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NAVAL STAFF MONOGRAPHS
(HISTORICAL).

FLEET ISSUE.

VOLUME XI.

HOME WATERS—Part II.

September and October 1914.

December 1924.

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NAVAL STAFF MONOGRAPHS (HISTORICAL).

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VOLUME XI.

HOME WATERS—Part II.

September and October 1914.

NAVAL STAFF,
TRAINING AND STAFF DUTIES DIVISION,
December 1924.

HOME WATERS, PART II.

September and October 1914.

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HOME WATERS, PART II.
September and October 1914.

Introduction and Note on Sources.

This monograph is Part II in the Home Waters series, and continues the history of naval operations in Home Waters from the Battle of Heligoland Bight on 28 August 1914 to the end of October 1914.

The following monographs should be read in conjunction with this volume:—

- (a) No. 6.—Naval Movements, August 1914, associated with the Transport of the British Expeditionary Force. C.B. 1585 (quoted as "B.E.F.").
- (b) No. 7.—The Patrol Flotillas at the commencement of the War. C.B. 1585 (quoted as "Patrol Flotillas.").
- (c) No. 11.—The Battle of Heligoland Bight, 28 August 1914. C.B. 1585.
- (d) No. 18.—The Dover Command, Vol. I. C.B. 917*d*.
- (e) No. 19.—The Tenth Cruiser Squadron, 1914–1916. C.B. 917*e*.
- (f) History of British Minesweeping in the War. C.B. 1553.
- (g) The Economic Blockade. C.B. 1554.
- (h) Home Waters, Part I. C.B. 917*h*.

The principal sources from which this monograph has been compiled are as follows:—

- (a) *War Registry Telegrams for the Period*.—These are contained in H.S. Vols. 59–71 inclusive. The essential ones are reproduced in Appendices A, B, and C.
- (b) *M Branch Letter Books (Miscellaneous Series)*.—These volumes contain Admiralty Out Letters.
- (c) *Secret Packs of the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet*.—During the period of the war papers of a confidential nature in the office of the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets, were filed in packs, numbered separately from the non-confidential records, in a series 001 to 0050 inclusive. Copies of relevant telegrams were filed in these packs, but a complete set of all telegrams was also maintained. The papers have been bound in 90 volumes. They are referred to in this monograph as G.F.S.P.
- (d) *The Grand Fleet Narrative*.—This is a continuous diary of proceedings which was forwarded to the Admiralty by the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, at first daily, but, after 23 October 1915, weekly. The last date is 28 November 1916, when Admiral Jellicoe relinquished the command. The narrative is bound in a series of volumes, and is referred to in this monograph as G.F.N.

- (e) *Papers of Commodore (T)*.—These are the office papers of Commodore T, now bound in 13 volumes.
- (f) *Papers of Commodore (S)*.—Reports of the work of the 8th Submarine Flotilla in Home Waters during 1914 are in H.S. volume "Commodore S, War Records," Vol. I, which contains also some orders and memos. by Commodore S.
- (g) *Orders and Memoranda issued by the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, for general distribution*.—These have been bound, under the title "G.F. Orders and Memos."
- (h) *Signal and W/T Logs*.—These are stored at the Royal Naval Victualling Yard, Deptford, where they are registered and numbered.
- (k) *Unbound Papers*.—A great number of unbound Admiralty papers have been examined. The more important of these are at present in the custody of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence, by whom summaries have been prepared of all papers examined but not retained. Unbound papers are quoted by their Branch Registry Number or by their Record Office Title.

Details of other sources of information will be found in the monographs mentioned in the introduction to this volume. Use has been made of the daily return issued in the Admiralty entitled "Positions and Movements of H.M. Ships," though in all cases of importance the logs of ships concerned have been examined so far as they are extant.

The following official histories have been consulted :—

- (a) "Military Operations in France and Belgium, 1914." Brigadier-General J. E. Edmonds, C.B., C.M.G., R.E. (retired), p.s.c. (Lond. 1922.)
- (b) "The War in the Air," Vol. I. W. Raleigh. (Oxford, 1922.)
- (c) "La Guerre des Croiseurs," Tome I. (Paris, 1922. A. Challamel.) Referred to in this monograph as F.O.H. I.
- (d) "L'Action de L'Armée Belge." Rapport du Commandement de L'Armée. (Lond., 1915.)
- (e) "Der Krieg zur See, 1914–1918: Nordsee, Band II." (Berlin, 1922.) Quoted in this monograph as G.O.H. II. See criticism of Band I in introduction to Home Waters, Vol. I.
- (f) "Schlachten des Weltkrieges, 1914–1918: Antwerpen, 1914." (Berlin, 1921.) Compiled by the Archival Staff of the German War Office. The maps and sketches are good. For some reason General Rawlinson is consistently called Rawlenson, and General Capper, G.O.C., 7th Division, is called Cappes. The work is quoted in this monograph as Antwerpen 1914.

All times in this monograph are G.M.T. unless otherwise stated.

HOME WATERS, PART II. September and October 1914.

CHAPTER I.

EFFECT OF THE THREAT TO THE CHANNEL PORTS EXPEDITION TO OSTEND, AUGUST 26.

1. **Demonstration at Ostend, August 22.**¹—Little more than a fortnight after the outbreak of war, signs began to manifest themselves of a duty which, as events proved, was to absorb the energies of a considerable portion of the British naval forces in southern waters until the end of the war.

The area in which the navy were now called upon to play their part was the Belgian coast.

On August 21 it was reported that the German cavalry were approaching Ostend and were expected to be before the town next day; and without loss of time the Admiralty arranged for a demonstration off Ostend by a light cruiser and two divisions of destroyers from Harwich, supported outside the shoals by two of the cruisers of Rear-Admiral Christian's command, which was supporting the Harwich flotillas on the Broad Fourteens Patrol during the passage of the 4th Division of the Expeditionary Force. The ships were not to fire on the town, but were to open fire on any bodies of the enemy which might offer a clear target. The orders went out from the Admiralty that evening.²

Admiral Christian arrived off Ostend in the *Euryalus*, with the *Hogue* and *Sapphire*, at 6 a.m. on the 22nd, and found there the *Fearless* and three divisions of destroyers. Two of the latter were ordered into the inner roads to make a demonstration, while the third division remained watching the approaches. From the Burgomaster the Rear-Admiral learnt that it had been decided not to defend the town; the Civil Guard had been disarmed and their rifles sent to Antwerp; and it was feared that if the destroyers fired on the German troops the safety of the town and its inhabitants would be endangered.³ In any case, the configuration of the land rendered it difficult for the ships materially to assist in the defence of the town, for the roads into the place along the sea front were practically concealed behind the sand dunes. Finding that there was little purpose in his presence,

¹ Papers titled X. 3942/1914.

² Appendix B 1–3.

³ B 4–9, 12.

the Rear-Admiral asked for instructions,¹ and received a reply from the Admiralty to withdraw the entire force; and this was done the same evening.²

2. German Threat to the French Channel Ports.—It was not only for Ostend that fears were entertained; more serious was the threat to the French Channel ports. The landing of the British Expeditionary Force as originally constituted had been completed on August 16, though already the decision had been taken to send a further division, the 4th, the dates for crossing the Channel being fixed for August 22 and 23. On the latter day the British troops in position on the French left were heavily attacked at Mons. The French 5th Army had been attacked at Charleroi two days previously, and had retreated, leaving our right wing in the air; and a retirement of Sir John French's force was necessitated. The German advance on Antwerp seriously threatened the Channel ports and the safety of the lines of supply of our army in France; and on the morning of August 24, the day which witnessed the commencement of the historic retreat from Mons, orders went out from the Admiralty to stop all sailings of ships with men and stores for Havre and Boulogne, and all unloading at these ports; and preparations were made to transfer their stores to Cherbourg. The latter place was favourably situated for naval co-operation in its defence, and so serious did the situation appear, that it seemed even Cherbourg might be attacked in the near future.³ The news from France was so grave that the Admiralty warned Sir John Jellicoe he might have to consider a situation where the enemy commanded Calais and the French coast, and the position which the Grand Fleet should take up in that eventuality.⁴

On the commencement of his retirement, Sir John French had urged that immediate attention should be given to the defence of Havre;⁵ and as the day passed without there appearing to be any instant necessity for a change of base, the orders to hold up transports for Havre were cancelled on the evening of the 24th, though at 10 o'clock that night orders went out that Boulogne, the main port of disembarkation of stores, was to be closed down, such stores as could not be used up being transferred to Havre.⁶

Dunkirk and Calais were highly important for the security of the Channel, and the Admiralty had no intention of abandoning them to the enemy if it were possible to save them. For naval co-operation in the defence of these ports they authorised the withdrawal of the armoured cruisers of Admiral Rouyer's squadron

¹ This telegram has not been traced. B 10 contains a reference to it.

² B 11.

³ Appendix A 2 and Monograph 6. "Transport of British Expeditionary Force," Appendix A 187, 188, 189, 193, 195, 196.

⁴ A 1.

⁵ H.S. 57, p. 113.

⁶ B.E.F. A 200, 201, 208.

from the Western Patrol; and although the French did not at first consider this to be necessary, by the evening of the 24th they had become aware of the danger, and gave orders to Admiral Rouyer to take his armoured cruisers to Cherbourg to replenish in readiness to move up Channel if required, leaving with Admiral Wemyss, who now assumed command of the line of watch in the western part of the Channel, four light cruisers of the 2nd Light Squadron and three mercantile auxiliaries. The submarines and torpedo boats from Cherbourg, which had been patrolling under Rouyer, were no longer required now that the transport of the main body of the Expeditionary Force was completed; and they were sent back to Cherbourg.¹

3. Orders for an Expedition to Ostend, August 27.—Late on August 24 the question of naval operations in connection with the defence of Ostend was raised once more. Although the defence of the town against serious attack was not within the power of the Allies, the Belgian authorities were not content that the place should be left defenceless before the detachments of German cavalry which were in the neighbourhood. At 7 p.m. the Burgomaster inquired of the Belgian Minister in London whether some British warships could be dispatched immediately, with a landing force, for the protection of Ostend and the coast, while early next morning, August 25, the Admiral of Patrols telegraphed to the Admiralty that he, too, had received, through the Governor of Dunkirk, a request for the assistance of warships to intimidate the German patrols.²

The Admiralty already had at their disposal a mobile field force for employment in such an emergency as that which had now arisen. Two days after the outbreak of war a battalion of Royal Marines had been formed at Eastney and Chatham respectively, followed soon after by the formation of a battalion each at Portsmouth, Plymouth and Deal. These units were constituted from men not required in the fleets at the time, and they were composed of active service and R.F.R. men, with a proportion of recruits. The intention of the Admiralty was to hold them in readiness for the seizure of overseas bases if required, an operation which had been practised at Scapa Flow in 1912.³ By August 6 a battalion of R.M.A., 470 strong, had been formed at Eastney, and a battalion of similar strength at Chatham, while the Portsmouth, Plymouth and Deal battalions were completed shortly afterwards. The newly introduced four-company battalion was the organisation adopted.

¹ A 2-10 and B.E.F. A 198, 202. The wording of signal B.E.F. A 198 does not seem to represent the actual situation. "Admiralty wishes a line of watch to be kept in the western part of the English Channel" might be clearer had it been worded "Admiralty wishes the line of watch to be maintained in the western part of the English Channel."

² B 13, 14.

³ See R.M.O. Circular Book and papers.

Within 24 hours of receiving the request of the Belgian authorities for help, the Admiralty decided to accede to it in full, and at 6.25 p.m. on the 25th, orders went out for the dispatch of the Field Force of Royal Marines in ships of the Channel Fleet and Cruiser Force C, to a destination which would be communicated later. On the afternoon of the 23rd, when the passage of the 4th Division, which had been expedited, was complete, the Admiralty authorised the return to Spithead of the Channel Fleet. The watching patrol on the Broad Fourteens was withdrawn the same evening, the destroyers returning to Harwich, while the cruisers, after carrying out target practice, were to return to the Nore to coal in readiness for further service.¹ The ships of the Channel Fleet had had steam up continuously for 24 days, and required 48 hours to clean their boilers; and half of the ships had drawn fires when orders for the Ostend operation arrived at 6.30 p.m. on the 25th. Four battleships of the 5th Battle Squadron were to embark a Portsmouth battalion of Royal Marines; a battalion from Plymouth was to embark in the ships of the 7th Battle Squadron, which had been kept ready for sea, and were to proceed from Portland to Devonport at once; Cruiser Force C was to transport a Chatham battalion. The *Amethyst* was to join Admiral Christian's flag for the operation, and the Admiral was further informed that his squadron would be accompanied by the *Sapphire* and 12 destroyers from Harwich, and as many tugs as could be spared for two days from Chatham and Sheerness.² Commodore Tyrwhitt's flotillas had returned to Harwich on the evening of the 23rd when the passage of the 4th Division was completed. The whole force was required for the Heligoland Bight operation on the 28th, and was to rest in harbour meanwhile; nor were any contrary orders sent by the Admiralty to Commodore Tyrwhitt, who received the first intimation that 12 of his boats were to be detached from Admiral Christian. The matter was cleared up on the following morning, August 26, when the use of Commodore (T)'s destroyers for the Ostend operation was cancelled by the Admiralty, and the Admiral of Patrols at Dover was ordered to send six boats,³ while arrangements were made for a further force of destroyers to be provided from Admiral Rouyer's squadron on the western patrol. The request of the Admiralty for a division of Rouyer's destroyers, made to the French Ministry of Marine at 12.35 p.m. on the 26th, was immediately acceded to, orders being given to the French Admiral to dispatch a division to Dover immediately.⁴ The armoured cruisers of Rouyer's force had already been withdrawn for co-operation in the defence of the Channel ports, causing a temporary gap in the western patrol line,

¹ B.E.F. A 183, 184.

² H.S. 57, pp. 380, 383, 389.

³ B 24, 26, 29, 33, 35, 37.

⁴ A 11, 12, 17. The French destroyers do not appear, however, to have taken part in the operation. They reached Dover on the morning of the 27th; four of them sailed at 5.45 p.m. and the other two at 6 a.m. on the 28th. (H.S. 57, pp. 749, 907.)

which Admiral Wemyss had to fill by extending his cruiser line further to the southward. On fuller consideration, however, the Admiralty decided that the co-operation of armoured cruisers in the defence of Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne was impracticable, and they asked that the French ships might be held in readiness at Cherbourg in case of a sortie of the German fleet in consequence of the operations which were about to be undertaken at Ostend. The *Gloire* and *Dupetit Thouars* were at Brest replenishing, and in compliance with the request of the Admiralty the Ministry of Marine ordered them and the *Gueydon* up to Cherbourg, renewing at the same time their offer to place at the disposal of the Admiralty the destroyers and submarines of the 2nd Light Squadron.¹

The forces, then, for the Ostend operation were as follows:—

Admiral Burney selected the *Prince of Wales*, flagship of Rear-Admiral Bernard Currey, *Venerable*, *Formidable*, and *Irresistible*. Vice-Admiral Bethell's squadron comprised the *Vengeance* (Flag), *Goliath*, *Prince George*, *Caesar*, and the attached light cruiser *Proserpine*. Admiral Christian in the *Euryalus* with Cruiser Force C was joined by the *Amethyst* and *Sapphire*, and the destroyers *Syren*, *Falcon*, *Gypsy*, *Kangaroo*, *Saracen*, and *Tartar* of the 6th Flotilla from Dover.

The command of the Marine force was entrusted to Colonel Sir George Aston, K.C.B., Royal Marine Artillery,² who went on board the *Euryalus* at 1 a.m. on the 26th at Sheerness. The destination of the force was now officially communicated to Admiral Christian. Admiral Bethell was informed at 11.34 a.m. on the 26th and Admiral Currey two hours later, though the latter did not get the signal until 5.30 p.m.³

The first intention of the Admiralty was that the Chatham and Portsmouth contingents of the Marine field force should rendezvous three miles south of the South Goodwin Light Vessel and proceed in company to Ostend;⁴ but it was most important that a contingent of troops should arrive by the afternoon of the 26th, and as the Portsmouth division could not reach the rendezvous until 7 p.m. that day, Admiral Christian had to sail independently.⁵ A sweep of the Harwich flotillas into the Heligoland Bight was in orders for August 28, with Admiral Christian's cruisers in support; and after landing the Chatham battalion the Admiral was to leave for his rendezvous on arrival of Admiral Currey with the Portsmouth contingent.⁶

¹ A 4, 7-9, 15, 16, 18, 19, 26.

² Accorded temporary rank of Brigadier-General. For his orders see B 20.

³ Rear-Admiral Currey's Letter of Proceedings, August 28. (See papers titled X. 3942/1914.)

⁴ B 18, 19.

⁵ B 25, 39.

⁶ B 27.

The news from Ostend left it uncertain whether General Aston would find the town in the hands of the enemy, and instructions were sent as to the course of action to be adopted in that event. The main point was that the operation was a minor one only, and the General was to endeavour to avoid bringing calamity upon the town. If convenient, he was to land at some other point near by and so turn the enemy out of the town. This was left entirely to his judgment.¹ During the night of August 25-26, however, it was learnt at the Admiralty that, so far, Ostend had been threatened only by detached bodies of German cavalry, which had been repulsed by the gendarmerie, the object of these raids being apparently to cut the cable with England and perhaps damage the port. The Belgian Minister of War welcomed the prospect of a landing party, though he considered that 300 men would be ample;² and every facility for disembarkation was promised.³ This intelligence was telegraphed to Admiral Christian. The seaplane carrier *Engadine* and three seaplanes were to accompany him, and four minesweeping trawlers were ordered across from Lowestoft to sweep the approaches to Ostend from the north, as a precaution, though it was not anticipated that there were any mines off the place.⁴

4. **Landing of the Expedition.**⁵—The Chatham battalion of the Royal Marine force embarked on board the ships of Cruiser Force C during the morning of the 26th, and the squadron left at noon for Ostend. Arriving at 6 p.m., Admiral Christian sent in the *Sapphire* to ascertain the state of affairs in the town. The weather was thick, with heavy rain and a moderate swell; and by the time it was learned that Ostend was not in the hands of the enemy the very unfavourable weather conditions and the distance, five or six miles, of the squadron from the landing-place rendered it impossible to land the force in the ships' boats. The tugs from Chatham and Sheerness were not expected to arrive until 5 a.m. next day, but General Aston, who proceeded ashore, procured two Belgian Government vessels, the Ostend-Dover mail steamer *Princesse Stéphanie* and a tug, in which the first detachment of the force commenced to disembark from the *Euryalus* at 3.30 a.m. on the 27th, Captain Ceuke of the *Princesse Stéphanie* bringing his vessel alongside the ships under difficult circumstances in order to facilitate the transfer of the troops.⁶

¹ B 21.

² An offer of a force of 25,000 men seems to have been made to Brussels through the Foreign Office, to operate from Ostend, as distinct from the landing party to defend the town against marauders.

³ B 22, 23.

⁴ B 30, 32, 34.

⁵ The various Reports of Proceedings, etc., are in papers titled X. 3942/1914.

⁶ Admiral Christian afterwards reported that the employment of fast Ostend-Dover steamers which could carry 1,400-1,500 men apiece and could go alongside the only suitable landing place at Ostend would have been a more expeditious method of transporting troops from England than by bringing them in warships.

Rear-Admiral Currey's squadron arrived at 6.30 a.m. on the 27th and he took over the command; and in the course of the afternoon Admiral Christian sent the *Bacchante*, *Aboukir*, and *Hogue* to re-establish the watching patrol on the Broad Fourteens, following himself in the *Euryalus* with the *Amethyst* at 4 p.m., while the destroyers from Dover remained inshore. The *Sapphire* had been working inshore and knew all the arrangements, and Admiral Christian therefore left her with Rear-Admiral Currey.

The Portsmouth battalion, R.M.L.I., 750 strong, and 800 R.M.A., had embarked on board the ships of Rear-Admiral Currey's force between 5 a.m. and 7 a.m. on August 26. The sailing of the squadron was delayed by the failure of the pilots to arrive at the arranged time, but the Admiral got his ships away soon after 9 a.m. Neither he nor anyone in the Marine force had any idea of the service for which they were embarked, and it was not until 5.30 p.m. that day, half an hour before the expected time of arrival at the rendezvous, that Admiral Currey learnt that he was to proceed independently to Ostend, arranging his speed to arrive at daylight on the 27th. After landing his contingent he was to rejoin Vice-Admiral Burney's flag as soon as his four ships could be dispensed with by Vice-Admiral Bethell, who, with the 7th Battle Squadron, was to remain at Ostend as a permanent naval support to the landing force.¹ The order to time his arrival at Ostend for daylight entailed waiting about for several hours, and the squadron anchored from 10 p.m. on the 26th to 3.30 a.m. on the 27th in the middle of the Straits, to the north-east of Sandettie Bank. Admiral Currey signalled at 7.30 p.m. to Admiral Christian to warn all ships concerned of his presence, for the patrols were on the alert in view of the expected German attack. The squadron arrived at Ostend and anchored at 6.30 a.m. on the 27th, at Admiral Christian's suggestion, between Middelkerke and Ostend Banks, seven miles from the harbour, which was hidden by the fog until late in the day. The tugs which should have been sent from Chatham and Sheerness did not arrive, having been lost to sight since passing the North Foreland on the previous day; but the paddle boat *Princesse Clémentine*² came to the rescue and, aided by the destroyers *Syren* and *Falcon*, transported the troops and stores ashore. The former were disembarked by 11 a.m., the ships being cleared of stores by 5.45 p.m. About 4 p.m. Vice-Admiral Bethell arrived with the 7th Battle Squadron, and the command of the expedition afloat was transferred for the second time that day. It was not until 9 o'clock at night that the embarkation officer, beachmaster, and interpreters who had been landed from Admiral Currey's squadron were re-embarked and the boats hoisted; and the squadron consequently remained at anchor off Ostend during the night. The ships weighed at 4 a.m. on the 28th and proceeded to Spithead to rejoin Admiral Burney's flag. On arrival there sufficient men were withdrawn

¹ B 31, 36.

² Apparently another Ostend-Dover mail steamer.

from his ships and from the other four *Formidables* in the 5th Battle Squadron to man the *Duncan*, which was to rejoin the three other vessels of her class with the Grand Fleet, her refit being now completed.

The 7th Battle Squadron had left Portland at 9 p.m. on August 25 and arrived at Plymouth at daylight on the 26th. The Plymouth battalion of the Marine field force was embarked by 6 p.m. that day, and the squadron left immediately for Ostend at 14 knots, arriving about 4 p.m. on the 27th. At the request of General Aston the disembarkation of the troops was deferred until 8 o'clock next morning, in order to complete the landing of stores for the force from the 5th Battle Squadron. At 4 a.m. on the 28th the squadron proceeded to anchor in the Outer Road. Three tugs arrived from Dover at 7 a.m., and the Marine field force was disembarked an hour later. The destroyers established a patrol to north and east of the anchorage, and the Vice-Admiral landed for a conference with General Aston. Airship No. 3 arrived at noon, but neither General Aston nor Admiral Bethell required her, and she was sent back three days later. The *Sapphire* was retained by permission of the Admiralty, and with the *Proserpine* was employed to support the destroyer patrol; for the severe reverse which the German light forces had received that day in the Bight was not yet known, and Admiral Bethell's squadron was in a position exposed to destroyer attack. The minesweepers were urgently required on the east coast as the result of the discovery of the minefields off the Tyne and Humber, and the Vice-Admiral sent them back to Lowestoft.¹

Ashore, the troops were defending the immediate perimeter of the town and sending out patrols on commandeered bicycles. A squadron of 10 aeroplanes,² under Wing-Commander Charles R. Samson, had flown over to Ostend on the afternoon of the 27th, and were employed on reconnaissance flights over the area between Bruges, Ghent, and Ypres. By August 29 General Aston had established, through the Belgian military authorities, a good system of intelligence by telephone from the different villages, and was independent of aeroplane reconnaissance. Admiral Bethell, however, seems to have considered that the squadron was running considerable risk of torpedo attack for no special purpose, for the ships could give little support to the troops by their fire. Such fire, from the position in which it was possible for the ships to anchor, must necessarily be indirect, and owing to the complicated chain of communications between the G.O.C., the shore observer, and the guns, General Aston was averse from the employment of ships' fire, which he felt would limit too greatly the mobility of his forces in counter-attack, besides being ineffective against moving troops. The only method by which the fire of the ships could be effective was by predetermining zones to be covered ;

¹ B 28, 42, 44, 46, 48, 50, 51, 56-58, 62, 63.

² All arrived safely except one, which had to land at Dunkirk.

and arrangements were made to this end between the G.O.C. and the Vice-Admiral. The Admiralty were sending the three ex-Brazilian shallow draught monitors, *Humber*, *Severn*, and *Mersey*, armed with howitzers, to join Admiral Bethell,¹ and asked whether it was practicable to mount guns in the ships' tops to support the troops ashore. Admiral Bethell reported that this was impracticable, for the ships were too far from the shore for light guns to be used ; and he reminded the Admiralty that if the Marines were forced to retire there would be street fighting, in which the ships could take no part. Finally, the Belgian authorities did not wish the ships to open fire, being nervous, no doubt, that the force might bring disaster upon the town by putting up a resistance against serious attack, whereas all that the authorities wanted was protection against marauders.²

On the evening of the 28th the Admiralty had given to the French Ministry of Marine an assurance that they could transport and escort safely to Ostend a force of 16,000 Belgian troops, which had come through France to Havre from Namur, which had fallen on the 23rd ; and the first contingent of these was already embarking at Havre. To cover their disembarkation, General Aston was ordered to entrench strongly and hold the perimeter of Ostend against all attack. By now, the results of the Heligoland Bight action were known, and Admiral Bethell was told that for the present there was little danger of torpedo attack, though there was no need for the battleships to remain at anchor off the town.³ The first of the Belgian troops, about 6,000 in number, arrived from Havre about noon on the 30th and were railed to destinations up country.

5. Withdrawal of the Ostend Expedition, August 31.—Meanwhile, events had been occurring on the main battle front which proved Sir John French's concentration to be too far forward. By his stand at Le Cateau, General Smith-Dorrien had enabled the British Army to shake off the German pursuit and entrench behind the Oise ; but General Joffre had decided to retire still further, to the Marne, and consequently the British base at Havre could no longer be considered secure. During the evening of August 29-30 the decision was taken to change the base of the British Expeditionary Force to St. Nazaire, at the mouth of the Loire ; and as the battleships of the Channel Fleet were all needed to cover the new and longer line of communications, during the night of August 30-31, orders were sent to Admiral Bethell by the Admiralty to re-embark the Marine field force at Ostend and withdraw it. General Aston was informed that the withdrawal was to be carried out at his earliest convenience, but there was no need to hurry.⁴ Two tugs each from Sheerness and Dover were ordered across to re-embark the troops, and Admiral Bethell

¹ They did not leave Dover, however, until 6.15 a.m., 31st. (H.S. 58, p. 830.)

² B 43, 47-49, 52, 61.

³ B 53, 54.

⁴ B 66.

asked that three cruisers of Force C might be sent to assist in the withdrawal. The *Euryalus* and *Aboukir* were at Sheerness with leaking condensers, and the Admiralty sent orders to Admiral Campbell to take the three remaining cruisers to Ostend, leaving the destroyers of the Harwich force to carry out the Broad Fourteens patrol. These orders, however, did not go out until nearly 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and Admiral Bethell did not learn until 3.30 p.m. that the three *Bacchantes* were coming to assist him.¹

By this time the situation had materially altered, and the embarkation was being pushed forward with all speed, for during the morning German wireless signals calling the battleships *Braunschweig* and *Pommern* were heard increasing in strength, and the Admiralty telegraphed that there were indications that German ships were at sea; and Admiral Bethell's ships lay with steam on their capstans ready to weigh, in instant expectation of attack.² The entire force was embarked on board the four battleships, the *Vengeance* taking the R.M.A. battalion and head-quarter staff, and the *Goliath*, *Caesar*, and *Prince George* the Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Chatham R.M.L.I. battalions respectively; Admiral Bethell signalled to Admiral Campbell that his assistance was not required, and the three *Bacchantes* resumed the Broad Fourteens patrol.³

The last man left the shore at 5 p.m., and by 8 p.m. on the 31st the re-embarkation of the force, together with 150 tons of ammunition and stores, was complete. The squadron sailed half an hour later, the *Amethyst* and destroyers for Dover, and the battleships for the ports to which the respective Marine battalions belonged. The *Sapphire* accompanied the *Prince George* to Sheerness, and the *Proserpine* kept company with the flag to Portsmouth.⁴ The monitors arrived at Ostend at 9 p.m. on the 31st, half an hour after the 7th Battle Squadron had sailed, and they returned to the Nore.⁵

The voyage homewards was not without incident. At 9.42 p.m. on August 31 the four battleships were off the south end of Middelkerke Bank and on the point of altering course to starboard into the North Channel,⁶ when three destroyers came into sight three points on the starboard bow, about 3,000 yards off, from behind the sails of a drift-net vessel lying across the entrance to the Channel. The *Vengeance*, which was leading ship, challenged, without receiving any reply. There was no room to manoeuvre among the banks and shoals, and the original eight-point turn to starboard had to be carried out. Simultaneously, the suspicious destroyers also altered course and closed the squadron rapidly, turning down its port side on the opposite course as if to attack. The *Vengeance* challenged a second time, and, receiving no reply,

¹ B 67, 68, 71-73, 76.

² B 70.

³ A 34, B 79.

⁴ B 78, 82, 83.

⁵ B 81, 84, 85.

⁶ Between Middelkerke Bank and East Breedt.

she opened fire, followed by the *Goliath*, her next astern.¹ As, however, the destroyers showed no signs of pressing home the attack, it was concluded that they were French, and firing was stopped.

It was eventually discovered that the destroyers were part of the Dunkirk local defence flotilla.² At 7 p.m., an hour and a half



before the squadron proceeded, the Admiralty had signalled to the S.N.O., Dover, to warn the patrol that Admiral Bethell's ships would be returning from Ostend during the night.³ The warning was not, however, transmitted to the *Simoun*, the vessel fired on, by the French officer on the staff of the Admiral of Patrols. At the time, the *Simoun* was 10 miles east of the Franco-Belgian frontier, which was the eastern limit of the area agreed upon for

¹ The *Vengeance's* report (in papers titled X 3942/14) does not say whether the challenge for British or Allied ships was made, but states that just before firing was stopped the destroyers displayed a signal which was unrecognisable. It appears from the report of the C.O. of the *Simoun* that the French destroyer made the correct recognition signal. (See M. 01786/14, titled X 3018/14.)

² From the *Simoun's* report it appears that she was alone and the other vessels sighted by Admiral Bethell's force were pilot boats or something similar.

³ B 80.

the operations of the French *Défense Mobile*. This limit had not been communicated by the French to Lieutenant de Vaisseau Ertzbischoff of the *Simoun*, and Admiral Ballard had agreed provisionally that the patrol should extend as far as Nieuport and thence to the south-west end of Middelkerke Bank, in order to enable the inner channel of access to Dunkirk to be watched. However, the limits of the patrol were probably unknown to Admiral Bethell. The officers and men of his force had been in momentary expectation of attack during the forenoon, and it was for that reason that the re-embarkation of the Marine field force had been pushed forward with all speed, without awaiting Admiral Campbell's force. In the French Navy the same principles were recognised as in our own, that a torpedo craft came within gun range of a ship at her own risk, and that the onus of establishing her friendly character rested entirely with the torpedo craft.

"Considering the suddenness with which the expedition was despatched and the impossibility of previous arrangements for staff, etc. the promptitude with which the brigade was embarked, landed, and re-embarked was highly creditable," wrote the Admiralty to General Aston.¹ The Vice-Admiral ascribed the speed with which the re-embarkation was performed to the fact that the force was composed of Marines acquainted with the nature of the work. Owing to the necessity of keeping the ships' armament in immediate readiness for an expected destroyer attack, very few seamen could be spared to work in the tugs and on the jetties.² The Belgian authorities again placed the *Princesse Clémentine* at the Vice-Admiral's disposal, and it was found that this vessel and the paddle-wheel tugs were far better fitted for the work than screw tugs with small deck space and less manœuvring power. The expedition had no effect upon the military operations in progress on the Continent, nor was it intended to do more than defend Ostend against marauders. The moral effect, however, upon the inhabitants was stated by General Aston to be "altogether excellent."

6. The Dunkirk Aircraft Patrol.—It had been the first intention of the Admiralty to withdraw Commander Samson's aeroplane squadron with the remainder of the Ostend expedition, and the machines duly prepared to return via Dunkirk. On arrival there, however, the thick fog in the Channel rendered it hazardous to proceed, and while reporting to the Admiralty that he was delayed, Commander Samson asked permission for his squadron to be attached to the Army and to remain in France.³

It so happened that the request was timely. Information had been coming in to the Admiralty from many different sources that the Germans were preparing a large number of airships with

¹ M. 01749/14.

² Vice-Admiral Bethell's report, 1 September 1914. (In papers titled X 3942/14.)

³ B 74, 75.

which simultaneous attacks were to be made against England, and London in particular. At this date the Germans had in commission two naval and nine military airships,¹ whilst a considerable number of others were under construction. German airship sheds were situated at Metz, Cologne, and Düsseldorf; but it was expected that the enemy would establish bases in France and Belgium, now that their occupation rendered this feasible.

For the protection of London, Portsmouth, Chatham, and Dover against airship attacks the seaplane patrols around the coast north of Yarmouth were being concentrated round the Thames and Medway estuaries; and in addition to these measures the Admiralty decided to establish a force at Dunkirk to act offensively against the German airships and break up their attacks before they crossed the Channel.² The nucleus of such a force was already on the spot in the shape of Commander Samson's squadron; and late in the evening of August 31 the Admiralty sent orders to him to remain at Dunkirk in preparation for further service, while the Naval Air Base at Sheerness was ordered to prepare as many machines as possible to reinforce him.³

The force of aeroplanes under Commander Samson's command was gradually increased to three squadrons of 12 machines each, and in addition a number of armoured motor-cars, raised as soon as possible to a total of 60, armed with maxims, was sent over to work with the aeroplanes. The object of the force was to establish aerial control over an area within a radius of 100 miles from Dunkirk, in order to break up any attack by German airships on England, and to prevent the enemy from establishing temporary airship bases within the area defined.⁴

The operations of the mixed force consisted mainly of reconnaissances and patrols, in the course of which the armoured cars became engaged in various skirmishes with the enemy.⁵ An endeavour was made, early in September, by Major E. L. Gerrard, R.M.L.I., and three machines to attack from Ostend a German airship which was bombing Antwerp; but the attempt ended in

¹ These were the Admiralty figures (see Memo prepared by Director, Air Department, in Air Department Secret Publication "Royal Naval Air Service, 6 November 1914"). The Naval figures agree with the German figures as given in the "Marine Rundschau," March 1922. They do not include the small naval airship P.L.6, commissioned 1 September 1914, dismantled as being too small, 27 December 1914, nor the various small semi-rigid airships of no practical value.

² A 39, 40.

³ A 37. The time of receipt of this telegram by Commander Samson is not known, but there is no reason to suppose it was delayed, other than the statements in Commander Samson's "Reminiscences" (C.I.D., A.H. 76/5). These reminiscences were prepared for the Air Historical Section, and it is understood they were written after the war. They doubtless give a true picture of the general conditions under which Commander Samson's force worked, but in details they are not always borne out by the Admiralty papers.

⁴ A 40.

⁵ See R.N.A.S., 6 November 1914.

failure with the destruction of the three machines in a gale. Commander Samson's orders had indicated that attacks were to be made as soon as possible on the Zeppelin sheds at Düsseldorf and Cologne, and as September drew on the Admiralty repeatedly urged the importance of making the attack.¹ Accordingly, Major Gerrard proceeded to Antwerp with four machines, and on September 23 the attempt was made, two aeroplanes steering for Düsseldorf and two for Cologne, leaving Antwerp at dawn, the attacks being timed so as to be simultaneous. The machines soon ran into a thick mist, and the only pilot to succeed in locating his objective was Lieutenant Charles H. Collet, R.M.A. Gliding down from 6,000 ft., the last 1,500 ft. through mist, he suddenly came in sight of the Düsseldorf airship shed when only 400 ft. up and a quarter of a mile away. He dropped his bombs quickly. The first fell a little short and exploded, but the other two, though they apparently hit the shed, failed to explode. All four pilots returned safely to Antwerp.²

CHAPTER II.

CHANGE OF BASE OF THE BRITISH ARMY IN FRANCE FROM THE SEINE TO THE LOIRE, SEPTEMBER 1914.³

7. **Orders for the Evacuation of the Seine Ports, August 29.**—The advance of the German forces in France and Belgium towards the end of August was gradually compromising the security essential for the base of an overseas expedition. Orders were given on the night of August 24–25 to close down and evacuate Boulogne,⁴ and on August 27, owing to the retirement of the Allies southwards, it was seen that the Seine ports, Havre and Rouen, might also have to be abandoned. Two days later Sir John French telegraphed to the War Office asking for an alternative base to be established, the ports selected being St. Nazaire, at the mouth of the Loire, and Nantes, 40 miles further up the river. Officers from the staffs of the Inspector-General of Communications and the Principal Naval Transport Officer, Havre (Rear-Admiral E. G. Shortland), had already proceeded on the previous day to report on the suitability of these ports as bases; and all empty ships at Havre and Rouen, capable of the voyage to St. Nazaire,

¹ H.S. 60, p. 757; 62, pp. 604, 763, 998.

² "R.N.A.S., 6 November 1914," p. 15. However, some damage was apparently done to the airship shed (*op. cit.*, p. 27).

³ Based on records of the Ministry of Shipping and Report by Brigadier-General J. E. Capper, D.I.G.C., 29 March 1915, 1,798 in War Office (H.S.) Records.

⁴ See Monograph No. 23: "Home Waters," Vol. I.

were being retained.¹ In the early afternoon of August 26 the unloading of ships was stopped at Havre and Rouen,² to which latter place the advanced base had been moved from Amiens on the evacuation of Boulogne. During the afternoon of August 28, however, the information from General Headquarters was more reassuring, and the immediate necessity to delay unloading of ships was removed.³

On the 29th news arrived of a French reverse on the left of the British Army, and it was decided that in order to be able to supply the Army from the Loire ports as soon as Havre and Rouen became useless, half the stores and supplies at Havre should be sent to the Loire; and the Base Commandant at Havre was ordered to stop further unloading of ships except those containing personnel and material urgently required, and to start loading the supplies necessary to establish the new base, and further to prepare a scheme for the general evacuation of the port by sea to St. Nazaire if required.⁴ Two hours later, shortly after 7 p.m., orders went out for the immediate evacuation of all stores and personnel from Havre and Rouen with the utmost speed.⁵

The task of the Admiralty in providing ships for the evacuation of our own troops, stores, and supplies from Havre and Rouen was complicated by the necessity of providing tonnage for the French. On August 31 the Ministry of Marine telegraphed urgently from Paris that there were at the two ports 30,000 tons of petrol and a similar amount of oil, which they wished to remove. They themselves had no tank steamers available; but at their request the Admiralty took up and despatched vessels to remove the bulk of the stock, and further arranged to warehouse it in England, since the French could not undertake to store it at any of their ports on the Atlantic or Mediterranean. Some 27,000 French troops had been left isolated in the Northern Departments by the general retirement, and since their withdrawal by rail, with the Germans at Amiens, was dangerous, it was necessary to transport them to La Rochelle by sea; and the French requested us to provide tonnage for 15,000 of them. Some 2,000 Belgian cavalry and artillery, with the same number of horses, required to be conveyed in ships from Havre to Ostend; and the Military Governor of Havre was asking that 15,000 French troops (subsequently reduced to 10,000) might be transported by sea from Calais to Cherbourg, and 10,000 from Havre to La Rochelle, owing to the congestion of the railways.

The Admiralty dispatched from Southampton on September 4, 22 ships, with accommodation for 36,500 men. Fortunately, the French troops did not all immediately arrive at Havre, and

¹ C 1–4, and P.N.T.O. Havre's Report, 7 September 1914.

² C 2.

³ C 5–7. It appears from P.N.T.O. Havre's Report, 7 September 1914, that the congested state of the ports, owing to the stopping of unloading on August 26, was one of the reasons which induced the I.G.C. to order the resumption of unloading.

⁴ C 8–12.

⁵ C 13–15.

the ships were able to carry out the Calais-Cherbourg move and return to Havre for the voyage to La Rochelle. The eventual relief of the railway congestion allowed some of the French troops to be sent by rail, and eight of the ships not required were sent back to England.¹

8. Evacuation of Rouen, August 30-September 2.—The evacuation of Rouen was a comparatively simple matter, for there was no large quantity of stores at the port, and owing to the fact that but few ships were immediately available it was possible to draw up a regular programme of embarkation. More ships were demanded and arrived on August 30 and 31;² and the move to Le Mans, about midway between St. Nazaire and Paris, which was to be the new advanced base, commenced on the 30th, 6,000 reinforcements and advanced base units being sent by rail. The embarkation proceeded smoothly and quickly,³ the various stores and supplies were kept separate and units distinct, and the ships were employed to their best capacity. The only things left behind were a small quantity of supplies, chiefly oats. The last ship left the port at 3 a.m. on September 2, the Naval Transport Staff proceeding to the Loire.

9. Evacuation of Havre, August 29-September 5.—Very different was the tale at Havre. There were present here all the components of a large base, except a mechanical transport depot, which was at Rouen; they included 22,000 officers and men, 3,400 horses, 19,000 tons of ordnance stores, 15,000 tons of supplies, the base kits of 100,000 men, a heavy battery and ammunition column for the IVth Division which had recently crossed, tents and camp equipment, a number of hospitals, 1,100 tons of coal, and 133,000 gallons of petrol, the total measurement tonnage of stores, etc. (other than petrol), being 36,500.⁴ There were already a number of ships in the port unloading, and others were daily expected from England. Six vessels left England by Admiralty order on the night of the 29th, and others followed. Five French

¹ C 32, 35-40. The telegrams do not, however, make the various moves quite clear; and the figures given here are based on Rear-Admiral Shortland's report, 7 September 1914, and his orders to the D.N.T.O., Havre (Captain Sir Malcolm MacGregor, Bart., R.N.), who was left in charge at Havre to superintend the transport of French troops when the D.N.T.O. transferred to St. Nazaire.

² C 16-18, 20.

³ Ship.	Arrival.	Departure.
Saltees	30 Aug., 10.15 p.m.	31 Aug-1 Sept. midnight.
Lords Charlemont ..	31 .. 5.45 p.m.	1 Sept., 12.30 p.m.
Woodfield	30 .. 10.30 p.m.	1 .. 12.30 p.m.
Basil	30 .. 11.30 p.m.	1 .. 12.30 p.m.
Mellifont	31 .. 8.0 a.m.	2 .. 3.0 a.m.
Teviot	31 .. 1.0 p.m.	2 .. 3.0 a.m.
Glenarm Head ..	31 .. 1.10 p.m.	2 .. 3.0 a.m.
Dominic	31 .. 6.0 p.m.	2 .. 3.0 a.m.

⁴ C 19.

steamers were taken up at Havre,¹ and nine small ships, which were unfit for the voyage to St. Nazaire, were loaded up and sent back to Newhaven.² Loading up began at 10.30 on the 29th. The officers on the spot were not acquainted with the military situation, and the need for haste was believed to be imperative. This feeling of urgency was doubtless increased by the telegrams from the War Office, where the information tended towards the assumption that the German advance would be very rapid, and that two or three days only were available for the evacuation.³ Owing to the rush no detailed scheme was prepared, though orders were given to load ammunition first.⁴ Large quantities of stores were in camps three to six miles from the docks, the only transport available being 14 three-ton lorries. Two hundred carts were with great difficulty hired and induced to work night and day. Camped amongst the stores were French and Belgian troops, which added to the difficulties.

"Any ship that happened to be alongside a wharf was filled with the articles nearest to it, and personnel were embarked on the same ships as found convenient."⁵ Ships which had not the requisite charts on board were convoyed by those which had, pending the receipt of charts from England. They began to get away on August 30, and by the evening of September 5 the port was practically clear. Some stores were sent by train, though up to September 1 the Inspector-General of Communications believed that the railway to Le Mans from Havre via Rouen was unsafe, while by the following evening all movements by rail ceased owing to the departure of the French and British railway staffs.⁶ The sick and wounded were sent to England, and the naval transport staff proceeded to St. Nazaire.

10. Establishment of the Loire Bases.—The berthing facilities for ships both at St. Nazaire and Nantes were inadequate to deal quickly with a number of ships arriving at the same time. Nantes was only suitable for vessels up to 18 ft. draught and 450 ft. long, and some larger ships had to be stopped and partially unloaded at St. Nazaire. The Admiralty had sent over large ships, of sufficient tonnage for the voyage through the Bay of Biscay.⁷

The first ships from the Seine began to arrive at St. Nazaire on September 1, and by the 7th 67 had arrived in the Loire, 33 from England, 26 from Havre, and 8 from Rouen. "The cargoes

¹ From P.N.T.O. Havre's Report, 7 September 1914, it appears, however, that these ships had already been requisitioned by the French authorities to transport Belgian troops.

² C 20, 21, 23, 25.

³ Cf. C 29, 30.

⁴ C 21. French dock labour was used, M. Jacquy, Engineer of the Chamber of Commerce, giving valuable aid to the P.N.T.O. in obtaining the necessary supply of labourers.

⁵ Brigadier-General Capper's Report.

⁶ C 34.

⁷ C 18, 26.

had been put on board very hurriedly and without regard to departments. Nearly every ship had some part of a hospital on board mixed up with ordnance stores, ammunition, and supplies of every kind of thing." At Nantes, "ships arrived with mixed cargoes which necessitated re-berthing some of the ships when half empty, or transferring some part of their cargoes some way over land. Cargoes from Havre were impreventibly mixed, but there seems to be no reason for mixing of cargoes of ships from English ports. The difficulties were not lightened by the early arrival of reinforcements often in charge of Second Lieutenants, mostly Special Reservists from England. . . . The A.S.C. labourers were at first not very helpful owing to their indiscipline, which did not improve matters. . . . All departments and services suffered by the change of base from the Seine to the Loire," reported the Deputy Inspector-General of Communications. In consequence of the hurried loading of ships, it was impossible to sort or check stores, or to know where various things were stowed, with the result that confusion and delay occurred when stores, supplies, and personnel were afterwards required for the Army. The Ordnance Department was chiefly affected. For example, a number of maxim guns were placed on the train for the advanced base, but the tripods, belts, and boxes were loaded in a 10,000-ton ship. The latter arrived at Nantes on September 7. On the 8th and again urgently on the 10th the tripods were asked for, but not until the 13th did search in the holds discover them, and the belts and boxes were not found until next day. Similarly, it took five days to unload and despatch 5,000 urgently needed entrenching tools, owing to the ships having to wait for a berth. If any item was wanted search had to be made in the various holds to discover it.

However, in spite of the haste and the difficulties under which the change of base was carried out, no great quantity of stores or supplies was lost,¹ and practically nothing was abandoned or destroyed. No. 7 General Hospital at Amiens fell into the hands of the enemy, but was recovered again by the French when they entered the town.

11. Forces covering the New Transport Lines.—The change of base from the Seine to the Loire necessitated a redistribution of the covering forces. The immediate protection of that part of the route between Ushant and St. Nazaire was, by the War Plan, the duty of Cruiser Force I, under Admiral de Robeck; but that cruiser force was unable to come north of Finisterre,² and for a patrol of the Bay of Biscay there was only the French squadron to draw on. Admiral Rouyer had withdrawn his armoured cruisers to Cherbourg on August 25, in readiness to co-operate in the defence of the Channel ports if required; and the Admiralty now, on

¹ The losses amounted on paper to £178,790, but it is believed that the actual loss was considerably less than this.

² See Monograph No. 22, "The Atlantic Ocean, 1914," Section 57.

August 31, asked that one of his two divisions might be sent out at once to patrol and cover the route from Ushant to Finisterre, the other division remaining at Cherbourg ready to relieve the first or to move up Channel as might be required, while Admiral Wemyss, with Cruiser Force G, continued to cover the route from Ushant to the Lizard.¹ This request was immediately granted, and the 2nd Division of armoured cruisers² was dispatched under Admiral le Cannellier.³

A week later Admiral Rouyer's squadron was further called upon, for the VIth Division of the British Army was being held in readiness to sail from Southampton to St. Nazaire on September 7. The Channel Fleet had moved westward to Portland on the 3rd, as support for the Western Squadron; and in order to protect the transports of the VIth Division whilst in the Channel the Admiralty asked the French Ministry of Marine, which moved to Bordeaux on September 2 in consequence of the German threat to Paris,⁴ to station three of Admiral Rouyer's armoured cruisers⁵ on the route from Southampton to Ushant, while the 2nd Division continued to guard the remainder of the route to St. Nazaire.⁶ The sailing of the VIth Division took place on the 8th and 9th, and on the 11th Admiral Rouyer's 1st Division of armoured cruisers returned to Cherbourg, where the Admiralty asked that two of them should be kept at eight hours' notice for steam and the third at 48 hours' notice.⁷

A contingent of Canadian troops was expected to sail from Canada about September 24, and the Admiralty decided to use Admiral Wemyss' four cruisers to escort them across the Atlantic. In order to set Cruiser Force G free for this purpose, Admiral Burney, who returned to Portland with the Channel Fleet on the evening of the 10th from a movement towards the Straits of Dover in connection with a sweep of the Harwich Force into the Heligoland Bight,⁸ was ordered to send the 7th Battle Squadron⁹ under Admiral Bethell to take over the Western Patrol.¹⁰ The change was effected on the following afternoon, September 11,¹¹ and Admiral Wemyss proceeded with the *Charybdis*, *Talbot*, and *Eclipse* to Plymouth, the *Diana* having been sent on ahead that

¹ A 36. Admiral Wemyss' cruisers were *Charybdis* (Flag), *Diana*, *Eclipse*, *Talbot*.

² *Gloire*, *Dupetit Thouars*, *Gueydon*, *Kléber*, *Lavoisier* and three auxiliaries.

³ F.O.H. I, p. 193.

⁴ Marine, Paris to Admiralty, 82, 2 September 1914.

⁵ *Marseillaise* (Flag of Admiral Rouyer), *Amiral Aube*, *Jeanne d'Arc*.

⁶ A 57, 58.

⁷ A 60, 66, 71. But F.O.H. I, p. 193, states that they remained on the route Southampton-Ushant from 9-13 September.

⁸ See Section 20.

⁹ *Vengeance* (Flag), *Caesar*, *Prince George*, *Goliath*. The attached cruiser *Proserpine* remained at Portland.

¹⁰ A 64, 65.

¹¹ A 67, 68.

morning to remedy defects. The three former ships left Devonport at 5.20 p.m. on the 12th for Canada, the *Diana* following at 6 a.m. on the 14th.

It had at first been thought that the Canadian convoy would consist of 14 ships only. The response to the call for volunteers in Canada was so good, however, that by the time the convoy was ready to sail, its numbers had been more than doubled, and the Admiralty considered that it ought to be afforded the extra protection of an armoured ship on approaching the British shores. On September 17, therefore, Admiral Bethell was warned that one of his battleships would be required to meet the convoy about October 2 in 30° W. The Admiral chose the *Majestic*, which had joined his force on the previous day on relief as gunnery training ship at Devonport by the *Jupiter*, which had newly come out of dockyard hands. On September 19 a further call was made on Admiral Bethell's squadron, the *Goliath* being detached to take over escort duties in the East Indies, in place of one of the two light cruisers, *Chatham* and *Dartmouth*, which were being withdrawn to search for the *Königsberg*. In Admiral Bethell's opinion an effective patrol could not be maintained between the Lizard and Ushant with less than five ships, for with the lengthening nights and bad weather it was impossible to board every steamer, and it was necessary to escort vessels into port, thus taking the ships off their patrol. Two cruisers, the *Jeanne d'Arc* and *Amiral Aube* were therefore withdrawn from the Southampton-Ushant patrol and sent on September 20 to act under Admiral Bethell's orders, the Admiralty asking that they might be replaced in the Channel by two cruisers of the 1st Division of the 2nd Light Squadron from Cherbourg.¹

12. Rear-Admiral Tottenham appointed to Command Cruiser Force E, September 4.—On the western side of the Atlantic Admiral Cradock had been sweeping the north coast of Brazil in search of the *Dresden*. The Admiralty, on September 4, decided to give him charge of the South-East Coast of America, and to transfer Admiral Hornby from Cruiser Force E to the North America and West Indies Station. The latter transferred his flag from the *Doris* to the *Caronia* for the passage to North America, and he left in the *Caronia* at 15 knots on the afternoon of September 5, hoisting his flag on the North American Station in the *Glory*, which had just been sent to Halifax to support Cruiser Force H.²

¹ A 72, 84, 86. The dispositions of the ships of Admiral Rouyer's command at this date were as follows (see H.S. 63, pp. 439-40 and 632):—Western patrol: (Ushant-Finisterre), *Gloire*, *Gueydon*, *Dupetit-Thouars*. (Mouth of the Loire), *D'Estrées*, *Lavoisier*, *Surcouf*, *Desaix*, *Kléber*, *Amiral Aube*; A.M.C.s *Savoie*, *Lorraine*, *Malte*, *Newhaven*; *Baliste* and three T.B.s.

At Cherbourg: *Marseillaise*, *Jeanne d'Arc*; A.M.C. *Rouen*, *Pluton* (M.L.) 1st, 2nd and 3rd Divisions of Destroyers; four submarines.

Repairing defects: *Guichen*, *Chateaurenault*; eight T.B.D.s.

At Portsmouth: Six submarines.

In Straits of Dover: 2nd Submarine Flotilla.

² A 46.

Captain Hayes-Sadler, of the *Ocean*, who was on the coast of Ireland supporting Cruiser Force E, was left in charge of the squadron¹ temporarily, though on the 7th he was ordered to proceed to Plymouth to stand by to accompany to Gibraltar the *Minerva* and a convoy of the East Lancashire Territorial Division for the defence of Egypt, after which the *Ocean* was to join Cruiser Force I on the west coast of Spain and Morocco under Admiral de Robeck.²

The Flag Officer chosen to succeed Admiral Hornby in command of Cruiser Force E was Rear-Admiral Henry L. Tottenham, C.B., who had taken the *Albion* out to Gibraltar at the end of August as support for Cruiser Force I. Admiral Tottenham was instructed to transfer his flag to the *Sutlej* of that squadron, and return in her to take command of Force E, while the *Albion*, after coaling, was to proceed to St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, to join Cruiser Force D under Admiral Stoddart, her place in Force I being taken by the *Ocean* on the arrival of the latter.³

The *Sutlej* left Gibraltar on September 10, escorting the transports *Ultonia* and *Gloucester Castle*, which were bringing home the garrison of Regular troops from Malta on relief by Territorials. She parted company from the transports at 9.30 a.m. on September 14, at the entrance to the English Channel, and Admiral Tottenham steered for Queenstown to take over command of Cruiser Force E.

CHAPTER III.

THE MENACE OF GERMAN MINELAYING.

13. Effect of the Battle of August 28 on German Policy.—A month after the outbreak of war the Admiralty was still concerned with the problem of bringing the High Sea Fleet to action. Neither at the Admiralty nor at the Reichs-Marine-Amt had reliable intelligence yet been received to shed a clear light upon either enemy's naval plans or policy. In Berlin, obscurity still shrouded the position and movements of the Grand Fleet; whilst at the Admiralty the far-reaching effects of the raid of August 28 were unsuspected.

Prisoners taken during that action stated that the High Sea Fleet had been reinforced by vessels from the Baltic and was expected to move at any moment, and the Admiralty had information, though admittedly not of the first class, that the German Fleet would make a sudden attack directly after victory over the Allied forces on land.⁴ For the Germans, in the full tide of their advance on the Western front and retrieving in masterly manner

¹ *Doris*, *Isis*, *Juno*, *Venus*, *Pelorus*.

² A 47.

³ A 59.

⁴ A 27, 29.

the reverses recently suffered in East Prussia, the time was propitious. Paris also at this date discerned some indications of possible enemy activity in the North Sea.¹

In point of fact, the feeling in Berlin was the reverse of buoyant. The losses incurred by the Germans on August 28 had the effect of rendering the Higher Command even more hesitant than before of becoming engaged in a fleet action under other conditions than those entirely favourable to the German Fleet. There were in Germany two opposing schools of thought on matters of naval policy, the protagonists of which were respectively the Emperor and Admiral von Tirpitz, Secretary of State for the Navy. To the former school belonged the statesmen, politicians, and the powerful shipping magnates; the latter school was represented by the Secretary of State for the Navy and the Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet,² whilst the Admiralstab was, reluctantly perhaps, amenable to the orders of the Emperor. It was feared by the Emperor that the engagement of superior forces by the German light cruisers on August 28 might set a precedent for the High Sea Fleet; and his anxiety became so great that it was with difficulty that Admiral von Pohl, Chief of the Admiralstab, could dissuade him from issuing an order that the Commander-in-Chief was to apply for permission before engaging in a decisive action.³ The instructions issued to von Ingenohl already precluded action on the part of the main fleet against the Grand Fleet, except in the Heligoland Bight.⁴ The High Sea Fleet was to be kept intact for use in the decisive battle at the chosen moment; and so apprehensive were the Germans of attrition before that time should have arrived, that at the beginning of September, when intelligence was received of British warships in Fano Bay, it was submarines, instead of light cruisers and destroyers, which were dispatched to establish the truth of the reports. The rôle of the fleet degenerated for practical purposes into the defence of the German coasts and harbours.

The policy of excessive caution with regard to the employment of their fleet was costing the Germans dear. The unchallenged existence of the Grand Fleet rendered possible the uninterrupted transport of troops to France from all parts of the Empire; German seaborne trade, other than in the Baltic and Scandinavian waters, was destroyed; and gradually the isolation of Germany was being effected. The acquiescence of the Commander-in-Chief in the policy laid down for the High Sea Fleet was due not only to the superior force of the Grand Fleet, but also to the overrating of the submarine menace and to the fact that the Command, in the planning of operations, was hampered to an extraordinary

¹ A 31 and I.D., H.S. 781.

² But his Chief of Staff was not of the Commander-in-Chief's way of thought in this matter.

³ G.O.H. II, p. 84.

⁴ G.O.H. II, pp. 4, 297.

degree by the obscurity which shrouded the Grand Fleet, its bases, position and policy.¹ The Grand Fleet was numerically superior to the German Fleet in all classes of vessels except possibly light cruisers and destroyers. The High Sea Fleet included eight flotillas of destroyers, each of 10 boats and a leader, seven flotillas of which were available to fight a fleet action. There were at this time about 72 British destroyers ready for sea in the first four flotillas, though half of these formed the Striking Force² at Harwich and were not therefore normally in company with the Grand Fleet. The High Sea Fleet had two squadrons of modern light cruisers, nine vessels in all after the action of August 28, but only five British light cruisers were at this date available to form a squadron in the Grand Fleet, the remaining eight or nine being attached to battle squadrons or employed as flotilla leaders. In some quarters in Germany it was thought that the appearance on August 28 of British forces in the German outpost line presaged a close blockade or, at least, increased offensive activity on our part. The former conjecture was soon proved to be unfounded; but fear of attrition through losses of light craft, and the decision to employ practically the entire force of submarines in the defence of the Bight, prevented the reconnaissances which alone could have shed light upon the situation. It was assumed that the First Fleet and possibly also the Second Fleet were far away in the North, secure from any attack by light forces;³ but the Germans had not at this date located with certainty the Grand Fleet bases.

14. Reorganisation of the British Patrol System, August 31.—

To us, one fairly clear indication of the line of German naval policy in the immediate future seemed to be given by the discovery of the Tyne and Humber minefields. Our vulnerability to this form of warfare was exceptionally great; and in the prevailing belief that the Germans were employing trawlers and disguised merchant vessels to lay mines, the difficulty of meeting the menace appeared to the Admiralty to be very grave. It was obvious that raids upon the coast were incompatible with the indiscriminate sowing of mines in the open sea, which appeared to be the present policy of the enemy; and some alteration in the system of patrolling the coast was clearly called for.

The belief that the Tyne and Humber minefields had been laid by trawlers found a further protagonist in Rear-Admiral Ballard,⁴ Admiral of Patrols, who investigated on the spot the circumstances

¹ G.O.H. I, pp. 224, 247.

² This was the name by which it was commonly known after 1914.

³ The Admiralstab apparently were not aware that the terms First, Second, and Third Fleet were used to describe the state of preparedness of the ships in peace time rather than as an indication of their strategical disposition and employment in war.

⁴ Commodore Ballard was promoted to Rear-Admiral 27 August, 1914.

attending the laying of these mines. As the result of his inquiries he formed the opinion that they had been laid by trawlers and unarmed merchant vessels, unescorted by warships. The conclusion rendered it possible to reorganise the system of patrol, which had thrown a severe strain on the old boats of the 7th and 9th flotillas since the order went out on August 6 for continuous patrol of the coast against minelayers. The requirement was considered to be now no longer concentration of the patrolling vessels, but dispersion, since the destroyers could deal singly with unarmed minelayers. Instead of operating in divisions, each responsible for repelling a raid on a particular portion of the coast, the destroyers were now scattered singly along a 10-mile-wide strip, known later as the War Channel, coinciding approximately with the main route of shipping up and down the coast.¹

The patrol flotillas had originally been intended to guard against raids, and they were not sufficient to prevent the activities of small enemy craft, minelayers, submarines, etc., off the coast. Steps were already being taken by the Admiralty to utilise small craft for watch and defence against minelayers and submarines.² At the beginning of the war the Royal Naval Motor Boat Reserve had been formed, officered by yachtsmen who placed their craft at the disposal of the Admiralty and were granted commissions in the R.N.V.R. It was evident that, to deal with the large and continually increasing numbers of craft designed for peaceful purposes and manned by untrained crews, some definite scheme of organisation, employment, and training must be adopted; and on September 2 an important step was taken in putting the organisation of the Auxiliary Patrol Vessels on a proper basis. Yachts, trawlers, and motor boats were to be armed and organised in units, as they became available. The standard unit was to consist of one yacht, four trawlers, and four motor-boats, the two former classes being armed with guns.³ Units were to be sent where they were most required, the first places being Scapa, Loch Ewe, and Rosyth (four units each), the Humber and Cromarty (two units each). Their duties were to carry out night and day patrols of harbours and coasts, and to free to some extent the patrol flotillas for more important work. The armed trawlers retained their peace time appearance and were not painted grey, though they flew the white ensign and white pendant.⁴

¹ M. 05150/14, "Patrol Flotillas, Local War Orders"; M. 05151/14 "Patrol Flotillas versus Minelayers"; and papers titled C. 1059; see also Monograph No. 7: "The Patrol Flotillas," Section 22, and C.B. 1553: "The History of British Minesweeping in the War," pp. 11 *et seq.* The revised operation orders for the patrol flotillas are in M. 05152/14.

² A.L., 2 September 1914. (H.S. 59, pp. 519-20) and M. 01728/14: "Proposal for utilising small craft for watch and defence against minelayers, submarines, etc."

³ All three classes of vessels were to carry rifles, trawlers were to mount not more than one gun, yachts not more than two guns.

⁴ M. 01641/14 (see M, Letter Book No. 272, Vol. 3, p. 1918).

15. Appointment of Admiral, East Coast Minesweeping, September 13.—By September 3 the buoyed War Channel had been extended from the Outer Dowsing Light Vessel to Flamborough Head. In October, however, in view of the dangers of the Humber minefield and in order to exercise better control over traffic by making it hug the coast, the channel was placed further inshore, and ran from Haisborough Light Vessel to the Inner Dowsing Light Vessel¹ and thence to Flamborough Head, passing close north of Sheringham Bank and 3½ miles east of Spurn Light Vessel. The channel was for day use only. The endeavour to clear the large enemy minefields of unknown extent with untrained forces in heavy draught vessels was abandoned after the *Speedy* and a number of minesweeping trawlers had been lost and, instead, the policy was extended of endeavouring to control and concentrate shipping on a safe coastal track.

Trawlers were reporting in great numbers² for the work and they gave devoted service. But they were untrained, and officers of experience were almost wholly lacking. Moreover, the draught of the vessels employed as minesweepers at this date, extending in many cases up to 13½ and 15 ft., rendered their employment for this purpose most dangerous. This was soon recognised and light draught craft, such as excursion paddle steamers, drawing not more than 7 ft., were taken up for Admiralty service.

On September 13 the post of Admiral, East Coast Minesweeping (A.M.S.), was created and Rear-Admiral E. F. B. Charlton, C.B., was appointed to co-ordinate the work in all areas of the Minesweeping Service. Under his command were the gunboats, drifters, trawlers and other vessels employed in minesweeping, and the drifters and armed trawlers employed in watching the channels in the area St. Abb's Head to the South Goodwins (exclusive of the Nore and Harwich areas), but not the armed trawlers and other vessels employed on other duties than minesweeping.³

16. East Coast Lights Extinguished, September 7.—It was not known at this date that the Germans had temporarily abandoned minelaying in favour of submarine operations. The minefields off the Tyne and Humber were still taking toll both of minesweepers and merchant vessels; and reports of mines sighted in the North Sea were incessant, necessitating constant changes in plans of operations and delays in their execution.⁴ The majority of these reports were false, and by September 10 the Commander-in-Chief had come to doubt whether the Admiralty were right in accusing the Germans of strewing mines indiscriminately in the North Sea.⁵

¹ At that date in position 53° 20' N., 0° 35' E.

² By 1 September, 250 trawlers and drifters had been taken up for Admiralty service.

³ M. 01862/14: "Minesweeping Organisation."

⁴ Reports of mines sighted may be found in Grand Fleet Orders and Memoranda.

⁵ G.F.N. of date.

However, the precaution was taken of placing fleet sweepers to sweep ahead of the Grand Fleet, and the older battleships of the *Duncan* class were put at the head of columns. Admiral Jellicoe suggested that we should adopt the retaliatory measure of mining the Heligoland Bight;¹ but the Admiralty did not feel this to be advisable.²

In the prevailing belief that mines were laid by trawlers and merchant vessels flying neutral or even British colours (including captured British trawlers and merchant vessels in German ports, a descriptive list of which was issued to the Fleet),³ the difficulties of preventing enemy minelaying off the British coast seemed almost insuperable in face of the great number of vessels employed in coastwise trade and fishing. The Admiralty drew attention to the powers of commanding officers under the Prize Manual to deal with vessels, whether enemy or neutral, discovered to be fitted for minelaying, and thorough search of all foreign trawlers was undertaken by the Customs Authorities before they were permitted to leave a British port.⁴

No British ships were allowed to trade to ports in Holland, Denmark, Germany, the Russian Baltic ports, or Swedish ports except Gothenburg; and ships were forbidden, at their own risk, to attempt to enter or leave the estuary of the Thames or East Coast ports at night.

On September 7, in order to increase the difficulties of the enemy in laying mines off the coast, a policy of extinction of East Coast lights was initiated, and was later extended.⁵ Admiral Jellicoe urged that all vessels should be prohibited from fishing on the East Coast. He went even further and suggested closing the entire East Coast north of the Thames to trade, in order to render the work of the patrols less difficult. The Admiralty were very reluctant to take so drastic a step,⁶ though the limits within which fishing boats were permitted to operate were still further revised. Vessels were allowed to fish west of a line drawn from the Hook of Holland to Sumburgh Head and north of Lowestoft. Vessels going north to Iceland and the Faroe Islands were not allowed to pass through the Pentland Firth or enter ports at night. Fishing was permitted without restriction in the English Channel west of Dungeness and in all waters west of 4° W. and the Shetlands and Orkneys. On September 14 additional areas were prohibited, between the parallels of the latitude of the Farn Islands and Seaham Harbour from longitude 0° to within three miles of the coast; between the latitudes of Flamborough Head and Mablethorpe from longitude 1° 15' E. to within three miles of the coast; and between the latitudes of Yarmouth and Harwich, from longitude 3° E. to the coast.⁷

¹ A 70.

² M. 0078/14. "Conference in *Iron Duke*."

³ Papers titled X 3811/1914.

⁷ A 63 and H.F. 004 of 1 August 1914, XCIII, 128, 167. See also H.S. 58, p. 1052.

⁴ A 52-55, 61.

⁵ See Notes to Plan II.

⁶ A 54.

Numbers of vessels were constantly fishing to eastward of the Pentland Firth, and it was impossible to board any considerable proportion of them unless most of the cruisers and destroyers of the Grand Fleet were employed solely on this duty. There were, however, strong reasons why fishing should be permitted to continue, for, apart from the food supply, fishing vessels were of value in bringing early information of mines.

Responsibility for the prevention of minelaying by the enemy fell not only upon the coast patrol. Up to date the Patrol Flotillas had kept the War Channel along the coast clear, but they were not able to prevent mines being laid from 20 to 50 miles off shore. So far, Scotland was believed to be free of mines, and it was most important to keep the entrances to Rosyth and Cromarty clear, Acting upon instructions from the Admiralty the Commander-in-Chief instituted, therefore, a new patrol area, No. VII, between the parallels 55° 20' N. and 57° 3' N., 50 to 120 miles from the coast, which was patrolled continually.¹ The policy underlying the dispositions of the Grand Fleet cruiser squadrons for the prevention of minelaying, the protection of trade, and observation of the western side of the North Sea generally was to cover the approaches to the North of Scotland and the Orkneys from the east by squadrons occupying areas III, VI, and VII, the minelayers which had been sent to join the Grand Fleet toward the end of August being employed as cruisers in watching area III, area VI being usually watched by the cruisers of the 10th Cruiser Squadron; and when the dreadnought battlefleet was coaling at Scapa, areas I and VI or IV and V were also occupied, the 3rd Battle Squadron supporting the cruisers in those areas, area VI not being used in this case. Admiral Jellicoe had to employ the *Duncans* of the 3rd Battle Squadron on work which was properly speaking the duty of cruisers—namely, boarding suspected vessels.

The Commander-in-Chief asked for more light cruisers, since only by continual sweeps by these craft could he keep the lines of approach to his bases free from minelayers. He had only six light cruisers to support destroyer raids, act with the battle cruisers in offensive sweeps, aid the 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons in covering the approaches to Scapa, cover the front of the battlefleet at sea, and protect its van and flanks in action. The high visibility and fine weather which ruled during the first month of the war had enabled him to manage with his single squadron of six light cruisers, but it was not expected that this favourable state of affairs could continue. But so urgent was the call for light cruisers in other waters that the Admiralty were quite unable to accede to the Commander-in-Chief's request.²

¹ A 61 and G.F.N. (H.S. 415, p. 49). See Plan V.

² M. 01736/14: "Shortage of Light Cruisers in the Grand Fleet." The Admiralty seem to have been the less impressed by Admiral Jellicoe's request because the cry from the sea for more light cruisers was a common experience throughout history.

17. **Dogger Bank Patrol Instituted, September 12.**—In the south, Cruiser Force C and the Harwich flotillas were keeping the Broad Fourteens and the eastern side of the Dogger Bank clear of minelayers. On September 6 Captain Blunt, in the *Fearless*, took out eight destroyers of the 1st Flotilla to patrol for 24 hours on the meridian of 3° E. between 55° N. and 56° 20' N.¹ Apprehensions of further submarine and minelaying operations by the enemy off the east coast caused a patrol to be permanently established on the Dogger Bank on September 12, in addition to the watching patrol on the Broad Fourteens. The limits of the new patrol were 55° 30' N. and 53° 30' N. on the meridian of 3° E. It was to be maintained by eight destroyers and one of the light cruisers *Amethyst*, *Fearless*, or *Lowestoft*, in the latter of which Commodore Tyrwhitt was still flying his flag pending the repair of the damage sustained by the *Arethusa* on August 28. Two of the armoured cruisers of Admiral Christian's force, which consisted at this time of his flagship *Euryalus*, the *Bacchante* (flagship of Rear-Admiral H. H. Campbell), *Aboukir*, *Cressy* and *Hogue*, were to be off the Swarte Bank in support of the new patrol, the remainder of the force supporting the destroyers in the Broad Fourteens.² Admiral Christian was of the opinion, however, that the Swarte Bank Patrol should be strengthened, for he thought that the enemy must be aware of the presence of this isolated, unsupported force,³ and might send out a strong cruiser squadron to attack it. Moreover, the Swarte Bank was strategically the position for a strong support of the Broad Fourteens Patrol, since a squadron here could cut off any enemy cruisers retreating to Heligoland after an attack on the flotilla on the Broad Fourteens, a factor which would deter the enemy from chasing the destroyers far south.⁴ The armoured cruisers, however, were suffering from condenser troubles and needed each some days in port in turn; and the best that could be arranged was for two of them to cruise on the Dogger Bank and one in support on the Broad Fourteens.⁵

18. East Coast Ports closed to Neutral Fishing Craft, October 1.

—Although the Admiralty were not prepared to adopt the drastic measure proposed by Admiral Jellicoe of closing the East Coast to trade and fishing, the continual reports of the sighting of suspicious trawlers rendered it necessary that some step should be taken. An announcement was therefore made to the Powers concerned that from October 1 the East Coast would be closed to

¹ A 48.

² A 69 and M. 05201/14: "Proposed arrangements for patrolling in North Sea."

³ It is clear from G.O.H. that this was not the case.

⁴ M. 02105/14: "Dogger Bank and Broad Fourteens Patrols. Proposals as to force, etc." (In H.S. 47.)

⁵ A 81.

neutral fishing vessels, and on September 27 the following telegram was sent to all ships in home waters, the necessary notification being sent to neutral Powers:—

From October 1 inclusive East Coast ports of Great Britain will be closed to neutral fishing craft which, if found north of 54° 30' N and west of 1° 0' E, or south of that latitude and west of 2° 30' E, are to be treated as under suspicion of minelaying. Consideration should be given at first to vessels not actually suspected and proving themselves ignorant of the order. Innocent vessels to be warned off. Those defying prohibition to be seized and treated as guilty of unneutral action. (2000.)

CHAPTER IV.

RECONNAISSANCE OF HELIGOLAND BIGHT, SEPTEMBER 10.

