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NAVAL STAFF MONOGRAPHS
(HISTORICAL)

FLEET ISSUE.

VOLUME V.

THE EASTERN SQUADRONS, 1914.

April, 1922.

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S. 604. (Established—August, 1924.)

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THE FIRST AUSTRALASIAN CONVOY, 1914

INTRODUCTION

The first Australasian Convoy, 1914, was a significant event in the history of the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand. It was the first time that a large number of troops from both countries were transported together to the Western Front in Europe. The convoy was organized by the Australian and New Zealand Governments and was a major achievement in the logistics of the war.

THE FIRST AUSTRALASIAN CONVOY, 1914

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AUSTRALASIAN CONVOY,

1914.

THE FIRST AUSTRALASIAN CONVOY, 1914.¹

INTRODUCTION.

The arrangements for the escort of the Australasian convoy and its voyage from Sydney to Suez were contemporary with a long period of anxiety in Eastern waters and occupied a considerable part of the Admiralty's attention during the first few months of the war. The convoy has, therefore, seemed a suitable subject for a monograph, though it is realised that a detailed story of it will bring about a certain amount of repetition of matter which must also appear in monographs treating of the stations through which it passed.²

This may not be thought a great disadvantage, since here, events are viewed as they affected the convoy, while in the other monographs the convoy is considered only in the effect it had upon station arrangements. Thus two different view-points are presented from which to assess the effect of intelligence or the complications bound to arise from conflicting demands upon Naval force.

Sources.—The telegrams, reports and other documents concerning the Australasian Convoy have been collected and bound by the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence; these volumes are titled³ H.S. 1 and H.S. 2, and consist together of over 650 leaves. The arrangements made by the Transport Department are to be found in the volumes T.3340/15 and T.11209/14 dealing with the Australian and New Zealand Expeditionary Forces separately.

References.—An appendix of telegrams has been added, and references to this is in footnotes beginning with the letter A. Telegrams quoted verbatim in the text are not given in the Appendix.

No references are given for movements of H.M. Ships or for Intelligence Reports; the former are taken from the logs, and the Intelligence Reports are to be found in a summarised form in a Return called "Disposition of German, Austrian, and Italian Ships," issued by the Intelligence Division throughout the war.

THE FIRST AUSTRALASIAN CONVOY, 1914.

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¹ Slightly abridged from C.B. 926.

² For example see pp. 58-103 of this volume.

³ For the meaning of the word "titled" see p. 31.

THE FIRST AUSTRALASIAN CONVOY, AUGUST TO NOVEMBER, 1914.

CHAPTER I.

THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

The threat of war between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente roused great enthusiasm in all British Dominions and Colonies, nowhere more than in Australia and New Zealand. On July 31, 1914, a resolution was passed in the New Zealand Parliament which stated that New Zealand was prepared to send her utmost quota of help in support of the Empire; and on August 3 the Commonwealth of Australia offered to despatch an Expeditionary Force of 20,000 men of any desired composition to any destination indicated by the Home Government.¹

War with Germany was declared on August 4. Next day a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence (with Admiral Sir Henry B. Jackson in the Chair) was appointed by the Prime Minister to consider combined operations against the German Colonies; their first decision was to invite the Governments of Australia and New Zealand to undertake the seizure of the German wireless and cable stations in the Pacific. Australia was accordingly asked to take New Guinea, Yap and Nauru, while New Zealand was to seize Samoa, in addition to sending to Europe the Expeditionary Forces they had offered. The seizure of these German possessions is described in C.B. 917, Naval Staff Monographs (Fleet issue), Vol. I, No. 2; they will be mentioned here only in so far as they affect the transport home of the forces intended for the main theatre of war. Australia's contingent was one division and one light horse brigade, ready in four to six weeks, while New Zealand would have 8,270 men and 3,838 horses ready to embark in four weeks' time. As the ships in which the troops would be transported were chiefly those employed in the frozen meat trade it was decided that they should also bring a full cargo of mutton and other home goods for private shippers.²

To the Admiralty the provision of escort for so large a body of troops was a serious question, particularly in view of the fact that the small expeditions in the Pacific would require for some

¹ H.S. 1, Sc. 20.

² C.I.D. Paper 114-C; H.S. 1, pp. 25, 32.

weeks all the Naval force on the station. The matter was not immediately urgent since the contingents for home were not ready; and by careful adjustment both services could be managed. As soon as the *Encounter*, *Sydney* and *Melbourne* had completed their duty of supporting the Australian Expedition to New Guinea they could return to take up the escort of the convoy for Europe, and on August 13 it was considered by the Admiralty that they would be available in good time.¹

The preparation of the New Zealand force proceeded more rapidly than had been anticipated, and on August 14 the Governor announced that it could start on the 27th if the necessity was urgent.² Ten ships had been chartered,³ nine of which plied normally in the cold storage trade.

The Australian Contingent also was making rapid progress and the Governor-General of the Commonwealth, influenced probably by the fact that no enemy had been active in Australian waters, on the 18th telegraphed:—

In about a week it is proposed to start horses in slow ships, other ships following as soon as they are ready. Is it considered necessary to have a convoy?

This proposition was almost identical with that made about the same time by the Canadian Government, who also wished to send their troopships one by one as soon as ready; it received the same reply to the effect that the transports must leave in one convoy, the date of its departure to depend on Naval opportunity. There were German war vessels in the waters through which the Australian transports would pass, and until these were hunted away the convoy could not leave unescorted.⁴ The *Königsberg* and some liners possibly armed were known to be in the western part of the Indian Ocean. In the Pacific Ocean the chief danger was from the German Cruiser Squadron commanded by Admiral Von Spee. His most powerful units, the two armoured cruisers *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, had not been located since the outbreak of war, but were thought to be together in the Marshall Islands. They had over 20,000 tons of coal afloat, which gave them a very large radius of action. Intelligence had been received that the light cruiser *Emden* had left Tsingtau with four colliers on August 4, and she had not since been reported. Another light cruiser, the *Leipzig*, had coaled at San Francisco on August 17, while the third light cruiser, *Nürnberg*, was thought to be accompanying the German Admiral. The gunboats of the German squadron were all at Tsingtau or up rivers in China, and did not enter into the

¹ See Appendix A.1. The vessels mentioned in this monograph are described in C.B. 917 (Vol. I of this issue).

² A. 2.

³ *Maunganui*, *Tahiti*, *Arawa*, *Athenic*, *Waimana*, *Star of India*, *Hawkes Bay*, *Ruapehu*, *Orari*, *Limerick*. H.S. 1, pp. 49, 51.

⁴ A. 3. H.S. 1, p. 82e.

question, but close to Australian waters was the gunboat *Geier*, which had last been heard of in the Makassar Straits on August 5.¹

The supply of a suitable escort was a difficult matter. The Samoa Expedition, under the escort of three "P" Class cruisers, *Psyche*, *Philomel*, and *Pyramus*, was halfway to Noumea, where it was to be met by the *Australia* and *Melbourne*, which were to join the expedition and to take it on to Samoa, while the *Sydney* was at Port Moresby in charge of the transports and auxiliaries of the New Guinea Expedition. Until Samoa should have been occupied none of these ships could be available to escort the New Zealand and Australian Contingents for home, and the earliest date for which escort could be arranged was estimated to be September 14.

The route recommended by the Admiralty was to be—Wellington 1,860 miles to Port Adelaide, where the Australian Contingent should join up, thence 1,400 miles to Fremantle, 3,100 to Colombo, 2,100 to Aden, 1,300 to Suez. The chief difficulty anticipated was in the supply of enough water for the horse ships between Fremantle and Colombo, but in the result this did not arise.²

The difficulties of the situation were considerably eased when on August 23 Japan declared war upon Germany, a step which so largely increased the Allied Naval power in the North-Western Pacific that it was probable Admiral von Spee would keep away from it. The Australian Admiral thought he would go east or south-east across the Pacific, visiting Samoa and Tahiti, and Admiral Jerram (Commander-in-Chief, China) considered that an additional possibility would be an attack on our trade routes between Australia, Singapore, and Colombo. His view received some confirmation from charts and mail bags captured in a prize, which indicated Padang (Sumatra) as the immediate destination of Admiral von Spee's Squadron, and Admiral Jerram, having received orders to leave trade protection north of Hong Kong entirely in the hands of the Japanese, sailed from there on the 25th for Singapore with the *Minotaur* and *Hampshire*, to be followed by the *Yarmouth* and *Dupleix* (French).³

Some slight friction had been caused by the imperfect understanding which prevailed among the various Departments of State as to their responsibility in connection with movements of troops overseas. In the case in point, the Admiralty, War Office, and Colonial Office were all concerned; and learning that the War Office had apparently been sanctioning arrangements for the embarkation of the New Zealand troops on August 30

¹ Disposition of German, Austrian and Italian ships, August 18, 1914.

² Admiralty to Colonial Office, August 24, H.S. 1, p. 83f.

³ See p. 55.

without consultation with the Naval Authorities, the Admiralty felt constrained to point out that decisions as to the route, escort, and dates of sailings of convoys must rest solely with them. In this case their intention was for the Australian and New Zealand Contingents to come in one convoy.¹ The undesirability of scattering the transports was emphasised on August 27, when the *Geier* was reported to be definitely south-east of Madura Island, near Soerabaya, while what was thought to be the *Gneisenau's* wireless was heard at Cocos Island, directly on the route the transports would have to take between Fremantle and Colombo. Two days later the *Goldenfels*, a German steamer which had been serving the *Königsberg*, arrived at Sabang (Sumatra) with part of the crew of the *City of Winchester*, a British ship sunk by that German cruiser off the coast of Arabia on August 10. The *Goldenfels* managed to spread a rumour that she had been accompanied almost into port by the *Königsberg*, which seemed so much to strengthen the probability of a concentration of German force in the East Indies that the Admiralty warned Admiral Patey (Australia) on the 30th that the hostile cruisers might be in the Eastern Archipelago.²

The New Zealand Expedition with him had occupied Samoa without resistance, and he was now free for other work. This was the Australian Expedition for the seizure of the Bismarck Archipelago and German New Guinea, which required the escort of the *Australia*, *Montcalm*, and a light cruiser, at any rate till the German armoured cruisers were accounted for. The *Melbourne* was to be sent back *viâ* Nauru, and the *Sydney* from Port Moresby on relief by the *Australia*, the two light cruisers to be ready to leave Sydney with their transports on September 22.³

The New Zealand Contingent for home was ready to embark but the *Psyche* and *Philomel*, which were to escort it to Port Adelaide, were not expected back from Samoa till September 20. At Port Adelaide it was to join up with the Australian Contingent, and from there it would proceed to Fremantle, after being joined by the transports from Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne, and Hobart.⁴

On September 8 the *Nürnberg* raided Fanning Island and cut the cables there. Nothing definite had been heard of the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, and consequently, as they might be in the East Indies, it was felt necessary to provide a stronger escort for the 22 transports than that of the Australian light cruisers only. Admiral Jerram was told that he must send the *Minotaur* and *Hampshire* with them from Australia to Colombo, meeting the convoy somewhere about the Cocos Islands on October 5.⁵ It now appeared that the machinery of the

¹ Letter to War Office, H.S. 1, p. 18.

² A. 4, A. 5, A. 6.

³ A. 8.

⁴ A. 7.

⁵ A. 9.

Psyche was in such a bad condition that she could not be ready till September 24, though the *Philomel* and *Pyramus* would be available on the 20th for the escort of the New Zealand troops¹: these would fill 10 ships, and the number of transports from Australia had increased to 25, so that from Fremantle to Aden the convoy would consist of 35 ships. There had been a change in dates. The idea in Australia appears to have been to send a convoy to Fremantle on October 9 instead of October 4, to be followed by another on October 12, and a third on November 12. The Admiralty felt unable to provide three separate escorts, but guaranteed a strong one on October 7, to be followed by another in six weeks' time, and the Australian and New Zealand authorities were instructed to make arrangements accordingly.² The escort was to be strengthened still more by the presence of the *Australia* as well as a cover to be afforded by the China Squadron.³ This, which was now based on Singapore, had searched Sumatra, Java, and adjoining seas, but found no trace of the German ships, nothing being known of the Pacific Squadron since August 9, when they coaled at Ponape (7° N., 158° E.). Herbertshöhe in New Pommern had been occupied by the Australian Expedition without opposition, and after a short fight inland at the wireless station the officer commanding the German forces had surrendered unconditionally. After the occupation of Rabaul, which was expected immediately, Admiral Patey would be free to use the greater part of his force in escort work. His proposal to leave Simpsonhaven for Sydney on the 14th, to pick up the transports, was approved by the Admiralty, who ordered the *Hampshire* only to Fremantle, leaving the movements of the *Minotaur* in abeyance.⁴

The New Zealand Contingent, which was now to leave on September 25, was to be escorted from Wellington as far as longitude 145° E. by the *Psyche* and *Philomel*, to be relieved there by the *Pyramus*, and taken on by her to Fremantle without calling at Port Adelaide; in this arrangement the Admiralty did not interfere, as they had left all details to Admiral Patey. The Australian Government also abandoned Port Adelaide as the point of concentration, and chose King George Sound, Albany, for the assembling of their transports, now numbering 27 ships.⁵ During the absence of the Australian cruisers, the *Minotaur*, *Ibuki*, and *Chikuma* were to form a squadron under the command of Captain Kiddle of the *Minotaur*, and act from New Britain, while the waters south of Singapore were to be patrolled by the *D'Iberville*, three French destroyers, and the *Askold*.⁶

Thus all seemed satisfactorily arranged. The Contingent sent by the New Zealand Government was to be brought by its own cruisers as far as Fremantle, while the Australian transports,

¹ A. 10. ² H.S. 1, p. 138. ³ A. 11. ⁴ A. 13, 14.

⁵ A. 15; H.S. 1, p. 161; A. 17. ⁶ A. 16.

after assembling at King George Sound, would be escorted by the Australian squadron, reinforced by the *Hampshire*, and joined somewhere on the route by the 10 New Zealand transports. The powerful ships of the China Squadron would act as a screen to the east and north of the transport route, while lighter forces patrolled the passages between Sumatra and Australia. But no sooner were all the arrangements complete than a serious disturbance took place.

CHAPTER II.

CRUISERS ON THE CONVOY ROUTE.

Two telegrams caused the disturbance. One reported a German message overheard ordering a collier to the neighbourhood of New Guinea, and the other stated that the *Emden* had suddenly appeared in the Bay of Bengal.

The New Zealand Government were already feeling considerable uneasiness at the fact that the escort for their expedition would consist of only "P" Class ships as far as Albany,¹ and their anxiety was deepened when, in addition, it was learned that the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* had appeared off Samoa on September 14, and had left it in a N.W. direction. This news caused a great alteration of the arrangements; the *Australia*, *Melbourne*, and *Sydney* had left Simpsonhaven for Sydney, but the *Australia* was retained in the Pacific, and the China Squadron was redistributed in accordance with the following telegram:—

Situation changed by appearance of *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* at Samoa on 14th, and *Emden* in Bay of Bengal.

Australia and *Montcalm* to cover *Encounter* and Expeditionary Force from attack, and then search for the two cruisers.

Melbourne to be used at R.A.'s discretion; *Sydney* to return for convoy of Australian troops to Aden.

Hampshire and *Yarmouth* to sink *Emden*.

Minotaur to arrive at Fremantle by October 4 for Australian convoy; one Japanese cruiser to accompany *Minotaur*.

(176 to China; 18 to R.A., *Australia*; 27 to Navy Board, Melbourne. Sent 12.40 p.m., 16.9.14.)

The Japanese cruiser chosen was the *Ibuki*, carrying four 12 in. and eight 8 in. guns, an easy match for the German armoured ships. On receipt of the telegram Admiral Patey turned back for Simpsonhaven with the *Australia* and *Sydney*, choosing the latter, as the *Melbourne* required slight repairs

¹ A. 18.

which she could easily carry out at Sydney before being required for escort work. But these arrangements, since they promised no increase in escort to the New Zealand forces between Wellington and Albany, did little to calm the anxiety of the New Zealand Cabinet, several Ministers threatening to resign on the subject. The Australian Cabinet also considered that the Admirals in the Pacific had failed to cope with the German Squadron, and in their eyes it was a grave menace to the convoy, which now numbered 41 ships.¹ The Admiralty's interpretation of Admiral von Spee's appearance at Apia was that he did not even know that Samoa had been taken, and would know nothing of the arrangements of the New Zealand sailings; they considered it incredible for him to steam 2,000 miles south into waters where he could get no coal other than what he brought with him, and they assured the New Zealand Government that there was really no need for escort of any kind if due precautions were taken. To withdraw the Australian Squadron for escort duty would mean the abandonment of the New Guinea Expedition, which they felt would be the goal of the German Admiral, and they were not prepared to agree to such a course. In response to these representations the New Zealand Government did not press its objections, and on the 21st consented that the expedition should leave Wellington on the appointed date.²

But the trouble was not over, for the German cruisers were thought to have come from Samoa towards Fiji, and a meeting of the New Zealand Cabinet, held on September 22, expressed dissent with the Admiralty views as to the safety of the route, the Leader of the Upper House threatening to resign. The Admiralty again refused to withdraw the *Australia* from New Britain, and suggested that, as no further escort was available, the departure of the contingent had better be postponed; they pointed out, however, that the Australian Contingent would leave on the day already arranged. Perhaps this last remark had a settling effect on the New Zealand Cabinet, for at a meeting which discussed this reply they finally decided to let their men sail on the 25th.³

Meanwhile, the Admiralty ordered the *Minotaur* and *Ibuki* round the south coast of Australia to meet the convoy.⁴ Thus all seemed to have been satisfactorily settled, and the *Pyramus* left for Melbourne while two transports proceeded from Auckland with the *Philomel* to join up with the rest of the New Zealand convoy at Wellington. But at the last moment there was a serious hitch.

¹ A. 18, 19, 20, 49.

² A. 21, 22.

³ A. 23, 24, 28.

⁴ A. 25.

CHAPTER III.

THE ATTITUDE OF THE DOMINION GOVERNMENTS.

The fact that we had taken no obvious steps to seek out and destroy the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, though due entirely to the necessity of first eliminating their means of communication and supply, was having various effects upon the minds of the Australian and New Zealand peoples. Of these, the chief were distrust of the Admiralty's assurances as to the safety of the transports; annoyance at the Admiralty's handling of the Australian Fleet, coupled with regret that they had not retained a larger measure of local control; and dissatisfaction at what was considered to be the failure of Admiral Jerram, Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Fleet, to prevent even the most insignificant of the German ships from slipping through his line or cutting important cables. In New Zealand there was, further, a feeling that the Admiralty should have sent out the battle cruiser *New Zealand*, named after and paid for by the Dominion, to be available for escorting their own expeditions instead of forcing them to rely for protection on Australian warships which were wanted for the Commonwealth contingents, and whose absence at Samoa for New Zealand purposes had held up the Australian seizure of New Guinea for over a month. The "singularly little damage" done by the German squadron which the Governor-General of Australia remarked on in his despatch of 17 September, 1914, seems to have been considered locally as a lucky accident rather than the result of the Admiralty's naval strategy; and when Admiral von Spee steamed off westward from Samoa local anxiety for the safety of the convoys, should they start, became acute. To the Australian Cabinet and the Governor-General "it was obvious " that the only great coup open to German cruisers in the " Pacific was to attack and destroy the Australasian transports, " either before or after they reached their rendezvous, or while " they assembled in King George Sound," and they refused to accept the Admiralty's statement that such an attempt was incredible. In Australia there was a strong feeling that the New Zealand troopships, should they sail as arranged, would be in serious danger of immediate attack, and the Governor-General was himself convinced that should any unprotected transports be sunk by the enemy it would be no longer possible to maintain a good understanding between the Admiralty and the Commonwealth, who would certainly demand that the Australian Navy should be returned to them. He felt impelled to secure delay, and telegraphed to the Governor of New Zealand: "Personal and Secret. I think your transports run

"serious risk and that until you consult Admiralty their sailing should be delayed,"—a message whose receipt, at 7 p.m. on September 24, so deepened the uneasiness of the New Zealand authorities that they countermanded the departure of their contingent and recalled the *Philomel* and her two transports to Auckland. The *Pyramus* was, however, allowed to continue her voyage to Melbourne as it was considered the use of wireless would only attract the attention of the enemy, whom they presumed to be already in the Tasman Sea.¹

The report of this postponement made it clear to the Admiralty that some concession must be made to local feeling, imperfectly understood though it was until the arrival some five weeks later of the Governor-General's despatches quoted above; and they agreed to fresh arrangements, which were telegraphed to the Governors as follows:—

"Admiralty adhere to the opinion that despatch of transports from Australia and New Zealand ports to point of concentration at Fremantle is an operation free from undue risk.

"In view, however, of anxiety felt by your Ministers the Lords Commissioners propose to send *Ibuki* and *Minotaur* to Wellington to fetch New Zealand Convoy and escort it westward along Australian coast, picking up Australian transports on the way and bringing the whole to their destination. Delay of about three weeks will be caused by this. Exact dates will be telegraphed later."

(Sent from Colonial Office, 2.30 p.m., 24.9.14.)

while to New Zealand was added:—

"Governor-General, Australia, has been informed that their contingents must wait until both yours and theirs can come together."

The *Minotaur* and *Ibuki* were to arrive at Fremantle September 29, and could reach Wellington by October 14.²

The arrangements in this telegram were much appreciated in New Zealand. The troops disembarked from the transports and continued their training ashore. Three Australian troopships had started from Brisbane for Albany, but they were ordered to concentrate at Melbourne, H.M.A.S. *Melbourne* leaving Sydney on September 26 to cover them; and the departure of the others was delayed till further Admiralty instructions.³

The transports were ordered to assemble and remain at Sydney, Melbourne, Hobart and Adelaide.

The *Pyramus* arrived safely at Melbourne on September 29, and whatever danger had been anticipated had not manifested itself. That it was imaginary was proved next day by a report from Samoa that the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* had, on the

¹ A. 29, 30, 49, 50.

² H.S. 1, p. 231; A. 31.

³ Convoy Naval Orders, No. 35, 26.9.14, H.S. 2, p. 326; A. 32.

22nd bombarded Papiete (17° 30' S., 149° 30' W.), halfway between Australia and the South American coast, and over 2,000 miles E.N.E. of Auckland.¹

This intelligence "cleared the Naval situation in New Zealand and Australian waters and rendered the military convoy practically safe from attack by the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*," and confirmed the Admiralty view that the transports could proceed forthwith to the point of concentration.² There seemed to be some difference of opinion among the authorities on the spot, for the Navy Board, Melbourne, reported that the New Zealand troopships would proceed independently to Port Phillip, the *Melbourne* and the New Zealand cruisers forming a screen between Auckland and Green Cape, N.S.W.; while the S.N.O., New Zealand, stated that the convoy was delayed until the arrival of the *Minotaur* and *Ibuki* at Wellington. To the Admiralty it seemed quite safe now for the expedition to embark, and, under escort of "P" Class cruisers, to join the Australian Contingent at Port Adelaide; the *Minotaur* could meet them on the way, and also it was desirable that the contingent should leave with the minimum delay in order to fit in with the escort arrangements made for them beyond Suez.³ It was considered essential for them to form one convoy across the Indian Ocean, and in order to secure this the Admiralty telegraphed through the Colonial Office to the Government of New Zealand:—

"Admiralty are clearly of opinion that, in view of latest news as to German cruisers, arrangements for concentration of transports in Australia can safely be made without further delay.

"This involves despatch of New Zealand Contingent without escort of *Minotaur* and *Ibuki* until in Australian waters. Are your Ministers prepared to accept Admiralty opinion and to despatch contingent forthwith."⁴

At the same time the Australian Government was informed that their contingent must await the arrival of the New Zealand transports before crossing the Indian Ocean. But this did not satisfy the New Zealand Cabinet, which announced that they would consider as a breach of faith any alteration in the arrangements whereby the transports were to be escorted from Wellington by the *Minotaur* and *Ibuki*. In point of fact, the action of the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* in bombarding Papiete had produced opposite effects on the minds of the Admiralty and the New Zealand Cabinet. At Whitehall, and in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, China, it merely confirmed the already formed view that Admiral von Spee's objective was South America rather than Australia, and had the effect of relieving their anxiety as to the safety of the transports; but in the Colony it, and the activity of the *Emden*, were regarded as signs

¹ H.S. 45, p. 366.

² H.S. 2, p. 17.

³ A. 33, 34, 35.

⁴ H.S. 2, p. 29.

of failure on the part of the Navy to cope with the situation ; and the Admiralty's assurance that coaling difficulties were alone sufficient to prevent any incursion into the Tasman Sea was discredited when it was learned that there were colliers with the German cruisers. It was thought that the sea north of Auckland was too dangerous for even a cable ship to start, and the Prime Minister threatened to resign if "adequate" escort were not provided for the transports.¹ The Admiralty's comment on the telegram from New Zealand was :—

" . . . In regard to the escort, the Naval situation on the Pacific became sufficiently favourable, when the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* were located, to render the transport of the troops from New Zealand to Australia free from risk. . . . Had the advice of the Admiralty, as then conveyed to the New Zealand Government by the Secretary of State, been promptly acted upon, the necessity for an escort would have disappeared. The unwillingness of the New Zealand Government to act promptly and despatch the expedition now increases the possibility, though not the probability, of attack, which their Lordships consider as unlikely at the present time as when Mr. Harcourt's telegram of September 24 to the Government of New Zealand was despatched.

" The matter thus rests with the New Zealand Government. . . . If (they) so decide, the escorting arrangements which provide for the escort of the New Zealand troops by *Minotaur* and *Ibuki* (all the way from Wellington) will hold good, with the consequent delay to both naval and military forces in their active operations against the enemy." (To Colonial Office. H.S. 2, p. 30.)

The telegram which went from the Colonial Office to the Governor of New Zealand, however, did not speak quite so plainly ; it merely said :—

" Admiralty have agreed in deference to views of Prime Minister that transports should await arrival of escort *Minotaur* and *Ibuki* in accordance with existing arrangements stated in my telegram of September 24."

As remarked by the First Sea Lord, " this in no way conveys our views." ²

The New Zealand Government's fear of an attack in the Tasman Sea by the German armoured cruisers was, as before, proved groundless, for while the Prime Minister was making his threat to resign office Suva wireless station was intercepting a German wireless message which, as interpreted, read, "*Scharnhorst* on the way between Marquesas Island and Easter Island." Wellington W/T station also took in this message with further groups reading " Present position 130° W.," a thousand miles further from New Zealand than Papiete. There could be no more doubt that Admiral von Spee was retiring from the Western Pacific and there could be little wonder at this, for he knew the battle cruiser *Australia* was off New Guinea and that a powerful Japanese Squadron was holding the waters near Australia. In answer to an inquiry from the New Zealand

¹ A. 36, 50.

² H.S. 2, p. 37e.

Government the Admiralty replied that the date of departure of the expedition would depend on the arrival at Wellington of the *Minotaur* and *Ibuki* about October 12, unless they cared to let the transports sail without this escort as soon as the troops could be re-embarked.¹ Apparently, this latter risk was not accepted ; for the arrangements made on the spot were for the *Minotaur* and *Melbourne* to leave Albany on October 28 with 26 Australian and 10 New Zealand transports, to be joined at sea by the *Ibuki* with 2 transports which she would bring from Fremantle.²

There was to have been another Japanese ship in the escort, the *Nisshin*, a heavy cruiser which in the later stages of the Russo-Japanese War had acted with the battle squadron. She had been put at Admiral Jerram's disposal and as early as September 21 was told off for the convoy. The various delays since had given Admiral Jerram a chance to employ her for the Sandakan Patrol,³ where, unfortunately, she had grounded ; she came on to Singapore, but on arrival was found to be too seriously damaged for repairs to be completed in time. The Japanese Admiralty offered to send one of the two light cruisers *Yahagi* or *Hirado* instead, but neither could reach the convoy till it arrived at the Cocos Islands.

The arrangements reached at this stage turned out to be really the final ones. In accordance with them H.M.A.S. *Melbourne* left Melbourne for Sydney on October 11 to cover the movement of the Australian transports down the coast. The *Philomel* brought two transports from Auckland to Wellington to join the other eight ships there and wait for the arrival of the *Minotaur* and *Ibuki*, for the New Zealand Government had decided not to let their men go without the presence of the two armoured cruisers. The impossibility of securing the *Nisshin* or any other of the ships of the China Squadron for the Australasian Convoy, since they were all either occupied with other escort duties or in chase of the *Emden*, suggested the idea of employing the *Pioneer*, another " P " Class cruiser which ever since the outbreak of war had been patrolling in the vicinity of Fremantle. She had insufficient coal capacity to steam all the way to Colombo, and the only chance of utilising her would be to tow her during the daylight hours ; but this project was dropped, and instead it was decided that she should go as far as the Cocos Islands and then join the force in the Pacific, the *Sydney* being detached from Admiral Patey's command and ordered to go with the convoy under the Captain of the *Minotaur*.⁴ She had to coal at Sydney and was not expected at Albany till the 25th.

¹ H.S. 2, p. 40.

² A. 37.

³ See p. 79.

⁴ A. 38.

Although so anxious for a powerful escort to accompany the New Zealand Volunteers, the Minister of Defence in that Colony had sent off 7 officers and 140 men of the Imperial Reserve in the *Corinthic*, an ordinary passenger liner, without escort on the 10th. He had been asked to distribute these reservists over his 10 ships, but had not done so owing to ill-feeling between the men themselves, and he was now asked for an assurance that no more reservists or troops should proceed without escort.¹

CHAPTER IV.

THE CONVOY'S VOYAGE.

The *Minotaur* and *Ibuki* arrived at Wellington at 4.30 p.m., on October 13, and at 6 a.m., on October 16 the New Zealand troops left Wellington for Hobart, their departure being witnessed by the Governor, Ministers, and a large and enthusiastic crowd. The *Minotaur* led the convoy, which was in two divisions, each of five ships, the *Psyche* taking one line and the *Philomel* the other; in rear came the Japanese battle cruiser *Ibuki*. They arrived on the 21st at Hobart where they found the *Pyramus*, which had come down from Melbourne. Meanwhile the Australian transports had been making their way along the coast and were collecting at King George's Sound, Albany. They had no direct escort, but H.M.A.S. *Melbourne*, coming from Sydney on the 17th, patrolled off Green Cape during the 19th and 20th, and Admiral Patey, with the *Australia* and *Montcalm*, occupied the waters in the neighbourhood of Fiji.

On October 22, at 2.45 p.m., the New Zealand convoy proceeded from Hobart, escorted as before by the *Minotaur*, *Ibuki*, and *Philomel*; but the *Psyche* had been relieved by the *Pyramus*, since she was in need of an extensive refit. The idea was for the two New Zealand cruisers to go on to Suez with the convoy and then remain in the narrow waters of the Red Sea, where their services could be better utilised than in the immense stretches of the Pacific, for which their limited radius of action rendered them unsuitable. As they could not steam all the way between Australia and Colombo without coaling they were to leave the convoy at the Cocos Islands, coal at Singapore, and bring from there any French transports which had arrived from Saigon, so that these could come on

¹ War Office to Minister of Defence, New Zealand, 14.10.14, see H.S. 2, p. 71.

from Colombo under the protection of British cruisers.¹ On October 22 H.M.A.S. *Melbourne* left Melbourne for Albany, not directly escorting transports, but speaking to them as she overtook them. No news of the departure of the convoy was allowed to be published, since it was important to keep secret the probable date of its arrival in the Indian Ocean, where most danger was to be feared, chiefly from the *Emden*, which was thought to be getting intelligence by wireless almost every night from the steamer *Roon*, at anchor at Chilachap Harbour, south of Java.²

Meanwhile events were taking place which nearly had the effect of diverting the whole of the Australasian Contingents for home to an unexpected sphere of action. The outbreak of war had been greeted in the Union of South Africa with the same expressions of loyalty which had marked the attitude of the other great Dominions of the British Empire. The British garrison had been embarked for service in France, and a large volunteer force had been raised for the seizure of the neighbouring German Colony of South-West Africa; but General Beyers, in supreme command of this, showed himself disloyal, and Colonel Maritz, who was in charge of the force operating on the North-West Frontier, became an active rebel in the pay of Germany. Further, General Christian de Wet endeavoured to raise commandoes among the disaffected Dutch in the outlying districts, urging them to rebel against the constituted authority and set up again the Dutch Republics, which had been abolished as the outcome of the Boer War. The whole situation was so threatening that it seemed desirable to bring the Australasian troops to Durban in preference to sending them through Egypt, and at a Cabinet meeting held on October 25 it was decided to bring the Australasian Convoy home by the Cape instead of the Suez Canal. It appeared that many of the transports could reach Durban without coaling, and these could go with the *Minotaur* direct; a second convoy of fast ships with less coal capacity could be escorted *viâ* Mauritius by the *Melbourne*, which would also need to coal somewhere between Albany and Durban; while the remainder could come on with the *Ibuki* or H.M.A.S. *Sydney*, which had that morning left Sydney for King George Sound. The Japanese were known to be anxious for the return of the *Ibuki*, and the *Sydney* alone should have been sufficient escort, as the *Emden* was thought to be north of Australia and danger was apprehended only from the *Königsberg*.³ The New Zealand

¹ A. 39, 40, 41.

² To our protest on this subject the Dutch replied that the *Roon's* wireless gear had been dismantled. Nevertheless, she certainly made signals to the *Geier* and *Emden* in mid-October, though both ships were so far away that they may not have taken in the signals. M.18577/14 and I.D.H.S. 1338.

³ H.S. 2, p. 143.

convoy, with the *Minotaur*, *Ibuki*, *Philomel*, and *Pyramus*, arrived safely on October 28 at King George Sound, where they found assembled the whole of the Australian Convoy except the transports from Fremantle, which the *Ibuki* left next day to fetch, and final arrangements were made for the escorting of the Australasian force to the Cape, the *Philomel* and *Pyramus* to go on to Suez as they were required for work in the Red Sea.¹

On October 28, however, General Botha, who had taken over the supreme command of the Union Forces, inflicted a severe defeat on Beyers, and the other chief rebel, Maritz, retired across the German frontier. The consequent improvement in the political situation made it questionable whether the effect of the passage of the Australasian Convoy round the Cape would sufficiently compensate for the resulting delay in their arrival at the scene of action, and at a Cabinet meeting held on the 30th it was decided that the convoy should proceed as originally arranged till it reached Colombo, by which time the condition of affairs in South Africa should have become clear, but arrangements for coaling at the Cape were still carried on in case the convoy would ultimately have to go there. In accordance with this decision orders were sent for the convoy² to leave Albany for Colombo as soon as possible under the escort of the *Minotaur*, *Melbourne*, *Ibuki*, and *Sydney*, which last was due at King George Sound next day. The *Yahagi* would not now join the escort as she was engaged in hunting the *Emden*.³

At 5.30 a.m., on Sunday November 1, the *Minotaur* weighed anchor in King George Sound, and proceeded out of harbour followed by all the transports in divisions. By 9.15 a.m. the whole convoy and its escort was out of harbour, and the Fleet went to prayers. The sky was clear, the sea calm, and at 10 knots the 36 transports in three lines steamed along the remainder of the Australian coast with the *Minotaur* leading them and the *Melbourne* and *Sydney* on either beam. Cape Leeuwin was rounded at 2 next morning, and course was set to pass eastward of the Cocos Islands, then distant 1,600 miles. On November 3 at 3.30 p.m. the *Ibuki* and *Pioneer* came up with the two transports *Ascanius* and *Medic* from Fremantle, and thus completed the convoy. The Japanese cruiser took station on the starboard hand, and the *Melbourne* moved to bring up the rear.⁴

¹ For details of the arrangements, see A. 43.

² The Australian transports were:—*Afric*, *Anglo-Egyptian*, *Argyllshire*, *Armada*, *Benalla*, *Clan MacCorquodale*, *Euripides*, *Geelong*, *Hororata*, *Hymettus*, *Karoo*, *Katuna*, *Marere*, *Miltiades*, *Omrah*, *Orviolo*, *Pera*, *Port Lincoln*, *Rangatera*, *Saldanha*, *Shropshire*, *Southern*, *Star of England*, *Star of Victoria*, *Suffolk*, *Wiltshire*—26 ships. Two more, the *Ascanius* and *Medic* were at Fremantle.

³ A. 44.

⁴ Log of *Minotaur*.

The only enemy ships near enough to attack the convoy were the *Königsberg* and *Emden*. The former had not been definitely located, but on October 23 had been considered probably south of Mozambique, while the *Emden* had added to her attacks on trade in the Bay of Bengal a daring raid at Penang on October 28, in the course of which she had sunk the Russian light cruiser *Zhemchug* at anchor and the French destroyer *Mousquet* in the entrance to the harbour. But the *Emden's* captain would hardly be bold enough to attack a convoy guarded by a battle cruiser, an armoured cruiser, and three light cruisers, of which only one, the *Pioneer*, carried lighter guns than herself. It was as well that the *Pioneer* was not regarded as part of the escort, since she was only three hours with the convoy before breaking down, and at 6.30 was sent back to Fremantle with condenser defects, her projected voyage to join the Australian admiral in the Pacific having to be abandoned. Without further incident the voyage proceeded till the morning of November 8.

A week before, when the convoy left King George Sound, the last definite news of the German Pacific Squadron with Admiral von Spee was already a month old, being nothing more than an intercepted wireless message to the effect that he was on his way to Easter Island. Although the Australasian Governments had never lost their fear that the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* would return to attack the convoy the Admiralty regarded this as improbable, holding rather the view that von Spee's most likely objective was the trade on the south coasts of America, and to meet him they had ordered Admiral Cradock with a mixed squadron first to the Falkland Islands, and then round the Horn to the coasts of Chile. Their appreciation was correct; off Coronel in Chile the two admirals met, and a battle was fought on November 1 with the result that we lost two armoured cruisers with all hands, including Admiral Cradock himself, and the fragments of our squadron were forced to run for the Falkland Islands. This battle, though a disaster, justified the Admiralty's opinion that the convoy ran no risk from von Spee. The powerful escort which the pressure of Australasian opinion had compelled the Admiralty to attach to the convoy as protection against the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* was no longer necessary, and, indeed, the armoured ships were urgently required elsewhere. Provision was made from other sources to strengthen all the points the victorious German admiral would probably attack, except the Union Expedition against German South-West Africa, and to protect this last the *Minotaur* was selected. On November 6 at 3.35 p.m. a telegram was sent to her *viâ* the Cocos Islands to turn the convoy over to the senior officer present and proceed at once to join the *Albion* off South-West Africa, in view of a possible raid by the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*.¹ The telegram took some time to reach her, and it

¹ A. 45.

was not till 7.0 a.m. on the 8th, in $14\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ S. $99\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ E., that she parted from the convoy, having turned it over to Captain M. Silver of the *Melbourne*.¹

The escort was now reduced to the Australian light cruisers *Melbourne* and *Sydney* and the Japanese battle cruiser *Ibuki*. The only possible enemy that could attack them was the *Emden*, for the *Königsberg* had been located up the Rufiji River in German East Africa, where she was being kept under observation by the *Chatham*,² and the *Nürnberg* and *Dresden* were with Admiral von Spee on the coast of Chile. As regards the *Emden*, her exact whereabouts was unknown, but Captain Kiddle of the *Minotaur*, in turning over the convoy, had warned Captain Silver that the intelligence received from the Commander-in-Chief, China, led him to expect her to make an attempt on the cable and W/T station at the Cocos Islands.³ It was not, therefore, unexpected that at 6.30 a.m. on November 9 a W/T message was intercepted from Cocos to *Minotaur*: "Strange warship at entrance," followed by the wireless signal of distress and Telefunken jaming. Luckily the convoy with its powerful escort was only 55 miles to the northward of Cocos, and Captain Silver, to whom the safety of the transports was the chief concern, decided that his best course was to get in touch with the enemy cruiser. He therefore directed the *Sydney* to proceed to Cocos, working up full speed, and stationed the *Melbourne* and *Ibuki* on the south-west side of the convoy, that being the quarter from which attack was most likely. The *Sydney* steamed off at 7.0 a.m. Two and a half hours later she signalled that the enemy was in sight. It was, as expected, the *Emden*, and a brisk engagement ensued. The captain of the *Ibuki*, as soon as he heard the *Sydney* had sighted the enemy, was anxious to participate in the action, but his assistance proved unnecessary, for at 11.15 a.m. the *Sydney* signalled that the German cruiser had been grounded to avoid sinking; she surrendered at 4.35 p.m., after having lost nearly all her men. The *Sydney's* damages and casualties were very slight.⁴

Admiral Jerram's dispositions had been affected by the approaching passage of the convoy through what was now his station. Fearing that the *Emden* might possibly attack the transports, he ordered the *Hampshire* and *Empress of Russia* from the Colombo focal area, which they were patrolling, to proceed at high speed to cover the convoy into Colombo, and as soon as he heard that the *Emden* was attacking the Cocos station ordered the *Empress of Asia* to go also. These orders arrived too late for any of the ships named to get anywhere near the spot in time.⁵

¹ Log of *Minotaur*.

² Captain Silver had not been told this. (See p. 103.)

³ H.S. 2, p. 343d.

⁴ For an account of the action, see Appendix E.

⁵ See A. 46 and pp. 99, 103.

With both *Königsberg* and *Emden* gone from the list of possible attackers, there was no longer any necessity for fast ships with the convoy, and the Admiralty telegraphed to the Naval Board, Melbourne:—

"100. As the Pacific and Indian Oceans are now clear of enemy ships Admiralty desire to utilise *Melbourne* and *Sydney* for service in the Atlantic where fast cruisers are urgently required. Ships have accordingly been ordered to Malta." (Sent 10.11.14, 9.10 p.m.)

The *Melbourne*, on receipt of this order, turned the convoy over to the captain of the *Ibuki*, and at 8.0 a.m. on November 12 in 3° S., 88° E., increased speed to 15 knots for Colombo, leaving the convoy behind. That afternoon she passed the *Empress of Russia* and *Hampshire* coming S.E. From the former she heard that the *Königsberg* was accounted for; while the *Hampshire* stated that she would join the convoy, which was then in an anomalous position, being a large Australasian army under the sole protection of a cruiser of Japan, which, in pre-war days, Australians considered as their chief probable enemy. But this situation was of short duration, for the *Hampshire* and *Empress of Russia* soon joined them, while the *Empress of Asia* went on to the Cocos Islands. Some idea of the difficulty of protecting such a convoy from determined attack by a fast cruiser may be judged from the fact that, even at her speed of $19\frac{1}{2}$ knots in the opposite direction, the *Empress of Asia* took 40 minutes to pass the 37 transports, then under the protection of the *Ibuki* only.¹ The whole convoy arrived on November 15 at Colombo, where they were joined by the *Sydney*. They left two days later for Aden escorted by the *Ibuki* and *Hampshire*.²

At the time of the enlistment of the Australasian forces it had been assumed that they would serve, after training, in France with the rest of the British forces on the Continent. We have seen how at one time they were very nearly diverted to the Cape by the rebellion; but by now General Botha had completely stamped out that menace and there was no need for their presence there. On the line of their advance a fresh danger had arisen, for the attitude of Turkey since the outbreak of the war had been so unsatisfactory that on November 5³ we had been compelled to declare war on her, a step which put Egypt in some fear of attack. Accordingly it was decided that the Australasian troops should not go direct to England,⁴ and on

¹ Log of *Empress of Asia*, November 12, 1914.

² A. 47, 48.

³ A state of war had been in existence since October 31, though we had delayed making an official declaration in the hope that the Turkish authorities would comply with our demands.

⁴ The principal motive in disembarking the Australasian forces in Egypt was not the defence of Egypt, where there was no shortage of British troops, but the impossibility of obtaining in England any other training ground than Salisbury Plain, where it was feared the inclement conditions would have a serious effect on the physique of the contingent. (War Office Archives, 121s., Overseas, 161.)

November 20 the Colonial Office telegraphed to the Australasian Governors :—

“ Disembarkation of Australian and New Zealand Contingents in Egypt has been found advisable to assist in its defence, and to complete their training there. They will go direct to the front with other British troops in Europe when this is completed.”

Having reached Aden on November 25, the convoy went on under the escort of the *Hampshire* alone next morning. The main body arrived at Suez on December 1, the *Orvieto* and *Maunganui*, in which were the Headquarters Staffs, having gone on ahead so as to arrive the previous day. In spite of all the fears of the Australasian Governments, no active enemy ship had been within 5,000 miles of it, excepting the *Emden*, of which nothing remained but a tangle of iron.

THE CHINA SQUADRON, 1914,

INCLUDING

THE “EMDEN” HUNT.

(Short Title : “CHINA AND EMDEN.”)

THE CHINA SQUADRON, 1914 (including the "EMDEN" HUNT).

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THE CHINA SQUADRON, 1914 (including the “EMDEN” HUNT).

(Short Title: “CHINA AND EMDEN.”)¹

INTRODUCTION.

This monograph describes the operations of the China Squadron until the end of 1914 when it was dispersed and its ships sent to Home Waters or other Stations. The depredations of the *Emden* and the hunt for her took place outside the original China Station; but, as will be seen from the narrative, the vessels engaged in the hunt were all those of the China Squadron, and, therefore, the operations against the *Emden* are treated here.

The operations of the East Indies Squadron are dealt with on pages 117–159.

A description of the Pacific and its stations and squadrons has already been given in C.B. 917, Naval Staff Monographs (Fleet Issue), Vol. I, in the section dealing with the German Cruiser Squadron, where also is a summary of the earlier movements. For the sake of continuity here, these will be recapitulated in the opening chapters, even at the risk of some repetition.

Appendices are attached as follows:—

C.—Important telegrams.

E.—Action between *Emden* and *Sydney*.

Note on Sources.

The chief sources for the information given in this monograph are (a) the general letters of the Commander-in-Chief, China, now bound with some miscellaneous papers in the volume “titled” H.S. 34, and (b) telegrams to and from the China Station, bound in the volumes “titled” H.S. 11 and H.S. 17. These volumes have been prepared by the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and are at present in the custody of that section.

The “title” of a paper or collection of papers registered in the Admiralty Record Office is merely a symbol indicating its place on a shelf. All volumes prepared by the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence are titled “H.S.”

¹ Slightly abridged from C.B. 930.

Those papers which, for some reason or other, have not yet been sent to the Record Office will in this monograph be quoted by the number given them by the branch registry concerned. Papers dealing with operations are usually registered by "M" (Military) Branch of the Admiralty Secretariat.

The War Archives of the Intelligence Division of the Admiralty have been arranged and bound by the Historical Section of that division. These will be referred to as I.D.H.S., followed by the number of the volume.

Other sources, when quoted, will be mentioned in the footnotes.

No footnote references are given for the movements of H.M. Ships; these have been taken from their logs unless otherwise stated.

Intelligence of the movements of foreign ships, where not substantiated by a footnote, has been taken from the "Daily Return of Enemy, British and Allied Ships Abroad" compiled at the time by the Intelligence Division.

The *Emden's* career has to be pieced together from various diaries, letters and other papers captured, and from statements of prisoners. The chief documents are:—

- (a) Diary of Petty Officer Plotz. (M. 04529/14.)
- (b) Diary of Lieutenant Fikentscher. (M. 04554/16.)
- (c) Signal Log of S.M.S. *Emden*, October 16 to November 8, 1914. (N.I.D. 11618; M. 09840/15.)
- (d) *Emden's* Chronometer Journal (captured in *Exford*). (M. 0955/15.)
- (e) *Markomannia's* Track Chart (copy in M. 0309/15).
- (f) Several books by von Mücke, one of the *Emden's* officers.

The German Official History—"Der Krieg zur See, 1914–1918. Kreuzerkrieg Band I"—has as its principal subject the operations of Admiral von Spee. It was unfortunately not received till after this monograph was printed; but it has been used as a check and where necessary the fresh information in it has been embodied.

THE CHINA SQUADRON, 1914 (including the "EMDEN" HUNT).¹

CHAPTER I.

THE SQUADRON, THE STATION AND ITS PROBLEMS.

1. **The China Squadron.**—In July 1914, the China Station was in the charge of Vice-Admiral Sir T. H. M. Jerram, K.C.B., who had under his command the battleship *Triumph*; the cruisers *Minotaur* and *Hampshire*; the light cruisers *Yarmouth* and *Newcastle*; the destroyers *Colne*, *Chelmer*, *Ribble*, *Jed*, *Kenner*, *Welland*, *Usk*, *Fame*, with their depôt ship *Rosario*; the sloops *Cadmus*, *Clio*; the first class gunboats *Bramble*, *Britomart*, *Thistle*; and the river gunboats *Kinsha*, *Teal*, *Moorhen*, *Widgeon*, *Woodcock*, *Woodlark*, *Sandpiper*, *Nightingale*, *Robin*, *Snipe*. In addition, he had as Admiral's yacht the *Alacrity*. At Hong Kong were four torpedo boats and the three submarines *C.36*, *C.37*, and *C.38*, while the surveying vessel *Merlin* was working at Labuan. The Commander-in-Chief flew his flag in the *Minotaur*; the *Triumph* was not in full commission, but was at Hong Kong in the hands of a nucleus crew, the intention should war become imminent being to lay up the small craft and use their crews to bring her up to full strength.

2. **Pre-war Arrangements.**—Admiral Jerram had drawn up an agreement with Rear-Admiral A. Huguet, commanding the French Division in the Pacific; by it the French commander guaranteed to send his effective cruisers *Montcalm* (flag) and *Dupleix* to join the British squadron, while the *D'Iberville*, an ancient cruiser, and three destroyers would proceed from Saigon to the Malacca Straits, there to assist the East Indies Squadron in the guard of that exit from the China Seas.²

With Japan our alliance would hold good until July 1921, but its terms did not involve that power in a war between Great Britain and Germany alone; and nothing beyond her benevolent neutrality could be counted upon.

3. **The China Station.**—The limits of the China Station, as fixed on April 1913, included Borneo, Celebes, Timor, New Guinea, and as far south as 30° below the equator, the eastern boundary being left undefined. The station thus contained all

¹ For General Map, see p. 116.

² M. 01587/14.

the German possessions in the Pacific;¹ of these Tsingtau, a fortress in the German territory of Kiao-Chau; Angaur, an island in 7° N., 134° E.; and Yap, an island some 1,700 miles from Hong Kong, in 9° 30' N., 138° E., were the westernmost. Yap was of special interest, since from it radiated cables to Shanghai, to Celebes and the neighbouring United States island of Guam; these cables were partly owned by Holland, and it had been decided not to cut them;² but Yap had also a powerful wireless station newly erected, which would be easier to deal with.

To the south of the China Station was the Australian Squadron, under Rear-Admiral Patey, consisting of the battle cruiser *Australia*, the light cruisers *Melbourne*, *Sydney*, *Encounter*, other small craft, and three submarines. Three "P" class light cruisers formed the New Zealand Division; while to the west of the Malay Peninsula was the East Indies Squadron, consisting of the battleship *Swiftsure*, the cruisers *Dartmouth* and *Fox*, and some sloops, under Rear-Admiral R. H. Peirse.

There was only one British defended port on the China Station proper; this was Hong Kong, a second class naval base protected on a scale sufficient to deter attack by a powerful armoured squadron and to repel a raid by not more than 2,000 men supported by such a squadron. Though not on the China Station as laid down in the Orders of April 14, 1913, yet destined to be largely used by Admiral Jerram, Singapore, in the East Indies Command, was fortified on the same scale as Hong Kong; and these two ports later became the headquarters of the China Fleet.

Organisation of Naval Intelligence.³—In the system of collecting and passing items of intelligence, the world was divided into intelligence areas, corresponding approximately, but by no means exactly, to the limits of the naval stations. In each intelligence area was one naval intelligence officer who received reports from the reporting officers in his areas; these were usually the consuls for foreign ports and the principal officials in British ports. In 1914 the naval intelligence officer, in addition to his duty of controlling and transmitting intelligence, had also the control of merchant shipping in war time; this control was then much less than it later became, and at the time was almost wholly confined to the offering of suggestions to masters as regards their route and procedure and the precautions they should take to lessen the chances of capture. These suggestions took the form of telegraphic instructions to the reporting officers under him.

Naval intelligence officers, and port officers with their permission, had the power to close any particular trade route

¹ For details, see C.B. 917 Naval Staff Monographs (Fleet Issue), Vol. I, pp. 58 to 61.

² M. 0475/13.

³ I.D. 941; I.D. 972.

which they deemed unsafe; and until this route was reopened, merchant shipping would proceed along it at its own risk. Each naval intelligence officer was under the command of the Admiral commanding his station.

The intelligence areas mentioned in the present monograph are:—

Hong Kong, which included Siberia, China, the Philippines, New Guinea, New Zealand, and all the Pacific Islands;

Singapore, which extended northward to Moulmein, and included the whole of Dutch East Indies;

Fremantle and Sydney, in which were Australia and the southern shores of New Guinea;

Colombo, in whose sphere was the Indian Ocean, west of Moulmein and north of the Chagos Archipelago, both inclusive.

4. Enemy Forces.—Opposing the British force in the Pacific the Germans had their East Asiatic Squadron, generally called the "Cruiser Squadron," commanded by Vice-Admiral Graf von Spee. It consisted of the armoured cruisers *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*; the light cruisers *Emden*, *Nürnberg* and *Leipzig*; the five gunboats *Iltis*, *Jaguar*, *Tiger*, *Luchs*, *Cormoran*; the river gunboats *Tsingtau*, *Vaterland*, *Otter*; and the destroyers *Taku* and *S.90*. The only fortified German base on the station was Tsingtau in the province of Shangtung, China.

Austria had one old light cruiser, the *Kaiserin Elizabeth*. Italy, the third member of the Triple Alliance, was represented by the light cruiser *Marco Polo* and the gunboat *Sebastiano Caboto*.

5. Attack on Trade expected.—In view of the anticipated attack on trade on the outbreak of war, the Admiralty were in process of making arrangements to reinforce the China Squadron by two Empress liners (Canadian Pacific Railway Company) which were to be recalled to Hong Kong, manned by any excess ratings from the gunboats after the *Triumph* had been completed, and armed with the 16—4.7 in. guns kept in readiness at the British naval base.

The ideas of the Staff on the subject of attack on our China trade are reflected in the following appreciations¹ made in July 1914:—

China trade may expect attack from:—

(a) The German cruisers on the station.

(b) Mercantile cruisers armed either on the high seas or at Tsingtau.

¹ H.S. 34, p. 214.

As regards (a), whatever the German force may do, it will require the whole British force to deal with it and no vessels can be spared for direct commerce protection. As regards (b) there are always some German vessels either at Tsingtau or in the vicinity suitable for conversion into armed vessels, and no doubt all German ships which do so will seek the safety of Tsingtau where they can be rapidly armed.

It is, therefore, not improbable, especially in view of recent intelligence, that attacks might be made on British shipping within a week at the most.

The urgency of arming and manning mercantile cruisers is at once evident when the relative force of cruisers to our possible antagonists is examined.

Thus :—

		GERMAN.			
		Tons.	Guns.		
<i>Scharnhorst</i>	11,420	{ 8—8·2 in.		
<i>Gneisenau</i>			3,400	10—4·1 in.
<i>Nürnberg</i>	3,200	,,		
<i>Leipzig</i>				
<i>Emden</i>				

5

16—8·2 in. ; 12—5·9 in. ; 30—4·1 in.

		BRITISH.	
<i>Triumph</i>	Partly manned.	
<i>Minotaur</i>	4—9·2 in. ; 10—7·5 in.	
<i>Hampshire</i>	4—7·5 in. ; 6—6 in.	
<i>Newcastle</i>	2—6 in. ; 10—4 in.	
<i>Yarmouth</i>	8—6 in.	

4

4—9·2 in. ; 14—7·5 in. ; 16—6 in. ; 10—4 in. (without *Triumph*).

Added to which the Austrians have :—

Kaiserin Elizabeth—3,936 tons, 8—5·9 in.,

and the Italians :—

Marco Polo—6—6 in. ; 4—4·7 in. Neither, however, is a modern ship.

It will be seen that our cruisers will have more than enough to do in following and bringing to action the hostile vessels.

Our trade will largely be at the mercy of any merchant vessels armed by either of each of these Powers.

In view of these considerations the Admiralty decided that two armed merchant cruisers for the China Station should be manned at Hong Kong from any excess ratings after the *Triumph* was completed, instead of at Sydney from the Australian Reserve, as had been the case in the arrangement then in force ; and a letter to that effect was on its way to China when the situation in Europe began to grow threatening.¹

CHAPTER II.

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.

6. War Threatening.—The precautionary telegram of July 27, which conveyed a warning that war between the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente was by no means impossible,² reached Admiral Jerram at 9 a.m. on Tuesday, July 28, at Wei-hai-wei, whither he had just returned from a cruise to Japan and Vladivostock. The squadron, consisting of the *Minotaur*, *Hampshire*, *Yarmouth*, and six destroyers, was coaling there ; the remaining light cruiser *Newcastle* was at Nagasaki coaling, preparatory to rejoining the Admiral at Wei-hai-wei. The message, though not the “warning” telegram, conveyed news serious enough for him to take immediate action. He established night patrols at Wei-hai-wei to guard the Fleet from surprise attacks, telegraphed for the *Newcastle* to join him at once, ordered the gunboat *Thistle* from Wei-hai-wei to Hong Kong, directed the other two gunboats to stand by to leave Shanghai for Hong Kong, and sent the *Yarmouth* to Shanghai to complete with oil fuel, and to act as a wireless link if he had to leave Wei-hai-wei. He also ordered the Commodore at Hong Kong to prepare the *Triumph* for service, and gave him supplementary instructions as to Fleet auxiliaries in the event of war.³

That night the Admiralty ordered him to prepare to take up four merchant ships to be armed instead of the two previously decided on, and next day, the 29th, sent out the “warning” telegram at 10.20 p.m. This reached the Admiral at 8 a.m., local time, on the 30th (midnight 29/30 G.M.T.).⁴

He thereupon prepared his ships for war by landing unnecessary gear ; ordered all the river gunboats, except the *Teal* and *Widgeon* in the Upper Yangtse, to be laid up and

¹ H.S. 34, p. 214, 216.

² Appendix C. 2.

³ China General Letter, No. 20 in H.S. 34. These letters will, in future, be quoted as C.L.

⁴ C. 3, 4 ; C.L. 20.

their crews to be sent to Hong Kong; directed the *Cadmus*, *Bramble*, *Thistle*, *Alacrity*, and *Merlin* to pay off at Hong Kong; and established through the Commissioner at Wei-hai-wei a censorship which, however, was abolished a few days later by the Colonial Office.¹

He had made special inquiries as to the positions of foreign men-of-war, and was now in possession of the following information:—

At Tsingtau	<i>Kaiserin Elizabeth</i> , <i>Emden</i> , <i>Iltis</i> , <i>Tiger</i> , <i>Luchs</i> , <i>Cormoran</i> , <i>S.90</i> .
At Shanghai	<i>Jaguar</i> .
At Kobe	<i>Marco Polo</i> .
At or near Yap	<i>Scharnhorst</i> .
In Eastern Pacific	<i>Nürnberg</i> , <i>Leipzig</i> , somewhere near the coast of Mexico.
At Singapore	<i>Gneisenau</i> . ¹

This last item was, however, quite a misapprehension, due to a coding error. The ship at Singapore was really the German gunboat *Geier*, which was on a visit there from July 26 to August 3.² She left there on July 29, and was not again heard of with any certainty for some weeks.

7. Proposed Concentration off the Yangtse.—Should war break out, Admiral Jerram's intention was to take up station at a rendezvous north of the Saddle Islands, off the mouth of the Yangtse River, and to keep his squadron generally to the northward of the line from there to the south of Japan in readiness to commence hostilities if ordered, thus being in a favourable position between the ships at Tsingtau and those elsewhere.¹ With this in view, he telegraphed to the Admiralty his arrangements as follows:—

"110. *Minotaur*, *Hampshire*, 4 *T.B.D.s* leaving Wei-hai-Wei, 4 p.m. G.M.T. to-day, Thursday (July 30). *Newcastle* joins at sea to-morrow. One destroyer remains Wei-hai-Wei until 4 a.m. G.M.T. to-morrow (Friday), bringing war telegram if received before then. *Yarmouth* should arrive Shanghai 11 p.m., G.M.T., to-night, and will remain until outbreak of war.

"I am sailing for rendezvous north of Saddle Islands, and if hostilities commence I hope to prevent *Gneisenau*, *Scharnhorst*, from the south and *Marco Polo* from Japan reaching Tsingtau.

"*Kaiserin Elizabeth*, *Emden*, and small craft are at Tsingtau now. . . ."

(Received at Admiralty 1.10 p.m., 30.7.14.)

Two hours before the receipt of this, however, the Admiralty had sent him orders as below:—

"95. You should concentrate at Hong Kong and take following action as regards *Triumph*, *Alacrity*, *Bramble*, *Britomart*, *Thistle*,

¹ C.L. 20.

² C. 1.

and seven river gunboats to lay up at Hong Kong,¹ crews turning over to *Triumph*, balance of seamen, marines, and stoker ratings being made good with natives. This leaves *Clio* and *Cadmus* for action against German sloops. Report your arrangements with the French."

(Sent 11.20 a.m., 30.7.14.)

8. Concentration at Hong Kong.—He received this order just before leaving Wei-hai-wei, and remarks: "As regards this order to concentrate at Hong Kong, I must confess that I was reluctant to do so, as it placed me almost 900 miles from what I conceived to be my correct strategical position. I assumed, however, that Their Lordships had good reason for sending me there, and proceeded accordingly, at a speed of 10 knots, in order to economise coal. At the same time I sent my telegram, No. 111, reporting my action, having in my mind that possibly I might receive directions to carry out my original intention."²

Telegram 111 read:—

"111. In compliance with order contained in your 95, I am paying off *Cadmus* and *Clio*, and I am proceeding to Hong Kong instead of as stated in my telegram 110 unless I hear to the contrary through *Yarmouth* at Shanghai.

"Commodore, Hong Kong, hopes to have *Triumph* commissioned and ready 10 days' time, but she will be many ratings short without crews of *Cadmus* and *Clio*, and I consider it extremely doubtful whether natives will serve.

"*Montcalm* (French) is in South Sea. *Dupleix* (French) on passage to Nagasaki from Hakodate.³

"I have not yet received instructions to co-operate, but if you authorise me doing so propose to ask for them to join with me and carry out arrangements already sanctioned by Admiralty."

(Received at Admiralty, 9.54 p.m., 30.7.14.)

The Admiralty, however, gave him no directions to carry out his original intention, merely replying—

"97. Your 111 noted. Delay any definite action as to co-operation."

Accordingly he proceeded with the *Minotaur*, *Hampshire*, and four destroyers on July 31 at 3.25 a.m. from Wei-hai-wei, leaving the *Usk* behind as wireless link till the *Yarmouth* could

¹ This step had been approved by the Foreign Office, which, however, urged that the river services should be re-established as soon as possible. (See H.S. 11, p. 24.)

² C.L. 20.

³	Date.	Trial Speed	Tons.	Guns.
<i>Montcalm</i>	1887	21	9,177	2 7·6 in. 8 6·5 in.
<i>Dupleix</i>	1897	21	7,432	8 6·5 in. 4 3·9 in.

arrive at Shanghai. The *Newcastle* from Nagasaki joined him outside, and the squadron rounded Shantung Promontory on the way to Hong Kong. Next morning the *Cadmus*, *Bramble*, and *Thistle* left Shanghai, and on August 2 the *Yarmouth* also left there, having embarked the crews of the Yangtse gunboats. Through her and through the *Newcastle*, which he had sent to Amoy, the Commander-in-Chief had been receiving telegrams and news, among the former being the following authorisation:—

"102. You can enter into communication with the French Senior Officer on your station for combined action in case Great Britain should decide to become an ally of France against Germany.

"Situation very critical. Be prepared to meet surprise attacks."

It seemed urgent that he should get to Hong Kong quickly, and at 2 a.m. on August 2 he increased speed to 15 knots with the *Minotaur* and *Hampshire*, leaving the destroyers to continue at 10 knots, which was all the speed their coal endurance allowed them. The gunboats from Shanghai were being followed closely by the *Newcastle* and *Yarmouth*.¹ The Admiral reached Hong Kong at 3 p.m. on the 4th, and by the 5th the concentration of the whole China Squadron was complete. The *Usk* from Wei-hai-wei had also arrived.

9. **Proposed Reduction of Hong Kong Garrison.**—It was at this period that the War Office announced to the Admiralty a few hours before the declaration of war that it had been decided to reduce the garrison of Hong Kong by transferring to Calcutta one of the Indian Army battalions, two sections (four guns) mountain battery, and a proportionate number of men and mules of the Supply and Transport Mule Corps; they asked that arrangements for the conveyance of the troops should be made with a view to their departure from Hong Kong as speedily as possible. This move seemed to the Admiralty most undesirable at that moment, and they replied that—

"... they must deprecate most strongly any reduction in the garrison of Hong Kong at the present juncture, and they would be glad to hear that the Army Council had abandoned their intention.

"If it were decided to move from Hong Kong the troops mentioned in your letter, it would be essential to convoy them, and under present circumstances none of H.M. Ships can be spared for the purpose."

(Letter to War Office M/T 5428, August 6, 1914.)

Two days later the Army Council announced that they would not carry out the reduction of the garrison at Hong Kong.²

10. **"Dupleix" and "Montcalm."**—The Commodore at Hong Kong had taken up as merchant cruisers the *Empress of Asia*, which should be ready by August 13, the *Empress of Japan* and *Himalaya*, due on August 13, and the *Empress of Russia*, due on the 21st.³ But a more speedy reinforcement

¹ C.L. 20.

² H.S. 11, p. 134.

³ C. 14.

of the squadron was provided by the *Dupleix*, Captain Daveluy, which reached Hong Kong at 8 a.m. on August 5.¹ By that time Admiral Jerram had received the instructions—

"You had better enter into the closest co-operation with French Officers on your station."

(Admiralty to all Senior Officers at home and abroad, 6.25 p.m., 4.8.14.)

Accordingly he took the *Dupleix* into his squadron under his immediate orders. He had been unable to get into communication with the French Admiral in the *Montcalm*. Captain Daveluy knew that she was due at Samoa on August 7 from Tahiti, and was then to go on to Fiji, but beyond that had no definite information of her position. He was very anxious about her, since she was alone in the South Pacific Ocean, and might be unaware of the state of hostilities.² Her position was unknown even to the French Government, who, on the 5th, asked us to communicate the following:—

"Marine à Consul France, Suva, Fiji.

Prière passer par radio à *Montcalm* telegramme suivant:—

Guerre déclarée entre France et Allemagne seule. Soutenez Amiral Anglais à Hong Kong. Capturez tout ennemi rencontré."

11. **Opening of Hostilities.**—Admiral Jerram had asked whether he might leave Hong Kong before the declaration of war if strategy appeared to demand it, and though he received the following reply, "Use your own discretion about leaving "Hong Kong," our ultimatum to Germany expired, and we were in a state of war before he had completed his preparations. The order to commence hostilities forthwith reached him on the morning of August 5.³

CHAPTER III.

THE BOMBARDMENT OF YAP.

12. **Intelligence.**—Of the German naval force in the Pacific nothing was known except that it was probably not yet concentrated. Yap Wireless Station had been heard on August 1 trying hard to communicate with the *Scharnhorst*. Berlin had endeavoured to get a message through Port Moresby (New Guinea) to the surveying ship *Planet*; the collier *Tannenfels* had left Singapore with 6,000 tons of coal but no clearance papers on the 2nd; two German colliers had left Newcastle, N.S.W., about the same time under sealed orders; wireless messages intercepted by Northern Australian stations seemed to

¹ Log of *Hampshire*.

² C.L. 21.

³ C. 15.

indicate that the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, and other German ships were near New Guinea; further German signals between the *Scharnhorst* and Yap were heard by Australian stations that night; and finally, on the 6th, the Navy Office, Melbourne, informed the Admiral that from wireless indications the probable position of the *Scharnhorst* at noon on August 5 was approximately 8° S., 162° E., and that she possibly had the *Gneisenau* and *Nürnberg* with her.¹

This intelligence brought Admiral Jerram to the conclusions expressed as below:—

"I regarded this information as sufficiently reliable to work upon, and it seemed probable that the German Admiral was either—

"(a) Chasing, or searching for, *Montcalm*.

"(b) Proceeding to some rendezvous to coal from colliers which had left Newcastle, N.S.W., on August 1 and 2.

"(c) Proceeding to the South American trade routes.

