

UNCLASSIFIED

No. 162

DEFENCE INFORMATION SERVICES



00291399-6

5528
 O.U. 5528(H)
C.B. 917(H)

NAVAL STAFF MONOGRAPHS
(HISTORICAL)

FLEET SUE.

VOLUME X.

HOME WATERS--Part I.

From the Outbreak of War to 27 August 1914.

April 1924.

UNCLASSIFIED

S. 604. (Established—August, 1924.)

To be inserted inside the front cover of all Secret and Confidential books in Loan Libraries.

Navy Office Loan Library.

Attention is drawn to the regulations relating to the care and custody of Secret and Confidential books as laid down in C.B. Form U2D.

This book is issued upon the following conditions:—

I. That its confidential character is to be strictly maintained and that when not in use it is to be kept locked up.

Note.—**SECRET** books must be kept in the steel chest provided for confidential documents.

II. That it is returned to the Loan Library from which it was borrowed within one calendar month or earlier—

- (a) If no longer required.
- (b) If asked for by the Officer in charge of the Loan Library.
- (c) In the event of the borrower being discharged to a Naval Hospital or Sick Quarters or otherwise ceasing to serve in one of H.M. Ships or Establishments.

III. That the care of this book is regarded as a serious matter and that any want of proper precaution which may result in its confidential character being impaired will be regarded as a disciplinary offence indicating a grave neglect of duty.

IV. That it will not be sent through the post if by so doing it is likely to pass through the hands of foreign post office officials.

Note.—**SECRET** books must not be sent through the post under any circumstances.

If the book is required for a longer period than one month application should be made to the Officer in charge of the Loan Library stating the further period for which it is required.

N.I.D. 7255/24.

[1753] 10923/D361 20m 9/24 G & S 126

VV 8129


grats
RANSC

UNCLASSIFIED

MOD D/NHB(L) 4/1/3

1st August 1984



| | |
|--------------------------------|---|
| DEFENCE INFORMATION SERVICE | |
| CALL No. | 940.45 NAV |
| ACC. # | 291399 |
| CRV. | DEFENCE INFORMATION SERVICES  |
| CAT. | 00291399 6 0825/1011 |

CP

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Attention is drawn to the Penalties attaching to any infraction
of the Official Secrets Act.

O.U. 5528 (H)

~~C.B. 917(H)~~

NAVAL STAFF MONOGRAPHS (HISTORICAL)

FLEET ISSUE.

VOLUME X.

HOME WATERS—Part I.

From the Outbreak of War to 27 August 1914.

NAVAL STAFF,
TRAINING AND STAFF DUTIES DIVISION,
April 1924.

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL.

This book is the property of His Majesty's Government.

It is intended for the use of Officers generally, and may in certain cases be communicated to persons in His Majesty's Service below the rank of commissioned officer who may require to be acquainted with its contents in the course of their duties. The Officers exercising this power will be held responsible that such information is imparted with due caution and reserve.



NOTE.

To ensure accuracy and completeness in the Historical Monographs, Officers who were concerned in the matters described and who detect obscure points which they can elucidate, or statements which require correction, are requested to furnish Additions and Amendments. It should be borne in mind that these Historical Monographs are based entirely on official documents, and no amendment which is not substantiated by such documents can be accepted. Remarks should be addressed to the Director of Training and Staff Duties, Admiralty, S.W.1.

**HOME WATERS, PART I,
from the Outbreak of War to 27 August, 1914.**

CONTENTS.

| | PAGE |
|--|------|
| INTRODUCTION.. .. . | vi |
| NOTE ON SOURCES | vii |
| CHAPTER I.—THE BRITISH AND GERMAN FLEETS PRIOR TO THE WAR | 1 |
| 1. The Situation on the Outbreak of War. 2. The Home Fleets. 3. The German Fleet. 4. The W. List and Disposition of the British Fleet. 5. The British War Staff and War Plans. 6. War Orders for the Grand Fleet and Channel Fleet. 7. The Cruiser Squadrons. 8. Coast and Harbour Protection. 9. Minelaying Squadron. 9a. The Naval Air Service. 10. System of Command in Home Waters. 11. Effect of Geographical Conditions on Strategy. 12. British and German Naval Bases. 13. The German War Plan and Forecast of British Action. | |
| CHAPTER II.—EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE OUTBREAK OF WAR | 23 |
| 14. The Test Mobilisation. 15. The Fleet proceeds to its War Stations, July 29. 16. Concentration of the German Fleet, July 27. 17. Mobilisation of the British Fleet ordered, August 1. 18. Mobilisation of the German Fleet, August 2. 19. Germany declares War on France, August 3. 20. Arrival of the British Fleet at Scapa, July 31: Shortage of Colliers. 21. Change of British Commander-in-Chief and Outbreak of War: Grand Fleet proceeds to Sea. 22. The concentration of the Channel Fleet. 23. Local Defence Flotillas. | |
| CHAPTER III.—THE OPENING DAYS OF WAR | 39 |
| 24. German Defence Arrangements in the Heligoland Bight. 25. Germany enters into a State of War, 6.30 p.m., August 4. 26. Cruise of <i>E.6</i> and <i>E.8</i> to the Heligoland Bight, August 5-8. 27. Escape of the <i>Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse</i> into the Atlantic, August 5. 28. Sweep of the Grand Fleet, August 4-7. 29. Search for German Submarine Bases on the Norwegian Coast. | |
| CHAPTER IV.—GERMAN MINELAYING OFFENSIVE OPENS. 48 | |
| 30. German Mining Policy. 31. Minelaying Operation off the Thames by the <i>Königin Luise</i> , August 5. 32. Loss of the <i>Amphion</i> , August 6. 33. Coastward Channel initiated. 34. Change in the Function of the Patrol Flotillas, August 6. | |
| CHAPTER V.—THE BLOCKADE AND PROTECTION OF TRADE | 54 |
| 35. The Blockade in the West. 36. Cruiser Force E. 37. British System of Blockade in the North. 38. Treatment of Merchant Shipping by Great Britain and Germany prior to Outbreak of War. | |

| | PAGE |
|---|------|
| CHAPTER VI.—GERMAN SUBMARINES APPEAR IN THE NORTH, AUGUST 9: GRAND FLEET WITHDRAWS FROM THE NORTH SEA | 63 |
| 39. The Expeditionary Force leaves England: Grand Fleet proceeds to Sea, August 7. 40. Orders for a concerted German Submarine Operation against the Grand Fleet, August 6. 41. The Operation: Search for British Patrol Line. 42. Sinking of <i>U.15</i> by the <i>Birmingham</i> , August 9: Grand Fleet withdraws to the North-westward. 43. Commander-in-Chief's appreciation of the Submarine Menace, August 11. 44. Search for German Submarine Bases in Norway, August 11. | |
| CHAPTER VII.—PASSAGE OF THE BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE: GERMAN SUBMARINE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE COVERING FORCES | 70 |
| 45. Covering Forces. 46. Decision to Despatch Submarines to interrupt the Transport of the B.E.F. 46a. Admiralty appreciation of the situation. 47. Order for the 3rd Half-Flotilla, August 8. 48. Operation against the British Covering Forces, August 8-11. | |
| CHAPTER VIII.—BRITISH OPERATIONS TO CLEAR UP THE SITUATION IN THE NORTH SEA, THIRD WEEK IN AUGUST | 78 |
| 49. Scapa abandoned: Fresh War Anchorage adopted at Loch Ewe, August 11. 50. The Scottish Bases and War Anchorages: Question of Defences. 51. Admiral Christian appointed to Command the Forces in the Hoofden, August 15. 52. Possibility of Invasion: Grand Fleet ordered to Return to the North Sea, August 12. 53. Sweep of the Grand Fleet towards Heligoland, August 15-17. 54. Shortage of Coal for the Grand Fleet. 55. Operations of British Submarines off the Ems and Weser, August 16-17. | |
| CHAPTER IX.—GERMAN SUBMARINE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE BRITISH FLEET, AUGUST 15-21, AND SUBSEQUENT CHANGE OF POLICY | 86 |
| 56. German Appreciation of the Situation, August 9. 57. Attempt to Discover the Close Blockade Line. 58. Second attempt to locate the Distant Blockade Line, August 15-21. 59. <i>U.22</i> proceeds to the Humber, August 15. 60. Submarine Operations against the British Fleet abandoned. | |
| CHAPTER X.—THE TYNE AND HUMBER MINEFIELDS | 92 |
| 61. Raid on the Broad Fourteens Patrol, August 18. 62. The Raid on the Fishing Fleet, August 22. 63. Outcome of the Broad Fourteens Raid: Cruiser Force "K" constituted, August 19. 64. The Grand Fleet, August 18-28. 65. German Mine-laying Operations off the Tyne and Humber, August 25-26. 66. Discovery of the Minefields, August 26. 67. Position of the Minefields. 68. Admiralty Announcement of August 31. | |

PLANS.

| | To face page |
|--|--------------|
| I.—Escape of the <i>Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse</i> , 5 August 1914 .. | 44 |
| II.—Minelaying Operation of the <i>Königin Luise</i> , 5 August 1914 .. | 52 |
| III.—Northward Sweep of German 1st Submarine Flotilla, 6-11 August 1914, and Contemporary Movements of Grand Fleet | 68 |
| IV.—Sweep of the Grand Fleet, August 15-17, and Operation of <i>U.20</i> , 21, and 22.. .. . | 90 |
| V.—Raid on the Broad Fourteens, 18 August 1914.. .. . | 94 |
| VI.—Minefield laid off the Tyne by the German Minelayer <i>Albatross</i> , 25-26 August 1914 | 104 |
| VII.—Humber Minefield laid by the German Minelayer <i>Nautilus</i> , 25-26 August 1914 | 106 |

APPENDICES.

| | PAGE |
|---|------|
| Appendix A. Organisation of the British Naval Force for War .. | 108 |
| „ B. Organisation of German North Sea Forces | 112 |
| „ C1. Operation Signals: Sweep of Grand Fleet, August 4-5 | 114 |
| „ C2. Operation Orders: Sweep of North Sea, August 15-17 | 118 |
| „ C3. General Orders for a Reconnaissance in Force by Cruiser Squadrons and Flotillas: dated 18 August 1914 | 121 |
| „ D1. Operation Orders: German Submarine Sweep to Northward, August 6-11 | 123 |
| „ D2. Operation Orders: Submarine Attack on Forces covering British Expeditionary Force | 124 |
| „ D3. Operation Orders for Second German Submarine Operation to the North, August 15-21 | 125 |
| „ D4. Orders for German Minelaying Operation off the Tyne, August 25-26.. .. . | 126 |

HOME WATERS, PART I, from the Outbreak of War to 27 August 1914.

Introduction.

This monograph¹ is the first of a series dealing with the operations in Home Waters during the period of the war. A statement of the principal forces engaged will give an indication of the scope of the work. These forces comprised—

- (a) The Grand Fleet, including the Northern Patrol (carried out by Cruiser Force B) and the Humber Force (Cruiser Force K).
- (b) Harwich Flotillas, 8th Submarine Flotilla, and their short-lived support, Cruiser Force C.
- (c) Coast Patrol Flotillas, Auxiliary Patrol and Minesweepers.
- (d) Dover Patrol.
- (e) Channel Fleet.
- (f) Western Patrol by Cruiser Force G and the French 2nd Light Squadron.
- (g) Cruiser Force E.

The work of certain of these forces has been dealt with in detail in separate monographs, as have also some of the more important operations which took place in Home Waters; and this method will be continued and extended.

This volume covers the period from the test mobilisation in July 1914 up to, but not including, the Battle of Heligoland Bight, 28 August 1914, which is dealt with separately in Monograph 11. The following monographs should be read in conjunction with this volume :—

- (a) No. 6.—Naval Movements, August 1914, associated with the Transport of the British Expeditionary Force C.B. 1585 (quoted as "B.E.F.").
- (b) No. 7.—The Patrol Flotillas at the commencement of the War. C.B. 1585 (quoted as "Patrol Flotillas").
- (c) No. 11.—The Battle of Heligoland Bight, 28 August 1914. C.B. 1585.
- (d) No. 18.—The Dover Command, Vol I. C.B. 917*d*.
- (e) No. 19.—The Tenth Cruiser Squadron, 1914–1916. C.B. 917*e*.
- (f) History of British Minesweeping in the War. C.B. 1553.
- (g) The Economic Blockade. C.B. 1554.

¹ Slightly abridged from C.B. 960.

In this monograph the term "Grand Fleet" has been used to describe Sir John Jellicoe's command. To avoid confusion, the term "Admiralstab" has been used to express the German Admiralty Staff, and "Reichs-Marine-Amt" for the Imperial Navy Office.

All times are G.M.T.

Note on Sources.

The principal sources from which this monograph has been compiled are as follows :—

- (a) *War Registry Telegrams for the Period*.—These are contained in H.S. Vols. 50–58 inclusive. The majority of the essential ones are reproduced in the Appendices to Monographs Nos. 6, 7 and 11.
- (b) *M Branch Letter Books (Miscellaneous Series)*.—These volumes contain Admiralty Out Letters.
- (c) *Secret Packs of the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet*.—During the period of the war papers of a confidential nature in the office of the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets, were filed in packs, numbered separately from the non-confidential records, in a series 001 to 0050 inclusive. Copies of relevant telegrams were filed in these packs, but a complete set of all telegrams was also maintained. The papers have been bound in 90 volumes. They are referred to in this monograph as G.F.S.P.
- (d) *The Grand Fleet Narrative*.—This is a continuous diary of proceedings which was forwarded to the Admiralty by the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, at first daily, but, after 23 October 1915, weekly. The last date is 28 November 1916, when Admiral Jellicoe relinquished the command. The narrative is bound in a series of volumes, and is referred to in this monograph as G.F.N.
- (e) *Papers of Commodore (T)*.—These are the office papers of Commodore T, now bound in 13 volumes.
- (f) *Papers of Commodore (S)*.—Reports of the work of the 8th Submarine Flotilla during 1914 (except in the Baltic) have been bound in H.S. Vol. 225. The office papers also are bound under the title "Commodore S, War Records," Vol. I of which covers the period 1914.
- (g) *Orders and Memoranda issued by the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, for general distribution*.—These have been bound, under the title G.F. Orders and Memos.
- (h) *Signal and W/T Logs*.—These are stored at the Royal Naval Victualling Yard, Deptford, where they are registered and numbered.

(k) *Unbound Papers*.—A great number of unbound Admiralty papers have been examined. The more important of these are at present in the custody of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence, by whom summaries have been prepared of all papers examined but not retained. Unbound papers are quoted by their Branch Registry Number or by their Record Office Title. Details of other sources of information will be found in the monographs mentioned in the introduction to this volume. Use has been made of the daily return issued in the Admiralty entitled "Positions and Movements of H.M. Ships," though in all cases of importance the logs of ships concerned have been examined so far as they are extant.

On the French side there is a volume published by direction of the Historical Section of the Naval Staff, *La Guerre des Croiseurs*, Tome I, Paris, 1922 (A. Challamel). It is referred to in this monograph as "F.O.H."

The principal German source of information is the Official History, *Der Krieg zur See, 1914–1918: Nordsee*, Band I, quoted as "G.O.H." A short description and criticism of this work appeared in the introduction to Monograph No. 11, but it should be added that further examination reveals a certain number of textual errors, particularly in positions, dates and times, while there is evidence of careless compilation in the frequent inconsistencies which exist between the text and the plans, etc. Where necessary, these errors have been noted in this monograph.

Other sources of information, as well as published works, both British and German, when quoted in the text of this monograph, are mentioned in the footnotes.

A subject index of this volume will be issued at the end of Part III.

CHAPTER I.

THE BRITISH AND GERMAN FLEETS PRIOR TO THE WAR.

1. **The Situation on the Outbreak of War.**—Ten years before the outbreak of war in 1914 the political situation was such that the British Fleet was scattered over the whole world; in the Mediterranean and China Squadrons there were as many battleships as in the Home and Channel Fleets. The Russo-Japanese war of 1904–5, which resulted in the destruction of practically the whole of the Russian Fleet, and the conclusion of a treaty between Great Britain and Japan in 1905, enabled us to remove all but a small group of cruisers from the Pacific. Further, an Entente which was reached with France, though purposely somewhat indefinite in its provisions, gave us the opportunity of withdrawing all battleships from the Mediterranean. With Russia powerless, France a friend, and Japan an ally, the only Naval Powers of importance with whom we might have to reckon were Germany, Austria, Italy, and the United States; and of these, the most probable enemy was the first, either alone or in combination with Austria and Italy. The navies of Austria and Italy were based on the home ports in the Mediterranean. If, therefore, the whole French Navy also could be concentrated in that area, the British main fleet could be massed in the North Sea and oppose an almost overwhelming force to that of Germany. This condition was reached by an understanding with France that in the event of war we would protect her Channel and Atlantic coasts from serious aggression. The result of our alliance with Japan and the Entente with France was that in 1914 all our battleships except two¹ were in Home waters.

The ten years had not passed without incidents which had their effect on the minds of the War Staffs of the two principal antagonists, Great Britain and Germany. In 1911 occurred the so-called "Agadir incident." Agadir is a port on the west coast of Morocco, a country in which France was gradually securing a foothold. On 1 July 1911 there appeared off Agadir the *Panther*, a small German gunboat, as a concrete expression of Germany's intention of securing a port in the Atlantic and of checking the French advance. The *Panther* was speedily

¹ The *Swiftsure* and *Triumph*, which, being of Italian build, were of different specifications from ships in the Grand Fleet. One was in the China Squadron and the other in the East Indies.

replaced by a larger vessel, the light cruiser *Berlin*. In this desire of Germany to expand at the expense of France we did not acquiesce. British statesmen in public speeches made this quite clear to Germany and she had to withdraw her claims. But it was not only the speeches which had produced this change of attitude. The German Naval War Staff had been watching the movements of our Fleet. Whereas in their own Fleet their reserves were disbanded as usual after the summer manœuvres, their informants from England brought stories of readiness for immediate war on the part of the British Fleet. According to this information "the British battleships lay in the Forth ready for action, torpedo boats with darkened lights were in position off the Thames, the reserves for the Fleet were speedily made ready for sea, and large supplies of coal were hastened at enormous cost to the East Coast ports." Overpowered by these warlike preparations, the German Government adopted a more conciliatory attitude,¹ and the danger of war passed away with the conclusion of a Treaty between France and Germany on 4 November 1911.

The reports of the German agents had, however, given a more alarming account of our preparations than was strictly warranted by the facts. There were three periods of maximum tension during this episode, namely, July 24, August 19, and September 18. On July 24 our battleships were in the southern ports giving leave; on August 19 they were at Invergordon, prepared against a sudden attack, though anything likely to cause offence was rigorously excluded; on September 18 the Admiralty ordered the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets, to move his base gradually to Scapa Flow and to continue practices from there. On the last date the Admiralty directed the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla to use Dover, the Downs and Margate; but there was nothing unusual in this as our flotillas frequently operated from there. No evidence has been found of the alleged hasty preparation of the reserves for sea or the shipment of coal to East Coast ports. The German Press, however, reported movements of large quantities of coal along their own coast at this time and possibly imagined we were taking the same measures.

The Agadir incident showed that Great Britain was prepared to take the part of France in opposing Germany's desire to find a new base in the Atlantic. In the following year Germany passed the Army Bill of 1912 which appreciably increased her land forces. Her expansion towards the Atlantic being checked, her statesmen now directed their attention more to the Near East, where a general Balkan war was in progress. Until its conclusion with a treaty between Greece and Turkey in November 1913, Germany made continuous efforts to gain some advantage from the conflict, a course of action which brought her sharply

¹ G.O.H., p. 5.

against Russia. That country, after her defeat at the hands of the Japanese, was credited with a reorganisation of both her army and navy and was a firm friend of France. Fear of Russia had been ever present in the minds of Prussian statesmen, and this collision brought it once more to the surface. Apart from the possibility that the Russian army might overrun East Prussia, the stronghold of the influential Prussian aristocracy, there was the Russian Baltic Fleet to be considered. Germany's battle squadrons had to be divided between Kiel on the Baltic shore and Wilhelmshaven on the North Sea, with the peninsula of Denmark between them.

For some time the increase in the size of battleships rendered the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal useless for communication between the North Sea and the Baltic by the more modern capital ships; but the canal was in process of being widened, and it was expected that the work would be completed in the summer of 1914.¹ Until then, a sudden outbreak of war with Russia might find Germany with a fleet in the Baltic inferior to that of her enemy.

2. The Home Fleets.²—Prior to the war the British vessels in Home waters were divided into three fleets which were respectively in progressive states of readiness.³ In the First Fleet, the twenty available Dreadnoughts and the *Agamemnon* composed the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Battle Squadrons, while the eight "King Edwards" formed the 3rd Battle Squadron. Attached to these Squadrons were the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron consisting of four out of the seven battle cruisers, the remaining three being in the Mediterranean; the 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons⁴; the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron⁵; and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Flotillas, each consisting of a leader and twenty destroyers.⁶ The First Fleet was kept fully commissioned and

¹ A trial passage was arranged for August 1914, but in view of the political situation it was put forward, and on July 25 the battleship *Kaiserin* made the passage successfully, though she had to be lightened by discharging part of her coal (G.O.H., p. 21). In his diary, under date 20 September 1914, Admiral von Pohl, Chief of the Naval Staff, wrote:—"The Commander-in-Chief reports that the 3rd Squadron cannot pass through the Canal until the ships have discharged 1,600 tons of coal." (See "M.I.R.," July 1920, p. 45.)

² See Appendix A.

³ The designation First, Second, and Third Fleet had reference solely to the state of preparedness for war in which the vessels were maintained. It had no connection with the strategic disposition or functions of the various squadrons composing each fleet, though the composition of individual squadrons was based on their strategical and tactical employment in the event of war.

⁴ Also the 4th Cruiser Squadron, which, however, usually cruised in foreign waters.

⁵ Four vessels, increased on the outbreak of war to six.

⁶ The 3rd Flotilla had only 15 boats, of the new "L" class, to which further boats were soon drafted as they became available.

ready for immediate service off the shores of the British Isles. The Second Fleet consisted of the 5th and 6th Battle Squadrons and the 5th and 6th Cruiser Squadrons; with it were also grouped the Home Defence Patrol Flotillas, comprising seven flotilla cruisers, four patrol flotillas, and seven flotillas of submarines. Except for the fully commissioned submarines, the vessels of the Second Fleet were manned by "active service crews," a term which implied the carrying of about 60 per cent. of the full complement of personnel, including all the specialist officers. Each depôt maintained the necessary balance to complete the complement from numbers undergoing training. The remaining ships on the active list formed the Third Fleet, consisting of the 7th and 8th Battle Squadrons and the remaining Cruiser Squadrons; all these were old ships, manned by "care and maintenance" parties,¹ a term which indicated either that the ship in question was undergoing extensive repairs or that her service in the Fleet would only be required in an emergency.

The organisation of the Home Fleets for war envisaged two main forces, the Grand Fleet and the Channel Fleet, together with certain Atlantic Squadrons.² The Grand Fleet was composed of the whole of the First Fleet ships, except the 4th Cruiser Squadron, with certain cruiser squadrons of the Second and Third Fleets and the more modern submarines; whilst the Coast Patrol Flotillas north of Dover were also under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, with reservations as to their employment in offensive operations away from the British coast. In the Channel Fleet were the battleships of the Second and Third Fleets, two cruiser squadrons, and the minelayers. The remaining cruiser squadrons of the Second and Third Fleets were detailed for duty on the Atlantic trade routes.

3. **The German Fleet.**³—In the summer of 1914 practically the entire naval strength of Germany was concentrated in home waters. There were a few cruisers in foreign waters, namely, a battle cruiser and a light cruiser in the Mediterranean, two cruisers and two light cruisers in China, and four light cruisers in Pacific, Atlantic, and East African waters. The naval forces in home waters were organised as follows. The High Sea Fleet consisted of five squadrons of battleships, the 1st and 3rd composed of Dreadnoughts in full commission, though the 3rd Squadron, to which the newest ships belonged, included four vessels only for some days after war broke out, when two

¹ A care and maintenance party comprised a few men as caretakers, with an engineer officer to each ship, and a few other officers in charge of groups of vessels.

² See Appendix A.

³ See Appendix B.

more newly completed Dreadnoughts were added to it, bringing the strength of the squadron up to six. The 2nd, 4th and 5th Squadrons were formed of pre-Dreadnought battleships, the 2nd Squadron only being in full commission.¹ The 6th Squadron was formed on August 12 of coast defence battleships.

The cruisers of the High Sea Fleet were organised in three scouting groups, to which two more groups were added during August 1914. The three battle cruisers in home waters formed the 1st Scouting Group, together with the armoured cruiser *Blücher*, which, however, operated with the battle cruisers only in emergency. The 2nd and 3rd Scouting Groups were composed of light cruisers, as was the 5th, which was formed on August 12 from old but heavily armed light cruisers. Of the armoured cruisers destined to form the 4th Scouting Group one only, the *Roon*, was ready at the outbreak of war. Two of the modern light cruisers and a number of older vessels were among the forces detailed for the Baltic. The best of the destroyers were organised in eight flotillas,² consisting each of a leader and ten boats; and owing to the configuration of the German coast, which required but few vessels to be allocated to its patrol, the Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet was enabled to employ simultaneously six at least of the flotillas for offensive operations.³

In August 1914 the head of the Reichs-Marine-Amt, namely, the Secretary of State for the Navy, was Admiral of the Fleet von Tirpitz. Admiral von Pohl was Chief of the Admiralstab, and Admiral von Ingenohl commanded the High Sea Fleet. The German Emperor was the ultimate naval authority, and his office, the Marine-Kabinet, presided over by Admiral Georg von Müller, was an actual portion of the Imperial Admiralty.

4. **The W. List and Disposition of the British Fleet.**—The development of the German navy and its strategical distribution had been closely watched by our naval authorities, and they were ready with a plan for war should hostilities become inevitable. From 1904 onwards the Admiralty kept in circulation and under constant revision a document called the W. List, or War List, which formed a species of code for use during the

¹ The 4th and 5th Squadrons were employed mainly in the Baltic. They were 1st class battleships, but their fighting value was not high. According to the German Official History a considerable time elapsed before the ships of these squadrons were ready for action.

² Possibly only seven prior to the war, but the 8th Flotilla was constituted by 10 August 1914.

³ This gave to the High Sea Fleet, in the early part of the war, the advantage over the Grand Fleet in action of a considerable numerical superiority in destroyers, except on occasion when the Harwich flotillas were working with the Grand Fleet. This factor exercised its effect on the strategy and tactics of the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet.

stages between the commencement of strained relations and the actual declaration of war by or against any Power. This document contained a series of orders, each with a code word and number, and a list of the officials and authorities to whom the message should be addressed. At first, the other departments of State, such as the Treasury and the Board of Trade, were somewhat dilatory in making practical arrangements for carrying out the war measures in which, with the Admiralty, they would probably be jointly concerned. The General Post Office authorities, however, always showed themselves keenly sympathetic and ready for co-operation. Just before the Agadir incident the Committee of Imperial Defence, to whose notice the Admiralty W. List had been brought, took up the question of co-ordinating departmental action on the outbreak of war. "Its labours resulted in the production of a War Book in which was tabulated what every department had to do, and how and when it was to do it."¹ In addition to the general War Book, each department made its own detailed list of orders which should give effect to the steps laid down in the general book. That of the Admiralty retained its name of W. List. It contained over fifty orders, the later ones frequently embodying many of the earlier, and it was designed to cover all foreseen contingencies from a long-drawn period of tension ending in peace to a sudden attack without preliminary warning. The measures it set to work were so arranged as to give the security arising from position without imperilling, by the adoption of too aggressive an attitude, the possibility of a favourable termination to the strained situation.

The disposition aimed at in the W. List was a concentration of all the Dreadnought and most modern pre-Dreadnought battleships in the northern part of the North Sea, with the due complement of cruisers and destroyers; a large force of modern destroyers and submarines at Harwich to act offensively in the enemy's waters; groups of the best of the older destroyers at various selected places on the East Coast to engage minelayers or convoys of enemy troops should invasion be attempted; a mixed force of destroyers and submarines to hold the Dover Strait; the older pre-Dreadnought battleships massed in the Channel; while forces of older cruisers from the reserve were to be mobilised to patrol the western approaches to the Channel, the Irish Sea and the Atlantic trade routes. The Nore was to have a flotilla of old torpedo craft and submarines to guard the approaches to the Thames, while the remaining destroyers, torpedo boats and submarines were stationed as local defence flotillas at the Home ports.

5. The British War Staff and War Plans.—The W. List ended with the order to commence hostilities; it gave no

¹ Corbett, *Naval Operations*, I, p. 19.

indication of the method of carrying on operations or of their object. These subjects were treated in the War Plans and War Orders, which were under continual revision. At first the drafting of these was part of the work of the Naval Intelligence department of the Admiralty. In 1911 this important duty was transferred to the Mobilisation department. But after the Agadir Incident, which had called the attention of all Government offices to the necessity of still further perfecting the arrangements for war, a war staff was organised in the Admiralty; all the departments directly concerned with war were put under the Chief of the War Staff, and became divisions of his staff. Responsible to him were the Directors of Operations, Intelligence, and Mobilisation. The production of War Plans and War Orders became the function of the Operations Division,¹ and what was to be the final revision was at once begun.

The primary function of the naval forces, it was considered, was to destroy the enemy's naval forces and obtain command of the North Sea and English Channel in order to prevent the enemy from making any serious attack upon British territory or trade or interfering with the transport of British troops to France should the situation necessitate their despatch. To obtain this object, the Grand Fleet, based on the Scottish coasts and islands, was continually to be in movement in the North Sea; while the Channel Fleet operated generally in the English Channel, being liable in case of urgent necessity to act in conjunction with the Grand Fleet. The exertion of economic pressure upon Germany by cutting off her shipping from oceanic trade was an important part of the main strategic idea, and would be ensured by the action of patrolling cruisers, supported in the manner described above by the two fleets, which together were superior in all classes of vessels to that of Germany.²

The Admiralty, in view of the development of the submarine, the mine and torpedo, did not consider it any longer practicable to maintain a perpetual close watch off the enemy's ports³; the maritime domination of the North Sea upon which our whole war policy was based was therefore to be secured by occasional driving or sweeping movements carried out by the Grand Fleet traversing in superior force the area between the 54th and 58th parallels. The details of these movements and the general disposition of his forces were at the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief, who was, however, to keep the Admiralty fully informed of his intentions and progress. The sweeps of the Grand Fleet were to be sufficiently frequent and sufficiently advanced to

¹ See Appendix to First Lord's Statement on Navy Estimates, 1912-13.

² This was the considered opinion of the Operations Division just before the outbreak of war. The High Sea Fleet was, however, superior in destroyers. See note 3, p. 5.

³ The Admiralstab views on this subject are given in Section 14.

impress upon the enemy that he could not carry out any enterprise far from his home ports without serious risk of encountering an overwhelming force. The normal position of the Battle Fleet would be north of 55° N.¹

There were three probable objectives in the North Sea on the part of the enemy:—

- (1) To break out of the North Sea in order to attack our trade.
- (2) To raid the East Coast, either on a small scale or by an operation in the nature of an invasion.
- (3) To attack in the Channel the transports crossing to France.

The strategic disposition of the fleets was framed to meet all these exigencies. Minor raiding enterprises on the part of the enemy were to be dealt with by the coast patrols and land forces, unless they could be intercepted on the passage without diverting the Grand Fleet from other more important duties. In the case of invasion, however, the Admiralty contemplated that a situation might arise in which an attack on the transports was of paramount urgency, even if the enemy's main fleet was within reach.

There were certain precautions which senior naval officers might expect to be ordered by the Admiralty to take during the period of strained relations, that is, if a political situation should arise which rendered it possible that hostilities might ensue. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battle Squadrons, the *Duncan* class of the 6th Battle Squadron, the 2nd and 4th Destroyer Flotillas, and Cruiser Force A would assemble at Scapa Flow and remain north of the 57th parallel. The 1st and 3rd Destroyer Flotillas would assemble at Harwich, from which base one of them was to establish a patrol of the Thames Estuary from Orfordness to the North Foreland until the Nore Local Defence Flotilla was mobilised to relieve it.

On the issue of the Warning Telegram² the Grand Fleet was to take up its war station as above, if it had not already done so; the Patrol and Local Defence Flotillas would be completed to full crews; and all submarine flotillas were to take up their war stations.

On the telegram, "Take up War Stations," the whole of the naval forces would proceed without further orders.³

¹ B.E.F., A 43, 51.

² This was one of the telegrams in the W. List instructing the recipients to adopt all precautionary measures in anticipation of attack by enemy torpedo craft.

³ It was probably contemplated that the order to mobilise would have been given some time previously.

6. Orders for the Grand Fleet and Channel Fleet.—The Admiralty intended to retain general control of the strategic situation in war. It was their intention, as soon as the active operations of war should begin, to place the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleets in command of the Grand Fleet in the North Sea while the Vice-Admiral Commanding the Second and Third Fleets took command of the southern or Channel Fleet. The Channel Fleet was always to be held in readiness to meet emergencies in the North Sea and to assist the Commander-in-Chief. Should a hostile fleet break out, standing to the southward, the Channel Fleet might expect either to be ordered to reinforce the Grand Fleet, which would probably move southward, or to observe, check, weaken, or delay the enemy according to circumstances, so as to assist the Northern Fleet to cut him off from home and bring him to action under favourable circumstances. Should the enemy move northward, the Channel Fleet might be ordered either to reinforce the Grand Fleet as before or to cut off the enemy's retreat. The Channel Fleet was, further, to deal with small enemy squadrons or single vessels which might succeed in passing through the patrols in the Straits of Dover.

The Grand Fleet included three cruiser forces, namely, A, B, and C, though the first only of these was intimately associated with the fleet. Cruiser Force A was composed of the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, the 2nd, 3rd, and 6th Cruiser Squadrons, and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron. All except the 6th Cruiser Squadron of three armoured cruisers¹ were squadrons of the First Fleet; the 6th Cruiser Squadron was manned on a Second Fleet basis. The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron consisted of four ships, but this number was increased to six on the outbreak of war. No special orders were issued by the Admiralty to Cruiser Force A; but in a fleet action their rôle was defined by the existing orders.²

Cruiser Force B was to be employed on the duty of intercepting German merchant ships passing between the Shetlands and the coasts of Norway and Scotland, or men-of-war or armed merchant vessels passing in and out of the North Sea, and in guarding the Shetlands. It was not to participate in the drives or sweeps of the Grand Fleet except under extraordinary

¹ The fourth, the *Good Hope*, was required elsewhere and never joined up with the 6th Cruiser Squadron.

² Prior to the war, the orders governing the conduct of a fleet in action were issued in the form of Home Fleet General Orders (H.S. Vol. 260) and "Remarks on Conduct of a Fleet in Action" (H.F. 0235 of 5.12.13 and 03 of 14.3.14). When Admiral Jellicoe succeeded to the command of the Grand Fleet on August 4 he initiated a series of Battle Orders and Manœuvring Instructions. These were kept under continual revision and elaboration. They have been collected and bound under the title "Grand Fleet Battle Orders."

circumstances. The 10th Cruiser Squadron, comprising eight old cruisers on a Third Fleet basis, constituted Cruiser Force B.¹

To Cruiser Force C was allotted the duty of supporting the 1st and 3rd Flotillas in the Hoofden.² The 7th Cruiser Squadron of four old cruisers of the *Bacchante* class, manned on a Third Fleet basis, constituted this cruiser force. The squadron was based on the Nore, with the Humber as alternative fuelling base.

The rôle of the 1st and 3rd Destroyer Flotillas was to operate in the Hoofden and keep the eastern approaches to the English Channel clear of enemy torpedo craft and minelayers, and to reconnoitre and give early information of the movements of enemy vessels. The force was to operate from Harwich under the command of Commodore (T), who received his orders from the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet. Commodore (T)'s force was an integral part of the Grand Fleet, and though it would normally operate to the southward of the 54th parallel, between the meridians of 2° E and 6° E, it might, in certain circumstances, be required to join the Grand or the Channel Fleet if the latter entered the North Sea. The establishment of a temporary patrol of the Thames estuary by one of the two flotillas, if a situation should arise which rendered it possible that hostilities might ensue, was an important duty of the force.

The 2nd and 4th Flotillas were appropriated to accompany the Grand Fleet unless otherwise ordered.

A further force was in war time to operate from Harwich and offensively towards the German North Sea coast, in the Heligoland Bight or possibly in the Cattegat. This was the 8th Submarine Flotilla, consisting of 16 of the newest boats under the Commodore (S), Captain Roger J. B. Keyes, C.B., M.V.O.³ Previous to the war, it was intended that the flotilla should be based on the Humber, but this was altered on August 3 to Harwich. Commodore (T) was to provide escorts for the submarines as necessary, as far east as 6° E, when oversea operations were undertaken. A further duty indicated in the orders which the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet issued to Commodore (S) was to reinforce Cruiser Force C.

7. The Cruiser Squadrons.—In a war with an enemy possessing sea power there was one form of aggression to which Great Britain was peculiarly susceptible, namely, a secret and sudden attack upon her merchant shipping. The danger lay not so much in the material damage which could be caused, as in the

¹ See Monograph 19 in C.B. 917E.

² The southern part of the North Sea. The term does not appear on British Charts, but it is extremely convenient and will occasionally be used throughout these monographs.

³ Commodore 2nd Class.

panic which might ensue in commercial and shipping circles, and thereby render precarious the food situation of the country. There were two principal methods by which it appeared that Germany could directly attack shipping, namely, by commerce raiders or by laying mines secretly off the entrances to our ports and in the congested routes of trade. Germany possessed a considerable number of fast liners suitable for conversion into armed merchant cruisers in war time. She claimed the right to arm merchant vessels without their returning to a home port, and it was her avowed policy to convert such as were suitable into armed commerce raiders on the outbreak of war, and send them out on to the trade routes.¹ To meet this danger a number of cruiser squadrons were allotted to the Atlantic, the area through which passed the most valuable and most vulnerable trade routes.² The Atlantic was divided into a number of lettered areas, to each of which a cruiser squadron was allotted, being then designated by the letter of its area. In peace time the cruisers were all on a Second or Third Fleet basis, except Cruiser Force H, the 4th Cruiser Squadron, which was on a First Fleet basis; it was usually employed on foreign service and was in West Indian waters on the outbreak of war. To it was assigned the protection of the North Atlantic west of 40° W. Cruiser Force D, the 5th Cruiser Squadron, operated in mid-Atlantic east of the meridian of 40° W; and the 11th Cruiser Squadron became Cruiser Force E on the outbreak of war and guarded the home end of the North Atlantic trade routes, being based on Queenstown, with Berehaven and Lough Swilly as its chief coaling bases. Its main station was off the Fastnet, with some vessels guarding the northern entrance to the Irish Sea. The squadron was on a Third Fleet basis in peace time, and was to be joined by the Cunard liners *Mauretania*, *Lusitania*, and *Aquitania* as soon as they could be got ready after the outbreak of war.

Cruiser Force F was under the orders of the Vice-Admiral Commanding the Channel Fleet, the intention of the Admiralty apparently being to use the ships to reinforce other areas if necessary, particularly Area E, where it was anticipated that the work would be heavy. On the outbreak of war the *Hogue* and *Sutlej* were allotted to Force F, also the *Pelorus* for a short time. The *Hogue* was sent to Queenstown and shortly afterwards joined Cruiser Force C; the *Sutlej* joined Cruiser Force I; and the *Pelorus* Cruiser Force E.

¹ In July 1914 forty-six German merchant vessels were known by the Admiralty to be fitted for conversion into armed auxiliaries in war time. It was calculated that at any given moment, such as the outbreak of war, 35 of these vessels would be outside the North Sea, and they would be in a position to attack our trade at an early stage of the war. (M. 0673/14. Agenda and Précis for War Conference, 24-25 July 1914. In G.F.S.P. Vol. LIX.)