19. **Sweep of the Grand Fleet Cruiser Squadrons to intercept Submarines, September 4.**—On the evening of August 28, when the reports had come in of the successful raid in the Heligoland Bight, the Admiralty sent instructions to Sir John Jellicoe to arrange for a similar sweep by the cruisers and light forces of the Grand Fleet into the Skagerrak, at an early date, supported, as before, by the battle cruisers, the Grand Fleet moving down to a position to prevent the light forces from being embayed in the narrow waters by the High Sea Fleet. The movement which was arranged by the Commander-in-Chief in accordance with these instructions had as part object the destruction of German minelayers, for the recent discovery of the minefields off the Tyne and Humber had increased the apprehensions entertained of the extension of this form of warfare by the Germans. The Commander-in-Chief proposed that the reconnaissance should take place at daylight, September 3, Aalbeck Bight, inside the Skaw, being searched for submarines, while the battlefleet moved down to Jutland Bank, sweeping north-westward on the return of the reconnoitring forces; he asked that Admiral Moore's battle cruisers and the Harwich flotillas might co-operate, sweeping northward along the meridian of 3° 30' N to intercept any German minelayers making for our coasts.

During the evening of August 31, however, information believed to be reliable was received at the Admiralty that four enemy cruisers and six submarines were coming out from the Baltic at midnight, September 3-4. It was believed that the enemy intended to skirt the coast of Norway to the latitude of the Orkneys, and then steer straight across the North Sea in the hope of destroying some of our battleships. The sweep arranged by the Commander-in-Chief was therefore cancelled, and the Admiralty proposed instead that a cruiser squadron should be sent out to cut in from the northward between the enemy cruisers and their

base. The arrangements made by Admiral Jellicoe were for the 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, supported by the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and accompanied by the 2nd Flotilla, to sweep to the entrance to the Skagerrak, starting from a position in Lat. 58° N, Long. 2° 36' E, at 4 a.m., September 4.¹

The sweep was continued as arranged until noon, by which time the entrance to the Skagerrak had been reached, but no enemy vessels were sighted, and a destroyer search for submarines on the line Pentland Firth-Ekersund also proved fruitless.²

This was probably the first occasion upon which the practice of zigzagging was adopted in waters where enemy submarines were believed to be operating.³

20. Reconnaissance of the Heligoland Bight, September 10.—⁴

Interrogation of prisoners taken on August 28 had elicited the intelligence that the German battle cruisers were preparing to come out on that day in support of the light forces, but had not been in time. From this it was believed at the Admiralty that a repetition of the raid might tempt to sea some of the German heavy ships, and possibly their main fleet; and within a week orders went out to Sir John Jellicoe for another raid, with the object of drawing the High Sea Fleet to sea. "You should be in position with the Grand Fleet to take full advantage of so fortunate a chance," the Admiralty telegraphed to the Commander-in-Chief: "If you keep east of Longitude 6° E there should be small danger from mines."⁵

The belief of the Admiralty that a repetition of the raid of August 28 would have the effect of drawing to sea not only the German battle cruisers, but also part of the battlefleet, was perfectly correct. The arrangements made by Admiral von Ingenohl for meeting a similar raid in future were as follows.⁶ The light cruisers lay at anchor in one of the estuaries from which they could issue forth in a body. They were not, however, to proceed without heavy ship support. The degree of readiness for sea of the latter was essentially increased. Two battle cruisers were held in readiness outside the minefields but inside the Jade bar, and both at Schillig Roads and in the Elbe a division of battleships and a destroyer flotilla lay ready to follow in immediate support. The remainder of the armoured cruisers and battleships lay at two hours' notice for sea behind the booms. A position behind the bar was necessary for the ships in the Jade on account of the submarine danger, but it had the obvious disadvantage which was felt on August 28 of limiting considerably the time

¹ A 25, 28, 33, 38, 43.

² See G.F.N. of date.

³ Zigzagging was introduced by H.F. 004 of 1 August 1914, No. 114, 31.8.14.

⁴ Termed by the Admiralty Plan IV. (See Appendix E.)

⁵ A 45.

⁶ G.O.H., II, p. 2.

during which the heavy ships could go to sea. A re-survey of the bar was now undertaken in order to discover the exact limits of time within which it could be crossed by heavy ships.

The Admiralty intended that the raid should take place on September 8.¹ The *Dreadnought* battlefleet did not, however, return to Loch Ewe until 4 p.m. on the 5th to coal; and on the Commander-in-Chief's representations the operation was deferred until the 10th.²

The plan of operations embraced a combined movement of all the forces of the Grand Fleet, commencing with simultaneous attack and sweeps on the enemy's patrols off Heligoland and the Ems by the destroyers of the Harwich Striking Force, supported by battle cruisers, cruisers, and light cruisers, while the overseas submarine flotilla from Harwich was to co-operate. In addition to the support of the Grand Fleet, the Channel Fleet moved up towards the Straits of Dover.³

The *Agincourt*,⁴ the battleship which, under the name of *Osman I*, had been completing at Elswick for Turkey and was taken over by the Admiralty on the outbreak of war, was working up her gunnery practices and was to join the fleet for the operation, and the *Orion*, which had been away for three weeks with faulty condensers, was to be ready by the 8th. The *Dominion* was away at Devonport, exchanging the 12-in. guns which she had cracked a fortnight previously; and the *Exmouth* remained at Scapa with boiler and engine defects. The *Erin*,⁵ the second of the two battleships building for Turkey and taken over at the outbreak of war, was doing her trials. The *Inflexible* had joined the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron at Scapa from the Mediterranean on August 31; she now exchanged places with the faster *New Zealand* in Cruiser Force K, in order that the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron might be rendered more homogeneous.⁶

The operation was carried out without any essential alteration in the plan.⁷ No enemy vessels were sighted, though the *Euryalus* sighted a seaplane when in 53° 50' N, 5° 27' E, now known to be No. 29, which left the Ems about 5 a.m. on the 10th. The various

¹ Admiralty to C.-in-C., H.F. 649, 4 September 1914.

² A 45. Corbett, "Naval Operations," Vol. I, p. 164, states that there was close connection between the operation and the transport of the VIth Division to France, which began on the 8th. This would be in accordance with previous practice, but the connection, if any, cannot be traced. From the fact that the date for the sweep was fixed on September 1, two days before the date of sailing of the VIth Division was notified to the Admiralty, it seems probable that the coincidence of the two operations was fortuitous. No mention of the transport of the VIth Division is made in the orders, etc., for Plan IV, nor does its sailing appear to have been notified to Admiral Jellicoe.

³ The Vice-Admiral, Second and Third Fleets, was known as Vice-Admiral, Channel Fleet, from September 5.

⁴ 27,500 tons, 22 knots, 14-12 in., 20-6 in., 4-3 pdr., 3 S.T.

⁵ 23,000 tons, 21 knots, 10-13.5 in., 16-6 in., 8-6 pdr., 3 S.T.

⁶ H.S. 58, p. 916; 59, pp. 272, 332, 361.

⁷ See Plan I.

squadrons, in proceeding from their bases and areas to join up for the operations, searched a considerable portion of the northern part of the North Sea, and on the way south the cruisers spread and covered as much ground as the visibility admitted. The weather was still and misty, and the brilliant sunlight caused a glare. Low visibility hampered the movements of the fleet and rendered Admiral Jellicoe apprehensive of attack by German destroyers. He considered that under such conditions of weather off the enemy's coast, all four of the Grand Fleet flotillas ought to be in company with the battlefleet, for destroyers would be the deciding factor in such an action, and the High Sea Fleet was exceedingly well supplied with torpedo craft.¹

21. German Dispositions to Meet the Raid.—The absence of German patrols in the Bight was believed by the Commander-in-Chief to be due to the enemy having suspected that the sweep was about to take place, which he thought was to be explained by the complete cordon of apparently neutral fishing boats discovered by the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron to be established about 150 miles from Heligoland. Search of these craft failed to discover anything of a compromising nature, though considerable suspicion attached to them because frequently wireless signals were noticed to be very strong after the fleet had passed these vessels;² and on the Commander-in-Chief's representations the Admiralty empowered him in future to send into port for strict search any neutral vessels which hampered his operations.³

Admiral Jellicoe believed that if another reconnaissance of the type proved abortive on the first day, a repetition 24 hours later might produce results, since the supposition that the fleet had withdrawn might induce the enemy to seize the opportunity of sending out minelayers, trawlers, and vessels for interfering with trade. The fuel supply of the flotillas and attached cruisers in this case would constitute a difficulty, though it would not be insuperable.⁴

Admiral Jellicoe was perfectly correct in his belief that the Germans suspected a repetition of the raid of August 28. A number of reports, each confirming the other, were received in Germany on September 8 that the British planned to undertake a major operation in the Heligoland Bight during the next few days. The moment was inauspicious for the Germans, for on September 3 the 4th Squadron and the *Blücher*, with two light cruisers and the 2nd and 6th destroyer

¹ M. 01969/14: "Remarks on Operations carried out by Grand Fleet during week ending September 12," and C.-in-C., H.F. to Adty., 377 and 379, 12 September 1914. (H.S. 61, pp. 840, 841.)

² Jellicoe: "The Grand Fleet, 1914-16," II, p. 125.

³ A 74, 75. The Germans deny that these fishing boats were used for such a purpose. (G.O.H., II, p. 21.)

⁴ G.F.N., 9-10 September, 1914.

flotillas, had been detached to the Baltic; moreover, since the offensive power of his fleet was thus hopelessly compromised, Admiral von Ingenohl had arranged for the *Moltke* to be out of action for 14 days with boiler and condenser tube repairs, while the other two battle cruisers,¹ *Seydlitz* and *Von der Tann*, which had similar defects, would be reduced to a speed of 19 to 20 knots for six or eight days. The intelligence which came in on September 8 rendered it urgently necessary to bring up the High Sea Fleet to readiness for action, and the Commander-in-Chief applied for the return of the forces detached to the Baltic. The request found the Admiralstab busy discussing an injunction from the Emperor that the initiative of the High Sea Fleet must be still further circumscribed. Admiral von Pohl, the Chief of the Admiralstab, was away in Luxembourg at General Headquarters, and his deputy,² Rear-Admiral Behncke, was an officer who realised that the available naval forces did not suffice to render Germany strong both in the Baltic and in the North Sea. He decided that weakness in the Baltic must be accepted, held up the Emperor's order, and instructed the 4th Squadron to coal and return to the North Sea immediately.³

On September 9 special orders were put into force for the period of high tension. In the Jade the *Seydlitz*, with the armoured cruisers *Roon* and *Prinz Adalbert*, lay as near the mouth as possible, and behind them the fleet flagship, the 1st and 3rd squadrons, and three destroyer flotillas. In the Weser lay all the available light cruisers and the 2nd squadron with a destroyer flotilla; while the 4th destroyer flotilla lay in the Ems, with the *Stettin* and six submarines, the latter with orders to proceed off the river mouth at dawn. By day all ships kept steam for high speed, but by night the heavy ships drew fires.

The defence of the Heligoland Bight had been radically altered after August 28. The former system of three concentric patrol lines had been adopted mainly as a defence against submarines, as which, however, it had failed. The present necessity of withdrawing the patrols at night or in thick weather, in order to avoid a repetition of the disaster of August 28, rendered it still less difficult for enemy submarines to penetrate into the inner bight. Searches of the bight at night by destroyers were now instituted in order to surprise submarines whilst charging their batteries; and for the same purpose armed trawlers watched the west coast of Schleswig-Holstein; it was by the north-about route round Heligoland that the Germans believed our submarines entered the

¹ It is uncertain whether the *Derfflinger* had yet joined the fleet.

² The Emperor's order here referred to was to the effect that the Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet was not to engage in a decisive action with the Grand Fleet without telegraphic permission of the Emperor. Von Pohl apparently persuaded the Emperor later on to withdraw the order, and it was never issued.

³ G.O.H., II, pp. 11, 12.

bight. The outer patrol line of destroyers, some 30 miles from Heligoland, was placed in position only by day and during clear weather; and armed trawlers were permanently in position on the arc Spiekeroog-Heligoland-Horn Reefs. This trawler line was to be strengthened and eventually doubled as boats became available.¹ In addition, practically all the available submarines were employed in the defence of the bight.² It had been decided to mine the bight after August 28, to prevent a repetition of the raid; and on September 9 a minefield was laid at a depth of 2.5 metres below mean low water between Norderney Gat and Heligoland, in a position which happened to be in the direct path of the westward sweep of the British 3rd Flotilla, as arranged for September 10. The number of mines, namely, 689, was only sufficient for a single row over a length of 15 miles. A second field was to be laid on the line Heligoland-Eider Lightship when mines became available.³ The laying of these minefields had been considered long before the war, but they had not been laid up to date for fear of restricting the movements of the German ships and submarines.

In his report on the operation Admiral Jellicoe pointed out that it was possible the sweep of the flotillas in the bight had begun too early.⁴ This was, in fact, the case. At dawn on September 10 seven German submarines, *U.5*, *U.7*, *U.16*, *U.17*, *U.23*, *U.25*, and *U.27*, were sent out to take up an outpost line 20 miles north-west of Heligoland, where they arrived between 6.0 a.m. and 7.0 a.m. Ten miles behind them the 3rd Destroyer Flotilla prolonged the line of the minefield to the north-eastward, and a group of destroyers was stationed to southward of the minefield, near Norderney, while the light cruisers *Graudenz*, *München*, *Stuttgart*, and *Danzig* cruised in the bight. The 8th Destroyer Half-Flotilla was on outpost duty off the Ems. Daylight was about 4.30 a.m., but, unfortunately, by that time the sweep westward was well under way, and no British vessel was within 25 miles of Heligoland.

¹ On the outbreak of war the High Sea Fleet had 40 trawlers. (G.O.H., I, Table I.)

² See Plan I.

³ They were known as α and β minefields respectively. The remainder of the stock of mines was being reserved to fit out the auxiliary minelayer *Berlin* and for operations on the Belgian coast.

⁴ M. 01969/14. "Remarks on operations carried out by Grand Fleet during week ending September 12." It seems that the Admiralty intended the operation to be a night T.B.D. attack, whereas the Commander-in-Chief thought that the best means of drawing out the German heavy ships was for the flotillas to expose themselves in the bight by daylight. Commodore T. was evidently of the Commander-in-Chief's opinion, and he believed that 3.45 a.m. had been fixed as the time of the turn to the westward because the operation had originally been planned to take place a week earlier. The Commodore wrote to the C.O.S. suggesting that as the plan had been deferred all times mentioned should be put on half an hour. (H.S. 59, p. 724.) It is not known what reply was made by the C.O.S., but the time of the turn westward was not altered.

An air reconnaissance had been ordered for dawn on the 10th, and at 4.45 a.m. aircraft No. 20 set out¹ to scout in a north-westerly direction, but without sighting the enemy. At 5.45 a.m., however, *S.129*² sighted one of the divisions of destroyers of the 1st Flotilla off the Ems, slightly to the eastward of Borkum Reef Lightship, steering slowly³ on the westerly sweep, whilst smoke clouds were discernible to the northward.⁴ *S.129* reported the presence of the enemy, whereupon it appeared to her that the latter, finding that their presence was discovered, made off at high speed. This was not, in fact, the case, for the flotilla had not sighted the enemy destroyer,⁵ and Captain Blunt continued his sweep westward at 20 knots as arranged. On receipt of the signal of sighting the enemy, five submarines, *U.8-10*, *U.22*, and *U.24*, proceeded out on a previously arranged line to the northward of the Ems.⁶ Meanwhile, seaplane No. 29 had gone out from Borkum at 4.55 a.m. to scout in a WNW direction, and reported the remainder of the Ems raiding force and Admiral Christian's supporting cruisers still further to the westward. This was the seaplane sighted by the *Euryalus*. The submarines were immediately ordered to steer west to attack the enemy, but they were too late; by 6.35 a.m. the 1st Flotilla had come within sight of Admiral Christian's supporting cruisers, and the whole force withdrew unmolested.

No signs of the German patrols were discovered by the 3rd Flotilla. The 3rd (German) Destroyer Flotilla proceeded out from Heligoland at dawn on the routine patrol, and by 4 a.m. was formed on an outpost line about seven miles north-west of Heligoland, whilst the 1st Submarine Flotilla took up a line about 6 a.m. in prolongation to the north-westward of the new minefield. Due doubtless to the low visibility, Commodore Tyrwhitt's force and the 3rd (German) Flotilla failed to sight one another, and at 3.45 a.m. the 3rd Flotilla turned to N 73 W to sweep westward according to plan. The flotilla at this time was

¹ Apparently from Heligoland.

² Presumably one of the boats of 8th Half-Flotilla.

³ The flotilla was steaming 20 knots according to plan. (*Fearless's* Log, No. 19822.)

⁴ G.O.H., II, 17. But Karte 3 shows the smoke clouds to the southward.

⁵ The following signals appear in *Fearless's* log of September 10, No. 12113:—

Badger to *Fearless*, 5.55 a.m.: "Calling attention to ESE."

Hydra to *Fearless*, 5.56 a.m.: "Enemy in sight."

Ferret to *Fearless*, 5.57 a.m.: "Calling attention to ESE."

Capt. D to *Hydra*, 6.12 a.m.: "What did you see?"

Reply: "One cruiser and one torpedo craft steering into shore." Whether these reports referred to "*S.129*" or not is uncertain, but Captain Blunt considered that the vessels sighted belonged to the Dutch patrol off Friesche Zeegat, and he did not examine them more closely. (See Report of Captain D. (1) Harwich Force Packs, No. 0030, Vol. IV.)

⁶ G.O.H., II, 17. But Karte 3 shows another boat in addition, viz., *U.28*.

some four miles to the northward of position C as laid down in the orders for Plan IV, and it passed unwittingly within a few cables of the unsuspected German minefield instead of across it.¹

An active air reconnaissance of the bight by the Germans failed to discover any further signs of the enemy, and they were at a loss to understand what the British intention had been.

22. Operations of the Submarines in connection with the Sweep.

—The submarines detailed to proceed to the Heligoland Bight in conjunction with the raid of September 10 were *E.4* to the north of Heligoland, and *E.6*, *E.7*, and *D.2* to the south of the island. They were to meet the *Firedrake* and *Lurcher* at 4.30 a.m. on the 10th, off Smith's Knoll Light Vessel and sweep eastward at 11 knots, spread two miles apart, the destroyers scouting five miles ahead as far east as $4^{\circ} 50'$. Simultaneously *D.8* was to operate off the Ems.²

A patrol of submarines of the 8th Flotilla had been maintained almost continuously in the bight since the outbreak of war, though without result. The employment by the Germans of numbers of trawlers on patrol near the coast caused our boats to be stationed somewhat further out from Heligoland than formerly, in the possible track of vessels proceeding to and from the enemy's ports. Accordingly, *D.1*, *E.10* and *D.7*, which left Harwich on September 5 on the return of a large patrol of seven boats which had been operating during the 2nd and 3rd off the German coast, were given positions from 2 to 27 miles NNW of Noord Oost Gat Buoy, Terschelling, over 100 miles from Heligoland, as the western limit of their patrol. In such a large area it was a matter of chance whether a submarine happened to be in the right place at the right moment.


Our submarines reported at the beginning of September that the German destroyer patrols off Heligoland and the Ems were being maintained.³ The new trawler patrol between Spiekeroog and Heligoland was discovered, but although the night patrols had been sighted on several occasions since August 28, nothing was seen of them on the early morning of September 10, when the submarines arrived in position to take part in the operation ordered for that day.⁴ Their orders were to be in position before 2.30 a.m.


¹ See Plan I.

² Comm. (S)'s War Records, Vol. I, p. 174. In these orders *D.2* was detailed to proceed to the Ems, but from her report (p. 178) it appears that she was subsequently detailed to take *E.7*'s place south of Heligoland. However, both *E.7* and *D.2* operated south of Heligoland, and only *D.8* went to the Ems.

³ Comm. (S), No. 0022, 4 September 1914. (H.S. 225, p. 156.)

⁴ The submarines left Yarmouth on 9th, not on 10th as detailed in Comm. (S)'s orders. They arrived in position between 1.0 a.m. and 3.45 a.m. on 10th, except *D.8*, which was off the Ems at 11.45 p.m. on 9th. The reports of the submarines are in Comm. (S)'s War Records, pp. 166 *et seq.*





PLAN 1
SWEEP OF HELIGOLAND BIGHT
 10th. September 1914

NOTE

- Track of 1st. Flotilla based on "Fearless" log No. 19822 and positions in signals 0515 (10th.) to "Euryalus" and 0630 to "Aboukir".
- Track of 3rd. Flotilla based on "Lowestoft's" log No. 19697 and "Lance's" log No. L 600.
- Track of 3rd. Flotilla as ordered in plan of operations.
- Position of German minefield "A" from O. U 6020 A

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on the 10th and to remain submerged until 6 a.m. when they were to rise in readiness to attack any enemy vessels proceeding to chase our flotillas or returning after doing so.¹ Off the eastern Ems, at 7.20 a.m. on the 10th, *D.8*² sighted a light cruiser of the *Ariadne* class, doubtless the *Arcona*, which lay in the Ems during the night with the 7th Half-Flotilla. Twenty minutes later one of the German destroyers of the 7th Half-Flotilla attacked and forced Lieutenant-Commander Brodie to dive.³ At 3.30 p.m.,⁴ while on the surface, he sighted a German submarine end-on and mistook her for one of the other British boats out of station. As a matter of fact the submarine was *U.28*, and *D.8* soon discovered her mistake and dived; but before she could pick up the German in her periscope the latter had also dived. Under the circumstances stalemate was practically inevitable, for neither boat knew what to do with the other; and after an hour and a quarter, during which the two boats simultaneously rose and simultaneously dived again, the German retired out of the area.⁵

North-west of Heligoland *E.4*,⁶ on rising to the surface at 6 a.m., found herself 150 yards from *U.25*, which was steering NNW at 10 knots.⁷ There were numbers of German destroyers about, and at 3.20 p.m. Lieutenant-Commander Leir again had an opportunity of attacking an enemy submarine. This was *U.23*, which, with *U.25*, had been trying since 9.30 a.m. to get into position to attack *E.4*, and was now returning to Heligoland. Lieutenant-Commander Leir fired a torpedo at *U.23*, but the distance, 150 yards, was too short, and the torpedo passed underneath the boat without picking up its depth. *E.4* then fired a surface shot at *U.25*, which was following astern of *U.23*, firing at *E.4* the while with her gun, but the German was prepared and avoided the torpedo; and both the enemy boats then made off at high speed. Several destroyers of the 3rd Flotilla, and submarines *U.18* and *U.14*, were sent out to hunt *E.4*, but did not succeed in finding her. The light cruiser *Hamburg* proceeded on the same duty and, being mistaken for an enemy cruiser, was nearly torpedoed by *U.27*.

All five of the submarines concerned in the operation of September 10 returned to harbour without other incident than the sighting of a submarine by *D.8* at 7 a.m. on September 11, in 52° 58' N, 2° 55' E. This was thought at the time to be *D.2*, but was possibly *U.9*, one of the submarines ordered to attack the flotillas 24 hours previously.⁸

¹ M. 05172/14.

² Lieutenant-Commander Theodore S. Brodie.

³ This is not mentioned in G.O.H.

⁴ G.O.H., II, p. 19, says "4.50 p.m." (S.M.T.).

⁵ The report is in H.S. 225.

⁶ Lieutenant-Commander E. W. Leir.

⁷ The report does not say what happened next.

⁸ G.O.H., Vol. II. Karte 3 states, however, that *U.9* proceeded no further than Haaks Lightship, approximately 4° 22' E.

23. Grand Fleet ordered to Rest in Harbour, September 14.—

On the conclusion of the reconnaissance of September 10, the Grand Fleet swept northward on a broad front, with the object of intercepting any enemy ships which might be at sea and of closely examining all merchant and fishing vessels. The sweep commenced at 11 a.m. on the 10th,¹ from 55° N, 4° 30' E, the *Invincible* and *Inflexible*, with the minesweeping gunboats, sweeping towards Dundee, the 3rd Cruiser Squadron towards Aberdeen, the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron towards the Pentland Firth, and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron towards Stronsay, the ships being spread according to visibility. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron was in general support, and the battlefleet, divisions opened out to four miles apart, extended the sweep to the eastward. Possible mined areas were searched by the cruisers, but no mines were reported; and the Commander-in-Chief concluded it was safe to assume that no mines were at present laid north of 56° N.² The only incident of the day was an erroneous report from the *Zealandia* that she rammed and sunk a submarine about 10.30 a.m.³ A torpedo was said to have been seen passing between the two leading battleships of the division, but as a matter of fact no German submarine was in the neighbourhood.

The intelligence reports indicated that a large part of the German Fleet was in the Baltic, covering the landing of German troops for operations against Russia. In the absence of enemy activity in the North Sea the Admiralty telegraphed on September 14 that the battlefleet, which had arrived at Loch Ewe on the previous evening, was to be rested for engine-room defects.⁴

On September 17 a conference was held on board the *Iron Duke* at Loch Ewe, between the First Lord of the Admiralty, the principal members of the war staff, and the chief officers of the fleet, at which various important questions of policy and strategy were discussed.⁵ It was decided that the usual procedure in the North Sea should be to hold areas off our bases and off the British coast by cruiser squadrons, for the prevention of minelaying, the protection of trade, and the observation of the western side of the North Sea generally.

The areas to the eastward of the permanently watched areas were to be swept at irregular intervals by the battle cruisers and light cruisers and such other cruisers as were available, the battlefleet, or a portion of it, being in a northern position in support.

¹ The battle cruisers and light cruisers, being to scudward of the battlefleet, commenced the sweep at 7.30 a.m.

² G.F.N., September 11–12.

³ M. 02420/14. "H.M.S. *Zealandia*. Supposed sinking of a German submarine."

⁴ A 75.

⁵ G.F.S.P. 0022, Vol. LIX.

The question of naval attack on Heligoland was discussed. Naval opinion was unanimous that the reduction of the place would involve far more serious losses in capital ships than would compensate for any advantage gained, and that the difficulties in the way of a successful bombardment would be very great; and it was decided that, in the present phase of the war, no enterprise of this nature should be attempted. A similar conclusion was reached as regards the Baltic, where an attack on Kiel by light cruisers and destroyers had been advocated; but there was general agreement that some "E" class submarines could, without undue risk, operate off Kiel, if they could make the passage of the Belts in safety.¹

CHAPTER V.

BRITISH AND GERMAN SUBMARINE OPERATIONS, FIRST HALF OF SEPTEMBER.

24. **Submarine Alarm at Scapa, September 1.**—The hardening of the policy limiting the action of the High Sea Fleet to the defence of the German coasts and harbours, which was the principal result of the Battle of Heligoland Bight, left open to Admiral von Ingenohl two types only of active operations, namely, minelaying and the employment of submarines. The former had not proved particularly profitable up to date, nor did the Germans possess sufficient mines to carry out an extensive mining policy.² For a time the mining offensive was abandoned in favour of submarine operations.

The Grand Fleet at this date was still without an anchorage in the far north where it could lie secure from submarine attack. The arrangements for the defence of Scapa had been approved by the Admiralty on August 30, including the laying of certain minefields at the entrances³; but the defence against submarines still depended upon such inadequate measures as anchoring light cruisers and destroyers off the various entrances and a patrol outside the main entrance, whilst the fleet was inside⁴; and consequently the fleet never remained longer in harbour than was necessary for fuelling purposes. Nor was the state of protection of the alternative base at Loch Ewe any better.

The lack of a safe base in the north for the Grand Fleet was a matter which it was essential should be remedied. "The only possible action, in the event of an alarm being given of the

¹ See Monograph 25. C.B. 955. *The Baltic*, 1914.

² G.O.H., II.

³ H.S. 58, pp. 677, 843, 950.

⁴ The arrangements for the defence of Scapa Flow on various dates may be found in "G.F. Orders and Memoranda." See also T.H. 37: "Inception and Development of the Northern Base." C.B. 1515 (37).

presence of a submarine, was to take the fleet to sea," wrote Admiral Jellicoe, "and, in addition to the dangers arising at that time from a hurried departure in thick weather, a feeling of insecurity was created which was bad for moral, and the ships were deprived of opportunities for cleaning boilers, refitting machinery, etc., which experience was showing was essential if the steaming efficiency of the fleet was to be maintained."¹

Such an alarm as the Commander-in-Chief here referred to occurred on September 1. On this day the Dreadnought battle-fleet, the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, 6th Cruiser Squadron, and the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla were at Scapa Flow, having just returned from a precautionary cruise in the northern part of the North Sea during the sweep of August 28, the ships being now engaged in cleaning boilers, storing, and taking in ammunition. The 3rd Battle Squadron, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, and the 3rd and 10th Cruiser Squadrons had not yet returned from a sweep carried out on information pointing to the possibility of minelaying by the enemy off the Pentland or Moray Firth during the night August 31 to September 1; the sweep was arranged to intercept the enemy minelayers on their return trip, but it was unproductive, for the alarm of enemy minelaying was false.

On September 1 the *Falmouth* was anchored to the westward of Holm Sound, with the remainder of the squadron forming an outpost line to the southward. At 6.30 p.m. she reported the periscope of a submarine in sight inside the harbour, and immediately opened fire. The periscope was seen for about 30 seconds a foot above water, about 50 yards from the ship, making a feather of about 10 yards.² Directly afterwards the *Vanguard*, one of the outer line of battleships, also opened fire on an object reported as a periscope, which was fired at too by one of the destroyers patrolling between the fleet and the Hoxa entrance. Ships with net defence got their nets out and the whole fleet raised steam with all dispatch, pending which all the available small craft, drifters, steamboats, motor boats, yachts, etc., and the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla, which was in harbour, were ordered to steam up and down the lines at high speed with the object of confusing the submarine or ramming her if sighted. A few minutes later the submarine was again sighted, this time by the *Drake*; and at 7 p.m. the *Falmouth* again opened fire at what she believed to be a submarine's conning tower 600 to 800 yards off.

The fleet weighed by divisions as soon as steam was ready and proceeded to sea. The mist of a dull evening thickened as darkness closed down, and in the absence of navigational facilities for leaving harbour at night, or in thick weather, considerable difficulty was experienced in getting the fleet to sea.³ By 11 p.m.,

¹ *The Grand Fleet, 1914-16*, p. 118.

² M. 03118/14. "1st L.C.S. Summary of reports of submarine attacks."

³ Jellicoe: *The Grand Fleet, 1914-16*, p. 117.

however, all the ships had got out without mishap except the 2nd Flotilla, which was left behind to locate and destroy the submarine; and in a thick fog the fleet cleared the Pentland Firth.

No further trace of the submarine was seen, and, as a matter of fact, the alarm was without foundation. The supposed periscope sighted by the *Falmouth* was probably an old cross-target pole caught in the wash of a destroyer steering across the light cruiser's bows at the time.¹

25. Measures to Increase Defence and Efficiency of the Scottish Bases.—The defencelessness of the Scapa base was at once represented to the Admiralty by the Commander-in-Chief, and measures were put in hand without delay which, when complete, would render the harbour practically secure from submarine attack.² These consisted in blocking several of the narrower entrances by sinking old merchant ships,³ whilst the passages which were left free for the use of the fleet were to be strongly protected by batteries and searchlights. Pending the provision of reliable defences for the main entrance, arrangements were made to lay buoyed drift nets in the entrance, watched by drifters.

Vice-Admiral the Hon. Sir Stanley Colville was appointed Admiral Commanding the Orkneys and Shetlands, and proceeded north to supervise the work of rendering the base secure.⁴

Orders had already been given for *Fisgard I* and *Fisgard II*, the workshop training ships for boy artificers at Portsmouth, to be dispatched to Scapa in order to increase the efficiency of the base in dealing with repairs. After preparation for the voyage their departure was delayed some days by bad weather, but on September 16, in a lull, they set off in tow of two tugs, proceeding west-about. On the 17th it again blew hard from the west, and about 4 p.m. *Fisgard II* was seen to be in difficulties off Portland; she sank half an hour later, with the loss of several of the naval ratings and dockyard men aboard. *Fisgard I* was of no use without *Fisgard II*, which was the workshop; and orders were sent to intercept her. She was discovered by the *Goliath* in the early morning of the 18th, 20 miles south of Plymouth, and directed to return there.

¹ M. 03530/14. "Supposed sinking of submarines by *Falmouth* on September 1."

² M. 03469/14 and papers titled X 4076/1914.

³ Fourteen vessels were required. By September 24 eleven of them had arrived at Scapa. (M. 02406/14: "Scapa Flow obstructions—Blocking ships.")

⁴ Admiral Colville waived his seniority, as it was desirable that the officer holding the appointment should be junior to the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet. Rear-Admiral Miller continued in charge of the administrative work at the base, occupying a position similar to that of an Admiral Superintendent of a dockyard port.

A further arrangement which had been made to increase the resources of Scapa was the dispatch of a floating dock from Portsmouth. Another floating dock, to accommodate large ships, was sent to Invergordon. Arriving on September 6, it was ready on the 21st, on which day the *Shannon* was taken in hand for touching up her bottom. The increased importance of Invergordon rendered necessary a reinforcement of the patrol of the Moray Firth against minelayers, and the four destroyers *Flying Fish*, *Bat*, *Fairy* and *Star* of the Shetland patrol were sent to strengthen the watch there, arriving on the 18th. The flotilla cruiser *Forward* had been sent to the Humber from the Shetlands 10 days previously. The apprehensions entertained by the Admiralty, prior to the outbreak of war, of a German landing at Shetland, were now less vivid, and it was considered sufficient for an occasional visit to be made by the destroyers placed at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief for the defence of the Grand Fleet bases, the number of which was now increased.

The arrangements made for the defence of the fleet at Loch Ewe were as follows:—¹

Two destroyers patrolling outside day and night from Greenstone Point to seven miles to the westward.

Three picket boats on patrol day and night across the harbour entrance.

Illustrious and *Seagull* (gunboat) anchored in positions on the western shore to guard the entrance.

The Sound entrance guarded by destroyers anchored there.

Outer ships of the battlefleet to have guns and searchlights ready.

Ships darkened and to have net defence out at night.

On September 15 Admiral Jellicoe represented to the Admiralty the necessity for the provision of net defences, for in winter it would not be possible to anchor ships in exposed positions, nor would an efficient patrol be possible by destroyers and patrol boats in bad weather.² However, at the Conference on September 17 it was decided not to mount fixed defences, but to station six 30-knot destroyers there, to leave the *Illustrious* in the entrance as a gun and searchlight defence, and to provide a submarine obstruction if possible.³ It was not until a month later, however, that the trend of events resulted in immediate steps being taken to render the base secure from the entry of submarines.

26. Sinking of the "Pathfinder," September 5, and First German Submarine Attack on the Firth of Forth.—On the very day following the false alarm at Scapa a similar alarm occurred in the Firth of Forth. About 10.30 p.m. on September 2 Carlingnose

¹ G.F.N., p. 59. See also Papers titled X 9109/1915.

² *Ibid.*, p. 65.

³ G.F.S.P., LIX.

Battery and the machine-gun battery situated close to the water below it, opened fire on what they took to be the periscope of a submarine proceeding up under the bridge. The *Invincible* and *New Zealand* had come in here after the Heligoland Bight operation, at 8 a.m. on August 30, consequent on the mining of the Humber approaches; and their picket boats were sent away to hunt the submarine, of which, however, nothing more was seen. There were no nets across the firth at this date, and the only batteries which a submarine had to fear were Inchkeith and Carlingnose, the first of which could be given a wide berth.

At the time, the report of the submarine was not credited, nor, indeed, was any German submarine in the neighbourhood.¹ Three days later, however, an event occurred which caused a reversal of this opinion.

After the raid of August 28 all the German submarines in the North Sea were placed under the command of Korvetten-Kapitän Bauer, who was designated leader of the submarines.² So large a number of boats had been detailed for the defence of the bight, that at the beginning of September two submarines only were available for distant operations. On August 30 reliable information was received by the Admiralstab of the presence of heavy ships in the Firth of Forth, which were expected to leave soon. This intelligence referred no doubt to Admiral Moore's two battle cruisers. It was further learnt in Germany that the *Liverpool* had landed some of the prisoners taken from the *Mainz* at Leith, after the battle of August 28; and the conclusion was drawn that we intended to make more use of the Firth of Forth than hitherto.³ Accordingly, it was decided to dispatch the two available submarines *U.21* and *U.22* to the Firth of Forth.

The two boats left on the afternoon of September 2, with orders to penetrate up the firth and in the narrow waters west of May Island to attack incoming and outgoing ships. *U.22* broke down the same evening and had to return, and *U.21*⁴ proceeded alone, on the surface. At 6.30 a.m., September 4, she sighted the Scottish coast, near Dunbar, dived to avoid the shipping, and steered for May Island, which was reached about 10.30 a.m. Here for the first time she sighted some of the destroyers of the Forth patrol. She turned eastward to gain the open sea and charge her batteries. At 6.20 p.m. she sighted a submarine to the southward of her, and coming within hail discovered it to be *U.20*⁵ which had been sent across in place of *U.22*. The night

¹ Two petty officers captured from *U.B.124* on 20 July 1918, stated that they served in *U.21* on her cruise to the Firth of Forth on this occasion. (See C.B. 10469 O.X.O.) The two petty officers evidently had an imperfect recollection of dates.

² Gayer: "Die Deutschen U-boote in ihrer Kriegführung," I, 12.

³ G.O.H., II, pp. 4, 5.

⁴ Kapitänleutnant Hersing.

⁵ Kapitänleutnant Dröschner.

was spent by *U.21* at sea in repairing her starboard oil engine, while *U.20* proceeded to the firth under cover of darkness. The presence of the destroyer patrol forced her to submerge, however, and at 10 p.m. her captain decided to return to the open sea to re-charge his batteries. He was unable to effect this completely, being constantly forced under by the lights of approaching vessels; and about 5 a.m. on the 5th, when he made his second attempt to enter the firth, the batteries were not fully charged and he was compelled to turn eastward out of the firth once more at 12.20 p.m., having penetrated no further than Fidra. The visibility was good, but he could discern no warships, and being ignorant that they lay above the bridge,¹ he seems to have concluded that none were in the firth. The behaviour of the British patrols convinced him that his presence was discovered, and he made for the open sea. Suddenly, about 3.45 p.m., the boat was shaken by an underwater explosion, though no enemy boat could be discerned through the periscope.

The explosion was caused by a torpedo fired by *U.21*. The latter had commenced the attempt to enter the firth at 3.20 a.m. on the 5th. Coming to the surface four hours later to charge her batteries, off May Island, she sighted a cruiser to the south-east. This was the *Pathfinder*, flotilla leader of the Forth Destroyer Patrol (8th Flotilla), which formed the outer patrol of the local defence, on the line St. Abb's Head-Gregness. The cruiser soon disappeared, but about 3 p.m. Lieutenant-Commander Hersing sighted her again. Three-quarters of an hour later he torpedoed her at a distance of 1,500 metres, 10 miles south-east of May Island.

The torpedo exploded a magazine, and the *Pathfinder* sank in four minutes, with the loss of a large part of her crew. It was at first thought that she had been mined, but Captain Martin Leake, who was wounded and saved, reported that she had been torpedoed by a submarine. She was the first British warship to be sunk by a submarine during the war. In spite of the efforts of the patrolling destroyers *U.21* escaped.

A patrol directed against minelayers had been instituted this day on the northern edge of the Dogger Bank for 48 hours by the *Fearless* and eight destroyers from Harwich, supported by three of Admiral Campbell's cruisers.² About 6 p.m. on the 6th the *Jackal* sighted a submarine proceeding south-eastward at easy speed.³ This was probably one of the two enemy boats returning to Heligoland, where they both arrived safely on September 7.

There was at this time no air patrol of the Firth of Forth, otherwise *U.21*, which had spent no less than three hours on the surface, between 9.40 a.m. and 12.40 p.m. on the 5th, would no

¹ This was ordered in H.F. 004 of 1 August 1914.

² A 48.

³ M. 01991/14. Patrol of the 3rd meridian of east longitude.

doubt have been sighted. The Firth of Forth was within the area of the coast patrol carried out by the military Flying Corps, but the machines did not go far enough from land to sight the enemy submarines, and the seaplane patrols north of Yarmouth by the Naval Wing had been withdrawn, and were now concentrated around the Thames and Medway estuaries for the defence of London. At Scapa there were five seaplanes for the defence of the fleet base, though the two aeroplanes stationed there had been withdrawn at the beginning of September to reinforce Commander Samson at Dunkirk.¹ We possessed at that time only a very small number of machines, and they had to be husbanded.²

27. Submarines to Hunt Enemy Submarines.—The appearance of German submarines in the Firth of Forth decided the Admiralty to form a force of submarines to operate against the enemy boats. The Firth of Forth submarine flotilla consisted of nine C boats, *C.22-30*. In the Humber was the 6th Submarine Flotilla, consisting of six boats, *C.7-10*, *C.12*, and *C.13*, whose services were no longer required there since the mining and abandonment of the base.³ On September 8, therefore, the six boats in the Humber were detached to Queensferry, making a total of 15 at that base. Six of these were placed under the orders of Captain Vernon H. S. Haggard of the depot ship *Vulcan*, who was directed to employ them "to search for, stalk, and, if possible, attack enemy submarines in the area in which they have been seen and on the line Bass Rock-Heligoland."⁴

After the sweep of September 10 the battle cruisers abandoned the Firth of Forth as their coaling base and made use of Scapa. For the defence of the approaches to the latter it was decided at the conference of September 17, on board the *Iron Duke*, to form a submarine flotilla at Cromarty, by moving thither Captain Haggard's six submarines.⁵ The *Bonaventure*, which had been detached to South Queensferry on September 8, was sent to Cromarty as parent ship; and the submarines were employed, under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, in the defence of the approaches to Cromarty and Scapa against enemy submarines.

28. Sinking of the "Hela," September 13.—After the return of *U.20* and *U.21* to Heligoland, on September 7, there was for a time a cessation of German submarine activity. The Germans at this date possessed 24 submarines, namely, *U.5-12*, *U.14*,

¹ H.S. 59, p. 600.

² See M. 01450/14 (H.S. 57, p. 261) and Comm. (S) No. 026, 11 September 1914. (H.S. 225.)

³ Inference.

⁴ The orders are in H.S. 60, p. 705.

⁵ Two of the boats, which were in dock, were to follow later, when ready.

U.16-30.¹ Two boats, namely, *U.13* and *U.15*, had been lost in the operation against the Grand Fleet, August 6-11. Three of the newest boats, *U.27*, *U.29*, and *U.30*, were in the Baltic, working up,² and about this time *U.23*, *U.25*, and *U.26* were sent to the Baltic and placed under the command of Prince Henry of Prussia, Commander-in-Chief of the Baltic, to avoid the disorganisation entailed by the previous system of detaching submarines temporarily from the North Sea for Baltic operations. In spite of the fact that in some quarters it appears to have been realised that the employment of submarines off our harbours offered prospect of good results, the entire force of submarines in the North Sea was detailed for the defence of the bight, in the sanguine expectation of the reappearance there of our light forces; and for a time after the sinking of the *Pathfinder* no offensive operations were undertaken by the German submarines in the North Sea or Channel, other than the dispatch, without result, of *U.16* to the Firth of Forth.³

The sinking of the *Pathfinder* did not long remain unavenged. On September 12 submarines *D.3*, *D.5*, *E.1*, *E.8*, and *E.9* of the 8th Flotilla left Yarmouth⁴ for a reconnaissance and cruise in the Heligoland Bight, between Ameland and Sylt.⁵

The weather that day was so bad in the bight that the German destroyer patrols had to be withdrawn and the defence entrusted to light cruisers. The north-west wind raised such a heavy sea that it was thought British submarines would be unable to operate, and Admiral von Ingenohl determined to seize the opportunity of taking the High Sea Fleet to sea for exercises, for the first time since the outbreak of war. The fleet was covered by light cruisers scouting to the west and north-west. Early on the following morning, September 13, the old light cruiser *Hela*, being of little value for such work, was sent back to the Jade.⁶

At 7.15 that morning *E.9*,⁷ on patrol five miles south of Heligoland, sighted the *Hela* returning to the Jade, about 1½ to 2 miles off, and proceeded to attack her. At 7.28 a.m.

¹ It is not known if any of these were in dockyard hands, but *U.6* and *U.11* are not mentioned in G.O.H. at this period, though they reappear later. There were apparently one or two new, unnumbered boats working up in the Baltic which, with *U.27*, *U.29* and *U.30*, formed the 4th Half-Flotilla.

² Gayer: "Die Deutschen U-boote in ihrer Kriegführung," Vol. I.

³ No details of this cruise are given in G.O.H. *U.16* returned to Heligoland on September 14.

⁴ It seems at this date to have been a frequent procedure for the submarines of Harwich force to proceed from Harwich to Yarmouth on the day previous to leaving for the bight, either in order to shorten the voyage or to avoid the Southwold mined area.

⁵ The experiment of placing the submarine patrol at a distance of 100 miles or more from Heligoland (see Section 22) seems now to have been abandoned.

⁶ *Hela*, Freg.-Kap. Paul Wolfram. Completed 3 May 1896, 2,004 tons, designed speed 19.5 knots, 2-15 pdr., 4-4 pdr., 3 T (18 in.).

⁷ Lieutenant-Commander Max K. Horton.

Lieutenant-Commander Horton reached a position 600 yards on the cruiser's starboard beam, and with much movement on the boat he fired two bow torpedoes at her at intervals of 15 seconds. The first torpedo missed astern, but the second hit her; the bulkheads gave way, and the *Hela* sank in 25 minutes, the majority of the crew being saved by *U.18* and the patrolling torpedo-boats and outpost trawlers. These opened fire on *E.9* when she rose after delivering her attack to watch the *Hela's* proceedings, but she was unhurt. It was erroneously believed by the Germans that *E.9* subsequently ran on a minefield and was destroyed, for about 10 a.m. on the 13th *U.16*, returning from her unsuccessful cruise to the Firth of Forth, observed a heavy explosion in the minefield.

All five of the British submarines returned safely to port, despite the exceptionally heavy weather which was experienced on September 14 and constituted a severe test of their sea-keeping qualities, a test through which the boats passed successfully; minor damages were sustained only by *D.3* and *E.8*, whose forward hydroplanes were damaged. None of the boats sighted the High Sea Fleet on its return to the Jade, in consequence no doubt of the gale which was raging and the consequent low visibility.¹

29. High Sea Fleet abandons the Bight as Exercise Ground.—

The sinking of the *Hela* seems to have raised in Admiral von Ingenohl's mind the most serious apprehensions. He could see no means of putting an end to the ceaseless supervision which the British boats were exercising in the Heligoland Bight. In spite of the Emperor's orders, he apparently had not abandoned the hope of leading his fleet into action against the Grand Fleet, and he had a vision of his ships, blockaded in harbour by British submarines, forcing their way into the open sea at the price of heavy losses. Yet, "How to make them keep their distance we do not know," he wrote to the Chief of the Admiralstab.² "We can search the bight day and night with torpedo-boats, steam at high speed, space the ships of our squadrons widely, alter course frequently, and proceed to sea under cover of darkness searching the shallow waters and protected by a destroyer screen; but it is questionable whether even these methods will ensure security." It was Admiral von Ingenohl's belief that our submarines in the bight communicated with home by means of W/T relaying,³ and the intelligence that the High Sea Fleet had proceeded to sea would be the signal for our destroyers to dash out and attack it, while the minelayers mined the approaches to the German harbours against the return of the fleet. "In short, for squadrons to leave harbour by day is dangerous, despite the employment of every

¹ It is not known on what day or at what time the High Sea Fleet returned to harbour. *E.9* and *D.5* remained in the bight until the 15th; the other three submarines left for home on the 14th.

² G.O.H., II, p. 24.

³ This was incorrect. The practice was not adopted until October 10. (See Section 58.)

device to ensure security; and frequent emergence from harbour by night is equally out of the question." Clearly, the Heligoland Bight was no place for the High Sea Fleet. For exercises, squadrons would in future be sent to the Baltic, one at a time, for periods of eight to ten days. If the fleet had to proceed to sea the risk of submarines must be taken, but it was the Commander-in-Chief's intention not to become seriously engaged with the Grand Fleet, even if the latter should appear in the bight, whilst one of his squadrons was away in the Baltic.

Thus at the critical period of the war, when the military situation which was developing in France and Belgium might call for instant action on the part of the High Sea Fleet, the state of readiness of the latter was hopelessly compromised by the dispatch of some of its most important units to an exercise ground from which they could not return in less than 48 hours. In France, the race for the sea had begun. The German Army was thrusting for the northern French ports, and the British Admiralty, placing their resources once again at the disposal of the military authorities in a manner which was in striking contrast to the German lack of co-operation between the two fighting services, were making preparation for the immediate dispatch to the north of France of an expedition designed to hinder the operations of the enemy in that area.

CHAPTER VI.

LOSS OF THE "ABOUKIR," "HOGUE," AND CRESSY."¹

30. **Expedition to Dunkirk, September 19.**—The important movement towards the north of France developed during the middle of September by the German Army, threatened both the security of the Channel ports and the plan of operation of the French Commander-in-Chief. Strong German forces arrived at Valenciennes and Cambrai, and after a four days' battle the Belgian army was forced to withdraw under the forts of Antwerp. The Germans had managed to check the French pursuit after the Battle of the Marne, at the Aisne. General Joffre, unable to force their front, decided to try to turn their right flank; and taking up a proposal made earlier from London,² he asked that a diversion might be made from Dunkirk and Calais by a British force acting against the German communications. The importance of possession of the Dover Straits ports for the security of the Channel sufficed to commend the plan to the Admiralty, who decided to dispatch immediately, in conjunction with the War Office, a mixed force consisting of a Marine brigade and a Yeomanry regiment.

¹ Papers in H.S. 47.

² Edmonds: "Military Operations," p. 403.

On the night of September 18–19, within a few hours of the receipt of General Joffre's request, the orders for the dispatch of the force went out.¹ The Marine Brigade was to sail for Dover on the following afternoon, September 19, the Yeomanry embarking at Southampton the same night; and the entire force was to be landed before daylight on the 20th at Dunkirk. This place was strongly defended by the French, and would require a siege to reduce it; and the Admiralty had promised the assistance of warships to cover the flanks in case of attack.² Wing-Commander Samson's aeroplanes and armoured cars were to join the new mixed force, which would be augmented later by more armed motor cars. The whole expedition was to be controlled, administered, and supplied through the Royal Naval Division Staff.³ The command was entrusted to General Aston, to whom the following orders were sent:—

1. You will proceed with your brigade, 2,600 strong or more, but without latest recruits, during September 19 to Dunkirk. You will assume command of a mixed force as follows: (1) The Marine Brigade, (2) Queen's Own Oxfordshire Hussars, (3) Commander Samson's aeroplanes and armed motor cars, (4) 20 Royal Engineers.

2. You will work in harmony with the Governor of Dunkirk, and establish yourself within his lines, which are strong and extensive.

3. You will give the impression to the enemy that you are the advance guard of a considerable British force acting against the German communications. But in effect your strength only enables you to demonstrate. Minor enterprises to cut railway lines may be launched with armed motor cars where possible; but the main body of your force must make sure of its retreat to Dunkirk if seriously threatened. Germans can undoubtedly bring overwhelming force, with cavalry and infantry, to bear if they choose. Such a concentration by the enemy would achieve your object.

4. As a guide, subject to circumstances, your mounted forces may in the first instance push forward on a 25 mile radius from Dunkirk to Ypres and Hazebrouck, with patrols to Lille and perhaps Arras, and your armed motor cars, covered by aeroplane reconnaissance, till they make contact. After that you must act according to circumstances, reporting daily.⁴

The transports carrying the Marine Brigade arrived off Dunkirk at 8 p.m. on September 19, but owing to the state of the tide they were unable to disembark until daylight. Disembarkation was complete by the evening of the 20th, though the Yeomanry did not arrive until later.⁵

The Marine Brigade was equipped only for defensive and not for field operations, and was fit for garrison duty only; while the training and equipment of the Yeomanry was far from

¹ M. 05138/14. "Dispatch of Marine Brigade and Yeomanry, etc., to Dunkirk, 19 September 1914."

² M. 01857/14. "Situation at Calais."

³ For description of the R.N.D., see Section 45.

⁴ These orders are taken from an unsigned draft in the First Lord's handwriting, marked (apparently by Assistant Secretary) "19 September 1914. Sent by 5 a.m. train." A signed copy of the orders is not forthcoming.

⁵ The date of their arrival cannot be ascertained. They had disembarked by September 24.

complete.¹ At the request of the French a battalion of marines was sent to Lille, and on September 30 the remainder of the brigade moved into cantonments at Cassel. General Aston had secured a number of motor omnibuses and 50 more were sent over by the Admiralty on September 26, bringing the number under General Aston's command up to 120, with 15 cars. With these the General watched the country with parties of troops. The operations of the Army at this date were taking place on the line Valenciennes-Cambrai-St. Quentin, the latter place being the headquarters of the German 6th Army.

The Germans apparently were well aware of the real nature of the expedition, and they paid no further attention to it than to hasten the attack on Antwerp.²

31. Withdrawal of Cruiser Force K to Scapa, September 7.—

By September 18, when the expedition to Dunkirk was decided upon, the covering forces in the Hoofden had been considerably reduced. The dangerous situation in which Admiral Christian's force might be placed by an incursion of the German battle cruisers into the area had been recognised by the Admiralty after the raid of the *Strassburg* and *Stralsund* on the Broad Fourteens Patrol on August 18; and it was for this reason that Cruiser Force K had been created. The squadron had a dual rôle, for, in addition to providing support for Admiral Christian's forces, it was to act as an advanced cruiser force of the Grand Fleet. With the mining of the Humber base and the transference of Cruiser Force K to Rosyth, the intention with which the Admiralty had created it was lost sight of. Moreover, since the sinking of the *Pathfinder* and the appearance of German submarines off the Firth of Forth,³ Admiral Jellicoe had withdrawn the squadron still further north, to Scapa, and its primary function had lapsed. The association of Admiral Moore's two battle cruisers with the Grand Fleet was now complete, and the forces in the Hoofden were left without any immediate armoured ship support.

The danger to Admiral Christian's cruisers was realised at the Admiralty.⁴ The *Bacchantes* were probably not even a match for the German armoured cruisers in the normal North Sea weather which might be expected to endure for the next six months, since none of their main deck guns could be fought in a seaway, a factor which did not affect the *Yorck* and *Prince Adalbert* classes so adversely. Further, their speed was too low for effective action against the more modern German armoured

¹ H.S. 64, p. 217.

² Edmonds: "Military Operations," p. 404.

³ No statement has been found that the appearance of submarines off the Firth of Forth was the reason for the withdrawal of the *Invincible* and *Inflexible* to Scapa, but there can be little doubt that this was so. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron ceased to use Rosyth at the same time.

⁴ See Minute by C.O.S. in M. 02105/14.

cruisers or their fast light cruisers. Apart from this, it was realised at the Admiralty that there was a very real danger to these old armoured cruisers from German submarines in the narrow waters of the southern North Sea.¹ It was intended that the Channel Fleet should move up from Portland to Sheerness on September 23, in order to provide more proximate support for Admiral Christian's force;² but before any steps had been taken in respect of the danger from submarines an event occurred which removed the matter out of the control of the Admiralty.

32. Destroyers withdrawn from Broad Fourteens Patrol.—

The Dogger Bank Patrol was instituted on September 12. There was a rumour on the 15th that four German cruisers and some destroyers intended to break out of Emden that night; and acting upon the instructions of the Admiralty, Rear-Admiral Christian concentrated his force off the Maas Light Vessel during the early hours of the 16th, in order to watch the Broad Fourteens.³ The north-westerly gale, under cover of which the German High Sea Fleet proceeded out for exercise in the Heligoland Bight on the 12th, scattered the destroyers; and the boats of the Broad Fourteens Patrol were withdrawn to Harwich at midnight 14th—15th, the Dogger Bank Patrol following them in at daylight on the 15th. It was arranged that if the weather moderated the 10 destroyers detailed for the two patrols on the 16th should rendezvous instead with the cruisers off the Maas Light Vessel; but at 10 a.m. that day the Admiralty learnt that the rumour of German cruisers leaving Emden for a raid was false, the concentration off the Maas Light Vessel was cancelled, and by 6 p.m. the two patrols were once more in their normal positions.⁴

One gale followed another, and on September 17 the destroyers had again to be sent back to shelter. By the morning of the 19th the weather had moderated and the *Fearless* took out eight destroyers on to the Broad Fourteens. The weather steadily grew worse, however, until by noon it was again blowing a gale from the north, with a heavy sea,⁵ and at 7.15 p.m. the destroyers returned to Harwich; and, with Admiral Christian's concurrence, Commodore Tyrwhitt refrained from ordering out their reliefs.⁶

At 4.40 p.m. that day the Admiralty decided that, as the weather was too bad for destroyers, the Dogger Bank Patrol was to be discontinued and the Broad Fourteens were to be watched by the cruisers alone.⁷ Accordingly, the *Euryalus*, *Aboukir*, *Cressy*, and *Hogue* concentrated off the Maas Light Vessel on the early morning of the 20th, to watch the Broad Fourteens. Their watch had recently assumed a new importance

¹ See Minute by First Lord, 18 September 1914, in N.L. 3899/14. "Loss of H.M.S. *Aboukir*, *Cressy*, and *Hogue*. Report and Minutes of Court of Inquiry." (H.S. 47, p. 367.)

² A 92.

³ A 77.

⁴ A 78-80.

⁵ H.S. 63, p. 416. Wind force 7-8, *Fearless'* deck log, No. 19822.

⁶ A 87, 88.

⁷ A 89.

owing to the apprehension that the Germans intended to block the Scheldt.¹ The *Euryalus* was due to coal, and her aerial had been damaged in the gale and was defective. The weather was too bad to permit Admiral Christian to shift his flag to one of the other cruisers, and the Rear-Admiral accordingly turned over the patrol to Captain John E. Drummond of the *Aboukir*, and parted company at 6.21 a.m. for Sheerness. The *Bacchante*, Admiral Campbell's flagship, was at Chatham undergoing five days' overhaul.²

On handing the patrol over to Captain Drummond, Rear-Admiral Christian made the following signals:—³

Euryalus to Aboukir. September 20, 5.10 a.m. *Euryalus* will proceed to Sheerness 7 a.m. if Admiralty approves, and you will take charge of Broad Fourteens Patrol which is to consist of three cruisers. Area to be patrolled may be extended, but generally speaking is bounded by lat. 51° 45' N and lat. 53° N, and long. 3° 15' E and a line joining Maas and Haak light vessels. If weather permits suspicious vessels should be boarded. At night squadron may withdraw to the south and south-west or continue patrolling. *Amethyst* will join patrol on Monday evening [21st] most probably. It should be understood that if an attack by enemy cruisers is made on patrol it will be necessary for latter to close rapidly and I consider therefore they should never be out of visual signal distance by searchlight from one another and should close without orders if weather becomes permanently thick. (0500.)

Euryalus to General. September 20. 5.40 a.m. *Aboukir* will be in charge of patrol in absence of *Euryalus* who is going to coal. When patrolling and squadron is spread it is left to captains to carry out alterations of course to guard against submarine attack. Suspicious vessels should be boarded if weather permits, especially those coming from the north and north-east. No destroyers will be out on patrol for the present. (0530.)⁴

¹ N.L. 3899. (H.S. 47, p. 371.)

² The question of the patrol being left without a flag officer in charge subsequently assumed some importance. No blame attached to Admiral Christian, but the following facts need to be made clear. The Admiralty orders were that, generally, three out of the five armoured cruisers were to be at sea in support of the patrols. No orders were given that one of the two Admirals was always to be at sea. Admiral Christian was in command of all the forces in the narrow seas, including the flotillas and submarines, and he had full liberty to shift his flag and remain at his headquarters at Harwich or any other place suitable for general supervision. Admiral Campbell was in command of Cruiser Force C, which consisted of the four *Bacchantes*, but did not include the *Euryalus* or *Amethyst*. The former took her turn on patrol owing to the shortage of cruisers. (See H.S. 47, pp. 384-5.) In N.L. 3953/14, "Report by Rear-Admiral Christian on circumstances leading up to the sinking of the *Cressys*," the Admiral gives it to be understood that, had the weather permitted, he would have transferred his flag and remained on patrol. But from signal 0500 it appears that he always intended to leave the *Aboukir* in charge, nor was any objection raised to this course by the Admiralty (A. 90). (See also Minute by First Sea Lord, H.S. 47, p. 372.)

³ *Euryalus*' Signal Log No. 31536.

⁴ Admiral Christian stated in his evidence that this signal (which he says was made at 6.50 a.m., not 5.40 a.m. as log states) was "especially intended to caution [the ships] about the presence of submarines and zigzagging." (H.S. 47, p. 113.) But having spent five or six weeks on patrol without sighting a submarine, the squadron had apparently little apprehension of the danger.

Not until 5 a.m. on the 22nd was the weather suitable for destroyers, and Commodore Tyrwhitt took out eight boats to the Broad Fourteens.¹

33. "U.9" dispatched to the Mouth of the Channel, September 19.—The fact that the dispatch of the British Expeditionary Force of four divisions and a cavalry division, as originally planned, was not the conclusion of the transport of troops across the Channel, did not escape the notice of the Admiralstab, though it was badly informed as to what was actually taking place. On September 16 the Admiralstab sent the following instructions to the High Sea Fleet:—²

"Large number of transports are at present sailing to Ostend.³ The interruption of this transport will be of great value to the General Staff of the Army. You are to consider the possibility of attacking the transports by submarines in spite of the navigational difficulties."

It was not until three days later that the weather permitted the submarines to leave;⁴ and thus it was simply by chance that their departure synchronised with the expedition to Dunkirk.

The Germans had not located the Dogger Bank and Broad Fourteens patrols. On September 16 *U.24* and *U.8* were ordered to reconnoitre as far as Haaks Light Vessel; but although they came safely through the gale they discovered none of the patrols. Nothing definite was known in Berlin of the time or place of embarkation of the imaginary expedition to Ostend, but it was thought that the Thames, Dover, Folkestone, and Portsmouth were being used; and Lieutenant-Commander Otto Weddigen of *U.9*, whose boat was chosen for the operation of interrupting the transport of the troops, was ordered to proceed to the position likely to afford the best results, between the West Hinder Light Vessel and Ostend.

U.9 left Heligoland at 4.15 a.m. on September 20. The weather rendered navigation so difficult that during the afternoon, in order to fix his position, he turned due south from his westerly course, to make the land, which he sighted at 7.30 a.m. on 21st, near Ameland. Throughout the day and the greater part of the night *U.9* steered along the coast on the surface, for an attempt to rest the crew by lying on the bottom at 25 metres had to be abandoned, as the boat bumped so heavily. About midnight

¹ The weather began to moderate during the first watch on the 21st. The *Aboukir* reported to the *Maidstone* at 6.55 p.m. that day: "Still rather rough, but going down." The Court of Inquiry found that, as far as Commodore Tyrwhitt could judge, "the weather was not suitable for sending out destroyers at an earlier hour than he did." (H.S. 47, pp. 425-6.) Cf. A. 91.

² G.O.H., II, 48.

³ This was, of course, quite incorrect.

⁴ The hangar at Borkum and two seaplanes were destroyed by the gale on 18th.

21st to 22nd, when the wind had dropped somewhat, Lieutenant-Commander Weddigen sighted a vessel without lights 1,000 yards off and thought it advisable to submerge to 15 metres and alter course to the south-westward.

It is highly probable that the ship sighted by U.9 was one of the patrolling cruisers. Captain Drummond had been patrolling on a NE by N course during the day, examining steamers and trawlers. At sunset, the three armoured cruisers were near the northern limit of the patrol area, *i.e.*, off the Haaks Light Vessel. The squadron turned 16 points and steered down toward Maas Light Vessel until midnight. Course was altered slightly to the westward until 4 a.m., when the squadron again turned to the north-eastward.

Daylight was about 5 a.m. The wind had eased to a light breeze and there was a slight sea and swell. The squadron, with ships spread at $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 2 miles distance, was about 15 miles north of the Maas Light Vessel. Being at the southern end of the beat, Captain Drummond had little apprehension of submarine attack;¹ and the ships were steaming on a steady course at 9 or 10 knots,² when U.9, steering for the Maas Light Vessel, sighted them approaching from the southward.


34. Sinking of the "Aboukir," "Hogue," and "Cressy," September 22.—Lieutenant-Commander Weddigen's first belief was that the three cruisers composed part of the screening vessels of a fleet. It was not until the last moment, when still no sign of a main body was to be seen, that he decided to attack the ships before him, less valuable though they might be. Steering first for the *Aboukir*, which was in the centre, he reached a position 500 yards on her port beam about 6.25 a.m. and fired a torpedo. The torpedo took effect just abaft the foremost funnel and flooded two adjoining compartments; and the ship listed at once about 20 deg. Steam went immediately and the boom boats could not be hoisted out; the only boat available was one cutter, the other sea boat having been shattered by the explosion and the remainder of the boats landed on the outbreak of war. The sick and injured were placed in the cutter and the ship's company fell in on deck. An attempt was made to get the ship on an even keel by flooding the starboard wing compartments, but time was too short and

¹ Captain Drummond's Evidence. H.S. 47, p. 225.

² The evidence is somewhat conflicting as to the custom of the ships with regard to frequent alterations of course as a protection against submarines. Admiral Christian, in his evidence at the Court of Inquiry, stated that when no destroyers were present course was altered four points each way every 15 or 20 minutes, except in very bad weather. From the evidence of other officers in the squadron it does not seem that this procedure was generally observed. The usual patrolling speed of the cruisers seems to have been about 9–12 knots in ordinary weather, higher speed being employed only for intercepting ships or in emergency. At speeds above 12 knots the coal consumption of the *Bacchantes* was very high.

the list increased rapidly. All the loose wood was thrown overboard,¹ and the men were ordered to take to the water; and in 20 to 30 minutes the ship capsized and sank.

On the explosion taking place the *Aboukir* hoisted the signal for the *Cressy* and *Hogue* to close her. It was at first thought that the *Aboukir* had been mined, and Captain Drummond ordered the *Hogue* to keep ahead in order to be clear of a probable line of mines. A few minutes later, however, the *Aboukir* signalled that she had been hit, not by a mine, but by a torpedo. Captain W. S. Nicholson, of the *Hogue*, in his anxiety to render assistance, decided to take the risk of standing by the *Aboukir*, minimising it as far as possible by remaining on the side opposite to that on which she had been struck. After torpedoing the *Aboukir*, U.9 had circled round her bows, and meeting the *Hogue*, fired two torpedoes at her at five seconds' interval, at a distance of 350 yards, whilst the ship was momentarily stopped to avoid running down



her two cutters which were proceeding to the assistance of the *Aboukir*. Both torpedoes took effect in the engine room, the explosions being very violent. The engine-room watertight

¹ In the *Aboukir* hammocks had not yet been lashed up and stowed, and were therefore useless as lifebuoys.

doors were half open, and the ship at once began to settle and took a heavy list. *U.9* was seen to come up on the port quarter for a moment after firing the torpedoes, but no gun could be got to bear on her before she disappeared. It was evident that the *Hogue* was doomed. Captain Nicholson ordered the ship's company to save themselves, and in a very few minutes the ship capsized and sank.

Captain R. W. Johnson, of the *Cressy*, had closed the *Aboukir* when the latter was torpedoed. Reaching a position about two cables on the port beam of the *Aboukir*, he stopped and sent his boats away to pick up survivors. Captain Nicholson, whilst closing the *Aboukir*, had signalled to the *Cressy* to beware of submarines, and almost immediately after the *Hogue* was struck a periscope was reported by the *Cressy* 300 yards on the port bow. It was probably a piece of wreckage, for *U.9* was a mile or more distant at the time, but the engines were put to full speed ahead in order to run down the submarine, and the *Cressy* opened fire at the object sighted. Captain Johnson now began to send out W/T calls for help.¹ Five minutes later, nearly an hour after the torpedoing of the *Aboukir*, whilst the *Cressy*, with little way on, was engaged in assisting with her boats the crews of the two torpedoed vessels, *U.9* came up on her starboard side, 600–1,000 yards off, and fired two torpedoes at five seconds' intervals. The *Cressy* opened fire at once with her starboard guns, and the order was given to go full speed ahead with both engines; but before the ship could gather way one of the torpedoes struck her almost amidships, the second missing astern by about 20 ft. The ship listed about 10 deg. and remained steady. The watertight doors were closed and the men came up from below. It seemed likely that the ship would remain afloat; and the work of saving the crews of the other two ships went on.

A quarter of an hour later *U.9* was suddenly sighted again some 500 yards on the starboard beam, and the *Cressy* opened fire. But almost immediately a second torpedo hit her aft in a boiler room and destroyed her chances of remaining afloat. The ship heeled rapidly and capsized in a few minutes, remaining with her keel above water for some 20 minutes before disappearing.

The loss of life on board the three cruisers was very heavy, little more than a third of the total of over 2,000 officers and men being saved. The majority of the crews were men of the Royal Naval Reserve, whose discipline withstood the shock of the disaster in a manner worthy of the highest traditions of the Service. Some of the ships' boats had been landed on the outbreak of war, and neither the *Aboukir* nor the *Hogue* were able to hoist out their boom boats; whilst the *Cressy*, before she sank, had sent away all her boats to save the crews of the other two ships, and her own crew had to take to the water. Two Dutch sailing vessels² which were near, hesitated to close the sinking ships, probably from fear

¹ A 94.

² Or possibly there was one only.

of mines; but the Dutch ship *Flora* came on the scene later, and, steaming in regardless of danger, rescued 28 officers and 258 men. Others were saved by the Dutch steamer *Titan* and by the Lowestoft trawlers *Coriander* and *J.G.C.* The *Flora* landed her survivors at Ymuiden, and the Dutch Government, after treating them with the utmost hospitality, sent them safely back to England on September 26.¹

35. Action taken on the News of the Disaster.—Commodore Tyrwhitt, in the *Lowestoft*, intercepted the *Cressy's* call for help at 7.7 a.m. on the 22nd, two hours after he left harbour. The Commodore spread his eight destroyers on both bows, worked up to full speed, and steered for the Broad Fourteens. At 7.31 a.m. the *Cressy's* position was received, 52° 18' N, 3° 41' E, after which her signals became fainter, and finally died away, nor did she acknowledge the *Lowestoft's* signal reporting that she was coming to her assistance. By 10.30 a.m. the flotilla had arrived on the scene and was beginning to assist in the work of rescue when the *Lennox*, *Lucifer*, and *Lance* reported submarines in sight. After watching the three cruisers sink, Lieutenant-Commander Weddigen had retired to the northward, for he had fired all his torpedoes, and the report was false, as Commodore Tyrwhitt soon realised, though he took the precaution of ordering four destroyers to steam round the *Lowestoft* whilst the survivors were transhipped from the boats and trawlers.

The *Fearless* and 1st Flotilla at Harwich raised steam on hearing of the disaster. Commodore Keyes embarked in the *Fearless*, and left with the flotilla at 11 a.m. for Terschelling, to cut off the retreat of the submarines, of which there were believed to be more than one. Nothing was seen, however, before dark, and the flotilla returned.² The remainder of the 3rd Flotilla left Harwich soon after noon, and joined the *Lowestoft* and her eight boats on the Broad Fourteens, where at 4.10 p.m. the Admiralty sent out their recall. Admiral Christian, with the

¹ The relevant portion of "Convention for the Adaptation of the Principles of the Geneva Convention to Maritime War" (Hague, 18 October 1907), Article 15, is as follows: "The sick, wounded, or shipwrecked who are landed at a neutral port with the consent of the local authorities, must, in default of arrangement to the contrary between the neutral State and the belligerent States, be guarded by the neutral State so as to prevent them from again taking part in the operations of the war." Austria, Germany, and Holland had signed this convention, but Great Britain had not done so, and the rules did not therefore apply to her. The papers dealing with the subject (M. 02400/14, *Aboukir*, *Hogue*, and *Cressy*, Release of Officers and Crew of) are not forthcoming, but from a copy of one of the papers originally contained in the docket it appears that the Netherlands Government spontaneously interpreted the convention as applying only to belligerent persons landed by their captors; and it released the survivors of its own free will without the necessity of any request being made by Great Britain.

² *U.9* reported sighting enemy destroyers off Terschelling at 3 p.m. and 6.20 p.m. on 22nd, apparently searching for her. (G.O.H., II, p. 56.)

Euryalus and *Amethyst*, had also proceeded out of harbour, but was ordered not to go further than the Tongue Light Vessel, after which he returned to the Nore.¹

The Grand Fleet had been carrying out a sweep down to the line Horn Reefs Light Vessel-Flamborough Head to examine and send into harbour some of the trawlers which were believed to have prejudiced the success of the sweep of September 10 by informing the German High Sea Fleet of the presence of the Grand Fleet. The weather, however, was too bad to permit of any examination of trawlers to be carried out. On the evening of the 21st information came in that a small force of German cruisers, torpedo-boats, and submarines was said to have passed Esbjerg on the previous day, steering north,² and on his return northward Admiral Jellicoe spread the fleet on a front of 150 miles and swept the eastern half of the North Sea, but without result. The *Cressy's* message that the *Aboukir* and *Hogue* were sinking in 52° 18' N, 3° 41' E, was received at 7.42 a.m. on the 22nd; and on learning that Commodore Keyes had embarked in the *Fearless* and was proceeding to Terschelling with the 1st Flotilla to intercept the enemy submarines, afterwards sweeping to the Ems to attack the patrols at dawn, the Commander-in-Chief at 3.40 p.m. ordered Admiral Gough-Calthorpe, who was in the southern part of Area VII, to take the 2nd Cruiser Squadron south, to a position 30 miles north of Terschelling, to reinforce the Commodore. At 7 p.m., however, the Admiralty negatived the proposed operation off the Ems, and the 2nd Channel Squadron returned to their patrol in Area VII.³

On September 25 the Customs Officer at Lowestoft telegraphed to the Admiralty that a trawler returning to port that day reported sighting a submarine with "9" on the bows at 11 a.m. on the 21st, 50 miles ESE of Lowestoft.⁴ At the time, *U.9* was off the Texel, nor was any other submarine, British or German, near that position;⁵ but all the circumstances pointed to the submarine being *U.9*, whose movements, prior to the sinking of the *Aboukir*, *Hogue*, and *Cressy*, were unknown. In the hope that the promise of a reward for the timely information of sighting enemy submarines might induce fishing vessels to return at once to port with their news, instead of waiting until it was too late, as in the case of the Lowestoft trawler, the Admiralty issued a notice to fishermen that a reward not exceeding £1,000 would in future be paid for such information.⁶

¹ A 95-97.

² 756 to Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet. The information was false.

³ A 98.

⁴ The report did not reach Admiral Christian until September 28, being contained in a weekly summary for week ending September 26, forwarded from the Admiralty. (See H.S. 47, p. 124.)

⁵ Commodore S., War Records; and G.O.H. II.

⁶ M Letter Book No. 278, p. 210.