"Considering this information in conjunction with the facts that:—

"(a) *Emden*, escorting four colliers, left Tsingtau on August 3.²

"(b) N.D.L. *Yorck* left Yokohama at 7 p.m., August 4, heavily laden with coal and provisions.

"(c) *Leipzig* was reported in the press to have left Mazatlan (Mexico) about August 6.

"I regarded it as likely that the German Admiral intended to concentrate his forces in the South Seas, but in the present state of my knowledge I did not feel justified in leaving the China Seas to search for him through the Southern Pacific Ocean, and, moreover, the *Australia*, *Sydney*, *Encounter* and three destroyers were comparatively close to him.

"I thought it worth while, however, to try to cut off *Emden*, *Yorck* and the four colliers. The route they would take was, of course, quite doubtful, but it seemed likely they might be bound for, or call at, Yap, the principal place in the Caroline Islands, which is about 1,560 miles from Hong Kong, and I found that by steaming at 15 knots I could reach Yap before *Emden* and the colliers, but that *Yorck* would probably get there before me.

"*Minotaur*, *Hampshire* and *Newcastle* were the only ships whose coal endurance gave sufficient margin for the purpose, and I decided to take them first to Yap in the hope of my surmise proving correct, and then to go north to join the remainder of the squadron engaged in watching Tsingtau, with a view to preventing the egress of colliers or of merchant cruisers believed to be fitting out there."³

His intentions he reported to the Admiralty in:—

"119. I am endeavouring with *Minotaur*, *Hampshire* and *Newcastle* to cut off *Emden* and four colliers bound south-east from Kiao-Chau, and I may possibly proceed as far as Yap; shall then go to base in process of formation, Saddle Island, where remainder of squadron is assembling.

¹ C. 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13.

² Plotz and Fikentscher give only one collier with *Emden*. M. 04529/14, 04554/16.

³ C.L. 21.

"Coal probably for German Admiral, who, with three ships, may either be proceeding to South America or chasing *Montcalm*, or returning to Kiao-Chau. FitzMaurice commands *Triumph*, whose crew has been almost completed by 100 2nd Battalion Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry."

(Received 11.45 a.m., 6.8.14.)

12. **Manning the "Triumph."**—Great efforts had been made to complete the *Triumph*; the crews of the *Alacrity*, *Bramble*, *Britomart*, *Thisle*, *Merlin*, and river gunboats were transferred to her, but they proved insufficient; and when Admiral Jerram reported that natives were found unwilling to take the risk of joining a warship the Admiralty ordered one of the sloops of the East Indies Station to Colombo ready to proceed to Singapore if her crew should be wanted for the *Triumph*. Even when the Naval Reserves were mobilised the numbers were still insufficient.¹

The solution of the difficulty of manning the ship is stated in Admiral Jerram's letter, No. 21:—

"I have great pleasure in reporting that, by permission of His Excellency Major-General F. H. Kelly, C.B., commanding the troops in South China, the complement of *Triumph*, which would otherwise have been very short, was augmented by 2 officers, 100 rank and file, and 6 signallers from the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, and I believe that the whole garrison of Hong Kong would willingly have volunteered. It is highly gratifying to observe such spirit."

The Admiral appointed Captain M. S. FitzMaurice from the *Cadmus* in command of the *Triumph*, and she was to leave in a day or two to join the Tsingtau watching force at their station near the Yangtse. The communications for this rendezvous presented great difficulties, but the Admiral had made an arrangement with the wireless station at Shanghai, where he had also chartered S.S. *Victoria* as a fleet messenger, and had provided for the telegraph ship *Patrol* to splice a brace into the British cable between Shanghai and Hong Kong. A third source of communication was the yacht *Mekong* at Nagasaki (fitted with powerful wireless apparatus) which the Duc de Montpensier, her owner, had offered to the Admiral.²

13. **Bombardment of Yap.**—Having thus made all arrangements for carrying out his original plan of watching Tsingtau, the Admiral proceeded at 6 a.m. on August 6 from Hong Kong with the *Minotaur* (flag), *Hampshire*, *Newcastle*, *Yarmouth*, *Dupleix*, and destroyers. Outside the port he sent the *Yarmouth*, *Dupleix*, and destroyers off to the Saddle Islands, there to await the arrival of Captain FitzMaurice, who was to be Senior Officer of the watching force, while with the *Minotaur*, *Hampshire*, and *Newcastle* he himself proceeded for Yap. To conceal his movements he forbade his ships to use wireless after

¹ C. 5, 8.

² C.L. 21.

10 p.m. on August 6, though he still continued to take in signals from the shore stations and the *Triumph*.¹

By 3 p.m. on the 10th he had reached a position 60 miles north-west of Yap, and there he stationed his three ships 5 miles apart on a line bearing E.N.E. Dense rain squalls obscured the view, but next morning a ship hove in sight; this proved to be a German collier named *Elsbeth*, bringing 1,800 tons of coal from Tsingtau to Yap. As a prize crew could not be spared, her crew were removed, her seacocks opened, and she was sunk by gunfire from the *Hampshire*. A bag of mails addressed to the *Scharnhorst* was recovered in a sodden state.² She was not one of the colliers the Admiral had hoped to meet, and as it seemed fairly certain from call signs and fragments of messages intercepted that neither the *Emden* nor *Yorck* was coming to Yap but rather to some rendezvous further south, he proceeded to carry out the destruction of the wireless station on the island, ordering the *Hampshire*, whose coal was running short, back to Hong Kong.¹

The *Minotaur* and *Newcastle* sighted Yap at daylight on the 12th and proceeding round its N.E. corner arrived at 8 a.m. off the harbour. No shipping was to be seen; but the wireless station, surrounded by dense palm groves, stood conspicuously on an isolated hill about 2 miles from the settlement.

In the intervals of jamping by the station he made the following message three times in German:—

“From the British man-of-war. Precisely at 9 a.m. heavy guns will open fire at the wireless telegraphy installation. Everyone should withdraw from the neighbourhood of the W/T station. Acknowledge receipt of this communication.”

No answer was received, but people could be seen leaving the buildings, and as an additional warning the *Minotaur* at 9.20 a.m. fired a shot well over the station. After waiting a further 10 minutes she opened slow firing of 7.5 in. lyddite at 4,500 yards. The second shot set fire to the buildings, and with 14 rounds the whole station was destroyed, the mast brought down and the oil in the power house set alight. The destruction of the station³ robbed the German Admiral of a direct means of communication with Germany, for Yap was connected by cable with Shanghai through Tsingtau.

At 10 a.m. the *Minotaur* and *Newcastle* proceeded south-west till the island was out of sight, and then turned northward for the Saddle Islands, the flagship intending to pass south of the Liu Kiu group, while the *Newcastle* was to take the northern passage in order to increase the chance of falling in with any armed liners which might have got out from Tsingtau.¹

¹ C.L. 21.

² Log of *Hampshire*.

³ It was privately owned by a German firm, but had been used to pass coded messages. C.L. 21. It is now known that the landing places were defended by guns of the gunboat *Planet*; these had been set up on cement mountings and were manned by the crew of the ship. I.D.H.S. 513, p. 770.

14. **Yangtse Gunboats.**—In the Yangtse River where both Germany and ourselves had gunboats, both sides agreed to dismantle their vessels. Sir J. Jordan, our Minister in Peking, reported:—

“On July 30 officers and crew of H.M. Ships *Kinsha*, *Woodcock*, and *Snipe* left Hankow for Shanghai after depositing guns and papers with His Majesty's Consul-General.

“His Majesty's Consul at Ichang reported on July 31 that the following ships were in harbour:—

United States Ships *Helena* and *Monocacy*, *Palos* (nationality unknown), and Japanese ship *Toba*.

“German ships *Luchs* (? *Lachs*) arrived at Kiao-Chau on July 30, and His Majesty's Consul at Nanking reports that *Vaterland*, which has entirely dismantled wireless telegraphy installation and whose crew has been sent by rail to Kiao-Chau, left for Shanghai on August 8 in tow of the *Otter*, which has also deposited war materials in German hulk at Nanking.

“There would, therefore, appear to be no danger of fighting between German and British vessels in the Yangtse, but pending definite information as to attitude of Japanese Government and resumption of direct telegraphic communication with the Admiral I do not propose to raise question of neutrality of the river with German Chargé d'Affaires.”¹

Contrary to anticipation, no German armed ships had so far molested British shipping, and the Admiral declared the trade route from Singapore to Shanghai to be clear, and that from Shanghai to Japan to be safe also if a certain track were followed.² The extreme south of the station was, to a certain extent guarded by the *D'Iberville* and the three French destroyers; these arrived at Singapore from Saigon on August 10, and left again three days later to patrol the Java Sea.

CHAPTER IV.

THE ATTITUDE OF JAPAN.

15. **Japan and Germany.**—During the Admiral's cruise political events of great importance to his station had been taking place. On August 10 the Russian Admiral placed the *Askold* and *Zhemchug*,³ 4 torpedo boats and 4 armed volunteer

¹ Telegram 147, Peking to Foreign Office, H.S. 11, p. 114.

² Telegram 151, Peking to F.O., 10.8.14. H.S. 11, p. 155.

³		Tons.	Trial Speed.	Date.	Guns.
<i>Askold</i>	5,905	23.4	1901	12—6 in.
<i>Zhemchug</i>	3,130	24.1	1904	8—4.7 in.

ships at his disposal; the Australian navy had also been transferred to Admiralty control, and he had been instructed to co-operate with it.¹ But of more importance than either of these was the increasing desire of Japan to take up arms against Germany whose unfriendly attitude at the conclusion of the Chino-Japanese war she had keenly resented and whose unwarrantable seizure of Kiao-Chau had long called for revenge. At first our Foreign Office informed Japan that we should not call on her for assistance, repeating this statement on August 10, in view of Australian apprehension that Japan would seize the opportunity to extend her empire further southward; even so late as the 9th we endeavoured to limit her action to the protection of our commerce against the German armed liners. But the Japanese were determined if they took action at all "to wipe out Germany from their part of the world for ever." On the 11th our Ambassador in Tokyo telegraphed that Japan was determined to declare war on Germany, and would at once commence operations to seize Tsingtau with or without our co-operation,² and on the strength of this the Admiralty telegraphed to Admiral Jerram:—

" 128. Practically certain Japan declares war against Germany on August 12. Communicate by wireless with Japanese Commander-in-Chief and concert measures.

" Send forthwith one light cruiser to close *Rainbow* at Vancouver, coaling at Honolulu.

" You may now leave whole protection of British trade north of Hong Kong to Japanese, concentrating your attention in concert with Australian Squadron on destroying German cruisers."

(Sent 8.30 p.m., 11.8.14.)

This telegram, received at night on the 12th, completely altered Admiral Jerram's movements. It was no longer within his orders for him to concentrate his forces off the Saddle Islands; and anticipating an immediate declaration of war by Japan, he altered course in the *Minotaur* for Hong Kong, detaching the *Newcastle* to proceed to Vancouver *via* Yokohama.³ She thus left his command and was absorbed into the force which operated in the Eastern Pacific. He was further instructed from home:—

" 129. Our trade on the Pacific coast is being threatened. Directly Japan declares war *Hampshire* in addition to light cruiser is to be sent to Esquimalt. Arrange for coal on passage."

(Sent 12.20 p.m., 12.8.14.)

The *Hampshire* was then well on her way to Hong Kong to coal.

16. Watching Tsingtau.—The rest of his squadron was now in place for the watch on Tsingtau. The *Triumph*, being ready earlier than was anticipated, had left Hong Kong shortly after

¹ C. 20, 21. ² C. 18, 22, 23; H.S. 11, pp. 161, 162. ³ C.L. 22.

2 p.m. on the 6th, and that same evening had overtaken the *Yarmouth* and *Dupleix*, whereupon Captain FitzMaurice directed the *Yarmouth* to lead the squadron and fly the Vice-Admiral's flag so as to give passing steamers the impression that the *Minotaur* was present. In the evening of the 8th the *Dupleix*, which was in touch with the French wireless station at Shanghai, heard from there that the *Emden* with two small ships had been seen at 10 a.m. on the 7th about 120 miles south-east of Kiao-Chau steering southward. At the same time German W/T was heard about 60 to 80 miles away, and the squadron raised steam for full speed; but the strength of the signals died away and nothing hostile was sighted.¹

As the rendezvous was found untenable in the south-west monsoon then prevailing, the flotilla assembled at a proposed new base on the north-west side of South Saddle Island, and here the *Triumph* and *Dupleix* coaled on arrival at daylight on the 11th, while the *Yarmouth* and three destroyers patrolled between the Yangtse and the southern corner of Korea. Captain FitzMaurice, however, realising that with his small force he could not from there control the passage of vessels to and from Tsingtau, determined to close the hostile base and had given orders to that effect when he received Admiralty telegram 128 regarding Japanese action. In view of this news he despatched the *Yarmouth* at 20 knots to communicate the telegram to Admiral Jerram, and at noon on the 13th sent the *Dupleix* south to form a W/T link with the *Yarmouth*. With his reduced squadron, consisting of the *Triumph* with the gunboats and destroyers, he cruised for the protection of British trade and to prevent enemy merchant ships from leaving Shanghai.² Our enemies were now two in number, for on the 13th we declared war on Austria;³ but as Austrian naval force in the Pacific was limited to the old light cruiser *Kaiserin Elizabeth*, still at Tsingtau, it did not affect the strategical situation. On the other hand, the anticipated entry of Japan into the conflict caused Admiral Jerram to inform the Japanese Commander-in-Chief through the *Yarmouth* and *Triumph* that in the event of a declaration of war on Germany by Japan all our ships and the *Dupleix* would be withdrawn to Hong Kong for the purpose of operating to the southward.⁴

17. British Expeditions to seize Pacific Islands.—This was the more necessary since expeditions were on foot from Australia and New Zealand to seize Samoa and German New Guinea, and Admiral Jerram had been instructed to cover them. The Australian Admiral's force had been strengthened by the

¹ H.S. 34, p. 42. The vessels seen were possibly *Emden*, *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* and the collier *Markomania*, which left Tsingtau, 7 p.m., August 6. (Fikentscher, M. 04554/16.)

² H.S. 34, pp. 43, 44.

³ C. 27.

⁴ C.L. 22.

Montcalm which, on arrival at Suva on the 12th, was directed to co-operate with him during the passage of the expeditions, and subsequently to join Admiral Jerram.¹

18. **The Japanese Ultimatum.**—On August 15 the Japanese sent an ultimatum to Germany demanding the unconditional surrender of Kiao-Chau to Japan in order that it might be eventually restored to China; a week's grace was given, but the ultimatum would expire on August 23. This delay till the 23rd was unexpected on our part, but the Japanese stated that they would at once place cruisers on the trade routes to shepherd British and Japanese merchant ships and to round up enemy vessels.² It was not quite certain that Germany would refuse to agree with Japan's demands as she had already been approached by China with a view to returning Kiao-Chau to her. This we learned by an intercepted telegram. Our Ambassador at Peking reported:—

“ . . . Following is text of two telegrams sent last night in English by the German Chargé d'Affaires to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs . . . :—

‘ Radowitz, Wilhelmstrasse 76, Berlin.

‘ Engagement with *Miss Butterfly* very probable—Maltzan.’

“ Second message begins:—

‘ Baron Stumm, Hohenzollernstrasse 8, Berlin.

‘ Tell Montgela's landlord sounded me regarding return of lease on account of present difficulties. Regards, Maltzan.’ ”

She had also proposed to neutralise East Asiatic waters if Great Britain did the same, as we learned by a telegram from Bethmann Hollweg to German Embassy, Newport, intercepted by Poldhu, on the 14th at 6.5 p.m.³

In spite of these suggestions, until August 23 the watch on Tsingtau would have to be maintained by Captain FitzMaurice's Squadron. The Admiral, in response to his request, had now been given authority to use his discretion as to the declaration of the blockade of Kiao-Chau in combination with the Japanese; and he had strengthened the watching squadron on August 15 by the *Empress of Asia*, the first of the merchant cruisers armed at Hong Kong; she left there on the 9th, her crew having been completed by 1 officer and 20 men of the Royal Garrison Artillery and 25 men from the 40th Pathans. Further reinforcement was provided in the *Dupleix*, which came up with the *Empress of Asia*; the *Yarmouth* also, having communicated with Admiral Jerram, was sent back by him from the latitude of Hong Kong to rejoin the *Triumph* on the 17th.⁴ Germany appeared still to have hopes of keeping Japan from joining

¹ C. 18a, 24.

² Tel. 85, Tokyo to F.O. H.S. 11, pp. 250, 251.

³ H.S. 11, pp. 202, 241.

⁴ C. 25, 19; H.S. 34, p. 44.

the belligerents, for Poldhu wireless station reported on August 17:—

“ Following intercepted at 2.30 p.m. from Hanover to-day. Begins:—

“ No. 24. Berlin. 25 words. German Embassy, Newport. 125. Wiederholung für Tokio.

“ Ostasiatisches Geschwader angewiesen feindliche Akte gegen England zu unterlassen falls Japan neutral bleibt. Bitte Japanische Regierung benachrichtigen. Zimmermann.”¹

A few minutes later, however, a further message cancelling this was intercepted, and next day Hanover sent out:—

“ German Embassy, Newport.

“ Please forward following message to Governor, Tsingtau:— Attack by Japan at latest on August 23. Emperor commands to defend Tsingtau to the last. Send out women and children. Inform cruiser squadron. Marine Office. Zimmermann.”²

On August 20 the whole squadron under Captain FitzMaurice, in accordance with orders from Admiral Jerram, proceeded for the vicinity of Tsingtau. Here they captured four German steamers coming from the German base (*Senegambia*, *C. Ferd Laeisz*, *Paklat*, and *Frisia*), and a suspicious American ship, the *Hannametal*. From the *Senegambia* it was learned that the ships were bound for the Dutch East Indies with coal and provisions, and that the Germans had armed and despatched from Tsingtau a fast Russian mail boat captured early in the war.³

19. “**Kennet**” and **S.90.**—In the evening of August 22 Captain FitzMaurice withdrew his squadron from Tsingtau so as not to come in the way of the Japanese should they take action during the night. Just as the ships were moving away the destroyer *Kennet* observed the German destroyer *S.90* making for Tsingtau from the east and gave chase, in the course of which she suffered some damage and casualties from the guns of the German destroyer. Although the *Kennet* fired 136 rounds and one torpedo she does not appear to have damaged the *S.90* at all.⁴ The whole British squadron withdrew to Wei-hai-wei while the *Dupleix* proceeded south for Hong Kong to join the Admiral.

He had communicated no statement of his movements to the Admiralty, who, though they had been sending and receiving messages knew nothing of his operations beyond his telegram of August 6, in which he said he would try to cut off the *Emden*.

¹ Translation:—“ Repetition for Tokio. East Asiatic Squadron informed abstain from hostile acts against England in case Japan remains neutral. Please inform Japanese Government. Zimmermann.” H.S. 11, p. 286.

² H.S. 11, pp. 289, 299.

³ C.L. 23, Enclosure.

⁴ C.L. 23, Enclosure 4.

On the 13th they asked the Commodore, Hong Kong, if he knew the position and movements of the Commander-in-Chief, but learned in reply that Hong Kong was not in touch with him. Next day, however, our naval agent at Shanghai reported that he had been told to inform the Admiralty that the Commander-in-Chief's address was Hong Kong, and from that place came the following:—

" 198. Am in wireless touch with Commander-in-Chief, China, and expect him to arrive at Hong Kong with *Hampshire* on August 17 from direction of Yap Island."

(Received at Admiralty 8.11 a.m., 14.8.14.)

20. Patrol of Trade Routes.—Admiral Jerram reached Hong Kong on August 17, and found that the *Hampshire* had got in the day before. Transferring his flag to the *Alacrity* next day he sent the *Minotaur* to patrol for a week between Hong Kong and Cape Padaran (Cochin China) while the *Hampshire*, after docking, visited Swatow, where four German ships had been reported in shelter, and patrolled the routes from Hong Kong to the northward as far as the parallel of 26°.

As soon as he had destroyed Yap W/T station, Admiral Jerram opened communication with Admiral Patey in the *Australia*, whom he informed of his arrangements, but he had been cut off from news other than Admiralty telegrams.¹ The intelligence he received on his return was still not very definite as to the position of the enemy. The *Princess Alice* (a convertible liner) and two colliers at Manila were thought to be about to leave there for New Guinea, which strengthened the Admiral's opinion that the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, and *Nürnberg* had met. He reported this appreciation and the result of his cruise as below:—

" 121. Probably *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Emden*, *Nürnberg*, are now together, but their position is still unknown, though Marshall Islands seem likely.

" They have more than 20,000 tons of coal afloat.

" I am watching Tsingtau and arranging to protect trade routes between Japan, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Singapore, with all available ships, including *Minotaur* and *Dupleix*, and also armed mercantile cruisers as they become available.

" Until situation is clearer, or it becomes desirable to work as a squadron, I shall personally remain at Hong Kong, whence I can make arrangements which may be authorised with Russians and Japanese and exercise general control.

" Possible objective of German squadron may be Dutch East Indies, but more likely Pacific Coast of America. In latter case, owing to absence of facilities for obtaining information, our earliest certain knowledge will be their arrival, and I suggest for consideration whether it may be possible to spare any cruisers from home waters to meet this danger.

¹ C.L. 22.

" Is it still probable Japan will declare war against Germany? Result of my recent cruise, one German collier with 1,800 tons of coal captured and sunk; wireless station at Yap destroyed.

" Expect *Newcastle* to leave Yokohama to-morrow, Tuesday, for Vancouver Island *via* Honolulu in compliance with Admiralty order. *Hampshire* ready to follow from Hong Kong if Japan declares war."

(Received 2.5 a.m., 17.8.14.)

This was the first report the Admiralty had received from him since August 6. Just before it arrived they had sent him:—

" 140. Report proposed movements. Has Wireless Station Yap been destroyed? China Squadron should promptly deal with it and Angaur. Due to uncertainty of position of *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, *Australia* and *Montcalm* are being used to cover Samoan and New Guinea Expeditions."

(Sent 6 p.m., 16.8.14.)

To this he replied:—

" 122. Wireless Station at Yap Island already destroyed. Angaur not being connected by cable is of minor consideration, and as I cannot spare ship for necessary voyage of 3,000 miles I propose leaving it for the present.

" Owing to Admiralty Letter M. 0475 of March 29, 1913,¹ cable from Shanghai to Yap Island has not been cut, but telegraph ship is now arranging to leave for Shanghai ready to cut it if desired.

" If *Sealark* and *Fantome* are not appropriated for any war service, may they be ordered to Hong Kong to pay off so that officers and men could be utilised as requisite?"

The three suggestions above were answered by the Admiralty:—

" 144. Your 122. Concur about Angaur. Cable Shanghai to Yap not to be cut. *Sealark* and *Fantome* on Australian Station not available."

(Sent 3.35 p.m., 17.8.14.)

The *Sealark* and *Fantome* were two surveying vessels, the former was then on her way to Suva, where she was to assist in local defence, while the *Fantome* had left Fremantle for Sydney on August 14.²

21. Co-operation with the Japanese.—The chief matter to decide was the extent of our co-operation with the Japanese, who intended to make an immediate attack on Tsingtau. Political considerations, mainly the fears of Australia, the United States and China that Japan might embark on a campaign of aggression, compelled us to lend our presence so that the attack on Tsingtau might appear to be undertaken by Great Britain and Japan in co-operation. To this end Admiral Jerram, after correspondence with the Admiralty, agreed that after the Japanese declaration of war he would not withdraw the whole British force in the north, but would leave the *Triumph* and a

¹ See para. 2.

² H.S. 11, p. 277.

destroyer to escort a contingent of British troops from Tientsin to Kiao-Chau, and to assist in the landing operations. In exchange for them the Japanese placed the *Ibuki* and the light cruiser *Chikuma* at Admiral Jerram's disposal.¹ Both these were modern ships, the *Ibuki* being what may be called a second-class battle-cruiser, and formed a valuable addition to Admiral Jerram's force. Meanwhile, he arranged a series of patrols of the whole trade route as follows:—

<i>Clio</i>	Shanghai to Japan.
<i>Cadmus</i>	Shanghai to Foochow.
<i>Hampshire</i>	Foochow to Hong Kong.
<i>Empress of Japan</i>	} Hong Kong to Singapore. ²
<i>Empress of Asia</i>	
<i>Minotaur</i> , to be relieved by	
the <i>Himalaya</i>	

22. **Japan at War.**—The period of suspense regarding Japan's action came to an end on August 23, when she formally declared war on Germany and assumed responsibility for the protection of trade north of Hong Kong.

CHAPTER V.

THE CHINA SQUADRON CONCENTRATES IN THE SOUTH.

23. **The Dutch East Indies.**—Admiral Jerram was now free to consider the situation afresh. It was hardly probable that any German Squadron would face the Japanese Navy in the North-West Pacific, and the safety of our trade there was secured. But as regards the south, he says, "I was aware that "the whole of the Australian and New Zealand Squadrons and "*Montcalm* were well to the eastward of Australia engaged in "escorting expeditions first to Samoa and then to New Britain, "which would keep them occupied until the middle of "September; that the best ships of the East Indies Squadron "were engaged in escorting troops from India westwards; and "that the only British force on the great trade routes between

1	Tons.	Trial Speed.	Date.	Guns.
<i>Ibuki</i>	14,600	20·9	1910	4—12 in., 8—8 in. 14—4·7 in., 8—6 in.
<i>Chikuma</i>	4,950	—	1912	8—6 in.

¹ C.L. 22.

"Colombo, Singapore, and Australia were *Fox* and *Espiègle* "near Colombo, and *Pioneer* near Fremantle.¹

"I have mentioned the possibility of the Germans going "to the Dutch East Indies, and bearing in mind the disastrous "results to our trade if they did so, the conclusion was "irresistible that a strong force was needed to work from "Singapore.

"I decided against the alternative of proceeding in force "to search the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall Islands on the "ground that:—

"(a) By the time I could get there the Germans would probably have sailed, as I failed to see any object in their remaining there. If they had gone to America I should be too far astern to catch them, and if they had gone to the Dutch East Indies I should be leaving the trade routes entirely exposed to attack.

"(b) As regards the Marshall Islands particularly, the Australian Squadron is better situated for the purpose, the distance being 3,500 miles from Hong Kong, and only 1,500 miles from Fiji, where the Australian Squadron will be coaling on September 2."²

Admiral Patey's opinion was that the Germans were collecting supplies and concentrating somewhere north-east of New Britain, and his belief, as telegraphed to Admiral Jerram, was that the main body would go eastward, visiting Samoa and Tahiti, while auxiliary cruisers, acting from a base in the Pacific, would attack our China, Pacific and Australian trade.³ This last menace could also be countered by the China Squadron's proposed move to Singapore.

24. **Admiralty wish von Spee to be hunted.**—But the Admiralty had other views as to the effective use of Admiral Jerram's force. In an important memorandum, dated August 20, 1914, we find:—

" The Commander-in-Chief in China should detail *Triumph* to co-operate with the Japanese Fleet in the attack on Tsingtau, and should proceed himself immediately with *Minotaur*,

1	Class.	Tons.	Date.	Trial Speed.	Guns.
<i>Fox</i>	Light cruiser.	4,360	1895	19·9	2—6 in., 8—4·7 in.
<i>Espiègle</i>	Sloop	1,070	1902	13·5	6—4 in.
<i>Pioneer</i>	Light cruiser.	2,200	1900	19·7	8—4 in.

² C.L. 22.

³ C. 29.

Hampshire and *Yarmouth* to Rabaul. . . . As soon as the minor enterprises against Yap, etc., have been executed, the Commander-in-Chief should devote himself in conjunction or combination with the *Australia* and *Montcalm* to searching for *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, assuming we do not know by then that they have left Australian and China waters. . . .

"With the destruction of the German base in the Pacific, and the hunting down of the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, the three heavy ships in China together with the *Australia* will become available for service in home waters for the climax of the Naval war." ¹

The idea that the Australian Squadron from the south and the China Squadron from the north should search in conjunction for the German armoured cruisers was telegraphed to Admiral Jerram in:—

"155. Japan declared war with Germany at noon to-day.

"How is China Squadron disposed? The destruction of *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* is of the first importance. Proceed on this service as soon as possible with *Minotaur*, *Hampshire* and *Dupleix*, keeping in communication with R.A., Australia, who, together with *Montcalm* is engaged on the same service. They are at present searching for them at Samoa. . . ."

(Sent 8.30 p.m., August 23, 1914.)

The Admiralty had not yet made any provision for meeting the German Squadron should it be driven eastward, nor for guarding the rear should it elude pursuit in the vast spaces of the Pacific and double back on to the rich trade routes behind. The protection of these seemed to Admiral Jerram, as we have seen, the most vital necessity of the moment, and he replied:—

"131. . . . From charts and mailbags found on board prize captured shortly after she had left Tsingtau it is believed German Squadron, probably consisting of *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Nürnberg*, *Emden*, *Luchs*, may be now or shortly on southern side of Sumatra, perhaps near Padang, and that their auxiliaries are also using Dutch Islands in Java Sea as their base. This view receives support from other sources.

"As East Indies Squadron is to the westward I am sailing for Singapore with *Minotaur* and *Hampshire* as soon as possible, either to-morrow evening or morning of 26th, followed by *Dupleix* and *Yarmouth* when ready; and shall also ask *Ibuki* and *Chikuma* to follow and assist in search. . . ."

"I consider that Marshall Islands should be examined by Australian Squadron after they coal at Fiji Islands about September 2, and before escorting expedition to Rabaul unless I have previously located German squadron. . . . I am not doing this myself as the possibility of Germans being on trade routes is of first importance and there is ample naval force north of Australia. . . ."

The order for the *Hampshire* to go to Esquimalt had been countermanded, as the Japanese were keeping their cruiser *Idzumo* on the Pacific Coast of North America.² All the North China Division except the *Triumph* and one destroyer were now on the way to Hong Kong, and the armed merchant cruisers

¹ H.S. 7, pp. 315-318.

² H.S. 11, p. 333.

Himalaya and *Empress of Japan* were acting with the *Empress of Asia* on the patrol of the routes between Singapore and Hong Kong. The *Empress of Russia* would be ready by the 28th, and was to join them in this work.¹ The manning of the armed merchant cruisers presented even greater difficulties than that of the *Triumph*. By the time the *Empress of Russia* was ready there were practically no Naval ratings left. However, all her mercantile crew, including Chinese, signed on; there were numerous volunteers from shore, and the remainder of the Island Guard of Marines from Wei-Hai-Wei were embarked. But even so there were not sufficient hands, and the ship's company was completed by the crews of the French gunboats. Commander Archibald Cochrane, R.N., was given command; the senior French Officer on board was Lieutenant-Commander Jean Jacques O'Neill, who had been French Intelligence Officer at Shanghai; other French Officers were Lieutenant Aubin and Surgeon Carpentier from the river gunboats. With this miscellaneous and possibly unique crew, who throughout worked together in perfect—though occasionally vociferous—harmony, the *Empress of Russia* left Hong Kong on August 29.

25. Move to Singapore.—The movements proposed by Admiral Jerram were not interfered with by the Admiralty,² and in the evening of August 25 he proceeded from Hong Kong for Singapore with the *Minotaur* and *Hampshire*, to be followed as soon as possible by the *Yarmouth*, *Dupleix*, *Cadmus*, *Clio*, and destroyers then on passage from the north to Hong Kong. With them, increased by the *Ibuki* and *Chikuma*, due at Hong Kong on the 31st, he intended to make a thorough search of the East Indian Archipelago.¹ The French destroyers returned on the 24th to Singapore; they had seen nothing of any German ships.

The enemy's supposed presence in that district received confirmation in a report on August 27 from our Intelligence Officer at Singapore that the *Gneisenau* had been heard by Cocos Island, and the *Geier* was south-east of Madura in the Java Sea. At the Admiralty this was considered to indicate that the *Gneisenau* was to the south of Java, with the *Geier* as W/T link to the Dutch East Indies, the Australian trade to Colombo and the wireless at Cocos being the probable objectives, though this view was modified by a later telegram from Melbourne to the effect that the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* had disappeared to the north-eastward, which suggested the Australian Expedition to New Guinea as possibly the objective of Admiral von Spee.³

Still further evidence of a presumed concentration in the East Indies was afforded by the arrival at Sabang, Sumatra, of a German steamer called the *Goldenfels*, which spread a rumour

¹ C.L. 22.

² H.S. 11, p. 378.

³ H.S. 11, p. 405; C. 30, 31.

that she had been accompanied almost into port by the *Königsberg*, a German light cruiser last heard of in the Gulf of Aden.¹

Admiral Jerram arrived with the *Minotaur* and *Hampshire* on August 30 at Singapore, whither the *Yarmouth*, *Dupleix*, *Clio*, *Cadmus*, and destroyers were on their way to join him. He sent the *Hampshire* to join the *D'Iberville* and French destroyers in the patrol of the western end of the Straits of Malacca in case the *Königsberg* should be lurking there, and proceeded in the *Minotaur* for a short cruise to the eastward pending the arrival of the rest of his force, when about September 3 he intended to start a systematic search of the Java Archipelago.²

Knowing the susceptibilities of the Australians as regards Japan he had inquired of the Governor-General whether there was any objection to the use of the Japanese ships in waters adjacent to Australia; no objection was raised by the Australian Government;³ but in view of the feeling which undoubtedly existed, the Admiralty telegraphed to him:—

"156. . . . H.M. Government would prefer, if possible, British men-of-war being used south of latitude of Singapore, but in case of necessity you have complete freedom of action."

26. **Proposed Sweep of Pacific Islands.**—While Admiral Jerram was thus concentrating his attention on the Dutch East Indies as the probable base of the German Squadron, Admiral Patey, on the other hand, again suggested that the China Squadron might co-operate with him in a combined sweep of the Caroline and Marshall Islands;⁴ but Admiral Jerram considered that while the Australian Squadron was to the north-eastward of Australia he himself should remain to the west of New Guinea; and the question of the combined sweep of the Pacific Islands remained in abeyance. Admiral Patey's own squadron was insufficient for the purpose, since he had been warned that his three cruisers would soon be required to escort as far as Aden a large contingent of Australian troops being raised in the Commonwealth for service in Europe.⁵

27. **Convoys and the Philippines.**—Admiral Jerram's sole contribution to a search of the Pacific Islands, namely, an order to the *Askold* to visit the Mariana Group on her way south from Vladivostock, he had to cancel owing to the necessity of escorting three transports⁶ bringing to Calcutta the British regiments from Tientsin, Hong Kong, and Singapore. In view of Japan's complete command of the sea north of Hong Kong, he considered no direct protection necessary from Tientsin to that port, but from there he ordered them to be escorted as far as Singapore by the *Askold* and *Zhemchug*, which had arrived at

¹ C. 32. ² C.L. 22. ³ H.S. 34, p. 241. ⁴ C. 33.
⁵ H.S. 45, p. 93. ⁶ *Arcadia*, *Nile* and *Carnarvonshire*.

Hong Kong and were at his disposal. From Singapore the *Yarmouth* was to take them to Calcutta. They were to leave Hong Kong on September 16, and in the meantime the *Askold* cruised down the east coast of the Philippines, returning through the Celebes and Sulu Seas with a view to intercepting German colliers which were known to have been leaving Manila.¹

The Philippines, as a suspected base for German supply ships, attracted the greater part of the weaker vessels under Admiral Jerram's command. The armed merchant cruisers *Empress of Asia* and *Empress of Russia* arrived at Singapore on September 1, and these he sent to patrol the east coast of the group, while, to provide a watch over the channels between the Philippines and Borneo, he ordered the *Cadmus*, *Clio*, and five destroyers from Hong Kong to Sandakan, which was to be their base while they carried out a patrol north and east of Borneo.¹

28. **Examination of the Dutch East Indies.**—Having thus provided for German activity at Manila, he started his examination of the Dutch East Indies. No new intelligence of importance had been received. The Admiral, in reporting his dispositions on his departure from Singapore, added:—

"137. . . . Nothing heard of *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* since August 9, when they were coaling at Ponape (Caroline Islands).

"It seems possible, therefore, they may have gone East, though reported movements of large quantities of coal moving towards Java Sea make me very uncertain of it. . . ."

(Sent 12.40 p.m. Received 5.55 a.m., 3.9.14.)

The *Minotaur* and *Yarmouth* left Singapore at noon on September 3 for a search of the coasts of Java. In company they passed through Banka Strait, on the south side of which they separated, the *Minotaur* proceeding to Batavia, which she reached on the 5th, while the *Yarmouth* passed through Sunda Strait and visited all the harbours south of Java. The two met again on the 9th in Madura Strait, the entrance to Surabaya, where they once more separated, the flagship proceeding back along the coast of Java, while the *Yarmouth* took the more easterly passage *viâ* Seruta Island (1° 43' S., 108° 40' E.), where, at 6 a.m. on the 11th, she met the *Ibuki* and *Chikuma*, which had arrived at Singapore on September 5 and had left four days later to search the Java Sea. Off Etna Shoal, 50 miles north of Batavia, the flagship was joined by the *Hampshire*, which, on the report of the possible presence of the *Königsberg*, had been sent on August 30 from Singapore to keep watch off Acheh Head, the north point of Sumatra. She had gone into Sabang on September 1, and having found that there was no truth in the rumour that the *Königsberg* had come that way,¹ was ordered by Admiral Jerram to search the west coast of Sumatra.

¹ C.L. 23.

From September 2 to 10 she worked her way round from bay to bay, visiting Padang on the 7th, and, after coaling off Etna, joined company with the flagship and returned with her through Banka Strait to Singapore.

The ports of the Philippines and the Dutch Islands were full of German steamers, there being 22 in the American Group and 37 in Sumatra, Java, and other Dutch possessions; almost every steamer met at sea was owned by the British, who had no difficulty in getting cargoes. Our Consul-General at Batavia confirmed the fact that German steamers had been moving in an inexplicable manner, but stated that the Dutch authorities seemed anxious to observe the strictest neutrality.¹ As he reported that no armed German ship had been near Java since the war began, and there seemed no indications of the presence of any, Admiral Jerram became convinced that he had better return to Singapore, especially as he was experiencing great difficulty in maintaining wireless communications.² He arrived there on September 13.

29. **Escort Questions.**—In his absence a new duty had devolved upon his squadron. The Australian Imperial Force for European service would soon be ready, and the question of its escort across the Indian Ocean began to press. From the Australian Squadron the *Sydney* and *Melbourne* would be available, but these alone were felt by the Admiralty to be insufficient between Australia and Colombo, and on September 8 they telegraphed to Admiral Jerram:—

“ 166. If the two German armoured cruisers are not accounted for by end of month you must escort with *Minotaur* and *Hampshire* to Colombo the Australian contingent which leaves Fremantle on October 3 for Colombo.

“ You should arrange to meet the 22 transports on their lines of advance near Cocos.

“ *Sydney* and *Melbourne* will convoy all the way from Fremantle to Colombo.”

(Sent 12.5 a.m., 8.9.14.)

Two days later, however, the arrangements were changed, and the *Australia* was directed to accompany the transports across the Indian Ocean, the part to be played by Admiral Jerram being explained to him in the following telegram:—

“ R.A., Australia, has been directed to proceed to Sydney and escort Australian troops for England across Indian Ocean. They are to leave Fremantle for Colombo on October 7 with *Australia*, *Melbourne* and *Sydney*.

“ You are to assist by covering their passage to the northward within wireless touch unless German armoured cruisers are previously accounted for.

“ *Encounter* with flotilla and troops from Rabaul will seize wireless at Angaur and occupy New Guinea. You have also *Dupleix*

¹ See para. 74.

² C.L. 23.

and Japanese cruisers so that your force is sufficient to work in two divisions if you think fit, each strong enough to engage *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*.

“ Acknowledge and report any further proposals.”

(Sent 8.15 p.m., 10.9.14.)

The *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* were still unlocated; in fact, the only reported activity on the part of Admiral von Spee's Squadron was the temporary interruption of our cable at Fanning Island by the *Nürnberg*, which, after coaling at Honolulu on September 1, had approached that isolated station on the 7th under the French flag and raided the cable office. In contrast to this one act of war we had bombarded Yap Wireless Station, occupied Samoa on August 31, destroyed Nauru Wireless Station on September 9, and captured Herbertshöhe on the 11th,¹ while the Japanese were maintaining a strict blockade of Tsingtau and preparing for a military assault on it. A powerful Japanese Squadron was about to leave Japan for a few weeks' cruise to the Mariana and Caroline Islands, so that there was little likelihood of the Germans remaining near there.² But with the absence of the *Australia* on convoy duty there was a possibility that Admiral von Spee might return to attack the expedition at Simpsonhafen, and Admiral Jerram arranged with the Admiralty that the *Minotaur*, *Ibuki*, and *Chikuma* should proceed under the orders of the Captain of the *Minotaur* to New Britain and act from there; this would cover Australia during the absence of the Australian cruisers, and would place the ships in the best position from which to meet any attempt of the German cruisers to remain in the Pacific Islands or to return in the direction of New Guinea or Australia.³

That they would take either of these courses was not Admiral Jerram's opinion. He telegraphed:—

“ There is absolutely no news of the *Gneisenau* and *Scharnhorst* since August 9. They are well supplied with coal, and I consider it possible, or even probable, that they will be next heard of on our American coast, and that they will attack our trade either off Straits of Magellan or off mouth of River Plate.”

(139 from Commander-in-Chief, China; received 1.20 a.m., September 12, 1914.)

30. **Projected Return to Hong Kong.**—Though his flagship was to go to New Britain, the Admiral did not propose to go himself as it would be impossible for him to control from there the complications of the work devolving upon him. Under him were British, French, Russian and Japanese ships;⁴ the

¹ See C.B. 917—Monograph: *German Cruiser Squadron*.

² C. 34.

³ C. 37, 38.

⁴ Some idea of the miscomprehensions which arise in an international squadron can be gathered from the remarks made to a British Officer acting as liaison in a Japanese ship; he was told there was no objection to his praying in the wardroom, and was asked: “What is the chief recreation of British Naval Officers besides drinking?”

Triumph at Tsingtau, the Sandakan division which was now in place, the escort of the British regiments from China, the Australian convoy which the *Hampshire* had been ordered to join, the French Squadron guarding the Malacca Straits, and the patrol of the trade routes by the armed merchant cruisers all called for his supervision. As Singapore had for wireless only an installation improvised in a merchant ship, he proposed to establish his headquarters ashore at Hong Kong, where he would be in a central position well served with the machinery of communications.¹

His proposal was approved by the Admiralty on September 13, but before a move could be made the whole situation was changed by the receipt of intelligence that a new enemy had appeared in a new area.

CHAPTER VI.

THE "EMDEN" APPEARS.

31. **Early Movements of "Emden."**—One of the objects of Admiral Jerram's visit to Yap had been to intercept the light cruiser *Emden*, then known to be making her way southward from Tsingtau. He had not seen her and nothing more had been heard of her; indeed, it was thought at one time that she had returned to Tsingtau; but the Japanese had ascertained that she was not there. The most natural assumption was that she had joined von Spee, and this, in fact, was what she had done. From captured documents and German publications it has been possible to piece together an account of her movements and we now know that, in the first week of August, she proceeded from Tsingtau towards Vladivostock, captured a Russian volunteer liner named *Riasan*, and took her back to Tsingtau where the prize was armed and renamed *Cormoran II*. The *Emden* then, on August 6, started from Tsingtau with one collier, the *Markomannia*, and proceeded straight to the Ladrone Islands, where Admiral von Spee was preparing for war.

Here her Captain, Karl von Müller, suggested that he should attack British commerce in the Indian Ocean, where the chances of cruiser warfare were good and where his appearance would have great effect on the natives. Admiral von Spee had at one time considered the question of taking the whole squadron into the Indian Ocean but was deterred by coaling difficulties. However, he consented to the departure of one light cruiser, and gave Captain von Müller his fastest collier, the *Markomannia*.² The *Emden* proceeded on August 14, coaled at Angaur, and on

¹ C.L. 24; C. 35. ² German Official History. *Kreuzerkrieg I*, pp. 80-82.

August 25 coaled again off the island of Timor. From there the two ships passed along the northern shores of Flores and Sumbawa Islands. On the way the *Emden* stopped, but released, the S.S. *Tromp*; however, the vessel was Dutch, and no hint of the incident reached our intelligence agents. Passing on, the *Emden* slipped southward through the passage between Bali and Lombok, and by August 29 was in the Indian Ocean.¹

Admiral Jerram's expectation that a search of the Dutch East Indies would yield some result was very nearly realised, for as on September 4 the *Emden* was coaling at Langeni, or Telok Delam, on the east side of Simalur Island, the *Hampshire* in the course of her search of the west coast of Sumatra (see para. 28) must have passed close to her. In fact, she had searched that very anchorage the previous day.

Equally unconscious of what had so nearly been a meeting, the ships proceeded in opposite directions, the *Hampshire* to rejoin the Admiral at Singapore, and the *Emden* into the Bay of Bengal. She was the first warship of any nation to enter that peaceful spot since the outbreak of war.

32. **Shipping Precautions.**—On August 4 the Admiralty had issued a general telegram to all Commanders-in-Chief and Intelligence Officers to the effect:—

"Advise all British shipping with which you may be in touch to abandon regular tracks, complete voyages without bunkering if possible, reduce brilliancy of lights. . . ."

This was in accordance with the Admiralty policy that trade should be as little hindered as possible by war operations; a policy directly opposed to that of Germany, whose merchant ships had been instructed to run for the nearest neutral port and stay there till the end of the war. At first, British ships in the East showed some reluctance to move for fear of possible armed merchant cruisers; but they soon recovered confidence. On August 9 the Intelligence Officer, Singapore, stopped the route to ports north of Java in view of information he had received, but the Admiralty immediately wired to him:—

"Most important trade should not be stopped unless absolutely necessary."

Again, on August 31, they telegraphed:—

"Constant complaints received from shipowners, vessels being detained, especially in Far Eastern and Australian waters. A Government scheme for war insurance has been designed to keep ships running in spite of some losses.

"Essential trade of Empire should continue uninterrupted. If vessels sail after dark, make good offing and avoid regular tracks, danger of capture small.

"Most essential impress this on all concerned. No ships should ever be detained unless definite news of presence of enemy cruisers in immediate vicinity."

¹ M. 0955/15. See plan at p. 116.

The losses anticipated from enemy action did not occur, and by the middle of September the Oriental trade route seemed so safe that in the Bay of Bengal, the only large portion of the sea whose shores are entirely British, shipping was proceeding as in peace time, and even the elementary precautions of avoiding regular tracks and obscuring lights were neglected. It should be remembered in this connection that to avoid the regular track means a more expensive, because longer voyage; and to obscure lights increases the danger of being in the wrong in case of collision, both results being particularly repugnant to owners and masters. Not only had these almost forgotten the danger they ran through the war, but the Ceylon and Indian papers continued to give exact details of the cargoes, dates of arrival and sailing, and destinations of the merchant ships in the East,¹ and these papers were, of course, on board the ships themselves.

33. Captures on the Colombo-Calcutta Route.—The first vessel to run into the *Emden's* arms was the *Indus*, which had left Calcutta, September 7, for Bombay to take up duty as a Government transport. At 9.10 a.m., September 10, in Lat. 11° N., Long. 38° 45' E., she sighted a warship which she naturally assumed to be British; but the cruiser was the *Emden*, who, after boarding the *Indus* and disabling her W/T, transferred her crew to the *Markomannia*, and sank the prize by 10 shots.²

While this was in progress there came up another vessel, a Greek collier named *Pontoporos*, with 6,000 tons of Bengal coal aboard. This was a valuable reserve for a raider existing like the *Emden* on captures, and the Greek ship was not sunk but added to the squadron, consisting now of the *Emden* and two colliers. The three then proceeded slowly along the trade route towards Calcutta.

Next day another vessel came up to them. She was the *Lovat* from Calcutta, also chartered as a Government transport. Her master, seeing the cruiser and the two ships, thought this must be the convoy he was to join; but he was soon undeceived, and two hours later his ship went to the bottom while her crew was transferred to the *Markomannia*, six Indian firemen being sent to the *Pontoporos* to trim coal. The *Emden* continued her course northward.

Throughout the daytime of September 12 she saw nothing, but at 11 p.m. a steamer with lights approached and was stopped. She was the *Kabinga* from Calcutta, not a transport this time, but with general cargo. At first Captain von Müller intended to sink her, but learning that the captain had his wife and child on board, he allowed them to remain aboard till daylight, and

¹ Report from I.O. Colombo, N.I.D. 3116/14.

² For details of the cargoes of the ships captured by *Emden*, see Fayle: *Seaborne Trade*.

then when at 7 a.m. another ship, the *Killin*, came up to him, he decided to use the *Kabinga* to accommodate his rapidly increasing prisoners.

A few hours later a big ship was observed approaching. This was the *Diplomat* from Calcutta with 7,000 tons of general cargo. Sighting the *Emden* the master assumed her to be the British cruiser with three German prizes of which he had heard; he was right as to the cruiser and prizes, but soon found himself wrong as to the nationality, and the *Diplomat* went down to the bottom before sunset, carrying with her 30,000 chests of tea. The loss of this ship cost the Government £82,000 insurance money. She was accompanied to her end by the *Killin*, although that ship had 5,000 tons of Bengal coal aboard. Probably Captain von Müller felt he had enough of this in the *Pontoporos*, and did not want to spare another prize crew.

Just before they sank, another vessel overtook the squadron, this time from the south. She was the Italian S.S. *Loredano*, bound for Calcutta, a neutral. Captain von Müller stopped her, endeavoured to get her to relieve him of his prisoners, but this the Italian skipper, Captain Giacopolo, refused to do on the grounds that he had not enough provisions. So she had to be released in spite of the presumption that she would soon give the alarm. She had no wireless, which gave Captain von Müller a short breathing space; but he was now in 18° N. and 86° E., not far from Calcutta, whence news of his raid should soon start a hunt for him. Before he left the district, however, he took two more prizes. The first of these, the *Traboch*, a large coasting steamer bound for Calcutta, he captured 33 miles south-east from False Point; her crew he transferred to the *Kabinga*, which he sent off to Calcutta with all prisoners. Shortly after she had left, the *Clan Matheson* arrived and was captured and sunk. Captain von Müller waited some time longer and coaled from the *Pontoporos*; then, feeling probably that Calcutta had been warned he made off for Rangoon.¹

The Italian master of the *Loredano* had done well. Meeting the *City of Rangoon*, a vessel with cargo worth £600,000, he warned her to turn back; and it was this vessel that gave the alarm.² Thus, at 10.26 p.m. on September 14 the Admiralty received from Captain Caulfeild, R.M.A., Intelligence Officer, Colombo:—

“German *Emden* with four prizes sighted by Italian steamer, position 18° N., 86° 16' E. Time not reported. Estimated 8 a.m., September 13. . . .”

This he followed next morning by a further telegram giving the time of the encounter as 5 p.m., September 13, and when the

¹ Fikentscher's Diary mentions another Italian, the *Dandolo*, as met on September 13.

² M. 10041/14.

Kabinga came in he was able to add from the reports of her crew:—

“ *Emden* position 16 miles south-east of False Point, Bay of Bengal, 11.30 p.m., 14th.”

(Received 5.14 p.m., September 15.)

The news had come from the Port Officer, Calcutta, who on receipt of it immediately closed his port and informed his chief at Colombo. There the Intelligence Officer gave instructions for all vessels in the Bay of Bengal trade to be detained in port and for the Colombo-Singapore route to be closed;¹ these orders had the effect of depriving the *Emden* of any further bait.

34. Inauguration of the Hunting Squadron.—The raid had taken place in waters belonging to the East Indies Station, but Admiral Peirse's Squadron was fully employed with convoy work, a large body of Indian troops being due to start in a few days. There was now no ship at the Colombo focal point, which, in the early days of the war, had been patrolled by the *Fox* and *Espiègle*; for the *Fox* was on escort duty and the *Espiègle* had left Colombo on September 13 for the Persian Gulf. In fact, there was no man-of-war in the Bay of Bengal at all.² The chase of the *Emden*, therefore, devolved on Admiral Jerram, and as soon as he heard the intelligence (which did not reach him till the night of September 15–16) he took prompt action. The only ships he had available were those which had just returned from their cruise to the Java Sea, and these he ordered off to make a combined search of the Bay of Bengal. The *Hampshire*, being coaled and ready, got away first at 4.30 a.m. on the 16th, the *Chikuma* left the same afternoon, and the *Yarmouth*, which had been in dock, at noon on the 17th. These he placed under the orders of Captain H. W. Grant of the *Hampshire*, to whom he gave instructions to search for the *Emden*.³

35. Captain Grant's Scheme of Operations.—Captain Grant's original intention had been to proceed with the *Hampshire* and *Chikuma* direct to Dondra Head, the southern point of Ceylon, and thence work up the trade routes towards Madras and Calcutta, while the *Yarmouth* examined the Nicobar and Andaman Islands on the way towards Rangoon; but on September 18 the *Yarmouth* developed machinery defects and had to put into Penang, and he, therefore, decided to go up the Eastern Islands himself, while the *Chikuma* proceeded alone for the west shore of the bay.⁴ The northern entrance to the Straits

¹ Fayle: *Seaborne Trade*, Vol. I, p. 206.

² See plan.

³ C.L. 24. The Admiralty had sent orders for *Hampshire* and *Yarmouth* to go in search of *Emden*, but he seems to have taken action before receiving them. See C. 41, 44, 45.

⁴ Captain Grant's Report of Proceedings. M. 0309/15.





SEPT. 15. EMDEN REPORTED IN BAY OF BENGAL.

Positions of H.M. Ships from their logs; of Allied Ships estimated.

of Malacca was still guarded by the *D'Iberville* and French destroyers, to which was now added the *Dupleix*, which was to take charge of them as soon as she was ready. She had followed Admiral Jerram down to Singapore, and on September 7 had gone on to Penang where she was carrying out machinery repairs.¹

35A. Von Spee Located.—It will be remembered that the last arrangement had been for the *Minotaur*, *Ibuki* and *Chikuma* to go to Rabaul and cover Australia during the absence of the main part of Admiral Patey's Squadron with the Australian convoy which was about to start. The *Chikuma* had now been taken to hunt for the *Emden*, while from the Pacific had come some intelligence which was to alter considerably the remainder of the arrangements. On the morning of September 14 the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* made their first appearance since the outbreak of war, at the spot which Admiral Patey had considered them most likely to visit. This was Apia in the Samoan Group,² now in possession of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force. Finding there the British Flag flying, the two German cruisers steamed off in a north-westerly direction without firing a shot. At last the main strength of the German East Asiatic Squadron was located, and the Admiralty, who received the news from the Colonial Office at 2 a.m. on September 16, reconsidered their plans for dealing with the various operations within striking distance of the German Admiral.

36. New Dispositions.—The Samoa force was presumably safe, for it was in possession of the islands and the Germans had no men to spare for landing parties, but the fleet base at Simpsonhafen was protected only by the light cruiser *Encounter* and the smaller craft of the Australian Navy, since Admiral Patey with the *Australia*, *Melbourne* and *Sydney* was already on his way to Australia where he was to pick up the transports of the Australian contingent. He was expecting the *Minotaur*, *Ibuki* and *Chikuma* to leave Singapore for Rabaul on September 18, in accordance with the last arrangement made between Admiral Jerram and himself; but Singapore was 3,000 miles away, and in the meantime the base at Simpsonhafen must be protected. Accordingly the Admiralty now sent to the two Admirals the following orders:—

“ Situation changed by appearance of *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* at Samoa on September 14 and *Emden* in Bay of Bengal.

“ *Australia* and *Montcalm* to cover *Encounter* and expeditionary force from attack, and then search for the two cruisers.

“ *Melbourne* to be used at R.A.'s discretion; *Sydney* to return for convoy of Australian troops to Aden.

¹ Corbett's *Naval Operations*: Vol. I, Map 13, gives a complete track-chart of the ships hunting the *Emden*. The inset, however, is incorrect. See para. 61.

² See para. 23.

"Hampshire and Yarmouth to sink Emden.

"Minotaur to arrive at Fremantle by October 4 for Australian convoy.

"One Japanese cruiser to accompany Minotaur."
(176 to China; 18 to R.A.C., Australia. Sent 12.40 p.m., 16.9.14.)

Admiral Jerram, therefore, countermanded the despatch of the *Minotaur* and *Ibuki* to Rabaul, and, instead, on September 18 sent the *Minotaur* to the west coast of Sumatra and the *Ibuki* to the Cocos to look out in those districts for the *Emden*, and to be ready to proceed to Fremantle when necessary.¹

37. Capture of German Collier.—The appearance of the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* off Samoa threw little light on the problem of their immediate destination. Admiral Patey had suggested that South America was their objective, with Tahiti as their next port of call, but against this there had been intercepted a German message which appeared to be an order for a ship called *Tannenfels* to make a rendezvous on the north side of New Guinea. This *Tannenfels* was a German vessel with 6,000 tons of coal, which had left Batavia on September 1.² She at first was sighted making apparently for Sunda Strait, but this was probably a false course, for on September 14 she was captured in Basilan Strait, south-west of Mindanao, by the *Chelmer*, one of the destroyers operating from Sandakan. Her capture was made the subject of a protest by the United States on the ground that it was within their territorial waters; but as the position of the *Tannenfels* when captured was more than 3 miles from the nearest land and could be reached without passing through an entrance less than 6 miles in width, the protest was apparently not allowed by us.³ The Sandakan Squadron made another capture next day in the Sulu Archipelago of the *Rio Passig*, a United States collier, which had left Manila on August 5 for the German Squadron, but after visiting Yap, Angaur, and Ceram, had been unable to find them and still had her 4,000 tons of coal on board.⁴

These captures reduced by two more the supply ships upon which Admiral von Spee might be dependent. Any use of the northern chain of Pacific Islands would soon be denied to him, since a Japanese Squadron,⁵ three powerful, but slow, cruisers and two destroyers, had left Yokosuka on September 14 to search the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall Groups.⁶

38. Manila.—Besides this squadron the Japanese were preparing to send another to watch ships leaving Manila, where

¹ C.L. 24.

² C. 40. She had been ordered by the Dutch to discharge her coal or leave the port (*Kreuzerkrieg* I, 115).

³ M. 03341/14. Position 6° 48' N., 122° 16' E.

⁴ C. 48.

⁵ *Kurama*, cruiser, 4—12 in., 8—8 in., 18·1 knots; *Tsukuba*, cruiser, 4—12 in., 12—6 in., 17·3 knots; *Asama*, cruiser, 4—8 in., 14—6 in., 18·4 knots; *Yamakaze*, *Umikaze*, destroyers.

⁶ C.L. 24; the telegram C. 47 mentioned only one destroyer.

the *Empress of Asia* and *Empress of Russia* were still maintaining their patrol. The German colliers *Elmshorn* and *Bochum* on September 14 were reported by our Consul at Manila as ready to leave, and three more German ships were stated by the French Consul to be coaling on the 15th. From one of the *Bochum's* stokers, an Englishman, our Intelligence Officer at Hong Kong heard that either the *Scharnhorst* or *Gneisenau* had met the *Emden* and *Geier* about August 24 off the north coast of Borneo.¹ Later evidence shows that this report was quite untrue, and, in any case, it could hardly affect operations since the two big cruisers were now known to be near Samoa and the *Emden* had made her appearance in the Bay of Bengal.

39. Emden off Rangoon.—After leaving the approach to Calcutta the *Emden* was next sighted at 6.30 p.m. on September 18 off Rangoon, and next morning the Norwegian ship *Dovre* arrived at that port with the crew of the *Clan Matheson*, who had been turned over to her by the *Emden*. Captain von Müller remained a couple of days in the neighbourhood, but finding no prey, as shipping was not on the move, he made off across the bay again. If the *Emden* had remained long off Rangoon she might have been caught by Captain Grant, who, in the *Hampshire*, was working his way north; but it is possible she knew he was coming, since the Indian authorities were sending messages "*en clair*"—a practice which seemed to Captain Grant so dangerous that he went in to Port Blair, Andaman Islands, at noon on the 19th, to request the stoppage of it. From there he continued his way northward towards Rangoon. About 4 a.m. on the 20th he passed through the position where it was subsequently discovered the *Emden* had been at noon on September 19. Captain Grant did not go in to Rangoon, but turned westward round the head of the Bay of Bengal. The *Yarmouth* completed her repairs and left Penang at 5.15 a.m. on the 20th, to proceed also in the direction of Rangoon, which she visited on the 22nd. The *Chikuma* steamed along the parallel of 6° N. towards Colombo,² and it was her turn this time to miss the *Emden*.

40. Raid on Madras.—Captain von Müller, finding that he was drawing blank at Rangoon, decided on a new operation. The fact was that traffic to and from the ports in the head of the Bay of Bengal had been stopped as soon as the *Emden's* presence was known, and no movement of British ships was in progress. The German captain may have realised this, for his next move was of a new kind. Standing right across the Bay of Bengal he arrived off Madras on September 22. At 9.30 p.m., approaching close to the shore, he switched on his searchlights and illuminated the harbour and town; simultaneously he opened fire on the Burmah Oil Company's tanks that lay close

¹ C. 36, 39, 42.

² Capt. Grant's Report, M. 0309/15.

to the town between his ship and the harbour. Before he had fired 30 rounds, two of the tanks were ablaze, the flames vividly lighting up the whole foreshore so much that the *Emden* had no difficulty in picking her target. They also lit up the ships and enabled the shore batteries to reply, but these had feeble guns and did no harm.¹ The *Emden* was firing for about half an hour. A few shots fell in the town and in bungalows near the oil tanks, and one shell burst aboard the S.S. *Chupra* in the harbour, causing altogether 26 casualties. The raider then switched off her searchlights, ceased firing and disappeared. The whole incident, its unexpectedness, the glare of the burning tanks and the ineffectiveness of the defence made a deep impression on the native mind and seriously disturbed the course of trade.²

The nearest ship to the scene of this episode was the *Chikuma*. Captain Grant, as soon as he heard that the *Emden* was at Rangoon, had endeavoured to order the Japanese cruiser there, but she did not get the message till she was near enough to Colombo to make it necessary for her to coal there before proceeding to Rangoon. She arrived at Colombo on the 21st, whereupon Captain Grant, who intended to coal at Madras, asked the *Chikuma* to go there with a collier; and in pursuance of this order, the Japanese cruiser proceeded with the collier at 9 a.m. on September 22.³ She was thus making for the same point as the *Emden*. From Colombo to Madras is 590 miles, and as the speed of the collier was only 7 knots, she would be 340 miles from the blazing oil tanks when the *Emden* disappeared from Madras. The news of the bombardment reached the Intelligence Officer, Colombo, at 11 p.m., and was immediately sent by wireless to the *Chikuma*, who, on receipt of it, sent the collier back to Colombo and hurried northward at her best speed. There was still a chance of a meeting since the *Emden* proceeded southward with her collier in company, and spent several hours off Pondichery next morning in order to coal from her.⁴ The two disappeared again at 2 p.m., September 23. The *Hampshire* was bearing down on her from the north, but at the moment when the *Emden* disappeared was still about 300 miles from Pondichery. Captain Grant does not seem to have received the Pondichery intelligence; in his Report of

¹ The defence consisted of 6 R.M.L. 6.3 in. Howitzers, 6 Maxims, 6 B.L. 15-pdrs.; there were also 2 Q.F. 4.7 in. guns as a moveable armament, intended to be hauled by 10 pairs of bullocks (Scheme for the Defence of Madras, 1913, General Staff, India).

² See Fayle: *Seaborne Trade*.

³ C. 54. Captain Grant in his Report of Proceedings says that after completing with coal she waited for further orders which were really unnecessary in view of the fact that she was carrying out the original programme of sweeping the East Coast of India.

⁴ *Markomania's* Track Chart, M. 0309/15.

Proceedings he does not mention it, and after stating that the *Emden* was reported off Madras, says:—

“ . . . *Chikuma* turned south to look out in the vicinity of Trincomali, which I thought *Emden* might possibly attack as she was apparently moving out of the bay.”

The third member of the hunting group, the *Yarmouth*, only left Rangoon that day to take up patrol off Acheh Head.

41. **Effect of Madras Raid.**—The effect of the *Emden's* raid on Madras was perhaps as great as that of any of her exploits. Captain von Müller had cleverly managed to give an impression of omniscience by telling the masters of some of his captures when they had left Colombo and what their cargoes were. But this information he had quite simply received from the Ceylon papers seized in the first ship he found. Again, at a time when attention was attracted to the eastern side of the bay, and only a few hours after the trade route to Calcutta had been declared “reasonably safe” again,¹ he had made a startling reappearance at one of the principal commercial harbours on that very trade route; and, disappearing amid flames and rolling smoke, left a deep impression, not only on the natives but on the British merchants as well. In the minds of the latter, who naturally could not rightly appreciate the difficulties of the situation, it was obvious that the advice given by the authorities could not be relied on; and mistrust of the directions of the Admiralty and Intelligence Officers began to spread. The Indian Press from September 23 onwards was full of letters pointing scorn at the ineptitude of the naval authorities. A favourite *nom-de-plume* for the writers of these letters was “Reasonably Safe.”

In the circumstances it might have been expected that Admiral Jerram would send more than three cruisers to deal with the *Emden*, and yet the general situation scarcely permitted such a course. Admiral Patey had repeatedly urged that the China Squadron should join his in a combined search of the Pacific Islands for von Spee; this, so far, had not been arranged. The *Minotaur* and *Ibuki* were to escort the Australasian convoy; the *Triumph* was at Tsingtau; the French and Russian ships at Admiral Jerram's disposal were mostly broken down; and the American neutrality at Manila compelled the Admiral to keep his weaker forces off that port. In fact, just after the bombardment of Madras, when he may have been considering the question of utilising in the Bay of Bengal some of the vessels engaged in the Philippines patrol, the Admiralty warned him that 15 German ships were now full of coal at Manila, and asked him whether he could not take steps to watch these vessels. He had two *Empress* liners relieving each other on patrol outside the Eastern Channel, with two sloops and a

¹ C. 49, 56.

destroyer flotilla watching the Southern Channel, and the Admiralty's telegram pointed to the necessity of still retaining them there.¹ Besides all these considerations there was, in addition, the movement of troops homeward, which here, as in the other stations, raised another demand upon naval force.

CHAPTER VII.

ESCORTS FOR TROOP TRANSPORTS.

42. **The "Arcadia" Convoy.**—Both the British cruisers searching for the *Emden* had before her appearance been intended for convoy duty, the *Hampshire* with the Australian contingent, and the *Yarmouth* with the British regiments from China. These last were now on their way, but had started several days later than the naval arrangements had anticipated. The transport *Arcadia* left Chingwangtao on September 16 with the 2nd Gloucester Regiment, and also brought the 100 men of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, who, at the outbreak of war, had volunteered for service in the *Triumph*;² the remainder of that regiment were in another transport, the *Nile*. With them also were the *Carnarvonshire* in which the Singapore garrison were to embark, and the *Cordillère*, a French ship bringing rifles and ammunition from Japan which the French Government had asked us to escort. North of Hong Kong no escort had been considered necessary owing to the Japanese command of the sea,³ but between it and Singapore the presence of armed ships was indispensable. The transports had accordingly left Hong Kong on September 21 escorted by the *Askold* and *Empress of Asia*. The intention had been that the *Zhemchug* should have taken the place of the *Empress of Asia*, which was wanted for the Manila patrol, but the Russian cruiser's engines were in bad condition, and she was to come on later with some French transports from Saigon. The destination of the British regiments was Calcutta, but the *Cordillère* was to wait at Singapore for the arrival of the French troopships with the *Zhemchug*, and would then be taken with them by the *Dupleix* to Colombo, and possibly Aden. A few days after the *Arcadia* convoy had started, the War Office wished to change the destination of the Duke of Cornwall's Regiment from Calcutta to Bombay; but to provide a separate escort for one regiment in the circumstances was impossible, and it was decided on September 22 that the British troops should all go to Bombay to join one of the Indian convoys, for it was ultimately arranged

¹ C. 57.

² The *Triumph* was still assisting in the blockade of Tsingtau.

by the War Office that they should come back to England.¹ They arrived at Singapore on the 26th, their passage having afforded some protection to the trade route, which for some time had not been patrolled, since the activity of the German colliers at Manila had caused Admiral Jerram to order the *Himalaya* from there to assist the *Empress of Russia* in place of the *Empress of Asia*.