² See C.B. 917(G) Monograph No. 22, "The Atlantic Ocean." (C4509)

Responsibility for the protection of the western entrance to the English Channel in the event of hostilities arising between an Anglo-French alliance and Germany had been assumed by France, and the French authorities had prepared for co-operation between the French 2nd Light Squadron based on Brest or Cherbourg and the British Cruiser Squadron, which together were to carry out the patrol of the area.¹ The British force allotted to the area was designated Cruiser Force G, and consisted of four protected cruisers of the Third Fleet, the 12th Cruiser Squadron being the squadron detailed on the outbreak of war. There was no mention of French co-operation or responsibility in the general orders issued in July 1914 for the Officer Commanding Cruiser Force G.

On the reorganisation of the cruiser forces on 1 August 1914, the 11th Cruiser Squadron became the 9th Cruiser Squadron and was allotted to Area I, where it was employed in the protection of the Atlantic trade to the south-westward of the Channel, its main station being the trade route off Cape Finisterre.

Thus the cruiser forces which guarded the Western entrances in war were Cruiser Force E off the Fastnet, and the Western Squadron in the mouth of the Channel, this force being composed of Cruiser Force G associated with the French 2nd Light Squadron of ten old cruisers and four light cruisers.

8. Coast and Harbour Protection.—The gun defences of the British coast and ports were manned and maintained by the Army, with the exception of those at Cromarty, for which the Admiralty was responsible. A Committee was appointed in 1913 to consider the coast defences. In its report the Committee recommended that the Admiralty should be responsible for manning the fixed defences, while the War Office should be responsible for their protection, but there had been no time to carry out the recommendation. The Committee, after investigating the entire defences of the United Kingdom, based its report upon the existing grouping of the Great Powers. Although it recommended that some of the guns at ports outside the North Sea should not be manned in the event of war, it considered that they should not be removed, so as to be ready for any future change in international relationships.² The defences were not designed to meet prolonged or regular operations by a large fleet, whilst the passive obstructions were mainly intended as a defence against torpedo craft. In conjunction with the defences the immediate protection of the coast of the United Kingdom was carried out by various

¹ See Section 35.

² M. 0803/14.

floating forces. At the Home ports—the Nore, Portsmouth, Devonport, Pembroke, Queenstown, and Rosyth—there were the local defence flotillas under the command of the respective local Commanders-in-Chief and Senior Naval Officers. The functions of these flotillas were to prevent minelaying by the enemy in the approaches to the ports to seaward of the area illuminated by the searchlights of the fixed defences; to sweep channels where other subsidiary vessels¹ were not available; and to deal with attacks on the coast and ports by enemy vessels of all descriptions.² Eight destroyers were allotted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet for the patrol from the Firth of Forth to the Orkneys³; and a further force of four destroyers and a light cruiser was stationed in the Shetlands, the Admiralty having entire responsibility for the defence arrangements of the Shetland Islands. There was a belief that hostilities might open with an attack on the Grand Fleet at its bases, by torpedo craft or airships, before the declaration of war; and a special order was given to the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet to patrol his fuelling bases or anchorages on the first sign of approaching war. For maintenance purposes, the submarines of the local defence were under the Commodore (S), who was under the jurisdiction of the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet. It was the intention of the Admiralty, in the event of war, to strengthen the local defence flotillas in the principal East Coast rivers, Thames, Forth, Tyne, and Humber, by stationing there armoured vessels from the Third Fleet.

The East Coast, from the Firth of Forth to Dover, was defended by the Coast Patrol Flotillas. This force received its immediate orders from the Admiral of Patrols, Captain George A. Ballard, C.B., A.d.C.,⁴ who was under the jurisdiction of the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, but was answerable to the Admiralty direct for the flotilla at Dover. The vessels allotted to the patrol of the coast and the local defence of the ports were the older destroyers; the torpedo boats, an obsolescent type of craft for the construction of which no further provision had been made since the programme year 1907–1908; and the submarines of A, B, and C classes, which were unfit for other employment than coastal work. The primary function of the coast patrols was to report the approach of enemy

¹ Viz., the trawler minesweepers.

² Admiralty Manual of War Organisation (Operations Division No. 10, August 1914).

³ In H.F. 004 of 1 August 1914 their employment was laid down as the local defence of the fleet, colliers, etc., at bases where there was no local patrol or mobile defence force.

⁴ Commodore 1st class.

vessels, and to assist the coast batteries to deal with raids.¹ Generally, the patrol flotillas were not to participate in the southerly sweeps of the Grand Fleet.²

The Dover Flotilla³ was charged with the special duty of denying the Straits to the enemy, attacking his armed vessels within the limits of the patrol and immediately reporting if any succeeded in getting through the Straits, of detaining all enemy merchant shipping in the Downs and directing eastward-bound shipping through the Downs.⁴ In this it would be assisted by two flotillas of French submarines based on Calais and Boulogne, and by the vessels of the Défense Mobile.

A further function of the patrol flotillas was to keep the approaches to the East Coast ports free from enemy mines, by means of the trawler sweepers. Practically every type of German warship, from battleship to destroyer, carried, or was fitted to carry, a limited number of mines, the newer light cruisers carrying, it was believed, as many as 70 apiece; and in addition, the Germans had, to the best of our knowledge, four specially built minelayers besides such auxiliary minelayers as they might fit out in war time. The Germans were credited with possessing nearly 11,000 mines of the horned type, but this was perhaps an over-estimate.⁵ Towards the end of July 1914 the Admiralty came into possession of certain information purporting to give the positions of lines of mines which the Germans intended to lay in the event of war. The information was circulated to the principal Flag Officers of the various commands, ashore and afloat, with the notification that the Admiralty viewed the intelligence with some reserve on account of the largeness of the scheme; but they indicated the positions which should be particularly watched, especially by the Patrol Flotillas.⁶

Under the Defence Acts of 1889–1898, 18 gunboats had been built, the majority of which were employed in 1914 on the minesweeping service. The Admiralty also owned 13 mine-sweeping trawlers, which were employed in peace time on miscellaneous services such as towing targets and experimental

¹ See Monograph No. 7, "Patrol Flotillas."

² In practice they never did so; they were fully occupied in the exercise of their primary function.

³ *Attentive, Foresight, Adventure, Sentinel*, 6th Flotilla (18 boats), 3rd and 4th Submarine Flotillas (one "C" and three "B" boats).

⁴ See Monograph No. 18, "The Dover Command, Vol I," and for the work of the Downs Boarding Flotilla, see C.B. 1554, "The Economic Blockade, 1914–1919," Chapter XX.

⁵ Some 2,650 mines were laid by the Germans in all waters (exclusive of local defence mines) in 1914. It is, however, apparent from G.O.H. II and "Der Krieg zur See, 1914–1915, Ostsee, Bd. I," that there was a shortage of mines at the beginning of the war.

⁶ H.S. 50, p. 140, and D.O.D. 121/14, "German Mines."

work. In war time this auxiliary fleet was to receive considerable extension. As a result of the report in November 1908 of the Admiralty Mining Committee, a certain number of hired trawlers were allocated in the event of war to various ports around the coast for the purpose of minesweeping. The scheme was developed until, in August 1914, the Trawler Section, under Captain Thomas P. Bonham, Inspecting Captain of Minesweeping Vessels, consisted of some 90 trawlers. These were to be based in war time on Cromarty, the Firth of Forth, North Shields, the Humber, Harwich, the Nore, Dover, Portsmouth, Portland and Devonport.¹ For the organisation of the minesweeping service the Admiral of Patrols was responsible.

9. Minelaying Squadron.—This squadron consisted of seven converted second class cruisers, six of them fitted to carry 100 mines apiece, and the seventh, the *Iphigenia*, 140 mines. There were no vessels specially built and fitted as minelayers in H.M. Service, nor were any constructed during the war, though various merchant vessels were taken up and converted into minelayers. The governing idea previous to the war was to confine our minelaying activities to laying a few lines of mines to defend certain areas, should it be found necessary to do so; but the mining of enemy waters was not seriously contemplated.² On the outbreak of war the minelayers concentrated at Dover, where they remained till August 23, when three of them, the *Latona*, *Naiad*, and *Thetis*, sailed to join the flag of the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet for employment as patrolling cruisers.

9a. The Naval Air Service.³—By August 1914 the naval and military wings of the Royal Flying Corps had been separated. The naval wing was in a very immature state; the personnel numbered about 140 officers and 700 men, and the machines consisted of 6 airships, 39 aeroplanes, and 52 seaplanes, of which about half were ready for immediate use when war broke out.⁴

Prior to the war, the main concern of the Naval Air Service was the defence of the Thames estuary in war time. In addition, on August 8 the Admiralty issued orders for the establishment of a patrol by airships in the Straits of Dover and a cross-Channel patrol by seaplanes, a station being established at Ostend in

¹ M. 15701 (A)/12, "Arrangements for the destruction of hostile mines laid off the coast of the United Kingdom," and papers titled X. 3291/13. See also A. Hurd, "The Merchant Navy," Vol. I, Chapter VI.

² See "History of British Minefields, 1914–1918," compiled by Captain Lockhart-Leith, C.M.G., D.S.O., R.N. This work exists only in typescript.


³ This section is mainly based on material supplied to T.S.D. by the Historical Section (Air Branch) C.I.D. Documents distinguished by the letters A H, to which reference is made, have not been consulted in the original, but instead the H.S., C.I.D. copies have been used.

⁴ Raleigh, "The War in the Air," Vol. I, Chapter VII.

connection with the seaplane patrol.¹ At the same time, a regular coastal patrol by aeroplanes was established from Kinnaird Head to Dungeness, the naval wing undertaking the patrol from the Humber to Clacton, whilst the military wing patrolled the remainder of the East Coast.²

The Naval Air Service was directly controlled from the Admiralty, Captain Murray F. Sueter, C.B., being in charge of the Air department.

10. **System of Command in Home Waters.**—The system of command in southern Home waters was somewhat complex. In the North Sea there was a single command, all the forces being under the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet; but in the southern theatre, that is to say the Channel and the Straits of Dover, there was no single corporate command.



Vessels in this theatre were under direct Admiralty control as far as their strategical disposition was concerned, but except the Patrol Flotillas they were to act under the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Channel Fleet, when he was in their vicinity. On the issue of the Warning Telegram the Admiral of Patrols with his vessels in the North Sea, with the exception of the Dover Flotilla which remained under the control of the Admiralty,

¹ M Letter Book, No. 272, pp. 800 a, b.

² AH. 15/227/14 O as amended by W.O. Memo 79/5488[#] (M.A.1) of 9 August 1914. (See M Letter Book, No. 272, pp. 939 *et seq.*)

came under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, who, however, was not to divert any portion from their duty as coast patrols, except in the gravest emergency, without their Lordships' sanction. The 1st and 3rd Destroyer Flotillas, under Commodore (T) at Harwich, were part of the Grand Fleet, but they came under the command of the Vice-Admiral, Channel Fleet, if the latter entered the North Sea. The possibility of this contingency did not, however, permit of the Vice-Admiral issuing regular instructions to Commodore (T) or regarding his force as a permanent component of the Channel Fleet.

11. **Effect of Geographical considerations on Strategy.**—The functions which in 1914 the British naval forces in Home Waters were called upon to perform in a war against Germany, were simplified by the geographical situation of the two countries relative to one another. The immediate object of the Navy was to protect the British coasts and trade. This could be ensured by the maintenance of the command of the North Sea and its exits, a command which the fleet already exercised by the simple virtues of numerical superiority and geographical position. By virtue of the latter, too, a very slight extension of the activities necessary to protect our own coasts and trade would suffice to exert economic pressure on Germany by cutting off her shipping from oceanic trade; whilst the safeguarding of the Channel, for the uninterrupted passage of troops, munitions, and supplies, was simply an element in the maintenance of the command of the North Sea and its exits. The great stream of the world's commerce flows to the west and south coasts of Great Britain and thence around our shores; only then does it reach Germany. Thus the normal flow of commerce to Germany and Europe could be intercepted and controlled by the British naval forces. Ocean shipping was intercepted by the various cruiser squadrons in the north and west, and was sent in to be examined by the Customs and Aliens authorities at Kirkwall in the north, the Downs in the south, and Falmouth in the west—the three principal places of naval control at home. Of these three examination centres, the Downs was by far the most frequented; about 40 vessels were dealt with here for every one examined at Kirkwall or Falmouth; and the Downs Boarding Flotilla was by far the largest of the three. Any protest which neutral Powers might wish to make against the control of their shipping could be countered by the exercise of economic pressure. Germany, on the other hand, was powerless to control any considerable stream of commerce. The route which rounded the Skaw was too far distant from her bases to be controlled with any prospect of success. Moreover, she was able to exercise but an imperfect control over the Baltic trade, owing to the importance to her of maintaining friendly relations with the Scandinavian countries and her inability to imitate Great Britain in exerting sufficient economic pressure to stifle their protests against interference with their shipping.

The advantage of geographical position was further accentuated by the failure of the Germans for a long time to make full use of the Skagerrak, the northernmost of the two entries to the North Sea which they possessed, linked as it was with the southern entry by an inland waterway.¹ By a right disposition of our naval forces, any advance of the Germans from the Heligoland Bight, whether to northward or southward, was flanked by a British force; and owing to the distance the enemy would have to traverse before reaching the British coast, his advantage of interior lines was impaired and the advancing force risked being cut off from its base. Only if the British Fleet should attempt to seek out and destroy that of Germany would the latter gain any advantage from her geographical position. But this was not the rôle of the British Fleet. To accept, even to attempt to bring about, a fleet action was one of its functions; but this did not entail seeking out the enemy's fleet behind its defences.

12. The British and German Naval Bases.—The weakness of the British position lay in the long, undefended stretch of the East Coast. The necessity of concentrating the main British Fleet near the northern exit from the North Sea and of establishing fleet bases in Scottish waters had been realised a decade before the war, when all the signs pointed to Germany as our future antagonist. The construction of a first class naval base had been commenced at Rosyth, which by the War Orders was to be the principal base and headquarters of the Grand Fleet.² But Rosyth suffered from certain disadvantages as an anchorage for a large fleet; and in August 1914 the work was far from completion. At Cromarty, powerful fixed defences against surface craft had been instituted,³ and the harbour was available as a fuelling base, though there had been no development of it as a naval base. It would only accommodate a small portion of the Grand Fleet,⁴ and by the summer of 1914 its unsuitability

¹ The westernmost channel of the Little Belt was controlled by the Germans, and available for vessels up to 27 feet draught. Its use in cases of necessity was clearly contemplated, as can be seen in various places in the German Official History. See also Monograph No. 23, "The Baltic, 1914." Section 8.

² It was Admiral Callaghan's intention, however, to make Scapa Flow the principal coaling base of the Grand Fleet battle squadrons, and to use Rosyth only for the battle cruisers, cruisers, and light cruisers. The 3rd Battle Squadron was to use Cromarty, and the flotillas Rosyth, Invergordon, or Scapa Flow as convenient. (H.F. 004 of 1 August 1914, XIV.)

³ The harbour defences of Cromarty consisted of one 9.2 in., two 4 in. guns, and four searchlights at the southern entrance to the harbour, with two 9.2 in., four 4 in. guns, and four searchlights at the northern entrance. A garrison of 390 Marines manned these defences, and a detachment of 120 men of the Border Regiment guarded the oil tanks at Invergordon. H.M. ships on entry observed the procedure usual to a defended port. (H.F. 004 of 1 August 1914.)

⁴ Jellicoe, "The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916," p. 147.

as a fleet base had already been realised. Shortly before the war, the decision was taken to make use also of Scapa Flow in the Orkneys as an anchorage and fuelling base for the main fleet in the event of war with Germany; but in August 1914 the harbour was unprovided with any means of defence or with any of the essential conveniences of a base. The difficulty of obtaining the necessary sums of money, and the constantly changing conditions of war at sea, resulted in the Grand Fleet being unprovided with a single base in the north where it could be secure from attack in case of war against Germany.¹ As subsidiary fuelling bases for the forces operating in the North Sea, the Tyne, Humber, Thames and Harwich were available, and at the Thames, Forth, Tyne and Humber the local flotillas were to be strengthened by old armoured vessels from the Third Fleet. As illustrating the rapidity with which the conditions of naval warfare were changing, so recently as August 1910 the Home Ports Defence Committee drew up a memorandum in which it was stated that "no type of submarine exists which is suitable when submerged for attacks on ports or for use in waters that are not absolutely open."² Since that date the evolution of the submarine had been rapid and continuous; and the view expressed above was no longer held by the Admiralty. Towards the end of July 1914 they appointed a Committee "to consider and prepare a brief statement on the capabilities of the British and German submarines now and in the near future to attack defended harbours, having regard to the use of mines and aircraft or any other means of defence additional to those existing at present"³; but hostilities broke out before the committee as originally appointed was able to commence its investigations. In August 1914 no harbour had been provided with defence primarily directed to resist attack by submarine; nevertheless it is probable that in the case of the Channel bases from Dover to Plymouth, the temporary local arrangements made by the ships using the ports, in conjunction with the harbour defences and the nature of the approaches, sufficed to render them practically immune from the incursions of submarines.

The German bases on the North Sea all lay within the semi-circle of the Heligoland Bight, and whilst the extended defence was aided by the stronghold of Heligoland the numerous shallows and sandbanks which fringe the shore of the North Sea coast rendered it difficult to approach and thus contributed to its security.

Where the natural avenues of approach occurred in the estuaries of the large rivers, Ems, Jade, Weser, and Elbe, they were protected by an elaborate and powerful system of coast

¹ See papers titled X. 3313/1913 and *R.M. Office*, 1 August 1914; and M. 01074/14, H.P.D.C. Memo. No. 38M.

² H.P.D.C. Memo. No. 15M.

³ M. 0916/14. "Defence of Harbours against attacks by Submarines."

fortifications. Wilhelmshaven, on the Jade River, 23½ miles above the entrance, was the headquarters of the North Sea Naval Station; the dockyard was a large and important establishment, only rivalled by Kiel on the Baltic, which connects with the North Sea by the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal. The passage of this occupied about 14 hours and it had recently been deepened to take the largest warships.¹ The minesweepers were based at Cuxhaven; Heligoland and Sylt were bases for patrol craft. In the west, a light force was based on the Ems, to keep the estuary open and also to attack in flank and rear any enemy destroyers which might advance against the ships in the estuaries.

13. The German War Plan and Forecast of British Action.²

—In no country is the question of the employment of the fleet one exclusively for the naval authorities; it is appreciably influenced by political and economic considerations and by the war situation on land. In Great Britain this co-operation of all interests of the State was arranged in peace time by the Committee of Imperial Defence and in war by the War Cabinet. But in Germany there was no co-ordinating body, other than the Emperor; and no general war plan had been drawn up which gave due consideration to military, naval, political and economic requirements. In deciding upon the naval policy to be pursued in war, the Emperor had been swayed by the arguments of his political, rather than his naval, advisers; and the strategic defensive was decided upon, the Chancellor having repeatedly urged the principle that the fleet should be kept intact throughout the war, so that Germany might wield a particularly imposing political weapon during the peace negotiations.

Doubtless the Admiralstab foresaw some of the results which would follow from this policy: the destruction of their seaborne trade, the isolation of Germany, the docility of the neutral Powers under British economic pressure, and the uninterrupted flow of troops and munitions to France. But they were all too apprehensive of the political consequences of a defeat at sea, and they inclined the more readily towards the adoption at first of a strategic defensive because they believed that they would be able in the course of the war to create more favourable military conditions for the decisive battle than those existing at the outbreak of hostilities.³ The fleet was expecting valuable reinforcements of battleships, destroyers, and submarines. In the meantime, it was hoped to reduce the British superiority to a reasonable figure by damaging our blockading forces through energetic advances from the defensive and by a ruthless mine and submarine offensive as far as the

¹ See Note (1), p. 3.

² This section is based upon the German Official History. Nordsee I, Chapters II and III.

³ G.O.H., p. 52.

British shores. The decisive battle was not to be risked until the personnel and matériel of the reserve formations were ready and the new ships were commissioned, thus permitting all available forces to be mustered.

The German Emperor outlined the policy to be followed in the North Sea in war against Great Britain under three headings¹ :—

- (1) Our object is to damage the British Fleet by means of offensive advances against the forces watching or blockading the German Bight, and also by means of a ruthless mining, and, if possible, a submarine offensive, carried as far as the British coast.
- (2) When an equalisation of forces has been attained by these measures, all our forces are to be got ready and concentrated, and an endeavour will be made to bring our fleet into action under favourable conditions. If a favourable opportunity for an action occurs before this, advantage is to be taken of it.
- (3) War is to be carried on against commerce as laid down in the Prize Regulations.² The Commander-in-Chief, High Sea Fleet, will determine to what degree this warfare is to be carried on in home waters.

The ships allocated for war against commerce in foreign waters are to proceed as soon as possible.

It appears that the Admiralstab knew little or nothing of the principles on which the British were acting. Various memoranda had been drawn up with the aid of details gleaned from our manœuvres and exercises and from the action which it was believed the fleet had taken during the Agadir crisis of 1911. The Germans expected light forces at least to be watching or blockading the Heligoland Bight from the very outset of war, perhaps even before the declaration of hostilities; and by the destruction of these forces the war at sea was to be inaugurated. Simultaneously, hostilities were to be carried to the shores of the British Isles by minelayers and submarines. The War Order anticipated this species of guerilla warfare as a prelude to major operations, and it will be seen how this policy was put into practice in the earliest days of the war.

The Admiralstab expected the heavy ships of the British First Fleet to be concentrated on the east coast of Scotland, and to operate from the Firth of Forth and the Moray Firth, these being considered the most suitable bases on account of their central position with reference to the German bases and the Skagerrak, as well as being defended, well equipped, and with good accommodation for a large number of ships and auxiliaries. The Thames was regarded as the most likely base of the Second

¹ "Operationsbefehl für den Nordseekriegsschauplatz," G.O.H., p. 54. No date for the order is given.

² A translation of these regulations was printed by the Admiralty in February 1915. (N.L. 01918/14.)

Fleet Battle Squadrons on account of its flanking position, the desirability of reducing the strain on the Scottish bases, and the effect on public morale which the absence of heavy ships from the Thames would have. The battleships of the Third Fleet were expected to operate from Dover and Portsmouth, or perhaps even also from the Thames.

For the Germans, less immediate interest attached itself to the conjectured disposition of the battleships than that of the lighter forces. It was expected that the cruisers of the First Fleet would be with the main body, while those of the Second and Third Fleets detailed for service in the North Sea would take up the duties specially assigned to them, and be based on Scapa Flow for watching the Shetlands-Norway area, in the Firth of Forth for guarding the Skagerrak, and in the Humber and Thames for watching the Hoofden. The destroyer flotillas patrolling for defence purposes were expected to be concentrated as follows: One at Scapa Flow, guarding the passages between the Shetlands, Orkneys, and North coast of Scotland, one in the Moray Firth or Firth of Forth for coast defence, one in the Humber for coast defence, one at Dover for coast defence and the closing of the Straits; while the five submarine flotillas, 3rd to 7th, would be distributed among the most important points along the East Coast, with Dover, the Thames, Harwich, the Humber, and Dundee as their principal bases.

The Admiralstab formed the opinion that the British would ultimately adopt the method of distant blockade, although a close blockade might be expected in the early days of the war to meet advances from the German coast. It was also considered probable that the close method would be adopted when the main fleet had to proceed to its bases, when additional protection against submarines, mines, and destroyers became necessary; also the same close blockade would have to be instituted during the passage of an expeditionary force from England to the Continent.

The Germans fully realised the difficulties of a near blockade. The necessity for strong supports; dependence on weather; the danger from destroyers and submarines, enhanced by the use of aerial reconnaissance; and the heavy demand on personnel and material, all militated against this system of blockade, so effective at Brest and Toulon a hundred years ago. By the establishment of a distant blockade the equalisation of forces outlined in the German war plan would prove a more difficult task. Yet this was the view regarded as the most probable, and the supposed British War Plan for such a policy was presumed to be as follows:—¹

- (1) "Our waters will be watched by advanced forces. As in the near blockade, endeavours will be made to damage our ships by the extensive employment of submarines, mines and destroyers.

¹ G.O.H., p. 58.

- (2) The entrances to the North Sea and the Skagerrak will be patrolled in order to cripple our commerce.
 (3) Endeavours will be made to entice our main fleet to make extended advances, and then to cut it off and bring it to action far away from our own waters."

The precise methods of attaining these objects could not be foretold, though it was apparent that light cruisers, destroyers, and submarines would play a very important part.

Even in the distant blockade the Admiralstab held the opinion that definite blockade lines could not be dispensed with, and that the probability was we should hold a line across the North Sea in the 61st parallel rather than the Peterhead-Stavanger, or southern line, on account of its shorter length and the possibility of substituting destroyers for cruisers. But no matter which of the lines we held, it was thought that we should be forced to watch the Skagerrak in order to prevent a surprise attack on the northern patrol.

Despite the arguments in favour of a distant blockade, the operation order issued at the commencement of the war clearly indicated the expectation of a British offensive and a close blockade of German waters. After the German naval manœuvres in May 1914, Admiral von Scheer, representing the enemy, expressed in his report the opinion that British prestige would never allow the abandonment of the close blockade of the German Bight.

In conclusion, it would appear that all pre-war deliberations of the Admiralstab pointed to our adoption of frequent alterations between the two species of blockades in accordance with the situation. When it came to actual warfare, plans were put into effect to meet a close blockade.

CHAPTER II.

EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.

14. **The Test Mobilisation.**—In November 1913 the Board of Admiralty decided to abandon the usual summer grand manœuvres for the following year; at the same time they discussed the possibility of carrying out a test mobilisation in 1914 which should include a few days' cruise by vessels of the Third Fleet.¹ Three months later the test was decided upon, and a tentative programme was drawn up, extending from

¹ M. 11959/14. *Case 392* contains the principal papers referring to the Test Mobilisation.

July 15 to 25, during which time the Fleet Reserve was to be called up. On June 19, concurrently with the completion of the ships of the Second and Third Fleets, the Admiralty issued orders for placing certain other services on a war footing. Owing to the disturbance likely to be caused to the public service, and for other reasons, it was found necessary to cancel in some cases and to modify in others certain of the orders by a revised set of instructions dated July 8.¹ Among the arrangements cancelled were those for the mobilisation and a special three-day test of all naval centres, war signal stations, and naval W/T stations, as well as those for the mobilisation of the examination service at Queenstown and Berehaven, and for the employment on special duties of the Irish Coast Guard. Several difficulties arose, some of which would not occur in an actual mobilisation for war, and others, such as the troublous condition of Ireland, formed part of the general political situation existing at the time. On July 8 the Admiralty decided to send the 4th Destroyer Flotilla and the *Falmouth*, *Diamond*, *Foresight*, and *Forward* to the coast of Ireland to be under the orders of the Senior Naval Officer, Ireland, and to have the balance active service crews of these cruisers in their depôts. As the occasion of the Test Mobilisation did not constitute an emergency, all the reserves could not be called out as in time of war, and, instead, a general invitation to volunteers had to be issued. Though a large proportion of reservists accepted the call, many ships had to be commissioned with crews other than their war complement. The men joined their depôts during July 12 and 13, and thence proceeded to their ships to prepare them for service. The flags of the officers commanding the various squadrons of the Second and Third Fleets were hoisted on July 12,² and a series of "K" Orders, in substitution for the W. List, brought the machinery of mobilisation into full swing. All the training establishments, with two minor exceptions, were closed down, and every endeavour was exerted to make the test as realistic as possible. In order to obtain the fullest value from the trial

¹ M. 0863/14 of 19 June 1914, M. 01023/14 of 8 July 1914.

² The following officers hoisted their flags :—

Vice-Admiral The Hon. Sir Alexander E. Bethell, K.C.B., as V.A., 7th Battle Squadron.

Rear-Admiral Cecil F. Thursby, C.M.G., as R.A., 7th Battle Squadron.
Rear-Admiral Henry L. Tottenham, C.B., as R.A., 8th Battle Squadron.

Rear-Admiral William L. Grant, C.B., as R.A., 6th Cruiser Squadron.
Rear-Admiral Arthur H. Christian, M.V.O., as R.A., 7th Cruiser Squadron.

Rear-Admiral J. M. de Robeck as R.A., 8th Cruiser Squadron.

Rear-Admiral Henry H. Campbell, M.V.O., as R.A., 9th Cruiser Squadron.

Rear-Admiral Charles L. Napier, C.B., as R.A., 10th Cruiser Squadron.

Rear-Admiral Dudley de Chair, C.B., M.V.O., Admiral, Training Service, assumed command of the Training Squadron.

the Admiralty appointed a flag officer to each of the three principal Home ports for the following purposes :—

- (1) To report on the working of the local mobilising arrangements during the test mobilisation, and whether the existing organisation could be considered in all respects adequate and satisfactory for the requirements of a general mobilisation ;
- (2) To visit coal, store, victualling, and ammunition establishments, and inquire into the organisation of each, with particular regard to the arrangements for water transport ;
- (3) To report in what respects, if any, the existing organisation was capable of improvement and increased efficiency.

So little time elapsed between the conclusion of the Test Mobilisation of July 25 and the Admiralty Orders of the 27th for the preparation anew of the Second and Third Fleets, that no alteration in the existing plans can have been possible as the result of these flag officers' investigations.¹ Little difficulty existed in preparing the Second Fleet ships for sea ; the operation was completed by the arrival of the balance crews from the depôts. The preparation of the Third Fleet ships, which were in charge of care and maintenance parties, involved very much more labour. The vessels got away from their Home ports, Portsmouth, Devonport, Chatham and Pembroke, between July 15 and 17 and proceeded to Spithead, where the King had arranged to review the fleet about July 20, after which a short exercise cruise would be carried out and the vessels would then return to their Home ports for reduction once more to care and maintenance parties.

The Test Mobilisation included placing on a war footing the examination service at the Nore, Dover, Milford Haven, Portsmouth, Portland, and Plymouth (temporary service only at the last three ports), though there was no special test of the service, and the examination vessels, after completing with crews and stores, discharged their ratings to the depôts.

Meanwhile, as the result of the murder on June 28 of the Austrian Arch-Duke Franz Ferdinand and his wife at Serajevo, the international situation had become very clouded ; and on July 20, the day on which the King reviewed the fleet, news was received that Austria had delivered an ultimatum to Servia. The next two days witnessed the display of the full strength of the British Fleet and the combined exercises of the mobilised fleets in the Channel. On July 23 Admiral Callaghan, Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleets, proceeded to Weymouth with the First Fleet, while the Second and Third Fleets returned to their own ports, where the reservists and pensioners

¹ Reports are bound in *Case 392*.

disembarked on July 25, no attempt being made to retain their services for a further period; and simultaneously the first watch of the active service ratings proceeded on the customary manœuvre leave.

15. The Fleet Proceeds to its War Stations, July 29.—After the dispersal of the fleet at Spithead on July 23 consequent on the completion of the Test Mobilisation, the First Fleet proceeded to Weymouth Bay whence it was to sail on July 27 to carry out a pre-arranged programme of gunnery practices at various places round the coast.¹

Owing to Austria's provocative ultimatum to Servia, the political situation did not appear too clear, though there seemed to be no reason for any alteration of the plans. At 4 p.m. on July 26, when the Servian mobilisation and the partial mobilisation of Austria-Hungary were known, the Admiralty telegraphed to the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets, countermanding the dispersal of the fleet, and enjoining that no ships of the First Fleet or flotillas were to leave Portland until further orders. Orders followed shortly to complete the First Fleet with coal and to carry out the practices arranged from Portland.² The *Bellerophon* had just left for Gibraltar to refit, and was ordered to return the following day with moderate despatch.³ Several other ships had already been detached. The *Natal* and *Shannon* of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron were at Sheerness; the *Roxburgh*, *Nottingham*, and *Lowestoft*, as well as the *Amethyst* and the 1st and 2nd Flotillas and the minesweepers, were at their Home ports giving leave; and the 3rd Flotilla was at Harwich. The *Liverpool* and *Falmouth* and the *Forward* and 4th Flotilla, which were on the Irish Coast, had not attended the Test Mobilisation and exercises and were still on their stations.⁴ On the following day, July 27, the Admiralty sent out a warning to British Senior Naval Officers abroad that the political situation rendered war between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente by no means impossible. In the Home Fleet all further long leave to officers was suspended, the second watches due for manœuvre leave were retained on board, and the reopening of the schools of instruction was postponed. In addition, the Admiralty ordered the preparation of the Second and Third Fleets to be carried out as quietly as possible.⁵ The news of the cancellation of leave reached Germany shortly afterwards through her Naval Attaché in London, and was regarded as a serious omen, particularly when taken in conjunction with the fortuitous advantage supposedly gained by the fleet through the Test Mobilisation. The First Fleet coaled with such despatch as the facilities at Portland rendered possible, and during the

¹ B.E.F. A 1.

² B.E.F. A 2, 4.

³ B.E.F. A 6.

⁴ The *Liverpool* was on passage from Portsmouth to Ireland.

⁵ B.E.F. A 7, 8, 10, 14.

evening Admiral Callaghan reported that he hoped the coaling would be completed by the following evening, July 28.

The only report received at the Admiralty on July 27 concerning the German Fleet, then visiting Norwegian waters, was a telegram from Bergen that T.B.D. 4 had left there on July 26. On the following day, July 28, Austria-Hungary declared war on Servia; and Germany rejected the British proposals for an International Conference to settle the Austro-Servian question. At 5 o'clock that evening the Admiralty took the decisive step of ordering the Grand Fleet to its war stations, to leave next day for Scapa Flow under the temporary command of Sir George Warrender, Vice-Admiral Commanding the 2nd Battle Squadron, while the Commander-in-Chief was to proceed to the Admiralty with his proposals for war.¹

The Vice-Admiral at Queenstown was ordered to send the 4th Flotilla to join the Fleet at Scapa Flow at once, and it sailed early next morning.²

In accordance with these orders the First Fleet left harbour early on the 29th, steering at first to the southward and then by a mid-channel course to the Straits of Dover *en route* for Scapa through the North Sea. It was intended that the fleet should proceed to its war stations via the west coast, and only in cases of sudden emergency or the possibility of bringing on a fleet action would the east coast route be used. The concentration of the German Fleet in Norwegian waters and the rapidly darkening outlook in the Balkans were responsible for the decision to use the east coast route. Before the fleet had quitted the Channel the Austrians were bombarding Belgrade and Germany was threatening immediate mobilisation unless all military preparations ceased in Russia.

Meanwhile events ashore were moving quickly. On July 29 the Admiralty ordered the examination service to be completed but not enforced, the War Signal Stations and Naval Centres to be connected with the general telegraphic system, and all officers and men on leave to be recalled at once.³ During the afternoon the Warning Telegram reached the Commanders-in-Chief at home and abroad by the employment of the code word entailing the fullest preparation, short of complete mobilisation, for an immediate outbreak of war. Trinity House was requested not to extinguish any lights or remove buoys without Admiralty concurrence. However desirable it might be to hide such preparations, the Admiralty considered it absolutely essential that they should not be postponed.

¹ B.E.F. A 15, 16.

² Admiralty to V.A., Queenstown, 6.30 p.m., July 28, and reply July 29. (H.S. 50, pp. 87, 146.)

³ B.E.F. A 17. The organisation of the War Signal Stations is given in O.D. No. 4: "Instructions for the Distribution of Naval Intelligence in the United Kingdom and Channel Islands."

Political events had sufficiently disentangled themselves to show that we should most probably find ourselves ranged with France. Accordingly the Admiralty despatched a telegram to all ships that in the event of war "War Stations No. 2" would come into force; these stations superseded "War Stations No. 1" in the event of an Anglo-French alliance against Germany, and they directed, amongst other things, that on the second day after the outbreak of war the Grand Fleet should, without further orders from the Admiralty, proceed to a position in the North Sea south of 56° N ready to follow up the main enemy battle squadron in the event of it attempting to interfere with the passage of an expeditionary force to France. Intelligence of the concentration of the German Fleet in its home waters on July 27 and 28 began to come through on the following days; but the British movements had been independent of these dilatory reports.

The Grand Fleet, under Sir George Warrender, passed the Straits of Dover at midnight, July 29-30, steaming at 13 knots, and steered wide out into the North Sea, crossing the parallel of 52° N in 2° 37' E and from there steering through 53° 20' N, 3° 20' E. At 5 p.m. on July 31 Broughness reported 24 battle-ships passing into Scapa Flow. The *Iron Duke* had been detached to Queensferry at noon on 30th, and the Commander-in-Chief left in her on the following day for Scapa with the destroyer *Oak* in company, while the Admiralty promulgated the announcement of Sir John Jellicoe's appointment to be second in command of the Grand Fleet and ordered him to embark at Queensferry next day on board the *Centurion*.¹

Intelligence of the enemy was meagre, the only information received on July 31 from the Embassy at Berlin being to the effect that four divisions of Wilhelmshaven T.B.D.s had been off the mouth of the Jade the previous evening. As the Defence Order² had by that time been given, the information was substantially correct. On the other hand, Press reports, both at home and abroad, became singularly unreliable, owing no doubt to the difficulty of verifying their accuracy before publication.

16. Concentration of the German Fleet, July 27.—Coincident with the British Test Mobilisation a cruise of the German High Sea Fleet to Norway had been planned. The fleet was to leave Home waters on July 15, and it was not considered necessary to cancel the cruise, in spite of the uncertain political outlook. The German Emperor himself had already left for Norwegian waters in his yacht earlier in the month. On July 20, in view of the incalculable and perhaps sudden consequences of the ultimatum which the German Government knew that Austria was about to despatch to Servia, the great German shipping

¹ This order was subsequently cancelled and Admiral Jellicoe proceeded to Scapa viâ Wick, where he embarked in the *Boadicea*.

² See Section 16.

companies Hamburg-Amerika and Norddeutscher Lloyd were warned to make their dispositions and to issue the necessary orders to their steamers abroad. The result of the ultimatum would be known on July 25, and until then the fleet, which was in the Skagerrak, was to remain concentrated in readiness to obey rapidly an order to abandon the cruise. On the 25th the fleet proceeded to Norway, but leave was arranged to render immediate recall possible. That same afternoon the mobilisation of the Servian Army was known, and the German Emperor issued orders for the immediate departure of the fleet for the Baltic, in readiness to deal a blow at Russia in the event of war. In a personal interview with the Emperor at Sognefjord, Admiral von Ingenohl, the Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet, protested that Great Britain was the quarter whence danger threatened; but his protestations met with the response that Great Britain could not be expected to join in the struggle. The belief that Great Britain would remain neutral seems to have influenced the policy of the Germans throughout the period of strained relations, and it lost to them the incalculable advantage which might have been gained by the favourite German device of a surprise attack. Nevertheless, by two separate processes of reasoning the decision was reached that the fleet should return to Home waters.

On the evening of July 27 the High Sea Fleet assembled at a rendezvous off Skudesnaes and proceeded towards Kiel, where it arrived next day, meeting on the way some of the French torpedo boats escorting home the French Dreadnoughts *Jean Bart* and *France*, which had been taking the President and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs on a mission to the Czar of Russia.

By July 30 the political tension between the Triple Alliance and Great Britain, France, and Russia had become so great that the German Emperor gave the Defence Order, which provided for carrying out urgent but unobtrusive preparations for war. A warning was sent out to the Mercantile Marine, the protection of Kiel Bay was undertaken, and defensive measures were put in force in the North Sea. Although the German Command had not abandoned hope that Great Britain would remain neutral, it was realised that this was no time for an attack in naval force on Russia. The strategical concentration of the British Fleet in the north, though its exact position was unknown, had to be met by a concentration of the High Sea Fleet in the North Sea. The first squadron passed through the Kiel Canal at once. The Fleet Flagship, *Friedrich der Grosse*, with the 3rd Squadron, the *Hamburg* and the 1st Submarine Flotilla, *U.5*, *U.7-10*, *U.15-18*, followed during the forenoon. The submarines went on to Heligoland and received orders to commence patrol duties in the Bight on the following afternoon.¹ The battle cruisers *Seydlitz* and *Moltke* had steam ready at half an hour's notice from midnight July 30-31, and

¹ For the system of patrol in the Bight, see Section 18.

after passing through the Canal they anchored in Schillig Roads, where the *Von der Tann* joined them at 8 p.m. July 31, though Admiral von Ingenohl, on his arrival at Wilhelmshaven, ordered them back to a less exposed position in Wilhelmshaven Roads. The depth of water was insufficient for the heavy ships to pass through the Canal locks for about two hours on each side of low water, while the outer Jade bar, which was impassable at low water, formed a further obstacle. On the afternoon of July 31, therefore, all battleships were ordered to pass out of the locks. The ships of the 1st Squadron anchored in Wilhelmshaven Roads, with nets out, ships cleared for action, guns loaded, and steam at 45 minutes' notice.

