there was a large concentration of troops. The conscription and collection of military stores by the Turks was proceeding actively in Syria, and the civil population was short of food; the crops and grazing in southern Syria were said to be suffering from the ravages of locusts. Further dissensions were reported between the Arabs, Turks and Germans. The War Office estimated that there were 50,000 enemy troops in Syria, Palestine and Sinai, and a further 5,000 in the southern Yemen and on the Aden frontier.⁴ At daylight on March 22 there was a skirmish at El Kubri between our troops and the Turks; and the *Philomel* and *Requin* moved into the Canal which Admiral Peirse was having swept for mines. The *Doris* returned to Port Said from escorting the Malta torpedo boats to the Dardanelles on March 28, and left for the Syrian coast on April 2, the Admiralty giving orders that whilst operating with the French 3rd Squadron she was to conform to the French Vice-Admiral's rules and directions.⁵ The *Chatham* was expected to complete her refit at Bombay on March 31 and was then to proceed to Suez. On April 4, however, the Admiralty cancelled this order and directed her to return temporarily to East Africa, where she had been employed prior to her refit.⁶ For on March 1 the British Government had declared a blockade of German East Africa, and operations were in progress for the destruction of the

¹ A 330. The *Goliath* had been refitting at Simonstown. She reached Aden on April 9 and went straight through to the Dardanelles in view of the needs of the operations.

² General Hamilton to Earl Kitchener, No. M.F. 24, 23.3.15.

³ Twenty-one transports left Avonmouth March 16-23, one left March 29.

⁴ C.-in-C., E.I., to Adty., 259, 20.3.15, and H.S. 110, p. 49.

⁵ A 329, 334a.

⁶ A 331. The Admiralty ordered her to join the V.-A., E.M.S., on May 16.

German light cruiser *Königsberg*, which had taken refuge in the Rufiji River.

The landing of the Allied troops and decisive attack on the Dardanelles was expected to take place during April, and the Admiralty warned Admiral Peirse that all available British ships from Egypt would be required to co-operate outside the Straits on that day; he would be apprised by Admiral de Robeck of the date on which the ships would be required. Admiral Peirse himself was to remain in Egypt, transferring his flag to one of his small cruisers and sending the *Euryalus* to the Dardanelles, provided the military situation on the Canal permitted the withdrawal of his armoured ships for a few days.¹

Our advance parties were in touch with Turkish camelry four miles from Kantara on April 7 and the *Montcalm* proceeded to Ismailia. The *Bacchante* and *Philomel* returned to Port Said on April 8 from Suez and the Great Bitter Lakes respectively, and Admiral Peirse arranged that the *Bacchante* and *Euryalus* should leave for Lemnos on 10th if there were no further developments²; subject to the weather conditions being suitable, it was hoped to carry out the landing at the Dardanelles on April 14. They left on the morning of the 10th as arranged, and Admiral Peirse transferred his flag to the *Proserpine*. The *Goliath*, which on March 25 the Admiralty had ordered to Suez from East Africa to be held in reserve for the Dardanelles, arrived at Aden on April 9. She left late that night for Suez, and on the following day the Admiralty ordered her to join Admiral de Robeck at Mudros.³ On April 11, owing to tracks being observed on the east bank of the Canal, Hopper No. 32⁴ was directed to sweep for mines, and a Turkish mine was found and removed from the fairway at mile 20.2. Indications of the Turkish expedition against Egypt continued to be manifest, and the ships on the Syrian coast⁵ were employed in harassing the enemy's advance and preventing his supply by sea.⁶ On April 12 the *Saint Louis* shelled two Turkish camps at Gaza composed of three brigades, her bombardment being completed

¹ A 332.

² C.-in-C., E.I., to Adty., 326, 8.4.15.

³ A 335.

⁴ Lieutenant E. H. Marsden, R.I.M.

⁵ *Saint-Louis*, *D'Entrecasteaux*, *D'Estrées*, *Latouche Tréville* and *Doris*. The *Jauréguiberry* and *Henri IV* had left for the Dardanelles, and also apparently the *Ashold*.

⁶ "Leur activité porte d'ailleurs ses fruits," states Admiral Dartige du Fournet, "le ravitaillement des Turcs par mer peut être considéré comme arrêté. Parfois un petit cabotage ennemi se risque à longer la côte; mais il ne tarde pas à être poursuivi et capturé. Quand il se réfugie dans les hauts fonds inaccessibles à nos grands tirants d'eau, nos embarcations lui donnent la chasse, le forcent à s'échouer et échangent de temps à autre des coups de fusil avec les postes ennemis qui surveillent la côte, tandis que leur bâtiment les soutient de son feu . . . Des jours entiers s'écoulaient sans qu'une voile ou une fumée paraisse à l'horizon . . . (Op. cit., p. 21.) But see Section 143.

by aerial bombing; on 16th she was down at El Arish shelling the forts and trenches, and after an aerial bombardment of the camp at Gaza on 17th and 18th by aircraft carried on board the *Rabenhels*, the *Saint Louis* again shelled it. On 19th Admiral Peirse reported to the Admiralty that the pressure on the north of Sinai seemed to have checked the active advance of the Turks to the Canal.¹ There were indications on 22nd of a possible attack of our post at Tor Abu Zenima on the Gulf of Suez, and the *Desaix* and some troops were being held in readiness to reinforce if necessary.²

The combined naval and military attack on the Dardanelles was now imminent, and the troops and stores, redistributed amongst the transports conveniently for landing, were being despatched from Egypt to Mudros. On April 18, in consequence of the attack on the transport *Manitou* two days previously in the Dardanelles area, by the Turkish torpedo boat *Demir-Hissar*, which had escaped the vigilance of the *Minerva* and two destroyers watching Smyrna, the sailing of transports was stopped for 24 hours, although Admiral de Robeck had arranged to escort them through the danger area. On hearing of the interruption in the transport of troops the Admiralty at once sent orders that this vital service was to be resumed, and that Admiral de Robeck alone was to decide when the dangers of the passage were such as to necessitate the concentration of troops being delayed.³

Suddenly, on April 29, after a week of calm, Admiral Peirse telegraphed home that the enemy's advance party was close to the Canal in several places, and there were indications that the main attack might be expected shortly; and he asked for the immediate return of the *Bacchante* and *Euryalus*.⁴ The Allied forces had landed at the Dardanelles four days previously, and were now committed to the adventure, and the Admiralty probably doubted whether Admiral de Robeck would be able to spare any of his ships. While ordering him, therefore, to return the two cruisers or their equivalent to Admiral Peirse they informed the French Ministry of Marine of the situation, and asked that the Syrian Squadron might be sent to Port Said at once for a few days to consolidate the position. The French Admiralty responded at once by ordering Admiral Dartige du Fournet to send immediately the *Jeanne d'Arc*, *D'Entrecasteaux* and *D'Estrées*; the latter had arrived at Port Said on March 16 to join the Syrian squadron and the *Jeanne d'Arc* had joined Admiral Dartige du Fournet on April 17. Admiral de Robeck's reply was received on April 30. He had despatched the *Goliath*

¹ C.-in-C., E.I., to Adty., 373, 19.4.15.

² C.-in-C., E.I., to Adty., 382, 22.4.15.

³ A 345, 346 and V.-A., E.M.S., to Adty., 382, 18.4.15.

⁴ A 349.

to reinforce the squadron in Egypt, but more he could not do. His plans were worked out to the last man, and already he was short of officers and men for beach and transport work. But the loyal manner in which the French responded to the call for assistance rendered it unnecessary to jeopardise the success of the operations at the Dardanelles by withdrawing ships. On receipt of the telegram from the French announcing the arrangements they were making to reinforce Admiral Peirse, Admiral de Robeck was told that he might recall the *Goliath*.¹

The *Jeanne d'Arc* arrived at Port Said on April 30 and the *D'Entrecasteaux* on the following day.² At daylight on May 1 indications were found of another attempt by the enemy to mine the Canal, at Little Bitter Lake. Traffic was stopped and the Canal was swept; but no mines were found and the Canal was opened to traffic at 6.30 p.m. that day.

Whatever the intentions of the Turks might have been they failed to materialise. A small skirmish occurred on April 29, when our troops attacked the enemy advance guards 15 miles north-east of Ismailia, sustaining some 20 casualties and killing or capturing some 40 of the enemy. On May 3 Admiral Peirse reported that the Turks had withdrawn from touch with the Canal. The discovery and capture on May 6 of some armed rafts in a backwater of Lake Timsah lent substance to the report that General von Kress, commanding the Turkish expedition against the Canal, was planning a surprise obstruction.³ But the Turks were now fully occupied on other fronts, and lack of water and the climatic conditions militated against a resumption of their attack against Egypt until the cold weather should arrive, pending which their object no doubt was to detain as many of our troops as possible in the country on the defence of the Canal. Meanwhile, our valuable Eastern trade *via* the Suez Canal proceeded undisturbed.

The Allied naval commanders were, however, shortly to be faced with a very different problem, namely, that of the German submarines which had now succeeded in penetrating into the Mediterranean.

CHAPTER XII.

U.21 ENTERS THE MEDITERRANEAN, MAY, 1915.

96. Loss of the "Léon-Gambetta," Night, April 26-27.—

After the first rumours in February that German submarines were about to attempt to enter the Mediterranean by the Straits of Gibraltar, some ten weeks passed without anything more substantial than reports such as that from Madrid on March 17, to the effect that a Spanish warship entering the Straits stated she had seen two German submarines. Reports of activity among the Austrian submarines in the Adriatic received substance on the night of April 26-27, when the French armoured cruiser *Léon-Gambetta*, flagship of Rear-Admiral V. B. Senès commanding the 2nd Cruiser Division of the Adriatic blockade,¹ was torpedoed in the Straits of Otranto. The moon was full and the cruiser was steaming at slow speed when she was struck. The loss of life was very heavy. All the officers went down with the ship, and only 136 men out of a complement of over 700 were saved, these thanks to the help of Italian torpedo boats which came out from Taranto and Brindisi.² It was believed that the Austrian submarines were commanded by German officers and manned by German personnel.

On April 14 the Admiralty gave the intelligence officer at Malta a summary of the information in their possession concerning submarines in Austria, namely, that one in sections passed Prague for Pola on March 27, two small ones left Kiel on April 10 by rail for Trieste, and two more were similarly consigned from Danzig two days later. On March 27 there were said to be 12 Germania (Kiel) type submarines in Austria,³ and on April 26 our Consul at Corfu reported he had information from a good source that three more German submarines had arrived at Pola by rail.⁴

97. Guns Mounted in Liners for Anti-Submarine Defence,

April 1.—On April 1 the Admiralty informed Admiral Peirse that it was proposed to fit certain important liners trading to the East with one 4.7 in. gun each for anti-submarine defence. The guns would be mounted at Gibraltar, and as the supply was limited, outward bound liners were to land their gun at Port

¹ There were two independent divisions, each under a Rear-Admiral.

² R. La Bruyère. The submarine which sank the *Léon-Gambetta* was reported to be U.5 (Lieutenant Georg Ritter von Trapp). *Chambre des Députés*, 1920, No. 634 gives the losses as 31 officers and 650 men.

³ Adty. (D.I.D.) to I.O., Malta, 33, 14.4.15 (A 337).

⁴ Gayer, "Die deutschen U-Boote," Vol. II, p. 13, says that the first consignment of small B and C boats sent by rail to Pola comprised nine only, though on p. 24 he enumerates ten, viz.: U.B. 1, 3, 7, 8, 14, 15; U.C. 12, 13, 14, 15. Of these, U.B. 3 (Lieutenant Siegfried Schmidt), U.B. 8 (Lieutenant V. Voigt) and U.B. 7 (Lieutenant Werner) left for the Dardanelles by May 13. U.C. 13 (Lieutenant Kirchner), U.C. 14 (Lieutenant Bauer) and U.C. 15 (Lieutenant v. Dewitz) followed them during May-June to Constantinople. 301, from Berne to F.O., 8.6.15, says that according to information received during last three months 10 submarines reached Pola from Germany, which corroborates Gayer's statement.

¹ A 350-355.

² The date of *D'Estrées'* arrival cannot be ascertained. "Positions of French Ships," April 30 (No. 4553, 2.5.15), gives her position as Port Said. 462 from C.-in-C., E.I., to Adty., says she left Port Said for the Syrian coast May 11.

³ C.-in-C., E.I., to Adty., 433, 6.5.15.

Said, where it would be transferred to a homeward bound vessel. This entailed delay, and as the Government had taken up large numbers of their ships the mail steamer lines were working with the minimum of vessels, and any delay at Gibraltar entailed a similar delay in the next sailing from home. The Admiralty ordered the work to proceed without intermission, by day and night, but the ships were not to be delayed more than two days; if the gun was not mounted by then, the workmen were to accompany the vessel and complete the work on the voyage, though on May 26 permission was given to the Blue Funnel Line to mount their guns on passage home from Port Said through the Mediterranean at the owners' risk, in order to obviate the four days' delay at Port Said.¹

98. **U.21 enters the Mediterranean, May, 1915.**—On May 3 the Foreign Office forwarded to the Admiralty a telegram received from the British Consul at Barcelona containing highly circumstantial, anonymous information concerning three German submarines which were to pass the Straits of Gibraltar on May 2.² Mention was made of Alboran, a Spanish island frequented by smugglers midway between Melilla and the coast of Spain, and the Admiralty evidently considered the information of sufficient importance for action to be taken, for they ordered the Senior Naval Officer, Gibraltar, to send an armed boarding steamer and two torpedo boats to Alboran Island in case a steamer should have gone there for the purpose of supplying submarines. Admiral Brock replied two days later that the senior officer of the torpedo boats reported there was nothing to be seen, and that no ship had been near the island except the weekly provision ship; but he had directed him to remain watching the island for the present.³

It seems, however, that the anonymous letter, whose contents our Consul at Barcelona had forwarded on May 3, contained some germs of truth; for at 3 p.m. on 6th T.B. 92⁴ of the Gibraltar Straits Patrol, which, with T.B. 96 and the armed boarding steamer *York*, was returning to Gibraltar from Alboran, sighted and attempted to ram a German submarine 40 miles west of Alboran Island. The submarine fired a torpedo at T.B. 92 which passed under the boat, and she then made good her escape.⁵

From the evidence it is clear that this was U.21, which early in the year Lieutenant-Commander Hersing had volunteered to try to take from the North Sea to the Mediterranean. After being specially prepared for the voyage, she left the Ems on April 25, and, passing through Fair Island Passage, was met at

¹ A 334, 340, 341, 393, and Adty. to S.N.O., Gibraltar, 604, 10.4.15. See also C.B. 1515 (13), T.H. 13, "Defensive Armament of Merchant Ships."

² Mr. Smith, Barcelona, to F.O., 99, 3.5.15.

³ A 357, 358.

⁴ Lieut. Comdr. W. W. Hunt.

⁵ Report titled N. 1106/1915.

a rendezvous about half way out by a supply steamer.¹ But the fuel oil which the latter carried proved to be unsuitable. Lieutenant-Commander Hersing had to decide whether to go on or to return with such oil as remained in his tanks; and though the home base was somewhat the nearer, the more favourable weather conditions in the Mediterranean decided him to go to Cattaro, since it was out of the question for him to reach his original destination, Constantinople, without re-fuelling. He passed the Straits of Gibraltar on the surface at early dawn probably on May 6, and reached Cattaro on May 13 with half a ton of fuel left on board. Here he found a special German naval party whose duty was the maintenance of submarines. A similar party was at Pola, engaged in assembling the parts of the six U.B. and four U.C. boats from Germany.² From the spot where the submarine was engaged by T.B. 92 on May 6 to Cattaro is a distance of some 1,600 miles. If, therefore, the submarine in question was U.21, she must have travelled at an average speed of nearly 10 knots in order to reach Cattaro on 13th. This was well within her capacities, for her surface speed was 17 knots.³ She was reported by the hospital ship *Delta* at 11 a.m. on May 7 in 36° 53' N., 0° 41' W. At 6 p.m. on 9th she was seen by the French auxiliary cruiser *Corte II*, N. 60° W. 30 miles from Bizerta; and the French destroyer *Carabinier* unsuccessfully attacked her at 8 o'clock on the morning of May 11 ten miles south-east of Cape Passaro.

99. **Measures to Meet the Submarine Menace.**—The Admiralty warned the Senior Naval Officer, Gibraltar, that the submarine which T.B. 92 had attacked might prove to be the forerunner of others. They also detailed measures to be taken for the safety of the transports in the Mediterranean. Ships were to be diverted from their usual tracks, they were to be darkened at night, and when troops were carried a strong armed guard was always to be on watch, with machine guns ready for instant service. Masters of transports were to be instructed in the best way to manœuvre their ships if a submarine was sighted.⁴ The French cruiser *Ernest Renan* was unsuccessfully attacked by a submarine at noon on May 15, three miles north of Cape Bon,⁵ and on the following day Admiral Limpus telegraphed from Malta that he estimated there were three German submarines in the Mediterranean, and that the rear of the Dardanelles operations and its store carriers were seriously menaced.

¹ Probably near Corcubion Bay (Finisterre). Elaborate arrangements had been made for U.21 to pick up a supply steamer with fuel and lubricating oil and fresh provisions.

² Gayer, "Die deutschen U-Boote," Vol. II, pp. 23-4.

³ "War Vessels and Aircraft," Quarterly Return. Her radius of action on the surface is given as 4,000 miles with normal stowage of oil, but she could probably increase this by filling her double bottoms with fuel.

⁴ A 359, 360.

⁵ Marine, Paris, to F.N.A., 815, 16.5.15. But telegram A.S., Malta, to Adty., 503, 16.5.15, gives the date as May 16.

It appeared to the Admiral possible that the Germans intended to transfer the activities of their large submarines to the rich hunting grounds of the Mediterranean, and to counter this there was great need of more destroyers. Admiral Limpus reported that there were 25 French destroyers in Malta harbour, and he hinted that better use might be made of them. His information of the dispositions of the French fleet was, however, very incomplete, and the Admiralty, therefore, asked the French Ministry of Marine to send them precise details of the organisation of their patrols of light cruisers and torpedo craft in order that they might arrange the transport routes accordingly. They also asked most earnestly that the French destroyers at Malta and Bizerta should be employed in hunting German submarines with the utmost vigour, and they enquired whether the French could supply six to eight destroyers to escort transports coming from Gibraltar about May 22 with an Army Corps for the Dardanelles. They informed Admiral Limpus that no more destroyers could be spared from home, but they did not think that more than two or three German submarines had been transferred to the Mediterranean.¹

100. **French Patrol Dispositions.**—The French Ministry of Marine replied to the Admiralty that the dispositions for protection against submarines were entrusted to the Commander-in-Chief. The latter had, however, been ordered to make his arrangements in collaboration with the British Admirals holding commands in the Mediterranean. The French Admiralty were placing at Admiral Boué de Lapeyrière's disposal all their available resources, but they pointed out that the absolute security of ships against submarines could no more be guaranteed in the Mediterranean than in the Channel or North Sea. All Admiral Boué de Lapeyrière's available torpedo boats and light craft had been occupied for several days in a strict search for submarines in the principal passages on the route from Gibraltar to the Dardanelles and on the coast of the Balearic Islands, where replenishing points were suspected. Italy was on the point of entering the war on the side of the Entente, and the French were under the obligation, which might mature at any moment, of placing at her disposal 12 destroyers and a flotilla of torpedo boats; and they had not even the means of escorting their own transports. They had avoided the formation of convoys for fear of attracting attention to them and offering an extended target to the attacks of enemy submarines. To escort the Army Corps on 22nd they could send to Gibraltar only two ships which were keeping a watch off Finisterre, which it appeared to them important not to abandon. Pending the despatch to Brindisi of the torpedo boat flotilla destined for Italy, it was being sent from Toulon to Bizerta to reinforce the watch being

¹ A 361, 362, 366, 369, 378, 379.

kept on the channels between Sardinia, Sicily and the Tunisian coast.¹

The dispositions made by the French Commander-in-Chief for hunting enemy submarines in the Mediterranean were as follows²:—

- (a) Patrol of four destroyers between Malta and Sicily.
- (b) In the waters immediately south of Malta, two destroyers.
- (c) Between Crete and Cape Matapan the cruiser *Jurien de la Gravière*³ and four or five destroyers.
- (d) Ionian Islands patrol, four destroyers supported by a fast cruiser.
- (e) Ionian Sea, between Italy and Greece, three armoured cruisers patrolling at full speed.
- (f) In the neighbourhood of Galita Islands, Cape Bon and southern shores of Tunis, patrol of small torpedo boats from Bizerta.

He also recommended that Allied transports should pass to the southward of Malta and Crete. Ten French armed trawlers left Cherbourg on May 22 to search for enemy submarines and their sources of supply in the Mediterranean.⁴

The disposition of the French fleet on May 23 was as follows⁵:

TOULON.—*Gaulois, Edgar Quinet, Cassini* (minelayer), 3 T.B.D.s, 1 submarine.

BIZERTA.—(Probably) 2nd Squadron, *Vergniaud, Justice, Vérité, République, Démocratie*. Cruisers, *Jules Michelet, Victor Hugo, Chateaurenault, La Hire* (torpedo vessel). Four submarines.

MALTA AND NEIGHBOURHOOD.—*Courbet* (flag of Commander-in-Chief), *Jean Bart*. 1st Squadron, *France, Paris, Diderot, Mirabeau, Voltaire, Condorcet, Danton*. 2nd, 3rd and 6th Destroyer Flotillas (20 boats, four fitted as minelayers). 8 T.B.D.s, 7 submarines, *Tourville* (training ship).

GENOA PATROL.—*Amiral Charner*.

EAST COAST OF SICILY PATROL.—Three T.B.D.s.

STRAITS OF MESSINA.—*Casabianca* (minelayer).

IONIAN SEA.—*Waldeck Rousseau, Jules Ferry, Ernest Renan*.

CAPE MATAPAN.—*Jurien de la Gravière*, 3 T.B.D.s.

SYRIA.—*D'Estrées*.

SUEZ CANAL.—*Jeanne d'Arc*,⁶ *D'Entrecasteaux* (?), *Requin, Montcalm, Desaix* left to join Fleet.

¹ A 373, 374.

² A 376.

³ 5,600 tons, 19.2 knots. 8—6.5 in., 2—9 pdr., 10—3 pdr.

⁴ Adty. to S.N.O., Gibraltar, 966, 23.5.15.

⁵ Marine, Paris, to Adty., No. 5614, and "War Vessels and Aircraft, Monthly Return."

⁶ Admiral Dartige du Fournet transferred his flag to the *Jeanne d'Arc* on May 6.

DARDANELLES.—*Suffren, Saint-Louis, Charlemagne, Jauréguiberry, Henri IV, Bruix.*

MUDROS.—*Patrie, Kléber, Dupleix.*

ATHENS.—*Latouche-Tréville.*

MOROCCAN DIVISION.—*Cassard* (south coast) *Duchayla* (south-east coast of Spain), *Cosmao* (Tangier).

LISBON.—*Dupetit-Thouars* left to join Fleet.

101. Search for Enemy Submarine Supply Depots.—

Admiral Limpus reported that it was clear to him that there were a number of fuel depots for enemy submarines.¹ He mentioned Vigo, Almeria, the Balearic Islands—especially Cabrera Island, where a felucca landed oil at the beginning of May and the s.s. *Villa de Andriatz* did the same on April 12—Alcudia Bay and Pollenza Bay, Syracuse, the German Emperor's villa at Corfu, Cythian² near Cape Matapan and the eastern extremity of Crete and neighbouring island of Elasa, all of which were in neutral territory; and Buk Point and the neighbouring islands such as Kalimno and Samos in or adjoining Turkish territory. Skala Nuova Gulf (opposite Samos) was suspected by Admiral Peirse, and during the early part of May he had discovered and put a stop to the secret despatch from Egypt of large quantities of empty barrels to Mitylene,³ the intended employment of which it was not difficult to guess. Budrum, 100 miles south of Smyrna, had also been suspected during April, and all arrangements had been made for Admiral Peirse to land a raiding force of marines, when it was discovered that the suspicion was without foundation.⁴ Admiral Limpus suspected a small tank steamer also, last seen in 34° 10' N., 20° 22' E. at 7 p.m. on May 15. It seemed to him that money must have been used to obtain these bases, and that free expenditure on our part might even now result in them being denied to the enemy. Depots in neutral territory, he considered, should be dealt with by means of secret agents engaged by our Ambassadors and Ministers and furnished with funds, the alien or Germanophil consuls at suspected places being replaced by British. The oil tank steamers could be located and dealt with by the same craft as were employed in hunting submarines. The Admiralty replied that they were taking all possible steps to find out and prevent access to all bases for the supply of oil to enemy submarines. All shipments of oil for Greek ports were ordered to be detained and reported to them.

¹ Telegrams of May 16 and 17, and Appreciation, dated May 23 (M. 04313). There is, however, no evidence to support this opinion. See Section 188.

² The telegrams say *Crythion* and *Cythian* respectively.

³ C.-in-C., E.I., to Adty., 444, 9.5.15, and 461, 11.5.15.

⁴ A 339, 343, 348. Later, however, Budrum became the starting point of German missions to the Turkish faction in Tripoli, and was frequently visited by enemy s/ms. See Sections 149, 169, 183, 188. A pilot boat was stationed at Budrum for *U.21* at the beginning of May.

At Palma there was a suspected felucca, the *Deseada*, which the Spanish authorities were detaining. The *Pelorus* had remained off Palma watching the *Fangturm* all through April, a collier being sent to coal her. On April 20 the French Ministry of Marine informed the Admiralty that they were sending two armed yachts, the *Eros* and *Atmah*, to the Balearic patrol, and the Senior Naval Officer, Gibraltar, was told that on relief by the first of these the *Pelorus* might return to Gibraltar to complete with coal and stores. The *Eros* arrived on April 23 and the *Atmah* on 28th.¹ However, the *Pelorus* remained off Palma until May 5, when Admiral Brock obtained permission from the Admiralty for her to return to Gibraltar for repairs, her engine defects having reduced her speed to 12 knots.²

On the Syrian coast the French 3rd Squadron was active in searching for and destroying presumed enemy submarine supply depots, one at Makry Bay being bombarded on May 12, and another destroyed at Alexandretta on 20th by the *D'Éstrées*.

102. Blockade of Smyrna.³—The watch on Smyrna and the coast of Asia Minor as far as Mersina, where Admiral Dartige du Fournet's authority began, had been kept by vessels detailed from the Dardanelles Command. On May 8 Admiral de Robeck asked that in view of shipments being made to Smyrna and the possibility that enemy submarines might make use of it as a base of operations against his squadron and communications, a blockade of the Gulf of Smyrna might be declared. He was in a position, he reported, to make it effective. This was approved by the Foreign Office, and the Admiralty on May 16 ordered Admiral de Robeck to consult with Vice-Admiral Nicol, who hoisted his flag in the battleship *Patrie* on 18th and left for Mudros. They warned him, however, against the risk to the blockading ships from submarines; the blockade was only of secondary importance compared with the safety of his ships.⁴

The blockade was declared from noon on June 2, three days of grace being given to neutral ships already in ports on the blockaded coast. The area of the blockade extended from 37° 35' N. to 40° 5' N., viz., from Samos to the Dardanelles, including the entrance to the latter, and the mainland; but the Admiralty warned Admiral de Robeck that the islands must not be comprehended in the blockade, for this would raise important international questions which required to be considered carefully. Admiral de Robeck represented that trade between the islands and the mainland by small boats would be difficult, and he hoped to be able to overcome it by a system of agents in the

¹ Log of *Pelorus*.

² H.S. 111, pp. 522, 533, 542, 826, 829, 831; 157, pp. 95, 96.

³ M. 03581/15, 03701/15, 04114/15.

⁴ A 363, 372.

islands and by frequent surprise visits. He considered that he could render the blockade effective without including the islands.¹ It was important to prevent trade between the islands and the mainland because there were political objections to interfering with the trade between Piraeus and the Greek islands, and it was improbable that the Greeks themselves would exercise any supervision. As far as Samos Strait this duty devolved upon Admiral de Robeck. South of the strait it was taken over by the French, to whom the British Government proposed to suggest that they should declare a blockade extending, if possible, all the way to the Egyptian frontier.² Admiral Dartige du Fournet seems, however, to have been convinced of the efficacy of his present arrangements for the patrol of the coast³ and to have satisfied the Ministry of Marine on the point.⁴

102A.—**Work of the Syrian Squadron, May to June, 1915.**—

On May 6 the French Admiral transferred his flag to the cruiser *Jeanne d'Arc*⁵ which joined the squadron from Mudros on the departure of the *D'Entrecasteaux* and *Saint-Louis* for the Dardanelles. A fresh cruise on the Syrian coast was inaugurated by the second bombardment of El Arish on 9th, where the reply was less vigorous than formerly. Twenty-five rounds sufficed to silence the enemy, and the squadron then steered towards the Karamania coast, where it was reported that an active contraband was in progress.

On May 11, between Rhodes and Castelorizo⁶ a Turkish sailing vessel carrying 400 drums of petrol was captured and burned. From the captain it was learned that the petrol had been taken on board at Makri,⁷ where there was a store which was doubtless intended for the use of German submarines. At five o'clock that evening the *Jeanne d'Arc* entered the bay and opened fire on the petrol store. Three rounds sufficed to set it on fire and the barracks were then bombarded and destroyed, and by 6 p.m. the *Jeanne d'Arc* was under way again. She returned to Alexandria on the evening of the 19th with a number of small vessels which she had captured, and she left again ten days later for a further cruise up the coast. On May 31 she destroyed the German Consulate at Jaffa as a reprisal for the desecration of the graves of some French soldiers of the Napoleonic Wars buried at Mount Carmel. On June 5 the petrol store at Mersina was destroyed, and two small steamers belonging to the Bagdad Railway were captured and taken to Famagusta on 6th.

¹ A 396, 399, 400.

² A 406.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 21.

⁴ Marine, Paris, to Adty., 705, 24.7.15.

⁵ 2—7.6 in., 14—5.5 in., 16—3 pdr. Captain Grasset.

⁶ 70 miles E. of Rhodes.

⁷ 50 miles E. by N. of Rhodes.

CHAPTER XIII.

ITALY JOINS THE ENTENTE—THE WAR OF
FLOTILLAS.

103. **Deficiency in French Light Cruisers.**—The loss of the *Léon-Gambetta* on the night of April 26-27 was the price paid by the French for their lack of fast light cruisers with which to carry out the blockade of the Adriatic. The *Waldeck-Rousseau* had been attacked not long before, and the French Commander-in-Chief now decided to withdraw the armoured cruisers from the Straits of Otranto to a supporting position, leaving the patrol to be maintained by the destroyers.¹

A further disadvantage arising from the deficiency of the French in fast light cruisers was exposed on May 6 when the Austrian light cruiser *Admiral Spaun* was sighted between noon and 3 p.m. in 38° 20' N., 18° 30' E., and was chased by the *Jules Ferry* and the destroyer *Bisson*, but escaped to the northward owing to the slowness of the French ships. Admiral Limpus considered that there was danger of a diversion by the enemy against our transports, ammunition ships, etc., and he suggested that the Admiralty should lend to the French two fast light cruisers in order to lessen the possibility of Austrian small craft slipping out of the Adriatic. To the Admiralty the danger seems to have appeared no less real, for they addressed a strong warning to the French Ministry of Marine regarding the importance of vigorously following up any Austrian cruiser which might succeed in escaping from the Adriatic.²

104. **Convention of May 10.**³—Unknown no doubt to Admiral Limpus, an arrangement was on the point of being concluded which would reinforce the Adriatic blocking force by the particular units in which it was deficient. This was the British, French, and Italian Naval Convention which was signed on May 10. A week previously Italy had denounced the Triple Alliance, and she was now making her preparations for ranging herself on the side of the Entente Powers in the present struggle.

The naval condition upon which Italy agreed to declare war was that the French and British navies should give her their active and continual support until the Austrian fleet was destroyed, or until the conclusion of the war. A first Allied fleet was to be formed, under the Command of H.R.H. Luigi di

¹ René la Bruyère. *Op. cit.*, pp. 240 et seq.

² A 362.

³ See Appendix F.

Savoia, Duke of the Abruzzi, Commander-in-Chief of the Italian Navy, at whose disposal the following war vessels and aircraft were to be placed:—

- (1) Twelve French destroyers.
- (2) As many torpedo boats, submarines, and minesweepers as the French Commander-in-Chief could spare; the number of submarines not to be less than six.
- (3) A squadron of six French seaplanes and if possible a seaplane carrier.
- (4) Four British light cruisers from the Dardanelles, which were to be replaced by four French cruisers.
- (5) A division of four British battleships as soon as relieved at the Dardanelles by six French battleships.

This arrangement by no means represented the intentions of the British Admiralty, who envisaged an Allied main fleet composed of Italian ships reinforced by four French battleships, while four British battleships would join up from the Dardanelles when the successful conclusion of those operations should render them available. For reinforcements were now on their way to Sir Ian Hamilton and there was apparently at this time little doubt that the Dardanelles operations would be brought to a successful conclusion at a fairly early date. There was no question as to the command of this fleet, for it was only natural that Italy should direct operations in the Adriatic, since one of the objects for which she entered the war was to make the Adriatic an Italian lake. The fact, too, that on the conclusion of the Dardanelles operations the French would be requested to transfer their four Dreadnoughts,¹ and four Dantons, to Brest, would make no difference to the general direction in the rest of the Mediterranean, which would remain in French hands. Clearly, this proposal was based on the assumption of a speedy and successful termination to the Dardanelles expedition, when the British Admiralty were prepared to hand over to the French the command in Turkish waters which they so greatly desired.²

The arrangement which was actually effected was a compromise, necessitated by the difficulty of securing co-operation of the Italian and French forces under the command of an Admiral of either nationality,³ and it resulted in the powerful French battlefleet being relegated to the rôle of reserve to a fleet which already outnumbered its opponent.

¹ *France, Paris, Courbet, Jean Bart.*

² M. 03553/15.

³ M. 06381/15.

The comparative strengths of the Austrian and Italian fleets at this date are given in the following table:—

Class.	Austria.	Italy.	Lent by Allies.
Dreadnought battleships ..	3 ¹	4 ²	—
Pre-Dreadnought battleships ..	3 ³	2	4
Smaller battleships	6	4 ⁴	—
Cruisers	2	9	—
Fast light cruisers	5 ⁵	3	2
Old light cruisers	2 ⁶	3 ⁷	2
Destroyers	18 ⁸	39 ⁹	12 ¹⁰
Torpedo boats, High Sea	42	28	—
Submarines	7 ¹¹	21 ¹²	7 ¹³

The terms of the Convention specified that the Italian Commander-in-Chief was to direct all operations in the Adriatic carried out by the First Allied Fleet. In the event of operations in the northern Adriatic, or for important operations calling for the entire naval strength of the Allies, a second Allied fleet was to be constituted from French, Italian or British ships not included in the First Allied Fleet; it would be under the command of the French Commander-in-Chief, who was to be ready to respond to any call from the Italian Commander-in-Chief. The Italians agreed to place all their bases at the disposal of the Allies; but generally speaking, while the First Allied Fleet would use Brindisi as its base, the second fleet was to use for preference Taranto, Malta and Bizerta.¹⁴ The Commanders-in-Chief were to communicate to one another their plans, dispositions and intelligence of the enemy, for which purpose they were to accredit one or more officers to the staff of the other.¹⁵

¹ Does not include *Szent Istvan*, probably not yet ready.

² Also *Duilio*, which did her trials June 13, and *Andrea Doria* nearing completion.

³ *Lord Nelson* type.

⁴ And two *Bons*, speed 15 knots.

⁵ Includes one built for Chinese Government.

⁶ And two older vessels.

⁷ And several older vessels, some of which had been taken for auxiliary services.

⁸ M. 03821/15, Report of Naval Attaché, gives 19.

⁹ M. 03479/15, Report of Naval Attaché, gives 37, and 7 more practically completed.

¹⁰ On June 14 these comprised *Bouclier, Carabinier, Aspirant Herber, Mameluck, Lansquenet, Commandant Rivière, Magon, Bisson, Commandant Bory, Protet, Spahi, Enseigne Henry.*

¹¹ Does not include German submarines put together at Pola.

¹² Only two over 300 tons.

¹³ *Monge, Ampère, Messidor, Cugnot, Fresnel, Aigrette, Papin.* Parent ship *Marceau.*

¹⁴ It will be seen, however, that when Italy declared war, her battlefleet became based on Taranto.

¹⁵ Captain W. H. B. Richmond, Assistant Naval Attaché, Rome, became Liaison Officer to the Italian Navy.

105. **Italy declares War against Austria, Midnight, May 23-24, 1915.**—On May 6 our Ambassador at Rome telegraphed that the Italians had given orders for all warships to be held ready to leave Venice, and it was reported from Venice next day that all naval classes had been called up.¹ On 12th Admiral Limpus telegraphed home that the Milan newspapers contained a warning to all Austrian steamships in the Adriatic or in refuge in Italian ports since the outbreak of war, to leave at once for Austrian ports.² A few days later the *König Albert* and *Moltke*, which had been under suspicion early in the war, with a third German steamship, the *Prinzregent Luitpold*, were reported to be preparing for sea once more at Genoa, the indications being that they intended to mount guns and make for a Spanish port.³

The Convention was signed on May 10, and a week later the Admiralty made preparations to give effect to its terms. After some crossing of telegrams, which nearly caused the substitution of Admiral Nicholson, Rear-Admiral Cecil F. Thursby, C.M.G., who was acting under Vice-Admiral de Robeck at the Dardanelles, was appointed to command the British Adriatic Squadron,⁴ and the Admiralty directed that the battleships *Queen* (flagship), *Prince of Wales*, *London*, and *Implacable* were to be at Malta, coaled and ready for service by dawn on May 26. The light cruisers detailed to join the British Adriatic Squadron were the *Dublin*, *Dartmouth*, *Sapphire*, and *Amethyst*; and they were to be ready to leave Malta for the Adriatic by the morning of May 23, three days before the battleships.⁵ The *Dartmouth* arrived at Malta on 20th and the remaining three light cruisers on 22nd, and owing to their defects and late arrival the *Dublin* only was ready by dawn on 23rd as ordered. The *Dartmouth's* speed was reduced to 21 knots through a recent boiler explosion. On May 23 the Italian Ambassador at Vienna presented to the Austrian Government a formal declaration of war, and at 8.15 p.m. next day the Admiralty despatched to the British naval commanders in the Mediterranean the telegram which informed them of the entry of Italy in the war against Austria.⁶

106. **Disposition of the Italian Naval Forces.**⁷—The entry of Italy into the war rendered the task of the Allies in blockading the Adriatic easier in so far that the coast on both sides of the entrance to those waters was now in possession of the blockading force, and the disadvantage of distant bases under which the French fleet had worked for nine months was obviated. Valona,

¹ Rome to F.O., 331, 6.5.15, and 336, 7.5.15.

² A.S., Malta, to Admiralty, 461, 12.5.15.

³ Adty. to I.O., Gibraltar, and I.O., Malta, 42, 19.5.15.

⁴ It was known at first as the 2nd Mediterranean Squadron.

⁵ A 365, 377, 380, 382.

⁶ Italy declared war against Austria-Hungary at midnight, May 23-24, 1915. The telegram stated erroneously that Italy declared war also against Germany.

⁷ Based on M. 04969/15 and M. 05326/15, Reports of Naval Attaché.

where the Italians had landed a force on December 26, 1914, was formally occupied on May 29, 1915, as a base for the forces blockading the Straits of Otranto.

The Austrian fleet was based on Pola, the only first class naval base which Austria possessed, though Fiume and Trieste were capable of carrying out repairs to large vessels. The latter port was situated about an hour's steaming from the Italian coast and some 65 miles distant from Venice. Cattaro was only a protected anchorage, overlooked by the Montenegrin heights.

The principal Italian naval bases on the east coast were Taranto and Brindisi in the south and Venice in the north. The first of these provided an extensive anchorage, well protected by nature; it possessed an arsenal, and a dock capable of holding the largest ships was in course of construction. Brindisi had been developed to serve as an advanced and a torpedo base. From their position, ships using these ports were practically free from torpedo attack. In the north, Italy possessed in the port of Venice a base for cruisers and light craft. Ancona, 120 miles down the coast, was an enclosed harbour with an oil fuel depot, coal store, and shipbuilding yard; but the batteries had been dismantled in October, 1914, and the port declared open.¹ The weakness of the Italian position lay in the long and completely unfortified stretch of coast between Venice and Brindisi.

Rear-Admiral Thursby arrived at Taranto with his squadron on the morning of May 27. Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère arrived at 5 o'clock that evening in the *Victor Hugo*, and a conference was held between the Italian, British and French Commanders-in-Chief. It was arranged that the Italian fleet should undertake the patrol of the Straits of Otranto and the responsibility for the whole of the Adriatic. Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère was to place his battle fleet in a strategic position to cover the fleet at the Dardanelles. He expected to make his base at Navarino, and his cruisers and destroyers were to protect the transports passing through the Mediterranean and to operate against the enemy submarines and their fuel bases.²

The active Italian naval forces employed in the principal theatre, the Adriatic, were divided into two commands: the main fleet in the south based on Taranto³ and Brindisi, and the northern command with base at Venice. The operations of the southern force were directed by the Commander-in-Chief, H.R.H. Luigi di Savoia, Duke of the Abruzzi, and the northern force was under Vice-Admiral A. Garelli. The Commander-in-Chief had a free hand in relation to all the vessels under his command, though questions involving general policy needed

¹ M. 03479/15. Report of Naval Attaché.

² M. 04424/15.

³ The Commander-in-Chief wished to form his base at Sabioncello at the southern end of the Dalmatian Archipelago, but this the Ministry of Marine would not permit. (M. 05386/15, Report of Naval Attaché.)

the approval of the Admiralty. But all plans for operations and the general conduct of the war in the southern Adriatic, as apart from the main strategy, were entirely in his hands.

The Duke organised his heavy ships in six divisions, four of battleships and two of armoured cruisers, with the four British battleships forming a further division. Pending the arrival of the Dreadnoughts *Duilio* and *Andrea Doria*, of which the former was almost ready for service, the 1st Division was not constituted.¹

Battleships.—3rd (Dreadnought) Division: *Conte di Cavour* (fleet flagship), *Dante Alighieri* (flag of Rear-Admiral C. Corsi), *Giulio Cesare*, *Leonardo da Vinci*.

2nd Division: *Regina Elena* (flagship), *Vittorio Emanuele*, *Roma*, *Napoli*.²

Allied Division.—*Queen* (flag), *London*, *Prince of Wales*, *Implacable*.

Cruisers.—4th Division: *Pisa* (flag), *Amalfi*, *San Giorgio*, *San Marco*.³

All the above were based on Taranto, where there were also nine Italian and four French torpedo boats for the extended defence of the port.

For supplemental defence and for operations radiating from Brindisi a division each of battleships, cruisers, and light cruisers was stationed at that port. These forces were under the command of Vice-Admiral E. Presbitero. Under him were Rear-Admiral Tripiani in command of the 5th (Cruiser) Division, and Rear-Admiral Millo in command of the light cruisers, destroyers and submarines. Admiral Presbitero seems to have received his orders for operations, in broad outline, from the Commander-in-Chief. In general, the orders sent by the latter contained (1) the object of the expedition, (2) the number of vessels required, (3) the general lines upon which it was intended to work, and (4) the date of execution.

Admiral Presbitero's force comprised:—

Cruisers.—5th Division: *Giuseppe Garibaldi*, *Francesco Ferruccio*,⁴ *Vettor Pisani*.⁵

Battleships.—6th Division: *Benedetto Brin* (flagship of Vice-Admiral Presbitero), *Reina Margherita*.⁶

Special Service—*Dandolo*.⁷

¹ This organisation is based on M. 04969/15, Report of Naval Attaché, and it differs considerably from that given in "War Vessels and Aircraft," Monthly Return, June, 1915.

² 12,425 tons, 20·3 knots, 2—12 in., 12—8 in., 24—14 pdr.

³ 20—21·4 knots, 4—10 in., 8—7·5 in., 16—20—14 pdr.

⁴ 7,234 tons, 18·8—19·4 knots, 1—10 in., 2—8 in., 14—6 in., 10—14 pdr.

⁵ 6,396 tons, 16·2 knots, 12—6 in., 6—4·7 in., 14—6 pdr.

⁶ 13,207 tons, 18·7—19·1 knots, 4—12 in., 4—8 in., 12—6 in., 20—14 pdr.

⁷ Completed 1882. 12,071 tons, 16 knots, 4—10 in., 7—6 in., 5—4·7 in., 10—6 pdr.

The 6th Division would probably act tactically with the British division.

For the extended defence of Brindisi there were 30 Italian and 7 French torpedo boats and 7 Italian and 7 French submarines, the submarines being available for service on the enemy's coast.

107. **The Italian Patrols.**—The Admiralty had impressed upon the Italian Commander-in-Chief the importance of establishing an effective watch in the Straits of Otranto by means of trawlers and fishing boats with nets, supported by destroyers based on Brindisi and Valona and assisted by aircraft, in order to prevent German submarines from entering the Adriatic, where they would not only be a danger to the Italian fleet but would be able to replenish their torpedoes and carry out repairs in Austrian ports.¹ The Italians instituted four principal cruising forces in the southern Adriatic, based on Brindisi. These forces were commanded by Rear-Admiral Millo under Admiral Presbitero.

- (a) A cordon from Otranto to Saseno Island (at the entrance of the Gulf of Valona) to intercept ships passing into the Adriatic.
- (b) A destroyer working inshore.
- (c) A watch along the coast of Corfu.
- (d) A covering force for (a) and (b).

The cordon from Otranto to Saseno Island was maintained by three old light cruisers² and six destroyers, of which force one-third was at sea, one-third revictualling, and one-third was resting but was available for any operations which might be ordered or for reinforcement. French as well as Italian destroyers were employed on this, as also on the inshore patrol.³ The watch on the coast of Corfu was kept by a force working under similar conditions, armed merchant cruisers⁴ being used, one of which, with two French or Italian destroyers, was always on patrol. The covering force consisted of four large T.B.D.s.⁵ The fast light cruisers *Quarto*, *Marsala*, *Nino Bixio*, with the four British light cruisers, were not detailed for regular patrol work, but were available for support, for operations against the enemy's coast, and for fleet scouting, etc. The orders for

¹ A 390.

² *Agordat*, *Piemonte*, *Libia*.

³ Italian destroyers: *Nembo*, *Espero*, *Borea*, *Aquilone*. French: *Carabinier*, *Spahi*, *Aspirant Herber*, *Lansquenet*, *Mameluck*, *Enseigne Henry*.

⁴ *Citta di Messina*, *Citta di Catania*, *Citta di Siracusa*, *Citta di Palermo* (Flag of Vice-Admiral Presbitero and not generally used).

⁵ The destroyers for both services were taken from the following. Italian: *Indomito*, *Impavido*, *Intrepido*, *Impetuoso*, *Insidioso*, *Irrequito*, *Ardito*, *Ardente*, *Audace*, *Animoso*, *F. Nullo*, *R. Pilo*. French: *Bouclier*, *Commandant Rivière*, *Bisson*, *Magon*, *Commandant Bory*, *Protet*.

the British light cruisers were issued by Admiral Presbitero through the British Senior Naval Officer at Brindisi. The minelayers were based on Brindisi, where the submarine and floating depot ships also lay.¹

108. **The Northern Force.**—The force under Vice-Admiral Garelli at Venice was charged with the observation of Pola, operations in the Quarnero and Quarnerolo Channels and the northern part of the Dalmatian Archipelago, and if necessary in the defence of Brindisi. Admiral Garelli received all his orders from the Ministry of Marine, and he acted independently of the main forces except when vessels under his command were required to co-operate in any movement. The vessels of his command comprised the following:—

Battleships.—*Sardegna*,² *Emanuele Filiberto*,³ *Ammiraglio di St. Bon.*⁴ These three with the *Dandolo* at Taranto formed a special squadron, available for any particular service.

Cruisers and Light Cruisers.—*Carlo Alberto*,⁵ *Marco Polo*,⁶ *Etruria*,⁷ *Etna*,⁸ 11 destroyers,⁹ 29 torpedo boats, 13 submarines, minelayers *Goito*, *Montebello*.

109. **Italian Commander-in-Chief's Instructions.**—The instructions issued to the Duke of the Abruzzi by the Italian Government regarding naval operations in the Adriatic were to the following effect.¹⁰

(1) Raids on the coast by Austrian cruisers and torpedo craft cannot be prevented, and such attacks will not induce the Admiralty to allow their capital ships to be drawn into danger.

(2) There are a great number of mines off Pola and Sebenico and on the Italian coast; and until these have been cleared, and the enemy's torpedo craft and submarines have been so reduced as to make the southern portion of the Adriatic reasonably safe, no battleships will enter that sea. The battle fleet will be based on Taranto and will carry out exercises and firings from there.

¹ Fleet Minelayers *Puglia*, *Liguria*, *Partenope*, *Minerva*. Local Minelayer *Tripoli*. Mine Carrier *Bengazi*. S/M Depot ships *Lombardia*, *Marceau* (Fr.). Flying Depot ships *Elba*, *Europa*.

² 13,640 tons, 17½ knots, 4—13.5 in., 8—6 in., 12—4.7 in., 4—14 pdr., 16—6 pdr.

³ 13,552 tons, 15 knots, 4—10 in., 8—6 in., 8—4.7 in., 6—14 pdr.

⁴ 14,296 tons, 15 knots, 4—10 in., 8—6 in., 8—4.7 in., 8—6 pdr.

⁵ 6,396 tons, 16.2 knots, 12—6 in., 6—4.7 in., 14—6 pdr.

⁶ 15.8 knots, 6—6 in., 4—4.7 in., 6—6 pdr.

⁷ Light cruiser, 19.8 knots, 6—4.7 in., 6—6 pdr.

⁸ 15.5 knots, 4—6 in., 2—4.7 in., 2—14 pdr., 4—6 pdr.

⁹ *Bersagliere*, *Garibaldino*, *Covazziere*, *Lanciere*, *Artigliere*, *Carabiniere*, *Pontiere*, *Zeffiro*, *Fuciliere*, *Ascaro*, *Alpino*. All armed with 4—14 pdrs., 3 torpedo tubes, except *Ascaro*, 2—14 pdr., 4—6 pdr., *Zeffiro*, 5—6 pdr., 4 torpedo tubes.

¹⁰ Extract M. 04313/15.

(3) No operations requiring the assistance of the Army are to be undertaken—at any rate for the present. Small advanced bases or look-out stations may be established, but only such as can be taken and held by the Navy.

(4) Cattaro is not to be attacked, its capture involving the use of a large force with very heavy guns.

(5) The enemy's secondary bases are to be attacked, and signal stations destroyed as opportunity offers.

(6) A strict watch by destroyers and torpedo boats will be maintained in the Straits of Otranto.

(7) All commerce from Greek Ports is to be stopped.

(8) Only old ships of little value are to be used to protect the flanks of the Army.

110. **Bombardment of Ancona—Sinking of "Turbine,"** May 24.—At midnight May 23–24, when Italy declared war against Austria-Hungary, the main Italian fleet, consisting of four Dreadnought battleships, four pre-Dreadnoughts, and four armoured cruisers, was lying at Taranto with steam at half an hour's notice. The British battleships had not yet joined up. The light cruisers from Brindisi, each with two or three large destroyers in company, were on their way to take up a line across the Adriatic, approximately from Tremiti–Pelagosa Island–Lagosta, with the principal object of keeping watch for the enemy and giving warning of his approach to Brindisi, which was considered by the Italian command to be the most probable opening move of the Austrians.

In the event, however, the Austrians commenced hostilities in a manner which the Italians had not anticipated, by the bombardment of the open towns of Ancona, Rimini, and other small places along the coast. At Porto Corsini, owing to lack of preparations on the part of the Italians, the light cruiser *Admiral Spaun* and some destroyers were able to close the port and escape without serious damage. At Ancona the Italian submarines, instead of being at sea at daylight, were in harbour, unready; and no measures of protection against attack at daylight had been taken in the Upper Adriatic.¹

Owing to an eleventh hour alteration of the time for commencing hostilities from 8 a.m. on the 24th to midnight on 23rd–24th, the Italian light craft had not yet reached their positions on the line Tremiti–Pelagosa Island–Lagosta; but they gave chase, and succeeded in damaging the Austrian light cruiser *Novara* and the destroyers *Scharfschütze* and *Orjen* and T.B. 90. The Italian destroyer *Turbine*, in chase of an Austrian vessel, was caught unsupported by the Austrian light cruisers

¹ M. 05386/15. In consequence of this unpreparedness Admiral Garelli was shortly removed to half pay.

Novara and *Helgoland* and two or three destroyers of the new *Tatra* class, and was annihilated, only nine of her crew being saved, though the commander and 34 men were subsequently reported to have been picked up by the Austrians and made prisoners. On the same day the Italian destroyer *Zeffiro* raided Port Buso on the boundary between Italy and Austria, destroying the landing stage and boats in the harbour and taking 47 prisoners.

111. **Demonstrations off the Dalmatian Coast.**—On May 26 the Italian Government announced a blockade of the Austro-Hungarian coast from the Italian frontier on the north to the Montenegrin boundary in the south, including all islands, ports, bays, etc., and of the Albanian coast from the Montenegrin frontier in the north to Cape Kiephali (approx. 39° 55' N., 19° 55' E.) inclusive in the south. Four days later, the southern limit was raised to Aspri Ruga (40° 9' 36" N., 19° 35' 45" E.).¹

The Italians had decided upon "an untiring hunt for the torpedo craft and submarines of the enemy in order to clear the lower and middle Adriatic as much as possible." The concentration of the fleet was not yet complete, however. The British battleships and light cruisers and the French destroyers and submarines had not yet joined up, and some of the Italian destroyers were engaged in escorting the British battleships from Malta to Taranto and the Italian troops which were being transferred from Sicily to Naples. The first French submarines reached Taranto on May 25 and went on to Brindisi; and during the next few days the remainder of the Italian destroyers and the French and British ships arrived.² By May 29 the concentration was complete, and orders were issued for an operation designed to draw to sea the main Austrian fleet, which was believed to be in the Dalmatian Archipelago.

The general plan was to watch the outlets from the archipelago with two groups each of six submarines in position off Premuda Island and between Cape della Planka and Incoronata Island respectively.³ Each group was to be supported by a flotilla of two light cruisers and six destroyers stationed to the south-westward of them; and a third division, to seaward of the southern one, was to drop a line of burning tar barrels to simulate a fleet or squadron steaming northward towards Venice. If after waiting two hours no movement of the enemy was observed, the flotillas were to proceed southward. The operation was supported by four armoured cruisers of the *Pisa* class under Rear-Admiral U. Cagni, cruising in the latitude of Pelagosa, while a flotilla of destroyers was ordered to watch Cattaro and provide against a surprise from that port.

¹ A 378, 395.

² *Queen, Implacable, Prince of Wales, London*, arrived Taranto a.m., May 27. *Dartmouth, Dublin*, arrived Brindisi p.m., May 25. *Sapphire* left Malta for Brindisi 4 p.m., May 25. *Amethyst* arrived Brindisi May 28. Most of the French destroyers left Malta for the Adriatic a.m., May 26.

³ See Plan XII.

The operation was carried out on May 30, the submarines leaving for their positions on the previous day. But no enemy vessels were encountered, with the exception of submarines near Pelagosa, one of which fired a torpedo at the *Pisa*, but without success. On their way south, the light craft carried out a bombardment of the semaphores at Lissa and Lagosta and the fort at Ragusa and other places down the Dalmatian coast.

Lissa signal station was demolished on June 1 by the *Quarto* and *Dublin*, both ships being unsuccessfully attacked during the operation by enemy submarines; and on June 5 the *Dublin* put Glavat lighthouse out of action, in accordance with orders from the Rear-Admiral.¹

A second expedition took place on 6th, with the object of searching all the anchorages in the Dalmatian Archipelago, destroying any submarines and supply craft found there, and cutting the cables to Lissa and Meleda. The 2nd (Cruiser) Division² was ordered to cruise between Cattaro and Meleda, with the double object of destroying by gun-fire the large bridge carrying the railway line between Ragusa and Cattaro, upon which the latter place was militarily dependent, and of covering the light craft³ from attack by the naval force at Cattaro, which was reported by the Italian observation party on Mount Lovchen to consist of three third-class battleships,⁴ the cruiser *Kaiser Karl VI*, light cruisers *Szigetvar* and *Aspern*, four large destroyers and eight torpedo craft.

The operation was carried out according to plan, the light forces arriving at their positions at daylight and cutting the cables and destroying the lighthouses which were believed to be used as signal stations by the enemy; but no ships or submarines were discovered in any of the harbours among the islands. The railway bridge between Ragusa and Cattaro was seriously damaged by gun-fire.

On June 7 a dirigible which had gone to bomb the Austrian fleet at Pola returned with the report that the ships were no longer there. A submarine watch was being kept off the port, under conditions of some difficulty in the glassy calm and minefields of unknown extent, but it appeared that the Austrian fleet moved at night, close inshore, within the extensive minefields surrounding the approaches. The necessity of keeping a close watch on the Dalmatian coast resulted in a decision to form submarine bases at Ancona and Barletta, though there were no defences at these places nor were any immediate preparations made to remedy this defect.

¹ Presumably Rear-Admiral Millo.

² *G. Garibaldi, F. Ferruccio, Varese*, and light cruisers *Coatit* and *Agordat*.

³ *Libia* and 4 T.B.D.s for Lissa and Lagosta. *Quarto, Dublin*, and 9 T.B.D.s. for Meleda.

⁴ *Budapest, Wien, Monarch*.

112. **Torpedoing of the "Dublin," June 9.**—On June 8 an expedition was arranged to bring out a large convoy of food supplies for Scutari, which was held up at San Giovanni di Medua in consequence of the presence of Austrian light craft at Cattaro. Opportunity was to be taken to destroy enemy submarine bases reported near Cape Rodoni. It was believed that sailing vessels were moored up in certain places and were kept supplied by Austrian torpedo boats from Cattaro; and a cruiser, accompanied by two destroyers, was therefore ordered to be on the line Cattaro-Cape Rodoni before daylight on 9th in order to intercept these torpedo boats, while other torpedo boats were to get well inshore during the night in readiness to attack the supply vessels at daylight. The lighthouses were believed to be employed in assisting in the business, and they were to be destroyed and their keepers removed.

Nothing was seen of the supplying torpedo boats from Cattaro, though two sailing vessels found at the suspected places were burned. The lighthouses were destroyed, and colour was lent to the suspicions concerning them, by the fact that one of them blew up with a great report and flame such as mere supplies for the light would not have caused. At 9.32 a.m. the *Dublin*,¹ in 41° 22' N., 18° 56' E., with four Italian² and three French destroyers³ screening her, sighted a periscope 500 yards on the port bow. She opened fire immediately and the helm was put hard a starboard; but at that very instant the tracks were seen of three torpedoes, two of which passed ahead and astern respectively, while the third hit her in No. 1 stokehold, tearing a large hole in the ship's side. The Italian and French destroyers, ably handled, at once closed around her, and although several more submarines were sighted the screening destroyers drove off all attacks, and the *Dublin*, steaming 17½ knots, reached Brindisi at 3.15 p.m. Thirteen men, all engine-room and stokehold ratings, were killed by the explosion of the torpedo. A telegram from Vienna ascribed to the Austrian submarine No. IV, commanded by Lieutenant Singate, the credit of penetrating the destroyer screen and torpedoing the *Dublin*.⁴ This day, June 9, was one of mishaps, for the Italian submarine *Medusa*, returning to Venice, was torpedoed while running on the surface and sunk by an Austrian submarine,⁵ and the Italian dirigible M.2, which had been bombarding the works at Fiume, ran out of fuel and had to come down on the sea, where she was burnt and her crew were taken prisoners. This was an appreciable

¹ Captain John D. Kelly.

² *Audace, Ardito, Ardente, Francesco Nullo.*

³ *Bouclier, Bisson, Magon.*

⁴ Captain Richmond reported the submarine was probably the *Curie*, which the Austrians had salvaged and taken into their service, as she was the only one known of which could discharge three torpedoes in such rapid succession. The *Curie* had seven torpedo tubes, S/M No. IV had two only. ("War Vessels and Aircraft," Quarterly Return.)

⁵ Gayer states that it was U.B. 15, one of the German boats put together at Pola.

loss to the Italians, for the services of the dirigible had been valuable both for scouting and in assisting to render any prolonged stay of the Austrian fleet at Pola impossible.

113. **Shortage of Light Cruisers.**—Up to date, the war in the Adriatic had been one of flotillas, and the torpedoing of the *Dublin*, which necessitated repairs extending over many weeks,¹ rendered the shortage of fast light cruisers once more acute. On June 4 Admiral Thursby sent the *Dartmouth* to Malta for examination, for she had developed further defects in her boilers and her speed was now reduced to 16 knots. Both the *Sapphire* and *Amethyst* required a general overhaul, and their slow speed when burning the American coal which they took on board at Brindisi rendered them less useful than had been hoped. It was arranged that the *Amethyst* should be sent to Malta for examination of turbines and the *Sapphire* laid up at Taranto, one at a time, when the *Dublin* and *Dartmouth* rejoined the fleet; and on 23rd the *Topaze* left Dover to reinforce Admiral Thursby's squadron.² The *Marsala*, one of the only three fast light cruisers which the Italians possessed, was also out of action, undergoing boiler repairs at Taranto. At the moment, therefore, the situation as regards the fast light cruisers which were so essential for the war in the Adriatic was little better than before Italy entered the war. For the time being there was a lull in active operations in the Adriatic, though on June 11 the Gulf of Trieste was searched but without sighting the enemy.³

CHAPTER XIV.

THE THREAT TO THE TRANSPORT ROUTES.

114. **U.21 leaves Cattaro for Constantinople.**—The forecast of the Admiralty and Admiral Superintendent, Malta, as to the intentions of the enemy submarines in the Mediterranean to threaten the rear of the Dardanelles operations, proved to be accurate. On May 20 Lieutenant-Commander Hering left Cattaro to attack the Allied battleships off Gaba Tepe.⁴ On 25th the *Triumph*, lying off Gallipoli surrounded by small craft, was skilfully torpedoed, and this attack was followed two

¹ She was patched up at Taranto and sent to Spezia for repairs.

² A 409, 412.

³ Telegram from Captain Boyle, Rome, to Admiral Gamble, 12.6.15.

⁴ Gayer.

days later by the sinking of the *Majestic*. Admiral de Robeck considered that the submarine which carried out these attacks was identical with one that had been sighted by *B.11* entering the Gulf of Smyrna on May 17. *B.11* stated that the submarine was a large one; but there is, nevertheless, reason to believe that she was one of the German boats put together in Austria and now employed in working from Constantinople, while the sinking of the *Triumph* and *Majestic* was effected by *U.21*, which afterwards passed up the Dardanelles and arrived at Constantinople on June 5. The Germans were anxious, no doubt, to send submarines to Constantinople, in order both to impress the Turks and to operate against the Russian and Allied fleets should the latter succeed in forcing the Dardanelles.¹ The Admiralty estimated that two or three submarines had been transferred from Germany to the Mediterranean by sea, but it is probable that at this date one only, namely *U.21*, had entered by the Straits of Gibraltar.² There were, however, the submarines which had been despatched in sections to Pola to be reckoned with, and the estimate of the Italian Intelligence Department doubtless included these. The Italians believed there were three or four German submarines in the Mediterranean, two of which were in the Aegean and one or two in the Tyrrhenian; the objective of the latter was thought to be the new battleship *Duilio*, which was nearing completion at Spezia.³

115. Route Instructions Issued, June 4.—Reinforcements were being despatched to Sir Ian Hamilton and considerable movements of transports were taking place in the Mediterranean at this date. On May 13 the *Ivernia* and *Ascania* left Devonport with reinforcements for the Royal Naval Division at the Dardanelles, 3,142 of all ranks, passing Gibraltar on May 16 and 17 respectively. The *Orsova* left on the same date and the *Tunisian* three days later, passing Malta on May 22 and 26 respectively, these two transports bringing 3,387 troops for Sir Ian Hamilton. Further reinforcements for the Naval Division left Devonport in the *Kalyan* on May 17; and during the next two days five more transports⁴ left for Egypt with portions of the Lowland Division for Sir Ian Hamilton. These were followed between May 21 and 28 by the *Mauretania* with a

¹ M. 07944/15.

² According to Gayer, no boat followed *U.21* from Germany by sea until *U.34* and *U.35* left on August 4, 1915.

³ Tel. Rodd, Rome, to Adty., 27.5.15. The Italians seem to have appreciated the situation correctly, except as regards their fears for the *Duilio*. Gayer states that by May 13, when *U.21* arrived at Cattaro, three German S/M.s, *U.B.3*, *U.B.8* and *U.B.7*, had already left, though their destination was the Dardanelles and not Spezia. Three more, *U.C.13*, *U.C.14* and *U.C.15*, left "in the course of the summer."

⁴ *Marere*, *Georgian*, *Bornu*, *Oxonian*, *Ballarat*. They passed Gibraltar May 22 to 25.

huge number of troops, and by seven other transports,¹ advantage being taken of the passage of boarding steamers for the Dardanelles to use them as escorts for the slower ships. The *Star of England* and *Hymettus* were engaged in the transfer of the 69th and 89th Punjabis from Port Said to Marseilles and bringing back the 125th Rifles and 9th Bhopal Infantry to Egypt; and, in addition to the reinforcements which were arriving for Egypt from India, transports² were still taking Indian Cavalry and other reinforcements to Marseilles.

On May 22 the Admiralty instructed the British Admirals in the Mediterranean that transports proceeding with troops should be given routes which avoided areas dangerous from submarines. The protection of the transports was the province of the French Commander-in-Chief, who issued any special orders he considered necessary. A routine was initiated by which sailings were reported to the Admiralty in sufficient time to enable the latter to acquaint the French Ministry of Marine through the Naval Attaché, this roundabout route being a more rapid method of transmitting the information to Admiral Boué de Lapeyrière than from Gibraltar or Port Said direct.³ Arrangements were made for warnings of submarines to be sent to all transports and merchant ships fitted with W/T installations; and in order to facilitate communication between the Allied warships in the Mediterranean it was decided that all times should be given in mid-European time and all longitudes reckoned from the meridian of Greenwich.⁴

On June 4 Admiral Boué de Lapeyrière issued the first of a series of definite route instructions for transports, to come into force two days later. A modification was issued on June 10.⁵ From June 1 all transports with troops for the Dardanelles were sent to Alexandria to meet the wishes of Sir Ian Hamilton.⁶ Steps were taken to protect the transport base at Alexandria against the entry of submarines; from June 15 all lights were extinguished and the entry of ships was prohibited between sunset and sunrise; and net defence was established by 18th.⁷

116. Limits of the Mediterranean Commands fixed.—There were now four flag officers holding independent sea-going commands in the Mediterranean, in addition to the Italian Commander-in-Chief in the Adriatic and the Admirals at Malta and Gibraltar; but with the sole exception of Admiral Peirse in Egypt the limits of the various commands had not been definitely specified. On June 12, in view of the submarine

¹ *Shropshire*, *Star of Victoria*, *Runic*, *Empress of Britain*, *Massilia*, *Transylvania*, *Andania*.

² *Elephanta*, *Erinpura*, *Varsova*.

³ A 385, 392, 394, and Adty. to Marine, Paris, 2252, 25.5.15.

⁴ A 391.

⁵ A 402.

⁶ A.S., Malta, to Adty., 252, 11.7.15, says "General wishes all ships to be sent to Alexandria." Presumably Sir Ian Hamilton was meant.

⁷ S.N.O., Malta, to Adty., 245, 18.6.15.

menace and the necessity of providing escorts for transports, Admiral de Robeck asked that the limits within which the different Admirals were responsible should be clearly defined.¹

The proposal which on June 16 the Admiralty communicated to the French and Italian Ministries of Marine was that Admiral de Robeck should command in the waters north of the chain of islands from Samos to Euboea, and the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, the coast of Egypt as far out to sea as the usual local defence patrols extended. The authority of the Admiral Superintendent at Malta was to be bounded similarly to that of Admiral Peirse; and the Senior Naval Officer, Gibraltar, was to be responsible as far east as the 5th Meridian of west longitude. The Italian Commander-in-Chief was to command the coasts and local waters of Italy and the Gulf of Taranto, his sphere in the Adriatic being bounded on the south by the latitude of Cape Colonne. The French would have the direction in the remainder of the Mediterranean, which would be divided between the Commander-in-Chief and the Admiral on the Syrian coast as the French Government might arrange.²

The ten months which had elapsed since the Convention of August 6, 1914, came into effect, had witnessed very considerable departures from the terms agreed upon. Malta, Gibraltar,³ the Eastern Mediterranean, Egypt, and the Adriatic—one after another they had been cut off the French command; and now, by a loose application of the phrase "as far out to sea as the usual local defence patrols extend," the French Ministry of Marine foresaw that the authority of Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère might be "completely annulled." They held the view that the growing submarine menace rendered necessary a more complete unity of control than ever; the French Commander-in-Chief should be in command of everything which was not controlled by de Robeck in the Eastern Mediterranean or the Duke of the Abruzzi in the Adriatic. Thus Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère would become the organising centre of all naval movements in the Mediterranean; but in place of this, they were confronted with what, in their opinion, amounted to a proposal still further to curtail his sphere of influence in the Mediterranean.⁴

The misunderstanding was, however, soon removed. In place of the phrase "as far out to sea as the usual local defence patrols extend" the wording "territorial waters" was employed. An alteration was made in the Italian sphere of command, Corfu and the Greek coast, where the German submarines were reported to have supply bases, being excluded, since Italy was

¹ A 404.

² A 405, and M. 04581/15.

³ The Admiral Superintendent, Malta, and the S.N.O., Gibraltar, appear in practice never to have been under the French Commander-in-Chief to the extent outlined in the Convention of August 6.

⁴ M. 04898/15.

not at war with Germany, and Lybia and the territorial waters of the Dodecanese (the Islands of the Aegean in Italian occupation) added; and finally, at the end of June, the limits of the various commands in the Mediterranean were fixed as follows¹ :—

1. *British*.—Vice - Admiral, Eastern Mediterranean — the waters to the north of the chain of islands from Point St. Paul in Asia Minor, through Samos, Nikaria, Mykoni, Tinos, Andros, Euboea to Cape Griba on the mainland of Greece; arrangements for the passage and protection of transports west of the Doro Channel were left entirely to the French Commander-in-Chief.

Territorial waters of Egypt, Malta and Gibraltar, under Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, Admiral Superintendent, Malta, and Senior Naval Officer, Gibraltar, respectively.

2. *Italian*.—The Adriatic north of the line Cape Spartivento in Calabria to Cape Kephali² on the mainland slightly north of Corfu.

The three small islands Fano, Samothraki and Merlera.

The territorial waters of Italy, Tripoli, Cyrenaica, and the Dodecanese.

3. *French*.—The remainder of the Mediterranean.

If a patrol ship had to go outside its area the commanding officer was to notify his Senior Naval Officer. In September the limit of the Gibraltar command was extended to 5° W. (17 miles east of Gibraltar).

117. **French Dispositions, June 5, 1915.**³—On June 5 the disposition of the French ships in the Mediterranean under the command of Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère was as follows :—

The *Courbet* (fleet flagship) and the majority of the battleships were at Malta, with the cruisers *Victor Hugo* and *Jurien de la Gravière* and the 1st Destroyer Flotilla (apparently). The Commodore Commanding the Submarine Flotillas⁴ had his flag in the destroyer *Dehorter* at Malta.

At Bizerta there was a force of battleships⁵ and destroyers, the latter apparently comprising the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Destroyer Flotillas; and here also were the cruiser *Ernest Renan* and a submarine flotilla.⁶ The Défense Mobile of Bizerta, which also patrolled the neighbourhood of the Galita Islands, Cape Bon, and the southern shores of Tunisia, comprised 23 torpedo boats.

¹ A 417, 418 and M. 010095/15.

² Cape Kiephali is meant.

³ Telegram of June 6.

⁴ Captain F. J. Moullé.

⁵ *Diderot, Vergniaud, Vérité, République, Démocratie*.

⁶ "War Vessels and Aircraft," Monthly Return, shows Bizerta as the headquarters of the 2nd S/M Flotilla.

The following patrols were maintained :—

IONIAN SEA.—Cruisers *Jules Michelet*, *Jules Ferry*.

IONIAN ISLANDS.—S/M *Archimède*.

GENOA.—Cruiser *Dupetit-Thouars*.

LEGHORN.—Cruiser *Amiral Charner*.

PALERMO.—T.B.D. *Téméraire*.

CAPE BON—SICILY.—Cruisers *Guichen*, *Chateaurenault*, and destroyer *Renaudin*.

EAST COAST OF SICILY.—T.B.D.s *Spahi*, *Enseigne Henry*.

CAPE MATAPAN.—*Desaix*, torpedo vessel *La Hire*, T.B.D.s *Voltigeur*, *Hache*, *Mousqueton*.

ASIA MINOR COAST.—Cruiser *Bruix*.

MOROCCAN DIVISION :—

SOUTH-EAST COAST OF SPAIN.—Light cruiser *Cassard*.

GIBRALTAR.—Light cruiser *Duchayla*.

TANGIER.—Light cruiser *Cosmao*, and the auxiliary cruisers *Atmah*, *Cyclone*, *Foriban*.

The submarine *Gustave Zédé* left Malta on June 11 to patrol to the north of Santa Maura Islands, then Cephalonia and Zante, and Navarino Bay to Cape Matapan.

118. **Search for Enemy Supply Bases.**—On June 10, Admiral Limpus reported to the Admiralty that a submarine had been seen on the surface, just off Salina Bay, Malta, at 11 o'clock the previous night. The Admiral Superintendent was finding difficulty in patrolling the little bays around the island, because it was unsafe to move French destroyers about in them for fear of their being fired at by the somewhat imperfectly trained personnel of the shore batteries. He was short of trained ratings for manning small boats, and he therefore asked the Admiralty for some pensioner ratings ; but none could be spared, and he was told to draw on survivors of torpedoed ships.¹

The Intelligence Officer at Gibraltar had information that German submarines were getting oil from ships and the shore near Ayamonte on the borders of Spain and Portugal, and on the Moroccan coast at Arzila and Laraiche. The vessels of the Gibraltar Straits Patrol, namely, 11 T.B.s, three armed boarding steamers and the *Pelorus*, of which five T.B.s and two armed boarding steamers were continually on patrol, could not effectively cover a greater distance than 30 miles from Europa Point, and they were, moreover, fully occupied with the search for contraband of vessels passing through the Straits. Admiral Brock asked for two additional light cruisers and six destroyers to strengthen his force ; but the Admiralty could not then spare him any reinforcements, though they promised that when any

¹ A.S., Malta, to Adty., 829, 10.6.15, and reply 177, 11.6.15.

vessels became available the Gibraltar Straits Patrol should receive every consideration.¹ Our Ambassador at Madrid requested the Spanish Minister of Marine to have the Spanish coast patrolled in the neighbourhood of the suspected spots. The latter averred that there were no Spanish warships available, and though he promised to send urgent instructions to the authorities concerned to exercise the utmost vigilance, he could not guarantee that no supplies would be shipped for transference to enemy submarines at sea ; and it was left to the French Moroccan division to deal with the matter.²

The enemy submarines operating in the Aegean were believed to be receiving supplies from a powerful organisation which carried on a contraband trade in hashish over the entire Eastern Mediterranean, the supplies usually starting from the Piraeus and being either deposited at certain points or transferred to the submarines at sea. At the request of the Greek Government we had withdrawn the cruisers stationed to watch vessels sailing from the Piraeus, and consequently we were unable to stop the traffic, which had reached such a point by the end of June that it was reported that practically every sailing craft which quitted a Greek port for the Aegean carried petrol for enemy submarines. There were German agents at various points, and the Turks were reported to have ordered all Syrian ports to keep stores in readiness for submarines, one of which was stated on good authority to have revictualled at Latakiya on June 10. The French were unwilling to declare a blockade of any part of the coast owing to the number of ships it would necessitate, and they considered that the "very active watch" kept by the 3rd Squadron gave sufficient results.³

On June 19 the General Officer Commanding in Egypt put forward the suggestion that the Germans should be outbid and the hashish organisation employed in hunting enemy submarines, oilers and depots.⁴ The Admiralty took the matter up and instructed Admiral Peirse to confer with the General Officer Commanding on the subject and consider whether he could organise a flotilla of local armed craft manned by naval personnel available in Egypt. They inquired whether the *Hardinge* and *Dufferin* could be spared and their crews utilised, as General Maxwell appeared to think they might be dispensed with. But the two Royal Indian Marine ships were too useful in the Red Sea, and moreover their crews were composed mainly of lascars, who were unsuitable for the proposed work ; neither could Admiral Peirse obtain any suitable craft in Egypt. But by outbidding the Germans we could ensure all movements of

¹ M. 04449/15.

² Adty. to Marine, Paris, 2434, 12.6.15, and reply 584 of same date.

³ Marine, Paris, to Adty., 705, 24.7.15.

