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NAVAL STAFF MONOGRAPHS  
(HISTORICAL).

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FLEET ISSUE.

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VOLUME XVI.

LOWESTOFT RAID.

24th-25th April, 1916.

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*March, 1927.*

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VOLUME XVI.

LOWESTOFT RAID.

24th—25th April, 1916.

Monograph No. 32.  
NAVAL STAFF,  
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*March, 1927.*

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NAVAL STAFF MONOGRAPHS

(HISTORICAL)

FIRST ISSUE

VOLUME XVI

LOWESTOFT RAID

3RD EDITION 1916

## LOWESTOFT RAID, 24th-25th APRIL, 1916.

### CONTENTS.

	<i>Page</i>
NOTE ON SOURCES .. .. .	4
CHAPTER I.—ADMIRAL SCHEER'S STRATEGY. IRISH PROPOSALS .. .. .	5
1. Admiral Scheer's Memorandum of February 1916. 2. German Idea of the Situation, April 1916. 3. German Conference of April 15. 4. Irish Proposals. 5. Skagerrak Sweep and Situation on April 24.	
CHAPTER II.—BRITISH MOVEMENTS TO MIDNIGHT, APRIL 24 .. .. .	10
6. April 24 Grand Fleet to Sea again. 7. Orders to Commodore (T) and Captain (S). 8. Movements of British Submarines and Commodore (T).	
CHAPTER III.—GERMAN MOVEMENTS TO MIDNIGHT, APRIL 24 .. .. .	17
9. German Movements, April 24. 10. Effect of Dover Barrage. 11. High Sea Fleet sails	

### ERRATUM.

Plan I. In homeward track of I and II Scouting Group for 9.30 p.m. read 9.30 a.m.

CHAPTER V.—MOVEMENTS OF GRAND FLEET AND GERMAN RETURN .. .. .	31
22. Movements of Commander-in-Chief and Vice-Admiral, B.C.F., April 25. 23. German Return. 24. German Submarines.	
CHAPTER VI.—CONCLUSIONS .. .. .	35
25. German Strategy. 26. Question of Bases. 27. Special Intelligence.	

### APPENDICES.

APPENDIX A.—Forces, British and German .. .. .	43
B.—Telegrams, Admiralty .. .. .	47
D.—Signals, C.-in-C. Grand Fleet .. .. .	54
E.—Signals, Commodore (T) .. .. .	62
F.—Signals, "Melampus" .. .. .	67
G.—Reports, 5th L.C.S. .. .. .	69
H.—Reports, Submarines .. .. .	72
J.—Notes on Plans .. .. .	78

*Note.*—Appendix C is not required, and has been omitted.

### PLANS.

Plan I.—Lowestoft Raid, 24-25 April 1916 .. .. .	End
Plan II.—Lowestoft Raid, 25 April 1916 .. .. .	End

Abbreviations—(s) for Signal log ; (l) Deck log ; (r) report to Admiralty.

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NAVAL STAFF MONOGRAPHS  
(HISTORICAL)

## ERRATA

Plan I. In paragraph 12 of I and II sounding Group  
for 2.30 p.m. read 2.30 a.m.

VOLUME XVI

## LOWESTOFT RAID

288—289 April 1916

## LOWESTOFT RAID, 24th-25th APRIL, 1916.

## CONTENTS.

	<i>Page</i>
NOTE ON SOURCES .. .. .	4
CHAPTER I.—ADMIRAL SCHEER'S STRATEGY. IRISH PROPOSALS .. .. .	5
1. Admiral Scheer's Memorandum of February 1916. 2. German Idea of the Situation, April 1916. 3. German Conference of April 15. 4. Irish Proposals. 5. Skagerrak Sweep and Situation on April 24.	
CHAPTER II.—BRITISH MOVEMENTS TO MIDNIGHT, APRIL 24 .. .. .	10
6. April 24 Grand Fleet to Sea again. 7. Orders to Commodore (T) and Captain (S). 8. Movements of British Submarines and Commodore (T).	
CHAPTER III.—GERMAN MOVEMENTS TO MIDNIGHT, APRIL 24 .. .. .	17
9. German Movements, April 24. 10. Effect of Dover Barrage. 11. High Sea Fleet sails.	
CHAPTER IV.—THE MORNING OF APRIL 25 .. .. .	21
12. Movements of Harwich Force. 13. German Light Cruisers. 14. German Battle Cruisers. 15. German Movements. 16. German Airships. 17. The Submarines at Yarmouth. 18. The Harwich Submarines. 19. Movements of Aircraft. 20. Commodore (T) after the Action. 21. German Submarines <i>U.B.18, U.B.29</i> .	
CHAPTER V.—MOVEMENTS OF GRAND FLEET AND GERMAN RETURN .. .. .	31
22. Movements of Commander-in-Chief and Vice-Admiral, B.C.F., April 25. 23. German Return. 24. German Submarines.	
CHAPTER VI.—CONCLUSIONS .. .. .	35
25. German Strategy. 26. Question of Bases. 27. Special Intelligence.	

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APPENDIX A.—Forces, British and German .. .. .	43
B.—Telegrams, Admiralty .. .. .	47
D.—Signals, C.-in-C. Grand Fleet .. .. .	54
E.—Signals, Commodore (T) .. .. .	62
F.—Signals, "Melampus" .. .. .	67
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Plan I.—Lowestoft Raid, 24-25 April 1916 .. .. .	End
Plan II.—Lowestoft Raid, 25 April 1916 .. .. .	End

Abbreviations—(s) for Signal log; (l) Deck log; (r) report to Admiralty.

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- III.—Movements of Commodore (T), Commodore (S), *Nimrod, Laforey.*  
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- V.—German Sources. *Krieg Zur See, Nordsee*, Vol. V; Plan in Karte F.

<sup>1</sup> In box, Historical Section.<sup>2</sup> Even Day and Odd Day. The numbers are Deptford Yard numbers.

## LOWESTOFT RAID, 24th–25th APRIL, 1916.

## CHAPTER I.

## Admiral Scheer's Strategy. Irish Proposals.

1. **Admiral Scheer's Memorandum of February 1916.**—The raid on Lowestoft (25 April) was one of the four important sorties<sup>1</sup> carried out in 1916 by Admiral Scheer. The general basis of his strategy is to be found in a memorandum on "Guiding Principles for Sea Warfare in the North Sea,"<sup>2</sup> issued on his appointment to the command in February, with the intention of giving the activities of the fleet a more offensive direction. Deserving careful study as an exposition of the strategical aims of the German Fleet in 1916, it embodies the idea of a weaker fleet avoiding action, but using every method of minor warfare in order to bring pressure to bear on the enemy in order to entice detachments of his fleet into waters close to the German coast, where they might be attacked. The paper with the four headings given by Admiral Scheer may be summarised as follows:—

*Fundamental Principles.*—The present proportion of strength forbids us in the first place seeking a decisive battle with the concentrated forces of the English fleet. But our strategy must also prevent a decisive battle being forced on us by our opponents.

*Conclusions.*—Systematic and steady pressure must be exerted on the enemy to force him out of his attitude of waiting, and compel him to send forces against us, which will offer us favourable possibilities of attack. On the other hand, we must not allow the enemy's feeling of superiority to grow so strong that he will not hesitate to bring us to action when he will.

*Methods.*—The above aims are to be attained by: (1) Submarine warfare; (2) by mine warfare; (3) by war against the trade in the north<sup>3</sup>; (4) by the active employment of the High Sea Fleet in sorties.

*Execution.*—The war of the submarine against commerce and the war in the air have begun, and will follow their regular course. Mine warfare, the war against trade, and the sortie of the High Sea Fleet are all related to one another, and the more closely they are bound together within the frame of a programme of operations, the more prospect they will offer of success. The first task of the Fleet Command will be to concentrate on the

<sup>1</sup> 5–6 March, 24–25 April, 31 May–1 June, 19 August.<sup>2</sup> Leitgedanken für die Seekriegführung in der Nordsee, *Nordsee* 5/27.<sup>3</sup> Presumably British-Scandinavian.

preparation of a programme of operations that will provide, according to circumstances, minor or major undertakings to be executed by detachments or by the whole fleet; then to arrange for the supply of all material necessary, and, finally—an important point—to select the leaders and commanders for particular tasks.

The memorandum concluded by pointing out that any sortie of the fleet rested on one essential condition—the security of the German Bight between Horns Reef and Borkum against attack, which must be ensured by continuous and regular patrols, by the laying of minefields, and by frequent sorties of light craft to the outskirts of the area.

The German History goes on to say that a programme was drawn up which aimed at the continuous co-operation of all instruments of naval warfare to a single end, and which comprised an array of enterprises, varying from a sally of light craft by night within the area of the Bight to an advance of the whole fleet in conjunction with airships, planes, submarines, and minelayers to the Hoofden, the Dogger Bank, and the Skagerrak.

Though the Lowestoft raid actually derived its origin from a request from the Irish insurgents for a demonstration on the East Coast, it was apparently on these principles that it was planned. The appearance of the German fleet off the coast was intended to lead to the despatch of British forces, which would in turn offer a favourable opportunity for attack. How far these principles were actually applied in practice, and the degree of success they attained on 25 April 1916, is the subject of this monograph.

**2. German Idea of the Situation, April 1916.**—During April the Germans had received information, regarded as reliable at the time, but probably derived from tainted sources, that the English were contemplating some big enterprise against them. As to the possible objective, various opinions were held. Landings on the coast of Flanders, Holland, or Schleswig Holstein might be ruled out for want of available troops and on account of the threat to sea communications offered by Germany's undefeated fleet.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, it appeared possible that the pressure on German trade might be increased, especially in the direction of the Baltic, and that, in co-operation with the Russians, a plan might be maturing for cutting Germany entirely off from the sea. In any case, it was decided that till the situation became clearer it was necessary to keep the fleet and its auxiliaries at the highest possible pitch of readiness, and preliminary measures were taken to meet anything of the kind. In the case of reliable indications of any immediate attack, all forces placed at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief, Baltic, were to be recalled at once; all craft under repair were to be got to sea as soon as possible; and three cruisers equipped with mines were to be stationed in the Elbe and Ems ready to sail immediately.

<sup>1</sup> *Nordsee* 5/115.

Scheer had decided that if an attack was made on the Bight the High Sea Fleet should be got to sea before the exits were closed by mines or submarines, in order to meet the enemy on the outskirts of the Bight, and, if possible, bring him to action on his way across. The difficulty of getting out of the rivers stood, however, in the way of this, and if the attack came as a complete surprise, without any previous indication of the British movements, it was regarded as barely possible, starting from a normal state of readiness, to confront him with the High Sea Fleet in its full strength the same day. And even when the ships were out of the river the assembly and disposition of the force for any particular purpose required a considerable amount of time. In this case the only thing to do would be to oppose the enemy at first with the outpost forces alone, so as to throw out and confuse his plans. Then, if he retired, the outpost forces must do their utmost to keep in touch with him so as to permit of a torpedo attack the following night.<sup>1</sup>

**3. German Conference of 15 April.**—On 15 April, when these measures were discussed at a conference on board the fleet flagship between Admiral Scheer, Admiral von Holtzendorff,<sup>2</sup> Chief of the Naval Staff, and Grand Admiral, Prince Henry, Commander-in-Chief in the Baltic, the intentions of the British fleet had become sufficiently definite<sup>3</sup> to expect an offensive movement from it in the period 15 to 20 April.

There followed, therefore, on the same day a parade by the High Sea Fleet, "splendidly ready," and aiming at something "considerably more offensive" than before. Not a ship remained in harbour except the *Hamburg*, flagship of the leader of submarines. The outpost forces were reinforced by a third and fourth flotilla,<sup>4</sup> one—a fast one—off List, another in Heligoland, the two others in Schillig Roads. The ships not on outpost duty were to be at one hour's notice from 4 a.m. to 12 noon, and at three hours' notice for the rest of the day. For the passage of the fleet, four channels were kept swept and constantly patrolled, one west and one east of Amrum Bank, another to the west-north-west,<sup>5</sup> from which one could steer north or west, as the situation required, and a fourth led directly past the Frisian Islands to the westward.<sup>6</sup>

**4. Irish Proposals.**—These measures were largely designed from a defensive point of view, but something more offensive

<sup>1</sup> N.S. 5/116.

<sup>2</sup> He had relieved Admiral Bachmann in September 1915, when the latter supported von Tirpitz in protesting against the restrictions placed on submarine warfare.

<sup>3</sup> German History does not specify why.

<sup>4</sup> Making four in all. The normal outpost forces at the time were:—In the Jade—1 battle squadron, 2 battle cruisers, 1 flotilla; in the Jade and Weser—1 light cruiser scouting group; at Heligoland—1 flotilla; in Altenbruch Roads—half of the 2nd B.S.; in the Ems or Lister Tief—a half-flotilla.

<sup>5</sup> This was Way Middle, where the *Seydlitz* was mined.

<sup>6</sup> Called Coast Way, and later Way Black.

was to be attempted. After long negotiations with Roger Casement, the General Staff, in the middle of March, had decided to send to Ireland 20,000 Russian rifles and 10 German machine guns, with the necessary ammunition.

It was the Navy's task to land them there. The Irish urged, too, that the rising planned for Easter Sunday should be accompanied by a strong demonstration of the German fleet against the East Coast, and the proposal was supported by the Naval Staff. The very fact that in the middle of the war a rising was possible would in itself exercise a moral influence on neutrals, and the picture of a German ship passing unscathed through the blockade and supplying the rebels with arms was bound to cause acute uneasiness to the Allies. It was accordingly decided to meet the wishes of the Irish, and to carry out a bombardment of Lowestoft contemporaneously with the landing of arms in Ireland. The *Libau*, disguised as the Norwegian ship *Aud*, with rifles hidden under a cargo of timber in specially constructed compartments, left Warnemunde on 10 April with orders to be in Tralee Bay between 20 and 23 April. She passed north of the Shetlands, and, according to the German History, twice sighted British merchant cruisers on patrol, and was actually stopped by one on 16 April at 6.15 p.m., between Ireland and the Faroes.<sup>1</sup> Her story is only distantly concerned with the Lowestoft Raid. She reached Tralee Bay on 20 April, found no one there, cruised up and down, was captured by the sloop *Bluebell*, and was scuttled by her captain on the way into Queenstown. While these events were still in the making, Scheer, on 19 April, returned to a state of "ordinary readiness,"<sup>2</sup> and sent all his ships into harbour to fuel in readiness for the raid on Lowestoft, which was to synchronise with the landing of arms.

**5. Skagerrak Sweep and Situation on 24 April.**—Meanwhile, the Russians had been pressing for a demonstration in the North Sea to hold the German fleet there while they were replacing their minefields as the ice melted in the Gulf of Finland. To meet their views, the Commander-in-Chief had been planning a sweep in the Skagerrak for 22 April. Its object was to attack with submarines any warships that might be drawn to the northward. It was to be carried out by destroyers, with the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, off the Skaw, in support, and the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron and 2nd Battle Squadron behind them. Three Blyth submarines (*E.43*, *G.4*, and *G.5*) were to work in the Cattegat, and three Harwich submarines (*E.23*, *E.16*,

<sup>1</sup> Map in N.S. 5/122. There is no trace or mention of any ship intercepted in this position in the report of V.A., 10th C.S., for April in *G.F. Pack*, Vol. 32, H.S.A. 114.

<sup>2</sup> The German History infers incorrectly that the signal for "ordinary readiness" had been intercepted, and that the Skagerrak sweep was launched in reply. *Nordsee* 5/119. The signal was intercepted (19 April, 0927), but the instructions for the sweep had been already issued by the C.-in-C. on 18 April.

and *E.41*) were to be posted off Jutland Bank to attack any German forces which might come north. So the plan stood at first, but on 19 April<sup>1</sup> it was decided to add the *Lion* and 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and the 3rd Battle Squadron to the forces in support, the former to be in Lat. 56° 10' N, Long. 4° E (in the centre of the North Sea, at about the level of the Firth of Forth) at noon on 22 April. In pursuance of this plan the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron left Rosyth on 20 April at midnight, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron followed at 5 a.m., and the 2nd Battle Squadron left Scapa at 8 a.m. on 21 April. The *Lion* and 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron were due to sail at 8.30 that evening, when, in the afternoon, there came from the Admiralty an abrupt warning for two hours' notice, a sure prognostication that the High Sea Fleet was on the move.

The alarm had gone on the German side. At noon on 20 April a British submarine had been sighted off Baltrum, one of the East Frisian Islands, and the outposts had been ordered to search the Bight for submarines.

The German 9th Flotilla was hurried off to patrol to the north-west of List, and the two battle cruisers on outpost duty were ordered to join the 4th Scouting Group south of Amrum Bank at dawn, waiting for what might betide.<sup>2</sup> Nothing appeared, the alarm subsided, and the battle cruisers had returned, when, at 3 p.m. on 21 April, Neumünster, the German deciphering station, issued an intercepted British message which seemed to say that battleships and cruisers had left the Forth the night before and passed May Island on an E.S.E. course.<sup>3</sup> Again, it was thought that an attack was impending, and Scheer ordered all ships to be in a special state of readiness at 9 p.m. (21st). Further instructions went out at 5.10 p.m. The 1st and 2nd Scouting Groups with the *Rostock* and two fast flotillas were to scout to the north, to be followed by the battlefleet at 10 p.m., which was to advance to Horns Reef at daybreak.<sup>4</sup> These orders were taken in at Whitehall, giving rise to a counter-alarm, and at 5.40 p.m. (21st), the Commander-in-Chief was ordered to have steam at two hours' notice. This meant nothing less than the abandonment of the Skagerrak operation. At 6.34 p.m. the order was given to cancel it, and the forces already on their way were given new rendezvous to meet the new emergency.<sup>5</sup> The battlefleet was to concentrate 100 miles east of Aberdeen, with the battle cruisers 40 miles ahead. By 11 p.m. it had put to sea.<sup>6</sup>

Scheer's advance soon fizzled out. About midnight, when the Scouting Groups were going out to the north, the light cruiser *Graudenz* struck a mine, 15 miles south-west of Amrum Bank,<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> C.-in-C., Adty., 19 April, 12.33 p.m.

<sup>2</sup> *Nordsee* 5/126; War Diary I.D.

<sup>3</sup> *Nordsee* 5/122. The 2nd L.C.S. had sailed from Rosyth at midnight on 20-21 April, the 2nd B.C.S. and 4th L.C.S. at 4.40 a.m.

<sup>4</sup> War Diary, April 1916. <sup>5</sup> G.F. Tel. Out, H.S.A. 70.

<sup>6</sup> 3rd B.S. sailed from Rosyth at 8 a.m., 22 April.

<sup>7</sup> Laid by Princess Margaret, Sept. 10-11, 1915.



which forced the 1st and 2nd Scouting Group to turn back, in order to proceed by the eastern channel. At 4.25 a.m. the *Elbing* thought she saw a periscope 7 miles south-west of Vyl light; another was reported by two battle cruisers 8 miles south of the light,<sup>1</sup> and, "as it appeared that a further advance would merely expose ships uselessly to submarine attack," Scheer gave the order for all ships to return to harbour.<sup>2</sup> These orders were read by the listeners at Whitehall, and at 8.55 a.m. (22 April) the Commander-in-Chief was told that the High Sea Fleet was returning to harbour. It was suggested that the light cruisers should advance to the Skagerrak, not going beyond the Skaw, while the Grand Fleet should remain at sea supporting them, in order to try and draw the German fleet out again to the northward. The Commander-in-Chief, therefore, resumed the operation he had abandoned abruptly the evening before. The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron was ordered to be off the Skaw at dawn on 23 April. The B.C.F. was to proceed south-east and at 7 p.m. to be 75 miles north-west of Horns Reef, there to remain till dawn on 23 April, when the battlefleet would get in touch with it. The plan was not to materialise. A thick fog came down that evening, in which the *Australia* and *New Zealand* collided, and had to return to port. The light cruisers had seen nothing, and at 1 a.m. (23rd) the Commander-in-Chief broke off the operation on account of fog, and the fleet returned to its bases. The battlefleet arrived at Scapa at 7 a.m. the next day and started to fuel. Such was the situation on the morning of 24 April.<sup>3</sup>

## CHAPTER II.

### British Movements to Midnight, 24th April.

6. 24 April, Grand Fleet to Sea again.—By the afternoon of the 24th the Grand Fleet had returned to its bases, and was fuelling. In the south, Commodore (T) had sailed that morning with the *Conquest*, *Penelope*, and 17 destroyers on an exercise cruise. His forces were much depleted. Twelve destroyers<sup>4</sup> had been detached on 22 April to act under the Vice-Admiral,

<sup>1</sup> The nearest British submarine, *G.2*, was some 100 miles to the north-westward.

<sup>2</sup> *Nordsee* 5/127 says 4.40 (G.M.T.).

<sup>3</sup> For details and plan of Skagerrak sweep of 21-23 April see Monograph, *Home Waters* VI.

<sup>4</sup> The *Laforey*, *Lennox*, *Lark*, *Lookout*, *Larne*, *Laurel*, *Llewellyn*, and *Lucifer* to Sheerness to escort minelayers; the *Medea*, *Melpomene*, *Murray*, and *Milne* to Dover. The *Lydiard* and *Morris* left at 5 a.m., 24 April, for Immingham and Hull to refit.

Dover, in the big barrage operation impending against the Flanders coast, and from signals intercepted that day he learnt that they had been in action, and that the *Melpomene* and *Medea* had been damaged.

All was quiet in the Bight on the 23rd, but in the morning of the 24th indications of activity began to appear, and at noon the German fleet flagship took over wireless control, a sure sign of some intended fleet movement. Then, suddenly, about 4 p.m., there came a signal stating that the *Seydlitz* had struck a mine at 2.47 p.m.,<sup>1</sup> and at 3.50 Admiral Jellicoe was told to hold the Grand Fleet at two hours' notice as soon as it had fuelled. Commodore (T) had already been ordered at 3.25 p.m. to return and refuel, and half-an-hour later a telegram was sent to Admiral Jellicoe, which ran as follows: "Trouble has broken out in Dublin, and it is reported that the G.P.O. has been seized by rebels. We have information that the German fleet will assist by demonstrating against the East Coast, and this is confirmed by their making the usual preparations for coming out at night."<sup>2</sup> Orders followed shortly after to report when ships were at two hours' notice.<sup>3</sup> A strong southerly gale was blowing in the north, and the Commander-in-Chief replied that destroyers would not be able to face it.

The mining of the *Seydlitz* opened a wide window of information, for her disablement gave rise to a crop of messages dealing with her return, the sighting of British submarines,<sup>4</sup> and arrangements for escorting her. Scheer, however, was not to be deterred, and at 4.28 p.m. there came in a signal from him ordering the fleet to proceed with the undertaking, and stating that the main body was on its way, close under the East Frisian Islands. It was on these grounds that Admiral Jellicoe was informed at 5.53 that the "1st and 2nd Scouting Groups were in Lat. 54° 12' N, Long. 6° 45' E,<sup>5</sup> at about 3 p.m., apparently coming north-west, and we think main fleet is out. Information scanty."

It was desirable to warn the coast, and at 6.45 p.m. Commodore (T) and Captain (S) and the East Coast commands were ordered to hold local defence flotillas, submarines, and aircraft ready for a demonstration by the enemy that night or the next morning. Submarines were to be outside harbours, but in signal touch, ready to move before daylight. Aircraft were to scout at daybreak, and all within reach were to attack the enemy if reported.<sup>6</sup> The Commander-in-Chief had already

<sup>1</sup> Appendix C.1.

<sup>2</sup> Appendix B.3.

<sup>3</sup> At 4.41 p.m.; V.A., B.C.F., reported at 5.14 p.m.; V.A., 3rd B.S., at 5.17 p.m.; V.A.C., 1st B.S. (Invergordon) at 5.21; C.-in-C. at 7 p.m.

<sup>4</sup> Non-existent. There were no British submarines in the area. The only British submarines out were *E.43*, *G.4*, *G.5*, which left Blyth on 18 April, and were in the Lister Deep area.

<sup>5</sup> The *Seydlitz* was mined in 54° 13' N, Long. 6° 45' E. Minefield 8/11/1915.

<sup>6</sup> To A.C., Rosyth; R.A., East Coast; S.N.O., Lowestoft; Comm. (T); Capt. (S), *Maidstone*; Capt. (S), *Titania* (Blyth); Comm., Harwich; C.-in-C., Nore; V.A., Dover, 1845.

made the preparatory signal for leaving Scapa,<sup>1</sup> and the B.C.F., the 5th Battle Squadron, and 4th Light Cruiser Squadron had been ordered to raise steam for full speed.<sup>2</sup>

Between 5 and 7 p.m. information was received which threw a clear light on the intended raid,<sup>3</sup> and which culminated shortly after 7 p.m. in the Grand Fleet being ordered to raise steam, proceed to sea, and concentrate as necessary to intercept enemy forces.<sup>4</sup> The C-in-C. had already anticipated it. At 7.0<sup>5</sup> the squadrons in Scapa had been ordered to raise steam for 20 knots, and at 7.15 the Commander-in-Chief informed the V.A., B.C.F., of his intentions in a telegram, which ran: "Have proposed to Admiralty you should leave, when ready, and go down M Channel. 5th Battle Squadron and 4th Light Cruiser Squadron will leave Scapa at 9.30 p.m., at 20 knots, to support you. Battlefleet at 10.30, at 18 knots. 1st and 2nd Scouting Group in Lat. 54° 12' N, 45° E, at 3 p.m., steering to north-westward. Main fleet out. Do not get engaged with superior forces until I can support you."<sup>6</sup> By 8 p.m. the whole fleet was under orders to sail, and all ships were raising steam. A heavy sea<sup>7</sup> was running outside, and it was still doubtful whether the destroyers would be able to keep up.

It was 8 p.m.<sup>8</sup> when the substance of the messages received between 5 p.m. and 6 p.m. went out to the Commander-in-Chief, the Vice-Admiral, B.C.F., and Commodore (T). "*Seydlitz* has been damaged by a mine, and is returning. At 7.30 p.m. the 1st and 2nd Scouting Groups will be in Lat. 53° 57' N, Long. 5° 25' E, steering west-north-west, 20 knots. The 3rd (German) Battle Squadron passes Lat. 53° 48' N, Long 7° E, at 5.45, and then passes through Lat. 53° 38' N, Long 6° 8' E, eventually steering south-west at 14 knots from Lat. 53° 55' N, Long. 5° E. The 3rd (German) Battle Squadron is apparently heading the 1st and 2nd (German) Battle Squadrons. No information as to the destination of flotillas." It was clear by this time that the Germans were aiming a blow somewhere, and that their fleet was already on its way.

<sup>1</sup> 4.55 p.m., *King George V* (s). Negative *Hindustan* and *Campania*.

<sup>2</sup> *Barham* (s), 6.38 p.m. C-in-C. to B.C.F., 6.47 p.m.

<sup>3</sup> In particular, German signal, 5.13 p.m., Appendix C.9.

<sup>4</sup> Received *Iron Duke* 7.11 p.m., "Prepare for Sea"; 7.18 p.m., "Proceed to sea; concentrate as necessary"; 7.47, "Concentrate to south-eastward, Long Forties." H.S.A. 27.

<sup>5</sup> *King George V* (s).

<sup>6</sup> Grand Fleet, Out Tel.; also C-in-C. to Admiralty, 6.56 p.m. Approved by Admiralty, 7.30 p.m.

<sup>7</sup> Considerable enough for the *Barham* to warn her line as she got outside harbour.