43. **German Colliers at Manila.**—The *Empress of Japan*, which at first had shared the patrol of the Hong Kong-Singapore trade route with the *Himalaya*, had been at Singapore since September 13. When the *Minotaur* departed for the West Coast of Sumatra, Admiral Jerram shifted his flag to the *Empress of Japan* on the 17th, but feeling that she was being wasted in harbour he obtained the Admiralty's permission to hoist his flag on shore, and on the 23rd sent her through Banka and Makassar Straits to Sandakan, from which place she was to escort the prizes *Tannenfels* and *Rio Passig* to Hong Kong for adjudication by the Prize Court.² The presence of the squadrons on each side of Manila appeared to have stopped the departure of the coal for the enemy cruisers, no German vessels having left Manila between September 4 and 25.³ On the 26th, however, the *Elmshorn*, collier, which for some time had been reported as ready, sailed during the night of September 26-27, but sighting the *Himalaya* outside put back again.⁴ The Sandakan Squadron was to be strengthened by the Japanese cruiser *Nisshin*, which had been put at Admiral Jerram's disposal. He at first ordered her from Hong Kong on the 25th to Singapore as the Admiralty wished her to join the Australian convoy in addition to the *Minotaur* and *Ibuki*;⁵ but when the departure of that convoy was delayed he sent her in the meantime to Sandakan, where, with the two sloops and five destroyers she was to carry out a search of the Banda and Flores Seas in which possibly the *Geier* or the armed auxiliaries *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* and *Riasan* might be lurking. The anxiety of the Germans in Manila to get supply ships out lent some colour to the idea of the presence of some armed enemies in those waters.⁶

44. **"Minotaur" and "Ibuki" leave the Station.**—The delay in the departure of the Australian convoy which permitted the *Nisshin's* participation in this search was due to apprehensions on the part of the New Zealand Government that the appearance of the German cruisers at Samoa implied that they were coming south to attack the New Zealand transports. These were to have left Wellington on the 25th escorted by "P" class cruisers as far as Albany, where they would join up with the rest of the Australian transports, but in spite of the Admiralty's

¹ C. 45, 46, 50, 51, 60.

² C.L. 24.

³ This is corroborated by the German Official History, *Kreuzerkrieg I*, 112.

⁴ C.L. 25.

⁵ C. 52.

⁶ C.L. 52.

assurance that the route was safe the New Zealand Government refused to let them sail without a stronger escort.¹

The Admiralty, therefore, on September 23 ordered Admiral Jerram to send the *Minotaur* and *Ibuki* forthwith at good speed round the south of Australia to Wellington. There had been difficulty in communicating with them for some time owing to bad atmospherics in that region of electric storms;² but he got the order through, and the *Minotaur*, at 11.30 p.m. on the 23rd, started for Fremantle, working up gradually to 15 knots. She sighted the *Ibuki* on the 27th and together they proceeded for Wellington,³ which they were to reach on October 14, when the convoy would commence its long voyage to Europe, unless circumstances permitted an earlier start. The two most powerful ships under Admiral Jerram's command were thus detached for a voyage along the south of Australia, which seemed an unlikely place to meet an enemy vessel, or was at any rate away from the sphere of the *Emden's* activity.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE FIRST MINIKOI RAID.

45. The Oriental Trade Route.—So far the *Emden* had been operating only on the Calcutta branch of the great Oriental Trade Route. The main trunk of this route runs from Singapore to Aden, and for the protection of it the East Indies Squadron had been stationed in the Indian Ocean. Plans for the defence of trade in his command had been drawn up by Admiral Peirse, Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.⁴

The chief danger anticipated was from merchant vessels which the enemy might manage to arm. As the ports of the Indian Ocean were nearly all British, it was not from there that such raiders would be likely to come, but rather from the Dutch East Indies and the harbours of South China, from which intelligence was difficult to obtain. Should they appear on the trade routes Admiral Peirse considered that "the points at which they will probably strike are those where the trade routes are restricted and where, in consequence, the vessels are closer together and more easily found than in the open sea." Such points are not difficult to settle. A glance at the map will show a fringe of islands extending from Australia to Rangoon which constrain trade to pass through two Straits; Sumatra bars the way from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean, and trade from

¹ See pp. 13 to 19 for details.

² C. 53, 55.

³ Log of *Minotaur*.

⁴ See p. 123.

America and the Far East must pass either south or north of it, that is, either through Sunda Strait or between Aceh Head and the Nicobars. Coming further west all the routes converge on Dondra Head, the south point of Ceylon. Nothing can pass between Ceylon and the mainland since the Strait is not navigable. In the Gulf of Aden the routes coalesce into a stream which must pass the Straits of Bab el Mandeb. Thus four of the points considered by Admiral Peirse as affording the best chance of prey to a raider were Sunda Strait, the Straits of Malacca, Dondra Head and the Gulf of Aden. But there was a fifth, which though in mid-ocean has the curious property of being a focal point of trade.

46. Minikoi.—Four hundred miles from Colombo the route to Aden is crossed by a barrier reef of coral which runs north and south on the meridian of 75° E. for a thousand miles. There is a gap 120 miles wide in the barrier just where the line from Colombo to Aden cuts it, and in the middle of the gap is a little coral island called Minikoi; and thus within sight of Minikoi in Lat. 8° N. passes practically all our trade to and from the Far East, Calcutta, and the East Indian Archipelago, and much of that with Australia.¹ Any enemy vessel that could maintain itself near Minikoi would be certain of meeting ships; on either side of the island there is only 60 miles of clear water and the reef effectually prevents any wider diversion.

Admiral Peirse had, therefore, included Minikoi with the four other danger points and he had assigned the vessels under his command to one or other of these five stations. When war broke out, however, his plans were so altered by the necessities of the moment and the unexpected transfer of the Indian Armies to Egypt and France that, like the Bay of Bengal, Minikoi since the first week of the war had not seen a man-of-war.

47. Movements of the Hunting Squadron.—Captain Grant's attention was fixed on the Bay of Bengal. He had the *Yarmouth* on patrol off Aceh Head; the *Chikuma* seems to have gone north from Trincomali and then carried out a patrol off the east coast of Ceylon; the *Hampshire* herself continued southward from Madras and put into Colombo to coal on September 26. The *Emden* had disappeared. Captain Grant had now to settle his next move. Admiral Jerram had left him a free hand, furnishing him with all available information to assist him, but refraining, as far as possible, from hampering him with too much advice.² He had, however, asked him, if possible, to assist with the convoy work. Not only had the Admiral to consider the *Arcadia* convoy, which was to leave

¹ A detailed description of the Oriental Trade Route is given in Fayle: *Seaborne Trade*, Vol. I, Chapter VII.

² C.L. 25.

Singapore on September 28 for Colombo with the *Askold* and *Empress of Asia*, but also there was the *El Kantara*, a French ship, bringing eight batteries of field guns and ammunition urgently required by the French Government.¹ This ship was being escorted to Colombo by the *Dupleix*, which had left Penang on September 26 with orders to add the *El Kantara* to the *Arcadia* convoy; the *Dupleix* was still in need of repair which she would effect at Colombo and could steam only 10 knots. Still another French transport, the *Amiral Olry*, which had come up from Saigon to Hong Kong should leave there under the escort of the *Zhemchug* on September 27. The Admiral had thus felt compelled to call on Captain Grant for any assistance possible. Captain Grant, therefore, having no idea where the *Emden* was likely to turn up again, decided to follow the Colombo-Singapore trade route, and possibly carry out simultaneously the services of hunting for the raider and supporting the convoys.² He was halfway across to Achel Head when the *Emden* again revealed herself.

48. **Arrival of the "Gryfevale."**—With Captain Grant's concurrence the Intelligence Officer, Colombo, declared the route from his port to Singapore reasonably safe as from 8 a.m., September 28,³ and ships began to move again; but exactly 24 hours later, there came into Colombo a steamer, the *Gryfevale*, on passage from Bombay to Calcutta. She brought news of the *Emden*—authentic news; indeed, on board her were the crews of five vessels captured by Captain von Müller in the area between Colombo and Minikoi. From Pondicheri he had made out into the Bay of Bengal, and then rounded the South of Ceylon on the usual track almost within sight of land. Somewhere in this passage he must have come fairly close to the *Chikuma*. A prisoner taken from a ship by the *Emden* in October reports being told by her officers that "on seeing a Japanese cruiser "approaching, *Emden* promptly hoisted the British Ensign, "whereupon the Japanese saluted and passed on."⁴

Off the Point de Galle on September 25, the *Emden* met the first prize of what was to be the new batch. This was the *King Lud* on the way to Calcutta direct from Suez; she had called at no intermediate port and was quite unaware of danger. After embarking her crew and sinking her, Captain von Müller continued northward. So close did he go to Colombo, then well illuminated by searchlights, that he was able to watch the black hull of a steamer coming out, and decided to follow and capture her.⁵ She was showing the usual navigation lights and the chase was easy. After they had gone some 50 miles towards Minikoi Captain von Müller thought he was far enough from land and called on the steamer by Morse to stop. The signal took some time to get through, but finally she was stopped and

¹ C. 58, 63, 66.


² Captain Grant's Report, M. 0309/15.

³ C. 59.

⁴ M. 04929/14.

⁵ Lieut. von Mücke of the *Emden*, I.D. 1014.





DISPOSITION SEPT. 29. 8 A.M.

GRYFEVALE arrives at Colombo with news of *EMDEN*'s captures off Minikoi.
 Positions of H.M. Ships from their logs; of Allied Ships estimated.

boarded and was found to be the *Tymeric*, homeward bound. She was sunk during the night. Next afternoon the *Gryfevale* was captured; Captain von Müller retained her as a prison ship, which his previous experience had shown to be necessary. His next capture was an Admiralty collier named *Buresk* on passage to join the China Squadron. She was of the greatest value to him as the *Markomannia* was now empty, and, naturally, he did not sink the *Buresk*, but putting a prize crew on board kept her for his own use. On September 27, two more outward bound steamers, the *Ribera* and *Foyle*, were captured; and this total Captain von Müller considered to be enough. He had captured five vessels but had missed seven others,¹ though this he did not know. Keeping the *Buresk* and *Markomannia* with him he sent off the *Gryfevale* to Colombo with all the prisoners and once more disappeared.²

All this information the *Gryfevale* was able to give to our Intelligence Officer when she arrived at Colombo at 8 a.m. on September 29. The last position in which the *Emden* had been seen was 7° 50' N., 74° 45' E., at 10 p.m., September 27.³ The news brought by the *Gryfevale* found our ships disposed as in the attached plan. The *Hampshire*, after unconsciously following the *Emden* round the south of Ceylon, had put into Colombo; coaling there, she had then gone off eastward at 1 a.m. on September 27. She was now halfway towards Aceh Head. The *Chikuma* arrived at Colombo some hours after the *Gryfevale*; at first she intended to sail at once for the focal point at C. Comorin,⁴ but stayed behind to coal. The *Yarmouth*, which had been searching the Nicobars, was coaling at Penang. The *Dupleix* with her transport was halfway from Singapore to Colombo; and the *Askold* and *Empress of Asia* were in the Malacca Strait with their *Arcadia* convoy. The East Indies Squadron had just arrived at Aden with a large convoy of Indian troops and are out of the picture. The French cruiser *D'Iberville* and the three French destroyers seemed to have remained throughout in the close neighbourhood of Penang.

49. **Hunting Squadron, September 29 to October 5.**—The new intelligence did not reach Captain Grant till midnight, September 29–30, when he immediately altered course to west for Colombo,⁵ and ordered the *Chikuma* to proceed for Minikoi. The Japanese cruiser left at 8.30 a.m., September 30.⁶ The *Yarmouth* got away from Penang at 4 p.m., September 29, and steamed at 15 knots on the route to Colombo. By 1 p.m. next day she was off Aceh Head, but continued westward, a few hours later overtaking the *Askold*, *Empress of Asia*, and *Arcadia* convoy. When halfway across she turned back, patrolled off Aceh Head, and went into Penang again on

¹ Report of I.O., Colombo, N.I.D. 3116/14.

² Fikentscher's Diary mentions also the Dutch liner *Djoicja* on September 27.

³ C. 61, 62.

⁴ C. 64, 65.

⁵ Log of *Hampshire*.

⁶ C. 65.

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October 5.¹ She was presumably carrying out Captain Grant's idea of helping to cover the convoys.

The *Hampshire* went into Colombo on October 2, and after coaling proceeded down the east side of the Maldives, arriving in the morning of the 6th at Male, where she coaled from a collier. Here Captain Grant learned that the *Emden*, with the *Markomannia* and the *Buresk*, had been seen to the eastward of Felidu Atoll, 30 miles further southward, from September 28 to October 1 (inclusive), transferring coal underway, the enemy's last course observed being northward.² Accordingly Captain Grant proceeded again at 5.30 p.m. on October 6 for Colombo, where he expected to find the *Empress of Asia*, now attached to him by Admiral Jerram to assist in the *Emden* hunt. She had arrived at Colombo on October 4 with the *Askold* and *Arcadia* convoy, and was then coaling.

50. **Von Spee again located.**—Regarding the other end of the station a piece of intelligence of first-rate importance was received at the Admiralty on September 30 to the effect that the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* had, after leaving Samoa on September 14, proceeded eastward, and on the 22nd had bombarded Papieté, the capital of Tahiti (French) in the Society Islands (Long. 149° W.). The news was telegraphed from Whitehall to Admiral Jerram at 10 p.m. on September 30. Admiral Jerram's comment on the news and his appreciation of the situation were as follows:—

" 185. The unimportant results which *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* must have anticipated from the visit to Tahiti seems to point to the fact that they only went there on their way across Pacific Ocean to the American coast. Possibly it was a blind to draw our ships off, but that could have been attempted at less expense of coal and time.

" Their objectives may be to harass the coast of British Columbia, or attack our trade along the Pacific coast or to pass through the Panama Canal or Magellan Straits.

" To counter the two first objectives I think Japanese First Southern Squadron should cross Pacific Ocean as soon as it is known definitely that *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* have done so; that *Australia* and *Montcalm* should remain near east coast of Australia; that Japanese Second Southern Squadron, now coming south, should use Borneo east coast harbours as bases; and that *Minotaur* and *Ibuki* should continue their present services, which incidentally take them to New Zealand in case any attack should be made there in the near future.

" If the visit to Tahiti was a blind, squadrons would be still well placed. . . .

" The last two objectives can only be met by force from elsewhere." (2.10.14, sent 4.10 p.m.; received 1.27 p.m.)

It is clear from this telegram that Admiral Jerram dismissed the possibility that von Spee might return to the Western Pacific; there was too much naval force there to make such a visit attractive to the German Admiral.

¹ Log of Yarmouth.

² Capt. Grant's Report, M. 0309/15.

CHAPTER IX.

THE JAPANESE IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC.

51. **Early Japanese Movements.**—It was now five weeks since the Japanese had declared war. By this time they were in undisputed command of the Western Pacific. Tsingtau was being invested, and though its fall was not yet imminent, it could not long remain in German hands. The First Japanese Southern Squadron was already searching the Caroline and Marshall Islands. It visited Jaluit on September 29, and found there no coal, W/T, military works or garrison.¹ The Japanese Second Southern Squadron² left Sasebo (Japan) on October 1, and was due at the Pelew Islands about the 10th. There had been some misapprehension as to its next destination, owing to the difficulty all Japanese find in distinguishing between the letters "r" and "l." The Japanese Naval Attaché in London gave the ultimate station of this squadron correctly as Rabaul, whereas the Japanese officer on Admiral Jerram's Staff reported it as Labuan; this the Admiral welcomed as giving him a larger force for checking the German attempts to get coal out of Manila. The Philippines were still causing him anxiety and a German ship left Cebu without clearance on October 2, having taken a cargo of provisions from the liner *Princess Alice*.³ He at first had arranged with the authorities in Tokyo that Rear-Admiral Tsuchiyama should co-operate with him to the westward of Long. 140° E., while the First Squadron under Vice-Admiral Yamaya acted in conjunction with Admiral Patey to the eastward of that line.⁴ Finding, however, a few days later that the Second Squadron was bound for Rabaul, not Labuan, he asked the Japanese Admiralty to reconsider its destination, which they agreed to do. Admiral Jerram's opinion was that during the absence of the *Minotaur* and *Ibuki* on convoy duty there should be on each side of the 140th meridian a squadron capable of dealing with the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* until it was quite certain that Admiral von Spee would not return westward from Tahiti.⁵

If intercepted wireless messages could be entirely trusted the German Admiral intended to keep away from the Western Pacific, for on October 5 Suva Station took in a signal "*Scharnhorst* on the way between Marquesas and Easter Island," to which the station at Wellington added "present position 130° W.," Easter Island being two-thirds of the way from Fiji

¹ C. 68.

² *Satsuma* (flag of Rear-Admiral Tsuchiyama), battleship, 4—12 in., 12—10 in.; *Yahagi*, *Hivado*, light cruisers.

³ C. 69.

⁴ C.L. 24.

⁵ C.L. 25.

to Valparaiso. It was probable that von Spee had some knowledge of the naval situation; the station at Thursday Island at 4.45 a.m. on October 7 had taken in another German message *en clair* "Look out; the *Australia* and all large English ships have left Rabaul going east; the Japanese squadron is all over the place; to-day the English established wireless communication with Rabaul. Look out."

52. Division of the Pacific.—That same evening the Japanese Admiralty laid before our Admiralty a proposal based on Admiral Jerram's suggestions. The proposal was that the Western Pacific should be divided into three areas:—

1. West of 140° E., in which the British China Squadron and the Second Japanese Southern Squadron should co-operate.
2. East of 140° E., in which the Australian and First Southern Squadrons should co-operate.
3. East of 160° E., chiefly Society, Marquesas and Low Islands, in which the French ships should act reinforced as necessary by British and Japanese ships.
4. Each squadron to be stronger than the enemy combined.¹

The chief objection to this proposal, from our point of view, was that it would put the Australian Squadron with all its racial feelings under Vice-Admiral Yamaya, commanding the First Southern Squadron, and the ultimate arrangement after discussion between the two Admiralties was telegraphed to Admiral Jerram as follows:—

"219. Japanese Second Squadron to cruise north of 20° S. and west of 140° E.

"Japanese First Southern Squadron to cruise north of the equator and east of 140° E.

"The Australian Squadron to cruise and search south of the equator and west of 140° W. to include the French islands.

"All these squadrons should communicate whenever possible with each other and their respective Admiralties, and will by their movements assist each other's operations." (9.10.14, sent 6.20 p.m.)

The area detailed to the Second Southern Squadron thus extended from Japan to Australia and included Yap, Angaur, and the Philippines. The squadron had visited Yap on October 7, and found that the wireless had been repaired, used, and re-destroyed. This being so, the Japanese Admiralty suggested that the island should be occupied by either British, Australian, or Japanese forces.²

53. Watch on Manila.—Admiral Jerram was maintaining a strict patrol over the Philippines with the *Himalaya* and *Empress of Russia*, reinforced on October 9 by the destroyer

¹ M. 02521/14.

² H.S. 45, p. 391.

Ribble, which the *Himalaya* brought with her after her coaling at Hong Kong on the 5th. Shortly afterwards they were joined by the *Empress of Japan*, who, after taking the prizes *Tannenfels* and *Rio Passig* to Hong Kong on the 8th, proceeded to the Manila patrol. These practically blockaded Manila just outside territorial waters throughout the first fortnight of October. The other squadron based on Sandakan had been increased by the *Nisshin* which was to help in a search of the Banda and Flores Seas for the two mercantile cruisers which the Admiral thought Germany was employing in those waters. Unfortunately, the Japanese cruiser grounded on a shoal outside Sandakan on October 4 and had to return to Singapore, where her damages were found to necessitate some weeks' repair. A few days later the base of the squadron was changed from Sandakan to Darvel Bay, which the Senior Officer considered more suitable; and on the 10th the *Clio*, *Cadmus* and three destroyers proceeded south to search Makassar Strait in which persistent rumours had placed a German cruiser.¹ There was no information as to the name of this rumoured vessel. The *Geier*, which at first had certainly been in that neighbourhood, was now known to have been at Kusaie in the Carolines (163° E.) on September 4, and all the German vessels in the Dutch East Indies were being so satisfactorily looked after by the Dutch that the Admiral no longer considered it necessary to concern himself with them, concentrating his efforts rather on the Philippines. The laxity of the American regulations which seemed to permit the free use of the Philippine ports to German colliers induced him to urge the Admiralty to have representations made to the United States Government, and to make arrangements for preventing the export of Japanese and Australian coal to Manila.²

The close watch on the Philippine ports necessitated by the attitude of the United States authorities had attracted the armed merchant cruisers originally employed by Admiral Jerram on the patrol of the Hong Kong-Singapore trade route, and he was now quite unable to give any direct protection to merchant ships making that passage. So far, there had been no appearance of the German mercantile cruisers whose advent had been anticipated in the early days of the war. Of the German vessels on our list convertible into cruisers none were unaccounted for except the *Yorck*, *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* and *Seydlitz*, which were presumed to have been with the German Admiral at Romanzov Atoll in the Marshalls on September 15. The *Princess Alice* was at Cebu watched by our Borneo Squadron; the *Roon* at Chilachap on the south coast of Java, which had been rumoured to be arming, was under the control of the Dutch, and the *Kleist* had remained safely at Padang since August 7.

¹ C.L. 26.

² C. 60, 70, 71.

54. **More French Transports.**—Some protection had been afforded to the China trade route between September 21 and 29 by the passage of the *Arcadia* convoy and its escort;¹ another French transport, the *Amiral Olry*, had left Hong Kong on September 27 with the *Zhemchug* and arrived at Singapore on October 8. Waiting there were two more French transports—the *Magellan* and *Polynésien*—which had come in from Saigon. The *Zhemchug* was too weak to escort them across the Indian Ocean, and, moreover, her coal endurance was not sufficient; but the Admiral arranged that she should take them as far as Penang, from where the *Yarmouth* should escort them to Bombay to join an Indian convoy, being relieved in the *Emden* hunt by the *Empress of Asia*;² the *Zhemchug's* orders after turning over her convoy were to search the Andaman, Nicobar and Mergui Islands.³

55. **Capture of "Emden's" Colliers.**—Before taking over the French convoy the *Yarmouth* (Captain H. F. Cochrane) was able to carry out an important service. After coaling at Penang on October 5 she patrolled off Aceh Head till noon on the 11th, when she was ordered by Captain Grant to proceed to the West Coast of Sumatra. He had received news from the Admiralty that the Greek collier *Pontoporos*, known to have been with the *Emden* in the Bay of Bengal, was now anchored off the southern end of Simalur, and as the *Yarmouth* was the nearest of his ships to that spot he sent her there hoping that the *Emden* might possibly be found. Accordingly the *Yarmouth* proceeded on her mission, and at 6.10 a.m. on the 12th was rewarded by sighting two steamers near the expected position. Coming up close she found one of them to be the *Pontoporos* and the other the *Markomannia*, evidently waiting for the *Emden*. The *Yarmouth* sent a prize crew on board the *Pontoporos* to replace the German prize crew in the Greek ship, and, after embarking the Germans from the *Markomannia*, sank her at 1.10 p.m. by four rounds of 6-in. lyddite, two explosive charges having been fired in addition.

The positions in which the *Emden's* colliers had been captured and in which the *Markomannia* was sunk were outside territorial waters, as the Dutch men-of-war on the spot watching the process were able to note. Captain Cochrane in his report does not state why he sank the prize instead of sending her in. He had previously searched the *Markomannia*, and from logs and navigation books seized was able to plot the complete track of the ship from the time she left Tsingtau to the date of her capture.⁴

¹ C. 50.

² C. 72.

³ C.L. 26.

⁴ *Yarmouth's* Report, H.S. 34, pp. 176 to 182. The position was a few miles north of Langeni, where the *Emden* coaled on September 4. See para. 31. As he was hourly expecting the *Emden*, he probably felt he could not spare a prize crew for the *Markomannia*.

Having got rid of the *Markomannia*, Captain Cochrane proceeded at 8 knots with the *Pontoporos* in company for Penang, where he was due on October 15 to relieve the *Zhemchug* of the French convoy. His place at Aceh Head was to be taken by the *Chikuma*, which had left Madras on the 10th. At 9 a.m. on the 14th, the *Yarmouth* turned the *Pontoporos* over to the *D'Iberville*, and working up to 17 knots, put in to Penang next morning for coal and to discharge her prisoners. This done, she met the *Zhemchug* outside at 7 p.m. on the 15th, took over the convoy, now consisting of the *Amiral Olry*, *Magellan*, *Polynésien*, and the British ship *Empire*, and proceeded for Colombo. The *D'Iberville* reached Singapore with the *Pontoporos* on the 19th, and departed next day for Penang. The *Zhemchug* left Penang on the 16th to make her search of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and thus became definitely part of the squadron hunting for the *Emden*.

The Admiralty had endeavoured to augment this force by the *Askold* which had left Colombo on October 6 with the *Arcadia* convoy increased by the *Dupleix* escorting the *El Kantara* and *Cordillère*. Three days later the Admiralty telegraphed to Admiral Jerram that as the *Dupleix* alone would be sufficient escort as far as Suez, the *Askold* could leave the convoy at once and join Captain Grant's Squadron in hunting the *Emden*.¹ The Admiral was unable to get this order through to the *Askold* in time to obviate the necessity of her coaling at Aden, and even after her arrival there with the convoy on the 15th, she required five days rest to clean her boilers, and could not leave till the 20th.²

56. **"Emden" Hunt, October 8-18.**—The *Emden* hunt, therefore, had to be carried on by the *Chikuma* and *Zhemchug* on the eastern side of the Bay of Bengal and the *Hampshire* and the *Empress of Asia* on the west. The last two had met at a rendezvous off Colombo on October 8, and after patrolling that focal point for a few days went in to Colombo to coal. From there Captain Grant decided to visit Diego Garcia (8½° S., 72½° E.) in the Chagos Archipelago south of the Maldives. The two ships left Colombo and proceeded separately to the Chagos Islands, the *Empress of Asia* going on faster to Diego Garcia on the 15th, while the *Hampshire* remained to the northward of the group. The visit was again a week too late, for the *Emden* had been on the 9th at Diego Garcia where she was heeled to clean her bottom; she coaled from the *Buresk* and sailed next morning northward. In that remote British colony, where mails arrive only twice a year, the inhabitants were unaware of the existence of war, and an interchange of courtesies had taken place, the *Emden* being obliging enough to repair the

¹ C. 73.

² C.L. 27.

motor boat of a British resident before departing north again.¹ Hearing on the 15th that a ship like the *Emden* had been seen off the Little Basses, on the south-east coast of Ceylon, Captain Grant called up the *Empress of Asia*, and the two returned northward. The report was denied next day, and on the 18th the *Hampshire* and *Empress of Asia* went into Colombo and coaled.²

57. "Geier" Located.—In the interval occupied by Captain Grant's cruise the *Geier* had been located. She arrived at Honolulu at 7 a.m. on October 15 with the German collier *Locksun* and began to make extensive repairs. The *Nürnberg*, which at one time Admiral Jerram had considered might turn up in the Indian Ocean,³ was reported from Australia to have been with the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* just before they bombarded Papieté. On the 15th the gunboat *Komet* fitted with a complete wireless installation had been captured in the Pacific, which reduced by still one more Admiral von Spee's possible channels of communication. Some anxiety had been caused by the idea that the *Roon*, the German liner at Chilachap on the south coast of Java, had been endeavouring to communicate by wireless with the *Geier* and *Emden*.⁴ It was now known that the *Riasan* had been re-named *Cormoran*, and as the call signs for both *Cormoran* and *Luchs* had been heard, there was some reason to suppose that the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* had been re-named *Luchs* after the gunboat with whose guns she had presumably been armed at Tsingtau. Neither of these two merchant cruisers had as yet done anything hostile, nor was it known definitely where they were.⁵

58. Japanese Movements.—They could not be among the northern chain of islands, for the First Japanese Squadron, after occupying Jaluit, came westward and searched Kusaie on October 5, Ponape on the 7th, and Truk on the 11th, at the last place capturing a surveying ship of 110 tons. The Second Squadron visited Yap on October 7 and Pelew on the 8th. At Yap they sank the German surveying vessel *Planet* and learned afterwards that the guns, crew, and ammunition of the *Planet* had previously been transferred to the *Cormoran*, late *Riasan*, which had left Yap on October 1. The Second Squadron then separated. As the *Nisshin*, which it will be remembered had been ordered to assist in the escort of the Australian convoy, would be under repair till too late to join it, Admiral Jerram had requested the Japanese Admiralty to send a ship in her place. They selected the *Yahagi* for this purpose, to be due at Singapore on the 24th, and to meet the convoy at the Cocos Islands,

¹ Von Mücke, I.D. 1014.

² Captain Grant's Report, M. 0309/15.

⁴ See p. 21.

³ C. 74.

⁵ C.L. 27.

which it would reach a few days after leaving Albany on the 27th. At Admiral Jerram's suggestion the Admiralty seized this opportunity to bring along another French transport, the *Euphrate*, which the *Yahagi* was requested to pick up off Saigon. The second light cruiser of Rear-Admiral Tsuchiyama's Squadron—the *Hirado*—left Pelew Islands on the 10th to cruise through Molucca Passage and the Banda Sea, returning to Pelew about the 21st.¹ She was to search Portuguese Timor, which German colliers were reported to be using and, in view of the friendly attitude of Portugal, the Admiralty gave instructions, should any be found, that they were to be seized in territorial waters.¹ The Borneo Squadron, having found nothing in the Makassar Strait, returned on October 14 to Darvel Bay, where they resumed the patrol of the Basilan Strait to intercept German supplies from Manila. That port was still closely watched by the *Empress of Russia*, *Empress of Japan*, *Himalaya*, and *Ribble*, acting under the orders of the Commodore at Hong Kong. The Japanese cruiser *Kasuga* left the Pescadores on October 13 to cruise down the east coast of the Philippines, which were thus being so well looked after² that it was improbable that any coal could get away either to von Spee or the *Emden*; but the latter seemed to thrive without supplies from shore, and had in the meanwhile been by no means inactive.

CHAPTER X.

THE SECOND MINIKOI RAID.

59. The "Saint Egbert's" news.—The steamer *Saint Egbert* had left Colombo at 5 p.m. October 17, on a course set to pass 40 miles north of Minikoi, about the maximum diversion possible. There was, therefore, some consternation when at early morning of October 20 she put into Cochin on the south-west coast of India with the news that she and six other steamers had been captured by the *Emden* during October 16 to 19, all in the neighbourhood of Minikoi. The departure of ships from Colombo to the north and west was at once stopped for a day; but those from Aden to the eastward were allowed to sail as it was naturally assumed by the Intelligence Officer that by the time they arrived at Minikoi the *Emden* would have made off elsewhere.³ On board the *Saint Egbert* were the crews of the vessels captured—the *Clan Grant*, *Ponrabbel*, *Ben Mohr*, *Exford*, *Chilkana* all outward bound from home, and the *Troilus* and *Saint Egbert* from

¹ C. 76, 77.

² C.L. 27.

³ C. 78.



OCT. 20. ARRIVAL OF "ST EGBERT" AT COCHIN.
Positions of British Ships from their logs; of Allied Ships approximate.


the 18th the *Emden* had moved eastward to $8^{\circ} 19' N.$, $74^{\circ} 10' E.$ ¹ Soon after this, the *Troilus* was captured, and from her it was learned that "the authorities at Colombo have instructed British masters to pass Minikoi 40 miles to the northward." That night the *Saint Egbert* and *Exford* were captured. The *Saint Egbert* had newspapers on board which Captain von Müller immediately sent for. By 6.50 a.m. on the 19th he had made up his mind to send off the captured crews in the *Saint Egbert* to Cochin, and when the *Chilkana* came up her crew joined the others. Among the men from the *Troilus* were two German-speaking Chinese stokers; these were put on board the *Exford* to help the navigating party there. On the 19th the noon position was $9^{\circ} 10' N.$, $74^{\circ} 58' E.$ On the 20th, at 5.30 a.m., just about the time that the *Saint Egbert* reached Cochin and Captain Grant left Colombo for Dondra Head, the position was $8^{\circ} 47' N.$, $74^{\circ} 57' E.$ Captain von Müller was keeping Indian time, 5h. 30m. fast on G.M.T.,² presumably the same as Captain Grant who was cruising from and to Indian ports. From here the *Emden*, *Buresk* and *Exford* steamed south, and at noon were in $7^{\circ} 9' N.$, $75^{\circ} 23' E.$ At 6.35 p.m. they steered 110° magnetic, and at 7.35 p.m. 120° magnetic in order to pass south of Ceylon. By this time Captain Grant had turned and was coming westward from Dondra Head for Felidu Atoll. Captain von Müller had still the *Buresk* and *Exford* with him. At noon his position was $5^{\circ} 33' N.$, $77^{\circ} 57' E.$, and at 2 p.m., October 21, since Captain von Müller intended to send off the *Exford* to await him at a rendezvous, the squadron stopped for the last interchange of stores, having all unknowingly had a narrow and almost incredible escape from destruction.

61. "**Emden's**" **Third Escape.**—Her first escape was from the *Hampshire* on September 4 near Simalur; again on September 19 close to Rangoon there had been a possibility of a meeting; and having actually been challenged by the *Chikuma* on September 23 (that is, if the evidence is considered good enough), the *Emden* had just been missed by the *Hampshire* and *Empress of Asia*. During the night they had been steaming in single line ahead for Felidu Atoll; but at 6.30 a.m. the *Empress of Asia* began to move up to take position at 20 miles on the *Hampshire's* starboard beam. In so doing she was steering almost direct for the *Emden*, and when at 8 a.m. the *Empress of Asia* turned to port, having reached her station on the *Hampshire's* starboard beam, she was only a few miles from the German cruiser and her two colliers. Rain squalls obscured the view, and the little German squadron passed unobserved only 5 miles astern of the *Empress*

¹ Fikentscher's diary has the entry "October 18 in the forenoon *Fernando Po*" a Spanish vessel. There is no mention of this in the signal log of the *Emden*.

² See signal 20th, 3.10 p.m. "From *O.L.* In 5 minutes flag will be hoisted, G.M.T. 9.45.0." N.I.D. 11618/16.

of Asia.¹ It was the narrowest escape of the *Emden's* adventurous career.



61 (a). **New Instructions to Intelligence Officers.**—The *Emden's* successes off Minikoi suggested to the Admiralty the issue of new general instructions to Intelligence Officers. By these it was enjoined that instructions given by Reporting or Intelligence Officers should, whenever possible, be handed to masters of vessels in writing and a copy kept; masters were to distrust colours hoisted by approaching warships, and to avoid smoke; moreover, Intelligence Officers were to take care that vessels scattered widely on both sides of their usual track rather than proceeded on a definite route parallel to the normal one.²

¹ See plan. The *Emden* stopped at 2 p.m. in 5° 25' N., 78° 12' E., which gives a speed of 8.5 knots. Both this and the noon position may, of course, be unreliable.

Abstracts from ships' logs:—

Hampshire, Noon position by observation October 21, 5° 8' N., 76° 49' E. No current. Course, midnight to noon, S. 68 W. true, 11 knots. Weather, 4 a.m. overcast, passing showers; 8 a.m. overcast, raining.

Empress of Asia, Noon position, October 21, 5° 29' N., 76° 42' E. No current. Courses, 8 a.m. to noon S. 68 W., 11 knots; 6.30 to 8 a.m. N. 67 W., 16 knots, to take station 20' on *Hampshire's* starboard beam. Weather, overcast, raining.

² C. 83.

The *Askold* sailed from Aden eastward on October 20, having left the *Dupleix* behind; the French ship had been put under the East Indies Admiral on the 12th to assist with the Indian convoys;¹ but the *Askold* could not arrive on the scene of the *Emden's* late activities for at least a week. On the east side of the Bay of Bengal the *Chikuma* and *Zhemchug* were both usefully employed in guarding the focal point at Acheh Head and searching the islands for possible colliers of the *Emden*.

62. Japanese Squadron to participate in "Emden" Hunt.—

The only way in which Admiral Jerram could increase the force in search of the *Emden* was by depleting the squadron on guard over Manila, and he therefore ordered the *Empress of Russia*, then coaling at Hong Kong, down to Singapore. She could not leave till the 25th, and feeling that this was not enough, he was constrained to ask for further assistance in the only quarter likely to supply it. Pointing out that the *Emden* had become a serious menace to British and Japanese trade, he asked the Japanese Admiralty, through our naval attaché at Tokyo, whether they would be willing to send the *Hirado* at once to Singapore, to be followed as soon as possible, by one or two more cruisers if they could be spared. In reply, the Japanese Admiralty announced that they would form a new squadron in the Indian Ocean to be composed of the cruisers *Tokiwa* and *Yakumo*² under a Vice-Admiral, to which, on arrival, would be added the *Ibuki* and *Yahagi* when released from convoy duty, the *Nisshin* when repaired, and the *Chikuma*; they also asked that the *Hampshire*, *Minotaur* and *Yarmouth* should co-operate with the Japanese Admiral. In telegraphing this reply to the Admiralty, Admiral Jerram observed:—"This scheme presents many practical difficulties as to working, and involves employment of Japanese Vice-Admiral on East Indies Station senior to Commander-in-Chief, East Indies; but I can see no alternative likely to be acceptable to the Japanese, who, I am inclined to think, rather object to employment of their ships under the direct orders of British officers. If it is accepted, it should be conditional on definite spheres of action being assigned to Japanese and our forces respectively, which can be arranged by me when Japanese Admiral arrives at Singapore. I have referred this matter to Admiralty, as it largely affects East Indies Station. If Japanese proposal is approved, I will

¹ C. 75.

				Tons.	Trial Speed.	Guns.
				9,700	22.7	4—8 in., 16—6 in.
<i>Tokiwa</i>	9,646	21.0	4—8 in., 12—6 in.
<i>Yakumo</i>			

“communicate with Tokyo as necessary, and I might at the same time suggest a Rear-Admiral junior to Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, would be preferable to a Vice-Admiral.”¹ The Admiralty, considering the Japanese aid invaluable, invited the Japanese Admiralty direct to employ their squadron east of 90° E., the meridian which bisects the Bay of Bengal, and guard the focal points at Cape Negrais, Acheh Head, and Sunda Straits, using as bases Rangoon, Penang, and Singapore.² They also asked that the *Ibuki* might remain with the *Minotaur* till the Australian convoy had completed its voyage; this was now assembling in King George Sound, Albany, and was to proceed for Europe as soon as ready. At Cocos Island it was to be joined by the *Yahagi* with the French transports *Euphrate* and *Latouche-Tréville*, which the Japanese cruiser had brought to Singapore on the 26th.³

The *Askold* arrived at Colombo from Aden on October 26, but had been ordered to take up to Bombay the French convoy, to which was now added a contingent of volunteers from Ceylon embarked in the *Worcestershire*. She left on the 27th with them and arrived at Bombay four days later, so that she took no part in the hunting for the *Emden*, which had meanwhile carried out perhaps her most daring achievement.

CHAPTER XI.

PENANG RAIDED.

63. “*Emden*” Hunt after Second Minikoi Raid.—Captain Grant, little knowing how near he had come to finishing the *Emden*'s career, carried on to Felidu Atoll. There he gained no recent news. There seemed to be nothing better to do than to patrol the focal points again, so coming up the east side of the Maldives while the *Empress of Asia* took the west, he returned to Dondra Head and put into Colombo on October 27 with three days' defects.

The Admiralty, like Captain Grant, had “formed the opinion that the best way to deal with the *Emden* was to guard the focal points where the trade converges . . . rather than “guesswork searching”;⁴ the Eastern focal points would be looked after by the Japanese, but it did not appear from the operations of the hunting squadron that Calcutta was sufficiently in mind, and they ordered Admiral Jerram to station either the *Hampshire* or *Yarmouth* off the Hugli, the other to remain with

¹ C. 80, 81, 82.

² C. 84.

³ C.L. 28.

⁴ Admiralty to Japanese Naval Attaché, H.S. 17, p. 379.

the *Empress of Asia* between Ceylon and Minikoi.¹ But the *Emden* had no intention of re-appearing in that neighbourhood.

64. Movements of “*Emden*”—October 21-28.—Captain von Müller did not remain long near Ceylon. Having detached the *Exford* in 5° 25' N., 78° 12' E., at 4.30 p.m., October 21, he sent her at 7 knots to a rendezvous which is not mentioned in his Signal Log; he himself with the *Buresk* continued south-eastward out of all the tracks and then cut across them up towards the Nicobars. This route of his implies that he did not at this moment intend to trouble about merchant ships, and the deduction is strengthened when we find him ordering the *Buresk* to close in at night: “a distance of a thousand metres on the beam is far too much.”² In the afternoon of October 23, when still 100 or more miles south of the trade route, he carried out target practice, probably in preparation for the firing to come; it could hardly be with a view to further commerce raiding that he expended some of his irreplaceable ammunition. He was making for Nankauri in the Nicobars, where he intended to coal, although he had neither charts nor sailing directions of the neighbourhood. At 6.35 p.m., October 26, the two ships anchored and coaling began.

Here there is a break in the record of signals, but we know what happened afterwards. On October 27, after coaling was done, Captain von Müller detached the *Buresk* and then made straight for Penang. This was the base of the French destroyers and their broken-down cruiser *D'Iberville*. From there also the *Chikuma* and *Zhemchug* carried out their periodical sweeps of the Andamans and Nicobars. The *Chikuma* had left Penang on October 24 to have another look at Simalur in case the *Emden* should come after her colliers, and the *Zhemchug* had just completed a round tour of the Nicobars, Andamans and the Mergui Archipelago; had she gone the other way round she might have been just in time to catch the German ships at Nankauri. Arriving at Penang on October 26 she began to clean boilers and make good defects.

Penang Harbour is a sheltered anchorage formed by the channel running north and south between the Island of Penang and the mainland of the Malay Peninsula. The southern entrance has only 3 fathoms and was not used by men-of-war. The *Yarmouth*, when repairing at Penang, laid out a stern anchor and hauled up to it so as to lie east and west and thus command the northern entrance with her broadside, and when the *Zhemchug* came in to clean her boilers, an operation for which her Captain demanded seven days, it was impressed upon him that he should, like the *Yarmouth*, haul up to a stern anchor. Eventually the Captain concurred and gave orders for it to be done; but nevertheless on October 28 the *Zhemchug*

¹ C. 85.

² Signal at 5.35 p.m., October 22, N.I.D. 11618.

was not across the channel, but was lying with her stern to the northern entrance and her head to the tide, which at daybreak was flooding in from the south. Lieutenant Maund, R.N., the Liaison Officer for the *Zhemchug*, knowing that a poor system of look out was maintained, had felt some doubt whether alarm signals from the shore would be seen in the Russian ship, and taking up his position at military headquarters, obtained a launch, by which means he hoped to reach her in time to give warning, if necessary. The *Zhemchug* was in the man-of-war anchorage on the north side of the harbour, with the result that a raiding cruiser could fire at her without coming into the port at all. Further inward were the two French destroyers, *Pistolet* and *Fronde*, secured broadside to broadside at the northernmost pier. The *Pistolet* was at one hour's notice; but the *Fronde* had her fires out. Still further inward was the *D'Iberville*. She was overhauling her machinery, and in view of the danger which the man-of-war anchorage offered in the event of a surprise attack had, for the first time, taken up an inside billet among the merchant ships.¹

Penang was entirely undefended by shore works, but the third French destroyer *Mousquet* was on guard outside, and a launch, manned by natives, patrolled the entrance to give the alarm. Such then was the condition of Penang where Captain von Müller had determined to operate. The intelligence he had received was so scanty and unreliable that he had no idea the *Zhemchug* was there; it was the *Dupleix* that he expected to find.²

65. "Emden" at Penang.—In the mist of the tropical dawn, painted the British grey and fitted with a dummy fourth funnel, the *Emden* entered the harbour of Penang by the north channel at 5.15 a.m. on the 28th; her appearance and an undistinguishable flag lying in folds at the fore deceived the patrol launch into the assumption that she was a British cruiser, and she was allowed to pass unchallenged into the port. When about half a mile from the *Zhemchug* the *Emden* hoisted German colours and discharged a torpedo which took effect on the port quarter of the Russian cruiser and flooded the engine-room. Then when nearly abeam, the *Emden* fired about a dozen rounds, the splinters and fragments doing a good deal of damage to the *Zhemchug*. The Russian was by this time beginning to wake up, but it was not till the *Emden* had passed her that a gun was fired; the *Zhemchug* in the whole course of the action expended only 12 rounds. Steaming on past the French destroyers and the *D'Iberville*, who made no attempt to fire, Captain von Müller turned in towards them and retraced his course, still firing at the *Zhemchug*.³ As he passed the Russian

¹ Report from *D'Iberville*, H.S. 34, p. 120.

² Plotz's Diary, M. 04520/14.

³ According to Plotz, *Emden* expended 100 rounds at Penang.

cruiser on the return journey he gave her another torpedo which exploded the foremost magazine, whereupon the *Zhemchug* sank. Captain von Müller had seen the *D'Iberville* and seems to have intended to attack her next. The people on shore observed him to slow down and put his helm over after passing the *Zhemchug* the second time; but, from the accounts of officers on board the *Emden* it appears that just then it was reported to him that a cruiser was entering the port. He, therefore, turned northward again to meet the new-comer, which soon proved to be the patrol launch, exaggerated by the mirage into something more formidable.¹ He had opened fire on her, but ceased as soon as he found it was a boat filled with unarmed natives. He, however, did not turn back but continued his course; and being now clear of the channel steered westerly along the north coast of the island of Penang. He evidently did not fear pursuit; off the north-west corner of the island and only a dozen miles from the man-of-war in the port he stopped a steamer—the *Glenturret*—on her way in. She was carrying ammunition, and in accordance with the custom, she had the red flag at her mast-head. The *Emden* inquired what this meant and was told it signified that the *Glenturret* was carrying paraffin. Before the *Emden's* boarding party could make an investigation, the cruiser sighted a warship on the horizon, and hurriedly recalling his men, Captain von Müller made off to meet the enemy, having left with the master of the *Glenturret* a message of regret for his firing on the unarmed launch half an hour before. As the distance lessened the mirage faded, and the approaching warship was seen to be a destroyer. It was the *Mousquet*; she put up a gallant fight under her Commander Théroinne, but was overpowered and sunk in ten minutes. Meanwhile, the *Glenturret* had got into Penang. Satisfied with his hour's work, Captain von Müller, after picking up the survivors of the *Mousquet*, continued his course. By this time, the *Pistolet* was ready to leave;² working up to 20 knots she maintained touch with the *Emden* till 10 a.m., when a hot bearing developed, and she had to slow down. The *Fronde* was coming up; but she never succeeded in reaching the cruiser and went on to Acheh Head without seeing her. Having warned the *Chikuma* and *Yahagi* of the *Emden's* probable presence, she returned to Penang. The *D'Iberville* got away at 10 a.m.; but with one engine broken down could get only as far as the north-west corner of Penang Island, where she looked for the wreck and survivors of the *Mousquet*. Of the *Zhemchug's* crew, 1 officer and 90 men were killed and 2 officers and 106 men wounded.

¹ Von Mücke.

² In Lieut. Maund's report the time of *Pistolet* leaving is given as about 7.30 a.m.; the Captain of the *D'Iberville* in his written report says she was ready at 6.35 a.m., and his telegram of 28.10.14 says *Pistolet* and *Fronde* left at 7 a.m.

It is obvious from what has been said that the Russian cruiser was unprepared, and we find in Lieut. Maund's Report :
 " On board the *Zhemchug* only the after-gun and No. 2 starboard gun were cleared away, the latter being on the reverse side of the ship towards the island, while only 12 rounds of ammunition were provided on deck—6 to each gun cleared away. The ammunition from the starboard gun was transferred to the foremost gun, its opposite number having been put out of action at once by a boat falling across it. It also became necessary to flood the after magazine as smoke was seen to be rising from it. Fire was opened by *Zhemchug* when the *Emden* had passed her, and about 12 rounds in all were fired, two hits being obtained but unfortunately on the superstructure only." ¹

From the long and eloquent report of Commander Audemard of the *D'Iberville* ² the following are extracts :—

" . . . In the morning of this same day, towards 5.30 a.m., *D'Iberville*, *Pistolet* and *Fronde* being in the anchorage off Georgetown I was awakened by a deafening detonation resembling a distant clap of thunder, followed almost immediately by several others, the character of which could only be defined as a vigorous gunfire.

" When I went on deck, it was scarcely dawn, the ships at their moorings being vaguely outlined in the mist, on a calm sea.

" A mile away from us, bearing E.N.E., the Russian cruiser *Zhemchug*, to which my attention was immediately drawn, was disappearing in a cloud of yellowish smoke which enveloped her right up to her masthead.

" A few degrees on her right appeared the vague silhouette of a four-funnelled man-of-war which seemed to be making for the usual anchorage to the east of Cornwallis Light.

" The firing having ceased, my first impression was that the *Zhemchug*, by some fatal error, had opened fire on one of the allied ships.

" This opinion was shared by my officers, who, like myself, saw in the smoke of the *Zhemchug* the evidence of her aggression, since the newly-arrived cruiser appeared to have been under her fire without replying.


" The sudden cessation of fire could but confirm our opinion. The allied ships had doubtless recognised each other, and without delay I ordered away the boats to render assistance to the victims of what we considered to be an inexplicable error.


" Scarcely had this order been carried into effect when a violent detonation, similar to the first one, was heard ; at the same time the unknown cruiser, completing her turn towards the open sea behind several merchant ships which had momentarily hidden her from our view, showed her four funnels, of which the foremost one was visibly a dummy.

" Simultaneously we cried : ' It is the *Emden*,' and each man proceeded to his action station, the guns were loaded and ready to fire at my order. . . .

¹ The claim to these last two hits we know from the *Emden's* signal log to be mistaken.

² H.S. 34, pp. 118 to 125.





" . . . The opportunity for the *D'Iberville* to open fire on the hostile cruiser occurred when the latter, at a distance of at least 2,000 metres, bore about 15 deg. from right aft, the bows obviously heading the same way as those of *D'Iberville*. The only guns able to bear in this direction were two 65 mm. and two 47 mm. The after 10 cm. gun, the only one which could have produced any effect on this occasion, would not bear.

" Under these conditions could I give the order to open fire? I did not think so. To open fire would have been for the enemy, already triumphant, but the signal for another easy victory. For us, the useless sacrifice of our 300 sailors and the final annihilation of the allied forces assembled at Penang. For all these reasons I did not hesitate in keeping silent, at the same time holding myself ready to reply vigorously to any attack by the enemy.

" On board the torpedo boats secured alongside, about 1,300 metres S.S.W. of *Zhemchug*, the situation was just as full of anxiety as that on board *D'Iberville*. There prevailed there the same indecision concerning the motives of this inconceivable aggression, and each one attempted to penetrate this mystery, which, as on board us, was elucidated only on the *Emden* leaving, the cruiser then being outside the range of their torpedoes.

" The torpedo boats immediately commenced the preparation for sea; *Pistolet* was ready at 6.35 a.m. and departed in pursuit of the *Emden*. . . ."

Commander Audemard mentions no arrangements for passing alarm signals, and it seems clear that there was no efficient means of communication to the ships in the harbour. Each had to get its information from its own look-out.

A contemporary German report of the incident may be of interest. As soon as the *Emden* rejoined the *Buresk* signals began to pass, and in the *Emden's* signal log we find :—

" . . . 7 a.m. From *Buresk*. Captain to Torpedo Lieutenant. Good morning! It is time to get up. The sun does not appear to be shining in your cabin. Congratulations on your splendid success. The torpedo weapon has, as usual, done a lot. Please send me a short report by signal. . . ."

" 7.45. To *Buresk*. Good morning! The torpedo lieutenant is asleep and would fly at my head if I waked him. We arrived at Penang at 4 a.m., were in harbour about 5 a.m., only recognised *Zhemchug* at 800 metres. Fired first torpedo from starboard tube at 300 metres; hit her below the after-funnel. She at once settled by the stern up to the upper port-holes. Simultaneously directed devastating fire on her deck and crews' quarters. She looked like a sieve. Went about, in passing to port fired a torpedo. Tremendous explosion. Forepart torn away. Two minutes afterwards when smoke had cleared away ship had disappeared. Fire was opened on us from *Zhemchug* and elsewhere, but we were not hit. After all, the performance of the torpedo was nothing very special. Then recognised the *D'Iberville* in harbour. On going about to fire, what appeared to be a torpedo boat came in full speed towards her, opened fire, turned and recognised as a Government steamer. Later the *Mousquet* was sighted. Fire was opened at 4,600 metres. She replied at intervals, but at 4,000 metres after the third salvo was observed to be hit, the boiler having exploded. She was fired at until she sank. Thirty-six of crew saved out of 78, almost all wounded; three have since died here. Sent by steamer to Sabang. *Pontoporos* has been captured."

The raid on Penang, successful though it had been in a military sense, brought about far less disturbance of commerce than the bombardment of Madras. "Its effect on the immediate movements of shipping was surprisingly small. Some alarm indeed was excited in Calcutta . . . but though the port was closed for a few hours and several steamers which had just put to sea returned to the Hooghly, the interruption of trade was too short to be appreciable."¹

66. Hunting Squadron Reinforced.—Admiral Jerram on receipt of the intelligence that the *Emden* had sunk the *Zhemchug* countermanded the departure of the French transports from Singapore and ordered the *Yahagi* to proceed at full speed up the Malacca Straits to work with and under the *Chikuma* from Aceh Head to Rangoon. The *Empress of Russia*, which arrived at Singapore at 7 a.m. on October 29, he ordered to join the *Hampshire*, after coaling, and she managed to get away at 4.30 that afternoon. The Hugli now seemed a long way from the scene of operations, and Admiral Jerram, considering that the ship told off by the Admiralty for that area would be more usefully employed off the S.E. coast of Ceylon, obtained the Admiralty's approval to station the *Yarmouth* there.² As she had to coal she returned from Minikoi to Colombo on October 29, and was ordered by Captain Grant, when she left at 6 a.m. on November 1, to patrol south and east of Ceylon, coaling, if necessary, at Madras. The *Hampshire* had to spend from October 27 to 30 in harbour repairing defects, and the *Empress of Asia* remained at Colombo attending to her condensers from October 26 till November 2, when she rejoined the *Hampshire* off Cape Comorin. The *Askold* was also delayed by defects at Bombay, and would not be ready for sea till November 4, when she was to be sent to patrol the trade route between Madras and Calcutta.³


To increase the squadron available for dealing with the raider the Admiralty decided to bring a light cruiser from the Mediterranean, and ordered Malta to send either *Dublin* or *Gloucester* with all despatch to Aden, where further orders would be given. The *Gloucester* was selected, and she left Malta next day.


A speedier reinforcement should be, however, available from East Africa. The definite location of the *Königsberg* up the Rufiji River, East Africa, by the *Chatham* on October 30 changed the nature of the operations against the enemy from a widespread search to a blockade of the mouth of the river, and released for other duties some of the force till then employed in the search. A scheme of operations was devised to meet the new conditions and this was telegraphed to the authorities

¹ Fayle : *Seaborne Trade*, I, 270.

² C. 86, 87.

³ C. 88.





OCT. 28. DISPOSITIONS

Positions of H.M. Ships from their logs, of Allied Ships estimated.

Colombo. On November 6 the Admiralty ordered her also to Simon's Bay, leaving the convoy in charge of the Senior Officer, Captain Silver of the *Melbourne*. These alterations in his command were explained to Admiral Jerram in :—

" 270. Owing to situation in South Atlantic *Dartmouth* has been ordered to Simon's Bay. *Weymouth* is proceeding as ordered in my 259." (Sent 5.11.14.)

and :—

" 272. *Minotaur* has been ordered to leave convoy and proceed to South Africa at once, a very urgent necessity having arisen.

" *Triumph* will be your flagship and should return south when she can be conveniently withdrawn from Tsingtau, being replaced by a sloop." (Sent 6.11.14.)

To meet the possibility that the German Admiral might go north from Valparaiso the *Australia* was sent across to join the Anglo-Japanese Squadron off the west coast of Mexico ; and to provide protection to the Commonwealth we asked the Japanese to station one of their southern squadrons at Fiji. There remained the Eastern Archipelago, and here the Admiralty looked to the Japanese for assistance. They sent to the Japanese Admiralty :—

" With regard to the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific, it is now known that *Emden* is the only enemy ship at large. We, therefore, hope that the Japanese squadrons and vessels not involved in the eastward movement will draw westward into the vicinity of Sumatra and the Dutch East Indies in order to block every exit and deny every place of shelter up to the 90th meridian of east longitude.

" British Admiralty are combining in Indian waters in search of *Emden* the following light cruisers :—*Weymouth*, *Gloucester*, *Yarmouth*, *Melbourne*, *Sydney*, the armoured cruiser *Hampshire*, and Russian cruiser *Askold*. These ships will be ready by the middle of November. Thus by concerted action between the Allied fleets the *Emden* should be speedily run down." ¹

To this the Japanese Admiralty agreed, and the net round the *Emden* seemed to be growing complete. Vice-Admiral Tochinai with the *Tokiwa* and *Yakumo* should arrive at Singapore from Hong Kong on November 8, when he would be joined by the *Chikuma* and *Yahagi*, and he would take charge of the operations in the eastern half of the Bay of Bengal. The *Nisshin*, when her repairs were complete, would join him, as would also the *Ibuki* as soon as she had been relieved of the Australian convoy. Another ship on her way to join the Japanese Admiral was the *Ikoma*,² which had left

¹ H.S. 17, p. 531.

	Date.	Tons.	Trial Speed.	Guns.
<i>Ikoma</i> (cruiser)	1908	13,750	21.9	4—12 in. ; 12—6 in. ; 12—4.7 in.

Shimonoseki on November 1, escorting the transport *Monmouthshire*. This vessel was bringing ammunition from Japan and was to embark some troops at Hong Kong on arrival on November 7.

Other small vessels shortly due at Singapore were the *Pyramus* and *Philomel*, which left Fremantle on November 3 and were destined for use in the Red Sea ; the Borneo Division (*Clio*, *Cadmus* and destroyers) was also due in a few days as Admiral Jerram had called them to Singapore. In his opinion " the efforts of German colliers to escape from Manila appeared " to have ceased and the two armed merchant cruisers and the " destroyer stationed outside Manila were sufficient to deal with " them." ¹ They examined Tambelan Island and St. Barbe on the way as the enemy had been reported to have used those islands as a wireless station and coaling base.

At 7 a.m. on November 7, Tsingtau capitulated. This released the *Triumph* and *Usk* for other service ; but it was some time before they could get away, since Captain FitzMaurice had to superintend the embarkation of the British troops which had participated in the assault.

68. " **Geier** " Interned.—Next day (November 8) the *Geier* and the German auxiliary *Locksun* were interned at Honolulu, a long-delayed consummation which now relieved Admiral Jerram of further anxiety about them.

The *Geier's* career, so far as we know it, had been uneventful. She had been at Singapore preparing to cross to East Africa when surprised by the war. She left on July 29 and seems to have wandered about among the Eastern Archipelago for some months. She met the *Emden* near Angaur on August 20,² and on September 4 achieved her only success against commerce. In the harbour of Kusaie, one of the Eastern Caroline Islands, she found a steamer, the *Southport*, disabled its engines, and then thinking it safe departed on a fortnight's cruise, probably for food and coal, as these seemed to be her great need. When she came back the bird had flown ; the *Southport's* crew had ingeniously put together what they could muster of the machinery and had managed to escape. The *Geier* made no more captures, and when she reappeared it was at Honolulu, where her only course was to accept internment. If commerce-raiding had been her object, her net achievement was *nil*. The other German armed vessels about which Admiral Jerram had been from time to time disturbed were now causing him less anxiety. The *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* had been definitely located with von Spee off the Chilean Coast, and the *Cormoran* so far had not been reported anywhere.

¹ C.L. 29.

² Fikentscher's Diary ; also I.D.H.S., Vol. 508, p. 153.

The *Emden* had given no further signs of her presence beyond sending in to Sabang, on November 1, the 34 survivors of the *Mousquet* which Captain von Müller had put aboard the *Newburn*—a British ship he had met 140 miles west of Sabang on October 30. It will be remembered that the officer of the watch in the *Emden* had signalled to the *Buresk* when they met that the *Pontoporos* had been captured. This last item of information may have been obtained from the French prisoners. The *D'Iberville* had taken the *Pontoporos* to Singapore before returning to Penang, and the French sailors might not know of the capture of the *Markomannia*, which is not mentioned in this signal. But there was no secret about it; the Admiralty had announced in the "Times" of October 16 that the *Yarmouth* had captured the *Markomannia* and *Pontoporos* and the fact that on October 31 the news was fresh enough to be signalled implies that Captain von Müller's sources of intelligence, even in Dutch waters, were not particularly efficient. Anyhow, the news was enough to keep him away from the rendezvous to which he had sent the *Pontoporos*, and after picking up the *Buresk*, west of Sabang, Sumatra, in Lat. 1° 33' N., Long. 95° 23' E., at dawn on October 31, Captain von Müller proceeded down the west coast of Sumatra. Two days later he took 540 tons of coal from the *Buresk*, having taken 1,875 tons in all from her cargo of 6,700 tons; ¹ the scene of this coaling appears to have been 7 miles east of North Pagai Island.² He then steamed across the Sunda Strait at 5 knots from south to north, till at noon on November 5 he was in 6° 9' S., 105° 7' E. It may be guessed that he was expecting a friendly steamer, since on November 1 he had signalled: "There may be a chance to send letters home during the next few days. Letters to be delivered to officers of divisions not later than 4 p.m., November 3." The expected meeting does not seem to have taken place, and at noon, November 5, he steamed off south-west at 10 knots for what was to be his last exploit.

CHAPTER XII.

THE "EMDEN'S" END.

69. **Raid on the Cable Station at Cocos Island.**—Captain von Müller's operations had been so varied that to forecast his next proceeding seemed impossible. After a raid on commerce near Calcutta and Rangoon, he had set the oil tanks at Madras on fire. After sinking ships west of Ceylon, he had mended a motor boat at Diego Garcia, and having attracted our ships to

¹ Signal, November 3, 4.10 p.m.

² M. 0717/15.

that out-of-the-way place, had reappeared at Minikoi. Next, Penang, 1,500 miles from Minikoi, received his attention. Where would he go next? He might assume that by this time we should have taken effective measures to protect our trade route; if so, it would not be there that he would be found. Perhaps another raid might be expected.

Such a raid had been in Captain von Müller's mind since on October 21 he had detached the *Exford*; and it was now for her rendezvous (40' N. of Cocos Island)¹ that he was steaming with the *Buresk* in company. He carried out target practice again on November 7, and at dawn on November 8 picked up the *Exford*. His first inquiry from her was whether she had seen anything yet; but the reply was: "Have been here since October 30, and have seen nothing of the expected steamers."² After taking two barrels of flour and two of salt meat from her, he detached her again in charge of Lieutenant Lauterbach, and at 4.50 p.m. set his course, with the *Buresk* in company, due south for the Cocos Islands.

That the exposed position of the Cocos Islands would render it liable to attack had been foreseen by Admiral Jerram, who remarks in a despatch:—

"... The possibility of Cocos Island being seized by *Emden* had been constantly in my mind, and although I could not possibly spare a ship to be stationed there permanently I had instructed the cable station as to the precautions to adopt and the necessity of giving immediate warning in the event of a surprise attack, and furnished it with a list of the secret wireless call signs of all allied ships in these waters."³

Accordingly, when the *Emden* appeared the officers of the Eastern Telegraph Company were ready to act. The wireless operator immediately sent out "S.O.S.; S.O.S.; S.O.S.; Strange warship at entrance" *en clair* but was speedily jammed by the *Emden's* telefunken and was unable to get any further wireless signals through. The *Emden* at once lowered two boats manned by landing parties with maxims, news which the operator telegraphed by cable to all the stations he could reach. At Singapore the news caused Admiral Jerram some anxiety for the safety of the Australasian convoy, from which the *Minotaur* had parted about 24 hours before. The convoy, now under the escort of the *Melbourne*, *Sydney* and *Ibuki*, with Captain Silver of the *Melbourne* as senior officer, he knew to be near the Cocos Islands, and fearing a night attack on it he ordered the *Hampshire*, *Empress of Asia* and *Empress of Russia* to proceed at high speed to meet it and cover the remainder of its voyage to Colombo.³ His other arrangements he reported to the Admiralty in—

"258. Cocos or Keeling Island report this morning that *Emden* had arrived there and was sending two boats ashore armed with maxim guns.

¹ See *Emden's* signal log, noon, November 8.

² Signal log, November 8, 7.26 a.m.

³ C.L. 30.

" Telegraphic communication then ceased.

" *Yakumo* leaves Singapore this evening with *Colne*, *Jed*, *Welland* for Sunda Strait.

" Cable ship *Patrol* will join them there about November 13, and proceed with *Yakumo* to Cocos to repair cable, leaving destroyers to continue patrol of Sunda Strait.

" Vice-Admiral Tochinai, in *Tokiwa*, leaves Singapore to-morrow, November 10, for northern end of Sumatra; *Nisshin* will follow him November 16 or 17.

" I do not propose to disturb other ships from their present stations.

" *Clio* will act as wireless link between Singapore and ships in Sunda Strait."

(Received at Admiralty 8.15 a.m., 9.11.14.)

It was not till next morning that he learned that these efforts to block the eastern exit of the Indian Ocean against the *Emden* were no longer necessary.

The landing party sent by Captain von Müller "got to work" in double quick time. I¹ and the two W/T operators were "the first at the W/T station, where calls for help were still being sent out. We at once destroyed the accumulator, electric machinery, motor engine, switchboard, etc. Another party did the same work in the telegraph house. Lieutenant-Commander von Mücke fished up the cable and cut it through. The W/T mast was blown up and also a house with spare cables."


70. The "Sydney" comes up.—By this means Cocos Island was cut off from all communication with the rest of the world. But the S.O.S. signal had been heard, and help was speedily coming. The *Melbourne* (Captain Silver) in charge of the Australasian convoy intercepted the call shortly before 7 a.m. on November 9, the convoy being then about 55 miles to the northward of Cocos. Captain Silver knew only that the enemy was a cruiser and not having been informed that the *Königsberg* was safely blockaded up the Rufiji River could not be certain whether it was the *Emden* or the *Königsberg*. The safety of the convoy was his first consideration, but there was also the fact that the *Emden* was within reach, and might possibly attack his charge after dealing with the cable station. He chose to attack her first. In his despatch² he says:—


" I decided that it was in the interest of the safety of the convoy to get into touch with this cruiser, which could only be *Emden* or *Königsberg*.

" I thereupon directed *Sydney* to raise steam for full speed and proceed to Cocos. I also directed *Sydney* by W/T to rejoin convoy with despatch in case the cruiser had, in the meanwhile, departed."


¹ Letter from Hastrich, a member of the *Emden's* crew, to Engine P.O. Jagittis, N.I.D. 9663/15.

² Appendix E.





NOV. 9. SYDNEY ENGAGES EMDEN.

SYDNEY  Cocos Is.
EMDEN

The *Minotaur*, to whom the S.O.S. signal had been made in the first instance, took it in at 6.20 a.m., and sent the following signals:—

“ To *Melbourne*, 6.30 a.m. Cocos Island reports strange ship of war at entrance. Suggest you send ship to examine.

“ To *Melbourne*, 7.15 a.m. If you wish me to return please inform me at once. Do not answer if not considered expedient.

“ To *Melbourne*, 7.45 a.m. If it is *Emden* and you chase her, inform me what direction she takes and endeavour to head her towards me; my position at 8 a.m. is 15° 31' S., 94° 29' E.”

The *Sydney* (Captain Glossop) left the convoy at 7 a.m. and soon worked up to 20 knots. At 9.15 a.m. she sighted land ahead and almost immediately the smoke of a ship, which proved to be the *Emden* coming fast towards her. The *Sydney's* wireless message announcing this was picked up by the *Minotaur*, which signalled:—

“ To *Melbourne* and *Sydney*, 10.15 a.m. Am standing towards Cocos Island since 9.30 in case assistance is required.

“ Inform me when action is over so that I can resume course.”

But the *Minotaur's* assistance proved unnecessary, for the *Sydney* was considerably more powerful than the *Emden*, and had little difficulty in putting an end to the raider's career.¹

Owing to the destruction of the Cocos cable station it was some time before these events were known; but during the night of November 9–10 Cocos Island managed to set up an extemporised instrument and to send through the cable to Batavia, which the *Emden's* landing party had not had time to cut, a short message reported by Admiral Jerram as follows:—

“ . . . *Emden* has been engaged by British cruiser, result not known; landing party has seized sailing schooner and left island.