36. Effects of the Disaster.—There can be little doubt that to many officers the news of the disaster in the Broad Fourteens came as a revelation of the capabilities of submarines. The loss of the *Hogue* and *Cressy* was due to the anxiety of Captains Nicholson and R. W. Johnson, the latter of whom was drowned, to assist in saving the crew of the *Aboukir*; and at 11 p.m. on the 22nd the Admiralty sent out the following message to all ships:—

"The serious lesson to learn from loss of *Cressy* and *Hogue* is that it must henceforth be recognised by all Commanding Officers that if one ship is torpedoed by submarine or strikes mine, disabled ship must be left to her fate, and other large ships clear out of dangerous area, calling up minor vessels to render assistance.

"This is further application of well recognised rule of war to leave disabled ships in fleet action to look after themselves.

"At the same time, it must be recognised that captains of *Hogue* and *Cressy* were on this occasion only complying with dictates of humanity."

A further precaution taken by the Admiralty was to order the Commander-in-Chief to withdraw the *Duncan* class of battleship from Area VII, where they had recently been supporting the patrolling cruisers. In future no armoured ships patrolled that area. The Admiralty further gave orders that the practice of employing armoured ships to board vessels was to be abandoned, owing to the danger of stopping to lower a boat. There were, however, only two fleet messengers available to accompany the battle squadrons for the purposes of examination, and with the permission of the Admiralty the older battleships and the armoured cruisers continued to be employed on boarding duties in northern waters east of the meridian of 1° E.¹

The transference of the Channel Fleet from Portland to Sheerness was postponed on the evening of September 22, as a precautionary measure, no doubt, until the situation arising from the disaster in the Broad Fourteens had been appreciated. Twenty-four hours later, however, the order went out for the move to be carried out as previously arranged; and on the 25th, on completion of the exercises which the ships were carrying out, they proceeded up Channel.² As a base, the Medway suffered from the serious disadvantage that it was not adequately protected against the entry of submarines, and there was insufficient water for heavy ships to go to sea for about two hours on each side of low water; and at 10.50 a.m. on September 26, as part of the High Sea Fleet was still in the Baltic, Admiral Burney, off Dungeness, was informed that he might return to Portland.³

On October 6, on the termination of the Court of Inquiry at Chatham into the loss of the *Aboukir*, *Cressy*, and *Hogue*, Admirals Christian and Campbell struck their flags. The *Euryalus* and

¹ A 102, 119a.

² A 100, 105.

³ A 106.

Bacchante were employed on escort duty to Gibraltar with the convoys sailing to and from the Mediterranean, and the *Amethyst* went to Portsmouth to refit.¹ Thus the Harwich flotillas were left without the immediate armoured ship support which had been considered essential when the War Plans were drawn up; and for some weeks no remedy was found for a state of affairs which might have entailed serious consequences had the German High Sea Fleet shown any enterprise.

CHAPTER VII.

THE SECOND GERMAN SUBMARINE ATTACK ON THE FIRTH OF FORTH, SEPTEMBER 23-25.

37. **German Battle Cruiser Operation Planned.**—The continued inactivity of the High Sea Fleet, in consequence of the defensive rôle enjoined upon the Commander-in-Chief, was having the inevitable effect upon the moral of the crews. Rear-Admiral Hipper, leader of the Scouting Forces, submitted early in September a plan for a battle cruiser operation by which he designed to restore their moral. The plan was approved, and an advance of the battle cruisers was arranged to roll up and damage the British blockade line in the northern exit from the North Sea. The auxiliary cruiser *Berlin* was to undertake at the same time a mining operation off the west coast of Great Britain; and submarines were to be in position off the Firth of Forth and Moray Firth to attack the Grand Fleet, which it was confidently anticipated would proceed to sea when the presence of the German battle cruisers on the patrol line was known. For the same reason the approaches to these supposed Grand Fleet bases were to be mined. The submarines were relied upon to give timely warning of the enemy's emergence, and airships were also to be used to scout in connection with the operation. The holding ready of the seven available submarines for this service was the reason why no boats were for the present sent to follow up the success achieved by *U.9* in the Broad Fourteens.²

Even at this date the Germans had not succeeded in discovering the precise method by which the British Fleet was exercising surveillance over them. Their submarine reconnaissances in the middle of August, and other intelligence, indicated to them that a patrol line was established between the Shetlands and Norway by old cruisers and armed merchant cruisers, a second line being occupied from time to time to the southward of the first, between Norway and Scotland. British warships were constantly being

¹ Commodore T. now seems to have come under the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, once more. (Cf. H.S. 67, p. 539.)

² G.O.H. II, pp. 65 *et seq.*

sighted on the south coast of Norway, but nothing was known of the position of the main body of the Grand Fleet. The base of the latter was thought possibly to be the Moray Firth, and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron was believed to make daily incursions into the North Sea, returning to harbour at night.¹ It was known that two of the three battle cruisers in the Mediterranean had now been withdrawn, and the three raiding German battle cruisers might consequently have to meet twice their number.² Rear-Admiral Behncke, representing in Berlin the Chief of the Admiralstab, who was with the Emperor at General Headquarters, proposed that four battleships of the *Kaiser* class should accompany the battle cruisers and that the High Sea Fleet should be in support; but these proposals were negatived as being likely to bring about a fleet action under conditions perhaps unfavourable to the German Fleet.

The date of the operation was dependent upon the completion of the refit of the *Moltke*. The latter was in dockyard hands, and was expected to be ready on September 20. On that day, however, the *Princess Royal*, while carrying out with the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron a search of the minefields reported near the Little Fisher Bank, held up a Swedish steamer in 57° 10' N, 7° 10' E. This came to the knowledge of the Germans, and the plan of the battle cruiser operation was consequently altered, and in place of proceeding direct to the assumed British blockade line it was arranged that they should carry out first of all a reconnaissance of the Skagerrak entrance, to avoid being taken in rear by a superior force. The date of the operation was advanced 48 hours, the weather being too bad to allow the submarines and minelayers to proceed until the 20th; for their slow speed rendered it necessary for them to leave 48 hours in advance of the battle cruisers.

Shortly before dark on September 22, Admiral Hipper led his three battle cruisers out of the Jade and anchored outside the bar with nets out, in readiness to proceed at 2 a.m. on the 23rd. Scarcely had they anchored, however, before news came in which rendered reconsideration of the plan necessary. It was reported from Kristiansand that two British squadrons of 12 to 16 ships had been sighted on the 20th and 21st off the Naze and two warships off Lister Fjord, while on the 20th a squadron of six large ships, including the *Lion*, was sighted steaming slowly to the south-westward, between Lindesnaes and Hantsholm. The German battle cruisers had orders, in case of urgent necessity,

¹ Certain of the Grand Fleet cruiser squadrons were using Cromarty as their base at this time. The battlefleet and battle cruisers were using Scapa, and the Firth of Forth was deserted except for the patrols, though these facts were not known to the Admiralstab.

² The Germans at this date apparently had only three battle cruisers ready for service, namely, the *Seydlitz*, *Moltke*, and *Von Der Tann*. G.O.H. I., Tabelle 1, states that the *Derfflinger* joined the 1st Scouting Group at the beginning of September, but G.O.H. II, p. 109, states that she was doing trials on September 24.

to retire *via* the Little Belt, though this entailed the difficult and tortuous passage of Aarö Sund, and the risk of violating Danish neutrality; moreover, it was thought that, if the British forces should pursue the German battle cruisers into the Skagerrak, they would pay no regard to Danish neutrality. In the circumstances, the danger of encountering an overwhelming British force was too great; and the battle cruiser operation was postponed.

38. Further German Minelaying Operations Attempted, September 21-28.—The postponement was not, however, decided upon in time to affect the minelaying operation. The auxiliary minelayer *Berlin* left the Weser at 11 p.m. on September 21, with orders to proceed north-about to the west coast of Great Britain. Her departure was kept so secret that the bight patrols reported her as an enemy cruiser or battleship, until the mistake was at length discovered. On the 22nd, however, the visibility was so high that there seemed little likelihood of the *Berlin* getting through unobserved, for her character as a minelayer was obvious; and at 8 a.m., when 80 miles north-west of Heligoland, she turned back.

On the 22nd, before the postponement of the battle cruiser operation, the auxiliary minelayer *Kaiser* left the Jade for the Moray Firth, to mine in the Grand Fleet. The high visibility of 22nd gave place towards noon on the following day to mist. Suddenly, at 1.25 p.m., when in about 57° N, 2° E, she heard loud British W/T signalling and out of the mist came a warship steering in a west-south-westerly direction.¹ She altered course for the *Kaiser*, which promptly turned four points to starboard and made for the Skagerrak at her full speed of 12.8 knots. She threw off the pursuit in an hour, but her captain considered that it was useless to continue to prosecute his enterprise; his presence was betrayed, he was 170 miles from the Moray Firth, and could therefore not arrive and lay his mines before 3.30 a.m. when little more than an hour of darkness would remain, and his coal supply would not permit of his deferring the operation until the night of September 24-25. Accordingly, at 3.30 p.m. he broke off the enterprise and turned for home. The *Kaiser* did not reach harbour unmolested, for on the morning of September 24 she sighted an enemy submarine 40 miles north-west of Heligoland, and made for shoal water. This was apparently *E.4*, and the *Kaiser* imagined herself to be followed; for off the mouth of the Eider she states that a submarine was again sighted and in spite of being in only 13 metres of water two torpedoes were fired at her, neither of which exploded, though one seemed to hit her.²

¹ From the description of the vessel she was apparently an armed boarding steamer attached to the *Russell* and *Albemarle*, which were working in the northern part of Area VII. (Position, etc., noon 23rd, 56° 50' N, 1° 13' E. Course, N, 79° E. Speed, 12 knots.)

² None of the British submarines in the bight reported firing any torpedoes at a merchant ship on 24th. The *Kaiser* probably imagined the incident. She seems to have been suffering from nerves engendered by the dangerous nature of her cargo of mines.

On September 28 another attempt was made by the *Berlin* to carry out a mining operation on the west coast of Great Britain, but heavy weather caused her to turn back at 2 p.m. on the same day, and she had to go into dock for thorough refit of her engines and boilers before she was fit for further service.

39. Second German Submarine Attack on the Firth of Forth, September 23-25.—The boats detailed to watch the approaches to the Grand Fleet bases in connection with the projected battle cruiser operation were *U.19* and *U.22*, which left Emden for the Firth of Forth on the morning of September 20.

Both submarines were sighted by the Admiralty trawler *Truant Wolmer* on September 22nd on the Dogger Bank, steering in a north-westerly direction; and at 12.30 p.m. on the 23rd the trawler *Defender* reported them both off May Island.¹ All available destroyers and torpedo boats were sent out to search for them, and the patrol flotillas along the coast were warned. *U.22* spent the night of 23-24th lying on the bottom in Largo Bay, and on 24th she proceeded up to Inchkeith to reconnoitre. The sea was calm, and in the bright sunlight Lieutenant-Commander Hoppe was convinced that his wake was visible even when steering at a depth of 30 ft.; and about noon, no heavy ships at anchor being discovered, he threaded his way unseen among the searching patrol craft, and returned to Largo Bay for the night. *U.19* twice penetrated into the Firth of Forth during the 24th, but she found no ships to attack and she retired out to sea for the night. On the *Defender's* report submarines *C.22*, *C.23* and *C.26*, of the Firth of Forth patrol, were sent out to search to the eastward and southward of May Island on September 24, but they failed to sight the enemy boats, and Captain Haggard was of the opinion, as the result of some three weeks' experience, that the value of submarines to hunt submarines was not high.²

On the 25th further evidence of the presence of enemy submarines off the firth began to come to hand.³ At 11.45 a.m. that day *T.B.33* was two miles east of Bass Rock, steering for May Island at 10 knots, when the officer of the watch saw the track of a torpedo approaching on the starboard beam. Before it could be avoided the torpedo struck the torpedo boat aft without exploding or causing any structural damage. The torpedo had been fired by *U.19*, which then made her way straight out to seaward to escape the small craft which were immediately sent out to hunt her. At 3.30 p.m. that day the *Cheerful*, searching with the *Vigilant* and two other destroyers to the eastward of May Island, saw a torpedo break surface at the end of its run,

¹ Papers titled X 3421/14. A reward, the first apparently during the war, was paid to the *Defender's* crew.

² M. 02370/14, "Summary of Operations against Hostile Submarines, 24-30 September 1914."

³ The various reports are in M. 02370/14 and M. 0245/14: "Attacks by German Submarines in the Firth of Forth, September 1914."

1,500 yards astern of the *Vigilant*. The torpedo had been fired by *U.22* at the *Vigilant*, who had not seen it.¹ A quarter of an hour later the destroyer *Stag*, patrolling seven miles south-east of May Island, reported that two torpedoes had been fired at her from astern at a range estimated to be 2,000 yards. They were watched from the beginning of their run and were easily avoided, but no sign of a submarine could be seen.² At 6 p.m. a report came in that a fishing boat had seen the two submarines 6½ miles west of May Island at 4.30 that morning, and at 6.10 p.m. T.B.29 located one of them 18 miles ESE (magnetic) of May Island, a torpedo being fired at her, which missed.³

During the night of September 25–26 all available craft in the Firth of Forth were employed on a search plan, but without result. During the 26th ordinary patrols were resumed and three of the "C" class submarines were sent to stalk outside May Island, and the *Sentinel*, incautiously returning to harbour at slow speed, also reported that she had been fired at, though the report was considered doubtful. At 5.50 p.m. the *Cheerful* reported that a torpedo had been seen coming to the surface 1,000 yards on her port quarter, after apparently passing between herself and the *Mallard*, though again no trace of a submarine was seen. During the 27th to 30th there were continual reports of submarines being sighted and having fired torpedoes, and several times the patrolling craft and the shore batteries opened fire. All these reports of attacks after dark on the 25th were without foundation, for *U.22* had commenced the return journey to the Ems after firing at the *Vigilant*, while *U.19*, after attacking T.B.33 at 11.45 a.m. that day, went north to the Moray Firth. This she reached at 6.30 a.m. on the 27th. The sea was so rough that in diving to 20 metres *U.19* went down to 55 metres, but the hull stood the pressure. There was nothing to be done while the weather was so bad, and *U.19* turned homeward without delay, arriving in the Ems on the evening of September 29, two days behind *U.22*.

Early on September 24, a third submarine, *U.21*, was dispatched to the Firth of Forth. Leaving Heligoland at 5.15 a.m., she was sighted by *E.4* whilst steering on a northerly course to clear Horn Reefs. On reaching the light vessel she turned due west for the Forth, but for some reason she turned back when still 30 miles off the coast and, steering right across the North Sea, on the parallel 57° 15' N, she returned to Heligoland on the 30th.⁴

¹ G.O.H. II., Karte 6, shows *U.22* firing at a destroyer at 2.56 p.m. (G.M.T.), but from an examination of the evidence there is no doubt that this was the torpedo seen by *Cheerful*.

² G.O.H. II., Karte 6, shows no submarine in that position. The *Stag's* report was apparently false.

³ Like the *Stag's* report, this, too, was false.

⁴ No mention of the cruise is made in G.O.H. II, though Karte 5 shows *U.21's* track.

U.22 reported on her return from the Firth of Forth that a great volume of mercantile traffic passed in and out of the firth, 100 vessels being counted on September 24; and it was decided as soon as lengthening nights and thick weather permitted, to dispatch the *Nautilus* or *Albatross* to mine the entrance, as had been done in August off the Tyne.¹

The recrudescence of submarine activity which the Germans had manifested during the last few days called for fresh counter-measures. It seemed to the Admiralty that the recent attack on the Firth of Forth was an occasion where the modified sweep could have been employed. The fitting of the sweep to the boats of the patrol flotillas was being put in hand, and some of the destroyers of Harwich Striking Force were also being fitted. None of the boats of the Firth of Forth flotilla had the modified sweep as yet, however, and at the request of the Admiralty, Admiral Jellicoe now sent 12 sets to Rosyth.² The fitting of the sweep to the destroyers of the Grand Fleet flotillas commenced early in October.

It was obvious that the enemy were attempting by means of their submarines to bring about a reduction of our naval forces with a view to the main fleet action in the future. "Our policy should unquestionably be the exact opposite," telegraphed Admiral Jellicoe to the Admiralty, "viz., to retain the superiority in heavy ships and their necessary adjuncts at all costs, since the final result can only rest with them. Meanwhile we should devote our entire efforts to strangle German trade and protect our own, and disregard suggestions that involve undue risk to the ships which will eventually decide the naval part of the war."³ An ever increasing number of British trawlers was being taken up, armed with one or more guns and fitted with the single or the modified sweep, and employed in anti-submarine operations off the coast.⁴ Fifteen yachts were already in commission and as many more were being fitted out. About 300 trawlers and drifters, and 100 motor boats had been taken up by this date. The payment of rewards to merchant and fishing vessels was now authorised for information of enemy submarines and minelayers.⁵

¹ G.O.H. II, p. 80.

² H.S. 64, pp. 467, 492, 670, 671, 746.

³ A 120.

⁴ M. 02370/14: "Summary of Operations against Hostile Submarines, 24–30 September 1914."

⁵ H.F. 004 of 1 August 1914, No. 293 of 12 October 1914.

CHAPTER VIII.

GERMAN SUBMARINES APPEAR IN THE CHANNEL.

BRITISH MINEFIELD LAID OFF STRAITS OF
DOVER, OCTOBER 2.40. **Broad Fourteens Patrol re-instituted, September 24.**—

Whilst the enemy submarine offensive in the north was in progress, the Admiralty had been giving attention also to restoring the situation caused by the abandonment of the Broad Fourteens Patrol after the sinking of the *Aboukir*, *Hogue*, and *Cressy*, whereby no means remained of giving timely warning of any attempt which the enemy might make to interrupt the transport of the troops to Dunkirk. The immediate protection of the transports was being carried out by the Dover Patrol, which consisted (apart from the Downs Boarding Flotilla) of the light cruisers *Attentive* (Captain (D)), *Adventure*, *Foresight*, and *Sapphire*, with a flotilla of destroyers and submarines. The destroyers patrolled on the line East Goodwin Light Vessel to West Dyck, where the French Défense Mobile took over, the light cruisers being in close support to the westward, with groups of two or three submarines stationed near them.¹ Five of the larger French submarines which the Ministry of Marine had offered to the Admiralty on September 17 for employment in the North Sea were sent to Dunkirk on the 23rd and patrolled from 26th by day on a line north-east and south-west from the Straits of Dover to the parallel of 52° N.²

The objections to wearing out the destroyers of the Harwich Striking Force on patrol duties were obvious; and the Admiralty gave consideration to the possibility of employing the submarines of the oversea flotillas for this purpose. Here, too, however, the same objections ruled, with the addition that the chances of the few available submarines being in the right place at the right moment were very slender.³

The Broad Fourteens Patrol was accordingly re-instituted, the Harwich Force to carry it on. Commodore Tyrwhitt, with his broad pendant in the *Miranda*, took out the first relief on the morning of September 24, after being delayed by a dense fog. It was thought possible that the enemy might attempt to salve the confidential books belonging to the sunken cruisers, and frequent reconnaissances were made of the scene of the wrecks. In addition, two of the destroyers of the Dover Patrol were now

¹ The method of patrol, etc., is described in "Patrol Flotillas," Chapter IV.

² A 83, 101. The submarines were: *Berthelot*, *Prairial*, *Archimède*, *Mariotte*, *Gustave-Zédé*. Their orders are in H.S. 64, pp. 761-2.

³ Comm. (S) No. 029, 23 September 1914. (H.S. 225, p. 213.)

daily sent as far as North Hinder Light Vessel.¹ There seems to have been some indecision at the Admiralty on the point whether light cruisers should be exposed in the area of the new patrol, in view of the submarine danger; but it was eventually ruled that the flotilla cruisers should take part, with due precautions.²

The *Miranda*, in which Commodore Tyrwhitt had hoisted his broad pendant temporarily on September 24, was one of the new "M" class destroyers which were being drafted to his command as they became ready for sea, the arrangement being that the Commodore was to send two of his "I" boats to the Dover Patrol as each pair of "Ms" reached him.³ Admiral Ballard was then to send two of his old 30-knot boats to the Humber, where the reorganisation of the patrol system on August 31, consequent upon the belief that the Germans were laying mines from trawlers and neutral vessels, had thrown a great strain on the patrols.⁴

41. **U.18 enters the Channel, September 27.**—The sinking of the three armoured cruisers in the Broad Fourteens, though a resounding achievement, was strategically without effect upon the situation since the Germans failed to take advantage of the removal of close support from the Harwich flotillas. *U.9* had been dispatched to interrupt the transport of troops in the Straits of Dover, towards which the German military authorities had recently revised their former attitude of indifference. The transport continued, however, quite undisturbed; and the disaster, though regrettable for the loss of personnel and of cruisers which were now required in ever greater numbers for the work of escorting troops from all parts of the Empire, had at least the effect of demonstrating to the Admiralty and the British Navy the powers of the submarine, about which insufficient experience had been gained during peace time.

The achievement of *U.9* had not blinded the Admiralstab to the fact that the main object of her cruise had not been attained, though the decision to hold all the boats which could be spared from the defence of the bight in readiness for the battle cruiser operation to the northward prevented the prosecution for the time being of further attempts to interrupt transport across the Channel. On the postponement of the battle cruiser raid no less than 10 submarines fit for distant undertakings became available; and orders were given for one of them to be sent to the Channel.

U.18 was detailed for the mission, and received orders to proceed to a position near the West Hinder Light Vessel, to operate either against the Ostend transports and their covering forces, or in the mouth of the Thames or Channel. Proceeding


¹ A 104.

² Admiralty to Comm. (T) 82, 25 September 1914.

³ This arrangement was afterwards altered owing to the necessity of providing destroyer protection for the battle cruisers when working in the southern part of the North Sea.

⁴ M. 01975/14.

on the surface down the Broad Fourteens she sighted no enemy vessels until the evening of September 25,¹ when several of the destroyers of the Maas patrol were seen apparently engaged in searching for survivors of the *Aboukir*, *Hogue*, and *Cressy*. Mindful of his objective, Lieutenant-Commander von Hennig forebore to attack, but dived and remained for the night on the bottom, off the West Schelde. During the 26th he cruised off Middelkerke Bank, but without sighting anything more than one steamer, for the intelligence given in his orders, of transports sailing to Ostend, was erroneous. When darkness fell he came to the surface and decided to enter the Channel. He was off Sandettie about 11.15 p.m., and here he submerged and steered for Dover; and at 6.15 a.m. on the 27th he was right off the breakwater. But not a single warship of any description was to be seen in the harbour. He cruised about outside for two hours or more in vain, and then steered for Calais.



About 11 a.m. Lieutenant-Commander von Hennig sighted a light cruiser in the middle of the straits, seven miles off. This was the *Attentive*,² and for a long while *U.18* was unable to get near her owing to the proximity, first, of four submarines proceeding in line abreast and, secondly, of three "C" class boats steering in line ahead on the surface. Patiently conforming to the movements of the *Attentive*, at 1.45 p.m. Lieutenant-Commander von Hennig at length reached a position on the cruiser's port bow and, showing

¹ G.O.H. II, p. 130, says September 26. In the description of this cruise as given in G.O.H., all the dates appear to be a day in advance.

² Captain C. D. Johnson, M.V.O.

his periscope for a brief interval, he fired a torpedo at very close range.¹ Fortunately, the *Attentive* had sighted the submarine and was already turning under helm, with the result that the torpedo ran harmlessly along the port side of the ship. An endeavour was made to ram the submarine as she quickly submerged; but she was just outside the *Attentive's* turning circle, and the only gun which would bear missed fire at the critical moment.

42. Channel Transports stopped, September 28.—The submarines and light cruisers of the Dover Patrol were at once recalled to harbour, and all destroyers of the 6th Flotilla were sent out to search for the enemy submarines, of which the *Attentive* believed at the time that she had been attacked by two.² A division of the destroyers at Harwich was sent by Commodore Tyrwhitt to the North Hinder, to cut off the retreat to Heligoland. All lights, both British and French, which might aid the enemy boat to fix her position among the shoals during the night, were extinguished; and in case the submarine had gone down Channel six destroyers of the French 2nd Light Squadron established a patrol from eastward of Cherbourg to Beachy Head during the 28th.³ At 12.30 a.m. that day orders went out from the Admiralty to stop the sailing of all Channel transports until further orders, though this was cancelled 12 hours later, and passages were ordered to be made during the dark hours.⁴ The Broad Fourteens Patrol was re-established on the 29th, but the flotilla cruisers were not employed.⁵ From the night of October 1-2 all lights from the North Foreland to Harwich as far as 2° E were extinguished between the hours of 9 p.m. and 4 a.m.⁶ The Dutch had withdrawn their light vessels and extinguished their lights (with certain exceptions) soon after the outbreak of war.⁷

43. British Minefield laid off Straits of Dover, October 2-3.—The incursion of enemy submarines into the Channel was so serious a matter that it called for a drastic change of policy. It was within the power of these craft to pass the Straits of Dover submerged, and patrols were consequently ineffectual in preventing their entry. Admiral Ballard advocated a reduction in the visibility

¹ M. 02304/14, "Report of attack made on H.M.S. *Attentive* by hostile submarines on 27 September 1914," says *U.18* fired when only 10 to 15 yards off, and *Attentive's* log No. 19942 says 50 yards. But G.O.H. II, p. 132, says 250 yards, which seems more probable.

² A 108, 109, and "Patrol Flotillas," A 57.

³ A 111-113.

⁴ A 114-117, and H.S. 65, p. 317.

⁵ The patrolling destroyers had returned to Harwich on the 27th, after sweeping north to the Texel and back round the wrecks of the *Aboukir*, *Hogue*, and *Cressy* (A 107). Comm. (T) proposed to send out another relief on the 28th, but the system of patrol, which was apparently outlined in a private letter from Admiralty (?1st S.L.) to Comm. (T), and is referred to in telegram Comm. (T) to Admiralty 4.8 p.m., 27 September 1914, is not forthcoming. Comm. (T)'s records are by no means complete.

⁶ A 121.


⁷ See note to Plan 2.

GERMAN MINED AREA

— PLAN 2. — THE FIRST BRITISH MINEFIELD 2nd - 10th. October 1914 AND THE EXPEDITION TO ANTWERP

Minefields shown thus **44**
Route of Transports of VII Division **3rd Oct.**

NOTE. - All East Coast lights north of Orfordness (inclusive) were extinguished after Sept. 7, except Shipwash, Outer Gabbard, and entrance to Thames lights. All lights from N. Foreland to Harwich as far as 2° E. were extinguished from 9 p.m. to 4 a.m. from the night Oct. 1-2. On Oct. 27 the period of extinction was extended to 7 p.m.-6 a.m. All Dutch light vessels were withdrawn and all lights extinguished shortly after the outbreak of war, except Ymuiden, Scheveningen, Hook of Holland and Westhoofd (Goeree I.). The West Hinder (Belgian) apparently remained afloat until its removal on Oct. 26. Wandelaar and Wielingen Lt. V's were abandoned by their crews on Oct. 19. The Germans relighted Wielingen on Oct. 24.



Extinguished 27.10.14.

**North Hinder 29th Oct. 1914
new position.**

**Galloper Extinguished
27.10.14.**

BRITISH MINED AREA

**Extinguished
Aug 1914.**

67(a) 4th Oct.

44 3rd Oct.

63 10th Oct.

61 2nd Oct.

**Extinguished
27th Sep 1914**

**Remov. 20th Oct
1914.**

Exct. 27th Sep 1914

Remov. 30th Oct 1914

however, and when the minelayers sailed from Dover at 6.30 p.m. that day they were escorted to the Downs by destroyers of the 6th Flotilla. The first line of mines was laid that night by the *Intrepid*, *Iphigenia*, *Andromache*, and *Apollo*, about 10 miles north of Ostend, the *Apollo* laying the first British mine in the war. The operation was not conducted without mishap, for four mines exploded prematurely. One blew up right under the stern of the *Intrepid*, severely shaking the ship and wrecking all the cabins in the after part of the vessel. Several mines and sinkers were derailed, and only 39 out of 100 could be laid. A similar mishap occurred to the *Andromache*, which laid 25 of her mines only.¹ Other mines were safely laid during the nights of October 3, 4, 7, and 10 under the protection of Commodore Tyrwhitt's destroyers;² and thus was initiated a defensive scheme which was to be very greatly expanded and elaborated before the end of the war.

On October 2 the following communication was sent to the Press and to neutral powers:—

The German policy of minelaying, combined with their submarine activities, makes it necessary on military grounds for the Admiralty to adopt counter-measures.³ H.M. Government have therefore authorised a minelaying policy in certain areas, and a system of minefields has been established and is being developed upon a considerable scale. In order to reduce risks to non-combatants, the Admiralty announces that it is dangerous henceforward for ships to cross the area between lat. 51° 15' N and 51° 40' N, and long. 1° 35' E and 3° E. In this connection it must be remembered that the southern limit of the German minefield is lat. 52° N. Although these limits are assigned to the danger area, it must not be supposed that navigation is safe in any part of the southern waters of the North Sea.

Instructions have been issued to H.M. ships to warn eastgoing vessels of the presence of this new minefield.

In the publicity which was given to the presence and position of the minefields, and the precautions taken to ensure the safety of trading vessels of all nationalities, lay the essential difference between the British and German policies of laying mines in the open sea.⁴

On October 9 the Admiralty issued a warning that it might be necessary to extinguish certain lights and remove aids to navigation on the coast of the United Kingdom without further notice.⁵

¹ The cause of the explosions was attributed to the Heneage Mark II pistol, the use of which was discontinued after this operation.

² A 133, 134. The mines were laid about 20 ft. below L.W.O.S., spaced 120 ft. apart. No sinking plugs were fitted.

³ The emphasis which was laid on the German minelaying policy as the reason for the mining of the Straits was doubtless for neutral consumption. The evidence is to the effect that it was the submarine threat to the Channel transports which caused the decision to be taken.

⁴ The Admiralty Notice to Mariners (No. 1626/1914) was not issued until October 9, but the patrols, etc., were ordered on October 2 to warn all vessels of the danger. (A 130.)

⁵ Notice to Mariners. (No. 1627/1914.)

CHAPTER IX.

EXPEDITION TO ANTWERP, OCTOBER 1914.

44. **Decision to dispatch an Expedition to Antwerp, October 3-4.**

—The barring of the Straits of Dover against enemy submarines was the more vital because the situation in Belgium had now reached a crisis and the necessity had arisen of dispatching from England a considerable force of fresh troops to aid the Belgians. Practically the entire Belgian Army was besieged in the great entrenched camp of Antwerp. After two months of wellnigh continuous fighting and retreating the field army was reduced from 117,000 to some 80,000 men with 70,000 fortress troops. The men were disheartened; the forts of Antwerp were outranged by the guns brought up by the Germans, and with the example of Liège and Namur before their eyes the Command cherished little hope of holding the fortress when on September 28 the Germans launched a serious attack against it. The withdrawal of the field army via the Schelde was barred by the neutrality of Holland, and the only line of retreat was by a flank march westward, which would be rendered impossible if the Germans reached Ghent. As early as the following day the Belgian General Staff commenced to make arrangements for the evacuation, and it was decided that as soon as the outer defences fell the field army should be withdrawn, leaving the garrison to make such resistance as might be possible.

The possession of Antwerp by the Allies was considered to be of the first importance for the security of the Channel ports and the safety of our communications with France. Its fall would leave the Germans free to transfer their attacking troops¹ to the right of their line and thus reach the sea. To aid the defence we had already on September 8 sent over a battery of six 4·7 in. guns under the command of Lieutenant-Commander (Actg. Comdr. *emergency*) A. Scott Littlejohns; they were mounted on armoured railway wagons and were all in action by September 25. Three days later, when the German attack on Antwerp commenced, the guns came into action between the forts of the outer defences.² On the 30th the French offered a force of 15,000–20,000 men, contingent upon the dispatch of a similar number of British troops; and on the following day we agreed to send a regular division and a force of cavalry, and arrangements were immediately made for the dispatch of more heavy naval guns.³ On the night of October 1–2, with the break of the outer ring of forts at Antwerp, the situation

¹ 3rd reserve corps, 2 Landwehr brigades, 1 naval division, 2 reserve divisions with 2 brigades of artillery (including siege guns released by the fall of Liège, Namur, and Mauberge) and 2 Air detachments.

² See H.S. 65, pp. 787, etc. Commander Littlejohns' reports are titled Cap L. 58/1914. They have been printed by the Air Department, June 1915, under the title "Armoured Trains."

³ Four 9·2 in. and eight 6 in. None of the 9·2 in. guns reached their destination, and only six of the 6 in. arrived. The 9·2 in. and two 6 in. guns were formed into the 7th Siege Battery and were eventually sent to Havre.

became graver. The promised French troops turned out to be Territorials; they could not be sent off for 10 days, and, moreover, after our experience of French Territorials on the left wing of Sir John French's army at Mons, the British Government were unwilling to send over a regular division which by itself would not suffice to raise the siege of Antwerp. If the city was to be saved, however, or its fall postponed until British troops could fill the gap to the sea, some immediate action was necessary, for the Belgians were evidently disheartened by their apparent desertion by the Allies and the King had announced his intention of withdrawing the field army on October 3. The transfer of the Marine Brigade from Dunkirk to Antwerp had already been foreshadowed, and on the night of October 2–3 orders were sent to Major-General A. Paris, C.B., Royal Marines, who had that day succeeded General Aston in command of the Marine Brigade owing to ill health of the latter, to move forthwith.¹ The information that the Marine Brigade was coming was telegraphed to the Belgians, and hope of further troops was held out to them; and the Belgian Government agreed to postpone their departure from Antwerp and that of the field army.² The First Lord of the Admiralty crossed the Channel at once to examine the situation, and by the evening of October 3 he had come to a provisional arrangement with the Belgian Government that preparations were to be made at Antwerp for a further 10 days' resistance. At Deal there were two naval brigades in course of formation and training; these the First Lord ordered across to Antwerp at once, and during October 4 arrangements were finally concluded between the British and French Governments for the dispatch of an Allied relief force to Belgium. The British force was to consist of the Naval Division, 8,000 strong, under Major-General Paris, the 7th Division (18,000 men, 63 guns) under Major-General T. Capper, C.B., D.S.O., and the 3rd Cavalry Division (4,000 men, 6 guns) under Major-General Hon. J. Byng, C.B., M.V.O., the force being under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir H. S. Rawlinson, Bart., C.V.O., C.B.³ The French promised within five days a Territorial division (15,000 men) with its proper complement of guns and two squadrons of reserve cavalry, and a brigade of Fusiliers Marins,⁴ 8,000 strong. The British troops, other than the Naval Division for Antwerp, were to be sent to Ghent for co-operation with the French in any relief movement which might be possible, and also to secure the eventual retreat of the Belgian field army.

¹ A 124 and H.S. 66, p. 16.

² Before the news of the postponement of the withdrawal of the field army reached the Admiralty, orders were sent to withdraw the 6 in. guns. As this was impossible owing to the railway conditions, they were rendered useless, in order to deny them to the enemy. The 4·7 in. guns remained at Antwerp until October 7.

³ See correspondence in regard to the fall of Antwerp, September to October 1914 (Secret) in (War Office) Memo. M. 02, 15/10, No. $\frac{121}{1057}$, p. 23.

⁴ Two regiments of Marines and one regiment of Zouaves.

45. **Formation of the Naval Brigades.**¹—The two naval brigades which were to be dispatched to Antwerp to complete to the strength of a division the force under the command of General Paris had been constituted on 18 August 1914 from the officers and men of the Royal Fleet Reserve, Royal Naval Reserve and Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve not required for immediate service, together with a proportion of active service ratings. Each brigade was organised in the first instance at a strength of 3,750, the various battalions being named after different Admirals.² The battalion organisation of four companies of 220 men each, newly introduced in the Army, was adopted. The Royal Naval Division was to be completely equipped in all respects by the Admiralty with field hospitals, transport, ammunition column, signal companies, cyclists, motor-cars and machine guns. It was to be organised and trained under the Admiralty, and would remain available for service afloat should any unexpected needs arise. If at any time the naval situation should become sufficiently favourable to enable the force to be definitely released by the Admiralty for military duty, it would be handed over intact to the army for general service. The organisation of the division was at first directly under the First Lord and the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty. On October 2, however, it was placed under the Adjutant-General, Royal Marines.

The naval brigades were constituted by August 24 and embodied in camps for training at Walmer and Betteshanger (near Deal) respectively. Considerable difficulty was experienced in training, as little was known about the new four-company battalion organisation, and drill books were very deficient. Many of the men were totally without any previous training, for owing to a shortage in the Reserves a large number of recruits had to be drafted straight to the division. The 1st Brigade, for instance, received 1,000 recruits during the middle of September, most of them Yorkshire miners without any knowledge of military discipline. Officers were some 60 per cent. below complement. In the two naval brigades there were only some 15 officers from the Active List of the Royal Navy; the majority of the remainder belonged to the R.N.V.R.

A small supply of drill rifles was issued, but, as they had not been altered to charger loading, instruction in firing exercises could not be seriously undertaken. Service rifles arrived a few days only before the brigades left for Antwerp. Naval equipment, entrenching tools, and ammunition were obtained from Woolwich and the home dockyards, and were sent to Dover to meet the brigades; though, owing to the difficulties of handling such half-trained troops, very little was issued and serious deficiencies

¹ This section is based on: "R.N.D. Notes and Summaries" (Papers titled X 13/1914; Commodore Henderson's Report (papers titled Case 781); Papers titled X 12/1914, "A.G. Royal Marines," 5984/1914, and Case 1015; and files (R.N.D. Antwerp) in the possession of the Historical Section (Military Branch), Committee of Imperial Defence.

² See Appendix G.

existed in the uniform, clothing and equipment of the brigades. The men crossed to Antwerp in seamen's dress of blue serge jumper and trousers. At Dunkirk an issue of overcoats was made, though even then 20 per cent. of the men still lacked either overcoat or oilskin. Less than half had waterbottles. About 50 per cent. had a haversack and a bandolier. The shortage of waterbottles entailed much suffering from thirst whilst in Belgium; and the absence of mess tins seriously hindered the men from cooking their food.

46. **Arrangements for Transport of the Antwerp Expedition.**—The two naval brigades, 6,000 strong, crossed from Dover to Dunkirk on the night of October 4–5, in the transports *Mount Temple*, *African Prince*, and *Oxonian*. Submarine *B.3* had reported on October 2 that a torpedo had been fired at her off Dover, though no enemy submarine was sighted;¹ and a special warning was addressed to Admiral Ballard to keep the Straits well patrolled, while at the request of the Admiralty the French sent all their available torpedo-boats and submarines to patrol between the Owers Light Vessel and the Straits of Dover from the morning of the 4th. Special precautions were taken by Commodore Tyrwhitt off the eastern entrance to the Channel to prevent enemy submarines getting past, three divisions of destroyers being disposed on the 52nd parallel and two between the British and German mined areas, though the latter had to be withdrawn during the night of October 4–5 when the thick weather rendered their position between the minefields dangerous.² At Harwich, three divisions were kept ready for sea at an hour's notice.

Anxiety as to submarines was increased by a report from the *Coquette*, one of the destroyers of the Nore Local Defence, that she had chased a submarine off the North Foreland at 2 a.m. on the 5th. The first intention was that the 7th Division should begin crossing on the night of October 4–5, and should disembark at Dunkirk and Boulogne.³ During the evening of October 4, however, information came in that the French were sending an infantry division from Havre to Dunkirk on the morning of October 5,⁴ and in order to avoid congestion at Dunkirk, Calais was substituted as the port of disembarkation of the 7th Division.⁵ A few hours later, however, the arrangements had once again to be altered, for the War Office now wanted the Admiralty to take the troops on to Zeebrugge.⁶ It was arranged that the 7th Division should cross and disembark at that port on the nights of October 5–6 and 6–7, the 3rd Cavalry Division crossing to

¹ M. 02445/14. "Submarine *B.3*, Report of submarine attack on 2 October 1914."

² A 136, 138, 139, 144–147.

³ A 136.

⁴ A 140. Four of Admiral Rouyer's cruisers were withdrawn from the Western Channel patrol to escort this French division.

⁵ A 141, 143.

⁶ Corbett I, 190.

Ostend and Zeebrugge on the following night. The Transport Staff from Dunkirk proceeded to Zeebrugge and a staff was formed at Ostend to receive the transports.¹

By this time three lines of mines had been laid in the Straits,² and the Admiralty were under the impression that the approach to Zeebrugge was blocked.³ While ordering Commander Smyth of the *Intrepid* to report at once on the point, they arranged that the two southern groups of Lowestoft minesweepers, which were working at the time between the North Foreland and the Kentish Knock, should proceed at once to the West Hinder and sweep a passage from 1½ miles south-east of the light vessel to the north-east corner of the British prohibited area.⁴ It was eventually learnt at the Admiralty that there was a clear passage to Zeebrugge south of the minefields; the minesweepers were recalled,⁵ and the transports were ordered to take this route. Destroyers from the Dover Patrol were to accompany each individual transport, and the latter were to call at Dover for orders on their way from Southampton; their departure from Dover was timed so that they would arrive at Zeebrugge during the dark hours.⁶ At the request of the Admiralty the French torpedo boat patrol was maintained between the Owers and Dover Straits,⁷ and the 1st and 3rd Flotillas from Harwich covered the transports to the north and east of the British mined area from the British to the Dutch coast as on the previous night.⁸ In the anticipation that the enemy would attack Zeebrugge on learning of the use to which the port was being put, Commodore Keyes proceeded across in the *Lurcher* with submarines *E.4* and *E.11* for the protection of the base against bombardment until the landing of the expedition was completed.⁹ The 7th Division crossed to Zeebrugge on the nights of October 5-6 and 6-7 as scheduled, and the 3rd Cavalry Division to Ostend and Zeebrugge on the night of the 7th to 8th,¹⁰ all passages being made safely, though at 8.25 p.m. on October 6 the patrolling destroyer *Mohawk*, near the South Goodwin Light, sighted a submarine on her port quarter steaming about 14 knots with her conning tower awash. The *Mohawk* went full speed ahead, put her helm hard a-starboard and opened fire, but failed to hit the submarine, which dived and fired a torpedo that passed under her stern.¹¹

¹ A 148 and H.S. 66, p. 358, and papers titled Part T. 11100/1914, "General account by D.N.T.O. of Transport Work at Ostend."

² See Plan 2.

³ Corbett, "Naval Operations," Vol. I, p. 190, says the minefield actually blocked the approach to Zeebrugge, but this is not in accordance with the evidence.

⁴ A 149, 150.

⁵ A 154, 164. Two of them, the *Princess Beatrice* and *Drumoak*, were never heard of again. (H.S. 66, pp. 969, 978 and 68, p. 202.)

⁶ A 148.

⁷ A 156.

⁸ A 155.

⁹ A 157. The orders for the submarines are in H.S. 225, p. 34.

¹⁰ Four of the 14 transports of the 3rd Cavalry Division went to Zeebrugge. See H.S. 66, p. 1097.

¹¹ M. 02564/14, "Mohawk, Report of submarine attack on 6 October 1914." Shortly after this the *Kangaroo* reported that the *Fawn*, escorting a transport, was attacked, but this was an error.

The destroyer patrol by the 6th Flotilla in the Straits had been much reduced by the necessity of providing escorts for each individual transport. Commodore Tyrwhitt had no boats to spare, with which to reinforce the western end of the Dover Patrol line; but since the protection of the transports was of greater importance than the Broad Fourteens patrol, by Admiralty orders he sent the following night, while the 3rd Cavalry Division was crossing, eight boats to the danger point near the South Goodwins, where the *Mohawk* had been attacked on the previous evening.¹ Shortage of destroyers in the Dover Patrol necessitated the mine-layers, laying a line of mines off the Galloper that night, being protected by boats of the Nore Local Defence Flotilla. Though eight of the transports of the 3rd Cavalry Division had to be dispatched without escort, the return along the same track of the destroyers which had escorted the first six transports constituted practically a continuous patrol of the route, and all the vessels crossed in safety.²

47. German Submarines dispatched to attack Transports of Antwerp Expedition.—The alarms given by *B.3* on October 2, by the *Coquette* on the 5th, and by the *Mohawk* on the 6th were false, for though the transport activities in the south-east coast ports at the end of September and beginning of October had not passed unnoticed by the German General Staff, various circumstances combined to prevent the timely dispatch of submarines. On September 30 it was reported in Berlin from London that a large number of transports was assembling at Newhaven. Four submarines had just been dispatched to attack the British heavy ships reported in the Skagerrak,³ and there were available only two boats for distant operations. These two, *U.20* and *U.28*, the latter a new boat which was still working up, received orders to proceed to the Channel, but were prevented from leaving immediately by the westerly gale which was blowing. Before the weather had moderated sufficiently for them to sail, news came in which apparently falsified the intelligence of transports in Newhaven, and in the prevailing uncertainty the dispatch of *U.28* was cancelled. *U.20*, however, was sent out in the teeth of the north-westerly gale.⁴ She had her periscope damaged by the sea off Schiermonnikoog and had to return; and *U.19* was dispatched on October 7 in her place.

During the night October 8-9, *U.19* successfully passed through the patrol of Commodore Tyrwhitt's destroyers off the Maas, and arrived off the Schelde next morning. The last of the

¹ A 163, 167, 168. The dispositions of Comm. (T's) force on the night October 7-8 was as follows: 12 destroyers on the parallel of 52° N, four destroyers five miles north of a line parallel to the N. Hinder and Thornton Ridge, four between Thornton Ridge and Kaloo Bank. Twelve returned to Harwich for fuel on the 7th, and eight of them were detailed under A.O.P.'s orders to patrol east of the N. Goodwin L.V.

² A 169.

³ See Section 62.

⁴ Apparently on the afternoon of October 4.

transports of the Antwerp Expedition had by now arrived at Zeebrugge and Ostend, and *U.19* sighted nothing except the refugee traffic which was proceeding to England. About noon on the 9th, whilst submerging, she damaged her pressure hull and had to return to the Ems.

From the Hague it was learnt by the Germans in due course that transports were proceeding to the Belgian coast, evidently to land troops to take in the rear the German forces which were investing Antwerp, and the General Staff of the Army pressed for the dispatch of submarines to the Schelde and the ports on the Flanders and Channel coasts; and as the gale was moderating, *U.28* was sent out. She was in the Broad Fourteens on October 9, where Lieutenant-Commander Freiherr von Forstner found himself amongst a number of patrolling destroyers steering across the southern edge of the German mined area during the 10th. On the evening of the 10th he discovered that the distinguishing mark of the West Hinder Light Vessel had been replaced by that of the North Hinder, apparently for the confusion of German submarines,¹ and whilst lying on the bottom here he heard what he believed was a vessel striking a mine, which raised in his mind serious apprehensions of danger. Suspecting that mines had probably been laid on the line West Hinder-Ruytingen Light Vessel, he kept to the northward of it during the 11th, and he reported that whilst in this area a destroyer fired a torpedo at him and attempted to force him on to what Lieutenant-Commander von Forstner suspected to be a line of mines near Sandettie.² Steering on the surface down the western edge of Fairy Bank, he passed safely over at least one line of mines,³ and spent the next 36 hours cruising on the southern edge of the British mined area, where he attempted unsuccessfully to attack one of the four armoured cruisers which the French, undeterred by the recent disaster in the Broad Fourteens, were employing in this dangerous area for the protection of their transports sailing between Havre and Dunkirk. After two nights spent on the bottom, *U.28* proceeded to Calais on the 13th, arriving there somewhat sooner than her commander expected, owing to the strong southerly set of the tide. The removal of the Outer Ruytingen Light Vessel and the substitution of a buoy without distinguishing marks which he noticed on his way to Calais puzzled him. Being in considerable difficulty owing to the currents, Lieutenant-Commander von Forstner turned north to find a quiet spot in which to charge his batteries. The weather came on thick during the afternoon of the 13th, and under cover of the mist *U.28* turned for home, passing safely once more on the surface over the lines of mines on the western edge of Fairy Bank.

¹ G.O.H. II, p. 153. This was not correct. *U.28* evidently mistook her position. For details of extinction and removal of lights in this area, see Plan II.

² No mention has been found of the incident in the British records.

³ No. 67 (a) and possibly also No. 44. See Plan II.

48. Sinking of "S.116" by "E.9"; October 6.—Whilst the German submarines had been active both in the north and in the English Channel the submarines of the Overseas Flotilla at Harwich had maintained the surveillance of the Heligoland Bight. The patrol was kept without intermission throughout the exceptionally heavy gales of the third week in September. The position of the boats on a lee shore, within a few miles of the enemy's coast, was an unpleasant one. The short steep seas which accompany westerly gales in the bight made it impossible to open the conning tower hatches and limited vision from the periscopes to two or three hundred yards. There was no rest to be obtained on the bottom; even at a depth of 20 fathoms, with considerable negative buoyancy, the vessels rolled and bumped heavily. Cruising at a depth of 60 ft. the submarines rolled considerably and pumped vertically about 20 ft. For a long time they were not rewarded by any opportunities of damaging the enemy, owing to the decision of the Admiralstab to abandon the bight as an exercise ground, after the single cruise of the High Sea Fleet which resulted in the loss of the *Helga*. In such circumstances, the work of the submarines was limited to reconnaissance, and they soon obtained a very accurate knowledge of the method of patrol and defence of the bight. Minefield α was discovered by Lieutenant-Commander C. P. Talbot of *E.6* on September 25, when his boat fouled one of the mines in her hydroplane guard; the mine was cleared by Lieutenant Williams-Freeman¹ and Able-Seaman Cremer. Some of the mines apparently broke adrift in the gales, and were sighted by *D.4* on September 24. On October 1 *E.7* ran into the southern end of the minefield, and exploded one of the mines by rifle fire. Our submarines had frequently passed through the minefield previous to its discovery, but without accident.

The day patrol of German destroyers off the Western Ems was now thoroughly located by our boats, and the presence of a supporting light cruiser in the river was known.² It seemed to Commodore Keyes that the Germans were particularly anxious to keep the Ems open, and a raid on the patrols was accordingly arranged.³ A force of four divisions of the most modern of the Harwich destroyers was to be employed in the operation, supported by the *Arethusa* and *Fearless*, to deal with the light cruiser if she should escape being sunk by submarines *E.9*, *E.3*, and *E.6*, which were to be in position off the Ems to attack her if she emerged to support the patrols. The raid was planned for an early date,⁴

¹ Awarded D.S.O., 21 October 1914.

² The *Arcona*.

³ Comm. (S) No. 036, 1 October 1914, in H.S. 225, pp. 244 *et seq.* The operation was apparently known as Plan V. The operation orders are in Harwich Force Packs, Vol. IV, No. 0036.

⁴ From report of *E.9*, October 7 (H.S. 225, p. 266), it appears that the submarines were warned the raid might take place on the 5th or 6th, depending no doubt upon the weather.

but it was abandoned at the last moment, owing to the unfavourable weather;¹ and the heavy calls made on the flotillas for the protection of the transports of the Antwerp Expedition prevented any chance of carrying it out for some time.

The submarines, however, left Harwich on October 3 for their position off the Ems, 24 hours before the operation was cancelled. At 10.30 a.m. on the 6th, *E.9*, in position off the Western Ems, sighted two groups of patrolling destroyers, and an hour and a half later, as there was no sign of our raiding forces, Lieutenant-Commander Horton set his bow torpedoes to 5 ft. and commenced an attack on two destroyers working near him. These were *S.116* and *S.117* of the 7th Half-Flotilla. Twenty minutes later he reached a position 500 yards off, 7 points on the bow of *S.116*, and fired both his bow tubes. One of the two torpedoes struck the destroyer amidships, and she broke in two and sank in three minutes. Most of the crew were saved by *S.117* and *S.118*, while *E.9* made good her escape to the westward.

CHAPTER X.

THE DEFENCE AND EVACUATION OF ANTWERP.

49. Arrival of the Marine Brigade at Antwerp, October 4. Germans cross the Nethe, October 5.—The Marine Brigade, little more than 2,000 strong,² reached Antwerp in the early morning of October 4. The brigade proceeded straight to the trenches and took over the western half of a semi-circular entrenched position facing Lierre, from Lisp to the railway near Donck,³ relieving some exhausted Belgian troops. The outer forts had already fallen, and the state of the Belgian troops was tending towards demoralisation.⁴

During the night of October 4–5 the German shell fire increased in intensity, and on the following morning the enemy effected a crossing of the river Nethe and established themselves south of Boomlaer, and the Belgians could not dislodge them. The river was not under fire from the Marines' trenches. About midday the 7th Belgian Regiment was forced to retire, thus exposing the right flank of the Marine Brigade. The position was restored by the Marine Brigade late in the afternoon by a vigorous counter-attack, in which the Marines suffered a good many casualties, a squadron of eight of Commander Samson's aeroplanes co-operating. This success steadied the Belgian troops and, moreover, during the evening of 5th the German bombardment slackened. A counter-attack by the 5th Belgian Division was planned to commence at 2 a.m. on 6th, against the German position on the north bank of the Nethe, and orders to co-operate were sent to General Paris. The orders did not reach the General until 1.15 a.m. on the 6th; there was insufficient time to make the

¹ A 142 and Tel. from Comm. (T) to Chief of War Staff, 11 a.m. October 3, in Harwich Force Packs, Vol. IV, No. 0036.

² See Note ¹, p. 95.

³ See Plan III.

⁴ General Paris' evidence (written) before the Belgian Commission d'enquête, 27 November 1919 to 5 March 1920. (See Deguise, *La Défense de la Position fortifiée d'Anvers en 1914*, p. 158.)

necessary arrangements for co-operation, and, moreover, General Paris considered the plan to be ill-conceived and doomed to failure; accordingly he reported to the General Officer Commanding the 5th Belgian Division that the order had been received too late for action, and that he considered it essential for the safety of Antwerp to hold to the present trenches.¹ The attack was, nevertheless, carried out by the Belgians and it proved unsuccessful.

The Belgian troops were left in a seriously shaken condition and they evacuated nearly the whole of their trenches. During the morning of the 6th the enemy penetrated the Belgian line on the right of the Marine Brigade, and though he was forced out of a portion of the trenches, all efforts failed to dislodge him entirely. By 11 a.m. the position of the Marine Brigade, with its right flank exposed, had become untenable, and at 11.10 a.m. General Paris issued orders to retire. The retirement was successfully carried out under heavy fire, and soon after midday the brigade occupied an intermediate position between Bouchout and Vremde, which had already been partially prepared for such a contingency. The troops set about improving the defences, being assisted by a detachment of Royal Engineers² under Captain Rooke, which had crossed to Dunkirk on September 19 to co-operate with the Marine Brigade. It was impossible to deepen the trenches, owing to the presence of water near the surface; and the clearing of a field of fire in front of them by the Belgians had the unfortunate effect of exposing the trenches to view as artillery targets.

50. The Naval Brigades arrive—Defence of Vremde-Contich Position.—The 1st and 2nd Naval Brigades had arrived at Dunkirk during the morning of October 5, and were railed up to Antwerp during the following night. Arriving early in the morning of the 6th, they proceeded into billets at Wilryck, in rear of the inner line of forts. The efforts of Commodore Henderson to get into touch with General Paris, who had been placed in command of the Naval Division the previous evening,³ were at first unsuccessful. At 10 a.m. on the 6th, however, the two brigades moved up to Vieux Dieu in response to a request from General Dossin, Commanding the 2nd Belgian Division, under whose orders General Paris was now acting, that a brigade might be moved out at once to occupy the partially prepared Vremde-Contich position;⁴ and on arrival at Vieux Dieu they received orders from General Paris to come up and prolong the line on his right.⁵

Meanwhile, the Belgian troops on the right of the Marine Brigade had been retiring so rapidly that there was a prospect General Paris might have to fall back before the Naval Brigades could reinforce him. At 11.15 a.m. the movement of the latter to the Vremde-Contich line was therefore cancelled, and whilst the

¹ Dispatches by Major-General A. Paris, C.B., October 5 and 7, in (War Office) Memo. M. 02, 15/10. No. 121/1057.

² Two officers, 32 N.C.O.s and men.

³ Churchill, "The World Crisis, 1911–14" (Lond. 1923), p. 353.

⁴ See Plan III.

⁵ War Diary, 1st Naval Brigade (in papers titled Case 781).

2nd Brigade remained at Vieux Dieu the 1st Brigade moved into position between Forts 4 and 7 of the second line, and attempted without much success to improve the inadequate trenches with the very few entrenching tools at their command. In the early afternoon the German fire slackened, and the 1st Brigade came up on General Paris' right, the *Benbow* battalion at Boschoek, the *Drake* at Château de Weynincx, and the *Collingwood* and *Hawke* battalions in reserve at Bouschout and Het Schransken respectively.¹

51. Belgian Field Army withdraws from Antwerp, October 6-7.

—From the intermediate position between the outer and inner lines of defence of Antwerp, which General Paris had assumed at the request of the Belgian General Officer Commanding, he could not prevent the Germans from bringing up their artillery to several points from which Antwerp could be bombarded. The flanks of the Naval Division were in the air, and it was unlikely that the position could be held in the present condition of the Belgian troops.² The latter were quite demoralised and could not be relied on to stand in their trenches if subjected to shell fire. They were almost without officers, and were worn out, underfed, and physically incapable of resisting the enemy.³ A conference was held by the King of the Belgians, with the Belgian General Staff, the First Lord of the Admiralty, and General Rawlinson, at which the latter urged a retirement to the second line of forts. The 7th Division was now disembarking at Zeebrugge, and the alternative was discussed of bringing it up to recapture Lierre and the line of the Nethe; but the question was dropped when it was made clear that the division could not remain permanently locked up in Antwerp after the line had been re-established.

It was accordingly decided to withdraw to the inner line of forts. The Naval Division, supported by Belgian 2nd Division and the fortress troops, would hold this against bombardment, while the Field Army withdrew to the left bank of the Schelde to aid, to the best of their ability, any relieving movement from the west which might be possible. General Rawlinson would organise a relieving force at Ghent and Bruges and prepare to move forward as soon as possible.

The withdrawal of the Belgian Field Army from the city, via St. Nicholas and Selzaete,⁴ took place without delay, during the night following the conference, owing to the German threat to their retreat westward. The 4th Belgian Division had been stationed at Termonde to secure the retirement in that direction, but on October 4 the enemy crossed the river Dendre and attempted the passage of the Schelde at Schoonaerde and Termonde. During the 5th and 6th he repeated his attacks, but was repulsed by the assistance of the 6th Belgian Division which was sent on October 4 to support the 4th Division. By this time, however, the right wing of the main German armies had reached the outskirts of Lille; and to avoid being cut off the Belgian Field

¹ See Plan III.

² General Rawlinson's Dispatch.


³ General Paris' Dispatch, 7 October 1914.

⁴ See Plan IV.

Army was withdrawn from Antwerp at once. During the night of October 6-7, while the Naval Division was falling back on the inner line of forts, the Belgian Field Army marched out of the city, leaving its defences to the garrison, the 2nd Belgian Division, a few regiments of Belgian Infantry, and the Naval Division. Arrangements were now made by the Belgians to sink ships in the Schelde to block the passage to Antwerp.¹

52. Withdrawal of Naval Division to Inner Line of Forts, October 7.

—The retirement inside the second line took place at 2 a.m. on the 7th, without molestation by the enemy, and the brigades took up their positions as follows: 1st Brigade from Fort 2 to halfway between Forts 4 and 5; 2nd Brigade on the right of 1st Brigade to Fort 7; the 9th R.M. Battalion, with some Belgians, prolonged the line from Fort 7 to the Schelde, the remainder of the brigade being in reserve at Waesdonck.



The withdrawal of the Naval Division and the consolidation of the new position on the second line of forts was supported by the Naval Armoured Train under Commander Littlejohns. After

¹ H.S. 67, p. 59.


the fighting on September 29 the train had retired across the river Nethe owing to the evacuation of the territory to the south by the Belgians. The train came into action on October 4, 5, and 6, in conjunction with two French or Belgian armoured trains, at Waerloos, Contich and Hove; and it finally withdrew out of the Antwerp zone on the evening of October 7, half an hour before the bridge it had crossed was blown up.

The position in which the Naval Division now found itself was part of the semicircle of eight forts, 500 to 600 yards apart, that covered Antwerp on the south and east sides. The west flank rested on the Schelde, but in the north there was no obstacle other than an inundation between Forts 1 and 2. All the ground in front of the works had been well cleared of houses, walls, trees, etc., with great labour and expense, for it was as though a semi-suburban district, such as Eton, Staines, and Slough, had to be prepared for defence. The position was formidably wired, but the trenches were almost hopeless, wide and shallow, without dug-outs or head cover. There could be no attempt at concealment, and both forts and trenches offered admirable targets to the enemy's artillery. The forts were badly protected, ill armed, and poorly provided with ammunition. These second line forts were armed only with five or six 75 mm. guns apiece. Many of the forts were still incomplete when war broke out; some of their guns were not in place; and in numerous cases the concrete protection was wanting and had to be replaced by stone, earth, or sacks of cement. There were scarcely any searchlights. The great weakness of the position lay in the fact that if Forts 1 or 2 were occupied by the enemy, the position could be taken in reverse. There was no means of communication except in the open. Telephone communication between forts and redoubts had in many cases not been completed. The 1st Brigade, for instance, depended upon a single telephone between Château du Dragon and Divisional Headquarters at Pulhof. On the morning of October 8, when General Paris moved his headquarters to the Pilotage in the city, his only communication with the 1st Brigade was by messenger.¹

October 7 was spent by the Naval Division in improving the position as far as was possible with their few entrenching tools, aided by the detachment of Royal Engineers working on the trenches between Forts 2, 3, and 4. The enemy kept up a desultory artillery fire, but made no attack during the day; the Germans were expecting a counter-attack from the higher ground on the right of the intermediate position, east of Contich, and were not at first aware of the withdrawal to the inner line of forts.²

¹ General Paris' Dispatch, 11 October 1914, and War Diary, 1st Brigade (in papers titled Case 781, Encl. IVA).

² "Antwerpen, 1914," p. 77.










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PLAN III. THE DEFENCE OF ANTWERP

SKETCH MAP NOT TO SCALE, BASED ON
REPORTS & DESPATCHES AND PLAN
ATTACHED TO GEN. RAWLINSON'S DESPATCH 18-10-14

-  TRENCHES
-  FORTS
-  RIVERS & WATERWAYS
-  ROADS
-  RAILWAYS USED IN THE RETREAT
-  INUNDATIONS



About midnight October 7-8 the enemy began to bombard the city, forts, and trenches with an intensity which increased from minute to minute. The water supply had been cut off, and as no attempt could be made to subdue the flames the city was soon burning at many points.¹ A general exodus of the inhabitants followed.

Before dawn on 8th General Paris received from General Dossin, commanding 2nd Belgian Division, information that Forts 1, 2 and 4 had fallen. In consequence of the threat to his rear, he reported to General Rawlinson at Bruges at 7.15 a.m. that he would be compelled to retire across the Schelde to Haesdonck under cover of darkness, and he further warned General Deguise, commanding the defence, of his intention.

At a conference held at 9 a.m. on 8th it was agreed between Generals Deguise, Dossin and Paris that if Forts 1 and 2 had indeed fallen and could not be re-taken, the whole line would have to be withdrawn to the inner enceinte immediately round the city. This formed an exceedingly strong line of earthen parapets, with shelters and stores beneath them, strongly flanked by low caponiers, with wet ditches 60 yards wide and 10 to 15 ft. deep. To defend this position the fortress troops in Antwerp were considered sufficient, and it was decided that the Naval Division and the 2nd Belgian Division should cross the Schelde after dark and join the main Belgian Army to the westward of the river.

The intelligence that Forts 1 and 2 had fallen was soon found to be premature. But serious desertions both of officers and men had occurred after the withdrawal of the Field Army; and whilst dispatching troops to stiffen the defence, General Deguise took the precaution of destroying the bridges leading from the forts, to forestall any further attempts at flight. There was little hope, however, that the Belgian troops could hold the forts in the present condition of the men.² In the west, the Germans had now reached Lokeren,³ where they were checked by the 3rd Belgian Division.

By this time General Paris was aware that the enemy had crossed the Schelde south of Antwerp, at Schoonaerde, and were moving northward to surround the fortress. At 10.15 a.m. he

¹ General Rawlinson's and General Paris' Dispatches.

² Report by Colonel (Retired) Hon. J. E. B. Seely, D.S.O., M.P. (Special Service Officer on Staff of Field-Marshal Sir J. French) and Colonel T. Bridges, D.S.O., 4th Hussars (representing Field-Marshal Sir J. French in Antwerp), both dated 11 October 1914, in M. 02, 15/10, No. 121/1057. See also Deguise, "La Défense de la Position fortifiée d'Anvers en 1914," page 138.

³ See Plan IV.

telegraphed to the Admiralty, explaining the difficulties of the position.¹ The reply of the Admiralty was dispatched at 2.39 p.m. that day, as follows:—

Adty. to General Paris.

10 October 1914,
2.39 p.m.

It is not understood how shelling of individual forts can affect the security of your lines so long as the intervals between the forts are obstinately defended and the ruins of the forts themselves occupied and entrenched after dark. You are expected to make good your defence of the position and not to abandon it for any artillery attack, however severe. It is your duty, unless you receive further orders, to hold your position at all costs and to stand and repulse an infantry attack if one is delivered. Should your communications be endangered by a German advance from Termonde you will receive the necessary orders to retire in time from Sir Henry Rawlinson. But your responsibilities are limited to defending the lines you now hold and being ready to operate a retreat if ordered to St. Nicholas.²

53. Decision to surrender the Fortress, October 8.—On October 8 General von Beseler got most of his heavy guns across the Nethe. The bombardment of the city continued, but the main artillery attack was directed against forts 3, 4, and 5, whilst the German infantry advanced on the left, against forts 1 and 2, though no serious infantry attack was made on the trenches. During the forenoon, General Paris moved his headquarters to the Pilotage in order to be in the same building as General Deguise; and at 4.45 p.m. the two Generals again conferred on the situation. It was clear to General Deguise, from his reports, that he could not rely upon certain of his troops maintaining their positions. He was willing, he told General Paris, to employ every means of persuasion, even the most drastic; but he could give no assurance that his troops would stand. At that very moment definite information came in that Forts 1 and 2, upon the security of which so much depended, had been abandoned by their garrisons and that the reinforcements sent had refused to enter the forts. There was also a report that some of the British troops between Forts 3 and 4 had retired;³ and, in order to avoid a disaster, General Paris decided to carry out an immediate retirement under cover of darkness.⁴

Simultaneous orders were issued by Generals Deguise and Paris about 6 p.m. for the evacuation of the fortress by the troops of their respective commands. The withdrawal to the left bank of the Schelde was timed to commence as soon as darkness fell. General

¹ H.S. 67, p. 59.

² There is no evidence to show that General Paris received this telegram. Before leaving Antwerp on the evening of October 6, the First Lord of the Admiralty gave General Paris written orders *re* holding the position. These are not forthcoming, but they were apparently "That while the town endures bombardment, General Paris with naval division and Belgian support will defend inner line forts to the utmost." (Churchill, *op. cit.*, p. 357.) (See private letter from General Paris to Major Becke, 11 June 1922, in "General Paris' Comments on Deguise's Book," H.S., C.I.D. File No. 14, Antwerp.)

³ The report was incorrect. (Deguise, p. 153, *f.n.*)

⁴ General Paris' Dispatch, 11 October 1914.

Paris had already, during October 7, secured an independent line of retreat for his division, in case the enemy's fire or the pressure of traffic rendered the bridges impassable. Two depots of boats were made at the Burght pontoon bridge, sufficient barges, rafts, steamers, and tugs being collected to carry 7,000 men across the river at one time. The arrangements were completed at daylight on the 8th, and a guard of 100 men of the R.N.D. placed over the boats.¹ General Deguise issued strict orders, however, that the roads and bridges were to be cleared for the passage of the Naval Division, which was to have precedence of the Belgians in the withdrawal.² The orders had barely gone out when a report came in from General Dossin that the Belgian troops which had retired,³ had reoccupied their positions. But General Deguise considered that an attempt any longer to hold the right bank of the Schelde would merely result in a useless sacrifice of his troops; and he did not countermand the order for the evacuation.

Though General Paris did not learn of the fact until somewhat later, the British Government had already decided to withdraw the Royal Naval Division across the Schelde that night.⁴ General Rawlinson had reported to Lord Kitchener on the morning of the 8th that he was not strong enough to keep open the line of retreat and prevent the Belgian troops and the Naval Division from being forced against the Dutch frontier. The 3rd Cavalry Division was then disembarking at Zeebrugge and Ostend, and could not reach Ghent until the following afternoon, and the 7th Division could not arrive until the evening of that day. A small force of 1,500 to 2,000 Fusiliers Marins had reached Ghent during the night of the 7th to 8th, but the main French contingents had not arrived, and it transpired that the Territorials had been diverted by agreement between General Joffre and Field-Marshal French. General Rawlinson was instructed to assist in the withdrawal of the Naval Division in every way possible, and trains were ordered to be in readiness at St. Nicholas.⁵ He sent off the armoured cars under Commander Samson to give General Paris instructions for the retirement, but so congested were the roads that of four messengers sent off, the only one to reach his destination was a civilian motor-cyclist.⁶

¹ Colonel Bridges' Report.

² General Rawlinson's Dispatch, 18 November 1914.

³ Presumably from Forts 1 and 2.

⁴ The information was given to Colonel Seely over the telephone while he was reporting to Lord Kitchener the decision to withdraw the R.N.D. from Antwerp after the issue by General Paris of the orders for the withdrawal.

⁵ Colonel Seely's Report ("Minutes of Evidence at Court of Inquiry held at R.N. Barracks, Chatham, February 1919," page 9).

⁶ General Rawlinson's Dispatch, 18 October 1914, and Commander Samson's "Reminiscences."

54. **Retirement of the Main Body of the R.N.D.**—The following orders were issued by General Paris for the withdrawal of the Naval Division :—¹

The Royal Naval Division will retire on receipt of this order.

The 1st Brigade via Harenthal Gate. The R. Marines in the centre by the Malines Gate.

Both above brigades crossing the L'Escaut by St. Anne Bridge. The 2nd Brigade—Burg[h]t pontoon bridge and boats if necessary. On reaching opposite side the river, troops will move on Zwyndrecht.²

H.-Qr. Antwerp,
5.25 p.m.³

(Signed).....Richardson,
[Major, N.Z. Staff Corps]

By this time the city of Antwerp was an inferno. Houses were blazing in all parts of the city, and within 100 yards of the bridge at Burght the flames of thousands of tons of petroleum which it had not been possible to evacuate with the other stores were lighting up the surroundings as by day. Fortunately, the immense pall of smoke hid the bridge from the enemy's view, and it was a still, starlight night, otherwise no escape by the bridge would have been possible.⁴ Amid this scene of devastation, under a dropping shell fire, not only troops, but fugitives, cattle, animals, and every type of vehicle, were moving westward in a state of inextricable confusion, choking the narrow streets of the city and rendering intercommunication between military units practically impossible.

The first part of the Naval Division to retire was the 2nd Brigade, which received its orders through Captain E. F. P. Sketchley, R.M.L.I.⁵ The brigade was out of its trenches by 7 p.m.; and after assembling at Wilryk at 8.30 p.m., it was led by Commodore Backhouse through the indescribable confusion of the city to the bridge at Burght, where it arrived in good order at 10 p.m. and at once crossed and marched to the rendezvous at Zwyndrecht.

The order to retire was taken to the Marine Brigade by Lieutenant-Colonel A. H. Ollivant.⁶ It was decided⁷ that the 10th R.M. Battalion, one of the three which had been in reserve at Waesdonck, should cover the retirement of the division, half the battalion relieving the *Hawke* between Forts 2 and 3, and half relieving the *Collingwood* between Forts 3 and 4. The remaining three battalions of the R.M. Brigade retired by the Malines Gate and the St. Anne Bridge, and reached Zwyndrecht without loss.

¹ A carbon copy of the original order is in Papers titled Case 472, Vol. I.

² See Plans III and IV.

³ Apparently G.M.T.

⁴ General Paris' Dispatch, 11 October 1914.

⁵ G.S.O. II, R.N.D.

⁶ G.S.O. I, R.N.D.

⁷ Apparently by Commodore Henderson and Colonel Ollivant. The latter went to 1st Brigade Headquarters after delivering the order to retire to Brigadier-General Marchant, R.M.L.I., arriving there about 7 p.m., and it was then that the arrangement regarding the 10th R.M. Battalion was made.

Of the 1st Brigade the *Drake* battalion alone reached the rendezvous at Zwyndrecht, retiring by the Malines Gate and St. Anne Bridge.¹ In the darkness, however, the absence of the remainder of the Brigade was not noticed at the rendezvous; and at 1 a.m. on the 9th, after an hour's halt, the R.N. Division resumed its march.²

Beveren Waes was reached about 2 a.m., and here General Paris learnt that the enemy were in Lokeren and that trains to take the division to Ostend were in readiness at St. Gilles Waes instead of at St. Nicholas.³ In spite of the exhaustion of the troops there was no other alternative than to march to St. Gilles Waes, a distance of seven or eight miles. The confusion on the road was accentuated by the fact that the concentration area of the 2nd Belgian Division was at Vracene, on the road from Beveren Waes to St. Gilles Waes. The road was narrow, and soon became choked with British and Belgian troops, horse, foot, and artillery, refugees and motor omnibuses, some 70 of which latter had been taken off the streets of the cities of England, and, driven by their civilian drivers (enlisted and clothed as Marines), were employed to carry the stores of the Naval Division.⁴ All intercommunication between units was impossible, and the Naval Division, hitherto retiring in good order, degenerated by degrees into a rabble.⁵

The leading troops of General Paris' division reached St. Gilles Waes soon after daylight. The men were entrained as rapidly as possible, and soon after 9 a.m. they were all

¹ Colonel Seely met Comdr. Victor Campbell, commanding *Drake* battalion, on the Malines road and informed him of the order to retire, and that the remainder of the 1st Brigade had already withdrawn. (Comdr. Campbell's evidence at Court of Inquiry, pp. 150-1.)

² Apparently Colonel Seely reported to General Paris that the troops to which he had been detailed to carry the order for withdrawal were present, and General Paris took this to mean that the 1st Brigade was present in its entirety. ("Minutes of Evidence of Court of Inquiry," pp. 32, 37.) General Paris stated in his evidence that Colonel Seely was to carry the order to the 1st Brigade, Colonel Ollivant to the Marine Brigade, and Captain Sketchley to the 2nd Brigade. ("Minutes of Evidence," p. 32, and Colonel Ollivant's and Captain Sketchley's Reports, 20 October 1914, in papers titled Case 472, Vol. I.) Colonel Seely, however, states in his report of 11 October 1914, "My orders from General Paris were to retire the Royal Marine Brigade (11th and 12th Battalions) in reserve at Château Rouge, three-quarters of a mile behind the centre of the line by the Porte de Malines and the Pilotage bridge of boats, and generally to secure the orderly retirement of the centre of the line."