The Commander-in-Chief was still in the Baltic when the Defence Order was issued, and the senior Vice-Admiral, Wilhelm von Lans, commanding the 1st Squadron, made arrangements with Vice-Admiral Gunther von Kogick, Commander-in-Chief, Wilhelmshaven, for the application of the order to the Heligoland Bight. The command of the defence of the Bight was taken over by Rear-Admiral Hipper, the Senior Officer Scouting Forces, in the *Seydlitz*. In accordance with the Defence Order the light cruisers *Mainz* and *Stralsund* with the 7th Destroyer Flotilla proceeded, about midnight 30th-31st, to occupy the line Wangeroog-Heligoland-Eider, destroyers patrolling by night, cruisers by day. The destroyers rested at Heligoland during the day and the light cruisers in the river mouths outside the minefields by night.

The War Fleet Organisation was brought into force on July 31, with the allocation of commands in the event of war. The reports which were coming in gave various details of the British preparations for war, and the situation arising from the abandonment of the British policy of aloofness was now seriously considered by the Admiralstab. At 1 p.m. the fleet was ordered to hasten by every possible means the concentration of the naval forces against England in the North Sea. Later in the day the Higher Commands were notified that war was imminent, and orders were issued to carry out "measures for threatening danger of war." These included making every naval preparation for the protection and security of the country against hostile undertakings, while avoiding any offensive threat.

The first scouting operation took place during the afternoon of July 31, when the light forces extended to a position abreast of the Island of Juist, the *Von der Tann* acting in support. A few British steamships were met, including the s.s. *Nicoya* fitted with W/T, outside territorial waters, making for the Elbe and Weser, but they were not molested.

17. Mobilisation of the British Fleet Ordered, August 1.—

The political outlook was now rapidly darkening. On the evening of July 31 Sir Edward Goschen, the British Ambassador in Berlin, communicated to the Imperial Chancellor the refusal of the British Government to countenance any violation of

Belgian neutrality. The German ultimatum to Russia, demanding the cessation of warlike preparations within 12 hours, went out at the same time. The prospects of peace were now very slender. An attempt made by the British Government to obtain from Germany a satisfactory answer regarding her observance of Belgian neutrality merely evoked an evasive reply, and on the following day, August 1, Sir Edward Grey warned the German Ambassador in London that any such violation might force Great Britain to take action. During the afternoon it was learnt at the Admiralty that the German authorities were holding up British shipping and that no vessels were allowed to leave Hamburg.¹ Within half an hour the orders for the mobilisation of the fleets went out from the Admiralty, though this did not include the calling up of the Reserves. Orders were issued to engage the necessary colliers and oilers, squadron supply ships (7), hospital carriers (3), hospital ships (6), and frozen meat ships (3). Each of these orders was transmitted in the form of a single word from the W List, with the minimum amount of telegraphy. By the same method the Admiralty issued instructions for preventing the use of wireless telegraphy by merchant vessels within the territorial waters of the British Isles.² Clifden and Poldhu Marconi W/T stations were taken over by the Admiralty on August 2. Other messages consisted in the order to Flag Officers to hoist their flags in the Reserve squadrons, the despatch of ratings from the depôts for the Third Fleet ships, and a request to the War Office to bring into force certain examination services. Orders to charter the necessary trawlers for minesweeping were now given. Finally, the Admiralty issued orders to the various Senior Naval Officers for the local defence and patrolling flotillas to patrol their areas each night until further orders, with the exception of the submarine flotillas, which it was deemed inadvisable to employ during the precautionary period.³ This step guaranteed a degree of security against sudden attack or offensive mining operations on our shores.

18. Mobilisation of the German Fleet, August 2.—The Admiralstab at the same time occupied themselves with completing as unostentatiously as possible their preparations to meet any eventuality. Among the reports which reached Germany on August 1 were that the Harwich-Hook of Holland service had been interrupted with a view to preserving secrecy as to British naval movements, and that Lloyds were refusing re-insurance on shipping. During the day the Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet received the mobilisation telegram from the Reichs-Marine-Amt: "Mobilisation ordered; August 2 is first day of mobilisation."

¹ H.S. 51, p. 72.

² Arrangements set forth in confidential circular letter of 25 May 1914. M. 0101/14.

³ B.E.F. A 25. H.S. 50, p. 542.

Rear-Admiral Hipper, 1st Senior Officer of the scouting vessels, was responsible for the defence of the Heligoland Bight. Defence against enemy submarines was taken over by destroyers during the day, leaving the cruisers free to advance for scouting purposes. During daylight hours submarines patrolled on the line Wangeroog-Heligoland-Amrum, withdrawing to Heligoland at night, and a destroyer flotilla patrolled day and night on the line Spiekeroog-Heligoland-Schmal Tief. During the forenoon of August 2,¹ the light cruisers *Stralsund*, *Mainz*, and *Kolberg*, carried out a reconnaissance 50 miles from Heligoland. The battle cruisers went into the inner Bight.

The submarines were instructed to attack approaching French or Russian forces only in case of unquestionably hostile acts. The light cruiser *Strassburg*, which returned to Wilhelmshaven from foreign service on August 1, reported passing various British war vessels in the Channel, and that she had been shadowed, which latter report had, however, no foundation. The Admiral Commanding, Second and Third Fleets, did report passing the *Strassburg* 10 miles south of St. Catherine's Point, standing to the eastward at 6.35 p.m. on July 31, but no shadowing was attempted.² Thus, on the night of August 1, with the fleets at their war stations and the patrols out, the two great naval Powers faced each other across the North Sea.

19. Germany declares War on France, August 3.—At 7.30 p.m. on August 1 the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg handed the formal Declaration of War to the Foreign Minister. The news reached the Admiralty through Reuter by telephone at 10.45 p.m. Within three hours³ the Admiralty sent out the signal for the completion of the final stages of mobilisation by the order to "Mobilise Naval Reserves," which included R.F.R., classes A and B, R.N.R., including Trawler Section, Seamen Pensioner Reserve, pensioners not R.F.R. or S.P.R., and R.N.V.R.

The Cabinet meeting held during the forenoon of August 2 formally ratified the action taken, and afterwards Sir Edward Grey gave to M. Cambon an assurance which was in accordance with the understanding arrived at between the two Powers in 1912, to the effect that if the German Fleet came into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping the British Fleet would give all the protection in its power.⁴ This assurance, which was announced next day, made our participation in a continental war dependent upon German aggressive action, and, though it contained no promise of military co-operation, it enabled the French to settle the disposition of their fleet, which, with the

¹ Presumably. ² H.S. 50, p. 552. ³ 1.25 a.m. August 2.

⁴ B.E.F. A 27. The Admiralty immediately promulgated the substance of this assurance in a general telegram with the additional words, "be prepared to meet surprise attacks." B.E.F. A 28.

exception of the 2nd Light Squadron and local defence flotillas, was now concentrated at Toulon, awaiting orders to sail. At 3.50 p.m. on August 2, news was received that German troops had entered French territory at Ciery, and that the douane at Delle had been fired on.

The only intelligence of German naval forces received during the day was to the effect that the German Fleet was proceeding in the direction of Dantzig, which, in fact, was partly correct, for the Baltic Fleet had been ordered to proceed in accordance with the War Plan for war with Russia.

By the complete mobilisation of the naval forces, the establishment of patrols and the stationing of the British Fleet at its war stations, there now appeared to be less risk of an immediate surprise blow, though several important details remained still to be arranged.

At 12.40 a.m. on August 3, on receipt of intelligence that the 2nd and 3rd Squadrons of the High Sea Fleet had passed through the Kiel Canal for the Elbe, the Ministry of Marine in Paris ordered Rear-Admiral Rouyer to weigh immediately and take the French 2nd Light Squadron,¹ the Dunkirk torpedo boats and the Calais submarines, to defend by force the passage of the German Fleet in all places except British territorial waters; and the force of old vessels proceeded to the Straits of Dover.² The receipt of this information during the forenoon of August 3 almost synchronised with the issue of the order to our patrols to take up their war stations.³ The Admiral Commanding Coastguards and Reserves reported the war signal stations of all groups in complete readiness during the evening.

Even now, at the eleventh hour, another bid for British neutrality was made by Germany, with the promise that the German Fleet would not approach the English Channel or the north coast of France. Though war with France was imminent, and was actually declared by Germany at 6 p.m., the German politicians still persuaded themselves that it was possible to secure the neutrality of Great Britain, and, in the hope of attaining it, they even stopped the departure of auxiliary cruisers to the trade routes. Late on August 3, too, it was learned at the Admiralty that Germany had sent a Note to Belgium offering her an entente if she allowed the free movement of troops through her territories. Outwardly, Germany was still sanguine of limiting her opponents to Russia and France.

During the afternoon of August 3 the Admiralty were informed that three German transports had been seen passing

¹ For composition of the force, see Section 35.

² F.O.H., pp. 47-8, and B.E.F. A 31. The text of the order was as follows: "Appareillez immédiatement et défendez par les armes le passage de la flotte de guerre allemande partout à l'exclusion des eaux territoriales anglaises."

³ Sent 11.15 a.m. August 3, to A.O.P. *Victorious*, Grimsby, and Captains (D) 5th, 7th, 8th and 9th Flotillas.

Sprogo Sound, at the entrance to the Great Belt, about 5 p.m. on August 1, and in the belief that this presaged a raid on the Shetlands, they ordered the Commander-in-Chief to take steps to frustrate any such attempt.¹ The cruisers had already been ordered during the forenoon to raise steam²; the 3rd Cruiser Squadron had not yet completed coaling, but with the *Cochrane* and *Achilles* of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, the squadron proceeded at full speed at 6 p.m., to support the *Forward* and four destroyers of 8th Flotilla³ allocated to the patrol of the Shetland area, which were still on their way thither from Scapa.⁴ The cruisers were followed by the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron under Sir David Beatty, now with the acting rank of Vice-Admiral, with orders to cruise to the southward of Fair Island during the night unless required for support. The *Forward* was to use force to prevent any enemy landing.⁵ The search for the German transports continued throughout the night, but no sign of them was discovered.

In Germany the Admiralstab advanced the preparation for war by ordering a heavy vessel from the 1st or 3rd Squadron or the Scouting Forces to lie at anchor in Schillig Roads completely ready for action. On account of the fear of submarine or destroyer attack an anchorage was chosen which left the ship only just afloat at low water. The duty of this ship was confined to the protection of the Jade; support for forces at sea was otherwise provided for. News of the departure of destroyers from Dover reached Berlin during the day, with the consequence that the light cruiser *Mainz* and the 4th Destroyer Flotilla were ordered to the Ems for the protection of the estuary.

20. Arrival of the British Fleet at Scapa, July 31. Shortage of Colliers.—When the Grand Fleet reached Scapa on July 31 it found the *Hecla*, *Swift*, and 4th Flotilla already there. The 4th Flotilla had left Queenstown on July 29, and since its arrival at Scapa it had provided a destroyer for the patrol of each of the three main entrances to the Flow.

Previous to the departure of the fleet from Portland the Admiralty ordered 6,000 tons of oil and 63,000 tons of coal to Scapa, of which 24,000 tons was due by August 2.⁶ The ships were between 20 per cent. and 40 per cent. short on arrival, the total quantity required to complete them being about 21,000 tons.⁷ The colliers were delayed on August 2 by fog, and it was not until nearly 48 hours after the arrival of the fleet that the battle cruisers were complete with fuel. The *Iron Duke*, *King George V*, and *Ajax* coaled throughout the night of August 2-3; the 2nd Flotilla was sent to Invergordon

¹ H.S. 51, p. 534.

² H.S. 51, p. 444.

³ *Bat*, *Fairy*, *Flying Fish*, *Star*. They were based on Dales Voe.

⁴ They arrived at Lerwick at 8 p.m. August 3.

⁵ H.S. 51, pp. 690, 715.

⁶ B.E.F. A 26.

⁷ H.S. 55, pp. 215, 257.

to oil, and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron to Queensferry to coal from the hulk *Jumna*. The 3rd Battle Squadron was still 30 per cent. short at 6 a.m. on August 4.¹

21. Change of British Commander-in-Chief and the outbreak of war. Grand Fleet proceeds to sea.—Vice-Admiral Jellicoe, the newly-appointed second in command of the Grand Fleet, arrived at Scapa during the forenoon of August 2, after a passage from Wick in the *Boadicea*, and immediately hoisted his flag on board the *Centurion*. The same evening the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. Winston Churchill, telegraphed to him a warning that he must be ready within 48 hours after joining the fleet. This presumably referred to the intimation which had been given to Admiral Jellicoe in London before his departure north by the First Lord and the First Sea Lord that in certain circumstances he would be appointed to command the Grand Fleet in succession to Sir George Callaghan.² The appointment of the latter had recently been extended and had still some time to run, and the Admiralty apparently desired to retain him in the chief command until it was perfectly clear that no hope remained of avoiding war with Germany. Shortly after 2 a.m. August 4 it was deemed that the time had arrived when action could no longer be delayed and the Admiralty telegraphed to the two officers concerned, informing them of the decision to transfer the chief command forthwith.³ Admiral Callaghan was directed to strike his flag at once and proceed to London, and on August 4 Sir John Jellicoe hoisted his flag in the *Iron Duke* as Commander-in-Chief, with the acting rank of Admiral.⁴

The possibility of such a change in the command had not been mentioned to Admiral Callaghan, to whom the message that he received so early on the morning of August 4 came as a complete surprise.⁵

The suddenness with which the change of command was ordered was due no doubt to an eleventh hour alteration in the war plans. These had been framed in the expectation that the German Fleet would make an early attempt to interfere with the transport of the Expeditionary Force to France, and a sweep of the Grand Fleet to counter any such attempt was arranged to take place without further orders on the second day after the outbreak of war. On the night of August 3-4, however, the Admiralty received information which led them to believe that German armed merchant cruisers were attempting to break out into the Atlantic by the north about route, and as the despatch of the Expeditionary Force

¹ G.F.N. August 3-4.

² See "Grand Fleet, 1914-1916," pp. 3-5; also H.S. 51, p. 329.

³ H.S. 51, pp. 660, 662.

⁴ H.F. 004 of 1 August 1914, XVII.

⁵ "The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916," p. 4.

had not yet been decided upon, the Fleet was ordered to proceed to sea with cruisers spread, to sweep as far as 100 miles from the Norwegian coast. The cruisers were then to make a wide semi-circular sweep to the southward and westward, after which the fleet would turn towards Scapa. War might have broken out by then, and as it was desirable that the fleet from the earliest moment should be under the Admiral who would command it in the war, the new Commander-in-Chief must hoist his flag before the fleet left port.¹

At 10.15 a.m. on August 4 Admiral Jellicoe informed the Admiralty that he had assumed command of the fleet and was proceeding to sea. The international situation had become further darkened by the receipt of the news that the Germans would cross the Belgian frontier at 4 p.m., irrespective of their treaty obligations. An exchange of telegrams between the chancelleries concerned² led to the despatch at 2 p.m. of a general telegram from the Admiralty stating that the British ultimatum to Germany would expire at midnight G.M.T. August 4.³ It further ordered that no act of war should be committed before that hour, when the telegram to commence hostilities against Germany would be issued by the Admiralty. All British Senior Naval Officers were instructed to enter into the closest co-operation with the French officers on their station.⁴

During the forenoon of August 4 Stockton W/T Station intercepted a state telegram from Berlin announcing that war had been declared against France, Russia and England. However, the inclusion of England in this telegram appears to have attracted little or no attention.⁵

The examination services at Kirkwall and in the Downs were mobilised in skeleton form and a warning was sent out to shipping to take precautions; and at 7 p.m. the Admiralty advised the Board of Agriculture that no fishing vessels should be allowed to sail for fishing in the North Sea on account of the critical situation, while the fishing fleets already at sea should be ordered to return during daylight the following day. Over 200 vessels of the Boston Fleet were still at sea and were without W/T, but it was felt to be impossible to send, as requested, destroyers to scout for and order them home.⁶

¹ B.E.F. A 36, 39, 40. The despatch of four infantry divisions and a cavalry division to France was not ordered until August 5.

² These telegrams have been collected, arranged, and printed in "Correspondence respecting the European Crisis" (Cd. 7467).

³ Telegram 216 out—Admiralty to all ships—(B.E.F. A 38) gives the time for the expiry of the ultimatum as midnight G.M.T., though the time actually intended was midnight Central European time; and it was at this latter hour (2300 G.M.T.) that the War Telegram was despatched.

⁴ H.S. 51, pp. 816, 817.

⁵ H.S. 51, p. 696.

⁶ On August 5 the Admiralty ordered the patrol flotillas without leaving their stations to warn all fishing vessels that war had been declared with Germany.

Ashore the mobilisation of the military forces of the Crown was being carried out.¹

The postponement of the sailing of the Expeditionary Force was notified to Admiral Jellicoe late on August 4. Shortly afterwards the Admiralty informed him that he had thenceforward complete freedom of action as to fleet movements and instructed him to use his discretion with regard to the withdrawal of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron from the Shetlands. In the same telegram the Commander-in-Chief learned that firing had been heard off the Forth; subsequently, however, it transpired to have been the *Pathfinder* at target practice.

The day became night without any reply to the ultimatum, and at 11 p.m. the Admiralty sent out the War Telegram to all H.M. ships and establishments.²

22. The Concentration of the Channel Fleet.—The Channel Fleet under Vice-Admiral Burney, which had been ordered to complete on July 27 and 28, assembled at Portland, its port of concentration, between August 3-6. The *Agamemnon*, of the 4th Battle Squadron, had remained at Portland when the Grand Fleet went north on July 29, and joined the 5th Battle Squadron.

The forces on patrol in the south from east to west were as follows:—

- (a) 8th Submarine Flotilla.
- (b) Harwich Flotillas (1st and 3rd).
- (c) Dover patrol, comprising the *Adventure*, *Foresight*, *Sentinel*, 6th Flotilla, 3rd and 4th Submarine Flotillas, Minelaying Squadron, Downs Boarding Flotilla.
- (d) Cruiser Force C, *Bacchante* (flag of R.A. Campbell, C.V.O.), *Euryalus*, *Aboukir*, *Cressy*.
- (e) French local defence flotillas at Calais and Dunkirk.
- (f) 12th Cruiser Squadron (Cruiser Force G) and French 2nd Light Squadron at the western entrance to the Channel.
- (g) The *Challenger* patrolling Bristol Channel until relieved by the *Pelorus* on August 9. This was a station created on July 31 to prevent the Channel being mined or Cardiff attacked.
- (h) 11th Cruiser Squadron (Cruiser Force E) guarding the approaches to Irish Sea.³

23. Local Defence Flotillas.—The local defence flotillas under the orders of the Senior Naval Officers at the Dockyard ports, and the patrol flotillas at other ports on the east coast of England, were disposed for the purpose of dealing with raids

¹ Papers titled "W.O. 4.8.14." M. 01293/14.

² H.S. 51, p. 904.

³ The squadron did not arrive at its station until August 5, and meanwhile its place was taken by the *Drake* and *Leviathan*. (See Section 36.)

by detached naval or military forces of the enemy and affording support to the shore defences.

On July 28 the Admiralty ordered the local defence flotillas to be completed to full crews as soon as practicable without upsetting mobilisation arrangements and without recalling men on leave. The Portsmouth submarine flotilla (2nd) could muster only one boat, the remainder not being available for a month.¹ At the Nore, Portsmouth, Devonport, Pembroke and Queenstown preparations went forward, and on July 30 six torpedo boats proceeded to Portland. On August 1 the Admiralty ordered the patrol and local defence flotillas to patrol during the night until further orders.²

The Nore Defence Flotilla on mobilisation relieved the Harwich Flotilla as Thames estuary patrol. The local Senior Naval Officers conducted the operations and generally supervised the defence flotillas, none of which came into contact with the enemy during the period under review.

In addition to the eight submarine flotillas already detailed, another flotilla, the 9th, consisting of the *Pactolus*, *Bonetta* and submarines A.10, A.11, A.12, was based on Ardrossan for the defence of the Clyde. The *Challenger* arrived in this area after relief in the Bristol Channel by the *Pelorus* on August 9. The Admiralty ordered her to patrol the North Channel off the Mull of Cantyre, to look out for minelayers and submarines.³ Here she was joined later by the *Juno* of Cruiser Force E to patrol the northern approach to the Irish Sea, the southern approach being guarded by the remainder of the squadron.

On the commencement of hostilities the procedure for the entry of H.M. ships into defended ports in time of war was governed by instructions contained in various confidential publications.⁴ A committee presided over by Admiral Browning had been considering the question of the existing rules of procedure for entry, and was completing its report in July 1914; and on its recommendation the rules were all embodied in a single publication.⁵

¹ H.S. 50, p. 184.

² B.E.F. A 25.

³ H.S. 53, pp. 169, 301, 328.

⁴ (a) "Instructions for Private Signals for H.M. Ships." Sections I, II, and III.

(b) "Instructions on Defence matters and Rules for the Recognition and Entry of H.M. Ships into British Defended Ports at Home and Abroad." (O.D. No. 1), Parts I, V and VII.

(c) "Instructions for the Distribution of Naval Intelligence in the United Kingdom and Channel Islands." (O.D. No. 4) Chapters I, II and III.

(d) "Procedure for carrying out Defence Exercises at Defended Ports in the United Kingdom." (O.D. No. 8, October 1913.)

⁵ See M. 01089/14. Entry of H.M. ships into Defended Ports.

CHAPTER III.

THE OPENING DAYS OF WAR.

24. German Defence Arrangements in the Heligoland Bight.

—In the days immediately preceding the outbreak of war with England, Germany's prime concern lay in her preparations to meet an attack on the coast which never matured. As already recounted, the Defence Order was put into operation on August 2, when the most important units of the fleet had come through the Kiel Canal. The defence of the Heligoland Bight was a charge of the Senior Officer Scouting Forces, and the sector to be particularly guarded had its centre in the Elbe Lightship I. The defensive arrangements by day and night differed materially.¹

By day an outer line comprising one destroyer flotilla patrolled on an arc 35 miles distant from the Elbe Lightship, with a division of torpedo boats forming an inner line 23 miles distant from the lightship. Submarines were to patrol between the two lines,² and light cruisers remained in support in rear.³

The defence by day was directed primarily against submarines and secondarily against minelayers.

The orders instructed the outpost line of destroyers not to accept action with enemy destroyers but to avoid them, attempting at the same time to draw them over the submarines stationed six miles astern. The submarines were to attack only when certain of hitting; and the lightly armed, slow torpedo boats of the mine-sweeping division, six miles further in rear, whose employment as patrol vessels was necessitated through the lack of more suitable craft, had orders to avoid surface craft in good time. If enemy submarines penetrated the lines the destroyers and torpedo boats were ordered to harass them by zigzagging at high speeds to force them to exhaust their batteries and come to the surface. The order permitted the light cruisers to attack destroyers and light craft generally, though if they became aware of the presence of submarines they were to withdraw, leaving the hunting of the submerged craft to the destroyer flotilla stationed at Heligoland. So real was the danger anticipated from submarine attack that no cruisers, particularly those of recent design, were to be risked when submarines had been reported.

No mention was made of the duties of the heavy ships in connection with the defence. It will be remembered that Admiral von Ingenohl, on his arrival at Wilhelmshaven, had

¹ See G.O.H., Chapter I.

² Seven submarines was the usual number.

³ The older light cruisers were employed on this duty.

withdrawn them from Schillig Roads, where they had been stationed by Vice-Admiral von Lans, to Wilhelmshaven Roads, where the 1st Battle Squadron, which carried torpedo nets, was anchored. In case of surprise attack on the Bight, the light forces would find no support until they were under the guns of Heligoland. The effect of this was seen later, in the battle of August 28.¹

At night the submarines were withdrawn from the Bight and the destroyer flotilla retired to the inner line, where the torpedo boats were stationed by day. The vessels patrolled outwards and inwards on a course at right angles to the outpost line. Light cruisers worked in rear on the wings. In the New Harbour at Heligoland lay the submarines, the torpedo boat division, coaling if necessary, and a destroyer flotilla at immediate notice. The New Harbour was guarded by a light cruiser and a destroyer; two destroyer flotillas anchored in Altenbruch Roads; while a light cruiser with two further flotillas of destroyers in instant readiness for sea, lay in Schillig Roads. The defence by night was arranged to prevent minelaying or blocking operations in the Bight, particularly in the Jade and Elbe. Light cruisers were ordered to attack destroyers and other light forces, whereas the destroyer flotilla had to avoid all such craft, with the exception of minelayers, the boats resuming their stations as soon as possible.

The Defence Order omitted any reference to the patrol of the Ems approaches, which were relegated to the ordinary coast defence protection. For the protection of the Jade against destroyer attacks, from August 3 onwards one battleship of the 1st or 3rd Squadron or one battle cruiser lay at anchor in Schillig Roads, completely ready for action, in a position where she could be just clear of the bottom at low water. There was, however, no question of this ship being used as a support to the defence forces in the Bight.

Other local defence arrangements detailed in the mobilisation orders included the arming of the coast defence works, laying minefields off the Ems, Weser, Elbe, Jade, and Lister Tief and the defence of the Elbe by a barrage of ships at Cuxhaven. The removal of lightships, buoys, and certain well-known landmarks such as Wangeroog Church intensified the already considerable difficulties in the navigation of the German Bight.

Simultaneously with the patrolling of surface craft and submarines, aircraft carried out a morning and evening reconnaissance, especial importance being attached to the latter as a means of ascertaining any enemy movements likely to be indicative of a pending attack. Six aeroplanes carried out these duties from Heligoland, though their radius at first did not exceed 30 miles and little or no experience of their utility had been gained on the outbreak of hostilities. The only available

¹ See Monograph No. 11, "The Battle of Heligoland Bight," C.B. 1585.

airship, "L.3," carried out no distant reconnaissance work, but merely made practice flights over the rivers and estuaries.

A memorandum entitled "Principles for the conduct of the defence immediately after the commencement of hostilities" followed the Defence Order and amplified those instructions with further detail.

25. Germany enters into a State of War, 6.30 p.m., August 4.

—The entry into a state of war with England was announced at 6.30 p.m., August 4, and eased to some extent the tension in Naval circles. It was followed by certain instructions for the initial disposition of the High Sea Forces issued by Admiral von Ingenohl with reference to the operation order of the German Emperor. These instructions formed the first operation order. The first distribution of the fleet was to be as follows:—In the Jade the 1st and 3rd Squadrons and those ships of the High Sea Fleet based on the North Sea as they became available; in the Elbe the 2nd Squadron¹ and ships of the High Sea Fleet based on the Baltic; in the Ems one flotilla cruiser and one destroyer flotilla. Rear-Admiral Hipper, the Senior Officer, Scouting Forces, was given the control of all cruisers, destroyer flotillas, submarines, mine-sweepers, airships, and aircraft: with these forces he was to be held responsible for the defence of the Heligoland Bight and Ems. The Senior Officer of the Submarine Flotilla was ordered to prepare four submarines for immediate readiness to undertake long distance cruises.

The defence arrangements made on August 2 and 3 required no further change, so that all the measures considered necessary for the safety of the Bight had already been taken prior to the outbreak of war.

A few hours after the outbreak of war a torpedo boat off Heligoland reported the presence of a British submarine to the light cruiser *Stettin* on guard at the Northern Harbour, Heligoland. The report was without foundation, but at the time it was difficult to establish whether or not there were submarines in the Bight, though it was clear to the Germans that if the reports were true the submarines must have left England before the outbreak of war. In consequence of this report the light cruisers on patrol at once withdrew to the estuaries as directed by the defence orders, the destroyer patrols were reinforced, and the Senior Officer, Scouting Forces, prepared for a sweep of the Bight by the mine-sweepers, with their gear out.

Of the heavy ships only the 1st and 2nd Battle Squadrons were ready for action on August 5. The *Grosser Kurfürst*, of the 3rd Battle Squadron, though in commission, was not ready to

¹ The separation of the 2nd Squadron was due to their lack of torpedo nets, for which it was hoped to compensate them by the better protection of Cuxhaven.

undergo trials till August 12: the *König*, of the same squadron, was not commissioned till August 10. The 4th and 5th Squadrons, whose work lay chiefly in the Baltic, were still further behindhand in preparedness.

26. Cruise of "E.6" and E.8" to the Heligoland Bight, August 5-8. — In August 1914 the majority of the British submarines were of the "C" class. These boats were unfit for oversea work and were employed only on local defence or in the Channel. There were 17 more modern submarines, namely, eight "D" class¹ and nine "E" class, which constituted the 8th Submarine Flotilla, of which 15 were ready or almost ready for service.² For maintenance purposes all the submarines in the Navy were under Captain Roger Keyes, C.B., M.V.O., Commodore (S), whose office was situated at the Admiralty. The flotilla whose operations he conducted was the 8th; when the despatch of the Expeditionary Force commenced, and a patrol of the 4th and 8th Flotillas was formed across the eastern entrance to the Channel, Commodore Keyes took charge of the patrol himself in the destroyer *Lurcher*, aided by Captain Arthur K. Waistell in the *Firedrake*; and he continued the practice of actively conducting the operations of the boats of the 8th Flotilla when co-operating in sweeps of the Grand Fleet and on other occasions. Up to date no British submarines had operated at any great distance from the coast, while for a boat to keep the sea for five to seven days was looked upon as a considerable achievement.³ The duty of the 8th Submarine Flotilla in war was to operate off the enemy's coast, on the look-out for vessels leaving or returning to harbour; and in accordance with these orders, Commodore Keyes, who arrived at Harwich on July 31 with the *Maidstone*, *Adamant*, and 10 submarines of the 8th Flotilla, arranged for two boats to proceed to the Heligoland Bight as soon as war was declared, towing them as far as Terschelling Light Vessel in order to spare the vessels and their crews. If the two submarines returned with a favourable report he intended to send two more; but the Commodore regarded the operation as a hazardous experiment, in view of the fact, amongst other things, that submarines' engines were still somewhat unreliable for long surface cruises.⁴ He considered that better results were likely to be achieved nearer home, particularly if the passage of the Expeditionary Force when it took place should tempt the German Fleet to attack the transports. Pending the arrival of Cruiser Force C he proposed, therefore, to station four submarines to the

¹ "D1" was, however, unreliable and was not employed overseas.

² H.S. 225, p. 78.

³ Jellicoe, "The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916," p. 16.

⁴ Tel. Commodore (S) to C.-in-C., H.F., 31 July 1914. Commodore (S) rendered reports both to the Admiralty and to the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet. The above report may thus be found both in H.S. 225, p. 72, and in G.F.S.P., Vol. XLVII.

southward of the destroyer sweeps towards Borkum Flat, which the Harwich Flotillas were to carry out, relieving them by four other boats as necessary. These submarines patrolled between the Outer Gabbard and North Hinder Light Vessels, one pair remaining on a line 14 miles south-east from the Outer Gabbard and the other on a line 14 miles north-west from the North Hinder. In the event of the 1st and 3rd Destroyer Flotillas being withdrawn to the Channel, Commodore (T) arranged to detail a destroyer to scout for each pair of submarines. The patrol was withdrawn on the evening of August 6, when Cruiser Force C took up its war station; and during the passage of the Expeditionary Force other dispositions were made.¹

Early on August 5 *E.6* (Lieutenant-Commander C. P. Talbot), in tow of the *Amethyst*, and *E.8* (Lieutenant-Commander F. H. H. Goodhart), in tow of the destroyer *Ariel*, proceeded from Harwich to a position 30 miles NNE from Terschelling Light Vessel, which was reached at 1 a.m. on August 6, when they slipped and proceeded independently for operations in the Heligoland Bight. The orders gave the Commanding Officers some power of discretion as to the length of their stay in hostile waters; but they were not to remain in the Bight more than three days, and unless they found themselves very well placed for offensive operations they were to return after two days.² At 5.45 a.m. on August 6 *E.6* was W $\frac{1}{2}$ N 23 miles from Heligoland. The following morning she sighted a German submarine, but no opportunity for attack offered on this or any other occasion during the cruise. At 1.30 p.m. *E.6* was N 43 W 37 miles from Heligoland; the return voyage was commenced, and at 6.30 a.m. on August 8 she made Swarte Bank Light Vessel and proceeded to Lowestoft to report.³

E.8, after casting off her tow, proceeded on various courses, until by about midday, August 7, she had come well within the patrol line reported as established 50 miles from the Elbe. Throughout the voyage no opportunity for attack presented itself. *E.8* returned to Swarte Bank Light Vessel and reached Yarmouth at 11 p.m. on August 8. Both submarines sighted many trawlers and small craft in and about the Heligoland Bight. Beyond making their presence known they achieved nothing, and Commodore (S) considered that nothing much could be done by submarines in the Heligoland Bight until the German trawlers fitted with W/T, which he thought were being used as scouts, had been dealt with.⁴ For this purpose he submitted proposals for an operation against these craft by the 1st and 3rd Destroyer

¹ See Section 45.

² See C.-in-C., H.F., "Orders for 8th Submarine Flotilla," 3 August 1914. H.S. C.46.

³ The report of *E.6* (Comm. (S) War Records pp. 19-20) gives no reason for her leaving the Bight before the expiration of two days.

⁴ See C.-in-C., H.F., "Orders for 8th Submarine Flotilla," 3 August 1914. H.S. C.46.

Flotillas, in the hope that this preliminary would open up opportunities for the overseas submarines.¹

27. Escape of the "Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse" into the Atlantic, August 5.²—The despatch of German armed merchant cruisers on to the trade route, as commerce raiders, was a policy which the Admiralty were preparing to meet. It was on this account that the sweep of the Grand Fleet towards Norway on August 4 was arranged and, amongst other reasons, that the Northern Patrol had been instituted.

At 6.30 p.m. on August 4, when Germany entered into a state of war with Great Britain, orders were given for the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, a Norddeutscher Lloyd steamer of 14,000 tons, which had been armed and was officially known as Auxiliary Cruiser D, to proceed at once from Bremen, where she was lying. Stealing up the Norwegian coast, about 11.0 a.m. on August 5, when on the line Haugesund-Firth of Forth, she intercepted numerous English messages *en clair*. The Grand Fleet at the time had just finished searching the area 30 or 40 miles to the west of her course.³ The signals increased in strength till 3 p.m., when they began to decrease. The *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* was now 40–50 miles from Norwegian territorial waters. At 5 p.m. she altered course towards Iceland; and, successfully evading our forces, she got clear into the Atlantic on the following day. German authorities attribute our failure to intercept the vessel to the difficulty and insufficiency of the distant blockade in so vast an area,⁴ though in the light of subsequent events it seems more probable that it was due to the absence of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, which did not arrive on its station until August 9.

There appears little reason for doubt that similar good fortune would have attended the passage of other armed merchant ships which the Admiralstab had been so anxious to despatch during the delicate political negotiations preceding the outbreak of hostilities, but which the politicians vetoed as being likely to prejudice the bid for peace with this country.

28. Sweep of the Grand Fleet, August 4–7.—The sweep of the Grand Fleet ordered on August 4 had been designed to prevent any such attempt as that of the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, but it failed in its object through being confined to the waters too far west of Norway. The area swept was between 57° 30' N and 60° N as far as 3° 30' E,⁵ whereas the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* kept east of that meridian. At about 2 p.m. on August 5 she crossed the 60th parallel in 3° 45' E approximately, but by that time the Grand Fleet was retiring


¹ 8th Submarine Flotilla Memoranda and Reports. H.S. 225.

² G.O.H., p. 65 and Karte 32.

³ See Plan I.

⁴ G.O.H., p. 232.

⁵ H.S. 52, p. 130.



to the westward and was nearly 100 miles distant. Commencing at 3 p.m. on the 5th, the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, and the *Devonshire* carried out a sweep to the eastward between 58° 10' N and 60° N, and thence up the Norwegian coast, but they did not cross the track of the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* until some 20 hours too late. Several German trawlers were met during the sweep of the Grand Fleet, and, after removal of their crews, they were sunk to prevent their communicating to the enemy intelligence in regard to the movements of the fleet.¹ The release of carrier pigeons from German trawlers on the approach of British ships was thought to have taken place on several occasions, though none had been found on board any vessel; but the operations upon which the Grand Fleet was engaged did not admit of prize crews being placed on board the trawlers in order to bring them into port for the purpose of examination.² Apart from the possibility of their giving information of the movements of British ships, these trawlers were considered from their positions to be included in the category of deep sea fishing vessels, to which no immunity from capture was extended by the Hague Convention.³

At 8.30 p.m. on the 4th the 3rd Battle Squadron, which had left harbour 30 per cent. short of coal, was ordered to return to Scapa to fill up, accompanied by the *Antrim* and *Argyll*

¹ The German Government had issued a special notice to German fishing vessels on the subject of reporting the movements of the enemy. (See translation in M. 16173/14. Sinking of German trawlers *Hude* and *Borkum*.)

² No. 322/H.F. 0019. Letter from Commander-in-Chief to Admiralty, October 26, in G.F.S.P. 0019, Vol. XXXVI. An order was issued to the Grand Fleet a few days later that any vessel found with carrier pigeons on board in the war area would be considered to be performing unneutral service and would be liable to detention. The Admiralty left it to the discretion of the Foreign Office to inform Foreign Powers. (M. 01873/18.)

³ The germane articles of the Hague Convention, 1907, are as follows:—

“Vessels employed exclusively in coast fisheries, or small boats employed in local trade, together with their appliances, rigging, tackle, and cargo are exempt from capture. This exemption no longer applies from the moment that they take any part whatever in hostilities. The Contracting Powers bind themselves not to take advantage of the harmless character of the said vessels in order to use them for military purposes while preserving their peaceful appearance. (Naval Prize Manual, p. 68 (3).)

“Enemy merchant ships which left their last port of departure before the commencement of the war, and are encountered on the high seas while still ignorant of the outbreak of hostilities, may not be confiscated. They are merely liable to be detained on condition that they are restored after the war without payment of compensation; or to be requisitioned, or even destroyed, on payment of compensation, but in such case provision must be made for the safety of the persons on board as well as the preservation of the ship's papers.”

Note.—Germany had made a reservation as to this article, and therefore German ships were not entitled to the benefit of these provisions. (Naval Prize Manual, p. 65, 3 and note, p. 66.)

of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, in preparation for the sweep detailed for the second day of war. Late that night, however, the Admiralty informed Sir John Jellicoe of the postponement of the sailing of the Expeditionary Force and the consequent cancellation of the sweep arranged for the following day.

During the forenoon, August 5, the Commander-in-Chief reported to the Admiralty that he had swept the North Sea between 57° 30' N and 60° N as far as 3° 30' E, and that he intended the following day to sweep to the south-eastward. In reply he received instructions to remain to the north of 57° 30' N unless some tactical reason intervened; the domination of the northern entrance to the North Sea was considered most important. The postponement of the departure of the Expeditionary Force and the restriction imposed on his proposed movement to the south-east decided Admiral Jellicoe to employ the following day in patrolling the parallel of 59° N, westward from the Norwegian coast.¹ In preparation for this the cruisers and destroyers needed to coal, for whereas the Battle Fleet could maintain an economical speed, the cruisers and destroyers, especially in taking up stations in any new formation or alteration of course, required to employ greater speed and consequently consumed more fuel.² During August 5 the battle cruisers proceeded to Scapa, the 4th Flotilla was sent to Invergordon, and the 2nd Flotilla returned to Rosyth.