⁴ Paper titled S^a 363/1915.

supply vessels being reported to us, and the Admiral suggested that the most efficient organisation would be a flotilla of torpedo craft working on information supplied from Alexandria, which could be moved to any part of the Eastern Mediterranean as required. High speed was essential, and the flotilla would need to consist at first of at least four destroyers. The Admiralty had, however, no torpedo craft available for the formation of a separate flotilla, the shortage of these vessels being almost universally acute; but they authorised Admiral Peirse to try his plan of expending money to obtain information, which was to be passed to the Senior Naval Officers of the localities concerned for them to take the necessary action.¹

119. **The Transport Routes, July–August.**²—The immunity from submarine attack which had been enjoyed up to date by transports in the Mediterranean was disturbed on July 4, when the French transport *Carthage* was torpedoed and sunk off Seddul Bahr.³ This seems to have drawn attention to the fact that the routine of sending transports with troops and stores for Sir Ian Hamilton's force to Alexandria, where adjustments were made, instead of despatching them direct to Mudros, added 700 miles to their journeys and exposed them to increased submarine risks—a routine necessitated by the fact that the Transport Officers at home who loaded the transports and the Military Embarkation Staff were apparently in complete ignorance of the intentions and wishes of those responsible for the landing. Admiral Limpus at Malta was trying to get a decision on the point from the G.O.C., Egypt, and Admiral de Robeck. It seems that there was a conflict between military convenience in handling the transports and naval anxiety as to their protection,⁴ and it was not until several weeks later that the occurrence of a disaster brought about a settlement of the matter.

On July 19 an agent from the Piraeus reported that two German submarines had arrived at Smyrna in sections on 2nd and were being put together. Indications were found on Nelson Island in Aboukir Bay of an attempt to form a submarine base there, and continuous night signalling was observed in the neighbourhood, but search by seaplanes revealed nothing. On July 15 an enemy submarine unsuccessfully attacked the Italian gunboat *Misurata* off the Gulf of Sollum, and the sailing

¹ Telegram from Embassy, Paris, 7.6.15, and Adty. to C.-in-C., E.I., 352, 23.6.15, and reply 643, 27.6.15, and further reply from Adty., 372, 1.7.15, also C.-in-C., E.I., to Adty., 671, 4.7.15, and 680, 6.7.15. Admiral Peirse proposed to pay reward of £20,000 or £30,000 for information leading to the destruction of an enemy S/M. But these sums seemed to the Admiralty to be excessive at a time when British fishermen were being rewarded by £1,000; and the reward, as a general rule, was ordered to be limited to £5,000, a fortune beyond the dreams of avarice of a Levantine smuggler.

² See Plan VI.

³ By *U.21*. (Gayer, II, 41.)

⁴ A 432, 433.

of transports from Alexandria was held up for two days. Sir Ian Hamilton's force was making little progress on Gallipoli, and a fresh landing was projected to take place early in August at Suvla Bay, in an attempt to win the peninsula and bring the operations to a successful conclusion; and to this end large numbers of reinforcements and increased supplies of ammunition were being sent out from England.

Submarines were now making their appearance on the transport route in the Western Mediterranean. At 9 a.m. on August 1 a submarine was sighted going east by a fishing boat two miles off Algiers, and at eight o'clock that evening a torpedo was fired at the outgoing French auxiliary ship *Liamone*.¹

The French transport *Dumbea* stated that a torpedo had been fired at her at 10 p.m. on August 2 in the same area.² There was a crop of reports of German submarines which had entered or were intending to enter the Mediterranean, but the Admiralty were practically certain that up to August 25 one large German submarine only, viz., *U.21*, now known as No. 51, had passed the Straits of Gibraltar³, and they assumed the submarine off Algiers to be one of those put together in Austria. Their estimate of the number of the latter type completed was 10, viz., eight small and two large boats.⁴ Certain of these enemy boats were believed to have been damaged or destroyed.⁵ On June 22 one was reported to have struck a mine and sunk while on passage from Smyrna to Constantinople.⁶ On July 6 one was attacked with hydrostatic mine in the vicinity of Cape Helles, and oil rose to the surface, and on the following day an enemy boat was caught in an indicator net and attacked with explosive charges with unknown results. A French steamer, *La Camargue*, claimed to have hit a submarine twice on July 17 off Cape Krio. On July 25 *U.51* was reported to be under repair at the Arsenal (? Constantinople) after being aground at Chekmeje, and on the following day a submarine was observed being towed towards Constantinople by a destroyer.⁷

German submarines were reported to have received supplies at Alicante and from a Spanish schooner at Majorca; and during July the Spanish authorities discovered a supply of oil in barrels moored 30 miles from Finisterre, part of which was removed

¹ Adty. to Malta, Gibraltar, and V.-A., E.M., August 2, 1915.

² Consul General, Algiers, to Adty., August 2 and 3, 1915.

³ M. 06286/15. It was not known by the Admiralty at this date (August 25) that *U.34* and *U.35* had passed the Straits and reached Cattaro two days previously. See Chapter XVIII.

⁴ This agrees with Gayer, II, 24, who states that of these *U.B.8* had vanished 80 miles from Smyrna and was lost with all hands, and *U.C.15* was compelled by machinery defects to remain idle for several weeks in the Gulf of Kos.

⁵ Gayer states, however, that one only of them, viz., *U.B.8*, was lost during 1915, the cause being unknown.

⁶ Possibly *U.B.8*.

⁷ M. 06286/15.

by a German-owned trawler.¹ The Balearic Islands had long been suspected as a supply base, but although French ships had been patrolling off the islands for the last three months, searching all the bays, they had discovered no trace of submarines.²

120. **Loss of the "Royal Edward," August 13.**—On August 13 the transport *Royal Edward* was torpedoed and sunk in the Aegean, four miles south of Kandeliusa,³ with heavy loss of life.⁴ The hospital ship *Soudan*, which was on the way from Mudros to Alexandria, was in the vicinity and rescued 13 officers and 428 men,⁵ and a few more were picked up by trawlers and French destroyers which were hurriedly sent to the scene. Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère at once changed the route through the Scarpanto Strait to one more to the westward, through the Kaso Strait, thence to the west of Santorin and through the Doro Channel⁶; though it is probable that the new route was not issued in time to be followed by the hospital ships *Assaye* and *Gloucester Castle* and the transports *Manitou* (carrying the headquarters staff of the 54th Division), *Ajax* and *Franconia*, which left Alexandria on 12th and 13th, nor by the 12 transports which left Egypt on the following day for the Dardanelles. The heavy loss of life in the *Royal Edward* resulted in a request for supply of Carley floats for the transports.

CHAPTER XV.

EVENTS IN EGYPT AND THE RED SEA, JUNE–JULY, 1915—THE THREAT TO ADEN.

121. **Turkish Mining Activity in the Canal.**—The withdrawal of the Turkish forces from the Suez Canal at the beginning of May had not rendered any relaxation possible of the vigilant patrol maintained by Admiral Peirse in order to checkmate the attempts made by the Turks to mine the fairway. The Porte had issued a note to the British Government, stating that since the latter had not regarded the obligations imposed by the Convention of 1888 to maintain no warships in the Canal, but had even fortified it and landed troops in Egypt, the Ottoman Government found itself compelled to take military

¹ M. 05588/15.

² Adty. to Marine, Paris, 2757, 15.7.15, and reply 682.

³ 36° 30' N., 27° 0' E.

⁴ Gayer, II, 49, states she was sunk by *U.B.14* (Lieutenant von Heimburg), one of the German submarines put together in Pola, which was on her way from Cattaro to Constantinople.

⁵ Tel., Robinson, Cairo, to Adty., 249, 15.8.15. The *Royal Edward* carried 31 officers and 1,335 men, drafts for the 29th Division, with Labour Corps and R.A.M.C. details.

⁶ A 454.

measures to protect its imperial territory, of which Egypt formed part, and to extend hostilities to the Canal. An obvious reference to mines was contained in the warning to neutrals that if the measures proved prejudicial to their ships or goods the responsibility must be laid at the door of the French and British Governments.

At 3 a.m. on May 29 a party of Turks waded out into Little Bitter Lake, captured the crew of a pile-driver, and fired on a passing steamer. Traffic was stopped for 12 hours; and Admiral Peirse cited this to the Admiralty as his justification in asking for more small craft for the efficient patrol of the Canal. The shortage was felt particularly in the Bitter Lakes, where military posts could not be maintained on the east bank. Admiral Peirse had already taken up all suitable craft available locally, and he now pressed the Admiralty for the return of the Malta torpedo boats which had been withdrawn from the Canal two months previously. But the torpedo boats were required for anti-submarine work at the Dardanelles and could not be spared, and for the time being Admiral Peirse had to manage as best he could with the local vessels available.¹

Evidences of Turkish mining activity continued to be discovered. On arrival at Aqaba on May 23 the *Montcalm* found three mines moored in the position occupied by her when last at the port. On 31st a small enemy patrol was driven off near Balsah, and a buried mine was subsequently discovered near their tracks, a mile from the Canal; and on the night of June 16/17 a bomb of primitive design exploded under a train, without doing any damage, in the Suez section of the railway line on the west bank.

At 5.30 a.m. on June 30 the British steamer *Teiresias* was mined in the Suez Canal at the south end of Little Bitter Lake and sank, blocking the channel for 14 hours, the tracks of 20 men and two camels being subsequently discovered on the shores of the Lake opposite the position where the mine was placed.² Admiral Peirse strongly reiterated to the Admiralty the request he had made on May 29 for the return of the Malta torpedo boats. He was dangerously weak in small craft for the patrol of the Lakes and could not ensure immunity from further raids with the craft at present at his disposal. The *Teiresias* was soon refloated, and was towed to Alexandria for repairs; but the danger to be apprehended was lest a ship should be sunk, not on a sandy bottom but in a rocky portion of the channel, where dredging was impossible, and it was reported that a retired Canal Pilot of German nationality had advised the Turks to this effect. The torpedo boats could not be spared, but the Admiralty promised to send Admiral Peirse some motor boats, and they inquired of the French Ministry of Marine whether they could spare a few old torpedo boats for patrolling the Canal.³ The

¹ C.-in-C., E.I., to Adty., 532, 29.5.15, and A. 397.

² H.S. 156, p. 1156, and 183, p. 21, and Major-General Wilson's Despatch (Naval and Military Despatches, VI, p. 107).

³ It does not appear that any were sent.

French Ministry of Marine were fully alive to the danger, and had themselves pointed it out to the Admiralty. The strictest precautions were now put in force to prevent a repetition of the *Teiresias* incident, and also to prevent the possibility of mines being maliciously dropped by ships on passage through the Canal. In the rocky portion traffic was suspended from 11 o'clock every night until sweeping had been carried out after daylight and the banks searched for tracks of the enemy. In Little Bitter Lake further protective measures were taken, and military armed guards were provided for such ships passing through the Canal as were not considered entirely trustworthy.¹ The great value of our Eastern trade rendered it essential that every protection should be given to this link in the communications between Europe and the East.

The safeguarding of the Canal was made the excuse for searching vessels suspected of carrying contraband, westbound vessels on board of which search discovered goods liable to detention being sent to Alexandria and eastbound vessels being ordered to call at Aden.²

122. Attack on Perim, June 13, 1915.—It will be remembered that the expedition to Somaliland had been postponed early in May owing to the situation at Aden; now it was reported that Germans at Sheikh Sa'id were preparing the Turks and Arabs to invade the Protectorate. The evacuation of Kamaran Island by the Turks had been confirmed on April 24, and the India Office had sent orders that Kamaran, Jebel Zukur and Hanish Islands were to be occupied.³ On June 7 the G.O.C., Aden,⁴ proceeded in the *Empress of Russia* with a force to carry out the operation, and the islands were occupied on 10th without opposition, though at Loheija the *Minto* came under fire from the Turkish guns but without sustaining any damage.

On the morning of June 13 the Turkish guns at Sheikh Sa'id opened fire on Perim Island, putting the Upper Lighthouse out of action, and the patrolling ships were sent to investigate. A night attack by dhows on 15th was repulsed. There was undoubtedly a strong force of Turks at Sheikh Sa'id,⁵ and it was believed there were some German gunners among them. The guns were well concealed and could not be discovered from the sea; bombardment by the *Empress of Japan* on June 13 and 14 failed to destroy a single one. The nature of the guns was uncertain, nor did they open fire while the ships were off the place; but the *Empress of Russia* considered that besides smaller guns there were possibly three German 4.1 in.⁶

¹ A 426, 435, 447, and Adty. to C.-in-C., E.I., 452, 5.8.15, and reply 811, 6.8.15.

² Adty. to S.N.O., Egypt, 332, 13.6.15.

³ C.-in-C., E.I., to Adty., 574, 7.6.15.

⁴ Major-General D. G. L. Shaw. His despatch is in M. 08065/15.

⁵ The force had been estimated at 1,700 in the middle of May.

⁶ C.-in-C., E.I., to Adty., 612, 18.6.15.

Admiral Peirse reported on June 15 that the light was repaired, though it would continue to be vulnerable until the guns at Sheikh Sa'id were silenced, an operation which he thought it unlikely that the ships would be able to accomplish, and certainly not without aeroplane observation. The Admiralty telegraphed to him inquiring what action he was taking to prevent a repetition of the bombardment. They considered that the *Fox* should be sent to Perim without delay; and they informed Admiral Peirse that the *Venus* would be sent from Queenstown to Port Said to reinforce his squadron. The *Fox* at this time was at Ismailia, where the situation on the Canal rendered it necessary that she should remain. Admiral Peirse had stationed at Perim the *Northbrook* and the Sudan Government tug *Enterprise* which had been commissioned at Port Sudan on May 27 to replace the *Nurelbahr*, a coastguard vessel whose return was required by the Egyptian authorities; and he assured the Admiralty that unless landing operations were contemplated he considered these two ships to be adequate.¹

At this date the situation in Persia was somewhat critical and the British Government were giving consideration to the steps which would be necessary if war should break out. On June 20 the Admiralty ordered Admiral Peirse to report what ships he could make available for despatch to the Persian Gulf, if necessary, where the Navy might be called upon to assist and cover the landing of troops, patrol the Gulf, and blockade the ports.²

Admiral Peirse replied that he could send the *Fox* and *Northbrook* on the arrival of the *Venus*; but the Admiralty intended the latter for Aden, and they ordered Admiral Peirse to send her there as soon as she could be spared: the situation in the Persian Gulf was not yet sufficiently strained to necessitate the despatch of warships.³

123. Turkish Attack on Lahej.—The *Venus* arrived at Port Said on July 3 and left next day for Aden. On 5th Admiral Peirse telegraphed home that it appeared from reports that an attack on Aden was imminent: the *Northbrook* and *Minto* were already there, and the *Empress of Asia* and *Empress of Russia* were arriving that day. The *Himalaya* at this time was in the northern part of the Red Sea, where she found two floating mines at Tiran on July 10, and the *Empress of Japan* was at Colombo awaiting a decision as to whether she was to be paid off. On 6th Admiral Peirse reported there was skirmishing near Aden, and shortly afterwards more definite information began to come through. It appeared that on July 4 a British column made a forced march out to Lahej, some 15 miles up the east

¹ A 282, 283, and C.-in-C., E.I., to Adty., 612, 18.6.15.

² A 410.

³ A 413, 414.

coast, which had been attacked by Turks and hostile Arabs on the previous day, and was left open by the retirement of the friendly Arabs who had been stationed there to hold the place. The British column drove out the enemy, but was forced to retire owing to the desertion of the hired camels.

The troops were without food or water. It was one of the hottest days of the year, and British and Indians suffered severely from the heat. The Brecknockshire Battalion alone had some 50 per cent. of casualties from this cause. Most of the sick and wounded, of which latter, fortunately, there were few, were brought back to Aden, though about half a dozen were left in the enemy's hands. The British force retreated some seven miles to Sheikh Othman, from which, however, it retired unmolested a couple of days later and took up a defensive position at Khormaksan, north of Aden. Patrols were thrown out, but no further contact was established with the enemy, who appeared to have halted at Lahej.¹ An attack on the town of Aden was, however, momentarily expected, and work on the W/T station which was being erected was suspended and the officials were standing by to abandon it.

At home, as soon as the state of affairs was known, immediate steps were taken to restore the situation. On July 8 the Admiralty told Admiral Peirse to hasten the arrival of the *Venus* at Aden and to send either the *Fox* or *Philomel* to Perim to be available for service at the islands in the southern part of the Red Sea which had been occupied by us on June 10.² They also ordered the *Diana* up from Gibraltar to Port Said to reinforce his squadron. Preparations were being made to despatch a brigade of reinforcements from Egypt, but meanwhile the Senior Naval Officer, Aden, Captain Philip H. Colomb of the *Empress of Asia*, was authorised by the Admiralty to confer with the military and, if the latter desired it, to take the necessary steps to stop at Aden all vessels bringing reinforcements from India and Australia.³

The *Venus* arrived at Aden on July 9. The *Philomel*, which Admiral Peirse had ordered to Aden, had just left Alexandria. She stopped at Suez on her way down the Red Sea, in order to take on board General Younghusband, who was going to take charge at Aden.

¹ M.06018/15, Report of Proceedings by *Empress of Asia*, and General Duff's Report, dated March 9, 1916, on Military Operations in India since the outbreak of War.

² The G.O.C., Aden, had asked Admiral Peirse, after the occupation of the islands, whether he could ensure their protection from raids by sea. Admiral Peirse undertook to send a ship to visit the islands periodically, but he had not sufficient ships available to provide a permanent guardship; and he told the G.O.C. that, in his opinion, the garrison should be made strong enough to repel raids. (M. 06401/15.)

³ A 421, 424, 427, 428.

Captain Colomb disposed his ships to support the military defensive line which was being held to the north of Aden.¹ The town is situated on the eastern side of a high rocky peninsula some five miles in length, east and west, and about three miles in breadth, which bears much resemblance to Gibraltar. The harbour lies within the peninsula, on the western side. The *Venus* and *Empress of Russia* were stationed on the eastern side, 2,000 yards from the shore, and 500 and 1,200 yards respectively in advance of the military right flank, and burned their searchlights at night as an aid to the military. A lighter was taken up and armed with a 12 pdr. and a 3 pdr. gun and provided with a searchlight; and a launch, the *Camballa*, was requisitioned and armed with three 3 pdr. With the *Panther*² and the tug *Enterprise* these vessels protected the left flank, from inside the harbour, the *Northbrook* and *Empress of Asia* lying at buoys in support. The *Minto* was stationed to the north-west of Slave Island, one of several islands in the inner bay which was used solely by native craft. The G.O.C. decided to remove the guards from Hanish and Zukur Islands, and at midnight July 11-12 the *Empress of Russia* was sent to take them off. At 4 p.m. on 12th the decision was reversed, and, as the islands lay in a sector which it was difficult to reach by W/T from Aden, the *Empress of Asia* had to proceed in order to acquaint her with the decision.

Captain Colomb had detained seven transports in all,³ but on 12th he telegraphed to the Admiralty that he was sending them all on again to their destinations, with two exceptions, the *Medic* and *Suevic*.⁴ In his opinion there was little likelihood of an attack being made on Aden; the enemy would have to advance across flat, heavy ground under fire from the warships and exposed to the searchlights of the latter at night. Hostile Arabs had advanced to Sheikh Othman, and the result of our abandonment of the place was that one of the sources of the water supply to Aden was cut off; a riot was nearly caused, and in consequence the whole of the water supply produced in Aden was commandeered.

124. Reinforcements Arrive—Capture of Sheikh Othman.—Major-General Younghusband arrived in the *Philomel* on July 15 and took over the command. On the morning of 18th and 19th reinforcements arrived from Suez in five transports⁵; and under the direction of Commander A. E. Wood of the *Northbrook* the crews of the *Empress of Asia*, *Empress of Russia*, and *Northbrook* at once set about clearing the transports and landing the force. The disembarkation took place at Maala, south of Slave Island

¹ See M. 06018/15 and telegrams of date from *Empress of Asia* to Ady.

² Apparently a local vessel which had been taken up.

³ *Apenda*, *Awellando*, *Botanist*, *Malda*, *Suevic*, *Medic*, *Teesta*.

⁴ A telegram of July 13 from *Empress of Asia* says *Suevic*, *Medic* and *Teesta* were detained.

⁵ *Menominee*, *Annaberg*, *Alnwick Castle*, *Mashetra*, arrived 18th; *Japanese Prince* arrived 19th.

and two miles distant from the anchoring place of the transports. There was a good wharf 700 ft. long, with five steam cranes, but in the absence of lights no work was done after dark. Commander Wood borrowed from reluctant local firms tugs and lighters; and in spite of all difficulties, of tugs breaking down, limited towage, incapacity of natives in charge of tugs and lighters, delays at the wharves, and at times a considerable swell, the whole force of 4,191 men, 533 horses, 550 mules, 2 field batteries, ammunition and two months' supplies were landed by the night of July 20.

At dawn on 21st the force began an advance on Sheikh Othman. The Navy prepared to co-operate on the flank, a forward observation officer and two signalmen being landed for control of fire, the *Empress of Asia*, *Venus* and *Empress of Russia* taking up positions on the eastern side of the peninsula just before dawn, whilst the *Minto*, *Enterprise*, *Camballa*, and the armed lighter closed as near as possible to the shore. Their assistance was not required, however, for Sheikh Othman was quickly captured by the troops with some 25 casualties. The water supply to Aden was found intact. The situation at Aden was restored, and on 22nd the Admiralty informed Captain Colomb that no more daily telegraphic reports were necessary; the *Camballa* and armed lighter were returned to their owners, and the ships dispersed on patrol.

125. Arrangements to Relieve the Empress Liners.—Arrangements had now been made for the relief and replacement of the Empress liners in the Red Sea by smaller vessels. On July 7 the *Lunka* and *Lama*, vessels of some 2,200 tons belonging to the British India Steam Navigation Company, which it was found possible to withdraw from the mail service on which they were employed, were requisitioned; and a third vessel, the *Suva*, of 2,229 tons and 13 knots speed, was taken up through the Navy Board at Melbourne, and was expected to leave Australia about July 21¹ to join the Red Sea Patrol.

The crews for these ships were to be provided from the ratings available on the Egyptian station, but the Admiralty were sending out from England a fourth vessel, the *Asia*, about the middle of September, fully manned and armed. The new vessels were classed as armed boarding steamers.²

On July 24 the disposition of the ships in the southern part of the Red Sea was as follows: The *Venus* was guardship at Perim and the *Northbrook* at Aden. At Aden were also the *Empress of Asia*, *Philomel* and *Minto*, the last named completing repairs until July 31. The *Empress of Russia*³ was on patrol.

¹ Altered later to the middle of August.

² Adty. to C.-in-C., E.I., 347, 20.6.15; 377, 7.7.15; 431, 29.7.15. C.-in-C., E.I., to Adty., 653, 30.6.15; 660, 1.7.15.

³ Commander Archibald Cochrane.

On 23rd, under ineffective fire from the shore batteries, she bombarded Saliff, in Kamaran Bay, in retaliation for the shelling of Kamaran from that place. She set on fire and burnt the barracks and most of the town, silenced the six Turkish guns, and it was afterwards reported that her shell fire had put one of them out of action. Commander Cochrane was of the opinion that the bombardments of Perim and Kamaran by the enemy had as part motive the design of attracting our ships, in order that the running of supplies from Massawa in Abyssinia might proceed unmolested.¹

In Sinai, the Turks were said to be reducing their garrisons, owing to the difficulties of supply. They were reported to be using the sea route between Jidda and Wej, as the Arabs had closed the inland routes; and Admiral Peirse accordingly arranged for armed boats to be based on Hassani Island² and Rabieh³ to cut the enemy's communications.

The Northern Red Sea Patrol was being maintained by the *Himalaya* and *Hardinge*: the *Desaix* had been transferred to the Syrian Squadron on July 5.

126. Armed Intervention against Persia, July, 1915.—The unrest in Persia came to a head on July 12, when the British residency at Bushire was attacked by a force of Tangistani tribesmen. The Government decided to seize certain ports on the Persian Gulf and retain possession of them until reparation was made for the attack and an end put to German intrigues in the country by the arrest of the German agents in Persia. On 16th the Admiralty ordered Admiral Peirse to resume control of the Persian Gulf where Captain Wilfred S. Nunn, who was in charge of the naval operations in Mesopotamia, was Senior Naval Officer. The *Juno* left Gibraltar on July 11 for Aden, to join Admiral Peirse's flag; and her commanding officer, Captain Drury St. A. Wake, was appointed Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf, Captain Nunn's authority being now limited to Mesopotamia. The *Pyramus*⁴ was ordered up from the Cape; she arrived at Aden on July 31, and left two days later for the Persian Gulf.⁵

127. "Philomel's" Landing Party at Aden, September 25.⁶—The successful work of the ships during the threat to Aden in July had an unfortunate sequel.

At the request of the G.O.C., the Senior Naval Officer had given permission for two Maxim guns and an emergency W/T apparatus

¹ Report of *Empress of Russia*, M. 06402/15.

² 24° 58' N., 37° 3' E. See Plan XI.

³ This place is not known. Perhaps Sherm Rabegh (22° 44' N., 39° 0' E.) is meant.

⁴ Sister ship to *Pelorus*.

⁵ A 438, 441. For description of the operations, see Monograph No. 15, "Mesopotamia, 1914-1916" (C.B. 917B).

⁶ M. 08301/15.

to be landed at Sheikh Othman on August 12, under the charge of Lieutenant Fitzadam Millar, with 9 P.O.s and men. The detachment was stationed in the trenches at Sheikh Othman during a period of some six weeks. Not unnaturally, the men were keenly desirous of taking some part in the constant reconnaissances which were carried out by the military from the place; and it was arranged between Captain Thompson and Colonel A. M. S. Elsmire, commanding at Sheikh Othman, that they should take part in such work if required.

The opportunity occurred on September 25. At 4.45 a.m. that day the troops marched out to attack and turn the Turks out of Waht, about 10 miles distant, the Naval Machine Gun Section being attached to the expedition.¹ Waht was captured during the forenoon. It was intended that the troops should remain in the place until the cool of the evening, but shelling by the enemy necessitated a retirement during the heat of the day over the distressing desert country. The weather was very hot and the naval party were without previous training in marching under such conditions, and they were already somewhat exhausted by doubling a long distance to get their guns into action. One after another they were forced to give in. The chief petty officer² and two men³ fell and died by the wayside, in spite of such medical attention as could be given them. One man, Able Seaman Beagley,⁴ though himself very done, gave up his place on a mule to a comrade and continued to march on until he dropped and died in his tracks; and in the end Lieutenant Millar⁵ and Able Seaman F. G. Butland, R.N.R., were the only two who marched into camp unaided. The initial symptoms produced by the conditions of the march were great exhaustion and loss of physical strength, the strongest men being the chief sufferers, so that at last the men were unable to keep their legs. Once down, the overpowering heat of the sand did the remainder, and their comrades found they had hardly the physical strength left to drag them off the track. Lieutenant Millar and A.B. Butland, on their arrival at Sheikh Othman, were so weak that between them they were unable to lift a small box of .303 in. ammunition off the back of a mule. All the guns, rifles, ammunition and material of the naval detachment were safely brought back to camp. Thirteen men of the Buffs, the only white regiment taking part, also succumbed to the heat during the day. In consequence of this occurrence Admiral Peirse gave orders that in future any naval detachment which might be landed to co-operate in the defence of Aden was to be strictly confined to defensive operations.

¹ Captain Thompson had no knowledge of the expedition, which was suddenly and secretly arranged.

² George Phillips, G.M.

³ Leading Seaman George Richard Talmay, and A.B. Bruce Sidney Beagley.

⁴ Mentioned in "London Gazette," 19,11.15.

⁵ Awarded D.S.C.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE WAR OF FLOTILLAS IN THE ADRIATIC, JUNE—AUGUST, 1915.

128. **Austrian Raids on the Italian Coast Renewed.**—After the bombardment of the Italian coast by Austrian light craft, which marked the opening of the war between Italy and Austria, the latter remained quiescent at sea for over three weeks. Italian aircraft kept watch on the Austrian fleet, and it was found that their main fleet, consisting of one battleship of the *Viribus* class, three *Radetzky*s, three *Erzherzogs* and one *Sankt Georg*, remained fairly consistently in Pola harbour, while the other two ships of the *Viribus* class¹ appeared off the towns at the head of the Quarnero, probably for political effect, in order to overawe the local populations with the threat of bombardment in case of a rising. The Italian submarines did not, however, succeed in attacking them. Indeed, the submarines at Venice were for the most part employed upon the local defence of the port, which was also well protected by shore batteries and minefields. It seems, too, that there was a shortage in the Italian Navy of good submarine officers.²

On June 18 the Austrians once more attacked the Italian coast.³ At daylight the *Sankt Georg* and seven T.B.D.s bombarded Rimini, while the *Admiral Spaun* and three T.B.D.s attacked Pesaro and Fano. Next day the *Sankt Georg*, accompanied by the *Novara*, repeated the exploit on the Tagliamento coast, while the destroyer *Warasdiner*⁴ shelled Monopoli, and an Austrian aeroplane dropped two bombs on Brindisi. These attacks were followed by the bombardment by the *Admiral Spaun* of Bari,⁵ the seat and constituency of the Premier, Signor Salandra. There was an outcry for ships to protect the coast. It was stated that no guns were available for coast defence, as all that could be taken from obsolete ships or from the fortresses on the west coast had been given to the Army. Even Ancona and Barletta, where Italian submarines were stationed, were without protection against raids.

129. **Redistribution of the Italian Fleet.**⁶—In consequence of these attacks the Ministry of Marine ordered a redistribution of the fleet. The battle fleet was split up,

¹ The *Szent Istvan* apparently had not yet joined the Austrian Fleet.

² M. 05386/15, Report of Naval Attaché.

³ Tel. Rome to Adty., 21.6.15. But M. 05386/15, Report of Naval Attaché gives date as June 17.

⁴ Ex Chinese *Lung Yuan*.

⁵ The date cannot be ascertained.

⁶ See Italian organisation, dated June 30, in M. 05386/15.

the *Pisa* division¹ of armoured cruisers was sent to Venice and the division of *Elenas*² to Brindisi, the *Benedetto Brin* and *Reina Margherita* being withdrawn from the latter place to Taranto, where the 1st Squadron had now been constituted, and consisted of five Italian Dreadnoughts,³ the four British battleships and the two *Brins*. Admiral Garelli was now sacrificed to the popular clamour arising from the bombardment of Ancona on May 24 and was removed to half pay, and his place in command of the forces at Venice was taken by Admiral Cutinelli, the *Elenas* at Brindisi being placed under Admiral Presbitero.

The intention of this redistribution of the heavy ships was the protection of Ancona and Brindisi-Bari respectively; but events were soon to demonstrate the misconception of naval strategy by which it was inspired. The slow *Pisas* at Venice were too far off to prevent the bombardment of Ancona by fast enemy vessels, nor were they able to cut off the enemy's retreat before he could regain Pola or some part of the Dalmatian archipelago where he might have supports or defences.⁴ On the other hand, if the Austrians sent heavy ships to attack Ancona the *Pisa* division was too weak to fight them. And at Brindisi the case was similar. The *Elenas* could neither prevent a bombardment of Bari, nor could they intercept a bombarding squadron before it regained shelter. Moreover, Brindisi, since it was exposed to bombardment, could scarcely be considered a suitable harbour for heavy ships.⁵

130. **Loss of the Amalfi, July 7, 1915.**—It was not long before the inutility of the division of armoured cruisers at Venice was demonstrated. On July 5 a squadron consisting of three *Erzherzogs* and two *Arpads* was seen off the coast near the mouth of the Tagliamento, standing to the southward. From the ostentatious W/T signalling in which the ships indulged it was suspected that the intention of the Austrians was to draw

¹ *Pisa* (Flag of Rear-Admiral Cagni), *Amalfi*, *San Marco*, *San Giorgio*.

² *R. Elena* (Flag of Rear-Admiral Cutinelli), *V. Emanuele*, *Roma*, *Napoli*.

³ The *Duilio* did her trials on June 13 in the waters east of Malta and joined the Fleet on June 16.

⁴ The speed of the *Pisa* and *Elena* divisions was about 20 knots. The *Admiral Spaun* did 26.4 knots on trials.

⁵ The Italian Commander-in-Chief was not in favour of this distribution of the Fleet, which was ordered by the Ministry of Marine. It is possible that the latter were influenced by pressure brought to bear on them by the Italian War Office, whose original plan of campaign envisaged heavy ships up the Gulf of Trieste. Admiral Cagni apparently had instructions to assist the army in every possible way. (Report of Naval Attaché, 25.7.15.) The suggestion of the Duke of the Abruzzi at the beginning of the war, that the heavy ships should be stationed at Sabioncello, was negated by the Ministry of Marine. Admiral Thursby also submitted his views on the unsoundness of the new distribution of the Fleet. (M. 05386/15, Report of Proceedings, British Adriatic Squadron, 29.7.15.) The views of the British Admiralty on the correct strategic distribution in the Adriatic are given in A 365.

Admiral Cagni's squadron to sea and bring it to action with superior force, their early sighting by the Italian patrols being no doubt unintentional. Warned, however, by this premature sighting of the Austrian squadron off the mouth of the Tagliamento, the *Pisa* division remained in harbour.

Two days later a disaster occurred of a nature which had not been unanticipated in certain quarters. On July 7 the *Amalfi* was supporting, at a distance of 40 miles, some destroyers engaged in a sweep down the Istrian coast. Her position was about the centre of the area between Venice and Capo d'Istria,¹ and she was escorted by two small T.B.D.s. About daylight she was suddenly struck below the centre of the port boiler room by a torpedo fired from an enemy submarine, and she sank in six minutes, with the loss of several lives.² The danger to which heavy ships operating in these waters were exposed having now been demonstrated, the remainder of the *Pisa* division were ordered to remain in harbour henceforth, though it is not known what was the object of the Ministry of Marine in retaining these ships at Venice or what was their rôle.

131. **Reorganisation of the Otranto Straits Blockade, July, 1915.**³—A shortage of torpedo craft for offensive operations had been felt in the Adriatic since Italy declared war. At the beginning of July a reorganisation of the forces engaged in the blockade of the Straits of Otranto was put into effect, with the design to ensure greater stringency and at the same time to set free, for offensive operations elsewhere, some of the torpedo craft latterly employed upon that service. The means by which these results were to be achieved was by the more extensive employment of small merchant vessels for scouting and inshore work.

The position of the Austrian fleet at Pola and Cattaro rendered it possible to cover the operations of the blockading forces from Brindisi and Valona Bay by a small number of actual vessels of war. The only enemy craft against which the blockading ships had in general to operate were submarines and supply ships, so that the vessels employed needed but a small armament.

The dispositions now made were as follows:—

- (a) A blockading squadron between Otranto and Saseno.
- (b) A blockading squadron between Saseno and Aspri Ruga.
- (c) A blockading squadron between Leuca and Fano.
- (d) A look-out squadron between Fano and Aspri Ruga.
- (e) A blockading squadron between Saseno and Rodoni.
- (f) A look-out squadron round Corfu.
- (g) A look-out squadron in the Gulf of Taranto.

¹ About 5 miles south of Trieste. See Plan XII.

² Different reports place the number of lives lost from 40 to 75.

³ The reorganisation occupied some weeks, and was not complete at the end of July. (See papers in M. 05386/15, Report of Proceedings, British Adriatic Squadron, 29.7.15.)

Of these the most important, and the only one upon which warships were employed (other than the two French submarines operating on the west and north coasts of Corfu, with base at Fano), was the squadron working between Otranto and Saseno. This comprised the light cruisers *Libia* and *Piemonte*, mining vessels *Puglia* and *Liguria*, and six destroyers,¹ one cruiser and two destroyers being on patrol as a rule.

The principal objects of the patrol were:—

- (1) To stop all commerce going to or leaving Austrian ports.
- (2) To destroy all enemy merchant vessels² and submarines.
- (3) To seek out and destroy enemy sources of supply and bases, both at sea and on the coast.
- (4) To collect and furnish information of the enemy's movements.

The instructions for the cruiser force (c)³ working between Leuca and Fano were of a similar character to the above.

All Italian, allied or neutral merchant vessels met at sea were to be sent under escort to Bari or Gallipoli for examination, whatever their destination or cargo.

132. Search for Enemy Submarine Bases.—The remaining patrols were maintained by armed yachts, small steamers, motor boats and fishing vessels. Their energies at this date were mainly directed to endeavouring to discover the bases and intercept the supply vessels of the enemy's submarines. Two of the latter were reported on the night June 27/28 by the motor patrol boat in the Corfu Channel. The intelligence indicated the Piraeus, Salonika, and Prevesa as the principal places whence fuel supplies were brought, some being taken by sea in vessels normally employed in the carriage of oil products and some distributed by land. The traffic appears to have been conducted somewhat casually and openly, and there seemed every evidence of Greek connivance.⁴

There does not appear to have been any fixed routine for the number of Italian and French submarines at sea. The submarines worked in an area bounded on the north by the line Sebenico-Barletta, and on the south Brindisi-Semeni River.⁵ This area was divided by the line Brindisi-Cattaro, the French submarines

¹ *Nembo, Borea, Aquilone, Espero, Euvo, Granatiere.*

² Presumably supply ships are intended.

³ The force comprised three small steamers of the Puglia Società di Navigazione, *Bari, Danno*, and *Penceta*, and one auxiliary cruiser of the *Citta* class, two vessels being normally at sea.

⁴ Report of Naval Attaché.

⁵ See Plan XII.

working the northern and the Italian submarines the southern section. The procedure was for the boats to go out to the enemy's coast along the northern lines of their respective sections, and return along the coast southward and back by the southern boundary of each section.¹

133. Enemy Submarines' Minelaying Activity off Taranto, July, 1915.—Up to the end of June no enemy submarines made their appearance in the Gulf of Taranto, and the British and Italian battleships carried out exercises in the Gulf.² It was arranged that on July 10 the fleet should proceed to sea for exercises, in company with the *Reina Margherita* and *Benedetto Brin*, newly joined from Brindisi. The appearance of enemy submarines in the Gulf was not unanticipated in the near future, for it was reported that when the German agents had completed the establishment of supply depots at Corfu, Astokos, Prevesa, etc., submarines would commence operations in those waters; and it was known by now that the base at Corfu was established, though a search which was carried out by the Greek authorities at the instigation of the British Government revealed nothing.³

At 11 a.m. on July 9⁴ one of the four torpedo boats engaged in searching the Gulf sighted a submarine about four miles from Cape S. Vito, at the entrance to Taranto (outer) harbour. The submarine fired two torpedoes at the torpedo boat, neither of which took effect, and then escaped, the torpedo boat having no bombs or other means of attacking her while submerged. In consequence of this, the fleet exercises ordered for the following day were cancelled. As the Italian fleet was very short of torpedo craft, a patrol of ships' boats armed with guns, torpedoes, explosive creeps, etc., was organised to watch the coast for 20 miles on each side of the entrance to Taranto, pending the arrival of indicator nets. The patrol of the eastern side of the harbour was carried out by British boats⁵ under Commander K. G. B. Dewar, of the *Prince of Wales*.

On July 26 another enemy submarine was sighted by the Italian patrol, and was attacked, but escaped. On the following day four mines were discovered in the fairway, which were believed to have been laid by the submarine, an opinion which was soon confirmed. On August 13 and 14 enemy submarines were again seen off the entrance to the harbour, and shortly afterwards 16 mines were discovered and swept up. By the end of the third week in August over 100 mines had been swept up

¹ M.07566/15, Report of Proceedings—British Adriatic Squadron.

² The British ships adopted the Italian flags and code of signals.

³ M. 30853/15 and 41547/15.

⁴ M. 05386/15, Report of Proceedings by R.-A., *Queen*. But Tel. 24 from R.-A., *Queen*, to Adty., 10.7.15, gives the date as July 10.

⁵ Three picket boats and eight launches or cutters.

or sunk in the vicinity of Taranto.¹ They were all moored mines, and no signs had yet been discovered of the drifting mines which the enemy was credited with employing. In consequence of the presence of hostile submarines and mines the Ministry of Marine forbade the fleet to proceed to sea.

Indicator nets were placed in position during August, and the boat patrol was then withdrawn.

The *Elena* division returned to Taranto from Brindisi on July 16, apparently because it was thought that the enemy might celebrate the anniversary of the battle of Lissa by some attack. On the same day the two *Brins* returned to Brindisi for the purpose of local defence in case of bombardment.² The British battleships were now in need of refit, and it was arranged that they should be taken in hand in turn at Gibraltar. The *Duncan*, working with the 9th Cruiser Squadron, was ordered to the Mediterranean on August 14 and joined Admiral Thursby's flag at Taranto on 23rd, and the *London* left for Gibraltar on the following day to refit.

134. Occupation of Pelagosa, July 12.—On July 12 a small expedition was sent to occupy the island of Pelagosa, which was known to be used by the enemy as a look-out station. The island was occupied with practically no opposition, and five 75 mm. guns were mounted for defence. On the following day two enemy torpedo boats, accompanied by an aeroplane, arrived and shelled the island, but retired on sighting an Italian submarine which had been stationed there.

Simultaneously with the occupation of Pelagosa the island of Lagosta was raided by two French destroyers, the *Magon* and *Bisson*. The cable was cut and the cable house destroyed by a party which landed in a whaler and found the sentry asleep. Before withdrawing, the submarine depot and a considerable quantity of supplies, including some tons of oil fuel, were destroyed by gun-fire. The total casualties to the French force were one man killed. The capture of Lagosta had been strongly urged by the naval staff in June, as an aircraft, destroyer and submarine base for the patrol of the Adriatic; but the scheme had not been put into operation, owing to divided counsels on the part of the senior officers forming the Council of War, the

¹ During 1915 mines were laid by German or Austrian submarines in the following positions off Taranto:—

- | | |
|-------------------------------|--|
| 1. Lat. and Long. of 1st mine | { San Paulo Lt. Ho., bearing 350°, direction of minefield 282° (True), length 600 metres.
San Vito Lt. Ho., bearing 137°. |
| 2. Do. do. | |

Each minefield contained 12 mines.

(See O.U. 6020c, "German Statement of Mines Laid 1915-1918.")

² Report of Naval Attaché, 25.7.15.

objections being that the formation of another base involved a scattering of units, and that the place would be exposed to attack by a superior force which could descend suddenly and bombard the island or land troops.¹

135. Loss of the "Garibaldi," July 18.—On July 18 an operation was carried out by the cruisers of the *Ferruccio* division from Brindisi, supported by a force of destroyers, which was designed to destroy (a) the railway bridge at Ragusa which had now been repaired after its bombardment on June 6, (b) the military establishments at Gravosa, and (c) the wireless station, look-out station, and cables at Giuppana Island (42° 43' N., 17° 53' E.).²

On the way across the Adriatic from Brindisi the ships were sighted by an enemy aeroplane, which returned to Cattaro with news of the movements of the force. As the Italian cruisers were leaving the coast after heavily bombarding the railway bridge for 50 minutes they were attacked by enemy submarines, one of which fired two torpedoes at the *Giuseppe Garibaldi*, flagship of Admiral Trifari. One of the torpedoes took effect, and the ship capsized and sank shortly afterwards, the Admiral and the majority of the officers and men being saved.

The division of destroyers detailed to destroy the military establishments at Gravosa accomplished their work unmolested, but the division under Admiral Millo found that the W/T station at Giuppana Island had been removed inland. The apparent result of the various minor operations carried out by the Italians on the Dalmatian coast was to draw some 20,000 Austrian troops to these parts.³

136. Raids by Austrian Light Craft, July-August, 1915.—The *Admiral Spaun* was reported at sea on July 15 and 16, and a few days later⁴ she bombarded Tremiti, Termoli and Ortona, in company with some destroyers, without, however, causing much damage. Aeroplanes also bombed Bari, one being brought down by gun-fire and captured.

At 6 a.m. on July 28 news was received by the Italian command that the *Admiral Spaun* and four destroyers were bombarding the island of Pelagosa.⁵ The question whether anything should be done was discussed, and it was decided to

¹ Report of Naval Attaché.

² Resignation of Italian Minister of Marine, M. 07650/15.

³ Report of Naval Attaché, M. 06909/15.

⁴ The exact date cannot be ascertained.

⁵ M. 06909/15, Report of Naval Attaché, but M. 05965/15, Letter of Proceedings, British Adriatic Squadron, gives the date of the bombardment as July 27.

wait for further news.¹ At 12.10 p.m. the *Topaze*² was sent out from Brindisi to investigate, being joined on the way across by the Italian destroyers *Animoso*, *Intrepido* and *Irrequito*.³ On their arrival at Pelagosa at 8 p.m. they found that the Austrian raiding force, which consisted of six destroyers and two torpedo boats, supported by two cruisers of the *Spaun* class, had retired many hours ago and that the attack of the Austrian landing parties had been repulsed by the Italian garrison with no more than two casualties. The single French submarine at Pelagosa had delivered an attack on the enemy destroyers, which then turned on her and hunted her.

Three days later an Austrian Squadron was again reported at sea. At midnight on July 31 news was received that a force consisting of one *Erzherzog*, three light cruisers, and 16 destroyers had left Pola between the morning and evening routine visits of the reconnoitring aeroplane. It was believed that this presaged a renewed and determined attack on Pelagosa.⁴ But no force was despatched to engage the enemy. In the event, however, the forecast of the enemy's movements proved to be incorrect, for no attack was made on Pelagosa, and the Austrian squadron returned to Pola 48 hours later. It was subsequently considered that the squadron had visited Lagosta or Meleda, to reinforce the garrisons of those places and secure them against a *coup de main* such as that which gave the Italians Pelagosa.

On August 11 Bari was bombarded by two Austrian destroyers which approached within 200 or 300 yards of the coast. The Ministry of Marine, however, still maintained their decision to refrain from mounting guns for the defence of the place, asserting that, if defended, it would no longer be secure from bombardment. In what this supposed immunity consisted is not evident, for the town had been bombarded from air or sea seven times in eleven weeks. The repeated bombardments of the coast and the defencelessness of the towns were producing disquieting effects among the coastal population.

137. Evacuation of Pelagosa, August 18.—The expected resumption of the attacks on Pelagosa occurred on August 17, when a squadron consisting of two light cruisers and a number of destroyers appeared off the island at 5 a.m. and bombarded it heavily for more than two hours, firing between 6,000 and 7,000 shells into it. The *Topaze*, with the French destroyers *Commandant Rivière*, *Commandant Bory*, *Bouclier* and *Protet* (?)

¹ Report of Naval Attaché.

² Comdr. W. J. B. Law. She had arrived at Brindisi on July 5 to reinforce the British light cruisers. The *Amethyst* was refitting at Taranto and the *Dublin* was being repaired at Spezia. The *Dartmouth* paid off at Malta on June 30 for a long refit.

³ *Topaze's* Report of Proceedings.

⁴ Report of Naval Attaché.

slipped and proceeded at 5.25 a.m. to support the *Quarto*, which was cruising off Bari in company with four destroyers; and the *Bristol*¹, which had arrived at Brindisi two days previously to reinforce the British squadron of light cruisers, was ordered to raise steam with all despatch. The *Topaze* and the destroyers with her were ordered to return to Brindisi at 11 a.m.²; but the *Quarto* proceeded to Pelagosa, and found on her arrival that the enemy had retired without attempting to land. Despite the heavy bombardment, the defences remained unimpaired, and little military damage and few casualties had been caused.

In consequence of the raid it was decided to evacuate the island. The operation was successfully carried out on the following day (August 18) under cover of the Allied cruisers and destroyers; and the preparations for the occupation of Lagosta, about which the Ministry of Marine had not yet arrived at a definite decision, were now finally abandoned.

138. Enemy Submarines in the Lower Adriatic, August, 1915.

—By the end of August the Italian Ministry of Marine appeared to have decided definitely against the policy of attacking the enemy's submarine bases, in favour of prosecuting the operations with small craft against the submarines themselves. The latter were thus able to extend their radius of action by obtaining fuel and supplies at their bases, Lagosta, Cattaro, and Corfu, thereby saving the long passage up and down the Adriatic to their main base at Pola, to which they only returned after a lengthy cruise.³

The Italian small craft found it impossible to prevent the new Austrian and German submarines, of great radius, from issuing out of the Adriatic to attack the Mediterranean communications of the Allies. It seems that at this date the Italian authorities had taken no steps to fit their own merchant vessels with defensive armament.

On August 5 the Italian submarine *Nereide*, on duty off Pelagosa, was torpedoed and sunk by an Austrian submarine. It was reported that the *Nereide* fired the first torpedo, which missed; and as she began to dive the enemy torpedoed her and she sank at once. A week later, on the evening of August 12, the auxiliary cruiser *Citta di Catania*, on the Otranto Straits Patrol, was attacked by the Austrian submarine *U.3*, which fired two torpedoes, neither of which took effect. Destroyers were sent to intercept the submarine, and at dawn on the following morning the *Bisson*, in company with two Italian destroyers, sighted her, opened fire, and sank her with the third shot. The

¹ Captain B. H. Fanshawe.

² Report of Proceedings by *Topaze*. No reason for the order has been discovered.

³ Captain Richmond's Report. If Lagosta and Corfu were used it was by the submarines working in the Adriatic. The German submarines working in the Mediterranean probably used Cattaro exclusively, except when they proceeded up to Pola, if they ever did so.

crew of the submarine, one officer and 11 men of which were saved, admitted sighting the destroyers, but their previous experiences had not prepared them for such rapidity of action on the part of the latter.

On August 7 the Italian staff drew up an estimate of the Austrian and German submarines working in the Adriatic and Mediterranean.¹ Four small Austrian boats, they thought, were employed on local defence at Pola. The two remaining Austrian boats appeared to be stationed at Cattaro, together with two of the Germania-Krupp boats; while two more of the latter, with the *ex-Curie*, were at Constantinople.² The remaining seven³ submarines of the Germania-Krupp type were distributed, they thought, in the cruising service in the Gulf of Trieste and round the Italian ports, some of them being probably assigned to the new station of Porto Palazzo, in the island of Meleda.

The actual distribution of the Austrian and German submarines was probably as follows:—

	(1) <i>Austrian.</i>
U.1–U.6	In the Adriatic (? four at Pola, two at Cattaro).
Ex- <i>Curie</i>	In the Adriatic.
U.B.1, U.B.15	Germania-Krupp boats which joined the Austrian Navy in June. Working in the Adriatic (probably from Cattaro).
	(2) <i>German.</i>
U.B.14, U.C.12	In the Adriatic (probably worked from Cattaro).
U.B.7, 8, U.C. 13, 14, 15..	Working from Constantinople.
U.B.3	Lost with all hands.
U.21	Working from Constantinople.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE GULF OF SOLLUM PATROL.⁴

139. **Institution of the Patrol, May, 1915.**—By the Treaty of Ouchy, 1912, Tripoli, a former vilayet of the Ottoman Empire, had been transferred to Italy. It is divided into the two provinces of Tripolitania (Tripoli) and Cyrenaica, of which the latter is the easternmost and marches with the western frontier of Egypt, the boundary on the coast being near Sollum, where we had a small garrison.

¹ Papers titled N. 1102/1915.

² The *ex-Curie*, however, had probably not left the Adriatic.

³ Should be six, for there were only 10 Germania-Krupp boats in service (including the lost U.B.3).

⁴ See Plan XIII.

On May 7, 1915, the High Commissioner of Egypt informed the Foreign Office that the Italian Minister admitted the coast of Cyrenaica had not been patrolled by the Italian Navy for a long time. Arms, money, and agents were reaching the Senussi from the Turks, and the main entry was undoubtedly the unpatrolled coast of Cyrenaica, west of the Egyptian frontier, a region outside our jurisdiction and control.¹

The arrival of the German submarines in the Mediterranean coincided with Sir H. McMahon's report, and on May 11 Admiral Peirse telegraphed to the Admiralty that in the lack of supervision exerted by Italy over her Arab province he considered that Sollum was a likely place for an enemy submarine fuel store; and, at his suggestion, the attention of the Italian Government was drawn to the matter.² The latter replied by asking whether we could co-operate with them in patrolling the Gulf of Sollum to prevent the landing of munitions of war, and the Admiralty inquired of Admiral Peirse whether the Egyptian Coastguard could undertake this work, or, if not, whether he could arrange to patrol the locality himself. The most that the Egyptian Coastguard could do was to arrange for a gunboat to visit the Gulf of Sollum once a week. Admiral Peirse himself had no ships available without withdrawing vessels from the Red Sea, which he strongly deprecated in view of the situation there; nor had he any ratings available for manning additional vessels.³

On the very day (May 21) when Admiral Peirse sent this reply to the Admiralty's inquiry, he received a report that about 50 Turkish or German officers, with six field guns and six Maxims, had landed a fortnight ago on the coast west of Sollum. The significance of the report was enhanced by the fact that Enver Pasha's brother was with the party, and it was said he intended to attack Egypt shortly. The garrison at Sollum was weak, and the military were asking Admiral Peirse for naval support and for a more efficient patrol of the coast in conjunction with the Italians, who desired our co-operation. In view of our present relations with the Senussi, Admiral Peirse considered it most undesirable that any Italian ship should appear off the coast east of Sollum, the British sphere, that is to say⁴; and he asked to be allowed to retain for this service either the *Cornwall* or *Chatham*, both of which ships were on their way to the Dardanelles. The *Fox* was due at Port Said that day (May 22); but she would not be available, as Admiral Peirse required her to relieve the *D'Entrecasteaux* at Ismailia: a raid was expected on the Canal during the next few days, and the *D'Entrecasteaux*

¹ Sir H. McMahon to F.O., 264, 7.5.15. Our relations with the Senussi are detailed in Section 168.

² C.-in-C., E.I., to Adty., 456, 11.5.15, and F.O. to Sir R. Rodd, 506, 14.5.15.

³ A 381, 383.

⁴ The Arabs were hostile to the Italians, and Admiral Peirse was no doubt apprehensive lest the presence of Italian ships should lead to some regrettable incident which would endanger our relations with the Senussi.

had urgent defects necessitating her return to Port Said.¹ With the danger from submarine attack in their minds the Admiralty reluctantly agreed to allow the *Cornwall* to make a short visit to Sollum on her way to the Dardanelles, where she was urgently required. She left Port Said on May 24 with orders to search the coast for 50 miles on either side of the Gulf of Sollum; but she discovered nothing suspicious.

It was eventually arranged that British and Italian warships should patrol the coasts belonging to their own country, viz., British warships the Egyptian coast from a point immediately west of Sollum, and the Italians the coast of Cyrenaica.² From the end of May Admiral Peirse managed to arrange for one of his ships to patrol the Gulf of Sollum. The *Dufferin* left Port Said for the patrol on May 27, and the *Philomel*, which had returned from the Somaliland coast, left on June 2 to take her place. On May 29 it was reported that the Italian gunboat *Misurata* had made a careful inspection of the coast between Sollum and Tobruk, but without discovering the oil depot reported to exist there.

140. Reports of Enemy Activity on the Egyptian Coast.—

On August 3 the Italian Admiralty telegraphed to Whitehall that they had information that attempts would shortly be made to smuggle war material into Cyrenaica by means of steamers sailing from the Syrian coast, and they asked that British ships might co-operate in preventing this.³ The *Diana*, which had arrived at Port Said on July 23, was on the Egyptian coast at the time,⁴ having taken the place of the *Philomel*, which was in the Red Sea,⁵ until the arrival of the armed boarding steamer *Scotia* which the Admiralty were sending out.⁶ Admiral Peirse, for his part, had information that two Greek steamers intended to start from some point in the Aegean and land Turkish officers and munitions for an attack on Sollum, Barrani, or Matruh, with the assistance of Bedouins. A disturbing feature was the report that the expedition might possibly be accompanied by two submarines, which would render the operations of our patrol ships difficult. The submarines would be able to revictual on the coast, as Admiral Peirse had no vessels capable of dealing with them; and they would find easy prey amongst the

¹ C-in-C., E.I., to Adty., 499, 22.5.15. The *Cornwall* arrived at Suez May 21. *Chatham* left Aden for the Dardanelles on the same day.

² M. 05414/15.

³ A 446.

⁴ Sailing orders for *Diana*, 23.7.15. "Proceed to-morrow with *Dufferin* and arrange a continuous patrol from Damietta to Sollum to prevent landing of arms and ammunition and to support garrison of Sollum in case of attack. *Dufferin* returns to Alexandria 25th to make good defects. Two Egyptian gunboats, *Reschid* and *Abbas*, will assist you. Italian warships may be off Cyrenaica and will co-operate with you, but they must not appear off Egyptian Coast, as Arabs are hostile to Italy. (0612/16.)"

⁵ On 18th the *Empress of Asia* reported that the *Philomel* had been despatched to Perim on account of reports that the coal company's coolies were becoming restive.

⁶ A 440.

transports entering and leaving Alexandria and Port Said. The transport traffic was particularly heavy at the moment as large numbers of transports were leaving Alexandria for Lemnos with troops for the Suvla Bay landing which had taken place on August 6; and Admiral Peirse asked that he might be allowed some destroyers for purposes of protection. There were, however, no destroyers available, and the Admiralty told Admiral Peirse that they were taking far greater risks in home waters owing to lack of sufficient numbers. They had directed Admiral de Robeck to take what steps he could to protect the transports, and they ordered him to send one or two "B" Class submarines with an armed boarding steamer as parent ship, if he could spare them. The submarines were to be stationed off Sollum to surprise the Greek steamers, the boarding steamer being kept well out of sight.¹

Admiral de Robeck despatched the *Heroic* with submarines *B.6* and *B.11*, which arrived at Alexandria on August 13 and left next day for the Egyptian coast patrol. The armed boarding steamer *Scotia*, which had arrived from England two days previously, also left on 13th, and the *Minerva*² followed two days later to relieve the *Diana* as Senior Officer of the patrol. The *Minerva* had been despatched from Mudros to reinforce Admiral Peirse's squadron on August 8, for on the previous day a German plot for stirring up a rising in India and the East had come to light, and the Admiralty had ordered Admiral Peirse to send either the *Venus* or *Diana* to Colombo on relief by the *Minerva* or *Doris* from the Dardanelles. The *Venus* at this time was patrolling in the northern part of the Red Sea, and Admiral Peirse despatched the *Diana* on her return from the Gulf of Sollum.³ The Admiralty were also arranging to send out from England for the protection of the Canal the old battleship *Jupiter*, which had been employed as an ice-breaker in the White Sea, but she could not arrive until September.⁴

141. **The Incident at Cape Lukka.**—The despatch of submarines *B.6* and *B.11* to the Egyptian coast gave rise to an unfortunate incident. On August 16, ten miles south of Cape Lukka, a party of Arabs under officers in European uniform was observed displaying a flag of truce. The submarines had anchored at 8 a.m. 700 yards from the shore, and Lieutenant Holbrook, of *B.11*, pulled towards the shore in a Berthon boat to investigate, and spoke from the boat to a person wearing European uniform, attended by a native with a white flag. The circumstances aroused his suspicions, and he began to return to the submarine, when fire was opened from the beach, one of the boat's crew being killed and Lieutenant Holbrook and two men

¹ A 448, 450.

² Captain Francis H. M. Jackson.

³ She left Port Said for Aden and Colombo, August 18.

⁴ She passed Gibraltar to the eastward at 5 a.m., September 5.

wounded. The explanation furnished by the Shaikh of the Senussi was that the submarines were thought to be Italian, for the Arabs were hostile to the Italians. It seems that Admiral Peirse had been under a misconception regarding the western boundary of Egypt. His orders to the patrolling vessels were that the patrol extended from Damietta to the frontier west of Sollum, whereas our post at Sollum was considered the boundary, and the patrols were in future instructed accordingly, the incident being closed with the acceptance of the Shaikh's profound apologies.¹

The *Minerva* returned to Alexandria on August 24. The situation in the Gulf of Sollum was now much improved, but Admiral Peirse, fearing that intriguers might succeed in their reported attempts to force a rupture between the Senussi and Egypt, ordered the *Dufferin* to Sollum. It was the opinion of the Admiralty that large ships such as the *Dufferin* or *Minerva* should not be regularly employed at Sollum, on account of the danger of enemy submarine attack. The two armed boarding steamers, *Scotia* and *Heroic*, and the submarines were sufficient to prevent stores or emissaries being landed; if the Senussi attacked Egypt the ships could not stop them, and the matter would become one for the army to deal with. The two "B" class submarines, however, had already proved unsuitable for work so far from their base at Alexandria. They had low speed, no gun armament, and small radius of action.² Both of them had defects, and on Admiral Peirse's recommendation they were withdrawn, and the Admiralty ordered their parent ship, the *Heroic*, to be returned to the Vice-Admiral Commanding the Eastern Mediterranean.³

The withdrawal of the *Heroic* would leave Admiral Peirse one suitable vessel only, namely, the *Scotia*, for the Gulf of Sollum patrol, and he asked that at least one other suitable ship might be sent to replace her. Pending a decision, he retained the *Heroic* with the approval of the Admiralty, for the withdrawal of the garrison at Sollum in case of attack was dependent on the patrol vessel. The existence of a garrison which had to be withdrawn directly the enemy attacked it appeared somewhat Gilbertian; and the Admiralty instructed Admiral Peirse to ascertain from General Maxwell whether it was possible to render the post strong enough to resist attack for a short time. They were willing that a vessel should be despatched to assist the garrison in the event of attack, but they had no wish to be bound down to maintain a ship permanently at Sollum in immediate readiness to evacuate the troops.⁴

¹ C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty., 844, 16.8.15; 848, 18.8.15; and M. 06640/15.

² "War Vessels and Aircraft," Quarterly Return, July, 1915, gives their radius of action as 1,350 miles at 9.5 knots, and 950 at sea-going full speed.

³ A 459, 465.

⁴ A 472, 473. Reinforcement of the post by land from Alexandria, 250 miles distant, was impossible, as the road was unfit for wheeled traffic.

After conferring with the G.O.C., Admiral Peirse explained the situation in the following telegram¹ :—

"Garrison at Sollum cannot be increased at present, and in any case to do so sufficiently to make it self-supporting would undoubtedly be regarded by Senussi as a hostile act and precipitate a crisis. Any attack on Gulf of Sollum would certainly be preceded by cutting of telegraph line. Apart from this, to rely on aid arriving in time even if summoned by wire from Alexandria is impracticable with present garrison. Have therefore arranged for patrol ship to call daily at Gulf of Sollum, communicate, and ascertain that all is well. Two ships are necessary on patrol to carry out this routine, and in any case with only one ship patrol would be intermittent and practically ineffective. Ship is not immobilised by this duty as patrolling is carried out between daily visits. G.O.C. considers sufficient patrol of coast essential in view of experience in Turco-Italian war. Am reinforcing patrol with *Drama* and *Monaym*, but as neither of them have sufficient sea-keeping capacity for distant work or carrying capacity for assistance in evacuating garrison, have confined them to eastern part of coast. Submit therefore that two armed boarding steamers are necessary."

This explanation convinced the Admiralty of the necessity of sending out a second armed boarding steamer, and they informed Admiral Peirse that the *Tara* would be despatched. But he was warned that he must make her and the *Scotia* suffice, as she was the last one available.²

142. **Additions to Egyptian Squadron.**—The *Jupiter* was now on her way to Egypt³ and the Admiralty orders for her were that she was to be held in reserve in case she was required for the Dardanelles operations later on. Meanwhile, until required, she would be available for service in the Suez Canal, though as she was newly commissioned Admiral Peirse was told to arrange for her to work up her gunnery and drills in the Red Sea, where she would be safe from submarine attack.⁴ The first three of the 12 motor boats which the Admiralty were sending out for the patrol of the Suez Canal arrived at Port Said on August 30.⁵ Three more arrived on September 2,⁶ and a further three on 19th.⁷ Three more were being sent without crews, and the Admiralty told Admiral Peirse that if all 12 boats were required simultaneously he must man them from the ships of his squadron. The boats were too small to carry a 3 pdr. gun, though their efficiency would have been greatly increased by some sort of armament, and Admiral Peirse suggested that if any pom-poms originally used as anti-aircraft guns had now been replaced and were available, they might be sent to Egypt for arming the motor boats.⁸

¹ C.-in-C., E.I., to Adty., 938, 12.9.15.

² A 477.

³ She arrived at Port Said, September 17.

⁴ A. 476.

⁵ *Nina d'Asly*, *Eothen*, *Minnehaha*.

⁶ *Puffin*, *Lady Molly*, *Memphis*.

⁷ *Rolyatina*, *Sallee Rover*, *Allegro*.

⁸ Adty. to C.-in-C., E.I., 507, 31.8.15, and C.-in-C., E.I., to Adty., 903, 4.9.15.

143. **Work of the Syrian Squadron, July–August—Blockade of Asia Minor Coast declared, August 25.**¹—On July 9 the French 3rd Squadron at Castelorizo was augmented by the auxiliary cruiser *Lorraine*. The German Consulate at Alexandretta, which had been bombarded by the *D'Estrées* during May, was found on July 4 to be flying a flag once more and was destroyed by the *Jeanne d'Arc*. The *D'Entrecasteaux* had rejoined the squadron, and the *Desaix*, which joined on July 6 from the Red Sea, was working along the Samos shore. The French Commander-in-Chief arrived early in August on a tour of inspection. A store of arms, ammunition, and pontoons intended for the Turkish advance against Egypt, in the Wagner Barracks at Jaffa, was destroyed by the *Jeanne d'Arc* on August 12.

From the end of July and during the whole of August the British vessels *Anne* and *Raven* were working up and down the coast with French aeroplanes, bombing Chakaldere Bri'ge,² Adana, and Mersina. But these demonstrations gave unimportant results, for the aeroplanes had an endurance of barely four hours, found great difficulty in gaining height, and were supplied with small ineffective bombs. For the purpose of reconnaissance their restricted radius of action rendered them of little use.

The presence of the French Syrian Squadron on the coast of Asia Minor had not sufficed to stop the contraband trade between Turkey and the Greek Islands. The Italian Government, whose Navy, incidentally, was making no attempt to patrol the neighbourhood of the islands they occupied in the Aegean, as by the arrangement made at the end of June they should have done,³ drew attention to the contraband trade early in June, and seemed rather annoyed at the manner in which we had given in to Greece in the matter of withdrawing our vessels stationed off the Piraeus. The situation was, that we were trying to cultivate good relations with Greece, whom circumstances were forcing into our arms, and the Greeks resented interference with the island trade, which they regarded as a domestic concern. The Greek Government had promised to take certain steps to regularise and control the trade between the islands, though it was not anticipated that those steps would be effective in stopping the trade. An alternative policy was to proclaim a blockade of the whole Turkish coast from Samos to the Egyptian frontier; and on July 18 the Admiralty sounded the French Ministry of Marine semi-officially on the subject. The latter were averse from taking the step, which would require a large number of vessels to make it effective; and they averred that the arrangements made by Admiral Dartige du Fournet were adequate.⁴ A month later, however,

¹ M. 06743/15, 43245/15. The *Anne* and *Raven* were German prizes originally *Aenne Rickmers* and *Rabensfels*.

² Alexandretta.

³ V.A., E.M.S., to Adty., 126, 15.9.15.

⁴ Marine, Paris, to Adty., 705, 24.7.15.

they telegraphed to the Admiralty that they were instructing the Commander-in-Chief to declare a blockade of the Coast of Asia Minor from the Samos shore to the Egyptian frontier; and the blockade was declared effective from noon on August 25.¹

The Syrian Squadron at this date comprised the *Jauréguiberry*, the cruisers *Jeanne d'Arc*, *Desaix*, *Amiral Charner*, and *D'Entrecasteaux*,² the light cruiser *D'Estrées*, seaplane carrier *Foudre*, and three armed merchant cruisers, the *Indien*,³ *Tunisien* and *Ninive*, with the two British seaplane carriers, *Anne* and *Raven*.

The squadron was using Port Said and Cyprus as its bases. On August 12 the *Jeanne d'Arc* destroyed a munition factory at Jaffa, and on 22nd a schooner which attempted to run the blockade was driven ashore by the *Anne*. Ruad Island, between Latakia and Tripoli, was occupied on September 1 by a detachment of French Marines landed from the *Jeanne d'Arc*, *Jauréguiberry* and *Desaix*.⁴ The possession of the island without any part of the mainland 3,000 yards distant had no strategic value, but Admiral Dartige du Fournet hoped, by rendering it a refuge of Armenians from the Turks, to obtain useful intelligence of the enemy.⁵ Seaplane reconnaissance reported little progress on the south Syrian railway to the Suez Canal. The difficulties of transport and supply were so great during the summer that there was little likelihood of a renewed Turkish expedition against Egypt until the winter; and in the meanwhile events in the Mediterranean were taking a different and very serious turn for the Allies. The long expected intensive German submarine campaign was now opening.

¹ A 457.

² Shortly replaced by the *Guichen* (2—6.5 in., 6—5.5 in., 12—3 pdr.), *Capitaine de Frégate* *Brisson*.

³ A small ship captured from the Turks by the Syrian Squadron.

⁴ Dartige du Fournet, *op. cit.*, pp. 41, 42.

⁵ M. 07209/15.

CHAPTER XVIII.

OPENING OF THE INTENSIVE GERMAN SUBMARINE
CAMPAIGN—SEPTEMBER, 1915.¹

144. **The Gibraltar Straits Patrol, August, 1915.**—On August 10 the Admiralty telegraphed to the Senior Naval Officer, Gibraltar, that two German submarines with a cruising speed of 9 knots were on their way to the Adriatic and were expected to pass the Straits of Gibraltar between noon on 13th and noon on August 15.² These were *U.34* (Lieutenant Commander Rücker) and *U.35* (Commander Kophamel), which left Heligoland on August 4 with every precaution to avoid betrayal of their destination, no attempt being made to sink any ships after reaching the English Channel.³

The vessels of the Gibraltar Straits Patrol available at this date comprised the *Pelorus*, 10 T.B.s, two armed boarding steamers, and such local craft as could be obtained. Another armed boarding steamer, the *Woodnut*,⁴ was being sent out from Queenstown.⁵ One of the armed boarding steamers, the *Richard Welford*,⁶ had had an unfortunate experience whilst assisting the British steamer *Eburna*, which grounded in a fog under Ape's Hill (Morocco) on May 14. The *Richard Welford* was fired on by Moorish tribesmen, and Sub-Lieutenant Kent, R.N.R., and six of her crew, as well as seven of the *Eburna's* crew, were captured by the Moors. They were not released until August 25, and then only through the efforts of the Spanish authorities. No reprisals were taken against their captors as the prisoners had been well treated and the British Government had no wish to estrange the tribes, which were fairly friendly to us.⁷

¹ The chapters dealing with the operations of the German submarines in the Mediterranean are written before the publication of the German Official History, and much reliance has been placed on Gayer, "Die Deutschen U-Boote in ihrer Kriegführung, 1914-18."

² A 452.

³ Gayer, II, 44.

⁴ 450 tons, 2—12 pdr., 12 cwt.

⁵ Adty. to S.N.O., Gibraltar, 637, 7.8.15.

⁶ Lieutenant Charles Meikle, R.N.R.

⁷ Adty. to Senior Naval Officer, Gibraltar, 777, 25.8.15, and reply 959, 28.8.15.

Admiral Brock disposed his vessels as follows to counter the expected attempt of the German submarines to pass the Straits¹ :—

7 torpedo boats from Cape Tres Forcas to Cape Sacratif (36° 40' N., 3° 30' W.).

1 armed boarding steamer 10 miles west of Alboran Island for communication.

3 torpedo boats and 1 armed boarding steamer on line 35° 48' N., 6° 5' W. to 36° 3' N., 6° 13' W.

Pelorus zigzagging at full speed² from the meridian of Tarifa Point to Leone Point (five miles west of Ceuta).

One available seaplane to search 30 miles south-east of Gibraltar as often as possible.

Aeroplanes searching to westward as far as the line Cap Trafalgar—Spartel.

He telegraphed to the Admiralty also that he was trying to obtain some motor feluccas, two to assist the Cape Tres Forcas—Cape Sacratif patrol, and others to form a patrol line from Tetuan Bay to the northward.

145. **U.34 and U.35 Enter the Mediterranean.**—No sign was seen by the patrol vessels and aircraft of the expected German submarines, and Admiral Brock reported to the Admiralty on August 17 that all his patrols had resumed their normal stations, for he was of opinion that owing to the clear weather and good visibility it was improbable that any submarine had passed through the Straits undetected. The continuous steaming was a great strain on the torpedo boats, and the tugs on patrol were required for berthing ships. On August 21, therefore, the patrols were reduced to normal strength.³

That *U.34* and *U.35* had in fact passed through the Straits undetected, was made known to Admiral Brock on August 30, when the Admiralty telegraphed that the two enemy boats reached Cattaro on 23rd.⁴ They added the intelligence that two more submarines were on their way out, and it was estimated that the first would pass Gibraltar about September 6 and the second about 18 hours later; and they warned the Admiral to get the *Pelorus* into harbour in good time before the submarines were due.⁵

The two new enemy submarines were *U.39* (Lieutenant-Commander Forstmann), which left Heligoland on August 27, and *U.33* (Lieutenant-Commander Gansser), which followed her from Borkum a day later.

¹ Senior Naval Officer, Gibraltar, to Adty., 809 and 811, 11.8.15.

² About 17 knots.

³ Senior Naval Officer, Gibraltar, to Adty., 851, 17.8.15.

⁴ This is borne out by Gayer, II, 44.

⁵ A 462, 463.

146. U.39 and U.33 Pass the Straits of Gibraltar. —

The Admiralty intelligence again proved to be accurate, for on September 8 T.B.91,¹ 20 miles south of Alboran Island, sighted a large submarine which dived before the torpedo boat could attack. This was undoubtedly U.39. On her way eastward on 9th she sank three ships, the French s.s. *L'Aude* at 2 a.m. in 36° 54' N., 0° 16' E., the British s.s. *Cornubia* at 10 a.m. in 36° 54' N., 0° 15' E., and the French *Ville de Mostaganem* at 5 p.m., 70 miles N. 30° E. of Mostaganem.² At 8 a.m. on the following day she engaged the defensively armed British steamer *Antilochus* off Algiers,³ who drove her off. From here U.39 proceeded to Cattaro, which was reached on September 15.⁴

The progress of U.33 to the Mediterranean was marked by a trail of sunken ships, for on September 1 she sank the *Whitefield* midway between the Faroes and Hebrides, and carrying on southward she sank the *Cymbeline*, *Mimosa*, and the Norwegian sailing ships *Storesand* and *Glimt* on September 4 off the Fastnet. Off the Spanish coast she sank the *John Hardie* on September 6, and at noon on 9th, after passing through the Straits of Gibraltar, she was unsuccessfully engaged by T.B.95 in 35° 50' N., 4° W. She was reported again at 9 a.m. next day in 36° 47' N., 0° 27' E., some 270 miles further east⁵; and she reached Cattaro on September 16, a day behind U.39.⁶

147. **The new Submarines commence Operations, September, 1915.—Loss of the "Ramazan."**—After a few days spent in Cattaro taking in oil and stores and preparing for further operations, the submarines began to issue forth on the trade and transport routes.

The first of the new arrivals to proceed was U.35, which left Cattaro on August 31 for a cruise in the southern Aegean lasting until September 22. During this period she sank three ships totalling 10,577 tons,⁷ probably the s.s. *Ravitailleur*, an Austrian prize captured by the French, sunk September 17 off the southwest end of Crete; the transport *Ramazan* with Sikhs and Gurkhas from Alexandria to Mudros, sunk September 19 near the west end of Crete with loss of some 300 out of 400 on board; and her third victim was probably the British collier *Linkmoor* returning empty from Mudros with mails, which was sunk on September 20 in the same locality as the *Ramazan*.

U.34 left the Adriatic on September 1 for the southern Aegean, and soon found a victim in the cargo vessel *Natal*

¹ Gunner in command, Daniel J. P. Enright.

² 40 miles east of Oran.

³ Position 37° 42' N., 3° 5' E.

⁴ Gayer.

⁵ Her surface speed is given in "War Vessels and Aircraft" as 18 knots.

⁶ Gayer, II, 48, 49.

⁷ Gayer, II, 54.

Transport, which was sunk on 4th to the westward of Crete. Four days later she sank the French armed merchant cruiser *Indien* at anchor off Rhodes. Her cruise lasted for another nine days, viz., until September 17; but it does not appear that she met with any further success.¹

U.21 was also operating off the Dardanelles and Salonika from August 29 to September 26,² but without success. She was working from Constantinople and intended to return thither, but on account of the difficulty and danger of penetrating the new Dardanelles minefields she obtained permission from Vice-Admiral von Souchon, Commanding the Mediterranean Division in Constantinople, to return to Cattaro,³ which she made her headquarters for the present.

Of the German boats sent overland to Austria U.B.14 torpedoed the transport *Southland* on September 2 in the Dardanelles area. The *Southland* had left Alexandria at 7 p.m. on August 30 with troops for Mudros. Some 50 men were lost, mainly through panic, but the ship did not sink and was able to reach Mudros. Five other troopships, a store ship, and a hospital ship left Alexandria at about the same time as the *Southland*, but were not molested.⁴

On September 7 U.C.14 and U.C.13 arrived in Turkish waters within the Dardanelles, making five German submarines sent from Austria to Turkey up to date.

148. **Measures taken to Counter the Submarines.**—In view of this enemy submarine activity, the Admiralty decided to extend their policy of mounting guns in important merchant vessels on the eastern trade route. The practice was for such ships to mount a gun at Port Said for the homeward voyage, and disembark it there if outward bound; and it was now arranged that Port Said should deal with double the number of such transfers. On August 24 it had at length been arranged that all troop transports from England for the Dardanelles should proceed direct to Mudros, though store and supply ships continued to be sent to Alexandria.⁵ The arrangements for the routing of transports were made by the French Commander-in-Chief, and their movements were controlled by Admiral de Robeck.

The French had now decided to arm their troop transports, a practice which was later extended to food ships, and W/T was made compulsory.⁶ On September 22 the French Commander-in-Chief organised a mixed flotilla of 6 destroyers and

¹ Gayer, II, 54.

² Gayer, II, 54, gives dates September 22 and 26 in different places.