³ Apparently the civilian motor-cyclist brought the information. Colonel A. G. Dallas, G.S., Liaison Officer with the Antwerp Garrison, says in his report (11 October 1914 in M. 02) that but for this civilian's aid, General Paris would have known nothing of the arrangements made for trains by General Rawlinson.

⁴ Sir W. Raleigh: "The War in the Air," I, 390.

⁵ Lieutenant-Colonel Cornwallis West, commanding *Anson* battalion, 2nd Brigade. Private Diary. (H.S., C.I.D. 229/4.)

dispatched.¹ Many of the trains contained but few British troops, and were filled up with Belgian soldiers and refugees. Such was the confusion that the absence of three battalions of the 1st Brigade still remained unnoticed.²

55. 1st Brigade becomes Interned in Holland.—The order to withdraw the 1st Brigade was delivered about 7 p.m. on the 8th by Colonel Ollivant to Commodore Henderson at the latter's headquarters. The retirement was delayed by a discussion regarding the route to be followed, and by difficulties which occurred while the *Hawke* battalion was being relieved by the 10th Marine Battalion which was to cover the retreat and form a rearguard.³ A shrapnel attack on a deserted Belgian Field Artillery Battery in rear of the trenches between Forts 2 and 3 caused further delay, and it was not until 10 p.m. that the retirement commenced. It was precipitated by a report that the 2nd Brigade trenches appeared to be already evacuated, thus entailing a flank march across an unscreened enemy front.⁴ The *Drake* battalion had been reported as already withdrawn, and Commodore Henderson accordingly marched at once with the *Collingwood* battalion and A and D companies of the *Benbow*. The order to retire had not yet reached the other two companies of the *Benbow*, for neither the messenger nor the telephone messages sent by Colonel Maxwell of the *Collingwood* battalion got through to the men of the *Benbow* battalion in Forts 3 and 4.⁵

¹ General Paris says about 9 a.m., Colonel Seely 10.30 a.m., and Colonel Dallas 9.30 a.m.

² Commander Campbell stated in his evidence before the Court of Inquiry (*ibid.*, p. 156) that when he reported his battalion (*Drake*) present to General Paris at Beveren Waes, at 2 a.m. on 9th, he was told either by the General or by Colonel Bridges that the remainder of the 1st Brigade had not arrived and that its whereabouts was unknown. General Paris stated that it was not he who told Commander Campbell this. Colonel Bridges was in India at the time of the Court of Inquiry, and his evidence was not taken.

³ Colonel Ollivant, as Chief Staff Officer, after delivering the order to retire to the R.M. Bde., made it his duty to visit the other Bde. Hdqrs. to satisfy himself that the order had been received. He states in his report (20 October 1914) that he gave orders to Commodore Henderson to retire forthwith via the Malines Gate and St. Anne Bridge, but Commodore Henderson had reconnoitred the route leading to the Gare de Formation. (Commodore Henderson's Report, 13 October 1914.) General Paris' order was for the 1st Brigade to retire via the Harenthal Gate, but it seems doubtful from the evidence whether any of the three staff officers, Colonel Seely, Colonel Ollivant, or Captain Sketchley, took a copy of the orders with them from divisional headquarters.

It appears that, owing to the length and nature of the discussion between Commodore Henderson and Colonel Ollivant, the former did not understand that the order to retire was urgent. (Report of Court of Inquiry.)

⁴ Apparently Commodore Henderson arranged with Colonel Ollivant that the 2nd Brigade should not withdraw until an hour after the 1st Brigade. Colonel Ollivant had been informed by Commodore Henderson that the 1st Brigade would retire at 9 a.m. (Colonel Ollivant's Report, 20 October 1914.)

⁵ Report of Major Trefusis, 5 December 1914, in papers titled Case 781.

The Gare de Formation, towards which Commodore Henderson was retiring, lay outside the city, to the southward, near the Burght Bridge. The route necessitated the use of a succession of lanes and paths. The troops had to move in single file for considerable periods and the units of the column lost an inordinate amount of distance. One short halt was made in order to rest the men and allow stragglers to come up. Many men fell out owing to exhaustion, and most of them threw away their equipment. The rate of marching gradually dwindled to a mile an hour.¹ The Schelde was crossed in ferry steamers,² and about 4.30 a.m. on the 9th Commodore Henderson arrived at the rendezvous at Zwyndrecht. With him were only some 300 men, the leading half of *Collingwood* battalion. The remainder of the party lost their way and eventually arrived at Malines Gate, to find it blocked and barricaded and the roadway torn up. The drawbridges of the gates on the south of the town had been blown up at 10 p.m. Ultimately the detachment reached the Gare de Formation. The pontoon bridge at Burght was burning fiercely, and the party crossed the river in tugs, and eventually reached Zwyndrecht and rejoined the Commodore.

At Zwyndrecht, also, Captain Rooke placed his detachment of Royal Engineers under Commodore Henderson's orders. The detachment had retired with the 1st Brigade, but by now it had lost half its effectives.³

The men were in a state of considerable exhaustion. They were footsore and in want of sleep. Supplies in bulk had reached the trenches an hour and a half before the order to retire was issued, but they had not been distributed. In addition, lack of water-bottles caused the men to suffer from thirst, for the majority of the men in the brigade had crossed to Antwerp without either water-bottles, haversacks, or mess tins.⁴ No supplies were to be found at Zwyndrecht nor any information of the remainder of the division, for in the belief that the entire 1st Brigade was with the division, General Paris had not left any orders at the rendezvous. Commodore Henderson accordingly commandeered a Belgian motor-car and left in search of news. At Beveren Waes, where the Commodore arrived at 5.30 a.m. on the 9th, a seaman of the 2nd Brigade informed him that the division was bivouacked close by. The Commodore did not verify the information, and when he brought the brigade, now some 1,500 strong, up to Beveren Waes he found that there were no British in the neighbourhood. From the inhabitants it was learned that the division had

¹ Commodore Henderson's Report, 13 October 1914, and "Minutes of Evidence of Court of Inquiry," pp. 100-1, 108.

² A Staff Officer waited until 2 a.m. at St. Anne Bridge (where, by Gen. Paris' orders, the 1st Bde. should have crossed). He then assumed it had crossed by the Burght Bridge, but he now met with an accident and was put out of action for the time being.

³ Report of Captain Rooke, R.E. (Papers titled Case 781.)

⁴ Commodore Henderson's Report, 26 October 1914. (N.L. 56843, in papers titled Case 781.)

gone to St. Gilles Waes, and after issuing $\frac{1}{4}$ lb. of raw meat per man, the only food which could be obtained, the Commodore issued orders for the brigade to march at 9.45 a.m. for St. Gilles Waes and to arrive there by 4 p.m.¹ The Commodore himself pushed on to St. Gilles Waes in a motor-car, and here he learnt by chance that the division had entrained for Ostend that morning. About 11 a.m. Commodore Henderson succeeded in getting into touch by telephone with Colonel Bridges at Selzaete, and the latter at once made arrangements for trains to be sent to St. Gilles Waes to bring on the brigade.

The head of the long straggling column arrived at St. Gilles Waes at 3.45 p.m. Two companies of the *Hawke* battalion had become detached on the march, and the brigade was reduced to 700 or 800 men. These at once entrained, but at 4.15 p.m. the stationmaster reported that the line was cut at Moerbeke and that a refugee train was returning from that direction. It arrived shortly afterwards.

This seemed to Commodore Henderson to confirm the fears he already entertained. His information from Colonel Bridges was to the effect that there was nothing to prevent the Germans at Termonde from marching north and cutting him off. Moreover, Colonel Bridges had impressed upon him the need for haste and the momentary expectation of an attack by the enemy on the railway line.² The Germans had now occupied Lokeren with the 37th Landwehr Brigade; the 9th Ersatz Brigade was at Zeveneecken, and the 1st Bavarian Landwehr Brigade was advancing on Moerbeke. It was not, however, until late in the evening of October 9 that the railway line was cut,³ and trains of Belgian troops and refugees went through Moerbeke in safety to Selzaete as late as 9 p.m. on October 9.⁴ But of this Commodore Henderson was not aware; and he came to the conclusion that the only alternative to annihilation or capture by the enemy was to cross the frontier into Holland.⁵

About 5 p.m. the Commodore led his exhausted and half-famished brigade across the frontier at Hulst. With them went the small detachment of Royal Engineers. The Brigade-Major was dispatched in a car to find the missing companies of the *Hawke* battalion and direct them also across the frontier.

"B" and "C" companies of the *Benbow* battalion crossed into Holland on the following morning, October 10. The order to retire had not reached "C" company, holding Fort 4, until 4.30 a.m. on the 9th.⁶ By the time the two companies reached Burght Bridge the latter was on fire, and an attempt to cross was unsuccessful, though a steamer was soon found to take them to

¹ War Diary of 1st Brigade.

² Report of Colonel Bridges, 11 October 1914.

³ "Antwerpen," pp. 82-3.

⁴ Report of Colonel Bridges, 11 October 1914.

⁵ Commodore Henderson's Report, 13 October 1914.

⁶ "B" Company was apparently holding Fort 3 with some Belgians.

the other side of the river. After marching all day the detachment arrived at St. Nicholas, only to find that the line to the westward of them had been cut by the enemy. Marching on to St. Gilles Waes, they spent the night there, and next morning, October 10, most of the men took refuge in Holland.¹ A party consisting of Lieutenant G. G. Grant, R.N.V.R., Sub-Lieutenant Modin, R.N.V.R., and 35 men, refused to cross the frontier, and set off for Selzaete on foot. Before reaching here they were met by Colonel Bridges; having heard rumours of stragglers he had come out to look for them. Motor omnibuses were sent out to bring them in, and about 5.30 p.m. the party was successfully dispatched from Selzaete to Ostend by train.²

56. Retirement of "Hawke" and 10th R.M. Battalion.— During the night of October 8-9 the remainder of the 1st Brigade and the rearguard of Marines began gradually to straggle in to Zwyndrecht. Owing to misunderstandings and difficulties in turning over their trenches to the 10th R.M. Battalion the *Hawke* battalion did not commence to retire until 10.30 p.m. The battalion became split up into two parties, one of which was eventually joined by two companies of the 10th R.M. Battalion, under Major A. H. French, R.M., which retired after covering the withdrawal of the 1st Brigade. The combined party crossed the river by St. Anne Bridge, then the Marines marched on ahead, arriving at Zwyndrecht about 2 a.m. on the 9th, three hours before the seamen.³ The other half of the *Hawke* battalion did not cross the Schelde until 8 a.m. on the 9th, at Burght Bridge, shortly before the bridge was set on fire. Several seamen, stragglers from the *Collingwood* and *Benbow* battalions, were found here, and the party, now totalling 400 men, marched into Zwyndrecht, being joined on the way by Lieutenant-Colonel Luard and the other half of the 10th R.M. Battalion.

As the senior officer present, Colonel Luard assumed command of the party. Having received no orders and being in complete ignorance of the whereabouts of the division, he decided to march towards St. Nicholas, for there had been rumours that the 7th Division was coming up in that direction and he thought General Paris intended to try to effect a junction with it.

About 9 a.m. on the 9th the party marched off. The seamen were considerably demoralised by this time; they had thrown away most of their ammunition, their officers had no control over them, and in order to keep them together the R.M. Battalion was split up, two companies marching at the head of the column and two bringing up the rear. At Beveren Waes they passed through Commodore Henderson's brigade, but they did not stop; and they reached St. Nicholas about 5 p.m.

¹ Papers titled Pro B. 550/1914.

² *Ibid.* Report of Colonel Bridges.

³ The term seamen is employed for convenience, to indicate the men of the naval brigades; but, as a matter of fact, practically none of the men were on the Active List of the Royal Navy, and a very considerable proportion were untrained recruits.

Here the party learned that the enemy were at Lokeren, and that there was a service of refugee trains running from St. Gilles Waes to Ostend; and Colonel Luard continued the march to Kemseke, in order to pick up a train. The continuous reports of the enemy which circulated in the ranks induced the men to increase their rate of marching considerably. In the uncertainty whether the trains were at Kemseke or at Stekene, a few miles further down the line, the detachment became divided, but eventually the greater part entrained at Kemseke, the remainder being picked up at Stekene as the train passed.


The train was a long one, composed of open trucks and horse boxes, and it was already crowded with refugees. The men climbed into the nearest trucks, the officers being scattered along the train. The men were very exhausted and most of them pulled their boots off and went to sleep. At Moerbeke rifle firing was heard, but the train did not stop, and the shots were assumed to be fired either by a Belgian patrol or by enemy snipers.

Soon, however, the train came to a standstill, and a heavy attack developed upon it. The attacking troops were the advance guard of the 1st Bavarian Landwehr Brigade, with a field battery,¹ which they brought into action. Parties of Marines replied. At the head of the train Major French, and Lieutenant D. H. Gowney, R.M.L.I., with small parties of Marines, were engaged in repelling the attack, with some success.² But this was unknown to those at the rear end. Men, women and children were screaming, it was pitch dark and no words of command could be heard. Contradictory orders passed up and down the long line of trucks and there was a great deal of confusion. Suddenly the order to surrender ran along the train. Colonel Luard had been trying to re-start it, but its engine was found to be off the rails; hearing the cry of surrender he went down the line, trying to stem it and ordering the men to stand to their arms. But all attempts to stay the panic and infuse a spirit of resistance into the exhausted men was fruitless.

The officers of the Marine Battalion decided that the only course left to them was to retire on foot to the westward. All seamen and Marines were ordered to assemble at the head of the train. Some 140 non-commissioned officers and men of the Marine Battalion and a dozen naval ratings obeyed the order, though in the darkness it was difficult to estimate the numbers, and the small size of the force was not discovered until they had gone some distance from the train. Two sergeants returned to collect the stragglers, but they found the train empty; the remainder

¹ Ersatz-Abteilung of the 45th Field Artillery Regiment.

² The 7th Company of the 2nd Battalion, 1st Bavarian Landwehr Regiment, lost heavily in the attack on the train. ("Antwerpen," p. 86.)





HOLLAND

PLAN IV ANTWERP TO GHENT.

SKETCH MAP BASED ON MAP PREPARED BY
BELGIAN INSTITUTE OF MILITARY CARTOGRAPHY
AND USED IN THE SIEGE.

- ++++ RAILWAYS
- ROADS
- == RIVERS



of the British and Belgian troops in the train, a total of 2 officers, 900 British, and 400 Belgians had been captured by the enemy.¹

The party under Colonel Luard retired unmolested along the railway line to Selzaete, arriving there between 2 a.m. and 3 a.m. on the 10th; and shortly after daylight they entrained and left for Ostend.²

CHAPTER XI.

THE SUBMARINE DANGER IN THE CHANNEL: DIVERSION OF OVERSEAS TRANSPORTS.

57. Withdrawal of the Naval Division and Evacuation of Ostend, October 11-13.—The dispatch of the Antwerp Expedition, though it did not avail to save the city, postponed the inevitable capitulation until October 9.³ The Naval Division, after its retirement from the city, assembled at Ostend, where the troops re-embarked on the 11th and sailed after dark that evening for Dover, the naval and Marine ratings to return to their former camps at Deal.⁴ The 7th Division had just arrived at Ghent and the 3rd Cavalry Division was on its way; it had not yet been decided whether they would also be withdrawn from Belgium,

¹ "Antwerpen," p. 86. As far as can be ascertained the approximate numbers of the R.N.D. interned and captured during the Antwerp operations, were as follows. (General Paris' Dispatches, 11 October 1914 and 31 October 1914, and papers titled F.O. 21/10/14.)

	Strength.	Interned.	<i>Captured and</i> Killed.	Escaped.
1st Brigade ..	2,950	1,500	450	1,000
2nd „ ..	3,400	50	—	3,350
R.M. „ ..	2,200	50	400	1,750

The number of casualties is not known. The R.M. Brigade had the following casualties between their arrival at Antwerp and the withdrawal to the inner line of forts at 2 a.m. on the 7th: Killed, 1 officer, 6 men; wounded, 4 officers, 93 men. It is thought that the 2nd Brigade had no men killed. No proper nominal rolls of the men who embarked for Antwerp were available, owing to untrained staffs, which rendered it impossible at the time to ascertain the casualties in the two naval brigades.

² *References.* Proceedings of Court of Enquiry at Forton Barracks, 24 November 1914. Reports of Colonel Luard, Lieutenant-Colonel Lywood, Major French, Major Burge, Captain Stockley, Captain Syson, Captain Teague, Lieutenant Gowney, Company Sergeant-Major Dallison, Sergeant-Major Sutcliffe, Corporal Moore, Sub-Lieutenant I. Fraser, R.N.V.R.

³ This fact is not, however, specified in the letter of thanks addressed by the Belgian to the British Government after the capitulation. (See Appendix H.)

⁴ A 190. Transports *Honorius, Fremona, Belgravian, Minnesota*. They sailed at intervals of about an hour, commencing at 6 p.m. on the 11th. (See H.S. 67, p. 770.) The armoured trains under Comdr. Littlejohns remained on the Continent and co-operated with the Army in the retirement from Ghent and the subsequent fighting round Ypres.

but as a precautionary measure during the 11th and 12th transports were held in readiness with steam up at Ostend, Dunkirk, Dover, and the Thames, and the monitors *Severn*, *Humber*, and *Mersey* went into the Downs on the night 10th to 11th, ready to cross to Ostend at daylight to cover the re-embarkation, if necessary.¹ In the event, the 7th Division and 3rd Cavalry Division were not withdrawn, but remained in Flanders; and the services of the monitors which had crossed to Ostend were not required. Amongst the last vessels to leave Ostend on the morning of October 13 was one conveying the Belgian Government to Havre. The Admiralty intended that she should be escorted as far as Gris Nez by the three monitors, after which the latter were to return to Dover. The order arrived too late, however, and acting upon the latter part the *Severn* and *Humber* left for Dover, followed later by the *Mersey*, which was escorting some transports to Dunkirk.²

Orders for the evacuation of Zeebrugge transport base had gone out on the night October 10–11,³ and on the following day, since the Germans were advancing, General Rawlinson gave orders for the evacuation of Ostend. The Admiralty undertook the responsibility for transporting the stores, ammunition, and wounded of the Belgian Field Army. Guns, motor transport, and vehicles were sent by road to Dunkirk, and a large part of the victualling stores were sent inland to the troops. The various transports, to the number of 24, left during the 12th and the morning of the 13th, the transport staff proceeding to Dunkirk, where 11,000 Belgian recruits and reservists were awaiting transport to Cherbourg.⁴

58. New Dispositions of Harwich Flotillas, October 10.—

Further reports of submarines had come in from fishing boats off the Galloper, and there was every reason to believe that some enemy submarines were in the Channel. It was important to prevent these from returning home, and two destroyers of the Harwich flotillas fitted with the modified sweep were sent to sweep between Long Sand and the Galloper, and two between the East Goodwin and the Tail of the Falls.⁵ The arrangement by which the new "M" class destroyers were to join the Harwich Striking Force, as they became ready for service, had been cancelled on October 6, for Admiral Beatty was asking for a flotilla of 8 to 10 boats to screen his battle cruisers and so enable them to operate and exercise command from a central position in the North Sea whence any German raiders could be cut off on their return.⁶ It was decided, therefore, that the "M" boats should be sent north for this

¹ A 189.

² M. 02699/14. "Report of Proceedings of *Severn*, *Humber*, *Mersey*."

³ H.S. 67, p. 567.

⁴ Account by D.N.T.O. of Transport Work at Ostend. Titled Part T. 11100/1914.

⁵ Harwich Force Packs, Vol. IV, No. 36.

⁶ G.F.S.P., Vol. XXXVI, p. 466.

purpose.¹ One of them, the *Miranda*, was retained as second in command of the 3rd Flotilla, this duty in the 1st Flotilla being carried out by the *Faulknor*, after relief on October 13 as 3rd Flotilla cruiser, by the new light cruiser *Undaunted*.

The German naval force in the Ems had recently been augmented by the coast defence battleships *Aegir* and *Frithiof*, and the Admiralty had information that there were also stationed there 3 light cruisers, 15 destroyers, 5 submarines, 2 mine-layers, and 7 armed tugs.² It was thought that this force was destined for the Schelde on the fall of Antwerp, and after consultation the following dispositions were arranged by Commodore Keyes and Tyrwhitt.³ Two submarines kept watch off Terschelling by night and day for vessels proceeding to the westward and southward, reporting by wireless if the enemy succeeded in passing them. One of the two flotilla cruisers and four destroyers worked in W/T touch with these submarines and with the submarine patrol off the Ems, patrolling at not less than 15 knots 30 miles from Terschelling.⁴ Two divisions of destroyers guarded the Broad Fourteens by day, retiring to the parallel of 52° N after dark. One division watched the approaches to the Schelde, two boats patrolling six miles north-west of Schouwen Bank and two between Schouwen Bank and Browershaven Buoy.⁵ The *Firedrake*, which had relieved the *Lurcher* at Zeebrugge, returned to Harwich during the night of October 12–13, after the withdrawal of the naval division from Ostend.⁶ The French were maintaining their patrols to the westward of the Straits of Dover and on the line Cherbourg-Dunkirk.⁷

59. Change of Base of British Army, Loire to Seine, October 11.

—The effect of the submarine danger in the Channel, as manifested by the frequent reports of the sighting of submarines, was to cause considerable dislocation of the Admiralty transport arrangements, and particularly the diversion from Southampton to ports in the west of the transports bringing home troops from overseas

¹ M. 02374/14. "Attaching destroyers to 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron," and telegram Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief, H.F. 366, 6 October 1914. However, the arrangement was eventually cancelled.

² The *Aegir* and *Frithiof* were stationed in the Ems on September 20. It does not appear from G.O.H. that any other light cruiser was stationed there other than the *Arcona*.

³ H.S. 225, pp. 270–271, and Harwich Force Packs, Vol. IV, No. 36. Approval of the proposals was given by Tel. 121, Admiralty to Comm. (T), October 10. (A 186.)

⁴ Comm. (T's) report says "at least 30 miles north-west from Terschelling"; Comm. (S) says "out of sight of land, within 30 miles of Terschelling." In practice, however, the patrol appears usually to have been kept in the northern part of the Broad Fourteens, with resulting impairment of W/T communication with the submarines off the Ems.

⁵ These patrols were additional to the destroyers working with modified sweep between the Long Sand-Galloper and the E. Goodwins-Tail of the Falls.

⁶ A 194.

⁷ H.S. 67, p. 474.

for service in France. India at this date was sending two complete divisions and a cavalry division to reinforce the British Army in France; the British battalions, of which there was one to each Indian brigade, were being brought to England for brigading with the new divisions that were forming, but the Indian troops were landing at Marseilles, and were being railed up to the front. At home, another division, the VIIIth, was also being prepared for dispatch to France.¹ Thus before the end of October the strength of the British Expeditionary Force in France would be very considerably augmented. The northerly extension of the French and German forces during September had resulted in the British Army becoming embedded in the French line; and it was arranged by General Joffre that the British force should be moved from the Aisne and should return to its original place on the left of the French line. The move commenced on the night of October 1-2, and was completed on the 19th, the opening day of the First Battle of Ypres. The ports of St. Nazaire and Nantes, reserved though they were entirely for the British forces, were proving quite inadequate, and already during the latter half of September the Admiralty had been making use of Havre for the disembarkation of stores and supplies. The Germans had been brought to a standstill, and the evacuation of the Channel ports no longer seemed to be necessary. Within ten days of the establishment of the Loire bases the question of a return to the Seine had been mooted; but it was not until October 11 that it was decided to close the Loire bases and return once more to the Seine, using Havre as the main base, with Boulogne as a secondary base.² These ports were taken into use at once, though the evacuation of St. Nazaire did not commence immediately and was not complete until November 16, Nantes being cleared some five days later.³

60. Submarine Raids on the Channel, October 12-13. Overseas Transports diverted.—After the passage of General Rawlinson's relief force to Belgium and the withdrawal of the Naval Division on the fall of Antwerp there was for the time being a great diminution in the number of troop transports crossing the Channel, the traffic being confined mainly to store ships. Though the cross-Channel transports were little affected by the submarine danger, the case with regard to the overseas troop convoys was far otherwise. On October 12, while Admiral Wemyss with the Canadian convoy was off the Fastnet, the French reported the sighting of an enemy submarine at 2 p.m. off Cape Gris Nez. This was one of two boats which had been dispatched to the Channel on October 10 to attack the Canadian convoy, intelligence of the sailing of which had been received by the Admiralstab two days previously. The convoy had been reported in Germany on

¹ It began to arrive at Havre on November 6.

² A 192 and H.S. 62, pp. 575, 605, 804; 63, p. 511; 64, pp. 11, 117.

³ Report of Proceedings by P.N.T.O.

October 8 as leaving Quebec on October 2; and allowing 8 to 10 days for the passage, the Admiralstab expected it to be off Boulogne, the presumed port of disembarkation, on October 10 or 12.¹ *U.19* and *U.28*, which had been sent out to attack the transports of the Antwerp Expedition, were not expected to be able to remain out later than October 12, and consequently two more boats, *U.8* and *U.20*, were ordered to proceed to attack the Canadian convoy. The Fleet Command gave the order for the dispatch of these boats with considerable reluctance, for although the reports of *U.19* and *U.28* on the British mined area had not yet been received, the destruction of the s.s. *Ardmount* on October 5, three miles E by S½S from Wandelaar Light Vessel, whilst on passage from Dover to Zeebrugge, which was learnt by the Germans two days later, proved to them that the Admiralty announcement was no mere empty one.² But military headquarters were pressing for the interruption of the Canadian convoy; and the dispatch of *U.8* and *U.20* was consequently ordered.

It was the former of these two submarines which the French local patrol sighted off Gris Nez on October 12. On the previous day, whilst making for the Channel, *U.8*, steering down the Broad Fourteens for the Maas Lightship, encountered the destroyer patrol off the mouth of the Schelde, and at 11.42 p.m., half a mile south-east of Schouwen Light Vessel, the *Ferret* sighted her, 600 yards off. *U.8* had just fired a torpedo, but the destroyer had already put her helm hard over to ram, and the torpedo missed. The *Ferret* opened fire, but got off only one round, as her cartridge boxes were screwed up. *U.8* was not yet completely submerged, and as the destroyer passed over her the bow caught her periscope, carried away the magnifying lens, and rendered the periscope useless, a handicap which was the more severe since *U.8*'s spare periscope was not fitted with a magnifying lens.³ Nevertheless, her Commander, Lieutenant-Commander Stoss, continued his

¹ The information reported to the Admiralstab was that the convoy consisted of 24 transports escorted by eight warships (G.O.H. II, p. 153). This was substantially correct. The convoy numbered 32 transports and was escorted by Cruiser Force G (four ships) and by the *Glory* and *Lancaster* of Admiral Hornby's force, and it left Quebec on October 3. (See Monograph No. 22, "The Atlantic Ocean, 1914," Chapter IX.)

² G.O.H. II, p. 154, calls her the *Ardemonde*, but *Ardmount* is evidently meant. She was lost through disregarding the warning of the *Afridi* concerning the mined area. (M. 19917/14. See M Letter Book, No. 278, pp. 47-49.)

³ Harwich Force Packs 0037, Vol. IV, M (no number), and M. 02888/14. "Attack on *Ferret* by German submarine half mile from Schouwen Light-house, 12 October 1914," and G.O.H. II, p. 160. The extent of the damage caused to *U.8* was not known to us at the time. From examination of the *Ferret*'s bottom it seemed that she had struck something, but the *Ferret* believed that her first shot damaged the submarine's periscope, which seems very probable on the evidence. The *Ferret* suspected and reported Schouwen Light Vessel of giving information to *U.8*. (H.S. 67, p. 771.) This was not proved, but cf. A 245.

cruise, passing into the Channel on the night of October 11-12, close under the French and Belgian coasts, where he found all the lights burning as in peace time.¹

After the sighting of *U.8* off Gris Nez on the 12th, the French instituted a patrol from Cherbourg to within 15 miles of the Owers Light Vessel.² It seems, however, that the patrolling destroyers did not arrive in position until the 14th,³ and they were too late, therefore, to sight *U.20*, which cruised on the line Cherbourg to the Owers during the whole of October 13. Lieutenant-Commander Droscher had decided to take *U.20* into the Channel via the Outer Gabbard and Galloper light vessels. She was sighted off the latter at 2 p.m. on October 11 by the s.s. *Colchester*, but was thought at the time by the Admiralty to be one of our own boats, either *C.2* of the Thames Estuary Patrol, which was working from Harwich, or *D.8* which left on the afternoon of the 10th to patrol off Ameland.⁴ From the Galloper, Lieutenant-Commander Droscher steered for the eastern edge of the Goodwins, and he thus missed the British minefields. Passing through the Straits of Dover during the night of October 11-12, between Le Colbart and Gris Nez, *U.20* reached Cherbourg at 7.40 a.m. on October 13. She was sighted from the shore,⁵ but she almost immediately turned and proceeded across to Portsmouth, where she was sighted and attacked at 4.15 p.m. by T.B.116 of the Portsmouth Extended Defence, just off Culver Cliff at the east end of the Isle of Wight; but she escaped undamaged by diving.⁶ The proximity of an enemy submarine rendered Southampton dangerous of approach, and the Canadian convoy was directed into Plymouth Sound until the route to the Needles should have been cleared.⁷ It was a timely order, for after her encounter with T.B.116, *U.20* had gone west, and she crossed the track of the transports off Plymouth at 8 p.m. on the 14th, a few hours after they had safely entered harbour.

After a short refit of his ships at Devonport on return from escort duty, Admiral Wemyss took over the Western Patrol from Admiral Bethell on October 22, the *Euryalus* joining from duty with the Indian transports and hoisting his flag two days later, while the *Diana* was detached for escort duty with the convoys sailing to the Mediterranean. On October 31 Admiral Wemyss' flag was again transferred to the *Eclipse*. The 7th Battle Squadron was now broken up, the *Vengeance* going to the East Indies and the *Caesar*, *Prince George*, and *Majestic*, after refits of some length, being employed on various detached services. On October 24 Admiral Bethell hoisted his flag as President of the Royal Naval College, Greenwich.

¹ G.O.H. II, p. 161.

² A 195.

³ H.S. 68, p. 291.

⁴ H.S. 67, p. 752, and H.S. 225, p. 39. *U.20* reported that all the Thames estuary lights were burning, which materially aided her. But see note to Plan 2.

⁵ H.S. 68, p. 494.

⁶ A 198 and M. 03088/14, "Report of attack on enemy submarine."

⁷ A 199, 200. See Monograph No. 22, "Atlantic Ocean, 1914," Chapter IX.

The submarine situation in the Channel did not improve. The *Goshawk* had just reported that at 10.30 a.m. on October 12, while patrolling on the Broad Fourteens, she saw a torpedo in 52° 10' N, 4° 7' E which passed under her bottom, though she did not sight the submarine which fired the torpedo. The *Goshawk* was fitted with the modified sweep, but the depth of the water, 8 fathoms, was too shallow for its employment.¹ At 4 p.m. on the 13th, almost simultaneously with the appearance of *U.20* off the Isle of Wight, the monitors *Severn* and *Humber*, returning to Dover from Ostend, were attacked off East Dyck Bank (Dunkirk). The submarine which made this attack was *U.8*. After her encounter on the afternoon of the 12th with the French torpedo boat off Gris Nez, she apparently abandoned the hope of intercepting the Canadian convoy and steered through the Straits of Dover to a position between Middlekerke and Ruytingen, where she operated from the 13th to 15th on the southern edge of the British mined area.² It was here that she fell in with the *Severn* and *Humber*. About 3.45 p.m. on the 13th, in 51° 14' N, 2° 26' E, she sighted the two vessels, and took them to be French coast protection ships. The difficulties of navigation amongst the shoals prevented her from getting nearer than 1,800 metres, at which range she fired a torpedo, which apparently missed under one of the shallow draught monitors.³

In consequence of the continual reports of enemy submarines in the Channel it was decided that the transports of the Canadian convoy should not go on to Southampton but disembark their troops at Devonport.⁴ This was not the only convoy to be affected. Four transports were bringing the remainder of the Egyptian Army of occupation to England, escorted by the *Leviathan*, and a convoy of British battalions from India was also due to arrive in a week's time, under escort of the *Euryalus*, which with the *Bacchante* had made her first outward voyage in charge of the transports taking the Wessex Division, Territorial Force, from Southampton to India on the night of October 9-10. Both homeward bound convoys were diverted to Liverpool,⁵ a hazardous arrangement had the Admiralty but known it. For *U.20* had continued her westerly course after passing Plymouth. She rounded the Lizard about 11 p.m. on the 14th and set a course for Cape Clear. Dawn on the 15th found her in mid-St. George's Channel, but, fortunately, the Egyptian convoy

¹ The plans in G.O.H. II show no submarine. The *Goshawk's* report is numbered M. 02888/14, "Submarine attacks on *Ferret* and *Goshawk*." A copy is in Harwich Force Packs 0037, Vol. IV.

² See G.O.H. II, Karte 8. On October 20 the *Lapwing* picked up one of *U.8's* lifebuoys in the middle of the Straits.

³ G.O.H. II, p. 164. But from M. 02699/14, "Report of Proceedings of *Severn*, *Humber*, *Mersey*," it appears that the range was considerably less.

⁴ A 203.

⁵ See Monograph No. 21, "The Mediterranean, 1914-15," Sections 55 and 58.

was still 150 miles to the southward, and while Lieutenant-Commander Droscher proceeded steadily towards the Irish coast the *Leviathan* crossed his track 18 hours later and brought her convoy safely in to Liverpool.

Meanwhile, intelligence of the transport activity at Ostend caused by the withdrawal of the naval division had been reported by the German military aircraft, and at the instance of the General Staff *U.21* was sent out to operate against the transports. The dispatch of more than one boat was not considered advisable, for there was every expectation that submarine bases on the French coast would shortly become available; and Admiral von Ingenohl did not wish the number of his submarines to be reduced by losses before that should occur.

As a matter of fact *U.21* barely escaped destruction. Leaving Emden on the evening of October 14, she was off Schouwen Bank Light Vessel on the 16th, where at noon she ran into Commodore Tyrwhitt's destroyer patrol in a fog. She carried out an emergency dive and steered by submarine sound signal for the lightship; and about 2 p.m. she ran aground on Schouwen Bank. *U.21* got free, but the destroyer patrol kept her under, and she blundered from bank to bank, grounding continually and being in great danger owing to the shallowness of the water. Not until 5.20 p.m. did she finally get clear, and lay on the bottom at 30 metres. Going alongside Wielingen Light Vessel¹ on the 18th, Lieutenant-Commander Hersing learnt that Ostend was evacuated and that the German troops were probably already in occupation; and he tried to get into communication with the fleet by wireless via Norddeich to ask permission to use Ostend or Zeebrugge as a base for further operations. The carrying away of his aerial prevented him from obtaining communication, and he returned to Emden on the 20th without further incident.²

CHAPTER XII.

GERMAN SUBMARINE ATTACK ON SCAPA.—

SECOND WITHDRAWAL OF THE GRAND FLEET FROM THE NORTH SEA, OCTOBER 16.

61. Dispositions to cover the Canadian Convoy, October 3-14.—

It was not only in the Channel that the necessity had arisen of protecting the transports carrying out the great concentration of troops and men from overseas that was now taking place. The security of the transports on the high seas was the province of the Commanders-in-Chief of the various foreign stations and the flag officers commanding the Atlantic cruiser squadrons. To

¹ Off Zeebrugge. Wielingen and Wandelaar Light Vessels were abandoned by their crews on the following day, October 19. The former was occupied and relighted by the Germans on October 25.

² G.O.H. II, pp. 206 *et seq.*

protect the Canadian convoy, Admiral Wemyss had taken Cruiser Force G across the Atlantic in the middle of September, on relief on the Western Patrol by the 7th Battle Squadron. With the *Glory* and *Lancaster* of Admiral Hornby's squadron, the safety of the convoy whilst in those waters was assured; but the protection of the transports during the final and more dangerous stage of their passage necessitated special dispositions being made by the Grand Fleet.

Towards the end of September there had been a number of intelligence reports of German armed merchantmen in Northern European waters intending to escape into the Atlantic. At Bergen, the *Prinz Friedrich Wilhelm*, a fast large North German Lloyd liner, on the Admiralty list of vessels convertible into cruisers, and reported on September 27 as being about to attempt to escape,¹ was being watched by the Grand Fleet cruisers; another German merchantman, the *Brandenburg*, arrived from Philadelphia on August 31 at Trondhjem, and kept our patrols busy watching that port lest she should escape.² To stiffen Admiral Wemyss' escort of cruisers, the *Majestic* had been withdrawn from the Western Patrol and sent to meet the convoy in 30° W and bring it in. There was, however, at the Admiralty a further apprehension that the Germans intended to send out battle cruisers to attack the transports; and it was decided to detach one of the fastest battle cruisers from the Grand Fleet, minimising the risk entailed in weakening the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron by the preservation of such absolute secrecy that even the Canadian Government was not informed.³ The *Princess Royal* was chosen for the duty, and was detailed by Admiral Jellicoe on September 28 to coal at Scapa prior to proceeding to the rendezvous in 49° 30' N, 30° W. The Grand Fleet at the time was cruising on the line Kinnaird Head-Karmo in a northerly gale so strong that the destroyers could not face it; many of the ships lost their main aeriels, the *Hercules* and *Colossus* carried away their topmasts, and the *Vanguard's* steering gear became defective. Some anxiety was felt for the safety of submarines *E.1* and *E.5*, which had been reconnoitring in the Kattegat and Skagerrak preparatory to the dispatch of submarines to the Baltic. The *Drake*, with two light cruisers and two destroyers, was sent across to the Skagerrak to bring them in, supported by the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron; *E.5* was picked up but *E.1* was not encountered though she eventually made good her return to port unaided, after being compelled to take shelter inside the Skaw owing to a leak in her lubricating oil tank which became very serious when the vessel worked heavily in the gale.⁴

¹ For her subsequent movements, see I.D., Abstract of Information compiled by Section E 2: "Suspicious Ships," Vol. 7.

² See Monograph No. 19, "The 10th Cruiser Squadron I," Chapter II. The date of her arrival is given there as "early in September," but later information shows that she arrived at Trondhjem on August 31. (H.S. 72, p. 1055.)

³ A 93.

⁴ Report of *E.1* is in H.S. 225, p. 251.

The *Princess Royal* left Scapa at daylight on October 3. On the evening of the 2nd the Grand Fleet, which had come in to coal on September 29, left to take up a position to secure a close watch on the North Sea and ensure that no enemy vessels broke out during the passage of the Canadian convoy.¹ Cruiser Area No. 5 was patrolled by the 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons, the *Drake*,² and the *Edgars* of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, the ships patrolling north and south at the limit of visibility. Commodore Goodenough's light cruisers prolonged the line to the westward, patrolling east and west in line ahead in the northern part of Area 4. The cruisers were supported by the Dreadnought battlefleet in the centre to the northward of Area 5, with the 6th Battle Squadron to the eastward, off the Norwegian coast, and the 3rd Battle Squadron to the northward of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron. Admiral Beatty with the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron watched the Fair Island Channel from the westward, and the minesweepers patrolled to the eastward. Admiral Moore with the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron³ took under his orders the *Sappho* and the available minelayers and the armed merchant cruisers *Teutonic* and *Alsation*, of Admiral de Chair's force, and patrolled to the northward and eastward of the Shetlands. The Pentland Firth was closed to the passage of warships passing from east to west between October 3 and 8,⁴ and the "E" class destroyers, of which there were now 18 attached to the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet for the protection of his bases, patrolled the approaches. When the weather permitted, one of the two destroyer flotillas, 2nd and 4th, remained with the battlefleet.

62. **Attack on the "Antrim," October 9.**—It was, of course, out of the question that the sweeps of the Grand Fleet cruiser forces to the Skagerrak and off the coast of Norway to keep watch on potential German armed liners should have failed to come to the notice of the Admiralstab.⁵ The repeated reports of battle cruisers and light cruisers in the Skagerrak led to the inference that this was the cruising area⁶ of the First Fleet. The Second Fleet was believed to be between Scotland and the Norwegian coast, and the Third Fleet off the Straits of Dover or

¹ Operation Order No. 14. See Appendix F.


² The *King Alfred*, the other ship of the 6th Cruiser Squadron, was refitting at Portsmouth.


³ Cruiser Force K was known by this title from October 8.

⁴ Commander-in-Chief, H.F. to Senior Officer 2nd, 3rd, 6th, and 10th Cruiser Squadron, 1900, 1 October 1914.

⁵ On October 13 a new cruiser area, No. 8, was instituted. The southern base line joined the eastern corner of Area No. 6 ($58^{\circ} 58' N$, $1^{\circ} 43' E$) and Udsire Lighthouse. There was no definite northern limit. Ships working in this area and in Area No. 5 were ordered to keep out of sight of the Norwegian coast by day. (Memo. H.F. 004 of 1 August 1914, No. 234, 13 October 1914.) See Plan V.

⁶ Bereitschaftsstellung.





on the Dogger Bank.¹ Orders were given for air reconnaissances to confirm these assumptions, but for the time being the weather was too bad to permit of their being carried out.

Intelligence of the presence of *E.1* and *E.5* in the Kattegat reached the Admiralstab through agents on September 30; and four submarines, *U.5*, *U.6*, *U.12* and *U.16*, were at once dispatched to attack them. It was realised that the chance of intercepting them was but slender and, as a matter of fact, both the British boats were already on the way home. Heavy weather drove *U.6* back when but a few hours out, but the other three enemy submarines, as *E.1* had done some days previously, found shelter inside the Skaw; and there the Danish s.s. *Scott* sighted one of them on October 2 and duly warned the *Russell*, which was patrolling in Area 5.²

With the moderating of the gale, *U.12* and *U.16* proceeded across to the south coast of Norway. They sighted various units of the Grand Fleet, engaged in the operation to cover the Canadian convoy, but no opportunity occurred to attack. *U.12* on October 6 got within 2,500 yards of two of the cruisers patrolling off Skudesnaes, but was baffled by their zigzagging. About 11.30 a.m. on October 9, off Udsire, *U.16*³ sighted a four-funnelled cruiser zigzagging on a southerly course, and proceeded to try to reach a position to attack her. The cruiser was the *Antrim*. At 3 p.m., when off Karmo, she zigzagged three or four points to starboard, and while steadying on the new course sighted *U.16* on the starboard bow, about half a mile off. Hearing the alarm, Commander John A. Webster, M.V.O., the navigating officer, came up on to the compass platform and at once put the helm hard a-port and reversed the starboard engine full speed. *U.16* had just fired two torpedoes at 2 seconds' interval, and to the watchers in both the cruiser and the enemy submarine it seemed as if they must inevitably hit. But the effect of the helm and propeller just sufficed to withhold the *Antrim* from the line of fire until the torpedoes had crossed her bow.⁴ An attempt to ram the submarine barely failed.⁵

During the attack, a small vessel had been blowing off steam about three miles off, and was suspected by the *Antrim* of complicity. This was by no means the first occasion on which a suspicious vessel had been seen in the immediate neighbourhood during an attack by a submarine, though, in the circumstances, it was never possible to carry out an examination.⁶ After dark there

¹ G.O.H. II, p. 168.

² H.S. 66, p. 124.

³ Lieutenant-Commander Hansen.

⁴ Commander Webster was promoted to Captain for his action in saving the *Antrim*.

⁵ M. 03190/14. "3rd Cruiser Squadron, Return of encounters with enemy submarines," and papers titled X 4008/1914, "H.M.S. *Antrim*, Report of attack by submarine."

⁶ There is no evidence that the German submarines in distant waters worked in organised conjunction with surface craft.

was another report of a submarine being sighted. This was incorrect, for although *U.12* also was working close by, and indeed had sighted and attempted to attack the *Antrim* during the afternoon, neither *U.12* nor *U.16* sighted her again after dark. It led, however, to the issue of an order that, in dangerous waters, ships cruising at a less speed than 14 knots were to make an alteration of course just after dark, in case they should have been sighted during daylight and followed.¹

The *Alsatian*, on the Northern Patrol, thought she saw a submarine on October 9 in 61° 42' N, 0° 50' W. What was seen cannot have been a submarine, for neither *U.12* nor *U.16* had worked so far northward. *U.12* developed defects in her dynamo while re-charging her batteries on October 9 off Stavanger, and returned to Heligoland two days later.

The belief which had been held during the first half of August, that submarine bases existed off the coast of Norway, received fresh impetus through the attack on the *Antrim*, and on October 10 a search of the islands near Udsire was carried out by the *Liverpool* and half the 4th Destroyer Flotilla, supported by the 3rd Cruiser Squadron; once again no evidence was discovered to substantiate the belief.


But though there was no base near Udsire, *U.16* remained close to the post where she had attacked the *Antrim*. She sighted three cruisers on the 10th, doubtless the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, but was unable to attack. Admiral Pakenham's squadron left the Norwegian coast that afternoon for Cromarty to coal; and after cruising for a further 48 hours in vain, Lieutenant-Commander Hansen was obliged by shortage of oil to return to Heligoland, where he arrived on the 15th with three tons of oil, one day's provisions, and two days' water remaining.²

63. Sinking of the "Hawke," October 15.—While *U.12* and *U.16* were still at sea the Admiralstab was led by intelligence from merchant shipping circles to the inference that the British First Fleet, or part of it, was using Scapa Flow as its base, while the presence of ships to the westward of the Orkneys was also reported. In view of this intelligence they issued orders for *U.9* and *U.18* to attack the fleet, the former operating to the eastward of the Orkneys and the latter to the westward. The two submarines were to operate at a distance of 60 to 100 miles off the islands, as it was thought the British ships probably made their entry and departure at night only. They left Heligoland at dawn on October 13, but *U.18* almost immediately developed a hot bearing and returned to harbour, her place being taken by *U.17*.

¹ Memo. H.F. 004 of 1 August 1914. No. 267, 19 October 1914.

² G.O.H. II, pp. 172 *et seq.*

Steering direct for the Pentland Firth, *U.9*,¹ on October 15, sank the *Hawke* in Area 6, while *U.17*,² 30 miles to the northward of her, unsuccessfully attacked the *Theseus* of the same squadron.³ The lights of the Pentland Firth were sighted by Lieutenant-Commander Weddigen at 1 a.m. on the 16th, but after closing the Pentland Skerries he steered out to sea about midday to re-charge his batteries. The destroyers *Lyra*, *Nymphe*, *Nemesis*, and *Alarm*, of the 2nd Flotilla, were patrolling off the eastern approaches to the Pentland in line abreast to starboard, 5 cables apart, steering N 43° E at 13 knots in a glassy calm. At 1.15 p.m. the *Lyra* made a signal to alter course to S 63° W. The *Nymphe*, the next boat to the *Lyra*, had just put her helm over and increased to 15 knots when the officer of the watch sighted *U.9*'s periscope 300 yards off, about three points on the port bow. Lieutenant-Commander Weddigen, coming down from the northward on an opposite course to the destroyers, was steering to place himself between the *Lyra* and *Nymphe*, the western wing boats, with



the intention of torpedoing them simultaneously with a stern and bow shot respectively.⁴ He fired his bow torpedo at the *Nymphe* just as the destroyer sighted him and increased her 20° of starboard helm to full helm. The torpedo missed the *Nymphe*'s stem by some 2 ft. only, and ran along her starboard side as she

¹ Lieutenant-Commander Weddigen.

² Lieutenant-Commander von Hennig.

³ For details of these attacks, see Monograph No. 19, "10th Cruiser Squadron I."

⁴ G.O.H. II, pp. 180 *et seq.*

turned under full helm; continuing its course, it crossed 200 yards ahead of the *Nemesis* and passed on towards the *Alarm*, the starboard wing boat. The latter, on sighting the submarine flag hoisted by the *Nymphe* and seeing her open fire, put her helm hard a-starboard, and she too evaded the torpedo; according to her commanding officer it ran down his starboard side not more than 10 yards distant, so that he had to go hard a-port to prevent his stern from swinging on to it.¹ The *Nymphe*, immediately she was clear of the track of the torpedo, steered for the wake of the submarine in order to ram her. *U.9* was already submerging, but her escape from the *Nymphe* was so narrow that the wash from the propellers was plainly seen on board as the destroyer's stern passed over her.² The destroyers remained in the neighbourhood searching until dark, but, warned by the noise of their propellers, *U.9* forbore to break surface. Unfortunately, none of the four boats carried any form of depth charge.³

64. **Change of Base of Grand Fleet, October 16.**—It was apparent now that strenuous endeavours were being made by German submarines to attack the Grand Fleet.⁴ In addition to the attack on the *Antrim* on October 9, an enemy submarine was reported on the same day by the *Alsatian* on the Shetlands Patrol, and on the following day one was reported three miles south-south-west of Elieness, entering the Firth of Forth.⁵ There were further reports of submarines off the Firth of Forth on the 13th and 14th and in 59° 36' N, 2° 35' E on the 15th.⁶ Loch Ewe, which was unprovided with submarine obstructions, was thought to be no longer a safe anchorage, for at 5.30 a.m. on October 6 the repair ship *Assistance* believed she sighted one in the harbour; and so well founded did the report seem to be that Admiral Jellicoe abandoned Loch Ewe and shifted to Scapa all the colliers, store and ammunition ships.⁷ Less than a fortnight later Scapa Flow also came under suspicion. The submarine obstructions were still incomplete, and about 4 p.m. on the 16th Switha Battery reported a submarine entering the harbour, between Cantick Head and Switha. The report was not confirmed, nor in fact was it correct, for *U.9*, which arrived off the Pentland Skerries at 1 a.m. on the 16th, made no attempt to enter Scapa Flow, but steered out to sea to charge her batteries. But suspicious signalling was seen on shore, and the belief that the base was unsafe was strengthened on the following day, when a German submarine was reported inside the Flow, the *Swift* stating that

¹ The reports of *Nymphe* and *Alarm* are in X 4008/1914: "H.M.S. *Antrim*, report of attack by submarine."

² It was thought, from the damage which the *Nymphe's* propeller blades sustained, that she had struck *U.9*, but there is no mention of it in G.O.H.

³ X 4008/1914. Admiral Jellicoe's covering letter to M. 03007/14.

⁴ G.F.N., October 16-17.

⁵ Both reports were erroneous.

⁶ H.S. 68, pp. 82, 362, 579, 614. All these reports were false.

⁷ A 166, 171. The report was erroneous.

inside the harbour she had seen the conning tower of a submarine which fired a torpedo at her. Active search by destroyers failed to discover any submarines, but although Admiral Jellicoe himself did not believe that they had actually penetrated into the Flow, still, it was impossible any longer to regard either Scapa or Loch Ewe as safe bases. Despite the disorganisation of fuelling and storing arrangements which would be entailed, the Commander-in-Chief was faced with no other alternative than to seek other temporary bases until the completion of the submarine obstructions at Scapa and Loch Ewe, which were being pushed forward with all possible speed. The main base chosen by him was Lough Swilly, with Loch na Keal in the Island of Mull for the ships for which berthing space could not be found at Lough Swilly. "Both ports possessed comparatively narrow entrances, and at Lough Swilly the water was so shallow as to make it difficult for a submarine to enter submerged. It was also a 'defended port,' and therefore possessed an organisation which would be useful for regulating the entry of ships.¹" On the east coast of Scotland Cromarty was now considered secure against the entry of submarines, and the *Bonaventure* and her six submarines of the hunting flotilla were sent back once more to the Humber, arriving there on October 20.²

The ships at Scapa³ left after dark on the 16th, and the *Assistance* changed her anchorage for Loch na Keal, whither the *Illustrious*, guardship at Loch Ewe, also proceeded.⁴ The 2nd Cruiser Squadron at this time was working in Area No. 8. Having completed his patrol on the 16th, Admiral Gough-Calthorpe was steering for Scapa when the submarine alarm occurred in the Flow, and the Commander-in-Chief ordered him to take his squadron to Broadford Bay, in the Isle of Skye, altering this later to Lough Swilly. At 10 p.m. on the 16th the squadron passed through the Hole, the passage between Fair Island and Shetland, being missed in the dark by *U.9*, which arrived off the east side of Fair Island at 7 p.m. to spend the night there.⁵ The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, and two divisions of the 2nd Flotilla, had been carrying out a sweep from the Long Forties to the Dogger Bank on the 13th in order to search some of the trawlers under neutral colours which were suspected of working in conjunction with German submarines, followed on the 14th and 15th by a sweep up the Norwegian coast and a patrol of the northabout route from the Shetlands to the Skagerrak.⁶ *U.18*, which was ready again for service on October 14,

¹ Admiral Jellicoe, "The Grand Fleet, 1914-16," p. 145.

² A 213.

³ *Iron Duke, King Edward VII, Dominion, Invincible, Inflexible, Naiad, Thetis.*

⁴ The *Illustrious* had left Loch Ewe on the 14th for Lerwick with two 60 ft. targets, after which she was to have proceeded to Scapa to make good a hydraulic defect.

⁵ See Plan VI.

⁶ H.F. 0022/17 of 12 October 1914, in G.F.N. of date.

had been dispatched to this area on the following day, when intelligence had come in from Bergen that several British warships were off the coast between Kristiansand and Stavanger. The intelligence probably referred to the cruiser squadrons which had been covering the passage of the Canadian convoy, and it was out of date, for the convoy had now arrived at Plymouth and the Grand Fleet returned to Scapa on October 12; and though *U.18* went on to the 61st parallel, where she arrived on the 19th, and thence across to Muckle Flugga, she was too late to intercept the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, which completed their patrol of Area 8 and left the area on the 16th.


65. "*U.20*" sights the Grand Fleet off the Hebrides, October 17.—Had Admiral Jellicoe but known it, in moving his base from Scapa to Lough Swilly and Loch na Keal he was only exchanging one danger for another. While *U.9* was operating on the east side of the Orkneys as far north as Sumburgh Head at the southern extremity of the Shetlands, *U.20*, which, though she did not know it, had just missed the Canadian and Egyptian convoys, was now working up the west coast of Ireland and the Hebrides. At noon on the 16th, off Achill Head, she set a steady course at about 10 knots to pass between the Flannan Islands and the Hebrides.¹

The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron had completed their patrol of Area No. 8 and were coming south to the new Grand Fleet bases. Commodore Goodenough was bound for Lough Swilly, and took the route via the Minches, as did also Admiral Gough-Calthorpe with the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, who was about an hour and a half ahead of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and bound for the same base. The battle cruisers, however, were bound for Loch na Keal and were taking the route to the westward of the Hebrides. At 9 a.m. on the 17th Admiral Beatty was passing North Uist, just as *U.20*, steering on the opposite course, reached the same point. At what distance *U.20* passed the battle cruisers is uncertain, but she failed to sight them, and Lieutenant-Commander Droscher continued on his way.² About 1 p.m. on the 17th, *U.20* was off East Loch Roag, where the *Iron Duke* came in to anchor two days later.

The 2nd Battle Squadron had been patrolling to the north-eastward of Muckle Flugga. At 9 p.m. on the 16th the Commander-in-Chief ordered them to Loch na Keal, passing west of the Hebrides, and Admiral Warrender collected his ships and steered for the new base. At 5.45 p.m. on the 17th, in a lift of the rain squalls, *U.20* off the Butt of Lewis sighted in the dusk four


¹ See G.O.H. II, Karte 10.

² G.O.H. II, Karte 10, shows *U.20* passing within a mile of the track of the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron (as worked out from *Lion's* log), but the scale of the German plan is very small.



PLAN VI
WITHDRAWAL OF THE GRAND FLEET
 FROM THE
NORTH SEA
 17th. October 1914.

- TRACKS.
- 2nd. B.S. ————— } Based on logs of ships concerned
 - 1st B.C.S. - - - - - }
 - 2nd. C.S. - - - - - }
 - 1st. L.C.S. ········ }
 - "U 20" ————— } Based on G.O.H. II.
 - "U 9" - - - - - }
 - "U 17" - - - - - }



large ships without destroyer escort, 8,000 yards on her port beam. They were part of the 2nd Battle Squadron,¹ but *U.20* had seen them too late to attack.

Admiral Warrender arrived at Loch na Keal at 8 a.m. on the 18th and found the battle cruisers already anchored there, whilst the *Princess Royal* rejoined during the day from escorting the Canadian convoy. The Admiral without delay set about improvising submarine obstructions at the entrance to the harbour, whilst the same precaution was taken at Lough Swilly, where the *Iron Duke* and the remainder of the Dreadnought battlefleet arrived on the morning of the 22nd.

Though the presence of *U.20* to the westward of the Hebrides was unsuspected, there was a report on the morning of October 18 that two submarines had been sighted in the Minches. The report was false, a conclusion to which Admiral Jellicoe afterwards came, for *U.20* steered direct from the Butt of Lewis to the Fair Island Passage, through which she passed during the early morning of the 18th, just as the report was coming in of two submarines off Stornoway, 150 miles to the southward of her.

Ignorant of the fact that the Grand Fleet was cruising to the north-westward of her, *U.20* continued her voyage to Heligoland, where she arrived on October 20 without further incident.

66. Cruiser Patrols withdrawn further to the Northward.—

The danger from submarines rendered it necessary to withdraw the cruiser blockade and look-out patrol further to the northward while the fine weather favourable to submarine operations continued.² In place of occupying the former cruiser areas, two fresh lines were formed, the cruisers patrolling to the northward of the Shetlands, while the heavy ships cruised in the area north-westward of the Hebrides. "The organisation was such that it was probable that vessels attempting to evade the blockade would pass one of the two lines during daylight hours."³ Frequent cruiser sweeps of the North Sea as before were to be combined with this new organisation. On October 20 the yacht *Lorna* and six trawlers were sent north from Lowestoft to assist the Commander-in-Chief in searching for submarines off Scapa. In order to render enemy operations more difficult the British Meteorological Office, on October 21, ceased to make public its daily report, and the French were asked to discontinue theirs also.⁴

¹ *Orion's* log has: 4.25 p.m., sighted Rona I. on starboard bow; 5 p.m., formed single line ahead; 5.32 p.m., *Conqueror* left squadron for Devonport. Visibility 7 miles; 6 p.m., sighted Butt of Lewis S 29° W. Weather, 4 p.m., o.c.p.q., wind, 5-7. 6 p.m., o.c.q., wind 4-5. The squadron was steaming at 17 knots.

² A 216.

³ Admiral Jellicoe, *op. cit.*, page 146. The detailed organisation is set out in Monograph No. 19, "10th Cruiser Squadron I," Section 14.

⁴ A 281.

Admiral Jellicoe had grave suspicions that a German submarine base existed in the Hebrides or Skye. Cruisers and destroyers could not be used for searching the Minches and Pentlands, but a search of the bays and inlets was carried out by trawlers, and the military authorities conducted a search on shore. Though neither search produced any evidence in support of the Commander-in-Chief's suspicions, the danger still remained. On his representations all Germans, whether naturalised or not, were removed from the vicinity of the Grand Fleet bases, and on October 26 the military authorities established a post and telegraph censorship over the north of Scotland and Ireland, to prevent leakage of information upon which the enemy submarines might act.¹

Ever since the declaration of war the Grand Fleet Cruiser Squadrons, as envisaged by the War Plans, had been short of one of their number, namely the 6th Cruiser Squadron. This squadron was represented by a single ship, the *Drake*, for the *King Alfred* had joined Admiral de Chair on September 6, though she had to be sent south on the 24th for a long refit and was eventually paid off on October 16. Now, however, even the *Drake* was away, having been detached on October 11 with the armed merchant cruiser *Mantua* of Admiral de Chair's force, to fetch gold from Archangel, from which mission the two ships did not return until October 28.²

The order issued after the loss of the three *Cressys*, prohibiting armoured vessels from stopping to examine merchantmen, necessitated a large number of vessels suitable for boarding purposes being attached to the Grand Fleet. The high speed and coal endurance of the armed merchant cruisers rendered them peculiarly adapted for examining merchant vessels. On October 16 Admiral Jellicoe asked for 12 merchantmen or ocean-going tugs with adequate boats, and steps were taken to send him some vessels of a type suitable for the work.³

The available cruisers with the Grand Fleet had been still further reduced by the withdrawal of the minelayers *Naiad* and *Thetis*, required for reinforcing the Southwold minefield.⁴ They left Scapa for Sheerness on the night October 16-17, when the harbour was evacuated on the report that an enemy submarine had entered. One vessel of the class, however, the *Sappho*, was not fitted as a minelayer. She remained with the Grand Fleet and in the new scheme patrolled with the minesweeping gunboats between Sule Skerry and the north of the Orkneys. At 9 a.m. on October 20, off the western Shetlands, *U.18* sighted a cruiser which Lieutenant-Commander von Hennig identified as being of the *Apollo* class. The Admiralstab were aware that these

¹ A 246, 250, 253, 274, 283, 293, 294, 307.

² A 127, 131.

³ The vessels were classified as armed boarding vessels.

⁴ A 212.

cruisers were fitted for minelaying, but they did not know that Admiral Jellicoe was employing them as cruisers, and the incident strengthened the belief, previously current, that the waters between the Orkneys and Shetlands were mined.¹ Thick and heavy weather now drove *U.18* into more open water to the northward of the Shetlands. At dusk on October 21 she sighted one of the patrolling cruisers of the 10th Cruiser Squadron but could not get near to attack. The weather was now so bad that Lieutenant-Commander von Hennig decided to make for home, though it was not until October 28 that he at length reached Heligoland.

Unaware of the abandonment of Scapa and the withdrawal of the cruiser patrols further to the northward, *U.9*, after spending the night of October 16-17 off Fair Island, had worked her way to the old Stavanger-Kinnaird Head line, where she cruised from the 18th to 21st until compelled by shortage of oil to return home empty handed.

67. Sinking of the "Glitra," October 20.—The third of the three German submarines dispatched to the northward, namely, *U.17*, after her unsuccessful attack on the *Theseus* on October 15, was compelled, through a defective compass, to return home. Steering down the Norwegian coast on October 20, fourteen miles off Stavanger, her commander, Lieutenant Feldkirchner, sighted the British steamer *Glitra*, of Leith, 526 tons, from Grangemouth to Stavanger with 1,000 tons of coal, coke, oil, and general goods.

The question of the disposal of an enemy merchantman captured by a submarine was one which had never yet arisen. Both the British and the German Naval Prize Regulations gave to commanding officers of warships considerable latitude in the matter of destroying enemy merchantmen. The principal deterrent appeared from the British Naval Prize Manual to be the fact "that the owners of neutral goods, other than contraband, on board enemy ships are entitled to compensation, and that, in cases where such ships are destroyed without good cause, the liability for such compensations may be cast upon the naval officer."² The German regulations, however, permitted the destruction of an enemy merchantman "if it seems inexpedient or unsafe to bring her in,"³ and Lieutenant Feldkirchner determined to be the first submarine commander to take advantage of the latitude of this clause. Giving the crew of the *Glitra* ten minutes to abandon ship, he sank the steamer, after an undignified exhibition of hatred for the British flag. The *Glitra's* boats were towed for a short distance by the submarine and were picked up by a pilot boat and handed over to a Norwegian torpedo boat, which brought them into Skudesnaes.⁴

¹ G.O.H. II, p. 187.

² Article 76.

³ Article 112.

⁴ M. 18553/14 and G.O.H. II, p. 188.

CHAPTER XIII.

OPERATIONS CONNECTED WITH THE BELGIAN COAST
DURING THE LATTER HALF OF OCTOBER.**68. Dover Patrol constituted a Separate Command, October 11.**

—With the fall of Antwerp and the impossibility of preventing the Germans from reaching the coast, the Admiralty foresaw that naval operations on the Belgian coast would shortly become an important part of the work of the Dover Patrol. Already during the past fortnight the work of the Admiral of Patrols and his staff had increased very considerably, with the laying of the minefield guarding the Straits of Dover, the transport of the Antwerp Expedition, and the arrival of masses of Belgian refugees at Dover and the south coast ports. The Admiralty decided to create a separate command to control the work of the Dover Patrol, including the naval base at Dover and the Downs Boarding Flotilla. On October 11 the command of the Dover Patrol was transferred to Rear-Admiral the Hon. H. L. A. Hood, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.¹ Admiral Hood hoisted his flag at Dover two days later; and Rear-Admiral Ballard moved his headquarters to the Humber, his command now extending only from the Naze to St. Abb's Head. His forces consisted of the 6th and 7th Submarine Flotillas and the 7th and 9th Destroyer Flotillas, whilst the formation of a further flotilla, the 10th, consisting of a division of destroyers and a large number of trawlers with the modified sweep, for local patrol purposes, was foreshadowed.²

At Admiral Ballard's suggestion the submarine patrol flotillas were removed from his command on October 29 and he remained in charge only of such submarines as were stationed within the limits of his command. These consisted at present of the 10th Submarine Flotilla³ in the Tyne and the 5th Flotilla⁴ in the Humber. With the exception of the Overseas Flotilla, consisting of 21 boats, all submarines were now placed under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief or Senior Naval Officer at their bases. Commodore Keyes, in addition to commanding the 8th Flotilla, remained responsible for the maintenance of all submarines.⁵

Admiral Hood's force consisted of the 6th Flotilla (24 boats) with its attached light cruisers *Attentive* (Captain (D)),⁶ *Adventure*, *Foresight* and *Sapphire*; the 3rd and 4th Submarine Flotillas (3B, 10C boats and S.I.); the Downs Boarding Flotilla; and

¹ A 191. His title was Rear-Admiral Commanding the Dover Patrol and Senior Naval Officer, Dover; short title Rear-Admiral, Dover Patrol. At the time of his appointment he was Naval Secretary to the First Lord.

² M. 02603/14, "Dover and East Coast being made separate commands."

³ C. 19-21.

⁴ C. 7-10, C. 12, 13.

⁵ M. 02722/14, "Submarine Service—Relations with A.O.P."

⁶ Captain Charles D. Johnson, M.V.O.

auxiliary patrol and other vessels at Dover. The limits of his command were eventually fixed as a line joining Dungeness and Cape Alprech in the west, and in the east from the North Foreland to the position of Ruytingen Light Vessel, thence south (true) to the French coast.¹

The laying of the British minefield off the Straits of Dover had rendered desirable some revision of the system of patrol of the Straits. On October 5, before relinquishing the command of the 6th Flotilla, Admiral Ballard had proposed a new scheme. This depended upon the fitting of a large number of destroyers with the modified sweep, and, moreover, the line suggested, South Goodwin to Varne, was difficult to maintain owing to the cross tide; and Admiral Hood had not adopted the scheme. He did, however, effect some revision in the system of patrol within a few days of taking over the Dover command.²

69. British Warships sent to the Belgian Coast, October 17.—

A further reason necessitating some alteration in the system of patrol of the Straits was the shortage of destroyers caused by the operations now being undertaken on the Belgian coast. By October 15 the Allies succeeded in establishing their line to the sea. The Germans reached the coast at Zeebrugge and Ostend on this day, their front being some five miles west of Ostend. The French front was solid as far north as La Bassée, and the Belgian Army was now entrenched along the Yser Canal from Dixmude to Boesinge, a position from which the Germans were never, during the war, able to dislodge them. Their strength was some 82,000 men (48,000 bayonets), but they were weak in artillery. On the French left the British 7th Division and 3rd Cavalry Division was entrenching before Ypres, on the line Zandvoorde-Gheluvelt-Zonnebeke, and the British Army was coming up from the Aisne to prolong the line as far as the Belgian right, the gap being held meanwhile by French Territorials and Cavalry.³ Zeebrugge had been abandoned intact to the enemy, though the waters outside had been mined.⁴ The operation was carried out on October 16 by the French minelayer *Pluton*, a more suitable vessel than the British minelayers on account of her shallow draught.⁵ On the night of October 21-22 the *Pluton*

¹ M. 04314/14, "Limits of Dover Patrol."

² See "Patrol Flotillas," Sections 34-36.

³ This summary is based on Edmonds, "Military Operations," and "L'Action de l'Armée Belge." Rapport du Commandement de l'Armée. (London: The City Press, 1915.)

⁴ Corbett states (Naval Operations, Vol. I, pp. 214-15) that the Admiralty wished to render the port useless as a German submarine base, but left it intact on the representations of the War Office that it would be required as a port of re-entry when we had forced the Germans back from the sea.

⁵ A 197, 204, 205, 211, and "History of British Minefields," p. 96. The mines were doubtless swept by the Germans with little delay.

and a second French minelayer, the *Cerbère*, each laid a minefield off Ostend without interference by the enemy in occupation of the place.¹

The Germans were now preparing a great offensive movement against the Allied front between La Bassée and Dunkirk. On October 16 they attacked Dixmude and the battle of the Yser began. On the previous evening the Belgian Commander-in-Chief had asked for the co-operation of British warships on the flank of his line between Dixmude and Nieuport, and the request was repeated by General Joffre next day.² At 8.45 p.m. the Admiralty sent out orders to Admiral Hood to dispatch the three monitors to Dunkirk that night, screened by destroyers. A strong easterly wind was blowing, and the monitors were unable to sail. Admiral Hood was unaware of the extreme urgency of sending immediate support to the Belgian left, but the facts were explained to him by the Admiralty on the morning of the 17th, and during the early afternoon he took over the *Attentive* with the *Foresight* and several destroyers, followed later by the three monitors.³

To aid in the defence of Dunkirk on the land side the Admiralty decided to hold two battleships in readiness at Dover.⁴ The *Queen* and *Implacable* of the Channel Fleet were detailed for the service; leaving Portland at 8.30 p.m. on the 17th, escorted by four torpedo boats of the local defence,⁵ they arrived at Dover during the forenoon of the 18th. During the afternoon of the 17th we fought a successful destroyer action in the Broad Fourteens and the Admiralty fully expected that the Germans would follow up their raid by one in greater force. In less than 24 hours indications that something of the sort was in progress came to hand, and the Admiralty decided to retain the two battleships for the support of the Harwich flotillas.⁶ The *Irresistible* and *Venerable* were detailed in their stead for the defence of Dunkirk, and sailed from Portland for Dover the same evening.⁷

The French were sending four modern destroyers⁸ carrying 4 in. guns and the torpedo vessel *Dunois*,⁹ and the Admiralty suggested that they should also send coast defence ships, to aid the defence on the Belgian coast. The French had no coast defence vessels available, but they offered to send the *Kléber*

¹ The positions of these minefields will be found in H.S. Monograph, "Home Waters III" (in preparation).

² A 210, 214.

³ A 215, 218, 221 and H.S. 68, pp. 1018, 1069.

⁴ A 224, 227, 230. It is not thought that the Admiralty meant to imply that the French military authorities had specifically asked for battleships, though Corbett, Vol. I, p. 219, holds the contrary view.

⁵ The T.B.s were, however, unable to keep up, although the battleships reduced to 12 knots.

⁶ A 226.

⁷ A 236. The operations on the Belgian coast are dealt with in Monograph No. 18, "The Dover Command," Vol. I.

⁸ *Aventurier*, *Francis Garnier*, *Capitaine Mehl*, *Intrépide*. (See A 229.)

⁹ *Dunois*, six 9 pr., six 3 pr.

and *Desaix* of the Western Channel Patrol.¹ An arrangement had recently been made that Admiral Rouyer should maintain six cruisers on the Channel Patrol and three on the Western Patrol.² This arrangement was apparently the outcome of the difficulty which Admiral Bethell had experienced in maintaining the Western Patrol owing to the withdrawal of French cruisers to guard their transports in the Channel.³ The Admiralty had no wish to have it upset, and they diplomatically, but hastily, requested the Ministry of Marine not to withdraw the *Kléber* and *Desaix* from their present duty.⁴

70. **Action in the Broad Fourteens, October 17.**⁵—The service for which the *Queen* and *Implacable* had been diverted from the Belgian coast was the support of Commodore Tyrwhitt in the Hoofden, where there were indications of German operations in some strength. For nearly a month the lack of armoured ship support for the striking force at Harwich had not made itself felt. But at the first rumour of German movements the unprotected state of the Hoofden was brought urgently to the fore. It was in an attempt to remedy this that the Admiralty had considered the transfer of the Channel Fleet from Portland to Sheerness at the end of September, and they now gave orders for the anti-submarine defences of the Medway port to be completed irrespective of cost.⁶

On October 16, intelligence reached Admiral von Ingenohl of the occupation of Ostend and Bruges by German troops. New harbours of refuge thus became available for any German destroyers which, while operating in the Hoofden, might be cut off from the Heligoland Bight; and the Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet at once decided to carry out a minelaying operation originally planned on October 11. Four destroyers of the 4th Flotilla were to mine the Downs under cover of darkness, or if they should not succeed in reaching the Downs they were to lay their mines in the mouth of the Thames or some other point off the English coast.⁷ The object of the minefield was to destroy the mercantile traffic in the Downs and Thames, the interruption of which the Command believed would entail the most serious consequences in London. It was further hoped that the minefield might succeed in damaging the monitors supporting the Belgian

¹ A 227, 232. The *Furieux*, *Bowines*, *Carnot* and *Charles-Martel* were out of commission, the two former without guns. The only available vessel of the class was the *Requin*, coast defence ship at Bizerta. (H.S. 69, p. 161.)

² A 208. On October 16, the ships on patrol were as follows:—Channel Patrol: *Desaix*, *Kléber*, *Guichen*, *Chateaurenault*, and light cruisers *D'Estrées*, *Lavoisier*, *Surcouf*. Ushant-Finisterre Patrol: *Dupetit Thouars*, *Marseillaise* (night October 16-17), *Gloire* (October 18), destroyer *Baliste*, and one division of T.B.s from Brest. (H.S. 68, p. 1169.)

³ A 197a.

⁴ A 238.

⁵ The date given in Captain (D) (3)'s report is an error.

⁶ H.S. 69, pp. 635, 1368.

⁷ G.O.H. II, pp. 191 *et seq.*

left wing during their passage to and from Harwich, which was believed to be their base, for submarines had failed up to date to achieve any success against them. The 7th Half-Flotilla, consisting of S.119 (leader), 115, 117, and 118, under Korvettenkapitän Thiele, was detailed for the operation. These boats were the oldest and slowest in the High Sea flotillas, and had been chosen as the least valuable if they were lost; indeed, the undertaking was regarded as so entirely desperate that any man who wished was given the choice of leaving his ship before sailing. All secret instruments and other matter were discharged to the *Arcona* at Borkum, and in the early morning of October 17, carrying 12 mines apiece, the four boats left the Ems.