29. Search for German Submarine Bases on Norwegian Coast.—In view of the many reports³ of war vessels off the Norwegian coast received during August 4 and 5, Admiral Jellicoe suggested that careful investigations should be made in Norway, since the reports seemed to point to a German base north of 62° N. The replies received gave definite information that the Germans had established a base north of 62° N, the exact position not being known.

The situation which was now believed to have arisen was one which had already been considered some time before the war, namely, the seizure of a base by the enemy in Norwegian territorial waters. In such an eventuality it had been arranged that offensive action against enemy forces in Norwegian waters should be delayed until the enemy had been in those waters for 24 hours after the declaration of war. On the expiry of this time limit it could be assumed that only the inability of Norway to enforce her neutrality prevented the expulsion or internment of the enemy forces. Offensive action was only to be taken on the authority of the Admiralty, and would depend upon what was to be gained as compared with the risk of giving offence

¹ H.S. 52, pp. 130, 147, 361.

² See "Coaling of Fleet during War," H.F. 004 of 1 August 1914, p. 8.

³ H.S. 51, pp. 826, 828, 919. H.S. 52, pp. 58, 59, 184.

to Norway. The Admiralty memorandum further expressly ordered that no attack should be made on forces sheltering under the protection of shore batteries in defended areas.¹ On the afternoon of August 6 the Admiralty granted to the Commander-in-Chief authority to act in accordance with this memorandum.²

Sir John Jellicoe had learned during the night of August 5-6 of the establishment of a base in Norway, and he arranged for cruisers to sweep northward along the Norwegian coast to 61° 30' N during August 6. If the cruisers failed to locate the base, he intended to despatch a force with destroyers on the following day. The search of the coast was carried out by the 2nd Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, which afterwards returned to Scapa.³ Nothing was found to confirm our suspicions, and accordingly a formal apology was tendered to the Norwegian Government for our presence in their territorial waters, and the Commander-in-Chief reported that he would not carry out any further search unless reliable information concerning the presence of enemy ships was received.⁴ The Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs protested on August 8 to our Minister in Christiania that British men-of-war had entered Norwegian territorial waters in the vicinity of Vaago and had stopped Norwegian fishermen, by firing blank charges, to inquire whether any German war vessels had been sighted. He explained that this protest was merely formal, in case the German Minister should make any representations regarding the stopping of a German merchantman in Norwegian territorial waters by our ships.⁵ Despite the various assurances denying the establishment of a base or the presence of enemy vessels on the Norwegian coast, the Commander-in-Chief considered it probable that an attempt would be made to arm the enemy merchantmen reported to be collecting off the Lofoten Islands, and on August 7 the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, with the 2nd Flotilla, searched the coast between 61° N and 62½° N for a possible German base. After the search was completed he intended to send the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, supported by a ship of the 3rd Battle Squadron, to cruise off the Lofotens to attack German cruisers reported to be operating from that centre, colliers for the force being despatched to some suitable base in about 62° N.⁶

The operation was destined not to be carried out, however, for at noon on the 7th, while the *Iron Duke*, with the 1st, 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons, were coaling at Scapa, the Admiralty telegraphed that the Expeditionary Force would begin to move across the Channel on the following Sunday, August 9, and that

¹ M. 0030 of 12 April 1913.

² H.S. 52, pp. 350, 388, 424.

³ M. 01636/14.

⁴ H.S. 52, p. 424.

⁵ H.S. 52, p. 517.

⁶ H.S. 52, pp. 752-806.

the Grand Fleet was to remain at sea north of 57° N during the passage of the transports.¹ That the Germans had no intention of employing the High Sea Fleet to attack the transports, but intended to confine their offensive operations exclusively to mining and submarine attacks, was unsuspected at the Admiralty.

CHAPTER IV.

GERMAN MINELAYING OFFENSIVE OPENS.

30. German Mining Policy.—The German operation orders for the conduct of war in the North Sea had indicated a ruthless minelaying campaign as one of the means by which the equalisation of the British and German Fleets was to be accomplished. Until this situation had been brought about, the orders were definite that there was to be no thought of risking the German Fleet; consequently there was no question of undertaking mining operations off the British coast with the light cruisers and destroyers fitted for the purpose, for these would all be needed for reconnaissance work and in a fleet action.

The only fast modern minelayers in the fleet were the *Nautilus* and *Albatross*,² vessels of 20 knots speed, with a carrying capacity of 400 mines, though only half this number could be laid in succession from each vessel. These minelayers were not, however, to be risked until the nights grew darker and the system of the British patrol of the Heligoland Bight had been more accurately ascertained. Instead, auxiliary minelayers were to be employed, of which there were five in the High Sea Fleet.³ These vessels were capable of 13 or 14 knots only, with the exception of the *Preussen*, a Sassnitz-Trelleborg ferry boat whose inferior sea-going qualities rendered her unsuitable for work off the British coast. One of them, the *Königin Luise*, was detailed early in August for minelaying operations off the Thames.

31. Minelaying Operation off the Thames by the *Königin Luise*, August 5.—As early as the afternoon of August 1 the *Königin Luise*, officially known as Auxiliary Minelayer B, commenced at Cuxhaven her conversion into a minelayer. She was completed ready for sea in 12 hours, though she had not time to mount her guns. She arrived at Wilhelmshaven Roads on August 3, when the plans for her operations off the English coast

¹ H.S. 52, pp. 744, 849. H.S. 53, p. 24.

² G.O.H., Tabelle 1, shows a third, the *Pelikan*, with the Fleet on 10 August 1914.

³ Possibly three only were ready on the outbreak of war.

were discussed and agreed upon at a conference between her Commanding Officer, Korvettenkapitän Biermann, and the Commander-in-Chief, High Sea Fleet. Her orders were despatched immediately after the declaration of war with England at 6.30 p.m., August 4, and followed those for the auxiliary cruiser *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*. They ran as follows¹:—

“Proceed at utmost speed in the direction of the Thames. Lay your mines as near as possible to the English coast. Do not lay mines off neutral coasts, or further north than 53° N.”

Although the forecast of a near blockade had not yet been rejected by the Admiralstab, these two auxiliaries were allowed to proceed unescorted even to the line where the British blockading ships might well be expected,² though a certain measure of assistance was given to the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* by an aeroplane which reconnoitred some 80 miles north-west from Heligoland without sighting anything suspicious. Leaving the Ems, whither she had proceeded from Cuxhaven in order to be nearer her objective, the *Königin Luise* proceeded close inshore to the Dutch coast to avoid the main shipping route. During the night another coat of paint was added in an attempt to disguise her as a Harwich-Hook of Holland steamer. At 7 a.m. on the 5th, when to the west of the Maas Light Vessel, the *Königin Luise* altered course towards the English coast, and steered to pass between the Outer Gabbard and the Galloper towards the King's Channel, where the mines were to be laid. She had not long entered the main shipping route when she sighted a British steamer, which quickly passed out of sight. Commander Biermann was only too well aware that his disguise was imperfect, for his ship was well known in the North Sea³; and his fears were confirmed when the stranger sent out a W/T message. This the *Königin Luise* attempted to jam, though, as he believed, without success.⁴

All was now ready on board for the operation of laying the mines. Rain squalls assisted the vessel's progress unobserved, until during a clear period about 10.40 a.m. she sighted, 4 or 5 points on the starboard bow, an enemy flotilla steering a southerly course. This was the *Amphion* and the 3rd Flotilla, which with the *Fearless* and the 1st Flotilla had left Harwich about 6 a.m. on August 5 for a sweep on diverging lines from the

¹ G.O.H., p. 65.

² Probably owing to the fear of British submarines, one of which was (falsely) reported off Heligoland on the afternoon of August 4. See G.O.H., p. 66.

³ She was a Hamburg-Amerika liner, employed on the service to the seaside resorts.

⁴ G.O.H., p. 67. This signal cannot be traced in our records; it never reached the patrolling forces or the flotilla which eventually sank the *Königin Luise*.

Outer Gabbard Light Vessel.¹ This operation was in conformity with the functions of the Harwich flotillas, to keep the eastern approaches of the English Channel clear of enemy torpedo craft and minelayers by a series of sweeps which would prevent enemy vessels passing unobserved and unattacked through the area south of 54° N and east of 2° E. Commodore Tyrwhitt had arranged to leave harbour in the *Amethyst* with the *Ariel* two hours earlier, in order to take *E.6* and *E.8* in tow on their passage to the Heligoland Bight. As both destroyer flotillas were available for this preliminary sweep, the orders directed the Northern Flotilla to concentrate on their flotilla cruiser after the preliminary area had been searched. A return would then be made to refuel at Harwich while the duty flotilla continued the sweep to a line between 53° 33' N, 6° E, and 53° 57' N, 6° E, being relieved by the non-duty flotilla after refuelling. Thus it was hoped that each flotilla would have approximately 24 hours' stand off in 4 days.

At 10.30 a.m. the *Lance* and *Landrail* were ahead of the 3rd Flotilla, searching for a merchant vessel which had been reported by a passing trawler acting suspiciously and "throwing things overboard"² 20 miles north-east of the Outer Gabbard. Almost simultaneously the vessel was sighted; it was the *Königin Luise*, and she made off at her full speed of about 20 knots, with the flotilla in chase. On sighting the flotilla the *Königin Luise* immediately altered course to the southward and commenced minelaying unseen by our destroyers.³ The *Landrail* and *Lance* rapidly approached, while the remainder of the flotilla surrounded the vessel to the east and west. At 10.45 a.m. the *Lance* opened fire,⁴ followed by the *Landrail*, the range being about 4,400 yards. Just as the last few mines were being launched Commander Biermann brought the *Königin Luise* gradually to a south-easterly course, in the hope of regaining neutral waters and also incidentally of drawing his pursuers over the newly laid field; and he reported to the High Sea Fleet that his duty was accomplished and that he was in action. In the absence of her guns, which the *Königin Luise* had not had time to mount, she had available for her defence only two 3.7 cm. machine guns and small arms. After she had been badly hit by the destroyers a number of times in various parts of the ship, the Commanding Officer gave order to sink and abandon the ship in order to avoid further loss of life. About

¹ Memo. 001 of 30 July 1914 by Commodore (T). "Procedure of 1st and 3rd Flotillas in the event of war with Germany."

² *Lance's* Signal log, No. 12925.

³ This account is based on G.O.H., pp. 68 *et seq.*, and *Lance's* deck and signal logs. The times in these logs are at variance, nor are they in agreement with G.O.H. The *Lance's* report of proceedings cannot be traced.

⁴ G.O.H. states that she first of all fired a blank charge, whereupon the *Königin Luise* hoisted her colours.

11 a.m. firing ceased on both sides, and the *Königin Luise* sank in 52° 5' N, 2° 32' E. From the statements of the survivors the true nature of the enemy was soon discovered.

32. **Loss of the "Amphion," August 6.**—After rescuing the survivors of the *Königin Luise* the 3rd Flotilla proceeded to carry out their sweep. Captain Fox of the *Amphion*, in a report signalled at 2.20 a.m. on the 6th, gave the probable position in which the *Königin Luise* had laid her mines to be from Aldeburgh Ridge, in 52° 7' N, 1° 40' E, to 52° 10' N, 2° 25' E, though a survivor stated to him after the action that a long line of mines had been laid eastward from 52° 10' N, 2° 25' E.¹ Further reports mention the *Königin Luise* as steering east from Aldeburgh when first sighted, and that she then altered course to north-east. The 3rd Flotilla returned from the sweep on the morning of August 6, and at 6.30 a.m. the *Amphion* was in 52° 11' N, 2° 36' E,² seven miles eastward of the minefield Captain Fox had reported and within a mile of the line of mines stated by the survivor of the *Königin Luise* to have been laid.³ Suddenly the *Amphion* struck two mines in quick succession and sank immediately, with the loss of one officer and 150 men, as well as 18 of the prisoners taken from the *Königin Luise*.

The latter when attacked had reported by W/T to the High Sea Fleet that she had laid her mines in a position 52° 8' N to 52° 14' N, and 2° 20' E to 2° 30' E. This was approximately correct,⁴ for the minefield was subsequently located in an ESE direction on the parallel of Aldeburgh Napes slightly zigzagged between 2° 15' E and 2° 30' E. When swept, it was found to consist of a few mines only, and it is probable that the *Königin Luise* had not laid all her 180 mines when she was sunk.⁵

The loss of the *Amphion* did not become known to Commodore (T) for certainly more than 24 hours after the event, as evidenced by a message intercepted at the Admiralty on August 7 at 4.50 p.m. from Commodore (T) to the Rear-Admiral, *Bacchante*, reporting the former's inability to gain touch with the *Amphion*.⁶

¹ H.S. 52, pp. 383, 413. See Plan II.

² H.S. 52, pp. 499, 530.

³ At 5.40 p.m., August 5, Commodore (T) signalled to 1st and 3rd Flotillas: "Avoid going within area contained between bearings 16 miles ENE and ESE from lat. 52° 10' N, long. 2° 25' E where mines are reported to be laid (1705)." The position where the *Amphion* was sunk was within this dangerous sector, but it is not known whether she received the signal. The signal and W/T logs of *Amethyst* (Commodore T) and *Amphion* are not forthcoming, and the signal quoted above is taken from *Fearless' W/T* log.

⁴ G.O.H., p. 69. But O.U. 6020A, "German Statement of Mines laid by Surface Vessels and Submarines, 1914-1918," gives the position of the minefield between 51° 45' N, 51° 55' N, 2° 15' E, 2° 25' E, which is approximately the position shown in G.O.H., Karte 8.

⁵ C.B. 1553, "History of British Minesweeping in the War," p. 9.

⁶ H.S. 52, p. 809.

The Admiralty, in issuing a report to the Press on the sinking of the *Königin Luise*, raised against Germany a charge of laying mines with deliberate intention to damage merchant vessels and not in connection with military harbours or strategic positions, and the matter was mentioned two days later by the First Lord in the House of Commons.

On August 7, in an attempt to justify the minelaying operation of the *Königin Luise*, the German Government informed all neutral States that the routes to British ports would be closed by German mines.¹ Later, they denied the contention that the North Sea had been strewn with German mines, as had been stated by the Foreign Office in a circular addressed to all the Neutral Powers.

On the night of August 21-22 and the early morning of 22, two Danish steamers, the *Broberg* and *Maryland*, were sunk about 35 miles north-east of the Galloper Light Vessel, and the Admiralty issued a warning to neutrals of the dangers of

¹ The Convention of 1907 relative to the laying of automatic submarine contact mines prescribed the following regulations:—

Article 1.—It is forbidden:—

- (1) To lay unanchored contact mines, unless they be so constructed as to become harmless one hour at most after the person who laid them has ceased to control them.
- (2) To lay anchored automatic contact mines which do not become harmless as soon as they have broken loose from their moorings.
- (3) To use torpedoes which do not become harmless when they have missed their mark.

Article 2.—The laying of automatic contact mines off the coast and ports of the enemy with the sole object of intercepting commercial shipping is forbidden.

Article 3.—When anchored automatic contact mines are employed, every possible precaution must be taken for the security of peaceful shipping.


The belligerents undertake to do their utmost to render these mines harmless after a limited time has elapsed and, should the mines cease to be under observation, to notify the danger zone as soon as military exigencies permit, by a notice to mariners which must also be communicated to the Governments through the diplomatic channel.

On 27 March 1908 an inter-departmental Committee, presided over by Lord Desart, having carefully considered the effect of this Convention, reported that "The principles of the Convention appear to be clear."

- (a) It is contemplated that unanchored mines (so designed as to become harmless after one hour) would be used only in a hostile engagement.
- (b) Anchored mines (so designed as to become harmless when broken loose from their moorings) are not to be employed without every possible precaution being taken for the security of peaceful shipping.
- (c) No mines are to be laid off the coast and ports of the enemy with the sole object of intercepting commercial shipping.

Article 7 of the Convention prescribed that its provisions only held good if the belligerents were all parties to the contract.

Both France and Germany had reserved freedom of action with regard to Article 2.



traversing the North Sea owing to the practice of the Germans in scattering mines indiscriminately upon the ordinary trade routes.¹

33. Coastward Channel initiated.—Coincident with the sinking of the *Königin Luise* came coastguard reports from Flamborough and Usan, near Montrose, which caused the Admiralty, at 1 a.m., August 6, to prohibit the use of these waters by all heavy draught ships until the trawler sweepers had covered the suspected areas.² The order to clear these and the Aldeburgh minefields, or to sweep safe channels, with the trawler sweepers was given to the Admiral of Patrols. Commodore Ballard had only two minesweeping vessels available, and, while reporting that more were urgently required, he pointed out that if these two were sent elsewhere the Humber approaches would remain unswept; and he submitted that the Senior Naval Officer, Coast of Scotland, was responsible for the suspected area off Usan and the Senior Naval Officer, Harwich, for that off Aldeburgh.³ Obviously some other expedient to meet the situation had to be provided, and it was decided to establish a minesweeping flotilla of 80 trawlers at Lowestoft, under the command of Captain Alfred A. Ellison, of the minesweeping gunboat *Halcyon*, in order to ensure a clear channel from the Outer Dowsing to South Goodwins.⁴ Orders were issued for a channel to be swept between the coast and Aldeburgh Napes, and meanwhile a general warning was sent that mines had been laid between the British coast and the meridian of 3° E and between 52° N and 52° 30' N, and British merchant vessels were warned not to enter the North Sea, but to call for orders at south coast ports.⁵ In the north the minesweeping gunboats⁶ swept the Pentland Firth daily to keep a passage open for the Grand Fleet.

On August 7 the area about which the warning had been issued was prohibited, and this had the effect of deflecting shipping into a channel to shoreward of the danger. Thus was initiated the coastal route, which was later extended and became known as the War Channel,⁷ and the necessity for a vast expansion of the minesweeping forces was foreshadowed.

34. Change in the Function of the Patrol Flotillas, August 6.—Whilst opinion was coming round to the view that an alert

¹ See M. 05143/14. According to G.O.H. no minelaying operation in the North Sea, other than that of the *Königin Luise*, had been carried out at this date. The Admiralty no doubt concluded that the *Strassburg*, which was sighted off Smith's Knoll on August 18, was concerned in a minelaying operation, though in fact she was proceeding for a raid on the Broad Fourteens Patrol. (See Section 61.)

² H.S. 52, pp. 359, 433, 825. The Usan and Flamborough areas were found free from mines and the warnings were shortly afterwards cancelled.

³ H.S. 52, pp. 356, 464, 502, 725.

⁴ H.S. 52, p. 854.

⁵ B.E.F. A 50. H.S. 52, pp. 616, 618, 699.

⁶ *Skipjack, Circe, Gossamer, Jason, Leda, Speedwell, and Seagull.*

⁷ H.S. 52, p. 698.

patrol was no certain antidote to minelaying, the Admiralty were as yet by no means willing to admit that the prevention of enemy minelaying was impossible. Accordingly, on August 6, orders went out to the Admiral of Patrols that, instead of keeping his vessels concentrated in divisions to repel raids, he was to patrol the coast day and night to prevent a repetition of the recent enemy operation.¹ This order constituted a fundamental change in the functions of the Patrol Flotillas, and the continual patrolling threw a great additional strain on the personnel and material of the old vessels which were all that the Admiral of Patrols had at his disposal. Moreover, a division of the 9th Destroyer Flotilla was transferred on August 6 from the north-east coast to Scapa to assist in the defence of the northern bases; and where boats were few and old, and duties were exceptionally heavy, the withdrawal of even one division made itself felt.

CHAPTER V.

THE BLOCKADE AND PROTECTION OF TRADE.

35. The Blockade in the West.—The opening of the German minelaying offensive rendered it necessary that special precautions should be taken by the western patrols to prevent mines being laid by merchant ships in disguise during the period that the British Expeditionary Force was being transported to France.

The western entrance to the English Channel was designated Area G, and the 12th Cruiser Squadron was detailed to occupy it. The area as laid down in the original orders extended for a distance of 25 miles from the English coast, between the lines Eddystone-Triagoz and Wolf Rock-Ushant.² The 12th Cruiser Squadron consisted of four old cruisers on a Third Fleet basis, the *Charybdis*, *Diana*, *Eclipse*, and *Talbot*. Rear-Admiral R. E. Wemyss was appointed to the command of the squadron, being specially selected on account of his knowledge of and sympathy with the French, with whose navy the force might expect to be brought into close relation. No specific mention was made, in Admiral Wemyss' orders, of French co-operation, though the French authorities had drawn up a set of orders for a combined patrol by the French 2nd Cruiser Squadron and the British force allotted to the area.³

¹ "Patrol Flotillas," A. 8.

² M. 02494/14, Cruiser Force G. Report of Proceedings, August 2 to September 11.

³ M. 0049.

Admiral Wemyss hoisted his flag in the *Charybdis* at Devonport on August 2. His instructions were to establish a patrol from the Lizard to within three miles of Ushant, with Plymouth as his base, his principal duty being to intercept German vessels and contraband and to prevent detached squadrons or vessels of the enemy from entering the Channel from the westward. About noon on August 4 the Admiralty directed Admiral Wemyss, who had reported his squadron to be ready, to take up his patrol line by 8 o'clock next morning. He sailed from Devonport at 5.10 p.m. on the 4th, and shortly after received the general signal to enter into the closest co-operation with the French officers on his station. The patrol area was reached on the morning of the 5th, and shortly before noon he met Rear-Admiral Rouyer's squadron, which had been patrolling the Straits of Dover since the 3rd, but was now set free by the British dispositions for closing the Straits. The 2nd Light Squadron consisted of nine old armoured cruisers, two protected cruisers, and four light cruisers,¹ two of the latter being still on their way home from abroad. By arrangement with Admiral Wemyss the French Admiral took the 1st Division, comprising the *Marseillaise*, *Amiral Aube*, and *Jeanne d'Arc*, to Brest,² where they remained in support, leaving the remainder of the force under Rear-Admiral Le Cannellier in the *Gloire* to co-operate with Admiral Wemyss on patrol. A combined patrol was formed, the British and French cruisers being spread towards their respective coasts, with the two flagships in the centre, Admiral Le Cannellier being in general command.³ The light cruisers *Surcouf* and *Friant* arrived from abroad on the 8th and 11th respectively to join Admiral Rouyer, and the force later was augmented by some French armed merchant cruisers.

The orders of the Admiralty, issued to Admiral Wemyss on August 8, were that no ship of any description was to be allowed to pass through the patrol line without examination.⁴ Suspected ships were to be stopped and examined if the weather permitted, and if the weather was too bad for boarding they were to be sent in to Falmouth with due precaution to prevent evasion of the order. The body of trade would be innocent, and, if clearly so, vessels were to be allowed to proceed. Admiral Rouyer was

¹ Armoured cruisers *Marseillaise* (Flag), *Condé*, *Amiral Aube*, *Gloire*, *Gueydon*, *Dupetit-Thouars*, *Kléber*, *Desaix*, *Jeanne d'Arc*; protected cruisers *Guichen*, *Châteaurenault*; light cruisers *D'Estrées*, *Lavoisier*, *Surcouf*, *Friant*; eight auxiliary cruisers; four flotillas of T.B.s (local defence); 18 submarines; and a group of minelayers. (F.O.H., pp. 22 and 47 note). Throughout 1914 the *Condé* was in West Indian waters.

² Apparently.

³ Admiral Wemyss was senior to Admiral Le Cannellier, but the arrangement was doubtless made on account of the French acceptance of responsibility for the protection of the western entrance to the Channel. See Section 7.

⁴ B.E.F. A.58. The words "without examination" were no doubt inadvertently omitted from the telegram.

requested to give instructions in the same sense to his own ships on the patrol.

It was soon found necessary to modify these orders, although the passage of the Expeditionary Force was in full swing, for it was of the first importance to inspire trade with confidence and to keep up the normal flow. Accordingly, the policy was adopted of interfering as little as possible with British trade, and vessels were not deflected or sent in for orders unless absolutely necessary.¹ The main object of the cruisers on the trade routes was to destroy enemy armed ships. When a prize was taken, therefore, the cruiser did not leave her station, but sent the ship in with an armed guard aboard. If this was not possible, and the cargo was mainly enemy, the orders were for the crew to be removed and the ship sunk.²

Little alteration occurred during the first three weeks of the war in the regulations regarding contraband,³ though aircraft of all kinds and their accessories were transferred from the conditional to the absolute contraband list.⁴ A ship carrying absolute contraband was detained if she was to touch at an enemy port, if she was out of her course, if it could be proved that the goods were destined for an enemy country, or in suspicious circumstances. Conditional contraband could be seized only when destined for the use of the Government or armed forces of an enemy country.

It was highly important, however, to exercise some supervision over enemy supplies through neutral countries, and with this object the Admiralty issued instructions, the effect of which was to discourage the passage of merchant shipping up Channel, the danger from German minefields furnishing the British Government with an excellent excuse for diverting to Great Britain cargoes which would otherwise be landed in neutral ports on the Continent. British merchant ships bound for Rotterdam and other ports in Holland, Denmark, or the Baltic were ordered to proceed instead to some British port, though vessels bound to Antwerp or French ports were not diverted from their course, the supply of Belgium and Northern France being an important consideration.⁵ Great care had to be exercised

¹ B.E.F. A.98.

² H.S. 55, p. 347.

³ See Naval Prize Manual, 1914, pp. 86-87. The rules of maritime law, as there set out, were based on the Declaration of London, though this had not been ratified by Great Britain or any of the other parties on the outbreak of war. See C.B. 1554, "The Economic Blockade, 1914-1915," Chapter I.

⁴ H.F. 004 of 1 August 1914, XXI.

⁵ Admiralty to cruiser and destroyer forces in the Channel, 16 August 1914: "British merchant ships bound for Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and other ports in Holland, Denmark, or Baltic are to be ordered to proceed instead to some British port. If Captain is doubtful to which port owner would wish him to proceed he should be directed to proceed to some convenient signal station on south coast and wait orders from owner. Vessels proceeding to Antwerp or a French port should on no account be deflected from their course" (M. 01418/14, see M Letter Book No. 272, pp. 931 and 1348-9).

in the diversion of neutral ships with neutral cargo. It was of particular importance to keep the United States of America as a friendly neutral.¹ On August 20 it was reported that the German Government had taken control of all foodstuffs, thus constituting them contraband if consigned to places in Germany through neutral ports. The effect of this was that all foodstuffs consigned to Germany through neutral ports might be intercepted, and a neutral ship was to be detained for carrying conditional contraband even, for example, if she were proceeding to a Dutch port.² It was soon learnt, however, that the report was incorrect, and the food ships which had been sent in had to be released.

36. Cruiser Force E.—The home end of the North American trade routes lay within Area E, the western boundary of which was the meridian of 40° W, and its southern limit a line WSW true from the Scilly Isles, which met the meridian of 40° W in about Lat. 40° N. In the orders for the Rear-Admiral Commanding Cruiser Force E, which would occupy this area, it was laid down that in the initial stages of a war Force E was to consider its main station to be on the trade route west of the Fastnet, with a part of the force guarding the northern entrance to the Irish Sea.³

The cruiser force detailed to occupy Area E, and the Admiral appointed to command it, varied from time to time during the period preceding strained relations. After the Test Mobilisation Force E comprised the six *Cressys*, under Rear-Admiral Campbell; but on July 30 it consisted of the five *Junos* of the 11th Cruiser Squadron,⁴ under Rear-Admiral R. S. Phipps Hornby, C.M.G., who had been Rear-Admiral Second in Command of the 8th Battle Squadron during the Test Mobilisation. Admiral Hornby received orders on August 1 to hoist his flag in the *Doris* and take command of Force E.⁵ It was expected by the Admiralty that the work of the force would be heavier than actually proved to be the case, for the three large Cunarders *Mauretania*, *Lusitania*, and *Aquitania* were detailed to join it as soon as they could be armed and got ready after the outbreak of war, and the squadron was still further to be augmented by a cruiser force called J.⁶ In actual fact the *Mauretania* and *Lusitania* were found to be unsuitable for employment as armed merchant cruisers, and were not taken up⁷ on account of the difficulty of providing them with coal and water, for they burned some 30,000 tons of coal a week, about as much as the

¹ H.S. 55, p. 315.

² C.I.O. 47 (M. 15498/14) and H.S. 56, p. 18.

³ See C.B. 917(G), "The Atlantic Ocean, 1914."

⁴ *Juno, Isis, Venus, Doris, Minerva.*

⁵ H.S. 51, pp. 37, 104.

⁶ The Admiralty probably contemplated patrolling the trade routes as far as 40° W. The practice was soon abandoned.

⁷ M Letter Book No. 272, p. 1567.

Grand Fleet needed for a single coaling; and the *Aquitania*, soon after her arrival in the force, had a collision and was paid off and returned to her owners.¹ Force J was never constituted.

Provision was made for the defence of the cable landings at Valentia and in Cornwall, by stationing there the fishery gunboats *Thrush* and *Squirrel* respectively; these two vessels, from their long acquaintance with fishing craft, would, it was considered, readily detect any attempt by the enemy to cut the cables by means of trawlers, and they could also deal with minelayers and other small craft.²

The 11th Cruiser Squadron was on a Third Fleet basis in peace time, and on July 29, when the warning telegram was issued by the Admiralty, it was decided to send the *Drake* and *Leviathan* of the 6th Cruiser Squadron, to protect the home end of the Atlantic trade routes until the *Junos* could be got ready. The *Drake* and *Leviathan* arrived at Portsmouth on July 30, the former to refit. The *Drake's* refit was postponed, and on the evening of July 31 she left with the *Leviathan* along the homeward-bound route which runs from New York to the Fastnet and got in touch with the *Carmania*. If war was declared, one of the two cruisers was to escort the liner to Queenstown, while the other was to patrol the route as far as 500 miles from the Fastnet, returning to Queenstown to coal.³ The *Carmania* was duly picked up and was brought in to Queenstown about noon on August 6; Cruiser Force E by this time was ready, and the *Drake* and *Leviathan* were released for other services, the former to join the 6th Cruiser Squadron at Scapa, while the latter was despatched to the Azores.⁴

The desirability of stationing a cruiser in the Bristol Channel does not seem to have been foreseen, but as soon as war was imminent the necessity of protecting Cardiff presented itself. On August 3 the Admiralty ordered Admiral Burney to send the light cruiser *Pelorus*, which had been attached to his command on July 31, to patrol the Bristol Channel from Scarweather Light to the Foreland, to prevent the Channel being mined or Cardiff attacked. The *Pelorus* was in dockyard hands, and the *Challenger*, of Cruiser Force I, was therefore sent to the Bristol Channel until relieved by the *Pelorus* on August 9.⁵

Great efforts had been made to get the old cruisers of Force E ready for service. The *Venus* and *Minerva* proceeded from Portsmouth on the evening of August 4; the *Doris* and *Isis*, the former flying Admiral Phipps Hornby's flag, left

¹ H.S. 58, p. 969, and M Letter Book No. 272, p. 2009.

² M. 01421/14 (see M Letter Book No. 272, p. 1403). Only the *Thrush* appears to have been on the station by August 17, and she had not received any ammunition for her 4 in. guns.

³ H.S. 50, p. 455.

⁴ H.S. 52, p. 760. See "The Atlantic Ocean, 1914."

⁵ H.S. 51, pp. 535, 569, 604, 842, 868.

Devonport at 5.45 a.m. on 5th for a position 60 miles west of the Fastnet; and the *Juno* got away from Sheerness on the same day. Admiral Hornby despatched the *Minerva* to guard the northern entrance to the Irish Sea, though she had to be relieved on the 7th by the *Juno* on account of defects which necessitated her proceeding to Berehaven for 30 hours. On the 9th, in order to guard against enemy minelayers and submarines, a patrol of the North Channel of the Irish Sea between the Mull of Cantyre and Fair Head was instituted. For the time being it was undertaken by the *Challenger*, who had been relieved in the Bristol Channel by the *Pelorus* at 6 a.m. that day. Three days later, however, the *Challenger* was withdrawn, being required to join her squadron, Cruiser Force I, and her place was taken by the *Juno*.¹ The three remaining cruisers worked from Admiral Hornby's station 60 miles off the Fastnet, pushing out on to the trade routes. The *Aquitania* joined on 9th, and was ordered to proceed as far as 40° W, using Liverpool as her coaling base. Her endurance was only 6 days. On 20th she was damaged by collision with the Leyland liner *Canadian*, and was withdrawn from Cruiser Force E. A further reinforcement was the Cunarder *Caronia*, which left Liverpool on the evening of the 10th to join Admiral Hornby's command and was ordered to follow the *Aquitania* to 40° W.

On August 12 a change occurred in the functions of Cruiser Force E. Transports with the Expeditionary Force were due to commence leaving Queenstown, Dublin and Belfast on the following day; military exigencies now took precedence of trade defence, and Admiral Hornby disposed his squadron to prevent any enemy's cruisers from interfering with the passage of the transports as far as the latitude of the Scillies.² The *Juno* remained on guard in the North Channel, and the rest of the ships, *Doris*, *Isis*, *Minerva*, and *Venus*, took up their stations in that order from Kinsale Head to the Scillies. The *Isis* was withdrawn on 14th to guard the cable off Valentia West, which had broken through natural causes, though it was thought at the time that it had been cut by the enemy. The *Thrush*, whose duty was to guard it, was still without ammunition for her 4 in. guns.³ On the 17th, when the main body of the Expeditionary Force had crossed, the patrol between Queenstown and the Scillies was reduced to a single cruiser, and the ships proceeded to coal in sequence. On the 25th the last ship was withdrawn.

On August 20 Cruiser Force E was strengthened by the addition of the *Ocean*, of the 7th Battle Squadron.⁴ One or two changes had occurred in the squadron. The *Minerva* had been sent to join Cruiser Force I, and the fleet messengers

¹ H.S. 52, pp. 301, 328. H.S. 53, pp. 54, 171.

² H.S. 53, p. 113.

³ H.S. 55, p. 840.

⁴ H.S. 56, pp. 14, 146.

Tara and *Scotia* had joined Force E, the former for the patrol of the North Channel and the latter to relieve the *Pelorus* in the Bristol Channel.¹ A few ships were captured, but the work of the squadron in the protection of trade and enforcement of the blockade proved to be far lighter than was anticipated by the Admiralty before the war.

37. **British System of Blockade in the North.**—At this date the Admiralstab believed that the British system of blockade in the north consisted in a fixed patrol line between Peterhead and Ekersund, presumably occupied by light forces supported by cruisers; a surmise which was very far from correct. On August 1, for convenience and reduction of wireless signalling, the northern and central parts of the North Sea had been divided into certain numbered areas in which cruisers could be directed to work.² These areas were watched on a regular organised plan by the cruiser squadrons of the Grand Fleet, moving at fairly high speed, in such a manner as to reduce as far as possible the risk to the ships from submarines. Further north, Cruiser Force B patrolled between the Orkneys and the Shetlands and from the Shetlands to Norway, the position specially regarded as a fruitful one to watch being the coast of Norway in 62° N, where outlying dangers to navigation would compel vessels which had been hugging the coast to emerge from Norwegian territorial waters, and so render their capture possible. When the battlefleet was at sea, but not engaged in any definite operation, it usually cruised north of 59° N, the available cruiser squadrons, other than those occupying Areas III and VI, *i.e.*, covering the approaches to the north of Scotland and the Orkneys, being disposed as necessary for covering the battlefleet and for sweeping for enemy vessels which might be attempting descent on the British coast or endeavouring to escape into the Atlantic.³ The available cruisers were barely sufficient for the work, and on August 23 the *Latona*, *Naiad*, and *Thetis*, three of the minelaying squadron, were sent to Scapa to assist.⁴ It was hoped by this dual system to intercept any German war vessels which might be covering a raid on our coast or trying to reach the open sea to operate against trade, and to ensure that all merchant ships entering or leaving the North Sea should be examined.

On August 1, when the order to mobilise was given, the eight old cruisers of the *Edgar* class which were to form Cruiser

¹ The *Scotia's* sailing orders are in M Letter Book, No. 272, Vol. 3, p. 1442. The *Scotia* and *Tara* were two of four steamships taken up by the Admiralty on the outbreak of war. The other two, *Cambria* and *Anglia*, were sent to the Grand Fleet.

² See B.E.F., Map IV.

³ M. 01969/14. Remarks on operations carried out by Grand Fleet during week ending September 12.

⁴ Early in September the Commander-in-Chief considered the question of forming the older battleships of the 3rd Battle Squadron into a cruiser squadron.

Force B were in their home ports. By the greatest exertions Rear-Admiral de Chair managed on August 3 to get away from Portsmouth with the *Crescent*, *Grajton* and *Edgar*, and arrived at Scapa at 8.30 a.m. on 6th, where the *Endymion*, *Theseus*, and *Gibraltar* joined in the course of the day. It was not until the 9th, however, five days after the declaration of war, that the watch on the coast of Norway in 62° N was established. However, few prizes were missed, though the escape of the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* may be attributed to the absence of the squadron in the first days of war. The German policy towards their merchant marine was the opposite of ours. Whereas the Admiralty, with conspicuous success, exerted every effort to induce owners to continue their voyages as usual to other than enemy ports, as early as July 31 German merchant ships at sea were instructed to seek the shelter of neutral ports, and in the first days of August vessels in the North Sea hurriedly put into Norwegian harbours and lay up there. Twenty-one per cent. of the German merchant marine found shelter in neutral harbours, and 7 per cent. was captured by the British. One per cent. only of British shipping had been lost, and that was in enemy harbours on the outbreak of war.¹

38. **Treatment of Merchant Shipping by Great Britain and Germany prior to Outbreak of War.**—As early as August 1 the Reichs-Marine-Amt, acting on a decision of the Federal Council, ordered the detention if possible of British and other ships in German territorial waters, imports being urgently needed, more particularly oil and petroleum.² Diplomatic correspondence on the matter ensued between Great Britain and Germany, with the result that orders were ostensibly given for the release of the ships, accompanied by an explanation that they had been held up on account of mines being laid. Though a certain stratum of truth existed in the excuse, the conduct of the enemy in this matter violated all preconceived notions of International Law. During the afternoon of August 3 several British merchant vessels were allowed to proceed down the Elbe. One of them, the s.s. *San Wilfrido*, struck one of the defensive mines laid off Cuxhaven and sank, an occurrence which was made the excuse by Germany to forbid the further passage of steamers down the Elbe. From the s.s. *Sappho* 100 tons of sugar were compulsorily unloaded at Hamburg, and similar occurrences took place in other ships. Again, on August 4, before the British ultimatum was delivered to Germany, the Foreign Secretary continued to receive protests from British shipowners concerning the detention of British ships in Germany. Steps were taken by the German authorities to hinder ships discharging, in order to gain possession of ships as well as cargoes.³ Contrasted with this policy was the

¹ M Letter Book, No. 272, Vol. 3, p. 1544. Admiralty Summary of the Position, 20 August 1914. See Monograph 19, "Tenth Cruiser Squadron."

² G.O.H., p. 38.

³ See Fayle: "Seaborne Trade," Vol. I, Chapters I-III.

entire freedom allowed by us during the precautionary period to German merchant ships. The first case of detention in this country arose in connection with the German sailing vessel *Werner Vinnen* laden with Admiralty listed Rhymney coal owned by an English firm who requested that she might be detained to avoid possible capture on the voyage to Chile. As a result of this request the Admiralty on August 3 directed the collector of customs at Cardiff to delay her departure; she was afterwards allowed to proceed. On the same day the German s.s. *Ottokar* completed unloading stores in Devonport dockyard and proceeded on her voyage unmolested. The next and perhaps the most important case of detention was in connection with two German mail steamers at Falmouth during the forenoon of August 4.¹ One of them, the *Kronprinzessin Cecilie*, reported to be carrying bullion, mails, and passengers for England, was held up under a local order pending further instructions from London.