³ Gayer, II, 54.

⁴ It is possible that she sank a second ship about this time, but this cannot be definitely ascertained.

⁵ A 458.

⁶ Capitaine de Frégate Castex, "Synthèse de la Guerre Sous-Marine."

12 trawlers taken from the 2nd Light Squadron and despatched it to Toulon, from which base it was to guard the Western Mediterranean basin and to protect French transports making their landfalls off the ports of Algeria and the south of France.¹ Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère returned to Malta during September from a visit to Syria and the Dardanelles, and on 14th Admiral Limpus reported that all available French destroyers (four in number) were patrolling from Malta.² But the French Commander-in-Chief had no means available to watch the waters west of the Malta Channel, or the route from Gibraltar to Marseilles.³ On September 21, Vice-Admiral E. E. Nicol resigned his command at the Dardanelles and was succeeded by Admiral Dartige du Fournet, the place of the latter on the Syrian coast being taken by Vice-Admiral Gauchet.

The positions of the French ships on September 4 were as follows:—

TOULON.—*France, Condorcet, Patrie, Jurien de la Gravière, Latouche-Tréville, Kléber, Renan.* T.B.D.s *Fanfare, Cavalier, Janissaire.* Submarine *Archimède.*

BIZERTA.—*Courbet, Voltaire, Jean-Bart, Vérité, Justice, Démocratie, Waldeck-Rousseau, Jules Ferry, E. Quinet, Victor Hugo, Chateaurenault.* T.B.D.s *Mameluck, Mousqueton, Opinitaire* (two last left for a mission). Submarines *Leverrier, Coulomb, Faraday, Circe, Foucault, Franklin.*

MALTA.—*Diderot, Danton, Vergniaud, Mirabeau, Paris,* T.B.D.'s *Hussard, Coutelas, Voltigeur, Arbalète, Hache, Chasseur, Pierrier, Arc, Hallebarde.*

WEST COAST OF SICILY PATROL.—4th Division of trawlers.

AEGEAN PATROL.—*La Hire, Cassini,* auxiliary *Verdon,* 2nd and 3rd Divisions of trawlers. T.B.D.s *Dehorter, Casque, Fourche, Faulx, Mangini, Renaudin, Commandant Lucas, Fantassin, Cimeterre.* T.B.s 328, 332. Auxiliary cruiser *Indien.*⁴

IONIAN ISLANDS PATROL.—*Gustave Zédé.*

BRINDISI.—T.B.D.s *Bouclier, Carabinier, Spahi, Aspirant Herber, Lansquenot, Enseigne Henry, Commandant Rivière, Magon, Bisson, Commandant Bory, Protêt.* Submarines *Cugnot, Messidor, Ampère, Monge, Fresnel, Papin, Gay-Lussac.*


TARANTO.—T.B.s *Borée, Averse, Nos. 281, 349, 368, 369, 360, 288.* Submarines *Argonaute, Cygogne.*


¹ M. 07605/15.

² A.S., Malta, to Adty., 266, 14.9.15.

³ A.S., Malta, to Adty., 249, 13.9.15.

⁴ Sunk 4 days later.





PLAN VI
TRANSPORT ROUTES.
AUGUST 1915.

- ROUTE ISSUED 9 AUG TO COME INTO FORCE 15 AUG;
- - - ALTERATION 14 AUG AFTER LOSS OF "ROYAL EDWARD"
- · · · · ALTERATION 21 AUG;
- · - · - ROUTES ORDERED 29 AUG;

SYRIAN COAST.—*Jeanne d'Arc* (Ruad), *Jauréguiberry*, *Foudre* (Syrian coast), *Guichen* (Cape Kelidonia to Messina), *Desaix*, *Amiral Charner* (Port Said), *D'Entrecasteaux* (Brest), *D'Estrées* (left Port Said, September 4).

MOROCCAN DIVISION—

TANGIER.—*Jeannette*, *Atmah* (auxiliary cruisers).

ORAN.—*Cosmao*.

AGADIR.—*Duchayla*.

CASABLANCA.—*Cassard*.

ON PASSAGE TO ALEXANDRIA.—*Jules Michelet*.

One of the most important points in the anti-submarine campaign was the Straits of Otranto, for it was from here that the large German submarines issued forth to prey on the transport routes. West of Constantinople their only bases of repair and replenishment of torpedoes, with the possible exception of Smyrna, were the Austrian ports Pola and Cattaro, the latter of which they appear to have made their base, only undertaking the passage up the Adriatic to Pola when extensive defects rendered it necessary. The Straits of Otranto had consequently to be passed by submarines at the commencement and conclusion of each cruise. On August 4 Admiral Limpus had reported to the Admiralty that he learnt from Admiral Thursby that the Austrian submarines were able to pass through the Italian patrols and leave the Adriatic at will; and at the end of the month, with the transference of the four new German submarines to the Mediterranean, the Admiralty took steps to institute with all despatch a British drifter patrol under the Italians in the Straits of Otranto, in an endeavour to deny the passage to these craft.¹

In making this report, Admiral Limpus asked that six trawlers might be sent to him for minesweeping and for local patrol, and two or three seaworthy motor boats in addition. Since the despatch to Egypt in November, 1914, of the torpedo boats of the local defence patrols, sweeping had been done by dockyard craft, but as long ago as May 25 the Admiral Superintendent had represented that the dockyard tanks and tugs could not continue both their own work and the daily task of sweeping. On August 10, therefore, the Admiralty ordered the Admiral at Chatham to despatch six of the trawlers under his orders to Malta.² Four of them, the *Hercules III*, *Tokyo*, *Coningsby*, and *Marion*, left three days later, and the remaining two, *Miningsby* and *Libra*, on 26th, arriving at Malta on September 6.³

The Admiralty had not yet abandoned the hope of denying the passage of the Straits of Gibraltar to German submarines

¹ See section 155.

² Adty. to Chatham, 409, 10.8.15.

³ M. 08357/15.

entering the Mediterranean. To reinforce Admiral Brock's force by the two light cruisers and six destroyers for which he had asked in June was an impossibility in the existing acute shortage of these craft. But on September 21 they informed him that two trawlers, the *Rio Tejo* and *Neptune*, which had been purchased in Portugal, were to be commissioned as patrol trawlers under his orders, and that four additional trawlers due to arrive later from Portugal would be similarly commissioned. They instructed him to endeavour to give to these trawlers the appearance of fishing craft: they were not to be painted like warships, and their guns were to be mounted as inconspicuously as possible.¹

149. First Serious Submarine Raid, September 28 to October 14.

—The sinkings of merchant ships during the early part of September were merely a hint of what was shortly to occur; for at the end of the month the intensive German submarine campaign, transferred from the northern waters in which for the time anti-submarine methods had got the better of these craft and driven them to minelaying, opened in the Mediterranean with a furious bout of sinkings.

At this date 15 submarines of German origin had been transferred to the Mediterranean and were ready for action. Of these 5 had been despatched by sea and 10 overland in sections. There had been reports of further craft sent overland in sections to Austria and Turkey, but if these reports had foundation in fact none of the submarines were yet ready for service.

SUBMARINES SENT BY SEA.²

Name.	Arrived at Cattaro.	Left for First Cruise.
U.21	May 13	May 20.
U.33	September 16	End of September.
U.34	August 23	September 1.
U.35	August 23	August 31.
U.39	September 15	End of September.

SUBMARINES SENT OVERLAND TO AUSTRIA— MARCH TO APRIL 1915.

Name.	Left for First Cruise.	Remarks.
U.B.1	(?) June	Joined Austrian Navy in June.
U.B.3	Before May 13	Lost with all hands, summer, 1915.
U.B.7	Do.	Worked from Constantinople.
U.B.8	Do.	Worked from Constantinople. Lost during the autumn, 1915.

¹ Adty. to Senior Naval Officer, Gibraltar, 14, 21.9.15.

² Based mainly on Gayer, Vols. II and III.

U.B.14	During summer, 1915	Worked from Adriatic.
U.B.15	(?) July	Joined Austrian Navy in June
U.C.12	During summer, 1915	Worked from Adriatic.
U.C.13	Do.	Worked from Constantinople.
U.C.14	Do.	Do. do.
U.C.15	Do.	Do. do.

There were thus five large German submarines and two small working from Pola and Cattaro. Five small boats were working from Constantinople, one was lost, and two had joined the Austrian Navy, bringing the probable total of boats in Austrian waters up to 16.¹

U.39 commenced operations near the Cerigo Channel, where the transport routes from Malta and Egypt to Mudros converged. On September 28, 29 and 30, respectively, she sank the oiler *H. C. Henry*, from Alexandria to Mudros, the *Haydn* with grain for Glasgow, and the Italian *Cirene*. She was working round the south of Crete meanwhile, and on October 2, being then off the south-east corner of the island, she sank the *Sailor Prince* and that evening stopped the Khedivial liner *Borulos*, on passage from the Piraeus to Alexandria, which had picked up the survivors from the *Sailor Prince*. The *Borulos* was a British boat, but fortunately for her she had amongst her passengers a Turkish prince; and it was probably on that account that U.39 refrained from sinking her. From here U.39 seems to have gone east, for a vessel from Port Said to Mudros reported that a torpedo was fired at her on October 3 in 34° 19' N., 29° 21' E. Working back towards the Alexandria-Malta route she was sighted off Larnaca on 5th, and two days later she sank the *Halizones* in 33° 1' N., 26° 26' E. The Admiralty collier *Thorpwood* fell a victim to her on 8th, and the collier *Apollo* bound for Egypt was sunk next day. On 10th she fired at the armed transport *Ajax*, at a range too great for the latter's guns, but she was driven off by French destroyers which the *Ajax* called up by W/T.² Finally, on her way home to Cattaro U.39 sank one of the supply ships lying off the Montenegrin coast.³

Meanwhile, on October 1, when U.39 moved eastward, her place off the Cerigo Channel was taken by U.33, who sank her first ship that day, the French collier *Provincia* returning empty from the Dardanelles. Forty miles west of Cape Matapan, she also unsuccessfully chased the *Olympic*, which on her way to Mudros had picked up the crew of the *Provincia*. Next day,

¹ Viz., six pre-war Austrian boats, the ex-*Curie*, two Germania-Krupp boats handed to the Austrian Navy and two working with German officers and crews, and five U-boats.

² M. 47987/15. Chambre des Députés, 1920, No. 634, states that the French *Saint André III* (evidently a patrol boat) was sunk off Crete September 27 by a submarine. So far as is known U.39 was the only enemy submarine off Crete at the time.

³ Gayer, III, 18.

October 2, 12 miles west of Cerigo *U.33* sank the French *Sainte Marguerite* from the Dardanelles and the Ellerman liner *Arabian*. The loss of the *Arabian* was a serious matter, as she was carrying ammunition for the use of the expedition which was on the eve of sailing from Mudros to Salonika¹; and Admiral de Robeck at once despatched to that area the *Jonquil* with six trawlers and six drifters, to assist the French patrols in hunting the submarine. Another French ship, the *Antonie*, with supplies for Tenedos was sunk on 3rd. The 4th gave her the destroyer collier *Craigston*, 35 miles west of Ovo Island, loaded with 3,624 tons of coal; and she also attacked the French transport *Yunnan* bound for Salonika, but a French destroyer was near and *U.33* did not stay to sink the transport.²

The French 2nd Destroyer Flotilla was now hurriedly brought from Brindisi to guard the Cerigo Channel, where it arrived on October 6.

The *Burrsfield*, carrying coal and stores and towing a motor lighter for the Dardanelles, was sunk on 5th 70 miles west of Cape Matapan; and then *U.33* turned westward, and on 6th, sank three ships midway between Cerigo and Malta, the colliers *Silverash* and *Scawby* returning empty from the Dardanelles and the Greek *Demetrios Dandiolos* bringing a cargo of rice to London. On 7th the French transport *Amiral Hamelin*, who seems to have been somewhat off the route in force at the time, was unable to save herself by her gun-fire and was sunk, her survivors and those of the ship sunk on the previous day being picked up by the collier *Remembrance* and the hospital ship *Dunluce Castle* and brought to Malta, where the loss on board the *Amiral Hamelin* was found to be 61 out of the 353 on board.


Between September 28 and October 10, the two submarines *U.39* and *U.33* had destroyed no less than 18 ships; but now for a while the tale of sinkings diminished. *U.33* returned to Cattaro on October 9, and *U.39* three days later. On this day *U.35* issued from the Adriatic for a long cruise which was to last until November 12. She went first to the Asia Minor coast, and on 18th she sank the Italian steamer *Scilla* 12 miles west of Kalymnos, one of the islands of the Sporades, in the zone of the 3rd French Squadron. From here she shortly proceeded to the Gulf of Salonika to try her luck on the line of communications of the new Allied expedition.³ On 23rd she torpedoed without warning the British transport *Marquette*, 36 miles south of Salonika Bay, 29 out of 1,000 men on board being lost. This was apparently *U.35*'s only victim in this area. Commander Kophamel waited another week, then finding that transport

¹ See section 150.

² *Chambre des Députés*, 1920, No. 634, however, lists her as sunk, the following note being appended: "Damaged by torpedo and wrecked (réduit à l'état d'épave)."

³ See section 150.





PLAN VII

SUBMARINE RAID TH 28 SEPT TO TH 10 OCT 1915

ROUTE ISSUED 15.9.15
 " " " 1.10.15
 AFTER LOSS OF "Ramazan" }
 MODIFICATION 8.10.15
 2ND do do 8.10.15

NOTE THE NUMBERS IN THE CIRCLES
 SHOW THE DATES ON WHICH
 SHIPS WERE ATTACKED OR SUNK

was taking place by night only, he set a course for a rendezvous in the Gulf of Saros, known as the Hersing-Stand, in order to get news and instructions. Here he received orders to proceed to Budrum, in the Gulf of Kos, to meet a Turkish Mission and convey it to Sollum.¹

It was realised that the comparative immunity enjoyed from the attacks of enemy submarines during the last three weeks was merely a breathing space. "They will certainly reappear somewhere," wrote Admiral Limpus in his report of October 21. "In order to stamp out this plague we have got to take just such energetic and thorough measures out here as have defeated the 'submarine blockade' of England."²

150. Expedition to Salonika.—The transference to the Mediterranean by the Germans of the old-fashioned type of submarine warfare,³ coincided with a change in the Balkan situation, which necessitated a new Allied overseas expedition, and rendered it more than ever essential that means should be found to curb the activities of the enemy's submarines. By the middle of August, with the end of the Battle of Suvla, it was known to the world that we had shot our bolt in Gallipoli and that the greatest oversea expedition in history had been undertaken in vain. On September 22 an agreement⁴ was concluded between Turkey and Bulgaria by which the frontier became rectified in favour of the latter; and Bulgaria at once converted her partial into a general mobilisation,⁵ and a situation which had been gradually hardening became hopeless, though it was not until ten days later, on October 4, that the Entente Powers despatched an ultimatum to Bulgaria. Meanwhile Greece, where M. Venizelos had returned to power on August 22, replied to the action of Bulgaria by ordering a precautionary mobilisation on the same day. Up to date Serbia had refused to consider the cession to Greece of certain districts in Macedonia; but now she reversed her attitude, and showed herself compliant to Greece. Flirting with the idea of intervention, the latter further demanded as her price the guarantee of 150,000 British and French troops, which was agreed to by the Governments concerned. The intervention of Greece now rendered possible a thrust from Salonika to assist Serbia, which the Austro-German armies were on the point of invading once more, and on September 27 M. Venizelos obtained the secret consent of King Constantine to the proposed expedition. On the following day the Greek Government formally refused the French and British offer, but on October 2 M. Venizelos asked that the troops might be landed at Salonika as soon as possible,

¹ Gayer. *U.35's* further operations are detailed in sections 169 and 183.

² M. 08357/15.

³ That is, submarine war against shipping by guns and torpedoes, as opposed to minelaying, which was the latest activity of enemy submarines in home waters.

⁴ Known as the "Dedeagatch Agreement."

⁵ September 23.

and the transference from Mudros of the 10th British Division and a French Division was begun.

On October 5 the first Allied troops landed at Salonika. They were to be followed by other troops from France, Marseilles and Genoa being used as the ports of embarkation of the British, and Toulon and Cette for the French troops.

All available transports were ordered to be kept in the Mediterranean, coaled and ready.¹ In the shortage of French transports we agreed to place at their disposal 13 vessels² to assist in the conveyance of a French cavalry division, and also to transport a regiment of Chasseurs from Alexandria. On October 22 the Admiralty ordered every available transport at the Dardanelles and in Egypt to be sent to Marseilles without delay.³ The transference of troops to Salonika was expected to take about two months, and in addition to passenger and cargo vessels the old battleships *Mars*, *Magnificent*, *Hannibal* and *Terrible* were employed on transport service, carrying some 1,500 troops apiece on each trip. On October 31 a joint commission was appointed by the Admiralty and the War Office to control the transport arrangements in the Mediterranean. The Commission consisted of Rear-Admiral F. G. Eyre, Brigadier-General A. B. Hamilton, and Mr. Thomas Royden. It was accommodated on board the yacht *Valiant II* and proceeded first (early in November) to Salonika to consider the best method of employing the port to its fullest possible extent,⁴ and afterwards to Egypt.

The attitude of Greece changed almost from day to day. On October 5, the day on which the Allied troops landed at Salonika, M. Venizelos, bested by the King in the contest of wills, resigned on the refusal of the latter to support his policy; but next day King Constantine gave an assurance to the British Minister at Athens that Greek mobilisation would continue and that the disembarkation of the Allied troops at Salonika might proceed, and this was reiterated by M. Zaimis, the new Greek Premier. But with the change of Government all hope of Greek intervention gradually dissolved, and not even the offer of Cyprus could precipitate it. So doubtful indeed did the position of the British and French troops in Serbia become with the advance of the Austro-German and Bulgarian flood, that economic pressure was brought to bear on Greece⁵ and the Entente Powers were forced to despatch to the Government of M. Skouloudis, who assumed the reins of power on November 6, a note demanding non-interference with the Allied troops and

¹ A 496.

² *Californian*, *Commodore*, *Crispin*, *Indian*, *Eloby*, *Hydaspes*, *City of Edinburgh*, *Novian*, *Caledonian*, *Elele*, *Esmeraldas*, *Lake Michigan*, *Ascanias*. Stowage: 275 officers, 6,087 men, 6,217 horses, 700 vehicles.

³ A 517.

⁴ A 523.

⁵ A 540.

guaranteeing eventual restoration of the occupied Greek territory. On October 11 the Bulgarian Army crossed the Serbian frontier, war being formally declared between the two countries on 14th. This was followed by the declaration of a state of war with Bulgaria by Great Britain (October 15) and France (October 16), and the proclamation of a blockade of the Aegean coast of Bulgaria by the Entente Powers at 6 a.m. on October 16,¹ a British squadron composed of two cruisers, two monitors, a seaplane carrier, several destroyers and trawlers being detailed by Admiral de Robeck for operations on the coast.²

Meanwhile, measures were taken to provide a naval force to be held in readiness in case of hostilities with Greece. Four ships were detailed from the Grand Fleet, the *Zealandia*, *Albemarle* and *Russell*, under the orders of Rear-Admiral Fremantle in the *Hibernia*. An Allied Fleet was to be formed under Vice-Admiral Le Bris to operate in the French sphere of action, while Admiral de Robeck would take any action that was necessary within his own sphere. Admiral Fremantle was to join Le Bris in the event of operations being undertaken in the French sphere, and the composition of the British squadron was eventually determined as follows:—

BATTLESHIPS.³—*Hibernia*, *Zealandia*, *Russell*.

MONITORS.—*Havelock*, *M.18*.

CRUISER.—*Askold*.

DESTROYERS.⁴—*Fury*, *Comet*, *Basilisk*, *Beagle*, *Scorpion*.

SLOOPs.—*Peony*, *Heliotrope*. *Ben-My-Chree* (seaplane carrier), 5 trawlers, 9 drifters, *Queen Victoria*, *Prince Edward* (net layers), *Princess Alice* (net carrier).

The French were asked to provide four battleships and two armoured cruisers with their attendant destroyers, and two submarines. The intention was to despatch an ultimatum to Greece as soon as the French and British troops in Serbia were in a safe defensive position in Greek territory; if the reply was unfavourable or if any hostile acts were committed against the Allied troops instructions would be given for immediate offensive action, but meanwhile the danger that the Greeks might temporise until the German submarines in the Mediterranean could arrive on the spot, led to the decision that in spite of the loss of moral effect the Allied ships must not appear off the Greek coast until the reply to the ultimatum was received.⁵ In the event, however, the Note was despatched on November 23

¹ A 507, 510, 511, 512.

² A 514.

³ Left Milford Haven, November 10. They were delayed for 48 hours by a gale in the Bay of Biscay.

⁴ *Comet* and *Fury*, with *Redpole* and *Staunch*, left Devonport November 13.

⁵ A 529, 548.

and the demand of the Entente Powers found an immediate acceptance by the Greek Government.

151. French Patrols, October, 1915.—After the loss of the *Ramazan* on September 19, new transport routes were issued. The new routes differed, however, by a few miles only from the previous ones; and it was not until October 8, after the serious depredations of *U.33* on the Malta-Lemnos route, that the latter was boldly placed nearly 100 miles to the southward.¹

The area in which *U.39* and *U.33* had been operating was in the French zone, and its patrol devolved upon Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère. On October 4, in order to remedy the want of destroyers, the 2nd Flotilla was withdrawn from Brindisi to the Cerigo Channel, where they arrived on 6th, just as *U.33* had transferred her hunting ground 200 miles to the westward. On 8th a large French flotilla was established on the eastern side of the Channel, composed of the 1st Destroyer Flotilla, two T.B.s, two and a half divisions of French trawlers, and an armed merchant vessel. The base of the French patrol service in the Aegean and on the Syrian coast was Milo, and October 8 the distribution of their patrols was as follows:—

MILO.—*Jurien de la Gravière*.

ALEXANDRIA.—*Victor Hugo*.

MARITTIMO.—*Opiniâtre, Chasseur, Coutelas, Voltigeur, Mousqueton, Arc*.

ESCORT DUTY.—*Mazoutier, Nicolas II, Pierrier*.

CAPE MATAPAN.—*Carabinier, Spahi, Aspirant Herber, Lansquenet, Enseigne Henry, Mameluck*.

CERIGO-MILO-DORO.—*Dehorter, Casque, Fourche, Faulx, Mangini, Renaudin, Commandant Lucas, Fantassin, T.B.s 328, 332, Verdon, Paris, and 2nd and 3rd Divisions of trawlers, Richelieu and five trawlers of 1st Division*.

SALONIKA.—*St. Louis, Mortier, Sarbacane, Tirailleur*.

MUDROS.—*Kléber, Pique*.

SYRIA.—*Jeanne d'Arc* (Malta to Port Said), *Dupleix, D'Estrées* (on coast of Syria), *Foudre* (Karamania coast), *Guichen, Amiral Charner* (Port Said).

MOROCCAN DIVISION.—*Duchayla* (Tangier cruising), *Cassard* (Oran to Tangier), *Cosmao* (on passage from Tangier to Casablanca), *Atma* (Gibraltar), *Jeannette* (Oran).

Submarine *H.2* and the *Clacton*, the latter disguised as a tramp, with her guns concealed, were working in the Milo area, in addition to the *Jonquil* and her trawlers, and drifters. The

¹ A 493, 500-502.

Clematis also, with a force of trawlers, was kept in readiness by Admiral de Robeck to proceed to any area where a submarine was known to be working.

Like ourselves, the French were perilously short of the particular craft needed for the protection of transports and the prosecution of the anti-submarine war. For the former service they now adopted a system of convoys escorted by destroyers, the details of application of which were regulated by a Naval Circular of October 28.¹ The system involved a great strain upon the available destroyers. For the week October 15-22, the following vessels were engaged on this duty: *Renaudin, Fantassin, Coutelas, Arc, Épieu, Rapière, Béliet*. When a submarine was known to be working on a certain route, the sailing of transports was held up, a practice observed by us also in the case of unarmed transports for which no escort was available.

On October 10, Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère resigned the command of the Mediterranean owing to ill-health and his place was taken by Admiral Dartige du Fournet, who, when appointed to the Dardanelles on September 21, had been replaced on the Syrian coast by Vice-Admiral Gauchet. The latter now succeeded Admiral Dartige du Fournet at the Dardanelles, and Admiral Moreau took over the command of the Syrian Squadron.

152. British Measures to meet the Submarine Menace.—The majority of the vessels sunk in the recent submarine raid on the Mediterranean transport routes were engaged on Naval Service, and the Admiralty now determined to extend still further their policy of arming merchantmen, and to provide defensive armament for all merchant vessels carrying troops and war stores in and to the Mediterranean.² Vessels leaving the United Kingdom would receive their gun before departure, and a large number of guns were sent out to Alexandria for ships permanently employed in the Mediterranean. Arrangements were made by Admiral de Robeck and Admiral Limpus for store and ammunition ships to be armed both at Malta and at Mudros.

On October 31 the Admiralty ordered Admiral de Robeck to report how many more guns in addition to those which were being sent out were required to ensure that all vessels permanently employed in the Mediterranean on Government service, including colliers, would be defensively armed while on passage.³ Some 12 pdrs. and 3 pdrs. were also sent out for certain transports.

It was now clear that, in the words of Admiral Limpus, "a deliberate, organised, and energetic attack" must be made against the enemy submarines in order to rid the Mediterranean of the pest. The new French Commander-in-Chief was of one

¹ Capitaine de Frégate Castex. "Synthèse de la Guerre Sous-Marine," p. 81. This circular has not been seen.

² A 505, 520.

³ A 524.

mind with the Admiral Superintendent, Malta: the methods which had shown themselves efficacious in reducing enemy submarine activity in British waters must be transferred to the Mediterranean—both the vessels and officers experienced in those methods. The problem of the Mediterranean was much more complex than in the English Channel, where enemy submarines navigated in waters bounded by coasts which were closed to them. In the Eastern Mediterranean wellnigh every coast and every island afforded them places of refuge or replenishment. One fact emerged from the occurrences of the past few weeks, namely, that the enemy submarines had a wholesome fear of the measures which had been taken against them off the entrance to the Dardanelles, which rendered them very unwilling to face the passage of those straits. The points where Admiral Limpus advocated the adoption of increased severity of attack on hostile submarines were the neighbourhood of Gibraltar, Cattaro, the Straits of Otranto, Crete and Cerigotto, and Egypt.¹

Of these points perhaps the most important was Otranto, and here the Admiralty were now taking steps to establish an effective watch upon the mouth of the Adriatic.

CHAPTER XIX.

EVENTS IN THE ADRIATIC, SEPTEMBER TO DECEMBER, 1915.

153. Situation in the Adriatic, September, 1915—Resignation of the Italian Minister of Marine.—By August, 1915, Italian Naval policy was coming to regard the battlefleet as a covering force for Mediterranean, as distinct from Adriatic operations. It was obvious to every observer that either the Italian or the French fleet in the Mediterranean was redundant; but the difficulties of securing co-operation of the French and Italian forces under one Admiral rendered it impossible to effect any redistribution of the fleets.²

The results of the naval campaign in the Adriatic had conspired to cause both official and public discontent in Italy. Four months of war had resulted in the loss of two Italian armoured cruisers, one destroyer, two torpedo boats,³ three submarines,⁴ and two dirigibles, while the *Dublin* was still out of action as the result of being torpedoed on June 9. Against this the Austrians had lost only two submarines⁵ and three or more aeroplanes. "Every place of any importance upon the

¹ M. 08357/15.

² See M. 06381/15.

³ No. 5 P.N. torpedoed by Austrian submarine in Upper Adriatic, 26.6.15, and No. 170 S, destroyed by mine while minelaying off coast of Istria, night, July 2/3, 1915.

⁴ *Nereide*, *Medusa*, *Jalea*.

⁵ *U.12* sunk off Venice, 9.8.15, and *U.3* sunk 13.8.15.

Italian Adriatic coast has been made to feel the presence of the Austrian ships or aircraft," wrote the British Naval Attaché at Rome on September 28; but on no single occasion, save in the ill-starred engagement which marked Italy's entry into the war and resulted in the sinking of the *Turbine*, had the Italians succeeded in bringing the raiders to action. Four months after the declaration of war by Italy the position was that her heavy ships were forbidden to leave harbour. "In four months," wrote Captain Boyle from Rome, "the Austrian fleet has established a moral ascendancy in the Adriatic, and has played the part of the weaker force with conspicuous success. Not only has it succeeded in weakening the Italian fleet, but it has immobilised a force very considerably superior to itself."

On September 25 the resignation was officially announced of Vice-Admiral Leone Viale, Italian Minister of Marine. Ill-health was given as the ostensible reason for his retirement, but it is significant that both the Government and the public were profoundly dissatisfied with the results of the naval campaign. Serious deficiencies in Italy's naval preparations for war culminated at this time in an acute shortage of fast light craft, submarines, and aircraft, for the provision of which the Minister of Marine was responsible.¹

154. "B" Class Submarines despatched to the Adriatic, October, 1915.—To mitigate the shortage of submarines the British Admiralty offered to despatch to the Adriatic for service under the Italians six "B" class submarines, which had been found of little use in wide waters, though their small radius of action would be less disadvantage in the narrow waters of the northern Adriatic.² These were submarines *B.6-11* which had been employed in various capacities in the Mediterranean and were now at Malta refitting and preparing for further service. The offer was gratefully accepted by the Italians, and it was arranged that until a base at Venice was ready the boats should work from Brindisi. *B.7, 8* and *9* arrived at Brindisi on September 29 and left on October 6 for Venice, where they arrived on 11th. *B.6* and *B.11* arrived at Brindisi on October 23, after making good at Malta the defects sustained while operating off the Gulf of Sollum; they went on to Venice, arriving on October 28. *B.10* was still in dockyard hands at Malta. The submarine service at Venice was under the command of Captain Bonelli, Commander Wilfred Tomkinson being in charge of the British boats. The crews of the latter were accommodated in the old Italian cruiser *Marco Polo*, though eventually, on January 1, 1916, *B.11* was commissioned as an independent command and nominal parent ship to the British submarines. The instructions given by Admiral Thursby to Commander Tomkinson were to issue orders to the submarines under his command, in compliance with the wishes of the Italian authorities.³

¹ See M. 0750/15.

² A 485, 486

³ Rear-Admiral, *Queen*: Report of Proceedings.

By November the "B" class submarines had commenced operations in the northern Adriatic. They were hampered, however, by the number of mines, both Italian and Austrian, in those waters, and doubts as to their exact positions. Much bad weather was experienced, and the short steep seas which rose quickly rendered work difficult. The Italian submarines were frequently forced to return to harbour with structural damage due to the rough sea, but the British boats stood the weather better. On November 15, four submarines only out of the fifteen at Venice were fit to go to sea,¹ and Admiral Thursby asked that if possible two or three "C" class boats might be sent to Venice, to be manned by the crews of the "B" submarines which were undergoing repairs.

B.11 while on patrol on the afternoon of November 11 had a novel encounter with an Austrian seaplane. The seaplane descended and alighted on the water 500 yards from her, apparently owing to engine trouble. B.11 opened fire with Maxim and rifles,² but the mechanism of the former jammed after a few rounds. She then proceeded on gas engine and endeavoured to ram the seaplane, but the superior speed and manœuvring power of the latter enabled her to evade the submarine; and after about half an hour, having overcome the engine trouble, the seaplane rose and flew back to the Istrian coast.³

155. Net Drifter Patrol Established in Straits of Otranto, September, 1915.—At the time of the Allied Naval Conference which met in May to arrange the details of Italy's entry into the war, the British Admiralty had offered to the Italians 50 trawlers and some anti-submarine nets for use in the Straits of Otranto.⁴ The offer was accepted, but the vessels were not despatched, probably owing to the difficulty experienced by the Italians in finding the necessary crews to man them and guns for their armament. By the end of August, 1915, the Italians had not been able to establish in the Straits of Otranto the patrol of trawlers and fishing boats with nets which the British Admiralty had urged upon them in May; and enemy submarines were able to evade the patrols of light craft and to leave the Adriatic at will.⁵ The immunity of the Mediterranean trade and transport routes from the depredations of German submarines based on Austrian ports, which were now evidently preparing for an intensive campaign, was a matter which vitally concerned Great Britain. On August 30, therefore, the British Admiralty took steps themselves in the matter. The Naval Base at Poole was ordered to prepare immediately for service abroad 12 drifters

¹ M. 08931/15, Rear-Admiral, British Adriatic Squadron: Report of Proceedings.

² The "B" class submarines did not mount a gun.

³ Reports of Proceedings of Submarines. Taranto Base Papers.

⁴ M. 03553/15 and M. 04313/15.

⁵ A.S., Malta, to Adty., 593, 4.8.15.

with the necessary complements, and the Vice-Admiral at Dover and the Naval Base at Falmouth were each instructed to prepare twice this number. The fleet of 60 was to be sailed from Falmouth for Gibraltar in groups as they became ready, Commander J. O. Hatcher being appointed to command the Drifter Patrol in the Adriatic. The drifters began to arrive at Taranto on September 22, and by the end of the month the entire fleet of 60 had arrived. No time was lost in establishing the patrol, for on September '24 Admiral Thursby reported that he was sending the first two divisions to sea next day to lay their nets in the Straits of Otranto.¹

The drifters were organised in groups of eight boats, four groups being at sea and one in harbour.² The work of arming them was begun immediately on their arrival, and by October 20 Admiral Thursby reported to the Admiralty that 50 per cent. of them had been armed, some with a 3-pdr. apiece, but the majority with an Italian 57 or 47 mm. gun. Arming was complete by November 8.

LIST OF DRIFTERS ARMED WITH GUNS,
NOVEMBER 16, 1915.

"A" GROUP.			"B" GROUP.		
Adty. No.	Name.	Type of Gun.	Adty. No.	Name.	Type of Gun.
2278	<i>Clavis</i>	3 pdr.	1161	<i>Speranza</i>	3 pdr.
1141	<i>Hollybank</i>	3 pdr.	2159	<i>Union</i>	3 pdr.
2285	<i>Norlan</i>	3 pdr.	1037	<i>Hastings Castle</i>	57 mm.
2284	<i>Admirable</i>	3 pdr.	1072	<i>Lottie Leask</i>	3 pdr.
2135	<i>Ben Bui</i>	3 pdr.	1061	<i>Foresight II</i>	57 mm.
2134	<i>Beneficent</i>	57 mm.	2115	<i>British Crown</i>	3 pdr.
2270	<i>Craigneen</i>	3 pdr.	2166	<i>Burd</i>	57 mm.
2271	<i>Craignoon</i>	57 mm.	1827	<i>Clara and Alice</i>	57 mm.
2276	<i>Frigate Bird</i>	57 mm.	2215	<i>Clack Na Cudin</i>	57 mm.
2287	<i>Guerdon</i>	57 mm.	2131	<i>Evening Star II</i>	57 mm.
2274	<i>Helenora</i>	57 mm.	748	<i>Floandi</i>	57 mm.
2803	<i>Ivy</i>	57 mm.	1399	<i>Felicitas</i>	57 mm.
2296	<i>Lily Reaich</i>	3 pdr.	2102	<i>Gowan Lea</i>	57 mm.
2272	<i>Mill O' Buckie</i>	57 mm.	2127	<i>Morning Star II</i>	3 pdr.
2286	<i>Morning Star</i>	57 mm.	1837	<i>Maud Evelyn</i>	3 pdr.
1032	<i>Ocean Spray</i>	3 pdr.	2207	<i>Our Allies</i>	47 mm.
2289	<i>Prime</i>	3 pdr.	—	<i>Bono</i>	57 mm.
1411	<i>Selina</i>	57 mm.	2186	<i>Serene</i>	47 mm.
2185	<i>Sunnyside</i>	57 mm.	158	<i>Sedulous</i>	47 mm.
2196	<i>Unicorn</i>	3 pdr.	566	<i>Bon Espoir</i>	57 mm.

Note.—Group numbers of drifters run from A1–20 and B1–20 respectively in the order shown. The 3 pdr. were British guns, the 57 mm. and 47 mm. Italian.

¹ R.A., *Queen*: Report of Proceedings.

² The number of drifters was reduced at the beginning of October when Admiral Thursby was ordered to send 18 of them to Mudros for the use of Admiral de Robeck.

One of the drifters, the *Manzanita*, gave her name to the base at Brindisi as nominal parent ship, the Italians lending first one merchant ship, the *Gallipoli* of 2,000 tons, and in November a second, the *Adriatico*, which then constituted the British Adriatic Drifter Base.

156. **The Drifters at Work.**—Few days only elapsed after the establishment of the drifter patrol before the number of boats was considerably reduced; for on September 30 the Admiralty ordered Admiral Thursby to send 18 of the drifters to Mudros, to cover the impending movements of transports in connection with the expedition to Salonika,¹ and the boats left Brindisi three days later. Generally speaking, the drifters worked across the Straits of Otranto between the parallels 39° 55' N. and 40° 30' N.² Owing to the width—45 to 70 miles—and depth of the channel to be guarded it was found very difficult to hamper effectively the passage of enemy submarines. On October 15 Admiral Thursby asked that a further 20 drifters might be sent to him, and was told in reply that the 18 drifters sent to the eastern Mediterranean would be returned when no longer required.³ A month later, however, the Admiralty decided that a considerable increase in the number of boats was necessary, and on November 15 the Officer Commanding the Naval Base at Poole was ordered to despatch 40 of his best drifters. They began to arrive at Taranto on December 7, and were sent on to Brindisi to join the patrol.

Much bad weather was experienced by the drifters during these winter months. Losses of nets were heavy, some being carried away by submarine craft becoming entangled in them, others, at times entire fleets, being slipped in order to give chase to an enemy submarine. It appears that the existence of the patrol was not discovered by the Germans until about November 22, when *U.34*, returning to Cattaro from a cruise, made the discovery. At this date, however, the drifters were not supplied with E.C. mines, and the German submarines apparently did not stand very greatly in awe of the patrol.⁴ Difficulties were experienced by the drifters in keeping their assigned stations, owing to their inexperience of the currents in the Adriatic and the fact that many lights had been extinguished. Engagements with enemy craft were of frequent occurrence, though the drifters seem to have achieved little success in such encounters, largely, no doubt, owing to their small armament, the large German submarines mounting one or two 22 pdr. guns against the 3 pdr. or 57 or 47 mm. gun carried by the drifters. On October 12 the drifter *Restore*, armed

¹ A 492.

² On November 27 the northern parallel was 40° 18' N. (Secret Circular No. 1811, R.R.)

³ A 509.

⁴ Gayer, III, 26.

only with rifles, was sunk by an enemy submarine, with the loss of two of her crew, and on December 28 Admiral Thursby reported the loss of the *Lottie Leask*, sunk by a submarine near Saseno Island, the crew being saved. Unarmed drifters worked as far as possible with armed drifters, for purposes of security.

157. **Shortage of Light Cruisers.**—The establishment of the drifter patrol rendered it important that the force of cruisers and destroyers stationed at Brindisi should be capable of dealing with any attack made on them.¹ The Austrians at this date had four fast light cruisers of the *Spaun* class² of 24–25 knots speed and 8–3.9 in. guns,³ and two slow light cruisers, the *Szigetvar* and *Aspern*, of 17.3 knots speed, mounting 8–4.7 in. and 10–3 pdr. guns. To these, at the end of September, the Allies could only oppose two fast light cruisers, the *Bristol*, speed 24 knots, 2–6 in. and 10–4 in. guns, which was giving cause for apprehension of a possible breakdown, and the *Nino Bixio*, 25.7 knots, mounting 6–4.7 in. and 6–14 pdr. guns; and three slow vessels, the *Amethyst*, *Sapphire* and *Topaze*. The *Dublin* and *Dartmouth* were still in dockyard hands, as also was the *Weymouth*, which arrived at Malta on August 2 and was destined when her refit was complete to join the British Adriatic Squadron. The *Marsala* and *Quarto* were at Spezia and were not expected to rejoin the fleet for some weeks. The *Spaun*, however, was stated to have very serious engine defects and it was absolutely necessary that her boilers should be renewed, a requirement which could not be met, as up to the present Austria had been unable to provide the requisite spare parts of her Yarrow boilers. Eventually, on November 21, the force at Brindisi was strengthened by the *Napoli* and *Roma*, and by December 21 the remaining two cruisers of the *V. Emanuele* class were based there.

158. **Disposition of Austrian Fleet, September, 1915.**—By September the disposition of the Austrian fleet had assumed a permanent character, as follows⁴ :—

POLA—Battle fleet as under :—

1st Division—4 *Viribus Unitis* (Flag : *Viribus Unitis*).

2nd Division—3 *Radetzky* (Flag : *Franz Ferdinand*).

3rd Division—3 *Erzherzog* (Flag : *Erzherzog Karl*).

4th Division—3 *Arpad* (Flag : *Hapsburg*). *Sankt Georg*, flagship of scouting group. 2 light cruisers of *Spaun* type. 1st and 2nd T.B.D. Flotillas. 2nd and 3rd High Sea T.B. Flotillas.

¹ M. 07566/15.

² *Helgoland*, *Novara*, *Saida*, *Admiral Spaun*.

³ The *Spaun* had 7–3.9 in. guns.

⁴ R.A., *Queen* : Reports of Proceedings, Intelligence, etc.

CATTARO.—5th Division as under :—

3 *Wien* (Flag: *Monarch*). *Kaiser Karl VI*. *Szigetvar*
Kaiser Franz Joseph. *Panther* (at Risano). Torpedo vessels
of *Blitz* type. 1 flotilla of High Sea T.B.s.

SEBENICO.

2 light cruisers of *Spaun* type. 1 T.B.D. flotilla of *Ulan*
type. 1 High Sea T.B. flotilla of "T" type. 1 torpedo
vessel permanently near Zlarin.

159. **Changes in Italian Commands.**—During the autumn of
1915 several changes of command took place in the Italian fleet,
and on October 20 the principal commanders were as follows¹ :—

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.—Vice-Admiral H.R.H. Duke of the
Abruzzi (Fleet Flagship: *Dante Alighieri*).

1ST SQUADRON.—Vice-Admiral Presbitero (*C. di Cavour*).
Cavour Division, Rear-Admiral Millo. *V. Emanuele* Division,
Rear-Admiral Patris. *Margherita* Division, Rear-Admiral
Capomazza.

2ND SQUADRON.—Vice-Admiral Cutinelli (*Vettor Pisani*).

CRUISERS.—Rear-Admiral Bellini (*Bausan*).

160. **Loss of the "Brin," September 26.**—On September 26
an explosion occurred in the after magazine of the *Benedetto*
Brin, which was lying in Brindisi harbour. The ship was
completely wrecked, Rear-Admiral de Cervin, most of the officers,
and a large number of the crew being killed.

161. **Reorganisation of Routine of Blockade, October 6.**²—
On October 4, when the French 2nd Destroyer Flotilla was with-
drawn from Brindisi for patrol duty off the Cerigo Channel where
U.33 was operating, the reduction in the number of destroyers
available rendered necessary the institution of a new routine of
the vessels employed in the blockade.

The available vessels at Brindisi were apportioned to two
services, Duty and Stand-By. The former consisted of two
groups, A and B, each of one cruiser and three T.B.D.s; one
group cruising and the other in the outer harbour ready to proceed
instantly. The groups were to change duty at the end of 24
hours, total duty period being 48 hours. After their turn of
duty the two cruisers and six destroyers were to return to the
inner harbour and take over the stand-by service, one cruiser
and two destroyers being at three hours' notice, and one cruiser
and two destroyers with fires drawn but ready to light up

¹ M. 08206/15.

² Secret Circular No. 1475, October 6, 1915.

immediately. All the other cruisers and destroyers in harbour
were to be at six hours' notice.

The movements of the patrolling vessels were to be arranged
to explore as a general rule the part of the sea nearest the
Albanian coast at dawn. In bad weather the Italian destroyers
had frequently to be withdrawn, leaving a single cruiser on
patrol.¹

The vessels from which the patrols were drawn were as
follows :—

CRUISERS.—*Citta di Palermo*, *Sapphire*, *Topaze*, *Citta di*
Catania, *Bristol*, *Nino Bixio*, *Coatit*.

DESTROYERS.—*Borea*, *Dardo*, *Nembo*, *Intrepido*, *Ardente*,
Audace, *Impavido*, *Insidioso*, *Ostro*, *Strale*, *C. Rossarol*, *Euro*,
Granatiere, *Irrequito*.

162. **Reorganisation of Guard and Blockade, November 15.**²—
The *Dartmouth* recommissioned at Malta on October 1 and
returning to Brindisi on 23rd was detailed to convey Lord
Kitchener and his staff from Marseilles to Mudros and Salonika
on a tour of inspection. She left for this service on November 4,
and did not return until 28th. The *Dublin* arrived at Brindisi
on October 31, and two days later the *Sapphire* proceeded to
take her place in the dockyard at Spezia. The *Amethyst*, which
had stripped a turbine on October 19, left for Malta and England
on November 19. On 26th the *Bristol*, which had three boilers
out of action and her speed reduced to 20½ knots, left for Gibraltar
on the arrival of the *Weymouth* at Brindisi. It had been the
intention of the British Admiralty, when the squadron of four
fast light cruisers was completed by the arrival of the *Weymouth*
and *Dartmouth*, to withdraw the *Topaze* and *Sapphire*, for light
cruisers were urgently needed elsewhere. But the condition of
the *Bristol* necessitated the retention of the *Topaze*, which was to
be sent to England on the return of the *Sapphire* from refitting
at Spezia.

On November 15 the duties of guard and blockade of the
Adriatic were rearranged. Four light cruisers³ and four armed
merchant cruisers⁴ with six destroyers⁵ were detailed for blockade
duty, while the *Dublin*, *Quarto* and *Nino Bixio*, with the
destroyers of the *Intrepido* class, were employed as guardships
at Brindisi, taking turns of duty in the outer harbour in readiness

¹ *Bristol's* report, November 1, 1915. The report also stated that as the
routine of blockade was at present arranged, only one cruiser and one destroyer
were at sea at a time.

² Secret Circular No. 1746 of November 15, 1915.

³ *Topaze*, *Bristol*, *Coatit*, *Agordat*.

⁴ *Citta da Siracusa*, *C. di Palermo*, *C. di Catania*, *C. di Messina*.

⁵ *Strale*, *Borea*, *Espero*, *Ostro*, *Granatiere*, *Aquilone*.

for sea in case of being required. If necessary, the guard destroyers might be called upon to reinforce the vessels on blockade duty.

The degree of readiness of the ships in the outer harbour was to be as follows:—

From sunset to 6 a.m.—2 hours' notice.

From 6 a.m. to 10 a.m.—Immediate readiness.

From 10 a.m. to sunset—1½ hours' notice.

163. Further Reorganisation of the Blockade, November 27.¹—

On November 27 fresh orders were issued for the Brindisi force. The guard destroyers, namely, the *Animoso* and *Impavido* squadrons, were to provide one group each, ready at 15 minutes' notice, the other group remaining at three hours' notice. The turn of duty was four days. The cruisers were to work in two groups, viz., *Weymouth* and *Bixio*, *Dublin* and *Quarto*, and were to take alternate four days' duty, the degree of readiness of the group on duty being as follows:—

From 2 a.m. to 10 a.m.—Immediate readiness.

From 10 a.m. to 2 a.m.—2 hours' notice.

The group not on duty was to remain at six hours' notice. The *Insidioso* group of destroyers was attached to the *Weymouth* and *Bixio*, and the *Animoso* group to the *Dublin* and *Quarto*.

The patrol cruisers, consisting of the *Topaze*, *C. di Siracusa*, *C. di Messina*, *C. di Catania*, *C. di Palermo* and *Puglia*, were to work in that order. One destroyer of the *Nembo* group was to work with each cruiser in the order *Granatiere*, *Aquilone*, *Borea*, *Espero* (*Euro*, *Strale*, *Nembo*, on return from refit).

The orders provided that one cruiser and one or two T.B.D.s were to cruise for about 36 hours, one of the T.B.D.s remaining always with the cruiser, while the other, when on patrol, was to remain in the drifter zone to protect those craft. The cruiser was to patrol chiefly southward of the drifter line (39° 55' N. to 40° 18' N.) off the Albanian coast, particularly at dawn. The line of blockade was Cape Otranto—Aspri Ruga.

164. Supplying the Serbian Army—Expedition to Valona, December 1.²—In November, on account of the advance of the Bulgarian army, the Serbian line of communications with Salonika was cut. It was imperative that the Serbian army should be supplied by the Allies, and arrangements were made to effect this through Albania. Ammunition and supplies were

¹ Secret Circular No. 1811, R.R.

² M. 09373/15, Report of R.-A., British Adriatic Squadron, 1.12.15.

despatched from France to Brindisi, and sent across to Albania under the protection of the Italian Navy. An Allied Commission, known as the Serbian Relief Committee, proceeded to San Giovanni di Medua on November 24. Austrian prisoners taken by the Serbs were brought down to Valona, where a prisoners' camp was formed, and were evacuated from there.¹ Towards the end of November the Italians began to fortify Valona,² and three groups of the British net drifters were employed in protecting the entrance to Valona Bay.³ For a week they remained unmolested by the enemy, and on December 1 an expedition was despatched from Brindisi to Valona, comprising the transports *Dante Alighieri*, *America*, *Indiana*, and *Palermo*, carrying 5,000 men with two batteries of artillery and a mountain battery, 500 horses and mules, cattle, and provisions for 20 to 30 days.

The escort, consisting of the *Citta di Catania* (Senior Officer) *Quarto*, four T.B.D.s of the *Nievo* class, and four T.B.D.s of the *Intrepido* class, left Brindisi at 3 p.m. on December 1, the transports following as darkness fell, about 5.30 p.m. Commander Basil Poë, Admiral Thursby's Flag Commander, was sent to witness the operation. The ships seemed to experience great difficulty in taking up their stations, and when day dawned it was found that the expedition was dispersed; the destroyers were scattered up to a distance of four miles from the transports, the rearmost of which was itself some four to five miles from the leader. However, the expedition reached Valona unmolested, and anchored about 7.30 a.m.

Somewhat over 2½ hours later the first boat came alongside the *Dante Alighieri*, and was loaded with 24 men and 8 bicycles; and by 2 p.m. this transport had landed her infantry. At noon the *Palermo* was still hoisting out the specially prepared rafts which had been provided for landing, and the *America* did not begin to land her men until 3.30 p.m., though no reason could be discovered for the delay. The preparation and organisation appear to have been incomplete.

"The whole operation suffered from the absence of a directing authority in charge of, and responsible for, the disembarkation, there being no senior officer present at Valona to supervise the work," wrote Commander Poë.

Meanwhile the Bulgarian army continued its advance, parrying the feeble French thrust from Salonika and sweeping the remnants of the Serbian army before it into Albania. With the retreating Serbs came refugees of all nationalities which had

¹ The first batch left Valona December 16, 1915, for Sardinia in the transports *D. Alighieri* and *America*.

² 1 battery 4.7 in., 2 batteries 76 mm. and 4 A.A. guns.

³ See Plan VIII.

been serving in the Serbian army and had to be evacuated by the Italians, who, in addition to maintaining their own army of 20,000 men, had to supply the Serbian troops, estimated variously at 80,000 to 120,000 men, scattered all over Albania, but with their main concentrations at Scutari and Elbasan. The service of supply was considerably interfered with by the transport of troops to Valona, which was not completed until December 11, when all the available cruisers and destroyers were diverted to the work of convoying supplies.

On December 5th an enemy force, consisting of the *Sankt Georg*, one cruiser of the *Spaun* type (probably the *Helgoland*), and seven large destroyers, came down behind the islands of the Dalmatian Archipelago, and raided the port of San Giovanni di Medua, which was used for the disembarkation of supplies. Some steamers and a number of small craft were sunk, blocking the harbour. Durazzo was also raided. The entrance to Durazzo Bay had been mined, but no decision had been arrived at as to placing guns at Durazzo and San Giovanni di Medua; and it was doubtful whether the Italians desired to render them defended ports, even if the guns were available.¹ The Italians had no force available to meet the enemy, as all their cruisers and destroyers were engaged in covering the passage of troops to Valona.

Since October 13, however, an Italian or French submarine had been constantly employed working on the Albanian coast between the Semeni River and Cape Rodoni, to attack enemy submarines. On this day, the French submarine *Cugnot* was off Cattaro and the *Fresnel* in the Gulf of Drin. The former failed to sight the enemy, but the *Fresnel* ran ashore off the mouth of the Boyana River early on December 5, in circumstances unknown, and was destroyed by the enemy's gun-fire.


165. "E.21" Despatched to the Adriatic, December 14.—

The landing places for the supply of the northern area (Scutari and Elbasan) were San Giovanni di Medua and Durazzo respectively, and for the southern area (Monastir) Santa Quaranta. The two former were open anchorages possessing no facilities for handling cargoes, and they were within easy reach of Cattaro, where the Austrians had a force of torpedo craft and submarines, which unless a sufficient force was kept in the vicinity could dash out and attack the vessels unloading.² The Italians, moreover, were unable to watch Pola and Sebenico and gain early intelligence of the movements of the Austrian ships. They possessed no submarines capable of cruising in the Quarnero

¹ M. 09899/15.

² M. 09373/15. Report of R.A., British Adriatic Squadron, 1.12.15.

PLAN VIII.



SKETCH MAP OF VALONA BAY
SHOWING
APPROXIMATE POSITION OF BATTERIES,
POS^N OF MINEFIELD, NETS & DRIFTERS (D.D.).
NOV: 30TH 1915.
BASED ON M09373/15.

and behind the Dalmatian islands; and the Austrian vessels had a free passage up and down the coast, and could get back from San Giovanni di Medua and Durazzo before any force sent out from Brindisi could cut them off. This entailed keeping an Italian force at sea, but it was very difficult to determine the necessary strength of this force, as the Italians had no means of knowing what force the Austrians would bring against them, nor was there indeed any limit to the latter. The difficulty of keeping a large force at sea does not need to be emphasised; the Italian destroyers, owing to their small fuel storage, had a very poor sea endurance,¹ and the area in which the force could usefully work was very circumscribed and was dangerous from hostile submarines. At Malta there were some "E" class submarines destined for Admiral de Robeck's force; and it was decided to divert one of them to the Adriatic temporarily.²

E.21 was chosen. She arrived at Brindisi on December 14th, and was employed cruising between Cape Planca and Ragusa to prevent enemy vessels coming down behind the Dalmatian Islands to interrupt the transport of supplies to the Serbian army, and to stop the traffic from Cattaro to the northward. On 21st, however, she was forced to return to Brindisi with engine trouble, and she was sent to Malta on 27th. By now, however, the French T.B.D. flotilla of eight large and four small boats, which had been withdrawn to watch the Cerigo Channel during the first serious submarine raid, had returned to Brindisi.³ These boats had a better sea endurance than the Italian destroyers; and the French had also reinforced their submarine flotilla by three boats.⁴

The Allied submarines at Brindisi were under the Comandante della Flottiglia Sommergebili (Cap. di Fregata Giovanni Giovannini), with his pendant in the depot ship *Lombardia*. Sailing orders for the submarines were given by him direct, after consultation with the French Commodore and the British Senior Naval Officer, the latter being the senior captain of the light cruisers. Two submarines, S.1 and S.2, had been bought by Italy from Great Britain during the summer, and arrived in Italy on September 30.

166. Disposition of the Italian Fleet, December 21.—On December 21 Rear-Admiral Capomazza, formerly Rear-Admiral of the *Margherita* division of the 1st Battle Squadron, transferred

¹ Admiral Thursby reported that they could not remain cruising at high speed for more than 30 hours.

² A 590.

³ December 21.

⁴ For composition of French submarine flotilla at Brindisi, December 6, see Section 189.

his flag to the *Francesco Ferruccio*, which, with the *Vettor Pisani*¹ and *Varese*, now composed what was known as the 3rd Division and were sent to Valona. In Admiral Thursby's opinion it was more important than ever that the three *Pisas* should be brought down from Venice to Brindisi, where there was at present nothing which could deal with a squadron which should include a vessel of the *Sankt Georg* type. The *Weymouth* and *Dartmouth* might perhaps meet her with some slight prospect of success,² but they could not be continually at sea, and if they had to start from Brindisi they would be too late to come up with the enemy.³ He reported that he had frequently urged his views upon the Italian Commander-in-Chief. The Italian Government, however, was apparently apprehensive of an attack by the Austrian ships at Pola upon the right flank of their army advancing from Montfalcone, and there seems to have been renewed discussion of the question of moving the fleet to Venice.⁴ The Italians seem to have placed little reliance upon the efficacy of their submarines to prevent enemy vessels emerging from Pola: and not without reason, for their boats were quite incapable of keeping the sea during the bad weather of which so much was experienced during the autumn and winter. Even during the summer weather, after a day or two at sea, they returned to harbour and required a week's repair.⁵

DISPOSITION OF ITALIAN FLEET, 21.12.15.

- 5 Dreadnoughts, *R. Margherita* (refitting)—Taranto.
- 4 British battleships⁶—Taranto.
- V. Emanuele* class (*Napoli* docking Taranto)—Brindisi.
- Pisa* class—Venice.
- F. Ferruccio*, *Varese* (*V. Pisani* to join this 3rd Division after docking)—Valona.
- Nino Bixio*, *Quarto*—Brindisi.
- Marsala* refitting Spezia (due mid-January).
- C. di Messina*, *Siracusa*, *Catania*, *Palermo*—Brindisi.
- C. di Cagliari* and *Sassari*—Spezia fitting out, and will proceed to Brindisi.

¹ The *V. Pisani* did not leave until a few days later.

² This was Admiral Thursby's opinion.

³ *Weymouth* and *Dartmouth*, 23·8–25 knots, 8–6 in. *Sankt Georg*, 19–21 knots, —9·4 in., 5–7·5 in., 4–5·9 in., 9–11 pdr., 10–3 pdr.

⁴ M. 05386/15.

⁵ M. 05386/15, Report of Proceedings by R.-A., *Queen*.

⁶ *Queen*, *Prince of Wales*, *Duncan*, *London*, at Taranto; *Venerable* refitting at Malta.

DESTROYERS, NOVEMBER 6.

BRINDISI.

- 1st Flotilla—*Animoso*, *Ardito*, *Ardente*, *Audace*.
- 2nd Flotilla—6 "I" class (*Impavido*, etc.).
- 5th Flotilla—*Aquilone*, *Borea*, *Nembo*, *Espero*, *Zeffiro*
- 6th Flotilla—*Ostro*, *Dardo*, *Euro*, *Strale*, *Lampo* (will return from Cyrenaica).

VENICE.

- 3rd Flotilla—As before (? "War Vessels," Part I, September, 1915. I.D. 1016), plus *Granatiere*.
- 4th Flotilla—As before, less *Zeffiro*.
- 7th Flotilla—*F. Millo*, *A. Mosto*, *R. Pilo*, *G. Abba*, *I. Nievo* (temporarily at Brindisi).
- S. Schiaffino* (trials), *P. Bronzetti*, *G. Missori* will join when ready.
- Esploratori.—The big T.B.D.s¹ *A. Poerio*, *C. Rossarol*, *G. Pepe*.

BRITISH LIGHT CRUISER SQUADRON.

- Weymouth*—Brindisi.
- Dartmouth*—Brindisi.
- Topaze*—Brindisi.
- Amethyst*—Left Brindisi for Malta and England, November 19.
- Dublin*—Left Brindisi for repairs in England, December 10.
- Sapphire*—Refitting at Spezia.
- Bristol*—Left Brindisi for Gibraltar and England, November 26.
- Liverpool*—Joined Admiral Thursby's flag, December 26.

167. Action between "Dartmouth" and "Helgoland,"² December 29, 1915.—On December 28, 1915, the Austrian Naval Command ordered a raid to be carried out on Durazzo by the *Helgoland* and five destroyers. Vice-Admiral Fiedler, the Austrian Commander-in-Chief in Cattaro, had at this date concentrated under his immediate command the three old

¹ Completed in August, 1915. 1,012 tons, about 32 knots, 4—4 in., 4 T. (18 in. twin). *Rossarol* had 2 twin tubes and 6—4 in. guns.

² This Section was prepared for T.S.D. by Lieutenant-Commander A. C. Bell, R.N. (Historical Section, C.I.D.). See Plan IX.

battleships *Wien*, *Monarch*, and *Budapesth*; the cruiser *Kaiser Karl VI*; light cruisers *Helgoland*, *Novara*, and *Aspern*; and a considerable force of torpedo craft.

The Allied force at Brindisi, under the command of Vice-Admiral Cutinelli, was certainly more powerful; but, as the duty of embarking and conveying the Serbian army from Durazzo fell almost entirely upon his squadron, some of his cruisers were generally away on escort duty.

Durazzo Bay, where a large part of the Serbian army was waiting to be transported, was protected by a minefield, and the surrounding hills were posted with Italian troops and batteries, some of which covered the seaward approaches of the bay. The protection afforded was not, however, sufficient to render the place immune from a raid, and its position, only 80 miles from the mouth of Cattaro Bay, rendered it a vulnerable point.

The Italian High Command depended largely upon intercepting and decoding the Austrian operation orders for their knowledge of the enemy's movements; but they do not appear to have had any means of discovering beforehand what the enemy intended to do. Their intelligence system was none the less fairly good with regard to what was going on, and it was supplemented by reports from submarine patrols. At the end of December, however, the number of submarines capable of going on patrol appears to have been small. *E.12* was the only British submarine of the Brindisi force ready for service. The French submarine *Monge* was keeping watch to the south of Cattaro.

At 9 p.m. on December 28, Captain Seitz, the Commanding Officer of the *Helgoland*, received orders to raid Durazzo. He was to take with him the destroyers *Czepel*, *Tatra*, *Triglav*, *Lika*, and *Balaton*, and was to be off the bay by daybreak; if, when he got there, no Italian destroyers were found on patrol, he was to go inside at once and sink all the transports he could find.¹

By midnight the whole force was under way; and, when clear of the harbour, the destroyers took up their cruising formation; the *Balaton* astern of the *Helgoland*; the *Czepel* and the *Tatra* to starboard; and the *Lika* and *Triglav* to port. The night was clear, with very little wind²; and, just after half-past two, a submarine's periscope was sighted in the *Helgoland's* wake, just ahead of the *Balaton*. It was the *Monge*. She had no chance of saving herself from the *Balaton*, which rammed and sank her; and, an hour later, the raiders were again on their course with two officers and 25 men prisoners on board.

¹ N.I.D. Paper, 19.3.19.

² Dartmouth's log.

At 6 a.m. on the 29th the force was 15 miles to the westward of Durazzo¹; there were no signs that any of our ships were near, so the raiders turned in towards the bay. They still hoped to find a small force of Italian destroyers inside, and the *Helgoland* and the *Balaton* therefore steamed towards Cape Laghi, at the southern end of the bay, to cut off any ships that might attempt to escape. It was soon evident, however, that there were only three unarmed ships inside—a steamer and two small sailing vessels—and at 7.30 a.m. the whole force steamed in, with the exception of the *Balaton*, which remained outside watching for submarines.

Twenty minutes' firing sufficed to sink the ships in the bay. To carry out the attack, the destroyers had gone right in; but the *Helgoland* kept outside the line joining the buoys at the northern and southern ends of the bay,² and steamed slowly to and fro, to the south-westward of Durazzo. At about 8 o'clock the destroyers steamed up to the northern end to join her. As they did so the batteries on shore opened fire, and the destroyers turned sharply to port so as to keep out of the *Helgoland's* line of fire. Their new course brought them into the minefield to the south of the Talbot shoals. The *Lika* almost immediately struck two mines in quick succession and sank, burning fiercely, as the second explosion started a fire. The *Tatra* picked up as many survivors as she was able, but it was impossible for her to go alongside the *Lika* on account of the flames. Almost simultaneously with the first disaster, the *Triglav* also struck a mine abreast the boiler room.

The *Triglav*, however, remained afloat, and the *Czepel* was ordered to tow her out; but the towing cable got foul of her screw, and Captain Seitz then ordered the *Tatra* to relieve her. All this took time, and in the meanwhile the guns ashore were getting the range. The *Helgoland* made every possible effort to engage the batteries and to cover the operations; but it was not until 9.50 a.m. that the crippled flotilla moved out. The *Triglav* was entirely out of action; the *Tatra* was incapable of fighting so long as she kept the tow; and the *Czepel's* speed was much reduced by the tow rope which still fouled her propeller.

The difficulty of getting the *Triglav* safely back to harbour was, moreover, only one of the senior officer's anxieties. At 8.15 a.m. he had intercepted a signal from the Italian commander on shore reporting the raid to Brindisi.³ He expected, therefore, that our squadrons in Brindisi would be on the move, and at

¹ N.I.D. Paper, 19.3.19.

² See Chart No. 1590.

³ It was probably a repetition: the Italian Commander-in-Chief at Brindisi seems to have got the news a good deal earlier.

10.10 a.m. he sent a signal to the Austrian Admiral in Cattaro reporting the dangerous position of the flotilla. "The 'Lika' and the 'Triglav' have struck mines off Durazzo. The 'Lika' has sunk. 'Triglav' in tow, but making water. Durazzo has warned Brindisi; it is therefore possible that we shall be cut off." His estimate was correct, for our counter movement was by then well advanced.

Shortly after 7 a.m. an Italian officer came on board the *Dartmouth*. He informed Captain Addison that a force of Austrian destroyers was off Valona, and gave him an order from Vice-Admiral Cutinelli to proceed with the *Quarto* and five French destroyers and cut them off. The *Dartmouth* and *Quarto* had steamed up, but the French destroyers *Casque*, *Renaudin*, *Commandant Bory*, *Bisson*, and *Commandant Lucas* were not quite ready. Captain Addison decided not to delay and he got under way at once; but he gave the destroyers verbal orders to follow as soon as they could, and to meet him off Cattaro, as he had decided to get between the raiding force and their base before attempting to attack them. It was a fortunate decision, as he was acting on wrong information, for Durazzo, and not Valona, was the point attacked; but the step he took averted the miscarriage which might have arisen from the mistake. By eight o'clock the *Dartmouth* and the *Quarto* were clear of the harbour, and the *Casque* followed shortly after with the French destroyers.

At 7.45 a.m. Admiral Cutinelli sent a message to the *Weymouth* ordering her to raise steam at once, as an Austrian force of cruisers and destroyers was raiding Durazzo. As soon as he was able, Captain Crampton went on board the *Vittorio Emanuele*, the flagship of Vice-Admiral Cutinelli, and begged to be allowed to proceed. For the moment, the Italian Admiral was inclined to wait for news, but shortly after 9 a.m. a further signal was received to say that the Austrians were still off the town. This seems to have given him the confirmation that he required, for he at once instructed Rear-Admiral Belleni to hoist his flag in the *Nino Bixio* and proceed to sea with the *Weymouth* and the four destroyers *Abba*, *Nievo*, *Mosto*, and *Pilo* to reinforce the *Dartmouth* and bring the enemy to action if he could. At 10.10 a.m., therefore, when the captain of the *Helgoland* informed the Austrian Admiral at Cattaro that the flotilla was in danger, the *Dartmouth* and the *Quarto* were about 55 miles to the westward of him, steering for Cattaro; the French destroyers were following on the *Dartmouth's* track; and the Admiral Belleni's force was about 12 miles to the north of Brindisi, also steering northwards for Cattaro.

The necessity of towing the *Triglav* reduced the speed of the raiding flotilla to six knots. The Captain of the *Helgoland* made an effort to get on quicker by ordering the *Balaton* to assist the *Tatra* in towing the *Triglav*; but the experiment failed, and the

Tatra kept the tow. At Cattaro, the *Kaiser Karl VI* was being kept under steam; and at 10.35 a.m. the Captain of the *Helgoland* asked that she might be sent out in support. She was at once ordered to weigh and passed the harbour entrance at about 11.30 a.m. in company with torpedo boats Nos. 70, 17, 81, and 80. The position now consequently was that we had at sea four light cruisers and two destroyer flotillas, chasing a weaker force. But the *Kaiser Karl VI* was far more powerful than anything we could oppose to her unless Vice-Admiral Cutinelli put to sea with his heavier ships; so that if the Austrian forces succeeded in joining up, the *Dartmouth* and Admiral Belleni's squadron might at any moment be in a position of great danger. The Italian Admiral knew, fairly accurately, what forces the Austrians had concentrated in Cattaro and he learned by one o'clock that the *Kaiser Karl VI* and the *Novara* were at sea.¹ Apart from that, however, the information gained from the enemy's intercepted signals showed that the Austrians were making every effort to extricate the crippled flotilla. He decided, however, to remain in harbour. He signalled to the *Dartmouth* that Admiral Belleni was coming out to support him, and later he warned the Rear-Admiral that the *Kaiser Karl VI* and the *Novara* were out, but he did not himself proceed in support.

Captain Addison's force was the first to get in contact with the Austrians. Adhering to his intention to cut the raiders off from their base, he kept on his course for Cattaro; but about noon he received two messages from Admiral Cutinelli in Brindisi telling him that the raiders had lost two destroyers at Durazzo, and had left the bay at 10.30 a.m. with one boat in tow.²

Although the message was not correct in every particular, it sufficed to show Captain Addison that the raiders were to the south of him. He therefore turned north-eastwards towards the land, so as to be sure that the enemy should not escape him by hugging the coast, and after holding his new course for 20 minutes, made southwards in the direction of Cape Rodoni. At 12.38 p.m. the *Dartmouth* and the *Quarto* were joined by the French destroyers; and at five minutes to one, while they were still making towards Cape Rodoni, the *Dartmouth* sighted the smoke of *Nino Bixio* and the *Weymouth* on the starboard beam. Admiral Belleni was in fact following Captain Addison's original plan, and making towards Cattaro; but, unfortunately, the messages from Brindisi about the crippled state of the Austrian flotilla did not induce him to turn at once to the eastward, as the *Dartmouth* had done, which would have enabled

¹ *Weymouth's* Cypher Log.

² *Dartmouth's* Cypher Log. The messages were received at 10.50 and 11.20; but, owing to the time necessary for decoding them, they were not in Captain Addison's hands until nearly noon.

his squadron to come into action at least two hours earlier than it actually did. At 11 a.m. he sent on the *Abba* and *Nievo* to reconnoitre; but he held on his course until he heard from Admiral Cutinelli that the *Kaiser Karl VI* and the *Novara* were out, when he turned sharply to the eastward. Twenty minutes later he altered course to the southward on the information from his destroyers that they had sighted the *Kaiser Karl VI* further south, and that aeroplanes were in sight to the north-eastward.¹ Realising that the presence of an enemy armoured cruiser rendered his position difficult, he recalled his destroyers at 1.45 p.m., and steered for the *Dartmouth*, which was just coming into action with the enemy.

On joining up, the five French destroyers were stationed on the port beam of the *Dartmouth*. At about 1.20 p.m. two smoke clouds were sighted, the one ahead, and one fine on the starboard bow. The first came from the *Helgoland* with the *Balaton* and *Czepel* in company; the second from the *Tatra* towing the *Triglav*. Either because the light to the northward was clearer or because his own ships could not be seen so easily against the land, the Austrian Commander had become aware of our presence before we had sighted him. The *Czepel* had been unable to clear the towing rope from her propeller and could only steam at 20 knots; so that even if the *Triglav* were abandoned, the whole flotilla would be at least 5 knots slower than any one of the pursuing cruisers. Captain Seitz was by then aware that the *Kaiser Karl VI* was coming to his assistance, and he probably guessed that the *Aspern*, *Budapesth*, and *Novara* would follow as soon as possible. He realised, however, when he sighted our cruisers that the latter had got between him and his supporting forces.

However, the Austrian commander had no thought of abandoning the *Czepel*, whose slow speed was endangering the flotilla, and at ten minutes past twelve he sent out his final orders, which show that he intended to stand by her to the last. "If the enemy cruisers advance against us, the *Triglav* is to be sunk. The *Tatra* and the *Balaton* are then to close the *Helgoland*, which will endeavour to attract the enemy's attack to itself, and so give the *Czepel* a chance of getting away on the disengaged side. The *Triglav* is to be made ready for sinking. Documents, money, and crew are to be placed on board the *Balaton*."

He then continued on his northerly course, and at 12.50 p.m. had the good fortune to speak to *U.15*, which was patrolling in the neighbourhood. Realising that he would soon be in action, he told the submarine commander to stand by the *Triglav*,

¹ They actually reported a "cruiser of the *Sankt Georg*" type, and although no mention of the fact was made in the signal sent to Admiral Belleni, the aeroplanes attacked the *Abba* and the *Nievo* fairly vigorously. See *Weymouth's* log.

which would probably attract our light cruisers and so give him an opportunity of delivering a successful attack. A quarter of an hour later the *Czepel* and *Balaton* reported the *Dartmouth* and the *Quarto*, and orders were given to sink the *Triglav*.¹ Adhering strictly to his determination to save the destroyers if possible, the Captain of the *Helgoland* steered straight for the enemy, so as to cover the damaged *Czepel*; and at 1.30 p.m., when all hope of joining the *Kaiser Karl VI* was gone, he turned to the westward.

At 1.38 p.m., as soon as Captain Addison had made out the *Tatra* with the *Triglav* in tow, he detached the *Casque* and her destroyers to deal with them. The enemy were 13 miles away when the order was given, and by the time the French boats reached the spot the *Triglav* had been sunk and the *Tatra* had rejoined the *Helgoland*. The senior officer of the French flotilla reported this to Captain Addison at 2.12 p.m. and followed the *Weymouth* and *Quarto* to the westward. The French boats were several knots slower than our light cruisers and were not engaged during the afternoon.

By now (1.30 p.m. to 1.35 p.m.) the enemy was well settled on his westerly course. The *Czepel* had tried to escape to the eastward; but seeing that it was quite impossible to get past us and the French flotilla, turned after the *Helgoland*. At 1.35 p.m. Captain Addison steered south so as not to let the enemy draw too far ahead; seven minutes later he made a further turn to starboard and, almost simultaneously, opened fire at a range of about 14,000 yards. By then the *Helgoland* was steering to the S.S.W., as it must soon have become clear to Captain Seitz that the range would close dangerously if he attempted to hold his westerly course and cross the *Dartmouth's* bow.

When the action began, Admiral Belleni was 17 miles N.N.W. of the *Dartmouth* and *Quarto*, the *Kaiser Karl VI* 14 miles to the northward, and the *Aspern*, *Budapesth*, and *Novara* were just getting under way. Captain Addison had, therefore, definitely got between the *Helgoland* and her supporters, but it was still possible that he might be cut off from Admiral Belleni. The chances of this were, however, diminishing, as Captain Addison had informed the Rear-Admiral in the *Nino Bixio* at 1.30 p.m. that the enemy had turned to a westerly course—an intimation which would deter him from making too far to the northward and eastward, where the danger lay.

It was clear to Captain Addison that Admiral Belleni could not arrive for some time; and he soon discovered that the enemy

¹ It seems as though it took some time to carry out this order. The entries in the *Dartmouth's* log between 1 p.m. and 1.43 p.m. are as follows: 1.18, sighted smoke S. 30° E.; 1.22, more smoke 1 point on starboard bow; 1.30, portion of smoke observed to separate and cross to port, apparently one T.B.D. towing another. Remainder identified as *Novara* and 2 T.B.D.s. Increased full speed. 1.35, S. 5° W.; 1.40, T.B.D. slipped tow and proceeded to endeavour to join remainder of enemy's squadron; 1.42, Co. S. 25° W.; 1.43, opened fire.

had the heels of him. He therefore decided to use his intercepting position to drive the Austrian ships south-westwards towards Brindisi, where he hoped that Admiral Cutinelli would be waiting for them. It would be a long time before the enemy could work round his bows; and so long as he kept the *Dartmouth* to the north the enemy's advantage in speed would be countered, and, at the same time, his efforts to break north would keep him within range of the *Dartmouth's* 6 in. guns.

When Captain Seitz settled the *Helgoland* on a S.W. course at 1.34 p.m. he was fully alive to the *Dartmouth's* advantages, which consisted not in her position alone, for the *Helgoland's* 3.9 in. guns could not fire effectively at more than 10,000 yards. Between 1.40 p.m. and 2 o'clock, the converging courses of the two forces reduced the range somewhat rapidly, and at 1.55 p.m. the *Helgoland* was hit. Throughout the afternoon the Austrian gunlayers endeavoured to return our fire by aiming at our mastheads, with the sights set at extreme range; but the device was not successful, and from first to last Captain Seitz's only chance of escape lay in the speed of his squadron.

At 2 p.m. the *Helgoland* altered course due south, in order to open the range; but Captain Seitz brought her back to her south-westerly course a few minutes later, and renewed his effort to get round our bows. The *Helgoland* was not hit for the next hour, during which time the courses varied between S.W. and W.S.W. with the *Helgoland* slowly drawing ahead. In the meantime, Captain Accini in the *Quarto* was causing the Austrian commander the greatest anxiety. He had manœuvred his vessel into the *Helgoland's* wake, and it seemed as though the *Czepel* would be cut off in spite of all the efforts that had been made to save her. Captain Accini had apparently moved out to attack the lagging destroyers on his own initiative, and at about 2.10 p.m. Captain Addison directed him to take station on the *Dartmouth's* port quarter. As the helm was put over to obey the order, the *Helgoland* fired a torpedo; it was unperceived in the *Quarto* and yet it seemed, aboard the Austrian cruiser, as though the aim had been so good that the *Quarto* had moved out of the way to avoid the torpedo itself and a repetition of the attack.