It was to report such enterprises as this that we had established the Terschelling patrol. At 8 o'clock that morning *E.8* arrived off Akkepolle Gat, between Ameland and Terschelling, her position in the patrol line off the German coast, and an hour later she sighted the half-flotilla. Mistaking them for Dutch patrolling destroyers *E.8* dived to avoid them, nor did she report them to the flotilla cruiser working in conjunction with her off Terschelling.

The destroyer reliefs for the routine patrol off Terschelling sailed from Harwich at 6 a.m. on the 17th. The *Undaunted* (Captain Cecil H. Fox) had now relieved the *Faulknor* as 3rd Flotilla cruiser, and Captain Fox took the 1st Division, consisting of the *Lance*, *Lennox*, *Legion*, and *Loyal*, up the Broad Fourteens towards Terschelling, meeting and relieving at 10 a.m., in the Broad Fourteens, the *Fearless* and four destroyers of the previous 48 hours' patrol.¹

About 1.40 p.m. the *Undaunted* and 1st Division were in 52° 40' N, 3° 38' E, steering N35E at 16 knots, when the former sighted the smoke of four vessels apparently approaching from ahead. In 10 minutes' time they could be made out as German destroyers spread in line abreast; Captain Fox hoisted the action signal, and the destroyers proceeded at their utmost speed to close the enemy. The latter now seem to have become aware of the identity of the British forces; the four boats scattered and made off at full speed.

The four enemy destroyers, built in 1903 for a speed of some 26 knots, could only maintain 18 knots,² and in half an hour the *Undaunted* was well within 6 in. gun range. At 2.5 p.m. she opened fire at 8,000 yards,³ but ceased firing after a few

¹ Corbett, Vol. I, p. 217, says: "Information had been coming in of a certain activity of the German Flotillas in the Bight. In the evening of the 15th it became more definite, and the new light cruiser *Undaunted* . . . was sent out to investigate with the 1st Division (*Lance*, *Lennox*, *Legion* and *Loyal*)." The evidence is, however, that the *Undaunted* was relieving the routine patrol. It does not appear that information of any activity of German flotillas in the bight had yet been received, nor does G.O.H. II make mention of any such activity at that date.

² G.O.H. II, p. 193.

³ *Undaunted's* Signal Log. No. 14616. Captain Fox's report says 2.20 p.m.

rounds in order to avoid waste of ammunition, as the enemy were zigzagging and dodging the fall of shell; the Germans were throwing their mines overboard in order to clear the decks for action, and the splashes seem to have been mistaken by the British vessels for torpedoes. The range was soon down to some 2,500 yards, and by 3 p.m. the action had become general, the *Lance*¹ and *Lennox*² steering to cut off the two eastern boats of the enemy, and the *Legion*³ and *Loyal*⁴ the two western boats. The two wing boats were soon put out of action,⁵ for at the range the German 4-pounder guns could make but an inadequate reply to the British destroyers' 4 in. guns. The two centre enemy boats were now seen to have turned, and were steering towards the *Undaunted*. It seems that owing to a leaking condenser S.118 was unable to keep up, and therefore determined to sell her life dearly. Seeing this, Korvettenkapitän Thiele in S.119 turned to support her, for he knew that his force was doomed and he hoped to carry out a torpedo attack on the *Undaunted* before he was sunk. The attempt was frustrated by the gunfire of the British destroyers, while Captain Fox manœuvred the *Undaunted* so as to keep outside torpedo range. The enemy apparently fired several torpedoes, but all were avoided.

The unequal action could have but one sequel, though the inevitable end was postponed by the dodging tactics employed by the enemy; and the expenditure of a considerable quantity of ammunition was necessary to sink the German destroyers, even after they had been disabled and abandoned.⁶ By 4 p.m. only S.115 remained afloat, and even she was out of action and was sunk half an hour later by the *Undaunted*. The total casualties in the 3rd Flotilla were one officer⁷ and four men wounded⁸; little material damage was suffered. Thirty-four German officers and men out of a total of 258 were saved by the destroyers, and two more men were picked up next day by a neutral⁹ fishing boat.¹⁰

¹ Commander W. de M. Egerton.

² Lieutenant-Commander C. R. Dane.

³ Lieutenant-Commander C. F. Allsup.

⁴ Lieutenant-Commander F. Burges-Watson.

⁵ *Undaunted's* Signal Log, No. 14616, says: "3.14 (p.m.), first German destroyer sunk." "3.25 (p.m.), third destroyer sunk." Captain Fox's report says the four enemy boats sank at 3.17 p.m., 3.30 p.m., 3.55 p.m. and 4.30 p.m. respectively. The evidence of Captain Fox's report has been followed as it is substantiated by the report of the *Lennox* as to the sinking of S.115 at 4.30 p.m.

⁶ Ammunition expended: *Undaunted*, 74-6 in., 102-4 in.; *Lance*, 262; *Legion*, 254; *Lennox*, 246; *Loyal*, 179 (all 4 in.). No torpedoes were fired by the British force.

⁷ Lieutenant G. L. Davidson, H.M.S. *Loyal*.

⁸ One man afterwards died of wounds.

⁹ Apparently.

¹⁰ The foregoing account is based mainly on *Undaunted's* Log No. 19951, and Signal Log No. 14616, and on the reports titled X 4039/1914 (copies of the latter are also in Harwich Force Packs, Vol. IV, No. 36). The German account seems to be written rather with a view to making a heroic story than with strict regard for veracity.

71. **Sweep by the Harwich Flotillas, October 19.**—The Admiralty were completely in the dark as to the object of the recent German destroyer incursion into the Broad Fourteens, and no hint that it was a minelaying operation was gleaned from the survivors. It seems to have been considered an attempt to interrupt the naval operations on the Belgian coast, for it was incredible that the Germans would leave our forces off Dunkirk unmolested. Actually, however, the German Command had no intention of employing against Admiral Hood's forces any vessels other than submarines. But this was not known, and opinion of the Admiralty was that a repetition of the raid in stronger force might be expected; and in order to support Commodore Tyrwhitt the *Queen* and *Implacable* were retained at Dover.¹

Meanwhile, the Admiralty had received intelligence that the Germans were forming a line of outposts of light cruisers with armoured cruisers in support and searching as far as the northern edge of the Broad Fourteens; and an attack on the outpost line by the Harwich destroyer and submarine flotillas was planned.² The attack was to be carried out on the enemy's wing cruisers, by Commodore Tyrwhitt, who flew his flag in the *Arethusa* once more, supported by the two flotilla cruisers *Fearless* and *Undaunted*. The *Aurora*, another recently completed cruiser of the *Arethusa* class, was at Portland doing her trials. She was destined, when ready, to replace the destroyer leader *Swift* as flotilla cruiser of the 4th Flotilla with the Grand Fleet, but meanwhile it was decided to employ her in the present operation, and she was ordered up to join Commodore Tyrwhitt. Submarines were to operate simultaneously on the Terschelling line and beyond; and Rear-Admiral Thursby in the *Queen*, with the *Implacable* and *Sapphire*, and screened by four destroyers³ from the Dover Patrol, was to support the light forces from a position north of the German mined area.⁴

The order for the operation was signalled on the afternoon of October 18 to Commodore Tyrwhitt, then at sea in the *Arethusa* with four destroyers,⁵ keeping the Broad Fourteens Patrol.⁶ At 6.30 a.m. on the 19th the Commodore was in 52° 52' N, 4° E, sweeping towards Terschelling. The *Fearless* and *Undaunted*

¹ A 226, 230.

² A 233, 234. The intelligence was highly circumstantial, and was entirely without foundation. It was apparently an order to the *Ophelia* (see next section) misinterpreted by the Admiralty.

³ *Goshawk*, *Phoenix*, *Afridi* and T.B. 30.

⁴ A 235, 237, 239, 240, 245.

⁵ *Laforey*, *Lawford*, *Miranda*, *Meteor*. The two latter were of the new "M" class which were being drafted to the 3rd Flotilla.

⁶ According to the arrangement of October 10 (see Section 58) the flotilla cruiser and four destroyers should have patrolled off Terschelling; but they appear usually to have been further to the southward, in the northern part of the Broad Fourteens.

had brought out eight more destroyers¹ from Harwich on the previous evening, and were in company with the Commodore. Nothing had yet been sighted except a submarine which attacked the *Arethusa* at 5.15 a.m.² Submarines *E.3* and *E.8* were at this time patrolling off the Western Ems and Akkepolle Gat Buoy respectively, and four more boats, *D.3*, *D.5*, *D.8* and *E.7*, left Harwich on the 18th and proceeded to patrol in pairs off the Western Ems and from Terschelling, 15 miles to the northward respectively. Admiral Thursby's force was in the swept channel, off the Shipwash, steering towards Smith's knoll. The *Aurora* had only left Portland some five hours previously and was still in the Channel.

Throughout the 19th Commodore Tyrwhitt continued to search the Broad Fourteens, and at 6.30 a.m. on the 20th he was in 54° 2' N, 4° 45' E. The *Fearless* was returning to harbour to coal in readiness to take over the routine patrol; and the *Aurora* was just leaving Dover for Harwich. There was no sign of the enemy, and at 8.20 a.m. the Admiralty cancelled the operation and the forces returned to harbour, the *Arethusa* remaining out on patrol until relieved by the *Fearless*.³ The submarines remained out until the evening of the 21st, but sighted no enemy.

72. **Capture of the "Ophelia," October 18.**—An event had occurred on October 18 which Commodore Tyrwhitt believed to have dislocated the German plans. This was the capture of the s.s. *Ophelia*, acting, the Commodore thought, as a scout. At 1 p.m. on October 18, the *Lawford*, one of the four destroyers in company with the Commodore, heard a German ship making a coded signal by wireless.⁴ The vessel was sighted an hour later, in 53° N, 3° 50' E, steering south-west. On boarding her, the *Meteor* discovered her to be the German hospital ship *Ophelia*, fitted with wireless and under orders, signalled to her by W/T from the Admiral at Heligoland, to proceed to 52° 51' N, 3° 55' E. This was the precise position where the Admiralty had just warned Commodore Tyrwhitt in his Operation Orders that the enemy might be expected. The circumstances struck the Commodore as suspicious, and he had the *Ophelia's* wireless dismantled, and sent her into Lowestoft.⁵

¹ *Ferret*, *Forester*, *Druid*, *Defender*, *Lance*, *Legion*, *Loyal*, *Lennox*.

² Possibly *U.21* returning from the Channel (arrived home October 20), but no mention of it is made in G.O.H.

³ A 247, 248, 254, 255, 257, 260, 261, 265. The *Queen* and *Implacable* returned to Sheerness and the *Sapphire* to Dover.

⁴ The signal intercepted was not in the Naval Code but in that used by merchant vessels for naval communication. We had obtained a copy of this. The signal was from *Ophelia* to the Officer Commanding Fleet Auxiliaries, asking for further orders after reaching the Haaks Light Vessel. (H.S. A. 283, p. 388 and I.D.H.S.)

⁵ Harwich Force Packs, Vol. IV, No. 0038, contains the reports on which this narrative is based.

According to the German report the *Ophelia* had been sent out to search for survivors of the 7th Half-Flotilla in 52° 51' N, 3° 55' E, approximately the position in which Korvettenkapitän Thiele had reported he was in action on the previous day.¹ *D.4* had already reported a German hospital ship, answering to the description of the *Ophelia*, evading search and behaving suspiciously off Terschelling on October 8,² and on the morning of the 18th *E.8* sighted a suspicious German hospital ship off Akkepolle Gat and attempted without success to call up the destroyers of the Terschelling patrol with a view to having her examined.³ She was brought before a Prize Court, which found that she had never carried out or attempted to carry out her functions as a hospital ship, and indeed she was quite unsuited for such a purpose according to Admiralty standards, though she was well adapted to act as a signalling ship; considerable signalling appliances had been used, but no satisfactory reason for this was given; and, finally, her officers complied and were at all times ready to comply with orders from German warships.⁴ On 21 May 1915 the *Ophelia* was condemned by the Court and her crew made prisoners of war.

73. Loss of "E.3," October 18.—Contrary to fact, the Germans believed that the Admiralty had timely warning of the operation which culminated in the action in the Broad Fourteens.⁵ They thought it possible that we had agents in Emden and the neighbourhood, whilst the system of submitting copies of detailed plans of operations to the Chief of the Admiralstab in Berlin, and to the senior officers concerned in the Fleet, seemed to open up possibilities of leakage.

Surveillance by submarines off the German ports was, however, believed to be the method upon which we principally relied for intelligence. After the raid of the Harwich flotillas in the bight on September 10 the point of assembly for merchant shipping entering Germany had been changed from 10 miles north-west of Heligoland to List⁶; for it was thought that our submarines made use of the track followed by merchant vessels to enter the bight. It seemed to the Germans that the alteration accomplished its

¹ This is the position given in Comm. (T's) report. The longitude 3° 45' E given in G.O.H. II, p. 200, is possibly a misprint.

² It seems she was ostensibly searching for survivors of *S.116* sunk by *E.9* two days previously.

³ H.S. 225, pp. 277, 301, 305. The destroyers were 60 miles off at the time.

⁴ A *précis* of the Prize Court Proceedings (I.D. 1006) is in Harwich Force Packs, Vol. IV, No. 0038.

⁵ G.O.H. II, p. 192. The German belief now appears to them to be confirmed by Corbett's statement (*see* note ¹, p. 118). Apparently the plan of the operation was drawn up by the Chief of the 4th Destroyer Flotilla and was sent by post on October 14 in a specially marked letter from Emden to Wilhelmshaven, where the flagship's postman received it two days later. G.O.H. II, p. 199, Note 2.

object, for no British submarines were sighted in the inner Heligoland Bight for some weeks subsequently. As a matter of fact, this was not due to the alteration in the place of assembly of merchant shipping, upon which our boats had never relied for a safe passage into the bight, but to our decision to station the submarine patrols further out from Heligoland than formerly, in order to avoid the trawlers which the Germans were employing in great numbers to report and hunt our boats. The increased importance of the Ems, arising from the development of the military situation in Flanders, had caused the surveillance of the past month to be kept principally upon that river instead of inside the bight.

On October 16, *E.3*¹ left Harwich to patrol off the Western Ems, in company with *E.8*. The two boats parted company at 10 p.m. that day, and nothing more was heard of *E.3* until the Germans announced her destruction two days later.

The Germans at this date were employing submarines in the bight to hunt our boats, as we had done in the Firth of Forth after the sinking of the *Pathfinder*. On October 18, *U.30* was cruising to the northward of Borkum Reef Light Vessel and *U.27* to the southward, off the Ems mouth. At 10.25 a.m. Lieutenant-Commander Wegener of *U.27* sighted an object like a buoy, which was soon made out to be an enemy submarine. *E.3* seems to have been lying on the surface with six of her crew in the conning tower, looking out towards the Ems; and *U.27* had little difficulty in approaching unobserved down the path of the sun. Two hours after first sighting *E.3*, Lieutenant-Commander Wegener fired a torpedo at 300 yards. The shot took effect, and *E.3* broke in half and sank at once. Four men were seen in the water, but *U.27* made no attempt to rescue them, as her commander was afraid he might be attacked by a second boat. After waiting half an hour he approached the scene; but by now the survivors had sunk.²

This was the first loss which the submarines of the Harwich Striking Force had suffered during the 10 weeks since the outbreak of war, throughout which period they had maintained the surveillance of the Heligoland Bight and Ems. The indications of enemy activity in the Ems and the exposed position of Admiral Hood's ships off the Belgian coast rendered this surveillance indispensable. The Germans were making furious efforts to capture the French Channel ports, and the uncertainty of the situation was felt in northern waters and contributed a week later to a difficult and much discussed decision affecting the Grand Fleet.

¹ Lieutenant-Commander George F. Cholmley.

² G.O.H. II, pp. 253-4.

CHAPTER XIV.

LOSS OF THE "AUDACIOUS," OCTOBER 27.

74. **Admiralty approve withdrawal of Grand Fleet from the North Sea.**—The abandonment of one of the vital principles of the War Plans, entailed by the withdrawal of the Grand Fleet from the North Sea on October 16, unavoidable though it had appeared when submarines were reported in Scapa Flow, was causing Admiral Jellicoe grave uneasiness. The base he was using at Lough Swilly was more than 300 miles from the Pentland Firth, and the Commander-in-Chief did not feel justified in taking the responsibility for so radical a departure from the War Plans without the express sanction of the Admiralty: the more so since investigation of the evidence rendered it doubtful whether any German submarine had in fact penetrated into the Flow. To the Admiralty, however, the safety of the Grand Fleet was the paramount consideration, and they not only approved the use of Lough Swilly by the battle squadrons, but further gave permission for these to be withdrawn as far south as Berehaven, if Admiral Jellicoe considered it necessary, until the submarine obstructions, which were being sent north in a few days' time, should be in position at Scapa.¹ The natural difficulties of entry into Lough Swilly, reinforced by measures taken locally by the fleet, rendered unnecessary, however, any withdrawal of the battlefleet further southward. The battle cruisers were still using Cromarty as their base. Cromarty Firth suffered from the disadvantage that entry was only safe under cover of darkness; but it was thought to be secure from submarines. On the evening of October 26, however, there was an alarm in the firth, the ships opened fire, and some damage was caused ashore.² There was some doubt whether the net defence was efficient, on account of the tide,³ but the suspicion that a submarine had entered was not verified, and the battle cruisers continued to use Cromarty, whilst the 2nd, 3rd, and 10th Cruiser Squadrons, patrolling westward and north-westward of the Orkneys and Shetlands, made use of Busta Voe and Olna Firth in the Shetland Islands as their coaling bases. Leakages in the blockade north of the Faroes had come to light, and the *Alsatian* was sent to that area on October 20. She was the only armed merchant cruiser left with Admiral de Chair, for the *Teutonic* was coaling at Liverpool, the *Mantua* had not yet returned from Archangel, and the *Oceanic* had been wrecked on the rocks at Foula Island on September 8. The deficiency in armed merchant cruisers had been recognised, and the Admiralty were preparing additional vessels as reinforcement for Admiral de Chair.⁴

¹ A 258.² H.S. 70, pp. 679, 720, 745.³ H.S. 70, p. 819.⁴ See Monograph No. 19, "10th Cruiser Squadron I."

75. **German attempt to Mine the Firth of Forth, October 17.**—For nearly a month since the unsuccessful attempts towards the end of September the High Sea Fleet had undertaken no mining operations against the Grand Fleet bases. The incidence of a new moon on October 19 led to the decision to employ the period of darker nights in a renewal of the attempts to mine the Grand Fleet in its bases. Two expeditions were prepared, the one to be carried out by the minelayer *Nautilus* accompanied by the *Kolberg*, and the second by the auxiliary minelayer *Berlin*. Simultaneously, the battle cruisers were to make a short sweep to the Dogger Bank; and the 3rd Squadron, consisting of the six newest Dreadnoughts, was brought back from the Baltic where it had been carrying out exercises.¹

The *Kolberg* and *Nautilus* were the first to sail. Leaving harbour on October 16, they steamed on a north-north-westerly course from Heligoland to the 56th parallel, and then altered course for the Firth of Forth. At 4.40 p.m. on the 17th the force had reached a position 56° 10' N, 0° 50' E, about 100 miles from May Island, when suspicious wireless signalling was heard and clouds of smoke were observed. Thinking that they were discovered and that some units of the Grand Fleet were in the neighbourhood, the two ships turned 16 points and made for Heligoland.² It was a case of nerves, for beyond the coast patrols there were no warships within 200 miles of them, the Grand Fleet being engaged at the time in the withdrawal from the North Sea.

76. **The Voyage of the "Berlin," October 16-21.**—The 17,000 ton Norddeutscher Lloyd liner *Berlin*, disguised as a British vessel, left the Jade on the evening of October 16, a few hours after the *Kolberg* and *Nautilus*. Her orders were to mine the approaches to Glasgow between Garroch Head and Fairland Head in the Firth of Clyde, or, if this were not possible, to lay her mines between Pladda and Turnberry Point, at the entrance to the Firth.³ The *Pactolus*, *Bonetta* and submarines A.10, A.11 and A.12 employed in the defence of the Clyde, as laid down in the War Plan, had been reinforced by the destroyer *Maori* at this date. The information of the *Berlin's* commander, Captain Pfundheller, was to the effect that he must expect to have to pass a British blockade line between Peterhead and Lindsnaes, as well as a northern line between the Shetlands and the Norwegian coast, near the 61st parallel; for the Germans as yet

¹ G.O.H. II, p. 169.² G.O.H. II, pp. 190-1, and Karte 10. On October 20 information came in to the Admiralty that the *Vineta* and a German minelayer were in 56° 3' N, 0° 25' W on the previous night. This is 45 miles west of the position where the *Kolberg* and *Nautilus* turned back, and the date is 48 hours too late. (A 266.)³ See Appendix L. The orders for the operation, as given in G.O.H. II, are dated September 11, and were apparently the same as for the abortive undertakings at the end of September.

knew nothing of the far reaching effect of their latest submarine offensive against the Grand Fleet and the withdrawal of the patrolling cruisers to the northward. They were aware that the Atlantic trade routes were watched, and that units of the Grand Fleet made use of ports in the west as coaling and repair bases; but they expected the *Berlin* would find but few patrols in the Irish Sea, the narrow approaches to which she would be able to pass under cover of darkness.¹

The Admiralstab could not have chosen a more favourable moment for the attempt to send a minelayer through the blockade line. The entire Grand Fleet had withdrawn from the North Sea, the cruiser areas were deserted, and the *Berlin*, steering a north-north-westerly course, crossed the Kinnaird Head-Stavanger line in 2° 30' E, just after dark on October 17, and altered course to north (true) to pass between the Shetlands and the Norwegian coast. Again fortune favoured her, for the Grand Fleet Cruiser Squadrons were working to the north-westward of the Shetlands, and none sighted her.² Keeping well to northward she passed between Iceland and the Faeroes on October 19. This was the point where leakages in the blockade were reported and the necessity of a patrol in this area was recognised by Admiral Jellicoe, but he had insufficient ships at the time to watch the ground, and it was not until 24 hours later that the *Alsatian* was dispatched to the area.³ Steering right out to the meridian of 20° W, the *Berlin* altered course on October 21 for a 300 mile run eastward along the 56th parallel, to make the Irish Coast after nightfall.⁴

77. The "Berlin" lays her Minefield, October 22-23.—As the minelayer neared the Irish Coast she intercepted wireless signals which indicated that strong British forces were close to her; and she was enabled to fix two squadrons, one north-westward of the Hebrides and one off the North Channel. The former, though she did not know it, consisted of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron on patrol west of the Flannan Islands, and the latter of the *Albemarle* and *Exmouth* patrolling off Stanton Banks. At 4 p.m. on the 22nd these two battleships reached the southern limit of their patrol in 56° N, 8° 8' W and turned 16 points to a north-easterly course, while the *Berlin*, steering south-east by east, was in 56° 22' N, 11° 28' W.⁵ To the southward of the *Berlin*, the *Isis*, of Cruiser Force E, was patrolling west of Tory Island, but the minelayer's course took her no nearer to the *Isis*

¹ G.O.H. II, pp. 185 and 232 *et seq.*

² It is possible that signal A 267 refers to the *Berlin*.

³ A 292 and G.F.N. of date.

⁴ The account and track of the *Berlin's* voyage as given in Corbett, "Naval Operations," Vol. I, is apparently based on information by a member of the *Berlin's* crew (M. 0298/14, "Operations of German minelayer *Berlin*"). The account in this monograph is based on the German Official History, which was not at the time available for Sir J. Corbett.

⁵ See Plan VII.

than 30 miles. The patrol of the North Channel at this date was being carried out by the *Tara*, one of four small steamships taken up by the Admiralty on August 16 and commissioned as fleet messengers.¹ A second of these vessels, the *Scotia*, was patrolling the Bristol Channel, and the remaining two, the *Anglia* and *Cambria*, were attached to the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet.

It was clear to Captain Pfundheller that, contrary to his intelligence, the entrance to the Irish Sea was strongly patrolled, and he was doubtful of being able to penetrate to the Firth of Clyde. But hesitation appeared worse than useless, and increasing to his full speed of 17 knots² he held on. As soon as darkness fell he made ready his 200 mines and cleared his six 10.5 cm. (4.1 in.) guns for action. At 10 p.m. the soundings showed him to be close under the land, but the night was dark and the coast line could not be discerned. Suddenly Aran Island light shone to starboard and the *Berlin* put her helm hard over and altered course four points to port to avoid running ashore. At 11 p.m. Captain Pfundheller reckoned he was off Tory Island, but neither that light nor Fanad Head was burning.

In the absence of coast lights he concluded it was hopeless to attempt the passage of the North Channel. This was a fortunate decision for him, for the armed boarding steamer *Tara* was patrolling in the North Channel, between the Mull of Cantyre and Fair Head.³ Since he could not lay his mines in the Firth of Clyde, the best position for the minefield seemed to be to the northward of Tory Island, and at 11.35 p.m. on October 22 the *Berlin* began to lay her mines in this position, 2 metres below L.W.S.⁴ She was undisturbed, for although part of the Grand Fleet was lying at anchor in Lough Swilly, 30 miles away, the patrolling destroyers forming the anti-submarine protection worked inside the Lough only.⁵ By 12.10 a.m. on the 23rd the minelaying was completed, and the *Berlin* turned to a north-west by west course to escape into the open sea.

Her luck still held. The *Albemarle* and *Exmouth* had turned at 9 p.m. on the 22nd and were making a southerly stretch. At 1 a.m. on the 23rd the *Albemarle* was in 56° 5' N, 8° 25' W, with the *Exmouth* some 10 miles to the north-westward of her.⁶ The *Berlin*, closing them at an angle of 90°, was 15 miles to the southward; but at 1 a.m. the two battleships turned 16 points to commence a stretch to the northward, and they rapidly drew

¹ See M Letter Book, No. 272, Vol. III, p. 1354.

² The *Berlin's* speed is given as 16.5 and 17 knots on pp. 185 and 233 respectively of G.O.H. II, whilst the Operation Orders indicate 18 knots as her speed.

³ Log of *Tara*, T. 271/1915.

⁴ See Plan VII. There is a discrepancy between the position of the minefields given in G.O.H. II, Karte 12, and as reported by the German Government after the Armistice (see O.U. 6020A).

⁵ See G.F.N., 22-23 October 1914, for the positions of the destroyer patrols.

⁶ *Albemarle's* log, No. 19511, and *Exmouth's*, No. 19541.

away from the minelayer. The morning broke with mist and rain squalls which shrouded the *Berlin*, her speed reduced to 13 knots by dirty fires. But there was no need now for haste, for she had a clear run before her. Keeping well out into the North Atlantic she passed between Greenland and Iceland on October 30, intercepting on the 27th a British wireless warning which showed her that the minefield had been discovered. A few days later the British wireless signalling showed that something of importance had occurred in connection with the minefield, but the Admiralstab made no sign to her by wireless for guidance. All indications of her character as a minelayer were now removed as far as possible, and an attempt was made to repair the boiler defects which had developed under the strain of high speed steaming.

78. Operations of the "Berlin" on the Archangel Trade Route.—Captain Pfundheller's orders had instructed him, if he were not forced to escape into the Atlantic, that he was to raid the Iceland fishing fleets. But the weather was so bad that he realised the fishing vessels would have taken refuge in harbour, and he accordingly steered eastward towards the Russo-Norwegian coast to carry out his third duty, the raiding of merchant traffic on the England-Archangel route. The ordinary traffic had ceased at the end of October with the icing up of Archangel, but food ships were still running to England and colliers were taking to Russia much needed coal, whilst there was also a report of three Russian volunteer fleet ships taking reservists home from Genoa. On October 28, too, Norddeich had reported that war material was being shipped from Havre *via* Liverpool to Archangel.¹ The *Drake* and *Mantua* had already left Archangel and returned to Liverpool on October 28 and there was no warship to hinder the *Berlin*.

The conditions were not favourable, however, for commerce raiding. The *Berlin's* speed was seriously reduced, and the long, bright, moonlight nights rendered it doubtful whether she could overhaul any enemy merchantman before the latter found refuge in one of the numerous fjords and hiding places on the coast. Moreover, the coast was well furnished with telegraph and telephone communication for fishing purposes, and the *Berlin* could not long expect to remain unreported when once she commenced active operations. On the night of November 7-8, however, as the moon was obscured by clouds, Captain Pfundheller determined to close the Murman Coast to see what he could find.

At 10 p.m. he sighted his first ship. Whilst manœuvring to get between her and the land a second vessel came in sight. From the position of her lights she appeared to be a warship and

¹ G.O.H. II, p. 239. This signal was intercepted and decyphered by the Admiralty. It appears to be the first signal decyphered by means of the German cypher salvaged from the *Magdeburg*, a channel of intelligence which within a few weeks became of the first importance in the conduct of naval operations.

Captain Pfundheller took her for a British cruiser guarding the trade route, an impression which was heightened when she stopped and began exchanging signals with the first vessel. The *Berlin* had no night sight for her guns and no shells,¹ and under the circumstances Captain Pfundheller decided it was useless to attempt to fight. Under cover of a sudden snowstorm he steered out into the open sea and escaped.

His fears had been groundless, for the vessel sighted was not a British warship; but in the conviction that his presence on the Murman Coast had been discovered, Captain Pfundheller decided to move further south and try his luck southward of the Lofotens. Heavy weather again came on, however, causing a high expenditure of coal and rendering impossible all question of lowering boats to examine merchant vessels. In these circumstances it was hopeless to attempt to prosecute operations against trade.

On November 11 the *Berlin* got into wireless communication with the Admiralstab, and learned that a considerable volume of valuable war material was passing from America to Archangel. Meanwhile British wireless signalling had been heard, indicating that enemy warships were off the Lofotens and on the Norwegian coast, and that the patrol line between the Shetlands and Norway was occupied. This was not entirely correct, for though the 10th Cruiser Squadron was working off the Shetlands and the armed merchant cruisers between Iceland and the Faeroes, there were no British ships as far north as the Lofotens.

The weather continued bad, with heavy gales, and on November 15 Captain Pfundheller decided to take advantage of a clause in his Operation Orders which permitted him, if any other course was impracticable, to intern himself in a neutral port. His boilers were defective, coal was running short, and in the bright moonlight nights now ruling he seemed to have only a slight chance of evading the British warships reported by the Admiralstab off the Norwegian coast, and of reaching home. On the morning of November 17, in a thick snowstorm, he entered Trondhjem and anchored in the harbour at 9 a.m.; 24 hours later the ship was interned.

Intelligence of her arrival duly reached the Admiralty. It was known that the *Berlin* was fitted as a minelayer, while the emptiness of her bunkers indicated that she had recently completed a lengthy cruise; but no less than three weeks had now elapsed between the discovery of the minefield off Tory Island and the arrival of the *Berlin* at Trondhjem, and the Admiralty did not with any degree of certainty connect the two with one another.

79. Mining of the "Manchester Commerce," October 26.—It was not until nearly four days after the laying of the minefield that a ship fell a victim to it. At 2.15 p.m. on October 26 the

¹ G.O.H. II, p. 240. The meaning apparently is that she had solid shot only.

s.s. *Manchester Commerce*, 3,444 tons, outward bound from Manchester to Quebec, struck a mine in $53^{\circ} 35' N$, $8^{\circ} 12\frac{1}{2}' W$, 20 miles $N\frac{1}{4}E$ from Tory Island,¹ and sank with the loss of her master and 13 of her crew of 44 officers and men, the remainder being picked up in their boat at 2.30 a.m. on the 27th, seven miles south-east of Inistrahull, and brought in by the trawler *City of London* to Fleetwood at 12.30 a.m. on October 28.²

On the way to Fleetwood the *City of London* touched at Carnlough³ on the north-east coast of Ireland to report the news. There was a coastguard barracks at Carnlough, but the coastguard stations on the west coast of the British Isles had been closed on the mobilisation of the Navy and two-thirds of the personnel sent to man Third Fleet ships, the remainder manning the special war signal stations. On the east coast sufficient ratings were available to man the coastguard stations from Cape Wrath to Selsey Bill. Thirteen cyclist battalions, Territorial Force, were detailed, on the mobilisation of the Army, to watch the coast from Lunan Bay, Forfarshire, to Porthleven in Cornwall. The cyclist patrols were qualified to report military landings only, though special service sections of them might co-operate with any coast ratings not taken up by mobilisation, in watching the coast.⁴ But there was none of this coast watching organisation on the west coast, and only the ordinary police were on duty at Carnlough.

The information of the mining of the *Manchester Commerce* was sent from Carnlough by the sergeant in charge,⁵ to Torr Head, one of the war signal stations kept continuously manned in peace and war, whence it was telegraphed to the Admiralty and to Kingstown, the naval centre of the group;⁶ and by 11.35 a.m. on the 27th the Admiralty were in possession of the news.⁷ Admiral Jellicoe at Lough Swilly did not, however, receive the intelligence

¹ A 336a and the Chief Officer's deposition (in M. 18451/14, titled *Board of Trade*, 30 October 1914) give a different position. The position $20'$ $N\frac{1}{4}E$ from Tory Island is given in the deposition of the Second Officer of the *Manchester Commerce* (who was on watch when she was mined) and in return of *Merchant Shipping losses made to the House of Commons*, 1919, where, however, the date is erroneously given as October 27 as it is also in the Admiralty (Trade Division) *Return of British Vessels Captured or Destroyed by the Enemy*, 1 January 1918.

² Deposition of skipper of the *City of London* (M. 18451/14).


³ $54^{\circ} 59' N$, $5^{\circ} 58' W$.

⁴ Papers titled "War Office, 15 July 1914: Coast Watching."



⁵ Apparently of the R.I.C.

⁶ This was the correct procedure and was in accordance with the Instructions for the Distribution of Naval Intelligence in the United Kingdom and Channel Islands, 1913. (O.D. No. 4.)

⁷ A 336a. This telegram was sent off from Torr Head at 10.46 a.m. on the 27th. It is not known at what time the trawler *City of London* put in to Carnlough to give information, but the distance from the point where the survivors were picked up at 2.30 a.m. on the 27th is about 60 miles. At a speed of 8 knots the trawler would have reached Carnlough soon after 10 a.m., so that no delay appears to have occurred in the transmission of the news to the Admiralty.



PLAN VII.
 CRUISE OF THE "BERLIN"
 & LAYING OF TORY ISLAND
 MINEFIELD
 OCT 22 - 23, 1914
 TRACK OF "BERLIN" FROM G. O. H. I. KARTE 10 & 12.



until 2 p.m. that day,¹ for from Kingstown it had to go to Buncrana, the naval centre of the group in which Lough Swilly was situated, whence it was signalled to the *Iron Duke*.

The delay in receiving the intelligence was due to circumstances over which the Admiralty had no control and not to any fault in the intelligence system.² But had the news been received by the Commander-in-Chief six hours earlier, a serious disaster to the Grand Fleet could have been averted.

80. **Sinking of the "Audacious," October 27.**—On the night of October 22–23, when the *Berlin* laid her minefield, the *Iron Duke* and the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons were at Lough Swilly and the 2nd Battle Squadron at Loch na Keal. The squadrons remained in harbour, resting, cleaning boilers, etc., until 5 p.m. on the 26th, when the 2nd Battle Squadron sailed for a rendezvous in 55° 45' N, 8° 30' W at daylight on the following day, where the *Liverpool* from Lough Swilly was to be met with tugs towing battle practice targets. In proceeding to the rendezvous the *Liverpool* and the tugs unwittingly crossed the minefield laid by the *Berlin*, but without discovering it. The 2nd Battle Squadron met the *Liverpool* at 6.50 a.m. on the 27th, and the various ships took up their stations for firing practice and steered towards Malin Head. In the target line were the *Orion*, *Monarch*, and *Thunderer*, whilst in the firing line Admiral Warrender in the *Centurion*, all unconscious of the danger, led the *Ajax*, *Audacious*, and *King George V* straight for the minefield laid by the *Berlin*.

At 8.45 a.m. the *Audacious* was in 55° 34' N, 8° 12½' W,³ about a mile south of the position where, unknown to Admiral Warrender, the *Manchester Commerce* had been sunk on the previous afternoon. The ships were expecting to open fire in about a quarter of an hour's time, and the signal to turn to the firing course, south-west, had just been hauled down. The *Centurion* and *Ajax* had already turned, and the *Audacious* was turning just inside the wake of the latter, when an explosion occurred very deep down below her waterline on the port side aft. The time was about 8.50 a.m. It was at first thought that the ship had been torpedoed by an enemy submarine, and Captain Dampier signalled to the Vice-Admiral to this effect, and the remainder of the division sheered off out of the danger area in accordance with the orders issued after the loss of the *Aboukir*, *Hogue*, and *Cressy*.

The *Audacious*, with her port wing engine room flooded, was already heeling to port, having failed to right herself when the helm was taken off her after the turn. The port engine had stopped, but steaming with the starboard engine she shaped

¹ A 338b. But G.F.N. of date says the news was received at 1.8 p.m.

² Corbett, "Naval Operations, I," p. 240 note, apparently thinks otherwise.

³ M. 03176/14, "Loss of H.M.S. *Audacious*." Captain C. F. Dampier's Report gives the lat. 56° 34' N, but this is an error.

course for Lough Swilly. There was a heavy sea running¹ and the ship steered badly, making about 9 knots. The water was rising in the centre engine room, and about 11 a.m., when 15 miles had been covered and the ship was little more than 10 miles from shore, she ceased to steam.² Captain Dampier turned her head to sea and began to get out the boats.

The state of the sea was now very bad, and the ship was in danger of capsizing. The *Liverpool* was standing by, and Admiral Jellicoe had sent out all available destroyers. The White Star Liner *Olympic* had also arrived in response to distress signals. With the assistance of these ships' boats the crew of the *Audacious*, with the exception of some 250 seamen, was sent away to the various ships. Boat work in the bad sea that was running was rendered doubly difficult by the net shelves and booms of the heavily rolling *Audacious*, but was successfully accomplished.

In the prevailing weather conditions the chances of saving the *Audacious* were hopeless,³ though the officers at the scene of the disaster refused to entertain any such thought and addressed themselves with energy to the problem of getting her to shore. In the hope of towing the ship the Commander-in-Chief had sent out the collier *Thornhill*, the supply ship *Assistance*, all available tugs, destroyers, and the fleet messenger *Cambria*, in which Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, commanding the 1st Battle Squadron, proceeded to the scene to direct operations. The *Monarch* had reported sighting an enemy submarine at 11.9 a.m. in 55° 9' N, 8° 59' W, and in the momentary expectation of further attacks on the crippled battleship, Admiral Jellicoe dared not risk dispatching a large vessel to tow her.

About 2 p.m. the *Olympic*, handled by Commodore Herbert J. Haddock, R.N.R., with great skill in the heavy sea, with a fine disregard for the danger from submarines, succeeded in taking the *Audacious* in tow, the line being taken to her successfully under most difficult conditions by Lieutenant-Commander Charles G. C. Sumner of the destroyer *Fury*. Commodore Haddock managed to turn the ship's head towards Lough Swilly, but the battleship's handwheel flat was flooded and she could not be steered. She became unmanageable, sheered off into the wind, and the tow parted. Attempts to tow her were made by the *Liverpool* and the collier *Thornhill*, the *Fury* taking the line again and again with a fine display of seamanship. But both attempts failed.

¹ Captain Dampier's Report. *Ajax's* log (No. 19653) gives state of the sea at 8 a.m. as 2, but growing rapidly worse.

² Captain Dampier's Report. But at 10.30 a.m. the following signal was sent: "*Audacious* to Commander-in-Chief, H.F. Cannot steam. Send somebody to tow me." The originals of the signals connected with the disaster have been bound in G.F.S.P. 0021, Vol. XXXIX (H.S. A 121).

³ M. 01376/14. Admiral Jellicoe's covering letter to Captain Dampier's Report.

The intelligence of the mining of the *Manchester Commerce* had come in by now. When it was realised that the *Audacious* had been mined and not torpedoed, Admiral Jellicoe ordered the *Exmouth* to raise steam and proceed to take the *Audacious* in tow.¹

It was now 5 p.m. and getting dark. The quarterdeck was awash, the mushroom ventilators were torn away, and tons of water were finding their way below. With the exception of a small party chosen from the large number of volunteers, all hands were now sent away from the ship. The *Audacious* had just survived a period of very heavy rolling, but her displacement was increasing so rapidly that the time of the next period could not be forecasted.² The danger of her capsizing was so great that about 6 p.m. it was considered necessary to abandon her for the night. By the time the *Exmouth* arrived the *Audacious* had been abandoned and could not be towed.

The end came very soon afterwards. About 9 p.m. the *Audacious* capsized and sank with a terrific explosion which caused the only casualty incurred through the disaster, a petty officer being killed by a large armour plate hurled 800 yards on to the deck of the *Liverpool* which was standing by.

81. Distribution of Cruiser Force E, October 27.—At the time of the disaster the *Drake* and *Mantua*, returning from Archangel, were less than 24 hours' steaming from Liverpool. The intelligence of the minefield was sent to them by the Admiralty, who further instructed Admiral Tottenham to station one of his cruisers well out to the westward to warn homecoming traffic of the danger.³ The *Isis* was patrolling to the westward of the minefield, but by the evening of the 28th Admiral Tottenham had not succeeded in getting into communication with her, and the Admiralty had to take up the matter themselves.⁴ In the expectation, too, that an attempt would be made by the Germans to close the St. George's Channel, Admiral Tottenham strengthened the watch off the entrance, proceeding there himself in the *Sutlej* and drawing closer in to the entrance the *Juno*, which had been patrolling off the Fastnet with the *Pelorus*. The sixth cruiser of Force E, the *Doris*, had been patrolling with the *Venus* off the Scillies, and was now proceeding to Haulbowline to refit.⁵

82. The Sweeping of the Minefield.—Arrangements were at once made to define the limits of the minefield and to sweep a clear passage along the coast. That mines would be laid by the enemy on the west coast was so unsuspected that all

¹ G.F.N. says the Commander-in-Chief learnt at 4.40 p.m. that the sailing ship *Caldaff* had been mined in the same area on the night October 26-27. This is an error and has some connection with *Culdaff*, where there was a Coastguard station (see G.F. In Telegrams, Buncrana, to S.N.O., Rathmullen, October 29, 5.22 p.m.). The loss of the *Caldaff* is not mentioned in the Return of Merchant Shipping Losses.

² M. 03619/14, "Sinking of H.M.S. *Audacious*. Technical account by Ship's Officers."

³ A 347.

⁴ H.S. 71, pp. 216, 236, 261, 270. ⁵ A 350 and H.S. 71, pp. 100, 112.

the trawler sweepers were working on the east coast, with the exception of four at Milford. These four were sent to Lough Swilly, whilst from Lowestoft two groups of six trawlers each were sent to Larne and Milford, to keep the North and St. George's Channels clear.¹ In the possibility that the mining of Lough Swilly might have been part of a concerted operation, the sweeping trawlers at Scapa and Cromarty were sent out to search for minefields up to 30 miles from the bases.² Two of the fleet sweepers, the *Leda* and *Circe*, were at Lough Swilly, and Admiral Jellicoe ordered the *Skipjack*, *Speedwell*, and *Seagull* round from Scapa to assist them. The sixth gunboat, the *Gossamer*, was at Devonport.³

The minefield was not completely cleared until August 1915.⁴ On December 19 the *Tritonia* of Glasgow was sunk by a mine 22 miles NNE from Tory Island,⁵ and the Norwegian s.s. *Caprivi* was sunk on 23 April 1915 in the same area.⁶

83. News of the Disaster suppressed.—The loss of the *Audacious* still left the Grand Fleet with a superiority over the German High Sea Fleet of almost a complete squadron of Dreadnoughts. Since the outbreak of war the 4th Battle Squadron had been augmented by the *Agincourt* and *Erin*, and the *Benbow* was doing her trials. The battle cruisers *Invincible* and *Inflexible* had joined the fleet and the *Tiger* was doing her practices at Berehaven. The only capital ship added to the High Sea Fleet in the same period was the battle cruiser *Derfflinger*. After the loss of the *Audacious* Admiral Jellicoe had 21 Dreadnought battleships, 12 pre-Dreadnoughts, and 6 battle cruisers, against the German numbers 15, 12⁷ and 4⁸ respectively. Moreover, 10 of the British battleships and three of the battle cruisers mounted 13.5 in. guns, while none of Admiral von Ingenohl's ships were armed with a heavier gun than 12 in., and four of his Dreadnoughts and three of his battle cruisers carried 11 in. guns as their primary armament.⁹ In light cruisers we had added the *Arethusa* and *Undaunted* to Commodore Tyrwhitt's force and the *Aurora* to the 4th Destroyer Flotilla, whilst the Germans had completed no light cruisers in the same period. The loss of the *Amphion* had been set off by the destruction on August 28 of the *Cöln* and *Mainz*.¹⁰

¹ A 349 and H.S. 71, p. 138.

² G.F.N. of date.

³ A 346 and H.S. 71, p. 30a.

⁴ M. 06956/15, "Clearing of Tory Island minefield and recommendations of Officers in Charge."

⁵ M. 22192/14, "*Tritonia*, loss by mine," and Return of Merchant Shipping Losses.

⁶ M. 21305/15, "Loss of Norwegian s.s. *Caprivi* by striking a mine."

⁷ Excludes *Wittelsbach* and *Kaiser Friedrich* classes (five ships each), with 9.4 in. guns as primary armament.

⁸ Excludes *Blücher*, twelve 8.2 in. guns.

⁹ Two of the battle cruisers, the *Seydlitz* and *Moltke*, had ten 11 in. guns. All other battle cruisers, British and German, had eight guns only in their primary armament.

¹⁰ The *Ariadne*, lost in the same battle, was a harbour defence cruiser. Similarly the *Pathfinder* belonged to the Coast Patrol Flotillas.

At the end of September several reports had been received that certain of the German battleships were being re-armed with guns of larger calibre, and on October 9 a committee met to examine the question. The committee considered it possible that a heavier gun than 12 in. had been mounted in three of the latest German battleships, but that no such alteration was possible in any of their earlier Dreadnoughts; and this information was forwarded to the Grand Fleet on October 16.¹

Before the *Audacious* sank, Admiral Jellicoe telegraphed to the Admiralty to ask that every endeavour should be made to keep secret the fact that she had been damaged, both on grounds of general policy, to avoid giving the enemy information of which he could otherwise have no immediate knowledge, and also on account of the military situation at the time.²

At the time of the disaster the political and military outlook was gloomy. The Battle of Ypres had been raging for over a week and on the Belgian coast the situation was critical, and a decision was expected within the next 48 hours. Turkey, encouraged by Germany, was showing herself hostile, and it was felt that the news of the sinking of one of our latest and most powerful battleships might well supply the encouragement for a refusal to comply with the ultimatum we were on the point of dispatching to her. In view of the situation the Cabinet decided that all news of the disaster should be suppressed.³ The *Olympic* was detained for three days at Lough Swilly, and her passengers were kept on board, and the crew of the *Audacious* was distributed for the time between the ships of the Grand Fleet.⁴

With every precaution it was not thought that the news could be kept secret for more than a week or ten days. The Press could be and was successfully muzzled, but not so the civilian passengers of the *Olympic*, many of whom were Americans. On October 28 the Germans learned of the sinking of the *Manchester Commerce*, and the warning to shipping not to approach to within 60 miles of Tory Island duly came to their ears. But not until November 19, over three weeks after the disaster, was the intelligence of the loss of the *Audacious* received in Germany.⁵ The loss was not, however, officially admitted by the Admiralty until the conclusion of the war.⁶

¹ Papers titled "Foreign Office, 28 September 1914"; and M. 05183/14, "Report of meeting 12 October 1914 on Armament of German Ships," and M. 03080/14, "Rumoured re-arming of certain classes of German ships."

² A 342, and Jellicoe, "The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916," p. 152.

³ A 348, 353, 354, 356 and a number of other telegrams in H.S. 71.

⁴ M. 03315/14, "Disposal of ship's company of *Audacious*" and M. 05185/14, "*Audacious*, disposal of crew." ⁵ G.O.H. II, p. 237.

⁶ On December 4 the Admiralty issued a private and confidential notice to the Press (H.S. 78, p. 604a) stating that they were satisfied that up to the present the Germans did not with certainty know of the sinking of the *Audacious*. The ship's name was even retained in the Secret Publication, "Positions and Movements of H.M. Ships." In connection with the steps taken to muzzle the foreign press, cf. H.S. 79, pp. 324, 686.

CHAPTER XV.

SEAPLANE RAID ON CUXHAVEN AIRSHIP SHEDS,
OCTOBER 25.

84. **Apprehensions of Zeppelin Raids, October 1914—Raid on Cuxhaven planned.**—On October 18, while Commodore Tyrwhitt was still at sea engaged on the sweep off Terschelling, orders had gone out from the Admiralty for a raid of a more daring nature than any which had been undertaken up to date. There were reports at this time of zeppelins being brought to Cuxhaven, and the apprehensions of raids on London, the Grand Fleet, or the ships on the Belgian coast once more actively revived.¹ London and the home ports were mainly dependent upon aeroplane protection, and it was on account of the importance of denying the use of territory within 100 miles of Dunkirk to German airships that the Admiralty had assumed responsibility at the end of August for maintaining aerial command of the region. The intelligence reports in the middle of October indicated that the zeppelin station at Cuxhaven was being developed; and on October 18 the Admiralty decided to make an attack on the sheds by seaplanes.² Six seaplanes, two carrying one 100 lb. bomb and five 20 lb. bombs apiece, and the remainder carrying 20 lb. bombs, were to be taken across to Heligoland by the seaplane carriers *Engadine* and *Riviera*, two converted cross-Channel steamers of the South Eastern and Chatham Railway Company³ armed with four 12-pdr. guns apiece and having a speed of 22½ knots, which rendered them better fitted than the slow *Hermes*⁴ for an operation off the enemy's naval base. Commodore Tyrwhitt, who was in charge of the operation, was to escort the seaplane carriers, and Admiral Jellicoe detailed the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron to support him. As a diversion, a simultaneous attack was arranged off the Ems by the *Fearless* and ten destroyers.⁵

The operation was planned for October 22. Submarines had been reported in the Minch on the morning of October 18, so instead of coaling at Lough Swilly or Loch na Keal, the bases

¹ It was apparently not until October 28 that reports began to come in, indicating the British Fleet as the object of zeppelin attack.

² The actual situation of the airship sheds was at Nordholz, seven miles south-west of Cuxhaven.

³ They had been taken up for service during August, together with a third boat, the *Empress*, which was at first used as a transport and messenger vessel, but was now being converted into a seaplane carrier. M. 01640/14. (See M Letter Book, No. 272, pp. 1013, 1942.)

⁴ The *Hermes* could only steam 14 knots at this date.

⁵ A 242, 243. The orders seem to have been issued to Comm. (T) in writing by the Admiralty. They are in Harwich Force Packs, Vol. IV, No. 0036, and are undated. See Appendix K. Comm. (T) obviously knew of the operation by 8.45 p.m. October 19, as evidenced by signal A 255. Possibly he arranged the details in conjunction with the Admiralty. The orders issued by Comm. (T) for the operation are in M. 05199/14, "Aerial Operations, 23 October 1914."

which the Grand Fleet was using, the *Invincible* and *Inflexible*, on quitting their patrol between the Flannan Islands and Sule Skerry, went in to Cromarty on the early morning of the 20th, to coal and leave the same night for the operation in the bight, the Admiralty, at the Commander-in-Chief's request, undertaking to send Admiral Moore his orders direct.¹ By the evening of the 19th it had become clear that the operation could not be carried out on the 22nd, as arranged, for the Harwich Flotillas were still at sea searching for the supposed German outpost line off Terschelling.² By 5 p.m. on the 20th, however, Admiral Moore, who was due to leave Cromarty in a few hours' time, was still without either orders for the operation or information that it had been postponed, and it was not until he was on the point of sailing that he learned of its postponement.³

The selection of the actual date of the operation was left, within certain limits, to Commodore Tyrwhitt.⁴ On October 23 the weather conditions were unfavourable, and early that morning the Commodore signalled to Admiral Moore, who had by now received his operation orders and was on his way south, that the raid was postponed for a further 24 hours.⁵ Admiral Moore accordingly turned north to avoid disclosing his movements to the enemy, and to fill in the time he cruised to the northward of the 59th parallel, refraining from returning to Cromarty owing to the danger from submarines when entering by daylight.⁶ During the afternoon, however, the wind dropped and the Harwich flotillas and the seaplane carriers prepared to sail early on the 24th.⁷ Commodore Tyrwhitt omitted, however, to inform either the Admiralty or Admiral Moore,⁸ and the first intimation that the operation had commenced was a signal from the Senior Naval Officer, Harwich, which came into the Admiralty at 6.37 a.m. on the 24th, reporting that the flotillas had sailed.⁹ At 11 a.m. Commodore Tyrwhitt seems to have become aware of his omission,¹⁰ though he apparently did not know that Admiral Moore, acting on the intimation of the 23rd that the raid was postponed 24 hours, was already on his way south to support him. Moreover,

¹ A 244.

² A 255.

³ A 264.

⁴ Operation Orders, Appendix K.

⁵ A 276, 288, 296.

⁶ A 272, 296-302.

⁷ A 304, 309.

⁸ Rear-Admiral Moore "Letter of Proceedings" (M. 03085/14) says he first learnt that the operation had commenced at noon on the 24th.

⁹ A 310, 311.

¹⁰ His signal (A 317) is not very clear, but it is not thought that he meant to imply that his signal to the Admiralty (A 302) was wrongly worded. At 10.20 a.m. on the 24th, Comm. (T) sent a signal to the *Invincible* (A 315, received 11.55 a.m.) giving his 9 a.m. position, and stating that he expected to arrive at the final R.V. (off Heligoland) at 4.30 a.m. 25th. From the wording of the signal it seems as if Comm. (T) was under the impression that he had told Admiral Moore on the previous evening when he warned the *Engadine* to be ready early on the 24th.

the Admiralty had repaired the Commodore's omission by passing on to Admiral Moore the intelligence that the flotillas had sailed for the operation.¹

By now, the conditions were perfect,² and the Commodore was unwilling to let the opportunity slip. Failing Cruiser Force K, which he apparently imagined to be still in the north, Admiral Beatty was at the moment within supporting distance of him in the North Sea, with a force of battle cruisers and light cruisers, engaged in intercepting a reported German force; and Commodore Tyrwhitt asked that they might be ordered to support him in place of Cruiser Force K.³

85. Sweep of Battle Cruisers and Light Cruisers to the Skagerrak, October 22-25.—On the evening of October 20 intelligence had come into the Admiralty that a German force of cruisers, destroyers, and submarines had left Danzig three days previously, for the North Sea. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron was resting at Loch na Keal at the moment, the ships being at six hours' notice; they at once raised steam and by the Commander-in-Chief's orders proceeded to intercept the enemy. Leaving Loch na Keal at 6 a.m. on the 21st, Admiral Beatty steered round the west side of the Hebrides, to avoid the submarine danger in the Minch, and passing into the North Sea through the Fair Island passage, met Commodore Goodenough's light cruisers from Lough Swilly and the 4th Destroyer Flotilla from the Moray Firth. During the 22nd the force swept eastward along the lines of approach from the Skaw to Cromarty and the Orkneys, though the weather was so bad that the destroyers had to be sent back to harbour in the forenoon. Lister Light was made early on the 23rd, and the force then swept the Skagerrak as far as the Skaw, keeping out of sight of land. Nothing was seen, however, for the German force which left Danzig on the 17th was destined for operations in the Gulf of Finland and had not entered the North Sea. Sweeping out of the Skagerrak, the battle cruisers steered for Cromarty and the light cruisers for Scapa, arriving there at daylight on the 25th.⁴ Their employment in lieu of Cruiser Force K to support Commodore Tyrwhitt was unnecessary, for, as we have seen, Admiral Moore was in a position to reach his 6 a.m. rendezvous in 54° 36' N, 6° 13' E, 65 miles north-west of Heligoland, on the morning of the 25th; and the operation proceeded in accordance with the plan. With Admiral Moore was a division of the 4th Destroyer Flotilla⁵ from Cromarty.

¹ A 312-314, 316. The *Invincible* does not log the Admiralty's signal. It was possibly entered in her coding office log of date, which is not forthcoming, though Admiral Moore, in his Letter of Proceedings (M. 03085/14), makes no mention of it, but says that he "arranged to go south" on receipt of Comm. (T)'s signal at noon. The *Invincible's* logs, however, show that the Admiral turned south at 7 a.m., i.e., before either the Admiralty's or Comm. (T)'s signals were dispatched and evidently acting on A 296.

² But cf. Comm. (T)'s report, which states that it rained continuously throughout October 24.

³ A 317.

⁴ A 270, 273.

⁵ *Achates, Ardent, Ambuscade, Fortune.*

86. Seaplane Attack on Cuxhaven Airship Sheds, October 25.¹—The total strength of the Harwich Flotillas at this date was 44 destroyers, of which 11 were away in dock or working up. Some 26 of them were required for the operation.² On the eve of it Commodore Tyrwhitt had to send four boats to reinforce the Dover Patrol, for in addition to its patrol and escort duties the 6th Flotilla was engaged in protecting the ships off the Belgian coast and was so short of destroyers that the Straits patrol was reduced to two boats by day and four by night.³ In order to provide sufficient destroyers for the Cuxhaven raid, Commodore Tyrwhitt had to withdraw all the patrols of the Harwich flotillas,⁴ with the result that *D.2*, off Terschelling, was unable to get into W/T communication with him to report a German submarine proceeding down the Dutch coast towards the Straits of Dover. With Commodore Tyrwhitt in the *Arethusa*, there sailed from Harwich at 5 a.m. on the 24th the *Undaunted* and 16 destroyers. The *Aurora* had not yet joined the 4th Flotilla in the Grand Fleet, and was still at Harwich; but she was left behind as she had not yet completed her firings since commissioning. The seaplane carriers *Engadine* and *Riviera* joined up from Dover, and at easy speed the force steered for a position 54° 27' N, 8° 0' E, 15 miles north of Heligoland and about an hour's flight for the seaplanes from the Cuxhaven zeppelin sheds. The sea was calm, but a light rain fell during the whole of the 24th, and heavy rain was continuous throughout the night. At 4.45 a.m. on the 25th the force arrived at the rendezvous off Heligoland, and the necessary dispositions were made to guard against attack whilst the seaplanes were being hoisted out.

It was still raining heavily and the visibility was only half a mile; but it was a low dawn, and the weather showed signs of clearing. In view of the fact that the presence of the force would probably be reported to the Germans and put them on their guard against a repetition of the operation, Commander Lambe⁵ decided to carry out the raid rather than withdraw on account of the unsuitable weather conditions. The pilots reported that they were prepared to make the attempt, and the six seaplanes were hoisted out; and at 5.55 a.m., when the weather appeared a little brighter, the signal was made to them to proceed. Owing to the rain, four of the machines failed to rise from the water; one flew 12 miles, but had two engine failures due to the rain, and returned; and the sixth, after slipping its 100 lb. bomb, managed to rise and flew 20 miles, but returned owing to the remote chance of finding the objective and the uselessness of endangering the force for no result.

¹ The reports are contained in the following papers: M. 03085/14, "Rear-Admiral, 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, Letter of Proceedings"; M. 03236/14, "Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, Operations in Heligoland Bight." Harwich Force Pack, Vol. IV, No. 0036, contains the reports of Comm. (T), Captain (D) (1), and Comdr. Lambe (*Engadine*).

² Including, that is, the diversion by Captain (D) (1) off the Ems.

³ A 295, 303.

⁴ A 280, 286.

⁵ Acting Wing-Commander Charles L. Lambe, *Engadine*.

Commodore Tyrwhitt had intended, as soon as the seaplanes set out for Cuxhaven, to steam out to sea with the light cruisers, returning an hour and a half later to pick up the seaplanes once more. Under the circumstances, however, both flotillas and seaplane carriers remained off Heligoland. The operation orders had laid down that the light cruisers were not to remain off Heligoland longer than two and a half hours from the time of starting the seaplanes. The two machines which had managed to rise returned about 7 a.m. and were hoisted inboard; and at 7.30 a.m., having been off Heligoland for three hours without molestation by the enemy, the force got under way and retired at 20 knots on Admiral Moore to the north-westward, who supported the retirement until the flotilla was clear of Terschelling.

Meanwhile, Captain Blunt in the *Fearless*, with two divisions of destroyers,¹ had been creating a diversion off the Ems. The force left Harwich shortly after Commodore Tyrwhitt, ostensibly for the usual Broad Fourteens patrol. At 4 a.m. on the 25th, Captain Blunt was off the entrance to the Western Ems, and proceeded to patrol east and west about seven miles from the entrance. Commander B. M. Money, in the *Acheron*, had been detached off Terschelling with three destroyers, and these four boats approached the entrance of the Western Ems as closely as possible,² in the hope of driving towards the *Fearless* any patrols which might be out. No enemy were encountered, although the *Acheron*'s division advertised its presence by the firing of a few shells towards Borkum; and after some ten minutes the division withdrew at 8 knots.

Though the raid was a failure it had demonstrated that no mines existed in the area occupied, and that the objectives were beyond the reach of seaplanes carrying bombs. To Commodore Tyrwhitt it appeared that the Germans kept practically no watch on the coast, and though this was true by night it was not so by day, for their day dispositions apparently remained the same as had been adopted after the raid of August 28.

87. German Submarine Offensive on the Belgian Coast, October 22 to November 2.—The only enemy to be encountered during the operation was a seaplane which sighted the force at 9.5 a.m. on the 25th, and a German submarine which the *Badger*, one of the destroyers of Captain Blunt's force, attacked in the Broad Fourteens on the evening of October 24. For more than a week after the attempt by the enemy during the second week in October to disturb, by means of submarines, the transport of troops across the Channel and to prevent the arrival of transports from India and the Dominions, no more German submarines were dispatched to the Channel. The appearance of Admiral Hood's

¹ *Faulknor, Acheron, Archer, Ariel, Badger, Beaver, Hind, Hydra, Lapwing, Lizard.*

² Estimated position of *Acheron*, 4.15 a.m., 1 mile west of Western Ems Mirror Buoy.

forces off the Belgian coast was the signal for a renewed submarine offensive in the Narrow Seas, undertaken at the instance of the General Staff of the Army.¹

That an attempt would be made to disturb Admiral Hood's operations was fully anticipated by the Admiralty. On October 21, *U.21* was reported to be in Ostend harbour, and there was intelligence that the Germans were sending submarines in sections to the Belgian ports.² The situation ashore was critical and, in spite of the submarine menace, it was impossible to withdraw our ships from the coast—indeed, more vessels, chiefly old sloops, small cruisers and gunboats, were being sent across. The destroyers of the Dover patrol were protecting the ships on the coast in addition to their patrol and escort duties; and in one of these Admiral Hood hoisted his flag to direct the operations. Other devices, such as zaribas of nets strung from lighters, within which the ships might lie, were being tried, to protect the vessels engaged in bombarding. Arrangements were made for the ships on the coast to replenish their ammunition at Dunkirk in place of returning to Dover, and all ships of value, such as light cruisers, were sent back to Dover.

A further effect of the submarine danger in the Channel and the possession by the Germans of potential bases at Zeebrugge and Ostend was that the Dreadnought battleships of the Grand Fleet had to be diverted from Portsmouth to Devonport for refitting. Admiral Jellicoe had already been compelled to divert ships from Devonport, however, owing to the congestion of the dockyard with cruisers refitting, and Portsmouth had to be taken into use again, with special precautions to ensure the safety of the Grand Fleet ships.³

On October 23, the Belgian authorities agreed to the destruction of Ostend harbour. The British military authorities were not yet prepared, however, to abandon hope of recapturing it in the near future, and the destruction of the docks and quays by bombardment was postponed.⁴

The report that *U.21* was at Ostend on October 21 was incorrect, for, as already stated, Lieutenant-Commander Hensing had returned to Emden on the previous day, after his failure to get into wireless communication with the High Sea Fleet,⁵ nor was there, at the moment, a single German submarine in the Channel or off the Belgian coast. The orders for a submarine offensive against Admiral Hood's ships had, however, already gone out. Three boats, *U.24*, *U.27* and *U.30*, left the Ems on October 22, while *U.19* followed on the 24th, and *U.28* two days later.

It was the fourth of these, *U.19*, which the *Badger*⁶ attacked on the 24th, during the diversion against the Ems. At 7.25 p.m. that day, in 52° 51' N, 4° 12' E, the *Badger*, leading the 2nd

¹ G.O.H. II, p. 213. ³ A 228, 256, 291. ⁵ See Section 60.

² A 305, 308. ⁴ A 305, 306, 321, 323. ⁶ Comdr. C. A. Fremantle.

Division, sighted *U.19* proceeding on the surface at high speed, and rammed her just before the conning-tower at 12 knots. Unfortunately, Commander Fremantle stopped his engines, instead of continuing his course at full speed to force the enemy boat under. Destroyer and submarine became disengaged from one another, and though the *Badger* opened fire *U.19* was able to submerge before she had suffered any more essential damage than the wrecking of one of her mineguards.¹ Commander Fremantle's report made it appear certain that he had sunk the submarine, and an announcement to this effect was made; but subsequent investigation of the evidence showed that it was obvious the enemy boat had escaped. *U.19* had, in fact, received slight damage when the *Badger* rammed her, but the pumps were able to keep the water under, and Lieutenant-Commander Kolbe brought her safely back to Germany. The *Badger's* stem was badly injured and she had to be detached to Harwich without taking part in the operation off the Ems.

Meanwhile, reports had been coming in to the Admiralty which made it clear that the ships off the Belgian coast were running considerable risk.² The sloop *Wildfire* and the destroyer *Myrmidon* reported about noon on the 23rd that they had been unsuccessfully attacked by submarines; the s.s. *Brussels* reported a submarine that day 26 miles E½N from the Galloper, two more were reported at 11.30 a.m. in 51° 56' N, 2° 50' E; and intelligence came in to the Admiralty on the same day that *U.24* had been sighted off Ymuiden at 1 p.m. on the 22nd. All ships were now withdrawn to Dunkirk, with the exception of those actually engaged in bombarding; and in addition to the nets which the Admiralty were sending over to be slung from lighters for the protection of the ships, towing charges were prepared for use in shallow water by the destroyers engaged in protecting the bombarding vessels.³ On October 25 two "C" class submarines were sent to Dunkirk to lie in wait for German submarines coming from Ostend. One of them, *C.32* (Lieutenant-Commander B. V. Layard), spent several hours within a mile of the entrance to Ostend harbour, and this convinced Commodore Keyes that a resolute enemy submarine commander should be able to get within range of Admiral Hood's ships off the coast.⁴ But the difficulties of approach among the shoals were apparently too great for the Germans, and although alarms occurred, nothing worse than interruptions of a temporary nature were caused to the bombarding operations. It was thought by the German submarine officers that the fishing vessels in the Broad Fourteens were working in conjunction with the destroyer patrols, but this was not a fact. Of the British mined area at the

¹ M. 03113/14 and G.O.H. II, pp. 221-2.

² See Appendix M.

³ On October 24 Captain Claude G. R. Brandon (retired) was placed in charge of the arrangements for protecting the ships on the Belgian coast against submarine attacks.

⁴ Comm. (S), War Records, I, 663.

entrance to the Straits the German commanders seem to have had no very serious apprehensions, and they constantly passed through it both on the surface and submerged, and they frequently sighted mines. All the five boats dispatched to the Belgian coast during this offensive took the route close under the Dutch coast to the Maas Light Vessel, thence west to the meridian of 2° 30' E and down the western edge of the North Hinder and Fairy Bank, and they all passed undamaged through minefields 44 or 67 (a).¹

On October 14, during the raid on the Channel transports, when it was evident that the British minefield off the Straits of Dover had not sufficed to prevent the entry of German submarines, Admiral Jellicoe had suggested its extension.² His proposals were not immediately put into effect, but the Admiralty a few days later began to reinforce the German mined area off Orfordness and Lowestoft, as a protection against raids.³ Many of these early British mines broke adrift or dragged their moorings, and there were constant reports of mines sighted in the southern part of the North Sea.⁴ Sandettie and Ruytingen Light Vessels had been extinguished after the attack on the *Attentive*, on September 27, and they were withdrawn by the French on October 20; the West Hinder, a Belgian lightship, was removed on October 26, a buoy being left for a short time in the position of the light vessel; and the Galloper was extinguished on the following day. On October 29, on account, apparently, of the fear of German mines, the Dutch North Hinder Light Vessel, which had already been extinguished before the first German submarine entered the Channel, was moved from its position in 51° 35' N, 2° 37' E to 51° 47' N, 2° 41' E (approximately).⁵ Wielingen, which with Wandelaar Light Vessel, had been abandoned by its crew on October 19, was occupied and relighted by the Germans on the 24th. On October 27 the order went out from the Admiralty that with certain specified exceptions all lightships, lightbuoys, and buoys were to be removed from the Thames approaches. All lights west of 2° E were now extinguished between 7 p.m. and 6 a.m.⁶

88. Attack on the "Amiral Ganteaume," October 26.—

Although the German submarines were unable to achieve their object and drive Admiral Hood's ships from off the Belgian coast, they found other victims. On October 26 the civilised world was shocked by the announcement of the torpedoing by

¹ See G.O.H. II, Karte 11.

² A 206.

³ On October 19 the *Apollo*, *Andromache*, and *Intrepid* laid Field 3, about 23 miles east of Orfordness, 300 mines, 20 ft. below L.W.O.S., 150 ft. apart. On October 21 the same ships laid a similar minefield 15 miles east of Covehithe Ness (Lowestoft). The Admiralty also intended to reinforce the Humber minefield, but it was eventually decided not to do so for the present.

⁴ See Admiralty telegrams of date.

⁵ H.S. 69, p. 608; 70, p. 943. Notices to Mariners, 1704/1914, and 1723/1914. But cf. *ibid.* 1448/1914.

⁶ A 341, 360.

a German submarine off Gris Nez of the French s.s. *Amiral Ganteaume*, crowded with Belgian refugees, including men, women, and children. This was the act of Lieutenant-Commander Schneider in *U.24*. Leaving the Ems on October 22, she passed undamaged through the minefield off the North Hinder,¹ sighting a row of ten of the mines, and arrived off Nieuport on the afternoon of the 23rd.² It was not until the 26th that Lieutenant-Commander Schneider found a victim. At 4.10 p.m. he sighted a large steamer steering for Boulogne, her decks crowded with people. Without ascertaining whether these were troops or not, the German commander fired a torpedo at the ship and then dived to avoid a destroyer 3,000 yards off. The vessel was the *Amiral Ganteaume*,³ and though the British s.s. *Queen* succeeded in rescuing most of the 2,000 passengers, some 40 were killed by the explosion or drowned.

Although it was at first reported that the *Amiral Ganteaume* had been sunk by a mine, the Admiralty suspected that she had been torpedoed. The sailing of all transports for Calais and Boulogne was stopped for several hours, and Vice-Admiral Favereau, who had relieved Admiral Rouyer on October 20, was asked to pay particular attention to the patrol of the Southampton-Finisterre route, for the protection of our transports sailing to the East.⁴

89. Loss of the "Hermes," October 31.—At the time of the sinking of the *Amiral Ganteaume* the situation on the Belgian coast was approaching a crisis. The sluices were opened on October 27, but until the water had risen the fire of our ships and even the landing of parties from them with machine guns was indispensable,⁵ and they had to remain at their posts, suffering a number of casualties, and in the presence of enemy submarines which frequently attacked the destroyers guarding the bombarding vessels.⁶ The *Venerable*, by her timely arrival on the 26th, did much to save Nieuport from falling into the enemy's hands, and two days later she reported that she had been attacked by a submarine in West Deep. This was incorrect, for it was not until November 8 that a German submarine succeeded in penetrating into West Deep; it was an isolated incursion, and for the most part the enemy boats hunted in waters less dangerous to navigation.⁷

¹ See Plan 2.

² G.O.H. II, p. 213.

³ Her name is not given in G.O.H. II, pp. 219-20, whence these details are extracted, but it is clear she was the *Amiral Ganteaume*.

⁴ A 333, 334, 343, and H.S. 70, p. 812.

⁵ On October 18, in response to an urgent application from the Belgians, Lieutenant E. S. Wise was landed with a machine gun detachment. Lieutenant Wise was killed and four men were wounded.

⁶ Cf. Papers titled C. 1056/1914, "H.M.S. *Bustard*, Report of Proceedings." Rear-Admiral Hood's Report of Proceedings of this date is titled X 3940/1914.

⁷ Cf. G.O.H. II, Karte 11.

By October 28 Commander Samson's aircraft had been reduced by heavy work until he had only one machine fit to go up. More machines were sent over to Dunkirk on the 30th in the *Hermes*, which left again next morning for Dover without destroyer escort.¹ About 8.15 a.m. on the 31st, Lieutenant-Commander Wegener of *U.27*, one of the five German submarines dispatched to the Flanders coast between October 22 and 26, sighted her off the Outer Ruytingen. In a few minutes *U.27* reached a position 300 yards off and at 8.23 a.m. she fired a torpedo. The *Hermes* saw the track of the torpedo and put her helm hard over, but before she could complete the turn the torpedo struck her aft. Five minutes later *U.27* fired a second torpedo, which also took effect. The *Hermes* sank in a few minutes though destroyers and the cross-Channel steamer *Invicta* were quickly on the scene and most of the crew were saved. The Admiralty had already been considerably exercised by the submarine danger; and they now issued orders that no vessel larger than a destroyer or, in exceptional cases, a scout, was to cross the Channel east of the meridian of Greenwich except during the dark hours.² It was clear that the position of the *Venerable* on the Belgian coast was fraught with too much danger, and she was withdrawn to Sheerness that night.³ The military situation on the Belgian front had now improved, but the old battleship *Revenge*, which had been prepared for bombarding, was held in readiness to take the place of the *Venerable* if required. Admiral Hood remained at Dunkirk, devising a scheme, in conjunction with the French, for meeting the submarine menace.

¹ Admiral Hood signalled to her about midnight October 30-31 to return to Dover. This signal has not been seen; it is not entered in the *Crusader's* log (in which Rear-Admiral Hood was flying his flag), and *Hermes'* log is not forthcoming; and it is not known whether the wording was such as to make it clear to Comdr. Lambe that on account of the submarine danger he was to return during the dark hours. Corbett, I, 264, says that 10 minutes before the *Hermes* was torpedoed a signal was made to her to return to Dunkirk on account of the presence of enemy submarines, but there is no record of this in the Report of the Loss of H.M.S. *Hermes* (papers titled C. 265/1915), or in the "Proceedings of the Court of Enquiry into the loss of H.M.S. *Hermes* on 31 October 1914" (papers titled C. 780/1914).