After the despatch of the ultimatum the Admiralty ordered detention in certain cases through the respective collectors of customs. Despite the fact that these events took place before the expiry of the time limit imposed by the ultimatum, it cannot be said that our action prejudiced the international situation, for in no case came there a protest from the Germans similar to the many we had received concerning the treatment meted out to our shipping in German ports as early as August 1.

Despite the activity displayed with a view to diverting British ships bound for German ports prior to the outbreak of war with Germany, there remained in German ports on August 5 a total British tonnage of 170,000.² The presence of most of these vessels resulted from the refusal by Germany on various pretexts of facilities for departure.

On August 4 the British Government issued an Order in Council based on the terms of one of the Conventions of the Hague Conference, 1907, which provided for a period after the commencement of hostilities termed "days of grace" during which enemy vessels in the harbours of belligerents should be allowed to proceed either to one of their own national ports or to some neutral harbour. The whole scheme rested on a policy of reciprocity. Though so far as we knew through diplomatic channels the Germans had prevented our ships from leaving their harbours even before the declaration of war, the Order of August 4 enunciated our willingness to abide by the days of grace clause, provided that by August 7 it should appear that the Germans were according to our shipping a not less favourable treatment.³ However, the British Government were

¹ *Prinz Adalbert* and *Kronprinzessin Cecilie*, later commissioned as receiving ships for the Fleet under the names *Prince* and *Princess*. C. 915/14.

² "Seaborne Trade," Vol. I, pp. 54 *et seq.*

³ Order in Council of 4 August 1914. Articles 3-7.

unable to obtain the necessary assurance and they therefore seized a total of some 81,000 tons of German shipping in British ports. Hence the "days of grace" clause never operated in regard to Germany.

On August 12, when war was declared on Austria, the Order in Council of August 4 with reference to days of grace was re-drafted with certain modifications so as to apply to her, and was issued by proclamation the same day, August 15 being fixed as the determining date of the treatment accorded to our shipping by our new enemy. In this case the Austrian Government came to an agreement with regard to days of grace, and the limit wherein the prescribed ships could leave belligerent harbours was extended to midnight on August 22.¹ Five Austrian ships detained in United Kingdom ports obtained their release by this means; while a further number, of a total tonnage of 19,000, remained in British hands through circumstances or design.

CHAPTER VI.

GERMAN SUBMARINES APPEAR IN THE NORTH, AUGUST 9.

39. Expeditionary Force leaves England: Grand Fleet proceeds to Sea, August 7.—After coaling at Scapa on August 7 the Grand Fleet proceeded to sea at 6.30 p.m. to a position north of 57° N where it was to remain during the passage of the Expeditionary Force, due to commence on August 9. The *Russell*, *Exmouth*, and *Albemarle* joined up as the fleet was leaving Scapa, in accordance with the provisions of the War Organisation.

On leaving harbour the fleet passed westabout through the Fair Island Channel to the area which it had previously occupied in 59° N, 1° W to 1° E. On August 8 the *Orion*, *Monarch*, and *Ajax* were detached from the main body of the fleet to carry out firing practice to the south of Fair Island. While thus engaged, about 11.45 a.m. the *Monarch* reported being fired at by a submarine in 59° 21' N, 1° 41' W, whereupon the Commander-in-Chief ordered the firing practices to be abandoned and the ships to rejoin the fleet. At 6.45 p.m. the *Iron Duke* in approximately 58° 30' N, 0° 30' W sighted a periscope and altered course to ram, but without success. The *Dreadnought* a few minutes later also sighted the periscope.²

¹ H.S. 54, p. 599. M. 03200/14. M. 01408/14.

² There is no mention of these incidents in German sources. Possibly the submarine was U.13. See Sections 41, 42, and Plan III.

There were no orders in force at this date for the action to be taken by individual ships of a fleet on sighting a submarine.¹ This omission was now rectified by the Commander-in-Chief.²

There was no doubt in Admiral Jellicoe's mind that the Germans had already succeeded in locating the Grand Fleet with their submarines. The existing opinion regarding the limited radius of action of these craft renewed the belief that they were operating from some secret base in northern waters, the Faroes being especially suspected.³ In view of this disquieting conviction, and in the absence of fresh orders, he decided to remain north of 57° N between 2° and 5° E during the passage of the Expeditionary Force, in the belief that this area at any rate would be free from mines and submarines.⁴ However, early on the following day, August 9, indisputable evidence of the presence of enemy submarines in these waters also came to hand.

40. Orders for a Concerted German Submarine Operation against the Grand Fleet, August 6.⁵—The failure of the British forces to play into the hands of the enemy by an immediate appearance with surface craft in the Bight, before the system of defence had been accurately ascertained, quickly demonstrated to the German Command that it was unnecessary to keep their submarines to defend the Bight, and that if they were to play any part in the policy of attrition they must be sent overseas to discover the whereabouts of and to attack the main British fleet. It was believed that this would be found in the middle of the North Sea, between the parallels 56° N and 57° N, that is about 100 miles in advance of the blockade line which it was thought we had established between Peterhead and Ekersund.⁶ The idea fixed in the mind of the Admiralstab that we must permanently occupy this blockade line was probably responsible for the decision to employ the submarines in a great concerted operation, rather than to station them on the outward and homeward routes of the British vessels, just beyond the reach of the local patrols. The shortness of the northern nights, the brightness of the moon at this date, and the settled weather were all in favour of submarines, whilst the experience of the manœuvres of May 1914 had led the German Command to hope for considerable success from their operations.

On August 5, ten boats of the 1st Flotilla (*U.5, U.7-9, U.13-18*) were detailed for the operation which was to commence on the following day. These boats, the contemporaries of our

¹ None can be traced.

² H.F. 004 of 1st August 1914, XXXVI, 10.8.14.

³ H.S. 53, pp. 177, 183.

⁴ H.S. 53, p. 199.

⁵ See Appendix D1.

⁶ G.O.H., p. 72, and Karte 9.

"D" class, were not the newest submarines in the fleet, but while those of the 2nd Flotilla were of more recent construction their commanding officers lacked the practical experience upon which success in such a venture as this primarily depended.¹ The despatch at this date of ten boats to the latitude of the Orkneys on a concerted operation which was to last six days was no inconsiderable undertaking.

The operation was a major one designed to damage the British heavy ships; during the advance, light forces, if met, were not to be attacked unless the circumstances were exceptionally favourable. On the return journey, however, advantage was to be taken of every opportunity of damaging the enemy.

The submarines were to start from a fixed line² running east from the Dogger Bank, upon which the boats were spread seven miles apart. From here they were to steer N 2° W (mag.) for about 300 miles, to a second fixed line between Scapa and Hardanger Fiord, where they were to return to a third fixed line running approximately from Scapa Flow to Stavanger.³ They were to time their movements so as to arrive on this third line about 72 hours after their departure, that is, in the early morning of August 9; there they were to lie in wait until 5 p.m. on the following day, and they were then to commence the return journey to Heligoland.

41. The Operation. Search for the British Patrol Line.—In the early hours of August 6 the force left Heligoland, in unfavourable weather. The light cruisers *Hamburg* and *Stettin*, Flotilla Commanders' ships of the 1st and 2nd Flotilla respectively, were stationed 10 miles ahead of the wing boats, and escorted the submarines for about 100 miles towards the Dogger Bank before turning back, while the flotilla leaders *S.99* and *D.5* followed astern to act as W/T repeating ships, to enable the course of the submarines to be altered if reports of the enemy should be received after leaving Heligoland. No arrangements were made for the support of the *Hamburg* and *Stettin*, which were both slow boats, in the event of superior forces being encountered so far from home.

Whilst proceeding on the westerly course towards the Dogger Bank the submarines encountered numerous fishing craft, for the most part Norwegian. German trawlers reported nothing of the enemy between 56° and 57° N, although a destroyer's searchlight had been turned on to another trawler

¹ According to Gayer (A. Gayer, "Die Deutschen U-Boote in ihrer Kriegführung, 1914-1918," Berlin, 1920. A brief account by a German submarine officer, moderate in tone and generally accurate) the 1st Flotilla boats were unreliable and betrayed their presence by the noise of their oil engines and by profuse smoke by day and flame by night.

² "Standlinie."

³ G.O.H., p. 74. But Karte 9 shows the third fixed line between Wick and Haugesund.

in 56° N, 2° E, approximately in the supposed position of the enemy's main fleet. Just before midday *U.5*, the westernmost boat, sighted what she (incorrectly) believed to be an enemy submarine; it dived quickly and was not seen again. The first fixed line was reached during the evening of August 6, and the submarines altered course to the northward. All went well until, 225 miles from Heligoland, engine trouble obliged *U.5* to return, leaving *U.13*, Lieutenant-Commander Count Arthur von Schweinitz, as the westernmost wing boat of the line of submarines engaged in the sweep.¹ Her line of advance should have taken her through the area where Admiral Bradford was carrying out firing practices with the 3rd Battle Squadron during the forenoon of 7th, but the German official report states that no enemy vessels were sighted until the morning of August 9, with the exception of the possible submarine which *U.5* believed that she sighted about 11 a.m. on the 6th on the southern edge of the Dogger Bank.

The suspected position of the British blockade line was passed without the sighting of a single vessel by the submarines, and as there was plenty of time between the arrival at the second fixed line and the hour at which the boats were due at the third line, Lieutenant-Commander Spindler, commanding the 2nd Half-Flotilla, decided to take *U.18* up to the latitude 60° N, in the hope of locating the patrol line further to the northward. But his quest was without success, and he returned to the third line on the early morning of the 9th. At 4.45 a.m., just as he was approaching the line in a passing rain squall, the navigating petty officer reported a 3 or 4-funnelled vessel about a mile off. There was a heavy swell at the time, a strong breeze was blowing and the visibility was bad, and the Half-Flotilla Commander and the Captain of the submarine both considered the report doubtful, though they ordered the boat to dive quickly on the chance. Nothing more was seen through the periscope, but it is now almost certain that the vessel sighted was one of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron or 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, which were in this area screening the battlefleet. An hour and a half later *U.8* sighted an enemy destroyer in 57° 45' N, 3° 40' E, which was taken to be one of the vessels on the patrol line with the idea of which the Germans were obsessed.²

¹ This is based on the courses of the submarines from Heligoland to fixed line No. 1, as laid down in the Operation Order, paragraph 3. In the same paragraph, however, the sequence of the submarines from east to west gives *U.13* as the eastern wing boat. This appears to be one of the numerous textual errors which occur in the German Official History. The *U* numbers of the individual boats are not shown in Karte 9, which gives a plan of the operation.

² None of the vessels of the Grand Fleet was in this position at the time. Possibly *U.8* mistook her position, or the figures in G.O.H. may be another instance of the many misprints which occur in the text. The position is mentioned only once, and so cannot be checked. It is a long way from *U.8*'s correct line.

42. Sinking of "U.15" by the "Birmingham," August 9. Grand Fleet withdraws to the North-westward.—At 3.40 a.m. on the 9th the Grand Fleet was in approximately 58° 30' N, 1° 10' E. with the 2nd Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron forming a screen 30 miles ahead. Suddenly in 58° 35' N, 1° 56' E, the *Birmingham* sighted a submarine.¹ She turned quickly and rammed, striking the submarine aft, a glancing blow. The enemy boat came up astern, showing her number *U.15*, and appeared to be turning towards the *Birmingham* to attack. The *Birmingham* opened fire with all 6 in. guns that would bear, turned, and rammed the submarine amidships at full speed, cutting her in half. The submarine sank at once and no bodies came to the surface. The Grand Fleet had turned to the westward half an hour previously, just as the German submarines were approaching on their homeward sweep towards Heligoland.

So acute did the danger from submarines now appear that Admiral Jellicoe decided to take the battlefleet to the westward of the Orkneys directly the transport of the Expeditionary Force was completed and to clear the North Sea with light craft. It was even questionable whether it was safe for the fleet to remain in the North Sea while the military forces were crossing the Channel.² Meanwhile, the 4th Flotilla was sent to sweep as far as 2° E and then to rejoin the flag in 58° 10' N, 1° 4' E³; at dark the 3rd Cruiser Squadron swept from Noss Head towards 57° 50' N, 0° W, thence ESE, and a half-flotilla of the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla, which had returned to harbour the previous day, sailed at 4.30 p.m. to search for submarines on the Duncansby Head-Ekersund line at dusk and dawn as far as 1° 30' E. At 6.30 p.m. the Admiralty approved the Commander-in-Chief's suggestion and directed him to take his heavy ships northward at once and then west, and to remain with them to the north-westward of the Orkneys.⁴ The flotillas abandoned the submarine search and proceeded to Scapa to refuel ready for a rendezvous the following noon in 58° N, 0° W.

In the meantime, the German submarines were on their return to Heligoland, having sighted no other enemy vessels than those already mentioned; and they completed their pioneer cruise during the afternoon of August 11. One other boat, besides *U.15*, failed to return. This was *U.13* (Lieutenant-Commander Count Arthur von Schweinitz), which was never seen or heard of again after leaving Heligoland, August 6. The boldly conceived and, so far as can be judged, well-executed operation had met with less success than it deserved. The results achieved, although the Admiralstab expressed itself satisfied, seemed to them nil. The existence of the patrol line

¹ M. 03118/14, "1st Light Cruiser Squadron. Summary of Reports of Submarine Attacks." But signal 1020 from C.-in-C., H.F., to Admiralty gives the position 58° 26' N, 1° 58' E. The position shown in Plan 3 is that given in G.O.H., Karte 9.

² H.S. 53, p. 332.

³ H.S. 53, p. 34.

⁴ H.S. 53, p. 428.

in the expected position had neither been proved nor disproved; all that could be stated definitely was that one, or possibly two, submarines had been sunk in the neighbourhood of the patrol line by British vessels. "The observations made left it uncertain whether these British forces belonged to the regular patrol line, whether there was any patrol line in that position, or whether the presence of a patrol line further north, in the latitude of the Shetland Islands, might be assumed," states the German Official History. "The position and conduct of the enemy's Main Fleet remained uncertain." The principal results, so far as the Germans knew, lay in the valuable experience gained of submarine work under war conditions, for which, however, the loss of two out of ten boats was a heavy price to pay.


43. Commander-in-Chief's appreciation of the Submarine menace, August 11.¹—The presence of enemy submarines so far from Germany led Admiral Jellicoe to the opinion that they were working in one or more patrol lines, and were based on the Norwegian fjords and supplied at sea by tenders or parent ships. One or two incidents tended to confirm the theory of supporting parent ships, a theory which was very generally, but apparently quite erroneously, held in naval circles during the first eighteen months or more of war. During the early hours of August 9 a ship was heard sending on low power W/T to four tenders, and was judged to be within 50 miles of the position where *U.15* was sunk. During the middle watch on the night of 10th–11th the *Colossus* reported hearing signals on a 1,500 ft. wave; from this Admiral Jellicoe considered that some vessel was provisioning and supporting the enemy submarines, and he informed the fleet that it was of great importance to destroy her. He believed that one or more submarines were cruising on each side of Fair Island, that a patrol of these boats had been established between the Pentland Firth and Lister or Ekersund in Norway, and that possibly a second line existed further north.² Broadly, he placed the danger area between the parallels of 57° N and 60° 30' N, and he ordered the positions where enemy submarines were reported by our ships to be searched as far as possible at night, particularly just before dark and at dawn, when submarines were most likely to be on the surface.


On August 17 it was decided to form a Northern Trawler Flotilla of 16 boats, armed with two 3-pdr. guns each, to be based on Scapa specially for hunting submarines off the eastern Orkneys; they were to have the modified sweep, which at this period was the only weapon available against submerged submarines.³ A fortnight elapsed, however, before the flotilla was in position.

¹ H.F. 0022, 11 August 1914, in G.F.S.P., Vol. LX.

² The memo. says "further north in about lat. 57° 30' N," but this would seem to be a misprint.

³ M.G. 0693 in H.S. 55, p. 405.





NOTE:- From 6 p.m. 8th. 2nd. C.S. and 1st. L.C.S. were spread 80 miles ahead of battle fleet as a screen.

PRESUMED POSN OF 9-10th

BRITISH CRUISER SCREEN

BRITISH BLOCKADE LINE

PLAN III
NORTHWARD SWEEP
 OF
GERMAN 1ST S/M FLOTILLA
 6-11th. AUGUST 1914 AND CONTEMPORARY
 MOVEMENTS OF GRAND FLEET.

NOTE - Tracks of German S/Ms' are based on the German Official History and are approximate only.

Outward Tracks - - - - -
 Homeward

POSITION WHERE BRITISH MAIN BODY EXPECTED TO BE FOUND

Force leaves Heligoland am 6th Aug.

44. **Search for Submarine Bases in Norway, August 11.**—In support of the suspicions which Admiral Jellicoe entertained as to the use of a Norwegian base by German submarines or other craft, there came a report from Christiania on August 9 that two submarines had entered Stavanger the previous evening.¹ This report, following the sinking of *U.15* the same morning, seemed to justify his suspicions. The Commander-in-Chief did not possess full freedom for action, on account of the limit to which any search could be pushed by the encroachment upon territorial waters. He had already received a notification from the Admiralty concerning the objections raised by the Norwegian Government to the stopping of German merchant ships and Norwegian fishing vessels in their waters.² Our conduct in this matter could only be dictated by the prior violation of neutrality by the Germans, and it remained uncertain how far, if at all, this had taken place.³

On August 10 the Commander-in-Chief decided to commence a search of the Norwegian fjords, with a view to immediate offensive measures against any submarines using them as a base or remaining at anchor for more than 24 hours. Every precaution was taken to avoid offending the Norwegians. Under the orders of the Rear-Admiral, 3rd Cruiser Squadron, destroyers searched Skudesnaes Fjord early on August 11, but found nothing suspicious. Further, Christiania telegraphed a blank report on the investigations carried out by the Norwegian Navy in Stavanger Fjord, where a sentry had reported the presence of submarines. An apology had again to be offered to the Norwegian Government, and it was decided that no more searches of this nature should be made without reliable information of the presence of submarines.⁴

The possibility that armed enemy merchant vessels were based on the Lofoten Islands also suggested itself to the Commander-in-Chief, who wished to send the *Drake* to that area. To the Admiralty, however, it seemed of more immediate importance to search the Faeroes, where the trawler *Corona* had reported the presence of twenty large vessels and several smaller ones on August 6; and thither the *Drake* was despatched under Rear-Admiral Grant. The suspicions regarding the Lofoten Islands were allayed when the Commander-in-Chief learned that the Norwegian officers had supplied the 3rd Cruiser Squadron with the useful information that the Lofoten coast was closely watched and that no German vessels lay in those waters.⁵ On August 12, Admiral Grant reported the situation in the Faeroes to be satisfactory; the residents had seen no German ship for two years. After her visit to the Faeroes, the *Drake*

¹ H.S. 53, p. 490.

² H.S. 53, p. 437.

³ M. 0030.

⁴ M Letter Book No. 272, p. 999.

⁵ M. 01444/14. Use of a Norwegian Base by hostile submarines.

continued on patrol between the Faeroes and Iceland, where she was joined by the *Endymion* and *Gibraltar* in the watch for enemy vessels armed and unarmed.

Prior to the war, the Norwegian Government had claimed 4 miles from the shore as the extent of their territorial waters. The controversy was of long standing, and no agreement had been reached. Throughout the war neither England nor Germany recognised any extension of the limit beyond three miles, while Norway was perfectly well aware of her inability to enforce it. Eventually, the Norwegian Naval Authorities received instructions from their Government to confine their efforts to maintaining the 3 mile limit and not to fire on belligerent ships operating outside those waters.¹ Mines were laid by the Norwegians in connection with the defences of the principal harbours, and certain coast and entrance lights were extinguished. Holland also laid defensive mines in the approaches to her ports on the outbreak of war.²

CHAPTER VII.

PASSAGE OF BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE³: GERMAN SUBMARINE OPERATIONS AGAINST COVERING FORCES.

Previous to the war an understanding existed between Great Britain and France to the effect that if both these Powers should engage in war against Germany for the defence of France, England should send an Expeditionary Force to France to co-operate with the French army. The decision to despatch a force of four infantry divisions and a cavalry division was taken on August 5, the 9th being eventually fixed as the first day of embarkation. The main port of embarkation of troops was Southampton, and of stores, Newhaven; the ports of disembarkation being Havre and Boulogne respectively.

45. Covering Forces.—(a) *Channel Fleet*.—The principal naval force for covering this movement was the Channel Fleet, and on August 8 the Admiralty sent orders to Vice-Admiral Burney to dispose his force for this purpose.⁴ By this date several of the battleships in the Second and Third Fleets had been

¹ Admiralty Letter M. 25425 of 11 June 1918 to Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet.

² H.F. 004 of 1 August 1914. XVI and LXXI.

³ See Monograph No. 6, "Passage of the British Expeditionary Force, August 1914."

⁴ B.E.F. A 63.

detached for other duties. On August 8 the battle squadrons were reconstructed.¹ The *Russell*, *Exmouth*, and *Albemarle*, of the 6th Battle Squadron, had gone north to join the Grand Fleet on the previous day; the *Lord Nelson* joined the 5th Battle Squadron as flagship of Vice-Admiral Burney, also the *Agamemnon*, which, though properly of the 4th Battle Squadron, had remained at Portland when the Grand Fleet went north. The *Vengeance* now joined the 8th Battle Squadron; and the *Duncan* and *Cornwallis* were in dock, and were not commissioned during the first month of war. Of the 7th Battle Squadron, the *Majestic* was in dockyard hands and the *Illustrious* was reduced to care and maintenance party, to provide a crew for the *Erin*, one of the two battleships building for Turkey and pre-empted by Great Britain on the outbreak of war.² The *Jupiter* joined the 7th Battle Squadron, her own squadron, the 6th, having been dispersed, while the *Prince George* and *Cæsar* remained in the squadron, the former becoming the flagship of Vice-Admiral Bethell, Commanding the 7th Battle Squadron.³ The ships of the 9th Battle Squadron were dispersed, the *Magnificent* and *Hannibal* going to Scapa for harbour defence, and the *Victorious* and *Mars* to the Humber for the same purpose. The Channel Fleet was eventually reduced to two squadrons, the 5th and 7th, with the *Topaze*, *Diamond*, and *Proserpine*, as attached cruisers,⁴ for towards the end of August the four old battleships, *Albion*, *Glory*, *Canopus*, and *Ocean*, were sent to form supports to the Cruiser Forces at focal points on the trade routes, in anticipation of possible raids by German battle cruisers, which might succeed in breaking out of the North Sea.⁵ The *Ocean* went to Queens-town to support Cruiser Force E, the *Albion* to Gibraltar to assist Cruiser Force I, the *Canopus* to St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, to strengthen Force D, and the *Glory* to Halifax to support Force H in the North Atlantic. The 5th Battle Squadron, the stronger squadron, was stationed on the Newhaven-Boulogne line, which was the nearer to the expected source of danger, namely, an enemy raid from the North Sea, and it thereby covered both lines. This was the disposition by day. By night the squadron

¹ Admiralty Memo. M, no number, 8 August 1914. (M Letter Book, No. 272, pp. 792, *et seq.*)

² B.E.F. A 74.

³ This was his title in practice. The Admiralty memo., however, termed him Vice-Admiral, 3rd Fleet.

⁴ B.E.F. A 54. The 8th Battle Squadron did not finally disappear from the organisation until August 16, when the constitution of the squadrons was as follows: 5th Battle Squadron. *Lord Nelson* (Flag), *Prince of Wales* (Flag 2), *Queen*, *Venerable*, *Irresistible*, *Bulwark*, *Formidable*, *Implacable*, *London*, *Agamemnon*, *Diamond*, *Topaze*. 7th Battle Squadron. *Vengeance* (Flag), *Albion* (Flag), *Cæsar*, *Prince George*, *Goliath*, *Canopus*, *Ocean*, *Proserpine*. 9th Battle Squadron. *Hannibal*, *Magnificent*, *Victorious*, *Mars*. The *Majestic* became gunnery training ship at Devonport and the *Jupiter* took her place in dockyard.

⁵ H.S. 57, p. 599.

joined Cruiser Force C off Dungeness, moving to the south-west during the first half of the night and returning to Dungeness shortly after dawn. By day, distant touch was kept with Cruiser Force C, which patrolled during the day between Dungeness and Vergoyer Shoals, a few miles ahead of the battle squadron. The 8th Battle Squadron patrolled by day and night near the Southampton-Havre line, in close proximity to the transports, to protect them against a raid from the Atlantic. One ship at a time from both battle squadrons was sent in to coal, the 5th Battle Squadron using Portsmouth, whilst the 8th Battle Squadron used Portland as their base. On August 10 the 8th Battle Squadron was withdrawn to patrol between Cape St. Albans and Cape de la Hague, about 60 miles west of the Southampton-Havre troop transport route. Two days later the Admiralty withdrew the patrol altogether; Admiral Bethell took his squadron to Portland, and until August 25 the ships proceeded to sea only for gunnery exercises.

(b) *Cruiser Force C*.—Since the outbreak of war Cruiser Force C had been patrolling the Broad Fourteens from the North Hinder light vessel to Terschelling, in accordance with its primary function, which was to act as a support to the light forces from Harwich. On August 8 the squadron was withdrawn into the Channel during the passage of the Expeditionary Force, and patrolled between Dungeness and Vergoyer Shoal, 10 miles south-west of Boulogne.¹ Whilst operating in the Channel, Cruiser Force C came under Admiral Burney's command.

(c) *Watching Patrol on Broad Fourteens*.—Although the extent of the minefield laid by the *Königin Luise* was not accurately known to us, the Admiralty appear to have thought that it would confine to the route by the coast of Holland any force which the Germans might send to interrupt the passage of the Expeditionary Force. Accordingly, on August 9, the Harwich force took up a position between the Maas and Haaks Light Vessels, on the western edge of the Broad Fourteens, patrolling on a front of approximately 30 miles, with subdivisions 3 miles apart, the patrol being maintained by one destroyer flotilla at a time with the *Amethyst* or *Fearless*. On August 23, when the main body of the Expeditionary Force had crossed to France, the patrol was temporarily withdrawn and the destroyers returned to Harwich.

(d) *Submarine Flotillas*.—Commodore Keyes was strongly of opinion that the German High Sea Fleet would dispute the passage of the Expeditionary Force, and he decided to increase his patrol to ten boats and to shift it southward from the two lines which he had been maintaining 14 miles south-east from the Outer Gabbard and 14 miles north-west from the North Hinder respectively, to new positions 15 miles south-east from

¹ B.E.F. A 55, 73.

the Galloper and 15 miles north-west from the West Hinder.¹ On August 10, in order presumably to reduce the area covered, the patrol was withdrawn still further, to the mouth of the Dover Straits, on the line North Goodwin-Sandettie-Ruytingen. On August 12, however, the Admiralty ordered Commodore (S) to withdraw half the boats, which were to await orders at Harwich, two of the "E" class being sent to Yarmouth in case of a raid on the Norfolk coast.² Two days later the entire patrol was withdrawn, evidently in order that the boats might take part in the sweep of the Grand Fleet ordered for 16th; and subsequently the flotilla was principally employed on offensive operations.³ Between the South Goodwin and Calais, about 7 miles south-west of the line of patrol of the 8th Flotilla the 4th Submarine Flotilla was disposed. This flotilla was part of the Dover Patrol. Some 15 miles further south-westward there was a third line formed by the French submarines based on Calais, which patrolled across the south-east half of the Channel only, from the Varne Shoal in mid-Channel to Cape Grisnez. Both this patrol and that of the 4th Flotilla had been arranged in the pre-war dispositions, and they were maintained throughout the passage of the Expeditionary Force. French submarines patrolled also between Cape de la Hague and Portland, to the westward of the transport routes.

(e) *The Dover Patrol*.—Dover was the base of the 6th Destroyer Flotilla, consisting of "Tribal" class and 30-knot boats. This flotilla, with the 3rd and 4th Submarine Flotillas, four scouts, and two gunboats took over the duty of patrolling the Straits of Dover from the night August 1-2.⁴ Navigational difficulties restricted an enemy squadron penetrating into the Channel from the North Sea, to three narrow passages, which converge on a front only 14 miles broad. The bounds of these passages are the Goodwin Sands, South Falls, Sandettie Bank, and the Outer Ruytingen; and the Dover Patrol was disposed along the 14 mile front on to which they converge.

(f) *Air Patrol*.—The cross-Channel seaplane patrol between the Isle of Grain and Ostend was instituted on August 9, and was carried out regularly during each day that the transportation of the Expeditionary Force was in progress. Twelve machines were employed, starting at two-hour intervals. A temporary seaplane base at Ostend was established on August 13, and was maintained until the approach of the Germans on August 22.⁵

46. Decision to despatch Submarines to interrupt the Transport of the B.E.F.—The transport of the British Expeditionary

¹ Commodore (S) to Chief of War Staff, Admiralty 07, 8.8.14 (H.S. 225, p. 81).

² E.5 and E.7 were sent to Yarmouth.

³ B.E.F. A 71, 82, 95, 116, 122, 130, 142.

⁴ B.E.F. A 25, 38.

⁵ A.H. 15/227/15.0.

Force to France was timed to commence on August 9, and on the 7th advance details began to cross. Intelligence of the latter movement was received by the Germans through Holland on the same day, and on the following day their agents informed them that the transport of the Expeditionary Force "to Zeebrugge, Ostende, Dunkirk, and Calais was in full swing."¹ The intelligence apparently came as somewhat of a surprise to the Admiralstab, who had calculated that the embarkation of the force could not begin until the twelfth day of mobilisation,² and the German Emperor at once ordered Admiral von Ingenohl to attack the covering forces of the transports with destroyers, minelayers, and submarines.³

The possibility of disturbing the transport of the British Expeditionary Force had been considered shortly before the war by the Admiralstab, who had come to the conclusion that frequent and energetic offensives against the British blockade would result in disorganising the work. The employment of the fleet for the purpose of damaging the transports had been definitely ruled out, for the transports would receive ample warning to enable them to reach safe harbours, and the fleet during its advance would be exposed to destroyer and submarine attacks, and would perhaps be forced to accept action close to the enemy's coast against superior numbers and under unfavourable tactical conditions. Moreover, the German Command contemplated the employment of their fleet solely against the British Grand Fleet, and that only when the necessary equalisation of forces had been brought about. Any operations which it might be decided to carry out against the transports would be undertaken chiefly by submarines and by mining.

The premises upon which the German pre-war orders for obstructing the passage of the British troops were based were very quickly discovered to be false when it was learned that in place of the expected close blockade of the Heligoland Bight the protection of the transports was being ensured by stationing forces off the eastern entrance to the Channel. The Admiralstab believed that British outpost lines were between Swarte Bank and Terschelling and between Smith's Knoll and Haaks Light Vessel respectively, and that the covering forces would be found between 52° N and 53° N.⁴

It was hoped by the Admiralstab that the despatch of submarines, torpedo craft, and minelayers against the covering forces would disorganise the transport of the Expeditionary

¹ The German intelligence service had been crippled by the arrest on August 5 of all their spies known to our Home Office.

² It seems, too, that the doctrine had been taught that troops cannot be transported overseas whilst an undefeated enemy fleet remains in being.

³ G.O.H., p. 81. The wording of the telegram left the operation to the Commander-in-Chief's discretion (*Seine Majestät stellen Vorstoss mit Torpedobooten und Minen, besonders U-Booten, anheim*), but it was apparently regarded as an order.

⁴ See G.O.H., Karte 10. For details of these forces see B.E.F.

Force, though the German Army Command was apparently indifferent to any dislocation that might occur. In their first successful advance they were rather eager than otherwise to settle accounts with the 160,000 British troops.

46a. Admiralty Appreciation of the Situation.—On August 8 the Admiralty sent to Sir John Jellicoe the following appreciation of the situation with regard to the passage of the Expeditionary Force:—

Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief, H.F., No. 413. Sent August 8, 1914, 10.15 p.m.

1. To-morrow, Sunday, the Expeditionary Force begins to cross the Channel. During that week the Germans have the strongest incentives to action. They know that the Expeditionary Force is leaving, and that the mobilisation and training of the Territorial Army is incomplete. They may well argue that a raid or raids now upon the East Coast would interrupt and confuse and probably delay the departure of the Army, and further that it might draw the Grand Fleet rapidly south to interfere with the landing.

2. Alternatively or simultaneously, they may attempt to rush the Straits and interrupt the passage of the Army. It seems in the last degree improbable that if they did so they would use their modern Battle Fleet. Their principle has been, according to all we know about them, to aim at a general battle with the British Fleet when by attrition and accident our margin of superiority has been reduced. They may be assumed to know our general dispositions in the south, and the strong and numerous submarine flotillas, of which we and the French dispose. They must apprehend that the Straits are mined. Since the distance across the Channel can be covered by transports in six to eight hours, three hours' notice of their approach would enable every transport to reach safety. To force the Straits and enter the Channel with their best ships means the certain loss of units which it is vital to them to preserve if they are ever to fight a general battle. And this sacrifice, with all its hazards, would lead them only into an Anglo-French lake, lined with fortified harbours and infested with torpedo craft, at the end of which lies the Atlantic Ocean, and the Grand Fleet—wherever it is—certainly between them and home. If this plan were followed by the Germans, we should mine the Straits of Dover heavily behind them, and leave you to engage them at your convenience.

3. A far more probable German plan would be (a) to send a fast division to rush the Straits and attack transports, while at the same time (b) making raids on the East Coast to create a diversion. Our dispositions in the Channel and its approaches provide fully for (a). With regard to (b), it is not considered that more than 10,000 men can be spared from Germany at present for raids. Such raid or raids would inconvenience the military arrangements, but the Army is ready to meet the raiders if they land. Their Lordships would wish to emphasise that it is not part of the Grand Fleet's duty to prevent such raids, but to deal with the enemy's Battle Fleet. The enemy's older ships will possibly be used to cover either one or more raids. Their main Battle Fleet may be in rear to support them. They may expect you to come direct to prevent the raid, and therefore may lay one or more lines of mines across your expected course, or use their submarines for the same purpose. Whereas if you approach from an easterly or north-easterly direction, *i.e.*, behind them, you would cut the German Battle Fleet from its base, the landed raiders from all reinforcements, and you would approach by a path along which the chance of meeting mines would be sensibly reduced. In our view, therefore, you should ignore the raid or raids, and work by a circuitous route so as to get

between the enemy's fleet, or covering force, and home. It would seem undesirable to come south of latitude 57° until news of a raid has been actually received, and even then the possibility of the German Battle Fleet being still in the Heligoland Bight, *i.e.*, still behind you, cannot be excluded. This appreciation of the situation is not intended to hamper your discretion to act according to circumstances.

47. Orders for the 3rd Half Flotilla, August 8.—When the German Emperor's order arrived, Admiral von Ingenohl had only four submarines at his disposal ready for service. The Submarine Command regarded the proposed operation with disfavour, for they held the operational possibilities of the area east of the entrance to the Channel to be considerably less favourable than in the open North Sea. Apart from the fact that stricter anti-submarine measures were expected to be in force there, the navigational difficulties were great amongst the banks and in the strong and difficult tides. Moreover, until the operation of August 6, the submarines had never been provided with chronometers for taking sights.

Consequently the orders for the operation were framed in such a manner that little freedom of action was left to the submarines.¹ The forces covering the transport of the Expeditionary Force were indicated as the object of attack. Ships only were to be attacked, and the advance was not to be pushed further than the line Outer Gabbard-Maas Lightship. Leaving Heligoland on the evening of August 8, the four submarines, *U.19*, *U.21*, *U.22*, and *U.24*, enemy counter-measures permitting, were to proceed in company as far as the line Swarte Bank-Terschelling Light Vessel, where it was expected that the first British outpost line would be found, and they were there to spread on diverging courses 12 miles apart for a further advance. If none of the covering forces were sighted on this line, the boats were to advance to the second line believed to be established between Smith's Knoll and Haaks Light Vessel. The advance of the submarines beyond the second line was to be regulated in such a manner that if the enemy patrols were so strict as to force the boats to proceed under water, they were to make certain of being able to pass the patrol lines submerged on their return without recharging their batteries. As the submerged radius of action of the boats at 5 knots was only 70 miles, this order appreciably curtailed their prospects in the event of their being forced to submerge when advancing between the first and second lines. Low water at Dover on August 9 was at 6 a.m., and the submarines were due at the Swarte Bank-Terschelling line about 5 a.m. Consequently here, where they might expect to be forced to submerge, they would have a stream of about 3 knots in their favour until noon.² From this line to the line Smith's Knoll-Haaks Lightship is about 45 miles, and to the line Outer Gabbard-Maas Lightship a further 60 miles.

¹ See Appendix D 2.

² See Tide Tables.

The 1st Flotilla was still engaged on the expedition to northern waters, so that there would remain only one submarine available at Heligoland after the departure of the 3rd Half-Flotilla. Consequently, the 4th Half-Flotilla was recalled from the Baltic, whither it had been sent for training.

48. Operation against the British Covering Forces, August 8-11.—The four boats left Heligoland at 5.30 p.m. on August 8, and proceeded in company during the night. On the following morning the wind blew strongly from the south-west and raised a sea which rendered very slight the prospects of successful attack. *U.19* and *U.21*, the latter with the Senior Officer of the Half-Flotilla on board, were forced to turn back 10 miles south of Haaks Lightship. Of the other two boats, *U.24* reached the line Outer Gabbard-Maas Lightship but sighted nothing of importance. *U.22*, under Lieutenant-Commander Hoppe, was the only boat to obtain any useful information. After passing Haaks Lightship she proceeded in the direction of Ymuiden, where at 9.52 p.m. on August 9 two approaching destroyers forced her to turn away to the northward. An hour later a vessel turned two searchlights on in her direction, but she remained unobserved. By the following morning, August 10, the wind had dropped and the visibility was good, and *U.22* proceeded in a southerly direction past the Maas Lightship towards Schouwen Bank, and while on passage at 9 a.m. she sighted three torpedo craft. These destroyers formed part of the Watching Patrol on the Broad Fourteens, under the orders of Commodore (T), which had been established for the period of the transport of the troops to France.

Coming to the surface again two hours later, *U.22* sighted three more destroyers. At 3 p.m., on the approach to Haaks, two destroyers closed her at high speed and forced her to dive. Lieutenant-Commander Hoppe returned to Heligoland on August 11 with the conclusion that destroyers patrolled on lines 10 miles apart between 52° and $52^{\circ} 30' N$, and that no patrol existed north of these lines. None of the submarines had sighted any heavy forces, and this led the Fleet Command to discredit the theory of the Admiralstab that the transports were heavily guarded. The cruise showed that either the older battleships of the British Fleet must be further to the westward than imagined, or else, perhaps, that they had joined the main fleet in the north. The disagreeable fact remained that neither of the two submarine drives which concluded on August 11 had succeeded in locating the British capital ships.

CHAPTER VIII.

BRITISH OPERATIONS TO CLEAR UP THE SITUATION
IN THE NORTH SEA, THIRD WEEK IN AUGUST.

49. **Scapa abandoned; fresh War Anchorage adopted at Loch Ewe, August 11.**—By August 10 the Admiralty became convinced that Scapa Flow had been discovered by the enemy as the war anchorage of the Grand Fleet.¹ Batteries of 12-pdr. guns taken from ships of the 3rd Battle Squadron had been mounted for the defence of the main entrance to the Flow, and were manned by the Orkney Royal Garrison Artillery (Territorial Force), but the defence against submarines was still inadequate.² Consequently it was decided to establish a secondary coaling base at Loch Ewe. Rear-Admiral Richard P. F. Purefoy, M.V.O., was appointed in charge of the base, and the colliers from Cardiff were diverted there instead of to Scapa.³

The arrangements for coaling at Scapa had been improved at this date, and there were 50,000 tons of coal there, double the minimum stock which the Commander-in-Chief desired to maintain. Rear-Admiral F. S. Miller had just been appointed to take charge of the Scapa base. He was in command of the shore defences and the vessels of the local defence, and was responsible for all work in connection with the base.⁴

50. **The Scottish Bases and War Anchorages: Question of Defence.**—The appointment of Rear-Admiral Purefoy to Loch Ewe was followed by the appointment of a Flag Officer to take charge of the base at Cromarty. On August 12 Rear-Admiral Edmund R. Pears received his appointment as Senior Naval Officer in Charge.⁵ The position of these two Rear-Admirals towards the Admiral Commanding the Coast of Scotland was analogous to that of the Captain-in-Charge, Portland, towards the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth. The Admiral Commanding, Coast of Scotland, had general charge of the coast of Scotland for mobile defence and administrative purposes. The Rear-Admirals at Loch Ewe and Cromarty were appointed primarily for the base administration under the direct orders of the Admiralty, but this did not render these officers independent of the Admiral Commanding, Coast of Scotland, to whom matters involving his general responsibility had

¹ B.E.F., A 94.