Between 2.30 p.m. and 3.15 p.m. the *Quarto*, acting under orders from Captain Addison, again endeavoured to cut off the *Czepel*; but on this occasion the movement was not even noticed in the *Helgoland*, for apparently the opportunity had gone by.¹

¹ Captain Seitz speaks of the *Quarto's* turn towards the *Dartmouth* at 2.10 p.m. in terms of great relief; but he makes no mention of the second attempt to intercept the *Czepel*. His war diary runs as follows: "2.10, the direction of the torpedo is good: *Quarto* makes a large turn to port (*sic*): simultaneously *Czepel* is delivered: *Helgoland* is cleared for two hours."

It should be noted that, although the *Czepel* reported at about noon that she could only do 20 knots, she must have far exceeded that speed during the whole afternoon.

In spite of the difficulties of firing with 6 in. guns at ranges of 13,000 yards on a target which was frequently covered by smoke, the *Dartmouth's* shooting appears to have been accurate. At 2.30 p.m. the *Helgoland* was straddled and turned away soon after; she succeeded in throwing out the range, and the *Dartmouth* ceased fire to avoid wasting ammunition. For the next 50 minutes (2.40 p.m. to 3.30 p.m.) the *Helgoland* turned gradually to starboard, and the distance between her and the *Dartmouth* slowly lessened. The *Dartmouth* kept up an intermittent fire to test the range, and at 3.2 p.m. the *Helgoland* was hit by two of these ranging rounds. She was not touched again for an hour and a half; and, as she gained slowly on her pursuers, her chances of getting away were, at last, beginning to improve. At 3.15 p.m. the *Helgoland* had increased her lead so much that Captain Seitz felt that he could begin edging to the westward.¹ He made several turns to starboard; but at 3.30 p.m. he sighted Admiral Belleni's approaching ships and realised that his chances of escaping had dropped again. For some time past the Rear-Admiral had been seen approaching from the *Dartmouth*; but the smoke from the *Helgoland* and her destroyers seems to have obscured their view, and they did not sight him until he was nearly within range.

Admiral Bellini's squadron was in somewhat irregular order. At 2.5 p.m. Captain Crampton had asked for permission to chase. It had been granted, with the result that the *Weymouth* had edged considerably to the southward, and was to port of the *Nino Bixio* when the new squadron approached the scene of action. To port of the *Weymouth* were the destroyers *Mosto* and *Pilo*. The other two destroyers, *Abba* and *Nievo*, were on the disengaged side of the *Nino Bixio*. As they hauled down the *Helgoland*, Captain Crampton sighted the *Czepel* some distance to the southward, and asked permission to send the *Mosto* and the *Pilo* to cut her off (3.30 p.m.). The request was granted ten minutes later, and the two destroyers began to manœuvre towards the *Helgoland's* wake.

At ten minutes to four, when the *Weymouth* opened fire at the extreme range on the sights, the *Helgoland* had a slight lead on the new arrivals; but she was now outnumbered by four to one, excluding the destroyers; and the *Czepel* had only to lose a knot or two to be cut off by the *Quarto*, which was following in a position wide on the *Dartmouth's* beam.²


Once again the Austrian commander was in a position of great danger. At twenty minutes to four he had turned in the hope of breaking through; but the attempt soon proved

¹ Not shown on plan, as the *Helgoland's* position at 3.15 p.m. is conjectural.

² She had been ordered to cut off the *Czepel* at 2.30 p.m. and recalled at 3.15 p.m., but she does not appear to have obeyed the recall.—*Dartmouth's* Signal Log.

impossible, as the new course took him right across the track of the *Weymouth* and the *Nino Bixio*, and rapidly reduced his lead on the *Dartmouth*. Indeed, in a few minutes the range had fallen so much that the Austrian destroyers were bringing their guns into action against the *Dartmouth*; and Captain Seitz saw that it was no longer possible to escape to the westward. At 4 p.m., therefore, he turned sharply to the southward "in order to gain time until sunset." The move increased his difficulties; it put him on a course at right angles to his original pursuers, the *Dartmouth* and *Quarto*, and although the *Dartmouth* conformed and took up a parallel course, the *Quarto* held straight on and overhauled the *Helgoland* rapidly. Taking this as a threat to separate him from the *Czepel*, which he had risked so much to defend, at 4.7 p.m. the Austrian Commander turned to starboard again, and steered to the S.W. Again the *Dartmouth* conformed, and kept up the intermittent firing which had continued since the fight began. The difficulties in the way of accurate shooting were at the time very great, as the Austrian destroyers were sending up an exceptionally heavy smoke screen, and the colours at the *Helgoland's* masthead were often the only part of the ship still visible. At 4.25 p.m., however, the *Helgoland* was severely hit amidships. The fires in two boilers were put out, and the upper part of one funnel was torn away. "We were pursued by four cruisers; it was the hardest moment in the fight."




As a matter of fact, the *Helgoland's* chances of escape were improving. She was steadily increasing her lead, and at about 4.30 p.m. the *Czepel* rejoined her. She was hit again by a shot from the *Weymouth*, but although the flashes of the explosion went as high as the foretop, her speed was maintained. The sun had now set, and the *Helgoland* was clearly outlined against the evening sky. It is possible that Captain Seitz's view of our ships had been obscured by smoke, and that, in the confusion and uncertainty of the action, he had thought his position worse than it really was; for, only five minutes after the situation had seemed so black, he realised, as he looked down the range, which was clear for the first time since the fight began, that he had a good chance of escaping to the north-westward. He did not immediately make the attempt, but held on his south-westerly course for another 20 minutes, and was hit again at 4.45 p.m.; and it was not until 4.50 p.m. that he turned to a course parallel to the Italian coast, which was by then only 12 miles away. The moment was well chosen; for the *Dartmouth* and the *Quarto* were then well astern of him; and in the failing light he had a good chance of getting past Admiral Bellini, as the *Helgoland's* south-westerly course since seven minutes past four had carried him out of range of the *Nino Bixio*. The Rear-Admiral had kept on a more westerly course in the hopes of cutting off the enemy's retreat during his swerve to the southward; but the *Helgoland's* new movement towards



PLAN IX

ACTION BETWEEN THE DARTMOUTH & HELGOLAND

29TH DEC: 1915.



Monte Gargano peninsula now put them on to rapidly converging courses. Even supposing that the *Helgoland's* high speed carried her past the *Nino Bixio* and the *Weymouth*, it was certain that she would draw ahead slowly, and at close range, and, earlier in the day, our heavy armament would doubtless have sufficed to prevent the attempt from being made or to have destroyed the *Helgoland* had she actually tried it. But dusk was now gathering, and Captain Seitz decided to take the risk.

Between a quarter to five and five o'clock the *Weymouth* fired four salvos. The spotting officer could not see where the shot fell and was not aware of their accuracy, for one hit the *Helgoland* aft (4.45 p.m.). In spite of the increasing list of damages the latter maintained her speed; and at five o'clock the Commanding Officer signalled to the *Budapesth* squadron, which had put to sea during the afternoon and joined up with the *Kaiser Karl VI*, that he was trying to break through in the direction of Monte Gargano. The range between him and Admiral Bellini's ships was still decreasing; and, at 5.15 p.m., the *Weymouth* opened fire again. Fourteen salvos were fired, and, for a few moments, the enemy stood out clearly in the last glow of the twilight; but gunlaying and rangefinding were the merest guesswork in the growing darkness.¹

The last chance of preventing the enemy from getting back was now centred in the *Mosto* and *Pilo*—the two destroyers on the *Weymouth's* port beam; and, at about 5.20 p.m., they made a final effort to get within torpedo range.² As they approached, however, it was clear that they could not get into position without coming under the fire of our ships, and the attempt was abandoned. At 5.30 p.m. the range had dropped to 7,000 yards; the *Nino Bixio* was slightly hit; and in the obscurity Admiral Bellini thought he detected the enemy turning to the northward. He put his helm over to conform; but Captain Crampton, who was nearer, and saw no change of course, held on as he was, and so got between the *Nino Bixio* and the enemy. Admiral Bellini at once ceased fire; but the *Weymouth* continued to fire salvos until ten minutes to six, when she, too, stopped. At six o'clock, when the captain of the *Helgoland* saw that he had all his pursuers abaft the beam he turned north, and was soon lost to view, for it was by then quite dark.

¹ In spite of the difficulties, it seems to have been accurate. The enemy state that it "covered" the flotilla.

² They had been manoeuvring for position ever since 3.40 p.m., when Captain Addison ordered them to cut off the *Czeperl*.

CHAPTER XX.

EGYPT, OCTOBER-DECEMBER, 1915—THE
SENUSSIST RISING.

168. **Situation in Western Egypt, November, 1915.**¹—One of the duties upon which the German submarines were employed in the Mediterranean was the conveyance of Turko-German missions and convoying of ships with war material to Port Bardia, for the Turkish party in Tripoli.

As early as May, 1915, signs had manifested themselves that the steadily increasing pressure brought to bear upon the Senussi by the Turkish party under Nuri Bey, half-brother to Enver Pasha, was beginning to take effect, one of the moving spirits in the intrigue being Gaafer, a Germanised Turk of considerable ability, who arrived in Tripoli in April, 1915, with a considerable supply of arms and money. Amongst the Arabs, the figures of principal importance, upon whose adherence to one side or other the success of any rising in the country would depend, were the Shaikh El Senussi, Sidi Ahmed, and his younger brother Hillal. The latter was already hand in glove with the Turkish party, but the Shaikh El Senussi, following his own precedent in the Italian war, was apparently waiting to see which way the tide of fortune would swing before declaring himself. His influence was not paramount, though it would undoubtedly aggravate the situation should he come openly into the field against us. On the other hand, if he were definitely to oppose the Turkish faction, he would probably be murdered and deposed, a possibility of which he was doubtless well aware.

The tactful handling of the situation by Lieutenant-Colonel C. L. Snow, Egyptian Coastguard Service,² commanding in the western desert, was instrumental in deferring a rupture for many months. The incident of the treacherous attack upon submarines *B.11* and *B.6* on August 16 was closed by the acceptance of the Senussi's profound apologies and his assurance that the act had been committed in ignorance that the submarines were British; and a period of quiet ensued until November.

169. **Loss of the "Tara" and "Abbas," November 5.**—The principal British military posts in Western Egypt were at Marsa Matruh, Sollum, and Sidi Barrani.³ The posts were dependent

¹ Based on Sir J. G. Maxwell's despatches and C.-in-C., East Indies, Letters of Proceedings.

² Killed, December 11, 1915, near Marsa Matruh.

³ 50 miles E. of Sollum.

upon the Navy for reinforcement in case of attack, for the roads were not fit for infantry and heavy wheeled traffic. When, however, hostile submarines began to appear off the coast the problem of reinforcement was complicated by the fact that Admiral Peirse had not at his disposal the necessary vessels to protect the transports. It seems, however, that, apart from this, the military policy was not to hold Sollum and Sidi Barrani, but to garrison Marsa Matruh strongly and to depend upon the Navy to evacuate the Sollum post if attacked.¹ The frequent cutting of the telegraph lines and the weakness of this post still necessitated the provision of a ship by Admiral Peirse to pay a daily visit to the place. Armed boarding steamers, unsuitable though they were for the work, were all that Admiral Peirse had available for this duty. The *Scotia* and *Heroic* were employed upon the Coast of Egypt Patrol during the first half of October. On 21st of that month the *Tara* arrived from England, having been sent out to relieve the *Heroic* and enable the latter to return to the Dardanelles. Meanwhile, however, the *Heroic* had broken down and had been relieved by the *Lunka* from the southern Red Sea patrol. So weak was the garrison at Sollum that from October 21 to 27, during the Kourban Bairam when possible disturbances were anticipated, Admiral Peirse maintained one armed boarding steamer constantly off the place, at the request of the officer commanding; and it was not until 27th that the coast of Egypt patrol was reduced to the normal two vessels and the *Scotia* returned to Port Said to refit.

On the evening of November 3 reports began to come in of a submarine working on the transport routes north and east of Sollum. The submarine was *U.35*, which had left Cattaro so long ago as October 12 for the Salonika transport route, but had been diverted to convoy a mission from Budrum to Port Bardia.² She arrived at Bardia on November 4, towing two sailing vessels with war material, the unloading of which was begun without loss of time.³ Next day *U.35* sighted off Sollum the *Tara*,⁴ which was on patrol, torpedoed and sank her, and compelled the survivors, 70 out of a complement of 104,⁵ to land at Morraisa, where they were joined by the survivors of the *Moorina*, sunk by *U.35* two days later, and the whole party was captured by the Senussi. During the afternoon of 5th *U.35* proceeded to attack Sollum, sinking at her moorings the Egyptian coast-guard cruiser *Abbas* and damaging the *Nurelbahr*, her fire, it is said, being directed from the shore. The telephone line from Sollum had been cut meanwhile, and it was not until the

¹ M. 08844/15.

² See section 149.

³ Gayer, III, 27.

⁴ Captain Rupert Gwatkin-Williams, R.N. (retd.).

⁵ C.-in-C., E.I., to Adty., 288, 12.11.15.—Gayer gives the figures as 14 officers and warrant officers, and 79 men; but perhaps he includes the survivors of the *Moorina*.

following day that news of the sinking of the *Abbas* reached Admiral Peirse. The message reported that nothing had been seen of the *Tara* since 4th; and news of her destruction was not received until 7th, when the *Lunka*, which had been despatched to the scene of action, reported her loss. The Shaikh El Senussi, in reply to strong representations for the immediate release of the prisoners, merely feigned ignorance of the occurrence, and pretended to disbelieve it. An Emergency Squadron of the Royal Naval Armoured Car Division was sent on 9th to strengthen the post at Sollum, and Admiral Peirse took steps to arm with a 12 pdr. and a 1 pdr. each of the two remaining coastguard cruisers, one of which was from now onwards stationed at Sollum, to evacuate the garrison in case the post should become untenable if attacked. The telegraph line was re-established by 11th. The unprotected state of the coast of Egypt since the loss of the *Tara* led the Admiralty on November 14 to ask Admiral de Robeck whether he could spare two 9.2 in. monitors to support the trawlers off Port Said and Alexandria. *M.21* and *M.23* were despatched, and arrived at Port Said on November 29 and December 6 respectively. But they were practically useless for work off the Sollum coast; *M.23* could not steam for more than six hours without breaking down, and *M.21* carried only 27 tons of fuel, of which at least 20 had to be allowed for the passage from Alexandria to Marsa Matruh and back, leaving 7 tons for use there, of which she burned 2 tons a day with steam up but not steaming. As it was impracticable either to tow the monitors to Matruh or to place a supply of fuel there, they were allotted to the Canal defence.¹

170. Apprehensions of further Submarine Attacks on Sollum.

—The situation at Sollum continued to be critical and an attack was expected at any moment.² Another visit of a submarine was expected. On November 8 Admiral de Robeck despatched the *Jonquil* and 11 trawlers to patrol the transport route north-west of Alexandria, where *U.35* was still working; and Admiral Peirse stopped the sailing from Egypt for the Mediterranean of all unarmed or unescorted transports carrying troops.³ From the reports which he received Admiral Peirse believed that there were no less than six hostile submarines in the neighbourhood of Sollum.⁴ Their presence would render the co-operation of the ships practically impossible in the event of an attack on the post, and might even prevent the evacuation of the garrison; and Admiral Peirse represented that unless he were to be sent some monitors or small craft capable of dealing with submarines and of co-operation in repelling a shore attack, before the expected attack should materialise, the outlook was serious.⁵

¹ M. 09990/15.

² M. 08844/15.

³ A 543.

⁴ C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty., 242, 17.11.15, and 259, 19.11.15.

⁵ M. 09048/15.

The danger lay in the possibility that any considerable success on the part of the Senussi might be the signal for an Arab rising over the greater portion of North Africa, including Egypt.

At the Admiralty, where the Intelligence Division seems in the light of present knowledge to have possessed remarkably accurate information on the numbers and operations of the German submarines in the Mediterranean, Admiral Peirse's apprehensions found little credence. The fallibility of coast watchers was notorious—they reported everything they saw as a submarine. *U.35* had now brought her long and successful cruise to an end and for a moment there was a lull in enemy submarine activity on the Salonika-Egypt transport route. However, the Admiralty warned Admiral Peirse that he must hold up the transports if the danger should recur; and they explained to him in reply to his request for destroyers, that the reason why they were unable to furnish him with sufficient vessels for anti-submarine work was that they had not enough to supply all requirements. Even the Grand Fleet, they told him, had barely half the number of destroyers that the German High Sea Fleet possessed; and although the centre of submarine activity against merchantmen on the high seas had now doubtless shifted to the Mediterranean they were faced at home with a fresh development, namely, minelaying submarines, which were far more difficult to deal with.¹

171. Reinforcements sent to Marsa Matruh, November 23.—

On the night of November 14/15 two Egyptian sentries at Sollum were rushed and their arms carried off, and the following night the camp was systematically sniped, though without causing any casualties. The Coastguard barracks at Sidi Barrani were attacked on the night of the 18th/19th, the attacks being beaten off with loss of one man killed; and on 20th an unsuccessful attack was made on the Coastguard outpost at Salil, a small port 30 miles south-east of Sollum. Great unrest prevailed among the Arabs, and as it was desirable to keep the sphere of hostilities as far as possible to the west of the Delta and to avoid anything in the nature of a reverse, the G.O.C. decided to withdraw the western frontier posts to Marsa Matruh and to concentrate at that place a force sufficient to deal swiftly with the situation²; and on November 20 orders were issued for the assembly at Alexandria of a force composed of a mounted brigade and an infantry brigade with a detachment of the Egyptian Army Military Works Department (no R.E. being available) and an Australian Divisional Train, the force being under the command of Major-General A. Wallace, C.B.

The force was concentrated at Alexandria by November 23. The possible presence of enemy submarines necessitated the sea passage³ being performed by night only, while the depth of water

¹ A 571.

² Sir J. G. Maxwell's despatches.

³ The mounted brigade proceeded by land route.

in Matruh harbour limited the ships available at Admiral Peirse's disposal to the two coastguard cruisers and six trawlers¹ which had been sent to Egypt in October in response to the Commander-in-Chief's request for vessels to keep the outer guard at Alexandria. Four additional small steamers were obtained as soon as possible, and a third coastguard cruiser was fitted up as a hospital ship. The limited accommodation available rendered the operation of transferring the troops to Marsa Matruh very slow, and the Admiralty inquired of Admiral de Robeck whether he could assist, or if not, ask the French to detach from Milo some of our vessels which were working under them. Admiral de Robeck had already despatched the sloop *Clematis*² and six trawlers³ to bring a floating dock from Port Said to Mudros, and he now placed these vessels at Admiral Peirse's disposal,⁴ though, owing to the inefficiency of the sloop's W/T, it was not until her arrival at Alexandria on 26th that Admiral Peirse was able to get into communication with her.⁵ The Admiral allotted two, and later the whole of the trawlers for the transport of the troops, the *Clematis* being employed patrolling off the coast. On 28th the armed boarding steamer *Rowan* arrived to reinforce Admiral Peirse; but her size⁶ rendered it impossible to use her for the work of transport, nor had she the speed and handiness necessary for anti-submarine work. Moreover, she had 17 per cent. of her men and two of her lieutenants on the sick list; and she returned to Mudros on December 2.

172. Sollum Garrison withdrawn, November 23.—The garrison of Sollum was evacuated in the Coastguard cruiser *Rasheed* on the afternoon of November 23, the withdrawal of the posts at Sidi Barrani and Bagbag by land to Matruh being begun on the same day; and by December 7 the concentration at Marsa Matruh was complete.⁷ The numbers of the Senussists were estimated at 12,000, and they had an entrenched camp 20 miles west of Marsa Matruh. The Shaikh El Senussi had not yet declared himself, and Nuri Bey and his followers had now completely broken away from him. It was reported that an attack on Matruh was planned for December 3 or 4, though in the event it failed to materialise. This may have been due to the failure of German submarine support, for it seems that the policy of detailing such craft to support the Turkish faction in Tripoli had now been abandoned for the more effective one of

¹ 1487 *Remagio*, 1490 *Rodosto*, 1500 *Comrade*, 1598 *Abergeldie*, 769 *Falmouth II*, 1594 *Ronesia*.

² Lieutenant-Commander Tim M. Barrett.

³ 704 *Abronia*, 111 *Ocean Princess*, 1844 *St. Clair*, 1745 *Scooper*, 1600 *Scouter*, 1744 *Slasher*.

⁴ V.A., E.M., to C.-in-C., E.I., 528, 22.11.15.

⁵ M. 09403/15.

⁶ 1,493 tons.

⁷ Less five squadrons which were left at railhead (Dabaa) on account of insufficiency of water at Matruh.

concentrating on the attack of transports and merchant ships.¹ The Italians, who had declared war on Turkey on August 21, maintained a patrol on the Senussi Coast, and by agreement with Admiral Peirse it was arranged that our own and the Italian patrols should overlap near Sollum.

173. U.C.12 reported at Sollum.—On December 17 the Admiralty informed Admiral Peirse that the fleet sweepers *Magnolia*, *Mallow*, *Mimosa*, *Lily*, and *Veronica* were on their way to Egypt for anti-submarine work under his orders.² Three days later information was received that a submarine, reported to be damaged and short of fuel, was sheltering at Sollum. This was *U.C.12*, to support which *U.34* left Cattaro on December 21.³ The only vessel available in Egypt to attack her was the *Clematis*, and Admiral Peirse sent her to divert to Sollum the *Magnolia* and *Mallow*, which had left Marseilles on December 14 escorting some transports. The *Magnolia* had already passed, and arrived at Alexandria at 11 p.m. on December 20, short of coal; but the *Clematis* and *Mallow*⁴ met, and went into Sollum at daylight on 22nd. They found no sign of *U.C.12*, but they destroyed the pier and all boats in the harbour by gun-fire. They were fired on by two guns from the shore, apparently the two old 15 pdr. Krupp guns left there by the Egyptian Coastguard Garrison when the post was evacuated, which the enemy were reported to have repaired. The sloops were not hit, however, as the extreme range of the shore guns appeared to be only about 4,000 yards. The guns were, however, too well concealed to be destroyed.

On the first intelligence of the presence of *U.C.12* at Sollum the Admiralty, realising that Admiral Peirse was short handed, instructed Admiral Limpus at Malta to divert any small vessels to attack her. The French Commander-in-Chief despatched the cruiser *Amiral Aube*, followed by two destroyers, but with no more success than attended the *Clematis* and *Mallow*. In view of the fact that the *Amiral Aube* was an old cruiser of 9,534 tons and 19 to 21 knots speed, it was as well perhaps that she did not meet *U.C.12* or there might have been another regrettable occurrence such as the *Léon Gambetta* disaster.

174. Work of the Sloops off the Coast.—By December 23 the main transport of reinforcements which were being despatched from Alexandria to Matruh⁵ was completed, though there remained details and stores to be sent, which necessitated some trawlers being still allotted to that service. It was reported that Nuri Bey with a force about 14 miles west of Matruh was

¹ See Section 187.

² A 599.

³ See Section 183.

⁴ Lieutenant Ralph W. H. Roberts.

⁵ 1,200 men, apparently in addition to the troops sent at the end of November.

awaiting the rupture of the British communications to Daba¹ by Gaafer Pasha's force.² The Shaikh El Senussi himself was reported to be at the head of a column of 2,000 men marching via Siwa to the Fayum.³ The resources of the Senussists were said to be bad.

On Christmas Day our forces at Matruh, which now numbered some 5,000 infantry and 2,500 mounted troops, assumed the offensive and made a successful attack on the main body of the enemy to the south-west, the *Clematis* co-operating on the north flank. The latter's 4.7 in. gun was very useful for co-operation with the military, and Admiral Peirse arranged with Admiral de Robeck to retain her and to send another sloop to the Dardanelles in her place, as soon as the trawlers could be spared to return.

175. **The Red Sea Patrols, October.**—The relief of the Empress liners in the Red Sea was completed by October. The *Empress of Japan*, which left Aden for Colombo to refit on June 28, did not return to the Egyptian station. The *Lama* arrived at Aden on September 18 and the *Lunka* six days later, to relieve the *Empress of Russia* and *Empress of Asia* which were then to be sent to Hong Kong.⁴ However, the necessity of relieving on the Egyptian Coast Patrol the *Heroic*, which had been lent temporarily from the Eastern Mediterranean, caused the *Lunka* to be diverted to Sollum and the *Empress of Asia* remained pending the arrival of the *Suva*.⁵ The latter arrived at Aden on October 10, only to be found quite unfit for duty, and Admiral Peirse ordered her to proceed to Bombay forthwith to complete her equipment, the *Empress of Asia* following her to Bombay to turn over her crew.⁶ Meanwhile the *Asia*, which had been destined by the Admiralty to relieve the *Himalaya*, was found to be unsuitable, and the *Perth* was taken up and fitted. The *Himalaya*, however, was required for service in South America, and she was ordered home without waiting for relief by the *Perth*.⁷ She left Port Said on October 2, and her duties in the Red Sea were carried out temporarily by the *Jupiter*.

176. **Trade on the Arabian Coast.**—The Northern Red Sea Patrol was carried out during November and December by the *Montcalm*, *Venus*, *Dufferin*, and *Hardinge*. The *Montcalm*, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Huguët, was senior officer, though the arrangement by which a French officer was Senior Naval Officer of the patrol was not without disadvantages. However, Admiral Huguët was relinquishing the command of

¹ Probably Ras el Dhabba, on the coast, 75 miles W. of Alexandria.

² C.-in-C., E.I., to Adty., 406, 21.12.15.

³ Adty. to Marine, Paris, 4459, 21.12.15.

⁴ A 484.

⁵ By inference. No report of this arrangement has been seen.

⁶ A 504.

⁷ A 490.

the "Division Navale Detachée en Egypte" at the end of the year, when the French ships in the canal were to pass under the command of Vice-Admiral Moreau of the 3rd Squadron.

The British trade policy pursued on the Arabian Coast was somewhat involved. Our policy had been to allow the import of dura without hindrance, but to keep out wheat and flour, which were necessities for the Turks but merely luxuries for the Arabs. By the end of November, however, such large quantities of wheat and flour had been sent to Jidda from India, that there was a great surplus accumulation there. The supplies had been authorised on the assumption that the annual pilgrimage to Mecca would be of almost normal dimensions, whereas in the event it proved to be very small indeed. If the stores remained at Jidda, it was almost certain that they would fall into the hands of the Turks, and it was therefore decided to allow them to be distributed along the Hedjaz coast, until the surplus was worked off. The prejudicial political effects on the Arabs of cutting off supplies to Jidda were considered to outweigh any military advantage to be gained, although it was realised that a certain proportion of these food supplies found their way into the possession of the Turkish forces.

The anomaly of a situation where the patrol vessels in the Red Sea had orders to confiscate foodstuffs specially destined for the Turks, while the government of India continued to despatch supplies to Jidda, had been illustrated in a report rendered by Admiral Huguët on December 6. The *Montcalm* and *Hardinge* had recently seized, on dhows coming from Jidda, the one 15 sacks and the other 30 sacks of flour, part of a consignment of 13,000 sacks despatched to Jidda by the Government of India. In both cases the destination of the flour was in no doubt; it was to assist in revictualling the small Turkish ports on the Arabian coast, which were at the time entirely deprived of this commodity. Thus the Allied ships found themselves in the position of seizing flour on dhows while under their eyes this commodity was disembarked at Jidda under Government authorisation. Accordingly the future activity of our patrols was limited to preventing all Turkish communications by sea, and a policy of non-interference with supplies was adopted.¹ In order to ensure that no enemy agents passed across the Gulf of Aqaba from Egypt, the entry of all dhows into the Gulf and their landing on the coast of Sinai was prohibited.²

The *Fox* (Captain William H. D. Boyle), which had recommissioned at Suez with a new crew on October 28 and had been employed as guard ship in the Bitter Lakes, took over the duties of Senior Naval Officer, Northern Red Sea Patrol, from the

¹ M. 09813/15.

² M. 09990/15.

Montcalm on December 21; and on 27th the *Suva* arrived at Suez from refitting at Bombay and relieved the *Hardinge* to proceed to Bombay to refit.

177. **Southern Red Sea Patrol, November–December.**—By the end of October the Persian situation had again become critical.¹ It was reported that Persia was about to join in the war against us and that she would commit some act which would force our hands and compel us to declare war. On October 29 the Admiralty telegraphed to Admiral Peirse to make all preparations for war with Persia, and the *Philomel* was ordered at once to proceed with all despatch to the Persian Gulf.²

The Southern Red Sea Patrol was thus reduced temporarily to the *Jupiter* (Senior Naval Officer),³ *Lama*, and *Minto*, the *Enterprise* being engaged in towing a floating dock from Aden to Suez, whence it was to be conveyed to Mudros for the use of Admiral de Robeck's force.

The enemy forces in the neighbourhood of Aden had recently been reinforced and there were constant rumours of a renewal of the attack on the place. The only European troops stationed there were a territorial battalion of the Buffs, and it was arranged between Brigadier-General Price, commanding at Aden, and Captain Blunt, that the *Jupiter* which was remaining at Aden until the situation became easier, should assist in the land defence if required by landing a contingent of two companies of seamen and one of Marines with two Maxims and two 12-pdr. manned by 40 seamen.⁴

On October 30 the *Lama* captured at sea a Turkish officer, Bimbashi Hasan Izzat Bey, Commandant 1/115th Regt. Loheiya, engaged upon a political mission to the Yemen, on whose person important documents and cypher keys were found, which showed that the sheriff of Mecca, with whom the British Government had been negotiating since July 14 respecting the territorial limits of the proposed Arab State, was engaged in actively assisting the Turks, while the Idrisi was opposing them.⁵

Up to date the government of India had pursued a somewhat parsimonious policy towards the Idrisi, with disappointing results, and the Egyptian government were urging that more adequate assistance should be given to him in money and munitions.⁶ Practically unlimited trade by dhows was, however, allowed under licence between Aden and the ports in the occupation of the Idrisi Saiyid, whereas Turkish ports were blockaded. From November 15, however, owing to the unreliability of the dhows, which after clearing for Idrisi ports

¹ See section 126.

² A 521, 522.

³ Captain William F. Blunt, D.S.O.

⁴ M. 08844/15.

⁵ M. 09303/15.

⁶ M. 09553/15.

frequently altered their destination and carried their cargoes to Turkish ports, trade was permitted by steamer only, and all dhow traffic to the Arabian coast was prohibited. The work of the patrol vessels was thus much simplified, as all dhows found on the coast henceforth were liable to capture.¹ This stringent policy was, however, modified during December, to the extent of allowing intertrade by dhows between certain of the Idrisi's own ports, under control from Aden.²

178. **Preparations for Naval Defence of Suez Canal.**—It was anticipated that the Turks would renew the attack on the Canal in force in the spring, after the wells should have been filled with the winter rains, a probability which was much enhanced in December when it was decided to abandon the attempt to force the Dardanelles and to evacuate the troops; and on October 21 the Admiralty warned Admiral Peirse to make complete preparations in advance for the control and observation of heavy gun-fire from the ships co-operating in the defence.³

Admiral Peirse at this period flew his flag in the *Proserpine* at Port Said, and he had also for the defence of the Canal the *Minerva*, which was employed as necessity dictated on guard duty in the Bitter Lakes, and such of the ships of the Red Sea Patrols and the French 3rd Squadron as might be spared in emergency. In addition to these, the Admiralty informed him that the following ships would be sent to reinforce him if the attack appeared to be maturing: *Redoubtable*,⁴ *Illustrious*, *Sutlej*, two or three 12 in. monitors, and two or three river gunboats carrying two 6 in. guns each. Any suitable British subjects in Egypt who might volunteer were to be entered in the R.N.V.R., commissions in the R.N.V.R. being granted to educated men suitable for working observation stations.⁵ A sixth battleship was now available for Admiral Thursby's force at Taranto, and on November 8 the Admiralty ordered him to send the *Implacable*⁶ to Port Said to organise the preparations for the naval defence of the Canal. The *Implacable* was due for refit, but this was postponed, for after reaching Port Said she would be required to do very little steaming.⁷ She arrived at Port Said on November 17, and was sent to Ferdan, the position for which she was detailed by Admiral Peirse in case of attack on the Canal, to organise and fit the observation stations there. Monitors *M.21* and *M.23*,⁸ which had proved to be useless for work on the coast, were despatched by Admiral Peirse into the Canal to familiarise themselves with conditions at the points to which they were allotted in the scheme of defence. Another

¹ M. 09048/15.

² M. 09990/15.

³ A 516.

⁴ Formerly the old battleship *Revenge*.

⁵ A 516.

⁶ Captain Hughes C. Lockyer.

⁷ A 539.

⁸ Each 550 tons, 12 knots, 1—9·2 in., range 16,300 yds., 1—12 pdr. 8 cwt.,

1—6 pdr. H.A.

accession to the defensive scheme was the *Hannibal*. Employed as a transport in the early days of the Salonika Expedition, her worn out boilers were now in a dangerous condition. She came into Alexandria on November 29, and on December 6 the Admiralty ordered her to be retained as depot ship for the patrol trawlers which were being sent out. They authorised the employment of her guns for armed transports¹; but she had only four 6 in. Q.F. guns, and as few transports had the space or strength necessary to mount these guns Admiral Peirse retained them on board and moored the ship in such a position that she could fire over the breakwater.² On December 21 the Admiralty informed Admiral de Robeck that the following ships would be required from his command for Canal defence: *Cornwallis*, one battleship of *Glory* class or else *Prince George*, one cruiser of the *Euryalus* class, one 12 in. or 14 in. monitor, one Mark X. 9·2 in. and two 6 in. monitors. All the above were to arrive in Egypt not later than January 4.³ On November 15 Rear-Admiral Darrius, second in command of the Syrian squadron, hauled down his flag in the *Jauréguiberry* at Port Said in anticipation of the early arrival of his relief, Rear-Admiral de Spitz in the armoured cruiser *Pothuau*. The *Jauréguiberry* had serious engine defects, and was reduced to nucleus crew, and remained available at Port Said for Canal defence when required.

The French Ministry of Marine had authorised Admiral Gauchet, of the 3rd Squadron, to place at Admiral Peirse's disposal if it should become necessary for the defence of the Canal the armoured cruisers *D'Entrecasteaux* and *Pothuau* in addition to the *Jauréguiberry*, *Requin*, and *Montcalm*, which were already detailed for that purpose.⁴ At home, some motor boats armed with 3 pdr. guns were now coming to hand, and it was decided that twelve of them, with the yacht *Catania* as parent ship, should be despatched to Egypt for the patrol of the Bitter Lakes.⁵

179. Military Scheme of Defence.—By the end of October the Turks had advanced the railway to Beersheba and before the year was out the intelligence reported active preparations on their part of troops for Syria and Egypt. The preparation of telegraph and telephone lines and water pipes across Sinai were being pushed on with energy by the enemy, though no forward concentration was reported as yet. A large enemy patrol was located in Sinai on November 22 by agents and aeroplane reconnaissance, and was broken up by a detachment of the Mysore Lancers. This small success was reported to have had a most salutary effect upon the Sinai Arabs, who were said to be refusing now to furnish any more patrols for the Turks.⁶

¹ A 587.

² M. 09813/15.

³ A 607, 610.

⁴ A 585.

⁵ M. 09269/15.

⁶ M. 09403/15.

The basis upon which the military dispositions were made was the estimate that the enemy could bring from 200,000 to 300,000 troops within striking distance of the Canal by the end of January, 1916. The scheme of defence included three fortified lines, extending up to eight miles east of the Canal, with loops of light railway laterally and forward branches, together with a water supply carried by pipes from the west side. The defence was to be actively offensive, with the object of denying forward water supplies to the enemy, or forcing him to fight for them; attacking enemy troops as they arrived forward before concentration was complete; and giving him no time for rest or recuperation at forward points.¹

180. Aircraft Preparations.—An important item in the scheme was the need for an active air offensive against the enemy's resources and preparations in Syria. Admiral Peirse advocated the organisation of a central depot at Alexandria, and he suggested that some of the aircraft at Imbros might be utilised in Egypt when not required in the Aegean.² The Admiralty, however, decided that the services should be kept separate and the military and naval aircraft should work under the military authorities and the naval Commander-in-Chief, Egypt, respectively. The seaplane ship *Ben-My-Chree* would be sent from Mudros to Egypt in time to arrive not later than January 4, 1916, and a second seaplane ship and a kite balloon ship would also be sent out.³ Admiral de Robeck was instructed to send with the *Ben-My-Chree* some especially good seaplanes with bombs and necessary equipment.⁴

181. Relief of Admiral Peirse arranged.—Admiral Peirse had now been in command of the East Indies Station for three years. His authority had extended over an immense area, and he had been responsible for a diversity of tasks. The Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia, Red Sea, Suez Canal, and the Coasts of Egypt and Syria had all come under his authority. Trade and transport work, the defence of the Canal, coastal bombardments, anti-submarine patrols, and the important propagandist, reconnaissance and offensive work on the Syrian coast comprised some of his manifold duties. The fact that there had never been a time when he was not successfully making one ship do the work of two was too common an experience of those days to merit more than a passing mention. He had co-operated with the military, with the French, and with the Italians, with a remarkable absence of friction; and withal the holding in his hands of the threads of a thousand schemes had kept him tied for a year to a dull existence on

¹ M. 09990/15.

² C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty., 401, 19.12.15, *Urgent*.

³ Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies, 847, 23.12.15.

⁴ A 607.

shore. On October 29 the Admiralty informed him that he would be relieved at the expiration of three years in his present command; and it was arranged that Admiral Wemyss should relieve him early in the new year.

CHAPTER XXI.

SUBMARINE ACTIVITY, NOVEMBER-DECEMBER, 1915.

182. **U.38 enters the Mediterranean, November 2-3.**—After the raid by *U.39* and *U.33* during the first half of October, there was a lull in enemy submarine activity until November 3. At 10.30 a.m. that day the armed British s.s. *Woodfield* was captured and sunk off Gibraltar by a submarine entering the Straits, who unluckily put the *Woodfield's* gun out of action so that the merchantman was unable to put up a fight.

The submarine was *U.38*,¹ which had made the voyage from Germany and was working towards Cattaro; and she contrived during the week occupied on passage through the Western Mediterranean to do an enormous amount of damage, sinking no less than 14 ships.² After sinking the *Woodfield*, during the afternoon *U.38* fell in with the transport *Mercian* in 35° 52' N., 4° W., and attacked her with gun-fire. Again a lucky shot, one of the first fired by the submarine, took effect and destroyed the *Mercian's* W/T installation, so that although within the area of the Gibraltar Patrol she was unable to call for help. The transport had, however, a good turn of speed, and thanks to the skilful and resolute handling of the master, Mr. C. J. Walker, and the chance appearance of a patrol boat, she escaped being sunk. Of the troops which she carried 23 were killed and 6 officers and 48 men wounded by the submarine's fire; and 1 officer, 22 men, and 8 of the crew were drowned through the lowering of a boat without orders. A few hours later *U.38* fell in with the Japanese s.s. *Yasukuni Maru* and found in her an easy victim. On 4th she sunk no less than four ships: the French *Dahra* 20 miles north of Abuja Point (Cape Aiguille), the Italian *Ionio* and the French *Le Calvados* about 22 miles north-west of Cape Ivi, and the French *La Rochelle* 35 miles north-east of Mostaganem.³ On November 5 *U.38* was off Algiers and

¹ Lieut.-Comdr. Max Valentiner.

² Gayer, III, 17. I.D. 1039A credits her with 15.

³ Not mentioned in *Chambre des Députés*, 1920, No. 634.

was sighted 40 miles North 20 deg. East of that place at 4 p.m. Her toll of sinkings that day comprised the French *Sidi Ferruch* and British *Buresk*. She had not completed the destruction of the former when the British steamer *Huntsman* came in sight. *U.38* chased her, but finding her armed and resolute, she withdrew, and returned to finish off the *Sidi Ferruch*. For 48 hours the sailing of transports from Tunisian ports was stopped and the Admiralty ordered Admiral Limpus to divert west-bound vessels north of Sardinia for a few days unless they were armed.¹ On November 7 the route for west-bound vessels was changed by the French Commander-in-Chief, and they were ordered to go through the Straits of Bonifacio. Two torpedo boats were sent by the French Commander-in-Chief to patrol between Cape Bon and Algiers and two between Oran and Gibraltar, along the coast of Morocco; and ten trawlers were working between Cape Bon and Marittimo.²

The French were now gravely concerned, and they hinted to the Admiralty that it would be advisable to reinforce the Gibraltar Straits Patrol.³ The Admiralty instructed Admiral Currey to divert the *Azalea* by wireless to Oran or wherever *U.38* was operating at the moment,⁴ and they informed him that the *Narcissus* was being sent out to Gibraltar for patrol duties,⁵ and a second sloop was to follow.

But in spite of these precautions, on 6th *U.38* sank four ships, all between Cape Bougaroni and Cap de Fer, the Italian *Elisa Francesca* and *Ticino*, the British *Glenmoor*, and the French *Yser*.⁶ The two latter were sunk only four miles and two miles respectively off Cap de Fer, and *U.38* then turned her guns on the signal station which had been warning approaching ships of her presence.

She also shelled the *Lady Plymouth*, whom she had chased on the previous day; but again the merchantman escaped through possessing a good turn of speed.

On 7th, still working east, *U.38* sank the French ship *France III*⁷ and the Italian *Ancona*. On 8th she chased and fired at the *City of Cambridge*, which was, however, rescued by the patrol vessel *Venus III*, about five miles west-south-west of Marittimo Island. *U.38's* last victim was the Italian s.s. *Firenze*, which she sank on November 9 while she was making for the Straits of Otranto, where a submarine presumed to be *U.38* was reported on the following day off Saseno Island.

183. **Cruise of U.34 and U.35 in the Eastern Mediterranean, November, 1915.**—*U.34* operated from November 3 to 22 between Crete and the coast of Africa, apparently sinking four ships, the

¹ A 530.

² A 534, 535.

³ *Chambre des Députés*, 1920, No. 634, calls her the *France*.

⁴ A 532.

⁵ A 531.

⁶ A 533.

⁷ See Note 1.

Italian s.s. *Bosina* 80 miles south of Gavdo Island at 3 p.m. on November 10, the British *Treneglos* 90 miles west of Gavdo Island at 1 p.m. on 14th, the *Orange Prince* in 34° N., 22° 40' E. at 11 a.m. next day, and the *Hallamshire* in 35° 37' N., 23° 4' E. at 5 p.m. on 19th. Eighteen trawlers were sent by Admiral de Robeck to reinforce the French patrols near Crete, their places being taken by the 18 drifters from the Adriatic.¹ Returning to Cattaro at the expiration of her cruise, being no doubt the submarine reported off Saseno Island at 8.30 a.m. on November 22, going W.N.W., she made the discovery, unknown to the German submarines at this date, of the Otranto drifter net barrage. As, however, the nets were not yet provided with explosive mines, they inspired little uneasiness in her Commander.²

Meanwhile *U.35*, who it will be remembered had betaken herself to the Hersing-Stand to obtain news and instructions on finding that the transports off Salonika were eluding her, was engaged in convoying a mission to the Senussi. On November 3, on the way from Budrum to Bardia with two sailing vessels carrying war material in tow, she sank the *Woolwich* and unsuccessfully attacked with gun-fire the transport *Japanese Prince* from Alexandria to Salonika with drafts of the 2nd Mounted Division and other details. The convoy arrived at Bardia on 4th and commenced to unload their cargoes without loss of time. Next day *U.35* fell in with the armed boarding steamer *Tara* off Sollum and sank her, and entering the Gulf in the afternoon surprised the coastguard cruisers *Abbas* and *Nurelbahr*, and sank the former. On 6th she attacked the oiler *Lumina* in 33° 4' N., 25° 56' E. The *Lumina* was armed, but her gun, a 2½ pdr., was outranged, and after it had been put out of action and three of the crew wounded, the master abandoned ship and *U.35* took her gun as a trophy. On 8th Admiral Peirse reported that he had issued orders that no transports carrying troops were to leave Egypt for the Mediterranean unless armed or escorted, a policy which the Admiralty approved in cases where it was known that a submarine was working on a particular route.³ Working westward, between November 8 and 10, she sank eight more steamers, the *Clan Macalister* and *Caria* on 6th, *Moorina* on 7th, *Den of Crombie*, *Sir Richard Awdry*, and the Norwegian *Wacousta* on 8th, being herself attacked, but without success, just as she was finishing off the *Wacousta* by the *Marie Frédéric*, one of two large French trawlers working on the route from Alexandria between 21° E. and 25° E. On 9th, at 2.15 p.m., she torpedoed the *Californian* without warning 61 miles S.S.W. from Cape Matapan. The *Californian* had already been unsuccessfully attacked in 35° 4' N., 22° 50' E., at 8 a.m. that day, probably by *U.34*. She was in company with the *Melbourne* when she was

¹ A 551.

² Gayer, III, 26. The report of the discovery of the net barrage, as given in Gayer, is confirmed by I.D. records.

³ A 543, 544, 546.

attacked for the second time, steaming 12 knots, both ships being escorted by the French destroyer *Casque*. Probably she was torpedoed by *U.35*, but if so, this was the submarine's last victim on this cruise.¹

U.35 brought her cruise to an end on November 12. She had been 31 days at sea and had steamed nearly 3,400 miles, including 410 submerged.²

184. Cruise of U.33 on the Western Mediterranean Trade Routes, November, 1915.—Three days later *U.33* left Cattaro for another cruise. She was bound for the Western Mediterranean, and on 18th, when about 150 miles east-south-east of Malta³ she sank the transport *Eurosis*, killing the master by her shell fire, and the *Merganser* two days later, 40 miles N. 60° W. of Gozo. On 23rd she attacked the *City of Marseilles* off the south-west of Sardinia, who, however, drove her off by her gun-fire. Fresh route instructions were issued by the French Commander-in-Chief on 25th. After cruising for a day or two in the waters between Sardinia and the Balearic Islands *U.33* turned eastward, experiencing a good deal of bad weather but sinking no less than 14 more ships before bringing her cruise to an end on December 6.⁴ One of these was the *Clan Macleod* which *U.33* sighted on December 1, 100 miles S. 74° E. of Malta. The submarine chased her for two hours before overhauling her, and so angry was Lieutenant-Commander Gansser, her commander, at the merchantman's attempt to escape that he fired several rounds at her decks at close range while the crew were taking to the boats and the signal of surrender was flying from the *Clan Macleod*. Twelve men were killed and several wounded, though Lieutenant-Commander Gansser had the grace to attend to the master's wounds. The German is described as a stout, thick-set man, bald, with red hair and a moustache, and wearing a dressing-gown.

Fifty-two ships were attacked by these four submarines during November. Of these 40 were sunk (three defensively armed) and 12 escaped (five armed).

¹ I.D., however, thought she was probably sunk by *U.34* and the *Bosina* by *U.35*.

² Gayer, III, 27.

³ Another account gives the position about 35° 10' N., 19° 23' E.

⁴ Gayer, III, 26. Only 12 of these 14 ships can be accounted for, viz., French s.s. *Algérien*, 25 miles from C. Sandalo, Sardinia, 1.30 p.m., November 24 (? 25); British s.s. *Tringa*, 30 miles N.E. of Galita I., 3 p.m., November 26; French s.s. *Omara* and British s.s. *Tanis*, 2 miles N. of Zembra I., near C. Bon, at 8.30 a.m. and 8.45 a.m. respectively, November 27; British s.s. *Kingsway*, 20 miles E.S.E. from C. Bon, noon, November 27; *Malinche*, 50 miles east of Malta, at 1.30 p.m., November 29; *Colenso*, 95 miles E.S.E. from Malta, 10 a.m., 30th; the s.s. *Langton Hall*, 112 miles E.S.E. of Malta, noon, 30th; Greek s.s. *Zarifs*; and was fired at by French s.s. *Annam* about 1 p.m., November 30, in 34° 20' N., 16° 25' E.; British s.s. *Clan Macleod* (see text); s.s. *Umeta*, 112 miles E.S.E. from Malta, 12.30 p.m., December 1. Attacked s.s. *Commodore*, 160 miles E.S.E. from Malta, 6.10 a.m., December 2; ship sank at noon. Possibly Gayer included in the 14 ships the *City of Marseilles*, and the French s.s. *Tafna*, which was unsuccessfully attacked in 41° 45' N., 6° 25' E., at 9 a.m. on November 24.

The *Dublin*, on passage from Malta to Gibraltar, was unsuccessfully attacked by an unknown submarine on December 13 near Pantellaria, and again on 19th, this being the fifth occasion on which she had been attacked.

185. Western Mediterranean Patrols, November, 1915.—

Reports were again coming in of submarine supply ships and bases on the Spanish Mediterranean coast. Early in the month the Italian Consul at Malaga reported that the German submarines had a base near Alboran. Stores for these craft were said to be carried by the Spanish steamers *Sevilla* and *Cabo Paez* trading between Cadiz, Ceuta, Malaga, and Melilla, and by several steamers belonging to the Correos Company of Africa.¹ On November 22 the Admiralty issued orders that all British shipping should keep well clear of the Spanish Mediterranean coast.² The French were finding difficulty in maintaining an efficient patrol between Gibraltar³ and Oran, and early in November the Admiralty lent them seven large yachts for the patrol of the Algerian coast. These were the *Marynthea*, *Sapphire II*, *Narcissus II*, *Jeannette*,⁴ *Atlanta*, *Iolanda*, and *Eileen*; they were based on Algiers for use wherever required in the Western Mediterranean, being under the orders of the French Senior Naval Officer, Algiers.⁵

The French seemed to think that we ought to be able to prevent the entry of German submarines through the Straits of Gibraltar.⁶ The Admiralty, however, had now decided that the difficulty and uncertainty of ensuring this were too great to warrant the dissipation of the number, already too slender, of small craft which a determined effort to seal the Straits would necessitate, particularly since no hostile submarines returned by that route, all their operations being carried out further east, where it would be bad policy to reduce the number of patrol craft. They described the difficulties to the French, and reminded them that on September 8 we had a fleet of net drifters watching the Straits which had not prevented the passage of *U.39* and *U.33*.⁷

The Gibraltar Patrol had been augmented by four more Portuguese trawlers in October in addition to the *Rio Tejo* and *Neptuno*,⁸ and three more were added during November, two of which were armed by the *Pelorus*, now used as trawler depot ship, and one from the store at Gibraltar, making a total of

¹ Adty. to Marine, Paris, 3997, 12.11.15.

² A 573.

³ The French area began at the meridian of 5° W.

⁴ Afterwards named *Jeannette II*.

⁵ A 538, 545.

⁶ M. 09374/15.

⁷ A 537.

⁸ The names of the six trawlers were as follows: 175 *Arcturus* (*Rio Tejo*), 176 *Algenib* (*Neptuno*), 177 *Antares* (*Cabo Verde*), 178 *Altair Victoria Laura*, 179 *Algol* (*Maria Amalia*), 180 *Achernar* (*Ohire*).

nine trawlers at Gibraltar, a number which the Admiralty intended to augment as vessels became available. Of the two sloops which were being sent from England, one, the *Narcissus*, left the Clyde on November 14, and the *Acacia* followed on 19th. There were also some special service colliers fitting out at Gibraltar for submarine hunting. The *Pelorus* supplied guns for two of these, the *Bradford City* and *Remembrance*; and there were two more, the *Thornhill* and *Penhallow*. Every means was adopted to ensure secrecy as to the true nature of these vessels,¹ but suspicions were aroused, and their names, and as far as possible their appearance, were eventually altered on the high seas to *Saros*, *Lammeroo*, *Werribee*, and *Century*, false papers, etc., being prepared as necessary.² Nevertheless, the German submarine commanders got to know of the existence of one, at least, of the decoy ships. This was perhaps the *Margit*, which was working from Malta, at this date. Twenty-five armed trawlers were now on their way to Malta, where they were all to be retained pending a decision as to their distribution³; and another decoy ship, the *Wyandra*, had been ordered out from Queenstown.⁴

On October 27 Admiral Brock, who had completed three years in the Gibraltar command, was succeeded by Rear-Admiral Bernard Currey.

186. **Submarine Activity, December, 1915.**—On December 9, after a month spent in preparation at Cattaro or Pola, *U.38* left for her first cruise in the Eastern Mediterranean. This was to prove the most extended cruise up to date, for she was absent from her base no less than 33 days. Her first point was Port Bardia, to which she was taking war material to the Turkish faction, and she had also in tow *U.C.12* (Lieutenant Fröhner), which was bound for the same destination. In the Straits of Otranto she was forced to submerge in order to avoid the patrol boats; she slipped the tow, and that was the last she saw of *U.C.12*. *U.38* went on to Port Bardia, sinking three ships on the way, one of them being the Japanese passenger steamer *Yasaka Maru*, which she torpedoed at 2.25 p.m. on December 21, 16 miles north of Cape Brulos (between Alexandria and Damietta). From Port Bardia she seems to have proceeded up the Syrian Coast, putting in at Jaffa, Beyrut (December 24), and Alexandretta, and being everywhere received with acclamations and overwhelmed with Christmas gifts.⁵ On January 2, 1916, in the Bay of Marmarice she took on board more war material and a Turkish Mission for Port Bardia. But on this occasion the local patrols prevented any attempt to reach the port, and, frustrated, she returned to Cattaro on January 10.

¹ They appear to have been referred to as armed boarding steamers.

² A 594b.

³ A 576.

⁴ A 567 and M. 08613/15, etc. (in Papers titled X 9195/1916).

⁵ Gayer.

U.39 left the Adriatic for another cruise towards the end of November, and made for the Egyptian transport route. She sank her first ship, the *Middleton*, on November 30 in a position about 34° N., 23° E. Proceeding slowly south-eastward, it was not until three days later that she sank the *Helmsmuir*. The United States ship *Communi-paw* was stopped shortly afterwards and allowed to proceed; and about 2.30 p.m. on the same day *U.39* attacked the *Torilla* by gun-fire, but was driven off by the *Benalla* which came up carrying a heavier gun (4.7 in.) than the *Torilla*. The incident was cited by Admiral Peirse as a proof of the uselessness of the 3 pdr. gun as defensive armament for merchantmen. The Admiralty, however, did not share this view. They considered that the *Torilla's* 3 pdr. had prevented *U.39* from closing to effective range, and thus allowed time for help to arrive; and they cited in support of their views the destruction by 3 pdr. of two enemy submarines in the North Sea.¹ Two Italian ships, the *Dante* and the sailing vessel *Pietro Lofaro*, were sunk on 5th, and *U.39* also shelled the U.S. *Petrolite*, one day out from Alexandria, and obtained food from her. A Greek ship, the *L. G. Goulandris*, was sunk on 6th, and the British *Veria* next day, 24 miles north of Alexandria. *U.39* now seems to have turned for home. With her two 22 pdrs. she attacked the *Tintoretto* on 8th in 31° 40' N., 28° 29' E., but was driven off by the British ship's single 12 pdr. after a duel lasting nearly four hours. The master of the *Tintoretto* reported that there were two submarines and that they were accompanied by a supply ship, though this was not credited at the Admiralty, being a unique case.² Had the action occurred a day or two later *Tintoretto's* report would be easy to understand, for in the latitude of the south of Greece *U.39* picked up *U.C.12*, which had been dropped in the Straits of Otranto by *U.38* about December 9 and was now engaged in convoying a ship with war material to the coast of Tripoli; and *U.39* towed her to Port Bardia.³ But between this and the engagement with the *Tintoretto* some days must have elapsed, during which, on 9th, *U.39* sank the *Busiris* after taking provisions from her, and the *Orteric*. On 10th the Italian *Porto Said* was sunk in 33° 26' N., 22° 50' E., and at 10.45 a.m. on that day *U.39* was unsuccessfully attacked by the Italian patrol vessel *Capitano Verri* and the T.B. *Orsa*, as she was working into the Straits of Otranto.

Owing to lack of fuel *U.39* had been compelled to return alone to Cattaro, and on December 21 *U.34* was despatched from the Adriatic to support *U.C.12*. She was also carrying war material for the Senussists, and at 8.50 a.m. on 27th, whilst engaged in unloading the consignment at Port Bardia, the sloop *Mimosa*

¹ C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty., 336, 7.12.15, and reply, 783, from Adty., 8.12.15.

² M. 09815/15.

³ Gayer.

appeared off the harbour. Lieutenant-Commander Rucker broke off and proceeded to attack the patrol vessel, firing two torpedoes, but without success. On the passage back to the Adriatic he sank four more ships; and he reached his base on January 10, 1916.¹

187. Abandonment of German Submarine Missions to Tripoli.

—It is possible that one more of the German submarines working from Austrian ports was cruising in the Mediterranean during December. For at 9 a.m. on 30th of the month the *Abelia* was sunk by gun-fire in 34° 28' N., 20° 52' E., and it transpired during a conversation which her master held with one of the officers of the submarine that the latter was 20 days out from port.² She had sunk a Japanese vessel the day before (the *Kenkoku Maru*) in 34° N., 22° 20' E., and had also sunk a French vessel. The submarine may have been *U.C.12*, which was then 20 days out from port, but it was identified at the time by the Naval Intelligence Division of the Admiralty with *U.35*, though the vessel was described as having one gun only, whereas *U.35* mounted two. Moreover, there is reason to believe that between November 12 and January 11 *U.35* was overhauling at Pola.³ On November 18 her Commander, Korvetten-Kapitän Kophamel was appointed chief of the *U*-boat flotilla at Pola, and was succeeded in command of *U.35* by Lieutenant-Commander Arnauld de la Perrière, who later made a great name for himself as a submarine Commander.

One of Commander Kophamel's first actions was to obtain from the Naval Staff permission to discontinue the employment of submarines on the transport of war material to the African coast, which was using up boats that might more profitably be engaged in the war against commerce.⁴ A raid on the shipping at the Dardanelles was planned. American ships were only to be sunk if more than half of their cargoes were composed of contraband of war, though these orders had to be modified at the end of the year; and in consequence of the insistence of the United States on freedom of passage and immunity of her subjects from attack, the German submarines were instructed to refrain from interference with American ships.

Of the other three submarines working from Austrian ports *U.C.14* was engaged during the first half of December in laying mines off Brindisi.⁵

Nineteen ships had been sunk in the Mediterranean during December, of which two, namely, the *Persia*, sunk December 30 in 34° N., 26° 25' E., with loss of 334 lives, and the *Clan Macfarlane*, sunk on the same day in the same area with loss of 52 lives,

¹ Gayer, III, 32.

² I.D. 1078 (1).

³ Gayer.

⁴ *Ibid.*, III, pp. 33, 36.

⁵ Gayer, III, 38.

were armed, and were torpedoed without warning. Eight ships had been unsuccessfully attacked, of which five were armed.¹

188. Use of Supply Bases by Enemy Submarines.—During the ten months since the opening of the attack on the Dardanelles had introduced the probability of submarine attack on the lines of communication, the question of enemy supply bases had occupied a large measure of the attention of the Allied Naval Commanders in the Mediterranean, and had necessitated constant employment of vessels of all kinds to seek out and destroy such bases. The question arises: to what extent did the enemy underwater craft make use of these adventitious aids to extend their radius of action?

There were, undoubtedly, certain places to which the enemy submarines resorted in order to receive information and instructions. One such was the "*Hersing-Stand*" in the Gulf of Saros at which *U.35* called on October 27, when in doubt as to her future procedure. Orak, a little island in the Gulf of Kos, was another such point, where *U.C.15* remained immobilised for several weeks with defects²; and Budrum, a Turkish port on the Gulf, appears to have been the starting point of Turko-German Missions to Tripoli. The manner in which during December *U.38* entered Jaffa, Beyrut, and Alexandretta, despite the French blockade of the coast, has already been noticed; and it seems that the German submarines experienced little difficulty in entering and leaving Turkish ports on the Syrian and Asia Minor coast. At none of these ports, however, could repairs and replenishment of torpedoes and ammunition be effected, and herein lay their weakness as bases. As regard supply ships, during 1915 there was only one authenticated instance of a submarine receiving supplies from the shore or from a supply ship at sea,³ though submarines occasionally took provisions from vessels they stopped or sank. The submarine which sank the *Abelia* on December 30 was by her own account 20 days out from port at the time, but she took nothing except provisions, cutlery, and other small articles, although the *Abelia* had on board 250 tons of oil fuel and a large quantity of lubricating oil.⁴ Admiral Limpus wrote on December 4, "it is . . . certain that submarines are obtaining supplies from some neutral ship"⁵; if what he wrote was correct it is to be wondered whether the German staff work was better than in the case of *U.21* while *en route* to the Mediterranean, which reached her rendezvous only to discover that the wrong kind of oil had been provided for her. There was no authenticated instance of submarines being accompanied by a supply ship or tender.

¹ From I.D. Reports: Gayer, III; and "Merchant Shipping (Losses)," Adty. Return, Aug., 1919. London: H.M. Stationery Office.

² Gayer. ³ I.D. 10396. ⁴ I.D. 1078 (1). ⁵ M. 09493/15.

Perhaps the best test that can be applied in order to discover to what extent enemy submarines relied upon supply bases is to examine the length of their cruises:—

<i>Submarine.</i>	<i>Probable Duration of Cruise.</i>	<i>No. of Days.</i>
<i>U.21</i>	August 29 to September 26, 1915 ¹	.. 29 ²
<i>U.35</i>	August 31 to September 22 23
<i>U.34</i>	September 1 to September 17 17
<i>U.39</i>	September 25 to October 12 18
<i>U.33</i>	September 28 to October 9 12
<i>U.35</i>	October 12 to November 12 32
<i>U.34</i>	November 3 to November 22 20
<i>U.33</i>	November 15 to December 6 22
<i>U.38</i>	December 9 to January 10, 1916 33
<i>U.34</i>	December 21 to January 10 21

In two cases only was a submarine absent from her base at Cattaro or Pola for more than 30 days; and it is probable that at the expiration of such a period the need for repairs, quite apart from any question of supplies, would necessitate a return to her base.

CHAPTER XXII.

CONFERENCE OF DECEMBER 2/3.

NEW PATROL MEASURES DECIDED UPON.

189. French Dispositions, December, 1915.—The need was now pressing for the adoption of new and effective measures to counter the submarine danger. The French Commander-in-Chief was in agreement with Admiral Limpus at Malta that the methods must be introduced into the Mediterranean which had proved themselves to be efficacious in northern waters, and he had already advised the Ministry of Marine to that effect. "In increasing the forces in the Mediterranean by the addition of small craft," Admiral Dartige du Fournet wrote to the Admiral Superintendent at Malta, "there must be still closer mutual agreement regarding the zones of operation to be entrusted to the French and British Commanders."³

¹ Or September 22.

² Or 25.

³ "Vous penserez sans doute ainsi qui moi, toutefois, qu'à mesure qu'augmenteront nos forces en petits bâtiments, il conviendra qu'intervienne un accord encore plus étroit, entre nous, touchant la zone d'opérations à confier à chacun." (M. 08696/15.)

The dispositions of the French ships in the Mediterranean on December 6 were as follows :—

TOULON.—*Paris, Carabinier, Sagaie, Bélier, Faulx, Protêt, Sabretache, Mousqueton, Mameluck, Dehorter, Voltigeur, Archimède.*

BIZERTA.—*Diderot, Voltaire, Mirabeau, Condorcet, Danton, Vergniaud, E. Renan, J. Michelet, V. Hugo, Jules Ferry, La Hire, Cimeterre, Sape, Hache, Bernouilli, Circe, Franklin, Coulomb, Arago.* T.B.s 309, 311.

MALTA.—*France, J. Bart, Chateaurenault, Hallebarde, Courbet, Bouclier.*

MILO.—*Vérité, Justice, Démocratie, W. Rousseau, E. Quinet, Foudre, Casque, Mangini, Commandant Lucas, Renaudin, Fourche, Bisson, Bombarde, Fauconneau, Spahi, G. Zédé, Foucault, Faraday, Leverrier, Cassini.*

BREST.—*Guichen.*

L'ORIENT.—*D'Entrecasteaux, St. Louis.*

NANTES.—*Téméraire, Magon.*

ROCHEFORT.—*Flamberge.*

BRINDISI.—*Cugnot, Messidor, Ampère, Monge, Fresnel, Papin, Gay-Lussac, Argonaute, Cigogne.*

TARANTO.—*Averne, Borée,* T.B.s 281, 288, 349, 368, 369, 360.

ESCORT AND CONVOY—TOULON.—*Arc, Commandant Bory.*

ESCORT AND CONVOY—MALTA.—*Epée, Arbalète, Asp, Herber, Cavalier, Janissaire.*

CONVOY—TOULON—MALTA.—*Fantassin.*

CONVOY—MALTA—DORO.—*Lansquenot, Enseigne Henri.*

CONVOY—MALTA—MARSEILLES.—*Coutelas, Chasseur, Commandant Rivière.*

ON WAY MILO—MALTA.—*Sabre.*

ALGERIAN PATROL, TUNISIAN ISLANDS, AND ESCORTS—FRANCE—ALGERIA AND TUNISIA.—*Catapulte, Arquebuse, Epieu, Rapière, Baliste,* 10 trawlers.

AEGEAN PATROL, SOUTH OF CRETE DO., AND ESCORTS.—*Corse, Nord-Caper, Paris II, Pluton,* 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th. Divisions of trawlers, *Opiniâtre, Pierrier,* T.B.s 328, 332.

SOUTH ITALY AND IONIAN ISLANDS.—6 trawlers.

DARDANELLES AND SALONIKA.—*Patrie, Charlemagne, Gaulois, Henri IV, Bruix, Kléber, L. Treville, Hussard, Mortier, Pique, Sarbacane,* 3 trawlers, 2 drifters.

MUDROS.—*Suffren, République, Poignard, Topaze,* 4 T.B.s de défense. At sea on escort duty *Cognée, Tirailleur.*

CAPE HELLES PATROL.—*Trident, Fanfare.*

ZEROS.—*Dupleix.*

EN ROUTE FOR TOULON.—*Massue.*

CYCLADES PATROL.—*Poupée,* 4 drifters.

ANATOLIAN PATROL.—3 trawlers, 4 drifters.

The limit of Admiral de Robeck's patrols in the Aegean was the line Lat. 38° N. to Samos Strait, from which the French patrols took on, the senior officer's ship being stationed at Port Iero, thus ensuring quick co-operation and communication between the French and British patrols.

The French had now given up the Malta Channel and practically all the deep sea area in the Eastern basin of the Mediterranean, retaining portions near the coast for themselves and the Italians. The patrol of the Malta Channel was carried out by Admiral Limpus with the *Harrier* and six minesweeping trawlers, whilst the deep sea portion of the Eastern Mediterranean seems to have been practically without patrol, for the only patrol vessels available in Egypt were one armed boarding steamer, the two 9·2 inch monitors, six armed trawlers, and three sloops on passage out.¹

190. **French Transport Service, December, 1915.**—The transport of British and Indian troops from Marseilles to Salonika and Egypt was not proceeding altogether smoothly. There was a lack of coal and labour at Marseilles and a great shortage of French escorts; and on December 5 the Admiralty decided that transports which could steam not less than 14 knots might proceed without escort.² Early in the month, owing to the necessity of returning to Italy the torpedo boat flotilla placed at her disposal by the Naval Convention, the French found themselves unable to continue the escort of transports to Salonika.³ The main army was landed by this date, but drafts and supplies had still to be transported. On December 12 Admiral Dartige du Fournet therefore initiated a new service of supply for the army at Salonika.⁴ Six armed auxiliary cruisers, the *Savoie I, Lorraine II, Burdigala, Provence II, Lutetia,* and *Sant' Anna,* were detailed for the transport of the drafts of personnel; they were well armed and would not be escorted. For material, 14 merchant ships were employed, viz.:—*Colbert, Amiral Gantheaume, Amiral Charner, Havraise, Mont Cervin, Annam, Basque, Médie, Loire, Ville de Rouen, Chili, Néra, Britannia,* and *Caraïbe.* These ships mounted two guns each. They were not to be escorted, but would sail in pairs in order to be able to support one another by their gun-fire in case of attack. One vessel at least of each pair was to be provided with W/T, and not more than 150 troops were to be shipped aboard any one of these vessels. In exceptional cases the Ministry of Marine or the Commander-in-Chief might give orders that vessels carrying valuable cargo were to be escorted.

¹ M. 08613/15, etc.

² A 578, 586.

³ A 596.

⁴ M. 09781/15.

In acquainting the Admiralty of the decision no longer to escort their own transports in the Mediterranean, the French Ministry of Marine inquired under what conditions the transport of British troops should continue to be effected. Whilst refraining from stating definitely that they could no longer spare ships for escort, they informed the Admiralty that the provision of such vessels was a matter of extreme difficulty; and they suggested that the Admiralty should adopt their own plan of transporting troops in old battleships fitted for such service. Of the four warships, *Mars*, *Magnificent*, *Hannibal*, and *Terrible*, which had been thus employed since October, the *Hannibal* was no longer fit to steam and was moored at Alexandria as depot ship of the trawlers which were being despatched to Egypt for anti-submarine work, and the *Terrible* had definitely broken down and it was questionable whether she could even be rendered fit to steam home to England. The delays caused by waiting for escorts, and the resulting congested state of Marseilles harbour, had already evoked from the Admiralty permission for fast armed transports to proceed without escort,¹ but they advised the Ministry of Marine that they expected the Commander-in-Chief to take adequate measures for the protection, within the zones of French responsibility, of such transports as were slow or insufficiently armed. During December, therefore, the French continued to provide escorts for such ships, and these were eked out by making use of destroyers and other small craft on passage eastwards. But after January 1 the French reported that they would no longer be able to continue the escort service for their own transports and they hinted very plainly that the escort of British troopships would be inconvenient.² At this date, December 29, out of 71 British transports working in the Mediterranean all except 15 had been armed, and these would be armed as rapidly as guns could be obtained. Until then, however, the Admiralty was relentless in the decision that unarmed troop transports must continue to be escorted.³ The control of the transport service for the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force at Salonika was centralised under the Transport Officer at Mudros on December 12.⁴

191. **Schemes for Protection of Shipping.**—On November 20 Admiral Dartige du Fournet forwarded to the Ministry of Marine an estimate of the number of torpedo boats and trawlers necessary for (a) the protection of the principal routes in the Mediterranean, (b) the search for submarines in these waters at their supply bases and the destruction of the latter.⁵ As regards (a), some 9,000 miles of routes had to be patrolled. The French at this time were still using the system of escorted convoys, and the Commander-in-Chief estimated that 140 T.B.s would be required, of which the French could supply 57 and the British

¹ A 586. ² A 611. ³ A 617. ⁴ A 597. ⁵ M. 09493/15.

were counted upon to supply 83,¹ exclusively for the patrol and protection of the routes. Admiral Dartige du Fournet further suggested that the Straits of Otranto, Gibraltar and the Dardanelles should be hermetically sealed²—somewhat of a counsel of perfection, at least as regards the two former. For (b), the search for enemy submarines and their bases, he considered that 19 zones should be formed, divided as for responsibility between the British and French³ in accordance with the division of command at present in force. The Commander-in-Chief estimated that 280 trawlers would be required, of which the French could supply, at most, 78.

Admiral Dartige du Fournet acquainted with his scheme the Admiral Superintendent, Malta, and Admiral Wemyss, who was temporarily in charge at the Dardanelles during Admiral de Robeck's absence. It was clear to Admiral Limpus that the British Admiralty could not possibly supply all the destroyers which the plan called for, and he suggested that the number should be cut down to 80 or 84 for the patrol of the routes, by dispensing with convoy escorts. All the destroyers were to be under the direct control of the Commander-in-Chief, except those at Gibraltar and Otranto; and he suggested that an Admiral of Patrols should be appointed for the area west of Malta and one for the eastern half of the Mediterranean. The latter suggestion was partially put into effect on December 22, with the appointment of Rear-Admiral R. Le Marchant to serve under Admiral Limpus for the command of the auxiliary patrol boats based on Malta.

Admiral Wemyss considered that the patrol and searching flotillas throughout the Mediterranean should be controlled from one centre by an Admiral of Patrols, exception being made in the case of the Adriatic and the local protection of bases.⁴ Like Admiral Limpus, he was aware that the Admiralty would not be able to supply sufficient destroyers for escort work; and for the safe passage of shipping he proposed the following scheme. He pointed out that experience had shown that practically no ships were attacked by submarines at night, and he suggested that a series of "safe anchorages" should be provided, some 143 miles apart, in which ships could lie during the daytime if submarine activity rendered it advisable. The anchorages should be protected by nets and should be adequately patrolled.

192. **Conference of December 2-3.**⁵—However, the plans of the French Commander-in-Chief and the suggestions of Admirals Limpus and Wemyss remained in abeyance; for on December 2, as a result no doubt of Admiral Dartige du Fournet's report to the Ministry of Marine, a conference was held in Paris to discuss

¹ The Memo. says 73.

² "Hermétiquement gardées."

³ The Adriatic was not included in the scheme, and the coast of Tripoli is not mentioned.

⁴ M. 09650/15.

⁵ M. 09374/15.

the measures to be taken in the Mediterranean for the protection of shipping and prosecution of the anti-submarine war.¹

It was evident at the Conference that the French were not yet fully aware of the dangers attendant upon employing large, comparatively slow ships to hunt submarines. Admiral Ronarc'h, for instance, suggested the employment of old light cruisers such as our *Edgar* class for the protection of trade routes, and he even suggested that old battleships of the *Mars* and *Hannibal* classes should be used to convoy transports, though he did not press the point. The French did not consider that their patrol boats could keep the sea in winter, and it was evident that during those months their patrols would be limited entirely to coastal navigation.

It seems that the French could not acquit us of a dereliction of duty in having failed to prevent German submarines from passing the Straits of Gibraltar, and they clearly did not understand that these craft could remain submerged for about 75 hours, a length of time sufficient to enable them, if so they wished, to drift through the Straits on the current alone. They were of the opinion that the German submarines placed great reliance on bases of supply, whereas the British view was that a German submarine could keep the sea for a month without re-fuelling, after which it would probably be very necessary for her to return to a base port where repairs could be effected and she could be overhauled. As for provisions, bases were unnecessary, for she could take what she required from the ships she stopped.

193. Zones of Patrol Arranged.—The measures which the conference decided to recommend to their respective Admiralties comprised the following:—

- (1) A distribution of the patrol vessels of each nation in a series of zones.
- (2) The organisation of movements of merchant vessels, whether requisitioned or not.
- (3) The organisation of a service of information for ships at sea by W/T or by semaphore with regard to the movements of enemy submarines.

The zones of patrol were as follows²:—

Zone 1 (British).—*Straits of Gibraltar* up to line Oran-Cape Palos. (The seven British yachts at present on Algerian coast should be allotted to this zone.)

¹ The members of the Conference were as follows:—

Italy.—Captain di Vascello Grassi and Luogotenente di Vascello Leone (Italian Naval Attaché, Paris).

Great Britain.—Captain Grant and Commander Acton (British Naval Attaché, Paris).

France.—Vice-Admiral Ronarc'h and Capitaine de Vaisseau Grasset (sous-chef de l'Etat Majeur of the Commander-in-Chief).

² See Plan X.

Zone 2 (French).—*Western Mediterranean* bounded on the west by the line Oran-Cape Palos, and on the east by the lines Vintimiglio-Cape Corso; west coast of Corsica and of Sardinia, meridian Cape Spartivento.

Zone 3 (Italian).—*Tyrrhenian Sea.*—Boundaries: Vintimiglio-Cape Corso, east coast of Corsica, mouths of the Bonifacio, Sardinia, line Cape Spartivento-Trapani.

Zone 4 (French).—*Coast of Tunis* from the frontier of Algeria to the frontier of Tripoli, zone bounded by the broken line Tabarca-Spartivento-Marittimo-Pantellaria-Lampedusa-Zarsis.

Zone 5 (British).—*Malta.*—Southern Coasts of Sicily.—Boundaries: Cape Passaro, Medina Bank, Lampedusa, Pantellaria, Marittimo, Trapani.

Zone 6 (Italian).—*East Sicily-Otranto.*—Coasts of Cape Passaro to Otranto. Zone limited by the lines Otranto-Linguetta and Passaro-Kephali (passing to the north of Merlera).

Zone 7 (Italian).—*Adriatic Sea.*—To the north of the line Otranto-Linguetta. (All the British and French ships allotted in this zone are at the disposal of the Italian Navy.)

Zone 8 (French).—*Ionian Islands.*—The islands to the north of Corfu to Sapienza.

Zone 9 (French).—*Matafan.*—Sapienza-Kalamata-Kolokythia-Channels of Cervi and Cerigo. The Aegean Sea enters the parallel of Cerigotto, the southern limit of the Zone 13 and meridian of Milo (west point).

Zone 10 (French).—*Crete.*—Coast of the island and adjacent islands. Cerigotto Channel; bounded north and east by lines Cerigotto-Kamila and Kamila-Casso.

Zone 11 (French).—*Archipelago.*—Zone comprised between the parallels of Cerigotto and the southern boundary of Zone 13, the meridians west of Milo and west of Stampalia.

Zone 12 (French).—*Dodecanese-Asia Minor.*—Zone comprised between the meridian N. Stampalia, the coast of Asia Minor, the southern boundary of Zone 13, and the line Kamila-Casso-C. Khelidonia.

Zone 13 (British).—*Dardanelles.*—Zone to the north of the line Samos-Nicaria-Mykoni-Tinos-Andros-Eubea. (The 10 French trawlers allotted up to the present to this zone should be employed in the French zones.)

Zone 14 (French).—*Caramania.*—From C. Khelidonia to Mersina coasts west and north of Cyprus.

Zone 15 (French).—*Syria* (north part).—From Mersina to Khaifa (Jaffa) coasts east and south of Cyprus.

Zone 16 (French).—*Syria* (south part).—From Jaffa to Port Said.