² A 375.

³ A 372.

NOTE TO APPENDICES A, B, C, D.

Times given in the headings to telegrams and signals are times of dispatch, unless otherwise noted. In cases where a code time was suffixed to the original telegram the time of dispatch has not been given unless delay occurred. Times of receipt are usually only given where delay in transmission occurred. Times of dispatch and receipt are G.M.T. Times occurring in text of messages are local time, *i.e.*, G.M.T. in case of telegrams of British origin, and S.M.T. (one hour fast on G.M.T.) in telegrams of French origin.

All telegrams and signals are reproduced exactly as sent or received.

The following abbreviations are employed:—

Adty. T.	Director of Transports, Admiralty.
A.D.P.	Rear-Admiral, Dover Patrol.
A.O.P.	Admiral of Patrols.
C.-in-C., H.F.	Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet.
D.N.T.O.	Divisional Naval Transport Officer.
F.N.A.	French Naval Attaché.
F.O.	Foreign Office.
I.G.C.	Inspector-General of Communications.
P.N.T.O.	Principal Naval Transport Officer.
W.O.	War Office.

APPENDIX A.

A 1. Adty. (First Lord) to C.-in-C., H.F. 24.8.14.
556 Personal. News from France is disappointing, and serious results of battle cannot yet be measured, as it still continues over enormous front.

I have had the telegrams about it repeated to you.

We have not entered the business without resolve to see it through, and you may be assured that our action will be proportioned to the gravity of the need.

I have absolute confidence in final result.

No special action is required from you at present, but you should address your mind to a naval situation which may arise where Germans control Calais and French coasts, and what ought to be the position of Grand Fleet in that event.

A 2. Adty. (First Lord) to C.-in-C., H.F. 24.8.14.
558 My 556. Following sent by British to French Admiralty.

Admiralty think it most important to naval interests to defend Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne as long as possible. We release Admiral Rouyer Armoured Cruiser Squadron to co-operate in the land defences of these three places. We will reinforce him if necessary with a battle squadron. French flotilla bases and naval stores at Calais and Boulogne can be transferred to Dover, and all preparations for that should be immediately worked out. We can supply any necessary water transport. We wish also to receive without delay French views about land defences of Dunkirk, Boulogne, Calais, and Havre, and what the military prospects are of holding each or all of them. We will, of course, assist in any way in our power. Lastly, we are considering shifting all military stores of British Expeditionary Force now at Boulogne to Cherbourg. We wish to know the French views on the necessity for this as the result of the present battle becomes more clear. War Office inform us they are addressing you on the question of the permanent defence of the neck of the Cotentin Peninsula, in case the course of the war should require it to be held as a place of arm and sea base for British reinforcements.

24.8.14.

Sent 7.5 p.m.

Recd. 7.30 p.m.

A 3. Marine, Paris, to Adty. (F.N.A.)
17 Kindly inform the British Admiralty that, on the receipt of your telegram, orders were sent to Dunkirk and Calais to clear the floating dock of destroyers (? torpedo boats) and submarines. At present, according to our information, the situation does not appear to necessitate the rupture of our (? arrangerments) for the Channel and the sending of Rouyer's fleet to Boulogne and Dunkirk, nor the support of an English squadron, for which we thank the British Admiralty. The battle is raging along the whole line, but the results are still unknown to us. As for the land defences of Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, and Le Havre, I will transmit to you information from the War Ministry as soon as received.

25.8.14.

A 4. A.C., 12th Cr. Sq. to Adty.

Recd. 11.39 a.m.

French Rear-Admiral Rouyer has withdrawn all armoured cruisers both from patrol and from supporting force. He has left me four light cruisers and three mercantile auxiliaries, with which I am continuing the Western Patrol. (0945.)

A 5. Adty. (F.N.A.), to Marine, Paris. 25.8.14.
12.25 p.m.
264 We await your reports about Dunkerque, Calais, and Boulogne defences. Although general situation is undetermined it is urgent and necessary that all contingencies should be fully surveyed. Armoured Cruiser Squadron can return to Cherbourg to coal.

A 6. Marine, Paris, to Adty. (F.N.A.) 25.8.14.
Recd. 6.5 p.m.
22 and 22 bis. Answer to telegram number 264 (25th August): Dunkirk being protected by fortifications on the land side, and floodable land is well defended.

Calais is defended by fortifications on the land side, but is not very important.

Boulogne cannot be defended—it is therefore convenient for Admiralty to transport to Cherbourg stores prepared for the British Army. Our Ministry for War gives the assurance that Cherbourg will have a double serious defence—one distant and another close.

In accordance with my telegram of last night, orders have been sent to Rear-Admiral Rouyer to send back to Cherbourg his armoured cruisers, torpedo boats, and submarines. He will have his cruisers replenished, and will bring them towards Boulogne and Calais.

A 7. Adty. to R.A., *Charybdis*. 25.8.14.
18 Number your telegrams. The Western Patrol will be maintained. Can any ships be spared from your force for other duties? What kind of vessels are the mercantile auxiliaries; would they be suitable for the trade route? (2200.)

A 8. Admiral, Devonport, to Adty. 26.8.14.
8.24 a.m.
3 Rear-Admiral, *Charybdis*, reports that owing to gap in patrol lines, due to absence of French cruisers, steamer passed through to northward (have) has not been examined. This message has been sent to Admiralty, Senior Naval Officer, Scotland, and C.-in-C., Portsmouth.

A 9. Marine, Paris, to Adty. (F.N.A.) 26.8.14.
12.4 p.m.
28 and 28 bis. It seems useless to make ships co-operate in the land defence of Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne. I propose to you the following use of the ships of Rouyer's fleet.

Two divisions torpedo boats and the first division submarines would be put at the disposal of the Admiralty. The second division submarines would continue duty Straits of Dover. Division *Gloire, Gueydon, Dupetit-Thomas*¹ (French) can be employed to chase enemy's cruisers, according to your instructions. Other ships of Rear-Admiral Rouyer would continue duty of watching in the Channel as soon as transport of our material from Boulogne to Cherbourg and of our personnel from Cherbourg to Havre is completed.

A 10. Adty. (F.N.A.), to Marine, Paris. 26.8.14.
12.20 p.m.
269 We should regard German occupation of Calais as a serious naval disadvantage. We hope you will share our views. Energetic measures are required from you or us or both to secure this place effectually for some time to come.

¹ Should be *Dupetit-Thouars*.

A 11. Adty. (F.N.A.), to Marine, Paris. 26.8.14.
12.35 p.m.
270 (In cypher.) The Admiralty asks you to send as soon as possible a division of destroyers of the 2nd Light Squadron to Dover to take the place of British destroyers sent eastward in view of the landing of British troops at Ostend.

A 12. Marine, Paris, to Adty. (F.N.A.) 26.8.14.
Sent 2.45 p.m.
Recd. 2.49 p.m.
29 Answer to telegram No. 270. Order has been given to Admiral Rouyer to send as quickly as possible a division of destroyers to Dover.

A 13. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. 26.8.14.
3.45 p.m.
579 Re your narrative of 22nd August. *Albion, Glory, Canopus* and *Ocean* have been detached to form supports at focal points on trade route in anticipation of any raids by hostile battle cruisers.

Glory .. Halifax and New York.
Ocean .. Queenstown.
Canopus .. St. Vincent, C. de Verde.
Albion .. St. Vincent to Gibraltar.

A 14. Marine, Paris, to Adty. (F.N.A.) 26.8.14.
Recd. 4.15 p.m.
32 (Translation of telegram partly in code.)
(*Enclair.*) Answer to number 1: Information from War Department. There has been a misunderstanding in our telegram number 22 of 25th August.

(In code.) Calais causes no anxiety, its defence by land being to-day assured.

(*Enclair.*) Please acknowledge receipt.

A 15. A.C., 12th C.S., to Adty. 26.8.14.
Recd. 6.29 p.m.
2 In further reference to your 481. French mercantile auxiliary *Savoie* has now joined patrol; the other two French mercantile auxiliaries are *Flandre, Malte*; of these, *Savoie* is the only one which might be suitable for trade route.

With the four French cruisers and three French mercantile auxiliaries it is not possible to ensure having more than five French vessels on the line at the same time, and *Savoie* could not therefore be spared without replacement. (1625.)

A 16. Adty. (F.N.A.), to Marine, Paris. 26.8.14.
7.55 p.m.
272 Your telegram No. 32 received. The Admiralty requests you to let the Division *Gloire, Gueydon, Dupetit-Thouars* (French) stay at Cherbourg, holding themselves in readiness to weigh anchor at four hours' notice, in view of the operations in the east of the Channel.

The Admiralty is now transporting 3,000 Marines to Ostend, their landing being supported by armoured cruisers and destroyers. Landing will be finished to-morrow evening; one must be prepared for a sortie of the German squadron as a consequence of this operation, and it will be necessary to remain in force in the Channel.

The Admiralty requests you to consider this information as absolutely secret until the landing is accomplished.

A 17. A.C., 2nd and 3rd Fleets, to A.O.P. 26.8.14.
Intercepted by Adty. 9.40 p.m.

Marseillaise reports in accordance with Admiralty instructions French destroyer flotilla leaves Cherbourg for Dover at 7 p.m. to-night.

A 18. Adty. to *Charybdis*. 27.8.14.
12.50 a.m.
20 Your number 2. Your proposals are approved.

A 19. Marine, Paris, to Adty. Sent 11.38 p.m.
26.8.14.
Recd. 6.55 a.m.
27.8.14.

34 The *Gloire* and the *Dupetit-Thouars* (French) are at this moment replenishing at Brest. They will leave at once (group corrupt) for Cherbourg. I renew offer to put at disposal of Admiralty for all operations in the Channel, the Straits of Dover, or North Sea flotilla of torpedo boats and submarines of the 2nd Light Squadron. A single division remains with Rear-Admiral Rouyer.

A 20. Adty. to C.-in-C., Devonport. 28.8.14.
11.30 a.m.

Commodore Phillimore is to take command of *Inflexible* as Captain. Admiral's staff to be landed before sailing. *Inflexible* is then to proceed through Irish Channel to join the flag of Vice-Admiral Commanding 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron. Acknowledge.

A 21. Adty. to all Ships and Naval Centres. 28.8.14.
11.35 a.m.

In addition to moored mines the enemy might be sowing Leon unmoored mines.

These mines cannot be swept for. They will probably come to the surface within 48 hours of dropping. A description of this mine will be circulated to all ships.

A 22. Adty. to R.A., *Euryalus*. 28.8.14.
12.40 p.m.

Send destroyers into Harwich to oil. Approved for *Euryalus* to carry out firing, giving necessary warning. There will be little chance of a German destroyer attack for a day or two. To guard ships at Ostend. Watch southern end of Broad Fourteens. Some destroyers will be sent out as soon as oiled. Acknowledge.

A 23. Adty. to C.-in-C., Devonport. 28.8.14.
6.5 p.m.

Illustrious to proceed to Loch Ewe with dispatch. Acknowledge.

A 24. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. 28.8.14.

The Russians are placing a large order for coal from Blyth and Cardiff. One collier left on 18th for Archangel, others are leaving Blyth to-day—stop—Archangel is their only free port, they are also sending important consignments of guns. Stop.

You are to send one of the *Edgar* class to complete with coal forthwith, and then order her to proceed north calling at Alexandrovsk for information as to whether any enemy's ships have been seen in the White Sea. If there is no sign of the enemy—ship can return rendering any assistance to vessels en route. List of vessels being sent by post. (2020.)

A 25. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F., via Wick W/T. 28.8.14.
8.30 p.m.

You are to consider and arrange as soon as convenient a sweep of cruisers, light cruisers and 2nd and 4th Division of Destroyers into Skagerrak.

The battle cruisers supporting them to the entrance and the battle fleet taking up a position to prevent them being embayed by the High Sea Fleet.

A 26. A.C., 12th C.S., to Adty. 29.8.14.

5 Following message received from French Admiral *Marseillaise* :— Forwarded following to authorities concerned : one torpedo boat and three submarines will be sent from Cherbourg to the line Calais-Boulogne, 30th August, 2 a.m. ; their speed will be 10 knots. (1640.)

A 27. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 29.8.14.

247 V.A.C., 1st B.C.S., reports that German prisoners state German High Seas Fleet has been augmented by vessels from Baltic Sea and is expected to move at any time. (1045.)

A 28. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 29.8.14.
6.59 p.m.

248 I propose coaling Dreadnought battlefleet Monday, 31st August. 3rd Battle Squadron coaling now. Battle and light cruisers coaling Sunday. If no movement of High Seas Fleet propose Skagerrak movement for Wednesday or Thursday daylight.

A 29. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. 29.8.14.
7.37 p.m.

603 For information. Friendly member of neutral Embassy at Constantinople states German Ambassador has told him that German Fleet will attack suddenly directly after a victory over Allied forces on land.

A 30. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 30.8.14.
1.40 a.m.

254 The need of more destroyers for patrol work off Cromarty and Scapa Flow to meet the submarine and mine menace is much felt. Could 12 be spared from southern ports? A minefield in vicinity of these bases might prove disastrous. An efficient patrol would prevent mines being dropped.

Reply. 31.8.14.

Your 254. Not possible to spare more destroyers from the south. Eight armed trawlers are being sent to you.

A 31. Marine, Paris, to Adty. 30.8.14.
11.50 p.m., 29.8.14.

57 According to a telegram from Copenhagen dated 29th August mid-day six battleships type *Wellin* (German) and two armoured cruisers traversed the Belt of Fehmarn on 25th August, steering towards Kiel.

Unusual movement has prevailed for some days past at Wilhelmshaven and Kiel, and gives the impression that the Germans are preparing perhaps for offensive action in the North Sea.

(Passed 617 to C.-in-C., H.F.)

A 32. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Paris. 31.8.14.
1 a.m.

14 Will you kindly let us know in detail the nature and extent of the defences of Calais and Dunkirk, the number of guns mounted in modern works, and the strength of the garrisons. These places being of very great importance to our naval arrangements, we are anxious to form an exact impression of their military strength.

A 33. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

31.8.14.
9.30 a.m.

263 I am arranging for reconnaissance towards Skagerrak for daylight 3rd September, looking in Aalbeck Bight¹ for submarines. Battlefleet will move to south during the same forenoon as far as approximately lat. 56° 30' N, long. 6° 00' E. On return of reconnoitring force whole of Grand Fleet will sweep to north-westward. Submit battle cruisers and flotillas of southern forces may co-operate by carrying out following movements, leaving bases p.m., 2nd September, in time to arrive at lat. 53° 30' N, long. 3° 30' E, at 3 a.m., 3rd September, thence sweeping northwards at 15 knots in line ahead, patrolling as far as lat. 55° N on lookout for German minelayers returning from our coasts. On reaching lat. 55° N, force to proceed at 15 knots towards the Naze, but not crossing meridian 5° E unless ordered. Turn at 6 p.m. or time signalled and sweeping towards Aberdeen until daylight and then sweeping back to bases. If all approved, request instructions may be given to Flag Officers concerned and Comm. (T), and also inform Comm. (S). Consider it most desirable to take steps to destroy German minelayers' movements, have taken this as part object.

Reply.

31.8.14.
7 p.m.

615 Your 263. The whole movement is deferred for the present. Acknowledge.

Further reply.

31.8.14.
10.55 p.m.

277 Your 615. Northern Force is ready, but unless I hear by 8 a.m. to-morrow that Southern Force can co-operate will substitute sweep of middle area North Sea.

Further reply.

1.9.14.
2.35 a.m.

622 Your 277. No special operations should be undertaken till you receive a further message from Admiralty to-morrow. Acknowledge.

A 34. A.C., 7th C.S., to Adty.

31.8.14.

20 Vice-Admiral Commanding *Vengeance* directs me he does not require my assistance. Request instructions. (1903.)

Reply.

Your 20. Continue to patrol on the Broad Fourteens. (2235.)

A 35. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

31.8.14.
8.35 p.m.

618 French Admiralty have received following from Copenhagen:—Copenhagen, 30th August, 11.10. All the ships which had come to Kiel to replenish passed through the Canal yesterday, 29th August, to return to the North Sea. It has been noticed by fishermen that whereas one squadron of the High Seas Fleet is generally under steam and manœuvres round Heligoland, another squadron remains at anchor three or four miles south of the island. Signed Bapst.

A 36. Adty. to Marine, Paris.

31.8.14.
4.30 p.m.

291 As base of British Expeditionary Force has been changed to St. Nazaire, the Admiralty would be obliged if one division of armoured cruisers of the 2nd Light Squadron were sent at once to patrol and cover the route from Ushant to Finisterre. This would allow the British cruisers watching this route to spread further south. At present there is no sign of enemy's ships in the Bay of Biscay, but when it is known that the base has been changed it is possible that a raid may be made on the transports. The other division of armoured cruisers should be kept at Cherbourg ready to relieve the first or go to the East as may be required.

¹ Inside the Skaw.

Reply.

1.9.14.
10.45 a.m.

French division *Gloire* weighed anchor last night for cruise between Ushant and Cape Finisterre as requested in your telegram 291.

A 37. Adty. to Naval Air Base, Sheerness.

1.9.14.
12.35 a.m.

Aeroplanes ordered to remain at Dunkirk with transport, send stores over in morning in *Riviera*. Withdraw all land machines from stations leaving two at Immingham and Scapa Flow. Prepare as many machines as you can for reinforcing Dunkirk Station.

A 38. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

1.9.14.
4.25 a.m.

623 Following message received from a usually reliable source at 8.40 p.m. last night, begins:—

We have heard from a friend that the attack is not to be made to-morrow, but they are coming out of the Baltic, Thursday [3rd September] midnight—four cruisers and six submarines—no torpedo boats; they are not going up north, but are making straight across and hope to destroy some of our battleships.

A 39. F.O. to H.M. Ambassadors, Paris (526) and Antwerp (95).

1.9.14.
9 a.m.

Urgent. Admiralty propose to form an aeroplane station at Dunkirk. About 20 aeroplanes will be assembled for patrol work along the coast and some distance inland. You should notify the Government to which you are accredited, and request that all possible facilities may be afforded for forming this air patrol.

Reply.

Ambassador, Paris, to F.O.

The Ministry of War has no objection to proposed aeroplane patrol, and will give the necessary facilities.

A 40. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Bordeaux.

Date not known
(about Sept. 1).

526 The Admiralty considers it extremely important to deny the use of territory within 100 miles radius of Dunkirk to German zeppelins, and to attack by aeroplane all airships found replenishing there. With your permission the Admiralty wish to take necessary measures to maintain aerial command of this region. The Admiralty proposes therefore to place 30 or 40 naval aeroplanes at Dunkirk, or other convenient coast points. In order that these may have good radius of action they must be able to establish mobile temporary bases 40 or 50 miles inland. The Admiralty desires to reinforce Officer Commanding aeroplanes with 50 or 60 armed motor cars and 200 or 300 men. This small force will operate in conformity with the wishes of the French military authorities, but we hope it may be accorded a free initiative. The immunity of Portsmouth, Chatham, and London from dangerous aerial attack is closely involved.

Note.—This telegram is taken from Air Department Secret publication, 6th November 1914, "Royal Naval Air Service." The original has not been seen.

A 41. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Paris.

1.9.14.
1.50 p.m.

295 The Admiralty requests you to send to Portsmouth a division of submarines of the 2nd Light Squadron to help in the defence, the British submarines having been sent to the East Coast.

A 42. Marine, Paris, to Adty. (F.N.A.) 1.9.14.
Recd. 4.55 p.m.

75 Kindly communicate to Admiralty following telegram, requesting their instructions, because they dispose of all our ships in the English Channel: The Military Governor of Dunkirk, anticipating an attack in the near future, requests for Dunkirk six destroyers and one light cruiser to co-operate with troops in retarding investment on the east side.

Reply. 10.40 p.m.

Your 75. Quite concur in sending the light cruiser and six destroyers to Dunkirk. Will you give the necessary orders?

A 43. Adty. to C-in-C., H.F. 2.9.14.
1.14 p.m.

631 It is thought that the four cruisers with submarines mentioned in No. 623 would make for the Naze, skirt Norway coast to the lat. of the Orkneys, then go across. If so, a cruiser squadron coming down south keeping out of sight of Norwegian coast would have a chance of getting behind them and sweeping westward might eventually cut them off. It is for your consideration whether this should be tried.

Reply. Recd. 9.45 p.m.

300 Your telegrams Nos. 623 and 631. Am endeavouring to intercept this expedition with strong force of cruisers and destroyers Friday daylight. Battlefleet at sea eastward of Orkney Islands.

A 44. Adty. to V.A., *Vengeance* (77), V.A., *Lord Nelson* (95) 2.9.14.
R.A., *Euryalus* (48), A.O.P. (48). 7.55 p.m.

Sapphire is to be an additional ship in the Dover Patrol under the orders of A.O.P.

A 45. Adty. to C-in-C., H.F. 3.9.14.
7.45 p.m.

642 With reference to Plan IV sent by special officer to Scapa. Information taken from prisoners 28th August indicates that German battle cruisers were preparing to come out in support but were late. We must therefore be prepared to meet not only battle cruisers, but perhaps a division of the High Sea Fleet or the whole fleet. You should therefore be in a position with the Grand Fleet, to take full advantage of so fortunate a chance. If you keep east of long. 6 E there should be small danger from mines. Five cruisers of class *Bacchante* will be off Terschelling by 4 a.m. to support the 1st Flotilla, and will advance N 60° E magnetic at 15 knots for three hours towards them. Report earliest date that will suit for the operation after your present cruiser sweep against four cruisers and submarines.

Reply. 4.9.14.

309 Your 642. Grand Fleet must coal first. Earliest possible date fleet can be in southern position to co-operate is Wednesday (9th September) daylight. Should much prefer Thursday 10th to allow for contingencies and perfecting arrangements. Order in M 0075 will require amendment as 1st and 3rd Flotillas should close battlefleet ready for fleet action instead of proceeding direction of Harwich. Approximate cruising position of battlefleet, 8 a.m. to noon, would be lat. 55° 30' N long 4° E. Dreadnought type battlefleet will arrive Loch Ewe Saturday evening. 3rd Battle Squadron, Scapa Flow. Latter base not very safe till anti-submarine drift nets, being prepared, are in position. Please inform me as soon as possible of date selected. (0850.)

Further reply.

655 Your 309. Thursday morning 10th approved. Cancel Adty. tel. 649. Plan will be modified as you suggest. Acknowledge. (1519.)

A 46. Adty. to R.A., 11th C.S. 4.9.14.
2 p.m.

30 As soon as convenient you are to transfer your Flag to *Caronia* and proceed to North America. You will there transfer your Flag to the *Glory* and remain in charge of the North American and West Indies Station. *Caronia* is to remain under your orders . . . Cruiser Force E is to be temporarily under the orders of Senior Officer for the present. Acknowledge.

A 47. Adty. to R.A., *Albion*. 4.9.14.
4 p.m.

558 You are to transfer your Flag to *Sutlej* and return in her to take command of Cruiser Force E. *Sutlej* is to convoy the transports which are being got ready including *Ultonia* from Malta. Probable date 9th at Gibraltar. *Albion* is to complete with coal and proceed to St. Vincent, Cape Verde, under the orders of R.A. Stoddart. *Ocean* is being sent out to replace *Albion*. She will be under the orders of R.A. de Robeck, and stationed off Cape St. Vincent. Acknowledge and report whether you know the station limits and composition of Cruiser Force E.

A 48. Adty. to Comm. (T). 4.9.14.

59 To scout and look out for minelaying steamers or trawlers. *Fearless* and eight destroyers are to leave Harwich between 4 and 6 a.m. to-morrow Saturday; proceed via Yarmouth at economical speed and patrol with destroyers spread the meridian of 3° E between lat. 55° and lat. 56° 20' N, returning from the southern end of their beat sunset Sunday. Three *Bacchantes* if ready will be in support on the meridian of 3° E in lat. 54° 20' N.

A 49. R.A., *Doris*, to Adty. 4.9.14.
10 p.m.

28 Your wireless message No. 1400 of to-day. Am transferring Flag to *Caronia* to-morrow and leaving p.m. for destination. Captain of *Ocean* will be left in charge of Cruiser Force E. Are there any further orders for me?

A 50. V.A., *Lord Nelson*, to Adty. 5.9.14.
1.10 a.m.

Following message received from *Marseillaise*: The Governor of Dunkirk, having considerable amount of guns and troops at his disposal, has no further use for the destroyers or for the cruisers. Propose, if Admiralty agrees, to withdraw these vessels and use them to defend the west of the English Channel. Will leave at Dunkirk about 12 T.B.s.

A 51. Adty. to *Ocean*. 5.9.14.
9.40 a.m.

You are to be prepared to accompany *Minerva* in convoying 14 transports from Southampton to Gibraltar, sailing on 8th. Further orders as to rendezvous. Acknowledge.

A 52. Adty. to all Ships. 5.9.14.

537 It is now evident that the Germans are using vessels disguised as neutrals or even British ships for the purpose of laying mines in the North Sea. Commanding Officers are therefore directed to use the utmost vigilance in stopping and searching enemy vessels they encounter in these waters. Enemy's vessels may be sunk if there is any difficulty in sending them into harbour. Neutral vessels may also be sunk in the case of any resistance or if sending them in will endanger the efficiency of the service on which H.M. Ships are employed (*see* Articles 76 and 77, Naval Prize Manual), namely, the watch for and capture of minelayers. In all cases every endeavour should be made not to cause unnecessary loss of life. Persons caught minelaying under a neutral flag will be brought before a court-martial without delay.

A 53. Adty. to Patrols and Naval Centres. 6.9.14.

Admiralty have requested Custom House to give orders to all Customs Authorities that no foreign trawlers are to be allowed to leave port until they have been carefully and thoroughly searched. There is a strong suspicion that they have been laying mines, and that they have been carrying extra hands for this purpose. Customs Authorities have been ordered to report at once any suspicious circumstances to the Admiralty and the local S.N.O.

A 54. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 6.9.14.

328 It appears evident that the difficulties of patrolling the coast to prevent minelaying are very largely increased by the fact that so many steamers are using East Coast ports. Force available to board them is quite insufficient, and minelaying becomes easy. It seems essential to close entire East Coast to trade north of the Thames, and I recommend this.

Reply.

We are very reluctant to do this, and do not think that the circumstances justify such an extreme measure and the loss that it would entail.

A 55. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 6.9.14.

330 With my 328 the permission given fishing vessels to fish on the East Coast facilitates minelaying by German trawlers. Consider permission should be withdrawn, as large numbers of trawlers fish eastward of Pentland Firth. Impossible to board even a fraction of the number.

A 56. Adty. to all Ships. 6.9.14.

To-morrow, Monday, and until further orders no lights on the coast and on light vessels on the East Coast of Scotland and England from Noss Head Light to Orford Ness inclusive will be lighted. The Shipwash, Outer Gabbard, and entrance to Thames light will not be extinguished for the present. The Swarte Bank Light Vessel is being removed. Dudgeon and Cromer Knoll Light Vessels will be removed. Outer Dowsing and Smiths Knoll will be removed and replaced by pillar buoys.

A 57. Adty. to French Ministry of Marine. 6.9.14.
2.55 p.m.

321 Please instruct Rear-Admiral Rouyer to protect with his armoured cruisers the route from Southampton to Ushant, and for the second division to protect the route from Ushant to St. Nazaire from to-morrow noon, in order to ensure passage of the 6th Division of the Expeditionary Force.

A 58. Adty. to T.O., Southampton. 6.9.14.
6.45 p.m.

Following message received from War Office . . . The 6th Division is to be held in readiness and preparations made for it to start moving to-morrow, 7.9.14, but not to move until ordered.

A 59. Adty. to *Ocean*. 6.9.14.
7.20 p.m.

You are to turn over the command of Cruiser Force E temporarily to the Senior Officer pending the arrival of R.A. Tottenham in the *Sutlej*. Copy of War Orders for Cruiser Force E will be sent to S.N.O., Queenstown, for Admiral Tottenham. *Ocean* will join *Minerva* and convoy of 14 transports at a rendezvous which will be telegraphed later. Date of convoy probably Tuesday (8 September).¹ On arrival at Gibraltar you will place yourself under the orders of R.A. de Robeck in command of Cruiser Force I. Acknowledge.

¹ Date was afterwards altered to 10th.

A 60. Adty. (T.) to T.O., Southampton. 7.9.14.
6.50 p.m.
Sixth Division sails Tuesday and Wednesday (8 and 9 September) . . .

A 61. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. 9.9.14.

685 Some limit must be placed to the activity of the German minelayers. It is most important to keep the entrances to Rosyth and Cromarty free. As a temporary measure until Thursday (10 September), the Tyne Patrol Flotilla has been sent to Peterhead for Cromarty Firth. C Squadron and the Destroyer Flotillas have been used to keep the Broad Fourteens and eastern side of Dogger Bank clear of mines. Patrol Flotillas not been able to prevent mines being laid 20-50 miles off the coast from Humber and Tyne although they have kept the inner Channel close to the land clear. The Coast Flotillas must be augmented by cruiser sweeps and patrols outside this distance off Scotland. After Plan IV arrange for one cruiser squadron spread to be continually patrolling north and south, between 50 and 150 miles from the Scottish coast as far south as latitude 55° 20' N, the distance from the coast varying with the time of day. These mines are believed to be laid at night by every class of vessel.

Reply. 10.9.14.

367 Your 685. Arrangements will be made. Area now being swept by Grand Fleet, I submit minelaying cannot be stopped until East Coast traffic is diminished. Impossible to board any large proportion of vessels unless most of the cruisers and T.B.s are used solely for this purpose. This difficulty is stated in your last paragraph 685. (1640.)

A 62. Adty. to V.A., Channel Fleet. 9.9.14.
12.20 p.m.

103 Secret. At 2.30 a.m., to-morrow the 10th, a destroyer attack is being made off Heligoland and the Ems, battle cruisers light cruisers in support. The Grand Fleet has moved down in further support. Weigh with all the Channel Fleet and move down towards the Straits of Dover. If nothing occurs the Fleet can return, carry out any exercise before reaching Portland. Acknowledge.

A 63. Adty. to C.-in-C., Nore. 10.9.14.

All fishing is prohibited between the latitude of Lowestoft and the longitude of Dungeness.

A 64. Adty. to R.A. Wemyss, *Charybdis*. 10.9.14.
4.45 p.m.

32 You and your squadron are going to be temporarily replaced by V.A. Bethell and four battleships. As soon as V.A. Bethell has relieved you, you are to get your squadron coaled and proceed to Canada fill up with coal there and bring back a convoy of about 14 transports of Canadian troops. They expect to be ready to sail about 24th. Further details will be sent to you. Turn over attached French officer all details and arrangements of Western Patrol to V.A. Bethell and report when you have done so. Acknowledge.

A 65. Adty. to V.A., *Lord Nelson* and V.A., *Vengeance*. 10.9.14.
8.15 p.m.

V.A. Bethell is to proceed at once with his four battleships and take command of the Western Patrol of the Channel, taking over details from R.A. Wemyss in *Charybdis*, who with his squadron of cruisers is required for convoy duty. His coaling base is Plymouth, and his patrol extends from the Lizard to Ushant. V.A., Channel Fleet can return to Portland as convenient. Acknowledge.

- A 66.** V.A., *Lord Nelson*, to Adty. 11.9.14.
1.36 p.m.
148 Following message received from *Marseillaise*. Begins: The 6th Division having passed English Channel, I have returned to Cherbourg. I am ready for sea at two hours' notice. Ends.
- A 67.** A.C., 12th C.S., to Adty. 11.9.14.
16 I have turned over to Vice-Admiral Bethell all arrangements of Western Patrol, and I am proceeding into harbour at Plymouth. (1600.)
- A 68.** A.C., 7th B.S., to Adty. 11.9.14.
92 Have taken over western patrol from R.A., *Charybdis*. (1700.)
- A 69.** Adty. to R.A., *Euryalus*, Comm. (T), and Capt (D) 1. 11.9.14.
Organise and maintain a watching patrol of one light cruiser and eight destroyers to watch for minelayers and submarines on the meridian of 3° E between lat. 55° 30' N and lat. 53° 30' N. Two *Bacchantes* are to be in support. The Broad Fourteens Patrol will also be maintained, one *Bacchante* being sufficient while others are coaling. This patrolling force should leave at daylight to-morrow. Arrange for its relief. Acknowledge.
- A 70.** C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 11.9.14.
373 I suggest for consideration that the German minelaying be met by retaliatory measures on our part. As first step propose the next movement south should have this for its object. All minelayers to be used each escorted by a division of destroyers. Mines to be laid on one side of Heligoland leaving the other side for submarines. Later it may be desirable to mine the other side of Heligoland, submarines working well outside the minefield. Time of laying mines 11 p.m. to 1 a.m. Our destroyers to prevent interference in operations. Details will require very careful working out. Most satisfactory method will be for meeting to be held in Edinburgh or Perth, attended by the Chief of the Staff, myself, Comm. (S) and Comm. (T), and Senior Officer of minelayers. If very early decision is given meeting could perhaps be arranged for Monday (14th) or Tuesday while fleet is coaling. Grand Fleet to complete Danish movement. Mines must be laid in accurate positions. Best departures would be from Horns Reef L.V. Is this working? Being fitted with W/T it would not do to sight it by day.
- A 71.** Adty. to French Ministry of Marine. 12.9.14.
12.45 p.m.
340 The 6th Division of the English Army having passed, the cruisers of Rear-Admiral Rouyer can return to Cherbourg. Two cruisers should hold themselves ready for weighing at eight hours' notice, the third cruiser at 48 hours' notice.
- A 72.** Adty. to Admiral, Devonport. 13.9.14.
Jupiter when ready is to relieve *Majestic* as gunnery ship at Devonport for present. Letter follows.
Extract from letter to V.A., Channel Fleets or V.A., 7th B.S.: "*Majestic* (without waiting until she is relieved by *Jupiter*) is to join the 7th Battle Squadron."
- A 73.** Adty. to V.A., *Vengeance*. 14.9.14.
4.34 p.m.
82 French Admiralty wish *Friant* for service on Moroccan coast. This has been concurred in. Adjust the patrol as necessary.

- A 74.** C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 14.9.14.
397 From report by 1st B.C.S., 1st L.C.S., it is most likely that presence of Grand Fleet and preparations for sweeping of 10th September were reported to Germans by complete cordon of apparently neutral fishing boats established about 150 miles from Heligoland. Suggest that Dogger Bank Patrol be ordered to take some into harbour for strict search for wireless gear, etc. etc. I propose to send force to south to take similar action to eastward 4th meridian arriving Thursday (17th September) daylight. During Wednesday this force will search for floating mines on Fisher Bank. Battlefleet will support movements.
- A 75.** Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. 14.9.14.
713 Your 397. A considerable portion of the German Fleet being actively occupied in the Baltic. It is a good time to rest the battlefleet for engine-room defects. In the meantime, the legal aspect of seizing neutral trawlers in the high sea is being considered.
Further Signal. 11.55 p.m.
717 Your 397 and my 713. You have full authority to send into British ports neutral vessels which hamper your operations. Your own discretion will show you importance of not appearing to maltreat flag of a small neutral.
- A 76.** C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 15.9.14.
416 Propose to carry out programme of my 397 (as modified in your 717) on Saturday (19th) and Sunday, combining a sweep down Norwegian coast by H.M.S. *Drake* and armed mercantile cruisers, from 60° N to Ekersund (Norway). The whole movement supported by battlefleet. Cruisers will start Friday. Battleships Friday and Saturday.
- A 77.** Adty. to *Euryalus*. 15.9.14.
60 Report present position of the ships of your squadron which are at sea. There is a rumour that four German cruisers and some destroyers are breaking out of Emden to-night. Concentrate your ships and watch the Broad Fourteens.
Reply.
15 My position 52° 24' N, 4° E. Course S 54 W, 12 knots. *Amethyst* in company, but no destroyers. Ordered *Bacchante* and *Cressy* join me off Maas River Light Vessel 5 a.m. (2110.)
- A 78.** *Euryalus* to Adty. 16.9.14.
Have withdrawn destroyers from three degrees patrol. (2317.) (15th September.)
- A 79.** Comm. (T) to Adty. 16.9.14.
214 Urgent. R.A., *Euryalus*, has ordered 10 destroyers to meet him 10 miles W by N from Maas Light Vessel. Destroyers are raising steam and are those detailed for both patrols Wednesday (16th), no other being available at present. Request instructions, observing that destroyers cannot reach *Euryalus* before 6 a.m. when their value would be doubtful. (2330.) (15th September.)
Reply. 2.5 a.m.
73 If weather is suitable carry out the orders received from *Euryalus*. It is quite understood that the 10 you are sending belong to both patrols for Wednesday. Acknowledge.

- 16.9.14.
9.55 a.m.
- A 80.** Adty. to R.A., *Euryalus*.
- 61 Rumour of four enemy cruisers proceeding believed to be inaccurate. Two cruisers left Emden yesterday for usual patrol. Spread patrols.
- Reply.*
- 19 Your 61. Is it to be understood that patrols on Dogger Bank and Broad Fourteens are to be replaced forthwith? (1200.)
- Further reply.*
- 62 Your 19. The usual patrols on Dogger Bank and Broad Fourteens are to be resumed at your convenience as soon as weather will permit. (1445.)

- 16.9.14.
- A 81.** *Euryalus* to Adty.
- 20 *Amethyst* and four destroyers on Broad Fourteens. *Euryalus*, *Bacchante*, *Cressy*, and eight destroyers, with *Lowestoft*, on Dogger Bank Patrol. *Bacchante* proceed to-morrow to the Nore to coal and requires five days to make good engine-room defects. *Cressy* requires to coal 18th September, and thus I have no vessel to relieve *Amethyst* who requires coal shortly. Consider it is not possible to maintain always three cruisers on Dogger Bank and one on Broad Fourteens with present force. (1800.)
- 17.9.14.
1.28 p.m.
- Reply.*
- 64 Your 20. You may keep two cruisers on Dogger Bank and one on Broad Fourteens. Approval given *Bacchante* make good defects.

- 16.9.14.
11.15 p.m.
- A 82.** Adty. to *Duncan*.
- Cancel my 2100 to-day. Carry out instructions sent to you at 5.15 to-day by C.-in-C., Home Fleets.¹

- 17.9.14.
- A 83.** Sir F. Bertie (Bordeaux) to F.O.
- 356 French Admiralty have informed Naval Attaché that they consider that several of their larger submarines could now be spared from duty in English Channel and would like to put them at the disposal of the British Admiralty for service in North Sea. An official proposal to this effect will probably be sent by Minister of Marine.
- Further telegram.*
- 19.9.14.
- 360 Naval Attaché was informed at the Ministry of Marine to-day that Minister will not make official proposal regarding the use of French submarines in the North Sea unless he learns that the proposal will be accepted.

- 17.9.14.
- A 84.** Adty. to V.A., *Vengeance*.
- 87 One of your battleships will be required to meet the convoy under R.A. Wemyss at a rendezvous in 49° 30' N, 30° W. Convoy will be coming by Route 9 Blue North Atlantic route chart, and is estimated to arrive at rendezvous 2nd October. Ship selected will return to England with the convoy and is to fill up with coal at Queenstown before starting. Report name of ship and when you propose to send her to Queenstown. (2034.)

- 18.9.14.
- Reply.*
- 95 Your 87. Propose H.M.S. *Majestic* sails for Queenstown on evening of 28th. Submit if possible her place in patrol may be filled by another ship. Now nights are lengthening and weather getting bad it is impossible to board steamers and this necessitates being escorted to port, taking ship off patrol for some hours. Your reference to Route 9 Blue North Atlantic Route Chart is not understood. We have not this chart. Number of my last telegram should have been 94. (0920.)

¹ 1715 from C.-in-C., H. F., to *Duncan*: "Fill up with coal and proceed to join my flag at Scapa Flow; you will calibrate at sea when opportunity offers. Acknowledge."

- 19.9.14.
- A 85.** Adty. to V.A., *Vengeance* and V.A., Channel Fleet.
- Goliath* is required for convoy service in the East Indies. She is to fill up with coal at Plymouth if necessary, or at Gibraltar, and proceed at once. Two French cruisers are being sent to act under your orders in the Western Patrol.

- 19.9.14.
- A 86.** Adty. to Marine, Bordeaux.
- 366 Admiralty, being obliged to withdraw two cruisers from the western part of the Channel in order to protect transports, would be glad if you would replace them by two cruisers of the 1st Division, 2nd Light Squadron, now at Cherbourg. They will place themselves under the orders of Vice-Admiral Bethell, H.M.S. *Vengeance*. Kindly let him know as well as the Admiralty the names of the cruisers selected.

- 19.9.14.
- A 87.** R.A., *Euryalus*, to Adty.
- 24 Consider prevailing weather conditions too bad for destroyers to carry out Dogger Bank patrol duty, suggest they are directed to remain off Yarmouth until weather moderates. (0930.)

- 19.9.14.
4.40 p.m.
- A 88.** Adty. to R.A., *Euryalus*.
- 65 The Dogger Bank Patrol need not be continued. Weather too bad for destroyers to go to sea. Arrange with cruisers to watch the Broad Fourteens.

- 19.9.14.
6.50 p.m.
- A 89.** Adty. to Comm. (T).
- 75 In view of the weather on the Dogger Bank for destroyers the patrol will be limited to the Broad Fourteens. Eight destroyers and a light cruiser will be used and are to proceed to sea if weather is suitable to-morrow. The *Bacchantes* will act as supports as before. Captain (D) is given discretionary power about ordering destroyers into harbour for weather, informing R.A. of cruisers at sea.

- 19.9.14.
- A 90.** R.A., *Euryalus*, to Adty.
- 25 Your 65. *Euryalus* and three cruisers will arrive at Broad Fourteens five in the morning, 20th September. Propose *Euryalus* proceed to Sheerness, 20th September, to coal and refit defective aerial damaged in gale, leaving *Aboukir* Senior Officer of patrol. Destroyers are returning to Harwich, arriving 20th September in the morning. (2110.)

- 21.9.14.
- A 91.** Comm. (T) to Adty.
- Fearless* returned. Reported state of weather impossible for destroyers. Am remaining at Harwich. (0649.)

- 21.9.14.
1.5 p.m.
- A 92.** Adty. to C.-in-C., Nore.
- It has been decided to station the Channel Fleet, consisting of 10 battleships and two light cruisers, at Sheerness, inside the boom and in such a position that they are immediately ready for sea. Expected to arrive Wednesday [23rd September] or Thursday. Communicate direct with V.-A., Channel Fleet, at Portland.

- 21.9.14.
2 p.m.
- A 93.** Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

- 754 During the passage of the Canadian transports a battle cruiser, either *Queen Mary* or *Princess Royal*, will be required to assist the escort from a rendezvous lat. 49° 30' N, long. 30° 0' W, as far as the Fastnet, and then rejoin your flag. Convoy has been ordered to proceed by Route 9 Blue shown on North Atlantic Route Chart No. 2058, and is estimated to be at the rendezvous on 2nd October. All cruisers and battle cruisers have the chart named. Further copies are being sent to you in case you want them for battleships. Urgent.

- A 94.** *Cressy* to all Ships. 22.9.14.
7.8 a.m.
Urgent. Aboukir, Hogue sinking.
- A 95.** Adty. to S.N.O., Harwich. 22.9.14.
8.15 a.m.
Intercepted signal received that *Hogue* and *Aboukir* are sinking. This looks like a submarine attack. Order eight more destroyers to raise steam and proceed to join *Lowestoft* to chase submarines.
- A 96.** Adty. to R.A., *Euryalus*. 22.9.14.
12.20 p.m.
It seems unnecessary for *Euryalus* or *Amethyst* to proceed beyond the Tongue Lightship. *Lowestoft* and all 3rd Flotilla have been sent to Broad Fourteens. *Fearless* and 1st Flotilla to Terschelling to try and cut the submarines off. Acknowledge.
- A 97.** Adty. to Comm. (T). 22.9.14.
78 As enemy submarines may be in your vicinity, *Lowestoft* is to return to harbour as soon as survivors are recovered. Give necessary orders to destroyers. (1330.)
Further signal.
You are to return to harbour at once with the 3rd Flotilla. (1609.)
- A 98.** C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 22.9.14.
Recd. 4.10 p.m.
451 Commodore (S) informs me that he proposes to attack Ems patrol at dawn. Propose to support with available ships of 2nd C.S. from Area VII. Will they meet any of our ships on way to Terschelling Lightship during night? (1455.)
Reply. 6 p.m.
764 Your 451. This attack is not to take place. Commodore (S) has been informed.
- A 99.** Adty. to *Fearless*. 22.9.14.
Report your position. If no submarines seen before dark return to Harwich with flotilla. Inform Commodore (S) that submarines are to carry out their previous orders. (1742.)
- A 100.** Adty. to V.A., Channel Fleet. 22.9.14.
6.10 p.m.
120 The Channel Fleet is to remain in the vicinity of Portland for the present.
- A 101.** Adty. to Marine, Bordeaux. 22.9.14.
373 Admiralty willingly accepts now your offer made a few days ago to send several large submarines to the North Sea. Admiralty would be glad if you would send those of which you can dispose to Dunkirk, and would order the commanding officer of the flotilla to proceed to the Admiralty, London, for instructions.
Reply. 23.9.14.
39 *Berthelot, Prairial, Archimède, Mariotte, and Gustave-Zédé* have been told off to take part in the operations in the North Sea. . . .
- A 102.** Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. 23.9.14.
11.55 a.m.
766 Due to submarine menace, the *Duncans* are to be withdrawn. Stopping to examine by armoured ships must be abandoned. Area VII is not to be patrolled by armoured ships. Acknowledge.

- A 103.** C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 23.9.14.
461 From Sunday, 27th September, to Thursday, 1st October, I am arranging to watch line Kinnaird Head to Karmo with whole of force. Second lines will be one from Muckle Flugga North and another between Orkney Islands and Shetland Islands. Battle cruisers will support these positions. *Princess Royal* will leave on 27th September for rendezvous in your telegram 754. Shall I leave Scapa Flow with Dreadnoughts Friday afternoon west-about?
Reply.
770. Your 461. Approved.
- A 104.** S.N.O., Dover, to Adty. 23.9.14.
Urgently submit I may be informed of composition of any force at present permanently stationed to north-eastward of Straits of Dover patrolling and ships of Senior Officer whenever changed. Request permission to send two destroyers daily as far as North Hinder Light Vessel. (1210.)
Reply.
Your 1210 Twelve destroyers are going out on patrol approximately from abreast Schouwen Lightship in a north-easterly direction. Commodore (T) is going in a destroyer. There is no objection to your sending two destroyers daily to North Hinder. It seems desirable.
- A 105.** Adty. to V.A., Channel Fleet. 23.9.14.
8.35 p.m.
124 When convenient after completion of your exercises you are to proceed to the Medway as previously arranged.
- A 106.** Adty. to V.A., Channel Fleet. 26.9.14.
126 As the High Sea Fleet is reported to be in the Baltic the Channel Fleet can return to Portland. (1048.)
- A 107.** Adty. to Captain (D), *Fearless*. 26.9.14.
Survivors from cruisers crossing to-night in Flushing Packet. Sweep north for the night and see whether there are any trawlers near the wrecks. If nothing suspicious is seen, *Fearless* and flotilla can return to harbour after daylight to-morrow. (1655.)
- A 108.** *Attentive* to *Foresight*. 27.9.14.
All submarines to proceed into harbour. (1405.)
- A 109.** Adty. to Comm. (T). 27.9.14.
85 Enemy submarines attacked *Attentive* in Dover Straits at 2 p.m. to-day. Torpedoes missed. Send a division of destroyers to North Hinder Light at once to cut them off. No flotilla cruiser. Acknowledge.
- A 110.** Adty. to Préfet Maritime, Cherbourg. 27.9.14.
One or two German submarines have been seen off Dover about 2 p.m. They may have gone west. The Admiralty would be glad if, after having assured the defence of Cherbourg, you would send available torpedo boats of the 2nd Light Squadron to cruise at dawn on a line of 30 miles south-west of Owers in order to assist in the protection of Portsmouth.
- A 111.** Préfet Maritime, Cherbourg to Adty. (F.N.A.) 27.9.14.
I have to inform you that as enemy's submarines have been seen in the Straits of Dover, we have at the request of the Admiralty put out the lights at Sandettie and Ruytingen.

A 112. Adty. to C.-in-C., Nore. 27.9.14.
5.55 p.m.

19 Urgent. In view of enemy submarine activity use your discretion about extinguishing lights on Nore Light Vessel to-night. Report what you propose for the future as to the other lights.

Reply. Recd. 8.54 p.m.

23 Your 19 to-day. Submit I consider the Galloper Light, Sunk Light, Longsand Light, Kentish Knock Light, and Tongue Light Vessels' lights should be extinguished. Also that all other lights in the Thames Estuary should be extinguished between lat. 51° 27' N and 51° 51' N, and long. 0° 25' E and 1° 41' E, with the exception of the following buoys whose character should be changed to red: Sand, North Knob, Barrow Deep No. 15, West Oaze Deep, No. 1 Sea Reach. These laid buoys to be kept lighted for the use of the inner patrol.

A 113. A.O.P. to Adty. 27.9.14.

Request destroyers from Harwich may be sent to patrol to the north-west of North Hinder to endeavour to cut off enemy's submarines when returning. Suggest destroyers should extinguish North Hinder Light Vessel and West Hinder Light Vessel to render enemy's return difficult. I am requesting French to extinguish Sandettie Light Vessel and Ruytingen Light Vessel. (1500.)

Reply. 6.20 p.m.

75 North Hinder Light is a Dutch light and notice was issued that the light has been extinguished but vessel not removed.

A 114. Adty. (T) to D.N.T.O., Dunkirk. 28.9.14.
12.10 a.m.

No transports to be allowed to leave till further orders.

A 115. Adty. to Transport Officer, Dover, Southampton, Newhaven, Avonmouth, Liverpool, Dublin, London, St. Nazaire, Nantes, Havre, Rouen. 28.9.14.
12.30 a.m.

No transports to leave port till further orders. Report names of ships which it is desired to dispatch.

A 116. Adty. to P.N.T.O., Nantes. 28.9.14.
12.5 p.m.

My telegram last night transports may now sail.

Also sent to T.O.s at St. Nazaire, Havre, Rouen, and Dunkirk. (12.10 p.m.)

A 117. Adty. to Transport Officer, Newhaven. 29.9.14.
1.25 p.m.

... All transports must sail after dark till further orders.

A 118. Comm. (T) to *Fearless*. 29.9.14.

When weather permits send 12 destroyers from 1st Flotilla to search for submarines between Haaks Light Vessel and lat. 52° N. *Fearless* is not to go. Destroyers are able to work by divisions independently. (0600.)

A 119. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. 29.9.14.

From First Sea Lord, Secret and Personal. 810 I should be glad to hear your views by wire or letter on the recent submarine activities of the enemy. (1735.)

A 119a. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 29.9.14.

506 Your 766. Proposed to use older battleships and armoured cruisers for boarding merchant vessels when E of 1° E in northern waters.

Reply. Approved.

30.9.14.

Sent 4.15 p.m.

Recd. 6.13 p.m.

A 120. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

For First Sea Lord of the Admiralty—Secret and Personal. Your 810. We must expect this. It is obviously the proper policy for Germany to weaken our battle line before the main action is fought. Our policy should unquestionably be the exact opposite, viz., to retain the superiority in heavy ships and their necessary adjuncts at all costs, since the final result can only rest with them. Meanwhile we should devote our entire efforts to strangle German trade and protecting our own, and disregard suggestions that involve undue risk to the ships, which will eventually decide the naval part of the war. We should, of course, take every possible step to destroy his submarines. His present activity, if continued, should give us the best chance of doing this. The method of destruction to be employed should undoubtedly be the freest possible use of trawlers and similar small craft. The Germans have made the greatest use of trawlers and we should copy them. Some should be armed, but as their stems are a good weapon it is not necessary to arm all. As many as possible must be under naval command, and have wireless for, at any rate, the leaders in each flotilla of, say, six. The leader should be commanded by an officer, and she should be faster than the remainder. Active Service Chief Petty Officers, including Coast Guard, could command many of them. There is a surplus of Chief Petty Officers. The trawlers to work off bases and on line of approach from Heligoland and the Skagerrak to our bases, but within 60 miles of our coast. In the north the trawlers would be under the protection of our cruisers. Further south the patrol flotillas can assist. In both cases "C" class submarines might be employed between trawlers and bases. I think Commodore (S) would consider this feasible. The trawler's opportunity would arrive at dusk and dawn before submarines dived, or when they come up to verify position. They must be innocent in appearance. Am writing to confirm and amplify.

A 121. Adty. to all Ships. 30.9.14.

All lighthouses and light vessels between 51° 27' N and 51° 53' N, and between 2° E and 0° 25' E, will be extinguished between 9 p.m. and 4 a.m., from night of 1st October until further notice. Lights of all unwatched lights and light buoys within same area will be altogether extinguished from 9 p.m. on 1st October until further notice, excepting light of following five buoys: Barrow No. 15, North Knob, Red Sand, West Oaze, and No. 1 Sea Reach. Light of North Foreland Lighthouse will also be extinguished between 9 p.m. and 4 a.m. from night 1st October until further notice. (0200.)

1.10.14.

A 122. *Lord Nelson* to Adty. Recd. 12.50 a.m.

197 Following message received from *Marseillaise* begins: All lights are discontinued in the neighbourhood of Brest and Cherbourg, fog signals will be continued.

1.10.14.

A 123. Adty. (1st L.) to C.-in-C., H.F. 1.50 a.m.

824 *Secret and Personal.* Cabinet are pressing us very strongly institute extensive policy of mining in narrow seas thus making area between Straits of Dover and line Galloper-Hook of Holland a *mare clausum* in order to provide barrier against submarines and incidentally strangle Rotterdam. We should of course keep swept channel along coast and retain full freedom of action for submarines north of mined area. In first instance mines would only be laid from Belgian coast and about the North Hinder

and minefield thereafter developed and extended. We are teased by submarines in Straits of Dover threatening transportation to Continent and also Americans are going to challenge our whole principles of conditional contraband, etc. Antwerp is in jeopardy and with it would fall for the time being what remains of Belgian State. The main battle on the right-angled front Arras Compiègne Verdun tends to a complete deadlock. What do you think on naval grounds excluding political of a big mining policy three or four thousand mines? Would you apply it in the narrow seas or in Heligoland Bight. How would you apply it. I am most anxious not to do anything in the southern theatre which does not harmonise with our general conceptions with which we are in absolute agreement.

Reply.

2.10.14.
Sent 1.20 a.m.
Recd. 3.26 a.m.

541 *For First Lord. Secret and Personal.* Your 824. After consideration I am of opinion that result of mines in Heligoland Bight will not be worth the material expended as the minefield must be left unobserved and channel would soon be swept through it. If mines can be laid off mouth of Elbe, Jade, Weser and Ems rivers, good results might be achieved but the risk run in laying off Elbe and Weser would be so great both from enemies' mines and ships as not to be worth the result. On purely naval grounds I consider mining in the narrow seas is desirable. Unless it is intended to cover the movements of transports withdrawing troops from Antwerp, it seems preferable to mine to the west [of] Ruytingen Light Vessel than in localities further north, as the line will be so much shorter. The removal of buoys to the eastward [of the] lightship will render mining unnecessary between Ruytingen Light Vessel and shore. Mines in this locality could be easily maintained.

A 124. Adty. to General Paris.

1.10.14.
3.45 p.m.

The Marine Brigade will probably be required to move Sunday [4th October] or Monday. You should do your utmost to organise them with their motor transport and have them thoroughly mobile and ready. Bring in the battalion from Lille unless most serious reasons to contrary. First Lord hopes inspect Brigade Saturday early.

A 125. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

1.10.14.
Sent 3.30 p.m.
Recd. 5.10 p.m.

535 Submit that any ships being sent to North should be warned not to pass through Pentland Firth at night going East to West between night of 3rd October and 8th October inclusive as torpedo boat destroyers have orders to fire at all men-of-war sighted in Pentland going East to West between those dates.

A 126. C.-in-C., H.F., to S.O., 2nd C.S., 3rd C.S.,
6th C.S., 10th C.S.

1.10.14.
Intercepted by Adty. 7.45 p.m.

H.M. ships are warned not to pass through Pentland Firth at night going East to West between nights of 3rd October and 8th October inclusive as torpedo boat destroyers have orders to fire at all men-of-war sighted in Pentland Firth going East to West between [those dates]. (1900.)

A 127. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

2.10.14.
Sent 12.30 p.m.

835 A cruiser is to be sent to Archangel again—stop. She could look into the Faroe Islands Lofoten Islands and Norwegian ports also Alexandrovsk—stop. She is to report herself with any information at each place—stop. Orders will be sent to Archangel as to her return—stop. Report name of cruiser you propose to send also date of sailing and any other proposals you may wish—ends.

2.10.14.
Sent 3 p.m.
Recd. 5.27 p.m.

A 128. Admiral, H.F., to Adty.

544 Experience in cruiser work off the Naze shows that great volumes of trade are entering the Skagerrak, far more than under normal conditions. Bad weather and shorter days render adequate inspection of neutral ships becomes more than difficult. Large numbers not inspected at all. Petrol food etc. is certainly reaching enemy in considerable quantities. The only sure prevention is that all neutral ships be required to call at a British port for inspection before entering North Sea. After being passed to fly a private signal. Ships not doing so to be sent in for inspection by cruisers. Am forwarding proposals by post to-day. Suggest that notice be issued at once as to calls at British ports stating that failing this call neutral ships will have to be turned back in North Sea for the examination to be held at British ports.

A 129. Adty. to A.O.P.

2.10.14.
4.15 p.m.

91 In view of presence of submarines in the Straits of Dover arrange a destroyer escort for minelayers to the Downs. They should be ordered to proceed through the Downs to their destination and return that way if they will not arrive until daylight.

A 130. Adty. to all Ships.

2.10.14.
6.45 p.m.

Government have authorised minelaying in following area Lat. 51° 15' N to 51° 40' N, and long. 1° 35' E to 3° 0' E limit of German minefield off Southwold is 52° N. All British, Allied or neutral vessels whose tracks approach minefield to be carefully warned. This notice to be given fullest publicity. (1845.)

Note.—The French Ministry of Marine was informed in the above sense at 7 p.m. (Tel. Adty. to Marine, Bordeaux, 409.)

A 131. Admiral, H.F., to Adty.

2.10.14.
Sent 5.30 p.m.
Recd. 6.48 p.m.

554 Your 835. Will it suit if ship starts Friday, 9th? If so I would send *Drake*. She docks Tuesday. Propose to omit Faroe Is. which were visited last Sunday and substitute Trondhjem. As *Theseus* visited Tromso suggest leaving Lofoten Is. till return trip of *Drake*. Request I may be informed whether these proposals are approved.

Reply.

845 Your 554. Your proposals are approved. (1255.)

A 132. Adty. to British Consul, Dunkerque.

3.10.14.
Sent 1.35 a.m.

Following from General Paris:—

Bring back the battalion from Lille at once and concentrate your brigade. Be ready to move into Antwerp by the coast road during the morning. First Lord will arrive at Dunkirque about 5 a.m. Meet him there yourself or send Colonel Ollivant. Tell Commander Samson to provide five armoured cars to escort First Lord into Antwerp starting between 6 and 7 from Dunkirque. Have as many armoured cars and aeroplanes ready for service to-morrow as is possible, subject to the necessary outpost and reconnaissance service. Take plenty ammunition with you for Antwerp. Let the Officer who meets First Lord be ready to report fully on all these matters. Acknowledge.

A 133. Adty. to A.O.P.

3.10.14.
1.5 p.m.

96 Your 1030 to-day.¹ Proceed with reloading of minelayers. It is most desirable that another line should be laid to-night. (1230.)

¹ Reporting laying of line of mines, night October 2-3.

A 134. Adty. to Comm. (T). 3.10.14.
93 Arrange to guard the minelayers to-night. The line to-night will be to the west of the West Hinder.

A 135. S.O., 7th B.S., to Adty. 3.10.14.
3.25 p.m.
114 Four French ships have been withdrawn from patrol to-day. I shall have one away coaling for the next week. There are not enough ships left to cover ground satisfactorily by night or in low visibility. (1450.)

Reply. 5.10.14.
108 French Admiralty report that the French cruisers were withdrawn to escort transports from Havre to Ostend, but orders have been given to satisfy your request. (0130.)

A 136. Adty. to Marine, Bordeaux. 3.10.14.
411 In view of the dispatch of the 7th Battalion of the British Army, which will disembark at Dunkirk and Boulogne and of the present insecurity in the eastern part of the Channel where enemy submarines were seen again yesterday, the Admiralty asks you to send all available torpedo boats, including the 2nd Division, to patrol on the look-out for submarines from Owers up to the Straits of Dover from to-morrow morning until Tuesday evening (6th October). The troopships will leave Southampton singly, beginning Sunday evening.

A 137. Adty. to Marine, Bordeaux. 3.10.14.
9 p.m.
414 The British Admiral commanding the west of the Channel reports that four French cruisers have been withdrawn to-day, and that the number of ships under his command is not sufficient during the night or when the range of visibility is small. The Admiralty asks you if possible to maintain these cruisers at their stations, particularly during the passage of the transports. My telegram 411 concerns only torpedo boats.

A 138. Adty. to Transport Officer, Southampton. 4.10.14.
4.40 a.m.
Confirming telephone *African Prince*, *Mount Temple* and *Oxonian* should sail at once for Dover to embark 6,000 men and about 300 tons of stores for Dunkirk.

A 139. V.A., *Lord Nelson*, to Adty. 4.10.14.
201 French Admiral requests that all authorities should be informed that a large number of submarines, several torpedo boats, and other vessels, are cruising between Owers Light Vessel and Straits of Dover defending military transports.

A 140. Marine, Bordeaux, to Adty. 4.10.14.
Time of dispatch and receipt not known.
57 We have in fact invited Admiral Rouyer to send urgently to Havre four ships to convoy transports carrying to Dunkirk on Monday morning one infantry division. As soon as these transports have disembarked their troops the ships will resume their patrol duties. Orders have been sent to satisfy Admiralty's request expressed in telegram 411.

A 141. Adty. to P.N.T.O., Nantes. 4.10.14.
2.55 p.m.
Proposed to move 7th Division to Calais or Boulogne or both, beginning to-night. Capt. Travers appointed D.N.T.O., Boulogne, with staff. Send as many horse brows as possible to Boulogne in transport at once not less than four 36-foot brows to go most urgent. Cavalry Division will follow to same ports, and probably a division of Territorials later. Acknowledge.

A 142. Comm. (T) to Adty. 4.10.14.
Recd. 3.8 p.m.
232 For Chief of War Staff. Regret unfavourable weather prevents Plan 5. Am sending two more divisions in reply to your 97. (Urgent.) (1445.)

A 143. Adty. to Transport Officer, Southampton. 4.10.14.
3.50 p.m.
Seventh Division to embark beginning about 8 p.m. to-day destination not fixed but probably Boulogne or Calais, most probably both, numbers about 18,000 men, 5,400 horses, 90 guns, 520 vehicles. Cavalry Division not going till later. Ships must sail in daylight at such times as to bring them to Boulogne or Calais at dark, airships must be berthed in those ports before daylight, no ships to be outside docks after dark. 500 remounts to go to Havre to-morrow night, report names of ships for this at once.

A 144. Adty. to A.O.P. 4.10.14.
In view of Naval Brigade crossing to-night and movements of troops from Southampton to-morrow for Dunkirk keep the Straits well patrolled, and report the presence of any enemy submarines. Do you want any assistance from Commodore (T).

A 145. Adty. to A.O.P. (106), Commodore (T) (99). 4.10.14.
5.20 p.m.
(To A.O.P. only.) Your telegram this afternoon. Commodore (T) is to watch the area north of British mined area. West Hinder to Galloper is foul ground, owing to British mines. Make sure that all your patrols are aware of limits of British mined area which is not to be traversed by any British ships, unless specially ordered from the Admiralty. Stop. Has been repeated to Commodore (T).

A 146. Adty. to Comm. (T). 4.10.14.
Important movement of troops to Boulogne and Dunkirk from Dover and Southampton commencing to-night. Use sufficient destroyers north of British mined area and between German and British area to prevent German submarines getting past. A.O.P. may ask for some assistance for Dover Patrol.

A 147. Adty. to Transport Officer, Dover. 4.10.14.
6.35 p.m.
Transports conveying Naval Division to Dunkirk not to leave until dark to-night, and must await ammunition due from Woolwich in special train at 7 p.m. . . .

A 148. Adty. to Transport Officer, Southampton. 5.10.14.
2.45 a.m.
Seventh Division is to proceed to Zeebrugge ships to leave so as to arrive after dark and before 4 a.m. First transport to leave 4 a.m. They are to call off Dover for orders and no ship must pass Dover until she has received the route in writing.

A 149. Adty. to *Intrepid*. 5.10.14.
8.25 a.m.
Important and Urgent. Report the position of the westernmost mine of the Wandelaar and whether accurate bearings were taken. Transports may have to pass between the Hinder and this line. If not quite certain, say so . . .

Reply. Recd. 11.4 a.m.
Position westernmost of mines of Wandelaar line fixed cross bearings 51° 30' N, 2° 51' E. This position is accurate within half a mile. Urgent. (1055.)

- A 150.** Adty. to C.-in-C., Nore. 5.10.14.
10.30 a.m.
Direct two southern groups of Lowestoft minesweepers now between North Foreland and Kentish Knock to proceed at once to West Hinder and sweep in line abreast from $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles S.E. from West Hinder Light Vessel direct to lat. $51^{\circ} 40' N$, long. $3^{\circ} 0' E$.
- A 151.** Adty. to Comm. (T). 5.10.14.
102 What is the present disposition of your destroyers. They will probably all be required to-night. Have them all ready. Acknowledge. (1100.)
- A 152.** Adty. to *Intrepid*. 5.10.14.
1.55 p.m.
Urgent. Is it correct that the first mine was laid in lat. $51^{\circ} 22' N$, long. $2^{\circ} 55' E$. It has been decided for transports to pass south of the line of mines.
- A 153.** Adty. to A.O.P. 5.10.14.
2 p.m.
Special instructions are being sent down as to route transports are to take. It is most desirable that one destroyer or two if available should accompany each transport to look out for submarines.
- A 154.** Adty. to C.-in-C., Nore, and Capt. I/C, Lowestoft. 5.10.14.
2.15 p.m.
12 Cancel telegrams sent this morning concerning sweeping channel near West Hinder. Another channel has been selected. Minesweepers to continue their work.
- A 155.** Adty. to Comm. (T) (104), Comm. (S) (88). 5.10.14.
3.37 p.m.
Zeebrugge has been decided on as the port of debarkation for the 7th Division of the Army. Six transports leave Dover to-night and six more to-morrow night. The transports will make the West Hinder and pass to the southward of it. From there they will make the whistling buoys on the Ostend Bank, leaving them on starboard hand and close outside Wenduyn Bank to Zeebrugge. Destroyers are to cover this operation to the north and east of the British mined area. The transports will be convoyed by destroyers from the Dover Patrol. [? Inform] Commodore (S), when it is known that transports have arrived at Zeebrugge. Attack by the enemy there may be anticipated. Consider and arrange with Commodore (T) how best our submarines can defend the base and its approaches. A line of mines has been laid as arranged between lat. $51^{\circ} 22' N$, $2^{\circ} 55' E$ and $51^{\circ} 30' N$, $2^{\circ} 51' E$, also two lines to the west of West Hinder. These must on no account be crossed. Acknowledge.
- A 156.** Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Bordeaux. 5.10.14.
7 p.m.
419 The Admiralty asks you to kindly maintain until Wednesday morning [7th October] the torpedo boats at the stations assigned by my telegram, No. 411, to protect the British transports.
- A 157.** Comm. (S) to Adty. 5.10.14.
11.33 p.m.
20 Your 88. Comm. (T) informs me that destroyers will patrol approaches to Zeebrugge also in $50^{\circ} N$,¹ and I consider that they should know definitely that any submarines they sight are enemy. Propose to proceed with *Lurcher* and two submarines to Zeebrugge it is rather shallow for submarines but their presence should make bombardment of base from seaward impossible in daylight. Destroyer patrol should give good notice of enemy approaching.

¹ Probably $51^{\circ} 40' N$, northern limit of mined area.

- Further telegram.* 6.10.14.
8.20 a.m.
21 Submit I may be informed if proposal in my telegram 20 is approved. Submarine patrol off Ems River and Terschelling will be maintained as long as weather permits.
Note by D.O.D. (Rear-Admiral A. C. Leveson).
"C.O.S. approved by telephone Commodore (S)'s proposal in telegram No. 20 (and 21) for *Lurcher* and two submarines to go to Z . . . the 2 remain *inside Lurcher* connect outside with Tyrwhitt's destroyers. Dover to be informed."
- A 158.** Comm. (T) to Adty. 6.10.14.
Recd. 4.39 a.m.
238 Destroyers on patrol report weather thick, sea rising and difficult keeping their position. Request I may be informed if landing troops has been completed and if so whether destroyers minimising the danger be recalled. (0400.)
- 6.10.14.
Sent (a) 5.20 a.m. (b) 6 a.m.
A 159. Adty. to (a) All Ships and (b) Naval Centres.
From noon 10th October the following lights will not be lit nor fog signals made until 2 a.m. Greenwich time: Noss Head, Holburn, Scrabster, Muckle Skerry, Dunnet Head, Stroma, Cantick Head, Swona and Noup Head. Lother Rock and Papa Stronsay lights will be permanently extinguished from same date. All mercantile fleet auxiliaries to be informed.
- A 160.** Adty. to Comm. (T). 6.10.14.
Sent 6 a.m.
106 Your 238. Transports not arrived yet. Unless weather gets worse, do not recall destroyers.
- A 161.** Adty. to all Ships. 6.10.14.
It is a possible suggestion that imitation periscopes may be attached to floating mines to induce ships to ram them. Ships are warned accordingly.
- A 162.** Adty. to C.-in-C., Nore and Portsmouth. 6.10.14.
Euryalus and *Bacchante* to proceed to Portsmouth as soon as convenient. To be under orders of C.-in-C., Portsmouth ready for convoy sailing from Southampton on 9th October.
- A 163.** Adty. to Comm. (T). 6.10.14.
10 p.m.
107 A hostile submarine has been reported from the west end of the Dover Patrol line. If you can reinforce the Dover Patrol, do so. But do not cross the mined area. Each of the 11 transports is convoyed by a patrol destroyer.
- Reply.*
242 Your 107. Regret I am unable to reinforce Dover Patrol. (2345.)
6.10.14.
A 164. C.-in-C., Nore, to Adty. Recd. 1 p.m.
14 Your telegrams No. 3 and 12 of yesterday. Before receipt of No. 12 one group of trawlers had left under directions contained in No. 3. On receipt of No. 12 trawlers were sent to recall them but no information has yet been received of their return. As the position of mines was not known the trawlers were directed to go south-about to the West Hinder Light Vessel.
- A 165.** Adty. to all Ships at Home and Abroad. 7.10.14.
Belligerent reservists are from now not to be arrested in neutral ships.

A 166. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 7.10.14.

594 With reference to my telegram No. 587 and letter No. 193 of 2nd October *re* defence of Loch Ewe it has been reported that one if not two enemy submarines entered harbour yesterday morning being seen by *Assistance* and a collier. I have interviewed witnesses from *Assistance* to-day and consider there are real grounds for the assumption that the submarines were actually seen. 1st Lieutenant, *Assistance*, is quite positive that he saw one with conning tower showing quite clearly. *Assistance* fired at her. She was in narrow water and possibly did not attack *Assistance* for want of room to turn. Until harbour is defended and submarine obstacle is provided it will not be safe to use this base. Can steps be taken to hasten provision of obstacles both for Scapa and Loch Ewe. It is very undesirable to have all heavy ships at one base and neither is safe now.

A 167. Adty. to A.O.P. 7.10.14.
8.55 a.m.

124 There are about 14 transports with cavalry division on board to cross to Zeebrugge and Ostend to-night. It is most important that they should be convoyed. This is probably the last big contingent. Commodore (T) is being asked to reinforce you, but he is guarding the approaches north of British minefield right across. The French destroyers are patrolling between Owers and Dover but you must look out that the transports are guarded as they approach, especially during daylight.

A 168. Adty. to Comm. (T). 7.10.14.
9.20 a.m.

109 There are 14 transports with the cavalry division on board crossing to-night from Dover, four to Zeebrugge, and 10 to Ostend. It is important for you to send half a dozen destroyers to patrol off the South Goodwins as that is where they were attacked last night. Dover Patrol is providing a convoy of one to each as well as their usual patrol which is thus reduced. The protection of the transports to-night is of greater importance than the patrol of the Broad Fourteens. Report your proposed dispositions.

A 169. Adty. to C.-in-C., Nore. 7.10.14.
Sent 11.15 a.m.

Owing to an unusually large movement of transports to-night, it is impossible to provide any destroyers to escort or cover the minelayers. This must be done by the Nore local flotilla; at least four will be required. Please make necessary arrangements and inform *Intrepid* so that they can work in combination.

A 170. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 7.10.14.
Sent 10.5 a.m.
Recd. 11.27 a.m.

581 Admiral Lowry has sent me a copy of his report No. 886/057 of 30th September: I am fully in agreement with his recommendations (a) for mining our own harbours so long as contact mines are used instead of mechanical mines and (b) for using an explosive sweep. In regard to (b) request I may be furnished with drawings of the single sweep which will be more effective than the modified sweep at Northern base.

A 171. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 7.10.14.
Sent 11.50 a.m.
Recd. 2.26 p.m.

587 On receipt of information that submarines had been seen inside Loch Ewe, signal station on western coast was ordered to divert colliers to Lamlash or Scapa Flow whichever was nearest. Have also ordered 30,000 tons of coal only to be retained at Ewe Loch. Of the balance which was there, 15,000 tons have been sent to Scapa Flow and about 10,000 back to Lamlash and Campbelltown. Have also ordered *Assistance*, supply ships and store carriers to Scapa Flow.

A 172. Marine, Bordeaux, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 7.10.14.

5703 . . . Please let me know if Admiralty considers it desirable that a division of the 2nd Light Squadron should keep up a watch between Ushant and mouth of Loire, or whether they prefer these ships should be employed in the Western Channel Patrol.

Reply.

Admiralty would be glad if you would maintain a patrol between Ushant and Cape Finisterre for the purpose of protecting the route for transports between England and Gibraltar, as well as of covering the mouth of the Loire. Three cruisers seem to be sufficient for the purpose. It is not less important to maintain the line of patrol in the western end of the Channel another patrol of the Straits of Dover in order to ensure security of communication between two countries. These two patrols will without doubt be maintained until the end of the war.