<sup>8</sup> At 7.50 p.m. the C-in-C. was told that the signal *re* the German battle cruisers (i.e., of 5.53) was cancelled by later information. The position in it was the position where the *Seydlitz* was mined, and was correct at the time. The cancellation, therefore, was evidently merely a warning of the longer signal, which followed at 8 p.m.

7. Orders to Commodore (T) and Captain (S).—Their objective might be the eastern counties again, or possibly an attack on the Flanders coast in reply to the barrage laid that morning. The Admiralty, if one may judge from the disposition given to the light cruisers, seems to have leant to the idea that the enemy intended to penetrate some distance into the Hoofden. Till the Grand Fleet entered the arena the defence of this area must fall on the Harwich forces, and at 8.2 p.m. orders went out to Commodore (T) and Captain (S): "Send one destroyer and six submarines to Lat. 52° 10' N, Long 3° 5' E<sup>1</sup> by daybreak tomorrow. Their objective will be large German ships steering south-west. Report name of destroyer sent, and warn her to look out for messages. If submarines get out of touch they should return to-morrow after 7 p.m."<sup>2</sup> This position, about 68 miles from Harwich, was just at the south-east corner of the British dangerous area off Southwold, and right on the line of the German advance, if the German fleet continued its advance so far. Captain (S) had six submarines available (*E.55*, *E.29*, *E.26*, *E.22*, *D.4*, and *D.6*), and the *Melampus* (Lieut.-Commander Geo. Hewett) was detailed to attend on them. It was 10.30 p.m. when they left Harwich with orders to be in the above position before daybreak, and there to spread in pairs in echelon, 4 miles apart, facing north-east.<sup>3</sup>

At 8.40 p.m. Commodore (T) reported that the Harwich force would be ready for sea at 10.30 p.m., and shortly afterwards orders went out to the S.N.O., Harwich, to recall all vessels of the Auxiliary Patrol. The Commander-in-Chief, desiring to know what the Admiralty intended to do in the south, asked a little later what orders Commodore (T) would have, and was told that he would be held in the vicinity of Harwich.<sup>4</sup> At 10.20 p.m. the Admiralty sent out another signal to Commodore (T), Commander-in-Chief, Vice-Admiral, B.C.F., and Captain (S): "Enemy battlefleet will leave Lat. 53° 55' N, Long. 5° E, about 11.45 p.m. (G.M.T.), steering south-west, 14 knots.<sup>5</sup> Light cruisers should be in 52° 27' N, Long. 3° 27' E<sup>6</sup>, by daybreak, avoiding our submarines stationed in Lat. 52° 10' N, Long 3° 5' E, and then proceed slowly to north-eastward; if touch is obtained with enemy, retire to south-west, and draw enemy past submarines. Arrange for a destroyer to communicate this to the submarines' destroyer by visual after daybreak. 'L' class destroyers from Nore<sup>7</sup> and Harwich destroyers should rendezvous after daybreak in Lat. 52° N, Long. 2.50 E<sup>8</sup>, and follow your orders. Nore informed." A little later, at 10.40 p.m., orders were sent to the *Alecto*, submarine depot ship at Yarmouth, to

<sup>1</sup> Position B in Plan II.

<sup>2</sup> Sent 8.2 p.m., received Capt. (S) 8.27 p.m.

<sup>3</sup> Appendix H.11. <sup>4</sup> C-in-C. to Adty., 9.7 p.m.; reply, 10.12 p.m.

<sup>5</sup> Appendix B.21, C.9, C.10. <sup>6</sup> Plan II, Position A.

<sup>7</sup> Nine "L" class had been sent to Nore to escort the minelayers for Dover barrage.

<sup>8</sup> Plan II, Position D.

have the Yarmouth submarines at gun range off Yarmouth at daylight, and Captain (S) was told to make their number up to six.

These orders placed the light cruisers and submarines in the path of the German advance, 102 and 125 miles respectively from the estimated position of the enemy at 11.45 p.m., and, if the German battlefleet maintained its course, it should be sighted by the light cruisers about 6 a.m. The light cruisers were then to retire to the south-west, "drawing" the enemy towards the British submarines, 21 miles off. Such was the substance of the Admiralty's intentions in what may be called the "first disposition."

By this time the Grand Fleet had put to sea. The 5th Battle Squadron and 4th Light Cruiser Squadron left Scapa at 9.10 p.m., proceeding at 20 knots to support Admiral Beatty's forces. The 1st Battle Squadron left Invergordon at 10 p.m. The *Lion* and B.C.F. sailed from Rosyth at 10.50 p.m. The *Iron Duke* and the rest of the battlefleet left Scapa between 10 and 11 p.m.<sup>1</sup> By midnight the fleet was at sea, ploughing its way south against the gale. The 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron were the only forces still in harbour. At 4 a.m. they, too, sailed from Rosyth for a position 20 miles 80° from Farn Island to watch the northern exit of the Tyne area. Captain (S), Blyth, had been ordered by the Commander-in-Chief to spread all his available submarines in a line 360° from 54° 44' N, 0° 50' W, by 4 a.m., with the *Trident* to the eastward of them.

At 8.14 p.m. a German signal had been intercepted, which, though mutilated, gave the position, course, and speed of the battle cruisers at 9 p.m., and stated that they intended to shape course W½N at 1.30 a.m.<sup>2</sup> This led straight towards the Corton Light Vessel off Yarmouth, and revealed the German objective, though there still remained the possibility that the advance of the battle cruisers might be merely preliminary to a thrust by the High Sea Fleet down towards Flanders. In any case, the signal considerably altered the dispositions in the south. The *Melampus*, which had left Harwich at 10.20 p.m. with the Harwich submarines, was told at 11.40 p.m. to take them to a position 52° 37' N, 3° 36' E<sup>3</sup>, 33 miles north-east of the position previously ordered. A summary of the latest information with regard to the enemy was sent at the same time to Commodore (T), Commander-in-Chief, and Vice-Admiral, B.C.F.: "Enemy movements; battle cruisers will be in Lat. 52° 40' N, Long. 3° 30' E, at 1.30 a.m., and then steer W ½ N towards Yarmouth. Battlefleet will be in 52° 32' N, Long. 3° 32' E, at 6.45 a.m."<sup>4</sup>

Finally, there was the situation at Dover to be thought of. That very morning the big barrage of moored mine nets had been laid off Zeebrugge, and it was important to keep it continuously

<sup>1</sup> Grand Fleet Narrative. For details of forces see Appendix A.

<sup>2</sup> Appendix C.13. <sup>3</sup> *Melampus* (s), received 11.51 p.m. (C in Plan II).

<sup>4</sup> It actually did not come south of 52° 57' N. See Appendix C.10.

patrolled, but with the whole German fleet at sea, coming south, this was considered no longer possible, and the Vice-Admiral, Dover, was ordered to stop operations off the Belgian coast and keep his forces well concentrated for local defence. This was the last piece of intelligence that went out that night. Silence came down on both fleets.

#### S. Movements of British Submarines and Commodore (T).—

Submarines played an important part in the operations on both sides. It was on them that the Admiralty relied to secure the southern area, by the threat they offered to enemy forces operating there, for a ship torpedoed off the coast might find it difficult to reach Terschelling before Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers fell on it and cut it off. Their movements, therefore, are of special interest, and form a striking instance of the limitations imposed on the submarine by its inferior speed, accentuated still further in this case by the large extent of the Southwold dangerous area,<sup>1</sup> the necessity of keeping clear of the Harwich light cruisers till dawn, and the margin of time required for spreading. The submarines available consisted of six from Harwich (*E.55*, *E.29*, *E.26*, *E.22*, *D.4*, and *D.6*<sup>2</sup>) and four at Yarmouth (*H.5*, *V.1*, *H.10*, *H.7*), which were to be reinforced by two (*E.53* and *E.37*<sup>3</sup>) from Harwich to make them up to six. The Harwich submarines sailed with the destroyer *Melampus* (Lieut.-Commander George Hewett) about 10.20 p.m. To reach their first position in 52° 10' N, 3° 51' E (B in Plan II) by day-break, a distance of 65 miles had to be covered by 5 a.m. At 11.51 the *Melampus* received a signal to proceed to a point 33 miles north-east from that previously ordered.<sup>4</sup> This new position was about 90 miles off, a distance which the submarines at 11 knots could cover by 7 a.m. It lay about 5 miles east of the anticipated position of the 1st Scouting Group at 1.30 a.m.

The Yarmouth boats put to sea between 2 a.m. and 2.20 a.m. The positions allotted to them off Yarmouth<sup>5</sup> were as follows:—

*V.1*.—Smith's Knoll (21 miles, 72°).

*H.10*.—Half-way between Smith's Knoll and Cross Sand (15 miles, 78°).

*H.5*.—Cross Sand (7½ miles, 72°).

*H.7*.—Half-way between Newarp and Would (12½ miles, 20°).

The term "gun range" could be, and was, given a wide interpretation by the Commander<sup>6</sup> of the *Alecto*, who does not

<sup>1</sup> In the light of later events a position 25 miles east of Lowestoft would have proved a suitable one for interception, but it would have trespassed on the dangerous area.

<sup>2</sup> Left later at 11.30 p.m.

<sup>3</sup> Left shortly after midnight.

<sup>4</sup> Plan II, Position C.

<sup>5</sup> Figures in brackets are distances and true bearings from Yarmouth.

<sup>6</sup> Commander Alex. Quicke. No information as to the enemy was sent direct to him from the Admiralty, but he may have been informed by Capt. (S).

seem to have known anything of the enemy's course, for the position of *H.7* seems to have been chosen with a view to covering the northern approach to Yarmouth, while the others on the edge of the dangerous area were apparently selected to attack vessels coming along the swept channel. *E.37* and *E.53* had only got as far as Southwold when the German battle cruisers appeared, and it was only later<sup>1</sup> that they were given positions close to the track which the enemy had followed. Finally, *E.4*, *E.41*<sup>2</sup> and *D.1*<sup>2</sup> were ordered to patrol off the Shipwash, and Captain (S) himself, having completed his arrangements, proceeded in the *Lurcher* at 2.45 a.m., with the intention of joining the *Melampus*.

**Sa. Commodore (T) Proceeds.**—Commodore (T) left in the *Conquest* just after midnight.<sup>3</sup> The Admiralty message of 11.40 p.m. (*see par. 7*) had come in, and the departure was hurried. Ships got away as soon as they were ready. With the *Conquest*, or close on her heels, went the *Cleopatra*, *Penelope*, and some five destroyers.<sup>4</sup> They were off the Sunk by 1.30 a.m., and after proceeding eastward<sup>5</sup> for 7 miles, altered course to N 27 E. In view of the Admiralty message revealing Yarmouth as the enemy's objective, Commodore (T) had abandoned the intention of going to the Admiralty position, and proceeded up the coast, inside the Southwold minefield.<sup>6</sup> The *Mansfield* and *Matchless* had left shortly after 1 a.m., and were following fast. The *Mentor* joined at 3.5. The *Nimrod* had left just before 1 a.m., so hurriedly that she was not quite sure how many of her destroyers were with her, and signalled down the line for their names.<sup>7</sup> They were all there—the *Loyal*, *Laertes*, *Linnet*, *Lochinvar*, *Legion*, *Lassoo*, *Miranda*, and *Lysander*, and the division joined Commodore (T) at 3.40 a.m., just before the enemy was sighted. It seems to have been intended that the destroyers should rendezvous at the entrance to K Channel in readiness for a torpedo attack, for Commodore (T) states in his report that "owing to the hurry of departure, the change in the orders at the last moment, and also the difficulty of transmitting fresh orders to the flotilla"<sup>8</sup> the destroyers did not wait at the entrance to K Channel, but

<sup>1</sup> Arrived at Gorton Light Vessel at 8 a.m. and 7 a.m., and only received their orders from *Alecto* at 9.50 a.m. by motor boat.

<sup>2</sup> Temporarily under repair when orders came.

<sup>3</sup> *Conquest* (I) 1205.

<sup>4</sup> *Lightfoot*, *Termagant*, *Manly*, *Meteor*, *Mastiff*.

<sup>5</sup> *Cleopatra* (I). 1.30 a.m. Sunk abeam, S 80 E. 16½ knots.

<sup>6</sup> It is not very clear when he decided to do so. The short stretch to the eastward after passing the Sunk looks as if the cruisers were making for the original rendezvous (Plan II, Position A) up to 1.53 a.m. Though there is no record of any communication on the subject, it may possibly have been settled directly over the telephone with the Chief of the War Staff before leaving.

<sup>7</sup> *Nimrod* (s) 1.45 a.m. The *Moorson*, in the *Nimrod's* division, had temporary defects and did not get away till 2.30 a.m.

<sup>8</sup> There is no record of any signal on the subject to the destroyers. The *Laforey*, coming from Sheerness, was not informed.

joined him at dawn, adding that "the lightness of the night and the clear moon after 2 a.m. precluded the possibility of a torpedo attack on the enemy." The eight "L" destroyers,<sup>1</sup> which had been ordered to join him from the Nore, were still longer in getting away. They did not pass the Nore till 2.26 a.m., and were still in the Black Deep at 4 a.m. The rendezvous given by the Admiralty where they were to meet the Harwich flotilla was 52° N, Long. 2° 50' E (D in Plan II), and, as they were not informed of the sudden change in the situation nor given any further orders, they proceeded thither. When the German battle cruisers appeared off Lowestoft they were just leaving the Thames. (Plan II).

## CHAPTER III.

### German Movements to Midnight, 24th April.

**9. German Movements, 24 April.**—The alarms and excursions caused by the Grand Fleet sweep of 22–23 April had resulted on the German side in the Lowestoft Raid, which had been originally planned for 24 April, being postponed for a day; but even on the 24th it looked as if the project would be thwarted once again by a British counter attack. At 3.38 a.m. there came in from List a report of an aeroplane of unknown nationality landing at Hoyer. The outpost forces were ordered to push out to Amrum, and the fleet to concentrate at short notice in the outer roads. Then at 6.40 a.m. came the message, "False alarm." The outpost forces were recalled, and it was decided to proceed with the attack on Lowestoft.

Two of the large minelayers, *U.71* and *U.72*,<sup>2</sup> had left on 12 and 14 April to lay mines off the Firth of Forth and Moray Firth in conjunction with the raid. According to the German History they reached their respective areas on the 18th, but encountered strong opposition from hostile patrols, were attacked by depth charges, which started the oil tanks leaking, and had to give up the operations.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Laforey*, *Lennox*, *Lark*, *Lookout*, *Lance*, *Laurel*, *Llewellyn*, *Lucifer*.

<sup>2</sup> *U.71–U.80* class, carrying 36 mines and 2 torpedoes; slow and clumsy boats, rarely cruising at more than 6 knots.

<sup>3</sup> *Nordsee* 5/118. There is no confirmation of this in British reports. No reports came in on the 18th from Rosyth or Invergordon of any submarine having been seen or attacked in these areas. Moored mines were found on the 18th, about 13 miles east of the Bass Rock, and traffic instructions to avoid them were issued at 7.8 p.m. The area was reported clear at 10.14 p.m., 19 April. On 21 April, 10.16 a.m., 26 mines were found and exploded, 9 miles south-east of May Island, so that *U.71* evidently laid her mines, though not in the spot intended.

Just as the German Commander-in-Chief had decided to proceed, the Commandant of the Naval Airship Department sent word that he intended to make an air attack on England that night with seven or eight airships, a decision all the more welcome to the fleet command, as the co-operation of the airships would not only materially help the reconnaissance, but would add considerably to the weight of the blow.<sup>1</sup>

The 1st and 2nd Scouting Group had just left the Jade with their flotilla in order to proceed to the westward, when, at 10.36 a.m., Admiral von Schröder, commanding the Marine Corps in Flanders, reported that a large number of British light craft had been lying off the Belgian coast, whose intentions were still obscure.

**10. Effect of Dover Barrage.**—This was Admiral Bacon's barrage operation of 24 April,<sup>2</sup> which had a considerable influence, not appreciated at the time, on the German operations. It was part of Admiral Scheer's plan that five "U.C." boats and six "U.B." boats<sup>3</sup> of the Flanders command should co-operate in the attack on the coast. The former were to lay mines off the exits to Harwich and the Thames; of the six latter, four were to be posted in a line running 17 miles south-east from Southwold and two were to assist the fleet by marking the northern limits<sup>4</sup> of the minefield laid by the *Stralsund* on 3 November 1914.

The U.B. boats concerned were *U.B.6*, *U.B.10*, *U.B.12*, *U.B.13*, *U.B.18*, *U.B.29*; the two latter were to act as marks, the four former were to lie off Southwold. *U.B.6* was the only boat in position on 24 April, having heard nothing of the postponement of the raid; the others left Zeebrugge on 23 April and took up the positions ordered, with the exception of *U.B. 12*,<sup>5</sup> who posted himself by mistake off Lowestoft instead of Southwold.

The U.C. boats (*U.C.1*, *U.C.5*, *U.C.6*, *U.C.7*, *U.C.10*) did not leave till the morning of the 24th, and ran right into Admiral Bacon's barrage force off Zeebrugge. *U.C.7*, which had sailed at 3 a.m., turned back and gave the alarm, then attempted to get to sea again, but was forced to go to the bottom, and had to wait till dark to continue her passage. *U.C.5*, having nearly exhausted her batteries in running under water, had to return to Zeebrugge. *U.C.1* was caught in a drifter's net, and, proceeding under water, blundered finally into the mine nets, and felt a number of heavy detonations round her before she got free.

<sup>1</sup> *Nordsee* 5/130.

<sup>2</sup> Naval Staff Monographs (Historical), Fleet Issue, Vol. VI. Dover Command, 129.

<sup>3</sup> *Nordsee* 5/130.

<sup>4</sup> Approximately 15 miles 75° from Lowestoft. See Naval Staff Monograph, Vol. XII, Home Waters, III, 13; also History of British Minesweeping, T.S.D.D. 1920, 13.

<sup>5</sup> *U.B.13* disappeared, sunk, perhaps, by a mine off Zeebrugge—possibly on departure, or on the date she was due to return, the 25th. The *Cheero's* mine net explosion of April 23, 1916, seems too far north for it, and is in the *Stralsund's* minefield.

*U.C.10* also got entangled in the barrage shortly after noon, and had to go to the bottom, surrounded by heavy detonations, which gave her a list of 15 degrees. It was only at 8.35 p.m. that she could come to the surface, and then, at 10.30, she fell into another net before she was able at last to creep safely back to Zeebrugge.<sup>1</sup> *U.C.6* was the only one that actually got away, and, after passing a score of destroyers, was able to lay her mines between Orfordness and the Shipwash, right in front of the Sledway and Shipway,<sup>2</sup> about 11 p.m., less than a mile from where the *Melampus* and her submarines passed an hour later.

On the alarm given by *U.C.7*, six planes had been sent up from Zeebrugge, but were driven back by the British "double-deckers," armed with machine guns. An explosive boat, operated by a plane, was launched against the monitors, but its motor failed when still 4 miles off, and it had to be blown up. The intentions of the Dover force evidently puzzled the Germans, and about noon three large boats of the Zeebrugge flotilla, *V.67*, *V.68*, and *V.47*, were despatched to reconnoitre and attack the drifters. At 3 p.m. they came into a lively fight with the *Medea*, *Murray*, *Melpomene*, and *Milne*, which advanced at once to cover the drifters and drove the Germans back. In the ardour of their pursuit they came at 5.30 p.m. under fire from the coast batteries. The *Melpomene* received two shots in the engine-room and had to be taken in tow by the *Milne*, and the *Medea's* after gun was put out of action. The German destroyers advanced again, but the monitors covered the destroyers' retirement effectively, and prevented the Germans getting within torpedo range.

**11. High Sea Fleet Sails April 24.**—While these events were happening on the Flanders coast the German forces had sailed, and by 2 p.m. the whole force of 22 capital ships, 5 older battleships, 12 light cruisers, and 48 destroyers was on its way westward. It consisted of the 1st Scouting Group,<sup>3</sup> commanded by Rear-Admiral Boedicker, in the absence of Rear-Admiral Hipper, who was ill, the 2nd Scouting Group,<sup>4</sup> and the 6th and 9th Flotillas, with the *Rostock* and *Regensburg*. Behind them came the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Squadrons of the battlefleet, with the 4th Scouting Group, and the remainder of the flotillas.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *U.C.1* may have been the case of *Gleaner of the Sea*, at 2.20 p.m., 24 April; *U.C.10* the case of the drifter *Arndilly Castle*, about noon, 24 April; *U.B.13* may have been the submarine seen by the drifter *Glen Afton* in conjunction with a mine explosion at 4.30 p.m., 25 April. (O.X.O. C.B. 01292, Reported Destruction of Submarines, Summary, August 1914 to December 1916, p. 14.)

<sup>2</sup> The *Loch Buie* reported at 1640, 25 April, six mines swept up 3 miles south-east by south of Orfordness, off the north entrance to the Sledway and Shipway.

<sup>3</sup> *Seydlitz*, *Lutzow*, *Derfflinger*, *Moltke*, *Von der Tann*.

<sup>4</sup> *Elbing*, *Frankfurt*, *Pillau*, *Wiesbaden*.

<sup>5</sup> For details see Appendix A.

The battle cruisers had reached what was called Point I,<sup>1</sup> in the Norderney Gap,<sup>2</sup> by 1 p.m. They then turned north on their way to point K,<sup>3</sup> so as to avoid being seen from the Dutch coast. This route had been swept that day nearly as far as K when the minesweepers had sighted suspicious smoke, and turned round. It led north of the British minefield laid by the *Princess Margaret* and *Angora* on 8-9 November 1915, and the squadron had already turned<sup>4</sup> and gone some 4 miles to the west-north-west, when, at 2.47 p.m., the flagship *Seydlitz* struck a mine, which tore a hole about 270 ft. square in her torpedo room. The other battle cruisers turned back immediately. Rear-Admiral Boedicker turned too, and proceeded south-east for about 10 miles. Then there came in the report of a submarine,<sup>5</sup> and he turned back to the north-west and followed the 2nd Scouting Group. Unconscious of his danger, he apparently crossed the British minefield twice, once in his attempt to get home, and again in retiring from the imaginary submarine, but escaped without further damage.

About 4 p.m., as the battlefleet approached Norderney, the battle cruisers could be seen returning. The *Seydlitz* was no longer with them, and Admiral Scheer, assuming that the northern route was unsafe, decided to take the risk in the extraordinarily clear weather then prevailing of being seen and reported from the Dutch islands, and continued his course to the westward straight along the coast.

Rear-Admiral Boedicker, informed of the Commander-in-Chief's decision, left the *Seydlitz* at 6 p.m. and transferred his flag to the *Lutzow* at 7.30, which, by that time, had reached a point about 35 miles north of Terschelling,<sup>6</sup> leaving the *Seydlitz*, escorted by two torpedo boats, and with 1,400 tons of water in her, but still able to go 15 knots, to return to the Jade. At 9 p.m. the *Lutzow*, with the 1st Scouting Group, proceeded on a course south-east, at 21 knots, from a point about 50 miles north of the Texel,<sup>7</sup> with the 2nd Scouting Group, in three divisions, each of two ships and four destroyers, covering the van and flank. At 12 p.m.<sup>8</sup> the main fleet followed on the same course at 14 knots, steering for a point 20 miles west of the Haaks Light Vessel,<sup>9</sup> which it was intended to reach at 5 a.m.

<sup>1</sup> 53° 48' N, Long. 7° 0' E.

<sup>2</sup> The space of about 10 miles between Norderney and the German minefield, running north-east from Norderney Light Vessel, which was laid on 9 September, 1914, after Heligoland Bight.

<sup>3</sup> Lat. 54° 12' N, Long. 6° 56' E, 25 miles, 355°, from I.

<sup>4</sup> According to *Nordsee* 5, Karte F. The text, p. 134, says "just as they were on point of turning."

<sup>5</sup> There was no British submarine near.

<sup>6</sup> Lat. 53° 57' N, Long. 5° 25' E.

<sup>7</sup> *Nordsee* 5, Karte F, 54° N, 4° 52' E.

<sup>8</sup> *Nordsee* 5, Karte F, position 53° 55' N, 4° 45' E.

<sup>9</sup> Extinguished.

English wireless activity told the Germans that their movement had not passed unnoticed, and the English signal recalling all auxiliary patrol craft was intercepted at Bruges, and reached the German flagship at 8.30 p.m. Admiral Scheer's view of the situation must be regarded as peculiar. From Norway had come a report of a British squadron on 23 April, 40 miles south-west of the Naze,<sup>1</sup> and this, in conjunction with the report of the appearance of strong forces off the Flanders coast that morning, "confirmed the previous impression that the British forces were divided, and operating part in the north and part in the south." Admiral Scheer<sup>2</sup> states that his purpose was to push in between the two divisions and attack the one that was first sighted. The main body would then remain in support in the open waters to the north-west of Terschelling, where it would have liberty of action whatever happened, and where the waters were favourable for offering battle. "With luck one might even succeed in cutting off an enemy advancing from the Hoofden—on the north with the main fleet, on the south with the forces told off to bombard the coast." This latter conception would have been a more daring one. Had one division of the battle cruisers penetrated further into the Hoofden, and then turned west along the latitude of Orfordness, it is just possible that a situation might have developed similar to that of Heligoland Bight on 28 August, and the Harwich forces might have found themselves in a very difficult position. But nothing of this sort was attempted, and, in light of the actual events, the operation on the German side reduces itself to a belated demonstration against the coast, intended to enhance the effect of the Irish insurrection. There was no real attempt to make it anything more.

## CHAPTER IV.

### The Morning of 25th April.

12. **Movements of Harwich Force.**—Day was breaking, about half-past three. A light breeze was blowing from the southward,<sup>3</sup> sending an occasional ripple over the sea. Tyrwhitt's light cruisers were then off Southwold, going northward, at 15 knots. The *Nimrod* and her eight destroyers came in sight to the southward, and were ordered at 3.20 to take up night cruising stations on

<sup>1</sup> The Grand Fleet battle squadrons were cruising off the Naze in support of the Skagerrak operations from April 22/2200 to 23/0400.

<sup>2</sup> German C.-in-C. at 6.30 p.m. was told that 7 large ships and 30 destroyers were off Ostend that morning.

<sup>3</sup> Different logs say S, SSE, SE, SW; *Conquest's* log says S.2, b.c., sea 1.

the port beam.<sup>1</sup> They had barely done so, when, at 3.50 a.m., light cruisers and destroyers could be seen to the eastward<sup>2</sup> outlined against the morning sky. They were some 10 miles off, and Commodore (T) turned to the north-west<sup>3</sup> to await events. A few minutes later battle cruisers could be seen looming to the northward. Four of them and six light cruisers could be counted. Commodore (T)'s force consisted only of three light cruisers and eighteen destroyers, and, sending an urgent signal to the Commander-in-Chief and Admiral Beatty, he turned and made to the southward at full speed,<sup>4</sup> ordering the destroyers to take up Cruising Order No. 9—that is, the light cruisers in single line ahead, with the destroyers in divisions on the beam.<sup>5</sup> It was hoped that the Germans would follow.<sup>6</sup> They did not do so. The German light cruisers had turned to the northward at 4.12 to leave the range clear for the battle cruisers,<sup>7</sup> and at 4.13 the latter turned to the northward and disappeared from view, while the flash of their guns, still plainly visible, showed that they were bombarding Lowestoft. The endeavour to entice them to the south was vain, and Commodore (T) turned gradually round to the northward<sup>8</sup> to keep in touch.