Zone 17 (British).—*Egypt*.—From Port Said to Sollum.

Zone 18 (Italian).—*Tripoli*.—From the frontier of Egypt to the frontier of Tunis.

In each zone the patrols were to operate for the most part in those routes usually followed by vessels transporting troops or supplies, and the Allies interested in the various zones were to augment the number of their patrol vessels detailed to those zones and to keep them at sea as much as possible. The patrols were to operate against contraband of all kinds as well as against enemy submarines.

It was decided that the arming of all merchant vessels, but particularly troop transports and supply ships, with at least one gun and gun's crew should be carried into effect as soon as possible; and the Admiralty gave effect to this decision by authorising the transference of guns from colliers to troop or store transports or oilers as requisite, 2½ pdrs. being mounted in the colliers in lieu when available.¹ The value of such defensive armament to a merchantman was amply demonstrated by the figures of losses. In November 52 merchant ships (including transports, etc.) were attacked by enemy submarines in the Mediterranean. Twelve of these escaped, of which five were armed, and 40 were sunk, of which three only were armed, two, the *Woodfield* and *Lumina*, being outgunned, and one, the *Treneglos*, torpedoed without warning. Twenty-seven ships (at least) were attacked during December. Nineteen of these were sunk, including two ships armed with a gun, the *Persia* and *Clan Macfarlane*, both of which were torpedoed without warning, while of the eight ships which escaped five were armed. Even when an armed ship failed to escape, the effect of her gun was usually to compel the enemy submarine to expend a torpedo.

Up to the present it had been found possible to escort the greater number of troop transports and supply ships by means of the war vessels detailed for the purpose and by making use of sloops, trawlers, and other small craft on passage through the Mediterranean; but the winter weather and the deterioration of the vessels employed on this service, which it might moreover be necessary to employ for other purposes, rendered escort by small craft increasingly difficult and, in the opinion of the Conference, it would soon become impossible. Transports and supply ships were, therefore, to be sailed in groups of two or three, so that they might act for mutual protection, and must be given routes as far as possible in the patrol zones, these being frequently modified. The French Commander-in-Chief would continue to fix routes, but it was open to the naval authority commanding any particular patrol zone to modify the routes within his own zone according to circumstances. There would still remain considerable areas where no control or protection was



C & R. LTD. V. 439.

¹ A 594a.



Explanation of Letters against Numbers in Patrol Areas
 Br British, Fr French, It Italian.

PLAN X.
MEDITERRANEAN
 SHOWING
PATROL AREAS.
 1ST JAN: 1916.

provided for. Practically the entire eastern basin of the Mediterranean, for example, remained outside the zones of patrol; and it was decided that the British should allot to this area such vessels as they could provide, while the French undertook the responsibility in the basin west of Malta.

Finally, a service of information was organised under which a merchant ship or requisitioned vessel should signal the presence of a submarine and receive warnings of the presence of hostile craft. For the latter purpose the following signal stations were organised:—

Station.	Wave-length, metres.	Sending at hours, G.M.T.
Gibraltar	—	11 and 23
Bizerta (Sidi Abdallah)	1800	6 18
Toulon (Mourillon) ..	1350	1 13
Rome	2500	4 16
Malta (Rinella) ..	2500	9 21
Ben Ghazi	1400	0 12
Rhodes	1200	3 15
Port Said	600	6 18

and the Italians offered the following stations to co-operate in the detection of enemy submarines:—Favignana, Pantellaria, Punta Libeccio and Punta Troia (both in Marittimo Island), and Granitola.¹

194. **Measures to Increase the Local Patrol Vessels.**—It was decided that the new patrol arrangements should come into force on January 1, 1916, and the Admiralty at once initiated measures to increase the forces at the disposal of the British Senior Naval Officers in the Mediterranean up to the following strength:—

GIBRALTAR.—8 armed yachts, 6 sloops.

MALTA.—12 sloops, 4 destroyers, 2 yachts, 48 armed trawlers.

EGYPT.—12 sloops, 1 armed yacht, 48 trawlers.²

There were already at Malta or on passage there 25 armed trawlers awaiting disposal, 19 of them being German prizes; and on December 9 the Admiralty sent orders that they were to be distributed as follows. Three complete units of six boats per unit were to be retained at Malta, and one unit of six boats and the odd boat were to be sent to Alexandria,³ where the *Hannibal*, whose boiler tubes were no longer safe, was moored as depot ship. The unit sent to Alexandria was to be composed of boats armed with 12 pdr. guns.⁴ Sixty-six more trawlers and

¹ A 619.

² M. 09761/15.

³ The odd boat was, however, detained at Malta with defects.

⁴ A 593. The boats were: 1756 *Fulmar*, 1037 *Cabalsin*, 1932 *Cachosin*, 1935 *Calumsin*, 1931 *Charksin*, 1943 *Churchsin*.

three yachts were despatched in the middle of November from Falmouth—30 trawlers and two yachts for Malta, and 36 trawlers and one yacht for Alexandria.¹

The destroyers *Acorn*, *Minstrel*, *Rifleman*, and *Sheldrake* were despatched to join Admiral Limpus' force during December, the usual opportunity being taken of their passage to escort troop transports as far as Malta. Three armed yachts were fitting out, and were destined for Malta. Sloops were despatched as fast as they were received from the builders, though delivery was not expected to be complete until the end of February, 1916.² The *Narcissus*, which left the Clyde on November 14, was already working in the Gibraltar Patrol; and the *Acacia*, from Scapa, left Cardiff on December 29 to join Admiral Currey's force at Gibraltar.³

The armed yachts we had placed at the disposal of the French for patrol off the Algerian coast, which they apparently considered to be rather useless, were to be returned to Admiral Burney before the new patrol measures came into force, the date

¹ Trawlers sent to Alexandria as tenders to *Hannibal* :—

- Unit 70. 1152 *Dragoon*, 593 *Margaret Duncan*, 718 *Roscano*, 1799 *Penrice Castle*, 595 *Glenroy*, 305 *Natal II*.
Lieutenant H. J. Graves, R.N.R., Sub-Lieutenant W. F. Amy, R.N.R.
- Unit 107. 2655 *Princess Alice*, 2666 *Pointz Castle*, 2663 *Noogana*, 2667 *Bush*, 2669 *Ijuin*, 2670 *Salome*.
Lieutenant C. C. Humphreys, R.N.R., Lieutenant H. O. Pattison, R.N.R.
- Unit 51. 1577 *Jericho*, 1567 *Cardinal*, 1907 *Earl Kitchener*, 1608 *Retako*, 1615 *Relevo*, 1616 *Veresis*.
Lieutenant-Commander W. Dickson, R.N., Sub-Lt. I. T. White, R.N.R.
- Unit 76. 1378 *Spider*, 1370 *Dane II*, 1368 *King Eric*, 1754 *Esher*, 1755 *Thunderstone*, 1375 *St. Malo*.
Lieutenant W. J. Stevens, R.N.R., Lieutenant A. G. Dodman, R.N.R.
- Unit 72. 1177 *Lord Knollys*, 674 *Cerelia*, 1178 *Loch Tummel*, 1374 *Norbreck*, 673 *Revello*, 26 *Liberia*.
Lieutenant H. Tarver, R.N.R., Sub-Lieutenant C. S. McClure, R.N.R.
- Yacht No. 084 *North Star II* to join Unit No. 18.

Organisation of Auxiliary Patrol Vessels to be used from Malta :—

- Unit 41. 690 *Hawk*, 396 *Vigilant II*, 771 *Limewold*, 391 *Oceanic II*, 409 *Gull*, 1614 *Helonzo*.
Lieutenant H. J. Ferguson, R.N.R., Lieutenant D. Todd Gorrie, R.N.R.
- Unit 25. 966 *Eva Wales*, 369 *St. Vincent II*, 1587 *Destiny*, 712 *Bermuda*, 1547 *Lemberg*, 618 *Virginian II*.
Lieutenant H. L. Mack, R.N.R., Sub-Lieutenant F. A. C. Heslop, R.N.R.
- Unit 93. 1181 *Princess Mary*, 1582 *Doctor Lee*, 1235 *Lord Wolmer*, 1189 *Stratheden*, 1190 *Loch Lee*, 1234 *Lord Ashby*.
Lieutenant R. S. Durham, R.N.R., Lieutenant D. Mahood, R.N.R.
- Unit 96. 1753 *Drypool*, 1504 *Princeps*, 1198 *Loch Assater*, 1345 *Mary Weatherly*, 1750 *Strathugie*, 1574 *Rainbow*.
Lieutenant H. A. Ridsdale, R.N.R., Lieutenant H. Roberts, R.N.R.
- Unit 83. 1232 *Raetia*, 1233 *Strephon*, 1175 *Clementina II*, 1173 *Loch Hourn*, 1236 *Riparoo*, 1601 *Garn*.
Lieutenant G. Parry, R.N.R., Lieutenant H. H. Richards, R.N.R.

Yacht No. 082 *Aegusa* to join Unit 25.

Yacht No. 055 *Safa-el-Bahr* to join Unit 41.

² M. 09761/15.

³ A 616.

of which was fixed as January 1. In Egypt, Admiral Peirse had already under his orders, or on passage to join him, the sloops *Magnolia*, *Mimosa*, *Mallow*, *Lily*, and *Veronica*.¹

On December 22 Rear-Admiral Evelyn R. Le Marchant was appointed to Malta as Admiral of Patrols.

195. **The New Patrol Measures Initiated, January 1, 1916.**—The decisions of the Allied Naval Conference were communicated to Admirals de Robeck and Peirse, and the Senior Naval Officers at Malta and Gibraltar, who were asked to state their views.²

Admiral de Robeck considered that the zones were too small and that in fixing them more attention should have been paid to the great essential of any patrol scheme, namely, rapid wireless intercommunication. In his opinion the division of the Aegean, as it stood, would have the opposite effect; wireless intercommunication between the British and French had always been unreliable; and if the Admiralty could supply the necessary number of patrol craft Admiral de Robeck recommended that the British should assume responsibility for the whole of the Aegean, thus ensuring unbroken control from Salonika to Egypt.³ But this proposal would necessitate very large modifications in other parts of the Mediterranean, and it was too late now to alter the arrangements which had been made by the three Powers.⁴ Admiral Limpus only demurred at the introduction of the new measures at a date when the reinforcement of the local patrols would still lack completion and the W/T arrangements would be incomplete; and he suggested that the introduction of the scheme should be postponed until February 1.⁵ But he was averse from any change in the plan at this particular moment, which would lead to great confusion and delay; and in common with the French Commander-in-Chief he advised that, even though the plan might not be perfect, it should at least be given the necessary trial which would expose its shortcomings and permit of improvements based upon experience to be made.⁶

The year 1915 closed darkly in the Mediterranean as in the other theatres of war. At the Dardanelles, Suvla and Anzac had been evacuated and withdrawal from the Gallipoli Peninsula was imminent. The Serbian army was a broken remnant and the Allied troops who should have saved it were digging themselves in for their own protection in treacherous Greek territory. The German submarines, though they had not succeeded in holding up or even seriously affecting our trade and the communications of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, had at any rate escaped practically unscathed up to date. There were difficulties,

¹ See section 173.

² M. 09374/15.

³ A 614.

⁴ A 615.

⁵ A 608.

⁶ A 618.

too, in the smooth working of the transport system. Perhaps Admiral Limpus unconsciously voiced a feeling of impatience, not unshared by other officers, when he wrote of the scheme which was to come into operation with the new year: "It may not be the best possible scheme, but let us start with it and get it into working order." If there was a hint of impatience in his words, there was also the spirit of endeavour, a fitting spirit in which to commence the new year.

APPENDIX A.

TELEGRAMS AND SIGNALS.

1914.

A1. Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. (176).

S.N.O., Gib. (350), except A-B. 27th July.

A.S., Malta (215), except A-B. Ack. by C.-in-C. 5.59 p.m.

Secret. European political situation makes war between Triple Alliance and Triple Entente Powers by no means impossible. This is *not* the warning telegram, but be prepared to shadow possible hostile men-of-war. Measure is purely precautionary. The utmost secrecy is to be observed and no unnecessary person is to be informed.

A. Return to Malta as arranged at ordinary speed and remain there with all your ships completing with coal and stores. Warn *Defence* to be ready to rejoin with despatch. B.

A2. Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. (177).

S.N.O., Gib. (354).

29th July.

A.S., Malta (223).

Recd. by C.-in-C. 10.1 p.m.

Act on Secret War Standing Orders Articles II to IV inclusive in view of possibility of war with certain Powers. Put into force War Position Table from 2 a.m. 30th July. Acknowledge.

A3. Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn.

29th July.

Sent 11.40 p.m.

179 In the event of War your War Orders No. 2 will come into force.

A4. Adty. to R.A., 1st C.S. (Durazzo).

29th July.

6 *Defence* and Destroyers are to return forthwith to Malta. Inform C.-in-C.

A5. Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn.

30th July.

Sent 3.10 p.m. Recd. 8 p.m.

183 Should war break out and England and France engage in it, it now seems probable that Italy will remain neutral and that Greece can be made an Ally. Spain also will be friendly and, possibly, an Ally. The attitude of Italy is, however, uncertain, and it is especially important that your squadron should not be seriously engaged with Austrian ships before we know what Italy will do. Your first task should be to aid the French in the transportation of their African Army by covering, and, if possible, bringing to action individual fast German ships, particularly *Goeben*, who may interfere with that transportation. You will be notified by telegraph when you may consult with the French Admiral. Do not at this stage be brought to action against superior forces, except in combination with the French, as part of a general battle. The speed of your squadrons is sufficient to enable you to choose your moment. We shall hope later to reinforce the Mediterranean, and you must husband your force at the outset.

A6. British Consul, Brindisi, to Adty.

31st July.

Recd. 11.7 a.m.

Following from Consul at Brindisi last night. Signs of activity fleet to-night, battle squadron getting up steam. Torpedo boats taking oil. Reported that rendezvous Taranto.

- A 7.** Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. 31st July.
186 A ship of First Cruiser Squadron to be at Marseilles by evening of 3rd August to embark next morning Lord Kitchener, the Sirdar, and eight officers for conveyance to Egypt at moderate despatch. Ship to call for orders at Malta.
- A 8.** Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. 31st July.
Sent 2 p.m.
187 *Carnarvon* reports 11.20 a.m. lat. 49° 40' N., long. 4° 36' W., passed German cruiser apparently *Strassburg* steering E. 18 knots.
- A 9.** C.-in-C., Meditn., to Adty. 31st July.
Recd. 4.24 p.m.
375 *Re* your 183. In view of small numbers and strength of British Mediterranean Fleet, in comparison with Austrian and Italian Fleets, I consider it necessary to keep force concentrated in order to carry out orders to assist French Fleet to protect transports; cruisers or light cruisers detached to protect trade routes might be captured and would be severe loss. I do not, therefore, propose to take any action at present to protect trade in Eastern Mediterranean Basin. I propose to remain at Malta with whole till I have received permission to consult French Admiral, but I will send light cruiser to watch south entrance of Straits of Messina. Have requested S.N.O., Gibraltar, to keep special look-out for *Strassburg*.
- A 10.** Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. (192). 1st August.
S.N.O., Gib. (370). Sent 3.30 p.m.
Examination Service is to be now enforced. Acknowledge.
- A 11.** Sir F. Bertie (Paris) to Adty. 1st August.
Sent 9.30 p.m. Recd. 2.15 a.m.
2nd August.
115 Naval Attaché reports following information from Ministry of Marine:—The Chief of the General Staff reports that the whole of the French Fleet is ready in every respect for any eventualities. Battleships *France* and *Paris* will be ready to join the Fleet on 15th August.
- A 12.** Rome to Foreign Office. 1st August.
Sent 9.26 p.m.* Recd. 9.41 p.m.
German ship *Breslau* arrived early to-day* coaling reported that returns to Albania. Italian ships have all left.
* ? 31st July.
- A 13.** A.S., Malta, to Adty. 1st August.
Recd. 1.20 a.m. 2nd August.
963 Arrived Brindisi German cruisers *Breslau*, *Goeben*.
- A 14.** Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to Foreign Office. 1st August.
Sent 7.35 p.m. Recd. 1.20 p.m. 2nd August.
147 Following from Brindisi to-day:—German ship *Goeben* coaling.
- A 15.** Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. 2nd August.
Sent 10.20 a.m.
197 Recall *Black Prince*.
- A 16.** Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. 2nd August.
Sent 1.30 p.m.
196 *Goeben* must be shadowed by two battle cruisers. Approach to Adriatic must be watched by cruisers and destroyers. Remain near Malta yourself. It is believed that Italy will remain neutral, but you cannot yet count absolutely on this.

- 2nd August.
Sent 11.20 a.m. Recd. 3.45 p.m.
A 17. Mr. Sinclair (Brindisi) to Foreign Office.
7 Urgent. German ship *Goeben* at Taranto.
- A 18.** Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie (Paris). 2nd August.
Sent 5.40 p.m.
303 After the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon the following aide-mémoire:—
“ I am authorised to give an assurance that if the German Fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British Fleet will give all the protection in its power.
“ This assurance is of course subject to the policy of H.M. Government receiving the support of Parliament and must not be taken as binding H.M. Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German Fleet takes place.”
I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues to consider and that Government felt that they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany to-morrow, but it was essential to the French Government, whose Fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German Fleet took the action indicated, but it did give a security to France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean Fleet.
- A 19.** C.-in-C., Meditn., to Adty. 2nd August.
Recd. 7 p.m.
386 Your 196. *Defence*, *Indomitable*, *Indefatigable*, *Warrior*, *Duke of Edinburgh*, *Gloucester*, eight destroyers under R.A., First Cruiser Squadron, will leave Malta this evening to carry out Service Orders. *Chatham* leaving now to watch Straits of Messina, south coast of Italy, and rejoin Rear-Admiral. Submit that I may be informed whether if *Goeben* and German cruiser *Breslau* pass out of Adriatic watch on mouth of Adriatic is to be maintained by ships not shadowing them, or whether force should then be concentrated to carry out orders in telegram 183, 30th July. Four destroyers watching Malta Channel *Inflexible*, *Dublin*, *Weymouth*, *Blenheim*, four destroyers remain at Malta for the present.
- A 20.** Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. 2nd August.
Sent 7.6 p.m.
200 You can enter into communication with the French Senior Naval Officer on your station for combined action in case Great Britain should decide to become ally of France against Germany. Situation very critical. Be prepared to meet surprise attacks.
- A 21.** C.-in-C., Meditn. to Adty. 2nd August.
387 At present I have no cypher in which to communicate with French Admiral, can contents of Secret Package A be used as cypher ?
- A 22.** Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. 3rd August.
Sent 12.50 a.m.
204 Your 386. Watch on mouth of Adriatic should be maintained, but *Goeben* is your objective. Follow her and shadow her wherever she goes, and be ready to act on declaration of war, which appears probable and imminent. Acknowledge.

- A 23.** C.-in-C., Meditn. to Adty. 3rd August.
Sent 5.45 a.m.
389 *Goeben* German cruiser *Breslau* reported arrived Messina one p.m. 2nd August. I have taken steps accordingly. Acknowledge receipt of telegram 204.
- A 24.** C.-in-C., Meditn., to Adty. 3rd August.
Recd. 9.5 a.m.
391 *Goeben* German cruiser *Breslau* are not at Messina, will continue to search to westward and towards French transport line from Algiers. *Gloucester* with eight destroyers will watch Adriatic.
- A 25.** Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. 3rd August.
Sent 9.40 a.m.
206 Your 367.* Contents of Secret Package A can be used as cypher for communicating with French Admiral.
* Should be 387.
- A 26.** Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 3rd August.
Sent 2.45 p.m.
388 *Goeben* and *Breslau* have got away from Mediterranean battle cruisers. Patrol the Straits and keep careful watch and inform C.-in-C., Mediterranean when patrol is formed.
- A 27.** Foreign Office to Sir R. Rodd (Rome). 3rd August.
Sent 3.30 p.m.
249 Immediate. Admiralty wish to know where *Goeben* is coaling.
- A 28.** C.-in-C., Meditn., to Adty. 3rd August.
Sent 5.10 p.m.
392 In accordance with Admiralty telegrams 196 and 204 2nd August 1st Cruiser Squadron has been ordered to support *Gloucester* and 8 destroyers watch* mouth Adriatic. *Black Prince*, *Beagle*, *Harpy*, *Grasshopper*, *Bulldog* will leave Malta 7 p.m. to-day to join First Cruiser Squadron. *Indomitable*, *Indefatigable*, *Chatham* will search westward for *Goeben* and *Breslau* in accordance with Admiralty telegram 200. *Dublin* will be sent to Bizerta with letter to S.N.O. Have been unable to communicate by wireless (? or) cable. *Inflexible* and *Weymouth* will watch Malta Channel to-night in readiness to assist where requisite.
* Should be "watching."
- A 29.** C.-in-C., Meditn., to Adty. 3rd August.
Sent 7.35 p.m.
393 My 392. In view of impossibility of ensuring coal supply I am retaining 3rd Division destroyers Malta 1st and 2nd Division will watch Adriatic as previously arranged.
- A 30.** Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn., 3rd August.
Sent 6.30 p.m. Recd. 8.30 p.m.
208 The two battle cruisers must proceed to Straits of Gibraltar at high speed ready to prevent *Goeben* leaving Mediterranean.
- A 31.** Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey. 3rd August.
Recd. 8.18 p.m.
127 Naval Attaché reports following information from the Ministry of Marine :—French Fleet sailed from Toulon at 5 a.m. this morning to watch German cruiser *Goeben* and protect transport of French African troops, which will commence to-morrow.
- A 32.** S.N.O., Gib., to Adty. 3rd August.
Recd. 9.40 p.m.
704 Your 388. Patrol formed. C.-in-C., Mediterranean, has been informed.

- A 33.** A.S., Malta, to Adty. 4th August.
Recd. 12.17 a.m.*
311 Eastern Telegraph Company reports received message from Bona (Algeria) that three or four German ships bombarding Bona between five-thirty and seven a.m. to-day and then left. E.T. Co. have telegraphed news to Gibraltar.
* Evidently an error. ? should be 12.17 p.m.
- A 34.** C.-in-C., Meditn., to Adty. 4th August.
Recd. 10.58 a.m.
Indomitable, *Indefatigable* sighted *Goeben*, *Breslau* off Bona 10 a.m. They are shadowed, *Dublin* ordered to assist. (1018.)
- A 35.** C.-in-C., Meditn., to Adty. 4th August.
Recd. 11.7 a.m.
395 Following from Rinella begins :—Reports German collier waiting Palma (Majorca) for *Goeben*. (1023.)
- A 36.** Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. 4th August.
Sent 11.20 a.m.
Indomitable.
Indefatigable.
Your message 1000. Very good. Hold her. War imminent.
- A 37.** Adty. to Foreign Office. 4th August.
Most urgent. German battle cruiser *Goeben* and fast light cruiser *Breslau* have been found west of Sicily, and are being shadowed by British battle cruisers *Indomitable* and *Indefatigable*. It would be a great misfortune to lose these vessels, as is possible in the dark hours. They are evidently going to interfere with the French transports, who are crossing to-day. The following telegram has already been sent :—"Good—hold her—war imminent."
We wish to add this :—"If *Goeben* attacks French transports you should at once engage her." An immediate decision is required.
- A 38.** Adty. to A.S., Malta. 4th August.
Sent 12.10 p.m.
Recd. 5.2 p.m. by C.-in-C.
239 Transmit following to C.-in-C., Mediterranean :—214 If *Goeben* attacks French transports, you should at once engage her. You should give her fair warning of this beforehand.
- A 39.** Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. (215). 4th August.
A.S., Malta (240). Sent 12.55 p.m.
Recd. (*Inflexible*) 5.48 p.m.
215 The Italian Government have declared neutrality. You are to respect this neutrality rigidly and should not allow any of H.M. ships to come within 6 miles of the Italian coast.
- A 40.** Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. 4th August.
Sent 2.5 p.m. Recd. 7.2 p.m.
216 The British ultimatum to Germany will expire at midnight G.M.T. 4th August. No act of war should be committed before that hour, at which time the telegram to commence hostilities against Germany will be despatched from the Admiralty. This cancels the authorisation to *Indomitable*, *Indefatigable* to engage *Goeben* if she attacks French transports.
- A 41.** Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 4th August.
397 The Straits patrol is to include the territorial waters in their patrol.
(C2859)

A 42. C.-in-C., Meditn. to Adty. 4th August.
Recd. 2.50 p.m.
396 1 p.m. *Goeben* and *Breslau* steering east, 15 knots, followed by *Indomitable*, *Indefatigable* at 5 miles. Weather hazy. *Breslau* disappearing northwards. (1329.)

A 43. C.-in-C., Meditn. to Adty. 4th August.
Sent 2.49 p.m. Recd. 3.10 p.m.
397 In view of the impossibility of coaling eight destroyers watching Adriatic, have ordered them to Malta. First Cruiser Squadron and *Gloucester* remain to watch. (1336.)

A 44. Sir F. Bertie (Paris) to Adty. 4th August.
Sent 1.30 p.m. Recd. 5.0 p.m.
134 Secret. Naval Attaché reports following information from Minister of Marine :—French Fleet have been given orders to bring *Goeben* to action if possible. *Goeben* is at present off Algerian coast.

A 45. Sir F. Bertie (Paris) to Foreign Office. 4th August.
Sent 1.15 p.m. Recd. 5.0 p.m.
132 Following from Military Attaché :— . . . It is hoped to bring from Algeria a force of about 20,000 : at present it is not deemed advisable to commence transportation across Mediterranean owing to presence of German warships ; probable time for transportation 12 days. . . .

A 46. Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. 4th August.
Sent 6.30 p.m.
218 You can enter into the closest co-operation with French officers on your station.

A 47. Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. (219).
A.S., Malta (243).
S.N.O., Gib. (401). 4th August.
General Message. Sent 6.45 p.m.

The war telegram will be issued at midnight authorising you to commence hostilities against Germany. But in view of the terms of our ultimatum they may decide to open fire at any moment. You must be ready for this.

A 48. Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. 4th August.
220 Act on your War Orders No. 2.

A 49. C.-in-C., Meditn., to Adty. 4th August.
Recd. 7.58 p.m.
398 *Indomitable* and *Indefatigable* lost sight of *Goeben* and *Breslau* in 38° N., 10° 16' E. at 5 p.m. steering eastward, outclassed in speed. *Dublin* may possibly keep in touch. *Indomitable* and *Indefatigable* steering slow speed to the westward in case of *Goeben* and *Breslau* returning towards Palma (Majorca), where they have colliers. Urgent. (1814.)

A 50. C.-in-C., Meditn. to Adty. 4th August.
Sent 9.46 p.m.
399 Following are dispositions made in view of your telegram 216 :—
Inflexible, *Indefatigable*, *Indomitable*, *Chatham*, *Weymouth*, *Savage*, *Rattlesnake*, *Pincher* will concentrate westward of Sicily.

Dublin is still trying to shadow *Goeben*, north of Sicily. One vessel of First Cruiser Squadron *Gloucester* will watch south of Straits of Messina, others with eight destroyers mouth of Adriatic. Colliers have been engaged Malta for destroyers. Five destroyers remain Malta protecting merchant vessels (and) trying to capture German merchant ships in vicinity. (2146.)

A 51. Adty. to All Ships. 4th August.
Sent 11 p.m.
299 Commence hostilities at once against Germany. (2300.)

A 52. Mr. Cheetham (Cairo) to Adty. 4th August.
60 Urgent. Seven German ships in harbour at Port Said and one at Suez, all fitted with W/T, are utilising these two ports as communicating stations with German cruisers.
They are reporting the arrival and departure of British ships amongst other messages.

G.O.C. desires immediate instructions.
Repeated to Admiral at Malta.

A 53. C.-in-C., Meditn., to Adty. 5th August.
Is Austria Neutral Power ?

A 54. Reply. Sent 12.30 p.m.
222 Austria has not declared war against France or England. Continue watching Adriatic for double purpose of preventing Austrians to emerge unobserved and preventing Germans entering.

A 55. Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. 5th August.
221 Following received from Venice :—Austrian Fleet at Pola consisting of battleships cruising outside, 12 cruisers and battleships in harbour. Austrian merchant vessels ordered to leave Venice. (0930.)

A 56. Marine, Paris, to Adty. 5th August.
Sent 10.45 a.m.
Prière dire Attaché Naval demander immédiatement à l'Amirauté envoyer si possible un croiseur à Casablanca, un croiseur devant entrer Gironde et assurer sécurité transport troupes entre Casablanca et détroit Gibraltar. Quelques croiseurs français Méditerranée pourraient être mis à la disposition du Commandant Supérieur anglais sur sa demande.

A 57. Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. (223). 5th August.
S.N.O., Gib. (412). Sent 2.6 p.m.
Official notice received mines being laid in Bosphorus and Dardanelles and lights extinguished.

A 58. Secretary of State for India to Government of India. 5th August.
352 Reinforcements from India. Cabinet have decided upon the early despatch of one division from India to Egypt. The possibility of its employment in Europe is to be kept in view. . . .

A 58a. Sir R. Rodd. (Rome) to F.O. 5th August.
Sent 11.30 a.m. Recd. 6.30 p.m.
175. Following sent to Consul at Messina :—"Urgent. Have learnt privately that German ship *Breslau* is attempting to procure coal from British collier at Messina. Captain should be warned to supply no coal to belligerent. If force being used protest to local authorities."

A 59. Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. (225). 6th August.
via Malta (251). Sent 3.20 a.m.
Naval Authorities Messina report *Breslau* coaling. Suspected *Goeben* also at Messina.

A 59a. Rome to Adty. 5th August.
Recd. 3.30 a.m. 6th August.
Following from Consul, Messina, German ship *Breslau* returned to Messina from north, 5th August, 7 a.m.

A 60. Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. 6th August.
Sent 6 a.m.
226 Following from Consul, Messina, German ship *Breslau* returned to Messina from north, 5th August, seven a.m.

A 60a. Consul, Messina, to Adty. 5th August.
Recd. 9.5 a.m. 6th August.
Despatched 6.45, *Goeben* at Messina.

A 60b. Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to F.O. 5th August.
Sent 11.15 p.m. Recd. 9.30 a.m.
6th August.
178 Following from Consul at Messina despatched 6.45, *Goeben* is at Messina.

A 61. Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. 6th August.
227 Press reports German ships *Moltke* and *König Albert* were preparing to convert themselves into cruisers yesterday at Genoa, ready to leave for unknown destination. Ambassador is making representations to Italian Government. (0835.)

A 62. Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. 6th August.
Sent 10.50 a.m.
228 Following from Consul, Messina, begins:—Despatched 6.45, *Goeben* at Messina.

A 63. Foreign Office to Sir G. Buchanan, St. Petersburg. 6th August.
468 We have not taken any initiative in declaring war on Austria because France has not yet done so, and it is undesirable till French Fleet is ready to oppose Austria.

A 64. Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. (229). 6th August.
S.N.O., Gib. (417). Sent 4.45 p.m.
G.O.C., Cairo.
German merchant ships *König Albert* and *Moltke* left Genoa night 5-6 believed full of coal and going east.

Addendum sent 5.0 p.m. Vessels referred to reported to have been converted into auxiliary cruisers.

A 65. Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. 6th August.
Sent 7.45 p.m. Recd. 10.54 p.m.
232 If *Goeben* goes south from Messina, you should follow through the Straits, irrespective of territorial waters.

A 65a. C.-in-C., Meditn., to Adty. 6th August.
Recd. 9.42 p.m.
403 *Goeben*, *Breslau* left Straits of Messina 6 p.m. proceeding towards Adriatic, *Gloucester* shadowing them. German ship *Kalymnos* being sent to Bizerta as prize. (2041.)

A 66. Sir G. Buchanan (St. Petersburg) to Foreign Office. 7th August.
Recd. 12.30 a.m.
235 Very urgent . . . His Excellency* hears that Austrian Fleet has left Pola and has reason to believe that Austria has made arrangements with Turkey for entrance of her Fleet into Dardanelles. . . .

* The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

A 67. C.-in-C., Meditn., to Adty. 7th August.
Recd. 6.52 a.m.
404 5.0 a.m. 7th August. *Goeben* and *Breslau* 37° 43' N., 19° E., evidently going to Eastern Mediterranean.

First Cruiser Squadron abandoned chase 4 a.m. *Gloucester* followed, but has been ordered to drop astern to avoid capture. *Inflexible*, *Indomitable*, *Indefatigable*, *Weymouth* will complete with coal at Malta then commence searching Eastern Mediterranean. *Chatham* will watch Straits of Messina for German armed mercantile cruisers. First Cruiser Squadron *Dublin* 10 destroyers will coal in Ionian Islands. (0548.)

A 68. Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. 7th August.
Sent 11 a.m.
234 Keep French Admiral fully informed of the situation.

A 69. C.-in-C., Meditn., to Adty. 7th August.
Sent 2.30 p.m.
405 Careful plotting shows speed of *Goeben* 27 knots, *Breslau* 28 knots. Maximum speed available British battle cruisers 24, cruisers 21½, light cruisers 25.

Goeben, *Breslau* avoided action last night and have proceeded towards Crete. After coaling at Malta *Inflexible*, *Indomitable*, *Indefatigable* one light cruiser will search for *Goeben* again. Watch on Adriatic being maintained as ordered.

A 70. Adty. to A.S., Malta. 8th August.
264 Be prepared to render any assistance to the French Fleet which may be expected.

A 71. Adty. to All Ships. 8th August.
Recd. (Inflexible) 1.58 p.m.
371 Commence hostilities at once against Austria.

A 72. Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. 8th August.
Sent 1.45 p.m. Recd. 3.50 p.m.
372 Negative my telegram hostilities against Austria. Acknowledge. Urgent.

A 73. C.-in-C., Meditn., to Adty. 8th August.
Sent 4.35 p.m. (?)
407 Am I to understand Admiralty telegram 372 cancels orders to commence hostilities against Austria?
Reply. Sent 5.35 p.m. Recd. 5.45 p.m. (?)
236 *Re* your telegram 407 Yes.

A 74. Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. 8th August.
Sent 6.10 p.m. Recd. 6.19 p.m. (?)
373 With reference to the cancellation of telegram notifying war on Austria, situation is critical.

A 75. C.-in-C., Meditn., to Adty. 8th August.
Sent 6.20 p.m. Recd. 6.15 p.m.
409 In view of Admiralty telegram 371, I am not following *Goeben* into Aegean Sea.

A 76. Marine, Paris, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 8th August.
Courbet, *Jean Bart*, 1st Battle Squadron and 1st Cruiser Squadron are coaling hastily Toulon and will leave as soon as ready for Bizerta.
2nd Battle Squadron, 2nd Cruiser Squadron and T.B. Flotillas are en route for Bizerta where they will complete their coal immediately. Will you let me know where are the Squadron Milne and Division Troubridge?

A 77. C.-in-C., Meditn., to Adty. 8th August.
Sent 7 p.m.
410 Your 373 received. In the event of war between Great Britain and Austria submit I may be informed attitude of Italy.

Reply. Sent 9th August.
237 Italy should be treated as a neutral who is friendly disposed.

9th August.
Sent 3.5 a.m. 8th August.
Recd. 1.15 a.m. 9th August.
A 78. Sir G. Buchanan to Adty.
247 Following from Naval Attaché:—Russian Admiralty informed from Athens *Goeben* and *Breslau* passed Matapan morning of the 7th August steering to north-east.

A 79. C.-in-C., Meditn., to Adty. 9th August.
411 . . . Submit that Port Vathy, Ithaca, and neighbouring anchorages may be used as bases for ships watching Adriatic.

Destroyers are now coaling from cruisers at Zante and colliers are due Port Vathy, Ithaca, to-day and to-morrow. (0851.)

Reply.
241 Observe the neutrality of Greece so far as possible coaling under the lee of the islands.

9th August.
A 80. Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. Sent 12.50 p.m. Recd. 2.35 p.m.
239 Not at war with Austria. Continue chase of *Goeben* which passed Cape Matapan early on 7th steering north-east.

9th August.
Sent 5.10 p.m.
A 81. Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn.
240 Russian Embassy, Paris, report *Goeben* coaled Syra eight August.

A 82. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 9th August.
446 Your 667. Most important trade should not be stopped unless absolutely necessary. (667 said E. bound shipping advised temporary delay.)

A 83. Adty. (F.N.A.) to French Adty. 9th August.
21 The Admiralty invites you use Malta as your base of operations for replenishing in order fleet should be in its zone of action as soon as possible and remain there.

A 84. C.-in-C., Meditn., to Adty. 9th August.
412 Your 239. *Inflexible*, *Indomitable*, *Indefatigable*, *Weymouth* are proceeding on service ordered. (1356.)

A 85. Marine, Paris, to Adty. 9th August.
7 The Fleet will be concentrated at Bizerta to-morrow. Propose plan of operations as follows:—

(1) If Austrian Fleet is in Adriatic, and *Goeben* and *Breslau* in Eastern Mediterranean, C.-in-C. to chase *Goeben* and *Breslau* with 3 battle cruisers, and French C.-in-C. with his other ships using Malta as base blockade Straits of Otranto. After destruction of *Goeben* and *Breslau* Anglo-French Fleet to be constituted as Convention of 6th August.

(2) If *Goeben* and *Breslau* in Adriatic with Austrian Fleet whole Anglo-French Fleet block Adriatic under Milne, one cruiser squadron, if ordered, to demonstrate in Aegean.

If you concur in these proposals please inform us as soon as possible, also Admiral Milne, and we will acquaint the French C.-in-C.

Reply.
3 Admiralty accepts first plan of operations proposed. The armoured cruisers and destroyers will join up with the French squadrons. (Sent 10th August.)

A 86. Adty., Paris, to Adty. 9th August.
Telegram received from you inform Admiralty that French Fleet is to be sent to Malta.

A 87. Deleted.

A 88. Deleted.

A 89. Marine, Paris, to Adty. (F.N.A.) 9th August.
9 1st Squadron of line and 1st Division of cruisers left Toulon for Bizerta at 8.30 this morning. 2nd Squadron of line, 2nd Division of cruisers, and T.B.D. Flotilla will be at Bizerta this afternoon. Complementary division en route for Algiers, where they will take a convoy. *Bruix*, *Latouche-Tréville*, *Amiral Charner* en route for Coast of Morocco where they will arrive to-morrow. . . .

A 90. Deleted.

A 91. F.O. to Sir F. Bertie (Paris) 9th August.
348 Urgent. . . . The British Admiralty consider that the arrival of the French Fleet at Malta and the consequent declaration of war against Austria are of great urgency. They are anxious to be informed at once as to when the French Fleet would be likely to arrive.

A 92. C.I.G.S. to G.O.C., Egypt. (79/5453.)
The despatch to India, with the least possible delay, of two divisions and one cavalry brigade has been ordered. The force will be organised with a view to its possible employment in Europe. By 15th August the advanced details will probably leave India. India will arrange for all food supplies for the force. The Press and all concerned should observe the utmost secrecy.

A 93. Adty. to Sir F. Bertie, Paris. 10th August.
354 Please let me know with least possible delay the moment you hear that France has declared or is declaring war against Austria, as I propose immediately to act in the same sense here.

A 94. Adty. to R.A., *Defence*. 10th August.
382 *Black Prince* or *Duke of Edinburgh* to proceed at once through Suez Canal to thoroughly search Red Sea for hostile armed merchant cruisers, proceeding southward at moderate speed and reporting result on arrival at Aden to Admiralty and C.-in-C., East Indies, Bombay; then await further orders.

A 95. Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. 10th August.
R.A., *Defence*, and A.S., Malta.
380 Two more light cruisers to join C.-in-C. in search of *Goeben* which is of paramount importance. Colliers to be sent after C.-in-C. into Aegean.

A 96. A.C., 1st C.S., to Adty. 10th August.
I have ordered *Dublin* and *Gloucester* to join C.-in-C., Mediterranean. (1650.)

A 97. A.C., 1st C.S., to Adty. 10th August.
347 *Black Prince* proceeding immediately to Red Sea. (2215.)

A 98. Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. 11th August.

243 Information received from Dardanelles that *Goeben* and *Breslau* arrived there 8.30 p.m. 10th August. You should establish a blockade of Dardanelles for the present, but be on the look-out for mines.

Reply.

414 Am I to understand all vessels are to be denied egress and ingress to Dardanelles or German ships only? If formal blockade is to be established, will declaration be issued by Home Government? (1624?)

Further Reply.

245 In reply to your 1624, no blockade intended only to carefully watch the entrance in case enemy cruisers come out.

A 99. Marine, Paris, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 11th August.

9 Instructions sent to Admiral Lapeyrière after receipt of your telegram only reached him in the evening. By agreement with Admiral Milne he formed patrol with closer surveillance between Cape Bon and Marittimo. After receiving this information we have telegraphed C.-in-C., French Fleet, to assemble immediately fleet and proceed Malta. 1st Squadron and cruisers on the way, 2nd Squadron to follow.

Note.—The telegram referred to was evidently about *Goeben* and *Breslau* having passed Dardanelles.

A 100. Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. and R.A., 1st C.S. 11th August.

243 All vessels watching Adriatic under Rear-Admiral are to follow the orders of French Admiral, using Malta for same service. (1400.)

11th August.

Handed in 10.45 p.m. 10th.

Recd. 9.47 a.m. 11th.

A 101. Dardanelles to Adty.

10th August 8.30 p.m. *Goeben* arrived, *Breslau* arrived. Acknowledge this.

A 101a. Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn., and R.A., *Defence*. 12th August.

Send *Duke of Edinburgh* at once to Aden and inform French C.-in-C.

A 102. A.S., Malta, to Adty. 12th August.

French Fleet arrived . . .

A 103. Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. 12th August.

247 Proceed to Malta in *Inflexible*. Leave *Indomitable*, *Indefatigable* and one light cruiser at Besika Bay under Senior Captain to watch Dardanelles. Send one light cruiser to Port Said to complete with coal and await orders. Take the third light cruiser with you to Malta. Acknowledge.

A 104. Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. 12th August.

248 The following agreement has been made with the French Government. The German cruisers in the Mediterranean being disposed of, and Austria being the only enemy, our armoured ships except *Defence* to be withdrawn from Mediterranean. The supreme command of the French and remaining British forces in the Mediterranean to be vested in the French Naval C.-in-C. As you are senior to the French C.-in-C. you will have to return home with the armoured ships leaving Troubridge and Carden under French orders. In Home Waters and in all other parts of the world, all French naval forces are placed under the respective British Admirals. Detailed orders to you will follow. Watch on Dardanelles by 2 battle cruisers to be maintained.

A 105. Adty. to Marine, Paris. 12th August.

6 In order to escort British transports in the Red Sea, *Black Prince* and *Duke of Edinburgh* have been withdrawn from the Mediterranean. One light cruiser goes to Port Said and may be sent down Red Sea to catch *Königsberg*.

A 106. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. (469). 13th August.
A.S., Malta (278).

Commence hostilities at once against Austria.

A 107. Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. 15th August.

251 Your 423. *Warrior* not to be recalled.

A 108. Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn., R.A. *Defence*, French C.-in-C.

252 The situation as regards *Goeben* and *Breslau* is so unsatisfactory that the following dispositions appear desirable. *Defence*, *Blenheim* and all destroyers to proceed immediately to Dardanelles. Admiral Troubridge to shift his flag temporarily to one of the battle cruisers and establish a close watch for enemy ships off Dardanelles. The light cruisers to remain at disposal of French C.-in-C., also *Warrior* for the present.

A 109. Adty. to C.-in-C., Meditn. 15th August.

Return to Plymouth in *Inflexible* leaving some of your clerical staff at Malta. Acknowledge.

A 110. Adty. to *Duke of Edinburgh* and *Black Prince*. 16th August.

131 On arrival at Aden, both ships to coal. The first ship ready is to proceed to Bombay, get in touch with R.A., *Swiftsure*, and act under his orders for convoying transports to Aden. The second ship is to remain at or near Aden and convoy transports up the Red Sea to Suez.

A 111. C.-in-C., Meditn., to Adty. 16th August.

433 British agent at Cairo reports presence of British ships of war Suez is most urgently necessary in view of anticipated movement of Turkish troops and attempted blocking of Canal. Have ordered *Black Prince* to remain Suez to await Admiralty orders.

A 112. Adty. to A.S., Malta. 16th August.

294 *Black Prince* urgently required at Aden. Order *Chatham* to Suez at once. *Warrior* to Port Said. (1745.)

A 113. C.-in-C., Meditn., to A.C., 1st C.S., and *Warrior*. 16th August.

Warrior is to proceed immediately to Port Said and communicate direct on arrival with British Agent, Cairo. Report date and time due. Inform French Admiral this is Admiralty order urgent.

A 114. C.-in-C., Meditn., Malta, to Adty. 16th August.

437 French Admiral has ordered *Dublin* and *Weymouth* to remain at Malta to await orders.

A 115. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. (492). 17th August.
C.-in-C., Meditn. (257).

492 No merchant ships are to clear for the Dardanelles until further orders.

A 116. Deleted.

- A 117.** Adty. to A.S., Malta. 17th August.
296 *Warrior* to go to Port Said, remain there 12 hours of daylight and then take station at Alexandria pending developments.
- A 118.** A.S., Malta, to Adty. 17th August.
386 *Chatham* arrived Suez, awaiting instructions.
- A 119.** Adty. to *Chatham*, Suez. 18th August.
Chatham to remain at Suez to deal with any situation that may arise.
- A 120.** Adty. to S.N.O., Malta. 18th August.
260 A.S. will continue in charge of all Naval Establishments and torpedo craft for local defence at Malta, but is not to exercise any command over sea-going vessels on the station which are left in charge of R.A. commanding 1st Cruiser Squadron. Both Flag Officers to act under the orders of French C.-in-C. direct.
- A 121.** Adty. to S.N.O., Malta. 18th August.
262 Pass following to R.A., *Defence*. The Egyptian position requires the presence of more naval protection. Detach a division of 4 destroyers to Port Said. . . .
- A 122.** Adty. to R.A., *Defence*. 18th August.
7 Most important to show no hostile intentions to Turkey. Your duty is to prevent the *Goeben* and *Breslau* leaving the Dardanelles. Use no threats. Watch events. Keep in touch with Ambassador at Constantinople.
- A 123.** Adty. to R.A., *Defence*. 19th August.
8 Send one of the battle cruisers to Gibraltar via Malta to fill up with coal and await orders, sending her away after dark and keeping her movements from knowledge of Turks.
- A 124.** A.S., Malta, to Adty. 22nd August.
426 French Admiral informs me British Navy should undertake watch trade routes Malta to Port Said as may be necessary and places *Weymouth*, *Dublin* under my orders. Propose to send *Dublin* to Port Said under orders of R.A., Cruiser Squadron, and retain *Weymouth* in vicinity Malta.
- A 125.** Adty. to A.S., Malta. 22nd August.
321 Your 426. *Dublin* to proceed along trade route to Port Said, coal, and proceed at once to Jaffa to show the flag. Russians reported to be suffering from acts of the Turks. Trade near Malta protected by the known presence of the French Fleet. *Weymouth* to guard trade route south of Crete, using Port Said or Malta as a coaling base.
- A 126.** Adty. to *Chatham*, Suez. 23rd August.
You are to escort transports *Dongola* and *Somali* as far as Aden. They are now at Port Said.
- A 127.** Adty. to A.S., Malta. 23rd August.
322 Now order *Weymouth* to proceed along the trade route to Port Said instead of remaining south of Crete. Have you any information of any German armed merchantmen in Mediterranean waters, or of any Austrian cruisers or armed merchantmen getting out of the Adriatic ?

- A 128.** Adty. to French C.-in-C., Meditn. 23rd August.
Reference your directions to A.S., Malta, for R.A., *Indefatigable*, to be responsible for protection of trade routes between Malta and Port Said, detaching *Dublin* and *Weymouth* for that purpose. The British Admiralty feel that the trade route is reasonably safe but would wish to employ these cruisers in the Indian Ocean to hunt out *Königsberg* which is now a threat to the transport of our troops across that ocean. May the Admiralty ask you to prevent any Austrian raiding vessels getting away ?
- A 129.** A.S., Malta, to R.A., 1st C.S. 24th August.
Your 1800. *Black Prince* and *Duke of Edinburgh* are due Suez about 7th September escorting military transports with troops from India, and are at once to return to Aden for similar duty. (2316.)
- A 130.** A.S., Malta, to Adty. 28th August.
483 C.-in-C., East Indies, requests *Chatham* will act as convoy 2nd batch transports due Aden about 8th September.
- A 131.** Reply—Adty. to A.S., Malta. 28th August.
334 *Chatham* can be used.
- A 132.** Adty. to A.S., Malta. 29th August.
336 Traffic can be resumed to Turkish ports but at present not to Dardanelles or Black Sea.
- A 133.** Adty. to S.N.O., Aden. 29th August.
Chatham to escort *Dongola* and *Somali* to the longitude of Cape Gardafui, then *Chatham* return to Aden. *Somali* and *Dongola* to proceed independently to destination. *Swiftsure* and convoy now coming from Bombay. Acknowledge.
- A 134.** Adty. to R.A., *Indefatigable*. 1st September.
17 *Warrior* and *Weymouth* will be required to escort the Indian contingent from Port Said to Malta. Depending on the conditions at the moment, S.N.O. is to consider whether *Weymouth* will be sufficient beyond Malta.
- A 135.** S.N.O., Gib., to Adty. 2nd September.
861 Request instructions by wire as to notice at which *Indomitable* should be ready for sea. Was refitting at Malta when war declared and has many defects which can be made good by Gibraltar. (1202.)
- A 136.** Reply—Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 3rd September.
555 Your 861. *Indomitable* is to be at 48 hours' notice.
- A 137.** Further Telegram—Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 4th September.
559 With reference to your telegram 861, report time required to complete defects of *Indomitable*, ship being kept at 48 hours' notice.
- A 138.** Reply—S.N.O., Gib., to Adty. 5th September.
873 Your 559. *Indomitable* has a very heavy defect list which will take over a month to complete. More urgent defects can be proceeded with. Ship at 48 hours' notice.
- A 139.** Adty. to S.N.O., Malta. 4th September.
355 Following telegram sent to C.-in-C., East Indies :—Approved to put *Black Prince*, *Duke of Edinburgh*, and *Chatham* under your orders and use as you require.

- A 140.** Adty. to *Indomitable*, Gib. 6th September.
566 Proceed on the 8th instant to Port Said via Malta to convoy Indian troops. . . .
- A 141.** Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 6th September.
568 You are to commission H.M.S. *Wear* for service in Straits of Gibraltar. Crew leaves in the *Minerva* 7th September.
- A 142.** A.S., Malta, to Adty. 7th September.
569 Following telegram received from G.O.C., Egypt, begins :—Transports for England and Marseilles commence leaving Alexandria 10th September. Protection afforded by *Warrior* and *Weymouth* does not appear sufficient to ensure safe conduct in event of *Goeben* being able to break through the blockade. Please inform French Admiral. Ends.
French C.-in-C. has not been informed. Gibraltar reports *Indomitable* arriving Malta 10/9, arriving Port Said 13th September.
- A 143.** Adty. to S.N.O., Malta (360). 7th September.
S.N.O., Port Said.
Perugia and other transports with troops for England will be leaving Egypt about 10th instant. Direct *Weymouth* to escort them towards Malta as far as longitude 20 East where she can leave them if naval situation permits. Acknowledge.
- A 144.** A.S., Malta, to Adty. 8th September.
585 Receipt of telegram No. 360 hereby acknowledged. Following telegram received from C.-in-C., Mediterranean, begins :—Urgent. Request you will inform British Admiralty I am moving south this evening after coaling with my force and will make sure of safe passage for transport in the Mediterranean. Request you will, if possible, instruct transport not to leave Port Said or Alexandria before 8 a.m. 11th September. Patrol of Otranto will be continued by my cruisers.
- A 145.** Adty. to Navy, Malta. 8th September.
365 Transmit following to R.A.C., H.M.S. *Indefatigable*. Hand over the command to the Senior Captain under your orders, strike your flag and return to England forthwith. One destroyer may be detached to convey you to the nearest port where a passenger steamer can be met with. Acknowledge.
- A 146.** Adty. to S.N.O., Dardanelles. 8th September.
Your sole duty is to sink the *Goeben* and *Breslau* under whatever flag if they come out of the Dardanelles. The safety of important convoys of troops from Egypt, and other issues of the highest importance depend on your doing this. For this purpose you should use and dispose your whole force including the submarines when they arrive, and the destroyers. Enemy must be destroyed at all costs by night or day.
- A 147.** A.S., Malta, to Adty. 9th September.
Transport has been instructed in accordance with C.-in-C. message not to leave Port Said or Alexandria with troops before 8 a.m. 11th September. C.-in-C. has detached six French submarines for local defence Malta.
- A 148.** Adty. to A.S., Malta. 9th September.
370 You are not to make any arrangements regarding convoys; all such arrangements will be made by Admiralty.

- A 149.** Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Paris. 9th September.
332 The Admiralty has received from Malta information that the C.-in-C., Mediterranean, is proceeding southwards in order to protect the line of route of the troop transports, and has ordered those transports not to leave Port Said before the 11th. The Admiralty consider that it is essential to leave the French Fleet to operate in the Adriatic, and that the dispositions already taken and of which I have informed you by my telegram No. 326, are sufficient to ensure the security of the transports which ought to arrive at Marseilles as soon as possible.
- A 150.** Adty. to A.S., Malta. 9th September.
Hussar should be ordered after her present duty, to Syra to prevent any tampering with this important cable centre.
- A 151.** A.S., Malta to Adty. 10th September.
Following message received from C.-in-C. *Courbet* (French) begins :—
French Cruiser Division will arrive 15 miles to the north of Damietta Light by 10 a.m. 9th September, and will await convoy from Port Said.
Please instruct *Weymouth* (to) proceed to Alexandria (to) conduct Alexandria contingent. *Weymouth* is to leave Alexandria with transports 5 a.m. 11th September and join convoy from Port Said moving 12th September.
Please instruct Port Said and Alexandria accordingly. Ends. No action has been taken. Instructions are requested.
- A 152.** Adty. to S.N.O., Malta. 10th September.
377 *Warrior* to proceed at once to Dardanelles. As soon as she is in touch with *Indefatigable*, the *Defence* is to proceed to Gibraltar and fill up with coal preparatory to proceeding to S.E. Coast of America.
- A 153.** Adty. to Navy, Malta. 10th September.
Transmit following by W/T to *Indefatigable*. Turkish gunboats and flotilla from Red Sea are not to be interfered with when passing into Dardanelles to Constantinople.
- A 154.** Adty. to S.N.O., Malta. 10th September.
Inform French C.-in-C. only a small convoy of 3 transports leaves Egypt on the 11th-12th which *Weymouth* can escort. Main convoy of 3rd Division, 15 transports, does not leave for about 10 days.
- A 155.** Marine, Bordeaux to Adty. (F.N.A.). 10th September.
Received your telegram 332.
We have telegraphed by cable to V. A. Lapeyrère to recall the Cruiser Division that he has sent to Port Said, and not to delay at all the arrival of the transports at Marseilles.
By telegram to-day, V. A. Lapeyrère asks me for the *Bruix* Division to perform the convoy of those transports going from Bizerta* to Gibraltar, and the *Jauréguiberry* Division to escort those going from Bizerta* to Marseilles.
Your telegram 332 mentions only this last part. Will you please let me know if a portion of the troops is to disembark in the Atlantic as V. A. Lapeyrère indicates.
* ? Should be Egypt.

A 156. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Bordeaux. 11th September.

339 Answer to your telegram No. 11.

British steamers *Perugia* and *Osmanieh* carrying troops from Egypt to England are to leave Alexandria to-day with steamer *Assaye* carrying to Marseilles officers and advance details of the troops from India.

All three will be escorted as far as Malta by the *Weymouth*. The main body of the convoy from India will follow later, making in its entirety for Marseilles. The Admiralty thinks that the present situation in the Western Mediterranean is sufficiently safe for these transports to travel there without escort. We shall content ourselves with covering them.

A 157. Adty. to A.S., Malta. 16th September.

401 *Defence* will not now be required for S.E. Coast of America.

A 158. Adty. to A.S., Malta. 16th September.

405 *Indomitable* is to escort the convoy of Lahore Division of Indian troops from Egypt to Marseilles as soon as they are ready. . . . *Weymouth* should accompany *Indomitable*.

A 159. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Bordeaux. 19th September.

365 Considering that for about three months there will be important movements of troops between India and Marseilles and between England and India, the Admiralty are about to organise convoys between Bombay and Suez by means of old battleships of the *Majestic* class.

These convoys will sail about every fortnight. The Admiralty ask you to safeguard the convoys between Port Said and Marseilles by means of battleships of say the class *Bouvet*. Two battleships would be sufficient to escort one convoy, but it would be desirable to add one *Bruix* class or smaller cruiser.

A 160. Adty. to R.A. Carden, Malta. 20th September.

429 You are to hoist your flag in *Defence*, and sail at once to Dardanelles and there assume command of squadron in Eastern Mediterranean. This appointment is temporary. Admiral Limpus in *Hussar* appointed temporary Admiral Superintendent, Malta Dockyard, and has been directed to proceed there with all speed.

A 161. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Bordeaux. 20th September.

369 The entire Turkish Fleet being now absolutely controlled, and to a great extent manned by the Germans, the military value of the two battleships bought from Germany has become such that it is necessary to cover them by a superior force of battleships. Seeing that our force near the Dardanelles only contains battle cruisers and armoured cruisers, we ask if the C.-in-C. could detach two battleships of the *Démocratic* type, under the orders of the British Admiral Carden. Will you please inform me when they can be at the Dardanelles.

A 162. Adty. to A.S., Malta for *Indomitable*. 20th September.

432 *Indomitable* is to leave the convoy and proceed direct to join *Indefatigable* off the Dardanelles when the convoy reaches the longitude of the western end of Crete. Discretion is to be used if there is any indication of any enemy's ship being in the vicinity, and instructions asked.

A 163. Adty. to V.A., Carden, Malta. 21st September.

435 Assume command of the squadron off the Dardanelles. . . .

A 164. Adty. to A.S., Malta. 21st September.

437 Your 728.* *Minerva* to relieve *Weymouth* on escort duty to Marseilles. *Weymouth* to escort *Minerva's* transports to Egypt and at once proceed via Suez Canal to join *Dartmouth* and *Chatham* in hunt for *Königsberg*.

* 728 from A.S., Malta, asked if *Minerva* was to continue to convoy transports after passing Malta p.m. 21st September.

A 165. Marine, Bordeaux, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 21st September.

35 Transports will be escorted from Port Said to Marseilles by two groups comprising—(i) *Jauréguiberry*, *Bouvet* and *La Hire*, (ii) 2 battleships of the *St. Louis* class and one destroyer. . . . Orders have been given to Vice-Admiral Lapeyrère to send the latter group to Port Said immediately.

A 166. Adty. to S.N.O., Malta. 21st September.

439 *Hussar* to return to Syra to watch the cables and relieve the destroyer there. Destroyer to return to Dardanelles.

A 167. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 21st September.

180 *Weymouth* is being sent from the Mediterranean and placed under your orders to assist *Chatham* and *Dartmouth* in searching for *Königsberg*.

A 168. Adty. to A.S., Malta. 21st September.

442 My 437. *Weymouth* after completion of escort duties is to place herself under orders of C.-in-C., East Indies. Inform French C.-in-C., Mediterranean of these instructions. C.-in-C., East Indies, has been informed.

A 169. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 21st September.

177 *Ocean* and *Goliath* are now *en route* to replace *Chatham* and *Dartmouth* for escort duties. *Ocean* is now half way to Malta from Gibraltar. *Goliath* off Finisterre.

A 170. Marine, Bordeaux, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 22nd September.

36 In reply to your telegram 365 the battleships *Suffren* and *St. Louis* and the destroyer *Cassini* have received orders to go from Bizerta to Port Said to escort convoy.

A 171. Marine, Bordeaux, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 22nd September.

38 After agreement with Vice-Admiral Lapeyrère, I shall be glad if you will inform the Admiralty that two battleships of the Navy (deux cuirassés de l'armée navale) are to be sent to the Dardanelles under the orders of V.A. Carden.

A 172. Adty. to S.N.O., Malta. 24th September.

459 Your 774. Approved for *Minerva* sending *Thongwa* on to Gibraltar. *Minerva*, after seeing her convoy safe into Marseilles is to return to Port Said and proceed to Aden, place herself under the orders of C.-in-C., East Indies. Coaling as necessary. Acknowledge.

A 173. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 24th September.

184 *Ocean* and *Goliath* are delayed by defects but are ordered to proceed to Suez and should arrive 4th and 5th October respectively and then carry out escort work under your orders.

Minerva will be ordered to Suez to relieve *Black Prince* and arrive at Suez about 3rd October.

Vengeance will relieve *Duke of Edinburgh* later. If Red Sea is considered safe *Duke of Edinburgh* might return with you to Bombay for next Convoy. Reconsider escorts on this basis and report proposals.

A 174. Marine, Bordeaux, to Adty. 25th September.
42 *Charlemagne* has taken the place of *Suffren* in escort of Indian transports.

Vérité left 24th September at 4 p.m. to join *Suffren* at Dardanelles.

A 175. Adty. to S.N.O., Malta. 25th September.
471 Four transports with British forces from Egypt to England can leave when ready under escort of one French battleship as far as Malta.

The Indian troops from Egypt to Marseilles can follow when ready with remainder of French ships as escort. Inform Senior French Naval Officer and G.O.C., Egypt.

A 176. Adty. to S.N.O., Malta. 27th September.
Warrior to proceed with despatch to Port Said and consult G.O.C. in Egypt as to defensive measures to be taken, both on Mediterranean shore and in Red Sea. The two French battleships *St. Louis* and *Charlemagne* are to be requested to co-operate. *Minerva* can be detained at Suez for action against Akaba. Destroyers to be employed as necessary in the Canal. Report action taken on arrival.

A 177. A.S., Malta, to Adty. 29th September.
487 My 477. French ships are to proceed on convoy duty from Egypt as previously arranged. Inform *Warrior*.

A 178. S.N.O., Malta, to C-in-C., East Indies. 2nd October.
As *Minerva* is not now required to remain at Suez, she is to proceed south for escort duties and act under the orders of C-in-C., East Indies.

A 179. Adty. to S.N.O., Port Said. 6th October.
A.S., Malta (506).
Four transports from Port Said to Gibraltar escorted by French warships have been convoyed to Marseilles. Arrangements must be made to prevent such detours occurring in future. Homeward bound transports should be dropped by escort at Malta and proceed independently to Gibraltar without escort unless the Naval situation in Western Mediterranean necessitates one.

A 180. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 6th October.
Programme of convoy sailings henceforth referred to as P.C.S. Arrange for escorts from home to wait and bring back troopships from India and Marseilles.

A 181. Adty. to A.S., Malta. 6th October.
A programme has been drawn up for convoy sailings henceforth referred to as P.C.S. See that escorts Port Said and Malta adhere and understand general principle, e.g., escort Port Said to Malta waits convoy from Malta to Port Said.

A 182. Marine, Bordeaux, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 8th October.
5803 I have received your letter No. 725.* Before giving orders for organising convoys, I desire to know if British Admiralty thinks it indispensable that convoys from Malta to Marseilles should be escorted, this stretch appearing as safe as that from Malta to Gibraltar.

* Letter 725 enclosed the programme of troopship sailings from India to Marseilles and home, and gave explanations of the working of the escorts.

A 183. A.S., Malta, to Adty. 9th October.
942 Following received by W/T from *Warrior*. Egyptian Government next week will forcibly remove German and Austrian merchant ships now at Port Soudan outside territorial waters. *Warrior* will meet them to take them to Alexandria with prize crew for decision at Prize Court. As there are 15 ships in all, request that some ship(s) may be sent here to help with prize crews. I propose to take no action whatever until they have been placed outside 3-mile limit by Egyptian Government. (1505.).

A 184. Adty. to A.S., Malta. 9th October.
515 Your 945.* Transports from Egypt to England can proceed from Malta to Gibraltar without escort unless the naval situation in the Western Mediterranean necessitates it. At Gibraltar they will wait escort and proceed home in convoys every 16 days as per programme now on its way to you. Eastbound transports from Gibraltar can also proceed to Malta unescorted as above. From Malta to Egypt they are to be escorted as arranged by French. Arrange accordingly.

* Requesting instructions for escort for three transports from Malta to Gibraltar.

A 185. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Bordeaux. 9th October.
434 In answer to your 5803. Admiralty does not consider it indispensable to escort convoys from Malta to Marseilles. It would be sufficient for the C-in-C. in the Mediterranean to detach ships necessary for protection of the convoys from Malta to Marseilles or Gibraltar if he thinks that their security is in danger.

A 186. Adty. to Adm. Robinson, Finance, Cairo. 10th October.
Your telegram yesterday. Arrangements have been made by Admiralty to coal at Malta transports of 2nd and subsequent convoys on return voyage. They will, therefore, be directed to call there for that purpose. Did you ascertain what quantities of coal the transports will require?

A 187. Adty. to *Warrior*, via Malta. 10th October.
You are authorised to arrange with Chargé d'Affaires at Cairo and Egyptian Authorities for capture of enemy ships at Port Said and Suez and their navigation to Alexandria. *Concadoro* to go first to Port Sudan. Foreign Office are issuing necessary instructions to Cairo.

A 188. Adty. to S.N.O., Malta and Port Said. 11th October.
Black Prince, Suez.
520 *Black Prince* is to join *Warrior* at once at Port Said and assist in the capture of the ships to be released from that port.

A 189. Foreign Office to Various I.O's. 16th October.
The following has been sent to H.B.M. Representatives in all principal countries, to all self-governing Colonies and Dominions, and to all important Crown Colonies:—Experience in the first two months of war shows that no increase in loss of merchant shipping will be incurred by always keeping trade routes open.

When hostile cruiser makes her presence known by sending crews of prizes into port she is unlikely to remain on same route, and, short of closing all routes for indefinite time there is no remedy, as next point of attack is matter of conjecture.

At same time, detention of insured vessels in port is extremely costly to owners and merchants, and if continued defeats object of Government Insurance Scheme. Vessels sailing after dark and making good offing with dimmed lights run little chance of capture. Any detention of shipping should be at once reported by cable. Admiralty considers it essential that trade should not be stopped.

A 190. A.S., Malta, to Adty. 17th October.
27 Transports arrived Malta with Territorial Force for India. Their instructions are to call at Malta for convoy. There is no ship of war at Malta to act as convoy to them. Should they proceed eastward?

A 191. A.S., Malta, to Adty. 18th October.
35 With reference to telegram No. 27 French ship to convoy eastbound transports has arrived now and convoy will proceed.

A 192. Adty. to A.S., Malta. 18th October.
542 Your 32. French battleships are to escort transports between Malta and Egypt. Transports should wait until escort arrives. French C.-in-C. might be informed that no escorts required westward of Malta at present.

A 193. Adty. to S.N.O., Port Said. 19th October.
Black Prince to remain in company with *Warrior* for the present.

A 194. Adty. to S.N.O., Port Said. 24th October.
Continual reports show the evident intention at German instigation to lay mines to prevent the transport of troops through the Canal. A large convoy is now at or near Aden coming north. Arrange at once to fit sweeps for a pair of destroyers and take up two tugs, fitting them with a sweep. The vessels to be ready to sweep ahead of the transports from the entrance of the Gulf of Suez. Communicate direct with C.-in-C., E.I., as to the date of convoy arriving in the position.

A 195. *Warrior*, Port Said, to Adty. 24th October.
Referring to your telegram 24th October, arrangements have been made for two destroyers and two coastguard cruisers to sweep Gulf of Suez ahead of transports. I estimate it will take about 10 days to pass 39 ships from Shadwan Island to Suez if work is done thoroughly, taking six ships each time, which is probably the longest time which can be kept by mine sweeping vessels in swept area. *Foxhound* has been patrolling off the entrance to Gulf of Akaba since 23rd October. This is probably the principal direction from which danger may be expected. I am opinion safety of transports equally assured by systematic patrol of Gulf of Suez, particularly the four narrow places. This will reduce the time of transmission to normal and will not necessitate large number at anchor waiting for their turn. Large number of merchant ships pass up and down daily.

A 196. Adty. to *Warrior*, Port Said. 24th October.
Approve the entrance of Gulf of Akaba being patrolled. Patrol the Gulf of Suez in a similar manner and if there is any suspicion of any mines having been laid, have the narrow passage searched with the sweep, then if nothing is detected there will be no danger to transports proceeding without sweepers ahead. It is very undesirable to delay the transports unless circumstances require it.

A 197. Adty. to A.S., Malta (for V.A. *Indefatigable*). 26th October.
Send two destroyers at once to Port Said. Acknowledge.

A 198. Adty. to S.N.O., Port Said. 26th October.
Two more destroyers ordered to join you. When they arrive send two destroyers at once to Akaba. Give the Senior Officer instructions after consulting military authorities. Should the necessity arise one destroyer can be sent back at speed to Suez to convey information.

A 199. *Warrior*, Port Said to Adty. 27th October.
Rumour on good authority than 4 Turkish gunboats have left Alexandretta for Red Sea. Are they to be allowed through Suez Canal. In view of report, German officers and mines being sent south by rail, they will be a continual menace to transports.

A 200. Reply—Adty. to *Warrior*, Port Said. 28th October.
Turkish gunboats not to be allowed to approach Canal but to be stopped outside 3-mile limit, use of force being avoided if possible.

A 201. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 30th October.
759 Three transports from Malta to England, *Carnarvonshire*, *Arcadia*, and *Nile*, due at Gibraltar 3rd November should wait escort of *Diana*. Seven other transports from India due at Gibraltar 11th November should be escorted by *Bacchante*. Arrange accordingly.

A 202. A.S., Malta to Adty. 30th October.
138 Have instructed Reporting Officer to advise British ships not to visit Turkish Ports until further orders.

A 203. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 30th October.
251 Numerous vessels with pilgrims will be leaving Jeddah shortly. Important that such protection be given as will afford pilgrims some sense of security. Report action taken.

A 204. Adty. to *Minerva*, Suez. 30th October.
Urgent. *Minerva* to proceed at once to Akaba with despatch if necessary completing with coal before sailing with greatest rapidity. Report time of sailing. C.-in-C., East Indies, informed.

A 205. Adty. to V.A. *Indefatigable*, 579 via Malta. 31st October.
S.N.O., Port Said.
C.-in-C., East Indies (255).
S.N.O., Persian Gulf, via Fao.

Orders sent Ambassador, Constantinople, 8.15 p.m. 30th October to present ultimatum to Turkey expiring at end of 12 hours.

Do not yourself commence hostilities without further orders.

Addendum to—V.A. *Indefatigable*.

You may therefore expect Embassy to be leaving very shortly.

A 206. Adty. to S.N.O., Port Said. 31st October.
Have steam ready in one ship in case of hostilities with Turkey to proceed to El Arish to command the coast road to Egypt.

Minerva ordered to proceed to Akaba; may be delayed for coal.

Get into communication with G.O.C. and send a military officer with local knowledge of Akaba.

Minerva not to be delayed, officer to be sent by a destroyer to follow.

A 207. Adty. to S.N.O., Port Said. 31st October.
Any Turkish gunboat sighted approaching Port Said is to be captured or sunk.

A 208. Adty. to *Hussar*, Syra. 31st October.
Proceed at once to Dedeagatch to embark British Ambassador and suite.

A 209. Adty. to S.N.O., Port Said. 31st October.
Arrange to take one pair of destroyers or one pair of Egyptian vessels fitted for sweeping in the event of any mines being laid off Akaba. They may be laid by dhows. Inform *Minerva*.

A 210. Adty. to S.N.O., Aden and 31st October. Sent 5.5 p.m.
A.S., Malta (adding "inform V.A. and all ships.")

Commence hostilities at once against Turkey. Acknowledge.

A 211. A.S., Malta to Adty. 1st November.

163 If you consider the torpedo boats more useful to Mediterranean Detached Squadron or in the Canal than here, I can send them back in pairs with a collier to tow or stand by if necessary. One is bound to consider the 1,000 miles passage in the winter and the shortage of officers and petty officers in the boats.

Reply.

589 Your 163 approved. Send them to the Canal. This will relieve some of the destroyers for other duties.

A 212. Adty. to S.N.O., Port Said (for *Minerva*). 1st November.

Minerva on arrival is to bombard and demolish the fort at Akaba. It is reported that it is held by 60 men, some Germans amongst them.

Care is to be taken on approach for mines.

Minerva's principal duty is to prevent Turkish forces advancing on Egypt from Akaba. Destroy by gunfire all military storehouses. Consult the local military officers on board as to the presumed position of these places. Inflict all possible damage on the Turks. Don't waste ammunition. Ends. Report when received by *Minerva*.

A 213. Adty. to S.N.O., Port Said. 1st November.

Black Prince is to proceed to Alexandria to watch and protect British interests. Proceed in *Warrior* off El Arish. Stop by fire of the ship's gun(s) any armed Turkish forces proceeding along the coast road to Egypt. Fire on any Turkish forces in range. Keep G.O.C., Egypt and Admiralty informed of any movements of troops observed. Acknowledge.

A 214. Adty. to C-in-C., East Indies (259), and S.N.O., Aden. 2nd November.

Minto is to proceed up the Red Sea. To destroy every Turkish steamer that she can find. When that is done deal with the dhows, sinking Turkish dhows and collecting Arab dhows into suitable harbours where arrangements can be made to detain them. Acknowledge.

A 215. Adty. to *Warrior*, Port Said. 3rd November.

You are appointed S.N.O. of the Egyptian Station including the Gulf of Akaba, and the following ships are placed under your orders—*Black Prince*, *Minerva*, 6 destroyers, 6 T.B.'s from Malta, and *Proserpine*.

You will act in close co-operation with the military, consulting with the G.O.C. in Egypt, and reporting daily to Admiralty.

A 216. Adty. to S.N.O., Egypt. 4th November.

1 It is of the utmost importance to keep on friendly terms with the Arab Sheikhs, particularly Shaikh Idrissi and the Imaun on the coast of Arabia in the Red Sea, who are inclined to side with us against the Turks. You are therefore to keep in close touch with the Resident at Aden, who is in charge of the negotiations with them. No active operations against the coast towns nor the dhows should be undertaken without consulting him.

Information has been received that the Turks may send mines to Medina and transport them to the coast by camel to be eventually laid in the track of shipping. In order to prevent this it is necessary to capture all Turkish steamers of whatever kind, those employed at Jeddah excepted, as long as the pilgrim traffic is not interfered with and the Turkish steamers do not leave the port. British shipping engaged in the transport of pilgrims from Jeddah should be encouraged to continue and should be given all possible protection.

A 217. Adty. to S.N.O., Port Said, and S.N.O., Aden. 4th November.

Urgent. With reference to orders for *Minto* dated 2nd November, instruct her that she is not to interfere with any vessels at Jeddah nor is she to take action against dhows without further instructions.

A 218. Adty. to A.S., Malta. 5th November.

606 Cyprus has been formally annexed to-day. Inform V.A. *Indefatigable* and all ships.

A 219. Adty. to C-in-C., Grand Fleet. 5th November.

184 Secret. We are arranging to send you *Minotaur*, *Warrior*, *Duke of Edinburgh*, and *Black Prince* as soon as possible. Dates of their joining will be telegraphed you to-morrow.

A 220. Adty. to S.N.O., Egypt. 6th November.

3 *Black Prince* and *Warrior* are to proceed at once with moderate despatch to Gibraltar calling at Malta to complete with stores and ammunition. Inform G.O.C. that ships are urgently required in South Atlantic, and that they will be replaced by French warships very shortly. Acknowledge and report when ships have sailed.

A 221. Adty. to C-in-C., East Indies. 6th November.

266 *Duke of Edinburgh* is to return to Home Waters, accompanying convoy to Malta, where she can be docked if necessary. . . .

A 222. Adty. to C-in-C., East Indies and *Gloucester* at Aden. 6th November.

267 *Gloucester* is to proceed to Colombo . . . to join in search for *Emden*.

A 223. Adty. to *Minerva*, Port Said. 7th November.

4 After departure of *Warrior* and *Black Prince*, carry out duties of S.N.O., Egypt, keeping in close touch with General Officer Commanding. Send Admiralty a brief telegraphic report of state affairs and military situation daily, or if not possible to do so daily as frequently as possible. Should a Senior Officer arrive transfer these orders to him. Acknowledge.

A 224. Marine, Bordeaux, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 7th November.

129 The pending arrival of the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* in the South Atlantic Ocean appear to us also worthy of consideration. I have given orders to replace immediately the *Black Prince* by the *Amiral Charner* and the *Warrior* by the *Bouvet* in expectation of other British ships being sent to Egypt.

A 224a. Adty. to R.A. Cruiser Force E. 7th November.

51 Send *Doris* to Gibraltar at once to coal and proceed to Alexandria.

A 225. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Bordeaux. 7th November.

1029 The British armoured cruisers *Black Prince* and *Warrior* have been ordered to Gibraltar *en route* for West Africa to provide against the German armoured cruisers *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*.

Should the French Marine be able to spare 3 armoured cruisers, say of the *Edgar Quinet* class, to assist the two British ships, it would render a great service to the British Navy.

Neither of the two British ships are flagships, and the Admiralty would therefore be glad if one of the French cruisers could be a flagship, in which case British ships would be placed under his orders. . . .

A 226. V. A. Carden to Adty. 8th November.
12. Have established a watch outside Gulf of Smyrna to intercept contraband.

A 227. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 9th November.
196 *Vengeance* is to remain at Gibraltar for the present, getting on with her defective boilers as far as possible. *Proserpine* is to proceed to Egypt without waiting relief by *Pelorus* now on her way out to Gibraltar.