A 173. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. 8.10.14.
3.30 a.m.

884 British Minister in telegram dispatched from Christiania 10.30 p.m., 7th October, reports having just heard from absolutely reliable source four cruisers one submarine reported four miles off Skudesnes. Time and nationality not given.

A 174. Adty. to Comm. (T). 8.10.14.

112 Secret. Your 246. The troops may not disembark at Zeebrugge. Stop. Watch must be maintained. Arrange to fuel destroyers by Divisions. Stop. A.O.P. is proposing to send the eight destroyers back from South Goodwin patrol. (1055.)

A 175. Adty. to C.-in-C., Portsmouth. 8.10.14.

Euryalus and *Bacchante* are to carry out escort duty between England and Gibraltar. First convoy leaves Southampton to-morrow. They should work according to Admiralty programme a copy of which should be supplied by you to them. Give necessary orders. They should proceed through the Needles.

A 176. Adty. (T) to Transport Officer, Dover. 8.10.14.
5.52 p.m.

Confirming telephone message no transport to be allowed to leave Dover till further orders except hospital ship *St. David*.

A 177. Adty. (T) to Transport Officer, Dover. 8.10.14.
7.24 p.m.
Reference to my earlier telegram transports may now proceed.

A 178. Adty. to (1) C.-in-C., H.F. (891) and 8.10.14.
(2) Comm. (T) (115). 8.12 p.m.

For information of you and Commodore (S) reliable report states that at Emden are now stationed 2 coast defence battleships (*Siegfried* class), 3 light cruisers. 15 torpedo boats. 5 submarines. 2 minelayers. 7 armed tugs.

- (1) Telegram has been repeated to Commodore (T) for Commodore (S).
- (2) C.-in-C., Home Fleets, has been informed.

A 179. Adty. to Comm. (S). 8.10.14.
8.18 p.m.
89 Submarines can return at daylight to-morrow 9th.

A 180. Adty. to Comm. (T). 9.10.14.
11.10 a.m.
117 The troops should have disembarked by this morning. Twelve destroyers will be sufficient to sweep about the Broad Fourteens as before. Now that British mines have been laid this area may be considered closed as far as the Falls Shoal. There is a secret channel between the Kentish Knock and the Falls free of mines. Enemy submarines may pass down there by day. One or two destroyers with, and towing the modified sweep might sweep across from Long Sand to the Galloper or North Falls Tail. It is important to prevent enemy submarines now in the Straits returning home.

A 181. Adty. to Comm. (T). 9.10.14.
1.30 p.m.
Minelaying Squadron are laying mines to-night inside the Area and near North Hinder. Arrange that destroyers on the Broad Fourteens know this, and cover the operation to the northward of lat. 51.40 N.

A 182. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Bordeaux. 9.10.14.
433 (1) Owing to the large radius of action of modern submarines it is possible that some may get through to the Dover Patrol at night or in thick weather unobserved. These would endanger the movements of Allied ships and transports in the Channel or even ships on the Western Patrol.

(2) The Admiralty would be obliged if the French Admiralty would give orders for sweeps of destroyers to be made in the eastern area between the line St. Catherine, La Hague, and the Straits of Dover. If found desirable an occasional one being made to the westward.

(3) The presence of an Allied submarine being possibly dangerous in the region frequented by transports and destroyers it would be preferable to limit submarine excursions from Cherbourg to the immediate vicinity of the place or to give notice when submarines go out to sea.

A 183. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. 9.10.14.
4.35 p.m.
899 Your 594. Have bays and neighbourhood of Loch Ewe searched for enemy submarines. Orders have been given for material and all four dockyards are working continuously, a commander and a lieutenant have been appointed to superintend the work, some time must elapse before it is ready, in the meantime local resources and flotillas and trawlers should be used to protect base with modified sweep.

A 184. C.-in-C., Nore, to H.M.S. *Intrepid*. 9.10.14.
Recd. 6.35 p.m.
Suspicious submarines reported off Tongues collect all information by your convoy boat from outermost patrol and use your own discretion as to going by Swin Channel or other channel or anchor and return in the morning. (1814.)

A 185. S.O., 7th B.S., to Adty. 9.10.14.
122 Your 617 of 7th October forbidding arrest of enemy reserves in neutral ships. S.N.O., French patrol, has received orders Ministry of Marine to consider as embodied in enemy's forces all men of enemy nationality between ages of 18 and 50 whether travelling in neutral or enemy ships. (1921.)

A 186. Adty. to Comm. (T). 10.10.14.
11.45 a.m.
121 Urgent. Proposals approved. Necessary precautions against submarines to be taken. No advance beyond Terschelling line without approval. Inform Commodore (S) proposals approved. Send details in writing of proposed disposition before sailing.

A 187. Adty. to Comm. (T). 10.10.14.
2.20 p.m.
123 Urgent. Following from C.-in-C., Nore, begins: Nore Defence Flotilla report sighting submarine off North Knock at 10 a.m. to-day—ends. Send patrolling destroyers, with modified sweep, to attack her.

Reply.
Comm. (T) to Adty. 10.10.14.
Recd. 5.19 p.m.
Reference your 123. This was done at 1400. (1702.)

A 188. Adty. to C.-in-C. 10.10.14.
6.10 p.m.
910 Secret. Cancel my telegram 907 of this morning. *Drake* is required to leave forthwith for Archangel for an important cargo. Tell off either *Mantua* or *Alsatian* to complete with coal and proceed to Archangel for the same purpose. The two ships are to return in company. They are to report their movements.

A 189. Adty. to C.-in-C., Nore. 10.10.14.
8.5 p.m.
The three monitors are to proceed to the Downs to-night ready to cross to Ostend to-morrow morning at daylight. They must pass to the south of the mined area and are to place themselves on arrival in such a position that they can support, if necessary, the re-embarkation of troops.

A 190. Adty. (R.N.D.) to G.O.C., Naval Division. 10.10.14.
9.25 p.m.
8 All naval and Marine Brigades at Ostend are to embark for Dover for original encampment at Deal. Previous orders cancelled. Remainder of Division at Dunkirk, less Marine Artillery batteries and motor transport, also returning. Armoured trains with naval ratings of same, aeroplanes, armed and other motor cars, except those now at Dunkirk under Commander Samson, are placed under General Rawlinson. All other motor transport and cars to be collected Dunkirk. Dunkirk informed. Acknowledge.

A 191. Adty. to A.O.P. 11.10.14.
136 Your 0226A/30 of 9th October reporting proposed movements for October. R.A. Hon. H. Hood has been appointed as S.N.O., Dover Patrol, which is removed from your command. You should come to Admiralty to-morrow morning for discussion of details of transfer.

A 192. Adty. (T) to P.N.T.O., Nantes. 11.10.14.
9.27 p.m.
It has been decided to close St. Nazaire as a base, and no more ships will be dispatched there. It is now proposed to make Havre the main base and Boulogne a secondary base . . .

A 193. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. (918), Capts. (D) Tyne and Grimsby. 11.10.14.
Adml. Dunfermline (256), C.-in-C., Nore. 10.30 p.m.
It is reported from Emden that two minelayers left the Ems yesterday 10th at noon, steering to the northward.

A 194. Adty. to Comm. (S). 12.10.14.
4.20 p.m.
Lurcher and submarines are to leave Zeebrugge and return to Harwich at once. Acknowledge.

A 195. V.A., *Lord Nelson*, to Adty. 12.10.14.
11.46 p.m.
218 Following message received from *Marseillaise* begins: Desire you will inform authorities French torpedo boat sighted and attacked a German submarine this afternoon at 2 p.m. close to C. Gris Nez. A patrol of torpedo boats will patrol along the line from Cherbourg to 15 miles from Owers L.V. Ends. C.-in-C., Portsmouth, C.-in-C., Plymouth, S.N.O., Dover, have been informed.

A 196. Adty. to Transport Officer, Ostend. 13.10.14.
(By telephone.) 12.40 a.m.

Inform the three gunboats they are to leave with the vessel containing the Belgian Government officials, escort them as far as Gris Nez and then the gunboats to return to Dover.

A 197. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Bordeaux. 13.10.14.

450 Will you please let me know urgently whether *Pluton* and *Cerbère* are immediately available and how many mines they carry. This information would be useful to the Admiralty, which is considering the closing of the Belgian ports, information having been received that Germany is preparing an expedition by these ports.

A 197a. Adty. to V.A., *Vengeance*. 13.10.14.

113 It is understood that due to the absence of our ships the French have to keep six cruisers in their section. Report whether six would not be sufficient and arrange accordingly.

Reply.

131 Reduction in our ships from five to three has necessitated our southern ships being moved 11 miles further north. Insufficiency of ships was represented in my signal No. 95. I do not consider less than eight French ships on patrol, independent of those absent coaling, will make patrol efficient. There are eight on patrol now. (2125.)

Further reply. 13.10.14.

132 With reference to your 113 and my 131, two ships have now been withdrawn from French patrol, which is now reduced to six ships. (2055.)

A 198. Naval Centre, Portsmouth, to Adty. Recd. 5.20 p.m.

120 T.B. 116 sighted and attacked submarine five miles S.E. Culver Cliff, 4.30 p.m. Submarine dived and was not damaged. Naval Centres Devonport to Sheerness informed.

A 199. Admiral, Portsmouth, to Adty. Recd. 5.43 p.m.

21 In view of Naval Centre message 120 suggest disembarking Canadian troops Plymouth.

A 200. Adty. to R.A., *Charybdis*. 13.10.14.
6.20 p.m.

48 All transports are to be directed to proceed into Plymouth Sound to await orders. Acknowledge.

A 201. Comm. (T) to Adty. 13.10.14.

253 *Arctusa* returned at 3 p.m. There appears to be no movement of ships from Ems River. Propose disposition as follows: One flotilla of cruisers¹ and four destroyers in vicinity of Terschelling. Four destroyers off Schouwen Bank, two fitted modified sweep. Two destroyers south of Goodwin Sands, one fitted modified sweep. Two destroyers between Galloper Light and Longsand, one fitted modified sweep. (2230.)

Reply. 14.10.14.

127 Your 253. Approved. The patrol off Schouwen should be varied. (1020.)

A 202. Adty. to C-in-C., H.F. 14.10.14.
12.50 p.m.

937 Urgent. Most satisfactory assurances given by Norwegian Government about W/T station at Spitzbergen. Most undesirable for *Gibraltar* to proceed to Spitzbergen. *Gibraltar* is to be recalled at once use *Drake* as a connecting link.

¹ Should evidently read "1 flotilla cruiser."

A 203. Adty. to Admiral, Devonport. 14.10.14.
3 p.m.

Disembarkation of Canadian Expeditionary Force to proceed at Devonport for the present. War Office have been informed. Captain Stansbury Southampton will send Naval Transport Staff to assist and will confer with Admiral Superintendent as to arrangements.

A 204. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Bordeaux. 14.10.14.

454 The Admiralty asks you to be so good as to send as soon as possible the *Pluton* to Calais or Dunkirk with its mines and to ask the Officer Commanding to repair to the Admiralty, London. It is proposed to anchor mines along the Belgian coast and the *Pluton* drawing less water than the British minelayers would be of great service. I have not yet received any telegram from Admiral Rouyer.

A 205. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Bordeaux. 14.10.14.

455 The Admiralty would like to know how many mines you could place at their disposition for the North Sea, after reserving the number necessary for our own needs. I have received from Admiral Rouyer information that the *Pluton* is ready. I hope that you have been good enough to order her to go to Dunkirk.

Reply. 16.10.14.

6089 The number of mines that we have at our disposal is at present hardly sufficient for our needs. It is consequently impossible for us to furnish any to the Admiralty beyond those in the *Pluton* and *Cerbère*. We are trying to expedite delivery of order placed before the war, but we foresee a delay of at least a month.

14.10.14.
Sent 4.5 p.m.

A 206. Admiral, H.F., to Adty. Recd. 6.16 p.m.

667 It appears British minefield has not stopped German submarines from operating in Channel. I venture to submit following proposals to make mine defence more effective. Advertise area between German and British minefield as mined. Lay some mines near Galloper Light Gabbard line as tide permits. Maintain passage if required for our ships only. If not required replace lightship by buoy. Merchant ships to pass north of German mines. Make passage to northward tortuous to prevent submarines following neutral ships. Suggest alternative channels firstly Longsand L.V. Black Deep L.V. Edinburgh channel Tongue L.V. Secondly Longsand L.V. Knock Deep Tongue L.V. Elbow buoys. Thirdly Kentish Knock L.V. South Knock buoys Tongue L.V. Elbow buoys. I prefer first alternative. Keep safe passage absolutely secret. Officers and men neutral ships to be kept below hatches passing through channel. Letter follows. Shall I send minelayers south.

A 207. First Lord to C-in-C. 15.10.14.
2.10 a.m.

942 *Personal.* You are invited to give your opinion secretly on every aspect of the naval situation at home and abroad, and we welcome warmly any schemes you may put forward. Your proposals about mining are being attentively considered. The general aspect of the war is grim. The Russian pressure is not what we expected, and another avalanche of reinforcements is approaching the western theatre. Many thanks for your congratulations about my daughter.

A 208. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Bordeaux. 15.10.14.

456 . . . It has been agreed that Admiral Rouyer's squadron shall in future no longer provide more than six posts in the Western Patrol of the Channel and shall continue patrol Ushant—Cape Finisterre. The Admiralty thinks that this service, which only requires nine cruisers at sea, will allow personnel and matériel the necessary rest and overhauling.

A 209. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. 15.10.14.
947 Great activity prevails in the German Fleet. They are moving west from Danzig.

A 210. G.H.Q. to War Office. 15.10.14.
7.37 p.m.
O.A. 497 Col. Fairholme informs us that the co-operation of a British warship on the flank of the Belgian line from Dixmude to Nieuport is anxiously desired by the Belgian C.-in-C.

A 211. Adty. to R.A., Dover. 16.10.14.
17 The French minelayer *Pluton* will be laying mines off Zeebrugge to-night and intermittently for the next few days. None of our submarines are to be east of the longitude of Dunkirk. Acknowledge.

A 212. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. 16.10.14.
955 Send the minelayers as soon as they can be spared to Sheerness, they are required for minelaying operations. French minelayer *Pluton* is commencing to close Zeebrugge Harbour to-night.

A 213. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. (957) A.O.P. (146) 16.10.14.
Comm. (S) (96), R.A., Cromarty (146).
The *Bonaventure* and six submarines are to return to their original station in the Humber as soon as the coast is clear of enemy submarines.

A 214. Sir F. Bertie (Bordeaux) to Adty. Recd. (by F.O.) 6.45 p.m.
No. 25 (K) Minister for Foreign Affairs has handed to me following message, which he begs you may transmit to Admiralty for their favourable consideration:—

“General Joffre reports that as operations now extend up to North Sea, between Ostend and outer defences of Dunkirk, it would be advisable for Allied fleets to take part in them by supporting French left flank and by acting with long range guns against German right flank, in the event of that flank being extended as far as the Dunes. Commander of Naval Forces should concert his action with General Foch by intermediary of Governor of Dunkirk.”

A 215. Adty. to R.A., Dover. 16.10.14.
8.45 p.m.
19 The three monitors escorted by four destroyers are to proceed to Dunkirk to-night. They are required to support the French left by fire from the sea. The Governor of Dunkirk will give the necessary information and is the intermediary between General Foch and Captain of *Severn*. Submarine attack must be anticipated the destroyers using their best endeavours to protect the monitors. If not required at once monitors to remain at Dunkirk with steam up.

A 216. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 16.10.14.
Sent 7.40 p.m.
Recd. 9.44 p.m.
698 Activity of German submarines in northern waters makes it necessary to withdraw cruiser patrol further north. *Swift* has been attacked by three submarines and *Nymphe* and *Alarm* by one each this afternoon, another seen off Peterhead. I am preparing arrangements for stoppage of merchant vessels to northward of Shetland Islands and to westward of Orkney Islands. The recent fine weather has favoured submarines and while it continues cruisers should remain north. Will carry out a southern sweep at high speed as soon as light cruisers and destroyers are available but destroyers now largely engaged in protecting Scapa Flow against submarine attack. I propose at present coaling *Dreadnought* type at Broadford Bay¹ and later to use Loch Na Keal Mull as a coaling base until submarine defences of Loch Ewe and Scapa are ready. Am forwarding fresh proposals

¹ Skye.

against trade. Should be very glad of 12 merchant steamers to assist cruisers as discussed with Fourth Sea Lord. Good ocean tugs would be suitable if provided with adequate boats.

Reply. 4.20 p.m., 17th October.
936 Your 698. Eight fast lightly armed merchant ships have been taken up. Four more to follow.

A 217. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 17.10.14.
701 Submarine reported entering Scapa 5 p.m. Probably false report but considered it desirable to get heavy ships out. They left during the night. While doubts exist as to safety of base. I cannot use it and am coaling some ships in Broadford Bay, Skye, and some in Loch Na Keal, Mull, Sunday (18th) and Monday. I hope submarine obstructions are being pressed forward as I have no safe base at present and the only way to coal my ships is to shift coaling anchorage constantly. This seriously dislocates organisation of supply.

A 218. R.A., Dover, to Adty. 17.10.14.
7.5 a.m.
Owing to strong easterly wind monitors were not able to sail last night. They will start to-night, weather permitting. (0700.)

Reply.
Monitors are to sail as soon as weather moderates, accompanied by the destroyers as arranged.

A 219. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 17.10.14.
704 Request that for the present no more colliers be sent to Rosyth, Cromarty, or Scapa, but send them to Campbeltown. (1155.)

A 220. C.-in-C., British Forces, to Adty. 17.10.14.
Recd. 12.29 p.m.
6,000 Germans advancing from Ostend on Nieuport can you say when monitors can be expected?

A 221. Adty. to R.A., Dover. 17.10.14.
1.2 p.m.
24 Most important to send the scouts at once and some destroyers to work along the coast to Nieuport to support the Belgian left now being attacked by the Germans, also monitors as soon as the weather permits. Acknowledge.

A 222. Adty. to D.N.T.O., Nantes. 17.10.14.
Your telegram 14th and 17th *re* closing base. Question is under consideration and no action can be taken at present.

A 223. Adty. to C.-in-C., Nore. 17.10.14.
1.35 p.m.
Arrange for escort for minelayers from outer patrol as far as Harwich. Minelayers are sailing at 2 p.m. to-day. Commodore (T) will provide escort for their minelaying operations.

A 224. Adty. to V.A., Channel Fleet. 17.10.14.
2.30 p.m.
153 Two battleships are urgently required to proceed to support the eastern defences of Dunkirk; they should arrive there by daylight to-morrow. Further instructions will be sent as to position they are required to take up. Ships with nets if any should be selected. High angle good gunners will be required. Acknowledge.

Further telegram. 7.40 p.m.
155 The two battleships are first to proceed to Dover to wait events. R.A., Dover, is being ordered to send four destroyers to meet them off Beachy Head, then Portland torpedo boats can return. Communicate direct with Dover time and position for destroyers meeting battleships.

A 225. S.N.O., Dover, to R.A., *Queen*. 17.10.14.

British destroyer patrols in Dover Straits have been temporarily withdrawn as Rear-Admiral, Dover, has gone over to Belgian coast in *Attentive* with all available scouts and destroyers. (1958.)

A 226. Adty. to Comm. (T). 17.10.14.
8.20 p.m.

139 The first German attempt to send destroyers down the Broad Fourteens being so successfully defeated may cause a larger number to be sent next time. Be ready to meet them. We are sending scouts and destroyers to support the Belgian left at Nieuport. Two battleships are leaving Portland to-night for Dover, four more destroyers are being sent to escort them. Therefore if you can spare four destroyers send them temporarily for Dover Patrol to arrive at daylight.

A 227. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Bordeaux. 17.10.14.
9.20 p.m.

468 At the request of the French Military Authorities Admiralty is sending two old battleships of the *Formidable* class to contribute to the defence of Dunkirk. It is suggested that we might help with coast defence ships of the *Furiera*¹ class if they are available.

A 228. *Cyclops* to C.-in-C., H.F. 17.10.14.
Sent 10.52 p.m.
Recd. 10.59 p.m.

96 Your telegram of yesterday, it will not be possible to take *New Zealand* for five days' refit simultaneously with *Conqueror* as there are 10 others in hand besides new construction and at present there is congestion in the Engineering Department. C.-in-C., Plymouth. (2240.)

A 229. Marine, Bordeaux, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 17.10.14.

Orders have been given to Rear-Admiral, *Marseillaise*, to send immediately and at full speed to Dunkirk the four torpedo boats armed with 100 cm. guns.

A 230. S.O., Channel Fleet, to R.A., *Queen*. 18.10.14.

You are to proceed to Dover to wait events. R.A., Dover, is being ordered to send four destroyers to meet you off Beachy Head. Then T.B.s back to Portland, communicate direct with Dover time and position for meeting destroyers. (0015.)

A 231. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 18.10.14.

706 Scapa Flow cannot be used until submarine defence is placed. Defence of Cromarty type necessary in Switha Sound as well as Hoxa Sound. Loch Ewe should also have defence before used. Prefer Cromarty type there. Submit Commander Munro be authorised to place order for all these to be done day and night, orders for sections to be placed with different firms. Most essential to get place[d] quickly as Fleet is now forced so far from North Sea for coaling. Cruisers and 3rd B.S. now proceeding to Lough Swilly to coal; Dreadnought type Lough-na-Keal, will not be ready before Tuesday (20th).

Reply.

971 Your 706. Submarine defences of both types are being made with utmost speed.

¹ Should be *Furieux*.

A 232. Marine, Bordeaux, to Adty., F.N.A. 18.10.14.

87 Answer to 468. *Furieux* and *Bowines* out of commission, have no guns. The only available ship of this class *Requin* is at Bizerta. *Carnot* and *Charles-Martel* at Brest are also out of commission. It is proposed to send *Kléber* and *Desaix*.

A 233. Adty. to Comm. (S). 18.10.14.
2.35 p.m.

98 Reliable information. Germans are forming a line of outposts of light cruisers with armoured cruisers in support, and searching to lat. 52° 51' N, long. 3° 55' E. Send submarines at once to cruise to Terschelling and beyond to attack and intercept cruisers.

A 234. Adty. to Comm. (T). 18.10.14.
2.15 p.m.

142 Reliable information. German light cruisers ordered to form a line of outposts and search as far as lat. 52° 51' N, long. 3° 55' E, armoured cruisers will be distributed behind outposts. Be ready to attack wing cruisers *Fearless* and *Undaunted* being ordered out to support. Move submarines on Terschelling line and beyond to intercept.

A 235. Adty. to *Fearless*. 18.10.14.
2.15 p.m.

Take *Fearless* and *Undaunted* and join destroyers to support *Arethusa*. (Remainder of telegram repetition of 98 to Comm. (S).)

Note.—C.-in-C., H.F., was informed of above arrangements. (Tel. 976 from Adty., 3.58 p.m., 18th October.)

A 236. Adty. to V.A., *Lord Nelson*. 18.10.14.
3.30 p.m.

157 Two more ships required at Dover as *Queen* and *Implacable* have been sent on another service. Battleships selected are to sail for Dover at 8 p.m. to-night.

A 237. Adty. to *Queen*. 18.10.14.
3.25 p.m.

Urgent. *Queen*, *Implacable*, *Sapphire*, and four destroyers from the Dover Patrol are to proceed at once and not wait for *Sapphire* through the Downs and swept channel passing between German minefields and Smith's Knoll ready to reinforce *Arethusa* and light cruisers if attacked by armoured cruisers. Reliable information received shows that German light cruisers are forming a line of observation supported by armoured cruisers at intervals. The line is searching as far as 53° N, 4° E.

A 238. Adty. (F.N.A.), to Marine, Bordeaux. 18.10.14.
6.10 p.m.

469 (In code.) Answer to your 87. Admiralty thanks you for your proposal, but thinks that *Kléber* and *Desaix* are more useful in their functions as cruisers than if employed in the manner suggested.

A 239. Adty. to Comm. (T). 18.10.14.
6.30 p.m.

144 *Queen*, *Implacable* and *Sapphire* from Dover also *Aurora* from Portland have been ordered out to support you. They will come out between Smith's Knoll and the German minefield. Also eight destroyers with *Fearless* and *Undaunted*.

A 240. Adty. to *Aurora*. 18.10.14.
6.37 p.m.

You are to proceed at good speed and join Commodore (T) through the Downs and by swept channel then pass between the German minefield and Smith's Knoll to a position 53° N, 4° E; communicate on the way with Commodore so as to arrange a rendezvous.

A 241. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Bordeaux. 18.10.14.
9.25 p.m.
471 (In code.) German hospital ship *Ophelis*¹ has order signed by Admiral at Heligoland to proceed lat. 52° 51' N, long. 1° 35' E, Paris. As this is considered very suspicious the ship has been taken to Yarmouth and her wireless apparatus dismantled. This piece of information, coupled with several others, makes the Admiralty think that an important movement is in preparation by sea. The Admiralty asks you to send as soon as possible six submarines with their attendant destroyers from Cherbourg to Dunkirk or Calais for operations in the North Sea.

A 242. Adty. to C-in-C., H.F. 18.10.14.
970 Two battle cruisers will be required on Thursday next (22nd), early morning, in southern area North Sea. Details being sent to *Cyclops* by land wire, will you arrange to send for it and avoid communicating by wireless to battle cruisers the details.

Reply. 18.10.14.
710 Your 970. Cruiser Force K will carry out this service. (1820.)

A 243. Adty. to C-in-C., H.F.
357 B.972. Secret. On Thursday, 22nd October weather being suitable, an attack will be made by seaplanes on Cuxhaven Zeppelin sheds from seaplane carriers supported by two light cruisers and a destroyer flotilla 15 miles to the northward of Heligoland. At 6 a.m. two battle cruisers will be required to support the expedition and suggest they approach at speed with four destroyers on varying courses to a position some 65 miles to the north-west² of Heligoland, remaining under way and manoeuvring at high speed near this position. If weather is not suitable the battle cruisers will be informed by Commodore (T) in *Arethusa* in sufficient time to prevent them coming south.

A 244. C-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 18.10.14.
712 My 710. Owing to the presence of submarines in the Minch now reported am sending Cruiser Force K to Cromarty to coal arriving at 6 a.m. Tuesday (20th), leaving same night. Suggest that orders be sent direct to R.A. by special messenger. Request I may be informed if this will be done. (2120.)

Reply. 18.10.14.
987 Your 712. This will be done. The enemy's movements reported yesterday may cause a reconsideration of plan. (0013.)

A 245. Adty. to R.A., *Queen*. 18.10.14.
8.40 a.m.
Give Dutch Light Vessels a good offing, as enemy submarines are reported to use them as bases of observation.

A 246. Admiral, H.F., to Adty. 18.10.14.
Sent 10.45 a.m.
Recd. 11.40 a.m.
715 Grand Fleet may use anchorage in Hebrides. I have grave suspicion of a German base in either Hebrides or Skye. Submit thorough search be made and censor be established over telegrams and letters. Meanwhile, I gave orders that no telegrams reporting movements of ships are to be accepted, and telegrams in code treated with suspicion. Movements of submarines to be reported at once to Stornoway.

¹ Should be *Ophelia*.
² Original signal read "north-east"; this was corrected by Tel. 4 to C-in-C., H.F., Oct. 20.

A 247. *Aurora* to *Arethusa*. 18.10.14.
Intercepted by Adty. 12.50 p.m.
I am ordered to join you forthwith. Am at Dover now procuring special chart. Please give rendezvous and time I should be there. (1100.)

A 248. Comm. (T) to *Aurora*. 18.10.14.
Intercepted by Adty. 1.22 p.m.
Remain where you are until further orders. (1310.)

A 249. Adty. to V.A., *Vengeance* (121),
R.A., *Charybdis* (52). 18.10.14.
Force G on Thursday, 22nd, is to relieve the 7th Battle Squadron on the Western Patrol R.A., *Charybdis*, communicating direct with V.A., *Vengeance*, and making any necessary arrangements. The Admirals should meet and confer in Falmouth, *Vengeance* is then to proceed to Portsmouth, complete with coal and stores.

A 250. C-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 18.10.14.
717 With reference to my letter No. 220/H.F. 0022 of 9th October the additional armed trawlers promised for Scapa Flow, Pentland, Loch Ewe, and Moray are urgently required. Submarines still off northern base and in the Minch. Destroyers unsuitable for searching locks and creeks in the latter. Also desirable to establish coast watchers near likely harbours on north and west coast of Scotland and Hebrides suggest utilise R.N.R. men raised in districts.

A 251. Adty. to *Drake* (Archangel). 18.10.14.
As soon as special cargo has been embarked *Drake* and *Mantua* are to sail in company . . . Acknowledge.

A 252. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Bordeaux. 18.10.14.
1.30 p.m.
473 Replace the text of my telegram 472 by the following: Admiralty does not wish to draw upon your reserves of mines nor to have any of them placed at their disposal (other than the 550 to be used by *Pluton*), but they want to know for their own guidance what is the total French supply, as that is a factor which must influence their own mining policy.

A 253. Adty. to C-in-C., H.F. 18.10.14.
3.25 p.m.
992 Your 715. The most effective immediate action is to establish a censorship yourself under Defence of the Realm Act. If you want censorship for any length of time steps will be taken. Cannot the inlets be searched by destroyers and trawlers from the sea. Steps are being taken to have a search made on shore.

A 254. Adty. to C-in-C., H.F. 18.10.14.
5.20 p.m.
993 For information. German hospital ship *Ophelis*¹ was captured in the position enemy was expected using strong wireless, this has apparently disconcerted enemy's movements no sign of enemy reinforcements returning.

A 255. Adty. to Comm. (T). 18.10.14.
8.45 p.m.
Your 267.² Flotilla cruiser and destroyers are to remain out and patrol a line N.N.E. for 50 miles from a position 53° N, 4° E, and see whether there is any sign of enemy at daylight and report. Other operations will be postponed. Battleships keeping well to the westward as a support.

¹ Should be *Ophelia*.
² Asking whether operation arranged for Oct. 21 and 22 would be carried out.

Further telegram. 20.10.14.
9 p.m.
53 Operation postponed two days. Arrange to arrive at Admiralty, Thursday (22nd) morning to complete details.

A 256. Adty. to C-in-C., Devonport. 19.10.14.
C-in-C., H.F. (997). 9.20 p.m.

Tiger is to carry out gunnery and torpedo practices from Bantry Bay, instead of in the Clyde as previously approved.

Add to C-in-C., H.F.

Similar orders will be given to *Benbow* and *Emperor of India* unless the submarine situation improves.

A 257. Adty. to *Aurora* (Dover), 19.10.14.
Comm. (T) (149), S.N.O., Harwich. 9.20 p.m.

Aurora is to proceed to Harwich at daylight to-morrow Tuesday and act under the orders of Commodore (T). (2100.)

A 258. C-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 19.10.14.

728 Request to be informed whether it is considered I should risk the submarine menace at Scapa Flow and base heavy ships there, or whether situation admits of using base on west coast more than 300 miles from Pentland Firth until submarine obstructions are placed at Scapa Flow. I do not care to move so far south without approval of their Lordships. Request early reply. It cannot be stated with absolute certainty submarines were inside Scapa Flow although Captain (D), 4th Destroyer Flotilla, is positive H.M.S. *Swift* was fired at inside. I am of opinion it is not difficult to get inside at slack water. Please reply personal.

Reply. 20.10.14.

5 Your 728. The net defences for Scapa will leave dockyard on 24th October. In the meantime Admiralty approve battle squadrons remaining on the west coast and if you prefer they can proceed as far as Berehaven. In order to prevent being dogged by submarines a false course should be steered until a sufficient offing is made. Battle cruisers and cruisers will have to remain north to cover exit from North Sea. Cromarty appears to be a safe base for some of them. Report later what mail arrangements you want.

A 259. Marine, Bordeaux, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 19.10.14.

93 Answer to 473. Total number of submarine mines available is 2,895, distributed as follows 120 on *Pluton* 120 *Cerbère* 60 on other Channel ships. 610 reserve mines Cherbourg 768 on Mediterranean ships 1,217 at Toulon and Bizerta. We are disposing moreover at Cherbourg of 440 frames whose loading has been ordered.

A 260. Adty. to Comm. (T). 20.10.14.
8.20 a.m.

150 Leave usual patrol out. Reinforcements return to Harwich. Acknowledge.

A 261. Adty. to *Queen*. 20.10.14.
8.20 a.m.

As there are no signs of enemy *Queen* and *Implacable* are to return to Sheerness and *Sapphire* to Dover forthwith. Acknowledge.

A 262. C-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 20.10.14.
Sent 12.6 a.m.
Recd. 12.40 a.m.

732 Lough Swilly is at present in use as a coaling base depot. Submit examination service be established and entries restricted to H.M. Ships and Auxiliaries.

A 263. Adty. to V.A., *Vengeance*. 20.10.14.
124 On relief by Cruiser Force *G Caesar*, *Prince George*, and *Majestic* are to proceed to Plymouth to coal and await orders.

A 264. C-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 20.10.14.
737 Urgent. Rear-Admiral *Invincible* reports he has not received orders. He should leave to-night. (1655.)

Reply.

Invincible will not be required to sail till Thursday (22nd). Officer with orders leaves by train to-night. (1845.)

A 265. Adty. to *Queen*. 20.10.14.
3.35 p.m.
Urgent. Send your four destroyers back to Dover Patrol at once. (1530.)

A 266. Adty. to Admiral, Chatham. (22.) Sent 4.59 p.m. 20.10.14.

Admiral, Devonport. (8.)	4.44 p.m.	} Five Sent 5.11 p.m.
Admiral, Portsmouth. (2.)	Sent 4.46 p.m.	
Admiral, Queenstown.	Sent 5.11 p.m.	
Admiral, Dunfermline. (305.)	Sent 5.26 p.m.	
V.A., Kirkwall. (94.)		
R.A., Scapa Flow, Kirkwall. (372.)		
R.A., Aultbea. (86.)		
R.A., Cromarty. (166.)		} Sent 5.11 p.m.
R.A., Dover. (46.)		
Dockyard, Portland.	Sent 5.50 p.m.	
Ganges, Shotley Gate.	Sent 5.41 p.m.	
Naval Base, Lowestoft. (107.)	Sent 5.11 p.m.	
All Ships via Cleethorpes W/T.		Sent 4 p.m.

From reliable information the *Vineta* and a minelayer were in a position lat. 56.3 N, long. 0.25 W on the night of 19th October. The vicinity of this position is to be treated with suspicion and marked on chart as probably it has been mined. (1600.)

A 267. British Minister, Copenhagen, to Adty. 20.10.14.

I learn from a fairly reliable source that a German merchant vessel with funnel painted like those of United Shipping Co. is said to have been seen off Norwegian coast accompanied by German torpedo boat in a Norwegian harbour. Ship is stated to have been carrying mines underneath layer of coal. Lowther, British Minister.

Note.—Repeated by Admiralty to C-in-C., H.F. (25), Admiral, Coast of Scotland (313), V.A., Kirkwall (98) at 6.40 p.m.

A 268. Adty. to R.A., *Invincible* and 20.10.14.
C-in-C., H.F. (630). 6.45 p.m.

Invincible will not be required to sail till Thursday [22nd]. Officer with orders leaves by train to-night.

A 269. Adty. to Comm. (T), *Arethusa*. 20.10.14.
9 p.m.
53 Operation postponed two days. Arrange to arrive at Admiralty Thursday morning to complete details.

A 270. Adty. to C-in-C., H.F. (14) and 20.10.14.
V.A., Channel Fleet (164). 11.20 p.m.

On good authority several German cruisers, destroyers and submarines left Danzig on 17th October for the North Sea.

- A 271.** Adty. to C-in-C., H.F. 21.10.14.
12.5 a.m.
15 Shipowners inquire whether they may use Fair Island passage. Do you wish this?
- A 272.** C-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 21.10.14.
12.35 a.m.
741 Your telegram timed 1843 of to-day¹ re Cruiser Force K. I hope it is understood that battle cruisers can only leave Cromarty safely at night and that if they are required on Friday they must go to sea Wednesday night.
- A 273.** C-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 21.10.14.
9.37 a.m.
743 Your 14. 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, and 4th Destroyer Flotilla will sweep North Sea from Fair Island to the Skagerrak, due there about daylight 23rd. Thence westwards till dark. Then northward. When will Cruiser Force K leave?
- A 274.** C-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 21.10.14.
Sent 2.26 p.m.
Recd. 3.34 p.m.
747 Your 15. Only Pentland passage should be used. Request information as to steps to take to carry out proposal in my letter No. 200, H.F., of 2nd October. Submarine menace prevents satisfactory search of neutral ships by cruisers in Minch or vicinity Pentland. Trawler patrol will be used but necessitates adequate Customs examination and military guard at Stornoway.
- A 275.** Adty. to V.A., *Lord Nelson*. 21.10.14.
168 Your 240.² *Implacable* can go to Portsmouth without relief. Give necessary orders.
- A 276.** R.A., *Invincible*, to Adty. 21.10.14.
5.20 p.m.
52 Operation orders received. Am leaving midnight 22nd/23rd October.
- A 277.** Adty. to S.N.O., Dover (54), 21.10.14.
R.A. Hood, H.M.S. *Foresight*. 6.15 p.m.
Two French minelayers will be passing Dunkirk and Nieuport to-night 21st for the purpose of laying mines east of Ostend. Inform all concerned so that they are not impeded.
- A 278.** Adty. to R.A. Hood. 21.10.14.
7.30 p.m.
55 If circumstances permit drop a few shell in Ostend to-morrow to damage any submarines.
- A 279.** Adty. to C-in-C., H.F. 21.10.14.
7.35 p.m.
26 German submarine reported off Varnes Light, Lister Fiord, engines damaged. Will be repaired in 12 hours. Being watched by Norwegians.
- A 280.** Comm. (T) to Adty. 21.10.14.
272 Request instructions whether Schouwen Bank, Galloper Light to North Sand Head, and South Goodwin Light Vessel to Tail of the Fall Patrol with modified sweep can be dispensed with. (1758.)
- Reply.*
154 Your 272. Schouwen Bank should be maintained. Galloper to North Sands and South Goodwins to Tail of Bank can be withdrawn ready for the further operation.

¹ Should be "1845 of yesterday."² Tel. 240 concerned fitting experimental bow defence.

- A 281.** Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Bordeaux. 21.10.14.
480 At the request of the Admiralty, to avoid publishing information useful to the enemy the British Meteorological Office has ceased making public its daily report, and the papers have received instructions not to publish observations of the barometer and of the wind. It is suggested that the French Government should take similar steps, and that the Eiffel Tower should cease its meteorological signals. Letter will follow.
- A 282.** Adty. to C-in-C., H.F. 22.10.14.
32 My 26, it is now reported that German submarine put to sea 8 p.m. last night. (0135.)
- A 283.** C-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 22.10.14.
Sent 9.19 a.m.
Recd. 11.2 a.m.
749 Submit it is essential that all Germans even if naturalised or not should be removed from vicinity present or prospective naval base during hostilities. Post mistresses Salen Mull Island and Brodrick Bay are reported as Germans. There are naturalised German hotel keepers at Kirkcaldy. Submit we cannot afford to take any risks. This applies particularly to postal officials who we suggest, should be removed inland at once to ensure the safety of ships using base.
- A 284.** Admiral, H.F., to Adty. 22.10.14.
Sent 9.19 a.m.
Recd. 2.48 p.m.
753 With reference to Admiralty weekly orders 424 and 447. Submit presence of Dutch fishing fleet on Dogger Bank as foreshadowed by 447 will certainly be made use of by Germans to our disadvantage. Consider that only really effective means of dealing with North Sea is to close it to fishing vessels, but if this is impracticable, suggest that Dutch Government be asked to prohibit wireless telegraphy being carried, and to send patrol vessels to enforce it and to prevent their flags being used by vessels of other nations.
- A 285.** Adty. to Comm. (T). 22.10.14.
2.35 p.m.
154 Recall *Faulknor* and all destroyers now on patrol.
- A 286.** Adty. to C-in-C., H.F. 22.10.14.
6.35 p.m.
38 With reference to your letter 9th inst. No. 230/H.F., 0033, Dread-nought battleships proposed arrangements for docking approved, but no ship should be sent to Portsmouth.
- A 287.** Comm. (T) to Adty. 22.10.14.
Recd. 8.17 p.m.
273 *Aurora* has not fired a gun since she commissioned. Under these conditions, I do not think she should take part in operations. Request early decision. (2000.) Urgent.
- Reply.* 9.51 p.m.
158 Your 273. *Aurora* to remain behind, the first opportunity is to be taken for her to be ready for battle.
- A 288.** Adty. to R.A., *Invincible*. 22.10.14.
Secret. Be careful not to make wireless signals to Commodore (T) till he communicates with you, as otherwise you may disclose his position. He sails from Harwich, 5.30 a.m., 23rd. Acknowledge. (1440.)
- A 289.** S.O., Cruiser Force G, to Adty. 22.10.14.
31 I have taken over Western Patrol from V.A. with *Charybdis*, *Eclipse*, *Talbot*, *Majestic*. *Majestic* proceeds to Devonport to-morrow, 23rd October. *Euryalus* joins squadron Saturday [26th], when I will transfer to it. *Diana* remains at Devonport awaiting Admiralty instructions. (1700.)

A 290. Adty. to Admiral, Devonport. 22.10.14.

Diana is to be held in readiness to convoy transports to Gibraltar, probable date 29th. Further instructions will be sent.

A 291. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 22.10.14.
11.20 p.m.

764 Your 38. C.-in-C., Devonport, informs me that there has been great congestion at Devonport, and I have had to divert ships from that port in consequence. Can Devonport ships in southern waters be directed to Portsmouth if Grand Fleet ships are not to go there.

Reply.

50 Your 764. It is approved for *King George V* to be docked at Portsmouth about 29th inst. Grand Fleet ships can be docked at Portsmouth with precautions similar to those taken in case of *Emperor of India*. If tide serves ships to be taken up at night, and in any case are not to remain at anchor at Spithead for any length of time in daylight.

A 292. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 22.10.14.
10.50 p.m.

762 Your 36. I recognise the necessity for a patrol north of Faeroe Islands and established it at one period, but in absence of 6th Cruiser Squadron and with only two armed merchant cruisers cannot spare vessels for it. Can I be given two or three more armed liners. They are most suitable owing to size and coal endurance.

Note.—Adty. tel. 36 was: "For information. British Minister, Copenhagen, learns that possibly an attempt will be made to sail ships bringing contraband of war to Scandinavia for Germany north of Faeroe Islands and then south under shelter of Norwegian coast."

A 293. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. 23.10.14.
2 a.m.

41 *From First Lord. Private and Personal.* Every effort will be made secure you rest and safety Scapa and adjacent anchorages net defence hastened utmost will be strengthened by successive lines earliest. If you desire Cabinet will I think agree declare area 30 miles east Kinnaird Head to 30 miles north Shetlands and down to 30 miles south of Hebrides prohibited to all ships not specially licensed by Admiralty or you. All vessels whatever flag should be dealt with in this area as you desire. I wish to make absolute sanctuary for you there. I also propose proclaiming all Scotland north of Caledonian Canal including all islands and Inverness prohibited area. You can do what you think necessary for safety of fleet. Use your powers under Defence of Realm Act and ask for anything you want in men money or material. You must have a safe resting place. Tell me how I can help you.

A 294. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. 23.10.14.
10.55 a.m.

42 Post and telegraphic censorship will be established by military at Inverness, Fort William, Oban, Stornoway, Aberdeen, and Londonderry, thus relieving Navy all responsibility. Effective by 26th October.

A 295. A.D.P. to Adty. 23.10.14.
Recd. 3.36 p.m.

Reference to my telegram of yesterday owing to recall of *Goshawk* and *Phoenix* by Commodore (T) and other duties it has been necessary to reduce patrol to three destroyers by day and four by night. (1425.)

A 296. Comm. (T) to *Invincible*. 23.10.14.
Recd. 5.40 a.m.
Operations postponed for 24 hours. (0450.)

A 297. Comm. (T) to Adty. 23.10.14.
Recd. 6.15 a.m.

277 Regret weather impossible for operations. I have ordered carriers to return to Dover. Request you will postpone for 24 hours T.B. destroyers just arrived report heavy seas at that place. Informed cruisers. (0518.)

A 298. Adty. to Comm. (T). 23.10.14.
7.5 a.m.
159 Your 377. Approved to postpone.

A 299. Comm. (T) to *Engadine*. 23.10.14.
Anchor off Lowestoft or Yarmouth as convenient. Orders follow. (0840.)

A 300. S.O., Cruiser Force K to C.-in-C., H.F. 23.10.14.
Operations postponed for 24 hours. Propose cruising north of lat. 58° N, about long. 0°. (0847.)

A 301. Comm. (T) to *Engadine*. 23.10.14.
Proceed to Lowestoft. (0950.)

A 302. Comm. (T) to Adty. 23.10.14.
278 Cancel telegram No. 275 *re Aurora* proceeding to Portland. *Aurora* is preparing for battle at Harwich. Wind SW. Strong. Conditions unfavourable for operations. (1000.)

Note.—Comm. (T's) 275 was: "Suggest *Aurora* returns to Portland to prepare for battle."

A 303. Adty. to Comm. (T). 23.10.14.
Sent 7.45 p.m.
Recd. 8.46 p.m.

164 Commodore (T) is to send four destroyers to reinforce the Dover Patrol so as to free more of the Dover Patrol for service off Nieuport if required.

A 304. Comm. (T) to *Engadine*. 23.10.14.
Intercepted by Adty. 8.24 p.m.
The weather is satisfactory. I intend to carry out orders sent per T.B.D. (1950.)

A 305. Adty. to Admiral, Dover Patrol. 23.10.14.
11.8 p.m.

73 The Germans are reported to have brought submarines in sections by rail to Ostend. Destroy the railway station and railway line and all rolling stock if possible. Destroy quays and docks. Bombard the basins. Do not hesitate to bombard any portion of the town where enemy is. Report whether the block ships we have ready at Sheerness could be run in to the harbour and sunk there under cover of your fire. Report what ships you will use, providing as well for the support of the Belgian left.

A 306. Adty. to A.D.P. 23.10.14.
11.50 p.m.

74 Referring to Admiralty telegram 73. We do not want to destroy Ostend till certain we cannot recapture. Take no action in forenoon 24th except supporting Franco-Belgian left as heretofore. We are asking F.M. French what the prospects are. Have everything in readiness at Dunkirk for Ostend bombardment if desired in afternoon. Congratulate you on success of operations conducted at so much hazard.

A 307. C-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 24.10.14.
4.40 a.m.

782 *To First Lord. Private and Personal.* Very grateful for your 41. It would be adding greatly to the safety of the Fleet and northern base and would much assist operations against German trade and contraband trade in neutral bottoms if the area enclosed between the following lines were prohibited to all British and neutral ocean traffic, viz., a line drawn from a point east true from Buchan Ness through a point east true ten miles from Muckle Flugga through a point west true ten miles from Muckle Flugga through the Flannan Island Lighthouse Barra Head Lighthouse Skerryvore Lighthouse and Oversay Lighthouse Islay Island. This would close the Minch Pentland Firth and Fair Isle passage and greatly facilitate operations (against) hostile submarine tenders. If we can locate and destroy these tenders we can deal with hostile submarines with much greater effect. It will be necessary to permit some British local traffic to pass through the Minch and Pentland Firth, but this should be done under license and be kept to the minimum possible. I have asked to-day whether I am appointed competent authority under the Defence of the Realm Act. The submarine obstructions when in place will give great security. Contact mines would add to this and would also be in the nature of a submarine offensive. I hope steps are being taken to produce contact mines as distinguished from mechanical mines which might prove dangerous to friends. I have extemporised submarine obstruction at present base in view of shallow nature of harbour feel fairly secure.

Reply. 25.10.14.
56 Your 761. Contact mines are in hand

A 308. Sir G. Buchanan (Petrograd) to F.O. 24.10.14.
Sent (Aden) 5.5 a.m.
Recd. 5.40 a.m.

551 Following from Naval Attaché, begins :—

Russian information states that: Germans have sent 10 small submarines by rail to Ostend; it is confirmed that they are straining to occupy Calais. Two armoured ships, the *Agordat* and one division destroyers have been transferred from Tarento to Brindisi. Greek Government reports arrival of submarines at Rustchuk destined for Constantinople to be sent there either by railway or by Varna. Please communicate all above to French Admiralty. My French colleague [group omitted? says that] Calais is main base of French channel submarines with every facility there for their repair and upkeep.

A 309. Comm. (T) to *Engadine.* 24.10.14.
6 a.m.
Have sailed. (0555.)

A 310. S.N.O., Harwich, to Adty. 24.10.14.
Recd. 6.37 a.m.

Arethusa, Undaunted, Miranda, Lark, Legion, Lysander, Landrail, Lennox, Loyal, Hornet, Tigress, Sandfly, Jackal, Ferret, Forester, Druid, Defender, Meteor, Leonidas, Lydiard, Lucifer, Liberty, sailed. (0600.)

A 311. S.N.O., Harwich, to Adty. 24.10.14.
Recd. 7.36 a.m.

Fearless, Acheron, Faulknor, Ariel, Archer, Badger, Beaver, Hydra, Hind, Lizard, Lapwing, sailed. (0715.)

A 312. Adty. to Comm. (T). 24.10.14.
8 a.m.

167 Report briefly what you are proposing to do.

A 313. S.O., Cruiser Force K to S.O., 1st B.C.S. 24.10.14.
10.27 a.m.

Your 0830. To carry out Admiralty special operation orders. (1020.)

Note.—0830 asked where S.O., Cruiser Force K, was going.

A 314. Adty. to S.O., Cruiser Force K. 24.10.14.
10.30 a.m.

25 Commodore (T) has sailed for rendezvous. You should be in your pre-arranged position at the same time Sunday, 25th, instead of to-day. Acknowledge.

Note.—Not logged by *Invincible*. No acknowledgment has been traced.

24.10.14.
Sent 11.39 a.m.
Recd. (*Invincible*) 11.55 a.m.

A 315. Comm. (T) to *Inflexible* via S.O., Cruiser Force K. Intercepted by Adty. 12.5 p.m.
(via Stockton 11.57 a.m.).

Expect to arrive final position at 4.30 to-morrow morning. My position at 9 a.m. was Smith's Knoll L.V. (1020.)

24.10.14.
Recd. 10.53 a.m.

A 316. Comm. (T) to Adty.

280 Am carrying out programme in accordance with arranged plan. Weather is suitable, sea calm, expect to arrive final position at 4.30 to-morrow morning. (1030.)

24.10.14.
Recd. 11.28 a.m.

A 317. Comm. (T) to Adty.

287 My telegram No. 278 should have read weather conditions favourable. Weather conditions now are perfect; submit if cruisers cannot be sent, the operations may be proceeded with. *Lion* is within easy distance if *Inflexible* cannot reach rendezvous in time. Urgent. (1100.)

24.10.14.
Sent 12.5 p.m.

A 318. Adty. to Comm. (T). Acknowledged 12.47 p.m.

168 Your 287. Urgent. Proceed with operation. R.A., *Inflexible*¹ has been informed. Acknowledge.

A 319. Erased. 24.10.14.
10.40 a.m.

A 320. Adty. to S.O., 1st B.C.S. 24.10.14.
10.40 a.m.

100 For information. Reported that German submarine U.8 passed the Skaw, heading W, at 1.15 p.m., 23rd October.

24.10.14.
12.10 p.m.

A 321. Adty. to Admiral, Dover Patrol.

76 After further consultation with military we think it better wait for a day or two before wrecking docks and quays of Ostend. But railway station and approaches should be bombarded to-day and any activity in the harbour by enemy should be stopped.

24.10.14.
2.30 p.m.

A 322. F.O. to Mr. Findlay (Christiania).

No. 26. Treaty. From a fairly reliable source it is learnt that a German merchant vessel with funnel painted like those of the United Shipping Company, is said to have been seen off the Norwegian coast accompanied by a German torpedo boat, and in a Norwegian harbour. The ship is also stated to have been carrying mines underneath a layer of coal.

24.10.14.
3 p.m.

A 323. Adty. to R.A. Hood.

80 In view of Commander Samson's report that there is no activity in Ostend harbour or at the railway terminus, there is no need to bombard Ostend to-day unless local circumstances require it.

¹ Should be *Invincible*.

A 324. C.-in-C., H.F., to S.O., Cr. Force K. 25.10.14.
Intercepted by Adty. 7.14 p.m.

Proceed to Cromarty to coal. Enter between five and six a.m., Tuesday 27th. Arrange with Rear-Admiral, Cromarty, as to lights and gates. Look out for possible minelayers returning from direction of Buchan Ness at daylight in pursuance of instructions to sweep up middle of North Sea. (1837.)

A 325. Adty. to Comm. (T). 25.10.14.

171 Arrange for the usual patrols before returning to Harwich if fuel will allow. (2000.)

Reply. 26.10.14.

284 Your 171. Cannot leave patrol out, strong NW gale blowing, very heavy sea. My position at 7 a.m. near Smith's Knoll Light Vessel. (0745.)

A 326. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. 26.10.14.
1.45 p.m.

65 Information has been received that German battlefleet was at noon, 25th, between Brunsbüttel and Wilhelmshaven. Also that there are no large warships in Kiel harbour.

A 327. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 26.10.14.
6.30 p.m.

812 Am recalling all ships to coal. Compelled to use Scapa Flow for 3rd B.S. and 2nd C.S. Request any fresh information may be immediately telegraphed. Am remaining present base.

A 328. Adty. to Admiral, Dunfermline. 26.10.14.
A.O.P. 7.32 p.m.
S.N.O., Cromarty.

For information. Reported a submarine left the Ems 3 p.m., Sunday [25th October].

A 329. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. 26.10.14.
8 p.m.

69 Are the requirements for patrol service in the Minch adequately met by present dispositions. If not, please report what additions you consider necessary.

A 330. Adty. to C.-in-C., Nore. 26.10.14.
11.10 p.m.

Queen to keep steam at one hour's notice from 4 a.m. to-morrow 27th. *Queen* may be required to support Admiral Hood's squadron if it is attacked.

A 331. Adty. to S.N.O., Dover. 26.10.14.
11.10 p.m.

Irresistible to keep steam at one hour's notice ready for any service that may be required.

A 332. Adty. to Comm. (T). 26.10.14.
11.15 p.m.

173 The wind having gone down. Arrange to send the Terschelling patrol out, through the Broad Fourteens. It is important to have a watch well in advance of Admiral Hood's squadron, as there is a chance of it being surprised.

A 333. Adty. to Transport Officers, Newhaven 27.10.14.
and Avonmouth. 1 a.m.

No ships to sail for Boulogne till further orders. Ships may sail for ports south of Boulogne.

Note.—Orders in same sense were also sent to Transport Officer, Southampton.

A 334. Adty. to D.N.T.D., Calais and Boulogne. 27.10.14.
1 a.m.

No transports to sail till further orders except Red Cross ships which must leave in daylight.

A 335. Adty. to all Ships and S.N.O.s. 27.10.14.
1.30 a.m.

Adty. tel. of 7th October cancelled. All enemy reservists proceeding in neutral vessels to undertake military service should be removed on high seas as well as in British territorial waters.

A 336. C.-in-C., H.F., to *Illustrious*. 27.10.14.
Recd. Adty. (via Stockton). 10.12 a.m.

23 Send all destroyers immediately 55° 37' N, 8° 13' W to help *Audacious*. Beware of submarines. (0945.)

A 336a. Torr Head S.S. to Adty. 27.10.14.
Sent 10.46 a.m.
Recd. 11.35 a.m.

32 Message, 27th, 10.35 a.m. Following received from Carnlough to Coastguard Officer, Torr Head. S.s. *Manchester Commerce* struck mine and sunk Tory Island bore south one quarter west 20 miles, lat. 53° 35½' N, 8° 24' W, crew about 44, 30 saved. Sergeant, Carnlough, Torr Head.

A 337. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 27.10.14.
Recd. 11.55 a.m.

822 *Audacious* struck by mine or torpedo 55° 40' N, 8° 20' W. Fear she is sinking. Small craft have been sent to her assistance. (1030.)

A 338. Adty. to S.N.O., Dover. 27.10.14.
Noon.

Sapphire is to complete with coal and proceed by the swept channel to join the Grand Fleet.

A 338a. Adty. to S.O., 6th C.S. 27.10.14.
1.30 p.m.

1 Report present position, course, and speed. *Audacious* just been torpedoed by submarine, lat. 55° 40' N, long. 8° 20' W.

A 338b. Bunrana to C.-in-C., H.F. 27.10.14.
Recd. 2 p.m.

Recd. from Kingstown: Received from Sergeant, Carnlough, s.s. *Manchester Commerce* struck mine and sunk Tory Island bore S ¼ W, 20 miles, crew of about 44, 30 saved. Ends. Admiralty and Greenock informed. Should Bunbeg be told to transmit. (1240.)

A 339. Adty. to S.O., 6th C.S. 27.10.14.
2.25 p.m.

2 S.S. *Manchester Commerce* sunk by a mine 20 miles north of Tory Island. Beware of a minefield extending north of Tory Island. *Audacious* probably mined not submarined. Urgent.

A 340. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 27.10.14.

825 For Hydrographer. Do you consider River Shannon above Tarbet sufficiently surveyed for anchorage of 2nd B.S.

Reply.

80 Shannon not recommended, suggest Killary Bay.

Further Reply.

835 To First Sea Lord. Your 80. Think Killary Bay too narrow for ships over 600 ft. long.

(C5617)

A 341. Adty. to all Ships and S.N.O.s. 27.10.14.
3.50 p.m.
All lightships, lightbuoys, and buoys are being removed from Thames approaches between the meridian of 1° 25' and 0° 52', and between the parallels of 51° 49' and 51° 23', with the exception of Tongue Light Vessel and those marking the Edinburgh channels and Black Deep and channel south of Knock John and Knob buoys and the Daze Deep. All light vessels west of 2° E will not show their usual lights or riding lights at night between 7 p.m. and 6 a.m.

A 342. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 27.10.14.
4.35 p.m.
826 Submit every endeavour should be made to keep *Audacious* incident from being published.

A 343. Adty. to Transport Officer, Southampton. 27.10.14.
5.18 p.m.
Sailings to Boulogne may be resumed.
Note.—Transport Officers at Avonmouth, Newhaven, Havre, Boulogne, and Calais were also informed.

A 344. Adty. to C.-in-C., Portsmouth. 27.10.14.
6.15 p.m.
Hermes is to take the necessary seaplanes from Calshot, proceed to sea when ready, and place herself under orders of Admiral Hood off Dunkirk.

A 345. Adty. to S.N.O., Dover. 27.10.14.
7.35 p.m.
94 Pass following to Admiral Hood. Orders are being given for the French destroyers on coast of Belgium to be placed under your orders. Lieutenant de Vazelhes is available to assist you.

A 346. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 27.10.14.
7.41 p.m.
830 Can eight minesweeping trawlers be sent to Lough Swilly at once? Minefield apparently of great extent. Cannot draw on Northern Base.

Reply.
86 Your 830. Where are your fleet sweepers? Trawler sweepers are all on the East Coast, except four at Milford, which will be sent at once. (2310.)

A 347. Adty. to S.O., 11th C.S. 27.10.14.
8.40 p.m.
42 Two ships have been sunk to-day by striking mines off Tory Island. Apparently a line of mines has been laid north of this island and may extend 40 miles. Arrange for a cruiser to be stationed well to the westward to warn homecoming traffic of this danger.

A 348. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 27.10.14.
Sent 10.10 p.m.
Recd. 11.9 p.m.
834 Regret report that *Audacious* has sunk. Believe that only one life lost. Hope loss can be kept secret.

Note on original.—"Secretary. No mention of this is to be allowed in any newspaper until further orders.—W.S.C., 27.10."

A 349. Adty. to Capt. Supt., Pembroke Dock. 27.10.14.
10.55 p.m.
Send the four sweeping trawlers at once to Lough Swilly to act under the orders of S.N.O., Lough Swilly. The enemy have laid a large number of mines off Inistrahull and Tory Island.

A 350. Adty. to R.A., *Sutlej*. 27.10.14.
43 As the Germans have adopted a minelaying policy for the north of Ireland, send a cruiser at once to patrol and watch the entrance to St. George's Channel, as no doubt an attempt will be made to close this channel. (2315.)

A 351. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 28.10.14.
1.35 a.m.
839 For safety of British merchant shipping, as well as of fleet, I consider it essential to prohibit area mentioned in my telegram No. 782 to First Lord of the Admiralty, to all traffic, but the western limit should be the line from Flannan Islands to Eagle Island as far south as lat. 55° 30' N, thence to eastward south of this latitude.

A 352. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 28.10.14.
9.25 a.m.
841 Is there any fresh news of hostile battlefleet?
Reply. 11 a.m.
90 As far as we know the hostile battlefleet has not left the vicinity of Wilhelmshaven.

A 353. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. 28.10.14.
12.5 p.m.
91 To ensure secrecy, will you endeavour to caution passengers and crew of *Olympic* of the importance, in public interest, of keeping the loss secret as long as possible. *Olympic* is being ordered to remain at Lough Swilly and discharge passengers¹ until a safe passage has been found through minefield.

A 354. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. 28.10.14.
2.50 p.m.
93 Cabinet has decided that no publication of yesterday's affair should be allowed for the present, in view of the military and Turkish situation. Use every endeavour to have matter kept secret locally.

A 355. S.O., Cruiser Force E, to Adty. 28.10.14.
62 In view of probability of mines and submarines off Bantry Bay propose to discontinue using Berehaven as a coaling station until minesweepers and torpedo boat patrols are provided. (1735.)

A 356. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. 29.10.14.
1.20 p.m.
107 Your 857. The *Olympic* should be ordered to proceed by the north of Ireland route to Liverpool, when a safe course has been found free from mines. This can be used as the excuse for delaying the ship till to-morrow. Keep the passengers on board.

A 357. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. 30.10.14.
1.40 a.m.
112 For information. It is reported that the auxiliary cruisers *K.3*, *K.4*, *K.5* left Kiel through the Canal and that several war vessels and submarines left Kiel on Monday night. We have a patrol of one flotilla cruiser and four destroyers off Terschelling.

A 358. Adty. (First Lord) to Admiral Hood. 30.10.14.
2.8 a.m.
118 Aerial reconnaissance of Ostend and Zeebrugge will be ordered for to-morrow morning 30th. Try if situation permits to rest to-morrow. Colonel Bridges reports position less acute. *Revenge* should join you 31st, evening. Keep in close touch with military.

¹ This was afterwards cancelled, and passengers were detained on board.
(C5617)

30.10.14.
Sent 2.27 a.m.
Recd. 2.58 a.m.

A 359. A.O.P., Jarrow, to Adty.

With reference to your telegram No. 172 am making inquiry from Captain (D), 7th Flotilla, as to what orders have been given to *Violet*, *Vixen*. I have no knowledge of any minelaying off this coast by Admiralty orders. (0130.)

A 360. Adty. to all Ships. 30.10.14.

All lights on East Coast England and Scotland including lights of all off-lying vessels and light buoys, between Orfordness and Wick are extinguished. Following light vessels within these limits are withdrawn: North Carr, Swarte Bank, Outer Dowsing, Dudgeon, Cromer Knoll, Smith's Knoll. Position of Smith's Knoll is still marked by a pillar buoy. All buoys marking the following shoals are withdrawn: Outer Dowsing, Dudgeon, Leman, Ower, north and eastern sides of Haisborough Sands, Hammond Knoll, Winterton Ridge, and Smith's Knoll. In addition to above Outer Gabbard Light Vessel is withdrawn and replaced by pillar buoy. Shiplight still remains. (0220.)

A 361. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. 30.10.14.
3.30 a.m.

113 *First Lord to C.-in-C. Secret and Personal.* Prince Louis has resigned on grounds of parentage to my deep regret. The King has appointed Lord Fisher as First Sea Lord. He will assume office to-morrow afternoon. I expect Sir Arthur Wilson will be associated with Admiralty for special duties. Loss of *Audacious* has nothing to do with these events. There will be no change in naval war policy as set out in your War Orders. Please telegraph whether you think Grand Fleet could prudently take four or five days' rest in Portland harbour.

Reply.

876 *For First Lord. Secret and Personal.* Your 113. I have made present base secure against submarine attack and think it better to remain here than to go to Portland. I propose to send out our squadrons [one ?] at a time next week to fire at rocks off coast of Ireland as target practice is very necessary and towing targets is difficult in present weather and possibly unsafe. Think it would probably be best then to send one squadron to Cromarty, pending completion of obstructions at Scapa Flow as there is only room for two here. Am writing by messenger (group corrupt) to-day.

A 362. Adty. to all Ships (5 p.m.) and
Naval Centres (6.45 p.m.) 30.10.14.

On account of German mines having drifted to the southward, 51° 54' should now be considered as the southern limit of the Southwold danger area.

Note.—The previous limit was 52° N (G.F.O., Section 255, 18th October, 1914).

30.10.14.
Sent 12.10 p.m.

A 363. H.M.S. *Assistance* to Adty. Recd. 1.19 a.m. 31.10.14.

875 Customs Cardiff report Master *Manchester Civilian* from Gothenburg arrived 3 p.m. 29th October, reports mine north Ronaldshay Light-house bearing S 14 E correct magnetic distant three miles at 11 a.m. Monday 26th about 300 yards from ship between vessel and shore apparently carbon—its black colour floating freely on surface with horns and ropes to rides minelayer sighted just before seeing mine she steamed in westerly direction without acknowledging signals. Have requested Customs ascertain further particulars of reported minelayer. Request that all shipping may be warned of suspected presence of minefield between North Ronaldshay and Fair Island.

A 364. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. 30.10.14.
2.15 p.m.

116 Lloyd's Agent, Fleetwood, reports position where *Manchester Commerce* struck mine was 20 miles N $\frac{1}{4}$ E magnetic from Tory Island, the time being 2.15 p.m., Monday. It appears doubtful whether any other merchant vessel has been sunk. Board of Trade is being requested to make further inquiries at once.

A 365. Adty. to A.O.P., Jarrow. 30.10.14.
4.10 p.m.

176 British mines have been laid in the Southwold area, but not in the Flamborough or Tyne areas for the present. It is important not to remove mines in either of the three mined areas.

A 366. Adty. to all Ships (5.50 p.m.) and
Naval Centres (9.35 p.m.). 30.10.14.

North Hinder Light Vessel has been moved to an approximate position 51° 45 $\frac{1}{2}$ ' N, 2° 40' E.

A 367. Adty. to R.A. Hood. 30.10.14.
7.30 p.m.

123 Take all measures to protect *Venerable* for the night, using barges and nets if possible. From to-morrow night *Revenge* will wait in Dover harbour at your disposal. Send over as soon as possible your plans for preventing Ostend and Zeebrugge being used as submarine bases by the enemy. Would you use blockships for the purpose? From what positions would you propose to bombard? What assistance from minesweepers would you require? State your view about this operation. Meanwhile, you should continue to support the Belgian left, in conjunction with the military, husbanding ammunition as far as possible. The *Excellent* is now at Dover.

A 368. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. (119), 30.10.14.
V.A., Channel Fleet (174),
C.-in-C., Nore, S.N.O., Harwich,
R.A., Dover (124),
S.N.O., Scotland (354),
C.-in-C., Portsmouth. 7.55 p.m.

From reliable information an imminent attack may be expected by the two new zeppelins on either of the fleets.

A 369. Adty. to R.A., Dover. 30.10.14.
9.30 p.m.

If there is any submarine risk to *Hermes* arrange for her to go into Dunkirk for the night.

A 370. Adty. to *Lord Nelson*. 30.10.14.
9.30 p.m.

175 *Queen* is to remain at Sheerness, the Rear Admiral's flag being transferred to a ship at Portland.

A 371. Naval Centre, Pembroke Dock, to Adty. Recd. 11.28 p.m. 30.10.14.
Sent 11.2 p.m.

Re Tory Island minefield. Master of s.s. *Gro* reports sighting at 10 a.m., 26th October, off Durst Point, Mull Sound, a trawler of appearance of ordinary British trawler, with two masts, main and mizzen, steaming north at full speed about 10 knots, flying Dutch flag with letters TN or FN.

A 372. Adty. to *Venerable*. 31.10.14.
3.7 p.m.

Venerable is to return to Sheerness in the dark hours to-night, escorted by four destroyers, passing through the Downs so as to arrive off the Tongue Lightship at 6 a.m.

A 373. Admiral, Dunfermline, to Adty. 31.10.14.
361 Following received from R.A., Cromarty. Submitted for consideration of Admiralty, present number of destroyers at Cromarty not sufficient adequate protection of this base from minelaying in Moray Firth. V.A., 1st B.C.S., is strongly of same opinion. Request eight additional destroyers may be based on Cromarty and that four, if possible, may be sent immediately.

A 374. Adty. to C-in-C., H.F. 1.11.14.
5 a.m.
131 Your telegram 707. No anticipated movement intercepted. Several from reliable agents, ships in Thames, Firth of Forth, submarines arrival, I attempt landing 15,000 men Ostend, one large ship off Nieuport. (From H.S.A. 4 G.F. *In Tels.*, November, 1914.)

A 375. Adty. to R.A., Dover. 1.11.14.
6.45 p.m.
136 No ship larger than a destroyer, or in exceptional cases a scout at speed, is to cross the Channel east of the longitude of Greenwich, except during the hours of darkness.

APPENDIX B.

TELEGRAMS AND SIGNALS CONNECTED WITH THE OSTEND OPERATIONS, AUGUST 21-31, 1914.

B 1. Adty. to R.A., *Euryalus*. 21.8.14.
German cavalry force may be expected at Ostend to-morrow morning, Saturday. Stop. Arrange for a light cruiser and two divisions of destroyers to make a demonstration before Ostend and along the coast, supported by two *Bacchantes* outside the shoals. Stop. It is important not to fire on the town, but if any body of the enemy clear of the houses offer a sufficient target, fire may be opened. Stop. Keep Admiralty informed, tels. sent. Stop.

B 2. Adty. to R.A., *Euryalus*. 21.8.14.
The Belgian Government have reported that no mines are laid off the Belgian coast. It is believed that no lights have been extinguished.

B 3. Adty. to R.A., *Euryalus*. 22.8.14.
There are rumours that Ostend is already occupied by Germans. Warn destroyers accordingly.

B 4. Comm. (T) to *Euryalus*. 22.8.14.
4.50 a.m.
With reference to Admiralty telegram relative Ostend, *Amethyst* leaving Chatham at 10 a.m. and cannot be off Ostend until 4.30 p.m. to-day, Saturday. Request you will detail *Fearless* and two divisions first flotilla for this service, and inform me whether you wish *Amethyst* and two divisions 3rd Destroyer Flotilla to relieve them. 3.50 a.m.

Comm. (T), *Amethyst*, to Adty. 5.14 a.m.
192 Receipt of telegrams 41 and 42 here acknowledged. Following telegram sent to R.A., *Euryalus*, begins: (repeat above telegram).

B 5. Capt. (D), 1st Flotilla, to *Euryalus*. 22.8.14.
Belgian flags flying and no troops visible as far as Zeebrugge. Owing to embanked foreshore, it is impossible to see inland. (0800.)

B 6. *Fearless* to *Euryalus*. 22.8.14.
Rear-Admiral is now on his way to Ostend in *Sapphire*.

B 7. Comm. (T) to *Euryalus*. 22.8.14.
12.42 p.m.
I am proceeding to Ostend unless you direct otherwise. I can arrive at 4 p.m. Request instructions as to 3rd Destroyer Flotilla. (125.) [?(1225)].

B 8. *Bacchante* to *Euryalus*. 22.8.14.
2.56 p.m.
Third Flotilla patrol on line north 30 miles from 52.18 N, 3.55 E, *Aboukir* and *Cressy* in visual support. (1430.)

B 9. Adty. to R.A., *Euryalus*. 22.8.14.
11 Have you anything to report from Ostend ?

B 10. *Euryalus* to Adty. 22.8.14.
5.12 p.m.
Rear-Admiral, *Euryalus*, to Admiralty. Request earliest reply *re* withdrawal cruisers and destroyers from Ostend.

B 11. Adty. to R.A., *Euryalus*. 22.8.14.
12 Your 1135, 22nd August. Withdraw the whole force, giving necessary orders.

B 12. *Euryalus* to Adty. 22.8.14.
6.15 p.m.
Following was sent to-day from accounts received from *Sapphire*, code time 11.35: Have landed at Ostend and interviewed Burgomaster, who requests flotilla and cruisers may be withdrawn. He states that Civil Guard has been disarmed, and all arms have been forwarded to Antwerp, after consultation Chief of Belgian Coast Defences. Town is now defenceless and wishes to remain so. In his opinion if German troops were fired upon, safety of inhabitants would be endangered. British Consul left to-day. Burgomaster states report at three last night 80 German motor cars entered Ghent, proceeding south-westwards to Courtrai (Belgium). I have withdrawn flotilla to outer roadstead and request instructions. Returning to *Euryalus* forthwith. Steamship *Empress* carrying seaplanes, returning to coal; am leaving one destroyer during absence of *Empress* to attend air station.

B 13. Liebaert Bourgmaster, Ostende, to De Lalaing, 24.8.14.
Ministre Belgique, Londres.

I learn that detachments of German troops are scouring the country in neighbourhood of Ostende. Without wishing to meddle with defence of Ostende and the Belgian coast, and following on your telegram of the 21st inst., do you not think it necessary to send immediately some British warships with some landing troops to watch Belgian coast, principally Ostende ?

B 14. A.O.P., H.M.S. *Arrogant* to Adty. 25.8.14.
3.30 a.m.
Following received begins Governor of Dunkerque to British Admiral. Authorities Ostend request aid of man of war for intimidating German patrol [X ? bodies ?] ends. Am not sending any from patrol 2.30 a.m.

B 15. Adty. to V.A., *Lord Nelson*. 25.8.14.
6.20 p.m.
88 Four battleships of 5th Battle Squadron are to embark Field Force of Royal Marines at once for conveyance to a destination which will be communicated later. Acknowledge.

B 16. Adty. to V.A., *Vengeance*. 25.8.14.
6.25 p.m.
42 Proceed at once to Devonport with ships in company, and be prepared to embark Field Force of Royal Marines on arrival for conveyance to a destination which will be communicated later. Report all movements. Acknowledge.

B 17. Adty. to C.-in-C., The Nore. 25.8.14.
6.45 p.m.
Field Force of Royal Marines are to embark at once in ships of Cruiser Force C and *Euryalus*, for conveyance to a destination which will be communicated later. *Sapphire* and 12 torpedo boat destroyers from Harwich to accompany the squadron, also as many tugs as can be provided from Chatham and Sheerness for two days.