**13. German Light Cruisers.**—Meanwhile, the German light cruisers, after steering north for 5 miles, had turned to the south-east about 4.23 a.m., and, as the Harwich force came north again, could be seen on the starboard bow making to the eastward. By 4.30 the range had dropped to 14,000 yards,<sup>9</sup> and the British cruisers opened fire, but the shots all fell short. The German light cruisers turned away to the north-west, and made no attack to reply.

They did not have to wait long for support. The battle cruisers had heard the firing, and, abandoning any further attack on Yarmouth, were coming down at full speed. All six German light cruisers had now joined up, and with this strong support behind them they turned to the southward at 4.37 and opened fire. The range was too great, and the German fire soon ceased, though the *Regensburg* fired 15 rounds at a destroyer, and the *Elbing* 39 at two destroyers, at about 13,000 yards.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Appendix E. 11.

<sup>2</sup> *Conquest* (l) 3.48 a.m. E by S, 6 miles. *Cleopatra* (l) "to eastward, German battle cruisers NNE." *Penelope* (s) ENE.

<sup>3</sup> *Conquest* (l) NNW.

<sup>4</sup> Co. S 14 W, 25 knots. Appendix E. 21.

<sup>5</sup> Appendix E. 23.

<sup>6</sup> Comm. (T) says he hoped to draw them over the submarines; *E.53* and *E.37* were then some miles to the southward.

<sup>7</sup> N.S. 5/142.

<sup>8</sup> 4.13 Co., W; 4.21 NW; 4.23, N 14 E. *Conquest* (l).

<sup>9</sup> Appendix G. Capt. Roger Backhouse (r); *Conquest* (l) 13,000.

<sup>10</sup> N.S. 5/145, 12,700 to 13,600 yards. The German History laments the delay in giving increased elevation to the 4.1-in. guns, as they all had training pointer gear.

The British light cruisers replied, but the range was over 13,000 yards and the light poor, and, though the *Conquest* fired 28 rounds at the time, no hits were obtained.

**14. German Battle Cruisers.**—This long range action was suddenly broken off by the appearance of the German battle cruisers, which could be seen at 4.45 coming down from the north. Commodore (T) turned immediately,<sup>1</sup> and made to the southward. It was not too soon. At 4.47 Admiral Boedicker made the signal to distribute fire from the left, and from 4.49 to 4.56 the *Lutzow* and *Derfflinger* were engaging the light cruisers at 13,800 to 15,300 yards,<sup>2</sup> while the secondary armament was firing on the destroyers at 9,800 to 1,300 yards.<sup>3</sup> At 4.51 four or five 12-in. shell fell on the *Conquest*. Two hit her directly, bursting in the 6-in. upper ammunition lobby, completely wrecking it and killing everybody there.<sup>4</sup> One ricochet passed through the centre funnel, another demolished the stump mast and wrecked the main aerial. Fire broke out on the main and upper decks, while the 6-in. cordite charges on the after superstructure caught fire and blazed for a time. Fortunately, no vital damage was done, and, though the salvos fell unpleasantly close, no other ship was damaged except the *Laertes*, which was hit by fragments of a shell, and had one boiler put out of action.

The 9th Flotilla had been told at 4.37 to take station astern; all destroyers<sup>5</sup> were now ordered to take station 5 cables astern, and immediately afterwards to scatter and proceed at utmost speed, and make as much smoke as possible. The German battle cruisers made no attempt to pursue. The German History mentions Admiral Scheer's intention of thrusting himself in between two portions of the British fleet, and bringing one of its detachments to battle. His battle cruisers did not share this intention. At 4.56 they turned to the eastward, left the coast, and were lost to sight. The *Conquest's* speed had not suffered; the Commander-in-Chief and the Vice-Admiral, B.C.F., had been informed of the doings of the enemy,<sup>6</sup> and at 5.40 Commodore (T) turned to the north-eastward to regain touch.

**15. German Movements.**—Pustkuchen in *U.B.29* and Steinbrinck in *U.B.18*, the two submarines deputed to act as marks for the southern edge of the minefield, had taken up their positions at midnight, and had been showing a green and red light<sup>7</sup> respectively in anxious expectation of the battle cruisers coming. At

<sup>1</sup> *Conquest* (l) 4.45, (s) 4.46.

<sup>2</sup> Comm. (T) says 15,000 yards.

<sup>3</sup> The *Moltke* ceased fire after the first salvo so as not to impede the other two. *Lutzow* fired 33 and *Derfflinger* 27 12-in. shell.

<sup>4</sup> The total casualties were 25 killed and 13 seriously wounded.

<sup>5</sup> Appendix E 36, E 37.

<sup>6</sup> See Appendix E 22, E 28, E 41, E 42, E 44.

<sup>7</sup> The British patrols had been withdrawn, and there is no British mention of these lights having been seen.

1.30 a.m. the German battle cruisers had reached a position about 65 miles east of Lowestoft,<sup>1</sup> and had turned to the westward. The six light cruisers, in three divisions, each of two ships with four destroyers, were screening them ahead and on the flank. At 3.15 their smoke could be seen<sup>2</sup> by the German submarines, and soon afterwards the battle cruisers glided swiftly past in the moonlight. There were four of them in single line ahead, led by the *Lutzow*, with the *Rostock* and *Elbing*<sup>3</sup> screening them on the port quarter, about 8 miles to the south-east. Night clouds were still shrouding the coast, but at 4 a.m. the *Rostock* sighted British light cruisers and destroyers some six points to port, and reported them to the *Lutzow* by searchlight and wireless. The *Lutzow* had just sighted the Corton Light Vessel,<sup>4</sup> and the Admiral decided to proceed with the bombardment, leaving any attack on the light cruisers till the light was better, and turned south to begin the bombardment on a northerly course. The *Rostock*, thinking that the Admiral intended to engage the British light cruisers, turned to the northward to leave the range clear.<sup>5</sup>

The red buoys of the War Channel were in sight, and the battle cruisers turned up them, and opened fire on Lowestoft at 4.11 a.m., which was answered immediately by the batteries off the entrance. The firing conditions were unfavourable, and the smoke of the funnels and guns drifting shoreward mingled with a mist hanging over the coast, and it was only possible to distinguish a few of the larger buildings—the Empire Hotel and St. John's Church. These, however, served as marks for the principal targets—the swing bridge, the ships in harbour, the gas works, and railway station. The first salvos, at 6,750 yards with reduced charges, fell short, and the range had to be raised to 10,900 and to 14,200 yards before the shots began to fall ashore. The 5.9-in. then joined in, and obtained hits with sights set for 14,200 yards. The effect was visible in violent explosions and outbreaks of fire ashore, where 200 houses were destroyed, though the loss of life was small. At 4.17 the ships ceased fire,<sup>6</sup> and the guns were trained on Yarmouth. Here the distance was greater for the shoals forced the ships to keep further out, and nothing but the Nelson Column and the lighthouse could be

<sup>1</sup> *Nordsee* 5, Karte F, Lat. 52° 36' N, Long. 3° 25' E, 64 miles 83° from Lowestoft.

<sup>2</sup> *Nordsee* 5, p. 42, says "in a north-easterly direction," but it must have been easterly according to Karte F.

<sup>3</sup> The German History does not give the exact formation. From the diagram the *Rostock* appears to have been 7½ miles, 115°, from the battle cruisers at 3.54. The *Frankfurt* and *Wiesbaden* were together. The position of *Regensburg* and *Pillau* is uncertain.

<sup>4</sup> According to Karte F, the German battle cruisers were 3 miles from the Corton at 4 a.m. Light vessels to the west of 2° E were extinguished from 7 p.m. to 6 a.m. by order of 27 October 1914.

<sup>5</sup> The movements of the separate divisions of German light cruisers are not given in Karte F.

<sup>6</sup> Expenditure: *Lutzow*, 18—12-in., 45—5.9-in.; *Derfflinger*, 16—12-in., 32—5.9-in.

seen. The *Lutzow* opened fire at 4.24, but a 12-in. salvo, with reduced charges, fell short, and only the 5.9-in. could range. The *Von der Tann* did not even open fire; the *Moltke* fired a single salvo; the *Derfflinger*, judging range and direction by "navigational methods," fired fourteen 12-in. and twelve 5.9-in. at ranges of 12,000 and 14,200 yards, and ceased fire at 4.28 a.m. There was nothing in sight but an armed patrol boat north-east of the Corton, which the *Lutzow* set on fire with a salvo of 5.9-in. at 4.32. An aeroplane was sighted at the same time, then two others, but they all retired shorewards as they came under fire. Rear-Admiral Boedicker then<sup>1</sup> turned 16 points to resume the bombardment of Yarmouth on a southerly course with heavier charges, and at 4.42 opened again on the lighthouse. The *Lutzow* had fired eight rounds, all of which landed on shore, when the sound of guns came up from the southward. The Harwich force had come into action with the 2nd Scouting Group, and Boedicker ceased fire and went down to support them, opening fire shortly afterwards on Commodore (T) and driving him to the south.

**16. German Airships.**—The attack on Lowestoft had been preceded by an air raid. Between 11.10 p.m. and 1.20 a.m. six Zeppelins<sup>2</sup> had crossed the coast between Cromer and Southwold. Searchlights shone occasionally on them through rifts in the clouds, and a heavy fire was opened from various batteries with shrapnel and incendiary shell, but only *L.13* was hit, some shell splinters striking the fore gondola when over Theberton. A strong south-west wind blowing over the land hampered their progress, and the idea of a raid on London had to be abandoned. Fog, rain, and banks of clouds made observation difficult, and most of the airships, after cruising fruitlessly round and round for several hours, had to leave the coast without dropping a single bomb. *L.13* and *L.16*<sup>3</sup> were the only ones who had any success, the former bombing Norwich at 1 a.m. and a battery at Winterton half-an-hour later, while the latter demolished a number of houses at Cambridge at 1 a.m., and dropped the remainder of her bombs on Norwich. The sky cleared, and searchlights shone out on her as she went home, bringing her under a heavy fire at 1.50 a.m. *L.21* sighted the German battle cruisers, and was ordered to remain by them and screen them to northward. This was probably the airship which hovered over Cross Sand, outside Yarmouth, and was seen by submarine *H.5*.<sup>4</sup>

**17. The British Submarines at Yarmouth.**—*H.5* was one of the four Yarmouth submarines ordered by the Admiralty<sup>5</sup> to be at gun-range off Yarmouth at daylight. She had arrived at the

<sup>1</sup> About 5.35. N.S. 5/144 says between the Cross Sand Light Vessel and Middle Cross Sand Buoy.

<sup>2</sup> *L.16*, *L.17*, *L.21*, *L.23*, *L.13*, *L.11*.

<sup>3</sup> See N.S. 5, Karte F, for their track.

<sup>4</sup> Submarine *H.5*'s report, Appendix H. <sup>5</sup> Appendix F. 1.



Cross Sand Light Vessel about 3.50 a.m., and was cruising round it, when, at 4.5, she saw a long streak of smoke running north and south some 10 miles<sup>1</sup> off, and then, at 4.14, heavy flashes issuing from it bearing south by east. He approached on the surface till the hulls were visible, then dived and attacked, but, though he twice got within 2,000 yards of the enemy, only long chasing shots would have been possible, and the enemy turned eastward and disappeared. *H.10* and *V.1*<sup>2</sup> left Yarmouth at 2 a.m., and were off Cross Sand Light Vessel at 3.30 a.m., when they saw the Zeppelin coming from the westward and stopped for 10 minutes to avoid observation.<sup>3</sup> They were proceeding on their way again, when, at 4.10 a.m., they sighted the flashes of the German guns to the southward, and were proceeding south-east to close, when, at 4.40, they were attacked by planes from Yarmouth which forced them under.<sup>4</sup> When they rose again at 5.5 a.m. all opportunity for attack had gone. The ships could be seen to the southward, steering east, some 5 miles off. Of the other Yarmouth submarines, *H.7* was on its way northward to take station between Newarp and the Would, and saw nothing. *E.37* and *E.53*, coming up from Harwich, left the *Maidstone* at 12.5 a.m., but had to wait at the entrance to let the cruisers and destroyers get out, and had got no further than Southwold<sup>5</sup> when the German battle cruisers left the coast. Of the six Yarmouth submarines then, one got twice within a mile of the enemy but could not get a favourable shot; two were driven down by British planes when within sight of the enemy; the fourth was some 10 miles to the north, and two others about the same distance to the south of the German battle cruisers when the latter turned for home. There were still, however, the Harwich submarines to be reckoned with.

**18. The Harwich Submarines.**—When the German battle cruisers left the coast, about 5 a.m., they were heading for a time almost straight for the spot,<sup>6</sup> 35 miles to the eastward, which the *Melampus* had reached at 5.25 a.m. She was steering with her four submarines<sup>7</sup> to the eastward at 15 knots, when she received from Captain (S) in the *Lurcher*, some 45 miles to the westward, a signal to say the enemy were off Lowestoft, steering east, and

<sup>1</sup> *H.5*'s report says "1 mile distant," evidently a miscript.

<sup>2</sup> *H.10*'s post was half-way between Smith's Knoll and Cross Sand; *V.1* at Smith's Knoll.

<sup>3</sup> *H.10* dived.

<sup>4</sup> *V.1*—two bombs about 40 yards off; *H.10*—four bombs about 50 to 100 yards.

<sup>5</sup> 4.50 a.m. Southwold Light S 80 W, 8 miles. Capt. (S) was of opinion that *E.53* (which could go two knots faster) should have been sent on ahead, and *Alecto* informed of the delay, so that other dispositions could be made. H.S.A. 271/315.

<sup>6</sup> 52° 32' N, 3° 10' E.

<sup>7</sup> *D.4* was hull down, and *D.6* about 30 miles to westward.

asking for her position.<sup>1</sup> The *Melampus* immediately repeated the signal, and ordered the submarines to spread on a north and south line, 4 miles apart. *D.4* was still some distance off,<sup>2</sup> and the *Melampus* closed him to give him the new orders. At 5.47 another signal came in from the *Lurcher*<sup>3</sup> ordering him to spread the submarines further north to Lat. 53° 15' N,<sup>4</sup> leave them at once, and proceed at full speed south. While the *Melampus* was going up the line, which could not have spread much more than 3 miles in the interval, giving it the new orders, a signal came in from *D.6* reporting an enemy force of five cruisers in 52° 25' N, 2° 30' E,<sup>5</sup> steering 60°, and shortly afterwards, at 5.58, smoke was sighted to the westward, about 6 points on the port bow. The *Melampus* hoisted the signal, "Enemy in sight, north-west,"<sup>6</sup> and proceeded at full speed towards *E.55* at the head of the line, whose exhaust smoke prevented her seeing the signal. By 6.1 a.m. a squadron of ships could be made out with two three-funnelled cruisers proceeding east at very high speed. The information had been passed to the other four boats by semaphore and flags, and the *Melampus* was still proceeding towards *E.55* when the latter was seen to dive. It was then about 6.6 a.m. The enemy cruisers were about 18,000 yards off, on a rapidly converging course, and the *Melampus* turned to the eastward, and, passing through the patrol line, retired to the southward at full speed.<sup>7</sup>

Meanwhile, *D.6* had sighted enemy ships on the port quarter<sup>8</sup> at 4.45 a.m., and, after attempting at full speed to cross their track, which was foiled by their speed, he turned parallel at about 5 miles, and had begun to get his mast up when he was chased by a destroyer, and had to lower it and stand by to dive. When the destroyer turned away he got his mast up and sent a signal reporting the enemy to the *Melampus* at 5.40.

Three of the submarines with the *Melampus* sighted the enemy<sup>9</sup> to the westward between 5.55 and 6.12 a.m. What they saw were apparently the light cruisers of the 2nd Scouting Group.

They all dived, but none was able to get anywhere near. *E.55*, which was the furthest to the northward, sighted them at 6.12 on the port beam, and dived, but the enemy passed about

<sup>1</sup> Appendix F 7. Capt. Waistell had just joined Comm. (T). "5.8 a.m. 52° 16½' N, 1° 58' E, closed Comm. (T), who altered course to ESE; 5.26, 52° 14½' N, 2° 1' E, co. with Comm. (T) S 58 E, 12 knots" (pencil notes in copy of *Lurcher's* wireless log). H.S.A. 271/309.

<sup>2</sup> Hull down, *Melampus* (r).

<sup>3</sup> Appendix F 9.

<sup>4</sup> *i.e.*, some 40 miles to the northward.

<sup>5</sup> Appendix F 10. Signal 0540 received 5.52. The position is approximately that of *D.6*, about 23 miles to westward of *Melampus*.

<sup>6</sup> Appendix F 14. <sup>7</sup> Appendix H 1. <sup>8</sup> Appendix H 5.

<sup>9</sup> *E.29* at 5.55, 1 four-funnelled cruiser and another; *E.26* at 6.5, 1 four-funnelled, 1 three-funnelled, and 4 others; *E.55* at 6.12. Appendix H 3, H 2, H 4. See page 46, 2nd Scouting Group.

5 miles ahead.<sup>1</sup> Boedicker, as soon as he had cleared the mine-field, altered course to 60°<sup>2</sup> to make for Terschelling, which led him to the northward of the Harwich submarines. According to the German chart the battle cruisers do not appear to have passed to northward of the submarine line till after 7 a.m., but, though *E.55*, *E.26*, and *E.29*, had all returned to the surface at 6.45, there is no mention by any of them of having sighted battle cruisers at this time, and it seems probable that Boedicker, who had been warned of the presence of submarines by the *Rostock*, was keeping well to the northward of the light cruisers. Scheer, waiting about 70 miles from the British coast, had already turned for home at 5.20 a.m. To reinforce the reconnaissance he had ordered one airship to be over the Dogger Bank at dawn, a second with the main fleet, and a third over the Hoofden. *L.7*, told off for the main fleet, was not ready to ascend till 2.30 a.m., and had only got as far as the Ems by daylight. *L.6*, who was to carry out the Dogger Bank patrol, had been driven north, and steered from the Dogger Bank towards Terschelling at 3.20 a.m. *L.9*, scouting between the main fleet and the battle cruisers, was flying at 2,600 ft. about 40 miles east of Lowestoft at 4.38, when she was attacked by two British seaplanes.<sup>3</sup> These closed too rapidly for him to rise, and he, therefore, went off before the wind, zig-zagging to the north-east. The first plane turned away, but the second, though driven off once by machine gun fire from the upper platform, stuck to her doggedly, attacked a second time, and got directly over her, dropping five bombs, which, unfortunately, all missed. *L.9* did not venture to return, and the vigorous attack of the Yarmouth airmen prevented his seeing anything of the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron when it turned to follow the enemy at 5.40 a.m.

19. **British Aircraft.**<sup>4</sup>—The British aircraft were not so fortunate in dealing with the German submarines, and did nothing against their surface craft. Nine machines were sent up that morning from Yarmouth, six to deal with the Zeppelins and three to attack the squadron. At 4 a.m. a Zeppelin<sup>5</sup> had been sighted hovering out to sea at what appeared to be 4,000 ft. Five aeroplanes were sent up after her, and as they went off a second Zeppelin was seen, and a sixth machine was sent off in pursuit. *L.9* was pursued some 65 miles out to sea and attacked by two machines; the second Zeppelin<sup>6</sup> was followed by three Bristol Scouts, which were unable to gain on her and relinquished the chase. As they returned, one pilot sighted the enemy squadron, consisting of four battle cruisers, eight destroyers, and two submarines; the latter (which may have been British

<sup>1</sup> *E.55* seems to have been heading west; her report says 280°.

<sup>2</sup> Apparently about 5.45 (allowing him a speed of 22 knots), but Karte F does not state the time.

<sup>3</sup> Flight-Lieut. Nicholl and Flight-Lieut. Hards, from Yarmouth.

<sup>4</sup> R.N.A.S. Report, H.S. 230/958.

<sup>5</sup> *L.9*. <sup>6</sup> Possibly *L.21*. *Nordsee* 5/141.

*H.10* and *V.1*) he attacked with hand grenades, and forced them to submerge. When the German battle cruisers opened fire on Yarmouth, three more seaplanes, with wireless equipment, were sent up on patrol. One machine sighted the German squadron at 4.15 a.m., and came under a heavy fire; the pilot was seriously wounded, but managed to bring his machine back to land. The second machine sighted the enemy steering south-east; the third pursued them for a time, and reported having dropped bombs on the rear ship of the line, but as the German History states that no one did so,<sup>1</sup> it is probable that the bombs dropped were expended on *H.10* and *V.1*.

Two machines went up from Felixstowe. One sighted a German submarine 15 miles eastward of Southwold, and, diving to 500 ft., dropped three 16 lb. bombs, driving it under.<sup>2</sup>

Another machine from Felixstowe reported having sighted a submarine 5 miles off Thorpeness, steering south, at 6 a.m. Both these reports probably referred to "U.B." boats on their way home. The aircraft supplied no information of the least value as to the movements of the enemy fleet, did no damage whatever to his surface craft or submarines, and though they did good service in driving off the Zeppelin scouting for Admiral Scheer, their attack on the Yarmouth submarines fell at a particularly unfortunate moment.

20. **Commodore (T) after the Action.**—At 5.20 Commodore (T) had signalled<sup>3</sup> to the Commander-in-Chief and S.O., B.C.F., that the enemy were retiring to eastward at high speed. At 5.40 he turned eastward with the light cruisers to follow the enemy, ordering the *Nimrod* to take charge of the destroyers and remain in the vicinity of K Channel; but he had not gone far when this order was modified, and the *Nimrod* was told to follow 5 miles astern.<sup>4</sup> Captain (S), in the *Lurcher*, who had joined him at 5.26, now parted company to look after his submarines. At 6.35 a.m. a submarine<sup>5</sup> was sighted on the *Conquest's* starboard beam, and the light cruisers formed line abreast, 3 miles apart, and increased speed to 24 knots<sup>6</sup>. Three-quarters of an hour later another<sup>7</sup> was sighted by the *Cleopatra* just as it dived, 3 miles to the south-east. At 8.30 a large amount of smoke was sighted, approximately east-north-east, and, at 8.45, Commodore (T) having located the enemy, turned back, after the Admiralty had sent him an order to return to his base.<sup>8</sup>

As the three light cruisers were returning on a west-south-west course the *Penelope*, at 9.40, sheered out to starboard to examine a capsized boat. She was about a mile and a half on

<sup>1</sup> *Nordsee* 5/144.

<sup>2</sup> Possibly *U.B.12*, which was attacked at 5.32 a.m.

<sup>3</sup> Sent *Penelope* 0528, received *Lion* 0535, repeated S tune, received *Lion* 5.56. Appendix E 44.

<sup>4</sup> Appendix E 45, E 48. *Nimrod* apparently did not get signal.

<sup>5</sup> *U.B.18*. <sup>6</sup> 6.47 a.m. <sup>7</sup> Probably *U.B.29*.

<sup>8</sup> Adty. to Comm. (T) 0800, repeated 0805, received 0915, repeated 0925.

the *Conquest's* starboard quarter, going 23 knots to resume her station, when she was struck by a torpedo at 9.55 a.m. The weather was bright and sunny, the sea smooth, with a light ripple, broken occasionally by small white curling waves. The ship was at "day offence" stations, with three look-outs on the fire control platform, look-outs aloft and on the gun deck fore and aft, but the track was only seen when 100 yards from the ship by some men off duty in the battery. There was just time to give the order "Full speed ahead" when the torpedo struck. It had been fired from the port side, about 1,000 yards off, and some minutes later, when clear of the sun's rays, the feather of a periscope could be seen on the port quarter, about 1,500 yards off. The torpedo struck close to the rudder post,<sup>1</sup> completely annihilating the rudder, the steering engine compartment, and the interior of the captain's after cabins. The propellers were, fortunately, undamaged, and the ship was able to keep company and to return at 20 knots, steering with the engines.<sup>2</sup>

21. **German Submarines.**—The shot had been fired by *U.B.29* (Lieutenant Pustkuchen). After leaving the position where she had served as mark for the battle cruisers, shortly after 4 a.m., she had been driven down by British aircraft, and had been passed by the German battle cruisers' screen at 6 a.m. An hour later she had been forced to dive by a British submarine,<sup>3</sup> and had sighted the three British light cruisers coming up from the south-west at high speed. She followed them for a time, but had to dive again at 8.25 before the *Laforey* and her destroyers, coming up on a northerly<sup>4</sup> course. Soon afterwards the light cruisers were sighted returning, and the attack on the *Penelope* followed.<sup>5</sup> *U.B.18* (Lieutenant Steinbrinck) had meanwhile been stalking the British submarines, and was, unfortunately, able to claim a victim. She had been passed by the German light cruisers at 5.45, and, proceeding east, had seen the *Melampus* and *Laforey*<sup>6</sup> coming northward, and saw them return on a north-westerly course. Her periscope was sighted on the port beam at 9.10 a.m. by *E.29*, who turned 8 points to port and went off at full speed.<sup>7</sup> At 10.20 a.m. *E.26* sighted her periscope<sup>8</sup> 3 points on the starboard bow, and, after trying to ram her, proceeded at full speed to the north-west, warning *E.22* by arc lamp and informing the *Melampus*. Then, suddenly, at 11.40,<sup>9</sup> *E.29* saw *E.22*, patrolling at the time 2 miles to the north-west, blow up, and signalled to the *Melampus* for immediate assistance, warning her to beware of enemy submarines.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 30 ft. from stern frame at W.L., and 9 ft. below W.L.

<sup>2</sup> Capt. Hubert Lynes (r) 30 April. H.S.A. 146/498.

<sup>3</sup> Probably *D.6*, who does not mention having seen her.

<sup>4</sup> *Nordsee* 5/151. <sup>5</sup> *Nordsee* 5/151.

<sup>6</sup> "Nine destroyers," *Nordsee* 5/151.

<sup>7</sup> 52° 35' N, 2° 55' E, *E.29* (r). <sup>8</sup> 52° 36' N, 3° 2' E.

<sup>9</sup> *E.29* says 11.45, but *E.26* and German History say 11.40.

<sup>10</sup> Signal was made *en clair* 1155, and taken in as from *E.26*.

*E.26*<sup>1</sup> also saw an explosion, 3 miles to the south-east, and proceeded over the position with *E.29*, but found nothing but a few pieces of wood.<sup>2</sup> *U.B.18*, after picking up two survivors, sank a fishing boat, and putting its crew on the North Hinder lightship, made tracks for home. The *Melampus*, which was then to the north-westward, received *E.29's* signal,<sup>3</sup> but took it in as made by *E.26*, and came hurrying down to the latter's help, but when she reached her at 1.50 p.m. was told that she had made no signal for assistance.<sup>4</sup> The *Laforey's* division, which had been ordered by Commodore (T) at 8.50 to return to its base, was some 40 miles to the south-westward when *E.22* met her fate, and was off the Sunk at 2 p.m. The submarines remained on patrol till 7 p.m., and then returned to Harwich.

## CHAPTER V.

### Movements of Grand Fleet and German Return.

22. **Movements of Commander-in-Chief and Vice-Admiral, B.C.F., 25 April.**—Meanwhile the Grand Fleet was on its way south. It met with heavy weather, and the Commander-in-Chief's anticipations were fully realised. The destroyers were unable to face the sea, and daybreak found them dispersed. The 1st Division,<sup>5</sup> too, had lost touch, and did not join till 11 a.m. When Commodore (T)'s report of the enemy came in about 4.30 a.m. the battlefleet, going 14 knots, had reached the latitude of Cromarty, the 5th Battle Squadron was off Peterhead, and the B.C.F., going 20 knots since 2.30 a.m., had just passed the latitude of the Farne Islands. The 3rd Battle Squadron, mustering five battleships, accompanied by the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, *Fearless*, *Diamond*, and destroyers, had only sailed at 3.20 a.m., and had not cleared the Forth when the report came in. Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers were then some 165 miles ahead of the main battlefleet, and, in round numbers, some 220 miles<sup>6</sup> from Terschelling, while Boedicker was 135, this being the least distance he had to cover to return by the coast way in. These figures are worth

<sup>1</sup> 52° 40' N, 3° 3' E.