“ No further news and not possible to communicate reverse way.

“ Later information Cocos states that *Sydney* arrived there and that *Emden* is wrecked north of Cocos Island.”²

The Eastern Telegraph Company at Singapore also passed on to the Admiralty another telegram from their operator at Cocos describing the events from the shore point of view:—

“ . . . *Emden* came up 6 a.m., 4 funnels, 1 palpably canvas, with armed launch, 2 boats under counter with 40 men, 3 officers, 4 maxims, and threw them off close to outer buoy, they landed in 15 minutes. We put out wireless call for help, received by *Minotaur* and passed to *Sydney*. After smashing instruments, wireless installation, blowing up mast and engines except condenser and refrigerator, boats put off; but *Sydney* coming up *Emden* stood to sea firing her shots at first excellent but afterwards fell off; lost two funnels and mast and took fire astern. However, *Sydney* scarcely touched, 3 killed, 15 wounded; *Emden's* first shot tearing away *Sydney's* rangefinder and latter shooting at first not good.

¹ For Capt. Glossop's Report of the action, see Appendix E.

² Tel. 261 from C.-in-C., China, sent 11.5 a.m., received by Admiralty 5.12 a.m., 10.11.14.

Emden ashore north Keeling, burnt out; Captain of *Sydney* now returning there with our doctor and two assistants. Landing party commandeered two months' stores and left in *Ayesha* at 6 p.m. We were well treated and are all well except some petty pilfering, nothing private touched.

"Perth cable cut quite close to jetty, only small length required. Batavia and Rodriguez all right with exception of small store. No. 2 building damaged, *Ayesha* may be at Keeling, *Sydney* gone to sea." (Received at Admiralty 8 a.m., 10.11.14.)

71. "**Ayesha**" Commissioned.—This *Ayesha* was a sailing vessel of 97 tons, out of service, old and rotten, which was lying in the harbour. As soon as the *Emden* sighted the *Sydney*, Captain von Müller recalled the party which had landed to cut the cable, but had to run out to engage the *Sydney* before they could rejoin. Lieutenant-Commander von Mücke, therefore, returned to the island, hoisted the German flag, declared the island a German possession, put all the Englishmen under martial law, prohibited any signalling or communication with other places, and made arrangements for the defence of the beach, having trenches dug and installing the four maxim guns which the landing party had brought in anticipation of armed resistance. He intended to oppose the expected landing from a British warship by force. A few hours' reflection, however, modified this bold attitude, and he then decided to abandon this new German possession and fly. This course also required some courage. The only means of escape lay in the *Ayesha*; in this leaky craft he and his men embarked, and after filling her up with such stores as he could find, or were given him, he set sail with three cheers for the Kaiser amid the clicking of all the cameras on the island. He had announced that he was making for German East Africa, 3,500 miles away, but such was not really his intention. As soon as he was out of sight he turned to the east for Padang in Sumatra, 700 miles away.¹ His crew consisted of 3 officers and 40 men,² a large number for such resources in food and water as could be carried in so small a craft.

During the contest the *Minotaur* was steaming towards the Cocos Islands, but at 11.15 a.m., November 9, she intercepted the signal "*Sydney* to *Melbourne*. Enemy beached to save herself from sinking. Am pursuing her merchant collier." Accordingly, Captain Kiddle altered course to west again for Mauritius, and at noon was in 15° 14' S., 94° 23' E. The *Minotaur* had been in wireless touch with the *Melbourne* and *Sydney* throughout the encounter, and as she was also in touch with Perth W/T Station she was able that evening to telegraph to the Australian Naval Board a summary of events.³

¹ Von Mücke: Lecture in Vienna, I.D. 1014/15.

² C. 90.

³ *Minotaur's* log and W/T log.

72. **Protection of the Convoy.**—Captain Silver of the *Melbourne* with the Australasian convoy had steadily pursued his course for Colombo during the battle, though he had moved the escorting ships *Melbourne* and *Ibuki* to the convoy's southern flank, which was that nearer the Cocos Islands. The difficulty of defending so large a convoy from attack by any fast armed vessel is shown by the fact that it took the *Empress of Asia*, and would have taken the *Melbourne*, 40 minutes to pass from the head to the rear of the squadron at 19½ knots.¹ Captain Silver was somewhat anxious about the *Königsberg* and telegraphed to the *Minotaur* for the latest news, receiving in reply:—

"Last information about *Königsberg* was in telegram from Intelligence Officer, Colombo, received October 30, stating that *Dartmouth*, *Chatham*, *Weymouth* were searching for her East Coast of Africa. . . . Do not think there is any danger of *Königsberg* being in these waters."²

From this it is clear that the convoy's escort was not aware that the *Königsberg* was no longer at large.

Admiral Jerram's orders for the *Hampshire* and *Empresses* to proceed at high speed to cover the convoy into Colombo did not reach Captain Grant (*Hampshire*) till 1 a.m., November 10. The *Hampshire* was then cruising between Cape Comorin and Minikoi, with the *Empress of Russia* to the northward of her, while the *Empress of Asia* having left Colombo at 6 p.m. on November 9 was steering N. 68° W. to join the *Hampshire*. Captain Grant called the two *Empresses* to him and proceeded south-east in company. "At 2 p.m. received telegram to send "on one *Empress* at full speed, *Emden* having been accounted "for. I³ selected *Empress of Asia*, as she had just coaled, while "the *Empress of Russia* only had a week at full speed. As "the danger is passed at present, *Königsberg* being up a "river on East Coast of Africa, according to news brought by "*Empress of Asia*, I decided to reduce to 14½ knots; we "could have joined the convoy at 18½, but were burning over "300 tons per diem, and it would be leaving very little "reserve to get back to Colombo. In case of grave risk of "the convoy it was worth it. Now I am meeting the convoy "only a few hours later, and am in W/T touch." The *Empress of Asia* was to relieve the *Sydney* at Cocos Island, remaining there till the arrival of the *Cadmus*, which was coming from Singapore to make a thorough search of the wreck of the *Emden* and guard the island against a return of the *Ayesha*. The *Sydney*, however, left Cocos Island with the *Emden's* crew and all the wounded on November 11, three days before the arrival of the *Empress of Asia*.

¹ Log of *Empress of Asia*, November 12, 1914.

² *Minotaur* to *Melbourne*, 6.30 p.m., November 9, 1914.

³ Captain Grant's Report, M. 0309/15.

CHAPTER XIII.

SUMMARY OF THE "EMDEN'S" CAREER.

Perhaps no vessel on either side achieved such fame as the *Emden*; in both hemispheres her name was better known during the war than that of any other ship. The result of this notoriety has been the growth of certain legends which may be worth examination. Most of these stories can be traced in the first instance to remarks made by the crews of the ships she captured and kept on board, and to whom her officers told tall stories. One of these legends is that she had a most efficient system for gaining intelligence.

73. Intelligence.—One Saturday, in reply to a query as to what they would do if one of our cruisers suddenly appeared on the scene, the officers of the *Emden* said they were perfectly safe as they knew the *Yarmouth* was in Colombo, and that her crew were playing in a football match that afternoon. This story was swallowed by the listeners and repeated as an example of the marvellous intelligence system of the Germans.¹ But it was not true; the *Yarmouth* at the time was patrolling off Acheh Head. Again, Captain von Müller, on learning that the *Buresk* was a Government collier, closely questioned her skipper as to whether he was not carrying other Government stores. This seems a natural question in the circumstances; but the fact was that, while loading, the *Buresk* was left alone one night in the hands of the Admiralty, who had the docks guarded. This made the crew think they had some secret and important cargo on board, and Captain von Müller's questions led them to the conclusion that he knew all about it. The diary of one of *Buresk's* officers kept while in the *Emden* has the entries: "October 14, received wireless that '*Hampshire* was 500 miles off, also cruisers *Duke of Edinburgh*, *Chatham*, and *Weymouth* were searching for them, 'but knew their positions.'" In point of fact, the *Hampshire* was then about 300 miles off, but the remainder of the statement shows that this was pure guess work. On October 18 the diary has an entry: "Noon, received wireless that steamers 'were steering 60 miles north of track.'" The *Emden's* signal log records no such signal, and we know that the information that steamers were to pass 40 miles north of Minikoi was given by the crew of the *Troilus*.²

On the other hand, we have plenty of evidence that Captain von Müller was not aware of much that it was important for him to know. When the *Sydney* turned up it was at first thought on board that she was the *Newcastle*,³ which was then

¹ M. 04929/14.² See para. 60.³ M. 54970/16.

on the west coast of America. Again, he expected to find either the *Dupleix* or *Montcalm* at Penang; and in the preceding chapters will be found several other instances of similar ignorance on his part. The only piece of information obtained by wireless other than the press news circulated by the Dutch stations, appears to have been from an Indian shore station. The *Emden* asked, "Whose call sign is Q.M.D.?" whereupon the station replied "H.M.S. *Hampshire*." With such guileless operators in charge ashore, it is a wonder that she did not get more information. Captain von Müller told Captain Grant that he got no news by W/T as regards shipping;¹ having been in China together the *Emden* knew the *Hampshire's* note quite well, and probably the *Yarmouth's* too. From all these considerations, we may safely conclude that the *Emden* received few or no messages specially sent to her and relied for her intelligence on ordinary common sense, rather than on information, either from India or the Dutch East Indies.

74. Dutch Neutrality.—There seems no reason to suspect that the Dutch authorities had defended their neutrality in the East Indies otherwise than with fairness or even a slight bias in our favour. Dutch men-of-war constantly patrolled their own waters with embarrassing results to such arrangements as the German supply officers had been able to make. On September 9, Dutch men-of-war discovered three colliers—two German and one neutral; the two Germans were forced to discharge their cargo in Dutch territory, and the neutral preferred to leave Dutch waters. Again, at the end of September, a Dutch cruiser found the German S.S. *Hoerde* from Manila with coal in a little bay on the west coast of Sumatra; she was brought into Sabang and forced to discharge her cargo.² The *Choising*, which left Batavia suddenly in the night of September 26, was found prowling about and was brought into Padang on October 11; her subsequent escape to pick up the *Ayesha's* crew was evidently against Dutch wishes. The *Anghin* came into Sourabaya with 1,400 tons of coal on October 23, stating that she had left Manila on September 4 for Bangkok; she, however, did not leave again. Altogether, by October 31 the net result of Dutch activity was that 14,000 tons of coal intended for belligerents had been discharged in Dutch territory and 12,000 tons found at rendezvous was forced to go elsewhere. Against the abuse of wireless, the Dutch seem also to have taken all reasonable precautions, and in one case, that of the *Preussen* at Sabang, which on October 28 was found to have a clandestine installation, the master and wireless operator were both interned. After trial and an appeal, the Commander and Fourth Officer were sentenced, in March, 1916, by the High Court of Batavia, to one year's imprisonment each. According

¹ M. 04929/14.² She was waiting for the *Emden* and had on board Lieut.-Commander von Moeller, head of the Manila supply centre (see para. 86).

to the Governor-General, this installation can have been ready only a few days before discovery.¹ Altogether, it is clear that such success as the *Emden* achieved was not in any way helped by the action or inactivity of the Dutch.

75. Working Time.—The *Emden* was sunk 99 days after the start of her war career. The first 30 days of this were occupied in the voyage to the Indian Ocean, during which she made no organised attempt to interrupt commerce. On August 31 she was in the latitude of Sunda Strait and may be considered to have been in position. Her subsequent career may be summarised as follows:—

Date.	No. of Days.	Captures.
August 31–September 9	10	—
September 10–September 14	5	8
„ 15– „ 24	10	—
„ 25– „ 27	3	6
„ 28–October 15	18	—
October 16– „ 19	4	7
„ 20–November 9	20	2 ²

In the second blank she bombarded Madras, and in the last period she raided Penang. Counting each of these as a working day we have a total of 13 working days out of her 70 in the Indian Ocean. If also the capture of the *Riasan* be called a working day we have a grand total of 14 working days out of the 99 days since the outbreak of war with France and Russia on August 2. The remainder of her time was employed in changing station; one big blank period, that occupied in her visit to the Chagos Islands, was mainly due to faulty intelligence obtained from antiquated sailing directions.

75 (a). Total Loss caused by “Emden.”—The total number of ships sunk by the *Emden* was 16, and their value is estimated at £2,200,000.³ Two warships were sunk by her—the *Zhemchug* and *Mousquet*. Besides this, the damage to the oil tanks at Madras and the cable station at Cocos represent a considerable amount of money; in the case of Madras the loss to us was chiefly in the paralysis of business which followed.³

76. General Diary of Movements.⁴

- Aug. 2. At sea. Received news of outbreak of war with Russia.
 „ 4. Captured *Riasan*.
 „ 6. Coaled at Tsingtau and sailed with *Markomannia*.

¹ M. 0717/15; N.I.D. 20169/16; N.I.D. 10053/17. Papers titled F.O. 13/12/1914, *Activities of German Supply Ships*.

² *Glenturret* and *Newburn*, both released.

³ See Faile: *Seaborne Trade*.

⁴ See Map, p. 116.

- Aug. 12. Joined von Spee in Ladrone Islands. Coaled.
 „ 14. Detached with *Markomannia*.
 „ 19. Coaled at Angaur.
 „ 25. Coaled at N.E. point of Timor Island.
 „ 28. Passed between Lombok and Bali.
 Sept. 4. Coaled at Simalur. Passed *Hampshire*.
 „ 10–14. Raid on Colombo-Calcutta Trade Route.
 „ 16. Coaled from *Pontoporos*.
 „ 18. Off Rangoon.
 „ 19. Coaled from *Markomannia* in Andamans.
 „ 22. Bombarded Madras.
 „ 23. Off Pondicheri.
 „ 24. Escape from *Chikuma*.
 „ 25–28. First Minikoi Raid.
 „ 29. Coaled from *Markomannia* at Felidu Atoll.
 Oct. 5–8. Cruising West of Diego Garcia.
 „ 9. Coaled from *Buresk* at Diego Garcia.
 „ 16–19. Second Minikoi Raid.
 „ 21. Narrow escape from *Hampshire* and *Empress of Asia*.
 „ 26. Coaled from *Buresk* in Nicobars.
 „ 28. Sank *Zhemchug* and *Mousquet* at Penang.
 „ 30. Transferred survivors of *Mousquet* to *Newburn*.
 Nov. 2. Coaled from *Buresk* off Pagai Island, Sumatra.
 „ 4–5. Patrolling Straits of Sunda.
 „ 9. Raided Cable Station at Cocos. Sunk by *Sydney*.

CHAPTER XIV.

DISPERSAL OF THE CHINA SQUADRON.

77. Movements immediately after Destruction of “Emden.”—The *Emden* now being destroyed, the *Königsberg* blockaded, and all the men-of-war under Admiral von Spee located on the Chilean Coast, our ships in the Indian Ocean could be more profitably employed elsewhere. There was still the *Ayesha* with her armed crew to be accounted for, and also the *Cormoran*; but no fact has yet transpired to give any idea of the latter's present position or movements. Admiral Jerram ordered the *Hampshire*, *Askold* and *Empress of Russia* to Colombo and the *Yarmouth* to Madras for a few days' rest before proceeding on any further service, as they had been almost continuously at sea since the war began,¹ leaving any active operations against the

¹ C. 89.

Ayesha in abeyance for the time. The Admiralty, however, telegraphed :—

“ Arrange for armed merchant ships to search for *Ayesha* carrying *Emden's* landing party.

“ *Melbourne* and *Sydney* are to proceed to Colombo forthwith.”¹

The *Sydney* had already left Cocos Island to rejoin the convoy. The *Melbourne* during the night of November 11 received her orders to proceed to Colombo in advance of the convoy; they reached her through the *Hampshire*, which continued steaming south-eastward at 14½ knots till 8 p.m. on November 12, when she met the *Melbourne* and turned back for Colombo. The *Empress of Russia* also continued steering south-eastward to meet the *Sydney*, passing the convoy, now under the sole charge of the *Ibuki*, at 8 p.m., November 12. She met the *Sydney* at 8 a.m. November 13, and took over from her 93 German prisoners and wounded, after which, in company with the *Sydney*, she proceeded for Colombo. Arriving there at 11.10 a.m., November 13, she relieved the *Sydney* of the remainder of the *Emden's* prisoners, discharged 38 wounded to hospital and 150 to various ships of the Australasian convoy which reached Colombo, November 16.² It was not till November 18 that she could start for a cruise through the Maldives and Diego Garcia in search of the *Ayesha* and *Exford*.

78. Cruisers ordered Home.—Besides the *Melbourne* and *Sydney*, which were destined for Malta, the Admiralty on November 12 ordered home the *Hampshire* and *Yarmouth*.³ This suggested to Admiral Jerram a solution of a difficulty which he telegraphed as follows :—

“ With reference to escort of Australian convoy from Colombo, I submit it is undesirable *Ibuki* should be their sole protection, not so much from point of view of safety as of Australian sentiment.

“ Suggest *Hampshire* and *Yarmouth* should carry out this service if *Melbourne* and *Sydney* cannot be spared.

“ Moreover, Japanese have asked *Ibuki* may be released at Colombo as they are anxious for her to join their Second Southern Squadron without delay.”⁴

Although the First Lord “ entirely disagreed with the Commander-in-Chief's views ”⁵ the *Hampshire* was ordered to take the Australasian convoy on from Colombo and the question of the release of the *Ibuki* was considered, though the *Yarmouth* was ordered on to Gibraltar without the convoy.⁶

The Japanese Naval General Staff had suggested to our Admiralty that, now the *Emden* was destroyed, their ships in the Indian Ocean would be better employed against Admiral

¹ Tel. 283 to C.-in-C., China, 5.55 p.m., 11.11.14.

² Log of *Empress of Russia*. ³ C. 91.

⁴ Tel. 275 from C.-in-C., China, 13.11.14.

⁵ See H.S. 2, p. 232. ⁶ C. 92.

von Spee's Squadron and proposed that the *Ibuki* and *Nisshin* should join their Second Southern Squadron, the *Yahagi* and *Chikuma* to join the First Southern Squadron. The squadrons thus reorganised would comprise :—

First Squadron (headquarters, Suva).

Kurama (flag of Vice-Admiral Yamaya).

Tsukuba.

Ikoma.

Iwate.

Chikuma.

Yahagi.

Second Squadron (headquarters, Truk, Caroline Is.).

Satsuma (flag of Rear-Admiral Matsumura).

Ibuki.

Nisshin.

Hirado.

Umikaze.

Yamakaze.

Vice-Admiral Tochinai with the *Tokiwa* and *Yakumo* was to remain temporarily in the vicinity of Singapore.¹

Operations to be conducted by Admiral Jerram now resolved themselves into :—

- (1) Escort of various transports.
- (2) The watch on Manila.
- (3) Search for the *Ayesha*.

His squadron was shrinking daily. On November 16 the *Philomel* left Singapore with the French transports *Euphrate*, *Chili* and *Latouche-Tréville*, which had been waiting at Singapore for escort ever since the *Emden's* raid on Penang; she arrived with them at Colombo on November 23.

On November 17 the *Hampshire* sailed from Colombo with the Australasian convoy. The *Ibuki* was also acting as escort, since no orders about her return had then been received by Admiral Tochinai.² They arrived at Aden on November 25, the *Hampshire* continuing the voyage to Gibraltar, and the *Ibuki* returning east to join the Japanese Second Southern Squadron.

On November 17 also, Admiral Jerram received orders to send all his river-class destroyers to Egypt.³ In accordance with this order the *Colne*, *Jed*, *Chelmer* and *Welland* were docked at Singapore. The *Kennet*, after refitting, arrived from Hong Kong, and they left for Penang and Colombo on November 30. The *Ribble* was repairing defects at Hong Kong; in the same yard was the *Usk*, which on November 23 arrived

¹ C.L. 30.

² C. 93.

³ C. 94.

from Wei-hai-wei with the *Delta*, a hospital ship to be converted at Hong Kong into a transport for conveying the 2nd Battalion of the South Wales Borderers home from there. The *Usk* and *Ribble* were to leave Hong Kong for Egypt about December 1, the *Delta* to proceed earlier without escort. The two destroyers, however, were late, and were not able to leave Singapore till December 17.

On November 18, the *Yarmouth* left Colombo for Aden; the *Chikuma* and *Yahagi* left Singapore for Fiji,¹ and Admiral Jerram reported:—

“ . . . The sea-going force now under my orders consists of four armed merchant cruisers, two sloops, *Askold*, and *Triumph* when her refit is complete about end of December.

“ I consider two armed merchant cruisers and one sloop should continue to watch Manila until the enemy's squadron has been destroyed or has left the Pacific Ocean, leaving *Askold*, two armed merchant cruisers, and one sloop for general escort and patrol work.”²

But the Admiralty wanted his ships elsewhere, and replied:—

“ Arrange, if possible, for *Askold* to proceed to Egypt to operate against Turks on Syrian coast and in Dardanelles. . . .

“ Every available ship is required from the East for Egypt, the Dardanelles, and the Syrian coast to operate against the Turks.

“ *Askold* should be sent to Egypt, as already telegraphed.

“ Armed *Empress* liners are required to work the Red Sea convoys in conjunction with Indian Marine ships.

“ Requirements of China station should be met by Japanese.”³

In accordance with this, the *Askold* left Colombo for Port Said on November 24. Admiral Jerram's arrangements for the armed merchant liners were:—

“ *Empress of Japan* and *Himalaya*. These two vessels and also *Chelmer*, until I ordered her to Singapore, have been employed in watching Manila to prevent the sailing of German colliers.

“ As I consider that this watch should continue as long as there are any German cruisers in the Pacific, I have arranged that it shall be undertaken by Japanese ships, and *Chiyoda* should arrive off Manila to-day for the purpose.

“ The two armed merchant cruisers will then proceed direct to Singapore and on to Aden as soon as possible.

“ *Empress of Asia* left Singapore November 27 for Aden, calling at Colombo.

“ *Empress of Russia*. As it seemed probable that the schooner *Ayesha* might proceed to the westward, I sent *Empress of Russia* to Diego Garcia, leaving Colombo on November 18; she searched that vicinity from November 20–23, without result; and I think it is just possible that the *Ayesha* may never be heard of again as it is now 18 days since she left Cocos Island. I am informed that she makes 4 ft. of water a day when sailing and that both the pumps are out of order.

“ I have requested H.M. Consuls-General at Manila and Batavia that if *Exford* or *Ayesha* should arrive in American or Dutch waters the local authorities may be pressed to have them interned.

¹ C. 95.

² Tel. 290 from China, 18.11.14.

³ Tels. 298, 299 to C.-in-C., China, 18.11.14.

“ Whilst returning from Diego Garcia to Colombo, *Empress of Russia* was diverted to Aden by wireless. Due at Aden, November 29.”¹

This left Admiral Jerram nothing except the battleship *Triumph* and the sloop *Cadmus*, whose retention for general purposes the Admiralty approved; she was at the Cocos Island examining the wreck of the *Emden*.

The *Clio* left Singapore for Suez on November 22 with the transport *Monmouthshire* which had been brought, originally as an ammunition ship, from Shimonoseki by the *Ikoma*. The *Monmouthshire*, on arrival with the *Ikoma* at Hong Kong, had been fitted as a transport, and embarking 250 R.G.A. details left there on November 14 for Singapore² with the *Ikoma*. Vice-Admiral Tochinai sailed from Singapore for Fiji on November 24 with the *Tokiwa*, *Yakumo* and *Ikoma*, thus terminating the cordial relations which had been established between himself and Admiral Jerram.³

79. Search for “Ayesha.”—The convoys having left and the watch on Manila being in the hands of the Japanese, Admiral Jerram's main pre-occupation was the search for the *Ayesha*. It was not till December 2 that he heard any news of her, which, with his arrangements to meet it, he telegraphed to the Admiralty in:—

“ 308. Intercepted telegram from Sabang to Lloyds, London, states S.S. *Sahara* reports having seen several wrecks 50 miles to the west of Sabang, presumably yesterday morning, Tuesday.

“ Consul-General, Batavia, telegraphs newspapers to-night report schooner *Ayesha* entered Padang some days ago and left again flying German colours. It seems possible that crew of *Ayesha* may have joined *Exford* and be on trade route.

“ *Cadmus* returned from Cocos (Keeling) Island to-day and reports small guns and mountings were not on board *Emden*, so possibly they may be mounted in *Exford*. Five destroyers left Penang, 7 p.m., December 1, for Colombo, and I am endeavouring to inform them by W/T.

“ *Empress of Japan*, *Himalaya*, leave Singapore to-morrow morning, December 3, and I am ordering them call at Penang for orders; subject to Admiralty approval I propose to employ them searching for *Exford* until question of alleged wrecks is cleared up.

“ *Cadmus* will be ready for sea Friday morning, *Pyramus* Monday, and I could use them also.

“ *Empress of Asia* is at Colombo, and if not urgently required in Red Sea could cruise between Ceylon and Minikoi Island. No Japanese ships are available in vicinity.

“ Submit I may be informed if these arrangements are approved.”⁴

His arrangements were approved; but were not carried out, since:—

“ Further inquiry elicited following facts that wreckage reported consisted of only one large pulling boat and a spar.

“ Small guns of *Emden* were removed long time ago; none can be mounted, therefore, in *Exford*.

¹ C.L. 31.

² H.S. 34, p. 156.

³ C.L. 31; but telegram quoted as C. 95 says he left November 15.

⁴ Tel. 308 from C.-in-C., China, 2.12.14.

"*Ayesha* arrived at Padang, November 28, and sailed November 29.

"Even if *Ayesha* joins *Exford* they have very little machine-gun ammunition.

"All ports and ships have been warned already. Under these circumstances I have not detained *Empress of Asia*, but am sending *Empress of Japan* and *Himalaya* down West Coast of Sumatra, former to complete circuit of island, latter to part company off Padang and search northward again to Acheh, then proceed to Colombo.

"*Cadmus* has lost greater part of both bilge keels and cannot be ready for six days.

"*Pyramus* will proceed as ordered by Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, unless anything else occurs.¹

The trade route between Acheh Head and Colombo had been covered by the five destroyers which had left Singapore on November 30. They steamed spread to 15 miles apart, but on arrival at Colombo on December 6 had to report having seen nothing.

Admiral Jerram noted the removal of all British ships from the Far East with some apprehension in view of the fact that Admiral von Spee's Squadron was still at large. This he expressed in telegram:—

"316. After considering present disposition of ships on China and East Indies Stations I should like to make quite sure that Admiralty realise there is now no ship of allied nations to the east of Suez which is capable of dealing with a German cruiser except *Chatham* already fully occupied.

"In view of temporary success of *Emden* it seems not improbable German Admiral may send another light cruiser across Pacific or round Cape of Good Hope to replace her.

"The nearest suitable Japanese ship belongs to Second Southern Squadron in the Caroline Islands, and as the Japanese are reluctant to break up their squadron and have been deliberate in moving their ships it would certainly be a fortnight, and probably three weeks, before any force sent by them could be assembled where most probably required.

"Vice-Admiral Tochinai was despatched Singapore with *Tokiwa* and *Yakumo* for express purpose of operating against *Emden* and was recalled to Japan when *Emden* had been captured. I think that Japanese consider question of expense a good deal."²

80. **Effect of Battle of the Falklands.**—All apprehensions on this matter were, however, set at rest by the victory won at the Falkland Islands on December 9, in which the *Gneisenau*, *Scharnhorst*, *Leipzig* and *Nürnberg* were sunk, and the *Dresden*, sole German survivor of the fight, was driven to hide among the islands of the Cape Horn Archipelago; but on December 12, when the *Ibuki* was ordered to return to Japan from Singapore, Admiral Jerram suggested that the Japanese, if they were considering the redistribution of their ships, might think fit to keep two at Singapore in case any future attack on trade should be made.³

¹ Tel. 316 from C.-in-C., China, 7.12.14.

² Tel. 316 from C.-in-C., China, 7.12.14.

³ C. 96.

81. **Capture of "Exford."**—The *Pyramus*, having had her defects made good, left Singapore on December 8 for Colombo to join the East Indies command; she took no part in the chase of the *Ayesha* and *Exford* which thus devolved on the *Empress of Japan* and the *Himalaya*. "On December 11, "*Empress of Japan* recaptured *Exford* about 25 miles south-west from Padang and took out of her the German prize crew, viz., 1 lieutenant of reserve, 2 warrant officers, and 14 "men belonging to *Emden*, who have been landed as prisoners "of war at Singapore.

"*Exford*, manned by a prize crew from *Empress of Japan*, "has been brought to Singapore, where she will discharge her "cargo, of which only a small amount has been used for her "own steaming; she will then be discharged from Admiralty "service.

"During this search nothing was seen of *Ayesha*, so *Empress of Japan* returned to Singapore on December 15, whilst *Himalaya* "proceeded direct to Colombo; after coaling there she will "proceed to Diego Garcia, and after searching the Maldivé "Islands northwards as far as Minikoi, will proceed to Aden in "accordance with her original orders."¹

82. **"Cormoran" Interned.**—In the meantime, another German ship which had been on Admiral Jerram's mind was disposed of. This was the *Cormoran*, late *Riasan*, which, though never definitely located, had been considered a danger to the Pacific and Indian trade routes. On December 14 she arrived at Guam, an island north of the Philippines owned by the United States. She was within striking distance of the trade routes meeting at Singapore, and Admiral Jerram obtained the Admiralty's permission to keep the *Empress of Japan* and *Himalaya* instead of sending them on to Aden.²

The *Cormoran* was, however, interned on December 15, and Admiral Jerram, therefore, ordered the *Himalaya* to proceed to Aden after searching the Maldives, keeping only the *Cadmus* and *Empress of Japan*.³

83. **Career of the "Cormoran II."**—The *Cormoran*, late *Riasan*, fitted out at Tsingtau with the armament⁴ and the crew of the gunboat *Cormoran*, joined Admiral von Spee at Majuro in the Marshall Islands, and was detached by him to work with the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* as a commerce-destroyer in Australian waters. Proceeding westward, the *Cormoran* called at Kawieng on September 6, and carried on to the Molucca Passage, which she reached on September 11. She cruised there for a few days, called at Ceram on the 13th, and passing between New Guinea and Gillolo on September 14 made northward for Yap, probably

¹ C.L. 32.

² C. 97, 98.

³ C. 99.

⁴ 8—4.1 in.; 5—1-pdr.; 2 Maxims.

for coal and provisions. It was just about this time that our Sandakan Squadron captured the two colliers *Tannenfels* and *Rio Passig*¹ in this neighbourhood; indeed, the *Rio Passig* had been to Ceram. The colliers were reported to be waiting for von Spee, but it is possible they might have been met by the *Cormoran* if Admiral Jerram's watch on the exits from the Philippines had been less strict. The raider appears to have stayed at Yap from September 17 to 19, and obtained some coal and provisions. From there she came south again to New Guinea to rendezvous with the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*. The spot chosen was Alexis Bay, a few miles north of Friedrich Wilhelms Hafen, in 5° S., 145° 50' E., where was the seat of the German Government in New Guinea, and there the *Cormoran* arrived late on September 23. But her visit was ill-timed. Early next morning Admiral Patey with the Australian Squadron arrived off Friedrich Wilhelms Hafen, and the *Cormoran* was forced to run up a narrow creek and hide among the mangroves. It is certainly remarkable that a ship of this size could escape notice at all; but the Australian Squadron stayed no time at Friedrich Wilhelms Hafen, and made no search of the neighbouring harbours, but having received the formal surrender of the place departed at sunset for New Britain. Breathing again after her narrow escape the *Cormoran* crept out from her hiding place and made for Yap once more. About this time she met the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*; according to the captain of the latter the meeting took place at Alexis Bay on September 28,² but a track chart of the *Cormoran's* movements, compiled by various members of the crew,³ show the *Cormoran* as leaving Alexis Bay during the night of September 24–25, and as arriving at Yap on September 28. Here she embarked the remainder of the coal in store and taking on board a party from the surveying vessel *Planet*, with 3 pom-poms, 3 maxims and some rifles, left early on September 30, steering again for Friedrich Wilhelms Hafen, where she intended to make a surprise attack. The collier *Elmshorn* was to have joined her there, but was prevented from leaving Manila by our watching squadron.⁴ The *Cormoran* cruised about off Alexis Bay from the 4th to the 6th and then came back to Yap. Once more she was unfortunate. The Japanese Southern Squadron took possession of Yap on October 7, and when two days later the *Cormoran* arrived she encountered a Japanese warship, even getting within range of her guns. But a squall came down in which she escaped to the eastward. On October 12 she arrived at Lamotrek in 7° 30' N., 146° 20' E., a desolate reef in the Central Carolines, where a handful of savages support existence on fish and coconuts. Here she stayed two months, waiting for a collier from Guam, which she had ordered through a passing sailing ship.

¹ See para. 37.

² N.I.D. 6721/15; 6816/15.

³ N.I.D. 5101/15 and 5223/16 in I.D.H.S. 508.

⁴ *Kreuzerkrieg* I, 112, 426.

One day three officers went off in a cutter to search for the collier—a hopeless quest, since the Governor had stopped her sailing; at last, starving and depressed, the *Cormoran* weighed anchor and steamed with her remaining coal to Guam, the nearest neutral port. There she arrived on December 14 and was promptly interned.¹

84. Search for "Ayesha" Continued.—The internment of the *Cormoran* and the capture of the *Exford* left only the *Ayesha* unaccounted for. On December 16 a British steamer arriving at Colombo reported having sighted a three-masted schooner resembling the *Ayesha* at 6 a.m., December 9, in 3° 24' S., 99° 38' E., steering east.² Admiral Jerram thought this might be the *Ayesha* and disposed his force to search for her. The French destroyers were due to refit at Saigon; the *D'Iberville*, having refitted, was sent to cruise in the Java Sea. Sunda Strait and the west coast of Sumatra were searched by the *Cadmus*; the north coast of Java and the south coast of Borneo by the *Empress of Japan*. The *Himalaya*, on her way to Aden, spent ten days examining Diego Garcia and the Maldives.

85. End of the "Ayesha."—All these searches revealed nothing. In point of fact, by this time the *Ayesha* was non-existent and her crew had embarked, as Admiral Jerram foresaw, in another ship. After leaving Padang they drifted about for three weeks near a rendezvous where, on December 14, the *Choising*, specially sent out from Padang at last met them. Embarking in her they sank the *Ayesha* on the 16th and proceeded to Hodeidah in the Red Sea, where Lieut.-Commander von Mücke expected to find the terminus of the Hedjaz Railway; there the party landed on January 8, 1915, and after five months of adventures by sea and land managed to reach El Ulah (Lat. 26° 30' N.) on the Hedjaz Railway.³ From there the party proceeded in comparative safety and comfort to Germany, where they were received as heroes, an honour to which they were justly entitled.

86. German Supply Arrangements.—From the German Official History we learn that supply centres were organised at Shanghai, Manila and Batavia. In peace time they were managed by local commercial men; in war a naval officer took charge. The general system for the supply service prior to June, 1914, was that colliers were to be stationed at various named harbours where the cruisers could find them. In June, however, a new system was instituted. The colliers were to cruise on certain short, fixed lines where they would be met by and receive instructions from auxiliary vessels sent by the Cruiser Squadron.⁴ The Shanghai centre was manned by the personnel of the

¹ The authorities for this paragraph, in addition to those already quoted, are N.I.D. 20789/15, 12102/16, M. 42026/15 and W. 671 in I.D.H.S. 1479.

² C. 99.

³ Von Mücke's Lecture, I.D. 1014/15.

⁴ German Official History, *Kreuzerkrieg* I, p. 69.

MOVEMENTS OF "EMDEN"

1st AUGUST to 9th NOVEMBER, 1914,


AND

POSITIONS OF CHINA SQUADRON

To 13th SEPTEMBER.

Track of "Emden" taken from I.D. 1165, Oct. 1917, "German Raiders," plotted on Admiralty Chart 2483.

Positions of H.M. Ships from Ships Logs.
(Noon positions unless otherwise stated).



Variation Nil.

Variation Nil.

Variation 5° E.

Variation 5° W.

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MOVEMENTS OF
 IN AUGUST & SEPTEMBER
 AND
 POSITIONS OF CHINA SQUADRON
 TO 10th SEPTEMBER
 Track of "Endeavour" taken from 1 D 1165, Oct 1911.

THE EAST INDIES SQUADRON
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 THE EAST INDIES SQUADRON

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THE EAST INDIES SQUADRON, 1914.¹

Introduction.

The chief interest of the subject of this monograph lies in the unexpected nature of the calls upon the East Indies Squadron and its diversion from its primary function. It will be seen that though it was placed in the Indian Ocean to fulfil certain duties, no sooner did war break out than it had to be detailed for entirely different duties, and the work it had been specially got ready to perform was taken over by another squadron, originally disposed elsewhere for other purposes. In fact, the situation which war did in actual fact bring about proved to be quite different from what had been anticipated, and was met by the complete abandonment of the carefully considered procedure decided upon before the outbreak of hostilities.

Note on Sources.

The telegrams to and from the East Indies Station are in H.S. Vols. 12 and 32. The docketed papers have not yet been bound. They consist chiefly of telegrams and letters from the War Office and India Office, and will be referred to by their numbers in the Admiralty register.

The transport arrangements are in a volume titled T.7634/14, at present in the custody of the Ministry of Shipping.

No references are given for movements of H.M. ships; these have been taken from their logs.

¹ Slightly abridged from C.B. 929.

THE EAST INDIES SQUADRON, 1914.

(Short Title : "EAST INDIES, 1914.")

CHAPTER I.

THE STATION AND ITS SQUADRON.

1. **The East Indies Station.**—The Indian Ocean is exceptional in that its coasts are largely British. Its northern shores include India and Burmah; to the westward are British East Africa and South Africa; on the east side are the Malay States and Australia; while its southern boundary, if it can be considered to have one, is the open sea extending for nearly 5,000 miles between Africa and Australia along the parallel of 35° S.

This large extent of British coast line permitted us to set up a series of protected harbours. Of these, Bombay, the strongest, was a second-class naval base; while Singapore, fortified against a powerful squadron of armoured cruisers and a raiding force of not more than 2,000 men, was the most formidable of the defended commercial ports. The others in alphabetical order were: Aden, Calcutta, Colombo, Durban, Fremantle, Karachi, Mauritius, and Rangoon.¹

Germany's only colony and base in these waters was German East Africa with its ports Dar-es-Salaam and Tanga, neither of which was fortified.

The Indian Ocean being so large an area was under the care of three British Squadrons; of these, the East Indies Squadron (one battleship, two light cruisers, and three sloops) took the main portion from Java to Aden; the Australian Squadron (one battle cruiser, four light cruisers, and two submarines) under the control of the Commonwealth Government guarded Australian waters, and the Cape Squadron (three light cruisers) was responsible for the south-western portion as far north as the Equator and the Seychelles, thus including German East Africa. One effect of this arrangement was that the base which would presumably be used by enemy cruisers operating against our trade routes in the Indian Ocean was outside the jurisdiction of the force guarding those routes.

Before the Russo-Japanese War we had maintained in Far Eastern waters a powerful squadron, including six battleships, to counteract the Russian force in those seas, and the general idea was that our first move when war was imminent would be

¹ Admiralty Manual of War Organisation, 1914, Appendix.

to concentrate at Singapore the China, East Indies, and Australian Squadrons under the supreme command of the Commander-in-Chief, China, who would always be the senior of the three Admirals. But with the destruction of the Russian fleet and the renewal of our alliance with Japan, coupled with the concentration of the main force of the British Navy in Home Waters to meet the menace of growing German power, the three squadrons were all much reduced; and in 1913 Singapore itself was transferred with Sumatra, Java and the Malay Peninsula from the China Station to the East Indies which up to then had extended only as far as the northern entrance of the Straits of Malacca.¹ By this extension the East Indies Station now took in the whole of the very important trade route between the two focal points Aden and Singapore, the latter being the junction of the trade routes from China and the Eastern Archipelago.

2. Trade Routes.—Practically all the trade to and from the Far East, India and East Africa, and a large portion of the Australian trade, passes through the Gulf of Aden. At the island of Sokotra the main trunk of the trade route goes on to Colombo, throwing off branches to Karachi, Bombay, Mauritius and the African coast. Off Ceylon further important branches run to Calcutta, Rangoon, Sunda Strait and Fremantle, but the trunk itself continues to Singapore and up the coast of China. The value of this trade in hulls and cargoes is very great,² both from the money it is worth, and the indispensable nature of the goods; consequently, it might be judged to present an attractive target to an enterprising enemy. Yet Germany had within immediate striking distance only one light cruiser, and thus our squadron told off for the patrol of the Indian Ocean was a small one.

3. The East Indies Squadron.—The East Indies Squadron, under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir Richard H. Peirse, K.C.B., M.V.O., consisted of the following vessels:—

—	Class.	Completed.	Tons.	Guns.	Trial Speed.
<i>Swiftsure</i> ..	Battleship ..	1904	11,800	4—10 in., 14—7.5 in.	19.9
<i>Dartmouth</i> ..	Light Cruiser	1911	5,250	8—6 in.	25.8
<i>Fox</i>	Light Cruiser	1895	4,360	2—6 in., 8—4.7 in.	19.9
<i>Espiègle</i> ..	Sloop	1902	1,070	6—4 in.	13.5
<i>Odin</i>	Sloop	1902	1,070	4—4 in.	13.6
<i>Alert</i>	Sloop	1895	960	4—4 in.	13.4

¹ M. 12159 of April 14, 1913.

² See Fayle: *Seaborne Commerce*, Chapter VII, for details of the route and the value of its trade.

A reinforcement would be provided by the largest vessels of the Royal Indian Marine; these were to be armed on the outbreak of war and could be used either as transports or merchant cruisers. Arrangements had been made with the Australian Government that one of their light cruisers should be sent to Fremantle to be under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.

4. The pre-war arrangements for the East Indies Station were based on the assumption that the principal danger to be feared was from merchant vessels which the enemy might arm as cruisers; these might slip away from the southern ports of China, and pass unobserved through one or other of the numerous straits between Australia and the Malay Peninsula. The points at which they would probably strike would be those where the trade routes converged and merchant vessels would be most thickly collected; such would be (a) the Gulf of Aden, (b) the neighbourhood of Minikoi in the Maldivé Islands, (c) off Colombo, (d) the Straits of Malacca, and (e) the Straits of Sunda. The disposition of the East Indies Squadron at the outbreak of war would be ruled by these considerations, and the best allocation would, therefore, be: two sloops in the Gulf of Aden; the *Fox* and an Australian cruiser for the Colombo-Fremantle trade route; the *Swiftsure*, *Dartmouth* and two auxiliary cruisers for the Straits of Malacca and Sunda, to be reinforced by the *Triumph* from Hong Kong in certain circumstances. The Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, was to make Singapore his Headquarters.

5. Enemy Forces.—On July 27, 1914, the date of the despatch of the Precautionary telegram warning all Senior Officers abroad that war between the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente was by no means impossible, the German men-of-war in the Indian Ocean were the light cruiser *Königsberg*, of 24 knots, carrying ten 4 in. guns; the gunboat *Geier*, with eight 4 in. guns; and the surveying vessel *Möwe*, with three 1-pdrs. and two Maxims.

The *Königsberg* and *Möwe* were at or near Dar-es-Salaam, and the *Geier* was at Singapore.

Besides these, there were in the Indian Ocean several German vessels considered by us as convertible into cruisers. Of these, the *Tabora* (8,022 tons, 15 knots) was approaching Dar-es-Salaam; the *Kleist* (8,959 tons, 14½ knots), nearing Penang; the *Derfflinger* (9,144 tons, 14½ knots) in the Red Sea homeward bound; the *Zieten* (8,021 tons, 14½ knots) from Sydney to Bremen, nearing Colombo; and, largest of all, the *Princess Alice* (10,981 tons, 15½ knots) had left Suez for Yokohama.

In the Pacific Ocean was the German East Asiatic Squadron consisting of the two fast armoured cruisers *Scharnhorst* (Flag

of Vice-Admiral Graf von Spee) and *Gneisenau* and the light cruisers *Emden*, *Nürnberg* and *Leipzig*. The positions of none of these was known, except of the last, which was on the coast of Mexico. The *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* were last reported to have been at Truk Island (Lat. $7\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ N., Long. 150° E.) on July 7. The *Nürnberg* had left San Francisco on July 21, and the *Emden* was thought to be at Tsingtau.

At this juncture the disposition of the East Indies Squadron was :—

Swiftsure at Colombo.

Dartmouth in dock at Bombay.

Fox, *Alert* and *Odin* in the Persian Gulf.

Espiègle at Colombo.

The more important ships of the Australian Squadron were cruising off the Queensland Coast; the China Squadron was mostly at Wei-hai-Wei except for the gunboats in the Yangtse and West Rivers, and the *Triumph* in dockyard hands at Hong Kong; while the Cape Squadron was on passage from Mauritius to Zanzibar.

CHAPTER II.

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.

6. Arrangements for shadowing "Königsberg."—The situation which had led to the despatch of the warning of July 27 speedily became more threatening, and next day the Admiralty instructed the Cape and East Indies Admirals that the *Dartmouth* must be prepared to shadow the *Königsberg* until the *Nottingham* could get out to the Cape Station.¹ The *Nottingham* was to leave England at the end of August to relieve the *Pegasus*, and the *Falmouth* to relieve the *Fox*.² In actual fact, these two light cruisers remained at home.

On July 29 the "warning" telegram was sent out by the Admiralty, and at 11.30 a.m. on the 30th the Admiralty, having heard nothing from Admiral Peirse, sent direct to the *Dartmouth* instructions to proceed from Bombay to Zanzibar. In point of fact, Admiral Peirse had by that time reported his dispositions, but owing to the congestion of business at Whitehall his telegram was not seen by any principal member of the War Staff till August 1. He had ordered the *Dartmouth* to undock at Bombay with the greatest despatch and proceed to Zanzibar

¹ Appendix F. 1.

² M. Letter Book Miscellaneous 272, pp. 62, 276.

to shadow the *Königsberg*, had recalled the *Fox* from Muskat to join him at Colombo, and had ordered the *Espiègle* to Aden, the *Alert* to Bombay, and the *Odin* to remain in the Persian Gulf. Any hope he might have of getting touch with the *Königsberg* was faint, since the *Dartmouth* could not leave Bombay till the 8th, and, in fact, the *Königsberg* came out of Dar-es-Salaam on July 31, and though sighted by the *Hyacinth* of the Cape Squadron, disappeared in a short time and was not heard of again for some weeks. Admiral King Hall, Commander-in-Chief of the Cape Squadron, confidently believed that she would remain on the African coast.¹

Although arrangements had been made for the automatic transfer of the Royal Indian Marine ships *Dufferin* and *Hardinge* to the Navy with the issue of the War telegram, Admiral Peirse considered it desirable to arm them and to prepare them in advance; this was approved and the necessary authorisation sent out. In view of the fact that the *Triumph* at Hong Kong was short of a crew, Admiral Peirse was told that one of his sloops must remain at Colombo ready to move to Singapore should her crew be wanted for the *Triumph*, and he consequently cancelled his orders for the *Espiègle* to go to Aden.²

The Admiral proposed to go himself to Singapore in the *Swiftsure*, but this the Admiralty did not approve, as the Eastern Telegraph Company at Zanzibar had sent a warning that in addition to the *Königsberg* there were four large German armed steamers in the neighbourhood³ which might get on to trade routes. Until his reinforcements from the Royal Indian Marine should be ready he had only his original squadron to deal with this menace. The *Dufferin* and *Hardinge* were to be ready by August 12 and 15 respectively, and three more vessels of the Indian Marine (*Northbrook*, *Minto* and *Dalhousie*) were, on the 5th, put under Admiral Peirse to be armed at once in anticipation of formal consent from the Government of India,⁴ and to provide ratings for them he ordered the *Alert* to pay off at Bombay. The *Fox* joined him at Colombo that evening.

7. Protection of the Aden-Colombo Trade Route.—Until August 6, Admiral Peirse had been unable to take any steps to find the *Königsberg* or to protect the Colombo-Aden trade route; the *Dartmouth*, which had been definitely detailed by the Admiralty for this purpose, was still in dock at Bombay, but that morning the Admiral left Colombo in the *Swiftsure* to patrol the threatened route, detaching the *Espiègle* as the most powerful of his available ships to patrol the other route from Colombo to Singapore, to be joined by the *Fox* as soon as she

¹ F. 2, 3 and 8.

² F. 5, 6 and 7.

³ F. 9, 10 and 11. This was quite untrue, and is an example of the numerous scare telegrams which were accepted as true and much hampered operations at the outbreak of war.

⁴ M. 01294/14.

had finished her coaling at Colombo. The German gunboat *Geier* had left Singapore on July 29, and was thought to have been at Rhio, opposite Singapore, on August 3; the *Emden* was reported to have left Tsingtau on August 3 with four colliers; the *Nürnberg* left Honolulu on July 27; the *Scharnhorst* was considered from the wireless messages heard in Australia to have been in Lat. 8° S., Long. 162° E., steering south-east at noon on the 5th; the *Leipzig* left Mazatlan, Mexico, on the 6th; and the *Gneisenau* was considered to be with the *Scharnhorst*. Thus there seemed to be no immediate danger on the trade route across the Bay of Bengal except from the *Königsberg* and armed liners, only one of which, the *Tabora* (arrived Dar-es-Salaam August 2), had been located. The route west from Colombo seemed the more threatened, and the Admiralty, learning on the 7th that the *Dartmouth*, having finished her preparations a day earlier than was anticipated, had proceeded from Bombay for Zanzibar, ordered her to join Admiral Peirse to assist the *Swiftsure* in patrolling the western routes; this order reinforced instructions to her from Admiral King Hall (who appeared to think she was under his command) that she was to proceed quickly to Aden, looking out for the *Königsberg* at the mouth of the Red Sea, and from Aden, if there were no news of the enemy, to go on to Zanzibar.¹ His intention was that she should relieve the *Pegasus* there and remain with the *Astræa* for operations on the east coast of Africa. Next morning, the 8th, Dar-es-Salaam wireless station was destroyed by the *Astræa* and the Germans closed the harbour by sinking their floating dock in the channel, thereby blocking in the *Tabora* and preventing any possibility of the *Königsberg* taking refuge there.

8. The East Indies Squadron changes its Function.—So far the East Indies Squadron had carried out the plans devised by Admiral Peirse for the protection of trade; and though it was too early yet to be certain that no losses had occurred, at any rate none had been reported. But meanwhile decisions had been reached at home which were to make a complete change in the place to be filled by the East Indies Squadron in the general scheme of strategy. Shortly after he had left Bombay for the Gulf of Aden Admiral Peirse received the following urgent order:—

“113. *Swiftsure* and *Dartmouth* are to return to Bombay forthwith at highest possible speed and complete with coal. Report expected date of arrival. Prepare to convoy troops to Aden. Order all armed Indian Marine ships to assemble at Bombay.”²

From this moment the original plans of Admiral Peirse can be considered as abandoned. In framing them he had not

¹ F. 13, 14, 15.

² Sent to Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, and to *Dartmouth* 12.55 p.m., 9.8.14.

contemplated the transference of troops in large numbers from and to India, and yet it was the escort of transports and not the destruction of the enemy's forces which became the principal duty of the East Indies Squadron so long as those forces were within reach. This alteration in the function of a squadron in waters so remote from Europe was one of the far-reaching effects of the German Army's operations in France.

CHAPTER III.

THE FIRST INDIAN CONVOYS.

9. Arrangements for Escort.—As early as August 5 the Cabinet had given a decision to carry out a pre-war plan of reinforcing our army in Egypt by one Indian Division. Two days later they greatly increased the force, and on August 8 the Government selected for despatch to Egypt the 3rd (Lahore) and 7th (Meerut) Divisions and the Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade. The Admiralty, learning that advanced details would be ready to leave by August 15, at once ordered Admiral Peirse back to Bombay, and informed the India Office that “subject to any unexpected change in the naval situation, the Expedition should be able to leave on August 15 as proposed.”¹ The return of the *Swiftsure* and *Dartmouth* to Bombay would leave the trade route entirely unprotected; yet, safeguarding transports was considered a more urgent claim on naval forces than the protection of trade, and the risk had to be taken. Something, however, could be done, and on August 10, even while the *Goeben* and *Breslau* were still unlocated, the *Black Prince* and *Duke of Edinburgh* were detached from the Mediterranean Squadron to go to Aden searching the Red Sea for hostile merchant cruisers, some of which were expected to be at Massowah, the port of Italian Somaliland. The light cruiser *Chatham* also was ordered from the Dardanelles to Suez, and there was some intention of sending her on to hunt for the *Königsberg*.²

On August 12 the Admiralty gave the War Office a definite assurance that they would undertake the escort of the Indian troops from the 15th, provided all the transports sailed altogether.³ As we have seen, orders dealing with the situation had already been issued; in pursuance of them the *Swiftsure* returned to Bombay on the 12th and found the *Dufferin* and *Hardinge* preparing for war; she was joined later in the day by the *Minto* which then commenced arming. These three

¹ M. 01346/14.

² F. 18, 21.

³ H.S. 12, p. 115.

Royal Indian Marine ships were expected to be ready by the 15th. At Aden the *Dalhousie* was arming, with instructions to proceed to Bombay as soon as possible.¹

The necessity of providing escort had not entirely prevented trade protection in the Indian Ocean, for Admiral Peirse had stationed his only available ships, the *Fox* and *Espiègle*, at the trade focus off Colombo, on which port they were based; and the junction of the streams from China and Australia at Singapore was guarded, to some extent, by the French torpedo vessel *D'Iberville* and three French destroyers, searching that district for the *Geier* and *Kleist*.¹ In point of fact, the *Kleist* had arrived at Padang, in Sumatra, on August 7, but we had no consul there, and the intelligence officer of that area did not know that she was in port.

The *Dartmouth* steamed on towards Aden in pursuance of her instructions, and did not receive her order 113 till she was in wireless touch with that port; she replied that she would reach Bombay by the 17th. This would make her too late to accompany the convoy from its port of departure, and the Admiralty's intention was for the *Swiftsure* and the Indian Marine ships to bring it from India, being joined by the *Dartmouth* at some rendezvous midway; accordingly, they telegraphed to Admiral Peirse:—

"117. Report whether entire first division can be ready to sail under your escort 15th instant. How many transports? Are armed Indian Marine ships used as transports?"

"*Dartmouth* to coal immediately and to meet on your advance earliest moment. *Black Prince* and *Duke of Edinburgh* have been ordered to Aden searching Red Sea *en route*."

(Sent 2.10 p.m., 12.8.14.)

10. Delay in Departure of First Contingent.—In point of fact, the need for escort was not then so pressing as the Admiralty thought, for this telegram crossed with one from Admiral Peirse, in which he reported that the first transport was not expected to be ready till the 20th.

The delay gave an opportunity which the Admiralty utilised by sending the *Dartmouth* to search the Gulf of Aden and the Aden end of the trade route from Bombay for the *Königsberg* before meeting the convoy at some rendezvous on the route.² The trade route from Colombo is much the more important, but they are practically identical in the Gulf of Aden.

11. East African Expeditionary Force.—But not only had the large convoy for Egypt to be provided with escort; our slender force in East Africa seemed in need of reinforcement, and, in addition to that, a campaign for the subjugation of German East Africa was on foot.³ The intelligence received

¹ F. 19.

² F. 22.

³ See C.B. 917A for details of this campaign.

from there led the India Office to the conclusion that so many as seven battalions of Indian troops with a mountain battery and howitzers would be required.¹ Such a large force would require a considerable escort, which could not then be provided, and its despatch was, therefore, postponed, only the battalions to defend British East Africa being considered urgently necessary. Owing to the small number of men-of-war in the Indian Ocean the Admiralty came to the conclusion that these troops for British East Africa must sail with the larger convoy for Egypt and have the same escort as far as Sokotra, though this arrangement might entail some delay in departure from Bombay.² From Sokotra to its point of disembarkation the convoy for Egypt was to be escorted by the *Black Prince* and *Duke of Edinburgh*.³

By August 13 it was learned that the first convoy of troops for Egypt would not be ready till about the 20th, and would consist of 20 transports, their escorts being the *Swiftsure*, *Dufferin*, *Hardinge*, and *Minto*, the three R.I.M. ships being armed and to be used as cruisers, not transports.⁴ The *Dartmouth*, which put into Aden on August 13, had found no trace of the *Königsberg*; indeed, the enemy had been reported near Inhambane, on the African coast abreast of the southern end of Madagascar. All the cruisers of the Cape Squadron except the *Pegasus* were concentrating at Cape Town to be used for escorting the South African garrisons as far north as the Equator, and the *Astræa* was ordered from Zanzibar to the Cape to join her own admiral there, looking out for the *Königsberg* on the way.¹

12. Further Delay.—However, it was impossible for the troops either for Egypt or East Africa to start on the appointed date, and a postponement till the 28th took place. This delay of a fortnight enabled the Admiralty to send the *Dartmouth* right back to Bombay, so that she could complete with coal there and await orders from the Commander-in-Chief as to escorting the transports;⁵ thus no vessel was left to hunt for the *Königsberg* in the Gulf of Aden. Nothing more had been heard of the *Geier*; while of the liners supposed to be convertible into cruisers, the *Derfflinger* was immobilised at Port Said, the *Princess Alice* had arrived at Manila, and the *Kleist* at Padang in Sumatra; but the *Zieten* was unlocated. The *Möwe* (surveying vessel), known to be at Dar-es-Salaam on the outbreak of war, was thought by the Admiralty to be somewhere at large. To deal with her they countermanded the paying off of the *Alert*, which they knew Admiral Peirse had ordered for the purpose of providing crews for the R.I.M. vessels, and ordered him to send her to the Gulf of Aden to search for and destroy the *Möwe*.

The *Alert* was really unavailable, as she had been paid off and her crew and armament distributed among the various

¹ H.S. 12, p. 118.

² H.S. 12, p. 129.

³ H.S. 10, p. 63.

⁴ F. 23.

⁵ F. 24.

auxiliary cruisers ; moreover, she could not steam more than 5 knots against the monsoon then prevailing, and could not carry enough coal to take her to Aden. Accordingly Admiral Peirse asked that his arrangements might be allowed to stand ; this was approved, except that the Admiralty wished to send the *Odin* from the Persian Gulf on this mission. As it happened the *Möwe* had been sunk by the Germans inside Dar-es-Salaam harbour, though it was not reported to the Admiralty till the night of the 14th.¹ This released the *Odin* from the dangerous necessity of searching the Gulf of Aden, in the course of which she might have met the *Königsberg*.

13. Departure of the first Troops for East Africa.—The Government of India was sending, as an advance battalion of the expeditionary force against East Africa, the 29th Punjabis on August 19 from Karachi to Zanzibar in a transport called the *Nairung*. Admiral Peirse had concurred in this, and did not intend to supply an escort since the large convoy was to start a week later and would take all his available ships. The Admiralty, however, ordered him to employ the *Fox*, and he accordingly removed her from the Colombo focal point, where she and the *Espiègle* had captured several German ships,² and directed her to meet the *Nairung* at a rendezvous north of the Seychelles, thence escorting the transport on to Zanzibar.³ This left 4,000 miles of one of the richest trade routes in the world under the protection of one sloop, all the other ships in the Indian Ocean lying at anchor till such time as the troops should be ready to start or disembark.

14. Expedition "A" to Egypt takes precedence.—As the attitude of Turkey since the arrival at Constantinople of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* had been increasingly hostile the Home authorities felt that the greatest necessity was to show the loyal Indian Army taking the place of the British garrison in Egypt ; and of the three Expeditionary Forces from India—"A" to Egypt, "B" to Dar-es-Salaam, and "C" to British East Africa,⁴ the first now took precedence and the other two were delayed indefinitely. Lord Kitchener⁵ wished that the first echelon of Force "A" should sail on the 20th, and this was reported from India to be possible. The Admiralty, without consulting Admiral Peirse, informed the War Office that naval escort would be ready by that date for the Egypt and East Africa forces, but the Admiral and other authorities on the spot came to a final arrangement that the whole of the first division should sail in two sections—one from Bombay on the 24th, and the

¹ F. 25, 26, 27 and 28.

² *Rappenfels*, *Fürth*, *Australia* and *Moltkefels*.

³ F. 29, 34 and 36.

⁴ This expedition was now called "C" to distinguish it from the larger force for Dar-es-Salaam.

⁵ Secretary of State for War.

other from Karachi on the 25th, the two portions to meet at a rendezvous to be fixed by the Admiral. The *Dartmouth* was due to join the *Swiftsure* at Bombay on the 20th and the *Dalhousie* from Aden on the 22nd, while the *Northbrook* was to be ready by the 23rd. The *Dufferin* and *Minto* were sent by the Admiral on the 18th to Karachi to take charge of the convoy from that port.¹

The *Nairung* with the 29th Punjabis for Zanzibar left Karachi on the 19th as arranged for the rendezvous north of Seychelles, where she was to be met by the *Fox*. As far as the rendezvous she was without escort, but that there was danger seemed to be indicated by the fact that both cables to the Seychelles were reported cut on the 19th² and the Germans in East Africa were becoming active on the Rovuma River, which might mean that they were organising an expedition to seize the islands.³

15. Convoys versus Trade Protection.—In the middle of the anxiety caused by the unprotected state of the Indian Ocean came information that the Indian Government had been asked to send one Indian battalion to Singapore and one to Mauritius. The feelings of the Admiralty on receipt of this news are reflected in a note dated August 21 :—

"Our trade in these waters has been unprotected since about August 10, due to ships being sent to Bombay to escort transports due to leave August 15. These ships are still waiting at Bombay for the transports.

"In the meantime, *Königsberg* is free to attack our trade, and no doubt losses will be heard of.

"Both cables to Seychelles we know have been cut.

"The Government are responsible financially for all losses of ships, and if escorts for troops are to be continually made, H.M. Government should be informed that the cruisers cannot be held responsible if they are continually deflected from their own war duties [which are] to search for and destroy the enemy's ships."

When the question of escorting the battalion for Mauritius came up the Admiralty replied: "The double demand on "H.M. Ships for the convoys already arranged and the protection of British trade in the Indian Ocean can scarcely be reconciled even now, and further demands are for the present "inadmissible."⁴

16. "Königsberg" in the Gulf of Aden.—The Admiralty's fears for the safety of trade soon received a justification. Though at 12.10 p.m. on the 21st they informed the French Ministry of Marine that the latest news of the *Königsberg* was that she had been reported off Inhambane 10 days before, there had come into

¹ F. 32, 33, 35, 37 and 39 ; M. 03564/15.

² F. 38.

³ Tel. 130 from Commander-in-Chief, Cape, received 12.37 p.m., 20.8.14.

⁴ H.S. 12, pp. 221, 282.

the Admiralty that morning a telegram from the Commander-in-Chief, Cape Squadron, announcing that the German steamer *Zieten* had brought in to Mozambique the crew of the Hall liner *City of Winchester*, taken over from the *Königsberg* off Cape Guardafui on August 9.¹ The *Zieten*, after visiting Colombo on July 29, continued her voyage and had apparently been called up by the *Königsberg*. The *City of Winchester* had been captured by the German cruiser on August 6 in the mouth of the Gulf of Aden; she had left Colombo on July 30 before any instructions had been issued to merchant vessels, and being without wireless had not heard of the war till three hours before she was captured. The *Königsberg* took her to Makalla on the Arabian coast, and on the 10th to Khorya Morya Bay, where most of her crew were transferred to the *Zieten* which had now joined the *Königsberg*.² Two days later the Germans having removed so much as they wanted of the cargo of the *City of Winchester* sank her in the Bay.

This information showed that if the *Espiègle* and *Swiftsure* had been allowed to proceed along the trade route to Aden as originally proposed by Admiral Peirse, reinforced later by the *Dartmouth*, they would have had some chance of harrying the German cruiser and her consorts, even if they did not catch her. It will be remembered that his orders to the *Espiègle* were countermanded because her crew was thought to be necessary for the *Triumph*, and that the *Swiftsure* and *Dartmouth* were recalled on the 6th to escort a convoy which was even then (21st) not ready.³

The Gulf of Aden, however, was now powerfully protected by the presence of the *Duke of Edinburgh* and *Black Prince*, which arrived at Aden on the 20th and 21st respectively. The latter had been delayed a day by having to return with two prizes—the *Istria* and *Südmark*⁴—which she had captured in the Gulf of Suez. In the Red Sea they had sighted no hostile merchant cruisers, finding instead that the German and Austrian merchant ships in those waters had all taken refuge at Massowa.⁵

The Admiralty had sent orders on the 16th that the two cruisers were to coal at Aden, the first ship completed to go on to Bombay and assist in escorting the transports; the other

¹ F. 40.

² Deposition of Master of *City of Winchester*. M. 17304/14. Compare Plan 6a of Fayle's *Seaborne Trade*, Vol. I.

³ The responsibility for the delay is difficult to fix. The Viceroy, on August 18, said the Karachi force would be ready by the 21st, but on the 20th stated: "Naval Commander-in-Chief reports that no date earlier than 24th will suit naval arrangements." (F. 35, 39.) Again: "No delay has so far occurred as regards escorts." (Viceroy to I.O., 726 and 749, M. 01751/14.)

⁴ The *Südmark* had been in communication with the *Königsberg*, and her captain knew that the *City of Winchester* had been sunk. (F. 42.)

⁵ F. 41.

cruiser to remain at Aden and take the convoy on from there up the Red Sea to Suez.¹ They had for the time abandoned the idea of bringing the *Chatham* down the Red Sea to hunt for the *Königsberg* and had instead retained her at Suez to deal with any situation that might arise.

17. **Orders for the First Convoy.**—The convoy of troops for Egypt was at last ready to start from India on August 24. The greatest danger it had to face was a possible attack from the *Königsberg* and any auxiliaries which might have been armed. Of these, the *Derfflinger* had been interned at Port Said, the *Tabora* was blocked in at Dar-es-Salaam, while the *Zieten* was at Mozambique; the only one presumably within striking distance was the *Seydlitz*, which had left Sydney on August 3. From the Pacific there was now little to be feared, since two cruisers (thought to be the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*) had been sighted at Samoa on the 20th; the *Nürnberg* and *Leipzig* had recently been reported as leaving the vicinity of San Francisco, and only the *Emden's* movements were unknown beyond the fact that she had left Tsingtau on August 3. The *Königsberg* was the Admiralty's chief anxiety in East Indian waters, and they informed the French Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean that they wished to employ the *Dublin* and *Weymouth* in the Indian Ocean "to hunt out *Königsberg*, which was now a threat to the transport of our troops across that ocean."²

On his return to India Admiral Peirse had drawn up his convoy orders, and these he issued on August 17. The first echelon to be moved was to consist of the whole of the 3rd Indian Division, with several British regiments and Indian batteries, besides some additional native regiments. He hoped to get them all away between August 24 and 26. The transports were divided into four groups, and two embarkation ports, Karachi and Bombay, were used. The general idea was that the sailing of a group from Bombay should take place the day before another group left Karachi, which was a day nearer home; at a convenient rendezvous the two groups would join, and part of the escort could then return to pick up the next group. The rendezvous selected was Ghubbet-ar-rahib Bay in the Khorya Morya Islands.³ Group A from Bombay was to be escorted by the *Swiftsure* and *Hardinge*, and Group B from Karachi by the *Dufferin* and *Minto*. From the rendezvous on to Aden the *Duke of Edinburgh* was to join the escorting force, and her arrival would relieve the *Dufferin* and *Minto* to go back for the remainder of the transports; she left Aden on the 24th in the morning, for the rendezvous. In the meantime the Admiralty had ordered the *Chatham* down from Suez with two more

¹ F. 31.

² F. 44.

³ The Convoy Orders in 180 paragraphs are in M. 03564/15.

transports, the *Dongola* and *Somali*, bringing officers and officials back to India from home leave.¹ She would thus probably be available to help in the escort up the Red Sea, though perhaps not of the first convoy, which was due at Aden on September 2. She left Suez on August 24.