² The arrangements for the defence of the various Fleet Bases at different dates may be found in G.F. Orders and Memos.

³ B.E.F., A 94, 96, 107, and M Letter Book, No. 272, p. 993.

⁴ H.F. 004 of 1 August 1914, XXXVIII. R.-A. Miller flew his flag in the *Cyclops*.

⁵ H.S. 54, pp. 114, 453, and M Letter Book, No. 272, p. 1107.

to be referred. At the same time they were to fulfil to the best of their ability the requirements of the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, with regard to supplies, communications and other services.¹ The 3rd Battle Squadron arrived at Loch Ewe on August 13, and again the Grand Fleet, or a portion of it, found itself in a harbour completely devoid of defences. Neither Rosyth nor Cromarty, the two bases over which so much money had been spent, had so far been used by the battlefleet.² Admiral Purefoy pointed out the need for defences if it was intended to make any considerable use of Loch Ewe as a base in the future, and representatives of the Director of Naval Ordnance, after visiting Scapa, proceeded to Loch Ewe to draw up a scheme of fixed defences. At the same time the question of patrols for the local defence of the base was discussed. The representatives of the Director of Naval Ordnance reported on August 29 that they considered the most probable form of attack lay in a day or night attack by torpedo craft, when nothing could impede a few destroyers entering and sinking all the colliers at their anchorage; and they recommended an extensive armament of 4.7 in. guns and searchlights.³ Meanwhile, the *Illustrious* was sent to Loch Ewe on 30th to provide a temporary defence.

Among the subjects discussed on September 17 at a conference held on board the *Iron Duke* at Loch Ewe was the question of Loch Ewe as a base, and it was decided not to mount guns as proposed by the Admiralty Committee, but to station there six 30-knot destroyers, to leave the *Illustrious* in the entrance as a gun and searchlight defence, and to provide a submarine obstruction if found feasible.⁴

On August 25 modifications became necessary in the orders for patrolling and watching off the east coast of Scotland, consequent upon the appointment of Rear-Admiral C. H. Simpson⁵ as Rear-Admiral, Peterhead, with special responsibility for the coast between Gregness (near Aberdeen) and Knock Head, Banff. Under his command were placed eight mine-sweeping trawlers and four of the ten "watching drifters" employed in the Moray Firth, and he had authority to take up four more drifters if required. The drifters had orders to pose as fishing craft, and their crews, if captured, were warned to give no indication of being in Government employ.⁶ Admiral

¹ M 01379/14, and M Letter Book, No. 272, pp. 1087 *et seq.*

² A floating dock was sent up from Portsmouth to Cromarty in the latter part of August.

³ M. 01702/14. Report on visit to Loch Ewe with reference to the defence of the port as a temporary Fleet base.

⁴ M. 0078/14. In March 1915 the construction of the defences proposed by the Admiralty Committee was definitely postponed, as there was no longer any justification for the estimated expenditure of £10,800. (M. 0629/15.)

⁵ Retired.

⁶ Orders for Rear-Admiral, Peterhead, issued by Admiral Commanding, Coast of Scotland, 25 August 1914, G.F.S.P., Vol. LXXI, Section V.

Simpson's section was in the area of the Firth of Forth patrol, which extended from Berwick-on-Tweed to Knock Head, Banff; north-westward of this the duties were undertaken by the Cromarty Patrol. In addition to sweeping a ten-mile strip along the coast, every endeavour was made to extend the sweeping beats to 30 miles off shore at the principal headlands and ports.

A force of seaplanes and aeroplanes was stationed in the Orkneys to watch the approaches to the Pentlands for enemy submarines and minelayers. The number, originally eight, of old destroyers attached to the Grand Fleet for the defence of bases at which there was no permanent defence authority was gradually increased.

51. Admiral Christian Appointed to Command the Forces in the Hoofden, August 15.—On August 9 while the fleet proceeded to its new position to the north-westward of the Orkneys under the Vice-Admiral, 2nd Battle Squadron, Admiral Jellicoe himself went in to Scapa in order to make arrangements with the Rear-Admiral, 2nd Cruiser Squadron, for clearing the North Sea by the light craft attached to the Grand Fleet. His presence at Scapa enabled him to maintain closer touch with the Admiralty, so that he could discuss more readily his projected intentions. The difficulty of controlling the activities of the Harwich Flotillas and their supporting cruisers while the Grand Fleet was in northern waters, led him to ask that they might be separated from his command and placed directly under the orders of the Admiralty, a proposal which the latter accepted; and the measure remained in force throughout the war.¹

In consequence a special force was formed, composed of the Harwich destroyer and submarine flotillas and Cruiser Force C, the latter being now detached from Sir John Jellicoe's command. On August 15 the new composite force was placed under the command of Rear-Admiral Christian, who hoisted his flag in the *Euryalus*, the *Hogue* being ordered from Queenstown to join Cruiser Force C in her place.²

52. Possibility of Invasion : Grand Fleet Ordered to Return to the North Sea, August 12.—The necessary arrangements for the formation of a secondary coaling base for the Grand Fleet at Loch Ewe were made on August 11, from which date it superseded Scapa as the battlefleet coaling base. The procedure was for the battleships to coal half a division at a time. There was a prospect that the Grand Fleet would have to remain at sea for some time to come, for it was not expected that the transport of the Expeditionary Force would be completed until

¹ B.E.F., A 67.

² Papers titled "Admiralty, 11 August 1914" (Appointment of Rear-Admirals Christian and Purefoy), M Letter Book No. 272, p. 991, and B.E.F., A 127, 135.

August 27. The enemy were showing no sign of activity, and so far as was known no more mines had been laid since the operation by the *Königin Luise* at the outbreak of war.¹

The departure from England of the majority of the first line troops raised the question of a possible enemy landing on a large scale during the week. Commodore Keyes was ordered to withdraw half the boats of the 8th Flotilla, then covering the passage of the troops to France, and to hold them ready at Harwich²; and it was the opinion of the Admiralty that in order to deal with the situation the fleet ought to be nearer to hand. This was a view which they had held even previous to the abandonment of Scapa. The submarine menace and the silence and apparent inertia of the enemy had become important factors in the outlook. On August 12 they ordered the Commander-in-Chief to come east of the Orkneys as soon as he had shaken off the submarine menace and to arrange cruiser sweeps to the south and south-east as convenient.³ The first definite information of the position of the German High Sea Fleet had just come in from the Hague and Copenhagen, to the effect that the Dreadnought battleships were at Cuxhaven: intelligence which confirmed the statements of neutral merchant ship captains from Hamburg.⁴

53. Sweep of the Grand Fleet towards Heligoland, August 15-17.⁵—The Admiralty's new desire for the fleet to be in the North Sea upset the Commander-in-Chief's plan to keep his ships to the west and north-west of the Orkneys until they coaled on August 14 at Loch Ewe or Scapa. The attached cruisers, using Cromarty as their base, were now searching on lines 100 miles south-east and 100 miles north-east of Kinnaird Head, while the destroyers were watching between the cruisers and the Orkneys.⁶ Admiral Jellicoe's new arrangements were to coal on the 13th at Scapa or Loch Ewe and to leave during the night, proceeding northabout.⁷ Early on August 13 the Commander-in-Chief arrived at Scapa with the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Battle Squadrons and three *Duncans*, while the 3rd Battle Squadron, which had been detached on the previous evening, was coaling in Loch Ewe. Though the desire of the Admiralty for a return of the fleet to the North Sea had now assumed the concrete form of an order, Admiral Jellicoe remained of the opinion that southerly movements should only be for some definite object. He proposed to proceed through the Fair Island Channel at midnight, August 14, and sweep with his cruisers from 57° N, 4° E, towards the Horn Reef, with the object of examining the North Sea generally, and to get in touch with the enemy if out; and he asked that the 1st and

¹ B.E.F., A 109, 111.

² B.E.F., A 117.

³ See Plan IV and Operation Orders, Appendix C2.

⁴ B.E.F., A 118.

⁵ See section 45 (d).

⁶ H.S. 54, pp. 51, 169.

⁷ B.E.F., A 119.

3rd Flotillas from Harwich and Cruiser Force C should combine with the Grand Fleet for the operation.¹

The proposal of the Commander-in-Chief for the combined movement towards the enemy's coast was approved by the Admiralty. After remaining throughout the day to the north-west of the Orkneys the whole fleet passed through the Fair Island Channel at midnight, August 14–15, to carry out the first of the regular southerly sweeps or drives by which its functions were to be exercised. With the fleet were all the cruiser squadrons with the exception of the 6th and certain ships of the 10th. The 6th Cruiser Squadron was still represented by a single ship, the *Drake*, for the *Good Hope* and *Leviathan* had never joined up and the *King Alfred* did not join until August 19. With the *Drake* on patrol between the Faeroes and Iceland were the *Endymion* and *Gibraltar* of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, while the *Royal Arthur* and *Hawke* were on the Norwegian patrol. The Commander-in-Chief described the operation thus to the Vice-Admiral Commanding the 3rd Battle Squadron, which had been coaling at Loch Ewe and had not received the detailed orders² :—

“ The following will give you a general idea of the operation about to commence. The Grand Fleet proceeds eastward until about 6 p.m., when it will turn to southward, speed being regulated so that the battlefleet is in latitude 57° N by 3 a.m. on Sunday (August 16). The cruisers and light cruisers, supported by the battle cruisers, will be sent out at midnight 15th–16th to sweep adjacent areas each 30 miles wide as far south as the line Horn Reef light vessel—Flamborough Head, the battlefleet following in support. The cruiser sweep extends from 15 miles west of Horn Reef light vessel to longitude 3° 52' E, and I have arranged that Cruiser Force C and 1st and 3rd Flotillas shall sweep the south-western corner to complete the enclosed area. All the advanced vessels are due on the advanced line at 9 a.m. Sunday. After the sweeps are completed and if nothing occurs, I intend to withdraw to the northward, and shall coal the fleet on the first suitable day next week. Please inform Admiral Browning.”³

In order to cover as much of the North Sea as possible, the 1st and 3rd Destroyer Flotillas, supported by Cruiser Force C, the whole force constituting an independent command under Admiral Christian, were to sweep the area to the west of a line N 30° W from Terschelling Light.⁴ Four submarines would be sent to watch in pairs off the mouths of the Ems and Jade respectively, but no boats would be operating north of 54° 30' N whilst the sweep was in progress.

¹ B.E.F., A 123, 136.

² C.-in-C., H.F. to V.-A., 3rd B.S., 0630, 15.8.14.

³ R.-A., 3rd B.S.

⁴ B.E.F., A 142.

At noon on August 15 the *Iron Duke* was in 58° 16' N, 1° 45' E with the squadrons in company in cruising order, steering east preparatory to a turn towards the south. The various rendezvous had been fixed for the early hours of the following day, when by 9 a.m. Admiral Christian's force, comprising four *Bacchantes*, three light cruisers, and 36 destroyers would be on a line 40 miles long N 33 W from Terschelling. By 9.30 a.m. on the 16th the cruisers of the Grand Fleet reached the southerly limit of the sweep, Flamborough–Horn Reef line, without sighting any enemy ships. The fleet turned 16 points and proceeded northward, zigzagging at 12 knots. During the turn, at 10.25 a.m. the *New Zealand* (incorrectly) reported a submarine in 55° 45' N, 5° 26' E. Admiral Christian, with his flag in the *Sapphire*, advanced from the 9 a.m. line and at noon was off the western Ems; but nothing was seen of the enemy. The Rear-Admiral, Cruiser Force C, was of the opinion that the operation ought to be repeated on the following morning; but the Admiralty disapproved the proposal, for it necessitated a more advanced position for the destroyers than that envisaged by the arrangements for the transport of the Expeditionary Force. The landing of the original force of four divisions was completed on this day, and more troops were hastily preparing to follow.

According to German accounts this day, August 16, was the only day in August when the High Sea Fleet had a reasonable opportunity of attacking the Grand Fleet within suitable distance of the Heligoland Bight; but the Admiralstab were at the time unaware of the unique opportunity, nor were the vessels of the High Sea Fleet even at sea.¹

The Grand Fleet continued its northerly course and passed through the Fair Island Channel at 7.15 a.m., August 17 on its passage to Loch Ewe to coal. The 3rd Battle Squadron, *Liverpool* and *Blanche* proceeded to Scapa for 48 hours to fuel and clean boilers, and the 3rd Cruiser Squadron went to Cromarty. The 2nd Cruiser Squadron, after searching off the Norwegian coast as far as 60° N proceeded to patrol area No. 1 off Kinnaird Head, and the 10th Cruiser Squadron returned to its station. Early on the 18th the Commander-in-Chief arrived at Loch Ewe with the 1st, 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons, while the battle cruisers coaled at Scapa.

In the southern area of the North Sea, Cruiser Force C returned on the 17th to Terschelling about noon, having seen nothing of the enemy. The cruisers proceeded to the Downs and the *Amethyst* took the 3rd Flotilla into Harwich to coal, while the 1st Flotilla re-established the original watching patrol line on the Broad Fourteens, which had been instituted for the purpose of giving early information to the Expeditionary Force of the approach of the enemy.²

¹ G.O.H., Vol. I.

² H.S., Vol. 53, pp. 266, 300, 387, 418.

54. **Shortage of Coal for the Grand Fleet.**¹—The coaling situation at the Grand Fleet bases at this date had again deteriorated and was reported by the Commander-in-Chief to be very serious. The diversion of colliers to Loch Ewe had depleted the stocks at Scapa. The number of colliers was quite insufficient for rapid coaling and the amount arriving hardly kept pace with expenditure. On August 17 Sir John Jellicoe warned the Admiralty that unless considerably more colliers could be sent to him the operations of the Grand Fleet would be most seriously hampered. The Admiralty were making efforts to remedy the shortage, but supplies were actually getting less instead of greater. The matter was eventually remedied, but it was not until August 25 that the Commander-in-Chief was able to report that the coal stocks at the fleet bases, Scapa and Loch Ewe were once more up to requirements.

55. **Operations of British Submarines off the Ems and Weser, August 16–17.**—The only vessels to come in direct contact with the enemy during the sweep of August 15–17 were the submarines sent to the Ems (*D.2* and *D.3*) and Weser (*E.5* and *E.7*). In the early morning of the 16th *E.5* on her passage to the mouth of the Elbe sighted some German torpedo craft and at 9.30 a.m. an enemy destroyer attacked her unsuccessfully. At 1 p.m. she fired at a destroyer which avoided the torpedo by the successful use of helm; when she came to the surface three hours later patrolling craft obliged her to dive again and kept her under for three hours. *E.7* spent most of her time off the Weser in keeping out of sight of the enemy's patrolling craft. No better fortune attended the boats off the Ems. *D.3* sighted no enemy craft in the course of her patrol off the eastern Ems, other than a sailing trawler and a destroyer which she could not get near. *D.2* arrived in position 20 miles north of the western Ems entrance at 3.45 a.m. and slowly closed the coast. At 11 a.m. she dived to attack four destroyers approaching from the westward, but found them to be British, the advanced forces under Admiral Christian. At 4.30 p.m. she dived into the western Ems entrance, hoping to attack a vessel, apparently of *Fürst Bismarck* or *Hertha* class, moored head and stern, east and west, about four miles north-west from Rottum Lighthouse in Huibert Channel. Shoals, however, prevented the attack, and *D.2* retired to the northward at 6.30 p.m. Half an hour later, a patrol of about 8 T.B.D.s and trawlers came out of the western Ems. The trawlers appeared to patrol just outside the shoals and the T.B.D.s spread fanwise about five miles from the entrance. Apparently there was little activity in the vicinity of Emden. *D.2* spent the hours of darkness of 16th–17th on the surface charging her batteries undisturbed, 20–25 miles north of the river entrance.

At 8.30 a.m. August 17, *E.5*, between Heligoland Island and the mainland, sighted a German periscope 100 yards on her

¹ G.F.N. of date and H.S. 55, pp. 165, 176, 203, 236.

starboard beam and avoided a torpedo, which passed under her stern. Half an hour later she steered westward for the open sea till she was joined at 3 p.m. by *E.7*. Off the western Ems *D.2* closed the coast at daylight and found the patrols all inside. A sailing pilot vessel forced her to dive between 9 a.m. and 11.40 a.m. when she proceeded to dive to the entrance of Huibert Gap to attack the moored cruiser from the westward. On the approach she found a trawler without guns, W/T, or colours, patrolling in the vicinity of the position of the Western Ems light vessel, which had been removed. She continued to close the cruiser, which had apparently remained in the same position as previously, till within 1,000 yards when shoals prevented further progress. *D.2* proceeded west on the surface en route for Harwich, and at 5.55 p.m., when in 53° 42' N, 5° 49' E, steering north-west at 12 knots she sighted a German destroyer closing rapidly from due west. *D.2* turned east and dived immediately. In spite of trouble with diving trim, she proceeded to attack the destroyer, which steered irregular courses in the vicinity of her original dive. When about 3,000 yards distant the destroyer retired to the eastward without having sighted *D.2* since the first dive. The destroyer *S.165* reported later in the day that she had chased an enemy submarine without success. *D.2* returned to Harwich, reporting to Lowestoft en route.

The remaining submarine *D.6* returned to her station off the eastern Ems at 4 a.m., where she sighted a large sailing trawler which appeared to be a look-out, proceeding to and fro. At 2 p.m. *D.6* got under way and three-quarters of an hour afterwards sighted a destroyer, which attacked. She then proceeded to the westward, getting on the gas engine at 4 p.m. and followed the destroyer's smoke till dark, when she altered course to north-west for two hours and proceeded to Harwich.

From the reports of *E.5* during the operation of August 16–17, it appeared to Commodore (S) that enemy vessels were using a channel to the northward of Heligoland, close inshore.¹ On this assumption he informed the Chief of Staff that two submarines would be sent to operate north of and one submarine to the south of the island. Commodore Keyes wished to maintain three submarines continually in the Bight, though he considered that if they were to operate successfully the patrolling trawlers fitted with W/T should be driven away.

From this time the boats of the 8th Flotilla worked almost continuously in the Bight, though the German heavy ships never put to sea and the patrols were so numerous and watchful that no successes were achieved during August.² Commodore Keyes correctly surmised that the German trawlers fitted with W/T, which constantly followed and watched our submarines, were employed by the naval authorities for that purpose; and on the representations of the Commander-in-Chief the Admiralty on

¹ H.S. 225, p. 111.

² The reports are in H.S. 225.

August 23 issued general orders that all German trawlers fitted with W/T were to be treated without warning as vessels of war.¹ The patrol of the Ems estuary at this date had been taken over entirely by trawlers, the destroyers being thus released for more distant scouting, in which they were occasionally supported by aircraft.² The presence of our submarines, which were daily reported by the German patrols, caused the Germans on August 26 to commence the attempt to close the Bight by means of nets.³ Even the fleet anchorages in the Jade and Weser were not considered safe.⁴

CHAPTER IX.

GERMAN SUBMARINE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE BRITISH FLEET, AUGUST 15-21, AND SUBSEQUENT CHANGE OF POLICY.

56. **German Appreciation of the Situation, August 9.**⁵—The conclusions to which Admiral von Ingenohl had come after the first week of war were that the British policy was to avoid any serious encounter with the German forces for the present, and to wait their own time for action. On August 9, before the reports on the submarine sweeps then in progress had come to hand, the German Fleet Command, assuming that during the passage of the Expeditionary Force the British First Fleet would be in the north, and the Second and Third Fleets in the south, an opportunity which might not occur again, seriously considered whether an attack should be made on the First Fleet by the High Sea Fleet in full strength with all destroyer flotillas, in order at one blow to bring about the equalisation of forces for which the war order stipulated. The idea was eventually abandoned, mainly on account of the obscurity which shrouded the movements of the British Fleets and rendered it doubtful whether the First Fleet would be encountered.⁶ Another factor in the decision was the restricted radius of action of the destroyers, which would not permit of an operation exceeding 48 hours in duration. Assuming a speed of 15 knots, and allowing 30 per cent. of their fuel for the general action, the destroyers' fuel would permit the fleet to steam out a distance of only 250 miles, while the distance from the Elbe Lightship to the Firth of Forth was 420 miles and to the Orkneys 475 miles. It was more probable than not that the advance would result in a thrust into the void, without the advantage of a fleet action

¹ H.S. 56, pp. 111, 113, 764.

² G.O.H., p. 136.

³ G.O.H., p. 139.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

⁵ G.O.H., pp. 87 *et seq.*

⁶ Doubtless, too, the policy of preservation of the Fleet was an important factor in the decision.

to compensate for the dangers of attack by enemy submarines on the outward and homeward journey. The Admiralstab considered that their scouting forces were numerically so inferior as to render it practically impossible for them to surprise the main fleet in the north.

57. **Attempts to discover the Close Blockade Line.**—It seemed, however, fairly settled that we had not established, nor attempted to establish, a close blockade of the German coast. Gradually the enemy pushed their scouting craft out from the coast until a certain knowledge of their limitations had been gained.

On August 9 the Ems group of the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla reconnoitred off Terschelling, without result. During the night of August 9-10 the *Rostock* took out the 1st Destroyer Flotilla to reconnoitre about 100 miles west of Heligoland. *V.189* thought she saw two enemy cruisers between 11 p.m. and 1 a.m., about 80 miles west of Borkum Reef, and reported them. Subsequently she again reported two large vessels, which she concluded were armoured cruisers, and that she had avoided attack by one of them. The Fleet Command deduced from these reports that a mining operation against the Heligoland Bight was in progress, and that the ships were of the *Apollo* class. At the suggestion of the Senior Officer, 1st Submarine Flotilla, the *Hamburg* and *Stettin*, with *U.20* and *U.21*, sailed to carry out a submarine attack against the enemy, but nothing more was seen of them; and, although the suspected area was at once swept, no mines were found. It appeared subsequently that the vessels sighted by *V.189* were Dutch warships. The German Fleet Command issued an order that all vessels sighted off the Ems without lights were to be considered hostile; the Dutch Government was informed that vessels ran a grave risk by remaining off the Ems without lights,¹ and was requested to light up their flags at night time in order to avoid mistakes.

On August 12 Admiral Maas, in the *Cöln*, with the 6th Destroyer Flotilla, repeated the operation west of Heligoland which had been carried out on the 9th and 10th. His force advanced a distance of 150 miles beyond Heligoland but without result. The reason for this new operation was possibly to search for the two submarines, *U.13* and *U.15*, which had not yet returned from the sweep to the northward.²

Preparations were being made to strengthen further the defences of Heligoland, and at the request of the local command a cruiser was allocated for the purposes of port defence during the dark hours. Every precaution was taken in the movement of the capital ships from the rivers. On August 11 the *Grosser*

¹ Negotiations between Germany and Holland had been in progress, for some years previous to the war, concerning the use of the Ems in war time.

² See Plan III.

Kurfürst and four instructional cruisers left the Jade for Kiel, via the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, for training purposes, and the *Blücher* proceeded from Kiel to the Jade. Prior to these movements the 2nd and 3rd Mine-seeking Divisions swept the fairway, a destroyer flotilla screened the ships against submarines, and a careful anti-submarine aerial reconnaissance was carried out over the Heligoland Bight.¹

The submarine operations and the various advances by light cruisers and destroyers, extended each time, showed the Germans that the Bight was by no means free from the incursion of hostile craft, though the only place where they could be certain of encountering enemy forces was in the Hoofden and eastern entrance to the English Channel, as observed by *U.22* on August 10. The *Cöln* and *Stuttgart*, with the 1st and 2nd Destroyer Flotillas, proceeded during the night of the 15th-16th to the sector between north and north-west of Heligoland, in order to surprise the British submarines supposed to be lying in wait there. Beyond the capture of two Danish steamers laden with foodstuffs for England no results were obtained. None of our submarines had by this time been in the sector searched. On the same evening the Ems division of the 3rd Destroyer Flotilla swept the area between west-north-west and west of Borkum to the west of Terschelling, also without result.

58. Second Attempt to locate the Distant Blockade Line, August 15-21.—The obscurity which still shrouded the dispositions of the British forces after the return of the submarines on August 11 from their reconnaissances decided both the Fleet Command and the Admiralstab that further reconnaissances must be carried out, and that meanwhile operations against the enemy must be confined to guerilla warfare. There was a feeling that public opinion in England might eventually force the British Fleet into making an offensive advance.²

On August 14 orders were issued to the 2nd Submarine Flotilla for further operations, the ultimate aim of which was to compel the British Fleet to institute a close blockade of the Heligoland Bight, and thus lay itself open to loss by attrition.³ It was hoped, further, that the submarines would be able to reconnoitre the coast and prepare the way for further mining operations. The attack, which was to be carried out on the presumed line of blockade Peterhead-Ekersund, was to be made on this occasion by submarines sweeping down the line instead of advancing against it on a broad front. Two submarines were to try once more to locate the line, and, after attacking the British ships which were believed to be patrolling

¹ Our overseas submarines, however, on this day were patrolling on the Galloper-North Hinder line.

² G.O.H., p. 92.

³ G.O.H., p. 93. For the Operation Orders, see Appendix D3.

there at wide intervals, to reconnoitre the areas off the Moray Firth and the Firth of Forth. Simultaneously, another submarine was to proceed to the mouth of the Humber to sink any heavy forces which might be stationed there. An essential element of these operations was that the submarines were to give some evidences of their activities off the British coast by attacking destroyers if more valuable objectives failed.

U.20 and *U.21* were chosen for the northern operation, as their engines were the most suitable for negotiating the great distances to be covered. They left Heligoland in company during the afternoon of August 15, and set their course for the Norwegian coast. Engine trouble in *U.21* caused the craft to lose touch with each other, and though both submarines reached the Norwegian coast the following afternoon they never met, and their subsequent experiences differed widely.

At 3 a.m. on the 16th *U.20*¹ sighted a cruiser and a destroyer off Lim Fjord, the extensive lake which insulates the northern portion of Jutland; this was doubtless one of the cruisers of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron which was screening 30 miles ahead and 30 to 60 miles eastward of the Grand Fleet battle squadrons; but no opportunity to attack occurred. Off the Norwegian coast a good deal of shipping was encountered. One steamer in particular aroused *U.20*'s suspicions by frequent alterations of course, and a destroyer shortly afterwards approached at high speed from her direction. After turning to the southward to avoid the danger, *U.20* sighted columns of smoke ahead, and (imaginary) projectiles commenced to fall about her. She dived, but was unable to see her attacker through the periscope. *U.20* reached the Ekersund-Peterhead line on the following day at 7.30 a.m., less than two hours after it had been passed by the Grand Fleet returning from the southerly sweep. *U.20* actually sighted its smoke, but engine and compass trouble forced her to turn to the southward again until the defects were remedied, two and a half hours later. During this time she sighted another destroyer, but could not attack.² The commanding officer then decided that in view of the defects in his engines his boat could not undertake the journey to the Firth of Forth, and at 4 p.m. he abandoned the operation and returned to Heligoland. Through the night no further trouble was experienced, with the result that on the following morning, August 17, he determined upon a fresh attempt to proceed to the westward. But the presence of enemy vessels continually forced him under,³ and he finally abandoned the operation. He reached Heligoland in the afternoon of August 19, having proceeded submerged for not less

¹ Lieutenant-Commander Droscher, with Lieutenant-Commander Albert Gayer, Senior Officer, 3rd Half-Flotilla, on board.

² This was probably erroneous.

³ No British warships were in the neighbourhood at the time. *U.20* probably suspected trawlers of being engaged in anti-submarine work.

than six, and sometimes as much as 12 hours each day, a feat which was regarded as a notable achievement in those early days of overseas submarine operations.¹

U.21, under Lieutenant Harsing, proceeded without incident direct to the supposed blockade line. The night of the 16th-17th was spent off Skudesnaes, and at 3.20 a.m. on the 17th he proceeded to sweep westward along the line. The 2nd Cruiser Squadron had passed *U.21* unseen during the night, and she crossed the track of the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron which was supporting the 2nd Cruiser Squadron in its search of the Norwegian coast. After proceeding along the line throughout the day, without sighting any enemy warships, she reached Kinnaird Head at 5 o'clock next morning, August 18. Here she found a considerable amount of traffic, and a line of trawlers in a north-westerly direction guarding the Moray Firth. Behind this line there appeared to be two other lines at intervals of about 20 miles. To get into the Firth would necessitate diving for a total distance of more than 80 miles in and out without re-charging batteries, and Harsing, abandoning the idea of breaking through in this manner, proceeded northward in the hope of outflanking these lines during the dark hours. This attempt also was foiled; for there was a phosphorescent sea and the patrol craft seemed to be everywhere.

In actual fact there were in all only 10 steam drifters stationed to watch the approaches to Cromarty; they worked in pairs, both boats of the pair being out at night and one during the day.² None of these vessels reported sighting *U.21*. These watching drifters had been hired locally on August 6, at the request of the Senior Naval Officer, Cromarty, under orders from the Admiral Commanding the Coast of Scotland, when only two destroyers, instead of eight as had been expected, were allotted to Cromarty.³


The following day *U.21* met with similar ill-success, and she proceeded southwards on the return voyage. While on passage, shortly before darkness set in she sighted four destroyers patrolling off May Island, but low visibility prevented any attack. *U.21* reached Heligoland without further incident on the morning of August 21, after the remarkable achievement of covering 1,300 miles in seven days.

59. "*U.22*" proceeds to the Humber, August 15.—The cruise to the Humber was entrusted to Lieutenant-Commander Hoppe of *U.22*, who had collected such valuable information, according to the German view, concerning our patrol arrangements at the eastern entrance to the English Channel. The operation consisted of an attack on the patrols off the Humber and a reconnaissance of the coast defences. If unable to force home the attack on the Humber, the submarine was to proceed

¹ G.O.H., p. 95.


² H.F. 004 of 1 August 1915, p. 29.

³ M. 01649/14.



PLAN IV
SWEEP OF GRAND FLEET
 15 - 17th. Aug. 1914
 and simultaneous advance of
GERMAN SUBMARINES

| | |
|-------------------------|-----------|
| Battle Fleet | ————— |
| 1st. B.C.S. | ----- |
| Cruisers outward tracks | - - - - - |
| do. homeward | ————— |
| "U 20" | ————— |
| "U 21" | ----- |
| "U 22" | - - - - - |



N O R T H
 S E A

DOGGER BANK

CRUISER FORCE "C"
 9 am 16th

Area swept
 by
 Harwich
 Force.

Leave
 Heligoland
 p.m. 15th "U 21" "U 20"
 "U 22"

"D 2 & D 3" operating
 16-17 Aug

Sapphire
 noon 16th

to the Newcastle area for the same purpose. Leaving Heligoland on the afternoon of August 15, *U.22* passed through the gap between the areas swept by the Grand Fleet and Admiral Christian's force respectively.¹ She spent the 16th to the south of the Dogger Bank, where she sighted numbers of trawlers, though whether these were patrol vessels or were following their peaceful vocation she was unable to determine. The large columns of smoke visible in several directions led her Commanding Officer to believe that he was between two lines of trawler patrols about 60 to 65 miles distant from the coast. He therefore stopped and remained submerged during the night. No mention is made of sighting torpedo craft,² though some of the smoke observed may have been from the 36 destroyers under the Rear-Admiral, Cruiser Force C, then occupying a line 40 miles long N 33 W from Terschelling.

Early on August 17, after passing apparently unobserved through a line of trawlers, *U.22* proceeded towards Flamborough Head. Here she observed for a short time, and evaded a submarine of the local defence which was patrolling awash. Closing the Humber to observe the traffic, *U.22* proceeded on the surface, and was apparently mistaken for a British submarine until the afternoon, when the approach of two destroyers obliged her to dive. On the following day, August 18, she carried out the same procedure; beyond an occasional destroyer, she sighted no enemy war vessel during the whole of her stay off the coast. She herself had not been unobserved. On the afternoon of the 18th the destroyer *Dove* sighted and chased her under when 15 miles west of Spurn Lightship, noting her number as she disappeared to be *U.27*, an easy mistake for *U.22*.³ On the following morning the trawler *Lucerne* sighted a buff coloured submarine with a black stripe stopped 37 miles north-east of Spurn Head.⁴ Engine trouble during the night of the 18th-19th prevented *U.22* from going on to the Tyne, and her Commanding Officer decided to begin the journey to Heligoland, which he completed at 6 a.m. on August 20.

60. Submarine Operations against the British Fleet Abandoned.

—The latest submarine operation had thrown some light on the British patrols off the Firth of Forth and the Moray Firth; it had established the fact that there were no barrages at the entrances to the Humber and Wash, so far as could be judged by the steady flow of traffic in and out, and that no vessels of value were stationed in the Humber; and most important of all, the myth of the Peterhead-Ekersund blockade line had been dispelled. But these were mainly negative results: no opportunity had occurred to attack the British heavy ships;

¹ See Plan IV.

³ H.S. 55, p. 633.

² G.O.H., p. 96.

⁴ H.S. 55, p. 804.

and the conclusions to which the Fleet Command came were as follows:—

“The British Main Fleet, and probably all war vessels which are worth attacking by submarines, are so far away from Germany that it is beyond the technical capacities of our submarines to find them. The harbours serving as bases for replenishing their supplies appear to be so strongly guarded that it would be impossible for submarines to penetrate into them (Moray Firth). It is not possible for submarines to lie in wait off the harbours for long periods owing to their distance from Germany. Submarine operations will therefore be abandoned for the present, until it can be assumed that the British Fleet has come nearer.”

The sum total of these conclusions formed a very important turning-point in German strategy at sea. Since the employment of submarines for offensive operations against the enemy's main fleet had met with no success, it was decided that further operations would have to be moulded with a different objective.

CHAPTER X.

THE TYNE AND HUMBER MINEFIELDS.

61. **Raid on the Broad Fourteens Patrol, August 18.**¹—The orders for the operations which were undertaken by the German naval forces subsequent to the return of the second submarine reconnaissance to the northward and the failure to locate the British main fleet and blockading forces clearly demonstrate their nature as designed for guerilla warfare. The earlier enterprises, the submarine advances to the British shores and the activities of the light forces to the westward of the Heligoland Bight, had been in the nature of reconnaissances; and the heavy ships had been held back in pursuance of the policy of avoiding action except upon their own terms. Now, however, a definite change is discernible. The operations which occupied the fourth week in August come clearly within the category of offensives as opposed to reconnaissances; and the fact that they were carried out without heavy ship support is evidence of their guerilla character.

It had been established by now that, contrary to the expectations of the Admiralstab, the Heligoland Bight was not closed in any manner by blockading forces and that surface vessels had freedom of exit. Surface vessels were therefore chosen to carry out the next operation. The only area in which the

¹ See Plan V.

Germans felt certain of encountering enemy forces was in the Hoofden and the eastern entrance to the Channel, where *U.22* had discovered their presence on August 10. The objective of the operation was therefore to be the Broad Fourteens destroyer patrol, which the Germans believed to have been established between 52° N and 52° 30' N.

The forces chosen for the operation were the fast light cruisers *Stralsund*, Captain Harder, and *Strassburg*, Fregatten-Kapitän Retzmann, accompanied by *U.19* and *U.24*. The two cruisers were to contrive to pass the patrol line during the night of August 17-18 and to be approximately on the parallel of 52° 30' N at daybreak on the 18th, that is, slightly to the southward of the presumed destroyer patrol line, which they were to attack from the south and roll up at dawn, on their return to Heligoland. The submarines were to take up positions north and south of 53° N respectively, in order to attack any enemy ships which might follow the light cruisers or be drawn towards them; and they were not to leave the neighbourhood of these positions until the German cruisers had passed on their return journey unpursued by the British forces, or at latest 3 p.m., August 18.

The operation was to be supported by the *Kolberg*, which was to take up a position about 30 miles north-west of Terschelling at daybreak on the 18th; and the three battle cruisers in Schillig Roads were to have steam in all boilers ready to sail instantly, a measure which, however, could give little beyond moral support to the light cruisers which were to push so far forward.

The force left Heligoland at 7 a.m. on the 17th and proceeded at 12 knots. By 7 p.m. it had reached a position about 90 miles west of Heligoland, when a report was received that a Dutch fishing lugger had sighted two British light cruisers on the morning of the 16th off the south-east corner of the Dogger Bank. The report probably referred to two vessels of Cruiser Force C co-operating in the Grand Fleet sweep of 16th, but it raised in the raiding force apprehensions of being cut off from home. Course was now altered for the run to the south-westward during the night, the two cruisers steering for positions some 30 miles apart. The supposed patrol line was passed without incident, and between 3.30 a.m. and 4 a.m. on the 18th the two cruisers turned northward.

The first discovery of the enemy was made at 4.30 a.m. on the 18th, when *E.5* and *E.7*, steering on the surface for Smith's Knoll Lightship on their return from operating off the Weser, sighted a four-funnelled cruiser hull down, bearing S by E. In an hour's time the cruiser was within visual signalling distance, and Lieutenant-Commander Benning of *E.5*, mistaking her for one of the cruisers of the *Cressy* class, put up his mast and hoisted the "Demand." He received in reply a salvo of 4.1 in. shells which fell around the two boats. The cruiser which he had challenged was the *Strassburg*, the western of

the two German light cruisers ; and she continued to bombard *E.5* and *E.7* vigorously as the submarines dived, but without hitting them.

The *Fearless*, Captain Blunt, and the 1st Flotilla had resumed the watching patrol on the Broad Fourteens at the conclusion of the sweep of the Grand Fleet. In the early hours of the morning of the 18th the flotilla was spread on a line WNW and ESE off Ymuiden, in subdivisions at three-mile intervals, steering S 28 W at 10 knots, when at 5.40 a.m. the *Lizard*, the leading boat of the western subdivision, reported by W/T that a suspicious cruiser was in sight.¹ Five minutes later she signalled that the cruiser was German and was engaging her.² Captain Blunt ordered the flotilla to chase north-west (5.56 a.m.) and shortly afterwards he sighted the 5th Division, *Goshawk*, *Phœnix*, *Lizard*, and *Lapwing* under fire from a cruiser whose masts and four funnels were just visible above the horizon. The cruiser was the *Stralsund*, but from the report of observers aloft in the *Fearless* Captain Blunt concluded that she was probably the *Yorck*³; and he ran to the south-westward, assembling the flotilla and calling up Admiral Campbell, who had anchored in the Downs with the 7th Cruiser Squadron an hour earlier, and Admiral Christian, who was returning to the Nore in the *Sapphire*.⁴ The alarm was passed to Commodore Tyrwhitt, who had left Harwich in the *Amethyst* with the 3rd Flotilla at 4.30 a.m. to relieve the 1st Flotilla on patrol; he was followed by Cruiser Force C, which broke off their coaling; Admiral Christian transferred his flag to the *Euryalus* and also proceeded in support.

About 7 a.m. the *Stralsund* broke off the action and turned to the northward,⁵ and the *Fearless* eased down to enable the flotilla to close her. The consensus of opinion in the flotilla was that the enemy was not the armoured cruiser *Yorck* but the light cruiser *Rostock*. She had last been seen in 52° 48' N, 3° 40' E, steering north-west; and at 8 a.m.,⁶ therefore, having collected his flotilla, Captain Blunt turned and steered at 22

¹ *Fearless*, W/T log, No. 12132.


² Captain Blunt's report, No. 020L, 19.8.14. Harwich Force Packs 0021, Vol. II.