A 228. Marine, Bordeaux, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 10th November.
137 The French guardship *Requin* now at Bizerta has been ordered to Port Said to co-operate in watching the Suez Canal. *Bouvet* is kept back to cruise off Barcelona, where neutral ships loaded with mines have been reported.

A 229. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 10th November.
275 Consequent on destruction of *Emden*, *Weymouth* and *Gloucester* are to proceed to Malta.

A 230. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Bordeaux 11th November.
1039 The Admiralty is very anxious to have your answer to the proposal contained in telegram 1029 because the departure of the British cruisers cannot be delayed. If so many cruisers are indispensable in the Adriatic *Dupleix* could be recalled at once and *Montcalm* after the escort of the Australian convoy.

A 231. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 11th November.
277 *Swiftsure* is to leave convoy and proceed with despatch to Suez. . . .

A 232. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 11th November.
278 *Swiftsure* must remain in Egypt for the present.

A 233. C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty. 11th November.
275 French Consul at Bombay having represented that French Consul at Hodeida is in danger, I have ordered *Duke of Edinburgh* to proceed there and embark him if necessary.

A 234. Adty. to Political Resident, Aden. 11th November.
Pass to H.M. Ships in Red Sea :—Jidda and other Turkish ports in Red Sea used for pilgrim traffic are not to be attacked or interfered with.

A 235. Adty. to S.N.O., Aden and S.N.O., Port Said (7). 12th November.
No vessel is to engage in attack on any Turkish port in the Red Sea without orders.

A 236. Adty. to S.N.O., Egypt. 13th November.
10 *Minerva* is to convey outward bound Territorial Convoy to Aden from Suez.

A 237. *Minerva* to Adty. 15th November.
Port Said. 15th November. Armed Arabs reported advancing on El Arish. Destroyer will reconnoitre daybreak 16th November. No other developments. Outward bound convoy now waiting Suez. In present circumstances consider necessary that *Minerva* does not leave Port Said until relieved by another ship. *Duke of Edinburgh*, *Swiftsure*, *Northbrook*, will arrive at Suez from southward 16th November. Request instructions for *Minerva* observing that *Minerva* is now S.N.O., Port Said.

A 238. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 16th November.
290 You are not authorised to direct any operations in the Red Sea; these operations will be directed by S.N.O., Egypt.

A 239. Adty. to *Minerva*. 16th November.
12 *Minerva* is to remain at Port Said until relieved by *Swiftsure*; then *Minerva* is to take outward bound convoy.

A 240. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 16th November.
292 It is necessary that you take charge of naval operations in Egypt as soon as possible. You should proceed to Egypt by the quickest route and hoist your flag in *Swiftsure*. You will retain command of East Indies Station while employed in Egypt.

241. Adty. to S.N.O., Egypt. 16th November.
13 In view of ships in Canal having possibly to engage Turkish troops, steps should be taken to extemporise fighting tops in which to mount light guns. Methods should be considered for directing the laying of the heavy guns from aloft, so that they can be used over the Canal banks. Canal authorities should be requested to allow tugs and launches and other suitable vessels to be armed. Reserve guns and mountings for this purpose should be obtained from Malta and steps should be taken to prepare the vessels, making use of Canal authorities' workshops and railway engineering works. The ships to be employed in Canal will be *Swiftsure*, *Doris*, *Proserpine*, *Minerva*, when she returns from Aden, and *Philomel*. Guns crews for armed vessels will have to be lent from above ships.

A 242. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 17th November.
293 Personal and Secret. Naval operations in the Red Sea and Egypt cannot be directed from India. Your presence in Egypt is imperative. You should rejoin your flagship *Swiftsure* at Port Said by the quickest route at once. *Gloucester* can take you if she has not already sailed. Telegraph what date you expect to arrive at Suez. On arrival you should consult with G.O.C., Egypt and work hand in hand with him with the British authorities. The Government of India will make its views known to the British Government, who will transmit all necessary orders and information to the G.O.C. and yourself. The following ships will be at your disposal in the Red Sea—*Swiftsure*, *Minerva*, *Doris*, *Proserpine*, *Philomel*, and 6 T.B.D.'s from Malta. Measures are also being taken to organise armed launches and improvised gunboats for use in the Canal. Telegraph whether you feel able to discharge other duties of your command, namely convoy and Persian Gulf Operations at the same time, or what temporary arrangements you suggest during your absence in Egyptian waters.

A 243. Adty. to C.-in-C., China. 17th November.
Send all your river class destroyers to Egypt. Arrange if necessary, for colliers to accompany them and for them to be towed. Acknowledge.

A 244. C.-in-C., East Indies to Adty. 17th November.
Recd. 18th November.

293 1st Lord of Admiralty. . . . Anticipate no difficulty with regard to other duties.

A 245. Adty. to A.S., Malta (for V.A. *Indefatigable*) (652). S.N.O., Egypt (15). 17th November.
More destroyers are urgently required in Home Waters as soon as possible. Recall the destroyers from Egyptian waters to join your flag; send 4 destroyers home at once and a second 4 as soon as 4 have rejoined you from Egypt. Acknowledge. S.N.O., Egypt informed.

A 246. Adty. to A.S., Malta. 17th November.
Pass following to *Duke of Edinburgh* by W/T (begins) *Duke of Edinburgh* is to proceed to Malta without convoy with all convenient despatch.

A 247. Adty. to C-in-C., China. 18th November.
298 Arrange if possible for *Askold* to proceed to Egypt to operate against Turks on Syrian Coast and in Dardanelles. . . .

A 248. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Bordeaux. 18th November.
1067 By reason of the considerable number of ships of the Japanese Navy placed at the disposal of the Admiralty in the Pacific, *Montcalm* will not now be required for the convoy from New Zealand. Admiralty asks you to send *Montcalm* to Suez when she has completed her mission to Tahiti, for protection of the Canal.

A 249. Foreign Office to Mr. Cheetham. 18th November.
357 Urgent. Home Government consider that it is important to get control of Turkish lighthouses in Red Sea without delay, and you should ask the naval and military authorities to arrange for this in whatever way is most convenient.

A 250. Adty. to C-in-C., China. 18th November.
299 Every available ship is required from the East for Egypt, the Dardanelles, and the Syrian Coast, to operate against the Turks. *Askold* should be sent to Egypt as already telegraphed. Armed *Empress* liners are required to work the Red Sea convoys in conjunction with the Indian Marine Ships. Requirements of China Station should be met by Japanese.

A 251. S.N.O., Egypt to Adty. 19th November.
Reports received of Turks assembling near El Arish to N.E.
Reply—17 Turkish troops at El Arish should be bombarded if G.O.C. desires it.

A 252. Adty. to S.N.O., Egypt. 19th November.
18 If *Northbrook* is with *Minerva* and convoy direct *Minerva* to quit convoy and return to Suez. If *Minerva* is the only escort direct *Minto* to meet convoy and relieve *Minerva* so that she can return to Suez.

A 253. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Bordeaux. 19th November.
1071 In order to provide against possible attacks by the Turks on Egypt, against risings in the country, and against massacres of the Christian population of the Ottoman Empire, the Admiralty considers it necessary to concentrate an important naval force in the Levant. The C-in-C., East Indies, has been ordered to Egypt to assume naval command. He will fly his flag in *Swiftsure* and have under his orders *Minerva*, *Doris*, and *Proserpine*. The *Askold* is joining his flag. The *Dupleix* or her successor will be detached for Egypt, and it is desirable that *Montcalm* should join soon. The Japanese Navy will assume the protection of the Far East.

A 254. Adty. to S.N.O., Egypt. 20th November.
20 Desirable coast trade of Arabia in Red Sea should not be interfered with. Small ship should be sent to visit coast ports and reassure local Arab chiefs.

It should be pointed out that as long as their dhows are not used for any military purposes they will not be stopped; also that the Allies have no intention of annexing territory.

Consult with Mr. Cheetham as to best method of carrying out this order.

A 255. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Bordeaux. 21st November.
1077 Admiralty considers that the sortie of the *Goeben* into the Mediterranean is henceforward improbable because :—

(1) She is seriously damaged.

(2) She is the most important means by which Germany can put pressure on the Turkish Fleet.

(3) If she succeeded in breaking through the barrier of battleships, destroyers and submarines in the Mediterranean, her return would be cut off and her career would be short because she could not coal anywhere.

The 2 British battleships and the destroyers now immobilised at the Dardanelles are imperatively needed in Home Waters.

Admiralty proposes therefore to hand over to the French Fleet the blockade of the Turkish-German forces in the Dardanelles. They will leave the fast cruiser *Dublin* to deal with the *Breslau*, and 3 submarines. Four French battleships with destroyers and submarines under a French Admiral would seem to be sufficient. The battleships acting with convoys in the Mediterranean are no longer necessary. The British naval forces now in Egypt will be maintained. An immediate reply is requested.

A 256. Adty. to S.N.O., Malta. 21st November.
Following for V.A. *Indefatigable* begins :—As *Goeben* has been damaged *Indomitable* should be sent to Malta at once to refit, every effort being made to complete her refit in as short a time as possible. Acknowledge; ends.

A 257. Marine, Bordeaux, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 21st November.
164 Until we are sure of damage to *Goeben* it seems necessary to leave a battle cruiser with *Dublin* and our 3 submarines.

A 258. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Bordeaux. 21st November.
1085 23rd November. Admiralty propose to leave *Indefatigable*, *Dublin*, and 3 submarines to watch Dardanelles, and ask you to replace *Indomitable* by 2 old battleships.

A 259. Marine, Bordeaux, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 22nd November.
165 On leaving Brest, *Desaix* has been ordered to Suez. As arranged, she will place herself under the orders of Admiral Peirse.

A 260. Marine, Bordeaux, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 25th November.
177 *Saint Louis* and *Charlemagne* will be at the Dardanelles to-morrow. *Poignard*, *Trident*, and *Cognée* will leave for Dardanelles to-morrow.

A 261. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Bordeaux. 25th November.
1099 In reply to your 177, Admiral Carden is still at the Dardanelles in the *Indefatigable*. It is proposed when it is definitely known that the *Goeben* is seriously damaged, to withdraw the *Indefatigable*, asking you to send an Admiral to assume command.

A 262. Adty. to C-in-C., East Indies, Port Said. 28th November.
306 My 293. Reference should be made to Resident at Aden before any important step is taken in Yemen.

A 263. Adty. to C-in-C., East Indies. 1st December.
309 You should confer in Cairo with G.O.C., Egypt, and Egyptian authorities as regards action to be taken in policing Red Sea and stopping supplies to Turkish garrisons there. Keep in touch with Resident, Aden. See previous telegrams to S.N.O., Egypt. Report proposed action when arranged.

- A 264.** Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 5th December.
325 The Russian Admiralty have agreed to *Askold* being placed under your orders for operations in Egypt or the Mediterranean.
- A 265.** Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 9th December.
332 Your 338. Destroyers returning from China Station are to be sent to Dardanelles to join C.-in-C., Mediterranean in order to permit of whole Mediterranean Flotilla returning to England.
- A 266.** Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 11th December.
336 *Clio* is placed under your orders. C.-in-C., China has been informed.
- A 267.** Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 11th December.
337 Consider question of watching Syrian ports, especially Alexandretta, Beirut, and Haifa with force at your disposal. Stoppage of supplies to Hedjaz Railway might have considerable effect. Suggestion only applies for such times as attack on Canal is not imminent. Alternative will be to request French to undertake duty.
- A 268.** C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty. 12th December.
347 Your 337. I had already arranged for *Askold* to reconnoitre Syrian coast as far as Beirut, sailing 12 December. This will now be extended to Alexandretta. I can also send *Doris* on completion of aeroplane reconnaissance at El Arish now in progress. No other ship at present available.
- A 269.** Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Paris. 13th December.
1170 I. It is very important to shut out supplies reaching the Turkish Army through Dedeagatch, the Aegean ports from Dardanelles to Gulf of Kos, and Syrian ports from Mersina to Jaffa.
The C.-in-C., East Indies is undertaking to watch the Syrian Coast with the few ships which can be spared from the Red Sea and the protection of Canal. *Askold* sailed yesterday from Port Said to reconnoitre the Syrian coast as far as Alexandretta.
1170 II. Admiralty suggest that the French Navy should take her share in watching Dedeagatch and the Aegean Coast. Lacking light cruisers, armed merchant cruisers would do very well for this work if any are available. The British Navy can provide no more and has practically reached the limit as regards taking up armed vessels on account of difficulty in manning them.
- A 270.** Marine, Paris, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 17th December.
227 We have received the following telegram from Admiral Lapeyrère. I am sending the *Amiral Charner* to watch the approaches to Smyrna. By agreement with Admiral Carden the latter is sending a torpedo boat to Dedeagatch until I can have this port watched by a large ship, which I will do as soon as possible.
- A 271.** Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 21st December.
355 Italian Government have entered protest against interference of legitimate trade in Levant, mentioning action by French torpedo craft near Smyrna about middle of November. Ascertain and report on the case. Are your present forces sufficient to efficiently blockade Syrian Coast, and if so, can French blockade coast from Dardanelles to Kos? Legitimate trade should not be unnecessarily interfered with unless blockade is declared and maintained.

- A 272.** Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 21st December.
357 *Ocean* should not proceed north of Perim until the question of bombardment of Shaikh Sa'id is settled. It is expected to be decided to-morrow.
- A 273.** C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty. 21st December.
372 Request instructions by wire as to whether escort for Indian convoy, 9 transports, due here 24th December is necessary through Mediterranean. Cannot obtain opinion of French C.-in-C., and he informs me that he has no ships available.
Askold could be withdrawn from Syrian Coast. Should be glad to know who is to provide for Mediterranean escort in future.
- A 274.** Marine, Paris, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 21st December.
236 Admiral Lapeyrère has received orders to send *D'Entrecasteaux* to the Syrian coast. A battleship will also be sent as soon as possible.
- A 275.** Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 22nd December.
359 Your 372 and 375*. *Philomel* should escort Indian convoy to Malta and refit there at once. Her services will be more required later than at present as far as can be foreseen.
* Reporting that Suez could not undertake *Philomel's* detects.
- A 276.** Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 22nd December.
360 My 357. *Ocean* should proceed to Port Said.
- A 277.** Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 24th December.
365 Operations against Shaikh Sa'id postponed till situation renders it necessary. Ships patrolling in southern part of Red Sea should be directed to reconnoitre periodically to ascertain no preparations are being made for embarking troops for attack on Perim.
- A 277a.** C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty. 26th December.
389 My 372. *Penza* and transport *Delta* due here end of the month. Is escort through Mediterranean considered necessary in future?
Reply. 372. Your 391.* *Reply.* No.
* 391 corrected an error in the text of 389.
- 1915.
- A 278.** C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty. 4th January.
9 Following telegram received from *Dufferin* at Goa, begins:—From all available information am of opinion that vessels at Goa have no intention of moving. Portuguese informed Germans that in event of war, vessels will be interned and not made prizes. Ends.
Propose withdrawal of *Dufferin* to strengthen Red Sea patrol. *Hardinge* leaves Bombay for Red Sea—8th January. *Northbrook* returns to Bombay shortly.
Reply. 18 Your 26. Approve withdrawal of *Dufferin*.
(Sent 10th January).
- A 279.** Adty. to A.S., Malta. 6th January.
22 Pending declaration of blockade of Turkish ports legitimate trade of neutrals must be allowed to pass unmolested.

A 280. C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty. 8th January.

21 Following telegram received from French Admiral 7th January (begins) :—

I propose to you to assign : Firstly to the *Doris*—supervision coast between Port Said and Alexandretta. Secondly to the *Amiral Charner* and *D'Entrecasteaux*—supervision between Alexandretta and Smyrna. Thirdly to the *Askold*—look-out and protection of convoy from Port Said to Kanthe Nisi. (Ends).

Following message sent in reply 8th January. (Begins) :—

Your telegram 1910. As great military importance is now attached to continuous watch being kept on Alexandretta to prevent passage of troops and materials destined for invasion of Egypt, I have entrusted this duty to *Doris*, and patrol between Alexandretta and Port Said to *Askold*. I think that (it) is inadvisable that my responsibility should be extended to west of Mersina, this being no concern of Egypt with whose safety I am specially charged ; but I think that coast of Syria as far as Mersina should be affiliated with Egypt. (Ends).

A 281. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 9th January.

14 Operations at Alexandretta are under consideration, using troops now in Egypt, covered by your squadron in which *Ocean* must be included.

Following information as to local facilities for landing required. Number and condition of piers and lighters, and how it would be proposed to land artillery and heavy transport, also state of land round town for encampment. *Doris* should obtain this and report, also nature of any defences and probable positions in which enemy would mount artillery to repel landing or advance to Beilan Pass. All special stores for expedition will have to be made in Egypt.

A 282. Adty. to C.-in-C., China. 14th January.

12 *Triumph* is to proceed to Port Said with all convenient despatch. Her reserve ammunition is to be sent after her by freight.

A 283. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 16th January.

32 Secret. Ascertain and report how many small steam vessels, tugs, etc., you could obtain suitable for minesweeping. They should be capable of making a sea passage in the Mediterranean, and the speed and draught of the vessels should be reported.

A 284. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 25th January.

50 *Re* your 35* report what instructions have been given to vessels patrolling Red Sea with regard to stoppage of supplies to Red Sea ports and engaging Arabs who show hostile intentions. Are all ports treated similarly, or have attempts been made to discriminate between those inclined to be hostile and friendly? Have any incidents similar to those mentioned in your 35 occurred recently? It is not desired to change the conciliatory policy unless forced to do so by Arabs.

* Reporting that Political Officer was fired on by natives at Diba on 13th January when attempting to land from *Himalaya*.

A 285. Adty. to R.A., Cruiser Force G. 27th January.

20 Transfer your flag if necessary to another vessel and send *Bacchante* or *Euryalus* to Port Said with all convenient despatch.

A 286. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 27th January.

92 . . . *D'Entrecasteaux* placed at disposal entered Canal 27th January. *Minerva* entered Canal.

A 287. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 29th January.

57 It is reported from Berlin and Amsterdam that the Suez Canal is closed to traffic. Report how the matter stands.

Reply. 99 Your 57. Suez Canal is open to traffic by day, but closed at night for safety of shipping and as a military precaution now that enemy is within striking distance seeing that sniping of ships' officers might result in vessels grounding and blocking Canal.

A 288. Marine, Paris, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 2nd February.

73 V. A. Dartige du Fournet has been appointed to the command of the 3rd Squadron detached to the Syrian Coast. This squadron will at present be composed of the *St. Louis*, *Jauréguiberry*, *Henri IV*, *D'Entrecasteaux*. Please inform Admiralty and ask what British ships will be placed under the orders of Admiral Dartige.

A 289. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Paris. 3rd February.

1194 . . . with reference to the French Admiralty's telegram No. 73, the First Lord wishes me to inform you that any British ship detached on the coast of Syria will automatically be placed under the orders of Vice-Admiral Dartige, and that if the military situation there requires more ships he will make every effort to comply with this requirement in sending there all ships available.

1194 *bis.* But the attack on the Suez Canal having been started we must deal with the most urgent matter, and we have for the moment no ships to spare having regard also to the other operations in prospect. If the *Henri IV* should be available, as all her light guns are under armour, she would be of the greatest use in the Canal.

A 290. Adty. to C.-in-C., Egypt. 4th February.

67 You must husband your ammunition carefully. Fighting on the line of the Canal may be prolonged and our reserves are limited to naval conditions.

A 291. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 6th February.

71 *Bacchante* left Gibraltar on 2nd February and *Euryalus* leaves Plymouth on 8th February to join your flag. *Triumph* should be sent to join Mediterranean Fleet at Tenedos I. *Swiftsure*, *Ocean*, and *Doris* will be required towards end of February for operations under Admiral Carden. In order to leave them available for Suez Canal as long as possible Carden has been directed to inform you when he requires them, and you should send them then. You should transfer your flag to any ship under your orders.

A 292. C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty. 7th February.

125 Your 71. In view of *Doris*' valuable local knowledge of Alexandretta and contemplated operations there submit *Minerva* be substituted.
Reply. 73. Your 125. Approved.

A 293. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 7th February.

74 You should direct *Fox* to join you after refit is finished and send *Philomel* to Persian Gulf instead.

A 294. C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty. 15th February.

161 Following telegram received from Admiral St. Louis, Bizerta (begins) : Being appointed in command of Allied Squadron, Syria, very pleased to send you compliments. I beg you will send *D'Entrecasteaux* to Bizerta as soon as possible. *Desaix*, which is due at Suez, will stand by you for your instructions (ends). This being my first intimation, request instructions as to limit of my command *re* my message 21 eighth January, also as to whether responsibility for watching Alexandretta is to be transferred to French Admiral.

A 295. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 18th February.
100. Report if *Clio* can be spared from Canal for Persian Gulf Operations.
Reply. 178 Your 100. *Clio* could be spared. (Sent 19th February.)

A 296. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 19th February.
103. In view of Turkish reinforcements in South Mesopotamia, *Clio* should proceed to Persian Gulf.

A 297. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 19th February.
308 A most vigilant watch should be kept for submarines passing the Straits.

A 298. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Paris. 19th February.
1318 The Admiralty ask you to be good enough to give instructions to the French Fleet to exercise the greatest vigilance in order to prevent Austrian submarines from leaving the Adriatic or Supply Ships for the Turkish Army from leaving Austrian or neutral ports during the operations in the Dardanelles. British Consuls in Italy have been instructed to watch carefully the loading of ships which might be suspected. French Consuls might receive similar instructions. Gibraltar has been warned to keep a strict watch on the Straits to prevent the passage of German submarines or supply ships.

A 299. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Paris. 19th February.
1320 Captain of *Bacchante* telegraphs from Alexandretta that the defences of Beilan are beginning to become formidable, men and guns arriving from Aleppo. Enemy making roads from Osmanieh to Rajun. Twenty 5 in. to 6 in. guns are at Hassan Bazli. Troops at Ergin and Arabli. Admiral Peirse considers that if occupation is intended it should be done without delay.

A 300. Marine, Paris, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 20th February.
153 Will you please urge the dangers and difficulties attending several simultaneous operations? It is impossible to carry out at the same time the operations in the Dardanelles and that at Alexandretta proposed by Admiral Peirse and mentioned in your telegram 1320.

A 301. Adty. to Director of Transports, Cairo. 20th February.
Urgent. Transports are required to be ready at Alexandria by 27th inst, for conveyance of Australian, etc., troops as required by G.O.C. in Egypt with whom you should communicate at once. . . . For the voyage contemplated, 50 per cent. more troops than normal accommodation may be carried in transports.

A 302. A.S., Malta, to Adty. 20th February.
441 Gibraltar reports:—Reason to suspect small vessel at Balearic Islands flying British colours and alleged to be registered at Gibraltar may be used for supplying enemy's submarines and bases. I suggest Balearic Islands should be closely watched by active British cruiser. I observe French Fleet is short of active light cruisers. Would it be possible to spare one *Doris* class and one *Proserpine* class, and lend them to French C.-in-C. for this specific purpose. It is always possible that German submarine might pass Straits of Gibraltar. But their maintenance in the Western Mediterranean would be difficult if a good officer had two such cruisers based at Algiers and £1,000 or so placed at his disposal.

A 303. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Paris. 22nd February.
1344 *Reply* to your 153. Admiralty have not approved of operations at Alexandretta.

A 304. Marine, Paris, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 24th February.
168 Kindly inform Admiralty that Admiral D'Artige du Fournet has taken up his command and left for the coast of Syria on 23rd.

Ask the Admiralty:—

(1) What are, or what will be the English ships attached to the Syrian Squadron and the name of the flag officer in command of the British Division?

(2) What is the present position of the *Askold*, and to which squadron is this cruiser attached?*

* This para. was later annulled by tel. 170.

A 305. C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty 24th February.
199 *Jauréguiberry* with Rear-Admiral Darrieus arrived here for service on Syrian coast and informed me Vice-Admiral du Fournet proceeded there in *D'Entrecasteaux*. Submit I am awaiting a reply to my message 161. 15th February.

A 306. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 24th February.
112 Your 161. An arrangement has been made with the French assigning to them the responsibility for the control of naval operations on the Syrian Coast. Any British ships employed there come automatically under the orders of V.A. D'Artige du Fournet. The Eastern limit of your command in the Mediterranean is fixed by the frontier between Egypt and Syria. Responsibility for watching Alexandretta is in consequence transferred to the French Admiral. *Bacchante* should remain there for the present and carry on reporting to the French V.A.

A 307. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Paris. 25th February.
1377 C.-in-C. (in Egypt) has been informed that—(1) The French Admiral on the Coast of Syria is responsible for the safe conduct of all naval operations on that coast; (2) Any British ships employed on the Syrian Coast will act under the orders of the French Admiral; (3) The Eastern limit of the British command will be the frontier of Egypt and Syria; (4) The watch on Alexandretta is transferred to the French Admiral, cruiser *Bacchante* will remain there for the present under the orders of Admiral D'Artige. If the Admiral wished for *Henri IV* to be sent to him, he would be asked to allow the *Bacchante* to return to Egypt.

A 308. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 1st March.
119 In consultation with military and with Admiral Superintendent, Malta, organise Abu Zabal Wireless Station for communicating French Admiralty messages to French Third Squadron and also for communicating with British ships in the Dardanelles.

Wave lengths should be 4,300 metres if possible. British Post Office informed.

A 309. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Paris. 1st March.
1414 A submarine of unknown nationality was reported off Gijon on the 27th. This is probably the one reported on 25th off Bilbao where she probably replenished.

A 310. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 1st March.
369 In case submarine reported off Gijon on morning 17th February is German and intends passing unseen into Mediterranean, she may try to pass Gibraltar during night of 2nd March or succeeding nights.

Endeavour to arrange that Gibraltar patrol operates in largest force possible, stretching to westward of Straits during afternoons, and passing back to eastward during dark hours, returning to westward next day.

Principal object to sink her or keep her under water and hamper her navigation to utmost. Possible under water range about 80 miles. Do not hesitate to destroy her if opportunity offers within Moroccan territorial waters.

A 311. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 2nd March.

122 It is desired to bombard and destroy the forts at Smyrna at the earliest possible moment, so that the port can be blockaded and prevented from eventually becoming a submarine base.

You are to take charge of the bombardment and should proceed with all despatch in your flagship to a rendezvous in lat. 38° 50' N., long. 26° 35' E., informing Admiral Carden of the time when you will arrive. You will be joined at the rendezvous by two battleships detailed from Carden's force. Bombard deliberately, making use of superior range of your guns, and destroy the batteries without injury to the town.

There is not to be a landing. . . .

When operation is finished, return to Egypt and detach Carden's ships to rejoin him.

Acknowledge, despatch is necessary. Admiral Carden has been informed.

A 311a. Adty. to Admiral Carden. 2nd March.

83 Detach two battleships if you can conveniently spare them to bombard Smyrna under the orders of Admiral Peirse. You should also send 4 minesweeping vessels if possible. . . .

A 312. Rodd, Rome, to Adty. 2nd March.

6283 Information has reached me from source that is considered trustworthy in view of former experience that three German submarines have been sent overland in sections to Pola to be put together as rapidly as possible with a view to operation against Allied Fleets in Mediterranean. (Sent to Malta.)

A 313. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Paris. 2nd March.

1427 On behalf of the First Lord.

I venture impress upon your Excellency the vital importance in this stage of the Dardanelles operations of the watch by the French Fleet on the mouth of the Adriatic to prevent Austrian submarines coming out. Not merely a line across, but an area broad enough to force a submarine to rise to the surface.

A 314. Marine, Paris, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 3rd March.

206 I have given Commander-in-Chief of French Fleet all the necessary orders in view of a possible attempt by Austrian Fleet.

A 315. A.S., Malta, to Adty. 3rd March.

572 Intercepted message—C.-in-C., Mediterranean to *Waldeck Rousseau*. Have been informed that several submarines with the *Admiral Spaun* have left for Ionian Islands and Greek coasts. Keep a good look out and let me know. Ends. From that and Gibraltar reports it is clear that submarine danger is greater than mines for ships in the approaches to Malta. Warn all ships coming here to approach harbour at a good speed on zigzag course while making their identity known.

C.-in-C., Mediterranean, S.N.O., Gibraltar, (?) *Inflexible*, C.-in-C., East Indies Squadron, Admiralty have been informed.

A 316. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 10th March.

138 Don't expend too much ammunition. If your operations do not progress, you should convert them into a mere demonstration and try your diplomacy on the Vali. You must be ready to send *Swiftsure* and *Triumph* back to Admiral Carden at any time he needs them.

A 317. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 12th March.

Phaeton is to complete to full stowage of oil fuel and proceed at once to Marseilles at 2/5ths H.P. Further orders will be sent on arrival at Marseilles.

A 318. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Paris. 12th March.

248 Please ask the Admiralty to settle under the orders of which Admiral, French or British, the *Askold* is placed. The ship is at the present moment at Vourlah where on 28th February Admiral Peirse placed her at the disposal of Admiral D'Artige.

Reply.

1550 Following on a request for the Russian Admiralty, the British Admiralty telegraphed on 25th February to Admiral Carden putting the *Askold* under his orders in order to represent Russia in the Allied Fleet at the Dardanelles, and especially for W/T communication with the Russian Fleet in the Black Sea.

A 319. Consul, Barcelona, to Foreign Office. 13th March.

53 I am informed that there are 83,000 boxes of petrol in German ship *Fangturm* detained at Palma on account of war. It may be that her presence at Palma was schemed preliminary to the war for use as a supply base for submarines. I am trying to obtain confirmation and further details. Sent to Embassy and Gibraltar.

A 320. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 15th March.

145 Your 247.* Proceed as you propose. Send *Swiftsure* and *Triumph* back to Admiral Carden, and return yourself to Egypt.

* Reporting that no further object was to be gained by remaining at Smyrna.

A 321. Adty. to S.N.O., Egypt. 15th March.

The Malta T.B.'s in the Suez Canal are to be sent to the Dardanelles. A cruiser should be sent with them in charge, and colliers may be used to tow them.

A 322. Marine, Paris, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 15th March.

269 *Montcalm* flying the flag of Admiral Huguet will receive orders to place herself under the orders of Admiral Peirse.

A 323. Marine, Paris, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 15th March.

268 Reply to 1573.

Steps have been taken by us since 3rd March as regards the *Fangturm*. Watch on the Balearic Islands both by agents and by an auxiliary cruiser has been carried out, but it is still advisable for the British Ambassador to take steps also.

A 324. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 17th March.

467 *Pelorus* should be sent to Palma Majorca to watch German merchant steamer *Fangturm* from outside territorial waters. Acknowledge.

A 325. Marine, Paris, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 19th March.

289 The *Henri IV* has received orders to proceed to the Dardanelles.

(C2859)

X

- A 326.** C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty. 20th March.
257 *Empress of Russia* requires refit. Propose to send her to Hong Kong in preference to Colombo as likely to save time. Is this approved?
Reply. 153 (22.3.15). Your 257. Proposal approved.
- A 327.** Gib. to Adty. 22nd March.
543 Your 467. *Pelorus* sailed for Palma. Departure has been delayed owing to boiler defects.
- A 328.** Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 24th March.
160 Barges and lighters are required for landing troops at the Dardanelles. Collect all that are suitable in Egyptian ports and make arrangements for sending to Mudros. . .
- A 329.** V.A.E.M.S. to Adty. 24th March.
263 Should *Doris* remain under my orders or return Port Said. *Dublin* is in need of a short refit.
Reply. 141 *Doris* should return to Egypt. . . .
- A 330.** Adty. to C.-in-C., Cape. 24th March.
107 You should join your flag to *Hyacinth*. *Goliath* is to proceed to Suez where she will join flag of C.-in-C., East Indies, and be held in reserve for Dardanelles Fleet.
- A 331.** Adty. to S.N.O., Bombay (73). 26th March.
C.-in-C., East Indies.
On completion of refit, *Chatham* is to proceed to Suez. Acknowledge.
- A 332.** Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 28th March.
167 It is desired to have all available British ships from Egypt to operate outside Dardanelles on the day troops are landed and decisive attack is made. V.A. de Robeck will inform you of this duty in sufficient time in advance and you should send your ships accordingly.
You should remain in Egypt yourself sending *Euryalus* to Dardanelles and transferring your flag to one of the small cruisers. This is subject to the military situation on the Suez Canal permitting of the withdrawal of the ships for a few days.
- A 333.** Adty. to *Phaeton*, Marseilles. 31st March.
Phaeton is to return to England to join Home Fleet with all convenient despatch calling at Gibraltar and Devonport. Acknowledge.
- A 334.** Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 1st April.
171 It is proposed to fit certain important liners trading to the east with one 4.7 in. gun each for anti-S/M defence. The gun and mounting is to be landed at Port Said on outward voyage and mounted in home coming vessel of same line.
- A 334a.** Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 3rd April.
177 Whilst operating with French Squadron *Doris* should conform to French rules and directions in such matters.
- A 335.** Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 10th April.
187 *Goliath* should proceed to Port Mudros.
- A 336.** Adty. to C.-in-C., China. 14th April.
53 When refit of *Empress of Russia* is complete she is to proceed to Aden and act under the orders of C.-in-C., East Indies.

- A 337.** Adty. to I.O., Malta. 14th April.
33 Following recent reports concerning submarines in Austria have been received. One submarine has passed Prague for Pola on 27th March.
Two small ones left Kiel 10th April by rail for Trieste.
Two small ones left Danzig 12th April by rail for Trieste.
On 27th March there were 12 Germania type submarines in Austria.
Sent to you only.
- A 338.** C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty. 15th April.
349 Experience of Red Sea patrolling shows that *Empress* steamers are too large to carry out necessary duties (group corrupt), and that it would be advantageous in view of their large coal consumption and expense of running to replace them by smaller vessels of smaller draft.
Suggest 3 *Britomart* gunboats from China would be suitable for watching Turkish ports, and two or three small armed merchant cruisers about size of *Osiris* (?) for work in Southern Red Sea.
Consider it desirable to retain one large vessel on account of favourable impression made on natives and to watch mouth of Red Sea, but if small vessels as above could be provided it would be possible to dispense with two *Empress* steamers and *Himalaya*.
Considerable expense would probably be saved and patrol work more efficiently carried out.
Reply.
197 Your 349. *Osiris* not available. Can you make local arrangements for taking up, manning, and arming suitable steamers in place of one *Empress* class, and arrange with Hong Kong for gunboats in place of *Empress of Russia*? If so, report proposals. No steamers can be sent from England except trawlers whose speed is insufficient for Red Sea work of patrolling.
- A 339.** Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 15th April.
196 We have information that 200 tons of fuel oil and 50 tons of lubricating oil is being sent from Constantinople to Budrum for use of German submarines.
It is desired to land a raiding force on 21st, 22nd, and 23rd April to occupy Budrum while oil is searched for and destroyed.
You are to take charge of this operation as de Robeck has too much on his hands.
De Robeck has been directed to supply you with two ships to cover landing, and a battalion of marines with machine guns as landing party or a larger landing force should local information as to Turkish troops render it necessary.
Get into communication with de Robeck and inform Admiralty later of your proposed arrangements.
- A 340.** Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 16th April.
640 Your 700* Orient point out that owing to large number of vessels taken up by Government, any delay at Gibraltar involves corresponding delay in outward mail sailing date. They ask whether a temporary fitting could be arranged failing which gun should be embarked but not mounted. Stores and crew should accompany gun.
* Re fitting guns in *Osterley* and *Orsova*.
- A 341.** Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 16th April.
641 Your 700 and my 640. Arrangements are to be made by working day and night to fit guns on board vessels in 2 days, but should any work be outstanding after that, men should accompany vessels to complete work on voyage.

A 342. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 16th April.

198 An expedition will proceed to Somaliland from Aden after the arrival of the Commissioners in P. and O. *Egypt*. *Philomel* is to co-operate with the military force; she should leave the gunboat at Aden, and arrangements should be made for another vessel to tow it on to the Persian Gulf.

Two 12-pdr. 4 cwt. guns will be sent out in *Egypt* with 75 lyddite and 25 rounds shrapnel per gun. *Philomel* is to provide guns crews and small escort for the guns when landed. Captain to communicate with Commissioner on his arrival in steamer *Egypt*.

A 343. C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty. 16th April.

356 Your 196. I am going to Budrum in *Goliath* 18th April making arrangements to meet force detailed by de Robeck at R.V. 36.46 N.26.40 E. p.m. 20th, landing 21st weather permitting.

A 344. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 17th April.

202 Suspend action as regards turning over crew of *Empress of Russia*. There will be great delay in getting a gunboat from China to Red Sea, and it is very doubtful if an old gunboat will be of much service owing to the time she will spend contending with strong head winds in Red Sea.

A 345. V.A., Mudros, to Adty. 18th April.

385 Admiral Robinson informs me that orders have been received to stop sailing of transports. I see no reason for this and am requesting him to send them without delay unless contrary orders have been received from superior authority. This message has been repeated to C.-in-C., Mediterranean.

A 346. Adty. to V.A., Mudros. 19th April.

222 You are the judge of whether transports are or are not to sail on military grounds. Only very exceptional dangers should delay the concentration of troops.

A 347. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 20th April.

673 The French are sending two armed yachts from Toulon to relieve *Pelorus*. The *Eros* sails to-day, and the *Aimah* shortly. On their arrival *Pelorus* should return to Gibraltar and complete with coal and stores.

A 348. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 20th April.

208 Raid on Budrum is not to take place at present in view of trustworthy information in that there is no oil for submarines at Budrum.

Goliath is to be sent at once to De Robeck for main operations. Acknowledge.

A 349. C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty. 29th April.

412 Submit that *Bacchante* and *Euryalus* be ordered to return immediately. Enemy advance party close to Canal in several places. Indications that main attack may be expected shortly.

A 350. Adty. to Marine, Paris. 29th April.

2005 Turks are threatening some activities against the Canal. All our ships are fully occupied at the Dardanelles. We should be very gratified if your Syrian Squadron could be sent at once to Port Said to consolidate the position. They will not be wanted to stop there long.

Reply.

A 351. Marine, Paris to Adty. 29th April.

441 We have ordered Admiral Dartige to send *Jeanne D'Arc*, *D'Entrecasteaux*, and *D'Estvées* immediately to assist in the defence of the Canal.

A 352. Adty. to V.A. de Robeck. 29th April.

263 *Euryalus* and *Bacchante* are urgently required for the defence of the Suez Canal which is now threatened. Send them or two other equivalent ships to Port Said at once with all despatch.

A 353. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 30th April.

230 French Marine have been requested to send Syrian Squadron to Port Said as it is impossible to spare ships from the Dardanelles.

A 354. V.A.E.M.S. to Adty. 30th April.

443 Your 263. *Goliath* has left for Egypt. The situation though now satisfactory on shore, does not permit of the withdrawal of the naval support in the least degree. *Albion* is temporarily out of action. Success in present operations depends on efficient co-operation. This is worked out to the last man. Any withdrawal of more ships at this moment would dangerously imperil position. There is already a shortage of officers and men for beach and transport work. Ships cannot be further depleted of personnel. I trust their Lordships will leave it to me to inform them the moment ships can be spared.

A 355. Adty. to V.A.E.M.S. 30th April.

269 Cancel my 263. French are now sending three ships from Syria to defend Canal.

A 356. Adty. to V.A.E.M.S. 30th April.

270 You may recall *Goliath*.

A 357. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 30th April.

769 Send an armed boarding steamer and 2 torpedo boats to Alboran Island in case of steamer going there to supply submarines. See telegram 99 of to-day from Mr. Smith, Barcelona to F.O. repeated to Gibraltar.

A 358. S.N.O., Gib. to Adty. 5th May.

860 Your 769 Officer commanding T.B. reports from Alboran Island nothing to be seen and has ascertained no ship has been near Island except weekly provision ship. I have directed him to remain watching for the present.

A 359. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 6th May.

800 Your 882.* Warn *Pelorus* to be vigilant. Torpedo boats should continue to patrol in case of more submarines following the first one.

* Reporting that T.B. 92 unsuccessfully attacked an enemy submarine at 3 p.m. 40 miles west of Alboran Island.

A 360. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies (246).
A.S., Malta (922) } A to B only.
S.N.O., Gib.

Torpedo Boat 92 engaged a German submarine at 3 p.m. yesterday 40 miles west from Alboran Island. Submarine escaped.

A. Everything possible should be done for the safety of transports in the Mediterranean and following measures should be taken :—

Diversion from usual tracks.

Darken ships at night.

When troops are carried, a strong armed guard should always be on watch and any machine guns with the troops should be ready for instant service.

Masters of transports should be instructed in the best way to manoeuvre ships to avoid attack if a submarine is sighted. B.

A 361. A.S., Malta, to Adty.

7th May.

410 It appears to me that the enemy are likely to try and cause a diversion in the Mediterranean, especially against commercial transports, ammunition ships, etc. We learn with certainty that a hostile submarine was 40 miles west of Alboran Islands at 3 p.m. 6th May. I now learn that the Austrian light cruiser *Admiral Spaun* was seen on 6th May between noon and 3 p.m. in lat. 38.30 N., long. 18.30 E. whence she escaped to the northward from slowness of French vessels. The French have no really fast light cruisers in the Mediterranean and the number of destroyers of all kinds available with the C.-in-C. are about 35, of which 8 are now in Malta Harbour. French destroyers seem unable to keep the sea and remain efficient to the same extent as British destroyers. V.A.C. Dardanelles appears to have ample work for his ships at the present moment. There is no doubt that the Admiralty is fully aware of the situation, but I feel there cannot be any harm in suggestion. It appears to me that the loan of two really fast light cruisers to the French C.-in-C. would much lessen the possibility of any Austrian small craft slipping out from Adriatic. Also that it might be worth while to send 8 destroyers to methodically sweep the Western Mediterranean clear of this hostile submarine.

A 362. F.N.A. to Marine, Paris.

7th May.

2094 The 1st S.L. asks me to inform you that on account of the large number of transports and store ships passing through the Mediterranean, it is of the highest importance that every Austrian Cruiser which succeeds in escaping from the Adriatic should be vigorously followed up.

A 363. V.A.E.M.S. to Adty.

8th May.

479 In view of shipments being made to Smyrna, and the possibility of its use as a base for enemy's submarines, submit blockade of Gulf of Smyrna be declared. I can make blockade effective.

A 364. Port Said to Adty.

9th May.

442 *Philomel* reports expedition postponed. She is now reconnoitring Somali Coast until 17th inst. Should she then remain at Aden or proceed to Persian Gulf in view of approach of monsoons?

Reply. 265 When *Philomel* has finished reconnoitring Somali Coast she should wait orders in vicinity of Aden. (Sent 14th May.)

A 365. Adty. (First Lord) to Minister of Marine, Rome. 14th May.

The battleships *Queen, London, Implacable, Prince of Wales* and the light cruisers *Amethyst, Sapphire, Dublin* and *Dartmouth*, under the command of Rear-Admiral C. F. Thursby, C.M.G., as soon as they have been relieved by French ships at the Dardanelles, will assemble at Malta to replenish coal and stores, ready to reinforce the Italian Fleet under its Commander-in-Chief.

The date of their readiness will be communicated as soon as it is known, by which time it is hoped your Excellency will be ready to indicate to what rendezvous they should proceed.

The Admiralty hope the berthing at Malomocco will be available at an early date for the superior Allied Battle Fleet and combined with Venice accommodate the cruisers and flotillas in addition.

Although the presence of a strong flotilla of light cruisers, destroyers and submarines, will exercise great restraint on the movements of the Austrian battle fleet, the possibility of its leaving Pola cannot be overlooked. As it will be impossible for the Allied battle fleet to cruise continuously in waters infested by submarines, a harbour in the North of the Adriatic secure against all forms of naval attack is practically a necessity, to ensure that the Austrian Fleet shall be brought to action by a superior force before it has time to seriously affect military movements or carry out raids of importance on the coast of Italy.

Information as to the present berthing facilities and the extent to which they are being increased would be appreciated. Vice-Admiral Sir Douglas Gamble, who has been associated with the negotiations at Paris, will shortly proceed to Malta to inform Admiral Thursby as to the new situation. Should your Excellency desire to see Admiral Gamble, he can be directed to pass through Rome and see you on his way.

A 366. A.S., Malta, to Adty.

16th May.

503 German s/ms. attacked *Ernest Renan* French cruiser off Cape Bon to-day. I think that there are three in Mediterranean and rear of Dardanelles Fleet is threatened and its store carriers are seriously menaced. There are now in harbour at Malta following French ships:—4 battleships, 4 cruisers, 8 submarines, and 25 destroyers. There are 6 destroyers* and 8 more are ready to raise steam. I understand that rest of French battleships are at Bizerta. I do not know what cruisers and destroyers are doing. Only order for destroyers here that I can find is that four are now ordered to go out and cruise between Malta and Sicily and one other to examine Lampedusa Island. One not included in the 25 is at my disposal and is now outside on her regular station. It is clear to me that Vigo, Balearic Islands, Syracuse, Crythion, (Kithera?) near Cape Matapan and German Emperor's villa at Corfu are used as depots for fuel, etc. Appears as if money must have been used to obtain these bases. Submit money freely used might even now deny further use of these bases to submarines.

* A word appears to be missing.

A 367. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Paris.

16th May.

2174 On account of the presence of enemy submarines in the Mediterranean the Admiralty would be glad if you would give them precise details as to the organisation of patrols of light cruisers and torpedo craft of the First Fleet in order that they may be able to give instructions to their transports where they may hope to find protection in case of danger.

A 368. Adty. to A.S., Malta.

16th May.

980 You should make proposals by telegraph as to how and where money can be spent to close down alleged enemy submarine bases.

A 369. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Minister of Marine, Paris.

16th May.

2177 On behalf of the First Lord, I venture most earnestly to ask that the French destroyers at Malta and Bizerta should be employed in hunting German submarines with the utmost vigour.

Also could your Excellency supply 6 or 8 destroyers to escort from Gibraltar transports coming with an Army Corps from about the 22nd onwards.

Full details will be supplied if your Excellency should be able to meet our wish.

A 370. C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty.

16th May.

480 What are *Chatham's* orders?

A 371. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies.

16th May.

272 *Chatham* is to join flag of V.A., Eastern Mediterranean.

A 372. Adty. to V.A.E.M.

16th May.

363 Your 479. It is approved to blockade Smyrna and such part of coast as your resources permit, in conjunction with French Vice-Admiral who will co-operate with you on his arrival about 20th. Report date you propose to commence blockade and days of grace to be allowed for outward neutral shipping, with limits of coast to be blockaded so that official declaration can be made here as well as locally. Menace from submarines must be taken into account in telling off vessels for this duty and the blockade is of secondary importance compared with the safety of the ships.

A 373. Minister of Marine, Paris, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 17th May.

5292 Reply to Admiralty that the C.-in-C. is entrusted with the disposition to make for protection against submarines. These dispositions must vary with the news received each day. I have ordered him to arrange this in collaboration with V.A. de Robeck, V.A. Peirse, and the Admirals commanding at Malta and Gibraltar. We are placing at his disposal all our available resources. Orders have just been given to send him 10 trawlers from the Channel, which will be replaced. I am asking him to inform me of the latest arrangements he has made. I will communicate them to you.

Absolute security of ships against risks arising from submarines can no more be guaranteed in the Mediterranean than in the Channel or North Sea.

A 374. Marine, Paris, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 17th May.

517 Reply to your 2177 and 2178 All the torpedo boats and light craft available have been occupied for several days in a strict search for submarines in the principal passages on the route from Gibraltar to the Dardanelles and on the coast of the Balearic Islands. Being, as we are, under the obligation to place at any moment at the disposal of Italy 12 destroyers and a flotilla of torpedo boats, we have not the means to escort our own transports. We are, besides, avoiding the formation of convoys for fear of attracting attention to them, and of offering through their sailing in company an extended target to the attacks of hostile submarine. They are recommended to steam fast and to clear all narrow and suspected parts at night and without lights. Under these conditions, we can only send to Gibraltar to escort British transports two ships which are at present keeping off Cape Finisterre a watch which it appears to be important not to abandon.

I am sending from Toulon to Bizerta the flotilla of torpedo boats destined for Italy, while awaiting their despatch to Brindisi. It will reinforce the watch being kept on the channels between Sardinia, Sicily and the Tunisian Coast.

A 375. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 17th May.

896 Your 970.* Retain *Pelorus* at Gibraltar for the present.

* Reporting that French yacht was at Palma watching the *Deseado* and *Fangturm*.

A 376. A.S., Malta, to Adty. 18th May.

526 Following message from C.-in-C.

Following dispositions have been made for hunting enemy's submarines in Mediterranean :—

Patrol of four destroyers between Malta and Sicily. In the waters immediately south of Malta—2 destroyers. Between Crete and Cape Matapan—*Jurien de la Gravière* and 4 or 5 destroyers.

Ionian Islands will be patrolled until further orders by 4 destroyers supported by a fast cruiser.

In the Ionian Sea between Italy and Greece three armoured cruisers will patrol at full speed.

In the neighbourhood of Galita I., Cape Bon and southern shores of Tunis are patrolling small torpedo boats from Bizerta. Allies' transports are recommended to pass to southward of Malta and Crete.

A 377. Adty. to V.A.E.M. (375). 18th May.
A.S., Malta (988).

Dublin, *Dartmouth*, *Sapphire*, *Amethyst* are to be at Malta coaled and ready for service by the morning of 23rd May. R.A. Nicholson with *Prince of Wales*, *London* and *Implacable* is to be at Malta, coaled and ready for service by dawn on 26th May.

Venerable will join flag of Admiral Nicholson at Malta.

A 378. A.S., Malta, to Adty. 18th May.

523 I submit there is a possibility of the activity of all large German submarines being transferred to the Mediterranean. If this is the case, I need not enlarge on the consequences; but I point out that good seakeeping destroyers, energetically and thoughtfully handled, would be needed to minimise the mischief. I doubt if any but British destroyers could deal with such a situation. I am not able to judge if this movement is likely because I have no means of gauging whether or why the density of submarine activity remains fairly constant or is decreasing in Home Waters. You alone can do that. But I think I should raise the point for your consideration. See my telegram No. 522.*

* Stating that Palma, Majorca, reported 3 enemy s/m's proceeding to Cabrera I. May 15th to get oil recently landed there.

A 379. Adty. to A.S., Malta. 18th May.

990 Your 523. No more destroyers can be spared from home. It is not thought that more than 2 or 3 German submarines have been transferred to the Mediterranean. The disposition of patrols has been provided for by the C.-in-C. message transmitted in your 526.

You should arrange with S.N.O., Gibraltar, to give secret instructions to transports as to their route, avoiding usual track and passing narrow waters in the dark when possible. Admiralty are taking all possible steps to find out and prevent access to all bases for supply of oil.

A 380. A.S., Malta, to Adty. 20th May.

557 Following received by W/T from V.A.C. Dardanelles (begins):—
553 Your 275. Admiral Thursby with *Queen*, *London*, *Implacable* and *Prince of Wales* are en route to Malta. Do you wish this altered? It would lead to serious inconvenience. *Dartmouth*, *Dublin*, *Sapphire* and *Amethyst* will proceed to Malta as ordered. (2019) (Message ends).

A 381. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 20th May.

279 Italian Ambassador has asked if we can co-operate with Italian Government to patrol Gulf of Sollum to prevent munitions of war being landed. Ascertain if the Egyptian Coastguard can undertake this. If not, can you arrange to patrol this locality?

A 382. A.S., Malta, to Adty. 21st May.

588 R.A. Thursby with *Queen*, *London*, *Implacable*, in dock, and *Prince of Wales*, docking to-morrow, now here, and will be ready dawn 26th. *Dartmouth*—only light cruiser which has arrived, and will be ready dawn 23rd. Your 988 with reference to R.A. Nicholson is not understood. He is not here. Does not R.A. Thursby retain command of the 4 battleships and cruisers as latter arrive?

Reply. Your 588. The arrangements proposed in V.A.E.M.'s 553 which was forwarded in your 557 have been approved. My 988 should be modified accordingly so far as Rear-Admiral Nicholson and *Venerable* are concerned.

A 383. C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty. 21st May.

495 Egyptian Coastguard can only arrange for gunboat to visit Gulf of Sollum once a week. I have no ships available without withdrawing from Red Sea, which I strongly deprecate, nor ratings for manning additional vessels.

A 384. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies (281).

S.N.O., Gib. (929).

A.S., Malta (10).

21st May.

All shipments of mineral and lubricating oil for Greek ports should be detained and reported.

A 385. Adty. to C.-in-C., Egypt (285).
A.S., Malta (21).
S.N.O., Gib. (956).

22nd May.

Re transports proceeding with troops through Mediterranean. Routes should be given to avoid areas dangerous from submarines.

French Commander-in-Chief should be informed of their sailings and it will rest with him to give any special orders he considers necessary.

A 386. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies.

22nd May.

286 Should you consider it of use, *Cornwall* may be sent Sollum on the way to Dardanelles to make inquiry. She should not remain long as she is urgently required in Dardanelles, and risk from submarine attack must be taken into account.

A 387. C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty.

23rd May.

Philomel completed reconnaissance. Awaiting orders at Aden.

Reply.

A 388. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies.

23rd May.

288 *Philomel* should proceed to Egypt.

A 389. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. (972).

A.S., Malta (37).

V.A.E.M.S. (425).

24th May. Sent 8.15 p.m.

A state of war exists from to-day between Italy and Austria and between Italy and Germany. Italy is consequently an Allied Power.

A 390. Adty. to A.S., Malta.

24th May.

39 For Admiral Gamble. You should impress on the C.-in-C. Italian Fleet the importance of establishing an effective watch in the Straits of Otranto by means of as many trawlers and fishing boats with nets as can be obtained, supported by destroyers based on Brindisi and Valona and assisted by aircraft to prevent German submarines from entering Adriatic, as this will not only prevent them from becoming an additional danger to the Italian Fleet, but also be of great service to the Allies by preventing any submarines operating against the ships at the Dardanelles or against transports and from replenishing their torpedoes from Austrian ports.

A 391. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Paris.

25th May.

2254 With a view to facilitating communications between the French, British, Russian, and Italian Fleets in the Mediterranean, Admiralty proposes to you that you should decide that all times should be given in mid-European time, and all longitudes counted from the Meridian of Greenwich.

A 392. S.N.O., Gib., to Adty.

25th May.

50 Your 970.* This has already been done for some time.

* A.S. Malta should be consulted *re* orders as to route to be given to transports in Mediterranean in view of enemy submarines.

A 393. C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty.

26th May.

516 Blue Funnel Line ask permission to mount their 4.7 in. guns on passage through Mediterranean in order to obviate the four days delay in Port Said necessary for preparing ship to take gun. May this be permitted? In view of submarines in Mediterranean I have hitherto insisted on guns being mounted before ships leave Port Said.

Reply.

301 Permission may be granted at owners' risk. (Sent 27.5.15.)

A 394. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies (300).

A.S., Malta (71).

S.N.O., Gib. (3).

S.N.O., Mudros (62).

27th May.

You should telegraph movements of transports carrying troops in the Mediterranean to Admiralty, if possible previous to their sailing. The information is required to enable the French Marine to be informed through the French Naval Attaché here. The approximate number of troops carried should be stated.

These reports are required in addition to any information sent by the transport officers to their department, and it is not intended that their procedure should be altered.

A 395. Adty. to Sir R. Rodd (Rome).
(Trade and Treaty).

27th May.

480 Blockade dating from 26th May proclaimed in regard to:—

(1) Austro-Hungarian coast from Italian frontier on north to Montenegrin frontier on south, including all islands, ports, bays, etc.

(2) Albanian coast from Montenegrin frontier on North to Cape Kiephali inclusive on south. Friendly and neutral ships will be allowed a time limit, to be fixed by C.-in-C. of Italian Naval Force, for free exit from blockaded zone.

(Translated by Port. Sent to Malta.)

A 396. V.A.E.M. to Adty.

30th May.

614 Request you will publish immediately a declaration of blockade on coast of Asia Minor extending between Dardanelles and Samos, both inclusive; blockade to commence as from 12 noon 2nd June. Neutral ships already in ports on blockaded coast will be allowed to pass out until noon 5th June. No ships will be allowed to enter port in blockaded area after noon 2nd June, even though they have already commenced their voyage to those ports.

Sent also to A.S., Malta, British Minister, Athens, and British Minister, Sofia.

A 397. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies.

30th May.

309 Your 532.* It is not possible to return the torpedo boats in view of their being required for anti-submarine work.

* Asking for return of the Malta torpedo boats for patrol of the Suez Canal.

A 398. Rodd, Rome (Military 519) to Adty.

31st May.

My telegram 480 of 27th May. Blockade proclaimed on 30th May to Aspri Ruga as southern extremity instead of Cape Kiephali inclusive. Line of blockade is, therefore, now from Cape Otranto to Aspri Ruga, and southern limit is 40° 9' 36" North, and 19° 35' 45" East. (Sent to Malta).

A 399. Adty. to V.A.E.M.S.

1st June.

477 Your 614 leaves some doubt whether you propose to blockade Samos or other islands in Greek occupation. Blockade of mainland is approved, but no blockade of islands should be undertaken without Admiralty sanction. Such action would raise important international questions which must be most carefully considered.

Report if you can make blockade effective without including islands.

A 400. V.A.E.M.S. to Adty. 2nd June.

629 Your 477. Blockade instituted as from noon 2nd June. No blockade of islands contemplated; ships trading with these will not be hindered beyond the usual search for (?) sulphur and oil and other contraband whose ultimate destination is suspected. Trade between islands and mainland by small boats would be difficult. This it is hoped to overcome by system of agents in islands and frequent surprise visits. Presence of motor patrol asked for in my 587 would greatly assist. Consider blockade can be made effective without including islands.

A 401. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 4th June.

318 Your 349 and 472. Navy Board, Melbourne, have been asked to try and obtain suitable small steamers of under 2,000 tons gross similar to our armed boarding steamers to relieve *Empress* class.

Trawlers only steam from 7 to 9 knots with a clean boiler in moderate weather, and would make very slow passage against the strong winds in Red Sea and could not catch a large dhow crossing the Red Sea with a beam wind. Almost all suitable trawlers have already been taken up and no more can be spared from Home Waters owing to the large numbers sent to Dardanelles.

A 402. A.S., Malta, to Adty. 4th June.

746 Following from C.-in-C. Instructions to transports.

From 6th June and until further notice transports will steer the following course. Ships entering Mediterranean will pass between Alboran Island and Cap de Trois Fourches, thence to a position in 37.50 N. 5 E. Thence passing 20 miles north Vathi, 15 miles off Cape Blanc, 15 miles off Bon, 15 miles west and south of Pantellaria Island and Malta, thence to a position 25° N. and 16° E. and from there follow the parallel 35° N. to Meridian 22° E. Pass south and close to Cerigotto, north of Milo Island, through Siphano Channel between Serpho I., and Siphano I. to S. and E. of Mykoni. Thence to Lemnos, passing W. of Skyros. The opposite course will be followed going west. Transports going alongside (*sic*) Egypt after clearing Malta will proceed to position 35° N. and 16 E.; they will then follow parallel 35° N. to the Meridian of 22° E. and from there direct to their destination. They will follow opposite course going west.

A 403. A.S., Malta, to Adty. 9th June.

818 C.-in-C. directs, until further notice and from 10th June, transports should take following route. Coming from Gibraltar pass half way between Alboran I. and Cape Tres Forcas then 30 miles to the N. of Algiers, 15 miles off Cap-de-Fer and follow to N. of C. Bon to the N. of Pantellaria I. and Malta, and to a point in lat. 35.10 N., long. 17 E. Follow parallel 35.10 N. to 22.20 E. Pass to S. of and close to Cerigotto, to S. of and to E. of Milo I., to East of Siphano I., to E. of Syra, crossing Mykoni Channel between Tenos and Mykoni and so to Lemnos by the W. of Skyros and Strati I.

Ships going to Egypt follow route indicated to 35.10 N., 22.20 E. Thence they will steer direct for Port Said or Alexandria according to instructions.

For return journeys same courses.

It will be advisable, as far as possible, to pass neighbourhood of Cape Blanc and Pantellaria Is. at night.

A 404. V.A.E.M. to Adty. 12th June.

686 In view of the present submarine menace and the necessity of providing efficient escort for transports I consider it most desirable that the limits of responsibility of the various commands in the Mediterranean should be clearly laid down. (0935).

A 405. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Paris. 16th June.

2479 Reply to your telegram. (6593.)*

The Admiralty propose the following limits for the Mediterranean commands.

V.A., Eastern Mediterranean Squadron to the north of the line running from Point St. Paul through Samos, Nikaria, Mykoni, Tinos, Andros, Euboea to Cape Griva.

C.-in-C., East Indies, the coast of Egypt from the frontiers of Syria to those of Tripoli, and as far out to sea as the naval local defence patrols extend.

A.S., Malta, the Maltese Islands as far out to sea as the usual local defence patrols extend.

S.N.O., Gibraltar, the Straits of Gibraltar as far as the meridian of 5° W.

Italian C.-in-C. will have command of all the Italian coasts and its dependencies as far out to sea as the usual local defence patrols extend, besides the waters of the Gulf of Taranto and the Adriatic to the north of the parallel of Cape Colonne.

French C.-in-C., will have command of all the rest of the Mediterranean.

I am confirming this telegram by courier to-night. The same proposal is being sent to the Italian Government.

* This telegram is not forthcoming.

A 406. Adty. to V.A.E.M. (532).
C.-in-C., East Indies (340). 16th June.

My 531.* In view of political objections to interfering with trade between Piraeus and Greek Islands, and improbability of Greek Government exercising adequate control, it is necessary to rely on stopping trade between islands and mainland.

As far south as Samos Strait this duty devolves on you.

Your 629 stated that control could be exercised by agents in Islands and frequent surprise visits, and you should report in due course on efficacy of these steps.

South of Samos Strait the duty will devolve on French Fleet, and it is proposed to suggest to the French Government that they should declare a blockade from there extending as far as practicable, and possibly all the way to the Egyptian frontier. Have you any remarks to offer before the suggestion is put forward?

* Admiralty telegram 531 was same in substance as 2479 to Marine, Paris.

A 407. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 17th June.

342 Report what action you are taking to safeguard Perim. It seems desirable *Fox* should proceed there without delay.

A 408. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 17th June.

343 *Venus* will be sent from Queenstown to Port Said to follow your orders.

A 409. Adty. to A.S., Malta. 18th June.

Following for R.A. *Queen* (begins). Your 13. Approved for *Amethyst* to be sent to Malta and *Sapphire* to be laid up at Taranto one at a time when *Dublin* and *Dartmouth* return.

- A 410.** Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 20th June.
346 Consideration is being given to the steps which would be necessary if war broke out with Persia. All occupations of Persian territory would be a military responsibility, but Navy might have to assist and cover landing of troops, patrol Gulf, and blockade ports. Prompt action would probably be advisable to secure all dhows and boats at Bushire and exercise surveillance against passage of arms. You should consult G.O.C. Egypt, S.N.O., Persian Gulf, and Government of India, and report what ships you could make available for Persian Gulf. Navy Board, Melbourne, are being asked whether they could commission *Psyche* and *Fantome* with Australian crews for this service.
- A 411.** Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 20th June.
215 Your 300. *Arno** should remain at Gibraltar till further orders.
* Formerly *Ansaldo* (destroyer); purchased from Portuguese Government.
- A 412.** Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 23rd June.
245 *Topaze* leaves Dover to-night for Gibraltar and Malta to join Admiral Thursby.
- A 413.** C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty. 23rd June.
629 Your 346. Could send *Fox* and *Northbrook* to Persian Gulf on arrival of *Venus*. Should they be ordered to proceed there, will further instructions be sent?
- A 414.** Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 24th June.
355 Your 629. *Venus* should proceed to Aden as soon as she can be spared. Persian Gulf necessities not yet urgent.
- A 415.** Adty. to A.S., Malta. 28th June.
331 *Dartmouth* is to pay off forthwith. . . .
- A 416.** S.N.O., Gib., to Adty. 26th June.
359 Your telegram 237 (M.03945), I desire aerial patrol to extend 70 miles on either side of Gibraltar. Short range machines are also required to assist torpedo boats to patrol 30 miles on either side of Gibraltar.
- A 417.** F.N.A. to Marine, Paris. 29th June.
2591 The following telegram has been received from Chief of Staff, Italian Navy, to Italian Naval Attaché, London.
I beg to confirm that following request of French C.-in-C., southern limit of Italian Command would be line Cape Spartivento, Calabria to Cape Kephali slightly north of Corfu. (Ends).
Admiralty have no objection to this alteration. If you agree, please make change in the Memo. which Admiral de Sugney is bringing you.
- A 418.** Adty. to Marine, Paris. 29th June.
2598 Sequel to my 2591 of 29th. According to a telegram from the Italian link-officer on board the *France* the small islands of Fano, Samothraki, and Merlera are included in the French area.
- A 419.** Adty. to R.A., *Queen*. 30th June.
5 Arrange for *Amethyst* to be repaired at Taranto after *Topaze* joins. Italian Admiralty have offered to repair *Dublin* at Spezzia.
Before accepting offer Admiralty wish to know probable time repairs will take.
Ascertain this and reply by wire.

- A 420.** Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 1st July.
372 Your 643.* No T.B.D.'s or other light vessels available for a separate flotilla. Your suggestion as to expending money for obtaining information may be tried. The information to be passed to S.N.O.'s of locality, who can then take action. Malta to be kept informed.
* Asking for flotilla of T.B.'s for destroying oil depots and catching submarines.
- A 421.** C.-in-C., East Indies to Adty. 5th July.
673 Aden reports attack on Aden appears to be imminent. *Empress of Asia* and *Empress of Russia* arriving Aden 5th July. *Northbrook* and *Minto* already there.
7th July (Recd. 8th July, 9.20 a.m.)
- A 422.** Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to Foreign Office.
652 My telegram No. 519. Adriatic blockade now extended to whole sea north of Otranto—Aspri Ruga line. Ships desiring safe conduct to Italian or Montenegrin ports must apply at Gallipoli.
- A 423.** Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 8th July.
384 Order *Diana* by W/T to proceed to Port Said with all convenient despatch.
Order *Juno* to Gibraltar to wait orders.
- A 424.** Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 8th July.
380 Hasten arrival of *Venus* at Aden. Send *Fox* or *Philomel* to Perim to be available for service at islands in southern part of Red Sea. *Diana* has been ordered to Port Said from Gibraltar to join your flag.
- A 425.** A.S., Malta, to Adty. 8th July.
188 Following route for transports passing through Mediterranean has been ordered by C.-in-C.; commences 10th July.
Transports entering Mediterranean from Gibraltar are to pass midway between Alboran Island and Cape Tres Forcas. Then 15 miles to the north of Cape Tenez and Algeria, 15 miles north of Cap de Fer, and following the coast of Tunis after passing Cape Serrat, pass 20 miles to the north of Cape Bon, to the south of Pantellaria Island and Malta, and to a point 35 degrees north and 16 degrees east, following the parallel of 35 degrees north to 20 degrees east. Pass through Cerigo Channel, west of Milo Island, and Anti Milo Island, pass between Serpho Island and Siphano Island, East Syra, through the Mykoni Channel between Tinos Island and Mykoni, and to the east of Skyros to Lemnos.
Ships going to Egypt follow route indicated to latitude 35 degrees north, longitude 20 degrees east, thence they will steer direct to Port Said or Alexandria in accordance with their instructions.
For the return journey the same course in the opposite direction.
It will be advisable as far as possible to pass the neighbourhood of Cape Blanc and Pantellaria Island at night.
Ships going from Egypt to Lemnos and *vice versa* are to pass between Scarpanto Island and Rhodes, between Amorgos Island and Kimaro, and join route for ships coming from the west off Mykoni Channel.
- A 426.** C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty. 8th July.
684 Referring to recent mining of S.S. *Teiresias* in Bitter Lakes, I strongly reiterate request for return of torpedo boats, see my telegram No. 532 of 29th May and Admiralty reply No. 309.
Am dangerously weak in small craft for Lake patrol, and immunity from further raids cannot be insured with means now at my disposal.

A 427. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 8th July.

383 Following telegram has been sent by War Office to G.O.C., Egypt (begins). An immediate attack at Aden is apprehended. Preparations should be made for sending at least a brigade at once when ordered by me. You should get in touch with Aden and Naval authorities and inform us fully what you can do. Time is of the utmost importance (ends). P.N.T.O., Egypt and S.N.O., Aden notified.

A 428. Adty. to S.N.O., Aden. 9th July.

Confer with military and if they require it take any necessary steps to stop all vessels at Aden bringing reinforcements from India and Australia.

A 429. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 9th July.

403 On arrival *Juno* should coal, and proceed to Port Said instead of *Diana*.

Juno should make the passage as fast as she can without risking breakdown of machinery.

When *Diana* arrives she should coal and wait orders.

A 430. Adty. (T.) to Robinson, Finance, Cairo. 9th July.

124 Confer with military and prepare to move at least an Infantry Brigade from Suez to Aden, reporting any action taken.

A 431. Walpole, Aden, to Adty. 9th July.

Work suspended owing to hostile force approaching, standing by for confidential books, ready abandon W/T station by order of officer i/c defence.

Philomel arrived Port Said and left for Perim embarking General Younghusband, Suez for Aden.

A 432. Adty. to A.S., Malta. 10th July.

470 Transports of troops for Dardanelles appear generally to go to Alexandria instead of direct to Mudros.

This causes delay and increased submarine risk.

As it is understood G.O.C. desires that transports should go to Mudros, do you know why they go to Alexandria?

A 433. A.S., Malta, to Adty. 11th July.

252 Your 470. On 1st June P.N.T.O., Mudros, replying to A.S., Malta, said:—

"General wishes all ships sent to Alexandria." Since this date all transports have been sent to Alexandria accordingly. On 1st July A.S., Malta telegraphed to V.A., Eastern Mediterranean as follows:—

"Following telegram received by Governor from Mudros:—'Admiral orders transports with new division should come to Mudros and not to Alexandria; please arrange accordingly. G.H.Q., Mediterranean Force.' Am I to understand all future transports carrying troops and horses and army supply ships are to be sent to Mudros? I find difficulty in communicating with G.O.C., Mediterranean Force. Before answering confer with him and let me know what is actually required." (1112.)

On 3rd July following was received by A.S., Malta from V.A., Eastern Mediterranean:—

"Your 1112 of 1st July. I did not order any transports to come to Mudros direct, but I sent following to Admiralty 30th June:—'No. 775. According to existing arrangements troops coming from England are being exposed to certain submarine risk which perhaps might be avoided. Present system is for transports to go direct to Alexandria where certain adjustments

are made and horses, etc., landed, after which they come to Mudros, troops being thus exposed to submarine danger for an additional journey of some 700 miles, which could be avoided if transports came direct to Port Mudros, proceeding thence to Alexandria."

"I understand that General sent similar message to War Office. Consider it necessary for orders to come from home." (0111.)

On 5th July Captain Glynn, proceeding to Dardanelles in the collier *Errington Court*, conferred with me and I requested him to lay before Sir Ian Hamilton and V.A., Eastern Mediterranean copies of 2 last quoted telegrams as well as my written remarks on the 2 routes they have—Mudros direct and Mudros *via* Alexandria.

I hope thus to obtain most expeditious decision and realise wishes of V.A., Eastern Mediterranean and Sir Ian Hamilton.

A 434. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 12th July.

394 *Juno* is being sent to you instead of *Diana*. She left Gibraltar on 11th.

A 435. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 14th July.

398 Your 684. It is not possible to return the torpedo boats.

Four motor boats of 40 to 60 feet length and speed over 10 knots and also four smaller boats will be shipped for you in about a week. A further four boats will be provided later. Motor boat reserve personnel will also be sent.

A 436. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 14th July.

453 Your 53. Italy is not at present in a state of war with Germany. Italian ships and ships bound for Italy should continue to be searched for German and other enemy reservists and manifests should be stamped as heretofore. Vessels should also be detained until Italy is at war with Germany whenever there is reason to believe that there are goods on board destined for Germany or are in transit for Switzerland.

A 437. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 16th July.

485 *Diana* should be sent to Port Said to follow the orders of C.-in-C., East Indies.

She should make the passage as fast as possible without risking breakdown.

A 438. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 16th July.

401 Armed intervention against Persia will shortly be commenced and it is under consideration to raise the Russian Force at Kasvin and Resht to 5,000 with cavalry and guns. British action proposed is to seize Bushire, Bunder Abbas, Lingah, and Muhammara and occupy Hormuz and then to inform Persia that we shall retain possession until reparation is made for attack at Bushire and until German intrigues are put a stop to by arrest of German agents in Persia. C.-in-C., Cape, has been ordered to send either *Pioneer* or *Pyramus* to Aden to follow your orders. *Fantome* commissions at Sydney on 27th instant for Persian Gulf. *Juno* left Gibraltar 11th to join you and *Diana* has been ordered from Gibraltar to join you. *Juno* should be sent on to Aden as a preparatory measure. You should resume control of Persian Gulf leaving operations up Shatt-al-Arab to present S.N.O.

A 439. C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty. 19th July.

729 If you have not special orders for *Diana* I propose she shall replace *Philomel* patrolling west coast of Egypt.

Reply. 411. Your 729. No objection as a temporary measure with due precaution against submarine attack.

When *Scotia* arrives she will be more suitable and should relieve *Diana*. (Sent 20.7.15.)

(C2859)

A 440. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 19th July.
407 *Scotia* has been ordered to proceed from England to Port Said to join your flag, calling at Gibraltar and Malta.

A 441. C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty. 22nd July.
747 All being now quiet propose ordering *Juno* to Bushire, Captain Wake assuming duties of S.N.O., Persian Gulf and Captain Nunn becoming S.N.O., Mesopotamia, with jurisdiction extending from Fao to the North.

A 442. I.O., Gib. to Adty. 26th July.
88 Reported from German source that two submarines will endeavour to pass Straits of Gibraltar 27th July.

A 443. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 30th July.
584 Your 703. When ready *Bristol* should proceed to Malta to coal and join flag of Rear-Admiral Thursby at Taranto.

A 444. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 30th July.
434 *Weymouth* proceed to Malta.

A 445. Adty. to A.S., Malta. 2nd August.
712 *Weymouth* should be refitted before joining Admiral Thursby. Work should take precedence of *Dartmouth*.

A 446. Adty. to V.A.E.M.S. (773). 4th August.
C.-in-C., East Indies (447).

Following from Italian Admiralty dated 3rd August :—

Please communicate to Admiralty that we are informed that attempts will shortly be made to smuggle war material into Cyrenaica with steamers sailing from Syrian coast. It would be very advantageous if British ships operating in Eastern Mediterranean could co-operate in preventing this as far as their duties allow. (Ends).

Above is forwarded for such action as you consider possible under the circumstances.

A 447. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Paris. 5th August.
2948 In reply to your secret despatch of 3rd August relating to the safety of the Suez Canal the Admiralty informs you that they have sent a few motor boats for the patrol of the Canal and that a despatch will be sent to Admiral Peirse to draw his attention to the points you point out.

The Admiralty wish me to inform you that if you can spare a few old torpedo-boats of no military value and armed with the 3-pounders and even with the 1½-pounder and a few rifles they might be of great value for patrolling purposes in the Canal.

A 448. C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty. 7th August.
816 Information from several independent sources indicates that two Greek steamers possibly escorted by two German submarines intend to start from some point in the Aegean Sea and land Turkish Officers, munitions, and presents for Senussi near (Gulf of) Sollum and attack Sollum, Barrani, or Matruh (Marsa) with the assistance of Bedouins. Presence of submarines would render interference from patrol ships difficult, and they would be probably able to revictual on the coast as I have no vessels capable of dealing with them. In any case if they reach this coast they will have easy prey in transports entering and leaving Alexandria and Port Said. Submit therefore in view of large transport traffic that I may be allowed some destroyers for their protection.

Reply. 461. Your 816. We have no destroyers to send out and are taking far greater risks in home waters owing to the lack of sufficient numbers.

Your 816 has been repeated to V.A., Eastern Mediterranean, and he has been directed to take any steps possible at his end should he get reliable information.

He has been directed to send you one or two B class submarines and an armed boarding steamer as mother ship if he can spare them.

The submarines should be stationed near Sollum to surprise the Greek steamers, the armed boarding steamer being kept well out of sight.

A 449. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 7th August.
637 Armed boarding steamer *Woodnut* is being sent from Queenstown to Gibraltar to assist in patrol of Gibraltar Straits.

A 450. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 7th August.
458 We are arranging to send *Jupiter* to protect Suez Canal, but she cannot arrive for a month. In the meantime, V.A., Eastern Mediterranean Squadron, has been asked if he can spare *Minerva* or *Doris* for Canal. On arrival of a ship from him you should send *Venus* or *Diana* to Colombo. Armed boarding steamer *Scotia* has been sent to you for patrolling northern coast of Egypt. Acknowledge.

A 451. A.S., Malta, to Adty. 9th August.
662 Following from Commander-in-Chief (begins).

Until further orders from 15th August routes recommended for transports are as follows :—

Gibraltar to Lemnos.—Proceed to vicinity of Ceuta, pass half way between Alboran Island and Cape Trois Fourches, and follow coast of Algiers and Tunis from Tenes, keeping 10 miles from promontories. Pass 20 miles from Cape Bon, to the south of Pantellaria Island and Malta and follow parallel of 35° 40'; pass between Cerigotto Island and Crete to the east of Milo Island, Siphano Island, Syra, through Straits of Mykoni and reach Lemnos by Skyros Island and west of Strati Island (Alinea).