<sup>2</sup> This must have been somewhat later. German History states that *U.B.18* picked up survivors and remained on the spot to try and catch *E.26*, but failed to do so, as the latter dived. The survivors' names appeared as prisoners of war: Fred. Buckingham (E.R.A.3) and Wm. Thos. Harrod (Signalman).

<sup>3</sup> Appendix F 28, 29, 30, 31.

<sup>4</sup> *E.26* apparently did not mention the explosion to *Melampus*.

<sup>5</sup> *King George V.* Appendix D.5, 6, 10, 14, 22.

<sup>6</sup> By M Channel.

noting, for they give an idea of what may be called the strategical arithmetic of the situation, and may be regarded as representing the utmost degree of risk that the Germans were prepared to undertake. Only on one other occasion had they ventured so far into the Hoofden,<sup>1</sup> when in the morning of 6 March, after the Zeppelin air raid of the night before, they had come down as far as the latitude of Lowestoft, only 70 miles from Zeebrugge, in the hope that the Harwich light cruisers might come out and expose themselves to attack.<sup>2</sup> This time they continued to the west, and attacked Lowestoft. The conditions were not favourable to the British. The battle cruiser force was handicapped by the heavy sea, and at daybreak the *Botha* counted only three destroyers in sight, two of which were 2 miles astern of station. As the Grand Fleet destroyers could only maintain 15 knots, and there were no signs of the sea diminishing, the Commander-in-Chief told the *Castor* they were not to be driven, and were to reduce to safe speed. The first signal from Commodore (T) reporting the appearance of the enemy battle cruisers, was received in the *Iron Duke* about 4.30 a.m., and there followed a succession of reports, winding up with Commodore (T)'s signal of 6 a.m., stating that he had lost touch with the enemy and that when last seen at 5.5 a.m. the Germans were steering east fast.

The enemy had been just an hour on the coast, and from this moment it was merely a question of getting to the southward as quickly as possible, at a speed which would give the flotilla leaders a chance of collecting their destroyers. The Commander-in-Chief had gone on at 5 a.m. at 18 knots, and was joined two hours later by the 1st Battle Squadron from Cromarty.

At 8.35 a.m. there came from the Admiralty intelligence that the German battlefleet at 6 a.m. was in a position about 30 miles west of the Texel and 50 miles from Terschelling. It was then on its way home, and there was but little chance of intercepting it, for Admiral Scheer showed not the smallest inclination to apply in practice the principles he had expounded earlier in the year, and passed through the area, which he had designated as a favourable one for awaiting battle, without a single stop, and without any sign of waiting for any sort of encounter with any portion of the British fleet. The German battle cruisers at this time (8 a.m.) were only 62 miles from the Terschelling area,<sup>3</sup> while Admiral Beatty was still 132 miles distant from it. The 5th Battle Squadron (going 21 knots) was 126 miles, or about 6 hours, behind him, and 54 miles ahead of the Commander-in-Chief. The battlefleet had taken up Cruising Order No. 3<sup>4</sup> about 9.30, but the screen could not be

<sup>1</sup> On 6 March 1916, to 52° 28' N; on 25 April to 52° 25' N.

<sup>2</sup> *Nordsee* 5/65. <sup>3</sup> 53° 30' N, 5° E.

<sup>4</sup> Appendix D 19, note. Fleet in six divisions, divisions disposed abeam; 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th Divisions in single line ahead, columns 6 cables apart; wing divisions, namely 1st and 6th, in single quarter line.

formed, for the destroyers were labouring in the sea, and as late as 9 a.m. the 12th and 11th Flotillas were still several miles astern of the *Iron Duke*. Admiral Beatty had spread<sup>1</sup> his light cruisers ahead with their centre in visual touch, bearing south-east by south, line of direction south-west by west, with pairs 5 miles apart, and at 8 a.m. the battle cruisers were going at the *Invincible's* utmost speed, which was 25 knots.

The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron had been sighted at 7.15 a.m. by the 5th Battle Squadron, and was told to follow down. Though by this time all hope of intercepting the enemy was fading away, Admiral Beatty held on his course, and gave the order to assume complete readiness of action by 11.45.<sup>2</sup> The Admiralty meanwhile had ordered the naval coastal authorities to resume normal conditions, and at 11.10 a.m. ordered the Commander-in-Chief and S.O., B.C.F., to return.<sup>3</sup> This was made from Aberdeen, and failed to reach Admiral Beatty, but when noon passed without any signs of the enemy, he told the light cruisers that if nothing was seen by 1 p.m. they were to turn at that time. The German battle cruisers had passed about 50 miles ahead of him about 11 a.m.<sup>4</sup> and at 11.45, when Boedecker turned to the eastward for home, without stopping and without any attempts at reconnaissance, Admiral Beatty was still 45 miles away.

There was nothing in sight, all hope of cutting off the enemy had vanished, and the battle cruisers turned back at half-past twelve. The 5th Battle Squadron and battlefleet came down to meet them, and by 2.30 p.m. the whole fleet<sup>5</sup> was making its way disconsolately home.

**23. German Return.**—Admiral Boedicker meanwhile had made no attempt to pursue Tyrwhitt's cruisers, on the grounds that pursuit was rendered useless by their superior speed. It had been intended that three Zeppelins should assist the fleet in reconnaissance—one to be over the Dogger Bank, one with the battlefleet, and one over the Hoofden. The assistance they rendered was small. When *L.9* was being attacked the German battlefleet was in sight, and as it was assumed that the British airman would report its position, and as the German battle cruisers were only 50 miles off at 5.20, Scheer turned for home at 15 knots. *L.9* was in sight, and was ordered by searchlight to scout to the north-east, but her recall came from home, and she went off to the east. This left only *L.6* to screen the retirement, which she did up to 7.30 a.m., when she, too, had to go home. Had *L.9* been able to remain, the fleet command might have discovered that the Harwich cruisers were behind them, renewing the attempt to get in touch.

<sup>1</sup> At 4.44 a.m. Appendix D 49, 57, 61.

<sup>2</sup> D 69, 70.

<sup>3</sup> Received *Iron Duke* 11.36 (Aberdeen to R.A., Scapa).

<sup>4</sup> At 11.7 a.m., according to Karte F.

<sup>5</sup> *Barham* (5th B.S.) turned 1.39; *Iron Duke* 2.4; *Britannia* (3rd B.S.) 2.35 p.m.

It was about 6.30 a.m. when Scheer received from Bruges a report based on decyphered British messages which influenced him considerably. It stated that the Dover forces were to retire and concentrate, and he came to the conclusion that the Harwich cruisers had retired to the southward to join them in making a counter attack the next day. It seemed, therefore, useless to wait off Terschelling, and urgently necessary to get home and refuel, ready to meet any such attack. If only, says the German History, *L.6* had been scouting over Dogger Bank, Beatty and his force would have been sighted coming straight for the spot where the German fleet anticipated an encounter, and was willing to accept battle. These arguments are not very convincing, for the mere absence of aircraft could not prevent Scheer waiting off Terschelling or sending his light cruisers to scout to the north-west. Actually, the chance of an encounter was increased by the route which Boedicker chose. Numerous reports of submarines sighted by the battlefleet<sup>1</sup> led him to haul out to the northward and return by Way Middle, the route on which he had started out, and he passed some 50 miles ahead of Beatty shortly after 11 a.m.

**24. German Submarines.**—None of the other German submarines did anything. *U.B.27* and *U.B.21* were to station themselves off the Forth. But on 25 April, at noon, the former was still some 180 miles east of it, and some 90 miles east of the Grand Fleet. Her commander made for the Forth, but saw nothing, and proceeded down the east coast, where he carried out a successful cruise against shipping. *U.B.21* remained for seven days off the Forth, penetrating as far as Inchkeith, but seeing nothing but patrols. The three German submarines off Southwold could boast of little more. *U.B.12*, which proceeded by mistake to Lowestoft, found herself between the opposing squadrons, with shell falling round her and above her. *U.B.6* and *U.B.10* were off Southwold at dawn, and the former saw the Harwich forces going north at 3.33 a.m., and later on witnessed the action between them and the German light cruisers. She dived at 5.22 as the Harwich forces came south, and met *U.B.12*, but at 5.32 a.m. was attacked by British aircraft and driven home.

The U.C. boats met with no more success, for the Dover barrage off Zeebrugge had completely dislocated their work. *U.C.6* was the only one that succeeded in passing the barrage on the 24th, and laid her cargo of mines off the Sledway about 11 p.m., which must have just missed the *Melampus*, and were found the next morning at 8.30 a.m. by the sweeper *Loch Buie*.<sup>2</sup> *U.C.7*, after lying quiet all day, was able to get away during the night of the 24th, and at 10 p.m. on the 25th had just begun to lay her mines off the Shipwash, when she ran ashore. For hours she struggled to get off, and at dawn was in danger of being caught by two destroyers, when she managed to get afloat, and went to

<sup>1</sup> There were no British submarines in the vicinity. <sup>2</sup> H.S. 230/651.

the bottom, finally laying her mines on the 27th between the Shipwash and Whiting, in the same area as *U.C.6*. *U.C.1*, on the 25th, passed the barrage on the surface at full speed, and at 7.20 p.m. laid her twelve mines off the Kentish Knock; on her way back she ran along the Flanders barrage till she found a gap which the German craft had made, and got safely back. *U.C.5* attempted to get to sea on the 25th, but was forced under by British destroyers, then attacked by French aircraft, and had to give up the attempt and return to Zeebrugge. On the 26th she finally got away, but ran ashore on the Shipwash, and at 2 a.m. on the 27th found herself high and dry. At 5 a.m. she managed to get afloat, but was attacked by British patrol craft, ran ashore again, and blew herself up—the second German submarine to be lost during the operation,<sup>1</sup> for *U.B.13* never returned.

The long story is already too long, and the forces may be left returning to harbour. On the German side the battle cruiser *Seydlitz* had been mined, and *U.B.13* and *U.C.5* lost. On the British side the *Conquest* had been damaged by gunfire, the *Penelope* by a torpedo, and *E.22* had been sunk.

## CHAPTER VI.

### Conclusions.

**25. German Strategy.**—The German raid on Lowestoft cannot be regarded as a very brilliant exploit in the sphere of either tactics or strategy. It bears, indeed, a superficial resemblance to the attack on Heligoland Bight in August, 1914. In both there is an approach to the enemy's coast; in both there is the shadow cast by a superior force; and in both the battle cruisers are confronted by nothing but light cruisers. There the resemblance ends. History did not repeat itself. Heligoland Bight opened with a preliminary attack by destroyers and light cruisers, which enticed the enemy light cruisers out and culminated in a sudden and overwhelming swoop of the battle cruisers. At Lowestoft there was nothing but an advance by the battle cruisers, a hurried bombardment, and an immediate retreat. Had Scheer sent light cruisers ahead to involve the Harwich forces in action and then swept in on them from a flank, he might have at least imitated the attack on the Bight. This would have been a more daring scheme, for two of his battle cruisers would have had to penetrate some 30 miles further to about the level of Orfordness, preliminary to sweeping in towards Harwich and

<sup>1</sup> *Nordsee* 5/131, 155.

up the coast, and any attempt of the sort would no doubt have been frustrated by the kindly persistence with which the German command regularly announced its intentions to the listeners at Whitehall, but a scheme on these lines would at least have given the operation a redeeming touch of dexterity.

26. **Question of Fleet Bases.**—But on the strategical side the Lowestoft raid is particularly interesting as a severe test of the disposition of the British fleet in the North Sea. In this disposition the distance of Scapa from the Hoofden<sup>1</sup> was the weak link, for to steam at 20 knots to the Hoofden and then engage in battle would have left many of the destroyers with barely enough fuel to get home. A further and even more serious weakness lay in the distance of Rosyth from Scapa, which exposed the battle cruiser fleet to the danger of finding itself facing the German High Sea Fleet without support. Had the Germans pushed persistently and constantly to the south, covering their line of retirement with minefields and directing their attacks not against coastal towns but against Dover and the shipping in the Downs, in menacing proximity to the vital line of British communications in the Channel, it would have become almost imperative to station a force in the Thames or Channel, in spite of the risk such a force might run from the Flanders submarines, and the question of a strong support for the battle cruiser fleet would at once have become acute.

It is true that the Germans never did anything of the kind. The Lowestoft raid is the furthest south they ever came, except on the night of 5–6 March, when they made no attack. It represents the utmost they were prepared to risk, and the most they ever actually tried to do in the south. But it does not represent the most they might have done. At noon on 25 April the battle cruiser fleet was some 50 miles from the German battle cruisers. This seems at first a narrow margin for the German battle cruisers to work on, for Admiral Beatty could have covered it in a couple of hours. But then between the British battle cruisers and the 5th Battle Squadron there stretched a long gap of some 115 miles, or not less than 5 hours, and between the 5th Battle Squadron again and the main body was another 80 miles, or 4 hours, making a total distance from the battlefleet of 195 miles, or some 9 hours, apart from the difficulties arising from the dispersion of destroyers and questions of fuel. Had Scheer been resolved to stand his ground stoutly with the battlefleet there was time for his battle cruisers to pursue the Harwich force, and the battle cruiser fleet, coming down to its help, would have found itself confronted with the whole German battlefleet—a situation whose possibilities could not be ignored, though in practice on this occasion the Germans fell far short of it. Boedicker would not wait even to pursue the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron, after inflicting visible punishment on the *Conquest*.

<sup>1</sup> A convenient German name for the southern portion of the North Sea.

He turned and retired at full speed, and, as the German History admits that he broke off the bombardment in order to engage the light cruisers, the Harwich force might claim, justly, that they had driven the German battle cruisers off the coast. This was a different spirit from that displayed in the British fleet on 28 August. And Scheer's strategy was no bolder than Boedicker's tactics. His memorandum declared his intention of drawing a detachment of the British fleet into waters favourable for action, but his movements in the Lowestoft raid were not framed on these lines. He did not wait even to glimpse the masts of Admiral Beatty's light cruisers on the horizon, much less the appearance of Admiral Beatty or the Commander-in-Chief. The German History bewails Admiral Scheer's lack of information, and pleads it as an excuse for his speedy retreat to the Bight.

“ If the weather and the order sent by the Airship Division  
“ to return had not prevented *L.6* from cruising on the look-  
“ out line ordered by the Commander-in-Chief, south-west  
“ of the Dogger Bank, it would probably not have escaped  
“ her, and through her the fleet command, that the whole  
“ British battle cruiser fleet passed this line soon after 10 a.m.,  
“ making at high speed for the very area where the German  
“ fleet, according to the original plan, had expected, with  
“ sound foresight, to meet the enemy's counter thrust, and  
“ was willing to meet him in battle. Perhaps *L.6* would  
“ also have reported that for a long distance behind the  
“ British battle cruiser fleet no other forces were supporting  
“ it, and thus Admiral Scheer was offered the very oppor-  
“ tunity, which the bombardment aimed at, of cutting off  
“ a portion of the enemy forces before the main body could  
“ come to its support. Unfortunately, the German Com-  
“ mander-in-Chief did not possess the means of gaining an  
“ idea of enemy's movements comparable with that which  
“ the latter, by the aid of a superior deciphering system, had  
“ so royally at his disposal, though he never fully utilised it  
“ to the point of gaining a decisive result.”<sup>1</sup>

These complaints, however, do not explain the fact that the German Commander-in-Chief made no attempt to scout for the approach of the British forces by the ordinary means of light cruisers.

But though the Germans did not dare to wait for the oncoming of the Grand Fleet and never ventured further south than Lowestoft, that was far enough to make the Admiralty supremely anxious for the safety of the coast and to bring the whole question of moving a portion of the fleet further south to a head. This had been one of the recurring questions of the war, sounding with a dull persistent note almost from the start. On the eve of the Yarmouth raid<sup>2</sup> of 1914, the 3rd Battle Squadron had been on its way to reinforce the Channel Fleet, and had later been based

<sup>1</sup> *Nordsee* 5/153.

<sup>2</sup> 3 November 1914.

on Rosyth. But while the Admiralty was inclined to emphasise the importance of defending the coast, the Commander-in-Chief and Vice-Admiral, B.C.F., attached great importance to the rapid concentration of the fleet, and disliked the idea of dispersion, particularly in ports so far south as the Humber or Thames, which were exposed to constant minelaying by the enemy. The pros and cons of the different bases—Scapa, the Forth, and the Humber—had been stated by the Commander-in-Chief in February 1915,<sup>1</sup> and had resulted then in a decision to retain Scapa as the battlefleet base. So matters stood for nearly a year, when the Admiralty re-opened the question. Their views were based partly on defensive and partly on offensive grounds. From the defensive point of view there was practically nothing in the south but submarines to oppose raids or bombardments, nor was there any adequate force to prevent German flotillas rounding up coastal patrols and shipping, by a surprise sweep along the East Coast. From the offensive point of view it was considered at the Admiralty that the battlefleet was too far off to succeed in bringing the Germans to action.<sup>2</sup> The completion of forts in the Humber and of the basin and lock at Rosyth made it easier to bring a portion of the fleet south, and less than a fortnight before the raid, Admiral Sir Charles Madden, the Chief of the Staff, was discussing the question with the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Henry Jackson. The Admiralty was distinctly in favour of moving the fleet from Scapa to the Forth, as it would give the enemy less time for offensive action on the coast, and also wished to have a force in the Humber sufficiently strong to compel the enemy to bring out the whole of his dreadnought fleet to support any attack. The Commander-in-Chief therefore suggested that eight or nine of the older Dreadnoughts should be based on the Humber, with the remainder on the Forth, and the 3rd Battle Squadron at Sheerness or Portland,<sup>3</sup> though he refrained from expressing an opinion as to whether the move was strategically advisable.

Three views then, all of cardinal importance, were running side by side previous to the Lowestoft raid. The Admiralty was in favour of the Grand Fleet moving south, in order to cover the coast, give greater security against raids, and increase the chance of intercepting the enemy. The Commander-in-Chief was prepared to move as soon as security against submarine attack could be assured, but wished to keep the battlefleet concentrated. The Vice-Admiral, Battle Cruiser Fleet, so long as the battlefleet remained at Scapa, was desirous of having a fast battle squadron at Rosyth to support him, a view which the Admiralty favoured. The Lowestoft raid, where the B.C.F. found itself approaching Terschelling with the British battlefleet nearly 200 miles away,

<sup>1</sup> C.-in-C. to Adty., 15 February 1915. H.S.A. 94/393.

<sup>2</sup> M. 02696/1916 of 5 April 1916.

<sup>3</sup> Conference held at Admiralty on Rosyth Defences, Adty. to C.-in-C., 15 April 1916; C.-in-C. to Admiral Madden, Chief of Staff, 18 April 1916.

threw a strong light on the situation, and gave an impetus to the whole question. The Admiralty pointed out that the Harwich force had been reduced to one light cruiser, and asked the Commander-in-Chief on 26 April for his views. The Commander-in-Chief, in answer,<sup>1</sup> suggested that the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron, with the *Hampshire*, should proceed at once to the south to be based on the Thames, Sheerness, or Dover; that the 7th Submarine Flotilla should proceed from the Firth of Forth to Yarmouth; that the defence of the East Coast should be strengthened by minefields; and that a patrol of three or four submarines of the 8th Flotilla should be maintained constantly off Terschelling. These views were expanded at length the same day in a letter, in which Admiral Jellicoe suggested that three battle squadrons (the 1st, 2nd, and 5th) should be based with the B.C.F. on the Forth;<sup>2</sup> the 4th Battle Squadron, 1st Cruiser Squadron, and 4th Flotilla on the Humber; and the 3rd Battle Squadron and 1st Flotilla on the Thames, Dover, or Portland, leaving in Scapa nothing but a single cruiser squadron (the 3rd Cruiser Squadron) to support the 10th Cruiser Squadron. This was to be accompanied by a reorganisation of the fleet, which would place the three *Revenge*s in the 1st Battle Squadron. This proposal was approved so far as the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron were concerned, and they left for the Swin on 29 April. These discussions culminated in an important conference at Rosyth on 12 May, attended by the First Sea Lord, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Vice-Admiral, B.C.F., with their Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander-in-Chief, Rosyth. The question of the berthing facilities and defences of the Forth was carefully thrashed out, but though it was decided to take over Port Edgar and push on with the defences, no definite conclusion was reached as to the strategic advisability of moving the fleet to the south. The point at issue may be put in the form of a question. What was the task of the Grand Fleet? If its task was to secure the vital line of military communications in the Channel, the menace it offered secured that area, but in the event of German battle cruisers striking to the south, the Battle Cruiser Fleet had to follow them at once, and in doing so ran a grave risk of meeting the German battlefleet, a risk which could only be met either by bringing the British battlefleet further south or by the support of a battle squadron. Lacking this it must find itself in the air too far from support to be effectively used.<sup>3</sup> It might still be open to discussion how far it was the task of a fleet to ward off sporadic coastal raids, but this was a question of policy, whose purview rested with the Admiralty. The question of shifting the bases of the fleet involved, however, all sorts of subsidiary questions—questions of berthing, of harbour defence, of fleet

<sup>1</sup> C.-in-C., Adty., 26 April. H.S. 231/159.

<sup>2</sup> The 1st, 2nd, and 5th B.S., 2nd C.S., 4th L.C.S., B.C.F., and three flotillas on the Forth. C.-in-C. to Adty., 26 April. H.S.A. 94/422.

<sup>3</sup> M. 00124/16.

exercises, of the care of a host of auxiliaries, all of which fell within the province of the fleet command, and which made the question a complicated one.<sup>1</sup>

It closely affected, too, the work of the Harwich Force. It was their task to screen the Dover flotillas against light craft attack, to cover operations on the Belgian coast, and to supply escorts to minelayers and air carriers operating in the Bight. But in the former case they were usually too far south to risk any attack by German battle cruisers, and in the latter case they were usually supported by Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers. This was the first time they had come within the range of battle cruisers, and all they could do was to retire at once, proving again what was proved at Heligoland Bight that light cruisers were helpless against capital ships.

In locating the enemy the Grand Fleet was largely dependent on the special intelligence of Room 40. It had not been so when Yarmouth was bombarded earlier in the war.<sup>2</sup> On that occasion the first report of the enemy's approach had come from the *Halcyon*, going out on patrol. In this case the German signals furnished considerable information as to their doings, and, though it seems at first impossible to over-estimate the value of this source, it had its limitations, and was not without its drawbacks. It meant that the fleet had to be kept in a constant state of readiness, which made it difficult to devote sufficient time to exercises; on 21 April it resulted in a "criss-cross" alarm, in which the movements of one of our squadrons, deciphered by the enemy, had set them on the move, and this in turn had compelled Admiral Jellicoe to abandon his intended operation in order to carry out an abortive concentration. The grave difficulties which accompanied these rushes to the south in heavy weather were never more clearly illustrated than when Admirals Jellicoe and Beatty found themselves at dawn on 25 April with their destroyers scattered beyond the horizon. No amount of intercepts could reduce the distance from Scapa to Terschelling, nor could they help the destroyers to make head against the sea, nor could they give the submarines a speed of two knots more. In enabling one to form a general appreciation of the situation, these signals were of priceless value, but in the sphere of tactics, when it was a question of bringing fleets actually into touch, their utility was less evident. To utilise them the fleet had to be prepared to sail immediately, and the policy of "immediacy" thus involved not only placed a severe strain on the administrative mechanism of the fleet, but tended to make its movements largely attendant on those of the enemy. In utilising this intelligence, too, it was evidently not always easy to decide whether a commander was to be given orders or intelligence; in other words, whether he should be given merely explicit orders to proceed at once to a certain

<sup>1</sup> For the question of shifting the main base, see H.S.A. 94; also M. 02696/16, 22 March 1916 and M. 04524/16, 15 May 1916.

<sup>2</sup> 3 November 1914. Staff Monograph, *Home Waters*, III.

spot, or whether he should be given full information as to the immediate and anticipated movements of the enemy, leaving his movements to himself. The Yarmouth submarines were merely told to be at gunrange off Yarmouth. The position to which the light cruisers were ordered had to be abandoned. The submarines were ordered to a certain position, but could not reach it. It was evidently thought at the time that had the submarines been only 5 or 6 miles further north they would have been able to attack the enemy successfully. But it must be noted that Boedicker's ships were making straight for the British submarines at 5.30 a.m., but sighted *D.6* at 5.40, and the *Melampus* and her submarines shortly after 6 a.m., and the sheer to the northward made about these times was probably dictated as much by considerations of security as of navigation. The submarines did not have time to spread and submerge. (See Plan II.)

The importance of a sufficient margin of time is indicated by Captain (S)'s suggestions, which he forwarded shortly afterwards. They amounted, briefly, to the establishment of certain lines of patrol, either within about 40 miles of the coast, or further out by Terschelling, to which submarines could be despatched if the enemy showed signs of movement, and orders were drafted by the Chief of the War Staff to facilitate this, with the aid of a squared chart and a 23-word code.<sup>1</sup> This disposition of the submarines was one of the most important questions of the day, and the raid is noteworthy as presenting an instance of 18 submarines (12 British and 6 German) operating simultaneously in the same area. While aircraft had a damping effect on the submarines, the German Zeppelins had no effect whatever on the British surface craft, and no German surface craft was touched by a submarine.

So far as the Germans were concerned the honours of the day remained with the two submarine commanders—Steinbrinck, the studious, and Pustkuchen, the happy-go-lucky—who first of all marked the limits of a minefield for the approach of their battle cruisers, and then went leisurely back, sinking a submarine and torpedoing a light cruiser on their way. With the exception of *U.C.6* the other German submarines did nothing, and *U.C.5*, when she finally arrived on the coast with her mines, went ashore on the Shipwash and was captured.

**27. Consequences of Raid.**—On the British side, as a consequence of the raid, the 3rd Battle Squadron was ordered to proceed to the Swin on 29 April,<sup>2</sup> and there, at the Commander-in-Chief's request, became an independent command on the same footing as the Harwich force.<sup>3</sup> It was decided that the completion of the new outer defences of the Forth was to be regarded as "urgent," and every provision was to be made for the Forth to become the primary base of the Grand Fleet before the winter.

<sup>1</sup> H.S.A. 271/494, Chief of War Staff to Capt. (S) 22 May 1916, Emergency Orders for Harwich submarines.

<sup>2</sup> C.-in-C. to V.A., 3rd B.S., 28 April 1916.

<sup>3</sup> M. 04346/16, 3 May.



Scapa Flow was not to be disestablished as a primary base, but was to become "more of an alternative base," affording a "submarine-proof sheet of water" for fleet exercises, and a base for the 10th Cruiser Squadron. The Dreadnought battlefleet was to be re-organised, the 4th Battle Squadron being constituted out of the older Dreadnoughts with 12-in. guns, and was "to be regarded as detachable (to the Humber for instance), if and when strategy or berthing considerations rendered it advisable, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief."