³ The *Lizard*, which was within 4 in. gun range, reported at 5.44 a.m. that the enemy was of the *Karlsruhe* class, but at the distance of the *Fearless* from the *Stralsund* there would be remarkable similarity between the *Yorck* and *Stralsund* classes.

⁴ H.S. 55, p. 434. The code time of the signal is 0610. *Fearless*' deck log gives 6.37 a.m. as the time of sighting the enemy, but this is evidently an error.

⁵ The *Stralsund* stated that she broke off the action owing to the appearance of a second British flotilla cruiser. (G.O.H., p. 105.) The plan (Karte 13) shows her turning to the northward at 6.45 a.m. (G.M.T.), but the *Amethyst* did not join the *Fearless* until 10.15 a.m. It is possible that the *Stralsund* mistook the *Halcyon*, which was sweeping with trawlers in 52° 12' N, 2° 35' E, for a flotilla cruiser.

⁶ *Fearless*, deck log.




PLAN V.

RAID ON BROAD FOURTEENS PATROL

BY "STRASSBURG" & "STRALSUND" 18-AUG-1914

"STRALSUND" ———
 "STRASSBURG" - - - -
 "KOLBERG" - · - · -

BASED ON GERMAN
 OFFICIAL HISTORY
 & CAPT. D. I's REPORT
 19-8-14. No. 020.L.



knots to intercept her.¹ But the *Stralsund* had made good her escape, and although Commodore Tyrwhitt hastened with the 3rd Flotilla to establish a patrol off Terschelling he was too late to cut her off, and both the enemy cruisers reached Heligoland in safety.

Neither of the two enemy submarines sighted the British forces. *U.24* was about 3,300 yards to the southward of the *Stralsund* when the latter opened fire on the 1st Flotilla, but she could not see the enemy nor did the *Stralsund* inform her what was happening. Similarly, the information given by the *Stralsund* to the *Strassburg* was insufficiently accurate to enable the latter to join in the action.² The battle cruisers did not leave Schillig Roads, and the *Kolberg*, though she steamed south at 6 a.m. in response to the *Stralsund's* W/T call, was too far away to arrive before the action was broken off.

Referring to the British W/T signalling during the engagement, the German Official History states—

“It was remarkable that the signals (calls for support) were given in plain language and were repeated and transmitted at 7 a.m. [G.M.T.] by a stronger English shore station, which made the signals so loud that they were intercepted with ease by our ships in Wilhelmshaven.

“The *Preussen*, for instance, intercepted the signal: ‘Captain 1st Flotilla reports 1st class cruiser chasing flotilla, can squadron support.’³ As the enemy did not usually send W/T messages in plain language, this must have been done with the intention of deceiving us and inducing our cruisers to retire.”

By the Admiralty the raid was thought to presage possible attacks on British trade and the local patrol flotillas; and a patrol of three submarines of the 8th Flotilla was consequently established between Swarte Bank and Smith's Knoll light vessels.⁴

62. The Raid on the Fishing Fleet, August 22.—On August 19, the day following the return of the *Stralsund* and *Strassburg* from the Hoofden, the Admiralstab issued orders for a raid against the British fishing fleet on the Dogger Bank. The light cruisers *Rostock* and *Strassburg*, with the 6th Destroyer Flotilla, were to be off the south-west corner of the Dogger Bank at dawn on the day of the operation, the date of which was to depend on the weather and on reports received. At 3.30 a.m. the destroyers were to sweep in a north-easterly direction over the Dogger Bank, followed by the cruisers.⁵

¹ *Fearless*, W/T log, No. 12132, and signal log, No. 12111.

² G.O.H., p. 106.

³ In English in original. This is apparently Admiralty signal 451 to R.A. *Bacchante* and R.A. *Sapphire* sent 0710 *via* Cleethorpes, but the evidence of the W/T and signal logs of the ships concerned is that the signal was made in code.

⁴ G.F.S.P., Vol. XLII.

⁵ G.O.H., Appendix 6.

As a preparation for the operation it had been intended that the *Cöln*, *Stuttgart*, and *Danzig* should carry out an extensive reconnaissance with the 2nd and 5th Destroyer Flotillas, sweeping a sector between WNW and N of Heligoland up to a distance of 120 miles, while five destroyers of the 3rd Flotilla reconnoitred for enemy submarines in the sector NW to W by N of Borkum, up to a distance of 80 miles. On the 20th, however, the outpost torpedo boats reported enemy submarines west of Heligoland; the first of the two reconnaissances was abandoned, and the raid on the fishing fleet was also postponed until further orders.

The submarines which had been sighted were *E.4*, *E.9*, and *D.5*. These three boats left Harwich at 4 a.m. on the 19th for operations in the Heligoland Bight, escorted as far as Terschelling by Commodore Keyes in the *Lurcher*, with five destroyers; three more boats, *E.2*, *E.5*, and *D.7*, operated between Swarte Bank and Smith's Knoll.¹ The Germans thought it possible that destroyers might be following the submarines they had seen, and the 2nd and 5th Destroyer Flotillas, in place of engaging in the reconnaissance 120 miles WNW to N of Heligoland, were spread on a 30-mile outpost line 40 miles west of the island, whilst at dawn on August 21 two more flotillas and two aircraft searched for the reported craft. As, however, nothing more was seen of them, the raid on the fishing fleet was ordered to commence that same day. To support the operation a single light cruiser was again considered sufficient. The *Mainz* was to be in position about 90 miles west of Heligoland at dawn on August 22, while the *Seydlitz* and *Moltke*, with the *Blücher* in place of the *Von der Tann* which was in dock, were to be ready for sea in Schillig Roads. Admiral Hipper seems to have wished to take the battle cruisers to a position about 100 miles WNW of Heligoland in order to afford nearer support to the raiding force, but this was disallowed by the Fleet Command.² However, at the last minute orders were given for three submarines to be in position east of the Dogger Bank³ in order to provide some support; and *U.5*, *U.16* and *U.17* were hurriedly sent out from Heligoland under the escort of the *Hamburg*. They were disposed at the points of an equilateral triangle of 30-mile sides, 60 miles east of the Dogger Bank.

The raiding force left the Weser in two groups at noon on August 21 for the somewhat inglorious adventure. The visibility was very good, the sea smooth, with a light north-westerly breeze. At 4 p.m. *D.5*,⁴ lying on the surface about 75 miles west of Heligoland, sighted their smoke to the eastward, dived, and discovered that she was in the centre of their approach. In three-quarters of an hour the enemy had come within range, and *D.5* proceeded to attack a four-funnelled cruiser with three

¹ See H.S. 225, pp. 111 *et seq.*

² G.O.H., p. 114.

³ G.O.H., p. 114, says south-east, but Karte 14 shows them in position east (true).

⁴ Lieut.-Commander Godfrey Herbert.

destroyers on each bow, which she took to be the *Roon*, though actually she was the *Rostock*. *D.5* had very little distance to proceed before coming to within 500 or 600 yards, immediately before the starboard beam of the *Rostock*; and in this position she fired both bow tubes simultaneously, contrary to orders, and both torpedoes missed ahead. The enemy opened fire immediately, but *D.5* dived and escaped unhit. *V.157* was ordered to remain until midnight to search for the submarine, and the remainder of the force proceeded on its way, steering zigzag courses with destroyers spread as a screen until dusk.

At midnight, 21st-22nd, the first British trawler was met and sunk. The sweep of the Dogger Bank commenced at dawn, the two groups acting independently, as an error of 10 miles in the *Rostock's* dead reckoning position prevented co-operation, although W/T was repeatedly used. The forces do not appear to have approached within 75 miles of the coast. The result of the operation was that eight British trawlers were sunk,¹ three of them by the *Hamburg*, which had remained in the neighbourhood of the supporting submarines. The crews, some 90 men in all, were brought to Wilhelmshaven as prisoners. The distance from the British coast at which the trawlers had been met was considered by the Germans to indicate that they were working in conjunction with the naval forces. They were accused of being engaged in minelaying and the captured crews were consequently treated with great brutality.²

63. Outcome of the Broad Fourteens Raid: Cruiser Force K constituted, August 19.—Admiral Christian and Commodore Keyes and Tyrwhitt were equally of opinion that more powerful support should be provided for the Harwich flotillas than the old vessels of Cruiser Force C, which had not fired their guns for years and were largely manned from the Reserves.³ The raid of the *Stralsund* and *Strassburg* on the Broad Fourteens Watching Patrol on August 18 clinched the matter. The Admiralty now recognised the dangerous situation in which Cruiser Force C would be if the German battle cruisers should make an incursion into the Hoofden; and they decided that a force of battle cruisers and light cruisers should be based on the Humber as a powerful advanced cruiser force for the support of the combined force under Rear-Admiral Christian, and to cut off the retreat of the enemy, should a repetition of the raid be attempted.⁴ Rear-Admiral Moore was to command the supporting force, which was designated Cruiser Force K. The nucleus of the

¹ *Marnay*, *Capricornus*, *Skirbeck*, *Wigtoft*, *Walrus*, *Flavian*, *Julian*, *Indian*. (Merchant shipping losses—Return rendered to House of Commons, 1919.)

² I.D., H.S. 513, p. 448.

³ Commander (S) to C-in-C., H.F., No. 5, 15.8.14. in G.F.S.P., Vol. XLII, Section A 1.

⁴ M. 0072/14, Orders to R.-A., *Invincible*. Reproduced in B.E.F., Appendix C.16, and N.L. 3899/14. Loss of H.M. ships *Aboukir*, *Cressy*, and *Hogue*. Reports and Minutes of Court of Inquiry. (H.S. 47, p. 370.)

force had just become available. The battle-cruiser *Invincible*, after extensive alterations to her turret power system, was now testing her guns in Irish waters; and Admiral Moore, who had hoisted his flag on board her on August 12, was told to take her round from Queenstown to the Humber, where the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet was to send the *New Zealand* to join him. Three small fast light cruisers of the *Arethusa* class, armed with 2—6 in. and 6—4 in. guns, were due to be completed shortly and were to join Admiral Moore. The force was to act under the orders of the Grand Fleet, to which it would serve generally as an advanced cruiser force.¹ The places of the *Invincible* and *New Zealand* in the Grand Fleet would shortly be filled by the *Inflexible* and *Indomitable* from the Mediterranean.

A further reason, no doubt, which rendered it desirable to maintain a closer grip on the southern part of the North Sea was the fact that it had been decided to send to France another infantry division, the IVth, in addition to the four which had already been despatched. It was expected that the main body of this division would begin its passage on the 23rd, though meanwhile base detachments, etc., were crossing, and the covering forces were still in position.² In view of the fact that the watching patrol on the Broad Fourteens had been located by the enemy, the Admiralty decided that the destroyers must be further concentrated and their position withdrawn further south, where the cruisers of Force C were to afford them closer support, at a distance of not more than 20 miles.³ It does not appear, however, that the patrol took up a more southerly line during the few days that elapsed before the conclusion of transport of the Expeditionary Force, which occurred earlier than had been expected, namely, on August 23, when the IVth Division had completed its passage to France, and the covering forces were withdrawn.

64. The Grand Fleet, August 18-28.—On the arrival of the Dreadnought Battlefleet at Loch Ewe on August 18, after its return from the sweep towards the Heligoland Bight, the Commander-in-Chief wished to carry out further operations of the same nature on August 23 or 24.⁴ This was not approved by the Admiralty, who directed that the fleet was to be rested for the present.⁵ The battlefleet left harbour again in the evening of the 20th for target practice to the westward of the Orkneys. Thick fog on the 21st interfered with the practices, and it was not until late at night that the fleet formed up, and passed through the Fair Island Channel

¹ H.S. 55, p. 764. H.S. 56, pp. 110, 280.

² The transport of the IVth Division began, however, on 22nd. See B.E.F., A 183, 184.

³ H.S. 55, p. 664.

⁴ G.F.N., August 17, and H.S. 55, p. 526. Typical orders for such a sweep are reproduced in Appendix C3.

⁵ H.S. 56, p. 110.

into the North Sea during the early morning of the 22nd. The fog detained the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron at Scapa during the 21st, and their target practices were not carried out until the following day, after which the squadron proceeded to a position in 59° 15' N, 1° E, to support the 3rd and 6th Cruiser Squadrons which were working to the southward of it, between Scotland and Norway. On the 25th the 3rd Battle Squadron, which had been detached to Scapa to coal on the 23rd, relieved the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, the 1st Battle Squadron leaving Scapa to join the 3rd Battle Squadron 24 hours later, while the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron returned to Scapa to coal. Admiral Jellicoe desired to coal all the Dreadnoughts and give them rest together, so that the period when the fleet was weak might not be prolonged. His coaling policy was based on the principle of keeping the ships continually with sufficient fuel to permit of their proceeding south for operations likely to require high steaming. The minimum depletion which he allowed was between 30 per cent. and 40 per cent. As all Grand Fleet battleships and cruisers would be required in the south simultaneously, if at all, it was desirable, in his opinion, that they should be coaled as nearly as possible at the same time, the approaches to the base being meanwhile covered by a force of cruisers. The Admiralty, however, did not approve of all the Dreadnoughts coaling simultaneously at present,¹ presumably until it was seen what the intentions of the Germans were with regard to invasion, now that practically the entire regular troops had left the country. Admiral Jellicoe proposed that if no southerly movement were required during the week he would send the ships into harbour, half at a time, though the fleet could easily remain at sea if necessary.² On the same evening, August 25, however, it was decided to despatch a force next day to occupy Ostend, and the Commander-in-Chief was warned by the Admiralty that this flank attack might cause some movement of the High Sea Fleet.³ The 1st Battle Squadron left Scapa on the 26th to join the 3rd Battle Squadron at sea, and was followed next day by the remainder of the battlefleet, which remained until the end of the month cruising in the North Sea between 58° N and 59° N, while the cruiser squadrons continued to sweep from Aberdeen to Norway.

So far, the 10th Cruiser Squadron had sighted no enemy ships on the northern patrol, and the Commander-in-Chief believed that either German ships passed the cruisers at night, or went up inside the fjords, or were not moving, which latter supposition is now known to be the true one. Admiral Jellicoe felt that in its present position the force was not being fully utilised, and by permission of the Admiralty the *Edgars* of the 10th Cruiser Squadron were brought further south to replace the more valuable cruisers of the Grand Fleet watching off

¹ H.S. 57, pp. 24, 170.

² H.S. 57, p. 409.

³ H.S. 57, p. 555.

Kinnaird Head to cover the movements of vessels to and from Scapa Flow and Cromarty Firth. The 10th Cruiser Squadron had been joined recently by the armed merchant cruisers *Alsatian* and *Mantua*, while a third, the *Oceanic*, was on the way. These vessels remained on patrol off the Shetlands, while the *Edgars* for some weeks became practically part of the Grand Fleet.¹ Some rearrangement of the cruiser areas was now carried out.²

No success had yet attended the operations of our submarines in the Heligoland Bight. The large number of enemy destroyers on patrol and the tactics they adopted compelled the submarines to remain submerged during practically the entire daytime. It appeared from their observations that the German destroyers detailed for night work were led at 5 p.m. or 6 p.m. to certain points by light cruisers; they then spread and proceeded to sea at good speed, returning at daylight. Commodore Keyes suggested that a drive, commencing before dawn from inshore close to the enemy's coast, would inflict considerable loss on the German destroyer patrols, while our submarines should be in place to attack enemy cruisers proceeding out in support or vessels returning to harbour.³ A sweep of this nature by the Harwich flotillas with eight submarines co-operating was ordered for August 28, supported by Cruiser Force K from the Humber, while Cruiser Force C, with the *Euryalus*, *Sapphire*, and the *Amethyst*, acted as reserve. The new light cruiser *Arethusa* was now flying the broad pendant of Commodore Tyrwhitt, in place of the *Amethyst*. Admiral Jellicoe wished to co-operate in the sweep by moving southward with the Grand Fleet to a supporting position. This was not approved by the Admiralty, though the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron were sent south to join Cruiser Force K in support of the operation.

Just as the forces were about to leave for their raid there came in to the Admiralty the disquieting news that at least two fresh minefields had been laid close to the British coast.

65. German Minelaying Operations off the Tyne and Humber, August 25-26.—Hitherto the Germans had felt some hesitation about embarking on an extensive policy of minelaying, principally because the minefields would constitute a considerable danger to German submarines so long as there was any intention of employing the latter off the British coast.⁴ After the minelaying operation of the *Königin Luise*, immediately on the outbreak of war, it was decided to postpone further operations of this nature until the submarines had made their detailed reports on the British coastal patrols; and it was hoped that a

¹ See Monograph No. 19, "The Tenth Cruiser Squadron."

² See B.E.F., Map IV.

³ Commodore (S) to Admiralty, No. 015, 23.8.14, in G.F.S.P., Vol. XLII.

⁴ G.O.H., pp. 118 *et seq.*

preliminary study of the most frequented shipping routes would render the mining operations more effective. In the last week of August there would be a new moon and, consequently, longer hours of darkness, and it was now decided to carry out a fresh operation which, contrary to the procedure followed by the *Königin Luise*, was to be done at night. This was the only restrictive instruction given to the commanding officers of the mining vessels *Nautilus*¹ and *Albatross*² when they were ordered, on August 22, to hold themselves in readiness for minelaying operations off the British coast.

The Germans intended to lay two minefields. One was to be off the Tyne, which was assumed to be frequently used as a base by colliers, tankers and ammunition vessels, as well as by portions of the British Fleet. The selection of the position of the minefield was influenced by the considerations that it would be most effective if laid close to the mouth of the Tyne, but that, on the other hand, the distance from the coast must be sufficiently great to prevent observation of the laying of the mines by the enemy. The other minefield was to be laid off the Humber almost simultaneously with that off the Tyne. In choosing the position of this minefield the chief object was to close the main shipping route from the Outer Dowsing to Flamborough Head. This entailed laying two fields each five miles in length in the area bounded by 53° 55' N, 53° 45' N, 0° 30' E, 0° 50' E. If the minefield should have to be laid prematurely, its direction was to be north and south, so that at least the route Humber-Heligoland should be closed. It is improbable, however, that the Admiralstab knew of the presence in the Humber of the newly constituted Cruiser Force K.

To divert enemy patrol vessels from the minelayers and to keep them at a distance during the actual laying of the mines a light cruiser and half-flotilla of destroyers were detailed to accompany each of the two minelaying vessels. The *Stuttgart* and the 11th Half-Flotilla³ were ordered to accompany the *Albatross* to the Tyne, and the *Mainz* and 3rd Half-Flotilla⁴ the *Nautilus* to the Humber.⁵ If the Tyne minefield was laid in the southern part of the estuary the *Stuttgart* might at her discretion carry out a short bombardment at long range of the South Shields forts should this be necessary to secure the *Albatross* from molestation. The German Command was convinced that a systematic watching of the North Sea was being carried out by British fishing vessels, and for this reason special orders were given that the crews of all trawlers encountered during the day were to be taken off and the trawlers sunk.

¹ Freg.-kap. Wilhelm Schultz.

² Korv.-kap. West.

³ V. 161 (S.O.), V. 151-155.

⁴ S. 149 (S.O.), S. 138-142.

⁵ The orders for the operation off the Tyne are reproduced in Appendix D4.

The use of W/T during the operation was to be restricted to a minimum, and no signals were to be made within 100 miles of the British coast, in order that the presence of the German ships might not be betrayed.

The northern group left Heligoland at 8 p.m. on August 23¹ and proceeded at 12 knots in order to economise the destroyers' coal. During the day the *Stuttgart* and destroyers were spread on a scouting line ahead of the *Albatross*, but the force closed up at night. At 7 a.m. on the 24th, when about half the distance had been covered, the force was recalled by the Senior Officer, Scouting Forces, for the *Mainz* had taken the ground in the Ems just before she should have sailed, and the operation was postponed for 24 hours as it was uncertain whether she would get clear in time; and it was important that the two operations should be simultaneous. The group returned again to Heligoland, and the destroyers went into harbour to coal. At 8 p.m. on the 24th they were again en route, the southern group, which had a shorter distance to cover, following at 5 o'clock next morning.

During the afternoon of the 25th V.152 of the northern group was sent back to Wilhelmshaven with leaking condensers. Soon after this the first enemy trawlers were met, north of the Dogger Bank, and from now until dark occasional fishing vessels were encountered, six of which were sunk,² their crews, to the number of 63, being taken prisoners. Speed was regulated after dark so that the northern group would reach a position 55° 11½' N, 1° 15' W,³ at 11.40 p.m., at which hour the Germans counted upon the watches being changed on board the British patrol vessels, with a consequent diminution of watchfulness. At this point the *Stuttgart* turned South ¾ East and steered a fixed course parallel to the land and some 10 miles distant, while the *Albatross* headed towards the estuary. This procedure was adopted in order to minimise the risk of discovery and also because, in the uncertainty whether the *Albatross* would be able to lay her mines in the prearranged position, it was important that a definite course should be laid down for the *Stuttgart*, so that she might be clear of the minefield. The night was misty, the ships being shrouded under a starlit sky by a thick low-lying fog which, though it enhanced the difficulties of navigation, was of service in concealing the ships. The *Albatross* commenced to lay her mines shortly after midnight, August 25-26, and completed the work of laying a field of 200 mines⁴ 11 miles long by 12.52 a.m. on the 26th. The depth setting of the mines was designed to bring them 6½ ft. below mean L.W.S., and they were laid 328 ft. apart.

¹ G.O.H., p. 120, says August 22, but this is evidently a mistake.

² *Rhine, Harrier, Lobelia, Valiant, Mersey*. The sixth trawler was probably the *Sati*, sunk on the return journey to Heligoland on the 26th.

³ The orders reproduced in G.O.H. give the long. 1° 15' E, but this is evidently a mistake.

⁴ O.U. 6026 A gives the number 194.

The shore lights were not discernible, owing to the fog,¹ and the minefield had consequently to be laid by dead reckoning; this was taken from the *Stuttgart's* calculation, which placed the ships in a position five miles further east than the captain of the *Albatross* considered them to be.² The force returned to Heligoland independently owing to the fog, one more trawler being sunk on the return journey.

The southern minelaying group proceeded on a northerly course from the Ems until north of lat. 54°, when they turned west until the middle of the Dogger Bank was reached. From this point they steered straight for Spurn Head. As in the case of the northern group, the misty weather facilitated an approach to the coast unobserved. Led by the *Mainz*, the *Nautilus* successfully laid the first minefield about 11 p.m., August 25, and the second half an hour later. Each field was of 100 mines, laid 295 ft. apart, and 6½ ft. below L.W.S., and they were laid about 20 to 25 miles off Spurn Head, 8 to 15 miles north of the Outer Dowsing.³ Before midnight the work was completed and the group was on the way home.

66. Discovery of the Minefields, August 26.—The Germans issued no public statement that they had mined the approaches to the great commercial harbours of the Tyne and Humber, and it was left to merchant shipping to find the minefields for themselves. They did not long remain secret. Within 24 hours both of the minefields were discovered. About 10 p.m. on August 26 the Danish fishing vessel *Skuli Fogeti* struck a mine in the Tyne field 28 miles E by N of the Tyne, with the loss of four of her crew,⁴ and that same night the trawler *City of Belfast* exploded two mines in her fishing nets in the Humber minefield.⁵ The *City of Belfast* came into the Humber to report her discovery, and by 5.47 a.m. on the 27th, the Admiralty were in possession of the information. The *Invincible* and *New Zealand* were due to leave about 11 a.m.⁶ that day to support the sweep of the Harwich flotillas into the Heligoland Bight arranged for August 28. The Admiralty had apparently not yet realised that a minefield had been laid off the Humber, or else they were satisfied that it was well to the northward of the course which the squadron would take to its rendezvous in 54° N, 3° E; for

¹ The Germans thought the lights might have been extinguished, but this was not done until 7 September 1914. From the position in which the mines were discovered it is clear that the enemy did not approach within 20 miles of the coast.

² G.O.H., pp. 123-4, states that the minefield was laid exactly in the position intended, but *ibid.* Appendix 9, "Report on Minefield" states that the longitude is correct within five miles only. The position shown on Karte 16 is about six miles from the coast.

³ See G.O.H., p. 124, and Appendix 10, and Karte 17.

⁴ M. 01650/14, Encl. 2.

⁵ H.S. 57, p. 734.

⁶ The Admiralty evidently thought they would leave rather later than 11 a.m.

whilst ordering the fleet sweepers *Speedy* and *Spanker* at 11.30 a.m. to proceed forthwith to the Humber to sweep Cruiser Force K out, at noon they informed the Rear-Admiral Commanding that the sweepers might not arrive in time, but that the route near the Outer Dowsing was probably clear of mines.¹ The squadron had already left the Humber when this signal was despatched,² but they kept a little to the southward of the direct route to the rendezvous, and passed close to the Outer Dowsing light vessel in safety.

67. **Position of the Minefields.**³—The *Invincible* and *New Zealand* had missed the nearest mines of the Humber field by two or three miles only, for mines were exploded as near as four miles N by W from the Outer Dowsing⁴; and on the night of August 26-27 mines were found as far as 17 miles N $\frac{1}{2}$ E from the same light.⁵

The sweeping of a passage from the Outer Dowsing to the Humber was commenced without delay, and until the work should be completed the Admiralty ordered the *Invincible* and *New Zealand* to remain at sea northward of 55° N, and not to approach within 50 miles of the coast.⁶ By the afternoon of August 29, however, it was seen that the Humber was untenable as a battle cruiser base, for the minesweeping service was still immature and the difficulties of defining and sweeping up a minefield within a reasonable period of time were insuperable. Accordingly, at 2.20 p.m. on the 29th the Admiralty ordered the squadron to proceed to Rosyth, the attendant destroyers⁷ being sent to Harwich.⁸

After the war, in conformity with the Treaty of Peace, the German Government stated where they had laid their mines.⁹ The positions they then gave for the Tyne and Humber minefields differ considerably from those in which mines were actually discovered before they could have drifted far from their original ground.

In the course of a few days, mines were exploded off the Humber, 5 miles south and 10 miles east of the limits given in the German statement. In the case of the Tyne minefield the discrepancy between the reported position and the positions in which mines were found was still greater. We have seen that there was a difference of opinion between the captains of the *Stuttgart* and *Albatross* as to their exact situation and that the Germans themselves were unable to fix the distance of the field

¹ H.S. 57, pp. 766, 793.

² Spurn Head reported them passing outwards at 11.17 a.m. The *Invincible* received the signal at 2.48 p.m.

³ See Plans VI and VII.

⁴ H.S. 58, pp. 388, 402.


⁵ H.S. 57, p. 908.


⁶ H.S. 58, p. 97.

⁷ *Badger, Beaver, Jackal, Sandfly.*

⁸ H.S. 58, p. 404.

⁹ O.U. 6020.





PLAN VI

MINEFIELD LAID OFF THE TYNE

BY THE GERMAN MINELAYER "ALBATROSS"

25th-26th AUG: 1914.

- Pos^s of minefield from O.U. 6020A
- - - Pos^s given in G.O.H. Karte 16
- Area declared dangerous by Admiralty 27th & 28th Aug:
- Ships sunk on the minefield (from Adm^y Tel^s M.01850/14, & M.04617/14.)

from the coast within five miles¹; but even this allowance would place the furthest mines only 13 miles from the coast. But most of the ships sunk on this minefield were mined 30 miles to seaward,² and if the German official statement is correct that the minefield was ordered to be laid as close to the shore as possible, it must be inferred either that the *Stuttgart* was genuinely and badly at fault in her dead reckoning position on the night of August 25-26, or that the unwillingness of the captain of the *Nautilus* to approach the shore more closely was responsible for the laying of the minefield so far to seaward.

A preliminary warning of the mine danger off the Tyne was sent out on the 27th, and at 5 o'clock that afternoon the Admiralty promulgated to all ships the announcement of three areas which were dangerous on account of mines, namely, off Southwold, Newcastle, and Flamborough Head; by the 29th the extent of these areas had been fixed as follows³:—

Southwold Area, extending between 52° 30' N and 51° 55' N to the west of 3° E to within 10 miles of the coast.

Flamborough Head Area, extending between 54° 15' N and 53° 30' N from 8 to 30 miles from the coast.

Tyne Area, lying between lines running NE and SE (magnetic) from the mouth of the Tyne and between 20 and 50 miles from the coast.

In the Flamborough Head foul area no mines had actually been found further north than 53° 30' N, the northern limit of the Humber field, but mines were reported 11 miles SSE of Flamborough Head, though search by patrol and minesweepers revealed only buoys, etc.⁴ The attempt to sweep up the minefields was abandoned almost immediately, though not before several minesweeping trawlers had been lost; and thenceforward the energies of the minesweepers were directed towards keeping clear a channel along the coast—a further development of the War Channel. A minesweeping patrol was formed of 32 trawlers from Rosyth, the Humber, Harwich, and the Nore, and was based on the Humber for duty in the neighbourhood of Flamborough Head.⁵

The discovery of the Tyne and Humber minefields increased the apprehension that the enemy might attempt to mine the northern base. A flotilla of trawlers, known as the Northern Flotilla of Trawlers, had been formed on August 17, armed with two 3-pdr. Q.F. guns apiece, fitted with W/T and provided with

¹ See footnote 2, p. 103.

² M. 04617/14. On November 17 the Swedish s.s. *Andrea* was mined 65 miles E by S $\frac{1}{2}$ S of the Tyne, viz., 62 miles from the coast.

³ H.S. 57, p. 902. H.S. 58, p. 528.

⁴ H.S. 58, p. 669.

⁵ M. 01691/14. Minesweeping Patrol in neighbourhood of Flamborough Head. Their parent ship was the *Victorious*, altered on September 12 to *Leander*. There was already a large patrol at Lowestoft (see Section 33).

the modified sweep¹; its present strength was 16 boats, but the Commander-in-Chief required the number to be raised to 36 at once.² The number of destroyers attached to the Grand Fleet for the defence of bases where no permanent defence authority existed was 12 at this date.³ This force, too, Admiral Jellicoe required to be increased; but there were no more destroyers available in southern waters, and the Admiralty sent him eight armed trawlers instead. The Commander-in-Chief was further of opinion that in view of the ease with which mines were being laid off the coast in face of the patrol flotillas, the latter should be further to seaward at night.⁴

68. Admiralty Announcement of August 31.—It was believed that the Tyne and Humber minefields had been laid by German trawlers, for although reports began to come in on August 26 of German warships sighted in the North Sea, they were not at the time connected with the minelaying operation. On the 26th the trawler *Elmira* reported that at 3.33 p.m. on the previous day she met two German destroyers 120 miles NE $\frac{1}{2}$ N of Spurn Light, and sighted two large warships on the horizon.⁵ This was probably the southern minelaying group; that force was met again later during the night of 25th–26th, 70 miles east of Flamborough Head, by a Norwegian steamer,⁶ whilst prisoners from the *Mainz* taken in the Heligoland Bight action reported that she had laid mines off the coast, near Hull, at 1 a.m. on the 26th.⁷ Against this, however, there was some evidence capable of the interpretation that the minefields had been laid by trawlers⁸; and despite the uncertainty and the expressed view

¹ M/G. 0693/14. (See M Letter Book, No. 272, p. 1393.)

² H.S. 58, p. 542.

³ "Positions and Movements of H.M. Ships."

⁴ H.S. 58, p. 498.

⁵ H.S. 57, pp. 544, 545.

⁶ "Patrol Flotillas," A 33.

⁷ "Patrol Flotillas," A 38.


⁸ The evidence upon which the Admiralty formed the opinion that the mines had been laid by German trawlers seems to be as follows:—

From A.O.P. to Admiralty, 28.8.14. Received 3.59 p.m. 58. Steam trawler reports vessel purporting to be *Linwood* of Middlesbrough flying signals of distress, but refused assistance when offered, position ENE 22 miles to the west of (?) Spurn Head. It seems probable was minelaying. Trawler *Martha* at about half-past 10 a.m., August 25, observed two cruisers and one minelaying vessel, position 53° 17' N, 4° 7' E, steering SW by S (1500).

From Stockton to Admiralty, 28.8.14. 47. Captain (D), 9th Flotilla, to T.B. 22, Hartlepool Customs reports that a steamer trawler *Excelsior* reports a German trawler *A.A.* 29 of Emden seen laying mines 29 miles SE of Blyth at 5 a.m. to-day. Pigeons on board. (1635.)

From Newcastle Naval Centre to Admiralty, 28.8.14, sent 6 p.m. Received 6.35 p.m. 33. Steam trawler *Excelsior* reports German lugger *A.E.* 24 of Emden seen last night 55 miles ESE from Blyth steering north. She has a large quantity of buoys, her crew on deck.

From Customs, Lowestoft, to D.N.I., Admiralty, 29.8.14. Smack *C.E.S.* reports seeing steamboat flying French (?) flag near Cross Sands heading NNE 4 p.m. Thursday (August 27) also at 9 (? p.m.), a



of the Inspecting Captain of the Minesweepers, Captain T. P. Bonham, who was thoroughly conversant with that type of craft and did not believe it at all likely that trawlers could lay mines, the Admiralty on August 31 issued the following notice:—

“ His Majesty’s Government have learnt that on or about August 26 an Iceland trawler is reported to have struck a mine 25 miles off the Tyne and sunk, and at least one foreign newspaper has stated that the mine was English. Although the German action in laying mines has forced the Admiralty to reserve to themselves the right to do likewise, the statement already made by His Majesty’s Government that no British mines have been laid remains absolutely true at this moment.

“ The mines off the Tyne were laid 30 miles to seaward, not as part of any definite military operation nor by German ships of war, but by German trawlers, of which a considerable number appear to have been engaged in this work. The number of one such trawler actually seen to be doing this was *A.E. 24, Emden.*”¹

The Germans in their reply, which was delayed until November 7, denied the charge of laying mines by trawlers and stated that their mines had been laid by German warships exclusively,² a statement which may confidently be assumed to be correct.

trawler laid by and refused to answer smack’s hail. Dutch steam trawler reports passing floating (? Dan buoy) this morning with large German flag on top near middle Cross Sands buoy. Hull and Naval Base, Lowestoft, informed.

Extract from note by D.I.D. (M. 05142/14), 29.8.14. “ A representative from William Cory & Son of Newcastle-on-Tyne, coal merchants and steamship owners, called to-day and reported that the Master of the s.s. *Vernon*, Captain McAlister, informed him that McAlister had overheard a telephone conversation in South Shields Post Office. The speaker in the telephone conversation was the Master of a Dutch steamer, and the talk was about mines and the money paid for laying them. . . . From the conversation overheard, McAlister had formed the impression that the Germans were paying the Masters of Dutch steamers trading to British ports for laying mines.”

Extract from letter received 28 August 1914 from Professor Meek, Armstrong College, Newcastle-on-Tyne. (M. 05142/14.) “ I hear that German fishing boats have been laying mines off here and a trawler and a Norwegian (?) boat have been blown up. Surely this could be dealt with. The boats are known to the fishermen although they are flying our flag.” (*Sd.* A. Meek.)

In addition, there were a number of reports of suspicious fishing vessels, etc., off the coast.

¹ H.S. 58, p. 568.

² M. 04617/14 and M. 15626/14.

APPENDIX A.

ORGANISATION OF THE BRITISH NAVAL FORCES FOR WAR.*

THE GRAND FLEET.

Fleet Flagship.

Iron Duke (C.-in-C., Admiral (acting) Sir John R. Jellicoe, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.). 25,000 t., 19·1 kts.,² 10—13·5 in., 12—6 in., 2—3 in. A.A., 4 S.T. *Sappho* (light cruiser). *Oak* (T.B.D.).

1st Battle Squadron.

Marlborough (Vice-Admiral (acting) Sir Lewis Bayly, K.C.B., C.V.O.). *St. Vincent* (Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, M.V.O.). *Colossus*, *Hercules*, *Neptune*, *Vanguard*, *Collingwood*, *Superb*. *Marlborough* as *Iron Duke*. Remainder 19,250—20,000 t., 18·8—19·2 kts., 10—12 in., 16 to 18—4 in., 3 S.T. *Bellona* (light cruiser).

2nd Battle Squadron.

King George V (Vice-Admiral Sir George J. S. Warrender, *Bt.*, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.). *Orion* (Rear-Admiral Sir Robert K. Arbuthnot, *Bt.*, M.V.O.). *Ajax*, *Audacious*, *Centurion*, *Conqueror*, *Monarch*, *Thunderer*. 22,500—23,000 t., 19 kts., 10—13·5 in., 16—4 in., 3 S.T. *Boadicea* (light cruiser).

3rd Battle Squadron.

King Edward VII (Vice-Admiral Edward E. Bradford, C.V.O.). *Hibernia* (Rear-Admiral Montague E. Browning, M.V.O.). *Africa*, *Britannia*, *Commonwealth*, *Dominion*, *Hindustan*, *Zealandia*. 16,350 t., 17·6 kts., 4—12 in., 4—9·2 in., 10—6 in., 4 S.T. *Blanche* (light cruiser).

4th Battle Squadron.

Dreadnought (Vice-Admiral Sir Douglas A. Gamble, K.C.V.O.). 17,900 t., 18·9 kts., 10—12 in., 24—12 pr., 5 S.T. *Bellerophon*, *Temeraire*. 18,600 t., 18·8 kts., 10—12 in., 16—4 in., 3 S.T. *Blonde* (light cruiser).

6th Battle Squadron.³

Russell (Rear-Admiral Stuart Nicholson, M.V.O.), *Albemarle*, *Exmouth*. 13,500 t., 18 kts., 4—12 in., 12—6 in., 4 S.T.

CRUISER FORCE A.

1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.

Lion (Vice-Admiral (acting) Sir David Beatty, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.), *Princess Royal*, *Queen Mary*. 26,350 t. (*Queen Mary*, 27,000 t.), 27—28·25 kts.,⁴ 8—13·5 in., 16—4 in., 2 S.T. *New Zealand*. 18,800 t., 23·5 kts., 8—12 in., 16—4 in., 2 S.T.

¹ Excluding those on foreign stations.

² Seagoing full speed.

³ Joined Grand Fleet, 7.8.14. The squadron worked with 3rd Battle Squadron until 17.8.14, when they were added to the 3rd Battle Squadron, and the 6th Battle Squadron ceased to exist.

⁴ Mean speed on trial.

2nd Cruiser Squadron.

Shannon (Rear-Admiral *The Hon.* Somerset A. Gough-Calthorpe, C.V.O., C.B.). 14,600 t., 20·8 kts., 4—9·2 in., 10—7·5 in., 16—12 pr., 5 S.T. *Achilles*, *Cochrane*, *Natal*. 13,550 t., 21·4 kts., 6—9·2 in., 4—7·5 in., 3 S.T.

3rd Cruiser Squadron.

Antrim (Rear-Admiral William C. Pakenham, C.B., M.V.O.), *Argyll*, *Devonshire*, *Roxburgh*. 10,850 t., 21·6 kts., 4—7·5 in., 6—6 in., 2 S.T.

6th Cruiser Squadron.

Drake (Rear-Admiral William L. Grant, C.B.), *Good Hope*,¹ *Leviathan*.¹ 14,100 t., 22·1 kts., 2—9·2 in., 16—6 in., 12—12 pr., 2 S.T.

1st Light Cruiser Squadron.

Southampton (Commodore 2nd Class, William E. Goodenough, M.V.O.), *Birmingham*, *Lowestoft*, *Nottingham*, *Falmouth*, *Liverpool*. 4,800—5,440 t., 25 kts.,² 8—6 in. (*Liverpool*, 2—6 in., 10—4 in.), 2 S.T.

CRUISER FORCE B.

10th Cruiser Squadron.

Crescent (Rear-Admiral Dudley R. S. de Chair, C.B., M.V.O.), *Edgar*, *Endymion*, *Gibraltar*, *Grafton*, *Hawke*, *Royal Arthur*, *Theseus*. Built 1893—4. 7,350—7,700 t., 17·3—17·5 kts., 1 to 2—9·2 in., 10 to 12—6 in., 1—12 pr., 2 S.T.

CRUISER FORCE C.

7th Cruiser Squadron.