Lemnos to Gibraltar.—Pass to west of Skyros Island, through Straits of Doro, pass to east of Zea, Thermia Island, through Straits of Siphano, Straits of Cerigo, proceed to Cape Pattaro,* along the coast of Sicily passing to the south of Cape Spartivento at a distance of 20 miles and from this point proceed to 10 miles to the north (of) Alboran Island, then direct to Gibraltar.

Gibraltar to Egypt.—Same route as Gibraltar—Lemnos as far as lat. 35° 40', long. 18° 20' then proceed direct to Alexandria or Port Said.

Egypt to Gibraltar.—From Port Said pass 20 miles north of Damietta, 20 miles from Gavdo Island and Cape Crio, then on the meridian of Cape Matapan join Lemnos—Gibraltar route.

Egypt to Lemnos.—Pass between Scarpanto Island and Rhodes Island, skirting Scarpanto to the west of Kandeliusa between Amorgos Island and Kinaros Island, then take the route for ships coming from the west to the entrance of Mykoni Island Channel.

Lemnos to Egypt.—Pass to the east of Strati Island, Caloyeri, Levatha, Kandeliusa, pass between Scarpanto Island and Rhodes, skirting Rhodes proceed to position 33° north 23° 20' east, then proceed to Port Said.

Recommendation.—As far as possible pass the vicinity of Blanc Nez and Pantellaria Island by night. Ships which cross the above mentioned routes by night should burn steaming lights. (Ends).

* Evidently Passero is meant.

A 452. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 10th August.

667 Two German submarines are on the way to Adriatic, expect to pass Gibraltar Straits between noon 13th and noon 15th. Cruising speed for long passage is 9 knots.

A 453. Adty. to R.A., 9th C.S. (Funchal). 14th August.

114 *Duncan* should proceed to Gibraltar and Malta taking every precaution against submarine attack.

A 454. A.S., Malta, to Adty. 15th August. Sent 10.55 p.m.
14th August.

763 Following received from Commander-in-Chief:—

Cancel routes ordered in my telegram 662 8th August for Egypt to Lemnos and Lemnos to Egypt, and substitute the following to take effect from 15th August.

Egypt to Lemnos.—Proceed to a position 32° 45' N. and 28 degrees east of Greenwich, then between Kaso Island and Crete, keeping to the west of the Strait to the south of Cristiani Island, and rejoin the route from the west between Milo Island and Polykandro Island.

Lemnos to Egypt.—Pass to the east of Strati Island, Mykoni Island, Amorgos Island, between Stampalia Island and Anaphi to the east of Sophrana Islands between Kasos Island and Crete, keeping to the east of the Strait, and thence direct to Alexandria.

A 455. S.N.O., Gib., to Adty. 17th August.

857 Have interviewed officer in charge of patrols and consider that owing to clear weather and good visibility, it is improbable that any submarine has passed east. All patrols have now resumed their stations.

A 456. Malta to Adty. 21st August.

851 Commander-in-Chief directs from 21st August onwards routes prescribed for transports are those indicated in my telegram 2244 (622 to Admiralty) modified as follows:—Egypt to Lemnos. Steer between Casso* and Crete to the east passage, pass to the south of Christiani Island, then join route for ships coming from the west between Milo Island and Polykandro Island. Lemnos to Egypt. Pass to the west of Skyros Island. Go through Doro Channel, pass to the east of Zea, Thermia Island, go through Siphano Channel, pass to the south of Milo Island, 20 miles to the south of Christiani Island, pass between Casso* and Crete to the west passage, pass to point 32° 46' N., 28 degrees E. Greenwich, and thence steer for Alexandria. Advice. Ships which, during the night, cross foregoing routes should carry steaming lights.

* ? Kaso.

A 457. Marine, Paris. to Adty. (F.N.A.). 21st August.

778 In view of the necessity of stopping supplies to the enemy at the Dardanelles and in Syria, we are instructing Commander-in-Chief of Fleet to declare a blockade of coast of Asia Minor from the Samos shore to the Egyptian frontier.

A 458. Adty. to S.N.O., Malta. 24th August.

931 My 825. War Office have now received telegram from G.O.C., Mediterranean Force concurring with V.A., that all troop transports from England should proceed direct to Mudros. Store and supply ships to go to Alexandria. Issue orders accordingly.

A 459. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 24th August.

497 Your 868.* It seems probable that if large ships such as *Dufferin* or *Minerva* are frequently at Sollum they will be torpedoed.

Scotia, *Heroic* and submarines are sufficient to prevent stores or emissaries being landed on the coast, and if Senussi attack Egypt ships will not stop him and it is a matter for the army.

* Reporting that *Dufferin* had been ordered to Sollum.

A 460. A.S., Malta., to Adty. 27th August.

947 Following orders issued by French Commander-in-Chief (begins).

From 27th August all transports with troops on board must cease to pass to the east of Crete, in order to follow the routes prescribed for ships coming from or going to Europe. Otherwise no change.

A 461. Malta to Adty. 29th August.

978 Following routes for transports passing through Mediterranean have been ordered by Commander-in-Chief, commencing 30th August, and will be in force until further notice:—

1. *Gibraltar—Lemnos.*—Proceed to vicinity of Ceuta, pass half way between Alboran Island and Cape Tres Forcas and follow coast of Algiers (Algeria) and Tunis from Tenes Cape keeping 10 miles from promontories. Pass 20 miles from Cape Bon to the southward of Pantellaria Island and Malta and follow parallel 35° 40'. Pass between Cerigotto Island and Crete, to the eastward Milo Island and Siphano Island, west of Syra and to the east of Jura Island, through Doro Channel to the east of Skyros Island and west of Strati Island.

2. *Lemnos—Gibraltar.*—Pass to the westward of Skyros Island through Doro Channel, pass to the eastward of Zea and Thermia Island, through Straits of Siphano and Cerigo, pass Cape Passaro at a distance of 20 miles, along the coast of Sicily, pass to the south of Marittimo Island and Cape Spartivento at a distance of 20 miles, and from this point proceed 10 miles north of Alboran Island, then direct to Gibraltar.

3. *Gibraltar—Egypt.*—Same route as Gibraltar—Lemnos as far as lat. 35° 40' (N.) long. 18° 20' (E.) thence proceed direct to Alexandria or Port Said according to orders received.

4. *Egypt—Gibraltar.*—From Port Said pass 20 miles north of Damietta, 20 miles from Gavdo Island to Cape Krio, then on meridian Cape Matapan and join Lemnos—Gibraltar route.

5. *Egypt—Lemnos.*—Route for transports carrying troops. Proceed to position 34° 30' N., 23° E. of Greenwich and thence steer north true and join route Gibraltar—Lemnos to the west of Cerigotto Island Channel.

6. *For other transports.*—Pass between Kaso Island and Crete keeping to the east channel, to the south of Christiani, then join route for ships coming from the west between Milo Island and Polykandro.

7. *Lemnos—Egypt.*—Route for transports with troops. Follow course Lemnos—Gibraltar. After passing through Cerigo Island Channel steer for position 34° 30' N., 22° 35' E. of Greenwich and thence direct to Egypt.

8. *For other transports.*—Follow route Lemnos—Gibraltar until Milo Island is passed, pass south of Milo Island, 20 miles south of Christiani and thence steer to position 32° 46' N., 28° E. of Greenwich, and thence direct.

9. *Recommendation.*—As far as possible pass vicinity of Blanc Nez and Pantellaria Island by night. Ships which cross above mentioned routes by night should burn steaming lights.

A 462. Adty. to V.A.E.M. (880).
A.S., Malta (995).

29th August.

We have reliable information that *U.34* and *U.35* reached Cattaro 23rd August.

A 463. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. (821). 30th August.
R.A., British Adriatic Squadron (22).

Two German submarines reached Cattaro 23rd. Two more are on way out to the Mediterranean, and it is estimated that the first will pass Gibraltar about 6th September and second about 18 hours later.

A 464. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Paris. 30th August.
3188 Admiralty are hastily assembling a flotilla of 60 drifters with indicator nets in order to send them to watch the Straits of Otranto so as to stop German submarines from replenishing in Austrian ports.

A 465. C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty. 31st August.
893 Submarine *B.6* has battery defects which necessitate repair by Dockyard.

Submarine *B.11* has now defects necessitating seven to ten days in harbour.

As vessels on Western Egyptian coast have to work 250 miles from Alexandria, the only harbour, B class submarines are most unsuitable for this work, more especially in the absence of depot ship.

Even if able to keep the sea for time required their utility is doubtful on this patrol owing to their low speed and lack of armament, principal duties required there being visit and search. I therefore recommend their withdrawal.

A 466. Reply.
508 B class submarines should be sent to Malta for repairs and will not return to Egyptian waters. (Sent 1st September).

A 467. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 2nd September.
847 When *Jupiter* arrives she should be despatched to Malta without delay in order to keep her well ahead of German submarines. She left Liverpool 30th August.

A 468. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Paris. 2nd September.
3209 The question of the limits of command in the Mediterranean has been raised anew by Gibraltar who asked to be informed as to their eastern limit.

Admiralty having received no reply to their memo. of 28th June other than your telegram 679, which refers exclusively to the Aegean, propose now, as far as concerns Gibraltar, to extend the eastern limit of the command to 7° 20' W. (Paris), the limit of their territorial waters being insufficient to ensure effective watch over the Strait.

A 469. Adty. to Marine, Paris. 3rd September.
3214 Your 796.* The limit proposed is the meridian of 5 degrees west of Greenwich, 16 miles east of Gibraltar.

* This telegram cannot be traced.

A 470. S.N.O., Gib., to Adty. 3rd September.
14 Following received by telegraph from S.N.O., Mudros (begins). Please arrange that transports arrive Mudros at daylight and that passage between Doro Channel and Mudros is made in hours of darkness (ends). Submit this may be included in route orders for transports before leaving England; until I hear all transports have been so informed I will issue necessary directions to all east bound transports when passing Gibraltar.

A 471. Marine, Paris, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 4th September.
797 Reply to 3214. Please reply to Admiralty that Minister of Marine agrees to your proposals, with the reservation that the Morocco Division shall retain all liberty of action to guard against contraband in arms on the Morocco coast within the limits indicated.

A 472. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies (515). 4th September.
V.A.E.M.S. (900).
515 *Heroic* should return to V.A., Eastern Mediterranean Squadron.

Reply from C.-in-C., East Indies. 907. Your 515. If *Heroic* returns to the Dardanelles Egyptian Coast Patrol is reduced to *Scotia* only. Submit at least one suitable vessel be sent to replace her. Am keeping her pending reply as withdrawal of Gulf of Sollum garrison if attacked is dependent on patrol vessel. (Sent 5th September).

A 473. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 6th September.
518 Your 907. You should confer with General and ascertain whether Sollum garrison cannot be made strong enough to resist attack for a short time. Should the post be attacked a vessel would be sent to assist the garrison as soon as possible, but the Admiralty do not desire to be bound down to maintaining a vessel always at Sollum in readiness to evacuate the garrison. Armed boarding steamers are very difficult to obtain here. You should retain *Heroic* pending conference with General.
Inform V.A., Eastern Mediterranean Squadron.

A 474. Adty. to V.A.E.M.S. (918). 8th September.
A.S., Malta (100).
D.N.T.O., Marseilles.

Most secret and urgent. As part of a series of moves it is necessary to carry 30,000 British troops from Marseilles and Toulon to Dardanelles, beginning embarkation 20th September. The following ships are to be sent to ports indicated in time for move: To Toulon—*Empress of Britain*, *Mauretania*, *Transylvania*. To Marseilles—*Ivernia*, *Lake Michigan*, *Megantic*, *Minnewaska*, *Nile*, *Ceramic*.

Five ships will be sent from England to Marseilles to complete the move. Arrange coaling, etc., with Malta, Alexandria, Mudros, as necessary.

Ships are to be used as they stand, best arrangements possible as to berthing and stores being made. This move will be followed at 10 day intervals by two similar moves with the addition of horses. Ships for these will be told off later. Imperative that above arrangements be carried out and the ships released for further service, otherwise later moves will be impossible. The above ships to be ready to return to ports of embarkation as soon as disembarkation completed.

Addressed to V.A., Eastern Mediterranean Squadron. Repeated to D.N.T.O., Marseilles, and A.S., Malta, who are to act accordingly.

A 475. Adty. to V.A.E.M. (927). 10th September.
S.N.O., Gib. (918).
S.N.O., Malta (133).

6th Light Cruiser Squadron consisting of *Skirmisher* (S.N.O.), *Foresight*, *Sentinel* and *Forward* are being sent to join V.A., Eastern Mediterranean.

T.B.'s 17, 18, 29 and 30 are also being sent. Each T.B. will be convoyed by a scout.

Each scout and its T.B. will sail as soon as ready without waiting for squadron to be complete.

S.N.O.'s at ports of call should pass these vessels on as quickly as possible. C.O.'s have been cautioned that they will have to explain any delay.

A 476. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 11th September.

528 *Jupiter* will shortly join your flag from Malta. She is being held in reserve in case she is required later for the Dardanelles and will be available for service in the Suez Canal until required. As she is newly commissioned you should arrange for her to work up her gunnery and drills in the Red Sea where she will be safe from submarines.

A 477. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 13th September.

335 Your 938.* Armed boarding steamer *Tara* will be sent out. You should endeavour to make her and *Scotia* suffice as *Tara* is the last one available.

* See text section 141.

A 478. Gib. to Adty. 13th September.

144 Italian Consul, Gibraltar, reports that all direct trade between Italy and Germany (exportation, importation, or transit) is suspended from 8th September.

A 479. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 14th September.

538 In view of submarine activity in Mediterranean it may be desirable to transfer more guns at Port Said. Can you deal with double present number of transfers?

A 480. Malta to Adty. 15th September.

282 Transport routes ordered by Commander-in-Chief, commencing 15th September and in force until further notice.

"A." *Gibraltar—Lemnos*.—Pass half-way between Alboran Island and Cape Tres Forcas and follow coast of Algiers and Tunis, keeping close to coast as far as Cape Bon. Pass to the southward of Pantellaria Island and Malta, through Cerigo Island Channel, between Anti-Milo Islands and Falconera Island, between Thermia Island and Zea, through Doro Channel to the east of Skyros Island and Strati Island. When possible pass Alboran Island, Cape Bon, and Pantellaria Island in the night and arrive at Lemnos at daybreak.

"B." *Lemnos—Gibraltar*.—Pass 20 miles off Cape Sigri to the east of Mykoní Island, between Siphano Island and Antiparos Island, to the east of Milo Island, and through Cerigotto Channel and follow parallel of 35° 45' N. During daylight make parallel of 36° 10' N., this will entail crossing Gibraltar—Lemnos route, pass to the north of Malta and Pantellaria Island, 20 miles from Cape Bon, 50 miles from coast of Tunis and Algiers, 20 miles north of Alboran Island, and thence to Gibraltar. Whenever possible leave Mudros so as to pass Mykoní Island before daylight and pass Pantellaria Island and Cape Bon in the night.

"C." *Gibraltar—Egypt*.—Same as "A" as far as south of Malta, and thence proceed to Alexandria, passing 50 miles from coast of Tripoli.

"D." *Egypt—Gibraltar*.—Proceed to lat. 34° 10' N. long., 22° 30' E. Greenwich, pass to the north of Malta, cutting route "A" during the daytime when possible and join route "B" in the Malta Channel.

"E." *Egypt—Lemnos*.—Proceed to position mentioned in "D," pass 50 miles west of Cape Krio and join route "A" in the Cerigo Channel.

"F." *Lemnos—Egypt*.—Follow route "B" as far as Cerigotto Island Channel, pass 30 miles west of Cape Krio and join route "C" in lat. 33° 40' N., long. 22° 54' E. Greenwich.

Recommendation.—Ships which cross routes by night should show their lights.

A 481. A.S., Malta, to Adty. 15th September.

294 Following routes for transports passing between Gibraltar and Marseilles and Malta have been ordered by Commander-in-Chief and come into force forthwith. Gibraltar to Marseilles. Pass half speed Alboran Island and Cape Tres Forcas, from there proceed to latitude 39 degrees North longitude, 5 degrees 10 minutes east of Greenwich, thence direct to Marseilles or Toulon. Marseilles to Gibraltar. Same route as Gibraltar to Marseilles as far as 50 miles north of Tenes, from there pass 20 miles to the north of Alboran Island and thence to Gibraltar. Marseilles to Malta. Proceed to a position 30 miles southwest of St. Antiocho Island, approach coast of Tunis, cutting the route "Malta to Gibraltar" in daylight if possible and follow route for transports from Gibraltar to Malta. Malta to Marseilles. Follow route "Gibraltar to Malta" to the southward of Sardinia, pass 30 miles to the southwest of St. Antiocho Island and from there direct to Marseilles.

A 482. Adty. to S.N.O., Malta. 17th September.

224 Your 114. Cancel my 931. War Office state arrangement was not intended to apply to ships conveying troops for Egyptian Garrison.

In future, G.O.C., Mediterranean Force will inform you as to destination of all troop ships.

Please comply and in case of doubt ask him for destination.

Store ships proceed Alexandria unless otherwise specially directed.

A 483. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Paris. 18th September.

3399 Italian S.S. *Porto di Savoia* at midnight 15th–16th September in lat. 33° 55' N., long. 21° 38' E., intercepted a radiogram *en clair* in German sent from a very short distance away, of which following is translation:—

KOT GUTLAND USET. We are in need of supplies. Where can we obtain them? Submarine 38.

A 484. C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty. 20th September.

963 Am ordering *Empress of Russia* and *Empress of Asia* to England on relief by *Lunka* and *Lama*. Is this correct?

Reply. 557. Your 963. *Empress of Russia* and *Empress of Asia* should be sent to Hong Kong. (Sent 21st September).

A 485. Adty. to R.A. Thursby (34).
A.S., Malta (278). 22nd September.

Submarines B.7, B.9, B.11, B.6, B.10, and B.8 will join your flag from Malta shortly and follow your orders.

The Italian authorities wish to base them on Venice and employ them in the Adriatic and there is no objection to this provided they are properly directed and looked after.

We have some misgivings as to the capacity of the Italians to use the submarines properly and are sending an officer with submarine experience to Venice as S.N.O. of submarines.

He will give the submarines their operation orders in compliance with the wishes of the Italian authorities provided they are reasonable and practicable, but in the event of this not being the case, he will inform you and wait your decision.

You should ask the Italians to provide a depot at Venice either on shore or afloat. Pending the completion of this arrangement the submarines could work from one of your ships at Brindisi as temporary base.

A 486. Adty. to Italian Minister of Marine. 23rd September.

We are shortly placing 6 B class submarines under orders of Rear-Admiral Thursby for service in Adriatic. Until a base at Venice is ready, it is suggested that the submarines should work from Brindisi.

A 487. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 24th September.
567 Your 982* *Tara* is refitting and leaves England 4th October.
Perth replaces *Asia*, date of completion not settled. *Himalaya* should return to England on relief by *Perth*.

* Asking when *Tara* and *Asia* would leave England.

A 488. Naval Attaché, Rome, to Adty. 25th September.
Resignation of Minister of Marine officially announced. Prime Minister assumes portfolio temporarily.

A 489. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 28th September.
70 Colliers *Bradford City* and *Remembrance* are being sent to Gibraltar to be fitted as decoys for submarines. Written orders will be sent to you regarding them.

A 490. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 29th September.
574 *Himalaya* should be sent home at once to refit and then proceed to South America.
Perth will be sent out as soon as ready to take *Himalaya's* place, in the meantime you should use *Jupiter* for *Himalaya's* patrol work.

A 491. Marine, Paris, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 30th September.
859 Ask the Admiralty if they would kindly lend us the assistance of the transports now in Egypt to effect the transport to Salonika of the French regiment of Chasseurs à Cheval now at Alexandria.

A 492. Adty. to R.A., *Queen*. 30th September.
39 Send 18 net drifters to Port Mudros as soon as possible.
They are required to cover important pending movements of transports.
Explain to the Italians that it is a case of necessity and time does not admit of sending them from England.

A 493. Malta to Adty. 1st October.
539 Secret. From 8 a.m. 2nd October Transport routes will be as follows—

"A." *Gibraltar—Lemnos*.—Pass between Alboran Island and Cape Tres Forcas, follow coast of Africa at a short distance from shore to Cape Bon, pass at least 5 miles north of Pantellaria Island and Malta, follow parallel of 36° 2' N. pass through Cerigo Channel, pass to the westward and north of Belo Pulo, between Zea and Makronisi Island, through Doro Channel, to the eastward of Skyros and Strati Island.

"B." *Lemnos—Gibraltar*.—Pass 20 miles from Sigri Island, to the westward of Kaloyeri, between Tinos Island and Mykoni Island, between Serpho Island and Siphano Island, between Anti-Milo Island and Phalconera Island, through Cerigotto Channel and during day make parallel 36° 16' N. cutting route "A." Pass north of Malta and Pantellaria Island, at least 12 miles from land, pass 20 miles from Cape Bon, 50 miles from coast of Africa, 20 miles north of Alboran Island, and thence direct to Gibraltar.

"C." *Gibraltar—Egypt*.—Same route as "A" to Malta, thence direct to Alexandria.

"D." *Egypt—Gibraltar*.—Make position 34° N., 22° 30' E. Greenwich, and thence to a point 12 miles north of Gozo, there joining route "B," cutting route "A" by daylight when possible.

"E." *Egypt—Lemnos*.—Make position 34° N., 22° 30' E. Greenwich, thence pass 50 miles to the westward of Cape Krio and join route "A" in Cerigo Channel.

"F." *Lemnos—Egypt*.—Same route as "B" to Cerigotto Channel, pass 30 miles to the westward of Cape Krio, thence join route "C" at a position 33° 26' N., 22° 54' E. Greenwich.

"G." *Gibraltar—Marseilles*.—Follow route "A" to Cape Tenes, thence to a position 39° N., 5° 34' E. Greenwich, thence direct to Marseilles.

"H." *Marseilles—Gibraltar*.—Make position 39° N., 5° 10' E. Greenwich, thence join route "B" 50 miles north of Cape Tenes.

"J." *Malta—Marseilles*.—Follow route "B" to Cape Bon, pass midway between Sherki and Adventure Bank, 30 miles to the westward of Maritimo Island, thence to Cape Corso, keeping at least 10 miles from land, thence to Marseilles, keeping at least 10 miles from land and keeping to the southward of Iles D'Hyères.

"K." *Marseilles—Malta*.—Same as to Marittimo Island, thence follow coast of Sicily to Girgenti, thence direct to Malta.

Recommendations.—Ships crossing other routes by night should carry lights. Alboran Island, Cape Bon, Maittimo Island and Cerigotto Island should be passed by night if possible. Speed should be regulated to pass Cerigo Island by night.

A 494. A.S., Malta, to Adty. 3rd October.
569 Following received by telegraph from Athens:—

While I was with M. Venizelos this morning telegram was brought to him from Milos stating that British were placing wire netting at entrance of Port Adamas; entrance was prohibited by night and only allowed by day under supervision. Venizelos protested vehemently against this infringement of Greek sovereign rights in an island within earliest limits of Greek Kingdom.

Addressed to Foreign Office, repeated to Malta, V.A., Dardanelles, No. 249.

French C.-in-C. is using Milo Island as a centre for his anti-submarine patrols. He has arranged with V.A.C., Mediterranean Squadron to assist with a net defence at or near harbour. I consider that patrol centres are absolutely necessary (in) the area between Matapan, Crete, Scarpanto, and Doro Channel. Personally I feel that Cerigotto should be such centre. The hostile submarines are no doubt based on Cattaro and Constantinople for repairs and refit. But they also use the less frequented Greek Islands so thoroughly for purpose of re-victualling, rest, and look-out work, that Allied patrols will find it almost impossible to compete with them unless some such steps as Venizelos complains of are arranged and sanctioned in some way. I have not communicated Athens telegram to French C.-in-C.

A 495. Adty. V.A.E.M.S. (68).
S.N.O., Gib. (103).
A.S., Malta (398).
S.N.O., Mudros (258). 3rd October.

All goods destined for Bulgaria *via* Dedeagatch should be detained pending further instructions.

A 496. Adty. to Robinson, Cairo (354).
V.A.E.M.S. (77).
Transports, Mudros (82). 4th October.

Secret. Large movement of troops Marseilles to Salonika is anticipated very shortly. No transports should be sent out of the Mediterranean either eastward or westward unless absolutely necessary. So far as practicable all transports should be coaled and prepared for service.

A 497. Adty. to V.A.E.M. 5th October.

81 In event of war between Bulgaria and Allies as much damage as possible should be done by bombardment, to points in military occupation and harbour works, railways, grain stores, enemy shipping and other vulnerable points.

Damage to neutral shipping should be avoided and residences of civil population should be respected as far as possible.

Be careful of enemy mines After ports have been damaged their outside approaches can be mined Report action proposed.

A 498. Adty. to V.A.E.M. 6th October.

88 With a view to trapping the submarines attacking transports it is very desirable that you should get some decoy ships to work as soon as possible without waiting for the colliers which will be prepared at Gibraltar.

A 499. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies (594).
S.N.O., Gib. (138).
A.S., Malta (448). 7th October

Tara left Devonport to-day (Thursday) for Port Said.

A 500. A.S., Malta, to Adty. 8th October.

665 My 539 1st October. C.-in-C. has made modifications to the under-mentioned routes as follows :—

Route Gibraltar—Lemnos.—From Gibraltar to Malta no change. After passing Malta proceed to parallel of 35° N., follow this parallel and arrange to pass through the region between meridian of Sapienza Island and Cerigo Island at night and also to pass through Cerigo Channel at night. From Cerigo Island to Lemnos no change.

Lemnos—Gibraltar.—From Lemnos to Cerigotto Island no change. After passing Cerigotto Island make the route Egypt to Gibraltar in lat. 34° 20' N. and long. 21° 15' E. Greenwich.

A 501. A.S., Malta, to Adty. 9th October.

674 My 665. Modification of route ordered by C.-in-C.

Route Gibraltar—Lemnos.—After passing Malta proceed along the parallel 34° 30' N. instead of 35° N.

A 502. A.S., Malta, to Adty. 9th October.

684 Route to be followed for ships proceeding through Doro Channel to Salonika.

Two routes, first known as route "A" and the other route "B."

Route "A."—After leaving Doro Channel steer to pass through a point 10 miles due east of Lithari Point Light, Skyros Island, until reaching lat. 49° north of Psathura Island Light, thence to a point 10 miles south west of Kassandra Point, thence for Cape Kara where they will be met by guard boats and conducted through net defences.

Route "B."—After passing Cape Doro steer to westward keeping within territorial waters of coast of Euboea, pass to the west of Skiathos and thence to Gulf of Salonika, keeping within territorial waters on west side of Gulf of Salonika.

Route "A" should be taken by fast ships; route "B" by slow ships.

A 503. C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty. 10th October.

57 In consequence of submarine activity in East Mediterranean six armed trawlers urgently required for outer guard at Port Said and Alexandria. No local craft available which can keep sea in winter.

A 504. C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty. 11th October.

66 Have ordered *Suva* to Bombay forthwith to complete equipment. She is quite unfit for duty and to receive new crew. *Emdress of Asia* will follow and turn over crew there.

A 505. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies (607).
A.S., Malta (497).
V.A.E.M. (121).
S.N.O., Mudros (285).
S.N.O., Gib. (163). 11th October.

Defensive armaments are being provided as rapidly as possible for all mercantile vessels transporting troops and warlike stores in and to the Mediterranean. Vessels leaving United Kingdom will receive guns before departure. As regards vessels which are permanently employed in the Mediterranean it is intended to send 25 2½-pounder Hotchkiss guns to Alexandria to arm these vessels with one gun each mounted aft.* Two men will be sent with each gun and are not to be diverted *en route*. . . .

* They left England 23rd October; also 18 12-pdr. guns.

A 506. A.S., Malta, to Adty. 14th October.

312 Following modifications in the transport route dated 2nd October 1915 have been ordered by C.-in-C. commencing 15th October 1915.

Lemnos—Gibraltar.—From Lemnos to Cerigotto Island no change. After leaving Cerigotto Channel proceed to a position 34° 40' N., 22° E. of Greenwich and from there join the route Egypt to Gibraltar in the neighbourhood of lat. 33° 56' N. and 21° 36' E. of Gibraltar.

Malta—Alexandria.—After leaving Malta, shape course to pass through the following positions :—(1) 34° 30' N., 15° 45' E. of Greenwich. (2) 33° 35' N., 21° 30' E. of Greenwich. (3) 33° N., 24° E. of Greenwich. (4) 32° 10' N., 29° 20' E. of Greenwich, and from there to Alexandria.

Alexandria—Malta.—Pass through the following positions :—32° 30' N., 29° 30' E. of Greenwich, 33° 20' N., 24° E. of Greenwich, 34° N., 21° E. of Greenwich, and thence direct to Malta.

Alexandria to Lemnos and Salonika.—The same route as from Alexandria to Malta as far as 34° N. and 21° E. of Greenwich, thence steer north to the parallel of 35° N. and from there to the Cerigo Channel and follow the route Malta to Lemnos. When possible arrange to pass the position of the route lying between the meridian of Sapienza Island and Cerigo Island at night.

Lemnos or Salonika to Alexandria.—From Lemnos to Cerigotto Island no change. After having passed through the Cerigotto Channel proceed to a position 34° 40' N. and 22° E. of Greenwich and join the route Malta to Alexandria in lat. 33° 35' N. and 21° 30' E. of Greenwich. Pass the portion of route between Cerigotto Island and the meridian of Sapienza Island at night.

A 507. Adty. to V.A.E.M. 14th October.

136 Blockade of Bulgarian coast is to be declared. Two days of grace for neutral ships to be allowed from date of declaration.

War has not yet been declared by Allies against Bulgaria, but any attack on their part should be repulsed.

A 508. Adty. to V.A.E.M. 15th October.

142 With reference to my 136, do not initiate offensive military measures against Bulgarian ports until ordered.

A 509. R.A., *Queen* to Adty. 15th October.
87 Request that 20 more net drifters may be sent to me. Italian C.-in-C. concurs.

Reply. Your 87. The 18 net drifters sent from Taranto to V.A., Eastern Mediterranean will be returned when no longer required by him. (Sent 16th October).

A 510. Adty. to A.S., Malta. 15th October.
543 Following for V.A., Eastern Mediterranean (begins). 143. Though war against Bulgaria will be probably declared to-morrow, H.M. Government are anxious not to commence actual hostilities, so unless some real military advantage can be gained, your action should be confined blockade, observation of coast, and defensive measures. Acknowledge.

A 511. Marine, Paris, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 15th October.
909 I have given orders to Admiral Commanding French Squadron at the Dardanelles to declare a blockade of the coast of Bulgaria with the same conditions as those contained in your 3677.

A 512. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Paris. 16th October.
3687 The blockade of the whole Bulgarian coast in the Aegean Sea has been declared from 6 a.m. 16th October.

A 513. A.S., Malta, to Adty. 17th October.
811 On what service is *Weymouth* to proceed on completion of refit?
Reply. 561 Your 811. *Weymouth* should join Rear-Admiral Thursby.

A 514. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Paris. 19th October.
3715 A British squadron composed of 2 cruisers, 2 monitors, a seaplane carrier, several destroyers and trawlers, to which the *Kléber* and *Askold* will probably be added later on, is in readiness to operate against Bulgaria.
The blockade of the coast is being maintained by British ships. The help of French and Russian ships will only be asked for in case of bombardment and now and again to show the flag. . . .

A 515. Adty. to A.S., Malta (592). 19th October.
R.A., *Queen* (53).
Submarines *B.6* and *B.11* should proceed to Adriatic when ready for sea. R.A., *Queen* should send them sailing orders.

A 516. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 21st October.
646 In view probable attack in force on Canal next spring make complete preparations in advance for controlling and observing heavy gunfire from ships. In addition to ships under your orders following will be sent should it appear that the attack is maturing:—*Redoubtable*, *Illustrious*, *Sullej*, two or three 12-in. monitors, 2 or 3 river gunboats carrying two 6-in. guns each. Any suitable British subjects in Egypt who volunteer should be trained and entered as R.N.V.R., educated men suitable for working observation stations being given R.N.V.R. commissions.

A 517. Deleted.

A 518. Adty. to V.A.E.M. (178). 22nd October.
S.N.O., Mudros.
Robinson, Cairo (408).

Reference Admiralty telegram 167* in addition to the ships for 5,500 horses for French Cavalry Division every available troop transport is to be sent to Marseilles for orders at earliest possible moment

* Allocating 13 transports for conveyance of French Cavalry Division to Salonika.

A 519. Adty. to R.A., *Queen*. 23rd October.
54 *Amethyst* should return to England for repair. . . .

A 520. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 26th October.
281 All defensively armed vessels proceeding through the Mediterranean are to retain their guns until arrival at Port Said unless special instructions are sent to the contrary.

A 521. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 29th October.
663 . . . all preparations should be made for war with Persia.

A 522. C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty. 30th October.
159 Have ordered *Philomel* to proceed with despatch from Aden to Persian Gulf.

A 523. Adty. to V.A.E.M. (221). 31st October.
A.S., Malta (710).
C.-in-C., East Indies (667).
Robinson, Cairo.

Admiralty and War Office have appointed joint Commission consisting of Rear-Admiral F. G. Eyre, Brigadier-General A. B. Hamilton, and Thos. Royden, Esq., to control the transport arrangements in the Mediterranean. The Commission will be accommodated on board yacht *Valiant* and will embark at Marseilles 1st November.

You are requested to afford the Commission facilities and information.

A 524. Adty. to V.A.E.M. 31st October.
223 Report by telegraph how many guns in addition to those mentioned in my telegram of 29th October you consider are required to be sent to the Mediterranean to ensure that all vessels permanently employed in the Mediterranean on Government service engaged in the carriage of troops and supplies including coal will be defensively armed on passage. To what ports should they be sent?

A 525. Adty. to A.S., Malta. 2nd November.
724 Following for Commission in *Valiant II* (begins). Proceed first to Salonika, consult with P.N.T.O. as to best method of employing port to its fullest possible extent, telegraph condensed report of your recommendations.

A 526. A.S., Malta, to Adty. 3rd November.
44 My 684 *re* Salonika transport routes. Please note following amendments:—Cancel following—"Route 'A' should be followed by fast ships, route 'B' by slow ships" and substitute—"All escorted ships, and unescorted ships if in Doro Channel before noon, are to follow route 'A.' Unescorted ships if in Doro Channel after noon are to follow route 'B.'" "

A 527. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 4th November.
345 Transports should keep close along Spanish coast as far as Cape de Gata if submarine is still operating midway between Spanish and African coasts.

A 528. Adty. to R.A., *Queen*, Taranto. 5th November.
62 When *Weymouth* has joined you and *Dartmouth* has returned from her present service, the light cruiser squadron of 4 *Bristol* class agreed to in the Convention will be complete if all are in good running condition.

Topaze and *Sapphire* will then have to be withdrawn for other service in the Mediterranean. One will replace *Doris* while repairing and the other will be attached to a squadron of 4 battleships which is shortly being sent to Mediterranean as a reserve.

Express regret of Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief for having to adopt this course which is due solely to the numerous and pressing demands for light cruisers in all parts of the world. Report condition of *Topaze* and *Sapphire*, and if necessary for any defects to be taken in hand at Malta.

A 529. Adty. to C.-in-C., Home Fleets. 5th November.

507 Owing to the uncertain and critical state of affairs in the Mediterranean, it has been decided to send out a detached squadron to be held in reserve.

We may be involved in hostilities with Greece of which the Austrian Navy may take advantage or more decisive naval action may be necessary at the Dardanelles.

Detached squadron will consist of *Zealandia*, *Albemarle* and *Russell*, under the orders of the Rear-Admiral in *Hibernia*.

They should complete with as much reserve ammunition as they can stow before leaving their base and proceed *via* north of Scotland to Milford Haven for orders.

A 530. Adty. to A.S., Malta. 5th November.

757 French transport *Calvados* sunk at 5.20 p.m. 4th 20 miles north west of Cape Ivy, east of Mostaghanem. Italian vessel *Ionio* sunk in same place half an hour earlier. *Peony* is hunting submarine. Westward bound trade should be directed north of Sardinia if possible for a few days unless vessels are armed.

A 531. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 6th November

362 *Urgent*. Direct *Azalea* by W/T to cruise in vicinity of Oran or wherever submarines are operating and hunt them.

She should look out on Q time for S.O.S. signals. Inform French authorities.

A 532. Marine, Paris, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 6th November.

959 Five steamers sunk on 3rd and 4th November by submarines off Algerian coast.

Please ask Admiralty if they do not think it necessary to increase the number of the patrols watching the Straits of Gibraltar.

A 533. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 6th November.

368 Sloop *Narcissus* has been ordered to proceed to join you from Glasgow. She should be used for patrol duties.

A 534. A.S., Malta, to Adty. 7th November.

125 C.-in-C. has made following modifications in transport routes for western bound ships (begins).

From Port Said to Malta and from Lemnos to Malta, no change.

After Malta, follow the route for ships going to Marseilles as far as the lat. of the northern point of Sardinia; pass through the Strait of Bonifacio (where the lights are extinguished) and join the Marseilles—Gibraltar route at a point 39° N. 5° 10' E. of Greenwich (ends).

A 535. A.S., Malta, to Adty. 7th November.

132 For information.

French Commander-in-Chief has just informed me that he has sent two T.B.'s to patrol between Cape Bon and Algiers, two between Oran and Gibraltar along the coast of Morocco.

Also 10 trawlers are between Cape Bon and Marittimo and two large trawlers are patrolling on the route from Alexandria between 21° and 25° east longitude.

A 536. C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty. 7th November.

190 Your 574 of 29th September. Submit *Perth* be hastened. With *Himalaya* withdrawn and *Suva* unavailable am seriously shorthanded.

A 537. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Paris. 7th November.

3927 Your 959. The Admiralty fully recognise the necessity of strengthening the patrols at Gibraltar. Lately six armed trawlers have been stationed there and three trawlers are being armed at Gibraltar to reinforce them. Two sloops are also being sent from England. It is very difficult to stop submarines passing the Straits to the eastward because they can keep close to Spain in territorial waters until near Gibraltar Bay, and the strong easterly current makes it very easy for them to dive a much longer distance than usual.

About the 8th September we had many drifters with nets watching the Strait, but two German submarines passed through without being seen. One submarine was afterwards seen near Alboran by a British torpedo boat and attacked without success.

The submarines only pass the Strait once on their passage out and do not return there so it would not be using our force to the best advantage to strengthen the patrol at Gibraltar at the expense of the Eastern Mediterranean where the submarines operate more frequently.

3931 Continuation of my 3927. Admiralty would be willing to send 6 good armed yachts to patrol Algerian coasts if you would agree to base them on Algiers or any other port you might consider preferable.

They will await your reply to order the movement.

A 538. Marine, Paris, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 8th November.

968 The Department ask you to thank the Admiralty for their offer of six good yachts for watching the Algerian coast. They accept with alacrity and all orders will be given so that the ports of Algiers and Oran may serve as bases.

These yachts will, of course, be placed under the command of the Prefet Maritime of the district for co-operation in the general watch. . . .

A 539. Adty. to R.A., *Queen*. 8th November.

65 *Implacable* should be sent to Port Said provided that remaining four battleships are in efficient seagoing condition and none require to refit before *Venerable* is available on 11th December.

Implacable will be used to organise preparations for naval defence of Canal and her refit deferred, as after reaching Port Said very little steaming will be required. In the meantime material for her refit will be prepared.

A 540. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. (567).

A.S., Malta (85).

C.-in-C., East Indies (752). 8th November.

Vessels bound for Greek ports with cargoes for Serbia and Roumania should be detained and consignments for those countries reported by telegraph.

A 541. C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty. 8th November.

197 Request adequate force destroyers and small craft with nets, etc., and experienced personnel be sent out to deal with submarines.

A 542. C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty. 8th November.

200 General Maxwell considered it most important Garrison Sollum should be adequately protected and continuous patrols maintained. *Lunka* only is available until *Scotia* completes refit fortnight's time.

Sloop *Jonquil* and 11 trawlers have been sent to cruise off Gulf of Sollum.

Telegraph line to Sollum still cut.

(C2859)

Z

A 543. C-in-C., East Indies, to Adty. 8th November.
204 Have given orders that transports carrying troops are not to leave Egypt for Mediterranean unless armed or escorted.

A 544. V.A., Eastern Meditn., to Adty. 9th November.
458 Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, telegraphs that he has issued orders that no transport carrying troops is to sail from Egypt unescorted unless fitted with W/T and armed.

A 545. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 10th November.
393 Yacht squadron consisting of *Marynthea*, *Sapphire II*, *Narcissus II*, *Jeannette**, *Atlanta*, *Iolanda*, leave Milford Haven for Gibraltar p.m. 10th November. *Eileen* will leave independently.

They will be based on Algiers and refit at Gibraltar and will be tenders to *Cormorant*.

They will operate wherever required in the Western Mediterranean, and when to the eastward of longitude 5° west will come under the orders of the French S.N.O. at Algiers.

* Name afterwards changed to *Jeannette II*.

A 546. Adty. to V.A.E.M. (273).
A.S., Malta (808).
S.N.O., Gib. (400).
C-in-C., East Indies (692). 10th November.

You should use your discretion as to stopping sailings of transports unless armed or adequately escorted when it is known that submarines are operating on their route.

A 547. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 12th November.
418 In the event of any ships on important Government service or carrying important Government stores arriving at Gibraltar *en route* for the Mediterranean without having defensive armament on board, the fact should be reported by telegraph to Admiralty stating also whether a gun is available at Gibraltar. Six 3-pdr. guns with two men per gun are being sent to Gibraltar for this purpose in P. and O. S.S. *Arabia* leaving London on 13th November.

This does not apply to colliers or hospital ships.

A 548. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Paris. 12th November.
4002 Your telegram 12458. *Secret*. The question of when and under what form to present to Greece what would be practically an ultimatum is a political question that is being discussed at the present moment by the Allied Ministries for Foreign Affairs. But it must not be lost sight of that any action that might be considered hostile by Greece would place the Army disembarked at Salonika in a most dangerous position.

The Admiralty dislike the idea of sending ships to be kept at anchor along the Greek coast while negotiations are going on, as the Greek Government might try to gain time until they had at their disposal German submarines.

Negotiations would not be at all helped by the destruction of an Allied battleship by a submarine. It would be better if the Allied ships only arrived at the moment when the ultimatum expired.

However, in order to be ready to put into action immediately the measures decided by the Allied Governments against the Greek Fleet, the Admiralty ask you what ships the French Government would be prepared to detail for this operation. It would be necessary to be able to overwhelm the Greek Fleet by an immense superiority of force.

The Admiralty propose that the French Navy should provide 4 battleships, 2 armoured cruisers, with their attendant destroyers and two submarines.

They also think that it would be useful to send two submarines if possible to the Gulf of Patras.

The Admiralty would be prepared to detail for this operation 2 or 3 battleships with destroyers and submarines.

A 549. A.S., Malta to Adty. 13th November.
247 My 238.* Two and a half pounder is entirely outranged by hostile submarines now in Mediterranean.

As many as possible 12-pdr. guns at least should be supplied.

* Reporting that piece of shell from *Mercian* showed gun to be of 3.4 in. calibre.

A 550. Adty. to V.A.E.M. 14th November.
301 Coast of Egypt is very badly protected at present since loss of *Tara*. Can you spare two 9.2 monitors to act as patrol vessels off Port Said and Alexandria in support of the trawlers we have sent there.

A 551. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Paris. 14th November.
4021 A proof of the complete understanding which exists between Admirals Dartige and de Robeck is furnished by a telegram from the latter saying that he cannot send back to Admiral Thursby the 18 drifters he asks for as he has sent 18 trawlers to reinforce the French patrol close to Crete and that he was using the drifters to watch the transport routes.

A 552. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 14th November.
432 Sloop *Narcissus* has sailed from Clyde to-day for Gibraltar. You should use her to patrol Mediterranean to westward of Oran. A second sloop will be sent when completed.

A 553. S.N.O., Gib., to Adty. 14th November.
782 Submarines *E.21* and *25* arrived, request instructions.

Reply. Submarines *E.21* and *E.25* proceed to Malta and report arrival to V.A., Eastern Mediterranean. French authorities should be communicated with in good time as to their movements. Either *Narcissus* or one of yacht squadron should convoy them should there be risk of attack by French patrols (443 to S.N.O., Gibraltar, 874 to A.S., Malta. Sent 15th November.

A 554. Adty. to C-in-C., East Indies. 14th November.
705 *Implacable* is being sent to Suez Canal. Her boilers need extensive repair but she will last some months in the Canal where steam will only be required for very moderate speed. Her officers should be utilised in preparing and organising the arrangements for using ships' guns' fire.

A 555. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Paris. 15th November.
4036 There are in the Eastern Mediterranean 45 British trawlers of about 200 tons, sent as minesweepers, which are not armed owing to lack of guns. Admiralty asks if you would kindly examine the question with the Ministry of War as to whether it would be possible to obtain for them 75 mm. field guns which are considered sufficient against submarines. Admiralty would furnish the mountings.

If the reply is in the affirmative, it would have to be considered whether it would be necessary to make special ammunition for them, and whether France could undertake the manufacture.

A 556. V.A.E.M. to Adty. 15th November.
492 Admiralty telegram 301. Monitors *M.21* and *M.23* have been detailed to join C-in-C., East Indies.

A 557. Marine, Paris, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 15th November.

996 C.-in-C. Armée navale has expressed a wish that to the composition of the allied force should be added a certain number of monitors. He had detailed for our part three ships: *Justice*, *Waldeck-Rousseau* and *Edgar Quinet*. Number of destroyers, submarines, and trawlers according to their availability considering the exigencies of the escort and patrol services.

Senior officer of Allied force will be Admiral Le Bris. Concentration to take place at Malta.

Operations contemplated by Admiral Dartige are:—

- (1) Destruction of Greek Fleet; bombardment of Salamis and the Piraeus; threats against Athens but respecting the valuable monuments that it contains.
- (2) Military occupation of Milo and Syra.
- (3) Military occupation of Corfu.
- (4) War on trade: blockade of Gulf of Athens and Corinth canal.

I have telegraphed to C.-in-C. Armée Navale, Admiralty's proposals relative to Milo.

A 558. Adty. to R.A., *Queen*. 16th November.

68 Forty net drifters are leaving Falmouth for Taranto to become tenders to *Manzanita* in a few days. . . .

A 559. S.N.O., Gib., to Adty. 16th November.

804 On 5th November C.-in-C., Mediterranean asked whether I could maintain efficient patrol from Gibraltar to Oran. I replied "No"; materiel and personnel insufficient. With reference to Admiralty telegram No. 393 if these yachts may be placed entirely under the orders of S.N.O., Gibraltar, I consider it possible to maintain patrol from Gibraltar to Alboran Island with armed yachts, T.B.'s and armed trawlers besides Straits patrol in connection with contraband. I consider this most desirable arrangement.

A 560. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Paris. 16th November.

4044 Admiral de Robeck suggests that steps should be taken to carry out a *coup de main* on the German Emperor's villa at Corfu and to destroy it, and if a sufficient force is available to seize all the Germans and Austrians in that Island. Argostoli might be made an additional base for the Allied Squadron in the Adriatic, which would have charge of operations at Patras.

The Admiralty inform you that they consider these proposals desirable.

A 561. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 16th November.

706 Monitors *M.21* and *M.23* are being sent from Mudros to be used for patrol work in vicinity of Port Said and Alexandria and for defence of Canal. Following are particulars:—

550 tons, 12 knots, 1—9·2 in., 16300 yds., 1—12-pdr. 18 cwt., 1—6-pdr. H.A., 2 maxims. *M.21* has steam engines with oil fuel, *M.23* has Bolinder oil engines.

* The particulars are précised here.

A 562. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 17th November.

466 Your 804. Services of Yacht Squadron have been accepted by Marine, Paris, and the arrangements cannot be repudiated.

From Oran to Meridian of 5° west longitude is in French sphere and French C.-in-C. can detail some of the yachts to patrol there should he wish to do so.

A 563. C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty. 17th November.

246 Urgent. Only 2½-pdr. guns now available for arming transports at Alexandria. I do not consider this gun efficient for defensive armament as *Lumina* and *Treneglos* thus armed both have been sunk in last few days. Should transports with troops be delayed until further 12-pdr. guns arrive?

A 564. C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty. 17th November.

242 Coastguard reports 3 submarines sighted 16th November between Sidi Barani and Marsa Matruh and 6 believed to be in the vicinity. Gulf of Sollum expects to be attacked. Have *Lunka* only in the neighbourhood and no suitable vessels available.

A 565. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 17th November.

712 Your 242. V.A., Eastern Mediterranean Squadron has been informed and asked to send some small craft. *Lunka* should be withdrawn, as if kept near Sollum she will certainly be sunk, in which case she can be of no service to the Garrison.

A 566. Adty. to V.A.E.M. 17th November.

315 C.-in-C., East Indies telegraphs that coastguard report 3 submarines sighted on 16th between Sidi Barani and Marsa Matruh and that Sollum expects to be attacked.

He has *Lunka* in the vicinity and has been directed to withdraw her on account of her size.

If possible you should send some small craft to visit neighbourhood of Sollum, a sloop and 4 armed trawlers would be sufficient. Report whether you can send any vessels. (Sent 18th November).

Reply. Sent 18th November.

506 *Clematis* with 7 trawlers is cruising to south of Crete with orders to follow and hunt submarines in that area.

She has now been ordered to visit Sollum.

I have requested C.-in-C., East Indies to inform *Clematis* direct of movements of submarines in Egyptian waters.

Jonquil with 11 trawlers has similar orders to *Clematis* for area west of Gavdo Island extending 90 miles to south of Kithera Island.

I cannot spare more small craft for Egypt.

A 567. Adty. to A.S., Malta. 17th November.

916 *Personal*. Decoy ship *Wyandra* has been ordered from Queenstown to Malta to be under your orders.

The greatest care is necessary to prevent the nature of the ship being disclosed when she is in port and the less writing or telegraphing there is about her the better.

The captain will inform you how she is worked and what she has done in the past.

A 568. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 18th November.

715 Troop transports without guns should be delayed until situation is more favourable.

A 569. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 19th November.

492 Sloop *Acacia* has been ordered to proceed to join you from Scapa. She should be used for patrol duties.

A 570. Adty. to S.N.O., Mudros (402).
A.S., Malta (953). 19th November.

Following for Vice-Admiral is not to be transmitted by W/T (324).

The following decisions have been made between French and British Governments:—

- (1) No operations will take place at Ayas Bay or elsewhere in addition to those now in progress.
- (2) Question of holding or evacuating Gallipoli peninsula awaits further report from Lord Kitchener and French General.
- (3) Until French and British troops in Serbia are in a secure defensive position in Greek territory, no ultimatum will in the meantime be presented to Greece.

If reply is unfavourable, or if hostile acts are committed by Greeks against Allied troops, instructions will be given for immediate offensive action by Allied Fleet under French Vice-Admiral Le Bris, which will operate in French sphere of action.

Action at Salonika or elsewhere within the limits of the British sphere of command will be under your orders.

It has been arranged with the French that a strong Allied squadron should be at Salonika when the reply to the ultimatum is due in addition to the Allied squadron under Vice-Admiral Le Bris which will operate in the French sphere of action.

Fremantle will join Le Bris. The two monitors mentioned in your 501 should join Fremantle at Milo.

You should report names of vessels detailed for the following services from your command.

- (1) To join Allied squadron under Le Bris.
- (2) For Salonika.
- (3) To safeguard army in Gallipoli, which is to be considered of the first importance.

The Greek Fleet are not to be allowed to enter the Dardanelles at any time. Use force if necessary.

The conduct of the Allied force under Le Bris and the question of bases to be used in Gulf of Athens should be left to Le Bris.

Probably a battalion of British troops from Mudros may be required to occupy Syra.

Addressed to V.A., Eastern Mediterranean.

A 571. C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty. 19th November.

259 Now that centre of submarine activity has shifted to Mediterranean, I again urge imperative need for sending out (a) destroyers and suitable small craft in sufficient force to hunt and exterminate this pest and to maintain efficient patrol of transport routes: (b) more guns for arming transports not smaller than 12-pdrs. To run transports unarmed in these waters will in my opinion be an unjustifiable risk for some time to come and neither French C.-in-C., nor V.A., Eastern Mediterranean, can provide escort.

Reply. 20th November.

728 Your 259. You are quite right to represent the situation as it appears to you, and transports must be held up if the submarine danger is known to exist on its routes. The reason you have not got sufficient vessels is because there are not enough to supply all requirements. The Grand Fleet has barely half the number of destroyers that the High Sea Fleet has. The centre of activity of the old fashioned submarines has doubtless shifted to the Mediterranean but we have the new minelaying submarines always with us and they are much more difficult to deal with. We are doing everything possible as regards guns but are many short of requirements.

A 572. Adty. to R.A., *Queen*. 20th November.

74 *Bristol* should proceed to Plymouth* for orders as soon as *Weymouth* joins and *Sapphire* should be retained until further orders.

* Altered 21st November to the Clyde.

A 573. Adty. to I.O., Gib. (187). 22nd November.
I.O., Malta (82).

Pending further instructions British shipping should be instructed to keep well clear of Spanish Mediterranean coast.

A 574. Adty. to A.S., Malta. 22nd November.

984 Cancel route given in my 757.

A 575. Adty. to V.A.E.M.S. (335).

C.-in-C., East Indies (732).

A.S., Malta (983).

22nd November.

G.O.C., Egypt, reports that situation at Sollum is serious and that troops are required there at once. He wishes infantry and stores moved there or to Matruh by sea but Admiral Peirse has not enough small craft to ensure safety against submarines. Can you assist or ask the French to spare some of our vessels from Milo whilst this is going on? . . .

A 576. Adty. to A.S., Malta.

23rd November.

13 Six armed British trawlers and nineteen armed German prize trawlers are being sent from England in batches as tenders to *Egmont*.

A 577. A.S., Malta, to Adty.

25th November.

471 C.-in-C. directs following revised transport routes to be followed to come into force midnight 25th to 26th November.

Gibraltar to Malta.—From Gibraltar pass 15 miles north of Alboran Island, then proceed to east as far as meridian of Oran, follow coast of Algiers passing 20 miles off all points as far as meridian of Cap de Fer. Pass 10 miles north of Galita Island, 20 miles north of Cani Rocks, 20 miles off Cape Bon, 5 miles north of Pantellaria Island and 10 miles north of Gozo Island. Pass within signalling distance of Valetta if not entering the port. When possible pass neighbourhood of Alboran Island and Cape Bon in the dark.

Malta to Gibraltar.—After leaving Malta pass 5 miles north of Gozo Island, 5 miles south of Pantellaria Island, 5 miles off Cape Bon, and 10 miles north of Cani Rocks. Follow coast of Algeria, passing 5 miles off all points as far as meridian of Oran; thence to Gibraltar, passing 10 miles south of Alboran Island. When possible pass neighbourhood of Pantellaria Island, Cape Bon and Alboran Island in the dark.

Gibraltar to Marseilles.—Follow route Gibraltar to Malta as far as meridian of Bougie, thence direct to Marseilles.

Marseilles to Gibraltar.—Proceed direct so as to join route Malta to Gibraltar at a point 5 miles north of Cape Bougaroni, then follow route Malta to Gibraltar.

Marseilles to Malta.—After leaving Marseilles pass 5 miles south of Iles d'Hyères and 10 miles north of Giraglia Island Light, Cape Corso, then 15 miles to the east of this light, then 25 miles to the east of Cape Comino and 25 miles to the east of Cape Carbonara and join route Gibraltar to Malta 20 miles north of Cani Rocks and follow this route to Malta.

Malta to Marseilles.—Follow route Malta to Gibraltar, passing 10 miles north of Cani Rocks and 20 miles north of Cape Blanc. From this position pass 10 miles to the east of Cape Carbonara, 10 miles to the east of Cape Comino, 5 miles to the east of Cape Corso, and 10 miles south of Iles d'Hyères, thence to Marseilles, keeping 10 miles from shore.

Malta to Salonika.—After leaving Malta proceed to lat. 34° 30' N. and follow the parallel of 34° 30'. The region between the meridian of Cape Sapienza and Cerigo must be passed in the dark. The parallel of 34° 30' is therefore to be followed for such a distance as to make this possible. The Cerigo Island Channel is also to be passed in the dark. Pass to the north and west of Belo Pulo, to the east of San Giorgio Island, between Zea and Makronisi Island, through the Doro Channel, keeping close to the coast of Eubœa, pass to the E. of Skyros Island, 10 miles off Lithari Point Light, then 10 miles to the east of Psathura Island Light, 12 miles south west of Cassandra Light, thence to the light buoy at the entrance to Salonika where the guard boat in charge of pilotage will be met.

Note.—Navigation is not allowed in the Gulf of Salonika during the day time. All ships which on arrival Doro find they cannot make Salonika before 8 a.m. the following morning are to proceed to Mudros.

Alexandria to Salonika and Mudros.—Follow the route Egypt for Malta as far as 34° N. 21° 16' E. of Greenwich. From there steer north to the parallel of 34° 30' and then follow the route Malta to Salonika and Mudros.

Salonika and Mudros to Alexandria.—The same as Salonika and Mudros to Malta as far as 34° 26' N., 21° 40' E. of Greenwich, then follow the route Malta to Egypt.

Mudros to Malta.—After leaving Mudros proceed to the south and pass 30 miles east of Skyros Island and join the route Salonika to Malta.

Malta to Egypt.—After leaving Malta follow the route Malta to Salonika, leaving the parallel 34° 30' in 21° 16' E. of Greenwich and proceed to a position 33° 45' N., 28° 50' E. of Greenwich; thence direct to Alexandria or Port Said.

Egypt to Malta.—Proceed to a position 33° 30' N., 28° 20' E. of Greenwich. From there join the route Salonika to Malta in 34° N. 21° 16' E. of Greenwich.

Malta to Mudros.—Follow the route Malta to Salonika as far as the position 10 miles east of Skyros Island. Thence direct to Mudros.

Salonika to Malta.—Pass 5 miles south west of Cassandra Light, 10 miles south of Cape Drepano, 5 miles south west of Strati Island, 30 miles east of Skyros Island, through the Doro Channel, keeping close to the coast of Andros Island, west of Jura Island, between Serpho Island and Siphano Island, between Falconera Point and Anti-Milo Island, pass through the Cerigotto Channel. From Cerigotto Island proceed to a position 34° N., 21° 16' E. of Greenwich and then direct to Malta.

Note.—The Cerigotto Channel and the region between Cerigotto Channel and the meridian of Cape Sapienza must be passed in the dark.

A 578. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Paris. 26th November.

4169 Transport officer at Marseilles reports that the French authorities only allow transports to leave at night and escorted and that through lack of escort there is an accumulation of transports ready to leave.

The Admiralty recognise that this question ought to be left entirely to the discretion of the Commandant Marine, Marseilles, but they would be grateful if you would acquaint them with the situation and ask Marseilles to allow the ships to leave as soon as it should be judged possible.

A 579. Adty. to A.S., Malta. 27th November.

70 British merchant ships should not be sent to ports on eastern shore of Adriatic.

A 580. A.S., Malta, to Adty. 27th November.

524 My 471. Commander-in-Chief directs following modification to come into force forthwith. Route Marseilles to Malta. After leaving Marseilles keep close to French coast as far as San Remo, and there pass to 15 miles to the east of Cape Corso. Remainder of route unchanged. Route Malta to Marseilles. No change as far as 5 miles to the east of Cape Corso. From there make Cape Ferrar and follow south of France at a distance 5 to 10 miles as far as Marseilles.

A 581. A.S., Malta, to Adty. 28th November.

529 Commander-in-Chief directs that transport route given in my 479 (?471) 24th November is to be called No. 1 and route No. 2 is as follows:—

Marseilles to Malta.—Pass 5 miles south of Iles d'Hyères and steer for point 10 miles to the west of Asinara Island, proceed along the coast of Sardinia so as to pass 10 miles off San Pietro, then 5 miles south of Toro. Steer so as to pass 5 miles south of Maritimo Island Light, follow coast of Sicily as far as Girgenti, from there pass 10 miles off Gozo Island and thence to Valetta.

Malta to Marseilles.—Pass 5 miles north of Gozo Island, 5 miles south of Pantellaria Island, 5 miles off Cape Bon, 10 miles north of Cani Rocks, from there pass 15 miles south of Toro, 20 miles to the west of Asinara Island. Thence to a point 10 miles south of Iles d'Hyères and proceed to Marseilles keeping 10 miles off shore.

Malta to Salonika.—After leaving Malta make the parallel of 36° 30' N., in doing this Cape Passaro is not to be approached within 30 miles, follow the parallel. Leave this parallel at a suitable time and proceed to a position 60 miles south of Sapienza Island and from there pass through Cerigo Channel. The region between the meridian of Sapienza and Cerigo, as well as Cerigo Channel, must be passed in the dark. From Cerigo Island follow Route 1, Malta to Salonika.

Gibraltar to Malta.—Pass 5 miles south of Cape de Gata, make San Pietro, Sardinia (?) at a distance of 10 miles, then 5 miles south of Toro. Pass 5 miles south of Marittimo Island Light and proceed along the coast of Sicily as far as Girgenti, 10 miles north of Gozo Island, and thence to Valetta.

Malta to Gibraltar.—After leaving Malta pass 5 miles north of Gozo Island, 5 miles south of Pantellaria Island, 5 miles off Cape Bon, and 10 miles north of Cani Rocks. From there pass 15 miles south of Toro and 10 miles off Cape de Gata and thence to Gibraltar.

Gibraltar to Marseilles.—Pass 5 miles off Cape de Gata, steer for San Pietro and when on the meridian of Bougie proceed direct to Marseilles.

Marseilles to Gibraltar.—After leaving Marseilles steer in direction of Cape Bougaroni as far as a line joining a point 15 miles south of San Pietro and a point 10 miles south of Cape de Gata. Follow this line so as to pass 10 miles south of Cape de Gata and from there to Gibraltar.

Malta to Mudros.—The same as Malta to Salonika as far as 10 miles to the east of Skyros Island, thence direct to Mudros.

Salonika to Malta.—Follow route No. 1 from Salonika to Malta as far as Cerigotto Channel, pass through the Channel and make the parallel of 35° 30' in the neighbourhood of the meridian of Sapienza. Follow this parallel and alter course to Valetta when most convenient.

Note.—The Cerigotto (Island) Channel and the region between meridians of Cerigotto Island and Sapienza Island must be passed in the dark.

Mudros to Malta.—After leaving Mudros steer south so as to pass 30 miles to the west of Skyros Island, then follow the route Salonika to Malta.

A 582. Adty. to A.S., Malta. 28th November.

89 Your 529. What are the intentions of Commander-in-Chief as regards the use of Route No. 2?

A 583. A.S., Malta, to Adty. 28th November.

541 My 529. Route No. 2 will not be adopted until distinct orders are given.

Routes 1 and 2 will be sent in writing by first opportunity and then it will be easy for French C.-in-C., to direct any part of routes 1 or 2 to be used as he wishes.

A 584. A.S., Malta, to Adty. 2nd December.

629 My 529. 27th November. Transport Route No. 2, Mudros to Malta, for "30 miles west of Skyros Island," read "30 miles to the east of Skyros Island."

Add to route No. 2 the following additional instructions (begins). Malta to Egypt. Follow the route No. 2 Malta to Salonika and leave the parallel of 36° 30' N. in long. 19° E. of Greenwich. From there shape course so as to join route No. 1 Malta to Egypt in long. 23° E. of Greenwich. Egypt to Malta follow route No. 1 Egypt to Malta to long. 23° E. of Greenwich, and from there shape course so as to join route No. 2 Salonika to Malta in long. 19° E. of Greenwich. (Message ends).

C.-in-C. directs that the instructions for Malta to Mudros and Salonika and back in route No. 2, and Malta to Egypt and back as given above are to be brought into force forthwith.

A 585. Marine, Paris, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 5th December.

1076 Please inform Admiralty I have authorised Admiral Commanding, III Squadron to place should it become necessary at the disposal of Admiral Peirse for defence Canal the 2 armed cruisers *d'Entrecasteaux* and *Pothuau* besides the three ships already detailed for that purpose *Jauréguiberry*, *Requin* and *Montcalm*.

A 586. Adty. (T) to Divisional Transports, Marseilles. 5th December.

428 Armed transports which can steam not less than 14 knots may proceed without escort.

A 587. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies (777). 6th December.
S.N.O., Alexandria.

In view of condition of *Hannibal's* boilers reported by S.N.O., Alexandria, in telegram sent at 1340 on 6th December, ship should remain at Alexandria.

She will be used as depot ship for trawlers being sent out.

Guns may be used for arming transports.

Orders will be sent as to reducing complement.

A 588. C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty. 7th December.

336 My 328,* *Torilla* was easily outranged by submarine whose shots were falling over while *Torilla's* 3-pdrs. were firing at extreme range and falling short. Ship was only saved by falling in with another vessel armed with 4.7 in. gun who opened fire and forced submarine to dive. In my opinion 3-pdr. guns as defensive armament are worse than useless and a positive source danger being quite ineffective if used and giving enemy an excuse for sinking ships without giving time for those on board to take to boats.

Reply. 783. Your 336. Your opinion is not concurred in. *Torilla* probably kept submarine from closing to short range by means of her 3-pdr. gunfire otherwise she would have been quickly finished off before help arrived.

Two submarines have been destroyed in the North Sea by means of 3-pdr. guns and on many occasions these guns have inflicted damage on submarines and driven them off. (Sent 8th December).

* Reporting attack on *Torilla*.

A 589. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. (639). 7th December.
A.S., Malta (220).

Vessels with cargoes for Greece detained at Gibraltar or Malta should not be allowed to proceed pending further instructions.

A 590. Adty. to A.S., Malta. 7th December.

231 Submarine *E.21* should be sent to join Admiral Thursby at once for temporary service in southern part of Adriatic.

If *E.21* is not available send another E. class boat.

Inform V.A., Eastern Mediterranean of temporary diversion of vessel.

A 591. Adty. to R.A., *Queen*. 7th December.

88 A.S., Malta, has been ordered to send you an E. class submarine temporarily.

She should be used in vicinity of San Giovanni di Medua or Cattaro to try and inflict loss on the enemy vessels interrupting transport of supplies to Serbian army.

Make all arrangements necessary with Italians and make them understand that it is not a permanent arrangement.

A 592. C.-in-C., East Indies, to Adty. 8th December.

340 Your 783.* Have I authority to allow *Torilla* and other troop transports armed with 3-pdrs. and 2½-pdrs. to sail unescorted under present conditions?

Reply. 785. Yes, as a general rule, but not under abnormal conditions, of which you must be the judge.

* Giving Admiralty view that 3-pdr. gun was adequate defensive armament for merchantmen.

A 593. Adty. to A.S., Malta. 9th December.

252 The 25 armed trawlers now at Malta or on passage there should be disposed of as follows:—

Three complete units of 6 boats per unit are to be retained at Malta. One unit of 6 boats and the odd boat should be sent to Alexandria and borne on books of *Hannibal*.

The unit sent to Alexandria should be composed of boats armed with 12-pdr. guns. . . .

A 594. Marine, Paris, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 9th December.

1094 Rear-Admiral Huguet will haul down his flag in *Montcalm* December 26th.

He will not be replaced, and on that date, *Montcalm*, *Requin*, *Jauréguiberry* and *T.B.250* will be attached to 3rd Squadron.

A 594a. Adty. to A.S., Malta (288). 11th December.
S.N.O., Mudros (487).

Guns mounted in colliers for passage from England may be transferred to troop or store transports or oilers as requisite, being replaced by 2½ pounders when available. . . .

A 594b. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 11th December.

681 Secret. Suspicions have been aroused concerning the four special service colliers at Gibraltar.

Their names are to be altered as follows:—

Thornhill to *Werribee*.

Penhallow to *Century*.

Bradford City to *Saros*.

Remembrance to *Lammeroo*.

The alteration is to be carried out after the vessels leave Gibraltar in such a way as to ensure secrecy, together with any other alterations to the appearance of the vessels which may be feasible, in order to add to their disguise. False papers should be prepared and their ports of registry altered to agree with Lloyd's Registry.

As soon as the vessels are ready they should proceed to Mudros to coal as ordered in Para, 2 A.L.M.00105 of 3rd October, 1915.

Officers and men are not to refer to the names of the ships, and their correspondence should be addressed to H.M.S. *Cormorant*. Acknowledge.

A594c. R.A., *Queen*, to Adty. 11th December.

148 Re Admiralty message 62*, request to be informed for information of Italian C.-in-C. whether *Bristol* and *Dublin* will return to Adriatic Squadron when repairs to boilers are completed.

Reply. *Liverpool* started from England to replace *Dublin* but had to return yesterday owing to breakdown.

We will endeavour to keep four modern light cruisers in Adriatic Squadron, *Liverpool* when again serviceable replacing either *Bristol* or *Dublin*. (Sent 12th December.)

* Light Cruiser Squadron of 4 *Bristol* class in Adriatic.

A594d. Adty. to (1) S.N.O., Gib. (686).
(2) A.S., Malta (296). 12th December.

My (1) 639, (2) 220. Vessels with cargoes for Greece detained at Gibraltar and Malta may be allowed to proceed.

A 595. Adty. to A.S., Malta. 12th December.

298 Sixty-six trawlers and 3 yachts are being despatched from Falmouth to Malta as tenders to *Egmont*, but 36 of these trawlers will be sent on to Alexandria to be tenders to *Hannibal*.

A596. Marine, Paris, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 12th December.

1107 I. On account of the lack of coal at Marseilles and the difficulty in procuring labour, please ask the Admiralty to send colliers to Marseilles to fill up with coal the next British troop transports in cases where it may be necessary to do so.

II. On account of the necessity of turning over to Italy the torpedo boat flotillas placed at her disposal by the Naval Convention, we have ceased to escort our transports to Salonika.

The personnel is now embarked in auxiliary cruisers and materiel in ships armed with guns. Please ask the Admiralty under what conditions the transport of the British divisions should be effected.

By taking measures similar to ours, embarking personnel in fast steamers and old battleships without lower deck guns and putting a gun in cargo boats carrying material, one could do without an escort which it is extremely difficult for us to provide.

A597. Adty. to S.N.O., Mudros for P.N.T.O., Salonika.
P.N.T.O., Egypt (626).
A.S., Malta (304). 12th December.

It has been decided in consultation with V.A., Eastern Mediterranean Squadron, that for the present the control of sea transport work for the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force shall be concentrated (centralised) under the Superintending Transport Officer, Mudros, whence the necessary orders will be given.

A 598. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 15th December.

818 12 twin screw motor launches are being sent to Port Said for service in Canal.

A 599. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 17th December.

820 Sloops *Magnolia* and *Mallow* left Marseilles with transports 14th December. *Mimosa* left with a transport 15th December all for Egypt. Sloops *Lily* and *Veronica* have arrived at Gibraltar en route Egypt. These 5 sloops should be used for anti-submarine work under your orders, using *Hanibal* as parent ship.

A 600. C.-in-C., East Indies to Adty. 18th December.

392 Operations in western desert are assuming increasing importance and need of naval co-operation is becoming urgent. Monitor *M.21* has insufficient steaming radius and *M.23* engine trouble, preventing their employment from Marsa Matruh. Request if available 1 or 2 Monitors with Bolinder engines in good condition and 9.2 in. Mark X may be sent. They can shelter in Marsa Matruh in bad weather and could operate from outside reefs on coast.

A 601. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies (826).
V.A.E.M. (479). 18th December.

Your 392. Situation at Dardanelles and Salonika does not admit of Admiralty ordering Monitors with 9.2 Mark X guns away at present, but your request will not be lost sight of.

Our information is that *M.21* can steam 650 miles at 10 knots and 800 miles at 8 knots.

Radius of action should be sufficient to admit of her being stationed at Marsa Matruh and operating at Sollum if a supply of fuel is sent to Marsa Matruh for replenishing.

Range of Mark VI. 9.2 gun is 16,000 yards with extreme elevation of 30 degrees using full charge and 13,000 yards reduced charge.

A 602. Adty. to A.S., Malta. 20th December.

408 A damaged submarine reported to be short of oil is said to be at Sollum.

Can you arrange to divert any small vessels to attack her?

C.-in-C. has at present only *Clematis* available, though *Mallow* and *Magnolia* have passed Malta.

Reply 2. French C.-in-C. sent cruiser *Amiral Aube* at noon 20th December, followed by 2 destroyers to endeavour to destroy this submarine.

A 603. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 20th December.

249 Yacht *Valiant II* has been ordered from Marseilles to Gibraltar to join Yacht Squadron when it comes under your orders.

A 604. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 20th December.

831 Your 402. We have information from another source that submarine at Sollum is short of oil. You should endeavour to destroy her. *Magnolia* passed Malta on 17th and *Mallow* on 18th both for Alexandria.

A 605. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 20th December.

750 *Acorn*, *Minstrel*, *Rifleman*, *Sheldrake*, should be used to escort troop transports during their passage to Malta, which is destination of destroyers.

A 606. Marine, Paris to Adty. (F.N.A.). 21st December.

1135 Date of January 1st is accepted*. Flotilla of yachts will be handed over before this date.

* Re institution of new Patrol Areas in Mediterranean.

A 607. Adty. to V.A.E.M.S. 21st December.

487 Your 690.* You should not be in a hurry to send ships to Milo unless French require it.

It now becomes necessary to provide ships for defence of Salonika and Suez Canal in addition to watching Dardanelles and supporting troops at Cape Helles.

* Telegram 690 referred to disposition of Squadron after evacuation of Suvla and Anzac.

For Suez Canal following ships are required :—*Cornwallis* ; 1 battle-ship of *Glory* class or else *Prince George* ; 1 cruiser *Euryalus* class ; 1 12-in. or 14-in. Monitor ; 1 Mark X. 9·2-in. Monitor ; 2 6-in. Monitors.

Large ships going to Port Said should be escorted and reserve ammunition for Suez Canal ships should be sent to Port Said but not all in one bottom.

Ships for Egypt should arrive there not later than 4th January.

One seaplane ship should be sent to Port Said. She will be required to hunt Turkish railway depots and camps in Syria and especially good seaplanes should be selected and bombs and all necessary equipment sent.

Report your disposition of ships for Salonika and Mudros and names of vessels detailed for Egypt.

A608. A.S., Malta to Adty. 24th December.

78. C.-in-C. informs me that French Ministry of Marine propose to bring new scheme of yours etc., into force 1st January, 1916, and asks for copy of my instructions. I have given him copies of Admiralty letter M.03974 of 10th December, and Admiralty letter M.09370 of 12th December, and have stated that I consider it impossible to start new scheme until British forces ready here. I propose that zones shall be manned and worked when necessary vessels arrive and become available, but as regards responsibility for transport routes in area outside zones east of Malta French navy should not be relieved of responsibility until British forces and arrangements including W/T are ready, and I suggest 1st February as probable date.

Reply. 471. January 1st should be adhered to for the change. By that date you should have 4 destroyers and about 40 trawlers and you will get some sloops during January.

A609. Adty. to A.S., Malta. 25th December.

Liverpool should join flag of Admiral Thursby.

A610. V.A.E.M.S. to Adty. 26th December.

720 Your 487 (of 21st December). Following ships are being sent to Egypt and will leave on or before 30th December :—*Cornwallis*, *Glory*, *Sir Thomas Picton** ; Monitors *M.15*, *M.31*, *Euryalus* now at Malta has also been detailed (1431).

* Changed for *Roberts*. (728 V.A.E.M.S., 28th December.)

A611. Marine, Paris to Adty. (F.N.A.). 27th December.

Reference to A357.

You have advised us that the Admiralty expects that the French Navy will continue to take adequate measures for the protection of transports which are either too slow or insufficiently armed within the zone patrolled by the French.

Admiral Dartige reports that the *Mousqueton* arrived at Salonika escorting two British transports armed with guns and steaming one 14 and the other 12 knots.

He considers that he will be unable to continue a service under these conditions. After 1st January the trade routes will be patrolled. Our transports will no longer be convoyed.

Please ask the Admiralty if they think it necessary to continue the escort service for English transports after that date. And if they do think it necessary will the Admiralty state precisely the call-signs, speed, and armament of the ships which will require convoying within the zone of French patrols.

A612. C.-in-C., East Indies to Adty. 28th December.

441 As *Clematis* having 4·7 in. gun is very useful in co-operating with military operations on Egyptian coast, have you got any objection to my retaining her and sending you one of the other sloops in her place as soon as her trawlers can be spared ?

Addressed to V.A.E.M.

Repeated to Adty.

A613. Adty. to C.-in-C., East Indies. 28th December.

870 Your letter 771 of 13th December, paragraph 7, approve retention of guns in Hannibal.

A614. V.A.E.M., Salonika, to Adty. 29th December.

735 Reference Admiralty letter M.09374, 10th December. From experience gained in working with French I strongly recommend that zones should be considerably larger and that as far as is possible they should be so allotted as to facilitate rapid wireless communication. The proposed division of the Aegean will have the opposite effect ; Wireless intercommunication between British and French has always been unreliable. Consider rapid communication most essential in any patrol scheme. The increase in size of guns will facilitate the quick reinforcing of patrol in any area temporarily favoured by enemy's submarines. If numbers of suitable small craft admit of it I recommend British assume responsibility for whole of Aegean, giving unbroken control from Salonika to Egypt. This might necessitate re-organisation of zones elsewhere.

A615. Adty. to V.A.E.M. 29th December.

316 Your 735. The arrangement as regards zones has been agreed to by the three powers and cannot now be altered.

If after sufficient trial it proves a failure, we can represent matter to the French and Italians and ask for a re-arrangement.