The first task of history is to state what happened, and it may safely be said that few who took part in it at the time could have seen the manifold ramifications of that day. It has been said that the task of technical history is to "undramatise" history, and strip it of interest, but those whose taste is for subdued tones and half-lights may find them in the picture of the Grand Fleet ploughing its dark way through a stormy sea, only to see the mirage of battle fading again on the horizon, and to find the sudden rush terminating again in a baffling 16 point turn. The marchings and counter-marchings in the harvest fields of Mons formed, perhaps, a more striking picture, and yet it remains splendidly true that it was the Grand Fleet always there, constantly holding the High Sea Fleet in check, and ever active as on that stormy night, that under-pinned the whole colossal structure of the world war.

## APPENDIX A.

## FORCES.

## British. 24th April 1916.

## GRAND FLEET.

Note.—Names of ships away are in brackets.

*Iron Duke* (Fleet Flagship) (Scapa). Admiral Sir John Jellicoe.

## 1st Battle Squadron (Cromarty).

*Marlborough* (Flag) (Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney), *Colossus* (Flag 2) (Rear-Admiral E. F. A. Gaunt), *Collingwood*, *Hercules*, *Neptune*, *St. Vincent*, (*Agincourt*),<sup>1</sup> *Vanguard*, *Revenge*, *Bellona*.

## 2nd Battle Squadron (Scapa).

*King George V* (Flag) (Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas H. M. Jerram), *Orion* (Flag 2) (Rear-Admiral A. C. Leveson), *Ajax*, *Centurion*, *Conqueror*, *Monarch*, *Thunderer*, *Erin*, *Boadicea*.

## 3rd Battle Squadron (Rosyth).

*Britannia* (Flag) (Vice-Admiral E. E. Bradford), *Hibernia* (Flag 2) (Rear-Admiral Cecil F. Dampier), *Africa*, *Commonwealth*, (*Dominion*),<sup>1</sup> *Hindustan*, *Zealandia*, *Diamond*.

## 4th Battle Squadron (Scapa).

*Benbow* (Flag) (Vice-Admiral Sir F. C. D. Sturdee), *Emperor of India* (Flag 2) (Rear-Admiral A. L. Duff), (*Dreadnought*),<sup>1</sup> *Bellerophon*, *Temeraire*, *Superb*, *Canada*, (*Blonde*),<sup>1</sup> *Blanche*.

## 5th Battle Squadron (Scapa).

*Barham* (Flag) (Rear-Admiral H. Evan-Thomas), *Queen Elizabeth*, *Warspite*, *Malaya*, *Valiant*.

## Battle Cruiser Fleet (Rosyth).

*Lion* (Flagship) (Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty).

## 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.

*Princess Royal* (Flag) (Rear-Admiral O. de B. Brock), *Queen Mary*, *Tiger*.

## 1st Light Cruiser Squadron.

*Galatea* (Brd. Pnt.) (Commodore L. S. Alexander-Sinclair), *Phaeton*, *Cordelia*, *Inconstant*.

## 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron.

(*Australia*),<sup>2</sup> (Flag) (Rear-Admiral W. C. Pakenham), (*New Zealand*),<sup>2</sup> (*Indefatigable*, with 3rd B.C.S.).

<sup>1</sup> Refitting.

<sup>2</sup> Repairing.

**2nd Light Cruiser Squadron.**

*Southampton* (Brd. Pnt.) (Commodore W. E. Goodenough), *Birmingham*, *Nottingham*, *Dublin*, *Champion*.<sup>3</sup>

**3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron.**

*Invincible* (Flag) (Rear-Admiral The Hon. H. L. A. Hood), *Indomitable*, *Inflexible*, *Indefatigable*.<sup>3</sup>

**3rd Light Cruiser Squadron.**

*Falmouth* (Flag) (Rear-Admiral T. D. W. Napier), *Yarmouth*, *Birkenhead*, *(Gloucester)*.<sup>4</sup>

**CRUISER SQUADRONS.****1st Cruiser Squadron.**

*Defence* (Flag) (Rear-Admiral Sir Robert K. Arbuthnot), *(Warrior)*, *Black Prince*, *Duke of Edinburgh*.

**2nd Cruiser Squadron.**

*Shannon* (Flag) (Vice-Admiral The Hon. Sir Somerset A. Gough-Calthorpe), *Achilles*, *Cochrane*.

**3rd Cruiser Squadron (Rosyth).**

*Antrim* (Flag) (Rear-Admiral M. E. Browning), *Devonshire*, *Roxburgh*.

**7th Cruiser Squadron (Cromarty).**

*Minotaur* (Flag) (Rear-Admiral H. L. Heath), *Hampshire*, *Donegal*.

**4th Light Cruiser Squadron.**

*Calliope* (Brd. Pnt.) (Commodore C. E. le Mesurier), *Caroline*, *Comus*, *Constance*, *(Royalist)*.<sup>1</sup>

**GRAND FLEET DESTROYER FLOTILLAS.****1st Destroyer Flotilla (Rosyth).**

*Fearless* (Capt. (D)) (Captain C. D. Roper), *Botha* (second in command) (Commander B. M. Money), *Acheron*, *Archer*, *Ariel*, *Attack*, *Badger*, *Beaver*, *Defender*, *Druid*, *Ferret*, *Forester*, *Goshawk*, *Hind*, *Hornet*, *Hydra*, *Jackal*, *Lapwing*, *(Lizard)*,<sup>1</sup> *Phoenix*, *Sandfly*, *(Tigress)*.<sup>1</sup>

**4th Destroyer Flotilla (Scapa).**

*Carysfort* (Capt. (D)) (Captain C. J. Wintour), *Tipperary* (Flot. Ldr.) (Commander A. D. M. Cherry), *Acasta*, *(Achates)*,<sup>1</sup> *(Ambuscade)*,<sup>1</sup> *(Ardent)*,<sup>5</sup> *Christopher*, *Cockatrice*, *Contest*, *Fortune*, *(Garland)*,<sup>5</sup> *Hardy*, *Midge*, *Owl*, *Paragon*, *(Porpoise)*,<sup>1</sup> *Shark*, *Sparrowhawk*, *(Spitfire)*,<sup>1</sup> *Unity*, *Victor*.

**11th Destroyer Flotilla (Cromarty).**

*Castor* (Capt. (D)) (Captain J. R. P. Hawksley), *Broke* (Flot. Ldr.) (Commander W. L. Allen), *Kempfenfelt* (Flot. Ldr.) (Commander H. E. Sullivan), *Magic*, *Mandate*, *Manners*, *Marmion*, *Marne*, *(Michael)*,<sup>1</sup> *Milbrook*, *(Minion)*,<sup>1</sup> *Mons*, *Moon*, *(Morning Star)*,<sup>1</sup> *Mystic*, *Mounsey*, *Musketeer*, *(Ossory)*.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Refitting.  
<sup>4</sup> Detached.

<sup>3</sup> Temporarily attached.  
<sup>5</sup> Aberdeen.

**12th Destroyer Flotilla (Scapa).**

*Faulknor* (Capt. (D)) (Captain A. J. B. Stirling), *Marksmen* (Flot. Ldr.) (Commander N. A. Sullivan), *Maenad*, *Mameluke*, *Marvel*, *Mary Rose*, *Menace*, *Mindful*, *Mischief*, *Munster*, *Napier*, *Narwhal*, *Nessus*, *Noble*, *Nonsuch*, *Obedient*, *Onslaught*, *Opal*.

**13th Destroyer Flotilla (Rosyth).**

*Moresby*, *(Narborough)*,<sup>1</sup> *Nepean*, *(Nerissa)*,<sup>1</sup> *(Nicator)*,<sup>1</sup> *Nomad*, *Obdurate*, *(Onslow)*,<sup>1</sup> *(Pelican)*.<sup>1</sup>

**HARWICH FORCE.****5th Light Cruiser Squadron.**

*Conquest* (Broad Pdt.) (Commodore R. Y. Tyrwhitt), (Captain R. R. C. Backhouse), (28.5 knots; 2—6-in., 8—4-in.). *Cleopatra* (Captain F. P. Loder-Symonds), *Penelope* (Captain H. Lynes), *Vindex* (seaplane carrier) (Lieut.-Comm. G. Ducat).

**9th Destroyer Flotilla.**

*(Undaunted)*,<sup>2</sup> (Captain F. G. St. John), *Lightfoot* (Commander C. K. MacLean), *Lysander* (Commander G. W. Taylor), *Laertes* (Commander M. L. Goldsmith), *Linnet* (Lieut.-Comm. J. V. Creagh), *Lochinvar* (Lieut.-Comm. C. H. Knox-Little), *Lassoo* (Lieut.-Comm. V. S. Butler), *Loyal* (Commander F. B. Watson), *Leonidas* (Lieut. W. E. B. Magee), *Legion* (Lieut.-Comm. T. G. Carter), *Lafrey*<sup>3</sup> (Commander G. R. L. Edwards), *Lark*<sup>3</sup> (Lieut. G. S. Holden), *Lookout*<sup>3</sup> (Lieut.-Comm. M. B. R. Blackwood), *Lennox*<sup>3</sup> (Lieut. E. K. Boddam-Whetham), *Lance*<sup>3</sup> (Commander W. de M. Egerton), *Laurel*<sup>3</sup> (Lieut. H. D. C. Stanistreet), *Llewellyn*<sup>1</sup> (Lieut.-Comm. G. S. F. Nash), *Lucifer*<sup>3</sup> (Lieut.-Comm. R. M. Mack), *Lydiard* (Commander G. H. Knowles), *(Landrail)*<sup>1</sup> (Lieut.-Comm. F. E. H. G. Hobart), *(Liberty)*<sup>1</sup> (Lieut.-Comm. P. W. S. King), *(Laverock)*<sup>2</sup> (Lieut.-Comm. J. N. Benbow).

**10th Destroyer Flotilla.**

*(Aurora)*,<sup>2</sup> (Captain Wilmot S. Nicholson), *Nimrod* (Commander R. G. Rowley-Conway), *Manly* (Lieut.-Comm. E. W. Kirby), *Mansfield* (Lieut.-Comm. A. F. W. Howard), *Mastiff* (Lieut.-Comm. R. V. Holt), *Matchless* (Lieut.-Comm. A. W. Benson), *(Medea)*<sup>4</sup> (Commander G. L. D. Gibbs), *(Melpomene)*<sup>4</sup> (Lieut.-Comm. H. H. de Burgh), *Mentor* (Commander E. T. Inman), *(Milne)*<sup>4</sup> (Lieut. H. R. Troup), *Minos* (Lieut.-Comm. E. H. B. Williams), *Miranda* (Lieut.-Comm. P. B. Crohan), *Moorsom* (Commander J. C. Hodgson), *Morris* (Lieut.-Comm. E. S. Graham), *(Murray)*<sup>4</sup> (Lieut.-Comm. H. T. Dorling), *Myngs* (Lieut.-Comm. F. A. Warner), *Termagant*<sup>4</sup> (Lieut.-Comm. C. P. Blake).

**SUBMARINES, HARWICH.**

Captain A. K. Waistell, Capt. (S), in the *Lurcher* (Lieut.-Comm. Lionel G. Dawson), *Melampus* (Lieut.-Comm. George O. Hewett), *E.55* (Lieut.-Comm. Gilbert Kellett), *E.29* (Lieut.-Comm. Herbert Shove), *E.26* (Lieut.-Comm. C. C. Dobson), *E.22* (Lieut. Reginald Thomas Dimsdale), *D.4* (Lieut. P. E. Phillips), *D.6* (Lieut.-Comm. Geoffrey Warburton), *E.53* (to Yarmouth) (Lieut.-Comm. I. B. Glencross), *E.37* (to Yarmouth) (Lieut.-Comm. R. F. Chisholm).

**SUBMARINES (YARMOUTH).**

*H.5* (Lieut. Cromwell Varley), *V.1* (Lieut. A. B. Lockhart), *H.10* (Lieut. Byron Carey), *H.7* (Lieut. E. S. Ebblewhite).

<sup>1</sup> Refitting.

<sup>2</sup> Repairing.

<sup>3</sup> To Sheerness, 22 April, to escort minelayers.

<sup>4</sup> Lent to V.A., Dover, 22 April, for barrage operations.

**German. 24th April 1916.****HIGH SEA FLEET.<sup>1</sup>**

*Friedrich der Grosse* (Fleet Flagship). Vice-Admiral Scheer.

**1st Squadron.**

Vice-Admiral Schmidt.

*Ostfriesland* (Flag), *Posen* (Flag 2), *Thuringen*, *Heligoland*, *Oldenburg*, *Rheinland*, *Nassau*, *Westfalen*.

**2nd Squadron.**

Rear-Admiral Mauve.

*Deutschland* (Flag), *Hannover* (Flag 2), *Pommern*, *Schlesien*, *Schleswig-Holstein*, *Hessen*.

**3rd Squadron.**

Rear-Admiral Paul Behncke.

*König* (Flag), *Kaiser* (Flag 2), *Grosser Kurfürst*, *Markgraf*, *Kronprinz*, *König Albert*, *Prinzregent Luitpold*, *Kaiserin*. *Bayern* completed, but not joined.

**4th Scouting Group.**

Commodore v. Reuter (temporarily to 2nd S.G.).

*Stettin* (Flag), *München*, *Frauenlob*, *Stuttgart*, *Berlin*.

**1st Destroyer Flotilla.**

*G.39*, *G.40*, *G.38*, *V.190*, *G.197*, *S.32*, *G.192*, *G.193*, *G.195*, *G.196*, *S.165*.

**7th Destroyer Flotilla.**

*S.15*, *S.17*, *S.20*, *S.16*, *S.18*, *S.19*, *S.23*, *V.186*, *V.189*, *G.172*.

**1st Scouting Group.**

Rear-Admiral Boedicker.<sup>2</sup>

*Seydlitz*<sup>2</sup> (v. Egidy), 10—11-in., 12—5·9-in.; *Lutzow* (Flag) (Harder), 8—12-in., 12—5·9-in.; *Derfflinger* (Hartog), 8—12-in., 12—5·9-in.; *Moltke* (v. Karpf), 10—11-in., 12—5·9-in.; *Von der Tann* (Zenker), 8—11-in., 10—5·9-in.

**2nd Scouting Group.**

Temporarily under Commodore v. Reuter.

*Frankfurt* (Flag) (v. Trotha), 10—5·9-in.; *Pillau* (Mommsen), 8—5·1-in.; *Elbing* (Madlung), 8—5·1-in.; *Weisbaden* (Reiss), 10—5·9-in.; *Graudenz* (repairing—mined 22 April 1916); *Stralsund* (rearming with 5·9-in.); *Rostock* (Commodore Michelsen), 12—4·1-in.; *Regensburg* (Commodore Heinrich), 2—5·9-in., 8—4·1-in.

*Note*.—All above, three funnels, except *Stralsund* and *Rostock*, which had four.

**6th Destroyer Flotilla.**

*G.41* (Lieut. Max Schulz), *V.44*, *S.49*, *V.43*, *G.87*, *G.86*, *V.69*, *V.45*, *V.46*, *S.50*, *G.37*.

**9th Destroyer Flotilla.**

*V.28* (Lieut.-Comm. Goehle), *V.27*, *V.26*, *S.36*, *S.51*, *S.52*, *V.30*, *S.34*, *S.33*, *V.29*, *S.35*.

<sup>1</sup> From Quarterly Returns and *Nordsee V*.

<sup>2</sup> Temporarily during Vice-Admiral Hipper's illness.

**Submarines.**

*U.B.18* (Steinbrinck), *U.B.29* (Pustkuchen), *U.B.6* (Voigt), *U.B.10* (Salzwedel), *U.B.12* (Kiel), *U.B.13<sup>1</sup>* (Metz).

**Note on German Forces.**

The *Rostock* and *Regensburg* were flagship and 2nd flagship of the two leaders of torpedo forces. Commodore Michelsen was first leader of torpedo forces, corresponding to the British Commodore (T). Heinrich succeeded Commodore Köthner as second leader after 25 March, when *G.194* had been sunk and the flotilla sent out against the *Medusa* had not found her.

## APPENDIX B.

**Telegrams and Signals, Admiralty.**

24th April 1916.

Noon to 6 p.m.

**B 1.** Adty. to Comm. (T) via Ipswich W/T. Sent 3.25 p.m.  
926 Return and refuel. 1525.

**B 2.** Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. (55).  
Afloat Invergordon (393).  
V.A., 3rd B.S. (575).  
V.A., B.C.F. (712). Sent 3.50 p.m.  
As soon as refuelled, Grand Fleet be at 2 hours' notice. (1550.)

**B 3.** Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. (56). Sent 4.6 p.m.  
Trouble has broken out in Dublin, and it is reported G.P.O., Dublin, has been seized by rebels. We have information that German fleet will assist by demonstrating against East Coast, and this is confirmed by their making the usual preparations for going out to-night.

**B 4.** Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. (57).  
V.A., 3rd B.S. (576).  
V.A., B.C.F. (713).  
Afloat Invergordon (394). Sent 4.18 p.m.  
Report when ships have completed refuelling and are at 2 hours' notice. (1618.)

**B 5.** Adty. to Captain-in-Charge, Lowestoft. Sent 4.51 p.m.  
315 Recall minesweepers and auxiliary patrol vessels to vicinity of the ports.

**B 6.** C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. (654). Recd. 4.58 p.m.  
Strong southerly gale at present. Destroyers could not face it, and light cruisers only at slow speed.

**B 7.** V.A.C., 1st B.S., Invergordon, to Adty. (279). Recd. 5.21 p.m.  
Your 394. Ships at my base have fuelled, and are at 2 hours' notice.

**B 8.** V.A., B.C.F., to Adty. (401). Sent 5.5 p.m.  
Battle Cruiser Fleet complete with fuel, and at 2 hours' notice. Recd. 5.14 p.m.

<sup>1</sup> Left Zeebrugge 23 April. Did not return.

**B 9.** V.A., 3rd B.S., to Adty. (376). Sent 5.9 p.m.  
 Recd. 5.17 p.m.  
 3rd Battle Squadron, 3rd Cruiser Squadron, 1st Destroyer Flotilla refuelled and now ordered to be at 2 hours' notice.

**B 10.** Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. (58). Sent 5.53 p.m.  
 58 1st and 2nd Scouting Groups were in lat. 54°12' N, long. 6°45' E.<sup>1</sup> at about 3 p.m., apparently coming north-west, and we think main fleet is out. Information scanty.

From 6 p.m. to midnight.

**B 11.** Adty. to S.N.O., Dundee; C.-in-C., Rosyth (526); S.N.O., Tyne; R.A., East Coast (820); S.N.O., Leith; S.N.O., Granton; S.N.O., Blyth; Captain-in-Charge Lowestoft (317); Commodore, Harwich (348); C.-in-C. Nore (805); S.N.O., Ramsgate; V.A., Dover (589); S.N.O., Gt. Yarmouth (615); R.A., Brightlingsea (499).

Sent 6 p.m.

All Customs authorities between Dundee and Ramsgate, both inclusive, have been ordered to stop all sailing of British and Allied merchant and fishing vessels from their ports. (1800.)

**B 12.** C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. (658). Sent 6.42 p.m.  
 Recd. 6.55 p.m.  
 Fleet will be fuelled and at 2 hours' notice by 7 p.m.

**B 13.** Adty. to A.C., Rosyth (528); R.A., East Coast (822); S.N.O., Lowestoft (319); Comm. (T) (927); Capt. (S), *Maidstone* (362); Capt. (S), *Titania*; Comm., Harwich (350); C.-in-C., Nore (812); V.A., Dover (591). Sent 6.45 p.m.

*Secret.*

Be judicious in acting on following directions, and do not raise a scare, as we are only preparing for an emergency, which may not materialise. Do not inform military; they will be informed through G.H.Q. Local Defence Flotillas, submarines, and aircraft should be in readiness for a demonstration by enemy to-night or to-morrow morning. Submarines should be outside harbour, but in signal touch, ready to move before daylight to-morrow. Aircraft should scout at daybreak, weather permitting. Should enemy be reported, all aircraft within reach should attack.

**B 14.** C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. (659). Sent 7.2 p.m.  
 Recd. 7.11 p.m.  
 659 Urgent. Propose Battle Cruiser Fleet leave when ready, steer down M Channel, and that 5th Battle Squadron precede me in support.

**B 15.** Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. (60). Sent 7.5 p.m.  
 Afloat Invergordon (395).  
 V.A., B.C.F. (714).  
 V.A., 3rd B.S. (577).  
 Grand Fleet raise steam and prepare for sea.

**B 16.** Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. (61). Sent 7.15 p.m.  
 Your 654. Weather is not bad further south, and you should proceed to sea with Grand Fleet and concentrate as necessary to intercept enemy forces. Further information as to enemy movements will follow.

<sup>1</sup> Based on German signal. Appendix C 1. T.S.D.D.

**B 17.** C.-in-C., H.F., to V.A., B.C.F. Sent 7.15 p.m.  
 Priority. Urgent. Have proposed to Admiralty you should leave when ready and go down M Channel, 5th Battle Squadron and 4th Light Cruiser Squadron will leave Scapa 9.30 p.m. at 20 knots to support you. Battle Fleet at 10.30, at 18 knots. 1st and 2nd Scouting Groups in lat. 54° 12', long. 6° 45' E, at 3 p.m., steering to north-westward. Main fleet out. Do not get engaged with superior forces until I can support you. (1915.) Acknowledge. (2004.)

**B 18.** Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. (62). Sent 7.30 p.m.  
 Your 659 approved.

**B 19.** Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. (63). Sent 7.50 p.m.  
 63 Your 657. Position 54° 12' N, 6° 45' W<sup>1</sup> at about 3 p.m. This is cancelled by later information.

**B 20.** C.-in-C., H.F., to V.A., B.C.F. Sent 7.51 p.m.  
 My 1915. Admiralty approve. Proceed as proposed. Report time of leaving. Weather bad here. 5th Battle Squadron may be delayed and will probably drop destroyers. (1951.) See B17.

**B 21.** Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. (64). Sent 8 p.m.  
 V.A., B.C.F. (715). Sent 8.10 p.m.  
 Comm. (T) (929).

Urgent. *Seydlitz* has been damaged by a mine and is returning. At 7.30 p.m. 1st and 2nd Scouting Groups will be in lat. 53° 37' N, long. 5° 25' E, steering west-north-west, 20 knots; 3rd Battle Squadron passes lat. 53° 48' N, long. 7° 0' E, at 7.45 p.m., and then passes through lat. 53° 38' N, long. 6° 8' E, eventually steering south-west at 14 knots from lat. 53° 55' N, long. 5° 0' E. The 3rd Battle Squadron is apparently leading the 1st and 2nd Battle Squadron. No information as to distribution of flotillas.

**B 22.** Adty. to Capt. (S), *Maidstone* (363). Sent 8.2 p.m.  
 Comm. (T) (930). Recd. Capt. (S) 8.27 p.m.

Urgent. Send one destroyer and six submarines to lat. 52° 10' N, long. 3° 5' E, by daybreak to-morrow. Their objective will be large German ships steering to south-west. Report name of destroyer sent, and warn her to look out for messages. If submarines get out of touch they should return to-morrow after 7 p.m. (2002.)

**B 23.** C.-in-C., H.F., to *Titania*. Sent 8.25 p.m.  
 Available submarines to be spread on a line 180° and 360° 15 miles east (true) of mouth of Tyne by daylight. *Trident* to be looking out to south-eastward. (2025.)

**B 24.** Adty. to Comm., Harwich. Sent 8.40 p.m.  
 352 Withdraw auxiliary patrols to the vicinity of the port or coast.

**B 25.** C.-in-C., H.F., to V.A., 1st B.S. Sent 8.40 p.m.  
 R.A., 7th C.S.

Fleet concentrate on plan No. 2, S.F.O. 26<sup>2</sup>; after passing D 3 steer for lat. 55° 30' N, long. 0° 30' E. *Iron Duke* will pass through B4 at 3.45 a.m., steaming 17 knots. (2040.)

<sup>1</sup> This was the correct position where *Seydlitz* was mined, but the 1st Scouting Group was no longer going north-west. (T.S.D.D.)

<sup>2</sup> Secret Fleet Order 26, Alternative Routes for Concentrating in the North Sea is in H.S. 265/82. D3 is lat. 57° 47' N, long. 1° 05' W; B4 is lat. 58° 25' N, long. 1° 0' W. (T.S.D.D.)

**B 26.** C.-in-C., H.F., to V.A.s, 2nd and 4th B.S.  
R.A., 2nd and 4th B.S.  
Capt. (D), XI and IV. Sent 8.41 p.m.

After passing through A4, B4, C4<sup>1</sup> steer for lat. 55° 30', long. 0° 30' E. Assume L.S. 1—16 at daylight. Battle Fleet form divisions in line ahead, disposed abeam, to starboard, in Organisation 5.

**B 27.** C.-in-C., H.F., to *Titania*. Sent 10.3 p.m.

My 2025. Place submarines on line 360° from lat. 54° 44' N, long 0° 50' W. *Trident* to eastward by 4 a.m. Look out for enemy battle cruisers. (2203.)

**B 28.** Adty. to Comm. (T) (931).  
C.-in-C., H.F. (67).  
V.A., B.C.F. (717). Sent 10.20 p.m.  
Capt. (S) (364). Recd. Capt. (S) 10.42 p.m.

Enemy battle fleet will leave lat. 53° 55' N, long. 5° E, about 11.45 p.m. (G.M.T.), steering south-west, 14 knots. Light cruisers should be in 52° 27' N, long. 3° 27' E by daybreak, avoiding our submarines stationed in lat. 52° 10' N, long. 3° 5' E, and then proceed slowly to north-eastward; if touch is obtained with enemy retire to south-west, and draw enemy past submarines. Arrange for a destroyer to communicate this to the submarines' destroyer by visual after daybreak. "L" class destroyers from Nore and Harwich destroyers should rendezvous after daybreak in lat. 52° 0' N, long. 2° 50' E, and follow your orders. Nore informed.

**B 29.** Adty. to C.-in-C., Nore. Sent 10.30 p.m.

815 "L" class destroyers which were escorting minelayers should proceed to join destroyers from Harwich in lat. 52° N, long. 2° 50' E, meeting them as soon as possible after daybreak. Six Harwich submarines will be stationed in lat. 52° 10' N, long. 2° 50' E. (2230.)

**B 30.** C.-in-C., H.F., to V.A., 3rd B.S. Sent 10.40 p.m.

Priority. Urgent. 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron proceed to position 20 miles, 80°, from Farn Island, and watch northern exit from Tyne area. (2240.)

**B 31.** Adty. to Capt. (S). Recd. 10.53 p.m.

Yarmouth submarines should be at gun range off Yarmouth at daylight. Make number up to six.

**B 32.** Adty. to Comm. (T) (933).  
C.-in-C., G.F. (69).  
V.A., B.C.F. (718). Sent 11.40 p.m.

Enemy movements. Battle cruisers will be in lat. 52° 40' N, long. 3° 30' E, at 1.30 a.m., and then steer W½N towards Yarmouth. Battle Fleet will be in 52° 32' N, long. 3° 32' E, at 6.45 a.m.<sup>2</sup>

**B 33.** Adty. to V.A., Dover (592). Sent 11.40 p.m.

In view of strong enemy forces coming south-west from Terschelling to-night, you should stop operations off Belgian coast and keep your forces well concentrated for local defence.

**B 34.** Adty. to Comm., Harwich (353). Sent 11.55 p.m.

*Vindex* seaplanes, with bombs, should start at earliest dawn and fly up coast to Yarmouth to attack any enemy ship sighted.