18. The Convoy starts.—On August 24 Group A left Bombay under the escort of the *Swiftsure* and *Hardinge*, and next day Group B left Karachi with the *Dufferin* and *Minto*. The Karachi group could make only 6 knots in the teeth of a south-westerly monsoon blowing with strength 5.² A report was current that the *Königsberg* was 500 miles south of Bombay exchanging wireless messages with the *Zieten*.³

Soon after the convoy started the Commander-in-Chief, China, telegraphed that charts and mail bags found in a prize indicated that the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Nürnberg*, *Emden*, and *Luchs* might be on the southern side of Sumatra; to meet the situation he intended to sail for Singapore with the *Minotaur* and *Hampshire*, to be followed by the *Dupleix* and *Yarmouth*. His appreciation received some confirmation on the 28th, when a German ship, the *Goldenfels*, arrived at Sabang (Pulo Wey) with the rest of the crew of the *City of Winchester*, and stated that she had been escorted almost into port by the *Königsberg*.⁴

19. The Second Convoy.—The German cruiser had made no attempt to interfere with the transports. The third group of the convoy⁵ left Karachi on August 28 under the escort of the *Northbrook*, which had commissioned at Bombay on the 26th and immediately proceeded for the northern port. The group to have sailed from Bombay with the *Dartmouth* as escort was not yet ready, and the *Dartmouth* remained at anchor in Bombay Harbour from August 20 till September 3. There were thus three groups of transports in the Arabian Sea at the end of August:—

- (a) A large convoy of 15 ships on the way from the Khorya Morya group to Aden under the escort of the *Swiftsure* and *Duke of Edinburgh*.
- (b) A separate convoy of seven ships proceeding from Karachi to Aden escorted by the *Northbrook*.
- (c) The *Nairung*, proceeding from Bombay to British East Africa, escorted by the *Fox*.

¹ F. 43, 45.

² *Dufferin's* log. Group A consisted of nine ships—*Assaye*, *Nurani*, *Baroda*, *Sumatra*, *Taiyabi*, *Bharata*, *Barpeta*, *Bangala*, *Purnea*. Group B was of six ships—*Ambala*, *Upada*, *Itola*, *Kirkfield*, *City of Glasgow*, *Ellenga*. The regiments in them are given in T. 7636/14.

³ Staff diary of Lahore Division.

⁴ See p. 55.

⁵ Seven ships, *Castalia*, *Sangola*, *Teesta*, *Takada*, *Akbar*, *Edavana*, *Itaura*. (T. 7636/14.)

This last had been diverted on the 25th to Mombasa as port of disembarkation without calling at Zanzibar, in accordance with a decision of the India and Colonial Offices.¹ She was due about September 2, and the *Fox*, after turning her over to the *Pegasus*, which was to come out to meet her, was to visit the Seychelles, where both cables had been interrupted since August 19. On August 27, however, communication between Zanzibar and the Seychelles was restored and all was reported quiet there,² in view of which the *Fox's* orders to visit the islands were countermanded. The rumour of the German expedition gathering in the Rovuma river had been disproved; it was evident that the Seychelles had not been raided and the *Königsberg* was thought by the Admiralty to have gone to the Dutch East Indies. So strong was this belief that we informed the French, who wished to send a liner full of reservists from Madagascar to Suez, that their route would be reasonably safe.³ This view was strengthened by the report spread by the *Goldenfels* at Sabang; and even on the 30th, when the French Governor of Madagascar reported that a three-funnelled cruiser, considered to be the *Königsberg*, under the German flag, had that morning paid a flying visit to Majunga at the northern end of his island,⁴ the report was not at first believed. But an intercepted cable from Zanzibar to the Eastern Telegraph Office in London stating that a preconcerted simultaneous attack by the *Königsberg* and a small gunboat (*Kaiser Wilhelm*) was expected in the absence of the *Pegasus* (which had gone to meet the *Fox* at Mombasa), and a telegram from Malta (519) to the effect that call signs of a German cruiser had been heard off Sokotra on the 28th,⁵ may have given rise to some anxiety at the Admiralty about our convoys. Actually, the Gulf of Aden was at that time being patrolled by the *Black Prince*; after embarking 20 men and two field guns at Aden, she landed them at Perim on the 25th, and coming eastward as far as Sokotra, patrolled between there and Somaliland across the trade routes during the 29th and 30th.⁶ She then went back to Aden to coal preparatory to taking the *Swiftsure's* convoy on from Aden to Suez.

At any rate the *Nairung* arrived safely at Mombasa on September 1, being escorted the last 70 miles by the *Pegasus* and *Fox*. She had met the *Fox* at the rendezvous in 0° 20' S., 58° E., at 5 a.m. on August 27, and had continued at first for Zanzibar, the change of destination to Mombasa not reaching the *Fox* till 4 a.m. on the 30th. The latter coaled and was ordered back to Bombay on completion. Her Captain proposed that he should visit Zanzibar and the Seychelles in connection with the reports of the proximity of the *Königsberg*, but the Admiralty replied: "In view of *Königsberg's* superior speed

¹ M. 01577/14.

⁴ F. 49.

² F. 46.

⁵ F. 50.

³ F. 47.

⁶ Log of *Black Prince*.

"this visit useless. Proceed as ordered to Bombay for "convoy duties. *Pegasus* can be sent to Zanzibar if desirable."¹ From this it was evident that no attack on Zanzibar was then expected. The *Fox*, however, went there in the early morning of September 3 instead of returning direct from Mombasa to Bombay.²

The large convoy escorted by the *Swiftsure*, *Hardinge*, and *Dufferin* arrived on August 30 at Ghubbet-ar-rahib Bay in the Khorya Morya Group. From there the two Indian Marine ships returned to India on relief by the *Duke of Edinburgh*, which, after searching the Arabian coast, had been waiting at the rendezvous since the 27th; she took station astern of the convoy, the *Swiftsure* leading. On September 1 the *Duke of Edinburgh* went into Aden to coal and replenish in preparation for continuing the voyage to Suez. On September 3 she and the *Black Prince* picked up the convoy off Aden, and took it on to Suez, arriving six days later. The *Swiftsure*, having safely disposed of the first convoy, went in to Aden.

20. **The Third Convoy.**—On September 3 the first instalment of the 7th (Meerut) Division and of the 9th (Secunderabad) Cavalry Brigade left Bombay; the convoy consisted of seven ships³ and was escorted by the *Dartmouth*, which had been lying there for a fortnight. The route followed was that of the Commander-in-Chief earlier. This concluded the despatch of the four groups allowed for in Admiral Peirse's Convoy Orders of August 17. But there were still more to come. The military situation in France was so desperate that we abandoned our military lines of communication across the Channel, and the French Government withdrew from Paris, which the victorious Germans might succeed in reaching at any moment. In the circumstances every soldier procurable was wanted in France, and the Cabinet decided to bring home the bulk of the British Regular troops abroad, replacing them where possible by Indian Territorial battalions; the British regiments in North China, Hong Kong, and Singapore were to come to India to replace the white troops there; and as many Indian battalions as could be spared were to go to Egypt and even to the front in France. These moves entailed a great deal of escort work and had effects in varying degrees on all our squadrons in foreign waters. As far as the East Indies was concerned the programme for the future was a heavy one. The remainder of the 7th Division and 9th Cavalry Brigade and two British regiments, in 24 ships, would be ready by September 10; in the course of the next fortnight 49 transports with troops were expected to leave;

¹ F. 51, 52.

² Log of *Fox*.

³ *Barala*, *Mongara*, *Elysia*, *Ula*, *Urlana*, *Fultala* with the Indian troops; *Thongwa* carrying the Sherwood Foresters.

and at the end of the month the Indian troops intended to garrison Egypt, and Expeditionary Force "C" for East Africa, a further 16 ship loads, would have their preparations complete.¹ With the small force at his disposal the escort of these huge convoys was a difficult problem for Admiral Peirse.

CHAPTER IV.

NEW ESCORT ORDERS.

21. **New Orders.**—At Aden the Admiral had been joined by the *Chatham*. The Admiralty had told him to arrange escorts for the next convoys with the Government of India,² and he reported the following programme:—

Northbrook's convoy to be taken by *Chatham* from Aden to Suez.

Dartmouth's convoy due at Aden on September 12 to be taken to Suez by the *Northbrook*.

Dufferin to bring about 12 ships from Bombay on the 9th and the *Hardinge* to escort remainder (about 12 ships) from Karachi on the 10th, these to be met half-way by the *Swiftsure*.

Echelon leaving India on the 15th under escort of *Fox* or *Dalhousie* and *Minto*.

Dartmouth to accompany whichever group of Force "C" most likely to fall in with *Königsberg*.

He also asked that the *Black Prince*, *Duke of Edinburgh*, and *Chatham* might be placed temporarily under his orders for work between Aden and Suez. This request was granted,³ and may be considered to have had the effect of extending the East Indies Station so as to include the Red Sea. But as regards his escort proposals the Admiralty strongly disapproved, thinking them too weak, and they replied by telegram:—

"153. Proposed escort insufficient. The minimum escort is two ships, one of which must be superior to *Königsberg*. Armed transports are not to be counted as warships, but as additional precaution. For a large convoy one more regular ship of war is to be added. You will probably find it best to organise fortnightly sailings, using the six ships at your disposal.

"You must remember your responsibility for the safety of the troops."

(Sent 11 p.m., September 4.)

These new orders compelled Admiral Peirse to alter his programme, but only at the cost of some delay. The *Northbrook's* convoy of seven ships had been met by the *Chatham*.

¹ M. 01751/14.

² F. 53.

³ F. 54, 55.

which the admiral had intended to carry on alone with them to Suez, sending the *Northbrook* in to Aden to coal; ¹ he had now to call the whole convoy into Aden to wait five days for the arrival of the *Dartmouth's* group, the combined convoy of 14 ships then to go on up the Red Sea escorted by the *Chatham* and *Northbrook* till met by the *Duke of Edinburgh* and *Black Prince*, which would return with them to Suez. The *Swiftsure* and *Dartmouth* would return to Bombay; and with the *Fox*, *Dufferin*, and *Hardinge* would leave India with the Meerut Division about the 18th. He explained that his previous arrangements had been made under the impression that the departure of the troops was urgent, remarking also that the *Königsberg's* movements were being closely watched. ²

22. **The "Königsberg" and Von Spee.**—Of the *Königsberg's* movements nothing certain was known at the Admiralty beyond the fact that she had been at the Khorya Morya Islands on August 12, nearly a month ago, since it may be taken that the simultaneous reports placing her at Majunga and near Sabang on August 30 cancelled one another in probability. She had not reappeared off East Africa, where the report of a threatened attack sent by the Eastern Telegraph Company was denied by the Resident at Zanzibar on September 9. Still, there were signs of activity inland. A small action at Tsavo had resulted in the repulse of the German attacking force by the 29th Punjabis, but there was every possibility of other raids, and the Viceroy was instructed that the remainder of Force "C" must leave on the 16th for Mombasa as arranged. ³ The *Pegasus* returned on the 5th to Zanzibar. No further news of the German Pacific Squadron had transpired; it was thought to be in the Dutch East Indies by the Commander-in-Chief, China, and until his search had been carried out the Admiralty prohibited the *Espiègle* from going east of Colombo. ⁴

23. **Modification of New Escort Orders.**—When the seven transports, escorted by the *Chatham* and *Northbrook*, arrived at Aden on the 6th, Admiral Peirse, considering unnecessary the seven days' wait caused by the Admiralty orders, pointed out that as the Red Sea was safe his original arrangement for *Chatham* alone to take them on should be sufficient, and the *Northbrook* after coaling could then take over the *Dartmouth's* convoy on the 12th; these proposals were approved, since the regulations as to strength of escort were intended to refer only to the passage of the Arabian Sea. ⁵ The Admiralty made a further suggestion that, as the *Dartmouth* could not reach Bombay till September 18, instead of bringing the large convoy all the way she should join it half-way, relieving the *Fox* to take the East African force on to Mombasa. ⁶

¹ *Chatham's* Sailing Orders, M. 03564/15.

² F. 56.

³ F. 62.

⁴ F. 59.

⁵ H.S. 12, p. 400.

⁶ F. 57, 58.

Admiral Peirse replied that to comply with this suggestion would be against the orders in telegram 153 as to minimum escort, and proposed the *Dartmouth* for the East Africa convoy, which he considered more likely to meet the *Königsberg*; it had now been ascertained that the *Goldenfels* had not been accompanied by any armed vessel whatever, and wireless indications implied that the *Königsberg* was near Zanzibar. In any case the restriction would have the effect of keeping back till the 18th the group of 24 ships which was to have sailed on the 9th and 10th with the remainder of the 9th Cavalry Brigade and 7th Division of Infantry. Realising this, the Viceroy put forward the suggestion that as later sailings would be proportionately delayed the Admiralty might increase the East Indies Squadron by more ships. ¹ This the Admiralty were not then prepared to do, but they modified the restricting orders to meet the number of available vessels by telegram

"158. It has been decided in view of the urgency of hastening the transport of troops from Egypt that the previous orders as to the numbers of warships attached to convoys can be modified to meet the number of vessels available for this duty unless a change for the worse occurs in the Naval situation in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea.

"*Black Prince*, *Duke of Edinburgh*, and one armed troopship should suffice for Red Sea.

"*Swiftsure*, *Dartmouth*, *Chatham* and armed troopship for Indian Ocean. *Fox* and armed troopship for East African convoy.

"Could not fortnightly sailings be arranged if convoy changes escorts in Long. 47° E., the escorts to coal at Suez and India, not calling at Aden?

"*Fox* could start with the first large convoy till *Chatham* joins and then proceed to East Africa.

"Unless objection seen arrange for this and report."

(Sent 6.50 p.m., September 9.)

In accordance with this the *Dartmouth's* convoy was taken over by the *Northbrook* ² off Aden on the 11th and the *Dartmouth* herself went in to the port, leaving next day for Karachi, 1,500 miles distant. Admiral Peirse himself in the *Swiftsure* reached Bombay on the 12th in readiness for the next convoy. He pointed out that the Admiralty's latest order did nothing to expedite the departure of the first large convoy, which must await the arrival of the *Dartmouth* at Karachi; and a further suggestion at the end of the same order that the escorting ships should not call at Aden he considered impracticable, since in the state of the monsoon ships must coal there, the bad coaling facilities at Bombay completely nullifying any saving of time gained by omitting the call at Aden. ³ The arrival of Force "B" for offensive operations in German East Africa was

¹ F. 61, 63, 64, 66.

² The *Black Prince* was ordered from Suez to meet her and picked up the convoy on the 14th about 700 miles from Suez. The convoy reached Suez on the 17th.

³ F. 67.

considered urgent and the Viceroy was ordered to prepare it for instant despatch, but replied that although the force would be ready very soon there were no ships in India available to transport it and no escort possible till October 5.¹ This would be on the return of the squadron to India after completing the escort of the large convoy due to leave on September 18.

24. **Arrangements for the Fourth Convoy.**—Admiral Peirse was at Bombay with the *Swiftsure*, *Fox* and *Dufferin* ready for his convoy of 31 ships,² and the *Hardinge* and *Minto* at Karachi were waiting for their convoy of 12 ships;³ the *Dartmouth* had left Aden on the 12th and was due on the 15th; but there was no hope of the convoy being ready till September 18. The route was to be the same as before, and the *Chatham*, then at Suez, was to meet them in Long. 55° E. just west of the Khorya Morya Group, when the *Dartmouth* and *Hardinge* would be detached with the two transports for Mombasa.⁴

25. **"Emden" appears.**—This was the situation when at 10.26 p.m. on September 14 a telegram from the Intelligence Officer, Colombo, reached the Admiralty reporting a new danger in the Indian Ocean. The *Emden* had been sighted the previous day with four prizes about half-way between Calcutta and Madras. Up to this time she had not been definitely reported anywhere and all that was known of her was that the Japanese had informed Admiral Jerram (China) that she was not at Tsingtau. In spite of the search he had been carrying out in the East Indies she had slipped past his cruisers, and had now appeared in the Bay of Bengal. Her position implied that her object was commerce-raiding and not interference with the transports, and in the area she had chosen, traversed by important trade routes in every direction, she had a rich field for her operations.⁵ The whole attention of Admiral Peirse's Squadron was occupied with the large convoy that was soon to start. The only ships he had at sea were the *Dartmouth*, due at Karachi on the 15th, and the *Northbrook* and *Black Prince*, due at Suez on the 17th. In the circumstances he had nothing he could send to the Bay of Bengal, and the effect of the *Emden's* raid was to sever that important half of his station from him and turn it over to the China Station. Admiral Jerram had in the first days of the war wished to concentrate his force off the Yangtse, but had been ordered to Hong Kong. When Japan entered the war on August 23 and took over the whole of the northern part of the China Station he moved further south to

¹ The telegrams, 892 to Viceroy and H. 845 from Viceroy, dated September 12 and 14, are in T. 6683/14.

² Group E, containing further portions of the Lahore and Meerut Divisions and Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade, and Group F, i.e., the *Bandra* and *Begum* for British East Africa.

³ Group G, containing some Indian and British regiments.

⁴ F. 68.

⁵ See pp. 60-64.

Singapore, which had been designated as the war headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies; and the operations against the *Emden* were carried out entirely by the vessels of the China Squadron, though they took place in the Bay of Bengal which had been considered the more important half of the East Indies Command.

The *Emden* soon made another appearance and was sighted at 6.30 p.m. on the 18th off Rangoon, into which port she sent the Norwegian ship *Dovre* with the crew of the *Clan Matheson*, which she had sunk off False Point four days previously. This second appearance showed still more strongly that commerce-raiding was her object and that the convoys in the Arabian Sea ran for the moment little danger of molestation from her.

The difficulties of escorting the Indian troops had now compelled the Admiralty to decide on increasing the force at the disposal of the East Indies Admiral. The old battleships of the *Canopus* class, which had at first been part of the Channel Command, had at the end of August been distributed among the various Atlantic cruiser forces as supports, or defences for advanced bases. The nearest was the *Ocean* at Gibraltar. On September 11 she had been attached to one of these forces and had arrived at Gibraltar on the 18th. Next day the Admiralty ordered her to Port Said ready for convoy duties in the East Indies.¹

26. **Departure of the Fourth Convoy.**—The departure of the remainder of Lahore and Meerut Divisions and the Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade was further delayed by excessive rain and did not take place till the 20th from Bombay and the 21st from Karachi. The *Swiftsure*, *Fox* and *Dufferin* took the Bombay convoy of about 29 ships,² and the *Dartmouth* and *Hardinge* the Karachi group of 11 ships.³ In the interval the route had been changed, and a new rendezvous in 18° 45' N., 61° 20' E., was fixed by the Admiral.⁴ Just as they left, there came in some serious news; the *Pegasus*, lying at anchor and repairing boilers at Zanzibar, had been bombarded and sunk by the *Königsberg* from the offing without being able to make any effective reply to the German cruiser's guns.⁵

¹ F. 69.

² *Bankura*, *Bamora*, *Havildar*, *Thistura*, *Subadar*, *Knight Companion*, *Taraba*, with Lahore Division; *Torilla*, *Ancora*, *Arankola*, *Manora*, *Euryalus*, *City of Sparta*, *Sofala*, *Chakraita*, with Meerut Division; *City of Exeter*, *Risaldar*, *Egra*, *Ellora*, *Ranee*, *Rajah*, *Tactician*, *City of Birmingham*, with Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade; *Somali* with Rifle Brigade and *Dongola* with Royal Berkshire Regiment; *Hedjaz* with supplies; *Bandra*, *Begum*, *Umfuli*, with Force "C" for Mombasa.

³ *Ekna*, *City of Lahore*, *Erinpura*, *Elephanta*, *City of Poona*, *Coconada*, *Pundua*, *Aronada*, *Devanha*, with Indian troops; *Dilwara* with Lancashire Fusiliers for Aden; *Braunfels* (a German prize) with supplies.

⁴ The *Minto* had gone on ahead to this rendezvous.

⁵ For details see C.B. 917A.

27. **Dealing with the "Königsberg."**—This news made no difference to the Admiralty's determination to bring the Indian troops to France without delay. To Admiral Peirse they telegraphed :—

" 175. The *Königsberg* was in action at Zanzibar this morning (September 20), afterwards steaming south. *Emden* is also located. Neither of these two ships can reach convoy before Aden.¹ *Dartmouth* and *Fox* are to convoy East African Expedition at best speed of transports to Mombasa.

" Order *Chatham* to proceed to Zanzibar at once. *Dartmouth*, after arrival of convoy, is to hunt *Königsberg* in concert with *Chatham*. Most urgent this ship should be destroyed.

" *Fox* to return for convoy duties.

" A further signal will inform you what extra ships are being sent you."

(Sent 12.30 p.m., 20.9.14.)

Now that the *Königsberg* was located the Admiralty could take definite steps to deal with her, and they ordered the *Weymouth* from the Mediterranean to join the *Chatham* and *Dartmouth* in hunting for her.² So far there had been no light cruisers available for that work, but the *Ocean*, half-way from Gibraltar to Malta, and the *Goliath* off Finisterre, were on their way to replace the *Chatham* and *Dartmouth* on escort duty and free them for active operations against the *Königsberg*.³ As regards the *Chatham*, she could have been at Aden much earlier if she had been relieved half-way up the Red Sea by the *Duke of Edinburgh*; but the latter lay at anchor off Suez from September 9 to 19, and the *Chatham* brought her convoy right on to Suez and did not leave there till the 17th. She reached Aden on the 21st, and left that night for Mombasa to begin operations against the *Königsberg*, being the first ship charged with that special mission.

28. **Voyage of the Fourth Convoy.**—Naval operations in the Indian Ocean at this point fell naturally into three groups :—

- (a) Convoy work in the Arabian Sea
- (b) Operations against the *Königsberg* near German East Africa.
- (c) Operations against the *Emden* in the Bay of Bengal.

With the first Admiral Peirse was mainly concerned; Captain Drury-Lowe, of the *Chatham*, later was given charge of the second; while measures taken to deal with the *Emden*

¹ This statement was probably made under the impression that the convoy had left Bombay on the 18th. As it was, the *Königsberg* and the convoy were both 1,500 miles from Makalla on the 20th; and the *Königsberg*, having much the greater speed, could have reached even the rendezvous before the two convoys met. T.S.D.D.

² F. 73.

³ F. 75, 76.

were directed entirely by Admiral Jerram.¹ The raider made another appearance on September 22 and bombarded Madras for a short time. Next morning she was seen off Cuddalore steaming south.

The large convoy which Admiral Peirse had under his charge met the Karachi Group under the care of the *Dartmouth* and *Hardinge* at noon on the 23rd near the rendezvous he had given (18° 45' N., 61° 20' E.), whereupon Admiral Peirse absorbed the latter into his own convoy and detached the three transports for Mombasa under the escort of the *Dartmouth* and *Fox*. They steamed off S. 12° W. for their journey of 1,900 miles, while the remaining 37 ships proceeded westward for Aden with the *Swiftsure* and the two Indian Marine vessels *Hardinge* and *Dufferin*. The *Black Prince* and *Duke of Edinburgh* reached Aden on the morning of the 24th, having taken five days to come through the Red Sea. The *Duke of Edinburgh* appears to have waited at Suez till her consort had completed escorting the *Northbrook's* convoy; indeed, the Indian Marine ship reached Aden a day ahead of them. From that port the *Swiftsure's* convoy was to be taken to Suez by the *Black Prince* and *Northbrook*, and the Admiralty intended, if the Red Sea were safe, to send the *Duke of Edinburgh* with Admiral Peirse to Bombay for the next convoy. The two big cruisers were not to remain long on escort duty, since they were wanted for service with the Grand Fleet;² the *Black Prince* was to be relieved at Suez by the *Minerva*, and the *Duke of Edinburgh* was to be replaced in the Indian Ocean by the *Vengeance* as soon as she could be spared from the Channel Fleet. The other two battleships, *Ocean* and *Goliath*, were delayed by defects and could not reach Suez for 10 days, so that the next convoy would have to be escorted by the *Swiftsure* and *Dufferin* from Bombay and the *Duke of Edinburgh* and *Hardinge* from Karachi.³

On September 27, seven days after leaving Bombay, the convoy of 35 ships arrived off Aden and was taken over from the *Swiftsure* by the *Black Prince* and *Northbrook*, and thus the second large force of Indian troops was carried safely across the Arabian Sea. The *Swiftsure*, *Dufferin*, and *Hardinge* went in to Aden to coal and left next day with the *Duke of Edinburgh* for India. The *Minto* had been placed at the disposal of the Resident, Aden, and was no longer available for naval duties.⁴

¹ For a description of operations in East Africa, see C.B. 917A. For operations against *Emden*, see pp. 60–116.

² H.S. 12, p. 574.

³ F. 76, 77, 78.

⁴ F. 78.

CHAPTER V.

THE OCTOBER CONVOYS.

29. **East Africa Attached to East Indies Command.**—We have seen that the necessity for escorting the Indian troops across the Arabian Sea had had the effect of transferring the control of operations in the Bay of Bengal to the Commander-in-Chief, China, who had been relieved on his original station by the Japanese. In the same way the claims of the Union Expedition to German South-West Africa,¹ and the transport of the Cape Garrison homewards, having proved all that the Commander-in-Chief at the Cape could manage with his small force, on October 1 the Admiralty transferred from the Cape Station to the East Indies the whole of the African coast north of Delagoa Bay.² By this change the new East Indies Station can be considered to have consisted of the trade routes from Colombo and India as far as Suez, and to include German East Africa, the principal base for hostile attack on them; this was perhaps a better strategic arrangement than that existing at the outbreak of war. It is to be remarked that the alteration was brought about not by any considerations of trade protection, but primarily by the double demand of the concentration of Imperial troops to meet Germany in the field, and of our attack on German overseas possessions, neither of which had seriously dominated the ideas on which the pre-war disposition of the Fleet had been based. By the inclusion of East Africa, Admiral Peirse's sphere of responsibility was considerably increased; but his squadron had been reinforced to a certain extent. The *Chatham*, *Dartmouth* and *Fox* were already on the East African coast and on October 1 the *Weymouth* arrived at Aden. There the Admiralty sent her orders that she was to cruise within 200 miles of Sokotra to deal with the *Emden* or *Königsberg* should they come to that important focal point; the order did not reach her, and she went on to Mombasa³ to join in the hunt for the *Königsberg*. Nothing more had been heard of that ship; but the *Emden* was known to have been near Minikoi on September 27, and her presence was having an indirect influence on the passage of the Indian convoys, for three empty transports necessary for the next group were held up at Calcutta by the Government of India till the Admiralty gave an assurance that it was safe for these to sail, provided they left at night independently, and kept wide of the recognised track.⁴

¹ This was an expedition being prepared by the Government of the Union of South Africa for the seizure of the coast of German South-West Africa.

² F. 82.

³ F. 81, 96.

⁴ M. 02349/14.

30. **Arrangements for the Fifth Convoy.**—In the organisation of the Indian Army, each infantry brigade included one British battalion of the Regular Army, and it was now decided to bring these battalions home, replacing them in the Indian Army by Territorial battalions. Thus the arrangements thenceforth had to be made with a view to the escort of convoys outwards as well as homewards from India, and on October 1 a programme was issued by the Admiralty to cover the movement of troops to and from India up to the end of January, 1915.¹ According to it the next convoy should leave Bombay on October 10, subsequent groups leaving at intervals of 16 days; the first outward bound group would leave Port Said on October 24, followed by other groups at 16-day intervals. No intermediate escorts would be arranged, so that transports which failed to leave with their proper group would have to wait 16 days for the next one. As, however, the transports held up by the *Emden* would be a few days late in reaching Bombay, two extra days were allowed, and, accordingly, October 12 was the date fixed for the departure of the next convoy.

The ships available for its escort were to be increased by the *Ocean* and *Goliath*,² which it was hoped would either arrive in time to start with it, or, at any rate, could meet it in the course of its voyage; the *Ocean* arrived at Port Said on October 2, but as the *Goliath* was not able to leave Malta till 6.45 that afternoon, the *Minerva*, then at Suez, was ordered to the East Indies to come under Admiral Peirse for escort duty. He proposed to use her, in conjunction with the *Duke of Edinburgh* and *Northbrook*, to take convoys up the Red Sea,³ but drew the Admiralty's attention to his lack of fast ships by telegram

"194. I wish to point out by gradual withdrawal of all fast cruisers from escort duties I shall be left with no ships approximating to speed of German cruisers.

"*Minerva* inadequate for escort if *Königsberg* or *Emden* slip into Red Sea, and as long as they are at large I submit that *Duke of Edinburgh* at least should be left under my orders."

(Sent 4.10.14, received 7.28 a.m.)

The *Duke of Edinburgh* had arrived at Karachi at 1.25 p.m. on the 3rd, and was to wait there about 10 days till the next convoy was ready. His arrangements for its escort were that the Karachi group should be taken by the *Duke of Edinburgh* and *Hardinge*, and the Bombay group by the *Swiftsure* and *Dufferin*, to be joined at a rendezvous by the *Ocean* and *Goliath*, one or both of the two battleships and the *Hardinge* going on with the Mombasa and Mauritius detachments. These general arrangements were approved, but he was told that one of the battleships would be sufficient for the East Africa contingent.⁴

31. **Search for "Königsberg."**—Beyond a wireless message intercepted from Nauen, which seemed to imply that she was

¹ H.S. 32, p. 10.

² F. 80, 83.

³ F. 84, 85, 87.

⁴ F. 85, 88.

still in East African waters,¹ there was no definite news of the *Königsberg*, though a search for her was being carried out independently by the *Dartmouth* and *Chatham*. Naval assistance was also required for the operations against German East Africa, and the *Fox* was ordered to co-operate with the Officer Commanding Expedition "B," both in the disembarkation and in subsequent operations on the coast.² She had arrived at Mombasa on the 3rd with the transport *Umfuli*, and remained there throughout October except for two short cruises. On the 5th Admiral Peirse ordered Captain Caulfeild of the *Fox* to take the *Chatham*, *Dartmouth*, and *Weymouth* under his orders and conduct the search for the *Königsberg*, so long as the operations remained conveniently near Mombasa, the *Chatham* to reassume command if the enemy were reported at a distance.³

32. "**Emden**" in the Arabian Sea.—The Admiral arrived with the *Swiftsure* and *Dufferin* at Bombay in the early morning of the 5th to prepare for the next convoy. In the course of his voyage from Aden he had inspected the Laccadive Islands in accordance with a suggestion from the Admiralty, but had found nothing there. In fact the *Emden* was well to the southward. The *Hampshire*, of the China Squadron, had gleaned some news of her. According to this the enemy was reported to have left Felidu Atoll in the Maldives (3½° N., 74° E.) on October 1, steering northward, after a three days' stay in that neighbourhood.⁴

The receipt of this news on October 6 found our ships in the Indian Ocean disposed as follows:—

Swiftsure and *Dufferin* at Bombay.

Duke of Edinburgh and *Hardinge* at Karachi.

Odin, *Éspière*, and *Dalhousie* in the Persian Gulf.

Goliath, *Minerva*, and *Northbrook* outward bound in the Red Sea.

Fox, *Chatham*, *Dartmouth*, and *Weymouth* at Mombasa or Zanzibar.

Dupleix and *Askold* just left Colombo westward with a convoy for Aden.

Chikuma leaving Colombo for Madras.⁵

Hampshire at Colombo.

As the information was already several days old it did not affect any of the principal work in hand, but the fact that the *Emden* was now in the Arabian Sea suggested the possibility of her making an attempt on our weak little squadron in the Persian Gulf, for which place a small force (Expedition "D") was now due to leave India in company at first with the main

¹ F. 89.

² F. 88.

³ F. 91.

⁴ F. 79, 90, 95.

⁵ For earlier movements of *Askold* (Russian) and *Chikuma* (Japanese light cruiser), see Index at p. 242.

convoy on the 15th from Karachi.¹ In the meantime, the Admiralty ordered the *Swiftsure* to search for the enemy and protect trade to the west of India, in accordance with which she left Bombay on the 10th at 6 a.m. and searched the Laccadive Islands, returning to Bombay on the 14th. Further, the *Duke of Edinburgh* was sent at the Admiralty's suggestion from Karachi to search the entrance to the Persian Gulf for the hostile cruiser.² She was occupied with this service from the 9th to the 14th, and, as will be seen, was in plenty of time to proceed with the convoy as arranged.

33. **A Convoy from China.**—Apart from the large convoy next due to leave India another collection of transports³ had left Colombo on the 6th for Aden under the escort of the *Dupleix* (French) and *Askold* (Russian),⁴ which last had brought the British transports from Hong Kong. This convoy reached Aden on the 15th, and was taken on through the Red Sea by the *Dupleix* alone, which, on the 12th, had been put under Admiral Peirse so long as the *Fox* remained with the East African Expedition.⁵

There was also another British force at Colombo awaiting escort; this was the Ceylon contingent booked to sail in the Bibby liner *Worcestershire* on October 20, and the idea was for the ship to be brought to Bombay to join one of the convoys leaving there. Admiral Peirse could offer no prospect of supplying an escort from his squadron before the end of October, by which time it was hoped he would have disposed of the large convoy, but this did not satisfy the people in Ceylon impressed, as they were, by the apparently unchecked activities of the *Emden*. The Governor telegraphed home that "Trade confidence in the Navy will be further shaken if the contingent cannot sail." It was finally decided that the Ceylon contingent should join the *Amiral Olry*, another French transport from Saigon which had arrived with the *Zhemchug* (Russian light cruiser) on October 8 at Singapore, where two more French transports (the *Polynésien* and *Magellan*) were waiting. These three left Singapore on the 13th escorted as far as Penang by the *Zhemchug* and from Penang to Colombo by the *Yarmouth*, which was then to take them and the Ceylon contingent to Bombay, where they would join the convoy leaving next after their arrival.⁶

34. **Departure of the Fifth Indian Convoy.**—As usual, the convoy due next to sail was delayed, this time by the difficulties of escort. It was, as we have seen, a triple one, part to go to the Persian Gulf, a large section to Egypt and later to France,

¹ F. 93, 99.

² F. 98.

³ *Arcadia*, *Nile*, *Carnarvonshire*, with British Garrisons from China; *Cordillère* and *El Kantara* with French guns and ammunition.

⁴ F. 92.

⁵ F. 104.

⁶ F. 94, 97, 100, 101. For earlier movements of *Yarmouth*, see Index.

and a third detachment to East Africa and Mauritius, and Admiral Peirse considered it advisable to wait for the arrival of the *Goliath* at Bombay on the 16th before starting; the *Ocean*, his other reinforcement, required three days' repair at Aden, but could meet the convoy *en route*.¹ His orders to the *Duke of Edinburgh* were for her and the *Hardinge* to leave Karachi on the 16th with Groups I and L² in time to meet the Bombay convoy at the rendezvous, now in 18° 55' N., 61° 30' E. Group N³ was to sail from Karachi on the 18th unescorted for the Persian Gulf, for which place Group M⁴ would sail from Bombay with the main convoy and be detached with the *Dufferin* as escort on arrival at the rendezvous. The large convoy to leave Bombay on the 16th under the escort of the *Swiftsure*, *Goliath*, and *Dufferin*, consisted of Group H⁵ for Egypt and Group K⁶ for East Africa and Mauritius.⁷

As expected, the *Goliath* arrived at Bombay at 2 a.m. on the 16th,⁸ and at 6.25 p.m. the convoy proceeded. Group K was led by the *Goliath*, and Groups H and M by the *Swiftsure*, while the *Dufferin* guarded the rear. At 7 next morning the *Duke of Edinburgh* and *Hardinge* started from Karachi with their convoy (Groups I and L) for the rendezvous, where they were to meet the Bombay Groups. The junction took place in the afternoon of the 19th; the *Ocean* had been met that morning by the Bombay convoy before the *Duke of Edinburgh* had been sighted, and at noon had gone instead of the *Dufferin* with four transports for the Persian Gulf. At 5 p.m. the *Goliath* also departed with eight transports for Mombasa and Mauritius.⁹ After the meeting of the Bombay and Karachi convoys, the small Group L of three ships parted company and proceeded for Mombasa with the *Hardinge*, and the remainder¹⁰ continued its course for Aden with the *Swiftsure*, *Duke of Edinburgh*, and *Dufferin* as escort. Off the Khorya

¹ F. 102, 103.

² Group I.—*City of Calcutta, Chanda, Glenlee, Islanda, Leicestershire, Onda, Sealdá, Tara, Ujina*, for Egypt—nine ships. Group L.—*Bharata, Homangun, Multra*, for Mombasa—three ships.

³ Group N.—*Okhla, Umta and Freienfels*.

⁴ Group M.—*Varela, Amaria, Berbera, Masunda*.

⁵ Group H.—*Aragon, Aratoon Apcar, Avon, Ballarat, Bangala, Caledonia, Clan Macfarlane, Clan Macphee, Chilka, City of Baroda, Dewa, Dunera, Franz Ferdinand, Glen Cluny, Gregory Apcar, Ionian, Ismailia, Itonus, Itria, Laomedon, Locksley Hall, Mashobra, Neuralia, Ormara, Pundit, Rajput, Saturnia, Seang Bee, Seang Choon, Surada, Veteria*, for Egypt—31 ships.

⁶ Group K.—*Abassieh, Assouan, Barjora, Jeddah, Karmala, Khosron, Lai Sang, Nairung, Pentakota, Rheinfels*, for Mombasa, and *Varsova*, for Mauritius—11 ships.

⁷ Convoy orders. M. 03564/15.

⁸ *Dufferin's* log.

⁹ These arrived at Mombasa, October 31, 1914, and Mauritius, November 4, 1914.

¹⁰ Thirty-eight ships according to the log of *Duke of Edinburgh*.

Morya Islands the *Minerva* joined the Admiral at 3 p.m. on October 20, and next morning the *Duke of Edinburgh* went on ahead to Aden to coal in preparation for taking the convoy on through the Red Sea. She came out again early in the morning of the 24th with the *Northbrook* and took over the convoy from *Swiftsure*. The voyage had not been without incident. Shortly after leaving the rendezvous the transport *Franz Ferdinand* of Group H, carrying part of the 1st King's Dragoon Guards and other details, broke down and had to drop out of the convoy. Admiral Peirse recalled the *Dufferin*, which had gone on ahead, and gave her charge of the disabled transport. After an unsuccessful attempt to get her going, the *Dufferin* took her in tow at 4 p.m., October 21, and managed to proceed at about 6 knots till the morning of the 23rd, when the hawser parted. By a day's work on the *Franz Ferdinand's* engines the *Dufferin* succeeded in getting her to go by her own steam, but she broke down again next morning, and the *Dufferin* had to tow her the remaining 280 miles to Aden, which she reached at 10 p.m. on the 25th.¹

Just outside, the *Swiftsure* had passed her. The flagship had coaled and was on her way back for the next convoy. At Aden Admiral Peirse received information of the approach of the Wessex Division on their way out to India to relieve the British Regulars; nine transports containing the Wessex men were due at Suez on October 26, and about a fortnight later the Home Counties Division would arrive there. It was arranged that the *Dupleix* should bring the Wessex Division from Suez as far as Aden, and having settled this matter, Admiral Peirse left Aden on October 25 for Bombay.²

The convoy he had brought from India went on without stopping at Aden with the *Northbrook*, *Minerva*, and *Duke of Edinburgh*, but the last, being required for the next convoy due to leave Karachi early in November, parted company on the morning of the 25th and turned back for Karachi, examining the Khorya Morya and Masira Islands *en route*. The convoy reached Suez safely on October 30.

35. Operations against "Emden."—During the passage of the convoy the *Emden* had been continuing her attacks on merchant shipping, and on October 20 a steamer, the *Saint Egbert*, arrived at Cochin, on the Malabar coast, with the crews of five steamers sunk and one captured by her near the focal point at Minikoi. Most serious of all was her capture of the British collier *Exford*, whose coal would presumably keep her active for some time.

In search of the raiding cruiser were the *Hampshire*, *Empress of Asia*, and *Chikuma* (Japanese), while the *Zhemchug* had visited the islands in the Bay of Bengal in search of her colliers. The Commander-in-Chief, China, who was in charge of the

¹ *Dufferin's* log.

² F. 109, 111, 112.

operations against the *Emden*, now withdrew the *Empress of Russia* from Manila, over which as a suspected base for colliers he had been keeping watch, and ordered her to Singapore to assist in the search for the *Emden*. The *Askold* had left Aden on the 20th and was due at Colombo on the 27th. The *Yarmouth* also had arrived on the 20th at Colombo with the French transports *Amiral Olry*, *Polynésien*, *Magellan*, and *Empire*, which it had been intended she should take on to Bombay to join the next convoy from there; but on the 21st the Admiralty sent orders for the French convoy to wait at Colombo, the *Yarmouth* being used for operations against the *Emden* and stationed on the trade route between Ceylon and Minikoi.¹

There were repeated reports from Constantinople that the *Emden* intended to go to Basra, and the Admiralty ordered Admiral Peirse, who was then half-way to Aden with his convoy, to send the *Duke of Edinburgh* to the Persian Gulf if she had enough coal, but on learning from him that the *Ocean* with the transports for the Persian Gulf was due at Bahrain on the 23rd they rescinded the order.²

Admiral Jerram further asked the Japanese to send, if possible, the light cruiser *Hivado* and one or two more cruisers to Singapore to assist in the search for the *Emden*, as there were so many demands on his own ships for escort duty. The Japanese Admiralty acceded to Admiral Jerram's wish rather more strongly than he had hoped, and stated that they would form a squadron in East Indian waters to consist of the *Tokiwa*, *Yakumo*, *Ibuki*, *Chikuma*, *Yahagi*, and *Nisshin* to be under a Japanese Vice-Admiral to whom they asked him to turn over the *Hampshire*, *Minotaur*, and *Yarmouth*, the British authorities to arrange for the whole squadron's supplies of coal and water. The arrival of a Japanese Vice-Admiral in East Indian waters would reduce the British Commander-in-Chief, Rear-Admiral Peirse, to a subordinate position, and the Japanese proposal was not welcomed with much enthusiasm by Admiral Jerram; but before any steps to secure a reduction in the proposed squadron had been taken, the Japanese had given Vice-Admiral Tochinai orders to sail with the *Tokiwa* and *Yakumo* to operate against the *Emden*. He had been instructed to keep a good understanding with the Commander-in-Chief, China, and to co-operate with Admiral Peirse; and he was leaving Japan shortly. Admiral Jerram sent to Tokyo a telegram expressing his thanks.¹

The *Askold* arrived at Colombo on the 26th from Aden, and as the Admiralty had suggested that she should take the Ceylon contingent and French transports waiting there on to Bombay she left with them on the 27th at 11 p.m., and arrived at Bombay on the 31st in time for the next convoy for home.³

¹ See Appendix C., 73 to 82.

² See C.B. 917B.

³ F. 108, 113.

36. "**Emden**" at Penang; "**Königsberg**" located.—Though when the *Askold* had started from Colombo there was some fear that the *Emden* might be near her, that enterprising German ship was 1,000 miles away by that time. At daybreak on October 28 she made an appearance at Penang, and sank there the Russian cruiser *Zhemchug* and a French destroyer.¹ The incident had occurred in waters outside the East Indies station, and was dealt with by Admiral Jerram. The only ship available on the spot to add to the squadron hunting the *Emden* was the Japanese light cruiser *Yahagi*, which had arrived at Singapore with the French transports *Euphrate* and *Latouche-Tréville*; these, it had been intended, she should have taken on to join the Australasian convoy off the Cocos Islands, but Admiral Jerram cancelled this arrangement and ordered the *Yahagi* to act with another Japanese cruiser between Penang and Rangoon. The Australasian convoy which the *Yahagi* was to have joined was bringing to Europe the first Australian and New Zealand contingents, and had now assembled in King George Sound, Albany. It left there for Colombo on November 1 escorted by the *Minotaur*, *Ibuki*, *Sydney*, and *Melbourne*.

Apart from the *Emden* the various convoys and trade routes in the Indian Ocean had little to fear, for the *Königsberg*, which so far had not been definitely located since August 10, was found on October 30 by the *Chatham* to be in hiding up the Rufiji river in German East Africa, and though it was some months before she was disposed of she could thenceforward be definitely considered as out of the game.

CHAPTER VI.

WAR WITH TURKEY: CORONEL: END OF "EMDEN."

37. **Egypt and Persian Gulf.**—The removal of the *Königsberg* from the board lightened the burden on Admiral Peirse's Squadron for only a very short time, for on arrival at Bombay on October 31 with the *Swiftsure* and *Dufferin* he found that a new force had arisen, whose entry into the conflict on the side of Germany altered the problems of his station and shifted its centre of gravity further West. The new enemy was Turkey, whose attitude since the arrival of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* on August 10 at the Dardanelles had been increasingly hostile towards us, till we had at last to send an ultimatum by which the Turkish Government was called upon to dismiss all German officials from their public services. This they refused to do, and on October 31 at 2.30 p.m. the Admiralty sent orders to Admiral Peirse and to the S.N.O., Persian Gulf, to commence

¹ For Dispositions in the Indian Ocean, October 28, see plan at p. 94.

hostilities. The operations in the Persian Gulf, though under the ultimate direction of the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, are geographically distinct from the general operations in the Indian Ocean, and they are not treated here but in a separate monograph entitled *Mesopotamia*.¹

So far as the East Indies was concerned the declaration of war on Turkey could not at once affect the squadron under Admiral Peirse. The *Minto*, which had been lent to the Resident at Aden, was indeed free for action, and was ordered by the Admiralty to proceed up the Red Sea sinking every Turkish steamer she could find;² but, at the moment, all the ships in the Arabian Sea were fully occupied with convoy work. The next large detachment of Indian troops was due to leave on November 2, and the 1st Wessex Division had left Suez for India on October 27, escorted by the *Dupleix*; it arrived at Aden on November 2³ just as the large Indian convoy was starting from India.

The Commander-in-Chief was no longer in the *Swiftsure*. The complexity of the work entailed in the control of his command was having the same effect as in the neighbouring China Station. The arrangement of escorts and convoys; the general supervision of operations in the Persian Gulf and East Africa; the protection and encouragement of shipping; the interpretation of intelligence; the necessity of keeping touch with the Government of India; all these things combined led to only one conclusion. A Commander-in-Chief afloat could not carry on the work of the station, and the Admiralty, feeling this even before the entry of Turkey into the war, had given him the option of remaining on shore. He did not at once exercise this option, for it arrived on October 16 just as the fifth convoy was starting; he proceeded with the Bombay group as already arranged, and it was not till his return that he hoisted his flag ashore.⁴

38. The Sixth Indian Convoy.—On November 2 at 11.20 a.m. the *Swiftsure* and *Dufferin* proceeded from Bombay with 25 British and 3 French transports,⁵ and next day at 6.15 a.m. the *Duke of Edinburgh* left Karachi with 10 more ships.⁶ Both groups, as before, made for the rendezvous in 18°55' N., 61°30' E., where they sighted one another at 6 a.m. on the 5th. During the 6th and 7th the faster transports *Amiral Olry*, *Edavana*,

¹ Vol. IV of this issue.

² F. 115.

³ F. 116. ⁴ F. 105, 107, 114.

⁵ Group O.—*Akbar*, *Amiral Olry* (French), *Atlantian*, *Bandra*, *Barala*, *Begum*, *Castalia*, *Circassia*, *City of Glasgow*, *Craftsman*, *Elysia*, *Fultala*, *Glenetive*, *Gloucester Castle*, *Itaura*, *Itinda*, *Itola*, *Magellan* (French), *Mongara*, *Monteagle*, *Norseman*, *Polynésien* (French), *Sardinia*, *Ula*, *Umballa*, *Upada*, *Worcestershire*. (Convoy Orders, Sheet 23, M. 03564/15.)

⁶ Group P.—*City of Manchester*, *City of Nagpur*, *Edavana*, *Ellenga*, *Freienfels*, *Mullah*, *Nurani*, *Sullej*, *Takada*, *Teesta*. (Convoy Orders, Sheet 23, M. 03564/15.)

Fultala, and *Takada*, went on ahead for Aden, and at 6 a.m. on the 8th the *Duke of Edinburgh* was detached from main convoy to coal at Aden, taking with her at 12 knots the *City of Manchester* and *Nurani*. She reached Aden at 9.53 a.m. on the 9th, and began to coal.

39. Effect of Battle of Coronel.—Since the convoy's departure from Bombay events of great importance had occurred. Our South American Squadron under Admiral Cradock had at last located the German Pacific Squadron commanded by Admiral von Spee, who had at first, it will be remembered, been considered not unlikely to come into the Indian Ocean. He had, however, proceeded steadily eastward to the coast of Chile, where, on November 1, he had defeated and dispersed the force with Admiral Cradock, an event whose effect reached even to the East Indies. Steps were taken by the Admiralty to provide sufficient force to oppose the German Squadron at whatever point it was likely to attack; one of these was German South-West Africa where we were landing troops, and to strengthen the defence there the Admiralty removed the *Minotaur* and *Dartmouth* from the Indian Ocean, ordering the *Hardinge*, which had taken the Mauritius garrison back from there to Mombasa, to take the *Dartmouth's* place on the East African Station.¹ They also decided to send to South America two battle cruisers from the Grand Fleet, and, to replace them, ordered home such of the armoured cruisers as could best be spared. One of these was the *Duke of Edinburgh*; and concerning the arrangements that her removal would necessitate they sent to Admiral Peirse, who had remained behind at Bombay, the following telegram:—

"266. *Duke of Edinburgh* is to return to Home Waters accompanying convoy to Malta where she can be docked if necessary.

"*Swiftsure* should accompany convoy to Suez, returning with the convoy of Territorials² to India.

"*Ocean* to return to Karachi for convoy leaving middle of November; *Dupleix* escorting convoy from Bombay.

"Report if any objection seen; if not, arrange accordingly.

"*Hampshire* will escort convoy from Bombay, sailing about November 28 unless *Emden* is dealt with previously."

(7.35 p.m., 6.11.14.)

In acknowledging this Admiral Peirse pointed out that the Captain of the *Ocean* was conducting combined operations in the Persian Gulf which would be delayed by his removal; and, as regards the *Duke of Edinburgh*, urged that his ships were falling into such bad condition from continuous running that he could not carry out his programme unless a ship was sent to

¹ The *Minotaur* was bringing the First Australasian Convoy home, and the *Dartmouth* and *Weymouth* had been ordered on the 4th from East Africa to join in the *Emden* hunt.

² This was the Home Counties Division due to leave Suez on November 15.

relieve her.¹ In the desire to keep secret their despatch of the battle cruisers to deal with the South American situation the Admiralty had not let him know the necessity for the presence of the *Duke of Edinburgh* in Home Waters; but now they decided to give him some reason for her removal, and on the 9th telegraphed:—

" 271. *Duke of Edinburgh* is required for important duties suited to her fighting powers.

" *Emden* is only enemy cruiser known to be within striking distance of convoys, and is located and being searched for by numerous cruisers.

" It appears that one strong ship with armed transport should suffice for moderate sized convoys in Indian Ocean, and one cruiser in Red Sea. Suggest *Dupleix* for Red Sea; she is to be relieved by *Desaix* shortly.

" Previous orders for *Hampshire* stand for one trip Bombay to Aden unless *Ocean* can be spared.

" Consider on these lines and report proposals."
(12.40 p.m., 9.11.14.)

They also gave permission for the *Hardinge* to return to escort work, whereupon Admiral Peirse ordered her to Colombo for convoys from Calcutta to Rangoon.²

The Admiralty's convoy programme which had just reached Admiral Peirse at Bombay laid down sailings at 16-day intervals of the groups of transports with Territorials; the idea was for the escort which had brought to Aden a group of Indian transports to return to Bombay, immediately after coaling, with a group of Territorials, repeating the process at Bombay. From Aden to Karachi is 1,470 miles; from Aden to Bombay 1,657 miles; and if the 16-day intervals were to be kept it was essential that the outward bound convoys should maintain a speed of 12½ knots between Aden and Bombay. However, the first Territorial convoy,³ which had left Southampton on October 9, and arrived at Bombay on November 9 under escort of the *Dupleix*, was found to be incapable of more than 10 knots. In pointing this out Admiral Peirse showed that delay was inevitable unless more ships were spared for escorting.⁴ The difficulty seemed a real one, but that day all difficulties were removed.

40. "**Emden**" Destroyed.—The First Australasian Convoy had left Albany for Colombo on November 1 under the escort of the *Minotaur*, *Melbourne*, *Sydney* and *Ibuki* (Japanese). The *Minotaur* departed on the 8th for the Cape; and on the 9th, shortly after the convoy had passed Cocos Island, that wireless station was heard giving out a message that a hostile cruiser

¹ F. 120.

² F. 122, 123.

³ *Alnwick Castle*, *Assaye*, *Braemar Castle*, *Cawdor Castle*, *Ultonia*, *Dunluce Castle*, *Kenilworth Castle*, *Nevasa*, *Galeka*—nine ships with troops; and *Thongwa*, *Ingoma*, *Kelvingrove*, without troops.

⁴ F. 124, 126.

was in sight. Captain Silver of the *Melbourne*, in charge of the convoy, decided to detach the *Sydney* (Captain Glossop) to investigate, and she had the good fortune to come up with the enemy. The hostile cruiser turned out to be the *Emden*. After a short engagement the *Emden* ran ashore and surrendered, and the Indian Ocean was thereby cleared of hostile ships.

This freed our cruisers for work elsewhere. Egypt was in need of more naval force, both for offensive and defensive operations against the Turks; the Grand Fleet was short of light cruisers; and in the Atlantic, Admiral von Spee was expected to become active before long. The Admiralty at once ordered the *Weymouth* and *Gloucester* back to Malta; the latter had left there on October 31 for the East Indies, with all despatch, and had been ordered on November 6 from Aden to Colombo, passing north of the Laccadives to hunt for the *Emden*. The *Melbourne* and *Sydney* also were both ordered to leave the Australasian convoy and push on to Malta.¹

As regards the Indian convoys then at sea, the Admiralty telegraphed to the *Swiftsure* that she was to leave the convoy and proceed with despatch to Suez; if no Indian Marine ships were available, the transports were to proceed independently and as fast as possible. The telegram was addressed to Aden; but the *Swiftsure* had already left for Suez with the convoy, and although Port Sudan was asked to pass it to her by wireless, the Governor refused to accept the message. The only way to get it to her was for the Eastern Telegraph Company to hand it to a British man-of-war by whom it could be made by wireless to the *Swiftsure*, who meanwhile was following her former orders, knowing nothing of the changed situation.² The *Duke of Edinburgh* was not with her. After coaling at Aden on November 9, she had proceeded with three fast transports, *Edavana*, *City of Manchester*, and *Nurani*, on a special mission.³

41. **Shaikh Said**.—On the Arabian Coast, opposite Perim, is the little bay of Shaikh Said, defended by a few forts, and, at the time, held by a garrison of Turkish troops. From its position it was a menace to our station at Perim, and to our trade, which, at this narrow strait, must pass within a few miles of it; and the arrival of the convoy with its powerful escort in Turkish waters had prompted the Government of India to ask Admiral Peirse for naval assistance in reducing these forts and dispersing the troops. Without waiting for the Admiralty's concurrence the Admiral acceded to the request, and by his orders the *Duke of Edinburgh*, after consultation with General Cox at Aden, carried out a bombardment of Fort Turba, and covered by gun-fire a landing of troops from the transports with her to demolish the Turkish works and

¹ F. 118, 119, 127.

² F. 128, 134.

³ *Duke of Edinburgh's* log.

drive off the enemy. While engaged in this operation she saw the rest of the convoy pass with the *Swiftsure* and *Northbrook* as its escort;¹ it had spent the night of the 9th at Aden, and was now on its way to Suez. At 5.47 p.m. on the 11th, the operations at Shaikh Said being concluded, the troops re-embarked and the *Duke of Edinburgh* proceeded with the *Edavana* and *City of Manchester* for Suez at 12 knots while the *Nurani* returned to Aden. It was not till 2 a.m. on the 14th that the *Duke of Edinburgh* sighted the large convoy ahead of her. The *Swiftsure* was still unaware of the Admiralty's latest order. When she joined, the *Swiftsure* at 9.45 a.m. left the main portion to her and went on ahead to Suez with the faster transports. The *Duke of Edinburgh's* section reached Suez on the 16th.

CHAPTER VII.

DISPERSAL OF THE EAST INDIES SQUADRON.

42. **Escorts no longer necessary.**—This was to be the last convoy in the Indian Ocean to be escorted by British ships. On November 11 the Admiralty telegraphed:—

"278. Convoys are not necessary except in the Red Sea, and homeward bound should collect and outward bound convoys disperse at Aden.

"Let *Dupleix* take her convoy as arranged.

"*Swiftsure* must remain in Egypt for the present. Send her reserve ammunition to Suez at once.

"Outward bound Territorial convoy will be escorted to Aden by *Minerva* or *Proserpine* if no Indian Marine ship is available, the escort then returning to Suez.

"Make arrangements for Red Sea convoys using Empress liners and Indian Marine ships as escorts."

(Sent 10.55 a.m., 11.11.14.)

As, however, no Indian Marine ship could be ready at Suez before the 16th, when the *Northbrook* was due there, the Admiralty ordered the S.N.O., Egypt, to detach the *Minerva* for that duty.²

As regards the recall of the light cruisers, there were several hitches. The *Gloucester* did not get her orders to return till her arrival at Bombay on the 13th, when she found she had to go the whole 4,000 miles back again. Before leaving, she obtained permission to go into Bombay dock for three days. The *Weymouth* seemed so necessary for the East African operations that the Captain of the *Chatham* strongly recommended her retention on the station, but the Admiralty on the

¹ Log of *Duke of Edinburgh*.

² F. 131, 135.

12th ordered her to Simon's Bay, recalling also the *Chatham*, *Hampshire* and *Yarmouth* to Gibraltar.¹ The *Yarmouth* left Colombo on the 18th at 6 a.m. and the *Hampshire* sailed from the same port on the 17th with the Australasian convoy.

Now that the *Emden* was disposed of, the Admiralty wished to finish off the *Königsberg*, the attack on which seemed to them to have been lacking in energy. On the 12th Captain Caulfeild of the *Fox*, who had been conducting the operations, was ordered home in the *Chatham*, and Captain Drury-Lowe of that ship was ordered to exchange into the *Fox* with the appointment of S.N.O., East African Coast. Under him were placed the *Fox*, *Goliath* and *Kinfauns Castle*, and he was ordered to make out a definite plan of operations in consultation with General Tighe, Commanding in East Africa, and to bombard Tanga and Dar-es-Salaam if they should attempt any defence. The removal of the *Chatham* did not commend itself to the officers on the spot, who pointed out that the *Goliath* and *Fox*, owing to their draught, could not bring any covering fire to bear in landing operations, and on the 14th the retention of both the *Chatham* and Captain Caulfeild in command were approved.

43. **Admiral Peirse goes to Egypt.**—By the appointment of Senior Naval Officers in Egypt, the Persian Gulf, and East Africa, and the transfer of the Bay of Bengal to the Commander-in-Chief, China, himself stationed at Singapore, very little of the original East Indies Station remained to Admiral Peirse and most of his ships had been ordered to other stations. In further reduction of his command he was told on November 16, in reference to orders he had given to the *Minto*, that he was not to direct operations even in the Red Sea.² In fact, the only area left to him was the Arabian Sea; and his squadron was represented by the *Dufferin* at Karachi, the *Dupleix* at Bombay, and the *Hardinge*, which, after taking the garrison to Mauritius, had left Seychelles for Colombo on the 14th. This anomalous situation did not last long, for at 9 p.m. on the 16th the Admiralty sent him

"292. It is necessary that you take charge of naval operations in Egypt as soon as possible.

"You should proceed to Egypt by the quickest route, and hoist your flag in *Swiftsure*.

"You will retain command of East Indies Station while employed in Egypt."

His duties were further explained to him next day by

"293. Naval operations in the Red Sea and Egypt cannot be directed from India. Your presence in Egypt is imperative. You should join your flagship *Swiftsure* at Port Said by the quickest route at once. *Gloucester* can take you if she has not already sailed.

¹ F. 130, 132, 133.

² M. 03564/14; M. 03567/14; F. 136.

Telegraph what date you expect to arrive at Suez. On arrival you should consult with G.O.C., Egypt, and work hand-in-hand with the British authorities. The Government of India will make its views known to the British Government, who will transmit all necessary orders to the G.O.C. and yourself.

"The following ships will be at your disposal in the Red Sea—*Swiftsure*, *Minerva*, *Doris*, *Proserpine*, *Philomel*,¹ and six torpedo boats from Malta. Measures are also being taken to organise armed launches and improvised gunboats for use in the canal.

"Telegraph whether you feel able to discharge the other duties of your command, namely, convoy and Persian Gulf operations, at the same time, or what temporary arrangements you suggest during your absence in Egyptian waters."

(Sent 2.10 p.m., 17.11.14.)

Admiral Peirse replied that he could perfectly well do all the work laid down; he retained general command of the operations in the Persian Gulf, but as they were chiefly military, turned over all details to the Captain of the *Ocean* as S.N.O., Persian Gulf, giving him authority to correspond direct with the Admiralty, the Government of India, and the Director of the Royal Indian Marine.² The *Gloucester* had left, but the Admiral took passage in the next P. & O. steamer and rehoisted his flag in the *Swiftsure* at Port Said in the afternoon of December 1.

44. Goa.—In addition to the entry of Turkey into the conflict it seemed likely that Portugal might decide to join in, though on the side of the Entente. There were several German merchantmen sheltering at Goa, the Portuguese colony on the west coast of India. The Admiralty were anxious not to let these escape, and on November 17 ordered Admiral Peirse to send there such vessels as he had available to capture any ships that might get away from the port. The *Hardinge* was on her way to Colombo, but he ordered her instead to Goa, where she arrived on the 19th. She remained off the port three days, paid a visit to Bombay to report, and went back to Goa on the 24th to resume her watch. She reported that the *Lichtenfels*, *Marienfels* and *Kommodor* had officers and a short supply of coal on board, but no crews; the *Brisbane* had 500 tons of coal and a full German crew; the *Numantia* had a full crew of Arabs but very little coal, and the *Vorwaerts* (Austrian) had 350 tons of coal and a full Austrian crew. These were all the enemy ships in port. The Portuguese Government had a gunboat (*Sado*) with steam up, and was prepared to resist their departure by force, calling upon the *Hardinge* to assist, but the captain of the latter had little faith in the gunboat's power to stop an evasion. The Admiralty accordingly sent orders for him to remain off the port watching the German ships, and this watch constituted the main duty of vessels in Indian waters for some time to come.³

¹ She was coming from the New Zealand Station.

² F. 138.

³ F. 137, 139, 143.

45. The Final Convoys.—There were several convoys at sea. The *Philomel* had left Singapore on November 16 with three French transports, *Euphrate*, *Latouche-Tréville* and *Chili*, and arrived with them at Colombo on the 23rd. She went on with the first two for Aden on the 26th, the *Chili* having proceeded independently.¹ The Australasian convoy had been taken from Colombo on the 17th by the *Hampshire* and *Ibuki*; it reached Aden on the 25th, and left there for Suez next morning with *Hampshire*, the *Ibuki* returning to the Far East. The Home Counties Territorial Division for India left Suez on the 18th, their departure having been delayed till the *Minerva* could be relieved in Egypt by the *Swiftsure*. On the way down the Red Sea the *Minto* relieved the *Minerva* and had brought them on to Aden, where they arrived on the 23rd. They sailed on the 26th for Bombay² unescorted, and arrived there during the first three days of December.³ The sloop *Clio*, coming from China to join the force in Egypt, escorted the transport *Monmouthshire* bringing R.G.A. details from Hong Kong and Japanese rifles and ammunition; they left Colombo on November 30 for home.

46. The Seventh Indian Convoy.—The largest convoy was, however, that from India, which left Karachi⁴ on November 20, escorted by the *Dufferin*, and Bombay⁵ on the 19th with the *Dupleix*, which had arrived 10 days previously with the Wessex Territorials. The two groups met at the rendezvous and continued with the *Dupleix* alone, the *Dufferin* returning to Bombay. At Aden the *Dupleix*, which was required to bring off the French Consul from Hodeidah and to visit Djibouti for stores, was relieved by the *Northbrook* which took the convoy on to Suez, arriving there on December 2.

This concluded the work of escorting convoys from India, which had so severely taxed the East Indian Squadron. During the escort period, which had started with the *Nairung* on August 19, over 200 transports had left India and had arrived safely at their destinations.

¹ F. 141.

² F. 142.

³ December 1, *Alaunia*, *Royal George*; December 2, *Corsican*, *Deseado*, *Dongola*, *Somali*; December 3, *Dilwara*, *Grantully Castle*. (H.S. 32, p. 751.)

⁴ Group R.—*Arankola*, *Baroda*, *Barpeta*, *Coconada*, *Devanha*, *Galeka*, *Nevasa*—seven ships.

⁵ Group Q.—*Alnwick Castle*, *Assaye*, *Bankura*, *Braemar Castle*, *City of Birmingham*, *City of Exeter*, *City of Lahore*, *City of Poona*, *Craftsman*, *Dunluce Castle*, *Euryalus*, *Gloucester Castle*, *Havildar*, *Huntsman*, *Ingoma*, *Kelvingrove*, *Kenilworth Castle*, *Malda*, *Manora*, *Rajah*, *Ranee*, *Risaldar*, *Sumatra* (for Mombasa), *Tactician*, *Ultonia*, *Urlana*—26 ships.

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THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE SQUADRON, 1914.¹

(Short title: "CAPE, 1914.")

INTRODUCTION.

The operations on the Cape Station during 1914 fall into two distinct sections, the attacks on German East Africa and German South-West Africa respectively. The operations against German East Africa have been described in Monograph 10: *East Africa*.² The present monograph deals only with the Naval operations on the South and West coasts of the station.

Military details of the expedition to South-West Africa and of the rebellion are not mentioned.

NOTE ON SOURCES.

H.S. 9 and 13 contain the telegrams dealing with the Cape Station from July 27 to December 9, 1914. Colonial Office telegrams of naval interest are also in these volumes.

H.S. 8 contains the Letters of Proceedings sent in by the Commander-in-Chief of the Cape Station during 1914, with certain miscellaneous papers dealing with the Station.

Papers titled *Colonial Office, August 14, 1914*, contain official correspondence between the Admiralty and Colonial Office on the subject of German South-West Africa. Copies of all important telegrams and minutes in this collection are also to be found in H.S. 9 and 13.

T. 6187/1914 is a bound collection of Transport Department papers dealing with the conveyance of troops from South Africa to England.

¹ Abridged from C.B. 939.

² Bound in C.B. 917A of this Issue.

THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE SQUADRON, 1914.

CHAPTER I.

1. The Cape of Good Hope Station included the whole coast of South Africa from Kismayu on the Equator, at the northern boundary of British East Africa, to the Kunene River, which was the northern limit of German South-West Africa. Eastward it extended to Mauritius and the Seychelles; westward it was bounded by the meridian of 15° W., thus having St. Helena in its northwest corner.¹ Within its limits were two large German colonies, German East Africa and German South-West Africa. On the east coast of the station the northernmost country was British East Africa, with Mombasa in 4° S. as its capital and principal port. Next came German East Africa, with its ports Tanga and Dar-es-Salaam (the capital) flanked by the British island of Zanzibar. Between 11° S. and 26° S. lay Portuguese East Africa, its principal ports being Mozambique and Lourenço Marques. East of this Portuguese possession stretches the French island of Madagascar, with Diego Suarez at its northern end and the port of Majunga in 16° S., 45° E. Southward of Portuguese East Africa and round to the Orange River in 29° S. on the West coast stretches the Union of South Africa; and from the northern boundary of the Union to the limit of the station extended German South-West Africa.

The coast of German South-West Africa lay between the Orange River in $28\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ S. and the Kunene River in 17° S.; its two principal ports were Lüderitzbucht, formerly known as Angra Pequena, in 27° S., and Swakopmund in 23° S.² In the very middle of this German coastline and adjoining Swakopmund was the small British possession of Walfisch Bay, consisting of a little settlement and a patch of territory some 30 miles along the coast and 10 miles deep. The British and German towns are only 20 miles apart. Off the southern part of German South-West Africa are some islets which also are ours; the two southernmost have the truly British names of Roast Beef and Plum Pudding. From Swakopmund a railway ran inland some 200 miles to Windhuk, where a high power German wireless station had been erected. The station had been completed on

¹ H.S. 9, p. 10.

² See map at end of this Monograph.

June 11, 1914, and could communicate with the German station at Kamina in Togoland, and perhaps, in highly favourable circumstances, with Berlin direct.¹ From Windhuk the railway turned south, parallel to the coast, and met another line coming out eastward from Lüderitzbucht. South of the Orange River is Cape Colony, while north of the Kunene is Angola, a Portuguese possession.