Your proposals would necessitate very large modifications in other parts of the Mediterranean and lead to much discussion and long delay.

The arrangements in Admiralty letter M.09374 come into force on 1st January.

A616. Adty. to S.N.O., Gib. 29th December.

831 Sloop *Acacia* left Cardiff to-day for Gibraltar to join your flag.

A 617. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Paris. 29th December.

4546 Your 1159. The Admiralty agree that it will not be necessary to escort the troop transports which are armed with guns after 1st January.

Out of 71 transports now working in the Mediterranean all except 15 have been armed, and these will be armed as soon as guns can be obtained. Until they are armed it will be necessary to protect them when carrying troops.

A 618. A.S., Malta, to Adty. 30th December.

186 In forwarding to Commander-in-Chief, V.A. Eastern Mediterranean's No. 735 to the Admiralty I have made following remarks :—(begins)

In my opinion any change of plan at the present moment would be highly undesirable and lead to great confusion and delay. We have now been given a scheme which has been accepted by France, Great Britain and Italy, and which is to come into force 1st January. It may not be the best possible scheme but let us start with it and get it into working order and then if necessary improve and amend as experience dictates. (Ends.)

A 619. Adty. to A.S., Malta.

30th December.

535 Italian Ministry of Marine inform us through Italian F.N.A. that the following signal stations could co-operate in the detection of submarines :— Favignana, Pantellaria, Punta Libeccia and Punta Troia both in Marittimo Island, Granitola.

A 620. Marine, Paris, to Adty. (F.N.A.).

30th December.

1171 I have received from Admiral Dartige the following telegram :— Admiral de Robeck communicates to me a telegram which he is sending to the Admiralty in which he is already proposing modifications in the division of zones in the Mediterranean. I think, in agreement with Admiral Limpus, that the recent division adopted in the Franco-Anglo-Italian agreement may not be perfect but that the moment would be very ill chosen to change it without having subjected it to a trial of some duration. I think, as Admiral Dartige does, that it is necessary to put into force on the date fixed upon the memorandum adopted by the allies. This memorandum by the way of creating Zone 13 has sanctioned the situation existing up to the present as concerns the region placed under Admiral de Robeck's command. It will be possible later as a result to add to the memorandum those modifications which experience will have proved necessary.

Reply. 4557. Your 1171. The Admiralty had yesterday telegraphed to Admiral de Robeck to the same effect as your telegram and had before then rejected the proposal of the Admiral at Malta to put off until 1st February the re-inforcing of the new measures.

APPENDIX B

OPERATIONS SIGNALS EXTRACTED FROM THE LOGS OF VARIOUS SHIPS.

Note.—Times of receipt and despatch and all times in text, unless otherwise stated, are ship time. Times of origin (Code times) are always G.M.T.

3rd August.

- B 1.** C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S. and *Chatham*. 2.59 a.m.
Goeben and *Breslau* arrived *Messina* 1 p.m. 2nd August. (0136.)
- B 2.** R.A., 1st C.S., to C.-in-C. 3.37 a.m.
Re 0136. Do I continue watching Adriatic? (0225.)
- B 3.** C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S. Recd. 4.23 a.m.
Your 0225. Yes, but *Goeben* is primary consideration. *Chatham* go right through Straits to the other side. She could then report if gone north. (0250.)
- B 4.** R.A., 1st C.S., to C.-in-C. Sent 5.6 a.m.
Shall I send battle cruisers to westward of Sicily passing by south of Sicily? (0345.)
- Reply.*
Your 0345. Should delay until you get authentic news of the *Goeben*. (0447.)
- B 5.** A.C., 1st C.S., to C.-in-C. Sent 6.50 a.m.
I am taking up position approximately 37° 34' N., 15° 45' E. If *Goeben* goes N. I shall send battle cruisers south about Sicily and remain with cruisers. In view of uncertain attitude of Italy I am not going with the heavy ships through the Straits of Messina. (0520.)
- B 6.** *Chatham* to C.-in-C. and *Defence*. Recd. *Defence* 7.52 a.m.
No signs of *Goeben* or *Breslau* or any man of war at Messina. (0647.)
- Recd. *Chatham* 8.27 a.m.
- B 7.** C.-in-C. to *Chatham* and R.A., 1st C.S.
Chatham should go west and endeavour to find *Goeben*, asking passing merchant vessels for information. (0711.)
- B 8.** C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S. Recd. 8.58 a.m.
Send *Gloucester* with destroyers to watch entrance of Adriatic using Ionian Islands as base. *Defence*, *Duke of Edinburgh*, *Warrior*, *Indomitable*, *Indefatigable* to pass south of Sicily and to westward. Further orders will be sent later but *Chatham* to go westward from north end of Straits. (0731.)
- B 9.** C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S. Recd. 2.33 p.m.
First Cruiser Squadron to support destroyers south of Adriatic. *Black Prince* will join leaving Malta 1900. Battle cruisers shape course to pass within 20 miles N.E. from Valletta and report time of arrival in that position at 14 knots. They will continue course to westward to search for *Goeben*. Further orders will be sent. (1234.)
- B 10.** C.-in-C. to *Indomitable*, *Indefatigable*, *Chatham*. 9 p.m.
Indomitable and *Indefatigable* proceed at 22 knots to Gibraltar ready to prevent *Goeben* leaving Mediterranean. *Chatham* rejoin flag 36° 23' N., 14° 41' E., by 6 a.m. Tuesday (4th August) at 20 knots. (1933.)

4th August.

B 11. C.-in-C. to A.S., Malta.

Flagships position, N. 38° E. from Saint Elmo. Send *Hussar* and one destroyer 8' apart between flag and Saint Elmo. Two destroyers 8 and 16 miles N. 38° E. from flag. *Weymouth* will be 6 miles S. 38° W. from C. Correnti. Destroyers go out at 15 knots. Outer destroyers bring flagship's and *Weymouth's* mails and correspondence. (0555.)

B 12. C.-in-C. to *Inflexible*, *Weymouth*, *Hussar*, and Destroyers.

If any British merchant steamers pass to eastward having appearance of colliers they are to be stopped and flagship communicated with. Particular lookout for vessel *Frederick Knight*. (0612.)

B 13. S.N.O., Malta, to C.-in-C. Recd. 8.50 a.m.

E.T.C. reports received message from Bona three or four German ships bombarding Bona* between 5.30 a.m. and 6.50 a.m. to-day and then left. Company has telegraphed news to Gibraltar. (0724.)

* *Indomitable* decoded this word as Dover.

B 14. C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S.

Three Germans bombarded Oran 6 a.m. to-day. Italy doubtful. Do not sight Italian coast. Keep high speed ready. Destroyers* better use islands south of Corfu. (0915.)

* Logged by *Defence* as "altogether."

B 15. *Dublin* to C.-in-C. (Time of receipt not given in log.)

Received news from Paris German collier anchored Palma. Supposed idea coal 2 German cruisers. (0930.)

B 16. *Indomitable* to C.-in-C. Sent 10.46 a.m.

Enemy in sight in lat. 37° 44' N., 7° 56' E. steering E. consisting of *Goeben* and *Breslau*. (0940.)

Note.—From W/T log of *Indomitable*. Not logged by *Inflexible*.

B 17. *Indomitable* to C.-in-C. (Time of receipt not given in log.)

Enemy in sight consisting of *Goeben*, *Breslau* 37° 44' N., 7° 56' E. *Indomitable*, *Indefatigable* shadowing *Goeben* and *Breslau* lat. 37° 44' N., 7° 56' E. at 0945. (0946.)

Recd. *Dublin* 11.15 a.m.

B 18. C.-in-C. to *Indomitable* and *Dublin*.

Dublin from Bizerta proceed immediately to reinforce *Indomitable* full speed. *Dublin* inform French Admiral. *Chatham* proceeds to Bizerta. (1008.)

B 19. C.-in-C. to *Indomitable*. Recd. 10.58 a.m.

Shadow *Goeben*. (0954.)

Sent 11.44 a.m.

B 20. *Indomitable* to C.-in-C. Time of receipt not logged.

Goeben 37° 36' N., 8° 6' E. (course) north,* (speed) 20 knots. (1015.)

* See below.

B 21. *Indomitable* to C.-in-C. and *Dublin*. Sent 11.54 a.m.

Lat. 37° 42' N., long. 8° 16' E. *Goeben* steering N.* 22 knots. (1034.)

* This was incorrect, she was steering E.

4th August.

B 22. C.-in-C. to *Indomitable*.

Indicate position, course, and speed of enemy. (1039.)

Note.—From *Inflexible's* log *Indomitable's* log gives :—

Indicate position of enemy and approximate course they are steering. Indicate bearing and distance of the nearest ship of the chase. (1039.)

B 23. *Reply*. Sent 12.16 p.m.

Your 1039. Lat. 37° 40' N., long. 8° 12' E., course E. bearing E. 10,000 yards. Weather hazy. (1110.)

B 24. *Dublin* to C.-in-C.

Have unmoored and proceeding out of inner harbour. (1105.)

B 25. C.-in-C. to *Weymouth* and *Indomitable*. Sent 1.28 p.m.

Endeavour to intercept and jam enemy's wireless signals. (1228.)

B 26. R.A., 1st C.S., to *Gloucester*.

Destroyers are always to be withdrawn by 6 p.m. and secreted on the Greek coast.

B 27. R.A., 1st C.S., to C.-in-C.

Urgent. In view your memo about Italy I am making my supports position about latitude Cephalonia. Submit patrol should move south of latitude Santa (Maria) di Leuca. I shall do my best to coal destroyers. (1120.)

Sent 1.50 p.m. Recd. 3.30 p.m.

B 28. Admiral Bizerta (French) to C.-in-C. via *Dublin*.

Dublin arrived. Thanks for sending her and letter. Bizerta W/T station at your disposal for communication with our main fleet. This morning *Goeben* bombarded Bona and *Breslau* Phillippeville, they then steamed to N.W. I believe their collier is at Palma. French Fleet consists of all our forces just left for Algerian coast. (1145.)

B 29. C.-in-C. to *Defence*. Recd. 2 p.m.

War imminent. Send destroyers Malta as fast as coal will permit keeping well clear of Italian coast. Retain *Gloucester* and watch Adriatic. (1250.)

B 30. C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S.

German merchant vessel *General* at Messina landed all passengers and remains at discretion of German Government. 15 knot ship. (1337.)

B 31. C.-in-C. to *Chatham*.

On arrival ask French Admiral Bizerta if W/T station there can conveniently communicate with C.-in-C. on 1,000 metre wave. (1405.)

B 32. C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S.

Report when flotilla starts and speed. (1410.)

B 33. *Indomitable* to C.-in-C. and *Dublin*.

My position 38° 0' N., 8° 30' E., course E. by N. (speed) 15 (knots) *Goeben* 10,000 yards ahead, *Breslau* out of sight. (1215.)

B 34. *Indomitable* to C.-in-C.

Breslau has rejoined *Goeben*. (1335.)

(C2859)

4th August.

B 35. *Dublin* to C.-in-C.

My position now is 37° 56' N., 9° 21' E. Enemy consisting of following ships, *Goeben* and *Breslau*, steaming east. (1345.)

Note.—*Inflexible's* log has 37° 57' N.

B 36. *Dublin* to C.-in-C.

Sent 2.54 p.m.

Out battle cruisers about 9 miles astern. (1350.)

B 37. *Dublin* to C.-in-C.

Sent 3.25 p.m.

Enemy lat. 38° 0' N., long. 9° 40' E. (course) N. 85° E. (speed) 26 knots. (1430.)

B 38. C.-in-C. to *Dublin*.

Recd. 3.52 p.m.

In signal 1145 do you mean Palma or Palmas?

Reply. Your 1450. Palma-Majorca. (1515.)

B 39. *Indomitable* to C.-in-C.

Recd. 4.10 p.m.

Germans are running away from me, steering east; speed 26 knots to 27 knots. 90 coal trimmers are urgently needed by these ships although we are using oil fuel.

Sent and Recd. 4.55 p.m.

B 40. *Dublin* to C.-in-C. and *Indomitable*.

Breslau parted company from *Goeben*. Shall I engage her? (1545.)

Reply (from C.-in-C.).

Your 1545. No. (1604.)

Reply (from *Indomitable*). Your 1545. No. Do not let them get between you and me. (1620.)

B 41. *Dublin* to C.-in-C. and *Indomitable*.

Sent 5 p.m. Recd. 5.1 p.m.

Breslau has now joined *Goeben*. They are both steaming about east. (1555.)

Recd. (C.-in-C.) 5.25 p.m.

B 42. *Dublin* to C.-in-C. and *Indomitable*.

Cruisers have separated, *Goeben* to the northward,* apparently *Breslau* to south-east. (1620.)

* *Inflexible's* and *Indomitable's* logs have "north-west."

B 43. *Indomitable* to C.-in-C.

Recd. 5.30 p.m.

Your 1600* about 13 (miles) at 1700 her position was 38° 5' N., 10° 30' E. only in sight of *Dublin* who reported both Germans turned to south. (1638.) From *Inflexible's* log. This signal is not logged by *Indomitable*.

* Not logged. Presumably should be 1601 from C.-in-C., asking for distance of *Goeben*.

B 44. *Indomitable* to C.-in-C.

Recd. 5.37 p.m.

Coal remaining at 1600. *Indefatigable*, 2,560 tons. *Indomitable*, 2,130 tons, but can only steam at full speed for 30 hours more, owing to shortness of coal in B boiler room. (1600.)

B 45. *Indomitable* to C.-in-C.

Your 1627.* *Goeben* only in sight of *Dublin*. (1645.)

* Asking how far ahead *Goeben* was.

4th August.

B 46. *Dublin* to C.-in-C.

Sent 5.57 p.m.

I am about 15 miles starboard bow of *Indomitable*. *Breslau* steering E.S.E. about 15 miles on port side* of *Dublin*. (1645.)

* *Inflexible's* log reads "port bow."

B 47. *Dublin* to C.-in-C.

Sent 5.56 p.m.

My position 4.15 p.m. lat. 38° 1' N., long. 10° 23' E. *Goeben* is about 15 miles from me and is now apparently steering E.N.E. I am about 15 miles on starboard bow of *Indomitable*, *Breslau* steering E.S.E. about 15 miles on port bow of *Dublin*. (1650.)

Note.—*Inflexible's* log gives apparent course of *Goeben* as N.52 E., and all the words after this are omitted. *Dublin* used G.M.T. in the text of this message.

B 48. *Dublin* to *Indomitable*.

Sent 6.2 p.m.

Goeben almost out of sight N. 30 E. from me, *Breslau* will soon be out of sight ahead. Request instructions. (1659.)

B 49. *Dublin* to C.-in-C. and *Indomitable*.

Sent 6.15 p.m.

(My position) 38° 7' N., 10° 45' E. *Goeben* bearing N. 47° E. steering E. by S., *Breslau* bearing N. 88° E., steering E. by S. (1710.)

B 50. C.-in-C. to *Chatham* and *Weymouth*.

Weymouth proceed at 22 knots to Graham's Shoal and patrol between it and Pantellaria. Shadow *Breslau* if seen. *Chatham* proceed at 22 knots, patrol between Pantellaria and Ras-el-Mirh. Shadow *Breslau* if seen. (1735.)

B 50a. *Dublin* to C.-in-C.

Sent 7.37 p.m.

Goeben out of sight now, can only see smoke; still daylight. (1620.)*

* Should be 1820. This signal is not logged by *Inflexible*.

Recd. *Indomitable* 6.50 p.m. *Dublin* 6.40 p.m.

B 51. C.-in-C. to *Indomitable*, *Indefatigable*, *Dublin*.

Dublin endeavour to keep in touch with *Goeben*. *Indomitable* and *Indefatigable* slow speed, steer west. (1740.)

B 52. C.-in-C. to *Indomitable*.

Recd. 7.35 p.m.

Goeben may turn to westward during the night, steering Majorca where his collier is. Shape course accordingly. *Dublin* may be able to keep you informed. (1754.)

B 53. C.-in-C. to *General*.Recd. *Defence* 10.50 p.m.

Italian Government has declared neutrality, which is to be rigidly respected. No ship is to approach within 6 miles of Italian coast. (1805.)

Note.—Not logged by *Indomitable*.

B 54. C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S. and *Wolverine*.

Recd. 8.10 p.m.

Urgent. Recall destroyers immediately and send them to Sta Maura to await collier. War will be declared at 1 a.m. (1859.)

B 55. *Dublin* to C.-in-C.

List sight of *Goeben* just before sunset. (1900.)

Note.—This signal is crossed out in pencil in *Dublin's* log. It is not logged by *Inflexible*. Probably it was never despatched.

4th August.

- B 56.** R.A., 1st C.S., to C.-in-C. Sent 8.34 p.m.
Your 1859 received. Against what powers? (1925.)
Reply. Recd. 10 p.m.
Your 1925. So far Germany only. (1959.)
- B 57.** C.-in-C. to *General*. Sent 9.5 p.m.
Ultimatum to Germany expires at midnight, G.M.T. Hostilities will commence after that time on receipt of telegram. Flagship will join battle cruisers to the westward, picking up *Chatham* and *Weymouth* on her way. First Cruiser Squadron and *Gloucester* will remain watching entrance to Adriatic and are not to get seriously engaged with superior force. First and Second Divisions of destroyers are to return immediately to Greek coast.
Fourth Division, except *Grampus*, will accompany C.-in-C. *Gloucester* or other vessel is to be sent to watch southern entrance to Straits of Messina. *Goeben* and *Breslau* were 40 miles west of Marittimo at 5 p.m. steering to the eastward, having been followed at high speed from Bona by *Indomitable* and *Indefatigable*.
At present there is no declaration of war against Austria. (1941.)
- B 58.** C.-in-C. to *Indomitable* and *Dublin*.
Dublin is to rejoin *Indomitable* before dawn. (1947.)
- B 59.** C.-in-C. to *Dublin*. Recd. 9.50 p.m.
Is enemy in sight? (2031.)
- B 60.** *Dublin* to *Indomitable*. Sent 10.25 p.m.
Having lost touch with *Goeben* am rejoining *Indomitable*. Coal on board 860 tons, oil fuel 257 tons.
- B 61.** *Dublin* to C.-in-C. Sent 11.18 p.m.
Enemy is not in sight. (2105.)
- B 62.** C.-in-C. to 1st C.S. Recd. 11.25 p.m.
I have asked British Minister, Athens, to send 1,000 tons coal from Piraeus in collier to Corfu. This is additional to coal from Malta. (2145.)
- B 63.** St. Angelo to All Ships.
Admiralty to all ships. Urgent. 355. Commence hostilities at once against Germany. (2300.)
- B 64.** A.S., Malta, to C.-in-C.
Your 1749. *Vesuvio* with 1,400 tons ready leave Wednesday* 1700.
Steamer *Erato* with about 3,000 tons late Thursday. (2130.)
* 5th Aug.
- B 65.** C.-in-C. to A.S., Malta.
Communicate with R.A., 1st S.C. as to where he wishes collier sent. (2250.)

5th August.

- B 66.** C.-in-C. to A.S., Malta. Sent 12.44 a.m.
Tell French Consul Telegraph in code to Bizerta for French C.-in-C. that British Admiral with 3 battle cruisers, 3 light cruisers and 3 destroyers will be to the southward of Sardinia searching for German ships who are 40 miles off Marittimo at 5 p.m. Tuesday steering east.
British Admiral will communicate by W/T with Bizerta if necessary. (2327. 4th August.)

5th August.

- B 67.** C.-in-C. to *Indomitable*. Recd. 1.3 a.m.
Shape course at 15 knots for C. Bon and then Pantellaria. Indicate present position, course and speed. (2325. 4th August.)
- B 68.** C.-in-C. to R.A., *Defence* and *Gloucester*. Sent 6.10 a.m.
Yesterday *Goeben*, *Breslau* steamed 26 knots. Warn *Gloucester*. (0515.)
- B 69.** British Admiral to Admiral, Bizerta.
Goeben lost sight of 38° 24' N., 12° 8' E., 8 p.m. steering E. by S. I shall be off Bizerta at 5 p.m. One battle cruiser three destroyers coal. (0915.)
- B 70.** *Dublin* to C.-in-C.
By plotting yesterday afternoon calculate highest speed of *Goeben* 27 knots, *Breslau* 28 knots. (1050.)
- B 71.** R.A., 1st C.S., to C.-in-C. Recd. 12.34 p.m.
My position will be known to Austrians very shortly. (1125.)
Reply. Your 1125. Keep altering position. (1251.)
- B 72.** A.S., Malta, to C.-in-C. and R.A., 1st C.S.
Time of receipt not logged.
Collier *Vesuvio* with 1,400 tons of coal will leave 8 p.m., 5th August for rendezvous west 10 miles distant from Cape Dukato, Santa Maura Island, at 8 knots. Collier *Trevose* with 4,500 tons of coal and 500 tons ammunition for C.-in-C., Mediterranean ready to leave 6th August p.m. Collier *Erato* with two thousand and — tons of coal and 300 tons of ammunition for R.A., 1st C.S., ready to leave morning 7th August. (1312.)
- B 73.** R.A., 1st C.S., to C.-in-C. Recd. 2.45 p.m.
In case *Goeben* is in these waters I am keeping within 30 miles of Santa Maura. If we encounter her I will attempt draw her into narrow waters when I can engage her at our range. (1230.)
Reply. Recd. 7.19 p.m.
Your 1230. In case she should come out use destroyer flotilla night work. *Dublin* arrives Malta Thursday morning; coals, will leave immediately join you with two destroyers. Give directions to *Dublin* to-morrow where join up. (1519.)
- B 74.** C.-in-C. to A.S., Malta, and R.A., 1st C.S.
Recd. *Defence* 7.21 p.m.
Vesuvio and *Erato* proceeding Port Vathi, Ithaca when ready. Inform *Defence* time of sailing. (1508.)
- B 75.** S.N.O., Malta, to C.-in-C., and R.A., 1st C.S.
Recd. *Defence* 8.14 p.m.
Collier cannot sail before 6th August. (1845.)
- B 75a.** S.N.O., Malta, to C.-in-C. Sent 4.56 p.m., Recd. 5.9 p.m.
Consul at Reggio reports men of war are at Messina*. (1556.)
(*) The cypher groups as sent was the group for Melindi (E. Africa), but the alteration of one figure gives Messina. The signal is not logged by *Inflexible*.
- B 76.** *Gloucester* to C.-in-C. and R.A., 1st C.S.
Recd. *Inflexible* 5.35 p.m.
Urgent. From strength signal *Goeben* should be in Straits Messina. (1522.)

5th August.

- B 77.** C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S. and *Gloucester*.
 Recd. *Defence* 5.4 p.m.
 German man-of-war is reported in Straits of Messina. (1529.)
- B 78.** C.-in-C. to *Dublin*.
 Proceed to Malta arriving 6 a.m. complete with coal with all despatch and proceed with two destroyers in company to reinforce R.A., 1st C.S. *Goeben* and *Breslau* are possibly in vicinity of Messina, so advisable shape course first for Zante. (1530.)
- B 79.** R.A., 1st C.S., to C.-in-C.
 I am proceeding endeavouring to intercept *Goeben* and instructing destroyers to do same if they have sufficient coal. (1740.)
- B 80.** R.A., 1st C.S., to Captain "D" (*Wolverine*).
 Recd. 6.55 p.m.
 Take any boats that can steam to Cape Santa Maria di Leuca and back being at Santa Maria by 2 a.m. to intercept *Goeben* through the Adriatic. No use if they cannot be there by then. (1745.)
- B 81.** Captain "D" (*Wolverine*) to R.A., 1st C.S., via *Black Prince*.
 Now sailing 6 destroyers afraid too late but will try. (1815.)
- B 82.** R.A., 1st C.S., to Captain "D" (*Wolverine*).
 Recd. 11.30 p.m.
 Return to Santa Maura. *Goeben* has not left Messina. (2035.)
- B 83.** C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S. Recd. 12.24 a.m., 6th Aug.
 1,000 tons coal is being sent Corfu in Greek ship by British Minister, Athens, for your disposal. (2219.)
- B 84.** *Indomitable* to C.-in-C. Recd. 12.35 a.m., 6th Aug.
 Lights out on Algerian coast and round Corsica. No French watch kept between Cape Corso and Italy. Bizerta Défense Mobile watches in parallelogram Cape Serat, Galita Island, Cani Rocks and Cape Farina, as a rule sometimes get a little north of it*. Bizerta W/T Station accurately placed position of *Goeben* yesterday morning Tuesday and again at 1900 Submarines patrol between Cape Guordia and Cape Farina by day. (2232.)
 * *Inflexible* read this "sometimes I am waiting for you little north of it."

6th August.

- B 85.** A.S., Malta, to *Inflexible*. Recd. 5 a.m.
 R.A., 1st C.S. Recd. 4.53 a.m.
Indomitable. Recd. 5.10 a.m.
Gloucester. Recd. 4.54 a.m.
Goeben and *Breslau* at Messina. (0335.)
- B 86.** C.-in-C. to *Indomitable*. Sent 5.35 a.m.
 Report progress of coaling. Request French Admiral to inform British Admiral through you exact position of French Fleet to-day, and when first transports with troops will leave Algeria. (0435.)
 Reply. Recd. 10 a.m.
 French Admiral reports first transport left Algerian coast and French Fleet will not probably be free until 10th August as second shipment is necessary.

6th August.

- B 87.** A.S., Malta, to C.-in-C.
 Following from Admiralty begins:—Naval authorities at Messina report *Breslau* coaling, suspect *Goeben* also coaling at Messina. (0839.)
- B 88.** C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S.
 Adty.
 A.S., Malta.
 S.N.O., Gib. Recd. *Defence* 12.57 p.m.
 My position 38° 40' N., 10° 46' E. Course S. 72 E., 10 knots, in company with *Inflexible* and *Indefatigable*. (1146.)
- B 89.** Bizerta to *Inflexible*. Recd. 1.15 p.m.
 Four ironclads, three armoured cruisers of French Fleet quitted Philippeville 8 a.m. for Ajaccio where they arrive Friday* afternoon.
 * 7th August.
- B 90.** A.S., Malta, to R.A., 1st C.S. Recd. 2.46 p.m.
Dublin, *Bulldog*, *Beagle* left. (1332.)
- B 91.** *Dublin* to R.A., 1st C.S. Recd. 3.58 p.m.
 Our speed 15 knots. (1436.)
- B 92.** *Indomitable* to C.-in-C. Recd. 2.15 p.m.
 Your 0435 of 6th. Last position of French Fleet known here Wednesday 5th 3 p.m. *Courbet* at Algiers, 6 p.m. 2nd Squadron left Algiers conveying seven transports, Thursday 6th 8 a.m. squadron of eight cruisers left C. de Fer for Philippeville. French information from Rome Wednesday night *Goeben* and *Breslau* at Messina, 16 Austrian ships at Pola. (1227.)
- B 93.** *Indomitable* to C.-in-C. Recd. 3.45 p.m.
 Your 1003. Bizerta destroyers will be east of 9° E. but not north of latitude running through Galita Island. (1422.)
- B 94.** C.-in-C. to *Indomitable*. Sent 4.33 p.m.
 Inform French Admiral I have swept* eastward to Cape St. Vito turning to westward at 6 p.m. If German ships have sailed and are not sighted by 7 a.m. Friday* assume they have gone to northward either through Bonifacio or round Cape Corso. I am ready to come with two battle cruisers and 1 light cruiser to assist on transport line if you wish. Please reply quickly. (1518.)
 * *Inflexible's* log has "kept." * 7th August.
- B 95.** British Admiral to French Admiral, Bizerta. Sent 6.15 p.m.
 Please cancel my last Message via *Indomitable*, am continuing my course to the eastward.
- B 96.** S.N.O., Malta, to C.-in-C. and R.A., 1st C.S. Recd. *Defence* 4.24 p.m.
 Collier Vesuvio with 940 tons and destroyer coal outfit left 3 p.m. due rendezvous noon Saturday, 8th. *Trevose* leaves Saturday with 4,000 tons and ammunition.
- B 97.** *Gloucester* to C.-in-C. and R.A., 1st C.S.
 Recd. *Inflexible* 6.16 p.m.
 Recd. *Defence* 6.13 p.m.
 Intercepted by *Dublin* 6.11 p.m.
 37° 56' N., 15° 30' E. Position of *Goeben* steering east. (1710.)

6th August.

- B 98.** *Gloucester* to R.A., 1st C.S. and C.-in-C.
Sent 6.49 p.m.
Recd. *Inflexible* 7.4 p.m.
Recd. *Defence* 7.8 p.m.
Intercepted by *Dublin* 6.32 p.m.
Delayed by enemy jamming.

Urgent. *Breslau* one mile astern of *Goeben*. (1727.)

Note.—*Dublin* logs code time 1627.

- B 99.** *Gloucester* to R.A., 1st C.S., and C.-in-C.
Sent 7.42 p.m.
Recd. *Inflexible* 7.47 p.m.
Recd. *Defence* 7.42 p.m.
Delayed by enemy jamming.

Speed of enemy 26 knots (1728.).

Note.—*Gloucester's* W/T. log has 25 knots.

- B 100.** *Gloucester* to C.-in-C. and R.A., 1st C.S.
Sent 7.44 p.m.
Recd. *Inflexible* 7.45 p.m.
Recd. *Defence* 7.41 p.m.
Intercepted by *Dublin* 7.40 p.m.

Goeben will round Spartivento at 6.20 p.m.* G.M.T. (1740.)

* *Gloucester's* log has 6.25 p.m.

- B 101.** *Gloucester* to R.A., 1st C.S., and C.-in-C.
Sent 6.55 p.m.
Recd. *Inflexible* 7.21 p.m.
Not logged by *Defence*.
Intercepted by *Dublin* no time
[given.]

Course of enemy E.S.E. (1754.)

- B 102.** From *Gloucester* to R.A., 1st C.S., and C.-in-C.
Sent 7.29 p.m.
Recd. *Inflexible* 7.35 p.m.
Not logged by *Defence*.

Answer signals via *Rinella* 7 p.m. G.M.T. Am being deliberately interfered with. (1826.)

B 103. C.-in-C. to *Dublin*. Sent 8.40 p.m. Recd. 8.30 p.m.
Get position, course and speed of *Goeben* from *Gloucester*. If possible sink him to-night. (1843.)

B 104. R.A., 1st C.S., to *Wolverine*. Sent 6.56 p.m. Recd. 7.40 p.m.
Goeben left Messina 6 p.m. steering east, probably *Breslau* also. Be under way concealed in Vasilico Bay* by midnight with steam for full speed. (1740.)

* Santa Maura Island.

- B 105.** R.A. 1st C.S., to *Dublin*.
Sent 8.20 p.m.(?) Recd. 8.55 p.m.(?)
Intercepted by *Inflexible* 9.7 p.m.(?)

If you can arrive Zante Channel by 4 a.m. proceed there with destroyers at full speed. (1845.)

Reply. Recd. 8.24 p.m. (?)

Your 1845. Could arrive soon after 5 a.m.

6th August.

- B 106.** *Gloucester* to C.-in-C. Sent 7.41 p.m. Recd. 7.51 p.m.
My position* is 37° 51' N., 16° 0' E. Course S. 85 E., 18 knots. (1830.)
* Position given is that of *Goeben* not *Gloucester*.
Inflexible has code time 1930.
Dublin intercepted this signal at 7.47 p.m. but read course S. 55 E., speed 15 knots.

- B 107.** *Gloucester* to R.A., 1st C.S., and C.-in-C.
Recd. *Inflexible* 8.25 p.m.
Recd. *Defence* 8.19 p.m.
Intercepted by *Dublin* 8.4 p.m.
Course of enemy N. 50 E. (1906.)

- B 108.** *Gloucester* to *Dublin*, R.A., 1st C.S., and C.-in-C.
Recd. *Dublin* 8.30 p.m.
Recd. *Defence* 8.33 p.m.
Recd. *Inflexible* 8.44 p.m.
Enemy's position 37° 56' N., 16° 17' E., *Goeben* and *Breslau* approximate course N. 65° E., speed 18 knots. (1930.)
Note.—*Inflexible* reads speed "18 knots or over."

- B 109.** *Dublin* to C.-in-C. and R.A., 1st C.S.
Sent, no time logged.
Recd. *Inflexible* 9.15 p.m.
Recd. *Defence* 9.14 p.m.
If *Goeben* is not going more than 18 knots and remains on present course I could reach her vicinity by half an hour after daylight. Have altered course accordingly. (2000.)

Note.—*Inflexible's* log reads "If *Goeben* is going more," etc.

- B 110.** *Dublin* to C.-in-C. and R.A., 1st C.S.
Recd. *Inflexible* 9.43 p.m.
Recd. *Defence* 9.30 p.m.
Add to 2000. Request instructions (2005.)

- B 111.** C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S., and *Dublin*.
Recd. *Defence* 9.32 p.m.
Recd. *Dublin* 9.30 p.m.

Dublin follow Rear Admiral's orders. (2027.)

B 112. *Dublin* to R.A., 1st C.S. Sent 9.20 p.m. Recd. 9.43 p.m.
Have altered course for Zante. Is that in accordance with your wishes vide 2027? (2050)*.

* *Dublin* log's code time 2027.

Reply. Recd. 10.8 p.m.
If you cannot attempt anything on *Goeben* during the dark hours shadow her at daylight reporting position and course. I shall be off Fano Island at 4 a.m. (2055.)

- B 113.** *Gloucester* to C.-in-C. and R.A., 1st C.S.
Recd. *Inflexible* 9.22 p.m.
Recd. *Defence* 9.20 p.m.*
Intercepted by *Dublin* 9.14 p.m.
Breslau parting company from *Goeben*. *Goeben* continuing course. (2006.)
* From Signal and Admiral's logs W/T. log says 9.8 p.m.

6th August.

B 114. Captain "D" (*Wolverine*) to R.A., 1st C.S.

Recd. 11.25 p.m.

Coal remaining 66, 92, 75, 40, 63, 58, 79, 69 tons, on which I cannot do much. (2005).

Note.—*Defence* read figures 66, 92, 75, 46, 43, 58, 76, 69.

B 115. *Gloucester* to C.-in-C. and R.A., 1st C.S.

Recd. *Inflexible* 10.53 p.m.

Recd. *Defence* 10.19 p.m.

Intercepted by *Dublin* 10.10 p.m.

Position, course and speed of *Goeben* at 9.50 p.m., 38° 15' N., 16° 37' E., N. 65 E., 26 knots. (2108.)

Note.—1. *Defence* has code time 2100.

2. A note in *Gloucester's* W/T log says "Passed several times. 'D' (Operator's "ready to receive" signal) only *Defence*."

B 116. *Gloucester* to C.-in-C. and R.A., 1st C.S.

Recd. *Inflexible* 10.53 p.m.

Recd. *Defence* 10.20 p.m.

Intercepted by *Dublin* 10.12 p.m.

Position, course and speed of *Breslau* at 9.50 p.m., 38° 15' N., 16° 34' E., E.S.E., 20 knots. (2109.)

See Note 2 above.

B 117. R.A., 1st C.S., to C.-in-C.

Recd. 11.30 p.m.

My position at midnight will be 39° 8' N., 19° 55' E., course N. 34 W. Speed 15 knots. (2215.)

B 118. R.A., 1st C.S., to *Wolverine* via *Black Prince*.

Recd. 1.11 a.m., 7th August.

Gloucester reports at 8.30 p.m. *Goeben* and *Breslau* in 37° 56' N., 16° 17' E., course N. 63 E., 18 knots, *Breslau* (parted company destination unknown. As your base is probably known it is likely that she will be in your vicinity at daylight. My original intention was to combine with you at daylight but I am going north instead. Owing to Transposed Alphabet having been used to code my 1740 it is probable that the enemy understand it. Do your best. (2120.))

Note.—Words in brackets not logged by *Wolverine* who gives code time 2215.

B 119. R.A., 1st C.S., to *Wolverine* via *Black Prince*.

Position of *Breslau* at 9.50 p.m. 38° 15' N., 16° 34' E., course E.S.E., speed 20 knots, do what you can. (2215.)

Note.—Not logged by *Wolverine*, but note in her W/T log says "1 other sig. from R.A. (which) Capt. D. took." Probably both this and the foregoing signal were correctly received but not logged. *Wolverine's* W/T log shows evidence of having been written up after the event.

B 120. R.A., 1st C.S., to Captain D. (*Wolverine*)

via *Black Prince*. (2230.)

Recd. 1.11 a.m. 7th August.

Position of *Goeben* at 11 p.m. 38° 29' N., 17° 6' E. abeam course S. 73 E. 22 knots. Be careful *Gloucester* and *Dublin*. *Dublin* and 2 T.B.D.'s in company. Endeavour to intercept them.

Note.—From *Wolverine's* W/T log. The signal as sent to *Black Prince* for transmission was as follows:—

Position of *Goeben* 11 p.m. 38° 29' N., 17° 6' E., course S. 73 E., 22 knots. Take care of *Gloucester* and *Dublin* and 2 destroyers in company attempting to intercept them. (2321.)

6th August.

B 121. *Gloucester* to C.-in-C. and R.A., 1st C.S.

Sent 10.34 p.m. (?)

Recd. *Inflexible* 11.15 p.m.

Recd. *Defence* 11.8 p.m.

Intercepted by *Dublin* 10.1 p.m. (?)

Urgent. *Goeben* altering course to southward. (2146.)

Note.—Made on "G" tune owing to jaming on "S."

B 122. *Gloucester* to C.-in-C. and R.A., 1st C.S.

Sent 10.32 p.m.

No time of receipt logged by *Inflexible*.

Recd. *Defence* 11.25 p.m.

Have lost touch with *Breslau* at 10.15 p.m.* who has gone off steering E.S.E. 24 knots. Am shadowing *Goeben*. (2211.)

* *Inflexible's* log has 11.15 p.m.

Note.—(1) See note to previous signal.

(2) Not logged by *Dublin*.

B 123. *Gloucester* to C.-in-C. and R.A., 1st C.S.

Sent 11.37 p.m.

Recd. *Inflexible* 11.57 p.m.

Recd. *Defence* 11.36 p.m.

Goeben's position, course, and speed at 11 p.m. 38° 29' N., 17° 6' E., S. 73 E., 22 knots. (2221.)

Note.—*Dublin* intercepted this but does not log it.

B 124. *Gloucester* to C.-in-C. and R.A., 1st C.S.

Not logged by *Inflexible*.

Recd. *Defence* 11.58 p.m.

Intercepted by *Dublin* 11.55 p.m.

Position 38° 20' N., 17° 21' E., course S. 54 E., enemy's speed 22. (2256.)

B 125. R.A., 1st C.S., to C.-in-C. Recd. 1.15 a.m. 7th August.

(My) position midnight 39° 8' N., 19° 55' E., course south, 15 knots. (2325.)

B 126. *Gloucester* to R.A., 1st C.S., and C.-in-C.

Recd. *Inflexible* 1.9 a.m. 7th August.

Recd. *Defence* 12.37 a.m. 7th August.

Goeben midnight 30° 20' N., 17° 31' E., course S. 54 E., speed 22 knots. (2304.)

Note.—*Dublin* intercepted this signal at 12.40 a.m. but read position of *Goeben* 30° 20' N., 17° 49' E.

B 127. *Dublin* to R.A., 1st C.S. Recd. 12.30 a.m. 7th August.

Expect to meet both enemy's cruisers about 1.00 a.m. 37° 55' N., 14° 18' E. (2320.)

Note.—*Dublin* logs longitude 18° 14' E. which was obviously intended, though 14° 18' E. was made. *Inflexible* does not log this signal. *Gloucester* intercepted this signal but read the time of meeting as 0130.

B 128. C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S. and *Chatham*.

Recd. *Defence* 1.17 a.m. 7th August.

Chatham proceed to position off *Milazzo* to watch if *Goeben* and *Breslau* come back, proceeding 20 knots unless chased. C.-in-C. is going towards *Malta*. (2351.)

6th August.

B 129. *Gloucester* to C.-in-C. Recd. 1.53 a.m. 7th August.
Coal remaining midnight 700. Expenditure at this speed about 350 per day.
(2339.)

7th August.

B 130. *Dublin* to R.A., 1st C.S. Sent 1.30 a.m. Recd. 1.44 a.m.
Have *Breslau* right ahead. Is going to join *Goeben* am following her.
(0030.)

B 131. R.A., 1st C.S., to C.-in-C. Sent 1.55 a.m. Recd. 2.30 a.m.
Goeben is going towards Matapan by last report. (0045.)

B 132. *Dublin* to C.-in-C. and R.A., 1st C.S.
Sent 2.30 a.m.
Recd. *Inflexible* 2.45 a.m.
Recd. *Defence* 2.16 a.m.
My position, course and speed 2 a.m. 37° 48' N., 18° 19' E. *Goeben** right
ahead S. 55° E. 27 knots. (0100.)
* Should be *Breslau*.

B 133. *Gloucester* to C.-in-C. and R.A., 1st C.S.
No time of receipt logged by *Inflexible*.
Recd. *Defence* 2.7 a.m.
Goeben's position 2 a.m. 38° 4' N., 18° 8' E., course S. 54 E. speed 17 knots.
(0104.)

Note.—*Dublin* intercepted this at 2.5 a.m. but logs course south 54
west (probably an error in logging).

B 134. R.A., 1st C.S., to Captain D. Sent 1.57 a.m. Recd. 2.15 a.m.
Join me at once (same course)* 21 knots. (0055.)

* These words were not taken in by *Wolverine*. They refer evidently
to the course of the 1st C.S. which had been passed to Capt. D. at 1.2 a.m.
in a signal with code time 2402 (should be 0002).

B 135. R.A., 1st C.S., to Captain D. (*Wolverine*) via *Black Prince*.
Most urgent. Are you coming? (0140.)
Recd. 3 a.m.
Reply. Recd. 3.35 a.m.

Yes am coming at 21 knots ought to meet you a little before four.
(0200.)

B 136. R.A., 1st C.S., to *Dublin* and *Gloucester*.
Sent 2.54 a.m.
Recd. *Dublin* 2.55 a.m.
Recd. *Gloucester* 2.51 a.m.
1st Cruiser Squadron position 2.30 a.m. 38° 25' N., 20° 0' E., course south,
20 knots. Am endeavouring to cross *Goeben's* bows at 6 a.m. (0140.)

B 137. *Gloucester* to *Dublin*. Recd. 2.57 a.m.
By your 2 a.m.* position you must have *Breslau* ahead we are 24 miles
N. 28 W. from you with *Goeben*. (0141.)

* *Dublin's* log has 0209.

B 137a. *Gloucester* to C.-in-C. and R.A., 1st C.S.
Recd. *Inflexible* 3.8 a.m.
Recd. *Defence* 3.0 a.m.
Dublin seems to be chasing *Breslau* who is rejoining *Goeben*. (0155.)
Note.—*Defence* logs no code time.

7th August.

B 138. *Gloucester* to C.-in-C. and R.A., 1st C.S.
Sent 3.22 a.m.
Recd. *Inflexible* 3.30 a.m.
Recd. *Defence* 3.22 a.m.

Position of *Goeben* at 3 a.m. 37° 55' N., 18° 28' E., course S. 55 E., speed
17 knots. (0216.)

Note.—*Inflexible* does not log *Goeben's* speed.

B 139. R.A., 1st C.S., to *Dublin* and *Gloucester*.
Sent to *Dublin* 4.33 a.m.
Sent to *Gloucester* 4.5 a.m.
Recd. *Dublin* 4.35 a.m.
Recd. *Gloucester* 4.7 a.m.

Am obliged to give up the chase. (0255.)

B 140. *Dublin* to C.-in-C. and R.A., 1st C.S.
Recd. *Inflexible* 4.40 a.m.
Recd. *Defence* 4.28 a.m.

Position 0400, 38° 3' N., 18° 33' E., N. 27 E., 24 knots, chased *Breslau*
S. 55 E. for 1½ hours then turned to attack *Goeben* but failed to find her.
(0310.)

B 141. R.A., 1st C.S., to *Dublin*. Sent 4.8 a.m. Recd. 4.37 a.m.
If you have to retire go behind Zante Island. Have asked C.-in-C. for
instructions. (0310.)

B 142. S.N.O., Malta, to C.-in-C., and R.A., 1st C.S.
Recd. *Defence* 4.42 a.m.
Recd. *Inflexible* 12.24 a.m.
Intercepted *Wolverine* midnight 6-7th August.
Intercepted *Dublin* midnight 6-7th August.

Italian Press Wednesday state Austrian Fleet will leave Pola destination
unknown. Austrian torpedo boat already left probably Fleet is going to
South Adriatic to meet *Goeben*. (2220.)

Note.—*Defence's* log omits the last word "*Goeben*" and has code time
2222. Admiral Troubridge stated in his Report that this signal was
received at 1 a.m.

B 143. R.A., 1st C.S., to C.-in-C. Sent 4.49 a.m. Recd. 5.15 a.m.
Being only able to meet *Goeben* outside the range of our guns and inside
his I have abandoned the chase with my squadron request instructions
for light cruisers. *Goeben* evidently going to Eastern Mediterranean. I had
hoped to have met her before daylight. (0305.)

B 144. R.A., 1st C.S., to *Wolverine*. Recd. 4.16 a.m.
Proceed behind Zante Island at once.

Note.—No code time.

B 145. *Gloucester* to C.-in-C., R.A., 1st C.S.
Recd. *Inflexible* 5.4 a.m.
Recd. *Defence* 4.56 a.m.
Goeben's position at 5 a.m. 37° 42' N., 19° 0' E., course S. 55 E., speed
16 knots. (0356.)

B 146. C.-in-C., to R.A., 1st C.S. Recd. 5.45 a.m.
Are light cruisers in company? (0423.)

Reply. Recd. 6.22 a.m.
Gloucester is following *Goeben*. *Dublin* lost touch with *Breslau* and is now
coming to rejoin me. (0455.)

7th August.

B 147. C.-in-C. to *Gloucester*. Sent 5.32 a.m. Recd. 5.52 a.m.
Gradually drop astern. Do not be captured. (0433.)

B 148. *Dublin* to R.A., 1st C.S., via *Gloucester*.
I lost *Goeben* at 0300 when I came down for my torpedo attack and missed her gave up chase of *Breslau* in 37° 41' N., 18° 38' E., at 2.40 a.m. My position at 5 a.m. is 38° 17' N., 18° 39' E. Course N. 27 E. Speed 15 knots. (0455.)

B 149. C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S. Recd. 7.31 a.m.
Endeavour to make sure *Goeben* has gone to Eastward and not broken back to north or west. (0616.)

Reply. I do not think there is any doubt whatever about it. Her movement up north was a feint. (0650.)

B 150. C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S.
Why did you not continue to cut off *Goeben*. She only going 17 knots, and so important to bring her to action. (0721.)

Note.—(1) Not logged by *Inflexible* or *Defence*. (2) From paper handed in at Court-Martial on Admiral Troubridge. (3) Stated by him to have been received at 8.30 a.m. (local time inferred).

B 151. *Reply.*
With visibility at the time I could have been sighted from twenty to twenty-five miles away and could never have got nearer unless *Goeben* wished to bring me to action which she could have done under circumstances most advantageous to her. I could never have brought her to action. I had hoped to have engaged her at three thirty in the morning in dim light but had gone north first with the object of engaging her in the entrance to the Adriatic.

I was too late to intercept her when she altered course to the southward. In view of the immense importance of victory or defeat for such early stage of a war I would consider it a great imprudence to place squadron in such a position as to be picked off at leisure and sunk while unable to effectively reply. The decision is not the easiest of the two to make I am well aware. (1345.)

Note.—See Notes (1) and (2) above. Stated to have been dispatched at 6 p.m. (? local time.)

B 152. R.A., 1st C.S., to C.-in-C. Recd. 8.30 a.m.
In view of news about Italy I must give destroyers sufficient coal to get to Malta in case of necessity. (0654.)

Reply.—Approved if no collier arrives. I have no news about Italians. (0747.)

B 153. R.A., 1st C.S., to 1st C.S. and Destroyers
Made by visual, 9.4 a.m.
Wolverine is to be given 27 tons (of coal), *Scorpion* 17, *Renard* 25, *Foxhound* 25, *Mosquito* 36, *Raccoon* 20, *Basilisk* 22. (0752.)

B 154. *Gloucester* to C.-in-C. and R.A., 1st C.S.
Recd. *Inflexible* 9.5 a.m.
Recd. *Defence* 8.53 a.m.
Position of *Goeben* 8 a.m. 37° 17' N., 20° 0' E. Course S. 55 E., Steaming 18 knots. *Gloucester* following astern 15 miles. (0753.)

Note.—*Defence* has code time 0735.

7th August.

B 155. R.A., 1st C.S., to *Dublin*. Recd. 8.35 a.m.
Join me to the southward of Zante Island. (0715.)

Recd. *Inflexible* 10.45 a.m.
Recd. *Defence* 10.35 a.m.

B 156. *Gloucester* to C.-in-C. and R.A., 1st C.S.
Breslau is just rejoining *Goeben*. (0934.)

B 157. C.-in-C. to *Gloucester* Sent 11.31 a.m. Recd. 11.35 a.m.
Be very careful rounding the Cape. (1027.)

B 158. C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S. Recd. 1.3 p.m.
Watch on Adriatic to be maintained. *Dublin* will be required to relieve *Chatham* to-morrow northern entrance of Messina therefore coal should not be taken out of her, further orders will be sent. *Gloucester* will rejoin you and must be coaled the first opportunity. (1135.)

B 159. R.A., 1st C.S., to *Wolverine*. Made by visual 1.30 p.m.
Close *Defence* with T.B.D.'s outside 15 knots. (1200.)

B 160. *Black Prince* to R.A., 1st C.S. Made by visual, 2 p.m.
Submit *Foxhound* is 17 tons short, *Basilisk* 7 tons short of the amounts mentioned in signal 0752 to-day. Request Captain "D" be informed. (1250.)

B 161. R.A., 1st C.S., to *Black Prince*. Made by visual 2.40 p.m.
Why were not the full amounts given to destroyers? (1339.)

Reply. Submit both destroyers left *Black Prince* on observing signal for all destroyers to close *Defence* at 15 knots. (1342.)

B 162. R.A., 1st C.S., to *Wolverine*. Made by visual 2.55 p.m.
Withdraw T.B.D.'s return to your base. (1355.)

B 163. *Gloucester* to R.A., 1st C.S. and C.-in-C.
Sent 12.28 p.m.
Recd. *Inflexible* 1.45 p.m.
Recd. *Defence* 12.53 p.m.

Noon position of *Goeben* is 36° 36' N., 21° 35' E., *Breslau* 36° 42' N., 21° 23' E., course S. 55 E., 20 knots. *Gloucester* 20 miles astern of *Goeben* and ten miles astern of *Breslau*. (1149.)

B 164. *Dublin* to C.-in-C. Not logged by *Inflexible*.
Goeben has passed to W/T station at Athens a coded message to Bowalar, Constantinople and signed *Goeben*. (1205.)

B 165. C.-in-C. to *Gloucester*. Recd. 1.47 p.m.
What is your position now? Do not go further than Cape Matapan then turn back and rejoin Rear-Admiral. (1251.)

B 166. *Gloucester* to C.-in-C. Recd. 2.45 p.m.
Have engaged at long range with *Breslau* and retreated when *Goeben* turned. I am now following again. (1322.)

B 167. *Gloucester* to C.-in-C. and R.A., 1st C.S.
Recd. *Inflexible* 5.12 p.m.
4 p.m. enemy's ships in Cervi Channel steering east 15 knots, I am off Cape Matapan and returning N. 55 W., 15 knots. (1542.)

B 168. R.A., 1st C.S., to *Dublin* for destroyers.
Made by visual 4.37 p.m.
Join *Wolverine* at Vasilico Bay inside Cape Dukato Santa Maura.
(C2859)

7th August.

B 169. A.S., Malta, to R.A., 1st C.S. Recd. 9.34 p.m.
Collier *Trewyn* left Malta with 2,000 tons Welsh coal 8.45 p.m. due at Port Vathi, Ithaca, about 5 p.m. Sunday 9th August (2016.)

B 170. C.-in-C. to Meditn. Fleet. Recd. *Defence* 5 a.m., 8th August.
Note all position signals are to state time, this is always to be G.M.T. (1620.)
Note.—Not logged by *Inflexible*.

B 171. C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S. Recd. midnight 7/8 Aug.
Leaving midnight with 3 B.C.'s *Weymouth* 14 knots for Sapienza Light. Report when *Gloucester* coaled. Opinion seems war between Austria and Italy. Germans beaten by Belgians at Liège. (2224.)

8th August.

B 172. R.A., 1st C.S., to C.-in-C. Sent 5.47 a.m.
Captain "D" reports must have parent ship soon. Will *Blenheim* be sent? I am obliged to nurse them now six days without coal. *Gloucester* joining. (0415.)

B 173. C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S., and S.N.O., Malta.
Recd. *Defence* 6.36 a.m.
Blenheim is to land sixteen 21 in. torpedoes and then proceed with all despatch to join R.A., 1st C.S., at Santa Maura. (0524.)

B 174. C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S. Recd. 7.3 a.m.
Collier *Vesuvio* left Malta 3 p.m. on 6th August and Collier *Trewyn* on August 7th. *Paddington* left Port Said 11 p.m. on August 5th speed 7½ knots. All for Port Vathi. Collier *Petros* arranged direct by R.A., 1st C.S., with Minister of Athens. (0553.)

B 175. C.-in-C. to S.N.O., Malta. Sent 7.13 a.m.
Ask French Consul to Cable Bizerta to request French Admiral to order *Savage*, *Rattlesnake*, *Pincher* to return to Malta immediately, cable also yourself. (0603.)

B 176. R.A., 1st C.S., to *Black Prince*. Made by visual 8.45 a.m.
Collier *Vesuvio* due noon to-day off St. Maura from Malta. *Black Prince* proceed at 18 knots as far as Long. 19° 20' and report if seen. *General* is an armed merchant ship supposed to have left Messina last night fully armed. (0415.)

B 177. *Gloucester* to Adty., C.-in-C., Meditn., A.S., Malta, S.N.O., Gib.
Arrived Zaverda. (0736.)

B 178. *Gloucester* to R.A., 1st C.S. Recd. 9.31 a.m.
As *Vesuvio* ordered Vathi due about 6 p.m. shall I go there or remain? (0816)

B 179. R.A., 1st C.S., to *Black Prince*. Sent 9.39 a.m.
Proceed to 10 miles off Cape Dukato, if collier is there send her to Zaverda. (0828.)

B 180. R.A., 1st C.S., to *Gloucester*. Sent 10.42 a.m.
Your 0186. Remain Zaverda. *Black Prince* is ordering her to Zaverda. (0911.)

8th August.

B 180a. R.A., 1st C.S., to C.-in-C. Sent 10.7 a.m.
If all ships kept G.M.T., signals would be much more accurate. There has been much confusion of times. (0859.)

Reply. Your 0715* and 0859. No change in procedure. (0939.)
* Suggesting that signals to destroyers should be coded in Emergency Vocabulary instead of Transport Alphabet.

B 181. C.-in-C. to *Chatham*, S.N.O., Malta.
Chatham proceed to Malta 20 knots through Messina Straits. Warn *Harpy*. Complete with coal with all despatch. (0823.)

Reply. Arrive Malta 5.30 p.m. (0845.)

B 182. R.A., 1st C.S., to *Black Prince*. Sent 11.21 a.m.
Now appears collier ordered Port Vathi Ithaca. Proceed to the south of Cephalonia to find her and order her to Zaverda. She is due off Cape Skinari about noon. (1018.)

B 183. R.A., 1st C.S., to *Gloucester* and *Black Prince*. Sent 2.15 p.m.
Proceed instantly to Navarin with all ships and destroyers and collier. War with Austria. (1304.)

Note.—Not logged by *Gloucester*.

B 184. R.A., 1st C.S., to *Black Prince*. Sent 2.36 p.m.
Rejoin me 10 miles west of Dukato. Look out for Austrian destroyers. (1315.)

B 185. C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S. Sent 2.58 p.m.
Urgent. First Cruiser Squadron and *Gloucester* rejoin C.-in-C. My position 1330 G.M.T., 36° 16' N., 18° 42' E., N. 16 E., 16 knots. (1335.)

B 186. C.-in-C. to S.N.O., Malta. Sent 2.58 p.m.
Recall *Blenheim*. (1337.)

B 187. C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S., *Gloucester*, *Wolverine*. Sent 3 p.m.
Gloucester, 1st and 2nd Division Destroyers, *Beagle* and *Bulldog* rejoin C.-in-C. passing south of Cephalonia. Leave collier Ithaca. My position at 1330 G.M.T., 36° 16' N., 18° 42' E., N. 16 E., 16 knots. (1354.)

B 188. *Black Prince* to R.A., 1st C.S. Recd. 3.34 p.m.
Your 1315*. Will be at rendezvous at 5 p.m., have (not)** sighted collier. (1430.)

Note.—* Ordering her to join R.A. 10 miles west of Dukato.

** Signal as decoded in *Defence* read "have sighted collier," the word "not" was inserted some hours later in *Defence's* log.

B 189. R.A., 1st C.S., to *Black Prince*. Sent 3.52 p.m.
Rejoin me at high speed. (1435.)

B 190. *Gloucester* to C.-in-C. Recd. 4.16 p.m.
Urgent. Second Division destroyers in company with me have from 24-40 tons of coal. They cannot leave these waters without coaling. (1458.)

B 191. C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S., *Gloucester*, *Dublin*. Sent 4.45 p.m.
Recd. *Defence* 4.46 p.m.
Cancel previous orders to R.A., *Gloucester* and destroyers. Stop where you are *Dublin* watch mouth of Adriatic. (1522.)

8th August

B 192. C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S. Sent 4.52 p.m.
1st C.S. proceed off Cape Dukato and await further orders. Look out for collier *Vesuvio*. (1541.)

B 193. C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S. Sent 5.2 p.m.
Unless collier is in sight you are to arrange to coal destroyers from your ships. (1554.)

B 194. C.-in-C. to *Gloucester*. Sent 5.16 p.m. Recd. 5.19 p.m.
Retain sufficient coal to return to Malta at 15 knots and give as much as possible to destroyers. (1607.)

B 195. C.-in-C. to S.N.O., Malta. Sent 5.30 p.m.
Retain *Erato*. (1619.)

B 196. C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S. Sent 5.40 p.m.
In the event of war (with) Austria be prepared each ship take one destroyer in tow, others who have coaled to accompany and proceed best speed to Malta. (1626.)

B 197. *Black Prince* to R.A., 1st C.S. Recd. 5.19 p.m.
My position at 4.30 p.m. ship's time 38° 32' N., 20° 29' E., cannot see anything of collier. *Wolverine* reports same. (1600.)

B 198. R.A., 1st C.S. to C.-in-C. Sent 5.43 p.m. Recd. 6 p.m.
My position at 5 p.m. 38° 45' N., 19° 50' E., course S. 62 E., 10 knots. Have sent *Dublin* to watch Adriatic entrance. *Vesuvio* has been sighted near Cephalonia. Have ordered *Gloucester* and destroyers to coal. Is preference to be given to *Gloucester* and destroyers? Latter are very short of coal. (1614.)

B 199. C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S. Sent 5.52 p.m. Recd. 5.50 p.m.
Report immediately which destroyers can go to Malta without coaling. (1644.)

B 200. *Black Prince* to R.A., 1st C.S. Recd. by visual 6.26 p.m.
Submit I saw nothing of collier or any other ships since leaving your flag this morning. In view of your 1435 I was unable to look into port Vathi, but there was nothing in Gulf of Molo. (1750.)

B 201. R.A., 1st C.S., to C.-in-C. Sent 7.32 p.m.
Wolverine reported at 2.27 chasing a foreign two funnelled destroyer at noon steering N.W. This was received just after Admiralty 371. All my squadron chased to cut off. I have not been able to get *Wolverine* on W/T since, nor to find her and ceased the chase on receipt of your 1335. Your 1644. *Reply*—none, the maximum coal in any destroyer is 40 tons. (1710.)

B 202. C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S., and *Gloucester*
Recd. *Defence* 6.27 p.m.
Recd. *Gloucester* 6.33 p.m.
Gloucester is to proceed Malta as fast as coal will allow. Will reinforce you with *Weymouth* if necessary. My position at 1700 G.M.T., 36° 58' N., 18° 52' E., course N. by E. $\frac{1}{2}$ E., 6 knots. (1714.)

B 203. *Gloucester* to R.A., 1st C.S. Sent 6.37 p.m. Recd. 6.30 p.m.
Your 1555.* My orders from C.-in-C. I am giving coal to destroyers in Zaverda Bay. Have heard nothing of *Wolverine*. (1722.)

* Ordering her to continue coaling as previously arranged and report position.

8th August.

B 204. C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S. Sent 6.55 p.m.
Austrian situation critical. *Weymouth* reinforces you. Dispose destroyers to protect others while coaling. (1747.)

B 205. R.A., 1st C.S., to C.-in-C. Sent 7.15 p.m. Recd. 7.35 p.m.
My 1614. Negative collier having been sighted. Mistake made in coding. (1745.)

B 206. R.A., 1st C.S., to *Gloucester*. Sent 8.13 p.m. Recd. 8.17 p.m.
Look or send into Port Vathi and see if collier is there. (1755.)

B 207. C.-in-C. to S.N.O., Malta. Sent 7.7 p.m.
Immediately *Chatham* is coaled she is to be ready to leave with *Blenheim* for Santa Maura at *Blenheim's* best speed. Not to sail without orders. If time permits *Blenheim* to embark twelve 72-lb. mine cases and materials for fitting half of them as extemporised mines. This is not to delay *Blenheim*. (1748.)

B 208. R.A., 1st C.S., to C.-in-C.
Your 1626. Ambiguous. In event of war with Austria am I to proceed with destroyers to Malta or am I only to be prepared to do so? (1815.)

B 209. C.-in-C., to R.A., 1st C.S. Sent 7.50 p.m.
No time of receipt logged by *Defence*.
Intercepted by *Gloucester* 8.22 p.m.
First Cruiser Squadron proceed Malta without delay with destroyers towing as requisite. Continue giving me your position and I will get north of you to-morrow Sunday. (1914.)

B 210. C.-in-C. to *Chatham*.
French Admiral has been asked to send a cruiser to assist you in watching for German ships. (1826.)

B 211. R.A., 1st C.S., to C.-in-C. Recd. 10 p.m.
Your 2006.* I am trying to order destroyers to assemble at 0300 G.M.T. at Zante when I will take in tow. (2031.)

* Ordering R.A. to collect destroyers and proceed to Malta.

B 212. C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S. and *Weymouth*.
Before joining R.A. 1st C.S. in the morning *Weymouth* is to make certain by daylight that collier *Vesuvio* is not off Cape Dukato or in Port Vathi Ithaca. (2123.)

B 213. C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S.
Would it be easier and quicker for you to give destroyers coal before starting? (2154.)

B 214. R.A., 1st C.S., to C.-in-C.
Am getting up 60 tons of coal in each ship ready to coal destroyers. (2225.)

9th August.

B 215. C.-in-C. to *Weymouth*.
Search very carefully for collier *Vesuvio*. (0216.)

B 216. C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S.
Continue giving as much coal as possible to destroyers. Do not sail until further orders. *Weymouth* looking for *Vesuvio*. Wind too strong here for towing. My P.C. and S. 4 a.m. 37° 19' N., 19° 33' E., N. 59 E., 12 knots. (0338.)

9th August.

B 217. R.A., 1st C.S., to C.-in-C. Recd. 5.50 a.m.
Arrived Zante. Destroyers coming along side. (0400.)

B 218. R.A., 1st C.S., to C.-in-C. Recd. 8.19 a.m.
At 8 a.m. G.M.T. all destroyers will have 70 tons of coal except *Beagle*. Submit to stop when *Beagle* has 70 she requires 35 more. Cruisers all over 1,200 tons of coal short and speed reduced owing difficulty of trimming. Rest is required by the crews of ships and destroyers. (0645.)

Reply. Your 0645. Give all destroyers sufficient coal to return Malta 15 knots with a margin. Report when this is done. (0739.)

B 219. R.A., 1st C.S., to C.-in-C. Sent 10.2 a.m.
Your 0739. All destroyers completed with sufficient coal to return to Malta at 15 knots with a margin. Am getting under weigh. (0836.)

B 220. C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S. Sent 11.8 a.m.
Your 0836. Send destroyers under easy steam to anchor at Port Vathi or near neighbourhood. Tell Captain "D" keep a good look-out for colliers and coal immediately any arrive, constantly altering his base. After searching for collier *Weymouth* is to remain near destroyers for the present. 1st C.S. remain within 10 miles west of Vardiani Island Cephalonia till further orders. (0929.)

B 221. *Weymouth* to C.-in-C. Recd. 11.24 a.m.
Collier *Vesuvio* anchored in Port Vathi. (1015.)

B 222. C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S. and *Weymouth*. Sent 11.45 a.m.
Send destroyers at once to Port Vathi Ithaca to coal. Captain "D" is not to commence patrolling Adriatic until another collier arrives. R.A. look out for *Trewin* due this evening. (1033.)

B 223. C.-in-C. to S.N.O., Malta. Sent 12.22 p.m.
Cancel *Erato* sailing orders. Send her to Port Vathi Ithaca. Inform R.A., 1st C.S. time of sailing and arrival. Hold *Camarato* in readiness for battle cruisers. (1107.)

B 224. *Weymouth* to C.-in-C. and R.A., 1st C.S.
Collier *Vesuvio* arrived Vathi 1400 Saturday* . . . (1215.)
* 8th August.

B 225. *Weymouth* to C.-in-C. Recd. 12.44 p.m.
Collier *Vesuvio* has 960 tons of coal. (1138.)

B 226. C.-in-C. to S.N.O., Malta. Sent 12.53 p.m.
Chatham and *Blenheim* are to proceed when ready as previously ordered in 1748 of 8th August. (1253.)

B 227. C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S. Sent 1.58 p.m.
Sighted *Trewyn* and ordered her to Ithaca. Detail one of your squadron proceed at once coal from her at any convenient anchorage. (1222.)

B 228. C.-in-C. to R.A., 1st C.S. Sent 3.30 p.m. Recd. 3.20 p.m.
Leaving for east with battle cruisers and *Weymouth*. Take charge of patrol Adriatic you know of colliers arriving coal your cruisers *Chatham* and *Blenheim* (ordered Ithaca (1409)).

Note.—The words "ordered Ithaca" and code time were not taken in by *Defence*.

APPENDIX C.

FOREIGN OFFICE LETTER OF 22 NOV., 1912, EXPLAINING
THE UNDERSTANDING (BUT NOT AGREEMENT) BETWEEN
GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE BEFORE AUGUST, 1914.

(On 30th July, 1914, the French Ambassador reminded Sir E. Grey, the Foreign Secretary, of this letter saying that the peace of Europe was never more seriously threatened than it was now. The letter is given as an enclosure to letter 105, Collected Diplomatic Documents relating to the Outbreak of the European War, F.O. official book 1915).

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London.

Foreign Office,
22nd November, 1912.

My dear Ambassador,

From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a Third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

Yours, etc.

E. GREY.

Secret.

APPENDIX D.

WAR PLANS FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN STATION.

1. Deleted.
2. Deleted.
3. Deleted. (War Plans by C.-in-C., Mediterranean, 4th April, 1914.)
4. Deleted. (Telegram, Admiralty to C.-in-C., Mediterranean 183, 30.7.14.)

APPENDIX E.

CONVENTION OF 6TH AUGUST, 1914.

(Translation).

Memorandum of Agreements made between the British Admiralty and the French Naval General Staff. (M.05148/14).

It has been agreed between the British Admiralty and the French Minister of Marine, as represented by the Assistant Chief of the Naval General Staff, as follows:—

(i) Outside the Channel (for which the special agreements already come to remain in force) and the Mediterranean, the general direction of the naval operations will be in the hands of the British Admiralty, and the French Naval forces outside these two areas will be placed entirely under the orders of the British Senior Naval Officers.

(ii) In the Mediterranean the general direction of operations will be in the hands of the French. So long as the *Goeben* and *Breslau* are not destroyed or captured, the British naval forces at present in the Mediterranean will co-operate with the French fleet in their destruction or capture. When this operation has been completed the three English Battle Cruisers and two or three of the Armoured Cruisers will be released for general service, except in the event of Italy abandoning her neutrality. The following British forces in the Mediterranean, *viz.*, one or two Armoured Cruisers, four Light Cruisers, 16 Destroyers, and the Torpedo Craft forming the local defences of Malta and Gibraltar, will be placed under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the French Fleet. Malta and Gibraltar will serve as bases for the French Forces.

(iii) The French Fleet will undertake throughout the Mediterranean the protection of British and French commerce. In particular, it will operate against the Austrian Naval forces if war is declared between Austria and France, and will in any case ensure a strict watch over the mouth of the Adriatic. It will also watch the exit of the Suez Canal and the Straits of Gibraltar, and will prevent the entrance into the Mediterranean of enemy cruisers or auxiliary cruisers.

In order to facilitate the co-operation of the two Admiralties, rapid and safe communication between the French Ministry of Marine at Paris and the British Admiralty in London will be established by a direct telegraph line, and the two Admiralties will daily exchange all news in regard to operations.

When the transport of British troops across the Channel has been completed the French Naval forces employed in protecting such transports (with the exception of local defence flotillas) will remain at the disposition of the British Admiralty and may be employed in accordance with the Admiralty's plans of operations.

(*Sd.*) LOUIS BATTENBERG,
First Sea Lord.

(*Sd.*) A. SCHWERER,
*Assistant Chief of the General Staff
of the French Navy.*

London,
6th August, 1914.

(Copy of Translation.)

10th August, 1914.

Your Excellency,

I entirely share your view as to the Naval dispositions to be observed by our fleet in the Mediterranean. Orders have consequently been given, as you already know, and by the time this letter reaches you, Admiral Lapeyrère, with Battleships and Cruisers, will be at Malta ready to co-operate with your vessels. In this way we shall have a force sufficient to deal with the Austrian fleet while your Battle Cruisers are following the *Goeben* and *Breslau*.

Yours very sincerely,
(*Sd.*) VICTOR AUGAGNEUR.

APPENDIX F.

Secret.

I.8075.

BRITISH, FRENCH AND ITALIAN NAVAL CONVENTION.

(M. 03553/15.)

CONVENTION NAVALE.

En exécution de l'Article 3 du Mémorandum Italien signé à Londres le 26 Avril et dont les termes sont rappelés ci-après.

ARTICLE 3.

“ Les Flottes de la France et de la Grande Bretagne donneront leur concours actif et permanent à l'Italie jusqu'à la destruction de la Flotte Austro-Hongroise ou jusqu'à la conclusion de la paix.

“ Une Convention Navale sera immédiatement conclue, à cet effet, entre la France, la Grande Bretagne et l'Italie.”

La Convention Navale suivante a été passée à Paris entre les représentants des trois Amirautés intéressées :

ARTICLE PREMIER.

Les Flottes Alliées coopéreront ensemble avec le plus grand accord.

ARTICLE 2.

Il sera constitué, sous le Commandement du Commandant en Chef de l'Armée Navale Italienne, une Première Flotte Alliée qui sera composée, indépendamment des unités italiennes :

1°—De douze contre-torpilleurs français ;

2°—D'autant de torpilleurs, de sous-marins et de navires spéciaux dragueurs de mines qu'il sera possible au Commandant en Chef de l'Armée Navale Française de détacher :

- 3°—Si possible, d'une escadrille d'avions et d'un navire porte-avions Français ;
- 4°—De quatre croiseurs légers anglais, qui rallieront la Première Flotte Alliée dès qu'ils seront numériquement remplacés par quatre croiseurs français aux Dardanelles ;
- 5°—D'une Division de quatre cuirassés anglais à la disposition du Commandant en Chef Italien.

ARTICLE 3.

Le Commandant en Chef de l'Armée Navale Italienne aura l'initiative et la direction complète des opérations qui seront exécutées dans l'Adriatique par la Flotte Alliée indiquée à l'Article 2.

ARTICLE 4.

En vue des éventualités qui imposeraient à la Flotte Alliée indiquée à l'Article 2 de se porter dans le Nord de l'Adriatique, ou pour toute opération importante dans l'Adriatique paraissant nécessiter l'intervention de l'ensemble des forces navales Alliées, il sera constitué une Seconde Flotte Alliée composée des Vaisseaux de combat Français, des Vaisseaux de combat Italiens ou Anglais dont n'aurait pas disposé le Commandant en Chef de l'Armée Navale Italienne.

Cette Seconde Flotte Alliée, accompagnée de ses bâtiments de flotille et placée sous le Commandement du Commandant en Chef de l'Armée Navale Française, sera prête à répondre à l'appel du Commandant en Chef de la Flotte Italienne.

ARTICLE 5.

Toutes les bases de la côte Italienne seront mises à la disposition des Alliés.

Toutefois, lorsque la Première Flotte Alliée aura Brindisi comme base, la Seconde Flotte Alliée utilisera de préférence les bases de Tarente, de Malte et de Bizerte.

Si la Première Flotte Alliée remonte dans le Nord avec Venise comme base, la place de Brindisi ainsi que celle de Tarente seront à la disposition de la Seconde Flotte Alliée.

ARTICLE 6.

Tant qu'il y aura des forces navales ennemies dans l'Adriatique les Alliés s'engagent à assurer leur concours à l'Armée Navale Italienne, de façon à maintenir, autant que possible, la puissance navale Alliée nettement supérieure à celle de l'ennemi.

ARTICLE 7.

En vue de combiner leur action, les Commandants en Chef, se tenant en rapports de tous les instants, se communiqueront leurs plans d'action, leurs positions, les résultats des opérations, les renseignements sur l'ennemi et tous documents utiles à l'œuvre commune.

Pour réaliser plus étroitement cette union, chaque Commandant en Chef accrédiitera auprès de l'autre un ou plusieurs officiers de son Etat-Major.

Il est entendu que la première disposition à prendre est la constitution d'un code de signaux secrets pour les communications des Flottes Alliées entre elles. Ce travail sera exécuté à Londres.

Fait à Paris, le 10 mai, 1915.

Pour la Marine Italienne :	Pour la Marine Française :	Pour la Marine Britannique :
(signé) Mario Grassi, Capitano di Vascello.	(signé) F. de Jonquières, Vice-Amiral.	(signé) H. B. Jackson, Amiral.

Ont pris part aux délibérations :—

L'Amiral Sir Henry Bradwardine Jackson, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., F.R.S.,
Le Vice-Amiral Sir Douglas Austin Gamble, K.C.V.O.,
Le Capitaine de Vaisseau M. H. Hodges, M.V.O.,
Le Capitaine de Vaisseau H. W. Richmond,
Représentants de l'Amirauté Britannique.
Le Capitaine de Vaisseau Grassi.
Le Lieutenant de Vaisseau Leone,
Représentants de la Marine Royale Italienne.
Le Vice-Amiral de Fauque de Jonquières, Chef d'Etat-Major Général, p. i.
Le Capitaine de Vaisseau Salaun, Chef de Cabinet du Ministre de la Marine,
Représentants de la Marine Française.

Monsieur le Capitaine de Frégate Dmitrieff de la Marine Impériale Russe assistait aux séances de la conférence.

Ont signé la Convention Navale :—

Le Capitaine de Vaisseau Grassi.
Le Vice-Amiral de Fauque de Jonquières, Chef d'Etat-Major Général p. i.
L'Amiral Sir Henry Bradwardine Jackson, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., F.R.S.

CODICILLE.

A LA CONVENTION NAVALE ENTRE LES REPRESENTANTS DES PUISSANCES ALLIÉS.

I.—Les 12 contre-torpilleurs français qui doivent être mis à la disposition du Commandant en Chef de l'Armée Navale Italienne comprendront 6 bâtiments chauffant au charbon et 6 chauffant au pétrole.

Autant que possible les 6 contre-torpilleurs chauffant au pétrole auront un déplacement supérieur à 600 tonnes.

II.—Le nombre de sous-marins français qui doivent être mis à la disposition du Commandant en Chef de l'Armée Navale Italienne sera de 6 au moins.

III.—Les contre-torpilleurs et sous-marins français indiqués aux paragraphes I et II ci-dessus seront envoyés à la disposition du Commandant en Chef de l'Armée Navale Italienne dès qu'il le demandera au Commandant en Chef de l'Armée Navale Française.

IV.—Le nombre de croiseurs français aux Dardanelles sera le plus tôt possible porté à quatre.

V.—Dès que chaque croiseur français arrivera aux Dardanelles un croiseur léger anglais quittera les eaux des Dardanelles pour rejoindre le plus tôt possible l'Armée Navale Italienne.

VI.—Le nombre de cuirassés français aux Dardanelles sera le plus tôt possible porté à six.

VII.—Quatre cuirassés anglais de l'Escadre des Dardanelles, armés autant que possible de canons de 305 mm., seront mis le plus tôt possible à la disposition du Commandant en Chef de l'Armée Navale Italienne.

Ces cuirassés quitteront successivement les Dardanelles à mesure qu'y arriveront les derniers des six cuirassés français.

VIII.—Une escadrille française de six hydroavions sera dirigée le plus tôt possible sur Modane et Venise.

Fait à Paris le dix mai mil neuf cent quinze.

Pour la Marine Italienne :	Pour la Marine Française :	Pour la Marine Anglaise :
(signé) Grassi.	(signé) F. de Jonquières, Vice-Amiral.	(signé) Douglas A. Gamble.

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
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THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.



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				"	2. German Cruiser Squadron in Pacific.
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C.B. 917(A)	..	Vol. II	..	"	5. Cameroons, 1914.
				"	10. East Africa, to July, 1915.
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