<sup>1</sup> A4 is lat. 54° 30' N, long. 0° 45' W (30 miles, 360°, from concentration point). C4 is lat. 58° 20' N, long. 1° 15' W. (H.S. 265/82, T.S.D.D.)

<sup>2</sup> An important signal, giving the intended position of *Lutzow* at 1.30 a.m., and course W½N towards Yarmouth, was available about 11.30 p.m., and was embodied in above. See C13. (T.S.D.D.)

25th April 1916.

**B 35.** Adty. to all ships (Cleethorpes). Sent 4.30 a.m.  
Enemy ships firing on Lowestoft at 4.10 a.m. (0420.)

**B 36.** Comm. (T) to Adty. Sent 4.54 a.m.  
Enemy bombarding Lowestoft. (0410.)

**B 37.** Adty. to all ships. Sent 5 a.m.  
91 Gorleston reports battle cruisers steaming north; heavy firing. (0500.)

**B 38.** Adty. to all ships. 6 a.m.  
Aldeburgh reports at 5.20 a.m. light cruisers. Destroyers, battle cruisers bearing north east, 9 miles, steaming south, full speed.

**B 39.** Adty. to all ships. Sent 6.30 a.m.  
Aldeburgh reports enemy battle cruisers in sight at 5.40 a.m., steering east, high speed. (0630.)

**B 40.** Stockton to Adty. Recd. 7.48 a.m.  
Transmit to Adty. from Comm. (T).

Harwich force heavily shelled and driven off by battle cruisers and light cruisers. Am endeavouring to regain touch. Destroyers 10 miles astern my position 6.30 a.m. 52 V.E.

**B 41.** Adty. to Comm. (T). Sent 8 a.m.  
Return 0800.

*Note.*—Passed by Ipswich 8.26 a.m., received *Penelope* 8.35, repeated 0925.

**B 42.** Adty. to Comm. (T).  
C.-in-C.  
V.A., B.C.F. Sent 8.5 a.m.

("I" method from Aberdeen to R.A., Scapa.)

At 6 a.m. enemy battle fleet was in lat. 53° 3' N, long. 3° 55' E,<sup>1</sup> steering east north east, 15 knots. 2nd Scouting Group at 6 a.m. in lat. 52° 55' N, long. 2° 45' E. 1st Scouting Group course E, 21 knots.

**B 43.** Aldeburgh to Adty. Recd. 8.24 a.m.

967 From C. G., Thorpe, to Air Station, Felixstowe. Forced landing at Thorpeness. Sighted hostile submarine 5 miles off Thorpeness, steering due south, 6 a.m.; also enemy fleet bearing south east, pursued by our ships. From Sadler, Pilot of 8159 machine.

**B 44.** Adty. to R.A., East Coast.  
Capt., Lowestoft.  
Comm., Harwich.  
C.-in-C., Nore.  
V.A., Dover. Sent 9.55 a.m.

Auxiliary patrol vessels and minesweepers may be sent out. Merchant ship traffic may be resumed between Downs and Harwich and between Forth and Cromer. Traffic between Harwich and Cromer is to remain stopped until routes have been swept.

**B 45.** Adty. to R.A., East Coast. Sent 10.55 a.m.  
Resume normal conditions as regards local defence flotillas.

**B 46.** Adty. to C.-in-C.  
V.A., B.C.F.  
(Cypher "W.")

Return to Bases. (1110.)

<sup>1</sup> Practically same position as in German plan. (T.S.D.D.)  
(C9615)

26th April 1916.

B 47. Adty. to C-in-C., H.F. Sent 7 p.m.

81 Besides bombarding Lowestoft and Yarmouth on Tuesday morning, a force of light cruisers and destroyers swept down Belgian coast in search of our patrols which had been withdrawn to protect shipping in the Downs. The enemy have practically tested our weakness in southern waters, and will probably again act on the offensive in these waters shortly. The 5th Light Cruiser Squadron is reduced to one ship till the others are repaired, plus *Aurora* shortly. Until we are in a better position to meet these attacks in the south, we must call on your resources to safeguard southern waters. What do you propose?

27th April 1916.

B 48. C-in-C., H.F., to Adty. 2.38 p.m.

Your 81. Enemy must long been fully aware of our dispositions in south from reports of their submarines working there and reports from neutral vessels. Propose 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron, with *Hampshire*, proceed south at once and be based either in Swin Channel, at Sheerness, or Dover. They should have half flotilla from Harwich as screen until 13th Destroyer Flotilla comprises eight efficient destroyers, when one half of 1st Destroyer Flotilla will be sent instead. Position of base must depend on facilities for exit, with comparative safety from mines. . . . 3rd Battle Squadron will be sufficiently strong covering force to encounter enemy battle cruisers at present strength. Propose *Dreadnought* join when refitted. Propose 7th Submarine Flotilla . . . should be based on Yarmouth. Those with submarines of 8th Flotilla . . . should be ample defence against bombarding raids in that part of the coast, but defences would be strengthened if minefields were laid to eastward of coast . . . Propose patrol of three or four submarines of 8th Flotilla be constantly kept in area enclosed between line drawn 35 miles, 300°, from Terschelling Bank Light Vessel and Haaks Light Vessel . . . Propose alterations to Rosyth and Humber obstructions be pressed with the greatest energy, so that 1st Battle Squadron and 1st Cruiser Squadron can be moved Humber, and remainder of Battle Fleet to Firth of Forth, as proposed in mine of 26th April by messenger this morning.

29th April 1916.

B 49. C-in-C., H.F., to Adty. Sent 1.20 a.m.

Your 113. Following message sent to V.A.C., 3rd Battle Squadron, 28th April (begins). Admiralty direct that 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron are to proceed to Sheerness, which will be your future base, being escorted to Humber by T.B.D.s from Rosyth, after which Harwich T.B.D.s will escort. Leave as convenient to morrow, 29th April, proceed by M Channel until in lat. 55° N, long. 0° 20' E, thence to Humber. . . .

## APPENDIX D.

## Signals. C-in-C. Grand Fleet.

25th April 1916.

- D 1.** *Owl* to Capt. D.4. 3.10 a.m.  
We are shipping heavy seas. (0250.)
- D 2.** Comm. (T) to C-in-C. Recd. 4.36 a.m.  
Enemy report of four battle cruisers of 0405. See E 22.
- D 3.** Comm. (T) to C-in-C. Recd. 4.32 a.m.  
Enemy report of six light cruisers of 0406. See E 28.
- D 4.** Comm. (T) to C-in-C. Recd. *Iron Duke* 4.46 a.m.  
S.O., B.C.F.  
Enemy steering ESE. (0430.)
- D 5.** Flag to *Tipperary* (S.L.). 6.40 a.m.  
What ships have you in sight?  
*Reply.*  
Yourself only and 4th Flotilla. Permission to take station astern of you.  
What is your name, please?
- D 6.** Flag to *Tipperary* (S.L.). 6.55 a.m.  
What speed can you maintain without damage.  
*Reply.*  
Fifteen at present, but sea is rising.
- D 7.** C-in-C. to A.C., 1st, 2nd, 4th B.S. 6.54 a.m.  
A.C., 1st 2nd, 7th C.S.  
Capt. (D) 4 and 11, *Carysfort*.  
My position at 7 a.m., lat. 57° 26' N, long. 0° 30' W. Course, S 1 W.  
Speed of advance, 17 knots. (0646.)
- D 8.** *Orion* to Flag. 7.20 a.m.  
*Marlborough* is on my starboard beam.
- D 9.** Flag to *Castor*. 7.40 a.m.  
Do not drive destroyers; reduce speed if necessary. (0732.)
- D 10.** Flag to *Marksman*. 7.52 a.m.  
Collect your destroyers; join *Faulknor*. Reduce to safe speed. (0750.)
- D 11.** *Marlborough* to Flag. 7.55 a.m.  
4th Battle Squadron in sight, but not *King George V*.
- D 12.** C-in-C. to A.C., 2nd B.S. 8.32 a.m.  
Am in company with Battle Fleet, except your division; advancing 15 knots from 8 to 9 a.m. Try to get in touch. (0756.)
- D 13.** C-in-C. to Capt. (D.4). 8.5 a.m.  
Steer direct for 55° 30' N, 0° 30' E. (0750.)
- D 14.** C-in-C. to *Castor*. 7.47 a.m.  
Collect your destroyers, place them under orders of *Kempfenfelt*, with orders to follow me at safe speed, and then come after *Iron Duke* in *Castor*. My course, S 1 W; speed, 17 knots. (0735.)
- D 15.** Flag to General. 8 a.m.  
Reference position 7.45 a.m., 57° 14' N, 0° 26' W.
- D 16.** Flag to General. 8.30 a.m.  
Assume Organisation No. 5.<sup>1</sup> Form divisions in line ahead, columns disposed abeam to starboard. Columns to be 6 cables apart. Course, south. Admiral intends to proceed 15 knots.

<sup>1</sup> Battle Fleet in six divisions, as at Jutland. (T.S.D.D.)

- D 17.** Flag to General. 9 a.m.  
Have steam for full speed at  $\frac{1}{2}$  hour's notice.
- D 18.** C.-in-C. to *Kempfenfelt*, Capt. (D.4).  
Capt. (D.12). 9.15 a.m.  
Bring destroyers on as the sea permits. My course south, advancing 17 knots.
- D 19.** Flag to General. 9.27 a.m.  
Take up L.T.3 disposition.<sup>1</sup>  
Dreadnought Fleet in six divisions is in divisions disposed abeam; 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th Divisions each in single line ahead, columns 6 cables apart; the wing divisions, 1st and 6th, each in single quarter line outwards; ships in columns, 4 cables apart; distance between 1st and 2nd, and between 5th and 6th Divisions, 8 cables.—From G.F.B.O. December 1915. (H.S. 289.) (T.S.D.D.)
- D 20.** C.-in-C. to R.A., 5th B.S. 10 a.m.  
Increase to 22 knots. (0942.)
- D 21.** Flag to General. 10 a.m.  
Admiral intends to proceed 17 knots.
- D 22.** Flag to *Boadicea*. 10.20 a.m.  
Where is *K.G.V.* ?
- D 23.** Flag to *Carysfort*. 10.11 a.m.  
Did you see the flotillas as you passed ?
- D 24.** *Carysfort* to Flag. 10.20 a.m.  
I passed 1 mile to port of 12th Flotilla at 9.10 a.m., 9 miles astern of you, and 1 mile to starboard of 11th Flotilla at 9.35 a.m., 7 miles astern of you.
- D 25.** Flag to General. 10.38 a.m.  
Admiral intends to proceed 18 knots.
- D 26.** S.O., 3rd Battle Squadron, to C.-in-C. 10.17 a.m.  
My p.c. and s.  $55^{\circ} 47' N$ ,  $0^{\circ} 55' W$ ; S37E; 16 knots.
- D 27.** C.-in-C. to *Bonaventure*, *Hebe*, *Bonetta*, *Quail*, *Ernest*.  
10.36 a.m.  
Send submarines in and return to Tyne now. (0935.)
- D 28.** C.-in-C., S.O., 1st, 2nd, 7th Cruiser Squadrons.  
*Kempfenfelt*, *Faulknor* and *Tipperary*.  
10.54 a.m.  
My speed of advance 19 knots from 11 a.m. (1045.)
- D 29.** C.-in-C. to *Titania*. Sent 11.3 a.m.  
Withdraw submarines. (1103.)
- D 30.** Flag to *King George V*. 11.5 a.m.  
Take up L.T.3 disposition. My course, south; speed, 18 knots.
- D 31.** V.A., 5th B.S., to C.-in-C. 11.11 a.m.  
My position 11 a.m.,  $55^{\circ} 10' N$ ,  $0^{\circ} 36' E$ .
- D 32.** C.-in-C. to A.C. 1st, 2nd, 7th C.S. 12.25 p.m.  
Close. My noon position, lat.  $56^{\circ} 07' N$ , long.  $0^{\circ} E$ . (1200.) Course, south; speed of advance, 19 knots.

<sup>1</sup> Cruising Order No. 3 (L.T.3). Fleet in Organisation No. 5. H.S. 289.

- D 33.** C.-in-C. to *Kempfenfelt*, *Faulknor*, *Tipperary*. 1.6 p.m.  
I am turning about 1 p.m. Look out for me. (1204.)
- D 34.** R.A., *Cyclops*, to R.A., Invergordon. 12.8 p.m.  
For C.-in-C. by interceptions. Hostile submarine<sup>1</sup> reported by pilot of machine 25 in  $52^{\circ} 11' N$ ,  $1^{\circ} 46' E$ , steering south, at 6 a.m. Aberdeen 0902.

### Signals S.O. B.C.F.\*

\* *Lion's* Signal Log.

25th April 1916.

- D 35.** In company B.C.F. (neg. *New Zealand*, *Australia* and *Gloucester*). *Botha* and half-flotilla.
- D 35a.** S.O., B.C.F., to *Botha*. 12.2 a.m.  
My course and speed are S74E, 22 knots. (2350.)
- D 36.** S.O., B.C.F., to 1st Flotilla. 12.11 a.m.  
Cease communication by W/T, except on sighting enemy or replying to Admiral.
- D 37.** S.O., B.C.F. to S.O., 3rd B.C.S.; *Cordelia*; S.O., 1st L.C.S.;  
S.O., 2nd L.C.S.; S.O., 3rd L.C.S.  
2.23 a.m.  
Admiral intends to proceed at 20 knots at 2.30 a.m. (0214.)
- D 38.** Flag to General. 2.30 a.m.  
Speed 20 knots.
- D 39.** *Botha* to Flag (S.L.). 2.10 a.m.  
Destroyers are getting damaged.
- D 40.** *Botha* to Flag (S.L.). 4 a.m.  
I have only three destroyers in sight; two of them are about 2 miles astern of station.
- D 41.** Flag to *Tiger* (S.L.). 4.5 a.m.  
Can you see 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron?  
(Reply 4.20, No.)
- D 42.** Comm. (T) to S.O., B.C.F. Recd. 4.10 a.m.  
Urgent. Four enemy battle cruisers in sight, bearing north, steering north-west. My position  $52^{\circ} 4' N$ ,  $1^{\circ} 57' E$ . (0405.)  
Recd. Admiralty 4.15; recd. *Iron Duke* 4.36. (T.S.D.D.)
- D 43.** Comm. (T) to S.O., B.C.F. Recd. 4.32 a.m.  
Urgent. Six enemy light cruisers in sight, bearing north, steering north-west. My position  $52^{\circ} 4' N$ ,  $1^{\circ} 57' E$ . (0406.)
- D 44.** *Lion* to General. 4.15 a.m.  
Take up cruiser disposition No. 3.
- D 45.** Flag to *Botha*. 4.30 a.m.  
Collect your destroyers and proceed utmost despatch to lat.  $54^{\circ} N$ , long.  $4^{\circ} E$ . Repeat back position. (0415.)
- D 46.** Flag to S.O., 3rd B.C.S. 4.30 a.m.  
Close nearer to Admiral. Take up cruising disposition No. 3.
- D 47.** Flag to General. 4.45 a.m.  
Speed of advance, 22 knots.

<sup>1</sup> Probably one of the U.B. boats off Orfordness. (T.S.D.D.)

- D 48.** Flag to light cruiser. 4.44 a.m.  
Take up station as per diagram No. 6. Centre position to bear SE by S.  
Line of direction, SW by W.
- D 49.** Comm. (T) to C.-in-C. S.O., B.C.F. Recd. 4.50 a.m.<sup>1</sup>  
Enemy steering ESE. (0430.)
- D 50.** R.A., Falmouth, to Flag. 4.50 a.m.  
Am I to keep visual touch with you or 8 miles?  
*Reply.*  
Visual touch.
- D 51.** S.O., B.C.F., to S.O., 3rd B.C.S. 5.43 a.m.  
Speed, 23 knots.
- D 52.** Flag to General. 6.5 a.m.  
Reference position 6 a.m., 54° 58' N, 0° 33' E.
- D 53.** Flag to Light Cruisers. 6.14 a.m.  
Shall alter course to S61E about 8.5 a.m. Light cruisers to alter course  
beforehand so that centre of screen bears S61E. Line of direction, NE by E.
- D 54.** Comm. (T) to C.-in-C. S.O., B.C.F. Recd. Adty. 6.45 a.m.  
*Lion* 6.45 a.m.  
Have lost touch with enemy. Have been engaged and am damaged.  
Endeavouring to regain touch; have left destroyers in V Channel; enemy's  
position 5.5 a.m. was 52° 25' N, 1° 52' E, steering east fast. (600.)  
Not in *Iron Duke* (w). (T.S.D.D.)
- D 55.** *Botha* to Tynemouth S.S. for S.O., B.C.F. 7.17 a.m.  
1st Destroyer Flotilla compelled to reduce to 15 knots. (0710.)
- D 56.** Flag to *Invincible*. 7.20 a.m.  
What speed are you making now, and what speed can you make  
comfortably?  
*Reply to both questions.*  
25 knots.
- D 57.** Flag to R.A., *Invincible*. 7.38 a.m.  
When we alter course at 8.5, take station N61W, 2 miles, and form line  
abreast to port.
- D 58.** Flag to 1st Division. 7.50 a.m.  
Take station on a compass line of bearing N29E.
- D 59.** Flag to General. 8.2 a.m.  
Turn together to S61E.
- D 60.** Flag to Light Cruisers. 8.7 a.m.  
Distance apart of pairs to be increased to 5 miles, but visual touch is to  
be maintained. (0805.)
- D 61.** Flag to *Queen Mary* and *Tiger*. 8.16 a.m.  
What speed do you think we are going?  
*Reply.*  
*Queen Mary*, 23.5 knots; *Tiger*, 23 knots.
- D 62.** Comm. (T) to S.O., B.C.F. (via *Penelope* and *Stockton*). 8.51 a.m.  
My position 8 a.m., 52° 48' N; course, ENE; 24 knots. Am not in touch  
with enemy. (0805.)

<sup>1</sup> Recd. *Iron Duke* 4.46. (T.S.D.D.)

- D 63.** Comm. (T) to S.O., B.C.F. 8.54 a.m.  
Have sighted a large amount of smoke as from a fleet bearing ENE. (0830.)  
Recd. Admiralty 8.56. (T.S.D.D.)
- D 64.** S.O., B.C.F., to Comm. (T). 8.42 a.m.  
Sweep north-east with Harwich Force to regain touch. My position,  
course, and speed at 8 a.m., 83 D.R. 90, S61E, 23 knots. (0820.)
- D 65.** Flag to General. 9.45 a.m.  
Speed, 24 knots.
- D 66.** V.A., *Lion*, to R.A., *Princess Royal*. 9.45 a.m.  
I am afraid we are beat.  
*Reply.*  
Yes, I do not think we shall catch them; they will probably keep close to  
Terschelling, and then along the coast.
- D 67.** Flag *Invincible* to Flag *Lion*. 10.5 a.m.  
Following received from *Indomitable*. Begins. My W/I officer informed  
me that signals, apparently of a squadron from four to five ships, have  
increased from seven to nine during the last half-hour 0945. Ends. 1000.  
*Reply.*  
Thank you; I still have hopes.
- D 68.** Flag to Light Cruisers. 10.25 a.m.  
Assume complete readiness for action in every respect by 11.45 a.m.
- D 69.** Flag to Battle Cruisers. 10.25 a.m.  
Assume complete readiness for action in every respect by noon.
- D 70.** Flag *Lion* to Light Cruisers. 11.45 a.m.  
If nothing is sighted and no information received by 1 o'clock, course is  
to be altered 16 points to starboard and speed reduced to 20 knots advance  
without further orders.
- D 71.** Flag to General. 11.47 a.m.  
Reference position noon, 53° 58' N, 4° 2' E.
- D 72.** C.-in-C. to S.O., B.C.F. 12.9 a.m.  
Admiralty Telegram 1110.<sup>1</sup> Have you turned?
- D 73.** *Lion* to *Princess Royal*. 12.16 a.m.  
Have you received Admiralty message 1110?  
*Reply*—No.
- D 74.** Flag *Lion* to *Inflexible*. 12.15 a.m.  
Urgent. Have you received Admiralty message 1110<sup>1</sup>? If so, pass it on.
- D 75.** Flag to General. 12.30 a.m.  
Turn together 16 points to starboard.
- D 76.** *Inflexible* to Flag *Lion*. 12.36 a.m.  
This message has not been received in *Inflexible*.

<sup>1</sup> See B46. Made from Aberdeen, "I" method. Did not reach B.C.F.



### Signals R.A., 5th B.S., to 5th B.S.

(*Barham's* Signal Log.)

- D 77.** R.A. 5 to General. 4 a.m.  
Speed, 16 knots.
- D 78.** R.A. 5 to 5th B.S. 4.25 a.m.  
Ships in column to be 3 cables apart.
- D 79.** R.A. 5 to *Dublin* and destroyers. 4.45 a.m.  
Take station ahead.
- D 80.** R.A. 5 to General. 5 a.m.  
Speed, 20 knots.
- D 81.** R.A. 5 to *Dublin*. 5.40 a.m.  
Are destroyers still astern of squadron?  
*Reply.*  
Lost sight of destroyers at 3 a.m.  
*Note.*—4th Light Cruiser Squadron right ahead. 7.15 a.m.
- D 82.** R.A. 5 to General. 7.20 a.m.  
Raise steam for full speed.
- D 83.** R.A. 5 to General. 7.35 a.m.  
Speed, 21 knots.
- D 84.** R.A. 5 to *Calliope*. 7.40 a.m.  
I am ordered to follow battle cruisers through M Channel. Raise steam for full speed at 1 hour's notice.
- D 85.** R.A. 5 to General. 8.18 a.m.  
Prepare for 23 knots, 8.30 a.m.
- D 86.** *Calliope* to R.A. 5. 8.54 a.m.  
Regret can find no information regarding M Chart on board. Request salient points. (0840.) See D 89.
- D 87.** R.A. 5 to 5th B.S. 8.55 a.m.  
Take station 7 points abaft starboard beam.
- D 88.** R.A. 5 to General. 9.15 a.m.  
Indicate 8 a.m. position.  
*Replies.*  
*Barham*, 56° 17' N, 0° 2' E; *Warspite* 56° 14', 0° 4' E; *Malaya* 56° 19' N, 0° 5' E; *Queen Elizabeth*, 56° 20' N, 0° 2' E; *Valiant*, 56° 27' N, 0° 4' E.
- D 89.** R.A. 5 to *Calliope*. 9.30 a.m.  
Your 0840. 10 miles either side of a line through B. 55° 36' N, 0° 27' W; C. 54° 23' N, 1° 28' E; D. 54° 8' N, 3° 8' E. Full information in H.F. 005 of 15th January, 1915. (0900.) See D 86.
- D 90.** R.A. 5 to C.-in-C. 11.9 a.m.  
My position at 11 a.m., 55° 10' N, 0° 36' E. (1100.)
- D 91.** R.A. 5 to General. 12.50 p.m.  
Turn together to S27E.
- D 92.** R.A. 5 to *Calliope* and *Dublin*. 1.6 p.m.  
Course will be altered to S62E at 1.25 p.m.
- D 93.** R.A. 5 to General. 1.14 p.m.  
Form single ahead.

- D 94.** R.A. 5 to General. 1.38 p.m.  
Turn together 16 points to starboard.
- D 95.** C.-in-C. to Capt. D.4, 11, 12. 1.36 p.m.  
I am not turning yet. (1334.)
- D 96.** R.A. 5 to General. 1.47 p.m.  
Turn together 16 points to starboard.
- D 97.** R.A. 5 to General to C.-in-C. 2.14 p.m.  
S.O., B.C.F. Advance 18 knots.  
My position 2 p.m., 54° 22' N, 1° 38' E. Course, S62E. Request orders.
- D 98.** R.A. 5 to General. 2.23 p.m.  
Alter course in succession 16 points to starboard.

### 3rd B.S.

#### Signals of 3rd B.S. (Rosyth).

Vice-Admiral Sir E. Bradford.

(*Britannia's* Signal Log.)

#### 24th April 1916.

- D 99.** S.O., 3rd B.S. to 3rd B.S. 10.22 p.m.  
3rd C.S.  
*Diamond, Fearless, Nomad, Sandly.*
- Steam ready at 1 hour's notice.
- 25th April 1916.**
- D 100.** S.O., 3rd B.S. to 3rd B.S. 1.34 a.m.  
3rd C.S.  
*Diamond.* Unmoor.  
Raise steam for 12 knots by 2.45 a.m.
- D 101.** Flag *Antrim* to Flag *Britannia*. 2.50 a.m.  
Ready to proceed.
- D 102.** S.O., 3rd B.S. to 3rd B.S.<sup>1</sup> 3.21 a.m.  
*Britannia, Commonwealth, Zealandia* form single line ahead; speed, 10 knots.
- D 103.** Flag to Cruisers. 4.20 a.m.  
Take station ahead 3 miles.
- D 104.** Flag to Destroyers. 4.50 a.m.  
Form submarine screen for cruisers.
- D 105.** Flag to General. 5.55 a.m.  
Speed, 15 knots.
- D 106.** Flag to 3rd B.S. 7.30 a.m.  
Form divisions in line ahead, columns disposed abeam to starboard; columns to be 5 cables apart.
- D 107.** Flag to Cruisers. 7.46 a.m.  
Cruisers spread for look out duties on a straight line, 3 miles apart; guide to bear S37E, 15 miles from Admiral.

<sup>1</sup> *Hindustan* had foul cable, and joined later with *Africa*. (T.S.D.D.)

**D 108.** S.O., 3rd B.S., to S.O., 3rd C.S. 9.30 a.m.  
On arrival 55° 36' N, 0° 28' W, steer 138° and pass through M Channel.  
Repeat back position and course.

**D 109.** Flag *Britannia* to Flag *Hibernia*.  
*Royalist* and two destroyers from Tyne and 3rd Battle Squadron have been ordered to join C.-in-C. at 1530 in 55° N, 0° 30' E.<sup>1</sup>

**D 110.** Flag to General. 1.12 p.m.  
Alter course in succession 16 points outwards.

## APPENDIX E.

### Signals, Commodore (T). 5th L.C.S. (Harwich).

24th April 1916.

**E 1<sup>2</sup>.** Adty. to Comm. (T). Sent 11.25 p.m.  
932 *Melampus* has been ordered to take submarines to a position north-east, 33 miles, from previous position, and then leave them. Keep clear of them, and act according to circumstances.

**E 2.** Comm. (T) to Light Cruisers (lamp).  
Raise steam for full speed and report when ready to proceed.

25th April 1916.

**E 3.** Note in *Conquest* (s). 12.5 a.m.  
Slipped, and proceeded.

**E 4.** *Nimrod* to Comm. (T). Sent 12.15 a.m.  
Ready to proceed.

**E 5.** Comm. (T) to Light Cruisers. Sent 12.16 a.m.  
Speed, 10 knots.  
(And at 12.45.—Speed, 15 knots.)

**E 6.** *Nimrod* to 10th Flotilla. Sent 12.57 a.m.  
Slip.

**E 7.** *Nimrod* to General. Sent 1.15 a.m.  
Form single line ahead in sequence of fleet numbers. Speed, 12 knots.

**E 8.** *Nimrod* to General (lamp). Sent 1.45 a.m.  
Pass up line names of destroyers in company.

*Reply.*  
*Loyal, Laertes, Linnet, Lochinvar, Legion, Lassoo, Miranda, Lysander.*

**E 9.** Comm. (T) to General. Sent 2.5 a.m.  
Ships should be at action stations by 2.30.

**E 10.** Comm. (T) to General. Sent 2.15 p.m.  
Speed, 19 knots.  
(And at 2.55.—Speed, 15 knots.)

<sup>1</sup> About 65 miles east of Tyne. (T.S.D.D.)