2. Although included in the limits of the Cape Station were these two important German colonies, the German naval force on the spot in July, 1914, consisted only of the gunboat *Eber*² for the West Coast; while on the East Coast were the surveying vessel *Möwe*³ and the light cruiser *Königsberg*.⁴

Against this small display of force, of which only the *Königsberg* appeared to have any fighting power, we had in the Cape Squadron three old cruisers. These were the *Hyacinth* (Captain D. M. Anderson, M.V.O.), *Astræa* (Captain A. C. Sykes) and *Pegasus* (Commander J. A. Ingles). The *Hyacinth*, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral H. G. King-Hall, C.V.O., C.B., D.S.O., Commanding the Cape of Good Hope Squadron, dated from 1900; she was of 5,600 tons, 19 knots trial speed, and carried eleven 6 in. guns. The *Astræa*, almost the oldest light cruiser afloat, dated from 1894; she was of 4,360 tons, $19\frac{3}{4}$ knots trial speed, and carried two 6 in. and eight 4.7 in. guns. The *Pegasus*, half her size, carried only eight 4 in. guns. None of these had speed enough to catch the *Königsberg*, but the deficiency should soon be redressed by the arrival of the *Nottingham*, a modern light cruiser, which was to leave England for the Cape Station about August 31 and relieve the *Astræa* at St. Helena.⁵

By the pre-war arrangements for the Cape station it was intended that one cruiser should guard the trade focus off the Cape of Good Hope, while the remaining two should deal with the situation in East Africa.

3. The squadron was engaged on a cruise on the East Coast in the latter half of July, 1914, when the attitude of Russia and Germany became threatening; and it was not till August 7, three days after the declaration of war, that the Admiral in the *Hyacinth* arrived at Durban, having left the *Astræa* and *Pegasus* to operate against the *Königsberg* from their base at Zanzibar.⁶ At Durban, where the defences were to be organised by the

¹ From September onwards throughout 1914, no message from Berlin direct was understood by Windhuk. I.D.H.S., Vol. 1338, No. 280.

² Two 4.1 in. guns.

³ Three 1 pdr. guns.

⁴ Completed 1907; 3,350 tons; 23 knots designed; ten 4.1 in., one 7 pdr. guns; two 18 in. submerged tubes.

⁵ Appendix H. 1.

⁶ The movements of the squadron during this period are given in C.B. 917A of this Issue.

Union Government, nothing had yet been done. The Admiral, however, arranged that the 6 in. gun lent by the Admiralty to the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve should be put up on an extemporised mounting, and he erected on the breakwater a searchlight from a French surveying vessel. These, with four 15 pdr. field guns, also a searchlight and another gun on railway trucks, were the best defences he could arrange at the moment, and he considered them satisfactory.¹ The *Hyacinth* then left for Simonstown.

So far the West Coast had been entirely without naval protection. The German gunboat *Eber* had left Capetown hurriedly on July 30, but she seemed so far to have taken no advantage of her opportunity to attack ships on the trade route from the Cape to Europe. The Admiralty had ordered the merchant vessels armed for self-defence to be supplied with 15 rounds for each 4.7 in. gun carried, and learned on August 8 that four vessels had been given their ammunition at Simonstown. The instructions handed to the masters of these vessels when their ammunition was put on board were to the effect that they were to avoid conflict if at all possible; they were on no account to fire first, and if chased or stopped were at once to report the fact and their position by wireless.² At the same time the Admiralty had suggested to Lord Rothschild that he should temporarily suspend shipments of gold from South Africa.³ Advice had been issued to all merchant vessels to abandon their regular tracks, reduce their lights, and complete their voyages without bunkering if possible.

The Admiral disembarked at Durban and went by train to Bloemfontein, where he met General Smuts, Minister of Defence, and a representative of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief.⁴ He discussed with them various matters in which they could co-operate, and arranged a temporary transposition cypher for the Consular Codes G and M which had been compromised. He then left for Simonstown, and arriving on August 10 rejoined the *Hyacinth*. While there, he arranged for a 4.7 in. gun to be mounted to protect the wireless station, which was much exposed.⁵

The British settlement at Walfisch Bay was also without protection of any kind. Admiral King-Hall on August 1 proposed to the Union Government that they should provide it with guns and a garrison; this suggestion was reinforced by a letter from the Admiralty to the Colonial Office in a similar

¹ Letter of Proceedings, H.S. 8, p. 11.

² H.S. 9, pp. 31, 63, 75.

³ H.S. 9, p. 72.

⁴ Lt.-Gen. Sir J. W. Murray, K.C.B.

⁵ L. of P., H.S. 8, p. 12.

sense; but the latter office questioned the soundness of this proposal, apparently on good grounds, and it was not proceeded with.¹

Another urgent necessity was the provision of a garrison for St. Helena. Most of the local inhabitants volunteered for service and were formed into a militia. A portion of the Cape Garrison, 200 infantry, were got ready to embark, at first in a transport and later in the *Hyacinth*, and arrangements were made for artillery men to be sent from home.²

4. But besides these two measures of defence, other military questions had arisen which were to have a vital effect on the operations of the Cape Squadron. The Union Government had undertaken to be responsible for its own defence, and had made, moreover, declarations of loyalty which permitted the removal of the British troops in the Union³ to Europe, where their presence was urgently required. One matter, therefore, calling for arrangement was the transport and escort of these troops homeward. The numbers to be carried were five battalions of infantry, two regiments of cavalry, one brigade of artillery and two companies of Army Service Corps; but they could not all be ready at the same time. If escort would not be required from the Cape three⁴ transports could sail on the 23rd, 25th and 26th respectively, but the fourth⁵ was not likely to be ready till September 3.⁶

At the time no action as regards escort seemed immediately required, though between the Cape and home there were known to be two German cruisers, the *Karlsruhe* and *Dresden*, both in the West Indies at the outbreak of war; but in the early morning of August 12 the Admiralty learned that the *Dresden* had stopped three British ships off Alcantara on the North coast of Brazil, and they accordingly decided that the transports must be escorted from their point of departure. They cancelled their instructions for Admiral King-Hall to take the St. Helena Garrison when convenient, ordering him instead to escort with the *Hyacinth* the first three transports, which must leave in one convoy on the 26th.⁷ The *Leviathan*⁸ had been sent to search the Azores on account of rumours of enemy action there. The Admiralty on the 12th ordered her down the trade route to meet and take over the convoy to be brought up by the *Hyacinth*, which on relief could return for the fourth transport.⁹ Next day they

¹ H.S. 9, pp. 33, 38, 39.

² H.S. 9, p. 41; H.S. 8, pp. 213-219, 291, 292.

³ Appendix H. 2.

⁴ *Kenilworth Castle, Briton, Dunluce Castle.*

⁵ *Guildford Castle.* ⁶ H. 6.

⁷ The arrangements for the defence of St. Helena are in papers titled *R. 99/14 and Misc. Office, July 28, 1914.*

⁸ Capt. Marcus R. Hill: 1899; 14,100 tons; 23 knots; two 9.2 in., sixteen 6 in.

⁹ H. 6, 7, 8.

ordered the *Astræa* from the East coast to the Cape instructing her to keep a look-out for the *Königsberg* when off Inhambane in Portuguese East Africa, where she had been reported. Cypher messages to Swakopmund, thought to come from the *Königsberg*, led Admiral King-Hall to think she was making her way South. He therefore ordered the *Hyacinth* to patrol a line 50 miles South from the Cape of Good Hope; but the Admiralty countermanded this patrol, ordering him instead to proceed to Durban and cover the trade there while waiting for the transports to be ready.¹ He recalled the *Hyacinth*, re-embarked in her, and sailed for Durban in the morning of the 14th about the same time as the *Astræa* left Zanzibar, where the *Pegasus* remained alone on the whole East Coast of Africa to carry on as Senior Officer.

As was to happen with the other Commanders-in-Chief on Foreign Stations, the complexity of the work involved in the management of a widely spread squadron, and the arrangements to be made with shore authorities on transport questions, led Admiral King-Hall to ask the Admiralty to allow him to remain ashore at Simonstown.²

5. At the moment when he was making this request, there was still another matter awaiting his co-operation. The day after the outbreak of war a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence was appointed, with Vice-Admiral Sir Henry B. Jackson, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., late Chief of the Admiralty War Staff, in the chair, to consider suitable overseas objectives for our armed forces. Among the recommendations of this Sub-Committee was that of destroying the wireless stations on the coast of German South-West Africa with the co-operation of the Government of the Union of South Africa. The Colonial Office therefore suggested to that Government that it should "seize such part of German South-West Africa as would give them command of Lüderitzbucht, Swakopmund and the wireless stations there or in the interior."³ It was recognised that the seizure of Windhuk, though of great importance, would be a serious military undertaking and had better be postponed, effort at first being concentrated on seizure of the coast by a joint naval and military expedition, while raids across the land frontier might take place simultaneously in order to divert the Germans from the coast.⁴ The suggestion received a cordial welcome, and the Union Government began to make preparations. Information was received on August 12 that the Germans had evacuated Swakopmund and Lüderitzbucht after blowing up the jetties and sinking all harbour craft. According to other intelligence reports the enemy had a number of guns and

¹ H. 10, 11.

² H. 12. Compare pp. 71 and 152.

³ H. 2.

⁴ H. 5.

were strongly entrenched at the waterholes inland; and the Union urged the Home Government to allow the British artillery to remain for the expedition. This the Army Council could not grant as the guns were urgently required at home; but they pointed out that even without a strong force of artillery the Union forces could seize the points of main importance.

6. The *Hyacinth* was available at the Cape. The Admiralty considered that if a start was made at once she could escort the Union troops, assist in the landing and be back in time to escort the transports with British troops for home due to leave on August 26. They urged, therefore, that the expeditions to seize the two coast stations should not be delayed till artillery was available; their information pointed to the improbability of resistance at either port and it seemed possible to defend these on the land side by light guns.¹ The Union Government accepted this view and asked Admiral King-Hall to arrange for escort. This request he received a few hours after he had asked permission to take up his quarters ashore. He now suggested that the *Hyacinth* should return to the Cape leaving the *Astræa* to search for the *Königsberg* which had been reported off Inhambane in Portuguese East Africa. This report was by this time known to have been based on a mere guess that a ship seen in the distance might be the German cruiser; the Admiralty were therefore less anxious about the trade focus at Durban and they approved his proposal. The Admiral then recommended that even if the *Astræa* did not meet the *Königsberg* she should join the *Pegasus*, whose situation alone on the East Coast he considered very risky. However, the safety of the troop transports seemed all-important and on August 17 the Admiralty ordered him to use both *Hyacinth* and *Astræa* for their escort, the *Pegasus* accepting what they considered the slight risk of remaining at Zanzibar.²

The Admiral returned to Simon's Bay at 7.30 a.m. on August 17. He found that the British troops to be escorted would now fill six ships,³ which were all to be ready by August 26. The *Astræa* in pursuance of her latest orders left Durban on August 20 for Cape Town where the transports were being got ready. Information had been received from the G.O.C. that the 10th Hussars were also to go home, though five days previously the Admiral had been told that they were not to embark. He reported this to the Admiralty, with the remark that no ship could be got ready for them till September 6, as all available labour both at Cape Town and Durban was fully engaged on

¹ The Colonial Office telegrams and correspondence on this subject with the Admiralty are in H.S. 9, pp. 69, 91, 101, 106, 108, 121, 137-140.

² H. 13, 14, 15.

³ Kenilworth Castle, Briton, Dunluce Castle, Guildford Castle, Goorkha, Balmoral Castle.

the transports sailing on August 26; if the horses were left behind the men could sail on the 29th in the *Balmoral Castle*, but if not, the whole convoy must be delayed.¹ Orders were sent out from home for the sailing of *Balmoral Castle* on the 26th with the 10th Hussars, and the Admiral's suggestion that she should wait till the 29th so as to embark the women and children and then catch up the convoy at St. Helena was not carried out. Ultimately she sailed with the rest of the convoy.²

Any danger to be apprehended from the *Königsberg* was rendered more remote when it was learned, on the 21st, that the German ship *Zieten*, which had arrived at Mozambique two days before, had brought news that the enemy cruiser had captured a British ship, the *City of Winchester*, in the Gulf of Aden and was on the Arabian coast on the 10th. This disposed of the rumour that she had been off Inhambane at that period, and she was hardly likely to make the voyage to South Africa in time to attack the convoy in view of coaling and other difficulties. The *Hyacinth* and *Astræa* arrived at Simonstown on the 23rd, and the *Leviathan* was due at St. Helena on the 31st, when she would relieve the *Astræa* for return to the Cape; and thus the escort arrangements were all complete.

7. On August 26 the convoy of six transports³ left Cape Town, escorted by the *Hyacinth* and *Astræa*, the Admiral remaining at Simonstown. The horses of the 10th Hussars⁴ and about 1,000 men were to leave about September 1 in the Transport *Ingoma*, without escort, as she would be following the track of the first convoy and would be met by the *Astræa* and later the *Hyacinth*. The voyage of the first convoy continued without any incident of importance as far as St. Helena, which was reached at 9.30 p.m. on September 1. There they found the *Leviathan* waiting; she relieved the *Astræa*, and the convoy proceeded at 1.0 p.m. on the 2nd with the *Hyacinth* and *Leviathan* as escort, making a detour through 14½° N., 20° W.,

¹ H. 16.

² T. 7104/14 in T. 6187/14.

³ *Guildford Castle*, *Briton*, *Kenilworth Castle*, *Goorkha*, *Dunluce Castle*, *Balmoral Castle*, carrying over 5,000 men, 700 women and children, and 889 horses. For names of regiments see H.S. 9, p. 368.

⁴ The difficulties experienced by Admiral King-Hall in making arrangements is shown by a *précis* attached to his letter of August 25 (370/058/11 in T. 9041):—

August 10, from G.O.C., 1,039 horses to go; August 12, from G.O.C., 1,360 horses to go; August 13, from War Office, 2,048 horses to go; August 13, from G.O.C., add 840 officers and men; August 14, from G.O.C., add 450 women and 765 children; August 14, from G.O.C., subtract 10th Hussars; August 15, from G.O.C., add 450 mules; August 17, from G.O.C., subtract 280 mules; August 18, from G.O.C., add 10th Hussars; August 19, from G.O.C., 10th Hussars to go September 6; August 19, from G.O.C., no mules to go; August 21, from G.O.C., 10th Hussars to go August 26; August 23, from G.O.C., women and children to come out of *Balmoral Castle* and follow by mail.

and 32° N., 20° W., well away from the trade route. The *Astræa* returned from St. Helena southward without delay, but the *Hyacinth* continued with the convoy as far as 22° 6' N. (halfway between the Cape Verde Islands and the Canaries), where she was relieved by the *Europa* on September 11.

The convoy reached Southampton safely eight days later.

CHAPTER II.

8. The return of the *Astræa* to the Cape was being awaited by the Expedition against German South-West Africa, which, though not ready before the departure of the British troops, was now approaching completion. According to the plan drawn up by the Union Government, there were to be three simultaneous expeditions—one to seize Swakopmund and Lüderitzbucht from the sea with naval assistance, the second to land at Port Nolloth and advance across the Orange River, and the third to attack over the frontier inland at Kakamas;¹ but by August 22 nothing had been done to secure the destruction of the coast wireless stations, which the Admiralty had represented as an urgent necessity; and in the hands of the Union Government the force to be employed had grown to the dimensions of a large expedition for the invasion of the German colony from the sea and the capture of the inland station of Windhuk, rather than, as the Admiralty had at first hoped, merely the rapid seizure of the coast stations.² Further delay was caused by difficulty in providing escort. The *Hyacinth* and *Astræa* were occupied with the transports of the Cape Garrison, but two armed merchant cruisers were on their way out from home to join the Cape Squadron, and could be used either for escort or as transports. These were the *Armada Castle*³ and *Kinfauns Castle*,⁴ each of which carried eight 4.7 in. guns. The *Armada Castle* left St. Vincent, Cape Verde, on August 21. The fitting out of the *Kinfauns Castle* at Southampton had been delayed by the departure of the British Expeditionary Force to France, and she had not left home till August 15. As the expedition against the coast stations would be in five transports and was relying on naval assistance, the Union Government considered an armed merchant cruiser insufficient escort; and, though the force would be ready to sail on September 5, they decided to wait for the return of the *Astræa* about a week later before undertaking that part of the operations.

¹ H.S. 9, p. 184.

³ Captain O. F. Gillett, R.N.

² H.S. 9, p. 247.

⁴ Captain D. B. Crampton, M.V.O., R.N.

9. The second part, that is the Port Nolloth Expedition of 1,500 men and 1,300 animals, left Cape Town on August 30 without escort;¹ their landing place was in Union territory, and the Admiral had no ship to send with them, but he had ordered the *Armada Castle* from St. Helena, where she arrived on August 28, to proceed to Port Nolloth direct (1,500 miles) and cover the expedition's landing.² Attack from the *Königsberg* was hardly to be expected, for she had been reported off Majunga in Madagascar at the same time as the Port Nolloth Expedition left.³

10. Besides the large force for the seizure of Swakopmund and Lüderitzbucht which was calling out for escort, there was another transport for home to be convoyed. This was the *Dover Castle*, which, after bringing out a company of R.G.A. to reinforce the garrison of St. Helena, had then come on to the Cape, where she was to embark a half battalion of the Essex Regiment and the 2nd Battalion of the East Lancashires. At the same time the War Office was pressing for the other half battalion of the Essex Regiment to be brought to the Cape from Mauritius, where it was to be relieved by a regiment from India. To meet this requirement Admiral King-Hall proposed to send the *Kinfauns Castle* for the half battalion from Mauritius after the Port Nolloth Expedition had landed; but as the Admiralty wished the *Kinfauns Castle* to join the *Astræa* in supporting the Lüderitzbucht Expedition, they refused to allow this,⁴ and that particular half battalion had to wait till it could join an Indian convoy at Aden.⁵

In point of fact, the demands of the Army for convoy were so great as to cause considerable anxiety, since practically the whole strength of the Navy on both sides of the Cape Peninsula was engaged in escort duty. As Admiral King-Hall pointed out,⁶ at the end of August there was nothing on the African coast south of the Equator except the *Pegasus* at Mombasa and the *Armada Castle* at Port Nolloth, while in the Indian Ocean north of the Equator the whole of the East Indies Squadron was engaged in convoying troops. The important trade centre at the Cape was quite unprotected, and he asked that a cruiser

¹ The S.N.O. had been given discretion as to this. See M. 01626/14 in papers titled *Colonial Office, August 14, 1914*.

² L. of P., H.S. 8, p. 16.

³ H.S. 9, pp. 328, 330.

⁴ H. 18, 20.

⁵ H.S. 8, pp. 148-155. The War Office had apparently made arrangements for this move without any reference to the Admiralty, who informed the War Office that it was quite impossible to provide convoy for the half battalion from Mauritius, and asked that any further oversea movements of troops requiring escort might be the subject of personal conference between representatives of the Army General Staff and the Naval War Staff rather than of official letters.

⁶ H. 19.

equal to the *Astræa* should be detailed to patrol it till the *Königsberg* had been dealt with; but the Admiralty felt themselves unable to provide this, and no steps were taken to strengthen the Cape Squadron till several months later, when a greater danger appeared to be threatening.

11. At the moment there were two conflicting claims for escort from two different convoys, one the remainder of the Cape Garrison bound for home, and the other the Union Government's Expeditionary Force for operations against the coast of German South-West Africa. As regards the latter, the Union Government refused to allow their expedition to leave unless it had as much escort as the transports containing the Imperial troops. The Admiralty quite concurred in this view, and endeavoured to arrange that the *Dover Castle* and *Garth Castle*, with the Essex and East Lancashire Regiments, should sail with the Lüderitzbucht Expedition on September 12 under the escort of the *Astræa*, which was to cover the landing of the Union Forces and then come on to St. Vincent with the Imperial convoy.¹ Unfortunately, on account of the weather conditions at Port Nolloth, the transports, which on their return were to embark the Lüderitz Bay Expedition, were reported unable to get clear of stores till the 14th, and were hardly likely to start from Cape Town till more than a week later. The Admiralty reply to this information was that the expedition must wait, and the Imperial troops come home without delay, escorted by the *Astræa*.² This action caused some ill-feeling in South Africa. The Union Government felt disposed to cancel the whole expedition, pointing out that if the seizure of the coast wireless stations was an "urgent necessity," as they had been led to believe, the Admiralty must provide a proper escort. This not unnatural attitude on the part of the Union, which had taken up the Admiralty's suggestion with so much unexpected enthusiasm, raised the whole question as to which convoy had the prior claim to the only escort available. It seemed a question of comparative urgency. The War Office were asked whether one and a half battalions of regular infantry were so urgently required at home that they could not be delayed a week in order to complete the landing of an offensive expedition to destroy the three important wireless stations in South Africa. The result was that Lord Kitchener agreed to the postponement of the Imperial troops' departure,³ and the *Astræa* was told off to escort and cover the Union Expedition.⁴ She arrived at Cape Town on September 10, and at the Admiral's suggestion it was decided that the *Hyacinth*, which was relieved on the 11th by the *Europa* about half way between the Cape Verde and Canary Islands, should come direct to Walvisch Bay and take over the *Astræa's* covering duties, so that she could proceed

¹ H. 20.

² H. 22, 23.

³ H.S. 8, pp. 158-168; H. 24.

⁴ H. 25.

with the *Dover Castle* and *Garth Castle*.¹ The Port Nolloth Expedition had been covered by the merchant cruisers. The *Armada Castle* came back to Simonstown on September 6; her place was taken by the *Kinfauns Castle*, which the Admiral had ordered there on her way south from St. Vincent. The *Kinfauns Castle* remained till the 11th, when she returned to Simonstown with a prize, the German barque *Heinz*, captured off Port Nolloth.

Having received a report that German steamers had been seen off Swakopmund, the Admiral sent the *Armada Castle* to cruise off that port, and return within a fortnight, as she was to embark part of the expedition. On September 14 she completed the destruction of Swakopmund Wireless Station and went on to Walfisch Bay, where she embarked the officials and their families in view of a possible German raid. She remained there till relieved by the *Kinfauns Castle* on the 21st.

12. The Lüderitz Bay Expedition in four transports left Cape Town on September 15 escorted by the *Astræa*, arrived on the 18th, and meeting with no opposition occupied the town next day. So far, then, the expeditions seemed to be meeting with success.

13. But on September 20 two serious events took place. The first was the destruction of the *Pegasus* at Zanzibar by the *Königsberg*, which escaped undamaged to the southward; and the second, a political event, was the resignation of General Beyers, Commandant General of the Union Forces, on the grounds that the expedition for invading German South-West Africa was uncalled for, since the Germans had no quarrel with the Dutch. He published a manifesto of a strongly anti-British character, calculated to stir up racial strife in the Union itself. He was called upon to resign, and thenceforth became an active rebel. The result of his defection was really good since General Botha himself took up the supreme command of the expedition, a change which was in every way a gain.

In view of the destruction of the *Pegasus*, the only ship on the eastern half of the station, Admiral King-Hall proposed that the *Hyacinth*, instead of relieving the *Astræa*, should go with the *Kinfauns Castle* and hunt for the *Königsberg*. Such a move would delay the Imperial troops about a fortnight, but to get the one and a half battalions speedily home seemed of less importance than the destruction of the *Königsberg*.² His suggestion was made in ignorance of Admiralty dispositions; a division consisting of the *Chatham*, *Weymouth* and *Dartmouth* had been formed for the express purpose of hunting for the German cruiser.³ In reply he was told that the sailing of the convoy of Imperial troops was to proceed as arranged. The

¹ H. 26.² H. 27.³ See C.B. 917A.

last decision, it will be remembered, was for the *Dover Castle* and *Garth Castle* to accompany the expedition to Walfisch Bay, and be taken on from there by the *Astræa* as soon as she could be relieved by the *Hyacinth*; but the discharge of stores was so much delayed by weather that it was seen to be impossible for the expedition to start before October 1. The Admiral accordingly ordered the *Hyacinth* direct to Simonstown with the intention of embarking in her and overtaking the convoy at Walfisch Bay. She left St. Helena on September 26, and as the distance to Simonstown is about 1,700 miles, she could not be expected till about October 2. The *Astræa*, having seen her convoy safely landed at Lüderitz Bay, returned to Simonstown on September 26 to prepare for the fresh convoy of Union and Imperial troops.

14. Her report and that of *Armada Castle* brought Admiral King-Hall to the conclusion that a landing at Swakopmund would be a much longer and more difficult operation than the occupation of Lüderitzbucht; neither he nor the British G.O.C. had been consulted by the Union Government, and such information as he could gather as to the plans for the invasion of the German Colony seemed to show that they were inadequate for an operation of much the same magnitude and nature as we had undertaken in the Boer War. Moreover, a strong party in the Union was out of sympathy with the whole idea of the operations, and any large reverse would have most serious consequences. He felt that he could not protect Walfisch Bay from attack if he had also to safeguard the passage of reinforcements and supplies to Lüderitz Bay. Lüderitz Bay was a well found base, easy to defend if all the artillery available were employed there and not divided between it and Walfisch Bay, whereas the latter was geographically ill-suited for defence, Swakopmund was inconvenient for landing men and stores, and its distance from Cape Town, the base, was half as long again as to Lüderitz. In these circumstances, the Admiral felt constrained to urge these considerations on the Governor-General,¹ late as it was, in view of the advanced state of the preparations.²

CHAPTER III.

15. In addition to the geographical disadvantages of Walfisch Bay as a base for the fourth branch of the expedition there were other reasons for reconsidering the question of scattering the Union forces. So far, three separate expeditions were in train—Force A, under General Lukin, had landed at Port Nolloth and advanced across the Orange River; Force B,

¹ Viscount Gladstone.² H. 28, 29.

under Colonel Maritz, was operating towards Upington, near the south-east corner of the German Colony; and Force C, for Lüderitz Bay, was at Cape Town ready to sail, its advance party being embarked in the *Armada Castle*. Of Forces A and B the news was bad; an advanced party sent on by General Lukin had been captured at Sandfontein on the 26th and the loyalty of Colonel Maritz of Force B was under suspicion. In the circumstances and in view of Admiral King-Hall's objections the Union Government agreed to abandon for the time their intention of forming a fourth branch to the expedition, and decided to divide the troops prepared as Force D between General Lukin on the frontier and Colonel Beves at Lüderitz Bay. The idea of sending a force to Swakopmund was temporarily abandoned.¹ That port had meanwhile been kept under observation by the *Kinfauns Castle* which, when the Germans made a small raid on the British Settlement at Walfisch Bay, destroyed the Swakopmund pier and threatened to bombard the town if Walfisch were again molested.² It was now decided to bring her from Walfisch Bay after embarking all the white residents so that the settlement should be temporarily abandoned, but her actual recall was delayed in order that the Germans, under the impression that Swakopmund was to be attacked, should not concentrate on the force landed at Lüderitz Bay before the arrival of reinforcements.

16. The advance part of these (total strength, 1,368) sailed at 11 p.m. on September 29 on board the *Armada Castle*,³ which, while waiting, had patrolled for two days off Cape Agulhas. The remainder of the reinforcements (total strength, 1,365)⁴ under General Mackenzie sailed at daybreak on October 1 in seven transports. They were escorted by the *Astræa* and were accompanied by the *Dover Castle* and *Garth Castle* in which were the Essex and Lancashire Regiments, for home. At Lüderitz Bay the *Hyacinth*, which arrived there from the north that day, was to take over the duty of protecting the landing, while the *Astræa* proceeded with the British troops northward until relieved by a cruiser from Cruiser Force D. The advance party in the *Armada Castle* reached Lüderitz Bay the same evening, and commenced disembarking next morning. The remainder, under General Mackenzie, reached Lüderitz Bay late on October 3, the *Astræa* continuing northward with the *Dover Castle* and *Garth Castle*. She remained with these till the 20th when she was relieved off St. Vincent, Cape Verde, by the *Kent*.

17. Admiral King-Hall was thus left with only the *Hyacinth* and the two armed merchant cruisers for the six weeks of the *Astræa's* absence. He had represented to the Union Government that one reason for his objection to Walfisch Bay as a

¹ H. 30 and H.S. 9, pp. 624-626, 630.

² H.S. 8, p. 44.

³ H.S. 13, p. 9.

⁴ H.S. 13, p. 14.

base, was the inadequacy of his squadron to carry on such an addition to its normal work as the protection of the long line of sea communication that would be entailed by the passage of supplies to Swakopmund. To increase the Cape Force Admiral Sir Henry Jackson at the Admiralty suggested that the *Challenger*, then conducting naval operations at the Cameroons, should be sent down from Duala, while to reduce Admiral King-Hall's responsibilities the East Coast of Africa should revert to the East Indies command.¹ The latter part of this suggestion was adopted, and on October 1 Admiral King-Hall was sent—

“ 198. In order to relieve pressure on your resources the East Coast of Africa, North of latitude of Delagoa Bay, has been transferred for all purposes to East Indies Station. Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, has been informed.”

(Sent 8 p.m., 1.10.14.)

Admiral King-Hall's representation to the Governor-General had been made on the assumption that Walfisch Bay was to be the base; and he now submitted to the Admiralty—

“ 274. In view of decision of Union Government not to use Walfisch Bay and the convenient and defensive possibilities of Lüderitz Bay I am satisfied I can deal with the situation and request the reconsideration of the reduction of my command.”

(3.10.14.)

But the Admiralty adhered to its decision; and the East African operations were definitely removed from his control. The latest intelligence from there was a report he had received on October 1 from the *Chatham* that the *Königsberg* was rumoured to be using the Rufiji River as an anchorage; on the 7th, an intercepted telegram from the Portuguese Governor at Lourenço Marques indicated that the *Königsberg* was anchored off Caldera Island near Angoche, and this the Admiral passed to the *Dartmouth* with the suggestion that she should proceed there at once. A search of the group failed to locate the enemy; she remained undiscovered, and apparently inactive, for some time longer.

18. The last Imperial convoy having left Cape Town, and being relieved of the control of the East African operations, Admiral King-Hall's chief pre-occupation was with the expeditions against German South-West Africa. The plan of campaign had been altered; General Lukin's force could not advance from Port Nolloth owing to transport and water difficulties, and it was now proposed to send the bulk of it also to Lüderitz Bay, in addition to the two batches of reinforcements.² Although the troops in the *Armada Castle* had disembarked in one day, and she had arrived on October 5 at Simonstown with prisoners and German women and children from Lüderitz

¹ H.S. 9, p. 608.

² H.S. 13, pp. 33, 50-53.

Bay, the force under General Mackenzie was estimated to take about a fortnight to clear the seven transports which had been brought up by the *Astræa*.¹ The *Kinfauns Castle* left Walfisch Bay on the 7th bringing all the white population of the settlement; but next day was ordered by the Admiral to return as he had been informed that the new plan entailed a landing of 3,000 men and a large railway construction party at Walfisch preliminary to a simultaneous advance on Windhuk from Swakopmund and Lüderitz Bay. He pointed out to the Admiralty that these operations could not be undertaken unless both the *Hyacinth* and *Astræa* were held available solely for convoy and covering duties.²

The *Hyacinth* came in to Simon's Bay on October 9 for five days' repairs. The *Astræa* with her convoy was ordered on from St. Helena to Sierra Leone, the Rear-Admiral Commanding in that area being instructed to relieve her before she reached St. Vincent, if possible, as she was wanted back at the Cape. She would be in time, since the new Force D for Walfisch Bay would not be ready to embark till November 16. Further, the Governor-General of the Union suggested that the *Armada Castle* should, during the operations, be available to carry troops as well as to give protection, and in view of the naval participation in the proposed scheme called Admiral King-Hall to a consultation in Pretoria; he left Simonstown on October 9 having instructed his flag-captain to act as Senior Naval Officer in his absence.³ At Pretoria he learned that Colonel Maritz had at last definitely joined the Germans with most of his force and now threatened to invade the Union.

19. Besides the reverse suffered by General Lukin's force and the defection of Maritz, which it was feared might have the effect of inducing some of the Dutch to rise against British rule, there was the further possibility of attack from the sea on the bases of the expedition against German South-West Africa. At the outbreak of war there had been scattered at various points in the Pacific Ocean a German Squadron under Admiral von Spee consisting of the armoured cruisers *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* and the light cruisers *Leipzig* and *Nürnberg*.⁴ It now seemed most probable that these had concentrated and were making their way towards the Straits of Magellan with the intention of coming into the Atlantic; and it was reckoned they could be off Montevideo by October 18. Among possible objectives was an attack on the sea bases of the Union Expedition, and since in the Cape Squadron there was nothing capable of withstanding the 8 in. guns of the large German cruisers the Admiralty decided to have ready the battleship

¹ H.S. 13, p. 43.

² H. 31.

³ H. 32.

⁴ For details of the operations of this squadron, see C.B. 917.

Albion, which was then acting with Cruiser Force D. On October 12 they ordered her from St. Vincent, Cape Verde, to Ascension, and informed Admiral King-Hall that she was to be under his orders with the object of safeguarding the expeditions to German South-West Africa at their ports of disembarkation, in conjunction with his other vessels, and any local defence guns that may be mounted at Walfisch Bay and Lüderitz Bay. Everything was to be done to hasten the formation of these bases and transport of stores to them, in conjunction with Union Government, and also the placing of guns for their defence.¹

20. The Union Government were not contemplating a forward movement until the internal situation cleared, but, hoping soon to stamp out the incipient rebellion, asked the Admiral to keep the *Armada Castle* and *Hyacinth* in readiness for the purposes of the expedition when the despatch of troops to Walfisch Bay became possible. He ordered the *Albion* there to relieve the *Kinfauns Castle*, which had been maintaining a strict watch over Swakopmund since her return on October 7, but owing to some delay over stores the *Albion* did not leave St. Vincent till the early morning of the 14th. That day there was a small scare caused by a report from the Portuguese Administrator at Port Alexandre² that seven warships had been seen near there on the night of October 12-13. The news telegraphed from the Admiralty to Admiral King-Hall induced him to recall the *Kinfauns Castle* from her unprotected position at Walfisch Bay, but on inquiry he found that the ships in question were whaling craft, and on the 15th he ordered the *Kinfauns Castle* back again to await the *Albion*. In the meantime the Admiral sent the *Armada Castle* to bring away the women and children from Walfisch Bay who were still on board the *Kinfauns Castle*; she arrived there on the 18th at 3 p.m., embarked her passengers, sailed again at 7 p.m., and arrived at Cape Town on the 21st.

On that day the *Astræa*, having been relieved of her convoy, left St. Vincent, Cape Verde, to rejoin the Cape Squadron, and the *Albion* also sailed from Ascension to join Admiral King-Hall's command. He had ordered her to Walfisch Bay to relieve the *Kinfauns Castle*, which was still actively watching Swakopmund. As natives had reported that the Germans were moving stores, and occasionally soldiers had been seen on the mainland, Captain Crampton of the *Kinfauns Castle* sent a letter by native carrier to the Governor, who had retired to the frontier, demanding his personal assurance that the removal of stores would cease, and that all German troops in the Walfisch Bay district would be withdrawn. An acknowledgment of the letter was received from the Governor, but as it contained no

¹ H. 33.

² Just north of the Kunene River.

definite compliance with the demand the *Kinfauns Castle* proceeded to Swakopmund again on the 24th and fired 37 rounds at the Custom House and pier. From that time to October 30 the *Kinfauns Castle* made almost daily visits to Swakopmund, now apparently quite deserted; on her last visit she burned 20 tons of stores which were found stacked ready for removal. She was relieved on the 31st by the *Albion*, and proceeded *viâ* Lüderitz Bay for the Cape with the *Armada Castle*, which had arrived the day before with stores for the *Albion*.¹

Some activity had been reported among the German merchant ships at Loanda and other ports, and the *Hyacinth* and *Armada Castle* had for a few days patrolled to 180 miles South of Cape Point to intercept any German colliers which might be attempting to pass. On the 28th, when the *Armada Castle* sailed for Walfisch Bay, the *Hyacinth* continued patrolling between the Cape and Durban.²

21. The internal situation in the Union was much improved by a signal defeat inflicted by General Botha on Beyers, in which the rebels were driven off in a "headlong rout."³ Against this, in the Orange River Colony Christian de Wet had called up commandoes to establish a Boer Republic.

On the East coast there was also improvement. The *Königsberg* had at last been located by the *Chatham* at Sarari, six miles up the Rufiji River, and the naval operations in that district could now be concentrated on that one estuary. To assist in the final destruction of the enemy cruiser, Admiral King-Hall received the Admiralty's permission to send the hydroplane he had purchased for use at the Cape, and when the *Kinfauns Castle* arrived on November 3 she embarked the seaplane and left with it three days later, being absent from the Cape on this service for three weeks. As the *Königsberg* was unlikely to get out again, and operations against her could be carried on only by shallow draught vessels, the Admiralty on October 31 ordered the *Goliath*, which was at Mombasa, to prepare to proceed with all despatch to the Cape, where she would be of more use to protect the expedition's bases against the German cruisers.

22. Admiral King-Hall had asked on October 25 that two more 6 in. guns might be sent him to mount at Walfisch Bay, but as two battleships would shortly be on his station the

¹ Reports of Proceedings at Walfisch Bay, H.S. 8, pp. 42-83.

² H.S. 8, p. 36.

³ Governor-General to Colonial Office, H.S. 13, p. 290.

Admiralty now thought the guns unnecessary and telegraphed as follows:—

"247. No more guns will be sent you from home at present, but full use should be made of your existing resources, including reserves, to assist Union Government. With *Albion* and *Goliath* available, the necessity for mounting coast defence guns is not understood. Their services at the Cape are temporary and reserve guns are available at home if required. Report progress of expeditions on the coast."

(Sent 8.30 p.m., 2.11.14.)

This made no reference to telegram 214 of October 12,¹ in which he was told to mount guns at both Walfisch Bay and Swakopmund; it appeared to contradict that order. To clear up the point he telegraphed:—

"356. With reference to telegram 247 I am not clear what Their Lordships desire to be done in regard to defence of the base of the Union Government Expedition. My request for guns was made on receipt of Admiralty telegram 214,² which directed me to hasten the placing of guns for defence of base.

"In Admiralty telegram No. 247 received to-day, following occurs: 'with *Albion* and *Goliath* available necessity for mounting coast defence guns is not understood,' which apparently cancels orders in Admiralty telegram 214.

"But further in Admiralty telegram 247 I am informed that services of *Albion* and *Goliath* are temporary only, in which case apparently base should be fortified. Request instructions.

"In regard to progress of expedition on the coast matters are at a standstill. Governor-General informs me it is impossible to estimate when will start as this will not be until rebellion is suppressed or reduced to manageable dimensions."

(Sent 3.45 p.m., received 5.1 p.m., 3.11.14.)

But to this the only reply was—

"Your 356. Act in accordance with Admiralty telegram No. 247."

(Sent 12.45 p.m., 4.11.14.)

No further definition of the defence of the bases for the Union Expeditions was given.

23. A short time after the despatch of the above telegram it became evident that immediate steps must be taken to deal with the possibility of attack from the German cruisers. Rumours had been afoot that our South American Squadron had met with disaster, and these were confirmed by a telegram received from our Consul-General at Valparaiso, announcing that Admiral Cradock's Squadron had met Von Spee off Coronel on November 1, and had suffered defeat, with the loss of the flagship *Good Hope* and another cruiser, the remainder of our force escaping southward in the darkness. The German Squadron had apparently suffered no damage of importance, and had the way clear before it into the Atlantic, where the only

¹ H. 33.

² H. 33.

cruiser of greater power than the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* was the *Defence*, then with Admiral Stoddart off the coast of Brazil.

The Admiralty at once took steps to strengthen the forces at the various objectives considered likely for the German Squadron. One of these was German South-West Africa, where the Cape Squadron as it stood was no match for the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*; to render forces more equal, at 2.50 p.m. on November 4 the light cruiser *Dartmouth*¹ was ordered from East Africa to Simon's Bay, and at 8.45 p.m. the *Goliath* was instructed to proceed to Simonstown as soon as possible to refit. Neither of these was suitable for bringing the Germans to action, but within reach and probably capable of arriving in South Africa in time was the *Minotaur*,² an armoured cruiser of the same class as the *Defence*; she was convoying the Australasian contingent which had left Albany for Colombo on November 1.³ Her presence with the convoy, in addition to a powerful Japanese cruiser and two Australian light cruisers, had been considered necessary in view of possible attack from the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*. But there was now no probability of the enemy catching up with the convoy, and on November 6 the Admiralty sent her *viâ* the Cocos Islands, in which neighbourhood she was, orders to proceed to Simon's Bay at once, coaling at Mauritius if necessary; after coaling at Simon's Bay she was to join the *Albion* off South-West Africa in view of a possible raid by the *Gneisenau* and *Scharnhorst*. In addition, the departure of the *Goliath* was postponed, and she was retained in East African waters.

24. In the Admiralty's view at that time, Admiral Cradock's defeat had been due to his having detached the *Canopus* from his battle line owing to her inability to keep up with a cruiser squadron. Fearing lest Admiral King-Hall might repeat the same tactics they sent him—

"261. In view of possibility of *Gneisenau* and *Scharnhorst* coming to South African waters *Minotaur* has been ordered to Simon's Bay and will arrive on November 22. *Minotaur* and *Albion* must always act in concert to avoid defeat in detail. Cape Town and Simon's Bay have defences and can look after themselves. *Minotaur* and *Albion* should protect army base in S.W. Africa. A strong force of French and British armoured cruisers is being sent down West African Coast, leaving Gibraltar on 13th, and ships on South-east coast of America are being concentrated and strongly reinforced. *Albion* should meet *Minotaur* at Simon's Bay and be ready to leave with her as soon as *Minotaur* has coaled. *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* have light cruisers and colliers and left Valparaiso on November 4. Concentrate your ships in good time and do not leave *Armada Castle* too long at Walfisch Bay unsupported."

(Sent 7 p.m., 8.11.14.)

¹ *Dartmouth*, 1911; 5,250 tons; 23·8 sea-speed; eight 6 in. guns.

² *Minotaur*, 1908; 14,600 tons; 21·0 sea-speed; four 9·2 in., ten 7·5 in. guns.

³ See p. 23.

Admiral King-Hall had intended to send the *Armada Castle* to relieve the *Albion* at Walfisch Bay to give the battleship an opportunity for attending to small defects, but on receipt of this instruction he proceeded to concentrate his force; he cancelled the *Armada Castle's* orders, recalled the *Albion* to Simonstown, and ordered the *Hyacinth* to return from the patrol she was carrying out off Cape Point.¹

The Admiralty had not given him any details of the battle, and as all news of it had been suppressed he was obliged to ask on November 12 what were the losses on both sides. Captured Germans had announced that their squadron was coming to turn the British out of South-West Africa, and it seemed to him that Admiral von Spee might overrate the extent of the rebellion and consider the relief of the most important German colony a feasible operation.² The German Admiral had three good light cruisers with him; and to increase the Cape Squadron's strength in this class of ships the Admiralty now ordered the *Weymouth* from the East Indies to Simon's Bay, her transference being possible since the *Emden* had, on November 9, been disposed of by the *Sydney* at Cocos Island. The *Dartmouth* reached Simonstown on November 19, the *Weymouth* on the 21st, and the *Minotaur* on the 27th.

The total withdrawal of our ships from Walfisch Bay was viewed by the Union Government with some anxiety; they feared it might have a bad effect on the disturbed situation. Accordingly, when it was learned on November 13 that the German Squadron was still off Valparaiso, Admiral King-Hall sent the *Armada Castle* up there again to keep guard over Swakopmund.³

25. By November 22 the rebellion was collapsing under General Botha's vigorous blows, and the Governor-General was able to report that everywhere rebels were surrendering in large numbers.⁴ This improvement in the situation suggested a forward move, and the Union Government now proposed to send their expedition to Walfisch Bay about December 12. The Admiral had received Admiralty permission to proceed there with the *Albion* and *Minotaur* in company,⁵ and as the *Minotaur* was due in a few days the move seemed possible. But the Admiral considered that until the German Squadron was located or dealt with the expedition should not start, and asked for Admiralty instructions. After some delay, in the course of which the collapse of the rebellion caused the Union Government to advance the date of despatch of the expedition to December 2, the Admiralty informed him that it would be inadvisable to send the expedition to Walfisch Bay until he was joined by the *Defence*, which was to leave Abrolhos Rocks off Brazil for the

¹ L. of P., H.S. 8, p. 84.

² H. 34.

³ H. 35, 37, 38.

⁴ To Colonial Office, H.S. 13, p. 567.

⁵ H. 36.

Cape on November 25. With the *Minotaur*, *Defence* and the rest of his squadron he could proceed; but the route would not be safe unless the transports were escorted by a force able to defeat the enemy.¹

With the remembrance of Coronel before them, they were anxious that he should clearly understand the necessity of concentration, and warned him that until the *Defence* joined, the *Minotaur* and *Albion* were not to be separated, and all his other ships were to be in company with them or under the guns of Simon's Bay. In no circumstances was he to allow himself to be engaged by the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* without the *Minotaur* and *Albion* being united. He immediately recalled the *Armada Castle* from Walfisch Bay.²

26. These definite instructions enabled the Admiral to put his views before the Union Government. He explained that with the present arrangements there were four principal duties devolving upon the Navy: (1) to convoy the expedition to Walfisch Bay, (2) to cover and protect Walfisch Bay, (3) to cover and protect Lüderitz Bay, (4) to guard the lines of communication by sea from Cape Town to both bases. As he was to keep his force concentrated he could not simultaneously protect both bases, neither of which could be defended from shore against the 8 in. guns of the German cruisers. He pointed out the danger of using two separate sea-bases, both unprotected and neither self-supporting, and urged that the adoption of Lüderitz Bay alone would reduce the risks by 50 to 75 per cent. In any case, he could not be ready to escort a convoy from Cape Town to Walfisch Bay before December 14. The Admiralty went even further; they fully concurred in his views, and went on to say that the expedition to Lüderitz Bay must be in one convoy, with provisions and all supplies for one month, so as to obviate the necessity of guarding the sea lines of communication. These restrictions were, of course, only till our account with the German Squadron should be settled, after which they would be glad to facilitate the operations against German South-West Africa in every possible way.³ The same views the Admiralty expressed in a letter to the Colonial Office dated November 29.⁴

In order to effect a speedy concentration, the Admiral intended to proceed with all his ships except the merchant cruisers on December 1 to Lüderitz Bay, and thence on to meet the *Defence*; after concentrating, the whole squadron would return to Simon's Bay to coal, preparatory to escorting the Walfisch Bay expedition; should, however, his protests have effect, and the Walfisch Bay Expedition be postponed, he would not come back to Simonstown but coal at Lüderitz Bay, remaining there with the whole squadron until the Germans were located.⁵

¹ H. 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, and H.S. 8, pp. 196-200.

² H. 45, 46.

⁴ H.S. 8, p. 200.

³ H. 39, 41.

⁵ H. 46.

In consequence of the remarks of the Admiral and Admiralty, the Union Government agreed to postpone the departure of the Walfisch Bay Expedition for a fortnight, in the hope that the German Squadron would then be accounted for, but as they were anxious to reinforce General Mackenzie at Lüderitz Bay with 2,000 mounted men and some guns, they proposed to take the risk of sending the transports with these singly and unescorted. At the Governor-General's suggestion, Admiral King-Hall deferred his sailing till December 7, by which time it was hoped all the reinforcements would be ready to go in one convoy.¹

The latest news of the hostile squadron to reach the Admiral was a report sent him from home on December 1 that it had left Juan Fernandez, off the coast of Chile, a fortnight before, and on December 2 that four ships of unknown nationality had been seen off Iquique steaming northward. The enemy was therefore not yet known to be in the Atlantic; but on December 3 a German liner, the *Eleonore Woermann*, which had been in attendance on German men-of-war, left Buenos Aires full of provisions, which agents reported to be destined for South-West Africa, and she was to be followed by the *Gotha*, another suspected enemy supply ship.

27. The *Defence* left St. Helena on December 3, with orders to join the Admiral at Lüderitz Bay when he arrived with his squadron and convoy. But, as customary with convoys, the date of sailing was put off till the 8th, and even then two out of the five transports would not be ready till December 10. In view of the danger to unescorted transports from the German Squadron, which the Admiral considered to be on its way across to Africa, he proposed to wait till the 10th, leaving Lüderitz Bay open to attack; but if the Union Government wished it he was prepared to sail on the 8th with the three ready transports. The Admiralty did not agree that the German Squadron was already in the Atlantic; Admiral Sturdee's Squadron had swept the South American coast from Abrolhos Rocks almost to the Falkland Islands, where it was due on December 8. Nothing had been seen. The Union Government preferred that the two late transports should be without protection rather than the base, and the Admiral sailed on December 8 with the three transports, his squadron consisting of the *Minotaur* (flag), *Albion*, *Weymouth*, *Hyacinth* and *Astræa*. The *Dartmouth* was not with him as by Admiralty orders he had sent her to St. Helena for South America, but the *Defence* joined him in the afternoon.²

28. The internal situation in the Union had much improved. Christian de Wet and his force were captured on December 1, Beyers was drowned in the Vaal River on the 8th, and by the 9th the Governor-General was able to report the rebellion to

¹ H.S. 13, p. 651, and H. 48, 49.

² H.S. 50, 51, 52, 47.

be practically at an end. Thus the chief military obstacles to a vigorous offensive in South-West Africa were removed.


On the sea, too, the threatened danger of attack on the bases was removed by the defeat of the German Squadron by Admiral Sturdee's force off the Falkland Islands on December 8, a defeat in which the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Nürnberg* and *Leipzig* were sunk, only the *Dresden* escaping. To assist in the search for her the Admiralty ordered the *Dartmouth* from St. Helena to Pernambuco with orders to observe the Martin Vaz Islands on the way in case the *Karlsruhe* or *Kronprinz Wilhelm* might be there.

There was no longer any necessity for the armoured cruisers to remain at the Cape, and in informing Admiral King-Hall of the results of the battle off the Falkland Islands the Admiralty ordered the *Minotaur* and *Defence* to St. Helena, and on the 28th to Sierra Leone and Plymouth with all convenient despatch. The *Weymouth* was ordered on the 13th to dock at Simonstown and then relieve the *Chatham* in East Africa. The end of the year thus found Admiral King-Hall with the *Hyacinth* and *Astræa* of his original squadron, the merchant cruiser *Armadale Castle*, and the battleships *Albion* and *Goliath*, the latter having at last come to Simonstown to refit.


29. It is now known that after the battle of Coronel, as a result of which Admiral von Spee became temporarily predominant in the South Atlantic, the German Government seriously considered a project for sending supplies and troops to German South-West Africa. In Argentine and Chile there were 5,000 German reservists, including 100 officers; these, in view of our habit of removing them from ships in which they were taking passage, had been told to make no further effort to reach Germany. Acting under orders from Berlin the German Minister to Chile secretly organised 2,000 of them into a body of reinforcements for South-West Africa. They were to be given out as passengers to Germany and embarked with plentiful supplies in one of the German steamers at Valparaiso as soon as Chile could be induced to remove her embargo on the departure of German merchant ships. Rifles and ammunition were to be obtained locally. But before the organisation could be completed, Admiral von Spee's squadron was practically annihilated. The support of powerful cruisers was thought essential to the success of the expedition, and though at first the German Admiralty appear to have been considering whether they should send them out, by the end of 1914 they had made up their mind to abandon altogether the project of sending reservists and supplies from Chile to German South-West Africa.¹ Admiral King-Hall's opinion that the Germans after the battle of Coronel might consider the relief of South-West Africa feasible was, in fact, a singularly accurate appreciation.²

¹ See I.D.H.S., Vols. 1476, 1479.

² See H. 34.



AREA OF OPERATIONS OF THE CAPE SQUADRON, 1914.



APPENDICES.

APPENDIX A.

TELEGRAMS CONCERNING THE FIRST AUSTRALASIAN
CONVOY.

- A. 1. *From* Admiralty. August 13.
To Naval Board, Melbourne. (Sent 7.40 p.m.)
For R.A. *Australia*. . . . Use *Encounter*, *Melbourne*, *Sydney* for New Guinea Expedition and if possible destruction of wireless at Nauru. They will be required later for convoy of Australian troops to Aden. . . .
- A. 2. *From* Government New Zealand. August 14.
To Colonial Office. (Received 2.28 p.m.)
My Government can despatch Expeditionary Force about August 27 if there is urgent necessity. . . .
- A. 3. *From* Colonial Office. August 24.
To Governor-General, Australia. (Sent 6 p.m.)
Lords Commissioners of Admiralty consider it most inadvisable that any portion of Expeditionary Force should start at once. There are German warships on route of transports which have not yet been definitely located and until they are destroyed or hunted off route transports should not leave without convoy. Such convoy is not at present practicable as greater part of Australian and New Zealand Squadrons are engaged in offensive operations in Pacific. When force does start it should go preferably in one convoy and probably by Suez route.
- A. 4. *From* I.O., Singapore. August 27.
To Admiralty. (Received 3.30 a.m.)
Last night *Geier* reported definitely S.E. of Madura Island (Java Sea). *Gneisenau* heard from wireless station at Cocos and N. and W. coasts of Australia.
- A. 5. *From* I.O., Singapore. August 29.
To Admiralty. (Received 7 p.m.)
German Ship *Goldenfels* arrived Sabang night of August 28 escorted almost into port by *Königsberg*.
- A. 6. *From* Admiralty. August 30.
To R.A., *Australia*. (Sent 7.46 p.m.)
. . . . German cruisers may be in Eastern Archipelago.
- A. 7. *From* War Office. September 1.
To Minister of Defence, New Zealand.
Expeditionary Force should assemble at Wellington by September 20, by which date an escort is expected to be ready to convoy the transports to Port Adelaide where the Australian Contingent will join them. From Port Adelaide all ships will proceed *via* Fremantle, Colombo and Red Sea. . . .

A. 8. From Admiralty. September 1.
To R.A., Australia. (Sent 9.6 p.m.)

Australian troops for Aden will require escort of *Sydney* and *Melbourne* on September 22 at Sydney and (they) should be detached in time to be ready for this duty. *Melbourne* should deal with Nauru en route to Sydney if possible. Further details can be arranged after seizure of Simpsonhafen by remainder of your force.

A. 9. From Admiralty. September 8.
To Commander-in-Chief, China. (Sent 12.5 a.m.)

166. If the two German armoured cruisers are not accounted for by the end of month you must escort with *Minotaur* and *Hampshire* to Colombo the Australian Contingent which leaves Fremantle on October 3 for Colombo. You should arrange to meet the 22 transports on their line of advance near Cocos. *Sydney* and *Melbourne* will convoy all the way from Fremantle to Colombo.

A. 10. From S.N.O., New Zealand. September 10.
To Admiralty. (Received 9.26 a.m.)

148. Essential repairs will delay *Psyche* until September 24. *Philomel* and *Pyramus* will be ready September 20. Should Australian Expedition be delayed, could date of departure from New Zealand be altered instead of expedition waiting at Port Adelaide.

A. 11. From Admiralty. September 10.
To R.A., Australia. (Sent 8.50 p.m.)

Troops do not leave Sydney till September 27. You should escort them across Indian Ocean with *Australia*, *Sydney* and *Melbourne*. China Squadron will also cover them as far as Colombo. A contingent from New Zealand will join at Port Adelaide. . . .

A. 12. From Admiralty. September 10.
To S.N.O., New Zealand. (Sent 10.35 p.m.)

105. Australian troops leave Sydney on September 27 for Port Adelaide. New Zealand Contingent should join them at Port Adelaide escorted by New Zealand cruisers. Australian ships escort them to Aden. Arrange direct with R.A., Australia, as to movements so as to conform to his wishes.

A. 13. From R.A., Australia. September 13.
To Admiralty. (Received 9.38 a.m.)

73. Propose to leave Simpsonhafen with *Australia*, *Melbourne* and *Sydney*, September 14 or 15, for Sydney preparatory to escorting troops across Indian Ocean. . . .

A. 14. From Admiralty. September 13.
To Commander-in-Chief, China. (Sent 1.36 p.m.)

171. *Minotaur's* subsequent movements can be decided later. *Hampshire* is to join *Australia* at Fremantle by October 7 to convoy troops and remain for present under orders of R.A. . . .

A. 15. From Governor, New Zealand. September 13.
To Colonial Office.

Expedition will leave New Zealand, September 25, proceeding direct to Fremantle, arriving there October 7. S.N.O. with *Psyche* and *Philomel* will escort expedition to Longitude 145° E., having sent *Pyramus* on to coal at Melbourne, and *Pyramus* will escort expedition from longitude mentioned to Fremantle. Please telegraph whether Admiralty concur as soon as possible.

A. 16. From Commander-in-Chief, China. September 14.
To Admiralty. (Received 6.45 a.m.)

141. Your 171 I propose that *Minotaur*, *Ibuki*, *Chikuma*, under orders of captain of *Minotaur*, should proceed to New Britain and act from there. This will cover Australia during absence of Australian cruisers and would be best position from which to meet any attempt of German cruisers to remain in Pacific Islands or to return in the direction New Guinea and Australia. Arrangements will be made with French men-of-war and Russian Senior Officer for patrolling waters south of Singapore.

Reply.—172. Your 141. Action approved.

A. 17. From Navy Office, Melbourne. September 14.
To Admiralty. (Received 7.21 a.m.)

39. Arrangements have been made for Australian Expeditionary Force in 27 transports to assemble at King George Sound by October 5.

A. 18. From Governor, New Zealand. September 15.
To Colonial Office. (Received 10.35 a.m.)

The Cabinet has expressed considerable uneasiness with regard to the fact that the escort for the expedition between New Zealand and the point of junction with Australian Squadron will consist of "P" Class ships. . . .

A. 19. From Governor, New Zealand. September 17.
To Colonial Office. (Received 7.48 p.m.)

. . . Feeling runs high, so much so that certain Ministers threaten to resign, as Admiralty do not appear to appreciate position of Government if they allow transports to go to sea protected only by "P" Class cruisers when German warships have only short distance to go to reach Tasman Sea. . . .

A. 20. From Governor-General, Australia. September 17.
To Colonial Office. (Received 7.48 p.m.)

. . . . Disturbing element is failure of Admiral, China Station, with co-operation of other flags to cope with German cruiser squadron, which would become grave menace to the 41 Australian and New Zealand transports

A. 21. From Colonial Office. September 19.
To Governor, New Zealand. (Sent 5.40 p.m.)

Admiralty sends following: Begins: H.M.A.S. *Australia* is covering Commonwealth Expedition attacking New Britain. Fighting still going on. She cannot, therefore, reach New Zealand in time to convoy contingent. That *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* should steam 2,000 miles south into waters where no possible coal for them is incredible. They did not even know Samoa had fallen and can have no knowledge of date of New Zealand sailings or even that any are in contemplation. There is strong probability that Germans have turned N.W. to Marshall Islands where coaling base reported Jaluit on good authority. In these circumstances route is regarded by Admiralty as perfectly safe, and we advise proceed. No need for escort of any kind if they keep well off the track and steam without lights. Otherwise departure must await return of next convoy involving at least six weeks' delay. Ends.

A. 22. From Governor, New Zealand. September 21.
To Colonial Office.

Unless you advise me situation is inadvisable Expedition will leave as notified. . . .

A. 23. From Governor, New Zealand. September 22.
To Colonial Office. (Received 7.1 a.m.)

The Cabinet met this morning and consider that since German cruisers are reported this morning in vicinity of Fiji and Samoa, they cannot

agree with Admiralty views as expressed in your cypher telegram of September 19. Bell, the Leader of the Upper House, threatens to resign. . . . If Australian cruisers could meet the expedition in Tasman Sea it might help. . . .

A. 24. From Colonial Office. September 22.
To Governor, New Zealand. (Sent 4.35 p.m.)

There is no Naval Force available to provide immediate escort, and though the Admiralty adhere to their view in my telegram of 19th, it seems, in the circumstances, that the best practicable course for your Ministers is to postpone departure of your contingent until convoy can be provided. This will be done as quickly as possible, but it may involve a delay of six weeks. Departure of the Australian Contingent on the day already arranged cannot, of course, be delayed. HARCOURT.

A. 25. From Admiralty. September 23.
To Commander-in-Chief, China. (Sent 9.40 p.m.)

194. Until *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* are located, it is not considered advisable to transport the New Zealand and Australian troops under a convoy that cannot meet them.

Minotaur and *Ibuki* are, therefore, required to proceed forthwith at good speed past Fremantle round the south of Australia to Wellington.

Making coaling arrangements and report estimated date of reaching Fremantle, Melbourne and Wellington.

A. 26. From Auckland. September 24.
To Admiralty. (Received 12.4 a.m.)

Philomel and two transports sailed under sealed orders 9 a.m.

A. 27. From S.N.O., New Zealand. September 24.
To Admiralty. (Received 3 a.m.)

152. I leave with convoy September 25. Convoy should arrive at Fremantle by October 7. Presume escort will wait if convoy delayed by weather.

A. 28. From Governor, New Zealand. September 24.
To Colonial Office. (Received 9.33 a.m.)

. . . . Cabinet met September 23 and after I had clearly explained situation agreed that expedition should leave early September 25, as originally arranged. . . .

A. 29. From Governor, New Zealand. September 24.
To Colonial Office. (Received 10.42 a.m.)*

(Extremely urgent. Clear the line.)
Private and Very Secret.

Urgent telegram from Governor-General of Australia was received by me at 7 p.m. to-day telling me that we should run grave risk if expedition sails to-morrow. I have, therefore, issued orders countermanding sailing pending instructions from you. LIVERPOOL.

A. 30. From S.N.O., New Zealand. September 24.
To Admiralty. (Received 12.35 p.m.)

153. Departure of New Zealand Expedition has been delayed on account of telegram received by Governor New Zealand from Governor-General of Australia, who considers Tasman Sea may not be safe. *Pyramus* is on way to Melbourne, and it is considered safer for her to continue than to stop her by using wireless telegraphy.

A. 31. From Commander-in-Chief, China. September 25.
To Admiralty. (Received 5.16 a.m.)

Minotaur and *Ibuki* will arrive at Fremantle September 29; Melbourne or Hobart according to whichever is arranged October 8; Wellington

October 14. . . . Japanese ships have poor radius of action and appear to be extravagant with coal, and consequently can seldom exceed 10 knots for long voyages.

A. 32. From Governor, New Zealand. September 25.
To Colonial Office. (Received 12.45 p.m.)

Arrangements conveyed in your telegram of September 24 are much appreciated by my Ministers. Disembarkation takes place as soon as possible and training will continue. Owing to gale expedition could not in any case have sailed to-day. LIVERPOOL.

A. 33. From Navy Office, Melbourne. October 2.
To Admiralty. (Received 6.4 a.m.)

67. *Melbourne* and *New Zealand* cruisers should form a screen between north of New Zealand and Green Cape. New Zealand transports to proceed to Port Phillip independently.

A. 34. From S.N.O., New Zealand. October 4.
To Admiralty. (Received 4.36 a.m.)

158. New Zealand transports were delayed by Admiralty directions conveyed to Governor of New Zealand by Colonial Secretary, September 24, until arrival of *Minotaur* and *Ibuki* at Wellington. . . .

A. 35. From Admiralty. October 4.
To S.N.O., New Zealand. (Sent 12.40 p.m.)

Admiralty consider expeditions could embark and proceed at once with "P" Class cruiser escort and join Australian expedition at Port Adelaide and other convenient port and meet *Minotaur*, the latter not proceeding to Wellington.

Desirable expedition leaves as soon as possible to fit in with escort arrangements made for them after Suez.

A. 36. From Governor, New Zealand. October 4.
To Colonial Office. (Received 5.30 p.m.)

. . . . Cabinet consider that, as far as escort is concerned, any alteration of your telegram of September 24 would be breach of faith. . . . After news of attack on *Papiète* is published Dominion would not sanction expedition leaving without proper escort. Further than that cable ship *Belfast* recalled to Auckland yesterday owing to sea north of Auckland not being considered safe. Under the circumstances (Prime Minister) would tender his resignation if transports are not given adequate escort.

A. 37. From Navy Office, Melbourne. October 9.
To Admiralty. (Received 11.25 a.m.)

80. Present arrangements for convoying are that *Minotaur*, *Melbourne*, *Nisshin*, leave Albany October 27 or October 28 with 26 Australian and 10 New Zealand transports, *Ibuki* coals at Fremantle, and with 2 Australian transports from Fremantle joins convoy at sea.

A. 38. From Admiralty. October 14.
To V.A.C., Australia. (Sent 8.50 p.m.)

34. . . . *Pioneer* to proceed with the convoy until relieved by Japanese cruiser near Cocos, when she can return to Thursday Island, coaling at Port Darwin if necessary, and then work with the Australian Expedition. *Sydney* is to proceed to Sydney to coal and join the convoy under *Minotaur*.

A. 39. From Admiralty. October 21.
To S.N.O., New Zealand. (Sent 6.55 p.m.)

20. . . . *Philomel* and *Pyramus* are to proceed with convoy as far as Suez, where they will remain for the present. . . .

- A. 40. From Commander-in-Chief, China. October 23.
To Admiralty. (Received 6.29 a.m.)
218. *Minotaur* requests permission for *Philomel* and *Pyramus* to leave convoy in vicinity of Cocos Island to proceed to coal at Singapore and rejoin convoy at Colombo.
This is necessary owing to small coaling capacity and reduced steam quality, which makes it impossible for them to proceed direct from Fremantle to Colombo.
- A. 41. From Admiralty. October 23.
To Commander-in-Chief, China. (Sent 8.15 p.m.)
Your 218. Approved. Inform *Minotaur* and Navy Board, Melbourne. *Philomel* and *Pyramus* can then escort *Monmouthshire* with rifles and details and any French transports ready at the time to Suez. . . .
- A. 42. From Admiralty. October 26.
To Navy Board, Melbourne. (Sent 12.50 p.m.)
74. Secret and Urgent. It has been decided to bring the New Zealand and Australian convoy to England by the Cape of Good Hope route. Report detailed arrangements proposed as soon as possible. Do not let any vessels sail till orders are given that they may proceed. . . .
- A. 43. From Navy Board, Melbourne. October 29.
To Admiralty. (Received 3.35 p.m.)
134. After consultation with Captain Senior Officer *Minotaur* (group corrupt) as follows, begins: *Minotaur* with Australian 1st Division and New Zealand transports proceed at 10½ knots direct to Table Bay. *Melbourne* with Australian 3rd Division proceeds at 12 knots calling at Mauritius for coal for herself only, *Sydney* with Australian 2nd Division to proceed at speed of 11½ knots calling at Mauritius for coal for herself only, *Ibuki* bringing two transports from Fremantle turning over to *Sydney* rendezvous, then returning to Fremantle herself pending further instructions from Japanese Admiralty; her small radius of action renders it impossible for her to escort even to Mauritius without materially delaying convoy. Requirements are as follows: at Mauritius 2,000 tons Welsh coal, 500 tons oil fuel; at Table Bay for cruisers 4,000 tons Welsh coal, 1,200 tons oil fuel, and for transports, 25,000 tons of coal, 20,000 tons of water. Proposed dates of departure from Albany and Fremantle November 1, date of arrival Mauritius, *Melbourne*, November 13; *Sydney*, November 14; date of arrival at Table Bay *Minotaur*, November 21 (ends). Senior Officer, *Minotaur*, comments as follows:—*Melbourne* and *Sydney* cannot be relied on to reach Port Natal. By sending faster division *via* Mauritius and not employing *Ibuki* roughly five days can be saved, and in view of large number of horses this appears important. In that case services of *Weymouth* or *Dartmouth* will not be required. Propose that whole convoy and escort sail daylight November 1, *Minotaur* (ends).
- A. 44. From Admiralty. October 30.
To Navy Board, Melbourne. (Sent 7.50 p.m.)
82. Cancel my 74. Convoy is to proceed to Colombo as previously arranged, and can leave Australia at once under escort of *Minotaur*, *Ibuki*, *Melbourne* and *Sydney*. *Yahagi* will not join escort. "P" Class cruisers can start if ready but are not to delay sailing of expedition.
- A. 45. From Admiralty. November 6.
To *Minotaur* (*via* Cocos Islands). (Sent 3.35 p.m.)
Minotaur is to proceed to Simon's Bay at once, coaling at Mauritius if necessary. Place convoy in charge of Senior Officer present. After coaling at Simon's Bay you will join *Albion* off South-West Africa in view of probable raid by *Gneisenau* and *Scharnhorst*. Husband your oil fuel as there is none at the Cape.