B 18. Adty. to C.-in-C., The Nore. 25.8.14.
11.15 p.m.
29 The Cruiser Force with Flying Corps are to rendezvous three miles south of the South Goodwin Light. Time will be telegraphed later, when it is known when the Portsmouth Division are expected to arrive. If desirable to suit tides, the Cruiser Force can proceed when ready and anchor in the Downs. The tugs assembling in the Downs.

B 19. Adty. to C.-in-C., Portsmouth. 25.8.14.
Report the name of ships taking the Flying Marine Corps, the Senior Officer of the squadron, the expected time of sailing, the time of arriving at a speed of 14 knots three miles south of the South Goodwin Light Vessel. The cruiser force from Chatham with the Chatham Flying Corps will be ordered to rendezvous at expected time of arrival of the Portsmouth Division at this position.

B 20. Adty. to Col. Sir George Aston, K.C.B., R.M.A. 25.8.14.
At daylight to-morrow, 26th August, if circumstances allow, you will disembark such portions of your brigade as have arrived at Ostend, and occupy the town. You will push out reconnaissance of cyclists to Bruges, Thorout and Dixmude. You will establish yourself at Ostend, forming an entrenched picket line round the town in such a way as to enable you to cover the debarkation of a division of the Army. A squadron of aeroplanes will reach you before noon, having previously made an aerial reconnaissance of the country within 30 miles of Ostend. These aeroplanes will be placed under your orders. The object of this movement is to create a diversion favourable to the Belgians who are advancing from Antwerp, and to threaten the western flank of the German southward advance. It should therefore be ostentatious. You should not advance inland from Ostend without further orders, but some enterprise may be permitted to the patrols. Information about the enemy will be supplied to you personally at the Admiralty. The object in view would be fully attained if a considerable force of the enemy were attracted to the coast. You will be re-embarked as soon as this is accomplished. You are accorded temporary rank of Brigadier-General.

B 21. Adty. to R.A., *Euryalus*, and General Aston. 26.8.14.
20 If on arrival you find Ostend occupied by the enemy you must act according to circumstances and their strength, endeavouring to avoid bringing calamity upon the town for the sake of a minor operation, and if convenient landing at some other point near by and so turning them out. This is left entirely to your judgment.

B 22. Adty. to R.A., *Euryalus*. 26.8.14.
21 Following from H.M. Minister, Antwerp, dispatched 7.4 p.m., 25th August, begins: I have communicated with the Minister of War. Ostend has been threatened by detached bodies of German cavalry, largest of which, about 200, was repulsed this morning by the gendarmeries 150 in number. Object of these raids is to cut cable with England and perhaps damage port. Minister considers it very desirable that assistance should be given, and thinks utmost required would be 300 men landed from ships to support the gendarmeries.

B 23. Adty. to R.A., *Euryalus*. 26.8.14.
23 For your information and communication to General Aston following received from British Minister, Antwerp. All necessary instructions will be sent at once to the authorities at Ostend, and every facility for disembarkation will be given. Minister of War, after consulting the General Staff, says that proposed reconnaissances will be of the greatest value and utility. Acknowledge immediately.

B 24. Comm. (T) to *Euryalus*. 26.8.14.
7.56 a.m.
Your signal, 0245, not understood. I have received no orders regarding any destroyers acting with Cruiser Force C. It was understood that all destroyers were to rest with fires out, preparatory to commencing operations Thursday, 27th August. *Amethyst* will sail at 1 p.m. to join your flag in accordance with instructions received last night. (0740.)

B 25. Adty. to R.A., *Euryalus*. 26.8.14.
25 As Portsmouth Division will not arrive at rendezvous till 7 p.m., proceed direct with your force to Ostend, anchor your ship to make a demonstration. Report force embarked from Chatham. Give necessary orders to destroyers to proceed to Ostend. Report time you expect to arrive at Ostend. Confer with General Aston when it is possible to occupy the town.

B 26. Adty. to R.A., *Euryalus*. 26.8.14.
Reference my 0955. Cancel use of destroyers for Belgian coast operations.

B 27. Adty. to R.A., *Euryalus* and General Aston. 26.8.14.
27 The destroyer sweep ordered will be carried out as arranged. When the marines are landed from your cruisers, you will be free to leave on arrival of four battleships from Channel Fleet under Admiral Currey to-morrow morning. Admiral Bethell, in the course of the day, will arrive with Plymouth Division, and will remain with four battleships and *Proserpine* to victual and support marine landing party. A.O.P., Dover, is sending six destroyers to join you now, and they will remain at Ostend. Arrange a rendezvous with them. Inform General Aston. Acknowledge.

B 28. Adty. to Admiral, *Vengeance*. 26.8.14.
43 As soon as marine contingent is embarked, proceed at maximum speed to Ostend. Report time you expect to arrive there. Acknowledge.

B 29. Adty. to A.O.P., *Arrogant*. 26.8.14.
41 Six destroyers from Dover patrol are to be lent to Admiral Christian's force now proceeding to Ostend. This is not unduly to strain Dover patrol which must be reduced in number at sea. Arrangements are being made for you to get more French destroyers in 48 hours. Acknowledge.

B 30. Adty. to R.A., *Euryalus*. 26.8.14.

28 So far as can be anticipated no mines now off Ostend. It is certain that the Belgians have laid none. Four sweeping trawlers from Lowestoft are being ordered to Ostend but cannot arrive until to-morrow. Most important for your contingent of expedition to arrive this afternoon. Acknowledge.

26.8.14.
Sent (via Coastguard Wireless, Culver Cliff),
1.30 p.m.

B 31. Adty. to R.A., *Prince of Wales*. Recd. 5.30 p.m.

5 The Chatham Marine Force under Admiral Christian is proceeding direct to Ostend. Portsmouth Marine Force will be required to support them. Arrange speed to arrive off Ostend at daylight to-morrow, Thursday. Devonport contingent are following and V.A., *Vengeance*, with four battleships, will remain as a permanent naval support to the force. When he can dispense with your services you are to return to rejoin V.A., *Lord Nelson*. General Aston now in *Euryalus* will be command on shore. Acknowledge.

B 32. Adty. to *Halcyon*. 26.8.14.

Four minesweeping trawlers are to be sent to Ostend as soon as ready for use. Navigating Officer, *Halcyon*, to take charge and navigate them across. They are to act under orders of S.N.O., Ostend. Acknowledge.

26.8.14.
Sent 1.25 p.m.
Recd. 2 p.m.

B 33. Comm. (T) to Adty.

197 Your 0955 has not been received. Your 44 is therefore not understood; request explanation. R.A., *Euryalus*, has ordered 13 destroyers to meet him in the Downs at 4 p.m. Are these destroyers the same as those referred to in telegram 44?

B 34. Adty. to R.A., *Euryalus*.

30 Approved to take seaplane carrier *Engadine* and three seaplanes. Stop. Seaplanes not to approach nearer than necessary as they will be at a disadvantage with German aeroplanes. (1440.)

B 35. Adty. to Comm. (T). 26.8.14.
3.17 p.m.

45 In confirmation of telephone message your 197, yes. None of your destroyers are to go to the Downs. Admiral Patrols is now providing destroyers.

B 36. R.A., 5th B.S., to Adty. 26.8.14.
4.3 p.m.

Referring to your telegram 32 of 25th to C-in-C., Portsmouth, am due to arrive that rendezvous 6 p.m. Request instructions, as I have received none. (1530.)

B 37. Comm. (T) to *Euryalus*. 26.8.14.

Your 1010. Destroyers are raising steam with all dispatch and will join you when ready. Admiralty has telegraphed cancelling use of destroyers on Belgian coast. Are these the 12 destroyers you refer to? Telegram 0955 has never been received. (1415.)

B 38. A.C., 7th Squadron, to *Sapphire*. 26.8.14.

Urgent. Inform General Aston that lights ashore dangerously exposing the position of my fleet. Municipality should be asked to extinguish all lights on the sea front immediately. (2150.)

B 39. Adty. to R.A., *Euryalus*. 26.8.14.

32 The sweep ordered for Friday will be carried out as arranged. After landing the expedition and on R.A., Channel Fleet, arriving turn over the command afloat to him. Time your departure for Friday operation. When this is completed two cruisers can proceed to coal and make good engine defects. Three are to remain at sea with 12 destroyers to watch the Broad Fourteens. Acknowledge.

B 40. A.C., 7th Squadron, to *Prince of Wales*. 27.8.14.
11.50 a.m.

Expect to arrive about 4 p.m., make arrangements for disembarking force. (115.)

B 41. Adty. to Seair, Sheerness. 27.8.14.

Naval aeroplanes as ordered are to fly to Ostend, crossing Channel via Dover and Calais. Patrol flotilla has been warned to keep a look out on any machines requiring assistance. Report to Senior Officer, Dover, when machines start.

B 42. Adty. to V.A., *Vengeance*. 27.8.14.

45 On arrival at Ostend you will take charge of the naval situation, remaining there with your four battleships, *Proserpine*, and the six destroyers. You are to victual and support whole of Marine Force, making what arrangements you think fit in co-operation with General Aston. You are to send Rear-Admiral Curry's squadron back to rejoin Vice-Admiral Burney. Keep Admiralty informed of the situation. None of the ships' companies are to be landed. Acknowledge. (1359.)

B 43. R.A., *Euryalus*, to Adty. 27.8.14.

General Officer Commanding reports force of 2,400 is established from all parts of country. Enemy are not within 15 miles. Position is semi-circular from Mariakirke to Fort Napoleon. Force has only provisions till to-morrow. Request information as to when *Proserpine* may be expected. Reply to Rear-Admiral, *Prince of Wales*. (1415.)

B 44. A.C., 7th Squadron, to Adty. 27.8.14.
7.36 p.m.

45 Arrived at 4 p.m. General Aston does not wish force landed before morning. Rear-Admiral Currie's squadron leaves morning, 28th August. Your telegram 45 has been received and is understood. (1825.)

B 45. Adty. to V.A., *Vengeance*. 27.8.14.

46 Supply Marine Brigade with small arm ammunition machine gun ammunition and 12-pr. 8-cwt. ammunition, to the amount that General Aston considers necessary. Arrange to victual them.

B 46. H.M.S. *Halcyon* to Adty. 28.8.14.
10.59 a.m.

Fourth Sea Lord.

When may minesweeping trawlers sent to Ostend be expected back? At a standstill Lowestoft.

B 47. Adty. to V.A., *Vengeance*. 28.8.14.

48 Do you consider you can support the marines on shore by gunfire from your ships? Is it practicable to mount any guns in the tops? Three ex-Brazilian monitors with a draught of 4 ft. 6 in. are now en route to assist and should arrive to-morrow. They are each armed with two 6-in. and two 4.7-in. howitzers.

B 48. A.C., 7th Squadron, to Adty.

28.8.14.
4.22 p.m.

46 Plymouth Field Force disembarked at 8.30 a.m. Have conferred with General Officer Commanding. I submit definite instructions be given by Admiralty as to conditions under which force (?) is to be re-embarked. If attack is awaited before re-embarkation, it is difficult to see how (it could be) carried out without abandoning civil population to disaster.

Force is not equipped for mobile operations.

It is defending immediate perimeter of town, and sending out small patrols on a few commandeered bicycles; but no prospect is seen of thereby inducing enemy to divert forces from the decisive battle.

My squadron is anchored in outer roads. Should like to keep *Sapphire* as well as *Proserpine* in order to keep signals in touch with General Officer Commanding and to strengthen destroyer patrol; which is necessary owing to the exposed position of my squadron to torpedo attack.

Airship No. 3 arrived 10 a.m. General Officer Commanding did not require her. I do not think she will be of any use to me, and propose to send her back if Admiralty approve. (1430.)

B 49. Omitted.

B 50. Adty. to V.A., *Vengeance*.

28.8.14.

50 The four minesweeping trawlers are urgently required on the East Coast. If they can be spared, direct them to return to Lowestoft. Acknowledge and report action taken.

B 51. Adty. to V.A., *Vengeance*.

28.8.14.

51 Your 46. You may keep *Sapphire*. Further instructions follow. There is a patrol of three *Bacchantes* and 12 destroyers on the Broad Fourteens.

B 52. A.C., 7th C.S., to Adty.

28.8.14.
9.3 p.m.

48 Referring to your telegram No. 48 it will not be possible to assist marines by gunfire from ships and functionaries do not wish it attempted. If they are forced to retire there would be street fighting which I could not assist in from ships.

Brazilian monitors may be useful.

It is not practicable nor of any use mounting guns in tops.

B 53. Adty. to A.C., 7th Squadron.

28.8.14.

52 Force is to entrench strongly and hold the perimeter of Ostend against all attack in order to cover the disembarkation of 16,000 Belgian troops who will reach Ostend on their return through France from Namur.

You can vary your position as may be necessary; there is no need for you to remain at anchor off the town but the monitors should stay inshore.

B 54. Adty. to V.A., *Vengeance*.

28.8.14.

54 Four thousand Belgian troops are being embarked at Havre to-day for Ostend. On Sunday or Monday another 12,000 Belgian troops will be sent from Havre. French authorities suggest Zeebrugge for landing troops due to the draught of water of transports. Inform General Aston. There has been a big sweep of our destroyers and cruisers to-day from the Heligoland Bight outwards. Three German light cruisers sunk and some destroyers. We have received some damage. Details not yet known. No need to anticipate any torpedo movements at present.

B 55. A.C., 7th Squadron, to Adty.

28.8.14.
11.19 p.m.

49 Your 50. Minesweeping trawlers are being sent. I should like to have them back as soon as possible.

B 56. Adty. to V.A., *Vengeance*.

29.8.14.

56 Your 46. No. 3 Airship can be sent back.

B 57. *Euryalus* to *Vengeance*.

29.8.14.

Request information as to when *Sapphire* will rejoin me, services urgently required. (0700.)

B 58. A.C., 7th Squadron, to *Euryalus* from
Prince George.

29.8.14.
8.27 a.m.

Your 2140. Admiralty informs me that I may keep *Sapphire* for the present. (0800.)

B 59. Adty. to V.A., *Vengeance*.

29.8.14.

58 Send back to Sheerness two best tugs. Retain one small tug for landing the Belgian troops.

B 60. Adty. to H.M.S. *Vengeance*.

29.8.14.

59 For General Aston. Minister at the Hague forwards reliable information that only small bodies of German troops are in the country north of the Brussels-Liège road. (1130.)

B 61. Adty. to *Severn*.

29.8.14.

On arrival at Dover fill up all three monitors with coal and proceed to Ostend. Put yourself under orders of Vice-Admiral Bethell. Stop. Report by wireless how much provisions you have on board. Stop.

B 62. Adty. to R.A., *Euryalus*.

29.8.14.

42 *Sapphire* to remain at Ostend until further orders. Acknowledge. (1615.)

B 63. Adty. to *Euryalus*.

30.8.14.

44 *Sapphire* is to remain at Ostend until further orders.

B 64. Adty. to S.N.O., Dover.

30.8.14.

Send two tugs to Ostend to be under the orders of Vice-Admiral Bethell. They should arrive at daylight. Warn necessary patrols.

B 65. Adty. to C-in-C., Nore.

30.8.14.

Two tugs are to be sent over to Ostend to-night.

B 66. Adty. to V.A., 7th B.S.

31.8.14.

68 To General Aston. Secret. Force will be withdrawn at your earliest convenience. Please inform us what time you want. There is no need for hurry. Acknowledge. (0042.)

B 67. Adty. to V.A., *Vengeance*.

31.8.14.

70 Re Secret telegram. Sheerness has been ordered to send two tugs, and Dover two tugs. Some *Bacchantes* can be sent if you want them. (0140.)

B 68. A.C., 7th Squadron, to Adty.

31.8.14.
4.18 a.m.

63 Your 70. Please send three *Bacchantes*. (0345.)

- B 69.** Adty. to *Euryalus*, *Bacchante*, *Vengeance*. 31.8.14.
Stockton has intercepted several German call signs and signals indicating movements of German ships at sea.
- B 70.** A.C., 7th Squadron, to Adty. 31.8.14.
10.35 a.m.
70 German wireless has been heard for some time. Signals are getting stronger, calling sign *Braunschweig*, *Pommern* made out. Am ready to weigh. Have scouts out. Am embarking marines' stores.
- B 71.** Adty. to V.A., 7th B.S., H.M.S. *Vengeance*. 31.8.14.
72 Your 71. Report immediately your proposed arrangements for re-embarkation of whole force.
- B 72.** Adty. to R.A., *Bacchante*, repeat to V.A.,
Vengeance. 31.8.14.
To Rear-Admiral, *Bacchante*.
Proceed to Ostend with your squadron now at sea, leaving the destroyers to watch the Broad Fourteens. Your ships are to act under the orders of V.A., *Vengeance*, and be prepared to embark part of the Marine Force. This is repeated to Vice-Admiral *Vengeance* for information.
- B 73.** A.C., 7th Squadron, to Adty. 31.8.14.
3.46 p.m.
75 Referring to your telegram 72 Portsmouth marines embark on board *Vengeance*, *Goliath*, Chatham Division, R.M.L.I., in *Prince George* Plymouth marines in *Caesar*. (1528.)
- B 74.** A.C., 7th Squadron to Adty. 31.8.14.
Recd. 7.17 p.m.
77 Following from General Aston begins: Nine aeroplanes started 4 p.m. with instructions to land this side if considered desirable on account of the thick weather in Channel. (1840.)
- B 75.** Comm. Samson to Adty. 31.8.14.
Sent 8.45 p.m.
Recd. 9.15 p.m.
Landed Dunkirk with all machines, thick fog, impossible proceed, engine of No. 49 must be changed, small Bleriot broken, can repair, want gear, also Renault engine. Submit until weather changes not worth risking machines across Channel in thick fog unless service very urgent. Can we join Army, sending Grosvenor back if possible by steamer? Address Hotel Chapeau Rouge.
- B 76.** A.C., 7th Squadron, to Adty. 31.8.14.
4.25 p.m.
76 Your 1355. I did not know *Bacchantes* were coming to assist. Men are now embarking, and I hope to have sailed before the *Bacchantes* arrive. (1540.)
- B 77.** A.C., 7th C.S., to Adty. and *Euryalus*. 31.8.14.
5.9 p.m.
As destroyers have no flotilla cruiser with them I have left *Amethyst* for communication purposes, pending your instructions. (1635.)
- B 78.** Adty. to V.A., *Vengeance*. 31.8.14.
74 Send the Chatham detachment in *Bacchantes* to Sheerness. Take the remainder in battleships to Portsmouth and Plymouth.
Six destroyers to return to Dover.
Sapphire to go with *Bacchantes*.
Proserpine with you.
Tugs to their own ports. Acknowledge.

- B 79.** A.C., 7th Squadron, to A.C., 7th C.S. 31.8.14.
6.6 p.m.
Thank you, I do not now require your assistance. (1800.)
- B 80.** Adty. to S.N.O., Dover. 31.8.14.
7 p.m.
Warn patrol flotillas that four battleships and some cruisers will be passing through from Ostend probably to-night.
- B 81.** A.C., 7th Squadron, to Adty. 31.8.14.
7.24 p.m.
78 Monitors arrived Ostend 9 p.m. Instructions are requested for them.
- B 82.** Adty. to A.C., 7th Squadron. 31.8.14.
8.46 p.m.
79 Your 74. I have already embarked Chatham Division in *Prince George*, and am leaving 8.30 p.m. to-night. *Bacchante* cannot reach here before 10 p.m., which will prevent ship sailing to-night.
In view of crowded state of ship I am sending *Prince George* and *Sapphire* to Chatham. (200.)
- B 83.** A.C., 7th Squadron, to Adty. 31.8.14.
9.20 p.m.
80 All men and stores embarked and ships have left Ostend. (2115.)
- B 84.** Adty. to A.C., 7th Squadron. 31.8.14.
75 Your 78. Monitors have been ordered to the Nore. (2240.)
- B 85.** Adty. to *Severn*. 31.8.14.
Proceed to the Nore in company with *Humber* and *Mersey*. Acknowledge.

APPENDIX C.

SIGNALS AND TELEGRAMS CONNECTED WITH THE CHANGE OF
BASE OF THE B.E.F., AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 1914.

- C 1.** P.N.T.O., Havre, to Adty. (T). 26.8.14.
Sent noon.
I understand that C.-in-C. of Expeditionary Force and I.G.C. are in consultation with London regarding change of base. I have been requested to stop all unloading and retain ships here.
Am therefore discontinuing unloading ships capable of voyage of 500 miles to La Rochelle and unloading remainder.
- C 2.** P.N.T.O., Havre, to D.N.T.O., Rouen. 26.8.14.
1.10 p.m.
Stop unloading all ships with stores. Officer being sent with explanation.
- C 3.** P.N.T.O., to D.N.T.O., Rouen. 26.8.14.
4 p.m.
Obtain following information and hand it to officer now on his way to Rouen. (1) Number of ships in port, names, tonnage and number. (2) Is ship licensed for foreign trade? (3) Are masters and mates certificated for this? (4) Are instruments for navigation on board? (5) Can vessel do open sea voyage of 500 miles? (6) What coal required per 100 miles? (7) Would coal be required and how much is on board? (8) Capacity of stowage for stores. (9) Speed of ship. (10) What stores are on board, and quantity?

- C 4.** P.N.T.O., Havre, to Adty. (T). 28.8.14.
1.20 p.m.
I.G.C. has requested me to send an officer to accompany his representative to Nantes and St. Nazaire to report on their suitability as prospective bases. I am sending Commander Peile, starting at once.
- C 5.** I.G.C., to P.N.T.O., Havre. 28.8.14.
The immediate necessity for holding up supply and store ships has disappeared, no military objection to going on with off loading.
- C 6.** D.N.T.O., Rouen, to P.N.T.O., Havre. 28.8.14.
9.11 p.m.
Referring to your telegram, are all empty transports still to be detained here?
Reply. 9.40 p.m.
All empty ships to proceed to return port.
- C 7.** P.N.T.O., Havre, to D.N.T.O., Rouen. 29.8.14.
9.15 a.m.
Unloading of all transports now to proceed as usual.
- C 8.** I.G.C., to P.N.T.O. 29.8.14.
10.41 a.m.
If you have an officer to spare it might be worth while reconnoitring Caen as an auxiliary port in case of having to evacuate Havre.
Reply. 1 p.m.
Consider Caen unsuitable from naval point of view owing to limited depth of water only possible spring tides.
- C 9.** I.G.C., to P.N.T.O., Havre. 29.8.14.
3.45 p.m.
In event of Rouen having to be evacuated should be glad to know what number of ships and capacity could be sent at short notice to assist in the evacuation. I only propose to send stores and possibly up to about 50 horses only by sea to new base.
- C 10.** I.G.C., to Base Comdt., Havre. 29.8.14.
Recd. 4.35 p.m.
Stop further unloading of ships, except those containing personnel and matériel urgently required.
Start loading such supplies and stores as will be necessary to establish by sea a new base at St. Nazaire, whether Havre is finally retained or not.
Generally speaking, an equal distribution of the stores and supplies at your disposal should be made between Havre and St. Nazaire. Wire when first ships are ready to sail.
- C 11.** I.G.C., to Base Comdt., Havre. 29.8.14.
Recd. 5.20 p.m.
Prepare a scheme for the general evacuation of Havre by sea to a port at or near St. Nazaire in conjunction with P.N.T.O. State what ships will probably be available, and the length of time probably required to expect a clearance. No actual steps are to be taken without further orders. Your scheme should show the order in which you propose to move the stores. Your estimate of rail requirements should be telegraphed.
- C 12.** P.N.T.O., to Adty. (T). 29.8.14.
Recd. 6.23 p.m.
I.G.C. has wired to stop unloading, except personnel and matériel urgently required, and asks to commence loading with stores to establish base St. Nazaire. Am loading suitable ships for that purpose, and am also sending to Rouen some ships to assist. More ships must be sent to Havre and especially Rouen from England. There are 10 small ships here in various stages of unloading, which will be filled up and wait orders.

- C 13.** G.H.Q. to Base Comdt., Rouen. 29.8.14.
7.20 p.m.
It is definitely decided that Rouen is to be cleared forthwith. All stores to be loaded on ships with all dispatch, horses and vehicles to go by train. Motors by road as may be directed by D.D.T. . . . You should start clearing to-night.
- C 14.** I.G.C., to War Office. 29.8.14.
7.30 p.m.
Q. 590. From news received from G.H.Q. am moving whole of stores and personnel of Nos. 1 and 2 bases to mouth of Loire and Le Mans, which I am making base and advanced bases provisionally until their suitability for permanent use is established.
- C 15.** I.G.C., to Base Comdt., Havre. 29.8.14.
Recd. 7.15 p.m.
News received from G.H.Q. absolutely essential to proceed with embarkation of all stores and personnel with utmost speed and without intermission, using every available means of evacuation by water, including, if possible, barges, *via* Caen. This latter route might be used for stores intended for Le Mans. Please send up ships to Rouen to carry up to 6,000 tons. You should take precautions to obtain early information as to any advance of enemy from north-east and east. Arrange with D.N.T.O. to keep a ship ready for yourself and staff, either to reach the mouth of the Loire or, at any rate, Caen.
- C 16.** D.N.T.O., Rouen, to P.N.T.O., Havre. 29.8.14.
9.12 p.m.
Urgent. I.G.C. requests that those empty transports be sent Rouen immediately tide serves for embarking stores.
- C 17.** P.N.T.O., Havre, to Adty. (T). 29.8.14.
Sent 9.50 p.m.
I.G.C. informs me absolutely essential proceed with embarkation of all stores with utmost speed and without intermission, using every means of evacuation, including, if possible, barges *via* Caen. He requires ships at Rouen up to 6,000 tons. I am sending three ships. More ships for both ports urgently required.
- Reply.* 30.8.14.
Recd. 5.30 a.m.
30 Yours 29th August. All available ships with sufficient coal being dispatched immediately. Inform Rouen. Requirements of I.G.C. should be met.
- C 18.** War Office to Adty. (T). 29.8.14.
11.55 p.m.
88 Q.M.G.2. Please prepare to embark supplies for 100,000 men and 30,000 horses for two days at Avonmouth on Sunday. Also please send ships to Newhaven on Sunday, capable of steaming to Loire mouth to load up with as many supplies as possible. Embarkation Commandants informed.
- C 19.** Adty. (T) to P.N.T.O., Havre. 29.8.14.
Sent midnight 29-30.8.14.
Yours. State measurement, tonnage, stores, which will require transport from Havre and Rouen respectively, if decided to establish base St. Nazaire. Pending reply, ships are being sent Havre and Rouen.
Reply. 30.8.14.
D.N.T.O., Havre. 11.15 p.m.
There are now here 36,500 tons (measurement) stores and 133,000 gallons of petrol.

C 20. Adty. (T) to P.N.T.O., Havre. 30.8.14.
Sent 2.20 a.m.
Yours 29th August. Southampton has been instructed to send three ships to Havre and three to Rouen for conveyance of stores to St. Nazaire. 6,000 reinforcements proceed to-morrow night, some of the ships conveying these can also be used if necessary.

C 21. W.O. to I.G.C. 30.8.14.
Q.M.G. 7/35. Q.590. 29th August . . . Assure evacuation of ammunition from Havre and Rouen, whether by train, road or ship.

C 22. P.N.T.O., Havre, to Adty. (T). 30.8.14.
Recd. 9.5 a.m.
Referring previous there are five large French steamers here which can be engaged if necessary. Nine small ships with stores, unfit to proceed to St. Nazaire, are ready to leave. Shall they be sent Southampton or Newhaven? Instructions are requested.

C 23. Adty. (T) to P.N.T.O., Havre. 30.8.14.
Mine last night and yours to-day. Six ships left last night, remainder delayed by fog and cannot arrive in time. Engage French steamers mentioned in yours. Dispatch the nine small ships to Newhaven.

C 24. Adty. (T) to P.N.T.O., Havre. 30.8.14.
If transports require coal St. Nazaire, is coal available, or should collier be sent?
Reply. Sent 3.30 p.m.
From reliable information received there is ample supply of coal at St. Nazaire.

C 25. P.N.T.O., Havre, to Adty. (T). 30.8.14.
12.30 p.m.
I.G.C. requests that infantry reinforcements, 6,000, may be sent from Havre by sea, as soon as possible, to St. Nazaire. Request immediate instructions.

C 26. Adty. (T) to Transport Officer, Southampton. 30.8.14.
12.30 p.m.
War Office confirm orders to embark reinforcements this evening must stand. Destination not fixed. All ships utilised must have steaming radius at least 1,000 miles. Report if this causes difficulty.

C 27. P.N.T.O., Havre, to Adty. (T). 30.8.14.
B. 116. Transports have no charts on board, request that 12 sets of charts for navigating ships from Havre to St. Nazaire may be forwarded to me as soon as possible, and that ships coming over may be supplied with them.

C 28. D.N.T.O., Havre, to Adty. (T). 30.8.14.
9.15 p.m.
Instructions are requested as to disposal of transport staff at Rouen on that base being closed down, observing that Boulogne staff has gone to St. Nazaire, and I follow when Havre is cleared.

Reply. 31.8.14.
2.50 a.m.
All naval staffs should proceed to St. Nazaire and await further instructions.

C 29. Secy., W.O., to Base Comdt., Havre. 31.8.14.
Recd. 11.40 a.m.
No. 933. Q.M.G. 2. Is your base clear of supplies and stores? If not, report when you think it will be, and report again when actually cleared.

C 30. Base Comdt., Havre, to Secy., W.O. 31.8.14.
No. S30. In reply to 933 Q.M.G. 2. Estimate at least a week before this base can be cleared at present rate of arrival of ships.

C 31. Adty. (T) to P.N.T.O., Havre. 31.8.14.
Sent 1.15 p.m.
Report what length and draught is the limit for vessels to reach Nantes; is there coal there for ships? It may be decided to send stores and remounts to Nantes.

Reply. 4.20 p.m.
Under worst conditions vessels drawing 17½ ft. can reach Nantes, and at spring tides vessels drawing 26 ft. can do so. No supply of coal could be depended upon at Nantes, but there is ample at St. Nazaire.

C 32. French Ministry of Marine to Adty. 31.8.14.
66 The War Ministry wishes to transport urgently to ports on the Atlantic and Mediterranean stores of oil refineries existing at Rouen and Havre. The stores comprise 60,000 tons of oil and petrol, 40,000 at Rouen and 20,000 at Havre. Out of this total there are 30,000 tons petrol which it is necessary to carry first. No ship is available for this purpose, can you find at once in England tank steamers available? It is impossible to store the whole stock on the Atlantic and Mediterranean. Several of these tank steamers would be kept as floating depots. Hence the necessity of chartering them by time charters. Please send an immediate reply and conditions of charter.

C 33. Adty. (T) to P.N.T.O., Havre. 1.9.14.
Sent 4.25 p.m.
Ships from Newhaven will be ordered to St. Nazaire, but will be capable of proceeding to Nantes, where disembarkation should be carried out if possible.

C 34. Base Comdt., Havre, to I.G.C. 2.9.14.
Sent 5.45 p.m.
Movements by rail from here are stopped, because French and British railway staffs have left. Am not aware of the general military situation.

C 35. French Ministry of Marine to Adty. 2.9.14.
Sent 4.10 p.m.
80 If the transport of English matériel from Havre to St. Nazaire is finished, could the English transport ship(s) co-operate in the carrying of Belgian artillery and cavalry to Ostend, or the carrying to Port de la Pallice (La Rochelle) of 27,000 soldiers from the Département du Nord, arriving at the depot?

Reply. 3.9.14.
1.30 a.m.
Transports are now ready. Please indicate where to send them; how many Belgian soldiers and horses there will be; if there are horses and stores to transport with French soldiers, and which of the two transports is to have priority.

Further reply. 3.9.14.
Recd. 3 a.m.
83 Transport of Belgian soldiers is to have priority. It is composed of 2,000 soldiers and 2,000 horses, plus battery matériel. No horses with French soldiers. Departure will take place at Havre.

C 36. Adty. (T) to D.N.T.O., Havre. 3.9.14.
Sent 2 p.m.
Transports to convey 2,000 Belgian soldiers with 2,000 horses and battery matériel from Havre to Ostend, and to convey 27,000 French soldiers from Havre to La Pallice, are being sent from Southampton to-day . . .

3.9.14.

C 37. P.N.T.O., Havre, to Adty. (T). Sent 6.15 p.m.

Referring to your telegram *re* French and Belgian troops I have conferred with Military Governor, who informs me the Belgian troops will arrive here 5th September; there will also be 150 motor cars. French troops commence to arrive to-morrow. French authorities will provide transport for 13,800, but will require English transport for 15,000 troops and some horses, number unknown at present. I have made preliminary arrangements with the Governor and shall leave D.N.T.O. and staff at Havre for this service.

4.9.14.

C 38. P.N.T.O. to Adty. (T). Sent 10.45 a.m.

Referring to my telegram yesterday evening Governor now informs me an additional 10,000 French troops will arrive at Havre, and English transports will be required for 25,000 troops, and will take six days before embarkation is completed.

4.9.14.

C 39. P.N.T.O., Havre, to Adty. 4.30 p.m.

Referring to previous the Military Governor asks if sufficient transports to carry 15,000 troops from Calais to Cherbourg may be sent from those now coming here from England. This will not necessitate any additional ships from England.

5.9.14.

C 40. Adty. (T) to P.N.T.O., Havre. Sent 12.30 a.m.

Your B.169. Ships dispatched from Southampton yesterday were for use as follows: For Belgian artillery and horses (7 ships); for French troops (15 ships). Allowing five men for each empty horse stall, the ships for French troops provide accommodation for 36,500 men. If Calais-Cherbourg move agreed to, how many troops will require accommodation beyond 36,500?

APPENDIX D.

ORDERS FOR DUNKERQUE.

AIRCRAFT PATROL.

The object of this expedition is to establish an aerial control over an area within a radius of 100 miles from Dunkerque, with a view to meeting any attack of German airships on England, and preventing any temporary airship base being established within the area defined. The control will be established by means of an aerial reconnaissance, using Dunkerque as a main base, and will be supported by a force of armed and armoured motor cars, with the necessary personnel and stores to enable advanced subsidiary aeroplane bases to be established 30, 40 and 50 miles inland.

The whole of the area under control should be kept clear of all small raiding parties of the enemy, in order to secure any aeroplanes, which may have landed, from being captured, etc. The force will consist of aeroplanes and armed motor cars, with the necessary personnel and transport for the aeroplanes, and an armed force of 200 marines.

AEROPLANES.

2. The aeroplanes will be made up of three squadrons, each squadron consisting eventually of 12 machines, when these are available. The aeroplane transport will be similarly divided up so as to work with its own squadron of aeroplanes.

ARMED MOTOR CARS.

3. Sixty special motor cars will be armed with maxims, and will be protected with armour plating. They will be manned by marine crews, and will be detailed to work with the respective squadrons.

COMMANDS.

4. The Officer in command of the Expedition will be Wing-Commander C. R. Samson, R.N.

The Officers in command of the Aeroplane Squadrons will be—

No. 1 Squadron: Squadron-Commander E. L. Gerrard;

No. 2 Squadron: Squadron-Commander S. D. A. Grey;

No. 3 Squadron: Squadron-Commander R. B. Davies.

Squadron-Commander Risk will be in charge of the organisation of the armed motor cars and their crews, assisted by Major H. G. B. Armstrong, in charge of the detachment of marines.

Flight-Commander T. G. Hetherington will act as assistant to Squadron-Commander Risk as assistant transport officer.

Squadron-Commander E. F. Briggs will generally supervise all engineering work in connection with aircraft, motor vehicles and stores.

Mr. Blundell, gunner, will be in charge of the armament and of the supply of ammunition and explosives.

CORRESPONDENCE.

5. All dispatches are to be sent direct to Director, Air Department, Admiralty. Any important information is to be telegraphed, for which purpose a code will be supplied. Dispatches are to be forwarded at least twice a week, giving an account of all aerial scouting carried out.

All demands for stores, replacements, etc., are to be forwarded to Inspecting Captain of Aircraft.

COMMUNICATION WITH ENGLAND.

6. Communication with England will be kept up between Dunkerque and Sheerness as requisite, by H.M.S. *Empress*, or some other small ship.

7. Every care is to be taken to keep the French authorities at Dunkerque informed of movements, etc., and in all expeditions from Dunkerque French soldiers, if possible, should accompany the English, so as to make up a Franco-English expedition. The greatest care is to be taken to avoid giving offence in any way to the French authorities or to the inhabitants of the country.

MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS.

8. A small base hospital, with personnel and equipment complete, will be established at Dunkerque. Four motor ambulances will be supplied to work the outlying stations from the base hospital. Two medical officers will be appointed for duty at the base hospital, and four medical officers for work at the auxiliary stations. As regards equipment, each outlying station will be provided with a field chest, surgical haversack, and St. John's Ambulance party.

COMMISSARIAT.

9. An officer is to be detailed to be in charge of all victualling arrangements and for the accounting of the expenditure of public money. A quartermaster-sergeant has been detailed to assist in the victualling

arrangements. A sufficient supply of provisions will be sent from Sheerness, and is to be maintained at Dunkerque. Special cases of rations for the crews of the motor vehicles and for outlying bases are being prepared. Further details will be issued as regards this. Receipts for all local purchases are to be obtained, and care to be taken to obtain competitive tenders wherever possible in making contracts or purchases.

ATTACKS ON ZEPPELIN SHEDS.

10. When possible, attacks are to be made on the zeppelin sheds at Düsseldorf and Cologne.

11. Steps are to be taken as soon as possible after receipt of these orders to establish the advance bases mentioned in para. 1, and a report is to be forwarded as to arrangements carried out.

APPENDIX E.

PLAN IV.

RECONNAISSANCE OF HELIGOLAND BIGHT.

(Carried out 10 September 1914.)

A combined movement will be made, commencing with simultaneous destroyer attacks and sweeps on the enemy's ships found at sea off the Ems and Heligoland.

The Heligoland attack will be supported by the Light Cruiser Squadron, which will be in turn supported by the six battle cruisers under Vice-Admiral, *Lion*.

The Ems attack will be supported by cruiser force under Rear-Admiral, *Euryalus*.

The whole being supported by the Grand Fleet under the Commander-in-Chief.

The day has been settled with the Commander-in-Chief, and will be notified later to officers in command.

The object is to tempt the larger ships of the enemy, and possibly their main fleet, to come out and thus protect the vessels attacked.

There are presumptions that this was in progress in the attack on August 28, but the enemy were not in time.

PRELIMINARY ORDERS FOR THE 1ST AND 3RD FLOTILLAS.

Secrecy being of vital importance, the flotillas will not leave Harwich together.

The 3rd Flotilla are to leave 36 hours before operations, and are to anchor for the night off Yarmouth.

Commodore (T) will hoist his broad pendant on the *Lowestoft*, and will lead the 3rd Flotilla.

The 1st Flotilla, under Captain Blunt in the *Fearless*, will leave Harwich at daylight on the day before the operation, and proceed to the Broad Fourteens.

ORDERS FOR 1ST FLOTILLA.

- | | | |
|-----------|-------------------------|--|
| 4. 0 a.m. | (Day before operations) | Proceed to the Broad Fourteens. |
| 6. 0 p.m. | Do. | Proceed to a position 28 miles N 88° E from Terschelling Light Vessel. |
| 2.30 a.m. | (Day of operations) | Course N 77° E. Divisions to be two miles apart, 15 knots. |
| 3.45 a.m. | Do. | Subdivisions to be 1½ miles apart, 20 knots. |
| 5. 0 a.m. | Do. | Turn together to W by N. Sweep back. |
| 7. 0 a.m. | Do. | Close on <i>Fearless</i> and act under the orders of Rear-Admiral, <i>Euryalus</i> . |

FOR THE IMMEDIATE SUPPORT OF THE 1ST FLOTILLA.

At 4 a.m. (on the day of operations).

Euryalus, Cruiser Force C, and *Amethyst* are to be off Terschelling Light Vessel, and are to proceed N 60° E magnetic at 15 knots for three hours or until the flotilla is met.

When the forces meet, Rear-Admiral, *Euryalus*, to take the 1st Flotilla under his orders and close battlefleet at speed or act according to circumstances.

Rear-Admiral Christian, in *Euryalus*, will be in general charge of the Ems attack.

ORDERS FOR 3RD FLOTILLA.

- | | | |
|------------|-------------------------|---|
| 8. 0 a.m. | (Day before operations) | Sail from Yarmouth. |
| 11.30 p.m. | Do. | Arrive at A. Lat. 54° 36' N.
Long. 6° 25' E. |
| 2.30 a.m. | (Day of operations) | Arrive at B. Lat. 54° 24' N.
Long. 7° 23' E. |
| 3.45 a.m. | Do. | Arrive at C. Lat. 54° 2' N.
Long. 7° 32' E. |

Then turn to W by N ½ N.
Sweep out until the enemy is met or until 7 a.m.
Then, according to circumstances, retire on the supports.

ORDERS FOR LIGHT CRUISERS UNDER COMMODORE GOODENOUGH, 1ST LIGHT CRUISER SQUADRON.

Their main object is to support the 3rd Flotilla after daylight, if involved with hostile cruisers.

They should arrive at 3.30 a.m. on the morning of the operations at B, viz., 3rd Flotilla's 2.30 a.m. position, and proceed at 20 knots to cover the retirement or support the destroyers.

ORDERS FOR SIX BATTLE CRUISERS UNDER VICE-ADMIRAL
BEATTY, 1ST BATTLE CRUISER SQUADRON.

Their main duty is to support the light cruisers and the 3rd Destroyer Flotilla.

4 a.m. (day of operations).

To arrive at A, the 3rd Flotilla's 11.30 p.m. position, and then proceed W by N $\frac{1}{2}$ N, or act according to circumstances.

Vice-Admiral Beatty, in the *Lion*, will be in general command of the Heligoland attack.

General position of battlefleet may be—

Lat. 55° 30' N.

Long. 4° E.

The Commander-in-Chief having full discretionary power as to the position of the battlefleet.

SUBMARINES.

Any submarine seen can be taken as hostile.

Our submarines are under orders to be off the Heligoland Bight and off the Ems beforehand, but are to be on the bottom and to the southward of the flotillas from 2.30 a.m. until 7 a.m. on the day of operations, when they are free to operate to the southward of the above-water force, and are not to go farther north than the latitude of the northern point of Heligoland.

Special orders are being given to the submarines.

ORDERS FOR "LURCHER," "FIREDRAKE," AND SUBMARINES
E.5, E.6, E.9, D.2, AND D.8.

Lurcher and *Firedrake* and five submarines will leave Yarmouth during the morning of the day prior to that on which the operations are to take place.

The submarines will proceed to the following positions:—

One to the northward of Heligoland, and eastward of long. 7° 40' E.

Two to the southward of Heligoland, and to the southward and eastward of destroyer sweep.

Two off the Ems entrances to the southward of the destroyer sweep.

The submarines are to arrive before 2.30 a.m., and remain submerged until 6 a.m., when they are to rise and be in a position to attack the enemy's vessels proceeding to chase our flotillas or returning after doing so.

The *Lurcher* and *Firedrake* will scout for the submarines until they cross the meridian of 4° 50' E.

They are then to—

Join the *Euryalus* at dawn to act as anti-submarine lookouts for Cruiser Force C.

(Commodore (S).)

Approved.

(Signed) 6/9 L(ouis) B(attenberg).

Commodore not to go in a destroyer.

(Signed) L(ouis) B(attenberg).

SECRET.

GRAND FLEET—OPERATIONS, SEPTEMBER 1914.

Copies to Vice-Admirals Commanding, 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battle Squadrons and 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron; Rear-Admiral, *Invincible*; Rear-Admirals Commanding, 2nd, 3rd and 6th Cruiser Squadrons; Rear-Admirals, 1st, 2nd and 3rd (2) Battle Squadrons; Commodore Commanding, 1st Light Cruiser Squadron; Captains (D), 2nd and 4th Flotillas.

Also to Rear-Admirals, H.M. Ships *Euryalus* and *Bacchante*; Commodore (T); Captains (D), 1st and 3rd Flotillas; Commodore (S); and Admiralty.

H.F. 0022/11 OF 5 SEPTEMBER 1914.

OPERATIONS IN THE HELIGOLAND BIGHT, SEPTEMBER 10.

The Heligoland Bight will be raided on the 10th instant by the 1st and 3rd Flotillas, supported by the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with *Invincible* and *Inflexible*. *Euryalus* and the 7th Cruiser Squadron will be in support to the north-westward of Terschelling. The battlefleet will move south in case the German battlefleet or a portion of it should put to sea.

2. The *Dreadnought* battlefleet will leave Loch Ewe about 5.30 a.m., on Monday, September 7, steaming at 12 knots, and will pass between Fair Island and Sumburgh Head during the night.

3. The 3rd Battle Squadron will leave Scapa on Monday forenoon, and, passing west of the Orkneys and south of Fair Island, will rendezvous at 4 a.m., September 8, at 59° 50' N, 0° 40' E.

4. On Tuesday, 9th, the fleet will be exercised at gunnery, etc.; subsequently, the following rendezvous will be passed at the approximate times given:—

Rendezvous No. 1—58° 40' N, 4° E, 7 a.m., Wed., 9th September.

" " 2—57° 0' N, 6° E, 1 6 p.m., Wed., 9th September.

" " 3—55° 30' N, 4° E, 4 a.m., Thurs., 10th September.

5. The Rear-Admiral Commanding, 6th Cruiser Squadron, is to give the Captains (D), 2nd and 4th Flotillas, a rendezvous in area No. 6, at which they can meet him with the flotillas; they are then to proceed in company to rendezvous No. 1, arriving at 7 a.m., Wednesday, 9th.

The 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons are to rendezvous in lat. 58° 19' N, long. 4° 25' E, at 8 a.m., Wednesday, 9th.

6. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron (except *Lowestoft*) are to leave Rosyth at such a time as to be on a line lat. 55° N, long. 2° E—lat. 56° 20' N, long. 2° 50' E by daylight on Wednesday, 9th, to intercept any hostile vessels returning from minelaying on our coasts. They will leave this line at such a time as to enable them to arrive in the positions assigned to them for the operations on the early morning of 10th September.

7. The following cruising order will be adopted:—

2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons, 20 miles ahead of battlefleet, spread on a front of about 40 miles; *Drake* with *Swift* and half of 4th Flotilla,

¹ Altered later to 57° N, 2° E, in order to avoid reported mine danger off Little Fisher Bank.

five miles astern of cruiser line; the attached cruisers five miles ahead of the fleet and four miles apart; *Active*, 2nd Flotilla, and a half of the 4th Flotilla, acting as a submarine screen for the battlefleet.

Russell, *Exmouth*, and *Albemarle* will be stationed 10 cables ahead of each of the three *Dreadnought* columns.

8. At night, the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla is to be 10 miles on the port beam of the port wing column of the battlefleet, the half of the 4th Flotilla with *Blanche* being 10 miles on starboard beam of the starboard wing column, and the half flotilla with *Drake* to be 10 miles on her starboard beam.

The battlefleet columns will be opened to five miles as usual.

9. Each detached squadron or flotilla, when proceeding to join the battlefleet, is to sweep out as large an area on either side of the course as is practicable.

10. Cruising station is to be resumed at early daylight without further orders. Destroyer flotillas are to be most careful not to approach large ships until broad daylight, especially on the morning of September 10.

11. After noon on 9th, the greatest possible care is to be taken that no W/T signals, except those of real urgency, are made. It is particularly necessary to avoid indicating the presence of the battlefleet, battle and light cruisers and destroyer flotillas.

Searchlight signals are not to be made, nor are searchlights to be used as dusk is approaching, nor until broad daylight.

12. At daylight on September 10, the battlefleet will be formed in divisions or subdivisions, line ahead, standing alternately south-south-east and north-north-west.

The 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons are to watch a line passing north-east and south-west through lat. 55° N, long. 5° E, *Drake* acting as connecting link between them and the battlefleet.

Ships are to move at high speed to reduce the submarine menace.

(Signed) J. R. JELlicoe,
Admiral.

Lowestoft will fly the broad pendant of the Commodore (T), who will lead the 3rd Flotilla.

APPENDIX F.

DISPOSITIONS OF GRAND FLEET TO COVER PASSAGE OF CANADIAN CONVOY, OCTOBER 3-14.

SECRET.

GRAND FLEET OPERATIONS, SEPTEMBER 1914.

Copies to Vice-Admirals Commanding, 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battle Squadrons and 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron; Rear-Admiral, *Invincible*; Rear-Admirals Commanding, 2nd, 3rd, 6th and 10th Cruiser Squadrons; Rear-Admiral Commanding, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Battle Squadron; Commodore Commanding, 1st Light Cruiser Squadron; Captains (D), 2nd and 4th Flotillas; Captains of *Blonde*, *Bellona*, *Boadicea* and *Blanche*; Senior Officer of Minelayers; Senior Officer of Minesweepers; Senior Officer of Armed Merchant Cruisers; Admiral Commanding Coast of Scotland; Vice-Admiral Commanding, Orkneys and Shetlands; Rear-Admirals, Scapa and Cromarty; and Admiralty.

GRAND FLEET OPERATIONS, ORDER No. 14.

SEPTEMBER 24, 1914.

The under-mentioned dispositions will be made in the event of information being received that German battle cruisers are at sea and likely to attempt to pass north-about into the Atlantic, or if an important convoy is crossing the Atlantic Ocean, affording sufficient inducement to the enemy to attempt to attack it.

Note.—All bearings and courses are true.

2. *General Plan.*—Two patrol areas will be occupied at such a distance apart that it is improbable that a squadron steaming between 18 and 25 knots will pass unobserved through both areas during the dark hours (in September or early October).

NORTHERN AREA.

Pentland Firth Patrol.—The Pentlands will be guarded by the "E" class destroyers from Scapa. The patrol must be in full force at night.

Patrol between Orkneys and Shetlands.—The seven minesweeping gunboats and *Dryad* (under the Commander of *Skipjack*) will be employed on this duty. This patrol must also be in full force at night.

The Vice-Admiral Commanding the Orkneys and Shetlands is requested to issue the necessary operations orders to the gunboats and destroyers forming the Orkneys and Shetlands and Pentland Firth patrols.

Muckle Flugga Patrol.—*Invincible*, *Inflexible*, *Teutonic*, *Alsatian* (or *Mantua*) and the minelayers available (probably two) and *Sappho*, under the Rear-Admiral Commanding, Cruiser Force K (*Invincible*), will establish a patrol to cover a line extending 100 miles N 50° E from Muckle Flugga; ships to patrol S 40° E and N 40° W, 40 to 50 miles on either side of this line.

The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron will cruise in the vicinity of a position SW 40 miles from Foula Island.

SOUTHERN AREA.

The southern area will comprise areas Nos. 4 and 5.

Area No. 4 will be occupied by the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, which is to form a line-ahead patrol near the northern base line, varying its position daily by at least 20 miles; ships to be spread about eight miles apart and to zigzag; speed through the water to be not less than 12 knots during the day.

The Light Cruiser Squadron will be well placed to follow and shadow enemy cruisers making for the passage between the Orkneys and Shetlands.

Area No. 5 will be strongly held by the cruiser squadrons and the battleships *Russell*, *Duncan* and *Albemarle*, which will be spread in the following order:—


The 2nd, 3rd and 10th Cruiser Squadrons are to be spread in pairs as far as their numbers admit, the distance between each of the 10 cruising units shown in the diagram being 12 miles, so as to cover a front of about 110 miles.

If the ships of the 6th Cruiser Squadron are available they will prolong the cruiser line to the westward of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, so as to reduce the area patrolled by the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron.

The patrol is to cross the northern base line of area No. 5 to the southward between 6 a.m. and 10 a.m. each day, making good a course S 23° E. The actual time at which the line is to be crossed will be signalled by the Commander-in-Chief the previous evening. The depth (north and south) of the area is to be about 100 miles and squadrons are to turn to N 23° W at 7 p.m.

The speed of ships through the water is not to be less than 12 knots by day, the mean rate of advance, which by day is to be 10 knots, being reduced by zigzagging. The speed at night is to be nine knots.

Squadrons may pass to the northward of the area in the early morning, turning in time to readjust their line and cross the northern base line on a southerly course at the time ordered.



BATTLEFLEETS.

3. The *Dreadnought* battlefleets will be to the northward of area No. 5 in support.

The 3rd Battle Squadron will be to the northward of area No. 4 to support the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron.

The speed of the battleships through the water by day is not to be less than 12 knots.

DESTROYERS.

4. The 2nd Flotilla will be in company with the *Dreadnought* battlefleet.

The 4th Flotilla will remain at Scapa, with steam at one hour's notice, except one division at six hours' notice.

EXECUTIVE ORDER TO PUT THESE DISPOSITIONS INTO FORCE.

5. On the signal being made to "Take up stations ordered by Operations Order No. 14" all vessels concerned are to proceed to their stations.

The squadrons detailed to area No. 5 are to steer for the northern base line if they can reach it in daylight, and are then to commence working the area, adjusting the distance steamed to the southward during the day, so as to be in their correct positions on the northern base line at 8 a.m. on the following morning, which will be the time for crossing the base line on the day after the signal is made.

If, however, they are unable to reach their positions on the base line during daylight, they are to adjust their course and speed so as to pass it at 8 a.m. the following morning.

6. Senior Officers of squadrons adjacent to one another should exchange positions, course and speed when proceeding to the area, and also occasionally when on patrol.

(Signed) J. R. JELICOE,
Admiral.

APPENDIX G.

COMPOSITION OF THE ROYAL NAVAL DIVISION AT ANTWERP, OCTOBER 1914.

In Command.—Major-General A. Paris, C.B., Royal Marines.

1st Brigade.—Capt. Wilfred Henderson, R.N. (Commodore, 2nd Class).

1st (Drake) Battalion .. Comdr. Victor L. A. Campbell (R.N. Emergency List).

2nd (Benbow) .. Comdr. Frederick N. Fergus.

3rd (Hawke) .. Lieut. Sydney W. Beadle (R.N. Emergency List).

4th (Collingwood) .. Capt. Aylmer Maxwell, Grenadier Guards.
Strength, 2,950, all ranks.

2nd Brigade.—Capt. Oliver Backhouse, R.N. (Commodore, 2nd Class).

5th (Nelson) Battalion .. Lieut.-Comdr. Cyprian C. D. Bridge (retd.).

6th (Howe) .. Comdr. Rt. Hon. Viscount Curzon, R.N.V.R.

7th (Hood) .. Major A. Quilter.

8th (Anson) .. Lieut. George F. M. Cornwallis-West, Scots Guards.

Strength, 3,400, all ranks.

R.M. Brigade.—Col. Alfred E. Marchant, C.B., A.D.C., R.M.

Artillery Battalion¹ .. Lieut.-Col. and Bt.-Col. Gunning M. Campbell, R.M.A.

9th (Chatham) Battalion .. Lieut.-Col. Cunliffe McN. Parsons, R.M.L.I.

10th (Portsmouth) .. Lieut.-Col. Frank W. L. Luard, R.M.L.I.

11th (Plymouth) .. Lieut.-Col. Godfrey E. Matthews, C.B., R.M.L.I.

12th (Deal) .. Lieut.-Col. Robert D. Beith, R.M.L.I.

Strength, 2,200, all ranks.

¹ Did not go to Antwerp.

APPENDIX H.

LETTER OF THANKS OF BELGIAN GOVERNMENT FOR
THE ASSISTANCE OF THE ANTWERP EXPEDITION.Legation de Belgique,
Londres,

le 21 octobre 1914.

Monsieur le Secrétaire d'Etat :—

Je suis chargé de faire savoir à Votre Excellence que si la coopération britannique n'a pu sauver Anvers, le gouvernement du Roi n'en est pas moins profondément reconnaissant à la Grande Bretagne d'avoir déféré à sa demande. L'Allemagne s'est présentée devant Anvers avec une supériorité d'artillerie telle que, dès le premier jour du siège, la défense a paru compromise. D'une part, en effet, la résistance des forts était illusoire vis à vis des projectiles des canons de 42 centimètres et, d'autre part, les canons dont nous disposions, d'une portée insuffisante, ne pouvaient battre l'artillerie ennemie. Dans ces conditions la défense des intervalles devenait extrêmement meurtrière et nos lignes ont dû être reportées dès le 5 octobre sur la rive gauche de la Nèthe.

Le passage de cette rivière donnait à l'artillerie allemande la faculté d'attaquer la seconde ligne des forts et de bombarder la Ville. Enfin nos troupes, fatiguées par mois de campagne contre un ennemi d'une supériorité écrasante passaient de longues journées dans les tranchées sans jamais voir l'infanterie adverse. Malgré ces circonstances défavorables elles ont disputé le terrain pied à pied à l'envahisseur au prix de terribles sacrifices.

La chute d'Anvers est le coup le plus sensible qui ait été porté à la Belgique depuis le début des hostilités. Elle entraîne la disparition du pavillon belge de la dernière forteresse où il était encore arboré. Ostende, ville ouverte et qui se trouvait dans la zone des opérations militaires, ne pouvait être le siège du gouvernement. Si celui-ci a porté des préférences sur le Havre c'est à la suite de la retraite de l'armée belge, sur le territoire français et de la présence du Roi à sa tête.

En faisant connaître les motifs de ce choix à Votre Excellence je me permets de lui offrir les sentiments de profonde reconnaissance pour la gracieuse hospitalité qu'il avait bien voulu offrir au Gouvernement du Roi.

Je saisis cette occasion, etc.

(Signé) LALAING.

Son Excellence,
Sir Edward Grey, Bart., K.G., M.P.,
etc., etc., etc.

APPENDIX K.

ATTACK ON CUXHAVEN AIRSHIP SHEDS BY SEAPLANES,
25 OCTOBER 1914.

It is known that one airship shed has been built at Cuxhaven, 10 miles inland; recent report states that four zeppelins are now at this place, so probably the station has been added to.

Seaplanes.—As the *Hermes* can only steam 14 knots, she is too slow for this expedition. *Engadine* and *Riviera* will be used; these will each carry three seaplanes.

Armament.—Two seaplanes will carry one 100-lb. and five smaller 20-lb. bombs. Four seaplanes will carry 20-lb. bombs.

Escort.—A suitable escort—*Arethusa*, *Undaunted* and *Aurora* and 16 destroyers—will be provided, with a supporting force consisting of two battle cruisers, in case the seaplane ships are attacked in force. Whilst hoisting out the seaplanes a strong guard of destroyers is necessary. As the seaplanes may have some difficulty in locating our ships after their attack, it will be necessary to spread the destroyers out on a line to cover six miles to westward of rendezvous No. 3.

Weather.—To enable the seaplanes to get off the water with a heavy load of bombs, without risk of failure, a fairly calm night is required for the attack, and the selection of the actual date for the attack should be left within a certain limiting period to the officer in command of the force, Commodore (T).

Range.—The seaplanes can carry two 100-lb. bombs and fly 100 miles, or three 20-lb. bombs and fly 160 miles. A 20-lb. bomb has proved sufficient to destroy a zeppelin in a shed.

Necessity for Secrecy.—The *Engadine* and *Riviera* are to proceed to Dover to coal, and leave Dover at 4 a.m., and arrive at rendezvous (1) at 2.30 p.m., lat. 53-36, long. 3-41. They will proceed under Commodore (T) to a rendezvous (2) in lat. 54-55 N, long. 7-13 E, and get all ready for launching the seaplanes. The machines will be launched in lat. 54-27 N, long. 8-0 E, rendezvous (3) and sent to drop bombs on the Cuxhaven airship sheds. Should any machine be unable to locate these sheds, or should they have been wrecked by another machine, the bombs are to be dropped on destroyers in Wilhelmshaven or Heligoland.

Position of supporting battle cruisers to be at a rendezvous lat. 54-36 N, long. 6-13 E at 6 a.m.

Should there be any difficulty in picking up the machines, the pilots are to be rescued and the machines abandoned, if possible being wrecked before doing so.

A destroyer, on picking up a pilot, is to hoist a black flag, and is at once to proceed on a course west (true) at a speed of 15 knots.

If not attacked, destroyers are to tow seaplanes towards *Engadine* and *Riviera*, who will at once hoist machines in.

All destroyers to have dinghies ready for picking up pilots or making fast to machines as necessary.

ORDERS FOR BATTLE CRUISERS.

Battle cruisers *Inflexible* and *Invincible*, under Rear-Admiral Sir Archibald Moore, are to support three light cruisers and 16 destroyers, who are escorting the two seaplane-carriers *Engadine* and *Riviera* to a position lat. 54° 27' N, long. 8° 0' E, where the seaplanes will be launched at about 4 a.m.

The light cruisers will keep under way and return at about 6.30 a.m. to try and recover the seaplanes.

They will not remain for more than 2½ hours from the time of starting the seaplanes.

If weather is not suitable for seaplanes, Commodore (T) will signal to inform you.

The battle cruisers are required to be in a position some 65 miles NW of Heligoland at 6 a.m. as a support in the event of an attack on the light cruisers' force after daylight.

Our submarines will be in shore off the light cruiser squadron, and given strict orders not to come to the northward.

The presence of enemy's submarines must be suspected.

When approaching, and while remaining in support, a good speed is to be maintained, with frequent alterations of course and speed if practicable.

Four destroyers, if available, should accompany battle cruisers when the light cruisers' force retire.

Battle cruisers should keep to the northward as a support until they reach Terschelling, and then, if no further assistance is required, return and carry out any further orders of the C.-in-C., Home Fleet.

Fearless and some destroyers may make a night sweep off the mouth of the Ems as a diversion.

APPENDIX L.

OPERATION ORDERS FOR THE AUXILIARY CRUISER "BERLIN."

(G.O.H. II. APPENDIX 14.)

Translation.

Berlin,

11 September 1914.

I.—INFORMATION OF THE ENEMY.

(To be supplemented by latest news from the Fleet.)

1. The main body of the British fleet has up to date usually cruised in the northern part of the North Sea between Norway and the Orkneys. From time to time groups of cruisers have cruised in the middle of the North Sea.

2. You must expect the blockade line between the Shetlands and Norway to be occupied by cruisers of the *Edgar* class and armed merchant cruisers.

3. It is possible that a blockade line is kept between Stavanger and Peterhead by modern ships, but it is uncertain whether it extends right across the North Sea. Enemy forces have been repeatedly sighted off Stavanger.

4. There are reports of occasional visits of English warships off the Farøe Islands.

5. An old French warship has been sighted near Iceland.

6. English forces occasionally make use of the Irish Sea for purposes of rest and coaling.

7. In peace-time, Ardrossan, in the Firth of Clyde, is a submarine station (three A class boats and one old destroyer, depôt ship *Pactolus*).

8. Cruisers of the *Talbot* class keep a patrol between Ushant and the Lizard.

9. British warships watch the trade route between America and England. All traffic from America and Canada to the Irish Sea now apparently goes through the St. George's Channel.

II.—OBJECTIVE.

1. The approach to Glasgow is to be mined south of the Cumbrae Islands, approximately on the line Garroch Head—Fairland Head. If the entire channel cannot be mined, an attempt is to be made to mine the principal channel on or south of the line Garroch Head to Cumbrae lighthouse. If it is not possible to lay mines south of the Cumbrae Islands, you are to endeavour to mine the principal channel of the Firth of Clyde, somewhere between Pladda and Turnberry Head. The mines are to be laid two metres below L.W.S.

2. After carrying out this operation, or if it is not possible to do so, you are to attack the fisheries off Iceland, and the merchant traffic on the route between England and Archangel. The war on trade is to be carried out in accordance with the Prize Regulations. (See Notes, Appendix I.)

3. After carrying out these duties, you are to attempt to return home under cover of suitable weather conditions. If this proves impracticable, you are to take refuge in some suitable neutral harbour, if possible Norwegian, Swedish, or Danish, choosing one which has railway connection.

4. If, when in the North Atlantic Ocean, you are compelled to escape southward, you are to attempt to carry on cruiser warfare in the Atlantic. Cruiser warfare is to be carried out in accordance with the Prize Regulations and Overseas—O—Orders.¹ (See Notes in Appendix I.)

III.—SPECIAL ORDERS.

1. You are to take 200 mines on board at Cuxhaven or Wilhelmshaven as ordered by the Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet.

2. The Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet will fix the date for the operation.

IV.—NOTES FOR THE CARRYING OUT OF THE MINING OPERATION.

(See Appendix II.)

V.

1. The captain of the auxiliary cruiser is personally responsible that this order and its appendices does not fall into the hands of the enemy.

(Signed)

Chief of the Admiral Staff for the Navy.

APPENDIX I TO THE OPERATION ORDERS FOR THE "BERLIN."

(Ref. II Objective, para. 2.)

1. The Iceland fishing is carried on in September and October on the south coast of the island. From reliable intelligence, the English and French fishing vessels were in full activity during August, whilst English warships had sunk all the German fishing vessels present.

¹ Auslands-O-Befehlen.

2. Considerable traffic has passed since the beginning of the war on the England-Archangel trade route, in timber and foodstuffs (eggs and butter) to England, and coal from England to Russia. Russia is suffering from a shortage of coal. This traffic comes to an end at the end of October.

3. Three ships of the Russian Volunteer Fleet are due to leave Genoa on 15th September, bringing 4,000 Russians (? Reservists) to Archangel. The ships are—

<i>Woronesch</i>	10,700 tons; 13 knots;
<i>Mogiloff</i>	8,800 tons; 11 knots;
<i>Jekaterinoslaw</i>	6,500 tons; 11 knots.

They are unarmed and without W/T.

Note.—Further paragraphs of this appendix dealt with the prosecution of cruiser warfare in the Atlantic, and are not reproduced here, as this part of the plan was not carried out.

APPENDIX II TO THE OPERATION ORDERS FOR THE "BERLIN."

Certain notes for carrying out this operation are given here, but these are not to limit the freedom of the captain to make his own decisions.

NOTES ON CARRYING OUT THE MINING OPERATION.

1. *Time and Weather.*—The most favourable time is at the new moon period (next new moon, 19th September). At the time of the next new moon, moreover, a number of ships are coming from Canada to Liverpool. The *Berlin* has been disguised to resemble certain of these, so that it may be possible to carry out the operation by means of disguise within the following period of time. The ships expected are—

<i>Manitoba</i>	} Similar to <i>Berlin</i> .	September 16.
<i>Calgarian</i>		
<i>Laurentic</i>	September 19.
<i>Virginia</i>	September 24.
<i>Teutonic</i>	September 25.
<i>Grampian</i>	September 30.

Bad weather and, above all things, high seas, is the most favourable condition, for the steamer will be able to hold on whilst the enemy light forces and the old cruisers on the Northern Patrol line will have their speed seriously reduced.

II.—PASSAGE TO THE AREA OF OPERATIONS AND TO THE CARRYING OUT OF THE MINING.

1. *Through the North Sea.*—If possible, you should pass the line south Norway—Scotland under cover of darkness, unless very thick weather rules. If this line is occupied, it will be by fast and modern vessels. If you are sighted by them, you may easily be captured, or you may be able to report the presence of the Northern Patrol line before being captured. If you should succeed in remaining undiscovered, your chances of penetrating unseen through the Northern Patrol line are not bad, on account of the low speed of the British ships there and the element of surprise. In passing the Scotland—South Norway line remember that a number of British warships have been sighted on the south coast of Norway near Stavanger. After passing this line it may be appropriate, under certain circumstances, to hug the Norwegian coast, in order to enable you, if you are chased, and cannot escape, to enter territorial waters. The line South Norway—Scotland as far as the line Shetlands—Norway, approximately 170 miles, would take you some 10 hours at 18 knots. If you pass the first line about 9 p.m.¹ you will be able to reach the second about 7 a.m. This hour is not unfavourable, for in the early morning hours at this season, fog is frequent there. Moreover, the state of readiness for action of the personnel is likely, at this hour, to be less than usual.

¹ Times are S.M.T.

2. *Through the Atlantic to the Area of Operations.*—After passing the Northern Patrol line continue in a northerly course and pass between the Faeroe Islands and Iceland (passage approximately 180 miles broad) and keep well clear of the Hebrides. Steer for the passage Inistrahull—Rhinn of Islay. From here to the passage Rathlin Island—Mull of Cantyre is 33 miles. From here to the area to be mined is 55 miles. The passage between Rathlin Island and the Mull of Cantyre must, if possible, be passed under cover of darkness. The first passage too (Inistrahull—Rhinn of Islay) should, if possible, be passed at dusk or dark. This will be possible if you pass the passage about 7.30 p.m. The passage Rathlin Island—Mull of Cantyre can then be passed about 9.30 p.m., and the area to be mined can be reached between midnight and 1 a.m. Allowing an hour to an hour and a half for the mining operation, you should be able to pass between Rathlin Island and the Mull of Cantyre on the homeward journey during the morning twilight. In entering the Firth of Clyde, keep as far as possible from Lamash and Ardrossan (submarine station). The minefield will be most deadly if you steer for Fairland Head and then alter course for Garroch Head and begin to lay your mines at once. If possible, do not lay all your mines on one bearing, but in an irregular line, to render the sweeping of the field more difficult and to increase the uncertainty as to its extent. It may be possible to return and lay a second line of mines on an opposite course. If you still have some mines left, and if time and other circumstances permit, you should consider the mining of the passage between Pladda and Turnberry Head on your return journey.

3. *The Return from the Mined Area.*—The most favourable course is between Bute Sound and Kilbrennan Sound, where there is little traffic. This passage should not be used when entering, since the appearance there of a ship resembling an English steamer would cause remark. This matters less on the return journey. Being only a secondary passage, Kilbrennan Sound is badly lighted, and care is necessary when passing Erins Bank. After passing out of the Irish Sea the most favourable course to steer is a long stretch to the north-west.

Note.—Certain directions followed here with particular reference to wireless signalling. (These are not reproduced in the original.)

APPENDIX M.

ANALYSIS OF REPORTS OF SIGHTING OF ENEMY SUBMARINES (EXCLUDING REPORTS NOT CREDITED AT THE TIME), OCTOBER 22-31.

	Date.	Time.	Position.	Sighted or reported by	Remarks.
1	22nd	p.m.	12' SE of Corton L.V.	s.s. <i>Easeilon</i> ..	False report.
2	22nd	1.0 p.m.	20' NW of Ymuiden	s.s. <i>Dana</i> (Swedish) ..	U.24.
3	23rd	—	26' E ¼ N from Galloper.	s.s. <i>Brussels</i>	U.24, 27 or 30.
4	23rd	a.m.	70' N of Butt of Lewis, with suspicious steamer in company.	s.s. <i>Caledonia</i> ..	False report.
5	23rd	11.30 a.m.	51° 56' N, 2° 50' E, 2 s/ms.	s.s. <i>Plover</i> (G.S.N. Co.)	Possibly U.27 and/or 30.
6	23rd	11.0 a.m.	100' on course from Hantsholm to the Humber.	Swedish steamer ..	Possibly U.7, 9, 11 or 17.
7	24th	Daylight	52° 48' N, 3° 4' E ..	Trawler <i>Stirling</i> reported s/m circled round her.	False report.

ANALYSIS OF REPORTS OF SIGHTING OF ENEMY SUBMARINES
 (EXCLUDING REPORTS NOT CREDITED AT THE TIME), OCTOBER 22-31

—continued.

Date.	Time.	Position.	Sighted or reported by	Remarks.	
8	24th	5,30 a.m.	10' NE of Inner Dowsing.	Fleet oiler <i>Kremlin</i> reported s/m with canvas sail hoisted to resemble Dutch lugger.	False report.
9	24th	7.0 a.m.	53° 15' N, 2° 45' E ..	Trawler <i>Sterling</i> ..	False report.
10	24th	10.40 a.m.	Off Oban	s.s. <i>Princess Louise</i> ..	False report.
11	24th	11 a.m.	2' ESE of Longstone.	Motor boat 78 ..	False report.
12	24th	Noon	Off Terschelling ..	S/m <i>D.2</i>	<i>U.24</i> , 27 or 30.
13	24th	3 p.m.	30' W of the Skaw ..	Danish s.s. <i>Eos</i> ..	<i>U.10</i> .
14	24th	4.40 p.m.	Passing down the Tay	Tay defences ..	False report.
15	24th	4.40 p.m.	Off Redheugh (Firth of Forth).	Cyclist patrol ..	False report.
16	25th	7 a.m.	7' SSW of Dungeness.	Norwegian barque <i>Shorale</i> .	Possibly <i>U.24</i> , 27, or 30.
17	25th	1.30 p.m.	Near Bass Rock ..	A.P. vessel ..	False report.
18	25th	4 p.m.	Off Flamborough Head.	Flamborough Head ..	False report.
19	25th	4 p.m.	Off Udsire, 2 s/ms ..	Christiania (British Minister).	False report.
20	26th	10 a.m.	7' E by S ½ S of Naze (Norway).	s.s. <i>Volo</i>	<i>U.10</i> or <i>U.18</i> .
21	26th	Noon	Passing Aalesund ..	Christiania (British Minister).	False report.
22	26th	p.m.	Inside Cromarty Firth (not verified).	Several ships opened fire.	False report.
23	27th	8.15 a.m.	Off Nieuport ..	<i>Mohawk</i>	Possibly <i>U.24</i> , 27, 28 or 30.
24	27th	?	Between Bergen and Stavanger.	S/m stopped a Norwegian steamer and inquired which route the Wilson liners were taking.	<i>U.10</i> or 18.
25	27th	3 p.m.	Off Udsire	Christiania (British Minister).	Probably <i>U.18</i> .
26	28th	a.m.	7' NNE of Flamborough Head.	Trawler <i>Cydonia</i> ..	False report.
27	28th	1 p.m.	Passing the Skaw (2 s/ms).	?	False report.
28	28th	1.25 p.m.	3' off Collieston Bay (Cruden Bay).	Trawler <i>Thistle</i> ..	False report.
29	28th	3 p.m.	52° N, 3° 30' E ..	Amsterdam (British Consul).	Possibly <i>U.24</i> , 27, 28 or 30.
30	29th	4.30 a.m.	15' NNW of Flamborough Head.	Trawler <i>Euripides</i> ..	False report.
31	29th	a.m.	Close to shore of La Panne.	Belgian Military Staff	False report.
32	29th	8.30 p.m.	Off Carsaig (Mull) ..	Greenock	False report.
33	30th	p.m.	W of Sumburgh Head	R.A., <i>Cyclops</i> ..	False report.
34	30th	p.m.	Near Haaks L.V. (reported as <i>U.9</i>).	Amsterdam (British Consul).	Possibly <i>U.27</i> , 28 or 30.
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