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 230/485.

**E 11.** Comm. (T) to Destroyers. Sent 3.20 a.m.  
Destroyers take up night cruising order, port beam.

**E 12.** Note in *Nimrod* (s).  
Sighted submarine.<sup>1</sup> 3.30 a.m.  
Sounded six shorts on syren; fired Very's light. 3.33 a.m.  
Challenge. Reply.<sup>1</sup> 3.34 a.m.

**E 13.** *Nimrod* to General. Sent 3.33 a.m.  
Submarine in sight, starboard side.

**E 14.** *Penelope* to Comm. (T). Sent 3.48 a.m.  
Attention is called ENE.

**E 15.** Note in *Conquest*. 4 a.m.  
Sighted enemy.

**E 16.** Note in *Cleopatra* (s). 3.47 a.m.  
Sighted enemy's light cruisers and destroyers.

**E 17.** Note in *Nimrod* (s). 3.45 a.m.  
Sighted enemy firing from three ships.

**E 18.** Note in *Penelope* (s). 3.58 a.m.  
Five T.B.D.S and four submarines sighted (four with three funnels and one with four).

**E 19.** Comm. (T) to General (Flags). 3.58 a.m.<sup>2</sup>  
Course, WSW.

**E 20.** Note in *Nimrod* (s). 4 a.m.  
Sighted strange cruisers. Enemy consisted of four battle cruisers, six or seven light cruisers, and about twelve T.B.D.s.

**E 21.** Comm. (T) to General. 4.02 a.m.<sup>3</sup>  
Course, S14W; 25 knots.

**E 22.** Comm. (T) to C.-in-C. and S.O., B.C.F. 4.10 a.m.  
Four battle cruisers, probably hostile, in sight, bearing north. Course, NW.  
My position, 52° 24' N, 1° 57' E. (0405.)  
Recd. *Lion* 4.10. *Iron Duke* 4.36. (T.S.D.D.)

**E 23.** Comm. (T) to General. Sent 4.12 a.m.  
Form in cruising order No. 9.<sup>4</sup> Speed, 20 knots.

**E 24.** Note in *Conquest* (s). 4.15 a.m.  
Submarine<sup>5</sup> sighted port bow (British).

**E 25.** Comm. (T) to General. Sent 4.15 a.m.  
Course, SW by S.

**E 26.** Comm. (T) to General Sent 4.18 a.m.<sup>6</sup>  
Course, W.

<sup>1</sup> D.6. (T.S.D.D.)

<sup>2</sup> *Cleopatra* (s), 3.54.

<sup>3</sup> *Conquest* (s), 4.10; *Penelope* (s), 4.2; *Cleopatra* (s), 4 a.m.

<sup>4</sup> Note (L.T.9).—Light cruisers in single line ahead, destroyers in line ahead (on each side of light cruisers). See Comm. (T) War General Orders, Cruising Formations, 22nd April 1916, in H.S. 475. (T.S.D.D.)

<sup>5</sup> Probably *E.53* or *E.37*. (T.S.D.D.)

<sup>6</sup> *Cleopatra* (s), 4.22.

- E 27.** Note in *Conquest* (s). 4.17 a.m.  
Enemy opened fire on land.
- E 28.** Comm. (T) to C.-in-C. and S.O., B.C.F. 4.29 a.m.<sup>1</sup>  
Six light cruisers bearing north, steering NW, in sight, lat. 52° 24' N, 1° 57' E. (0405.)
- E 29.** Note in *Conquest* (s).  
Opened fire on enemy on starboard bow. 4.34 a.m.  
Enemy opened fire. 4.37 a.m.
- E 30.** Note in *Nimrod* (s). 4.33 a.m.  
*Conquest* fired.
- E 31.** Note in *Penelope* (s). 4.34 a.m.  
Action commenced.
- E 32.** Comm. (T) to General. Sent 4.34 a.m.  
Open fire with 6-in. guns.
- E 33.** Comm. (T) to 9th Flotilla. Sent 4.35 a.m.  
Take station astern of light cruisers.
- E 34.** Note in *Nimrod* (s).  
Firing ahead. 4.42 a.m.  
Enemy opened fire. 4.46 a.m.
- E 35.** Comm. (T) to General. Sent 4.46 a.m.  
Course, S14W; speed, 25 knots.
- E 36.** Comm. (T) to General. Sent 4.52 a.m.  
Scatter. Proceed at utmost speed.
- E 37.** Comm. (T) to 9th and 10th Flotillas. Recd. 4.54 a.m.<sup>2</sup>  
9th and 10th Flotillas take station astern, 5 miles.
- E 38.** Note in *Conquest* (w). 4.55 a.m.  
Aerial shot away.
- E 39.** Comm. (T) to General. Sent 4.30 a.m.  
Course, NW.
- E 40.** Comm. (T) to General. Sent 4.33 a.m.  
Course, NE.
- E 41.** Comm. (T) to C.-in-C. and S.O., B.C.F. Sent 4.30 a.m.  
Recd. 4.50, *Lion* (w).  
Enemy steering ESE. (0430.)
- E 42.** Comm. (T) to S.O., B.C.F. Sent 4.58 a.m.  
Recd. 5.8, *Lion*.  
Urgent. We are being chased WSW by battle cruisers. (0454.)
- E 43.** Comm. (T) to General. Sent 5 a.m.  
Make as much smoke as possible.
- E 44.** Comm. (T) to *Penelope*. Sent 5.20 a.m.  
Pass to V.A., B.C.F., and Recd. 5.56, *Lion*.  
C.-in-C.  
Enemy steering eastward at high speed. (0528.)

<sup>1</sup> *Cleopatra* (s). Recd. *Lion* 4.29, *Iron Duke* 4.32. (T.S.D.D.) <sup>2</sup> *Nimrod* (s).

- E 45.** Comm. (T) to *Nimrod*. Sent 5.40 a.m.  
Take charge of destroyers and remain in vicinity of K Channel.<sup>1</sup> I am going to search for the enemy.
- E 46.** Comm. (T) to Light Cruisers. Sent 5.40 a.m.  
Course, ENE; speed, 20 knots.
- E 47.** Capt. (S) to Comm. (T) (sem.). Sent 5.50 a.m.  
Can you give me last position and course of enemy, as *Melampus* and submarines are proceeding towards Brown Ridge?  
*Reply.*  
Enemy last seen in 52° 25' N, 1° 52' E, going east.
- E 48.** Comm. (T) to *Nimrod*. Sent 6.7 a.m.  
Follow me. Course, ENE; 22 knots; 5 miles astern.
- E 49.** Comm. (T) to Light Cruisers. Sent 6.57 a.m.  
Form line abreast, ships to be 3 miles apart.
- E 50.** *Cleopatra* to Comm. (T). Recd. 7.17 a.m.  
Submarine bearing south-east, about 3 miles; just dived.
- E 51.** Adty. to Comm. (T). Recd. 8.25 a.m.  
Return 0800. Recd. 0915.  
Repeated 0925. Sent 8.47 a.m.
- E 52.** Comm. (T) to General. Sent 8.47 a.m.  
Turn together 16 points to starboard.
- E 53.** Comm. (T) to Light Cruisers. Sent 8.52 a.m.  
Close in to 1 mile.
- E 54.** Comm. (T) to C.-in-C. and S.O., B.C.F. Sent 8.53 a.m.  
Have sighted a large amount of smoke, as though in a fleet, on a bearing ENE.
- E 55.** *Nimrod* to General. Sent 9.23 a.m.  
Course, W by S.
- E 56.** Note in *Penelope* (s). 9.55 a.m.  
Struck by torpedo. Port side. Hoisted N.U.C. balls.  
Submarine sighted off port beam, 2 to 3 miles. 10 a.m.
- E 57.** *Penelope* to Comm. (T). Recd. 10 a.m.  
Have struck a mine.
- E 58.** Comm. (T) to *Nimrod* via Felixstowe. Sent 10.20 a.m.  
Send three divisions to meet me in the Channel. My position 10 a.m. is 52° 42' N, 3° 2' E. Course, WSW; speed, 20 knots. (1020.)
- E 59.** *Penelope* to Comm. (T). Recd. 10.12 a.m.  
Submarine in sight bearing south-west.
- E 60.** Comm. (T). Loch Buie to S.N.O., Harwich. Recd. Adty. 10.23 a.m.  
Swept up enemy mine<sup>2</sup> 3 miles east-south-east of Orfordness. Mine sunk. (0850.)
- E 61.** Comm., Harwich, to Comm. (T). Recd. Adty. 10.41 a.m.  
Mine found in Sledway. Sunk passage safer.

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix J, Note on Plan. <sup>2</sup> Laid by *U.C.6* at 11 p.m., 24th April.

- E 62.** Comm. (T) to *Cleopatra*. Recd. 11.8 a.m.  
*Cleopatra* prepare to take *Penelope* in tow.
- E 63.** Adty. to Capt. (S). 5.35 p.m.  
 Recall your destroyers and submarines if not returned.
- E 64.** S.N.O., Harwich, to Comm. (T). Recd. 8 p.m.  
 Six moored mines swept up in vicinity of 3 miles south-east and south of Orfordness. (1445.)  
*Note.*—These were laid by *U.C.6* about 11 p.m., 24th April. (T.S.D.D.)

### Signals—"Laforey," 9th Flotilla.

24th April 1916.

- E 65.** C.-in-C., Nore, to *Laforey*.  
*Actaeon*.  
 Capt. (M). Recd. 10.20 p.m.  
 9th Flotilla are to raise steam for full speed and be at Edinburgh Light Vessel by daybreak to-morrow (Tuesday) to await further orders. Leave one destroyer in harbour to take Capt. (M) as arranged. (2149.)
- E 66.** Adty. to C.-in-C., Nore.  
 815. "L" class destroyers, which were escorting minelayers, should proceed to join destroyers from Harwich in lat. 52° N, long. 2° 50' E, meeting them as soon as possible after daybreak. Six Harwich submarines, will be stationed in lat. 52° 10' N, long. 2° 50' E. (2230.)
- E 67.** C.-in-C., Nore, to *Laforey*. Signal 2149 repetition.  
 Recd. 11.20 p.m.

All eight "L" class destroyers are to proceed forthwith to join destroyers from Harwich in lat. 52° N, long. 2.50 E.

- E 68.** *Laforey* to 9th Flotilla. Sent 11.55 p.m.  
 Raise steam for full speed with all despatch and report when ready to proceed.

25th April 1916.

- E 69.** *Laforey* to 9th Flotilla. Sent 1.55 a.m.  
 Slip.
- E 70.** *Laforey* to Comm. (T). Sent 4.40 a.m.  
 1st and 2nd Divisions of 9th Flotilla will arrive in vicinity of N. Hinder 6.15 a.m. (0430.)
- E 71.** *Laforey* to *Lance*. Sent 6.15 a.m.  
 I am going to steer to original rendezvous, then N62E, 8 miles up edge of minefield, unless I get orders to the contrary. Have you anything better to suggest.
- E 72.** *Laforey* to Comm. (T). Sent 6.15 a.m.  
 Arrive rendezvous 6.30; proceeding N62E, 25 knots, for 8 miles, then NE by N. (0625.)
- E 73.** *Melampus* to *Laforey*. Recd. 7.30 a.m.  
 At 6 a.m. sighted enemy's battle cruisers steering east in lat. 52° 42', 3° 5' E. Request permission to join up with your flotilla.

- E 74.** Note in *Laforey* (s).  
 Sighted submarine *D.6*. NNW. 8 a.m.  
 Sighted submarine *E.53* or *55*. 8.20 a.m.
- E 75.** *Laforey* to Comm. (T). Sent 8.15 a.m.  
 My position 7.40 a.m., 52° 21' N, 3° 10' E, steering N3W, 25 knots. *Melampus* joined.
- E 76.** *Laforey* to Comm. (T). Sent 8.49 a.m.  
 Steering ENE, 25 knots. (0835.)
- E 77.** Comm. (T) to *Laforey*. Recd. 8.58 a.m.  
 Return to base. (0850.)

### APPENDIX F.

#### Signals—"Melampus" and Submarines.

24th April 1916.

- F 1.** Adty. to Capt. (S). Recd. 10.53 p.m.  
 Yarmouth submarines should be at gun range off Yarmouth at daylight. Make number up to six.
- F 2.** Adty. to *Melampus*. Recd. 11.51 p.m.  
 Proceed with submarines to a position north-east, 33 miles, present position ordered, and then leave them. (2340.)

25th April 1916.

- F 3.** *Melampus* to *E.22*, *E.29*, *E.54*,<sup>1</sup> *E.26* (W/T). 12.45 a.m.  
 Proceed to Position north-east, 33 miles, from previous positions. (0030.)
- F 4.** *Maidstone* to *Melampus*. Recd. 2.17 a.m.  
 Submarine *D.6* has taken place of *E.37*, and has been informed of alteration in position. Am proceeding in *Lurcher* at 3 a.m. to join you at 8 a.m. (0105.)
- F 5.** *Melampus* to Submarines (lamp). 2.20 a.m.  
 Positions altered. Your positions are 33 miles north-east of previous positions. Proceed at utmost speed. (0220.)
- F 6.** Note (s). 4.20 a.m.  
 Sighted Zeppelin, port beam.
- F 7.** *Lurcher*—*Melampus* (W/T). 5.19 a.m.  
 Enemy off Lowestoft, steering east. What is your position? (0508.)
- F 8.** *Melampus* to Submarines (sem.). 5.40 a.m.  
 Get ready to dive. Spread on a line N10E and S10W, 4 miles apart, then steer east. Enemy off Lowestoft, steering east. (0540.)
- F 9.** *Maidstone* to *Melampus* (W/T). Recd. 5.47 a.m.  
 Order submarines to spread further north to lat. 53° 15'. Leave them at once and proceed at full speed south. (0530.)
- F 10.** *D.6* to *Melampus*. Recd. 5.52 a.m.  
 Urgent. Enemy fleet five cruisers, 52° 25' N, 2° 30' E, steering 60. (0540.)

- F 11.** *Melampus* to *D.4* (sem.) 5.55 a.m.  
*D.4* take southern end of line. (0555.)
- F 12.** *Melampus* to Submarines (flags). 5.55 a.m.  
 Course, N10W. Ships in column to be 4 miles apart. *E.55* guide the fleet.
- F 13.** *Melampus* to Submarines (sem.). 6.5 a.m.  
 You are to proceed lat. 53° 15'. I am ordered south.
- F 14.** *Melampus* to Submarines (flags). 6.5 a.m.  
 Enemy in sight.
- F 15.** *Melampus* to *Lurcher* (code). 6.5 a.m.  
 52° 31' N, 3° 10' E, steering N80E. Have spread submarines 4 miles apart, lying north-south. (0520.)
- F 16.** Note in Comm. (S) War Records.<sup>1</sup> Vol. III.  
 364 25.4.16. Enemy passed 4 miles north of northernmost submarine at 6.15 a.m. to-day in about lat. 52° 46' N, long. 3° 6' E, steering for Terschelling . . .
- F 17.** Capt. (S) to *Melampus*. 6.17 a.m.  
 Order submarines to steer north. *Melampus* retire south at full speed. (0612.)
- F 18.** *Melampus* to Capt. (S). 6.25 a.m.  
 Position 52° 42' N, 3° 10' E, two enemy cruisers steering east at highest speed; am steering south. (0610.)
- F 19.** Adty. to *Melampus*.<sup>2</sup> Sent 6.26 a.m.  
 Enemy ships at 5.40 a.m. were observed from Aldeburgh to be steaming east at high speed. (0626.)
- F 20.** *Melampus* to *E.22*, *E.29*, *E.54*, *E.26*, *D.6*, *D.4*, *E.55* (code). 6.30 a.m.  
 Steer north. (0630.)
- F 21.** *Laforey* to *Melampus* (S.L.) 7.10 a.m.  
 Challenge (reply correct). Is that *Melampus*?  
 Reply—Yes.
- F 22.** *Melampus* to Capt. (S). 7.20 a.m.  
 At 0605 submarines spread 4 miles apart north-south line; position, centre boat 52° 39' N, 3° 12' E, steering north. *Melampus* position 0630, 52° 27' N, 3° 16' E, steering south, full speed. *E.55* may have got a shot in at cruisers steering east to the northward of it, 0640.
- F 23.** *Melampus* to *Laforey*. 8.25 a.m.  
 Request permission to part company. (Reply approved.)
- F 24.** *Melampus* to *E.55* (sem.) 8.30 a.m.  
 Have you any news? (Reply—No.)  
 Where are you going? (Reply—Keeping my billet.)  
 How far did enemy cruisers pass ahead of you? (Reply—About 4 miles.)
- F 25.** *Melampus* to Capt. (S) (W/T.<sup>3</sup>) 8.5 a.m.  
 Expect to arrive searchlight signalling distance 9.30 a.m. (0800.)

<sup>1</sup> In pencil, buff sheet, no address, no time (evidently message to Admiralty). H.S.A. 271/274. (T.S.D.D.)

<sup>2</sup> H.S. 230/579. Not in *Melampus* signal and wireless log. (T.S.D.D.)

<sup>3</sup> From *Lion* (s). (T.S.D.D.)

- F 26.** *Maidstone* to *Melampus*. 9.40 a.m.  
 Return to harbour. (0932.)
- F 27.** *E.26* to *Melampus*. 10.37 a.m.  
 Sighted enemy submarine 10.35.
- F 28.** *E.26*<sup>1</sup> to *Melampus*. 11.55 a.m.  
 Urgent. In need of immediate assistance. (1125.)
- F 29.** *Melampus* to Capt. (S). 12.40 p.m.  
 Following received from *E.26*. In need of immediate assistance. Am proceeding to her assistance. (1205.)
- F 30.** *Melampus* to *E.26*. 12.47 p.m.  
 Am proceeding to your assistance, full speed.
- F 31.** *Melampus* to *E.26*. 1.15 p.m.  
 What is the matter with you. (1300.)
- F 32.** *Laforey* to *Melampus*. 1.18 p.m.  
 Can I be of any assistance to submarine *E.26* with my division? If so, what is position, 12.15.
- F 33.** *E.29* to *Melampus*. 1.30 p.m.  
 Beware of submarines. (1250.)
- F 34.** Capt. (S) to *Melampus*. 1.32 p.m.  
 Report as soon as possible what is the matter. Do you know his position accurately; if not, I will send *Lurcher* to help you. (1300.)
- F 35.** *Melampus* to *E.26* (sem.). 1.45 p.m.  
 What is the matter with you? (Reply—Nothing.) You asked for assistance (Reply—No.) Where are you going? (Reply—*E.55* proposes to shift patrol 3 miles to the west owing to mines.)
- F 36.** *Melampus* to *E.26* (sem.). 1.45 p.m.  
 Where is *E.22* and *D.4*?  
 Reply.  
 Last saw *E.22* to the south-east. Have not seen *D.4*.
- F 37.** *Melampus* to Capt. (S). 2.35 p.m.  
*E.26* does not require assistance; she has never asked for assistance. (1409.)

## APPENDIX G.

(See paras. 8a, 12, 20.)

### 1. Extracts, Comm. (T) to C.-in-C., 26th April. (H.S.A. 146/483.)

26th APRIL.

1.<sup>2</sup> . . . sailed from Harwich with the Harwich Force, consisting of three light cruisers, two flotilla leaders, and sixteen destroyers, at 11.30 p.m. on Monday, 24th April 1916.

2. The time at my disposal did not admit of my making a torpedo attack on the enemy, and, besides, the brightness of the night and a clear moon after 2 a.m. would have been fatal to any chance of success.

<sup>1</sup> It was sent by *E.29*. (T.S.D.D.) <sup>2</sup> Numbers are paragraphs in original. (C9615)

3. I proceeded along the meridian of 2° east, and, in accordance with my expectations, sighted strange ships at 3.45 a.m. about 3 miles distant. They were steering about north-west. I steered a parallel course, and awaited events. It was now nearly daylight, and it was possible to distinguish at least six light cruisers and many destroyers and a force of battle cruisers ahead—four or five in number—also followed by destroyers.

4. Owing to my hurried departure and the change in my orders at the last moment, and also the difficulty of transmitting fresh orders to the flotillas, the latter joined me at dawn, and did not wait at the rendezvous (entrance to K Channel) as I intended they should.

5. The enemy battle cruisers opened fire at the shore at 4.10 a.m. I saw several salvos fall into the water. I endeavoured to lead the enemy to the southward with the intention of drawing them away from Lowestoft, and also over our submarines,<sup>1</sup> at first with some success, as the light cruisers followed me, but they turned away again.

6. At 4.30 a.m. we engaged with 6-in. guns three light cruisers, two of the *Rostock* class, and one of those built for the Russians; range about 13,000 yards. The light was very bad for spotting, and it was difficult to see the result. They did not return our fire, as we, being behind the land, were probably invisible to them.

7. During this period the battle cruisers were bombarding the shore violently, steering north, and were temporarily lost sight of. At 4.45 a.m. they, the battle cruisers, were seen coming towards us, steering south, and I at once turned 16 points, and proceeded at high speed. The battle cruisers opened fire at 4.46 a.m. at a range of about 15,000 yards, firing rapidly and with much precision. The light cruisers were evidently their target, as we were frequently straddled. Several shells out of one salvo struck the *Conquest* aft, causing a serious fire and considerable damage. Several single hits were registered, one of the first carrying away our W/T aerial. The *Laertes* was the only other ship actually hit, luckily by a small shell and splinter, which disabled one boiler.

8. I ordered the destroyers to scatter and make smoke, and the latter soon prevented spotting, and by the time it was possible to stop the smoke the enemy was out of sight. I then ordered the destroyers to follow me 10 miles astern, and I proceeded with the light cruisers to regain touch with the enemy, and did so in lat. 52° 57' N, long. 3° 34' E. At 9.15 a.m. I received orders from the Admiralty to return to base.

9. In lat. 52° 46' N, long. 3° 00' E, *Penelope* was struck by a torpedo well aft, and reported her steering gear disabled, but able to proceed. The three light cruisers were spread 1 mile apart at the time. *Penelope* proceeded at 22 knots, steering with her engines without any difficulty, and the force under my command arrived at Harwich at 3 p.m.

## 2. Extracts from Report, Capt. Roger Backhouse to Comm. (T) "Conquest," 29th April 1916. (H.S.A. 146.)

2. . . . The ship opened fire with the two 6-in. guns on enemy light cruisers at about 4.30 a.m. at a range of about 14,000 yards. About 28 rounds were fired, but no hits were observed; owing to the poor light a good many shots were not spotted—none were spotted over.

3. . . . The enemy battle cruisers (*Derfflinger* and *Lutzow* leading) opened fire on us at 4.45 a.m., being then on our port quarter, steering approximately 110° to the right,<sup>2</sup> at a range of about 16,000 yards, although this is pure estimate, as there was a bad light behind them and no ranges were obtained.

*Conquest* was hit about 4.51 a.m. by four or five 12-in. shell, one or two direct, which burst in the 6-in. upper ammunition lobby, and three ricochets: one through the centre funnel, one through the stump main mast, and one in almost the same place as the direct hit (or hits). . . .

<sup>1</sup> *E.53* and *E.37* were to southward of Comm. (T). (T.S.D.D.)

<sup>2</sup> Small diagram (not reproduced).

5. As the result of the direct hits, a considerable fire broke out on the main deck and on the upper deck inside the after superstructure, and on the after superstructure deck.

The 6-in. cordite charges in two ready cases on the after superstructure caught fire and burned with a fierce flame until expended. . . . It is also believed that the ready charges (two) in the upper 6-in. lobby caught fire, but this is impossible to be sure of, as the lobby was completely wrecked, and all the men in it killed instantaneously.<sup>1</sup>

7. As the result of the stump main mast being cut through, and the explosion aft, the main W/T aerial was wrecked.

9. I saw at least eight light cruisers, but there may have been nine. *Pillau* and *Elbing* were unmistakable by their three large funnels.

10. . . . When first sighted I think I remember four light cruisers together in single line ahead, and three or four others, each with a flotilla some little distance away.

11. The light of the morning was extremely variable; at daybreak the German ships to the eastward were outlined clearly in the light of dawn, and we (bearing west from them) were probably invisible in the night sky. A little later, after the sun rose, the conditions seemed exactly the opposite; the land to the westward of us was perfectly clear and distinct, the German ships to the eastward and north-eastward (particularly the latter) were much less distinct.

## 3. Extracts from a Letter in C.-in-C.'s Memo. H.F. 0022, 20th May 1916.

I feel sure they were firing by a form of director. Spread was always in the small side for elevation, and seemed practically nil for direction. I should judge the elevation spread as a 100 to 200 yards, but some were probably less. The one of which I have the most vivid recollection straddled us over the fore-castle, two over and two short, and I cannot imagine how the nearest one each side missed the ship; the two short simply drowned us with water, and were really much the most unpleasant we experienced forward. I think three projectiles hit us aft out of one salvo—two direct and one ricochet—the fourth being short, but I cannot swear to this.

## 4. Extract from Report of Capt. Hubert Lynes, "Penelope," 29th April. (H.S.A. 146.)

Para. 2. The ship was torpedoed port side, right aft, at 9.55 a.m. when the squadron was in lat. 52° 46', long. 3° 0' E, disposed in single line abreast—*Penelope* 1 mile to starboard; *Cleopatra* 1 mile to port of *Conquest*; course, WSW; speed, 23 knots (to regain station<sup>2</sup>—speed of squadron 20 knots). The weather was bright and sunny, sea smooth with a light ripple, small white curls on the waves.

<sup>1</sup> Killed 23, seriously wounded 13, slightly wounded 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Penelope* had hauled out about half-a-mile to starboard at 9.40 to examine a capsized boat. (T.S.D.D.)

## APPENDIX H

(See paras. 8 and 18.)

Submarines, Extracts from Reports.<sup>1</sup>

## 1. "MELAMPUS" REPORT, 26th APRIL 1916.

At 5.25 a.m., in lat. 52° 32' N, 3° 10' E, steering N80E at 15 knots, received signal "A" :—

*Lurcher* to *Melampus*. Enemy off Lowestoft, steering east.

What is your position 0508; received 5.19 a.m.

Immediately cancelled previous orders and spread submarines on a north and south line, 4 miles apart, making *E.55* guide of fleet. Then proceeded to *D.4*, who was hull down, to give him the new formation; after which, returned to rear of line, proceeded to steam past each submarine (course north), giving them information of which I had knowledge, viz., signal "B" :—

*Maidstone* to *Melampus*. Order submarines to spread further north to lat. 53.15. Leave them at once and proceed full speed south. 0530, received 5.47.

At 5.58 I observed smoke about 6 points on port bow, at same time receiving signal "C" :—

Submarine *D.6* to *Melampus*. Enemy fleet five cruisers, 52° 25' N, 2° 30' E, steering 60. 0540, received 5.51.

Hoisted signal "Enemy in sight," and proceeded at full speed to head of line (*E.55*), who was then out of visual distance owing to smoke from her exhaust. At 6.1 a.m. I could distinguish enemy to be a squadron of ships, of which the two leaders were three-funnelled cruisers. They were steaming east at very high speed . . . About 6.6 I saw *E.55* apparently dive, and the leading enemy cruiser, being then only about 18,000 yards, and our courses rapidly converging, I turned to east and passed through the patrol lines on the enemy's course, immediately altering to south, and retired at utmost speed.