- A. 46. From Commander-in-Chief, China. November 9.
To Admiralty. (Received 5.1 p.m.)
260. As the Australian convoy will be passing within the limit of 100 miles from Cocos or Keeling Islands to-day *Emden* may detect their presence and possibly attack. I have, therefore, ordered *Hampshire* and *Empress of Russia* to proceed at high speed to cover them into Colombo. *Askold* and *Empress of Asia* take over trade route Minikoi to Colombo.
- A. 47. From Commander-in-Chief, China. November 13.
To Admiralty. (Received 7.16 a.m.)
275. With reference to escort of Australian convoy from Colombo, I submit it is undesirable *Ibuki* should be their sole protection, not so much from the point of view of safety as of Australian sentiment.
Suggest *Hampshire* and *Yarmouth* should carry out this service if *Melbourne* and *Sydney* cannot be spared.
Moreover, Japanese have asked that *Ibuki* may be released at Colombo, as they are anxious for her to join their 2nd Southern Squadron without delay. Request early reply.
- A. 48. From Admiralty. November 13.
To Commander-in-Chief, China. (Sent 5.55 p.m.)
289. Your 275. *Hampshire* is to take Australian convoy on from Colombo. Question of release of *Ibuki* is being considered. *Yarmouth* is to proceed to Gibraltar.
- A. 49. From Governor-General, Australia.
To Colonial Office.
Despatch dated September 17. Extract:—
. . . Our inability to locate the ships of the German Pacific Squadron may lead to trouble, and is causing uneasiness, especially as our best ships are now detailed for escort work, and will, therefore, be withdrawn from these shores, while the Admiral of the China Squadron has retired in ill-health to Hong Kong, from which station he proposes to direct operations.
The situation which arose after the R.A. ships were handed over to the Admiralty resulted in practically releasing the Australian Fleet from any one centre of control. The Admiralty ordered Admiral Patey to leave his two cruisers to protect the trade routes and proceed to sea. The Admiral wished to take his cruisers with him, hoping to come up with the two heavy German cruisers while destroying wireless stations. The New Zealand Naval Officer wired through the Navy Board to Admiral Patey asking when he would be ready to convoy New Zealand troops to Samoa. The Navy Board, considering H.M.A. Fleet was now under the orders of the Admiralty, transmitted this cable to Admiral Patey without informing the Minister for Defence. Admiral Patey replied to the New Zealand Officer that he would be ready on such and such a date, and proceeded with all his ships to an agreed rendezvous, leaving the Australian Expedition for New Guinea, which was within a day or two of being ready to start, hung up for a month. It might have been advisable to have cleared the seas first by the combined action of the China Squadron and the Australian ships, but the Pacific waters are so vast that success would have been problematic, and to the Australasian peoples the idea of annexing German territory and of driving a foreign power out of the neighbouring islands was far more attractive. Moreover, a purely Naval movement would have left the New Zealand troops unoccupied and caused dissatisfaction in that Dominion. The annexation of Samoa and German New Guinea has given great satisfaction, and the moral results of the achievement are worth the risk taken by leaving the German cruisers unaccounted for. It was, moreover, reasonable to expect that the China Squadron, reinforced by our Allies and armed merchantmen, would have located some, at least, of the enemy. The Admiral on the China Station has, however, failed to cope with any German cruiser. One of the lightest of

the hostile squadron is now making prizes off the Hoogly after slipping through his line in the East Indies; another has cut our cable at Fanning Island. Otherwise, singularly little damage has been done. We learnt recently that the two cruisers we have to fear have been seen in the neighbourhood of Samoa. There is cause for anxiety as to the convoy of 30,000 men of the Australasian Expedition, which begins to embark on different dates, commencing the 24th, in 41 transports at half-a-dozen ports, and has its rendezvous at King George's Sound on October 5. I referred to these circumstances in my cable of this date. Communications are now passing with the Admiralty, and fresh dispositions of convoying ships are being made.

I give this *précis* of Naval events, both for your information, and because later on a question is likely to be raised as to the degree of local control that it is expedient to give in order that the general directions of the Admiralty may be carried out satisfactorily in time of war.¹

A. 50. From Governor-General, Australia.
To Colonial Office.

Despatch dated September 29. Extract:—

On reaching Melbourne September 24, I went to the Navy Office and found increased concern in official circles, especially with regard to the unprotected New Zealand transports, and also as to the safety of our own contingent, which had begun to embark. The return of the *Australia* for escort service had been countermanded, and this left our seas open to the German cruisers, which, it was calculated could, with a 12 to 15-knot speed, reach these coasts from Samoa in ample time to play havoc with our 42 Australasian transports. A far easier feat than that accomplished for less serious ends in the Bay of Bengal by the *Emden*.

Mr. Fisher was as alive as I was to the military disadvantages of postponement, and to the prospect of discontent following upon a second dislocation of Australian plans owing to New Zealand being without her own warships to protect her own transports. Nevertheless, the risk involved under the circumstances to transports sailing without convoy seemed to him excessive, and he expressed that view to the Minister for Defence. I had come to a similar conclusion. It was obvious that the only great coup open to German cruisers in the Pacific was to attack and destroy the Australasian transports either before or after they reached their rendezvous, or while assembled in King George's Sound. Nor can it be assumed that the enemy is without sufficient knowledge of our movements. There are patriots among the many Germans here, whose able Consul-General seemed so dangerous an alien that before I left I asked for his closer surveillance.

The Navy Office had already cabled warning to the S.N.O. in New Zealand on September 22: "Remember that the armoured German cruisers are at large and unlocated." On returning from my visit to the Navy Office I received your cable of that 23rd. On the day also the Commander-in-Chief, China Station, cabled that cruisers were proceeding *via* Fremantle to Wellington to escort New Zealand transports. Under these circumstances, and knowing Mr. Fisher's mind, I cabled you, as requested, my personal opinion in favour of postponement, and regarded the embarkation as definitely delayed.

The first half of the New Zealand transports were timed to sail on the 24th. It seemed to me, therefore, that some risk might be saved, or avoidable confusion through the recall of transports at sea obviated, through the detention of a few hours of their ships while Lord Liverpool referred the matter home. I, therefore, wired to the Governor of New Zealand as follows: "Personal and Secret. I think your transports run serious risk, and that until you consult Admiralty their sailing should be

¹ H.S. 2, pp. 292 c to e.

delayed. Am cabling this opinion to Colonial Office without informing my Government."

I quite recognise that the cable was irregular. To be explained by circumstances and the urgency of the moment, and to be defended on the grounds of expediency alone.

I felt that a loss of unescorted transports would entail not only the loss of life—a matter for Naval and Military Authorities—but a loss of confidence in the Admiralty, which would raise the question of the advisability of handing over the Australian Fleet to Admiralty control. It would also accentuate the feeling that the *New Zealand* should be in New Zealand waters, so that the Australian Expedition should not be dependent on the movements of New Zealand troops. I feel convinced that were unprotected transports sunk by the enemy a good understanding between the Admiralty and my Government could not be maintained. The ex-Minister for Defence told me confidentially on quitting office that experience proved to him that there must be local control of all detail of movements in war time, subject to an agreed general Naval policy as laid down by the Admiralty.¹

APPENDIX C.

TELEGRAMS TO AND FROM CHINA

All telegrams are in the year 1914.

- C. 1. From Admiralty. July 21.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
78. German *Geier* visits Singapore July 26 to August 3.
- C. 2. From Admiralty. July 27.
To Commander-in-Chief, China, etc.
87. European political situation makes war between Triple Alliance and Triple Entente Powers by no means impossible. This is not the warning telegram, but be prepared to shadow hostile men-of-war and consider dispositions of H.M. Ships from this point of view. Measure is purely precautionary. The utmost secrecy is to be observed and no unnecessary person is to be informed.
- C. 3. From Admiralty. July 28.
To Commander-in-Chief, China, 90. (Sent 9.30 p.m.)
Commodore, Hong Kong, 139.
139. Be prepared to take up four vessels to be armed with the four sets of 4.7 guns now in stock at Hong Kong.
- C. 4. From Admiralty. July 29.
To Commander-in-Chief, China.
91. The "warning" telegram.
- C. 5. From Admiralty. July 31.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
87. Order one of the three sloops to Colombo ready to move to Singapore if crew are wanted for *Triumph*.
- C. 6. From Intelligence Officer, Singapore. August 1.
To Admiralty.

Following telegram received from Melbourne: *Comet* reported at Samoa, July 27 last night. *Comet* was within easy working range of

¹ H.S. 2, pp. 292 f to i.

Wireless Station, Port Moresby. Yap, Caroline Islands, is using utmost exertions to communicate with *Scharnhorst*. Commonwealth Board of Administration. Telegram ends. Commander-in-Chief, China, has been informed.

C. 7. From Singapore. August 2.
To Admiralty.

Following telegram received from Melbourne begins: Berlin is addressing *Planet* through Port Moresby Wireless Station. Commonwealth Naval Board of Administration (ends). Commander-in-Chief, China; Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, have been informed.

C. 8. From Admiralty. August 2.
To Commander-in-Chief, China.

101. Naval Reserves mobilised.

C. 9. From Singapore. August 3.
To Admiralty. (Received 5 a.m.)

German collier *Tammenfels*, 6,000 tons Australian coal, left yesterday, 6 a.m., without clearance papers, destination unknown. Commander-in-Chief, China; Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, have been informed.

C. 10. From Singapore. August 3.
To Admiralty. (Received 5 a.m.)

Following telegram received from Melbourne begins: Am informed two German colliers left Newcastle, New South Wales, under sealed orders, having dropped pilot, others prepared to leave. Commonwealth Naval Board of Administration—ends. Commander-in-Chief, China; Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, have been informed.

C. 11. From Admiralty. August 3.
To Commander-in-Chief, China. (Sent 1.15 p.m.)

106. You are authorised to take up a total of four ships to arm as armed cruisers (*sic*).

C. 12. From Commonwealth, Naval Board. August 3.
To Admiralty. (Received 9.53 p.m.)

Australia will be ready to leave Sydney evening August 4. Wireless signals heard by Northern Australian station for several days strongly indicate that *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau* and other German men-of-war are in vicinity of New Guinea. . . .

C. 13. From Singapore. August 4.
To Admiralty. (Received 6.32 a.m.)

Melbourne telegram begins: Night of August 2-3, Thursday Island heard that *Scharnhorst* signalled Yap and *Scharnhorst* signalled *Nürnberg*. Cooktown heard Naura and *Scharnhorst* exchanged signals. Port Moresby heard *Scharnhorst* and *Planet* exchanged signals. Broome heard steamship *Bochum*, signalled *Geier* and *Geier* to steamship *Frieberg*. Commonwealth Board of Administration. Telegram ends. Commander-in-Chief, China, and Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, have been informed.

C. 14. From Commodore, Hong Kong. August 4.
To Admiralty.

175. Four following vessels engaged as armed mercantile cruisers: *Empress of Asia* from July 31, complete August 13; *Empress of Japan* and *Empress of Russia* due Hong Kong, August 13 and 21 respectively, P. & O. steamer *Himalaya* due August 13. . . .

C. 15. From Commander-in-Chief, China. August 4.
To Admiralty. (Received 4.57 p.m.)

116. . . . Have I discretion to leave Hong Kong before declaration of war if strategical situations appears to me to require it?

Reply:—186. Use your discretion about leaving Hong Kong (sent 8 p.m., August 4).

C. 16. From Admiralty, General telegram. August 4, 11 p.m.
Commence hostilities at once against Germany.

C. 17. From Commander-in-Chief, China. August 5.
To Admiralty.

117. Orders to commence hostilities with Germany received. I assume this includes Austria unless I hear to the contrary.

Reply:—119. Your 117. No, we are at peace with Austria.

C. 18. From Foreign Office. August 9, 10 a.m.
To Tokio.

43. . . . I am therefore anxious at present to limit operations of war on China Station to protection of commerce at sea. . . .

C. 18(a) From Admiralty. August 9, 3 p.m.
To Commander-in-Chief, China, and R.A., Australia.

122. (To China). Military expedition in two transports leaves New Zealand about 11th instant for Apia, Samoa. S.N.O., New Zealand, has been ordered to arrange escort of at least one cruiser. You will be informed of actual departure of expedition. Guard against interference by enemy.

C. 19. From Commodore, Hong Kong. August 10.
To Admiralty. (Received 5 a.m.)

189. Fast mercantile cruiser *Empress of Asia* sailed on August 9. One officer, 20 men Royal Garrison Artillery and 25 men 40th Pathans on board to make up crew.

C. 20. From Intelligence Officer, Hong Kong. August 10.
To Admiralty. (Received 5.45 a.m.)

Following telegram received from Consul, Vladivostok, August 10, 1.30 a.m.: Russian Admiral requested me to inform Commander-in-Chief he holds at the latter's disposition following men-of-war:—*Askold*, *Zhemchug*, four torpedo boats and four armed Volunteer Fleet Mail Steamers. Commander-in-Chief, China, has been informed.

C. 21. From Admiralty. August 10.
To Commander-in-Chief, China, Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, and S.N.O., New Zealand. (Sent 11.30 a.m.)

Control of Australian Navy has been transferred to Admiralty, and you should co-operate in same way as neighbouring stations of Royal Navy.

C. 22. From Foreign Office. August 10, 12.40 p.m.
To Tokyo.

40. I have given following aide-mémoire to Japanese Ambassador. . . . "To avoid internal trouble and disturbance of trade in China, we are anxious to limit acts of war to operations at sea and more particularly protection of British merchant vessels."

C. 23. From Ambassador, Tokyo. August 10.
To Foreign Office. (Received 7.45 a.m., 11th.)

71. . . . the only course which the Imperial Government can take is to proceed on lines as already decided upon and declare war forthwith against Germany. . . .

C. 24. From French Naval Attaché. August 12.
To Ministry of Marine, Paris. (Sent 8.55 p.m.)

British Admiralty requests you to telegraph *Montcalm* at Suva where is at present orders to coal there and wait there for the arrival of a military expedition coming from New Zealand about August 20 to capture Samoa. . . . After the capture of Samoa *Montcalm* will act in concert with Commander-in-Chief, China.

- C. 25. *From* Commander-in-Chief, China. August 12.
To Admiralty. (Received 10.16 a.m.)
 Under certain conditions I wish to declare a blockade of Kiaochau. Authority is requested to do so at my discretion.
 Reply:—130. Authority is given for you to use your discretion as to the declaration of the blockade (sent 4.45 p.m., August 12).
- C. 26. *From* Admiralty. August 12.
To Commander-in-Chief, China. (Sent 12.20 p.m.)
 129. Our trade on the Pacific Coast is being threatened. Directly Japan declares war *Hampshire* in addition to light cruiser is to be sent to Esquimalt. Arrange for coal on passage.
- C. 27. *From* Admiralty. August 13.
To Commander-in-Chief, China.
 131. Commence hostilities at once against Austria.
- C. 28. *From* Commander-in-Chief, China. August 16.
To Admiralty.
 120. Russians desire to co-operate with me. May I do so?
 Reply:—137. Your 120. Yes.
- C. 29. *From* Commander-in-Chief, China. August 21.
To Admiralty.
 129. Following telegram received to-day from R.A.C., Australian Squadron, strengthening my opinion regarding intentions of German Squadron. Begins: There appears to be no doubt Germans are collecting large supplies of coal and concentrating somewhere N.E. of New Britain. I believe that main body will make across Pacific Ocean either East or South-East, possibly visit Samoa and Tahiti. Probably auxiliary cruisers will be left to work from base in Pacific on China, Pacific and Australian trade. Expect to arrive at Samoa August 20, and may be able to form better opinion. Ends.
- C. 30. *From* I.O., Singapore. August 27.
To Admiralty. (Received 3.30 a.m.)
 Last night *Geier* (German) reported definitely S.E. of Madura Island, Java Sea. *Gneisenau* heard from W/T Station at Cocos or Keeling Island, Indian Ocean, (and) N. and W. Coast Australia. . . .
- C. 31. *From* Melbourne. August 27.
To Admiralty. (Received 8.34 a.m.)
 19. Following is estimation of German position judging from wireless signals. *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau* have disappeared to North-Eastward. *Geier* now off North-West end of New Guinea. (? *Jaguar*) off South-West of Java. . . .
Staff Note:—This may mean objective is Australian Expedition to New Guinea.
- C. 32. *From* I.O., Singapore. August 29.
To Admiralty. (Received 7 p.m.)
 German ship *Goldenfels* arrived Sabang night of August 28 with part of crew of British ship *City of Winchester* remaining on board German transport *Ziethen* which is accompanied by *Königsberg*; latter sank *City of Winchester* in Indian Ocean.
Goldenfels escorted almost into port by *Königsberg*.
 Commander-in-Chief, China, Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, Admiralty informed.
- C. 33. *From* R.A.C., Australian Squadron. September 1.
To Admiralty. (Received 7.39 a.m.)
 48. With reference to escort of Australian troops to Aden it is suggested for your consideration this could not be done simultaneously occupation of Angaur, Yap, Nauru, owing to lack of ships.

- Would suggest that China Fleet might join up and carry out a combined sweep through Caroline Island and Marshall Islands, in which, if acceptable, ships might be spared for escort of troops to Aden. (1240.)
- C. 34. *From* Ambassador, Tokyo. September 9.
To Foreign Office.
 137. Cruises about to start. 1. A circular tour of three ships and two destroyers of Third Division round Marianne and Caroline Islands to last about four weeks. . . . 2. The despatch of some cruisers to watch and follow up ships leaving Manila and neighbourhood, which are stated to have been carrying supplies to German Squadron for some time past. . . .
- C. 35. *From* Admiralty. September 13.
To Commander-in-Chief, Singapore.
 171. . . . Proposal to establish your headquarters at Hong Kong is approved. *Minotaur's* subsequent movements can be decided later. *Hampshire* is to join *Australia* at Fremantle by October 7 to convoy troops and remain for present under orders of R.A. French Admiral in *Montcalm* has been told he is free to return to Saigon. You should arrange for further employment of French ships.
- C. 36. *From* Reporting Officer, Manila. September 14.
To Admiralty. (Received 6.13 a.m.)
 German ships *Bochum* and *Elmshorn* loading coal about 5,000 tons each; former nearly ready to sail. Please inform Foreign Office.
- C. 37. *From* Commander-in-Chief, China. September 14.
To Admiralty. (Received 6.45 a.m.)
 141. With reference to your telegram 171, I shall proceed to Hong Kong in *Empress of Japan*, when arrangements at Singapore are complete. I propose that *Minotaur*, *Ibuki* (Japanese), *Chikuma* (Japanese), under orders of Captain of *Minotaur* should proceed to New Britain Island and act from there.
 This will cover Australia during absence of Australian cruisers, and would be best position from which to meet any attempt of the German cruisers to remain Pacific Islands or to return in the direction of New Guinea and Australia.
 Arrangements will be made with French men-of-war and Russian Senior Officer for patrolling waters South of Singapore.
 On receipt of Admiralty approval arrangements will be made immediately with Japanese.
- C. 38. *From* Admiralty. September 14.
To Commander-in-Chief, China. (Sent 2.16 p.m.)
 172. Your 141. Action approved.
- C. 39. *From* Marine, Bordeaux. September 14.
To Naval Attaché.
 20. Consul at Manila signals that three German steamers are embarking a large quantity of coal.
 Consul at Hong Kong signals that the *Emden* is at Celebes and the *Geier* at Makassar. . . .
- C. 40. *From* Navy, Melbourne. September 14.
To Admiralty. (Received 8.58 p.m.)
 38. Urgent. Following signal from *Luchs* (German) to *Tannenfels* in cypher heard by Darwin and Wyndham night September 13. First group is incorrectly decoded as "widow" message begins:—
 At once go to the rendezvous 0 degrees 140 degrees E. Long. Give your report fully of progress made. Be brave. *Luchs*. (ends).
Tannenfels left Batavia September 1 for Manila. Was later sighted making towards Sunda Strait. Had 6,000 tons Australian coal. R.A., Commanding Squadron, and Commander-in-Chief, China, informed.
 (Darwin and Wyndham are Wireless Stations North Coast of Australia.)
 (C1054)

- C. 41. From Admiralty. September 15.
To Commander-in-Chief, China. (Sent 2.20 p.m.)
173. Send *Hampshire* at once to search for *Emden* in accordance with information received from Intelligence Officer at Colombo which you now have.
- C. 42. From Commander-in-Chief, China. September 15.
To Admiralty. (Received 2.32 p.m.)
142. Intelligence Officer, Hong Kong, has had personal interview with English stoker who had left German collier *Bochum* at Manila and who reports either *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau* met *Emden* and *Geier* about August 24 at a rendezvous somewhere in Malacca Passage east of Gillolo. *Bochum* and two other colliers were there also. They afterwards separated two former each with a collier in attendance.
R.A., Commanding Australian Squadron, has been informed.
- C. 43. From Intelligence Officer, Colombo. September 15.
To Admiralty. (Received 5.14 p.m.)
20. *Kabinga* released by *Emden*.
Crew report *Emden* left position about 16 miles S.E. of False Point (Bay of Bengal) 11.30 p.m., September 14.
Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, and Intelligence Officer, Singapore, have been informed.
- Priority.
- C. 44. From Admiralty. September 15.
To S.N.O., Singapore. (Sent 8.15 p.m.)
Urgent. *Yarmouth* is to proceed at once to capture *Emden* and work in conjunction with *Hampshire*. Inform Commander-in-Chief, China. Transports must wait.
- C. 45. From Admiralty. September 16.
To Commander-in-Chief, China. (Sent 12.30 p.m.)
175. *Askold* and *Zhemchug* are to continue convoy from Singapore on to Calcutta; this relieves *Yarmouth* and *Hampshire* to search and sink *Emden*. Acknowledge.
- C. 46. From Commander-in-Chief, China. September 17.
To Admiralty. (Received 7.2 a.m.)
147. With reference to your telegram 175. Engines of *Zhemchug* (Russian) are in a bad state and it seems improbable that she can steam from Singapore to Calcutta without coaling.
Under these circumstances I propose to send British transport to Calcutta under escort of *Askold* only.
Zhemchug is detailed to convoy French troops from Hong Kong to Singapore, coaling if necessary at Saigon.
Dupleix will escort French troops and *Cordillere* from Singapore to Colombo and possibly Aden, due to leave Singapore about October 2.
Meanwhile *Dupleix* (French) will remain to protect trade with Western entrance to Straits of Malacca against *Emden* should she avoid cruisers sent to deal with her.
- C. 47. From Commander-in-Chief, China. September 18.
To Admiralty. (Received 12.20 p.m.)
150. Following Japanese ships left Yokosuka September 14 to cruise Mariana Islands and Caroline Islands (North Pacific): *Kurama*, *Tsukuba*, *Asama* and *Umikaze*. This squadron is officially known as the Nankenshitai or Southern Squadron.
- C. 48. From Commander-in-Chief, China. September 19.
To Admiralty. (Received 11.52 a.m.)
153. United States s.s. *Rio Passig* was seized in Latitude 6° 25' N., Longitude 122° 28' E., on September 15 and taken to Sandakan, where she is now detained.

- Facts of case are as follows: She left Manila on August 5 with 4,000 tons of coal, and she was at Yap Island from August 24 to 27; Angaur August 28; Ceram Island from September 1 to 12, and states that Netherlands man-of-war *Tromp* then ordered her to Amboanga. Original cargo of coal is still on board and her papers do not show any destination for it.
In these circumstances I consider cargo is intended for men-of-war.
United States Consul at Sandakan protested and stated he was informing Washington.
Request instructions as to whether vessel should be sent to Prize Court for adjudication or release. (Ends.)
- C. 49. From Commander-in-Chief, China. September 20.
To Admiralty. (Received 7.4 a.m.)
154. . . . Until *Emden* is accounted for or located outside Bay of Bengal trade routes therein cannot be considered entirely safe, but if reopened noon, to-morrow, Monday, they would be reasonably safe.
Reply:—
183. . . . Your 154. Concur as to reopening trade routes noon, Monday, as reasonably safe.
- C. 50. From Hong Kong. September 20.
To Admiralty. (Received 5.46 a.m.)
Askold, *Empress of Asia* sailed 6.45 this morning for Singapore escorting *Nile*, *Arcadia*, *Carnarvonshire* and *Cordillere*.
- C. 51. From Commander-in-Chief, China. September 21.
To Admiralty. (Received 6.45 a.m.)
156. My 147. Commodore, Hong Kong, informs me that 2nd Batt. Duke of Cornwall's in transport *Nile* are ordered to go to Bombay instead of Calcutta. I do not see my way to provide separate escort for *Nile* or for escorting her from Colombo to Bombay if she accompanies French transport and *Cordillere* as far as Colombo.
Under these circumstances should *Nile* accompany the other British transports to Calcutta, and the troops be sent by train from there?
Reply:—190. Your 156. Yes; but if situation is favourable *Askold* should escort all four transports to Bombay instead of Calcutta.
- C. 52. From Admiralty. September 21.
To Commander-in-Chief, China. (Sent 4.45 p.m.)
186. It is understood that *Nisshin* is being sent to you. This enables the Australian convoy to consist of *Minotaur*, *Sydney*, *Ibuki* and *Nisshin*.
- C. 53. From Commander-in-Chief, China. September 22nd.
To Admiralty. (Received 7.45 a.m.)
158. Your telegram No. 180. On account of bad atmospheric disturbances I have been unable to communicate by W/T with *Minotaur* and *Ibuki* (Japan) during last few days, but shall probably be able to do so to-night or to-morrow through Cocos or Keeling Island.
May I consider it settled that they are to be at Fremantle by October 4, as in that case they will shortly have to start south?
Your telegram 186. It is unlikely *Nisshin* can reach Fremantle in time, and I submit *Minotaur*, *Melbourne* and *Ibuki* should be sufficient for escort and that *Nisshin* can be more usefully employed under my direct orders.
(Admiralty telegram 180 stated that *Minotaur* and *Ibuki* should remain in wireless touch with Singapore for the present.)
- C. 54. From I.O., Colombo. September 22.
To Admiralty. (Received 9.46 a.m.)
Chikuma left 9 a.m. escorting colliers from Point de Galle to Madras.

- C. 55. From Admiralty. September 22.
To Commander-in-Chief, China.
189. Your 158. Yes, it is settled. *Minotaur* and *Ibuki* are to be at Fremantle by October 4. *Nisshin* should join convoy as soon as practicable on their line of advance from Fremantle.
- C. 56. From I.O., Colombo. September 23.
To Admiralty. (Received 9.5 a.m.)
From information received from Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, I.O., Singapore, Melbourne, Cape Town, I am satisfied that trade routes are reasonably safe and advise accordingly. Masters of ships personally advised to keep well off usual tracks and not to send wireless message
- C. 57. From Admiralty. September 24.
To Commander-in-Chief, China. (Sent 2.50 p.m.)
195. Navy Office, Melbourne, reports that 15 German merchant vessels loaded with coal at Manila between September 7 and 14; can you take any steps to watch these vessels?
Reply:—166. Your 195. On September 13 there were 19 German vessels at Manila, of which five have been reported loading with coal. *Empress of Asia* and *Empress of Russia* are relieving each other on patrol outside Eastern Channel to Philippine Islands. *Cadmus*, *Clio* and five destroyers are based on Sandakan, Borneo, watching Southern Channel as far as radii of action permit. Japanese Second Squadron will shortly be in neighbourhood. No other ships are available.
- C. 58. From Commander-in-Chief, China. September 26.
To Admiralty. (Received 4.27 p.m.)
174. Unless anything unforeseen occurs transport *Nile*, *Carnarvonshire* and *Arcadia* will sail from Singapore, Monday morning, September 28, for Colombo and Bombay escorted by *Askold* and *Empress of Asia*.
French ship *Cordillère* with 50,000 rifles from Japan accompanying them as far as Colombo, and will be escorted thence to Aden by *Dupleix* as the rifles are urgently required.
Dupleix sails from Penang to-night as she has defects to make good at Colombo.
Nothing heard of *Emden* since September 23; *Hampshire*, *Yarmouth* and *Chikuma* are still searching for her.
- C. 59. From I.O., Colombo. September 27.
To Admiralty. (Received 8.14 p.m.)
Trade route Colombo to Singapore being declared reasonably safe from 8 a.m., September 28. S.N.O., Bay of Bengal, concurs.
- C. 60. From Commander-in-Chief, China. September 28.
To Admiralty. (Received 8.17 a.m.)
175. My telegram, No. 171, convoy sailed this morning, War Office telegram received just before they sailed, the three regiments are to proceed direct to England. Submit they may proceed to Bombay as directed in your telegram, No. 190, and join next convoy from there as a special escort cannot be spared for a longer period.
German collier with 6,000 tons of coal left Manila, night, September 26, but returned September 28; this may indicate frustrated attempt to convey coal to one or more German armed ships.
German mercantile auxiliary *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* is certainly armed and possibly also the captured Russian Volunteer Fleet Ship *Riasan*. They have not made their presence felt yet, but their whereabouts are unknown, as is also that of *Geier* reported active in early part of war (ends).
- C. 61. From I.O., Colombo. September 29.
To Admiralty. (Received 6.20 a.m.)
8. *Emden* (German) has sunk four British merchant ships near Ras Sora (British Somaliland), crews of ships returned to Colombo. Trade

- routes west closed. Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, I.O., Singapore, D.R.I.M., *Chikuma* (Japanese), *Yarmouth*, *Hampshire* have been informed.
- C. 62. From Intelligence Officer, Colombo. September 29.
To Admiralty. (Received 6.29 a.m.)
11. During September 26 and 27 *Emden* sank steamships *Tymeric*, *King Lud*, *Ribera*, *Foyle* and captured Admiralty collier *Buresk*.
Crews transferred to *Gryfevale* captured, which arrived at Colombo, 8 a.m., September 29.
Emden, 10 p.m., September 27, 7° 50' N., 74° 45' E.
Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, *Chikuma*, *Hampshire*, *Yarmouth*, Intelligence Officer, Singapore, Director Royal Indian Marine, *Dupleix*, Aden have been informed.
- C. 63. To Commander-in-Chief, China. September 29.
From Admiralty. (Sent 2 p.m.)
203. Your 171. Is there any objection to *Dupleix* escorting *Nile*, *Carnarvonshire*, *Arcadia* and *Cordillère* direct to Aden from Colombo, instead of the three ships going out of their way to Bombay?
- C. 64. From I.O., Colombo. September 29.
To Admiralty. (Received 6.10 p.m.)
Chikuma arrived Colombo 2 p.m. and sailed 11 p.m. to patrol neighbourhood of Comorin.
- C. 65. From I.O., Colombo. September 30.
To Admiralty. (Received 8.52 a.m.)
Chikuma delayed sailing on night of September 29. Has left 8.30 a.m. September 30 in direction of Minikoi Island by order of *Hampshire*.
- C. 66. From Commander-in-Chief, China. September 30.
To Admiralty. (Received 3.52 a.m.)
179. Your telegram 203. No objection except on grounds of insufficiency of force for such valuable convoy. Our regiments have wives and children with them. Messageries Maritimes steamer *Elkantara* with eight batteries of field artillery and ammunition is also with *Dupleix* and will somewhat delay convoy as she can only steam 10 knots. I will detail *Empress of Asia* to accompany *Dupleix* as additional protection.
- C. 67. From Admiralty. September 30.
To Commander-in-Chief, China. (Sent 2.30 p.m.)
Your 179. If no objection it is considered both *Dupleix* and *Askold* escort the five transports to Aden.
- C. 68. From Commander-in-Chief, China. October 1.
To Admiralty. (Received 6.20 p.m.)
184. Following telegram received from Tokyo (begins):—
Japanese Admiralty have received following report from First Southern Squadron. Arrived at Jaluit September 29. No enemy coal, wireless telegraphy, military works or garrison found there. British steam vessel *Induna* detained there has been released (ends).
- C. 69. From Manila. October 2.
To Admiralty. (Received 3.47 p.m.)
German ship *Weigand* left Cebu this afternoon by northern passage without clearance of customs with provisions from German ship *Princess Alice* for Damguar. (? Angaur.)
- C. 70. From Commander-in-Chief, China. October 5.
To Admiralty. (Received 10.55 a.m.)
188. Submit for consideration whether any measures can be taken to prevent German ships obtaining coal supplies from Manila.

Only small amount arrived there in British ships mostly consigned to United States Navy, but so far as I know, there is no restriction on imports from Australia or Japan and nothing to prevent such coal eventually reaching enemy.

British Consul-General suggests coal should be sent there only under guarantee (that) it will not be sold to Germans, but I doubt whether this can be made effective. Procedure observed in Dutch East Indies is to prohibit German ships shipping coal except for their own bunkers, and this would be effective if applied to Manila also. I believe Japanese Government is considering whole question, and possibly joint representation to United States Government might produce result as it is understood local Government is anxious about possibility of shortness of supply for local requirements.

C. 71. From Commander-in-Chief, China. October 7.
To Admiralty. (Received 10.40 a.m.)

191. My telegram No. 188. Can representations be made at the same time to prevent systematic use of Manila as a base for German colliers, especially as regards those colliers and their cargoes which take refuge there as a means of avoiding capture. As an example, German collier *Elmshorn* with 5,000 tons of coal sailed from Manila ostensibly for Bangkok September 26 and returned September 27 in consequence of sighting our armed mercantile cruiser outside. Apparently this ship is at liberty to make a fresh attempt. Owing to United States of America interpreting their neutrality in such a manner to permit this, I am obliged to maintain permanently close and continuous watch on Manila and approaches, employing force of three armed mercantile cruisers, two sloops and six destroyers for this service only.

C. 72. From Commander-in-Chief, China. October 9.
To Admiralty. (Received 10.30 a.m.)

193. Three French transports with 2,000 troops have arrived Singapore, but no escort is available except *Zhemchug* (Russia) which is not strong enough and has not sufficient coal capacity.

Yarmouth is nearest available ship, and with reference to your telegram No. 176¹ I propose to withdraw her temporarily from search for *Emden* leaving *Hampshire*, *Chikuma* (Jap.) and *Empress of Asia* to continue it.

Yarmouth could then escort transport to Bombay in time to join convoy sailing there November 1.

Your telegram No. 189² in case *Nisshin* (Jap.) should not be now required to go Fremantle I should be glad of early information as am very short of ships.

C. 73. From Admiralty. October 9.
To Commander-in-Chief, China. (Sent 2.5 p.m.)

218. Your 193. Approved for *Yarmouth* to escort French transports to Bombay, calling at Colombo for Ceylon contingent. Next convoy due to leave Bombay October 26 not November 1 as conjectured by you.

Nisshin is required at Fremantle as arranged as convoy is a very large one.

Dupleix should continue escort of *Cordillere* and transports to Suez and then return to your station; *Askold* to search for *Emden* under *Hampshire's* directions and may quit convoy as soon as orders can reach her by wireless from Aden.

Give necessary instructions and inform Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, and Intelligence Officer, Colombo. Acknowledge.

C. 74. From Commander-in-Chief, China. October 12.
To Admiralty. (Received 5.45 a.m.)

199. My telegram 198. *Nisshin* could not be made seaworthy under 14 days and complete repairs will take 35 days.

¹ See p. 65.

² C. 55.

Japanese Admiralty is being asked if they have any ship which could take her place, but it is only barely possible for one to arrive at Albany in time.

I am very unwilling to send *Chikuma*, as with *Yarmouth*, *Askold* and *Dupleix* all on escort duties, I should be left with only *Hampshire* to deal with *Emden*, and there is always a possibility of *Nürnberg* or enemy's armed mercantile cruisers turning up.

Attempted and reported movements of colliers indicate probable further operations on trade routes in these parts.

C. 75. From Admiralty. October 20.
To Commander-in-Chief, China. (Sent 8.30 p.m.)

224. *Dupleix* instead of returning to China is to be employed on escort duties with Indian convoys under Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, for the present. Inform *Dupleix*.

Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, has been informed.

C. 76. From Commander-in-Chief, China. October 20.
To Admiralty. (Received 4.50 p.m.)

211. One or two German colliers are now using territorial waters of Portuguese Timor Island as base, probably owing to stringency of Dutch regulations.

It seems improbable that Portuguese can prevent this misuse of their waters, but apparently I cannot seize them while there.

C. 77. From Admiralty. October 20.
To Commander-in-Chief, China. (Sent 4.50 p.m.)

234. Your 211. Secret. In view of our present relations with Portugal any colliers or enemy vessels are to be seized if taking shelter in isolated parts of Portuguese territorial waters.

C. 78. From I.O., Colombo. October 20.
To Admiralty. (Received 7.40 p.m.)

22. *Emden* sank five steamers and captured Admiralty collier *Exford*, October 15 to 19. Position about 60 miles to the west of Minikoi Island to 100 miles to the east of Minikoi Island.

Crews brought to Cochin by steamer *Saint Egbert* early next morning, October 20.

I have delayed ships sailing for Aden and Bombay from Colombo, but not from Aden.

Propose to reopen October 21 or 22.

C. 79. From Admiralty. October 21.
To Commander-in-Chief, China. (Sent 12.30 p.m.)

235. Your 213. French convoy must remain at Colombo for the present.

Yarmouth to be used for operation against *Emden*.

One ship, preferably *Yarmouth*, should be stationed on the trade route between Ceylon and Minikoi.

What is your news of *Askold*?

C. 80. From Commander-in-Chief, China. October 21.
To Admiralty. (Received 1.12 p.m.)

214. Have sent following by telegraph to Naval Attaché, Tokyo, to-day:—

Between October 15 and 19 *Emden* has captured or sunk six merchant ships near Minikoi Island, Laccadives. She has become serious menace to British and Japanese trade, and as I have so many demands for ships for escort duty I am much in want of more ships. Would Japanese be willing to send *Hirado* to Singapore at once and if they can be spared one or two more cruisers as soon

as possible? Matter presses and I should be glad of early answer. Probably arrangements can be made for Japanese ships working together.

C. 81. From Commander-in-Chief, China. October 24.
To Admiralty. (Received 8.46 a.m.)

221. My telegram 214. Following reply received from Tokyo:—

With the object of clearing the Indian Ocean and securing the safety of navigation, Imperial Japanese Admiralty intends to form a new squadron in these waters. Will be composed of *Tokiwa*, *Yakumo* under a V.A. and will be joined by *Ibuki*, *Chikuma*, *Yahagi*, *Nisshin*; *Ibuki*, *Yahagi* when released from convoy duty, *Nisshin* when repaired. *Tokiwa*, *Yakumo*, *Yahagi* will return from present station when their objective has been accomplished. Concurrence of Commander-in-Chief, China, asked as to co-operation of *Hampshire*, *Minotaur*, *Yarmouth*, with the Japanese Admiral after his arrival South. Further hoped that Royal Navy will arrange supplies such as coal and water as no supply ships or colliers will accompany squadron (ends).

This scheme presents many practical difficulties as to working and involves employment of Japanese Vice-Admiral on East Indies Station senior to Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, but I can see no alternative likely to be acceptable to Japanese, who I am inclined to think rather object to employment of their ships under the direct orders of British Officers.

If it is accepted it should be conditional on definite spheres of action being assigned to Japanese and our forces respectively, which can be arranged by me when Japanese Admiral arrives at Singapore.

I have referred this matter to Admiralty as it so largely affects East Indies Station. If Japanese proposal is approved I will communicate with Tokyo as necessary, and I might at the same time suggest a Rear-Admiral junior to Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, would be preferable to a Vice-Admiral.

C. 82. From Commander-in-Chief, China. October 26.
To Admiralty. (Received 1.49 p.m.)

223. My telegram, No. 221, following telegram received from Naval Attaché at Tokyo this afternoon, telegram begins:—

Following from Japanese Admiralty, Vice-Admiral Tochinai with *Tokiwa* and *Yakumo* has been ordered to operate against *Emden*. He has been instructed to keep a good understanding with you and co-operate with Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, also to arrange supply of this third squadron with you. I understand squadron leaving shortly (telegram ends). I have sent reply expressing my thanks.

C. 83. From Admiralty. October 26.
To Intelligence Officers abroad. (Received 4.55 p.m.)

It is undesirable that vessels on passage should be directed to converge on focal points such as Colombo or Singapore merely for orders and unless absolutely necessary.

Shipping must be more scattered off the routes and where a choice of passage exists this should be taken full advantage of.

As enemy is evidently aware of present scattering limits, substitute general order that vessels must scatter widely both sides of usual track, so that distribution of shipping shall be as effective as possible.

Instructions by Reporting or Intelligence Officers should, whenever possible, be handed to the Masters in writing and a record of such instructions should be kept. Masters must be warned to destroy these instructions if in danger of capture.

Colours are no identification of nationality until the vessel opens fire. It must, therefore, be impressed on all Masters that measures should be taken to avoid vessels directly they or their smoke are sighted.

All lights, except Navigational Lights, should be hidden, and Navigation Lights should not exceed brilliancy laid down in rules for Prevention of Collisions at Sea.

The second masthead light is unnecessary.

C. 84. From Admiralty. October 27.
To Commander-in-Chief, China. (Sent 4.35 p.m.)

249. Your 221 and 223. Japanese aid is invaluable and difficulties must be overcome.

Admiralty are replying in following sense to direct communication on this subject from Japanese Admiralty. Japanese are invited to employ their squadron E. of Long. 90° E., with special attention to guarding the following focal points:—

1. The vicinity of Cape Negrais,
2. " " Acheh Head,
3. " " Straits of Sunda,

using Rangoon, Penang, and Singapore as bases.

It has also been suggested that *Ibuki* should remain on convoy duty. Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, informed.

C. 85. From Admiralty. October 27.
To Commander-in-Chief, China. (Sent 6.45 p.m.)

250. In continuation of my 235. Now that *Askold* is going from Colombo to Bombay it is very necessary to station a cruiser in the vicinity of the mouth of the Hooghly. Report which ship you can best spare. It appears desirable that either *Hampshire* or *Yarmouth* should be sent. The other one remaining with *Empress of Asia* between Ceylon and Minikoi.

C. 86. From Commander-in-Chief, China. October 28.
To Admiralty. (Received 9.44 a.m.)

228. Your telegram 250, in view of knowing position of *Emden* this morning, Wednesday, I have directed *Hampshire* to recall *Yarmouth* to Colombo at once complete with coal and oil fuel and wait for orders.

Empress of Asia is at Colombo and cannot be ready for sea before November 2; condensers require repair.

Hampshire arrived at Colombo yesterday and is making some necessary repairs, ready to proceed October 30; *Empress of Russia* arriving at Singapore October 29 will leave to join *Hampshire*.

Yahagi left here to-day full speed to work in conjunction with and under *Chikuma* from Acheh to Rangoon with discretion to vary limit on receipt of special instructions.

Departure of French transports from Singapore is necessarily postponed indefinitely.

Askold will require several days in harbour on return to clean boilers and rest crew.

Several cases of heat stroke have been reported.

As force at my disposal is so limited I think *Yarmouth* will be more usefully employed off South-East Coast of Ceylon than at the entrance to Hugli River, and, subject to orders to the contrary, propose to send her there.

C. 87. From Admiralty. October 28.
To Commander-in-Chief, China. (Sent 2.7 p.m.)

254. Your 228. Concur in your dispositions.

- C. 88. From Commander-in-Chief, China, Singapore, November 1.
To Admiralty. (Received 8.31 a.m.)
242. Your telegram 261¹ *Askold* cannot leave Bombay till November 4 owing to defective machinery. Propose to establish her (then) on trade route between Madras and Calcutta.
Reply:—Your 242. *Askold* approved.
- C. 89. From Commander-in-Chief, China, November 10.
To Admiralty. (Received 8.18 a.m.)
I have ordered *Hampshire*, *Askold* and one *Empress* steamer to Colombo and *Yarmouth* to Madras.
I consider it necessary they should have a few days' rest before proceeding on any further service, as they have been almost constantly at sea since the war began.
The other *Empresses* are proceeding to Cocos Island to render medical assistance and take charge of prisoners. Casualties, *Sydney*—3 killed, 15 wounded; those of *Emden* very heavy.
- C. 90. From I.O., Colombo, November 11.
To Admiralty. (Received 8.26 a.m.)
10. Following telegram received from Sydney. Cocos Island received Colombo, November 11 (begins):—
Following for Admiralty: Commander-in-Chief, China, Commonwealth Naval Board of Administration—Schooner 3 masts, called *Ayesha*, escaped from Direction Island last night at 6 p.m. with 3 German officers and 40 men, four maxim guns, each two belts; 3 boats of *Emden* with it containing the destruction parties landed for cable (ends).
Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, Commander-in-Chief, China, and *Hampshire* have been informed.
- C. 91. From Admiralty, November 12.
To Commander-in-Chief, China. (Sent 9.20 p.m.)
287 . . . *Hampshire* and *Yarmouth* to proceed to Gibraltar.
- C. 92. From Admiralty, November 13.
To Commander-in-Chief, China. (Sent 5.55 p.m.)
289. Your 275. *Hampshire* is to take Australian convoy on from Colombo.
Question of release of *Ibuki* is being considered.
Yarmouth is to proceed to Gibraltar.
- C. 93. From Commander-in-Chief, China, November 17.
To Admiralty. (Received 7.9. a.m.)
284. I am sending *Askold* from Colombo to Hong Kong to meet stores and ammunition demanded from Vladivostock, and propose to keep her in that neighbourhood for the present ready to escort ship with Russian mines if necessary.
Your telegram 289. No further orders having been received about *Ibuki*, Japanese Admiral Tochinai has directed her to proceed with the Australian convoy as far as Aden leaving Colombo to-day.
- C. 94. From Admiralty, November 17.
To Commander-in-Chief, China. (Sent 4.25 p.m.)
Send all your River class destroyers to Egypt. Arrange, if necessary, for colliers to accompany them or for them to be towed. Acknowledge.

¹ 261. What do you propose to do with *Askold* now she has arrived with her convoy at Bombay?

- C. 95. From Commander-in-Chief, China, December 4.
To Admiralty. (Received 12.51 p.m.)
311. Vice-Admiral Tochinai with *Tokiwa* and *Yakumo* left Singapore November 15 for Truk (Hogulu) Island. *Yahagi* and *Chikuma* left Singapore November 18 and *Ikoma* left Singapore November 24, all for Fiji Islands, calling at Townsville for coal.
Japanese two Southern Squadrons are being reconstituted as follows:—
First.—*Kurama*, flagship, *Tsukuba*, *Ikoma*, *Yahagi*, *Chikuma*, *Umikaze*, *Yamakaze*, base Fiji Islands.
Second.—*Iwate*, flagship, *Nisshin*, *Ibuki*, *Hirato*, Base Truk (Hogolu) Island.
- C. 96. From Commander-in-Chief, China, December 12.
To Admiralty. (Received 1.20 p.m.)
326. *Ibuki* is ordered to return to Japan from Singapore. With reference to my telegram No. 316,¹ I have suggested through the Naval Attaché at Tokio that if Japanese are considering redistribution of their ships, perhaps they may think fit to keep two at Singapore in case any future attack on trade should be made.
- C. 97. From Commander-in-Chief, China, December 14.
To Admiralty. (Received 6.56 p.m.)
332. Japanese Admiralty inform me that German armed mercantile cruiser *Cormoran*, formerly Russian Volunteer Fleet Ship *Riasan*, entered Guam this morning, December 14, and is coaling and provisioning. *Himalaya* arrives Colombo, December 16. Propose that she should search Diego and Maldive Islands for *Ayesha* and then return to Colombo. *Empress of Japan* arrives at Singapore December 15. Submit I may keep both ships for protection of trade routes instead of sending them to Aden, although it is doubtful whether they are fast enough to catch *Cormoran*.
Japanese Admiralty have ordered *Ibuki* (Jap.) now at Singapore to wait for further orders, but I have not yet heard what other steps they intend to take.
Iwate (Jap.) is at Truk Island (Carolines), *Hirato* (Jap.) Pelew, *Nisshin* (Jap.) Pleasant Island.
- C. 98. From Admiralty, December 15, 1.5 p.m.
To Commander-in-Chief, China, Singapore.
Your 332. Proposal to retain *Himalaya* and *Empress of Japan* approved.
- C. 99. From Commander-in-Chief, China, December 16.
To Admiralty. (Received 5.12 a.m.)
335. My telegram, No. 332. Japanese Admiralty inform me *Cormoran* (German) has been disarmed at Guam yesterday, December 15. *Himalaya* will proceed direct to Aden after searching Diego Garcia and Maldive Islands.
British steamship reports having sighted schooner resembling *Ayesha*, 6 a.m. December 9, S. Lat. 3° 24' E., Long. 95° 13' (?); 99° 38' (?); 95° 20' (?). Course East.
I have asked Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, whether he requires *Empress of Japan* urgently; if not, I will employ her and probably *Cadmus* also in further search for schooner.

¹ Re Eastern situation generally, see p. 112.

APPENDIX E.

"SYDNEY'S" LETTER OF PROCEEDINGS.¹

H.M.A.S. *Sydney* at Colombo,
November 15, 1914.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to report that whilst on escort duty with the convoy under the charge of Captain Silver, H.M.A.S. *Melbourne*, at 6.30 a.m., on Monday, November 9, a wireless message from Cocos was heard: "Strange warship at entrance." I was ordered to raise steam for full speed at 7 a.m. and proceed thither. I then worked up to 20 knots, and at 9.15 a.m. sighted land ahead and almost immediately the smoke of a ship which proved to be H.I.G.M.S. *Emden* coming out towards me at a great rate. At 9.40 a.m. fire was opened, she firing the first shot; I kept my distance as much as possible to obtain the advantage of my guns. Her fire was very accurate and rapid to begin with, but seemed to slacken very quickly, all casualties occurring in this ship almost immediately. My foremost Finder in centre of main control position being dismounted quite early and the after control being put out at about the third salvo. First the foremost funnel of her went, secondly the foremast, and she was badly on fire aft, then the second funnel went, and lastly the third funnel, and I saw she was making for the beach on North Keeling Island, where she was grounded at 11.20 a.m. I gave her two more broadsides and left her to pursue a merchant ship which had come up during the action.

2. Although I had guns on this merchant ship at odd times during the action I had not fired and as she was making off fast I pursued and overtook her at 12.10, firing a gun across her bows and hoisting International Code Signal to stop, which she did. I sent an armed boat and found her to be the s.s. *Buresk*, a captured British collier, with 18 Chinese crew, 1 English steward, 1 Norwegian cook, and a German prize crew of 3 officers, 1 warrant officer and 12 men. The ship unfortunately was sinking, the Kingston knocked out and damaged to prevent repairing, so I took all on board, fired four shells into her, and returned to *Emden*, passing men swimming in the water, for whom I left two boats I was towing from *Buresk*.

3. On arriving again off *Emden* she still had her colours up at mainmast head. I inquired by signal, International Code, "Will you surrender?" and received a reply in Morse, "What signal, no signal books?" I then made in Morse, "Do you surrender?" and subsequently, "Have you received my signal?" to neither of which did I get an answer. The German officers on board gave me to understand that the captain would never surrender, and therefore, though very reluctantly, I again fired at her at 4.30 p.m., ceasing at 4.35 p.m. as she showed white flags and hauled down her Ensign by sending a man aloft. I have given these details very exactly as subsequently I heard they were indignant, saying I fired on a white flag.

4. I then left *Emden* and returned and picked up the *Buresk's* two boats, rescuing two sailors (5 p.m.) who had been in the water all day. I returned and sent in one boat to *Emden* manned by her own prize crew from *Buresk*, and one officer, stating I would return to their assistance next morning. This I had to do as I was desirous to find out the condition of cables and Wireless Station at Direction Island. On the passage over I was again delayed by rescuing another sailor (6.30 p.m.) and by the time I was again ready and approaching Direction Island it was too late for the night. A high Telefunken Note being also heard on Wireless Instruments.

¹ Original is in M. 04526/14.

5. I lay on and off all night and communicated with Direction Island at 8 a.m., November 10, to find that the *Emden's* party consisting of 3 officers and 40 men, 1 launch and 2 cutters had seized and provisioned a 70-ton schooner (the *Ayasha*), having 4 Maxims, with 2 belts to each. They left the previous night at 6 o'clock. The Wireless Station was entirely destroyed, 1 cable cut, 1 damaged and 1 intact. I borrowed a doctor and two assistants and proceeded as fast as possible to *Emden's* assistance.

6. I sent an officer on board to see the captain, and in view of the large number of prisoners and wounded and lack of accommodation, etc., in this ship and the absolute impossibility of leaving them where they were, he agreed that if I received his officers and men and all wounded, "then as for such time as they remained in *Sydney*, they would cause no interference with ship or fittings, and would be amenable to the ship's discipline." I, therefore, set to work at once to tranship them—a most difficult operation, the ship being on weather side of Island and the send alongside very heavy. The conditions in the *Emden* are indescribable. I received the last from her at 5 p.m., then had to go round to the lee side to pick up 20 more men, who had managed to get ashore from the ship.

7. Dark came on before this could be accomplished, and the ship again stood off and on all night, resuming operations at 5 a.m. on November 11, a cutter's crew having to land with stretchers to bring wounded round to embarking point. A German officer, a doctor, died ashore on the previous day. The ship, in the meantime, ran over to Direction Island to return their doctor and assistants, send cables, and was back again at 10 a.m., embarked the remainder of wounded and proceeded for Colombo by 10.35 a.m., Wednesday, November 11.

8. Total casualties in *Sydney*:—Killed, 3; severely wounded (since dead) 1; severely wounded, 4; wounded, 4; slightly wounded, 4. In the *Emden* I can only approximately state the killed at 7 officers and 108 men from Captain's statement. I had on board 11 officers, 9 warrant officers and 191 men, of whom 3 officers and 53 men were wounded, and of this number 1 officer and 3 men have since died of wounds.

9. The damage to *Sydney's* hull and fittings was surprisingly small, in all about 10 hits seem to have been made, though in the case of the after control there may have been two or three hits. The engine and boiler rooms and funnels escaped entirely. Both control positions were hit.

10. With such a crowd of prisoners and wounded on board it was impossible to do more than barely look after them; the wounded were in a terrible state and had to lay about on the upper deck and passages under what temporary shelter could be rigged, in close tropical weather, with heavy rain, and as a consequence the ship will require most careful and thorough disinfecting and cleaning at Colombo.

11. I communicated with *Empress of Asia* by signal at midnight on Thursday, November 12, and was more than thankful to be able to stop and tranship to *Empress of Russia* 18 Chinese (ex *Buresk*) and 5 officers, 4 warrant officers and 66 men belonging to *Emden*, most of whom were wounded, including 12 cot cases, but notwithstanding, I retained 9 of their worst cases as I did not like the transshipment; indeed, if we had not been most fortunately in smooth water, I could not have shifted the men.

12. I have noted down here a few interesting facts:—

- (a) Principal casualties occurred in the disengaged side, and in after control position, which was put out.
- (b) Total mileage by revolutions steamed from 9 a.m. to noon, 68 miles.

Action lasted from 9.40 a.m. to 11.20 a.m., during which time engines varied from 13 knots to an estimated 27 knots, i.e.:—

	22 minutes at 13 knots.
	43 " 20 knots.
1 hour 55 "	25-27 knots.

- (c) Enemy's shell appeared to fail to burst often, his steering gear was disabled very early in proceedings, and loss of speed occurred in consequence.
- (d) *Sydney* fired one torpedo, but owing to an immediate large alteration of course, nothing was known of its behaviour.
- (e) *Sydney* expended 670 rounds of ammunition, nearly all of which were lyddite, the effect of which was appalling, and could I have known it, I might have left her after the first half-hour.

13. I have great pleasure in stating that the behaviour of the ship's company was excellent in every way, and with such a large proportion of young hands and people under training it is all the more gratifying. The engines worked magnificently and higher results than trials were obtained, and I cannot speak too highly of the Medical Staff and arrangements on subsequent trip, the ship being nothing but a Hospital of a most painful description.

14. I passed the convoy between the hours of 4 and 5 a.m. on the 15th and arrived at Colombo at 10 a.m.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

To the Secretary of the
Admiralty.

Your obedient Servant,
(Signed) JOHN L. T. GLOSSOP,
Captain.

APPENDIX F.

TELEGRAMS TO AND FROM EAST INDIES, 1914.

- F. 1. *From Admiralty.* July 28.
To Commander-in-Chiefs, East Indies and Cape.
82. Until *Nottingham* joins Cape Station *Dartmouth* must be prepared to shadow German cruiser *Königsberg* now at Dar-es-Salaam.
- F. 2. *From Admiralty.* July 30.
To Navy, Bombay.
86. *Dartmouth* is to proceed to Zanzibar. Acknowledge.
- F. 3. *From Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.* July 30.
To Admiralty. (Received 11.15 p.m.)
83. Movements ordered *Fox* to Colombo; *Espiègle* to Aden; *Alert* to Bombay; *Sphinx* to Bombay preparing to pay off; *Dartmouth* to Zanzibar as soon as possible; undock Bombay, shadowing *Königsberg*; *Swiftsure* remaining Colombo ready for sea; *Odin* remaining at Persian Gulf.
- F. 4. *From Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.* July 30.
To Admiralty. (Received 3.50 p.m.)
- Your telegram 86. *Dartmouth* will not be ready to proceed until August 8.
- F. 5. *From Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.* July 31.
To Admiralty. (Received 6.5 a.m.)
88. Considering probable enemies submit desirable transfer *Dufferin* and *Hardinge* to Navy and issue proclamation to that effect on outbreak of war. Have requested Government of India in anticipation to authorise shipment of armaments and preparations for vessels forthwith.

- F. 6. *From Admiralty.* July 31.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
87. Order one of the sloops to Colombo ready to move to Singapore if crew are wanted for *Triumph*.
- F. 7. *From Admiralty.* July 31, 10 p.m.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
- Approved to arm and prepare *Dufferin* and *Hardinge*. Informing Government of India.
- F. 8. *From Admiralty.* August 1.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
88. Consul, Dar-es-Salaam, reports *Königsberg* left 4.30 p.m., northerly with decks clear, coal, provisions, water. *Königsberg* sighted by *Hyacinth* 6 p.m. July 31 off Dar-es-Salaam steaming fast to eastward unable to follow owing to her speed. Commander-in-Chief, Cape, confidently believes she will remain on Coast. Communicate to *Dartmouth*.
- F. 9. *Copy of Eastern Telegraph Company's Cable* :—
From Superintendent, Zanzibar. August 4, 7 a.m.
To Managing Director.
- German residents here active. Several thousand native German subjects residing Zanzibar, large number of whom likely receive arms if Zanzibar attacked. German cruiser and gunboat, also four large German steamers in neighbourhood, latter supported by well-equipped guns. Two Maxims with trained gun teams at Bawi, which fortified. Maxim to be mounted at station morning. To-night Resident General call to arms informed we received message saying attack expected be made on Station before war declared. Staff armed guarding station, military guard doubled. Cruisers cleared action, men sleeping at guns. Mombasa strongly guarded, attack expected there also. Sounds firing notified this morning reported by native guard.
- F. 10. *From Admiralty.* August 4.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
100. What movements are you proposing? Zanzibar reports German cruiser and four large German armed steamers. *Astræa* at Zanzibar. These steamers may get on Indian trade route.
- F. 11. *From Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.* August 5, 1.38 a.m.
To Admiralty.
92. Propose to leave for Singapore in *Swiftsure*. Is a sloop required there to complete *Triumph*?
- F. 12. *From Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.* August 5.
To Admiralty. (Received 9.31 a.m.)
94. Urgent. Have told (?) Commander-in-Chief, China, I shall not require *Triumph* unless Holland becomes hostile. Request instructions as to the likelihood of this and whether I should proceed to Singapore immediately.
- F. 13. *From Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.* August 6.
To Admiralty. (Received 8.55 a.m.)
98. Your telegram 100. Am leaving in *Swiftsure* to patrol Colombo-Aden trade route. *Espiègle* to-day to patrol Colombo-Singapore trade routes. Both ships will keep in wireless touch with Colombo.
- F. 14. *From Admiralty.* August 7, 1.55 p.m.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
110. *Dartmouth* left Bombay for Zanzibar this morning G.M.T. and you should now order her to assist you in protection of trade route between India and Aden. Similar telegram sent *Dartmouth*, Bombay, wireless. Acknowledge.

- F. 15. *From* Commander-in-Chief, Cape. August 7.
To Admiralty. (Received 8.27 p.m.)
98. Following telegram sent *Britannia*,¹ *Bombay*, and repeated *Britannia*, *Colombo*, begins :—
For Dartmouth. Have lost touch with *Königsberg* since August 3. She is believed to have been joined by collier. It is possible she may go mouth of Red Sea. Proceed Aden quickly looking out for her and if in that locality destroy her. On arrival at Aden if there is no news of her proceed Zanzibar. My telegraphic address Simonstown. Acknowledge receipt of this by telegraph.
- F. 16. *From* Admiralty. August 9.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
113. *Swiftsure* and *Dartmouth* are to return to *Bombay* forthwith at highest possible speed and complete with coal. Report expected date of arrival. Prepare to convoy troops to Aden. Order all armed Indian Marine ships to assemble at *Bombay*.
- F. 17. *From* Secretary of State. August 9.
To Viceroy.
- No. 399 If Naval situation permits it may be necessary to send the force of three Battalions in advance to Zanzibar and East Africa to ensure safety of those Colonies. These troops should, therefore, be prepared for immediate despatch. Please report Units and Commander selected and when probably ready.
- As regards expedition for German East Africa it is believed there may be strong opposition. . . .
- Under these circumstances the force now recommended on such information as Admiralty and Colonial Office can give is put at seven Battalions Indian troops including Imperial Service, one Mountain Battery, one Company Sappers, and, if possible, a Howitzer Battery. . . .
- F. 18. *From* Admiralty. August 10, 6.25 p.m.
To R.A., *Defence*, through Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.
382. *Black Prince* or *Duke of Edinburgh* to proceed at once through Suez Canal and thoroughly search Red Sea for hostile armed merchant cruisers, proceeding southward at moderate speed and reporting result on arrival at Aden to Admiralty and Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, *Bombay*, there await further orders.
- F. 19. *From* Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. August 12.
To Admiralty. (Received 10.52 a.m.)
110. Arrived in *Swiftsure* 10 a.m. disposition of Squadron *Dartmouth*, Aden; *Dufferin*, *Hardinge*, *Minto*, *Bombay*, arming, will be ready August 15. *Northbrook* expected at *Bombay* shortly to arm. *Dalhousie*, Aden, ordered to proceed as soon as possible to *Bombay*, armed. All above will be employed on convoy duty. First transport expected to be ready to leave August 20. *Fox*, *Espiègle* base *Colombo*, protection of trade routes. *Pioneer* protection of trade routes *Fremantle*. *Odin* Persian Gulf. *Sphinx*, *Bombay*, paid off. *Alert*, *Bombay*, about to be paid off. *D'Iberville* and three French destroyers off *Singapore* searching for *Geier* and *Kleist*. Supply ships and station colliers ready for service.
- F. 20. *From* Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. August 12.
To Admiralty. (Received 11.13 a.m.)
111. Urgent. In view of report unsuccessful attacks upon cable station at *Perim* Island nights of August 7 and 8 and German men-of-war reported in the Red Sea suggest that *Dartmouth* now at Aden be sent to

¹ Telegraphic address of S.N.O.

search. She could be spared from convoy and trooping, she would¹ not commence to leave before August 20. What arrangements have been made for convoying beyond Aden?

- F. 21. *From* Admiralty. August 12.
To Marine, Paris.
6. In order to escort British transports in the Red Sea, *Black Prince* and *Duke of Edinburgh* have been withdrawn from Mediterranean.
 One light cruiser goes to Port Said and may be sent down Red Sea to catch *Königsberg*.
- F. 22. *From* Admiralty. August 12, 6.40 p.m.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
119. Owing to delay in troops leaving *Bombay*, use *Dartmouth* to search Gulf of Aden and the Aden end of route from *Bombay* for *Königsberg* and then meet convoy. Two cruisers from Mediterranean ordered to Aden for convoy duties.
- F. 23. *From* Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. August 13.
To Admiralty. (Received 2.39 p.m.)
115. Government of India now reports leading unit, 1st Division, will not be ready for sea till about August 20. Escorting ships comprise *Swiftsure*, *Dufferin*, *Hardinge*, *Minto*, all armed, ready August 15. Total number transports leaving *Bombay* and *Karachi* with 1st Division, 20. It is uncertain yet whether all will sail in company, but shall keep as many as possible transits without unduly delaying main body. No armed Royal R.I.M. ships used as transports. [This is the precise wording. T.S.D.D.]
- F. 24. *From* Admiralty. August 13.
To *Dartmouth*.
123. As the expedition has been postponed until the 28th, *Dartmouth* to return to *Bombay* complete with coal and await orders from Commander-in-Chief for convoying the transports.
- F. 25. *From* Admiralty. August 13.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
123. The *Alert* is not to be paid off, but to be sent to the Gulf of Aden to search for *Möwe* and destroy her. Coal at Aden and report arrival.
- F. 26. *From* Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. August 14.
To Admiralty. (Received 10.18 p.m.)
117. Your telegram 123. *Alert* has been paid off and crew and armament have been distributed among additional auxiliary cruisers, without which they could not be commissioned. She cannot steam more than 5 knots against the monsoon, and carries insufficient coal to reach Aden direct. Submit that present arrangements may be allowed to stand.
- F. 27. *From* Admiralty. August 14, 4.40 p.m.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
126. Your telegram 117. Approve arrangements for *Alert* to stand. Can *Odin* be used for this service instead?
- F. 28. *From* Zanzibar. August 14.
To Admiralty. (Received 10.51 p.m.)
12. *Möwe* sunk by German authorities inside *Dar-es-Salaam*, 3½ miles from entrance to harbour, in 2½ fathoms.

¹ "They will" was meant; the code group used had either reading. T.S.D.D.

- F. 29. *From* Viceroy. August 15.
To India Office. (Received 5.56 p.m.)
 H. 276. 29th Punjabis and one section Field Ambulance will sail in *Naidisag*,¹ leaving Karachi 19th. Zanzibar will be informed.
- F. 30. *From* Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. August 16.
To Admiralty. (Received 7.12 a.m.)
 119. *Fox* and *Espiègle* captured Australian line ships *Australia* and *Fürth* respectively off Ceylon August 10 and took them to Colombo.
- F. 31. *From* Admiralty. August 16.
To Navy, Bombay.
 131. Following telegram sent to *Duke of Edinburgh* and *Black Prince*, begins :—
 On arrival at Aden both ships to coal. The first ship ready is to proceed to Bombay, get in touch with R.A., *Swiftsure*, and act under his orders for convoying transports to Aden. The second ship is to remain at or near Aden and convoy transports up the Red Sea to Suez. Acknowledge.
- F. 32. *From* India Office. August 17.
To Viceroy, Army Department.
 No. 507. Reference previous correspondence regarding Expeditions A, B and C, situation is changed by ambiguous attitude of Turkey. In circumstances most desirable to reinforce Egypt as rapidly as possible. Consequently Expeditions B and C will be postponed and the remainder of Expedition A expedited. 29th Punjabis may, however, proceed to Zanzibar if naval arrangements still admit.
- F. 33. *From* India Office. August 17.
To Viceroy, Army Department.
 No. 514. My telegram of August 17, No. 507. Lord Kitchener most anxious that first echelon of Expedition A should sail by 20th instant if possible without delaying for Hospitals or other accessories as owing to new situation most important to show Egypt troops commencing to arrive from India. . . .
- F. 34. *From* Admiralty. August 17.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
 133. Order *Fox* to meet at a suitable rendezvous the transport carrying the 29th Punjabis to Zanzibar and convoy her to Zanzibar, India Office anxious for this force to be sent at once. Acknowledge.
- F. 35. *From* Viceroy. August 18.
To India Office. (Received 7.2 p.m.)
 H. 327. Your 514, of August 17. Following troops will be ready to start from Bombay 20th, Karachi 21st if Navy can arrange escort. We are consulting Naval Commander-in-Chief as to this.
 9 Battalions Indian Infantry.
 2 Companies Sappers and Miners.
 1 Battery R.F.A.
- F. 36. *From* Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. August 19.
To Admiralty. (Received 6.40 a.m.)
 126. Your telegram 133. Transport *Nairung* with 29th Punjabis left Karachi to-day. Will be met by *Fox* North Seychelles and thence conveyed to Zanzibar.

¹ Error in coding. The ship's name was *Nairung*.