I think *E.55* may possibly have been able to fire, but no other submarine was in any near position. At 6.50 I personally, as also my First Lieutenant, saw an enemy submarine dive, about 600 yards on starboard beam, and shortly afterwards *Melampus* passed through an area lat. 52° 20' N long. 3° 22' E, in which there was a large number of floating black spherical mines. At 7 a.m. I observed smoke and eight destroyers steering north-east at high speed on starboard bow . . . At 7.5 I altered course to west, and at 7.15 the destroyer turned and chased *Melampus*. I now challenged, and found them to be 1st and 2nd Divisions of 9th Flotilla.<sup>2</sup> At 8.30 a.m. observed submarines, so parted company with flotilla. At 10.3 a.m. observed two or three cruisers bearing east and steering west. I proceeded west until 11.50 a.m., when I received a signal from *E.26*<sup>3</sup> asking for assistance . . . I returned, and came up to him about 1.50 p.m. . . . when last seen, *E.26*, *E.29*, and *E.55* were patrolling about 3 miles west of original position.

GEORGE O. HEWETT,

Lieut.-Commander.

<sup>1</sup> Commodore (S) War Records, Vol. III, 281. H.S.A. 271.

<sup>2</sup> i.e., *Laforey's* destroyers.

<sup>3</sup> It was *E.29* (T.S.D.D.)

2. REPORT OF *E.26*.

## 25th April.

- 5.30 a.m. Started to spread on line of bearing N10W<sup>1</sup>, 4 miles apart.  
 6.6 a.m. Sighted enemy cruiser 280°, 8 to 9 miles, steering approximately north at high speed; one four-funnel cruiser, one three-funnel cruiser, and four other ships undistinguishable.  
 6.10 a.m. Dived: an attack was impossible.  
 6.45 a.m. Surface, cruising with one engine.  
 7.8 a.m. Sighted British light cruisers approaching from west. Dived.  
 7.30 a.m. Surface. Cruising in various courses.  
 10.15 a.m. Spoke *E.22*.  
 10.20 a.m. Sighted periscope 3 points on starboard bow, 20 yards. Increased to full speed and turned towards it. Warned *E.22* by cruiser arc lamp, and proceeded to north-west at full speed. *E.22* proceeded north-east. Position of sighting periscope, 52° 36' N, 3° 2' E.  
 10.55 a.m. Spoke *E.55*, and informed him that I had sighted periscope.  
 11.40 a.m. Position 52° 40' N, 3° 3' E, saw explosion south-east, 3 miles. Investigated with *E.29*; found nothing.

C. C. DOBSON,

Lieut.-Commander.

3. REPORT OF *E.29*.

## 25th April.

- 5.40 a.m. Spread on line N10E, S10W (mag.). *E.55*, *E.26*, *E.22* in company with *Melampus*. Estimated position, 52° 30' N, 3° E.  
 5.55 a.m. Enemy in sight to westward, steering to north-east. Made out two ships, one (the leader) a four-funnelled cruiser the second believed to be a two-funnelled (or three-funnelled battle cruiser). Turned towards them and dived. Enemy passed about 7 miles to northward, it being impossible to cut them off. No more ships were distinguished.  
 6.17 a.m. Rose. Enemy now bearing about north, 8 miles. *E.26* and *E.55* in sight to northward and eastward respectively. Stood to southward on engines.  
 6.45 a.m. Sighted vessel to westward. Dived to cut her off. She proved to be a British light cruiser standing to north-east. Passed about 5 miles to northward. Rose and closed *E.26* when she had passed.  
 8.0 a.m. Shaped co. north-west, 9 knots. Estimated position, 52° 30' N, 3° 0' E.  
 8.20 a.m. Sighted "L" class destroyers passing to southward, proceeding E-ly.  
 9.10 a.m. Position 52° 35' N, 2° 55' E. Lookout reported periscope on port beam. Said he saw about 18 in. rise and dip again almost at once. A/C 8 points to port, and proceeded full speed, but sighted nothing.  
 10.0 a.m. Observed position 52° 34½' N, 2° 59' E. Destroyers in sight to south-westward, going westerly. *Melampus* detached herself from the flotilla. Closed her, and found *E.55* and *E.26* in company. Patrolled on line north and south of positions, about 3 miles apart, and frequently altering course.

<sup>1</sup> *E.55* says north and south. (T.S.D.D.)

**25th April.**

- 10.20 a.m. Three light cruisers (British) passed to northward, about 4 miles, going north-westerly. *Melampus* proceeded out of sight to north-westward.
- 11.45 a.m. Observed *E.22*, who was patrolling to northward, blown up about 2 miles distant. Proceeded at full speed, zig-zagging continuously. Closed *E.26*, who was to eastward of us, and together with him proceeded over *E.22*'s position. Found a moderate quantity of oil on surface and a few small pieces of wood. About 12.30 p.m. *E.55* in visual signalling distance. Informed him of destruction of *E.22* and that I had asked *Melampus* for assistance, and warned him to beware of hostile submarine. Position of *E.22* when blown up, estimated 52.35 N, 3.0 E. 1.15 p.m. (?) *Melampus* rejoined flotilla, which proceeded to patrol 3 miles to westward of former position. Afternoon somewhat hazy, and boats frequently lost sight of. Maintained position to southward of *E.55* and northward of *E.26*. *Melampus* lost sight of to south-eastward.

HERBERT SHOVE,  
*Lieut.-Commander.*

4. REPORT OF *E.55*.**24th April.**

- 10.35 p.m. Cast off and proceeded to sea.  
11.45 p.m. Off Orfordness. A/C 66° for billet.

**25th April.**

- 5.45 a.m. A/C north, spreading flotilla on line of bearing north and south.  
6.12 a.m. Sighted enemy cruisers on port beam. A/C 280°.  
6.15 a.m. Dived. Full ahead both motors.  
6.18 a.m. A/C 10°. Enemy passed ahead about 5 miles off.  
6.45 a.m. Surface. Charged batteries and proceeded north-west. Zig-zagging about billet.  
11.0 a.m. *E.26* reported enemy submarine about 6 miles to south.  
11.45 a.m. Heard explosion; thought it was a heavy gun.  
12.45 a.m. Sighted periscope of enemy submarine lat. 52.40 N, 3.7 E. Full ahead both. Closed and warned *E.29*, and later *E.26*. *E.29* informed me about *E.22*. In view of possibility of mines being laid, I shifted patrol line 5 miles to westward  
.....

GILBERT H. KELLETT,  
*Lieut.-Commander.*

5. REPORT OF *D.6*.**25th April.**

- 4.5 a.m. Challenged by trawler patrol, to which we replied repeatedly. Trawler patrol fired on us.  
4.35 a.m. Dived to correct trim, and came to surface, resuming course and speed—N76E, 11 knots.  
4.45 a.m. Sighted enemy's ships on port quarter on parallel course. Attempted to cross T, full speed on gas engine. As they drew rapidly ahead, and being then about 10,000 yards off, I turned parallel with them. I got the W/T mast up and attempted to signal. Enemy's destroyer turned toward me, and I had to get the mast down, and stood by to dive away from her. The destroyer turned away from me again. I got the mast up and W/T urgent in code, made to all ships, reporting enemy's squadron steering N60E (true), and giving the position. Signal was acknowledged by *Melampus*. Enemy's squadron consisted of four ships, with three thick funnels and two masts, the leading ship having the after funnel painted red. One four-funnelled cruiser and seven destroyers. . . . Proceeding to billet, passed *E.26*, *E.22*; also eight destroyers coming from the southward.  
9.0 a.m. Communicated with *D.4*. Cruised slow on surface, making "S" turns and zigzags.  
11.57 a.m. Received W/T signal *en clair* from *E.29*, asking for immediate assistance, but giving no position. Proceeded full speed, north and north-west, for an hour, when we got signal from *Melampus* saying she was proceeding to her assistance. Proceeded back to billet.  
7.0 p.m. Left billet and proceeded via K.K. and Sunk route to Harwich, arriving 6.30 a.m.  
4.15 Observed heavy firing to the northward. Sighted a Zeppelin about north-east of the "firing"

GEOFFREY WARBURTON,  
*Lieut.-Commander.*

6. REPORT OF *E.37*.**25th April.**

Left harbour at 12.10 a.m. in company with *E.53*.  
1.14, Cork Light abeam. Course, N65E; 12 knots. 1.42, co. N58E. 2.13, co. N80E. 3.0, co. N22E. At 4.50, in a position 8 miles east (true) from Southwold Light, I saw light cruisers and destroyers approaching from northward in action, and dived to attack the enemy, whom I supposed were approaching on a parallel course to our light cruiser squadron. At 5.0 I passed under our destroyers, and rose to surface at 5.40, having seen nothing of enemy while submerged. On coming to surface, observed an aeroplane descending straight for the boat, and, being unable to distinguish its colours, submerged. When at a depth of 16 ft., at 5.48, five or six bombs were dropped close to the boat. Dived to the bottom (120 ft.). At 6.15 rose to 20 ft. 6.30 rose to surface, and proceeded on engines to Corton, arriving there at 8 a.m., and patrolled there in company with *E.53*. 9.50 motor boat arrived with orders from *Alecto*. 10 a.m., proceeded to position 3½ miles south (true) from Cross Sand Light Vessel.

R. F. CHISHOLM,  
*Lieut.-Commander.*



7. REPORT OF *E.53*.

## 25th April.

- 12.10 a.m. Left *Maidstone*.  
 1.15 a.m. Cork Light abeam.  
 3.0 a.m. Position by cross bearings: Orfordness,  $W\frac{1}{2}N$ ; Shipwash,  $S\frac{1}{2}E$ .  
 4.35 a.m. Observed light cruisers and destroyers in action, bearing north.  
 4.50 a.m. Southwold Light,  $S80W$ , 8 miles. Dived to attack enemy, thought to be to northward of light cruisers.  
 5.10 a.m. Passed under destroyers.  
 5.19 a.m. Surface; no enemy in sight.  
 5.40 a.m. Ahead both engines, and closed *E.37*.  
 5.45 a.m. Observed aeroplane 6164 dropping bombs on *E.37*, who dived, and was not seen again. 5.50, shaped course north and closed Corton Light Vessel.  
 7.0 a.m. Arrived at Corton Light Vessel, and reported to *Alecto* by W/T.  
 9.50 a.m. Motor boat arrived with orders.  
 10.30 a.m. Started patrol; arrived position 6 miles east (true) from Corton Light.

J. B. GLENCROSS,  
*Lieut.-Commander.*

## 8. REPORT ON OPERATIONS OFF YARMOUTH.

2.0 a.m., first boat left (*V.1*); 2.20, last boat left (*H.10*). All clear of harbour, 2.40. Positions for which detailed as follows:—

- V.1*. Smith's Knoll.  
*H.10*. Half-way between Smiths' Knoll and Cross Sand.  
*H.5*. Cross Sand.  
*H.7*. Half-way between Newarp and Would.  
*E.53*. 6 miles east (true) from Corton.  
*E.37*.  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles south (true) from Cross Sand.

The latter two boats only reached Corton Light Vessel about 7 a.m.

*H.5's* REPORT.

At 3.42, 10 minutes before arrival on billet, saw a Zeppelin, steering south, about 3 miles on far side of Cross Sand. Reported this to *Alecto*. She remained in this vicinity about half-hour, and would seem to have been reporting movements of submarines.

4.5 to 4.10, saw a long streak of brown smoke running north and south about 1' distant, *H.5* at this time steaming round Cross Sand.

4.14, saw heavy flashes coming from this smoke about S by E (mag.).

4.15, approached on surface until hulls of enemy vessels were visible.

4.20, dived and attacked. Enemy steering south; altered to south-west<sup>1</sup> and then to north, thus getting inshore of *H.5*. Enemy altered course several times. *H.5* twice got to 2,000 yards distance, on one occasion from the last ship, and on the other from the third ship in the line of four ships; did not fire torpedoes, as they would have been chasing shots at extreme range fired at the tail of the line. When enemy started eastward *H.5* followed for a short distance and then returned to billet.

<sup>1</sup> The battle cruisers at 4.20 were steering north; the time referred to is apparently about 4.10. (T.S.D.D.)

9. REPORT OF *V.1* (YARMOUTH), 25th APRIL.

- 3.30 a.m. Off Cross Sand Light Vessel. Sighted Zeppelin coming from westward. Zeppelin remained in vicinity of Light Vessel at an altitude of about 5,000 ft. for a considerable time. Stopped for 10 minutes to avoid observation.  
 3.50 a.m. Course  $N82E$  for billet at Smith's Knoll Pillar Buoy.  
 4.10 a.m. Sighted flashes of big guns to southward; A/C south-east to close.  
 4.40 a.m. Attacked by aeroplane, which dropped two bombs about 40 yards off. Dived south-east and attempted to attack fleet.  
 5.5 a.m. Rose to surface. Observed several ships to southward steering east. Only funnel tops visible. Distance about 4-5 miles.  
 5.10 a.m. Dived south-east to attack.  
 6.0 a.m. Gave up attack.

A. B. LOCKHART,  
*Lieut.*

10. REPORT OF *H.10* (YARMOUTH).

- 3.30. Sighted Zeppelin steering south-east in vicinity of Cross Sand Light Vessel. Dived.  
 4.10. Saw flashes of bombardment to southward. Course, south-east, full speed gas engine.  
 4.40. Attacked by aeroplane, which dropped four bombs from 50 to 100 yards off. Dived and steered south; 6 knots.  
 5.0. Sighted two lines of ships steering north. Attacked.  
 5.5. Enemy altered course east, distance 2-3 miles.  
 5.30. Surface; course as requisite for billet.

BYRON CARY,  
*Lieut.*

11. *H.7's* REPORT.

*H.7* sighted nothing.

## 12. EXTRACT FROM CAPT. (S) "MAIDSTONE" (CAPT. A. W. WAISTELL) TO CHIEF OF WAR STAFF, 27th APRIL 1916.

H.S.A. 271.

1. Submarines *E.55*, *E.29*, *E.26*, *E.22*, and *D.4*, with *Melampus*, left at 10.30 p.m. on 24th April, followed later by *D.6*, who took the place of *E.37*, owing to the latter getting foul, with orders to arrive at lat.  $52^{\circ} 10' N$ , long.  $3^{\circ} 5' E$ , before daybreak, and there to spread in pairs in echelon, facing north-east, submarines being 4 miles apart. They were subsequently ordered by W/T from Ipswich to proceed to a position north-east 33 miles from the previous position.

2. Having despatched *E.53* and *E.37* to join the Yarmouth submarines, and arranged for the remaining three submarines, *E.4*, *E.31*, and *D.1*, the two latter being temporarily under repair, to patrol in the vicinity of the Shipwash, I proceeded at 2.45 a.m. in the *Lurcher* with the intention of joining the *Melampus*.

3. At 4.55, hearing heavy firing to the north, closed Comm. (T), who was in action, and at 5.14 a.m. wirelessed to *Melampus* that enemy was off Lowestoft, steering east, and subsequently ordered him to spread the submarines further north to lat.  $53^{\circ} 15' N$ , and to leave them at once and proceed south at full speed.

4. *Melampus* received my first signal when in lat.  $52^{\circ} 32' N$ , long.  $3^{\circ} 10' E$ , and immediately spread the submarines on a north and south line, and ordered them to steer north. At 6.12 a.m., after proceeding about 8 miles to the north the leading submarine, *E.55*, sighted the enemy cruisers on the port beam, and dived, but they passed about 5 miles ahead, steering east-north-east, steaming very fast. There were four battle cruisers, led by a four-funnelled light cruiser, accompanied by several destroyers. . . .

6. At 10.20 a.m. in lat.  $52^{\circ} 36' N$ , long.  $3^{\circ} 2' E$ , *E.26* sighted a periscope close to; *E.55* and *E.22*, who were in signalling distance, were warned, and the latter steered away to the south-east. But at 11.45 a.m. *E.22* was seen by *E.29* and *E.26* to blow up. . . .

7. My written standing order. . . . is that submarines on patrol are to remain submerged during daylight hours, but that if on the surface for any special purpose to keep under way and alter course as frequently as possible. . . . But it was never my intention that they should remain on the surface after an enemy submarine was sighted, and it was only a mistaken keenness to do their duty which caused them to do so. . . .

## APPENDIX J.

### J.—NOTES ON PLANS.

1. In Plan I courses are taken to positions observed at noon, and may not, therefore, agree exactly with reckoning or signals.

2. In Plan II the course of the *Melampus* and submarines has been transferred 4.3 miles,  $14^{\circ}$ . . . ., to agree with positions given later.

3. The Southwold Mine Area is from the chart (X.74 series), British Minefields, 17th April, 1916.

4. K Channel, which enters into a number of signals, ran from lat.  $52^{\circ} 15' N$ , long.  $2^{\circ} E$  to  $3^{\circ} E$ , between N73E and N84E (mag.).


5. The German courses are taken from the German Staff History (*Nordsee*, Vol. 5, Karte F), where the courses of the battle cruisers in the inset do not agree exactly with those on the main chart.


6. The German courses off Lowestoft and Yarmouth in above have been moved  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles to the eastward in order to agree with the distances given in the text, and with the bearing given by the Captain of the *Conquest* (Capt. Roger Backhouse).


7. It was high water at Dover at 4.16 a.m. on 25th April 1916. Tide was falling at Lowestoft at 4 a.m.

8. Variation in April, 1916, was  $14^{\circ} 30' W$ . on Doggerbank.

## PLAN I.







- A. POSITION FOR LIGHT CRUISERS ADM. SIG. 24/2200
- B. FIRST POSITION FOR S/M<sup>s</sup> ADM. SIG. 24/2002
- C. SECOND POSITION FOR S/M<sup>s</sup> ADM. SIG. 2340
- D. R.V. FOR LAFOREY DAYBREAK ADM. 2250

# LOWESTOFT RAID.

## APRIL 25, 1916.

- 5<sup>TH</sup> L. C. S. ————— from Conquest log
- "MELAMPUS" - - - - - from Melampus log
- "NIMROD" ..... Nimrod's log
- "LAFOREY" - . - . - . Laforey's log
- "GERMANS." ———— Nordsee 4, karte F

Note—Course of Melampus(from log) adjusted 4.3 miles, 14° at 4 a.m. to fit in with sighting of enemy.

## INDEX.

Note.—Numbers refer to paragraphs.

- AIRCRAFT (British), from Yarmouth, 19; attack *L.9*; attack British submarines *H.10* and *V.1*; Zeebrugge German planes driven back by British, April 24, 10; *L.6* and *L.9*, April 25, 23.
- BACKHOUSE, Captain Roger, Captain of *Conquest*, report, App. G.
- BACON, Admiral Sir Reginald. Barrage operation, April 24, 10.
- BATTLE CRUISER FORCE, instructions for, 6; sails, 7; position, 4.30 a.m., 22; position, 8 a.m.; does not get signal to return, 22; 45 miles from German Fleet, 22.
- BEATTY, Vice-Admiral Sir David. See Battle Cruiser Force; sails (*Rosyth*), 10.50 p.m.; view of situation, 26.
- BIGHT, GERMAN. Point I, 11; Point K, 11.
- BOEDICKER, Rear-Admiral, Command of 1st Scouting Group, instead of *Hipper*, 11.
- "CONQUEST" left Harwich midnight, *8a*; engaged and hit by German battle cruisers, 4.49 a.m., April 25, 14.
- CORTON LIGHT VESSEL, off Yarmouth, Germans make for, 7.
- DOVER, Barrage, effect of, 10; Dover monitors repel German destroyers, 10; destroyers *Melpomene*, *Medea*, *Murray*, *Milne*, 10.
- GRAND FLEET, Organisation, App. A; sails with C.-in-C., 10 p.m., April 24, 7; 5th B.S. goes on ahead to support Beatty, 7; position for 3rd B.S., 7; heavy weather, April 25, 22; position on receiving Comm. (T)'s report at 4.30 a.m., 22; intelligence from Admiralty, 8.35 a.m., 22; order to return, 11.10 a.m., 22; Beatty 45 miles from Boedicker at 11.45 a.m., 22; question of Fleet Bases, 26.
- "GRAUDENZ" strikes mine, April 21, 5.
- HARWICH FORCE, first rendezvous for, 7; leaves 11.40 p.m., 8; daybreak, April 25, 12; 9th Flotilla (*Nimrod*) joins 3.40 a.m., *8a*; sights enemy 3.50 a.m., 12; German battle cruisers sighted 4.45 a.m., 14; *Conquest* hit, 14; follows Germans to east, 20; turns back, 8.45 a.m., 20; *Penelope* torpedoed, 20.
- HEWETT, GEORGE, Lieutenant-Commander, *Melampus* report, App. H.
- HIGH SEA FLEET, Strength, 11; organisation and forces, App. A; sails 2 p.m., 11; *Seydlitz* mined, 11; proceeds by Dutch coast, 11; steers for Haaks light vessel, 12 p.m., 11; Scheer returns, 5.20 a.m., 23; 1st Scouting Group left Jade, April 24, 5; Boedicker crosses British minefield twice, 11; transfers flag to *Lutzow*, 7.30 p.m., April 24, 11; position, 1.30 a.m., 15; *Lutzow* sights Corton Light vessel, 4 a.m., 15; bombards Lowestoft and Yarmouth, April 25, 4.11-4.42 a.m., 15; 2nd Scouting Group engaged, 13.
- INTELLIGENCE FROM ADMIRALTY, April 24, 6; *re* German objective, 8.14 p.m., April 24, 7; remarks on, 27.
- IRISH REBELLION, April, 1916, 4, 6.
- JELlicoe, Admiral Sir John, Commander-in-Chief. See Grand Fleet; view of situation, 26; suggestions, April 18, 26.
- K CHANNEL, 8; Appendix J.
- "LAFOREY," with eight destroyers from Nore, orders and rendezvous for, *8a*.
- "LIBAU" or "AUD" at Tralee, April 20, 4.

LOWESTOFT RAID, Grand Fleet and B.C.F. to raise steam, 6; Orders for Comm. (T) and Captain (S), April 24, 7; movement of Harwich Force, 8, 12; movements of British submarines, 18; effect on strategy, 26.

LYNES, Captain Herbert, *Penelope* torpedoed, report, App. G.

"MELAMPUS," with Harwich submarines, *q.v.*, 7; movements, April 25, 18.

"MELPOMENE," damage in action off Zeebrugge, 10.

MINEFIELD (British), laid November, 1915; *Seydlitz* strikes mine, 2.47 p.m., April 24, 11.

"NIMROD," with Harwich force, 8.

SCHEER. See High Sea Fleet; Principles for Sea Warfare, 1; view of situation, 8.30 p.m., April 24, 11.

"SEYDLITZ" mined, 6, 11.

SKAGERRAK SWEEP for April 22, 5; rendezvous for, 5; cancelled, April 21, 6.34 p.m., 5; resumed, April 22, 5; broken off, April 23, 5; rendezvous for 1st B.C.S., 5.

STRATEGY (German), 1; German Conference, April 15, 2; view of situation, April 24, 11; review of German, 25; British position, April 25, 26; Fleet Bases, question of, 26; Conference at Admiralty on Rosyth, April 15, 26 (footnote); Conference at Rosyth, May 12, 26.

SUBMARINES (British)—

From BLYTH, with *Trident*, orders and rendezvous for, 7.

From HARWICH, *E.55, E.29, E.26, E.22, D.4, D.6*, with *Melampus*, 7; first orders and rendezvous, 8; movements, April 25, 18; *D.6* reports enemy, 5.40 a.m., 18; *Melampus* spreads submarines, 5.40 a.m., 18; *E.55* sights enemy, 6.12 a.m., 18; *E.26, E.29*, 18; Reports, App. H.

From YARMOUTH (Alecto), *V.1, H.10, H.5, H.7*; orders for, 8; *E.53* and *E.37* to join, 8; movements, April 25, 17; *H.5* sights German battle cruisers, 17; report, App. H.

TYRWHITT, Commodore Reginald, report to C.-in-C., App. G.

"U" BOATS, 10; *U.71*, Firth of Forth, 9; *U.72*, Moray Firth, 9.

"U.B." BOATS, Flanders, orders for, 10; movements, *U.B.6, U.B.10, U.B.12, U.B.21, U.B.27*, 10 and 24; *U.B.13*, sunk probably in Dover Barrage, April 25, 10.

"U.B.18" (Steinbrinck) marks edge of minefield, 15; torpedoes *E.22*, 21.

"U.B.29" (Pustkuchen), 10; marks edge of minefield, 15; torpedoes *Penelope*, April 25, 21.

"U.C." BOATS, *U.C.1* mines off Kentish Knock, April 25, 24; *U.C.5* runs ashore Shipwash, April 27, captured, 24; *U.C.6* mines off Sledway, April 24, 10; *U.C.7* runs ashore Shipwash, gets off, 24; *U.C.10* entangled in barrage, 10.

WAISTELL, Captain A. K., Captain (S) report, App. H.

WAY MIDDLE, 23.

WIRELESS (British), 11; message from Bruges to Scheer, 23.

WIRELESS (German), App. C.

ZEEBRUGGE FLOTILLA, *V.67, V.68, V.47*, in action, 10.

### LIST OF NAVAL STAFF MONOGRAPHS (HISTORICAL) ISSUED TO THE FLEET.

C.B. 917	..	Vol. I	..	Monograph	1. Coronel.
				"	2. German Cruiser Squadron in Pacific.
				"	3. Falklands.
				"	4. <i>Goeben</i> and <i>Breslau</i> (super- seded by Monograph 21).
C.B. 917(A)	..	Vol. II	..	"	5. Cameroons, 1914.
				"	10. East Africa, to July, 1915.
C.B. 1585	..	Vol. III	..	"	6. Passage of B.E.F., August, 1914
				"	7. Patrol Flotillas at com- mencement of war.
				"	8. Raid on N.E. Coast, December 16, 1914.
				"	11. Heligoland Bight, August 28, 1914.
				"	12. Dogger Bank, January 24, 1915.
C.B. 917(B)	..	Vol. IV	..	"	15. Mesopotamia.
C.B. 917(C)	..	Vol. V	..	"	14. First Australasian Convoy 1914.
				"	16. China Squadron, 1914 (in- cluding <i>Emden</i> Hunt).
				"	17. East Indies Squadron, 1914.
				"	20. Cape of Good Hope Squadron, 1914.
C.B. 917(D)	..	Vol. VI	..	"	18. Dover Command. I.
C.B. 917(E)	..	Vol. VII	..	"	19. Tenth Cruiser Squadron I.
				"	25. The Baltic, 1914.
C.B. 917(F)	..	Vol. VIII	..	"	21. The Mediterranean, 1914- 1915.
C.B. 917(G)	..	Vol. IX	..	"	22. Atlantic, 1914.
				"	26. Atlantic, 1915.
				"	27. Battles of Coronel and the Falkland Islands.
C.B. 917(H)	..	Vol. X <sup>10</sup>	..	"	23. Home Waters. Part I.
C.B. 917(I)	..	Vol. XI <sup>11</sup>	..	"	24. Home Waters. Part II.
C.B. 917(J)	..	Vol. XII	..	"	28. Home Waters. Part III.
C.B. 917(K)	..	Vol. XIII	..	"	29. Home Waters. Part IV.
C.B. 917(L)	..	Vol. XIV	..	"	30. Home Waters. Part V.
C.B. 917(M)	..	Vol. XV <sup>5</sup>	..	"	31. Home Waters. Part VI.
C.B. 917(N)	..	Vol. XVI <sup>16</sup>	..	"	32. Lowestoft Raid.

xvii