- F. 37. *From* Admiralty. August 19.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
 138. Admiralty are informing War Office and India Office that naval escort will be ready to-morrow, August 20, for Egyptian and East African forces.
 Important ; no delay.
- F. 38. *From* Aden. August 19.
To Admiralty. (Received 12.25 p.m.)
 Superintendent of Telegraphs, Zanzibar, reports that telegraph cable Zanzibar-Seychelles interrupted 40 miles from Zanzibar ; also Seychelles-Mauritius telegraph cable interrupted. Seychelles completely cut off. Intelligence Officer, Colombo, informed.
- F. 39. *From* Viceroy. August 20.
To India Office. (Received 8.54 p.m.)
 H. 363. We hope we can despatch whole of leading division partly on 24th and remainder from Karachi 25th, both under escort. Admiral reports that no date earlier than 24th will suit naval arrangements. . . .
- F. 40. *From* Commander-in-Chief, Cape. August 21.
To Admiralty. (Received 7.10 a.m.)
 133. Following telegram received from Censor, Pretoria, begins :—
 Following cable (two corrupt groups) for your information begins Mozambique August 19 to Department, Delagoa, confidential. German steamer *Zieten* came in to-day. When sailing from Colombo to Aden on 9th instant met near Cape Guardafui German cruiser *Koenigsberg*, 3 funnels, who had captured British steam vessel *City of Winchester*. *Koenigsberg* ordered *Zieten* to reach neutral port with her passengers 268 including 31 German seamen coming from New Guinea and took 17 men of captured ship's crew including all Captains. *Zieten* has not coaled. She took 250 tons from British ship at anchor for the purpose on Arabian coast. *Zieten* has plenty of flour as cargo and no coal. Ends. Repeating to ships on East Indies Station.
- F. 41. *From* *Black Prince*, Aden. August 21.
To Admiralty. (Received 10 p.m.)
 22. No hostile armed mercantile cruisers sighted in Red Sea. German ships reported at Massawa Channel *Persepolis*, *Christian X.*, *Segovia*, *Ockenfels*, *Borkum*, *Ostmark*, *Turnfels*. Austrian ships *Moravia*, *Ambra*. One of the above-mentioned reported as communicating with passing vessels, German and Austrian, ordering them to Massawa. Reported German Auxiliary cruiser *Zieten* landed part complement of *City of Winchester* at Mozambique, latter having been captured by *Königsberg* near Khorya Morya Island about August 10. Eastern Telegraph Co. reports unknown ships in company sighted 16 miles off Mombasa August 18. *Zieten* reported painted funnels British India S.N. Co. funnel bands and flying red Ensign. Resident at Perim Island reports one Turkish gunboat at Hodeida and four Turkish gunboats at Camaran (1409).
- F. 42. *From* A.S., Malta. August 22.
To Admiralty. (Received 3.3 a.m.)
 417. *Chasseur* reports that Eastern Telegraph Co. cable ship *Cambria* reports both Seychelles Islands cables interrupted since August 19. Seychelles Islands-Mauritius cables about 48 miles from Seychelles Islands and Zanzibar. Seychelles Islands cables about 40 miles from Zanzibar. British ship *City of Winchester* long overdue at Suez. Left Colombo July 30 with orders to report when passing Perim Islands. She has not done so. Captain of German ship *Südmark* states German cruiser sank *City of Winchester* after removing passengers and crew.

- F. 43. From Admiralty. August 23.
To Chatham, Suez.
You are to escort transports *Dongola* and *Somali* as far as Aden. They are now at Port Said. Acknowledge.
- F. 44. From Admiralty. August 23.
To French Commander-in-Chief, (Sent 8.10 p.m.)
Mediterranean, via F.N.A. to Paris.
256. With reference to your directions to Admiral Superintendent Malta for R.A. *Indefatigable* to be responsible for the protection of the trade route between Malta and Port Said detaching the *Dublin* and *Weymouth* for that purpose the British Admiralty feel that the trade route is reasonably safe; but would wish to employ those cruisers in the Indian Ocean to hunt out *Königsberg* which is now a threat to the transport of our troops across that ocean. May the Admiralty ask you to prevent any Austrian raiding vessel getting away.
- F. 45. From Chatham, Port Said. August 24.
To Admiralty. (Received 10.11 a.m.)
294. *Dongola* arrived at Suez half-past 8 o'clock this morning G.M.T. *Somali* expects to arrive half-past 1 o'clock this afternoon G.M.T. *Chatham* leaves (for) Aden with both transports on arrival of *Somali*. Following received from Aden (begins): Suez-Aden route clear. Cannot guarantee Aden-Ceylon route. *Black Prince*. (Ends.)
- F. 46. From Britannia, Zanzibar. August 27.
To Admiralty. (Received 3.12 p.m.)
18. Communication restored between here and Seychelles. All quiet there.
- F. 47. From Naval Attaché. August 27.
To Marine, Paris.
276. (Translation.) There is reasonable safety on the Madagascar-Suez route. Several British cruisers are now operating on or near this route, but the position of the *Königsberg* is not exactly known. We believe that she has gone east towards the Dutch East Indies.
- F. 48. From Admiral Supt., Malta. August 29.
To Admiralty. (Received 2.35 a.m.)
492. August 25. *Duke of Edinburgh*¹ transported 20 men, two guns to Perim at request of Resident at Aden.
- F. 49. From Marine, Paris. August 31.
To Admiralty.
The cruiser *Königsberg* appeared in the morning of August 30 before the Bay of Majunga, cruised from 6 till 8 o'clock before the entrance, and then departed in a north-westerly direction without further manifestation.
- F. 50. From Admiral Supt., Malta. August 31.
To Admiralty. (Received 4.38 p.m.)
519. Following received from *Warrior*:—
Steamship *Orsova* reports following from steamship *City of Calcutta* forenoon August 25.
German cruiser operating off Sokotra. Also afternoon August 28 steamship with call sign ASG calling DGD ends.
Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, *Black Prince*, *Duke of Edinburgh*, *Chatham*, have been informed.

¹ Should be *Black Prince*. T.S.D.D.

- F. 51. From Fox, Mombasa. September 2.
To Admiralty. (Received 10 a.m.)
It is most desirable that *Fox* if time permits should *en route* to Bombay visit Zanzibar and Seychelles Islands in connection with reports of proximity of *Königsberg* and other matters. Request approval by telegraph.
- F. 52. From Admiralty. September 2.
To Fox, Mombasa.
Yours-to-day. In view of *Königsberg's* superior speed this visit useless. Proceed as ordered to Bombay for convoy duties. *Pegasus* can be sent to Zanzibar if desirable.
- F. 53. From Admiralty. September 3.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
151. Expedition B for operations in German East Africa will not be sent from India at present. Expedition C for Mombasa, and one battalion Indian Infantry for Mauritius will be ready about 16th. Suggest *Fox* might act as escort. She is now returning to Bombay from Mombasa via Seychelles, and should arrive Bombay about September 14. *Fox* on return voyage from Mauritius is to form escort to British battalion *en route* to England from Mauritius as far as Aden. Large movements of troops from India to Egypt have been arranged, and will be leaving about September 10 and later. You should arrange escorts with Indian Government reporting proposals.
- F. 54. From Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. September 4.
To Admiralty.
141. Your telegram 151. Proposed convoy programme is as follows:—
Northbrook with seven transports conveying remainder 1st Division will be joined by *Chatham* off (port ?) September 6; transports to be escorted from Aden to Suez by *Chatham*.
Dartmouth with seven transports conveying troops 2nd Division and Cavalry Brigade due at Aden September 12; transports to be escorted to Suez by *Northbrook*.
Transports conveying next echelon of 2nd Division will leave Bombay, Karachi, September 9–10 with *Dufferin* and *Hardinge*: they will be met half-way by *Swiftsure* who will take them to Aden and then *Black Prince* and *Duke of Edinburgh* take them to Suez.
Further echelon will depart from India about September 15 under escort *Fox* or with *Dalhousie* and *Minto*.
If Force C is ready about same date *Dartmouth* will accompany whichever group is most likely to fall in with *Königsberg*, and *Fox* will accompany other groups.
Next echelon will be ready between 23rd and end of September and will leave with *Dufferin* and *Hardinge*, and so on.
It is suggested that *Black Prince*, *Duke of Edinburgh* and *Chatham* may be placed temporarily under my orders for work between Aden and Suez to ensure continuous escort from here onwards.
- F. 55. From Admiralty. September 4, 9.12 p.m.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
152. Approved to put *Black Prince*, *Duke of Edinburgh* and *Chatham* under your orders and use as you require.
S.N.O. Malta informed.
- F. 56. From Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. September 5.
To Admiralty. (Received 6.5 p.m.)
143. Your telegram No. 153,¹ revised proposals as follows: 14 transports due by September 12 Aden to be escorted by convoy of *Chatham* and *Northbrook* and met by *Black Prince* and *Duke of Edinburgh* about two days out, who would turn back with them to Suez.

¹ See p. 137.

This means delaying first seven transports here five days.

Swiftsure leaving here for Bombay to-morrow and *Dartmouth* about September 12.

These two with *Fox*, *Dufferin*, *Hardinge* could then leave India with 2nd Division about September 18.

Next sailing some 16 days later. Request approval.

I understood that departure of troops was urgent, plans made accordingly taking into consideration *Königsberg's* movements which are being closely watched.

F. 57. From Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. September 6.
To Admiralty. (Received 11.43 a.m.)

146. *Chatham*, *Northbrook*, and seven transports arrived Aden, September 6, and will be detained six or seven days until arrival of *Dartmouth*, to comply with instructions contained in your telegram 153.¹

In view of safe condition of Red Sea request consideration whether *Chatham* alone may escort these seven transports immediately and seven transports with *Dartmouth* may be escorted from Aden to Suez by an early opportunity, *Northbrook* coming from India about September 12. This will cause least delay and ensure earliest return of ships to Bombay for large convoy 2nd Division. Reply should be addressed to S.N.O., Aden.

Swiftsure will sail to-day.

F. 58. From Admiralty. September 6.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.

155. Your 143. Proposals approved, but it is suggested if 2nd Division and detachments for Mombasa leave together about September 16, *Dartmouth* could join half-way between India and Aden, when *Fox* could be detached with transports to East Africa.

Subsequent 16-day sailings approved. Acknowledge.

F. 59. From Admiralty. September 7, 12.12 a.m.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.

156. Until the China Squadron have searched the Dutch East Indies for *Gneisenau* and *Scharnhorst*, *Espiègle* should not proceed east of Colombo.

F. 60. From *Chatham*, Aden. September 6.
To Admiralty. (Received 5.10 a.m.)

487 N. Request reply to Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, telegram No. 146, *Chatham* and seven transports are now ready to leave for Suez if approved.

F. 61. From Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. September 7.
To Admiralty. (Received 9.19 a.m.)

150. Your telegram 155. Proposal would not comply with instructions regarding minimum escort ordered in your telegram 153.¹

Next convoy will consist of nearly 40 ships sailing from Bombay and Karachi.

To leave before *Dartmouth* arrives will entail Karachi group starting with *Mayo*² only, which was my original proposal. Moreover, to detach *Fox* half-way, will leave large convoy with only two warships in the more dangerous area, and is contrary to your orders.

When East African Force is sent, I propose *Dartmouth* should escort it, being the only match for *Königsberg* in speed, and having to pass through waters where likely to meet her.

F. 62. From Secretary of State. September 7.
To Viceroy, Army Department.

846. Please understand that remainder, Force C, must leave on 16th at latest for Mombasa as arranged.

¹ See p. 137.

² Probably coding error. T.S.D.D.

F. 63. From Intelligence Officer, Singapore. September 8.
To Admiralty. (Received 6.22 a.m.)

Referring to my telegram of August 29, Second Officer *City of Winchester* arrived at Singapore yesterday, reported personally to me that *Goldenfels* was not accompanied by an armed vessel of any kind whatever.

F. 64. From Viceroy. September 8.
To Admiralty. (Received 10.5 p.m.)

H. 735. Reference to your 846 of September 7, His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, has since informed us he has received order from Admiralty that the minimum strength of escort in future is to be two ships, one of which must be superior to the *Königsberg*, armed transports not being counted, and that one more regular ship of war must be added for a large convoy. Consequently, no naval escort on above conditions can be ready till 18th instant and the echelon of 24 ships which was to have sailed on 9th and 10th instant consisting of remainder of 9th Cavalry Brigade, remainder of 7th Division and two British battalions in relief, must now be detained until that date, when it is hoped that in addition to above, Force C and about 18 ships can sail with three Artillery Brigades, one British battalion in relief and supplies. Later sailings must also be proportionately delayed until escort returns unless Admiralty can be moved to make additional ships available to assist East Indies Squadron in this duty.

F. 65. From Admiralty. September 9.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.

158. Re your 143 and following telegrams re escort :—

It has been decided in view of the urgency of hastening the transport of troops from Egypt that the previous orders as to the numbers of warships attached to convoys can be modified to meet the number of vessels available for this duty unless a change for the worse occurs in the naval situation in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea.

Black Prince, *Duke of Edinburgh*, and one armed troopship should suffice for Red Sea.

Swiftsure, *Dartmouth*, *Chatham*, and armed troopship for Indian Ocean.

Fox and armed troopship for East African convoy.

Could not fortnightly sailings be arranged if convoy changes escorts in Long. 47° E., the escorts to coal at Suez and India, not calling at Aden?

Fox could start with the first large convoy till *Chatham* joins and then proceed to East Africa.

Unless objection seen arrange for this and report.

66. From H.M.S. *Pegasus*, Zanzibar. September 9.
To Admiralty. (Received 8.50 p.m.)

By wireless telegraph intercepted and impression conveyed to us at Tanga (German East Africa), consider *Königsberg* is in this vicinity.

F. 67. From Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. September 12.
To Admiralty. (Received 9.30 a.m.)

151. Your telegram 158 does not expedite departure first large convoy which awaits return of *Dartmouth* to Karachi. Have already arranged (17th) *Chatham* to meet us in Long. 55° E., when *Dartmouth* and *Hardinge* will be detached with East African Force. *Dartmouth* considered preferable to the *Fox* for this service as *Königsberg* on September 6 was reported in vicinity of Zanzibar.

Did not consider it safe in present conditions of monsoon for escort to omit coal at Aden, and time saved, even if timing of meeting proved practicable, would be small and completely nullified by bad coaling facilities at Bombay.

- F. 68. From Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. September 13.
To Admiralty. (Received 11.5 a.m.)
157. Disposition of Squadron September 13 :—
Swiftsure, *Dufferin*, *Dalhousie*, Bombay.
Dalhousie leaves here to-day for Persian Gulf.
Fox arrived here September 13.
Dartmouth left Aden for Karachi September 12.
Hardinge, *Minto*, at Karachi.
Odin, Bushire; *Espiègle*, Colombo; both of them about to leave for Shatt-al-Arab.
Black Prince, *Duke of Edinburgh*, *Chatham*, *Northbrook*, Red Sea.
Swiftsure, *Fox*, *Dufferin* leave Bombay September 18 with 31 transports.
- F. 69. From Admiralty. September 20.
To A.C. 9th Cruiser Squadron.
51. *Ocean* is required for convoy duties in the East Indies.
- F. 70. From Resident, Zanzibar. September 20.
To Admiralty. (Received 7.53 a.m.)
Following from Captain *Pegasus* begins :—
Regret *Pegasus* obliged to strike flag bombarded by *Königsberg* Zanzibar Harbour at dawn to-day while repairing engines and cleaning boilers.
Our guns could not reach enemy (message ends).
Königsberg has disappeared towards the South.
- F. 71. From Bombay. September 20.
To Admiralty. (Received 9.19 a.m.)
171. Owing to excessive rain several transports could not be got ready for sea on September 18. At request of Government of India departure of whole of convoys, therefore, postponed. *Swiftsure*, *Fox*, *Dufferin* leaving Bombay September 20 with about 29 transports. *Dartmouth*, *Hardinge*, *Minto* leaving Karachi September 21 with 11 transports. My telegraphic address is here at Bombay.
- F. 72. From A.S., Malta. September 21.
To Admiralty. (Received 3.52 p.m.)
728. *Minerva* asks if she is to continue to convoy transports after passing Malta p.m. September 21.
- F. 73. From Admiralty. September 21.
To A.S., Malta.
Your 728. *Minerva* to relieve *Weymouth* on escort duty to Marseilles, *Weymouth* to escort *Minerva's* transports to Egypt and at once proceed via Suez Canal to join *Dartmouth* and *Chatham* in hunt for *Königsberg*.
- F. 74. From Aden. September 21.
To Admiralty. (Received 2.32 p.m.)
Chatham arrived.
- F. 75. From Admiralty. September 21.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
177. *Ocean* and *Goliath* are now en route to replace *Chatham* and *Dartmouth* for escort duties.
Ocean is now half-way to Malta from Gibraltar, *Goliath* off Finisterre.
- F. 76. From Admiralty. September 24.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
184. *Ocean* and *Goliath* are delayed by defects, but are ordered to proceed to Suez and should arrive October 4 and 5 respectively, and then carry out escort work under your orders.

- Minerva* will be ordered to Suez to relieve *Black Prince* and arrive at Suez about October 23.
Vengeance will relieve *Duke of Edinburgh* later.
If Red Sea is considered safe *Duke of Edinburgh* might return with you to Bombay for next convoy.
Reconsider escorts on this basis and report proposals.
- F. 77. From Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. September 27.
To Admiralty. (Received 2.20 a.m.)
182. Your telegram 184. Consider it quite safe for present convoy to proceed Suez with *Black Prince* and *Northbrook*. Escort for next convoy from Bombay, *Swiftsure*, *Dufferin*. From Karachi, *Duke of Edinburgh*, *Hardinge* (group corrupt, ? would be advisable for), these groups to join and form one convoy. East African Force to leave with *Ocean* and *Goliath* on arrival at Bombay.
- F. 78. From Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. September 27.
To Admiralty. (Received 10.24 p.m.)
184. *Swiftsure*, *Dufferin*, arrived Aden September 27 and leave for Bombay September 28. *Black Prince*, *Northbrook* have proceeded with convoy of 35 transports to Suez. *Duke of Edinburgh*, *Hardinge* leave for Karachi September 28.
Minto expected to arrive at Aden shortly and will remain at disposal of Political Resident, Aden.
- F. 79. From Admiralty. September 30.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
192. In view of *Emden* possibly being in the locality of Laccadives, can you make a detour to the southward on the way to Bombay without delaying the next convoy ?
- F. 80. From Admiralty. September 30.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
195. Date of next convoy from Bombay will be October 10. Escort should be strengthened by *Ocean* and *Goliath* as soon after leaving as possible, as it is a very large one.
Give directions accordingly. Subsequent sailings are to be every 16 days, and dates adhered to as closely as possible.
Convoy from China will probably proceed direct from Colombo to Aden with *Dupleix* and *Askold*. If not, you will be informed. Acknowledge.
- F. 81. From Admiralty. October 1.
To Navy, Aden, for *Weymouth*.
Intelligence Officer, Colombo, for *Hampshire*.
Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
H.M.S. *Dartmouth*, Mombasa.
Weymouth is to coal as quickly as possible and proceed to cruise in the vicinity of Sokotra. She should keep not further than about 200 miles from Sokotra, picking up all the information possible from passing ships and by W/T from Aden and deal with *Emden* if she comes into that locality.
Königsberg also might come North. Acknowledge.
- F. 82. From Admiralty. October 1.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
199. In view of pressure on resources of Commander-in-Chief, Cape, the East Coast of Africa North of Latitude of Delagoa Bay is transferred to your command forthwith. Arrange accordingly. Acknowledge.
- F. 83. From Admiralty. October 2.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
Swiftsure, via Bombay.
201. My 195. *Goliath* and *Ocean* have been directed to proceed at good speed to Bombay coaling at Aden to be ready to strengthen escort for

convoy ready to leave about 12th for Egypt, Mombasa, and Mauritius. Sailing may be slightly delayed.

Give them detailed instructions and report proposals for escort. Acknowledge.

F. 84. From Admiralty. October 2.
To S.N.O., Malta (495).

Commander-in-Chief, East Indies (202).

Minerva is not now required to remain at Suez, she is to proceed south for escort duties and act under the orders of Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.

F. 85. From Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. October 4.
To Admiralty. (Received 6.55 a.m.)

193. Your telegram 201. Escort proposals for next convoy.

Swiftsure, *Dufferin* leave Bombay October 12. *Duke of Edinburgh* (corrupt group, probably *Hardinge*) leave Karachi October 13 for rendezvous position 18° 55' N., 61° 30' E.

Ocean and *Goliath* join at rendezvous and proceed thence with *Hardinge* to Mombasa.

Transports for Mauritius to be detached with *Hardinge* reinforced if necessary by battleship or light cruiser till in safe waters.

Swiftsure, *Duke of Edinburgh*, *Dufferin* proceed from rendezvous to Aden.

Black Prince or *Weymouth* and *Northbrook* from Aden to Suez.

Should not propose awaiting arrival of *Ocean*, *Goliath* at Bombay as this would delay departure by at least three days.

F. 86. From Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. October 4.
To Admiralty. (Received 7.28 a.m.)

194. I wish to point out that by gradual withdrawal of all fast cruisers from escort duties I shall be left with no ships approximating to speed of German cruisers.

Minerva inadequate for escort if *Königsberg* or *Emden* slip into Red Sea, and as long as they are at large I submit that *Duke of Edinburgh* at least should be left under my orders.

F. 87. From Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. October 4.
To Admiralty. (Received 10.1 a.m.)

197. My telegram No. 193. Proposed escort from Aden to Suez should be *Duke of Edinburgh*, *Minerva*, *Northbrook* instead of as stated.¹

F. 88. From Admiralty. October 4.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.

205. Your 193, 194 and 197. General arrangements approved, but as convoy may be delayed in sailing after 12th *Ocean* and *Goliath* should join as far east as possible. They are ahead of time previously given and one is sufficient for Mombasa.

Question retaining *Duke of Edinburgh* will be considered and further instructions given.

Fox will be required at Mombasa to assist G.O.C. Expedition "B" and is to be given orders to co-operate with him and assist him in disembarkation and operations on coast of German East Africa. *Fox* should assist in search for enemy cruisers till required for above operations in the vicinity of Zanzibar.

F. 89. From Admiralty. October 4.
To Commander-in-Chiefs, East Indies and Cape.

206. Intercepted messages from German Admiralty through Windhuk to *Königsberg*, which are to be repeated twice a day through Muanza from October 4 to 7 show that *Königsberg* may be in East African waters.

¹ In his telegram No. 193 of October 4, Commander-in-Chief, proposed *Black Prince* or *Weymouth* and *Northbrook* as escort from Aden to Suez.

F. 90. From Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. October 5.
To Admiralty. (Received 10.50 a.m.)

199. *Swiftsure*, *Dufferin* arrived Bombay. *En route* from Aden made detour northwards Laccadive Archipelago, but nothing suspicious seen or heard.

F. 91. From Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. October 5.
To Admiralty. (Received 12.42 p.m.)

201. Your telegram 205. Following telegram sent to S.N.O., East Africa, begins:—

Fox (?) is to take *Chatham*, *Dartmouth* and *Weymouth* under orders and assume charge of search for *Königsberg* so long as operations remain in area convenient to control by *Fox*, but in the event of *Königsberg* being reported at a distance from Mombasa charge is again to be transferred to *Chatham* and *Fox* is to remain in vicinity of Mombasa.

Inform ships concerned.

Details of search programme already approved are to be obtained from *Chatham* and are not to be interfered with, but *Fox* may suggest modification.

F. 92. From Intelligence Officer, Colombo. October 6.
To Admiralty. (Received 3.16 p.m.)

22. . . . *Dupleix* (French), *Askold* (Russian) and five transports left Colombo. . . .

F. 93. From Admiralty. October 6.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.

209. Very Secret. Indian Government are sending small force to Abadan leaving India with main convoy about 13th instant and to be called Expedition "D." Direct S.N.O. Persian Gulf to co-operate with G.O.C. and give naval assistance in disembarking and as necessary to forward the operations. After you have consulted with Military Authorities report arrangements you have made.

F. 94. From Admiralty. October 6.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.

210. Contingent from Ceylon ready about middle of October. Can you arrange to escort it from Colombo to Bombay in time for it to join next Indian convoy sailing about October 26? If possible to do so, arrange direct with Governor of Ceylon. Report arrangements made to Admiralty.

F. 95. From Intelligence Officer, Colombo. October 6.
To Admiralty. (Received 7.40 p.m.)

21. *Hampshire* reports *Emden* seen off Felidu Atoll Maldivé Islands for three days—left about October 1, steaming Northerly direction.

F. 96. From Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. October 7.
To Admiralty. (Received 3.2 p.m.)

208. *Weymouth* did not receive Admiralty telegram No. 198 of October 1¹ at Aden. S.N.O. Mombasa has been directed to send her back to Sokotra in accordance therewith.

F. 97. From Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. October 7.
To Admiralty. (Received 5.42 p.m.)

210. Your telegram 210. I see no present prospect of escort being available from Colombo to Bombay for Ceylon contingent before next convoy leaves at end of October. If *Emden* has been located by end of October it is considered contingent should proceed to Bombay unaccompanied.

¹ See F. 81.

- F. 98. From Admiralty. October 7.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. (Received 8.7 p.m.)
215. As the *Emden* is at large on the western side of India and the large expedition will not be ready to sail till 14th or 15th cannot *Swiftsure* search and protect trade and *Duke of Edinburgh* search to the entrance of the Persian Gulf for *Emden* or *Königsberg*? You might remain behind to complete escort arrangements.
- F. 99. From Admiralty. October 8.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
216. . . . It is possible that the *Emden* may attempt to come up the Persian Gulf to co-operate with any movement of the Turks in that region. . . .
- F. 100. From Governor of Ceylon. October 8.
To Colonial Office. (Received 8.50 a.m.)
1457. . . . On October 7 Legislative Council unanimously approved charge for the contingent. I have provisionally arranged passage of contingent by Bibby vessel on October 20, but Admiral telegraphs he cannot either promise to provide escort or guarantee safety without escort. Consequent deadlock. Can you press Admiralty to arrange for escort? Trade confidence in the Navy will be further shaken if the contingent cannot sail.
- F. 101. From Commander-in-Chief, China. October 9.
To Admiralty. (Received 10.30 a.m.)
193. Three French transports with 2,000 troops have arrived Singapore, but no escort is available except *Zhemchug* (Russian) which is not strong enough and has not sufficient coal capacity.
Yarmouth is nearest available ship, and . . . I propose to withdraw her temporarily from search for *Emden*, leaving *Hampshire*, *Chikuma* (Jap.) and *Empress of Asia* to continue it.
Yarmouth could then escort transports to Bombay in time to join convoy sailing there November 1. . . .
- F. 102. From Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. October 10.
To Admiralty. (Received 8.19 a.m.)
217. Departure of convoy postponed until October 16, as under existing circumstances it is considered advisable to await arrival of *Goliath* arriving at Bombay October 16. *Ocean* requires three days at Aden for repair of fan, etc., and will meet convoy at sea.
- F. 103. From Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. October 11.
To Admiralty. (Received 8.7 a.m.)
218. *Ocean* delayed at Aden with machinery defects until October 14.
- F. 104. From Admiralty. October 12.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
224. Whilst *Fox* is employed with Expedition "B" *Dupleix* is to be employed under your directions on escort duty with main convoys to and from India. Give her necessary directions. Commander-in-Chief, China, informed.
- F. 105. From Admiralty. October 15.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
226. For the better control of your command, you are given the option of remaining on shore at Bombay. Report what you decide.
- F. 106. From Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. October 16.
To Admiralty. (Received 10.52 a.m.)
225. Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, *Swiftsure*, *Goliath*, *Dufferin*, 47 transports and station collier *Reichenfels* left (leaving) Bombay 5 p.m. October 16. *Reichenfels* will be placed under control of *Chatham*. My telegraphic address remains Bombay until further notice.

- F. 107. From Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. October 16.
To Admiralty. (Received 10.45 p.m.)
226. Your telegram 226. I am proceeding with large convoy October 16 movements being somewhat complicated and arrangements having been already made.
- F. 108. From Admiralty. October 23.
To Commander-in-Chief, China.
244. Your 218¹ approved. Inform *Minotaur* and Navy Board, Melbourne.
Philomel and *Pyramus* can then escort *Monmouthshire* with rifles and details and any French transports ready at the time to Suez.
Your 215. *Askold* can escort French transports and Ceylon contingent to Bombay. They should leave Colombo as soon as possible after her arrival.
Inform Commander-in-Chief, East Indies and Colombo.
- F. 109. From Admiralty. October 24.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. (Sent 12.15 p.m.)
240. A printed programme of sailings of convoys from England to India and *vice versa* is now on its way to you. It is dated 1.10.14 M/T. Though departures are already behind time they should be adhered to as closely as possible.
A convoy of nine transports with Wessex Territorial Division left England October 10, and is due at Suez October 26. Escort to Bombay required. Report arrangements.
Another similar convoy for India leaves October 29 with Home Counties Territorials.
Programme of sailings was drawn up for outward and homeward convoys to meet at Suez so that escorts would be available in both directions without delaying troops and sailings were timed at 16 days intervals.
- F. 110. From Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. October 24.
To Admiralty. (Received 1.40 p.m.)
238. *Swiftsure* and *Minerva* arrived Aden October 24 with 38 transports.
Dufferin due at Aden October 25 with one disabled transport. Convoys proceeding to Suez without coaling at Aden escorting ships *Duke of Edinburgh*, *Minerva* and *Northbrook*. *Swiftsure*, *Dufferin* returning to Bombay when finished coaling. *Duke of Edinburgh* leaving convoy October 25 Red Sea and returning to Karachi otherwise departure of next convoy indefinitely postponed.
Ocean remaining in Persian Gulf safeguarding transports.
Goliath and convoys due at Mombasa October 31.
Hardinge and one transport due at Mauritius November 6 and will probably escort transport then (?) to Aden.
Dupleix detained at Suez with defects in machinery until October 27.
- F. 111. From Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. October 15.
To Admiralty. (Received 1.30 a.m.)
239. Your telegram 240. Territorial convoy could be escorted from Suez to Bombay by *Dupleix*, leaving Suez October 27. If further escort should be considered necessary they must wait for *Minerva* and *Northbrook* due at Suez October 30, and in that case could not leave Aden before November 10 with *Swiftsure* and *Duke of Edinburgh*.
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- ¹ 218 from Commander-in-Chief, China, to Admiralty 23.10.14, sent noon, received 6.29 a.m.
218. Your 239. *Minotaur* requests permission for *Philomel* and *Pyramus* to leave convoy in vicinity of Cocos Island to proceed to coal at Singapore and rejoin convoy at Colombo. . . .

- F. 112. *From* Admiralty. October 25.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
 241. Your 239. *Dupleix* will suffice in Red Sea unless you see objections. Suggest she be given further instructions at Aden before she proceeds to Bombay.
- F. 113. *From* Intelligence Officer, Colombo. October 28.
To Admiralty. (Received 1 a.m.)
 17. *Askold* left Colombo 11 p.m. October 27 with transports *Amiral Olry*, *Polynésien*, *Magellan* and Ceylon Contingent *Worcestershire*.
- F. 114. *From* Director of Royal Indian Marine. October 28.
To Admiralty. (Received 6.49 a.m.)
 Telegraphic address of Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, Bombay.
- F. 115. *From* Admiralty. November 2.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
 259. *Minto* is to proceed up the Red Sea to destroy every Turkish steamer that she can find. When that is done deal with the dhows, sinking Turkish dhows and collecting Arab dhows into suitable harbours where arrangements can be made to detain them.
- F. 116. *From* Aden. November 3.
To Transports, London. (Received 11.49 a.m.)
 Ns. 164. *Dupleix* and convoy here November 2 at 4 p.m.
- F. 117. *From* Admiralty. November 6.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
 266. *Duke of Edinburgh* is to return to Home waters, accompanying convoy to Malta, where she can be docked if necessary.
Swiftsure should accompany convoy to Suez, returning with convoy of Territorials to India.
Ocean to return to Karachi for convoy leaving middle of November ; *Dupleix* escorting convoy from Bombay.
 Report if any objection seen ; if not, arrange accordingly.
Hampshire will escort convoy from Bombay, sailing about November 28, unless *Emden* is dealt with previously.
- F. 118. *From* Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. November 6.
To Admiralty.
 258. *Gloucester* has arrived at Aden. What are her orders ? I have received no intimation of her joining East Indies Station.
- F. 119. *From* Admiralty. November 6.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
 267. Your 258. *Gloucester* is to proceed to Colombo, passing northward of Laccadive Islands, and then to join in search for *Emden* or as may be ordered. This telegram has been repeated to *Gloucester* at Aden.
- F. 120. *From* Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. November 7.
To Admiralty. (Received 9.30 p.m.)
 263. Your telegram 266. Consider it undesirable that *Ocean* should leave Persian Gulf at present as Captain is conducting combined operations with G.O.C. at Shatt-al-Arab. Also strongly deprecate withdrawal of *Duke of Edinburgh* from convoy duties without relief.
 To carry out programme just received, and to keep ships continually running until end of year, will tax them in all probability beyond endurance. I have received numerous representations that more time is required for cleaning boilers and necessary repairs. Unless some reliefs are available I fear that breakdown of programme will be inevitable.

- F. 121. *From* Admiralty. November 9.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
 271. Your 263. *Duke of Edinburgh* is required for important duties suited to her fighting powers.
Emden is only enemy cruiser known to be within striking distance of convoys, and is located and being searched for by numerous cruisers.
 It appears that one strong ship with armed transport should suffice for moderate sized convoys in Indian Ocean and one cruiser in Red Sea. Suggest *Dupleix* for Red Sea ; she is to be relieved by *Desaix* shortly.
 Previous orders for *Hampshire* stand for one trip, Bombay to Aden, unless *Ocean* can be spared.
 Consider on these lines and report proposals.
- F. 122. *From* Admiralty. November 9.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, and *Fox* Mombasa.
 272. Approved for Captain of *Fox* to remain in *Fox*, *Hardinge* to return to escort work unless you wish otherwise.
- F. 123. *From* Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. November 9.
To Admiralty. (Received 1.52 p.m.)
 265. *Hardinge* should be ordered to Colombo, being required to convoy between Calcutta and Rangoon.
 Addressed to *Fox* and repeated to Admiralty.
- F. 124. *From* Director of Royal Indian Marine. November 9.
To Admiralty. (Received 4.36 p.m.)
Dupleix and convoy arrived Bombay November 9.
- F. 125. *From* Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. November 9.
To Admiralty. (Received 9.58 p.m.)
 267. Following telegram sent to *Duke of Edinburgh* (begins) :—
 Admiralty telegraph *Duke of Edinburgh* to return home accompanying convoy to Malta, when she can be docked if necessary.
Swiftsure to continue to Suez with *Duke of Edinburgh* and convoy is to bring back convoy of Territorial Forces to Bombay.
Dufferin is to proceed from Aden to Karachi to escort convoy leaving Karachi November 20.
Northbrook should accompany *Duke of Edinburgh* to Suez and should return Aden with *Swiftsure* (ends).
- F. 126. *From* Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. November 10.
To Admiralty. (Received 9.24 a.m.)
 269. Impossible to adhere to programme of transport sailings just received, dated November 1 ; sixteen-day sailings were only possible so long as escort could maintain at least 12½ knots on return voyage Aden to Bombay, whereas speed of transports which arrived to-day was only 10. Every effort is being made to expedite, but delay at Suez from this cause inevitable unless more ships can be spared for duty of escorting.
- F. 127. *From* Admiralty. November 10.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
 275. Consequent on destruction of *Emden*, *Weymouth* and *Gloucester* are to proceed to Malta.
Melbourne and *Sydney* are to leave the convoy and push on to Colombo and then proceed to Malta.
- F. 128. *From* Admiralty. November 11.
To *Swiftsure*, Aden, and Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
 277. *Swiftsure* is to leave convoy and proceed with despatch to Suez. Convoy is not to be delayed if no Indian Marine ship is available—order troopships to proceed independently and as fast as possible.

- F. 129. *From* Admiralty. November 11.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
 278. Your 269. Convoys are not necessary except in Red Sea, and Homeward bound should collect and Outward bound convoys disperse at Aden.
 Let *Dupleix* take her convoy as arranged.
Swiftsure must remain in Egypt for the present. Send her reserve ammunition to Suez at once. Outward bound Territorial convoy will be escorted to Aden by *Minerva* or *Proserpine* if no Indian Marine ship is available, the escort then returning to Suez.
 Make arrangements for Red Sea convoys using Empress Liners and Indian Marine ships as escorts.
- F. 130. *From* Admiralty. November 12.
To S.N.O., Mombasa. (Sent 2.30 a.m.)
 Captain Caulfeild will exchange into *Chatham*, taking temporary command of *Chatham* and proceeding at once (immediately) to Gibraltar. *Weymouth* will also proceed to Gibraltar, both ships with all despatch. Report when they have sailed. . . .
- F. 131. *From* Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. November 12.
To Admiralty. (Received 7.42 a.m.)
 278. Your telegram 278. Outward bound Territorial convoy due at Suez November 11 must await *Northbrook* due there November 16 unless *Minerva* or *Proserpine* can bring them on.
- F. 132. *From* Admiralty. November 12.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, and S.N.O., Mombasa. (Sent 6.40 p.m.)
 281. *Weymouth* orders to proceed Gibraltar cancelled; she is to proceed at once to Simon's Bay. Acknowledge and report when she has sailed.
- F. 133. *From* Admiralty. November 12.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. (Sent 9.20 p.m.)
 282. *Ocean* is to remain on station and hoist your flag when no longer required in Persian Gulf.
Pyramus is to remain on East Indies Station. *Philomel* is to proceed to Egypt. *Hampshire* and *Yarmouth* to proceed to Gibraltar.
- F. 134. *From* Port Officer, Aden. November 13.
To Admiralty. (Received 8.45 a.m.)
 206. Governor, Port Sudan, refuses to accept telegram for Navy. Tel. has been repeated Port Said radio for transmission to *Swiftsure* by W/T. Eastern Telegraph Co.'s Station at Port Said has been instructed to hand copy to British man-of-war on arrival for transmission to *Swiftsure* by W/T.
 Message sent to Aden radio for transmission to all H.M. Ships in wireless communication during next week.
- F. 135. *From* Admiralty. November 13.
To S.N.O., Egypt (No. 10). (Sent 5.25 p.m.)
 Commander-in-Chief, East Indies (No. 283).
Minerva is to convoy outward bound Territorial convoy to Aden from Suez.
- F. 136. *From* Admiralty. November 16.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. (Sent 12.55 p.m.)
 290. You are not authorised to direct any operations in the Red Sea. Those operations will be directed by S.N.O., Egypt.
- F. 137. *From* Admiralty. November 17.
To Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
 294. In view of possible outbreak of war between Germany and Portugal, German ships at Goa will probably be ordered to sea at once. Capture them if you have any vessel available.

- F. 138. *From* Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. November 18.
To Admiralty. (Received 7.40 a.m.)
 293. 1st Lord of the Admiralty. Your 293.¹ *Gloucester* sailed November 16. Proceeding to (cancel leave—*sic*—Canal leaving?) November 21 due at Suez November 29. Anticipate no difficulty with regard to other duties. Have directed Captain of *Ocean* as S.N.O. Persian Gulf to correspond direct with Admiralty, Government of India and Director of Royal Indian Marine during my temporary absence from Indian waters continuing myself in general control, but as operations in Persian Gulf are chiefly military consider that details may safely be left to Senior Officer on the spot. I may be out of touch for a short time while on passage but best endeavours will be made to maintain communication. Convoy through Red Sea can readily be controlled as heretofore.
- F. 139. *From* Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. November 18.
To Admiralty. (Received 6.32 a.m.)
 292. Your telegram 294. I have ordered *Hardinge*, due at Colombo November 19, to proceed to sea.
- F. 140. *From* Aden. November 22.
To Admiralty. (Received 12.4 p.m.)
Northbrook arrived.
- F. 141. *From* Intelligence Officer, Colombo. November 26.
To Admiralty. (Received 8.51 a.m.)
 16. French transport *Chili* left bound for Djibouti November 25. *Philomel* and French transports *Euphrate*, *Latouche-Tréville*, left bound for Aden November 26.
- F. 142. *From* Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. November 26.
To Admiralty. (Received 10.10 p.m.)
 308. Eight transports conveying Territorial Regiments leave Aden for Bombay November 26.
- F. 143. *From* Admiralty. November 28.
To Director of Indian Marine.
 2. *Hardinge* should remain at Goa, being responsible that no German or Austrian ships escape in any circumstances though the declaration of war may probably not take place immediately.
 The prizes will be Portuguese.

APPENDIX H.

TELEGRAMS TO AND FROM THE CAPE STATION, 1914.

- H. 1. *From* Admiralty. 25.7.14.
To Commander-in-Chief, Cape.
 54. H.M.S. *Nottingham* leaves England about August 31 for the Cape Station calling at St. Helena and Ascension. *Astræa* should meet *Nottingham* at St. Helena.
- H. 2. *From* Colonial Office. 6.8.14.
To Union of South Africa. (Sent 6.35 p.m.)
 His Majesty's Government gratefully accept your offer to take over defence and internal order yourselves and to release Imperial troops from South Africa. All which are not actually required in duties which cannot otherwise be performed will accordingly be recalled.

¹ See p. 40.

Secret.—If at the same time your Ministers desire and feel themselves able to seize such part of German South-West Africa as will give them the command of Lüderitzbucht, Swakopmund and the wireless stations there or in the interior we should feel that this was a great and urgent Imperial service

H. 3. *From* Admiralty. 6.8.14.
To Commander-in-Chief, Cape. (Sent 11.25 p.m.)

74. Confer with General Officer Commanding five battalions infantry, two regiments cavalry, one brigade artillery, two companies Army Service Corps to leave South Africa. Wire earliest arrangements possible giving probable dates of sailing.

H. 4. *From* Admiralty. 9.8.14.
To Commander-in-Chief, Cape. (Sent 11.45 a.m.)

76. For the present *Pegasus* to remain on East Coast. Armed cruiser (*sic*) *Kinfauns Castle* sails to-day for the Cape and will act under your orders. Leave for St. Helena with garrison as soon as you feel the situation permits.

H. 5. *From* Colonial Office. 9.8.14.
To Union of South Africa. (Sent 12.25 p.m.)

My telegram of August 6. Seizure of coast wireless stations Swakopmund and Lüderitzbucht regarded by H.M. Government as urgent necessity. This can only be effected in reasonable time by joint naval and military expedition up the coast. Although capture of long distance station Windhoek is of great importance this would be a serious military undertaking that will occupy some time. It might follow another expedition against coast stations or be carried out independently from interior, but this must rest with your Government. Departure of expedition up coast must depend on local naval situation when force is ready and at present it is not probable that naval escort will be available. H.M. Government suggests that coast expedition might be prepared in consultation with Senior Naval Officer, Cape. Admiralty should be informed where and when it is proposed they should embark. No doubt your Government will consider whether in order to divert defending force from coast, raids across land frontier can be arranged.

H. 6. *From* Commander-in-Chief, Cape. 12.8.14.
To Admiralty. (Received 12.28 a.m.)

102. The four transports required will be ready to sail as follows:—*Kenilworth Castle*, August 23, *Briton*, August 25, *Dunluce Castle*, August 26, *Guildford Castle*, September 3. This is assuming they will sail independently and do not require escort from here.

H. 7. *From* Admiralty. 12.8.14.
To Commander-in-Chief, Cape. (Sent 12.30 p.m.)

80. *Leviathan* has been ordered to Cape for convoying transports. She is now near the Azores and is to coal at St. Vincent, Cape Verde.

H. 8. *From* Admiralty. 12.8.14.
To Commander-in-Chief, Cape. (Sent 1.40 p.m.)

81. Orders about St. Helena garrison cancelled. First three transports are to start together 26th instant. *Hyacinth* to escort till *Leviathan* is met, then returns for fourth transport.

H. 9. *From* Admiralty. 13.8.14.
To Commander-in-Chief, Cape. (Sent 11.40 a.m.)

86. Your 101.¹ *Nottingham* not available. *Astræa* ordered to Cape to convoy troops together with *Hyacinth*.

¹ Asked when *Nottingham* would join.

H. 10. *From* Commander-in-Chief, Cape. 13.8.14.
To Admiralty. (Received 12.39 p.m.)

107. *Hyacinth* proceeding to patrol line 50 miles long South (true) from Cape of Good Hope. *Königsberg's* whereabouts uncertain but Swakopmund was signalled to in cypher 11 p.m., August 12, and she may be working south. With reference to Admiralty cable 76 may I exercise my judgment as to keeping *Astræa* and *Pegasus* on coast.

H. 11. *From* Admiralty. 13.8.14.
To Commander-in-Chief, Cape. (Sent 5.5 p.m.)

87. *Königsberg* reported in vicinity of Inhambane. *Astræa* ordered to leave Zanzibar for Simonstown. *Pegasus* to remain Zanzibar to cover Durban and trade from *Königsberg*; abandon patrol mentioned in your 107 and proceed to Durban.

H. 12. *From* Commander-in-Chief, Cape. 15.8.14.
To Admiralty. (Received 1.50 a.m.)

111. Your telegram 91¹ has been repeated to S.N.O., Simonstown, in whose hands I have had to leave arrangements on my proceeding to Durban as directed in your telegram 87. I have instructed him to arrange accordingly and report direct to Admiralty.

I submit I should be better able to control the movements and disposition of ships and conduct the general operations on this station if I can remain for the present at Simonstown and suggest that I should return there from Durban by rail.

H. 13. *From* Commander-in-Chief, Cape. 15.8.14.
To Admiralty. (Received 4.37 a.m.)

112. Secretary of State for Colonies has requested Union Government to seize Swakopmund and Lüderitz Bay (German South-West Africa) without delay. Governor-General asked me for escort for expedition which is being prepared. I submit *Hyacinth* return to Cape forthwith and leave *Astræa* to search for and deal with *Königsberg*.

Reply:—93. Your 112. Approved *Hyacinth* to return to Cape. *Astræa* to search for and deal with *Königsberg*.

H. 14. *From* Commander-in-Chief, Cape. 17.8.14.
To Admiralty. (Received 5.59 a.m.)

116. I submit *Pegasus* being alone Zanzibar is very risky as *Königsberg* has just double weight broadside, superior speed and torpedoes. I recommend that instead of proceeding to Cape as ordered August 13 *Astræa* return from Inhambane if *Königsberg* should not have been met with and that she and *Pegasus* should act in company

H. 15. *From* Admiralty. 17.8.14.
To Commander-in-Chief, Cape. (Sent 11.50 a.m.)

102. Convoy of Cape troops must be escorted by both *Astræa* and *Hyacinth*. Slight risk to *Pegasus* which is to remain at Zanzibar must be accepted.

H. 16. *From* Commander-in-Chief, Cape. 19.8.14.
To Admiralty. (Received 11.15 a.m.)

123. Very urgent. General Officer Commanding-in-Chief informed me on August 14 that the 10th Hussars were not to go home. He now informs me they are to go. It is impossible to get ship ready to take them before about September 6 owing to all available labour Cape Town and Durban being engaged on transports sailing August 26. If they left their horses behind they could be sent in *Balmoral Castle* sailing August 29. Is this to be done or shall I arrange for them to go about September 6?

¹ Subject: transport arrangements.

I am not aware how far decision arrived at is *Hyacinth* and *Astræa* should escort convoy. If they are not back by September 6 only escort available will be *Kinfauns Castle*. If 10th Hussars are to return and all troops sail together sailing of convoy must be delayed.

H. 17. From Admiralty. 21.8.14.
To Commander-in-Chief, Cape. (Sent 3.15 p.m.)

115. *Leviathan* due at Ascension August 28, St. Helena August 31, and is ordered to assist in escort of transports. Use your discretion about ordering *Astræa* back to Cape on *Leviathan* joining. *Astræa* then available to return for further service. *Hyacinth* will be relieved by another cruiser either at Ascension or St. Vincent.

H. 18. From Commander-in-Chief, Cape. 2.9.14.
To Admiralty. (Received 2.42 p.m.)

180. 2nd Battalion East Lancashire Regiment can if necessary leave on September 12 under escort of *Astræa*, but at present no orders as to their departure have been received by the Military Authorities.

2nd Battalion Essex Regiment cannot start from Cape until about September 29.

This can only be arranged by sending *Kinfauns Castle* to Mauritius to return here with troops dispensing with any other escort for Mauritius trip.

Kinfauns Castle can sail for Mauritius September 11 and any transports can be ready on her return but no men-of-war except armed mercantile cruisers will be available for escort.

H. 19. From Commander-in-Chief, Cape. 2.9.14.
To Admiralty. (Received 2.45 p.m.)

179. At the present time from St. Helena on the West to Mombasa on the East, a distance of 4,000 miles, there is no man-of-war, except *Armada Castle* at Port Nolloth. *Kinfauns Castle* is near St. Helena and should arrive about September 8 and then required probably for Mauritius but the important trade centre off the Cape of Good Hope is quite unprotected and I suggest that a cruiser of *Astræa* force should cruise there until *Königsberg* has been dealt with.

H. 20. From Admiralty. 3.9.14.
To Commander-in-Chief, Cape. (Sent 3 p.m.)

144. Your 180. It is considered preferable for both *Astræa* and *Kinfauns Castle* to proceed with *Dover Castle* and the expedition to German South-West Africa. After landing the force at Swakopmund *Astræa* to escort the *Dover Castle* to St. Vincent. *Kinfauns Castle* remaining with expedition as long as necessary, troops at Mauritius must wait for another opportunity. You should consider best means of doing this and report further.

H. 21. From Admiralty. 5.9.14.
To Commander-in-Chief, Cape. (Sent 0.55 a.m.)

145. Arrangements should be made for half-battalion Essex Regiment in South Africa to come home with East Lancashire Regiment

H. 22. From Commander-in-Chief, Cape. 5.9.14.
To Admiralty. (Received 3.30 p.m.)

185. Your 145. *Garth Castle* has been taken up for wing of Essex Regiment now in South African Colonies. Will be ready to proceed September 14 with *Dover Castle* carrying East Lancashire Regiment, escorted by *Astræa*.

Union Authorities inform me sailing of expedition may be delayed a few days beyond September 12 which was original date fixed.

Request instructions whether sailing of Imperial troops is to be delayed in order that *Astræa* may also convoy Union Expedition as ordered in your 144.

Considerable delay is probable in disembarking at Lüderitz Bay and Walfisch Bay.

If Imperial troops are not to wait for Union Expedition latter must wait return of *Hyacinth*

H. 23. From Admiralty. 6.9.14.
To Commander-in-Chief, Cape. (Sent 12.40 p.m.)

147. Your 185. Sailing of Imperial troops for England is not to be delayed for Union Expedition to Lüderitz Bay. Inform Governor-General. Report when troops have landed at Port Nolloth.

H. 24. From Commander-in-Chief, Cape. 9.9.14.
To Admiralty. (Received 4.42 p.m.)

193. Union Government state unless a man-of-war can be detailed to cover landing at Lüderitz Bay and Walfisch Bay expedition will probably be cancelled. Expedition is ready to start on September 12.

In view of serious effect of damping enthusiasm which is at present very strong in Union I strongly recommend if a man-of-war can possibly be spared it should be used for the purpose.

Union Government not prepared to accept protection of armed merchant cruisers alone and consider same escort as required for Imperial troops necessary.

The matter from Imperial aspect is very serious and I recommend detailing of *Astræa* for the Union Expedition as the delay of the 2nd Battalion East Lancashire Regiment and 2nd Battalion Essex Regiment until arrival of another cruiser would seem preferable to effect of cancellation of expedition.

H. 25. From Admiralty. 9.9.14.
To Commander-in-Chief, Cape. (Sent 5.10 p.m.)

149. Cancel Admiralty telegram 147 of September 6. *Astræa* is to escort Union Expedition to German South-West Africa and act as detailed in previous orders on this subject

H. 26. From Commander-in-Chief, Cape. 10.9.14.
To Admiralty. (Received 4.15 p.m.)

199. Your 149. Imperial troops and Union Expedition will sail September 14. Union Force will delay *Astræa* at least seven days in Lüderitzbucht and 14 days at Walfisch Bay. If bad weather is experienced delay may be longer. This delay can be shortened if *Hyacinth* on her return from the present convoy proceeds from St. Helena to Walfisch Bay and relieves *Astræa* who would then get away with *Dover Castle* and *Garth Castle* 10 days earlier.

Reply :—154. Your 199. Approved. Give necessary orders.

H. 27. From Commander-in-Chief, Cape. 21.9.14.
To Admiralty.

236. I suggest that instead of *Hyacinth* relieving *Astræa* at Walfisch Bay she should come direct to Cape from St. Helena; that *Astræa* and *Armada Castle* should remain with Imperial troops until Union Expedition is safely landed, *Astræa* then proceeding to St. Vincent, Cape Verde, with Imperial troops and *Armada Castle*; and that I should proceed in *Hyacinth* with *Kinfauns Castle* to East coast and search for *Königsberg* in co-operation with *Chatham* which has been ordered from Aden to Mombasa.

The delay caused to Imperial troops will be about a fortnight and appears less important than the destruction of *Königsberg*.

Reply :—179. Your 236. Three fast cruisers have been sent after *Königsberg* from Aden. Convoy of Imperial troops must proceed without delay as arranged.

(C1054)

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H. 28. *From* Commander-in-Chief, Cape. 27.9.14.
To Admiralty. (Received 9.29 p.m.)

257. While not wishing to appear in any way an alarmist, I feel compelled to acquaint Their Lordships for information of the Imperial Government with following facts regarding operations already commenced against German South-West Africa:—

As far as I can gather there does not appear to be any comprehensive plan of campaign.

Three forces are operating now, one inland from Prieska, one from Port Nolloth, and one from Angra Pequena, and a fourth is intended to act from Walfisch Bay.

In view of my urgent representations, made without being consulted, the Naval Transport Department has been organised on a more or less workable basis but is still hampered from a want of co-ordination with a non-existent military staff. The arrangements made for supplying the various forces appear to me quite inadequate

The land transport arrangements appear to be equally unsatisfactory

There is not a good supply of ammunition available

I have offered what can be spared from Naval Ordnance Department at Simonstown.

It is contemplated to reconstruct the German railway which has been destroyed, and to lay a line from Walfisch Bay to join the line from Swakopmund. If and when this is accomplished so many men will be required to guard it there will not be much force left to operate.

Finally, a strong party in the Union is out of sympathy with the operations, and any serious reverse would have most serious consequences

In my view the campaign will resemble in character the South African War, and many more troops will be required than the Union Government seem to contemplate.

I have discussed this matter fully with General Thompson, Commanding Cape of Good Hope, and he concurs in the views expressed above and also in the necessity for placing them before the Home Authorities.

If the operations are to continue both General Thompson and I are strongly of opinion that the Walfisch Bay Expedition should be abandoned, and all forces concentrated at Lüderitz Bay.

Neither General Wolfe Murray, General Thompson or myself have been consulted as to best way to undertake the operations.

H. 29. *From* Commander-in-Chief, Cape. 28.9.14.
To Admiralty. (Received 3.26 p.m.)

258. Following telegram sent to Governor-General:—Begins—

Secret. In view of the information which I have received since the return of the transport convoy the expedition to Lüderitz Bay (*sic*) and the great difficulties of protecting Walfisch Bay from sea attacks so as to render it an absolutely safe base, I desire to put the following before you for consideration.

You are aware all Germans, not only from this but neighbouring stations, are not yet accounted for. You are also aware of the small force at my disposal, and of fact for some five weeks that force will be still further reduced.

In these circumstances I do not think I am justified in guaranteeing at present the safe conduct of the continuous stream of reinforcements and supplies which will be necessary for the two expeditions, and at the same time to protect Walfisch Bay from attacks.

From information now available, I am of opinion that if the two guns Q.F. 4.7, at present destined for Walfisch Bay and Swakopmund, were mounted at Lüderitz Bay in addition to guns now there, the port would be safe, and once the transports arrived there they would require no further protection. Anchorage is sheltered and safe; the pier, tugs, lighters,

condensing plant house, telephone, etc., are all intact and in working order. In short, the place forms an excellent base.

Walfisch Bay, on the other hand, is so large that a number of guns and garrison is required to completely defend it. It would be difficult to suitably place guns owing to the low-lying land. Swakopmund is, from a naval point of view, very unsuitable for landing men or stores, and further the pier is destroyed.

The distance from the Cape to Lüderitz Bay is two-thirds of that to Walfisch Bay and entails less risk to safety of ships on passage.

Military reasons may make it an absolute necessity to use Walfisch Bay, but unless such reasons are imperative, I suggest the advisability of making Lüderitz Bay the principal base for the time being may be considered.

When the naval situation has improved the occupation of Walfisch Bay would entail less risk than at the moment.

I have discussed this matter with General Thompson and he is in accord with the view above expressed.

I regret that at this late period of preparation I feel it necessary to make this representation.

H. 30. *From* Commander-in-Chief, Cape. 29.9.14.
To Admiralty. (Received 12.49 a.m.)

262. My 258. Government concurs with my suggestion and have abandoned Walfisch Bay Expedition for present and will concentrate at Lüderitz Bay.

H. 31. *From* Commander-in-Chief, Cape. 8.10.14.
To Admiralty. (Received 5.11 a.m.)

283. Union Government propose a considerable modification and expansion of expedition against German South-West Africa, entailing the earlier landing of 3,000 men and a large railway construction party with materials at Walfisch Bay to enable building of a railway between Walfisch Bay and Swakopmund, preliminary to advancing from there with a still larger force to Windhoek simultaneously with an advance from Lüderitz Bay to the North.

These operations can only be undertaken providing both *Hyacinth* and *Astræa* are held available solely for convoy and covering duties.

Request instructions whether this is to be done.

H. 32. *From* Commander-in-Chief, Cape. 9.10.14.
To Admiralty. (Received 5.45 p.m.)

289. Governor-General and Ministers have expressed a desire to consult me personally on matters connected with expedition to German South-West Africa.

I consider it very desirable in view of condition of affairs set forth in my telegram 257 that such advice as I can give should be at disposal of Union Government as early as possible consequently in spite of the drawback involved I am proceeding to Pretoria to-night

Flag Captain will be S.N.O. in my absence

H. 33. *From* Admiralty. 12.10.14.
To Commander-in-Chief, Cape. (Sent 9.50 p.m.)

214. *Albion* has been ordered to Ascension to await orders. She is placed under your orders with the object of safeguarding the expeditions to German South-West Africa at their ports of disembarkation in conjunction with your other vessels and any local defence guns that may be mounted at Walfisch Bay and Angra Pequena.

Everything should be done to hasten the formation of these bases and transport of stores to them in conjunction with Union Government, and also the placing of guns for their defence. Give *Albion* necessary orders on her arrival at Ascension.

H. 34. *From* Commander-in-Chief, Cape. 12.11.14.
To Admiralty. (Received 1.15 p.m.)

387. Request I may be informed as to Pacific Ocean battle and what were British losses and German. All the news has been suppressed here and I know nothing except for two Reuter telegrams I was permitted to see which said *Good Hope* was sunk and *Monmouth* uncertain. Is the German squadron supposed to be intact?

It is remarkable that on the occupation of Lüderitz two months ago Germans there confidently asserted that German ships would be there in two months and turn out British. Further a man was charged at Bloemfontein yesterday for recently saying that five German ships have arrived in South Africa. The accuracy in numbers of men-of-war seeing that no information as to German Squadron has been published here is noticeable.

It looks as if German Squadron is probably on way here to try and save their most important colony, which in view of rebellion here they may consider feasible.

H. 35. *From* Commander-in-Chief, Cape. 13.11.14.
To Admiralty. (Received 1.30 a.m.)

390. I informed Governor-General on November 9 that it would be necessary for me to withdraw ships from Walfisch Bay about November 13 or 14. His Excellency told me that he is telegraphing to Secretary of State on the subject, and he is anxious as to effect which the withdrawal may have and as to possibility of Germans taking advantage of it to reach Vice-Consulate at Windhoek . . . I have represented to His Excellency that the temporary suspension of expedition until the German Cruiser Squadron is accounted for is necessary, but in view of the internal situation it does not seem likely in any case this can advance for some time yet.

H. 36. *From* Admiralty. 13.11.14.
To Commander-in-Chief, Cape. (Sent 7.22 p.m.)

268. Your 390. When *Minotaur* joins you it will be possible for you to move to Walfisch Bay taking *Albion* with you and keeping all your forces concentrated. *Dartmouth* and *Weymouth* have also been sent to join you.

H. 37. *From* Admiralty. 13.11.14.
To Commander-in-Chief, Cape. (Sent 9.45 p.m.)

269. . . . Ten German ships were off Valparaiso early morning November 13. Eight went North-west, two came in, namely *Leipzig*, *Dresden* . . .

H. 38. *From* Commander-in-Chief, Cape. 14.11.14.
To Admiralty. (Received 4.48 p.m.)

394. In view of your 269 am sending *Armada Castle* this afternoon to Walfisch Bay to relieve *Albion*.

H. 39. *From* Admiralty. 22.11.14.
To Commander-in-Chief, Cape. (Sent 6 p.m.)

284. *Defence* will leave Abrolhos Rocks on 25th for St. Helena en route to South Africa. Until *Defence* joins your flag *Minotaur* and *Albion* are not to be separated and your other ships are either to be in company with *Minotaur* and *Albion* or under the guns of Simon's Bay.

In no circumstances are you to allow yourself to be engaged by *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* without *Minotaur* and *Albion* being united. When *Defence* joins you further orders will be issued.

H. 40. *From* Commander-in-Chief, Cape. 23.11.14.
To Admiralty. (Received 12.45 p.m.)

427. Union Government inform me they propose to send expedition to Walfisch Bay about December 12.

In view of uncertainty of movements of German Squadron and dependence of Lüderitz Bay and Walfisch Bay on sea communication, I am of opinion that until German Squadron is located or dealt with expedition should not start. I request Their Lordships' instructions for information of Union Government.

H. 41. *From* Commander-in-Chief, Cape. 23.11.14.
To Admiralty. (Received 12.58 p.m.)

426. Return to Simon's Bay forthwith. Addressed to *Armada Castle*. Repeated to Admiralty and Governor-General, Pretoria.

H. 42. *From* Commander-in-Chief, Cape. 24.11.14.
To Admiralty. (Received 9.46 a.m.)

430. My 427. Proposed date for sending expedition to Walfisch Bay now advanced to December 2. Early answer requested accordingly.

H. 43. *From* Admiralty. 24.11.14.
To Commander-in-Chief, Cape. (Sent 11.15 a.m.)

288. Your 427. A reply will be sent later when further news is available of *Scharnhorst* squadron's movements.

H. 44. *From* Admiralty. 26.11.14.
To Commander-in-Chief, Cape. (Sent 10.20 p.m.)

295. Your 427. When *Defence* has joined your squadron it will be safe to send the expedition to Walfisch Bay escorted by *Minotaur*, *Defence*, *Dartmouth* and your squadron, but the route will not be safe without ships being convoyed by a force which can beat the enemy.

H. 45. *From* Commander-in-Chief, Cape. 28.11.14.
To Admiralty. (Received 2.34 a.m.)

452. Your 295. I have telegraphed following to Governor-General:—
 Begins—

. . . I have received a further Admiralty telegram in consequence of which I desire to place following before you for information of Ministers. The naval situation regarding the Walfisch Bay Expedition going forwards is as follows:—There are four principal duties*devolving upon Navy—(1) to convoy expedition to Walfisch Bay; (2) to cover and protect Walfisch Bay; (3) to cover and protect Lüderitz Bay; (4) to guard the lines of communication by sea from Cape Town to Lüderitz Bay and Walfisch Bay. The enemy's naval force is known, and in a few days I shall be in a position to deal with it if met, but it is essential that my force be kept concentrated. It is not practicable to guarantee successful undertaking of these four duties simultaneously and it appears to me that the expedition to Walfisch Bay should be deferred until the enemy is dealt with. If I convoy a force to Walfisch Bay and remain to protect it you will see that Lüderitz Bay is at the mercy of the enemy. Conversely, if I protect Lüderitz Bay, the Walfisch Bay Expedition is open to risk of destruction. It is impossible to provide land protection at either Walfisch Bay or Lüderitz Bay fit to cope with German squadron as 9.2 in. guns will be required. I should like to be assured that Union Government realises these risks and to know which of four responsibilities mentioned they attach the greatest importance.

Personally I consider that the adoption of two separate sea bases both unprotected and neither of them self-supported is dangerous. I consider that limiting the sea work to Lüderitz Bay would reduce the risks by at least 50 per cent. and probably 75 per cent. in consequence of the shorter lines of communication to control and the fact that there is only one base to be guarded. The earliest date on which I can take a convoy from Cape Town for Walfisch Bay commanding the expedition, should it be decided to send it, will be December 14. Please send me early reply as to the decision arrived at. Ends.

In absence of further information of movements of enemy squadron propose to leave in *Minotaur* with *Albion*, *Dartmouth*, *Weymouth*, *Hyacinth*, *Astrea*, December 1 for Lüderitz Bay, proceeding thence to meet *Defence* coming from St. Helena, returning to Simon's Bay to coal preparatory to escorting expedition to Walfisch Bay if this decided, which I can then do by December 14. If expedition is abandoned or postponed I will after meeting *Defence* return to Lüderitz Bay and coal there remaining in vicinity until German Squadron is located.

H. 46. *From* Admiralty. 28.11.14.
To Commander-in-Chief, Cape. (Sent 5 p.m.)

302. Your 452. Admiralty concur with your view that it is dangerous to adopt two sea bases neither of which can protect themselves. Inform the Governor-General of this and that Admiralty have ordered you to keep your squadron concentrated until the situation clears. Also inform him that you can convoy an expedition to Lüderitz Bay and protect the base there on the understanding that the expedition consists of one convoy with provisions and all necessaries for one month but that the sea lines of communication cannot be covered for vessels passing to and fro constantly with subsidiary supplies for the main expedition. Owing to the arrangements made in South American waters and in the Pacific it is confidently expected that the German Squadron will soon be brought to action or very much restricted in its movements, and as soon as circumstances permit the Admiralty will be glad to afford the Governor-General every facility and to co-operate in every way possible to ensure success in the operations in South-West Africa.

H. 47. *From* Admiralty. 29.11.14.
To Commander-in-Chief, Cape. (Sent 3.55 p.m.)

305. Send *Dartmouth* to St. Helena to wait orders.

H. 48. *From* Commander-in-Chief, Cape. 30.11.14.
To Admiralty. (Received 2.54 p.m.)

461. Your 302 which I repeated to Governor-General. Following telegram received from him this morning :—Message begins—

Ministers are apprehensive that further delay in despatching reinforcements to Lüderitz and landing a strong force at Walfisch is likely to have most serious results. The bulk of reinforcements for Lüderitz cannot be ready by December 3 and Ministers think, therefore, will be necessary to take the risk and send them by single unescorted transports as fast as they can be shipped. By time these transports could return to Cape Town, Admiralty it may be hoped will be in a position to convoy the Walfisch Bay Expedition and to protect both bases.

Private. Could your move to Lüderitz Bay be delayed for a few days if that would enable the bulk of the reinforcements to be ready.

Message ends.

I have replied as follows :—Begins—I will defer my sailing a few days if desired in order to convoy troops. If German Squadron is met and defeated as Admiralty hopes both bases will be safe; otherwise I fear that situation will remain as at present. Ends.

H. 49. *From* Commander-in-Chief, Cape. 30.11.14.
To Admiralty. (Received 8.30 p.m.)

463. . . . Following telegram sent (to Governor-General) :—Begins—

Unless it should be necessary for me to meet German Squadron I will defer sailing until December 7 or 8 when troops will be ready. Ends.

H. 50. *From* Commander-in-Chief, Cape. 6.12.14.
To Admiralty. (Received 4.1 p.m.)

482. Following telegram sent to Governor-General :—Begins—

Naval Transport Officer informs that two transports cannot be ready before December 10. I am prepared to wait until they are ready,

leaving Lüderitz open to possibility of attack, or I will sail on December 8 with the three transports which will be ready, leaving the other two to come alone with the risk of being attacked.

Am inclined to think it better to wait until December 10 if military exigencies permit, for I consider troops unable to be convoyed run a grave risk, and from intelligence received the German Squadron appears to be on its way across, though definite confirmation has not yet been obtained.

Please reply urgently informing me of wishes of Government.

H. 51. *From* Admiralty. 6.12.14.
To Commander-in-Chief, Cape. (Sent 9.25 p.m.)

317. Your 482. There is no evidence that German Squadron is in the Atlantic.

Our squadron has swept South American coast from Abrolhos Rocks almost to Falkland Islands with no result.

It will arrive at Falklands on December 8.

H. 52. *From* Commander-in-Chief, Cape. 6.12.14.
To Admiralty. (Received 9.41 p.m.)

483. My 482. In view of reply from Governor-General I am leaving to-morrow as previously arranged for Table Bay, sailing thence for Lüderitz Bay December 8.

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