Bacchante (Rear-Admiral Henry H. Campbell, C.V.O.), *Aboukir*, *Cressy*, *Euryalus*. Built 1904. 12,000 t., 20·4 kts., 2—9·2 in., 12—6 in., 12—12 pr., 2 S.T.

FLOTILLAS.

Amethyst (Commodore (T) Reginald Y. Tyrwhitt).

1ST FLOTILLA.—*Fearless*, 20 destroyers ("I" class. About 750 t., 27 kts., 2—4 in., 2—12 pr., 2 T.).

2ND FLOTILLA.—*Active*, 20 destroyers ("H" class. As "I" class).

3RD FLOTILLA.—*Amphion*, 16 destroyers ("L" class. About 975 t., 29 kts., 3—4 in., 4 T.).

4TH FLOTILLA. *Swift*, 20 destroyers ("K" class. 935 t., 29—31 kts., 3—4 in., 2 T.).

8th SUBMARINE FLOTILLA.

Commodore (S) Roger J. B. Keyes, C.B., M.V.O., *Maidstone*, 8 "D," 9 "E" class submarines.

COAST PATROLS.

Admiral of Patrols. Commodore (1st Class) George A. Ballard, C.B., A.d.C.

6TH FLOTILLA (Dover).—Light cruisers *Attentive* (Captain (D)), *Adventure*, *Foresight*, *Sentinel*, 20 destroyers³ (33 kts., 2—4 in. or 5—12 pr., 2 T.).

7TH FLOTILLA (The Humber).—*Skirmisher*, 20 destroyers ("B" class), 12 T.B.s.

¹ These two ships did not join up at the outbreak of war.

² Designed speed.

³ Two of these, with five tugs, constituted the Downs Boarding Flotilla.

- 8TH FLOTILLA¹ (The Forth).—*Pathfinder*, 9 destroyers ("B" and "C" class) 12 T.B.s.
- 9TH FLOTILLA (The Tyne).—*Patrol, Forward*, 23 destroyers ("E" class).²
- 3RD SUBMARINE FLOTILLA (Dover).—Three "B" and three "C" class.
- 4TH SUBMARINE FLOTILLA (Dover).—Seven "C" class.
- 6TH SUBMARINE FLOTILLA (The Humber).—Six "C" class.
- 7TH SUBMARINE FLOTILLA¹ (Firth of Forth and Tyne).—Nine "C" class (Firth of Forth), three "C" class (Tyne).

CHANNEL FLEET.³

5th Battle Squadron.

- Lord Nelson* (Vice-Admiral Second and Third Fleets, Sir Cecil Burney, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.). *Prince of Wales* (Rear-Admiral Bernard Currey). *Queen* (Rear-Admiral Cecil F. Thursby, C.M.G.). *Venerable, Irresistible, Bulwark, Formidable, Implacable, London, Agamemnon.*
- Lord Nelson, Agamemnon.* 16,500 t., 16·8 kts., 4—12 in., 10—9·2 in., 24—12 pr., 5 S.T. Remainder 15,000 t., 16·9 kts., 4—12 in., 12—6 in., 16—12 pr., 4 S.T. *Diamond, Topaze* (light cruisers).

7th Battle Squadron.

- Prince George* (Vice-Admiral *The Hon.* Sir Alexander E. Bethell, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.). *Cæsar, Illustrious, Jupiter, Majestic.* Built 1896—98. 4—12 in., 12—6 in. *Sapphire* (light cruiser).

8th Battle Squadron.

- Albion* (Rear-Admiral Henry L. Tottenham, C.B.), *Goliath, Canopus, Ocean, Vengeance, Glory.* Built 1899—1902. 4—12 in., 12—6 in. *Proserpine* (light cruiser).

9th Battle Squadron.

(Harbour Defence.)

- Victorious, Mars* (The Humber). *Hannibal, Magnificent* (Scapa).

CRUISER FORCE F.⁴

- Hogue, Suttlej.* 12,000 t., 20·4 kts., 2—9·2 in., 12—6 in., 12—12 pr., 2 S.T.

CRUISER FORCE G.

12th Cruiser Squadron.

- Charybdis* (Rear-Admiral Rosslyn E. Wemyss, C.M.G., M.V.O.). Built 1894. 4,360 t., 16·7 kts., 2—6 in., 8—4·7 in., 1—12 pr., 3 T.
- Diana, Eclipse, Talbot.* Built 1896—7. 5,600 t., 11—6 in., 8—12 pr., 2 S.T., 1 T.

MINELAYER SQUADRON.

- Andromache, Apollo, Intrepid, Iphigenia, Latona, Naiad, Thetis.* Built 1891—93. 3,400—3,600 t., 16·5—16·9 kts., 4—4·7 in.

ATLANTIC SQUADRONS.

CRUISER FORCE E.

11th Cruiser Squadron.

- Doris* (Rear-Admiral Robert S. Phipps Hornby, C.M.G.), *Isis, Juno, Minerva, Venus.* Built 1897. 5,600 t., 16·9 kts., 11—6 in., 8—12 pr., 2 S.T., 1 T.

CRUISER FORCE D.

5th Cruiser Squadron.

- Carnarvon* (Rear-Admiral Archibald P. Stoddart). 10,850 t., 21·6 kts., 4—7·5 in., 6—6 in., 2 S.T.
- Cornwall, Cumberland, Monmouth.* 9,800 t., 22·2—22·4 kts., 14—6 in., 8—12 pr., 2 S.T.

CRUISER FORCE H.

4th Cruiser Squadron.

- Suffolk* (Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher G. F. M. Cradock, K.C.V.O., C.B.), *Berwick, Essex, Lancaster.* As *Monmouth.*
- Bristol* (light cruiser). 4,800 t., 24·1 kts., 2—6 in., 10—4 in., 2 S.T.

CRUISER FORCE I.

9th Cruiser Squadron.

- Amphitrite* (Rear-Admiral John M. de Robeck), *Argonaut, Europa.* Built 1898—1900. 11,000 t., 16—6 in., 12—12 pr., 2 S.T.
- Highflyer, Vindictive, Challenger.* Built 1898—1904. 5,600—5,800 t., 10 or 11—6 in., 8—12 pr., 2 S.T.

NORE LOCAL DEFENCE.

- Commander-in-Chief, The Nore—Admiral Sir Richard Poore, *Bt.*, K.C.B., C.V.O.
- Nore Flotilla. Twelve T.B.D.s, 20 T.B.s.
- 5th Submarine Flotilla. Six "C" class.

PORTSMOUTH LOCAL DEFENCE.

- Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth—Admiral *The Hon.* Sir Hedworth Meux, G.C.B., K.C.V.O.
- Portsmouth Flotilla. Six T.B.D.s, 13 T.B.s.
- 2nd Submarine Flotilla. Three "A," one "B" class.

PLYMOUTH LOCAL DEFENCE.

- Commander-in-Chief, Plymouth—Admiral Sir George Le Clerc Egerton, K.C.B.
- Plymouth Flotilla. Four T.B.s.
- 1st Submarine Flotilla.

FORTH LOCAL DEFENCE.

- Senior Naval Officer, Coast of Scotland¹—Admiral Sir Robert S. Lowry, K.C.B.
- Rosyth Flotilla (when constituted).
- Rosyth Submarine Flotilla (when constituted).

Note.—A list of Mercantile Fleet Auxiliaries (Supply Ships, Mine Carriers, Hospital Ships, Fleet Messengers, Seaplane ships, Colliers, etc.) is given in M Letter Book, No. 272, pp. 1015 *et seq.*

¹ Or Admiral Commanding on the Coast of Scotland.

¹ Under Senior Naval Officer, Coast of Scotland.

² *Forward* and four destroyers were employed on Shetlands Patrol.

³ As reconstructed, 8.8.14.

⁴ Never operated as a distinct cruiser force.

APPENDIX B.

ORGANISATION OF GERMAN NORTH SEA FORCES.¹

HIGH SEA FLEET.

Fleet Flagship.

Friedrich der Grosse (C.-in-C., Admiral von Ingenohl). 24,310 t., 19 kts., 10—12 in., 14—5.9 in., 12—22 pr., 4—3 in. A.A., 5 S.T.

1st Squadron.

Ostfriesland (Vice-Admiral von Lans.), *Thüringen*, *Helgoland*, *Oldenburg*. 22,440 t., 18.3 kts., 12—12 in., 14—5.9 in., 14—22 pr., 6 S.T.

Posen (Rear-Admiral Gädeke), *Rheinland*, *Nassau*, *Westfalen*. 18,600 t., 18 kts., 12—11 in., 12—5.9 in., 16—22 pr., 6 S.T.

2nd Squadron.

Preussen (Vice-Admiral Scheer), *Hannover* (Rear-Admiral Mauve), *Schlesien*, *Hessen*, *Lothringen*, *Schleswig-Holstein*, *Pommern*, *Deutschland*. 13,000 t., 16.6—16.8 kts., 4—11 in., 14—6.7 in., 18 to 20—15 pr., 6 S.T.

3rd Squadron.

Prinzregent Luitpold (Rear-Admiral Funke), *Kaiser*, *Kaiserin*, *König Albert*, *König*² (Rear-Admiral Schaumann), *Grosser Kurfürst*.² As *Friedrich der Grosse*. (*König*, *Grosser Kurfürst*, 25,390 t.)

4th Squadron.

Wittelsbach (Vice-Admiral Schmidt), *Braunschweig* (Rear-Admiral Alberts), *Wettin*, *Mecklenburg*, *Schwaben*, *Elsass*, *Zähringen*.

Braunschweig, *Elsass* as *Preussen*. Remainder built 1902—4. 11,611 t., 16.7 kts., 4—9.4 in., 18—5.9 in., 12—15 pr., 6 S.T.

5th Squadron.³

Kaiser Wilhelm II (Vice-Admiral Grapow), *Kaiser Friedrich III* (Commodore Begas), *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, *Kaiser Barbarossa*, *Kaiser Karl der Grosse*. Built 1899—1902. 10,474 t., 16.3—16.5 kts., 4—9.4 in., 14—5.9 in. (*K. Karl der Grosse*, 18—5.9 in.), 12 to 14—15 pr., 5 S.T.

Wörth, *Brandenburg*. Built 1893—4. 9,901 t., 15.3 kts., 6—11 in., 8—4.1 in., 8—15 pr., 2 S.T., 1 T.

6th Squadron.⁴

Hildebrand (Rear-Admiral Eckermann), *Heimdall*, *Hagen*, *Frithiof*, *Aegir*, *Odin*, *Beowulf*, *Siegfried*, 3rd Class (Coast Defence) battleships.

¹ Based on G.O.H., Table I, state on 10 August 1914. Details of armament, etc., from War Vessels and Aircraft, Quarterly Return, August 1914.

² Joined squadron August 12, but not yet ready for war. Rear-Admiral Schaumann hoisted his flag in *König* 17—18 August 1914.

³ Refitting on outbreak of war.

⁴ Completed to full crews 12.8.14. G.O.H. Table I shows Rear-Admiral Behring as Second Admiral of the Squadron (no flagship indicated), but this appointment cannot have lasted more than a few days, as Rear-Admiral Behring was appointed to command a detached force in the Baltic on 21 August 1914.

1st Scouting Group.

Seydlitz (Rear-Admiral Hipper, Senior Officer of the Scouting Vessels),¹ *Von der Tann* (Rear-Admiral Tapken, 3rd Admiral of Senior Officer of the Scouting Vessels), *Moltke*, *Derfflinger*.² 19,100 to 26,180 t., 26.2—27.25 kts.,³ 10—11 in. (*Derfflinger*, 8—12 in.), 12—5.9 in., 12—22 pr. 4 S.T.; (*Von der Tann*, 8—11 in., 10—5.9 in., 16—22 pr.) *Blücher*,⁴ 15,500 t., 25.86 kts.,⁴ 12—8.2 in., 8—5.9 in., 16—22 pr., 4 S.T.

2nd Scouting Group.

Cöln (Rear-Admiral Maass, 2nd Admiral of Senior Officer of the Scouting Vessels and Senior Officer of T.B.D.s), *Rostock* (Captain Hartog, 2nd Senior Officer of T.B.D.s), *Mainz*, *Stralsund*, *Kolberg*, *Strassburg*, *Graudenz*.⁵ 4,280—4,820 t., 25—27.5 kts.,³ 12—4.1 in., 2 S.T.

3rd Scouting Group.

München, *Danzig*, *Stuttgart*, *Frauenlob*. 3,200—3,400 t., 21—23.5 kts.,⁶ 10—4.1 in., 2 S.T.

Hela. Built, 1896. 19.5 kts.,⁶ 2—15 pr., 3 S.T.

4th Scouting Group.

Roon (Rear-Admiral von Rebeur-Paschwitz, Second Senior Officer of the Scouting Vessels), *Yorck*, *Prinz Adalbert*, *Prinz Heinrich*. 8,756—9,348 t., 18.6—19.2 kts., 4—8.2 in. (*Prinz Heinrich*, 2—9.4 in.), 10—5.9 in., 14—22 pr. (*Prinz Adalbert*, 12—15 pr., *Prinz Heinrich*, 10—15 pr.), 4 S.T. (*Prinz Heinrich*, 3 S.T., 1 T.).

5th Scouting Group.

Hansa (Rear-Admiral Jasper, Second Admiral of Second Senior Officer of the Scouting Vessels and Senior Officer of Reserve and New Formations), *Vineta*, *Victoria Louise*,⁷ *Hertha*. Built, 1898—1899. 5,575—5,790 t., 17.2 kts., 2—8 in., 6—5.9 in., 3—22 pr., 11—15 pr., 2 to 3 S.T.

FLOTILLAS.⁸

(1 Leader and 10 T.B.D.s each.)

1ST FLOTILLA.—638—646 t., 32.5 kts., 2—15 pr., 4 T.

2ND FLOTILLA.—520 t., 30 kts., 1—15 pr., 3—4 pr., 3 T.

3RD FLOTILLA.—603—625 t., 30—32 kts., 2—15 pr., 3 T.

4TH FLOTILLA.—394—413 t., 26 kts., 3—4 pr., 3 T.

5TH FLOTILLA.—555—561 t., 32.5 kts., 2—15 pr., 4 T.

6TH FLOTILLA.—545 t., 30 kts., 2—15 pr., 3 T.

7TH FLOTILLA.—555 t., 32.5 kts., 2—15 pr., 4 T.

8TH FLOTILLA.—465—625 t., 27 kts., 3—4 pr., 3 T. (six boats), 32 kts., 2—15 pr., 3—4 T (five boats).

¹ Literal translation of German title.

² Ready at beginning of September.

³ Mean speed on trial.

⁴ Ready August 8.

⁵ Ready August 10.

⁶ Designed speed.

⁷ Refitting on outbreak of war.

⁸ Designed speeds given. The names of the boats composing the various flotillas are given in Monograph No. 11: "The Battle of Heligoland Bight, 28 August 1914." Appendix E.

SUBMARINES.

1ST FLOTILLA.—*Hamburg* (light cruiser), two T.B.D.s, submarines *U.5*, 7-10, 13-18.

2ND FLOTILLA.—*Stettin* (light cruiser), two T.B.D.s, submarines *U.19-25*, 27, 28.¹

MINELAYERS.

Nautilus, *Albatross*, *Pelikan*.

Auxiliary Minelayers *Königin Luise*, *Kaiser*, *Preussen*, *Silvana*, *Apollo*.

Minesweeping Service.

1st Minesweeping Division.—15 T.B.s.

2nd Minesweeping Division.—15 T.B.s.

3rd Minesweeping Division.—13 T.B.s.

Outpost Vessels.

40 trawlers.

HARBOUR DEFENCE FLOTILLAS.**Ems.**

Arcona (light cruiser), three T.B.s, 14 outpost vessels, Ems Minesweeping Division.

Jade-Weser.

Ariadne, *Berlin*,² *Niobe* (light cruisers), *Zieten*, *Blitz*, *Hay*, *Drache* (gunboats). Two T.B.D.s, five T.B.s, Wilhelmshaven and Jade Auxiliary Minesweeping Divisions.

Elbe.

Nymphe, *Medusa* (light cruisers), *Pfeil*, *Fuchs* (gunboats), two T.B.D.s, four T.B.s, Cuxhaven Minesweeping Division.

Heligoland.

Five T.B.s.

Eider.

Hyäne (surveying vessel).

APPENDIX C 1.**OPERATION SIGNALS, SWEEP OF GRAND FLEET, AUGUST 4-5.**

(From *Iron Duke's* Admiral's Log, No. 16970.)

AUGUST 4.**Position of Fleet.**

Battlefleet, *Southampton*, *Birmingham*, and 4th Flotilla at Scapa.

1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron (less *Roxburgh*), *Cochrane*, and *Achilles* off the Shetlands.

2nd Cruiser Squadron (less *Achilles* and *Cochrane*), *Roxburgh*, *Nottingham*, *Falmouth*, *Liverpool*, and 2nd Flotilla at Rosyth.

¹ *U.23*, *25*, *27*, *28* completing and working up on outbreak of war.

² At disposal of High Sea Fleet.

1. C.-in-C. H.F. to General.

Prepare for sea and raise steam for 3/5 power immediately. Report when ready to proceed. (4.30 a.m.)

2. C.-in-C. H.F. to R.A., 2nd C.S.

On leaving the Firth, spread your cruisers to visibility range and sweep towards lat. 58° 40' N, long. 1° 30' E, German armed mercantile (cruisers) reported in North Sea (0755).

3. C.-in-C. H.F. to *Southampton* and *Birmingham*.

1st L.C.S. is to weigh at 9 a.m. and is to await fleet to the eastward of the Skerries. (0825.)

4. C.-in-C. H.F. to V.A. 1st B.C.S. and R.A. 3rd C.S.

Vice-Admiral, 1st B.C.S., with the cruisers now under the command of R.A., *Antrim* sweep an area between a line drawn Muckle Flugga to Selbume Fiord (? Selbjörns Fiord) and Fair Island to Stavanger as far east of (? as) meridian of 2°, arriving on that meridian at 3 p.m. (0805.)

5. C.-in-C. H.F. to General.

The fleet will proceed out of harbour in the following order in organisation No. 1¹ 1st B.S., 3rd B.S., 2nd B.S., *Iron Duke* and 4th B.S. Each squadron will proceed in single line ahead in sequence of fleet numbers. The 1st B.S. will weigh by signal from *Iron Duke*. The 3rd and 2nd B.S. are to weigh by signal from their V.A.s commanding in time to follow. *Iron Duke* and 4th B.S. will weigh by signal from *Iron Duke*. 1st B.S. will weigh at 9 a.m. (0815.)

6. C.-in-C., H.F. to 1st B.S.

Weigh and proceed out of harbour. (9 a.m.)

7. Capt. D. (4) to C.-in-C. H.F.

Am waiting for you. My position is 58° 46' N, 30° 8' W (0925).

8. C.-in-C. H.F. to V.A. 1st, 2nd, 3rd B.S., R.A. 1st, 2nd, 3rd B.S., Comm. 1st L.C.S.

After having passed Pentland Skerries course East signal will be made A 2 pt.—3rd B.S. 3 miles astern of 3rd Div.—8 knots. (10.32 a.m.)

9. A.C. 1st B.C.S. to A.C. 3rd C.S.

Spread cruisers SSW visual distance apart and sweep as much of northern portion of area mentioned in C.-in-C.'s 0805. I shall sweep south—*Bonne Espérance* (0935).

¹ Organisation No. 1.

BATTLEFLEET.

1st Division.—1. *Marlborough*; 2. *Hercules*; 3. *Colossus*; 4. *Neptune*.

2nd Division.—5. *St. Vincent*; 6. *Superb*; 7. *Vanguard*; 8. *Collingwood*.

3rd Division.—9. *Iron Duke*; 10. *Dreadnought*; 11. *Temeraire*;

12. *Bellerophon*.

4th Division.—13. *Centurion*; 14. *Monarch*; 15. *Conqueror*;

16. *Thunderer*.

5th Division.—17. *King George V*; 18. *Ajax*; 19. *Audacious*;

20. *Orion*.

Note.—The *Centurion* and *Orion* exchanged fleet numbers on August 4.

THIRD BATTLE SQUADRON.

6th Division.—21. *King Edward VII*; 22. *Africa*; 23. *Britannia*;

24. *Commonwealth*.

7th Division.—25. *Hibernia*; 26. *Hindustan*; 27. *Zealandia*; 28. *Dominion*.

The 3rd Battle Squadron did not form part of the fleet for manœuvring purposes unless ordered.

10. C.-in-C. H.F. to R.A. 3rd C.S. and V.A. 1st B.C.S.
Devonshire return to Scapa Flow forthwith to complete with coal. (1022.)
11. C.-in-C. H.F. to Capt. D.4.
 When the fleet forms in A 2 pt. with 3rd B.S. 3 miles astern half of your flotilla is to be stationed one mile on the beam of *King Edward VII* and *Hibernia* respectively. (1100.)
12. C.-in-C. H.F. to General.
 Form Divisions line ahead, columns disposed abeam to starboard, course East. Pivot ships reduce to 8 knots to expedite manœuvre. Columns to be 6 cables apart. (11.20 a.m.)
13. C.-in-C. H.F. to 3rd B.S.
 Take station astern of Admiral 3 miles. (11.20 a.m.)
14. C.-in-C. H.F. to Comm. 1st L.C.S.
Boadicea has been sent to join you. 1st L.C.S. spread on a straight line 8 miles apart, centre of line 10 miles East from C.-in-C. My course and speed will be East 10 knots. (11.25 a.m.)
15. C.-in-C. H.F. to General.
 The fleet will be steaming 10 knots throughout the day unless anything occurs. Battlefleet to have steam ready for 16 knots and steam for full speed at one hour's notice. Light cruisers and attached cruisers to have steam ready for 18 knots and steam for full speed at one hour's notice. V.A.'s report back. (1120.)
16. C.-in-C. H.F. to Capt. D.4.
 Flotilla is to form a submarine screen ahead of battlefleet as follows. A sub-division is to be stationed $3\frac{1}{2}$ cables and 6 points before the beam of each of the 5 battleship divisions. The latter columns are 6 cables apart. (1212.)
17. C.-in-C. H.F. to V.A. 1st B.C.S.
 You need not get to second meridian till 4 p.m., inform 3rd C.S. as well. (1200.)
18. C.-in-C. H.F. to V.A. 1st B.C.S. and R.A. 2nd C.S.
 By 6 p.m. the V.A.C. 1st B.C.S. is to form all cruisers with him on a line of bearing N 68° E and steer S 22° E covering a front of 40 miles. This line is to be formed so that the cruiser on the eastern flank is to steer as if to leave Jaederens Point 18 miles abeam. At 3 a.m. cruisers are to be in a line bearing S 68° W from Haugesund. Speeds to be adjusted accordingly. The R.A.C. 2nd C.S. is to adjust his speed so that his northernmost vessel arrives in $58^{\circ} 22' N$, $1^{\circ} 6' E$, by 9 p.m. and to have them spread by that time on a line of bearing S 16° W. His course is to be altered at 9 p.m. to S 63° E and speed adjusted so as to arrive on the meridian $2^{\circ} 50' E$ at 3 a.m. Bearings and courses given are magnetic. At 3 a.m. the battlefleet will be in a position $58^{\circ} 45' N$, $1^{\circ} 58' E$. Further orders will be given as to movements after 3 a.m. (1435.)
19. C.-in-C. H.F. to R.A. 2nd C.S.
 During the dark hours the 2nd Flotilla should follow you 15 miles west of your centre. (1510.)
20. C.-in-C. to All Flag Officers and Capt. D. (4).
 Before dark drop flotilla astern of fleet, following about 15 miles astern, present course and speed will be maintained. Close up after daylight to-morrow Wednesday. (1625.)
21. C.-in-C. H.F. to A.C. 2nd C.S.
 2nd Flotilla to part company with you at dusk and return to Rosyth to fuel. It is not to pass May Island before 4.30 a.m. (1650.)

22. C.-in-C. H.F. to V.A. 1st B.C.S. and R.A. 3rd C.S.
Antrim and *Argyll* return to Scapa Flow to coal arriving during to-morrow forenoon. (1700.)
23. C.-in-C. H.F. to Ships in company.
 Ships to be darkened by 9.15 p.m. Columns to be opened to manœuvring distance before that hour. (1810.)
24. C.-in-C. H.F. to General.
 Ships are to be prepared for attack to-night. Half the anti-T.B. guns and one or two turrets are to be manned. If the fleet is attacked lights are on no account to be thrown towards other ships. (1852.)
25. C.-in-C. H.F. to *Southampton*, *Birmingham*, *Boadicea*, *Blonde*.
 Ships are to be darkened by 9.15 p.m. Battlefleet will turn round at daylight and steer towards Scapa. At 8 p.m. *Southampton*, *Birmingham*, *Boadicea* are to spread on a straight line 5 miles apart, centre of line 5 miles ESE from Flag. (1812.)
26. C.-in-C. to V.A. 1st B.C.S., R.A. 2nd C.S., Comm. 1st L.C.S.
 Battlefleet's 8 p.m. position $58^{\circ} 50' N$, $0^{\circ} 18' W$, course ESE, speed 10 knots during night, will turn towards Scapa at daylight. Cruisers coming to northward must be sure of passing well to eastward of battlefleet. Cruisers to southward must be careful to keep well to southward of battlefleet. Admirals commanding cruiser squadrons to close their cruisers and close battlefleet after daylight. (2053.)
- AUGUST 5.
27. C.-in-C. H.F. to 1st, 2nd, 4th B.S., 1st L.C.S., *Blonde*.
 Raise steam for full speed by 3 a.m. (1.5 a.m.)
28. C.-in-C. H.F. to 4th Flotilla.
 Raise steam for 25 knots by 3 a.m. (1.10 a.m.)
29. Admiralty to All Ships.
 Commence hostilities at once against Germany. (0100.)
Note.—Recd. by *Iron Duke* 1.30 a.m. Made general by *Iron Duke* at 4.45 a.m.
30. C.-in-C. H.F. to General.
 Alter course, leaders together the rest in succession, 16 points to starboard. (3.12 a.m.)
31. C.-in-C. to *Swift* (Capt. D. 4).
 Form screen as yesterday. (3.40 a.m.)
32. C.-in-C. to General.
 Columns to be 6 cables apart. (3.45 a.m.)
33. C.-in-C. to Light Cruisers.
 Spread on a straight line 5 miles apart, centre of line 5 miles N 75° W from C.-in-C. (4.25 a.m.)
34. C.-in-C. to 2nd C.S.
 Take Station SW by W $\frac{1}{2}$ W 10 miles. (6.20 a.m.)
35. C.-in-C. to *Nottingham*, *Liverpool*, *Falmouth*.
 Join 2nd C.S. to reinforce. (6.20 a.m.)
Note in log.—"6 a.m. sighted 2nd C.S. and 3 cruisers on port beam."
36. C.-in-C. to *Swift*.
 In the event of meeting enemy put half of your flotilla on each flank of battlefleet. (0715)
37. C.-in-C. to V.A. 1st B.C.S.
 Indicate your present position. Rejoin with all despatch. My present position $58^{\circ} 42' N$, $0^{\circ} 40' E$, course N 75° W, 12 knots. (0700.)

38. C.-in-C. H.F. to R.A. 3rd C.S. and *Devonshire*.
Devonshire is to join me at 15 knots. My 7 a.m. position
(as above). (0720.)
39. C.-in-C. H.F. to *Blonde, Bellona*.
Join me at 15 knots. My 7 a.m. position is . . . (as above). (0736.)
40. C.-in-C. H.F. to General.
Bank fires in boilers not required for 16 knots. (8.10 a.m.)
41. C.-in-C. H.F. to Battlefleet.
Steam for full speed is to be ready at half hour's notice. (8.15 a.m.)

APPENDIX C 2.

SWEEP OF NORTH SEA, 15, 16 AND 17 AUGUST. (H.F. 0022/3 of 13 August 1914.)

BATTLEFLEET.

The battlefleet and battle cruisers will pass between Fair Island and North Ronaldshay at midnight 14th-15th. Course will be altered for a position in lat. $58^{\circ} 40' N$, long. $3^{\circ} 45' E$ during the night, and this position will be reached about 6 p.m. (15th), when course will again be altered to the southward for a position in lat. $57^{\circ} N$, long. $4^{\circ} E$, where the battlefleet should arrive at 3.0 a.m.

FLOTILLAS.

2. The 2nd and 4th Flotillas will leave Scapa at such time before dark on 14th as to enable them to rendezvous at 4 a.m. 15th in lat. $59^{\circ} 7' N$, long. $0^{\circ} 40' W$, where they will join the battlefleet, except two divisions of 2nd Flotilla, which will join the battle cruisers 15 miles further eastward, the 4th Flotilla being to the northward of the 2nd Flotilla. On their way to the rendezvous the flotillas are each to sweep an area about 12 miles broad, but they are not to get off the line between the Pentlands and the rendezvous, or to the northward of lat. $59^{\circ} N$ before daylight.

After joining the battlefleet and battle cruisers, the destroyers will be stationed as submarine screens during daylight, and will probably be stationed on the flanks at night as a screen against torpedo craft, distant about 10 miles from the nearest battleship column.

The Captains (D) are each to detail one division of destroyers one hour before sunset, to search well astern and on the quarters of the battlefleet; after doing so these destroyers are to take station 12 miles astern until daylight and then rejoin the flotilla.

MINESWEEPERS.

3. Six minesweeping gunboats are to leave Scapa before dark on 14th and proceed by the direct course to lat. $58^{\circ} 40' N$, long. $3^{\circ} 45' E$, where they should arrive by 6 p.m., and form ahead of the battle cruisers, with whom two pairs are to work during the night unless otherwise ordered; the third pair will fall back to the battlefleet, getting their sweeps out at daylight and then cruising three miles ahead of the centre column.

If the two pairs with the battle cruiser squadron cannot keep up they are to fall back at once on the battlefleet and sweep one pair ahead of each of the wing columns, distance three miles, if they can keep ahead; if not, they are to keep out of the way.

If the enemy is sighted the minesweepers are to leave the fleet and act as the senior officers of minesweepers may direct.

BATTLE CRUISERS.

4. After passing between F air Island and North Ronaldshay, the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron is to take station ahead of the battlefleet (*vide* diagram attached, Cruising Order No. 1), its cruising order being left to the discretion of the Vice-Admiral Commanding.

Two divisions of 2nd Flotilla will join the battle cruiser squadron about 4 a.m. to act as a submarine screen.

CRUISERS AND LIGHT CRUISERS.

5. The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron (except *Liverpool*) is to be 40 miles ahead of the battlefleet, ships 10 miles apart (distances being decreased at night as shown in diagram); the squadron's position at 4 a.m. 15th to be adjusted accordingly.

The light cruisers are to adjust their position for the new course of the battlefleet at the proper time in the afternoon of 15th so as to be in their station 40 miles ahead of the battlefleet, covering a front of 40 miles, after the latter has altered course to the southward at 6 p.m.

The 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons will be stationed 10 miles in rear of the light cruiser screen, the 2nd Cruiser Squadron being on the port hand of the battlefleet and the third on the starboard; the two squadrons to be 15 to 20 miles apart (*vide* diagram).

The cruising order of these squadrons, as also their distance from the light cruisers and from one another, is not rigidly fixed, but is left to the discretion of the Rear-Admirals Commanding; the Rear-Admiral Commanding, 2nd Cruiser Squadron, being in general command of the three squadrons whilst thus stationed ahead of the battlefleet. Distances to be reduced at night.

MINES.

6. If the signal D L O is received by W/T at any time, it is to be reported to the bridge without delay. Commanders of columns will at once and without further orders turn their ships 16 points to starboard in succession unless for any reason this turn is dangerous or impracticable, in which case they are to take such steps for turning their column as they consider necessary.

Similar action is to be taken in the event of a mine being exploded ahead of the fleet.

A copy of this paragraph is to be placed in all wireless telegraph offices.

AUGUST 16.

CRUISERS AND LIGHT CRUISERS.

7. At midnight, August 15-16, the signal MK will be made to the cruiser and light cruiser squadrons, which are then to proceed as follows:—

1st Light Cruiser Squadron.

(a) Close in to six mile intervals on the centre ship.

(b) When the 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons are abreast of the squadron increase speed to 15 knots and sweep the area shown in the attached rough plan.

2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons.—Increase speed to 15 knots and spread to sweep the area shown in the plan.

These three squadrons should time their arrival on the Horn Reef—Flamborough Head line for 9 a.m. or a little later.

BATTLE CRUISERS.

Unless otherwise ordered the battle cruisers will continue their course and speed until daylight, when they will increase to 16 knots and proceed south in the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron area, being about 30 miles behind the light cruisers at 9 a.m.

The two divisions of destroyers of 2nd Flotilla will accompany the battle cruiser squadron; the minesweeping gunboats will fall back on the battlefleet.

BATTLEFLEET.

The battlefleet will probably continue its course and speed until daylight and will then alter course and speed as necessary to act best as support to the whole sweep.

Two divisions of 4th Flotilla will probably be detached some 10 miles to the eastward to look out in that direction and cover the battlefleet's flank; the remainder will continue to act as a submarine screen, taking up their positions for doing so soon after daylight and without further orders.

CRUISER FORCE C AND 1ST AND 3RD FLOTILLAS.

8. Whilst the Grand Fleet is carrying out the sweep described in the foregoing paragraphs, the 1st and 3rd Flotillas, supported by Cruiser Force C, will sweep the south-western area as far to the east as the line joining the Haaks Light Vessel and a position in lat. $54^{\circ} 30' N$, long. $3^{\circ} E$, in order that the movement may be a general one and cover as much of the North Sea as possible.

WITHDRAWAL.

9. About 9 a.m., when the cruisers have arrived on the advanced line (Flamborough Head—Horns Reef Light Vessel), they are to turn 16 points and retire, covering much the same area as that swept out going south. The above assumes that the enemy will not be met, or at any rate not in force, but if he is other action will be ordered.

Ships are not to cross the line Horns Reef—Terschelling Light Vessel unless ordered to do so by me, nor are they to approach the German coast within 20 miles.

It is considered not improbable that a line of mines running north-easterly and south-westerly will have been laid over a distance of 50 to 60 miles in the centre of the Heligoland Bight within 100 miles of Heligoland.

J. R. JELlicoe, *Admiral*.

CRUISING ORDER No. 1.

Light Cruisers.

O 10' O 10' O 10' O 10' O
10'



2nd (or 3rd) C.S.


10'

×



3rd (or 2nd) C.S.

15'



B.C.S.

15'

Destroyers searching.

2 (or 1) B.S.



4BS

3BS

Ships of 6th B.S.
stationed ahead of
columns of Dread-
nought ships.

1 (or 2) B.S.

The order shown above is typical only of day cruising order in clear weather; distances between ships and squadrons are to be adjusted by

officers commanding squadrons according to the requirements of a situation, the support necessary for other squadrons, etc.

The cruising order of the battle cruiser and cruiser squadrons individually is left to the discretion of the respective Flag Officers Commanding.

At night or in thick weather the distances between squadrons are to be adjusted to about half those given in the diagram, but the light cruisers ahead of the fleet should be closed to eight miles only unless there is reason otherwise.

The destroyers will be moved out to the flanks well clear of the battlefleet, and to act as flank guards.

Note.—In the original a “ Rough Plan of Sweep ” followed here. It differed in no respect from the sweep as carried out (*see* Plan IV) and has therefore been omitted.

APPENDIX C 3.

GENERAL ORDERS FOR A RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE BY CRUISER SQUADRONS AND FLOTILLAS.

(H.F. 0022/4 of 18 August 1914.)

The following orders are typical ; the reconnaissance may be ordered to be carried out on any day when the forces required are available and the weather is suitable.

2. The basis of the plan is to approach the Heligoland Bight during the dark hours, the advanced line of cruisers arriving on a line 60 miles from Heligoland at dawn, when two flotillas, accompanied by the Light Cruiser Squadron, will pass them and continue the reconnaissance for about another 30 miles, the cruisers following in support but at reduced speed.

3. The ships and destroyers taking part in the reconnaissance will be ordered to assemble at any convenient rendezvous before dark on the evening before ; the direction of reconnaissance will then be along the line joining the rendezvous position and Heligoland.

TYPICAL ORDERS.

4. The forces denoted are to rendezvous under the Rear-Admiral Commanding, 2nd Cruiser Squadron, in lat. long. at p.m.
on and are to be formed in the cruising order shown in diagram 1 and ordered to proceed in that order on a course (the direct course from the rendezvous to Heligoland) at 15 knots, so that the cruiser and light cruiser squadrons may arrive on the line drawn at right angles to the course, and 60 miles from Heligoland, at dawn next day.

The force will be supported by the battle cruiser squadron about 30 miles in rear.

At dawn the cruisers to reduce speed to 12 knots, and the two wing flotillas to increase to 20 knots and pass ahead, at the same time spreading their divisions or sub-divisions so as to cover the area shown and converging on one another as they close Heligoland.

These two flotillas to be supported by the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron (including *Liverpool*) working in pairs, the pairs being about five miles apart, and about three miles astern of the flotillas.

(C4509)

K

The 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons to close in on one another to a distance of not more than 10 miles, each squadron to concentrate in pairs a mile or two apart, but keeping on the move to avoid submarine attack.

The centre flotilla (4th) to detach one division to join the Battle Cruiser Squadron for submarine screening purposes; the remainder of the flotilla reducing speed at the same time as the cruisers and remaining in reserve near the ships of 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons.

The Battle Cruiser Squadron to reduce to 12 knots, so as to maintain its distance from the cruiser squadrons, whilst being ready to support if required.

Diagram 2 shows the approximate position of the various forces two hours after dawn.

5. The two advanced flotillas to sweep in to a distance of about 30 miles of Heligoland, which distance is not to be reduced except for the purpose of engaging enemy vessels. The minimum distance must be dependent partly on the position of our own submarines—this would be communicated beforehand.

The primary objectives of the flotillas are the enemy's torpedo craft and submarines, but they are not confined to these if a good opportunity occurs for attacking larger vessels; if the enemy is met in much superior strength the advanced force should fall back on the cruisers.

It is undesirable to risk the loss of a number of destroyers without compensating advantage to ourselves; subject to this, the senior officer on the spot must decide what is to be undertaken, bearing in mind the superiority possessed by our destroyers in gunfire over those of the enemy.

6. A variation of the above scheme which might be effective is to feint with a half flotilla from one flank—the remaining flotillas being held in reserve on the other flank. The advanced half to fight if they can find an enemy, but to draw off in the direction of their light-cruiser supports before becoming seriously engaged, so as to enable the remaining light cruisers and destroyers to cut off the German vessels from their base. The Commodore (T) should consider this alternative and prepare a detailed plan for the employment of the torpedo boat destroyers.


7. The whole force will be under the general command of the Rear-Admiral Commanding, 2nd Cruiser Squadron, who is to use his discretion according to information received from the front as to the employment of the reserve flotilla and the cruisers.

The Commodore Commanding, 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, will be in immediate command of the light cruisers and advanced flotillas during the advanced movement, but will leave the Commodore (T) entirely free to direct the operations of the flotillas so long as the situation permits. The closest co-operation between the two commodores is essential to the success of the operation.

RETIREMENT.

8. If nothing occurs to render an earlier retirement necessary, or if active operations are not in progress, the order for the retirement of the light cruisers and flotillas will be given by the Commodore Commanding, 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, when the advanced line is reached, and he will at once communicate this fact to the Vice-Admiral Commanding, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, and the Rear-Admiral Commanding, 2nd Cruiser Squadron.

The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron will retire over the same water as was covered during the advance; the 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons will diverge outwards one or two points so as to traverse new water, the light cruisers being in the interval between them. These squadrons should retire at 15 knots, the cruisers and light cruisers being spread to 10 miles or less distance apart, according to the visibility and the discretion of the officer commanding the squadron, or the senior cruiser admiral if general orders are necessary.






DIAGRAM 2, SHOWING APPROX. POSITION
OF FORCES 2 HOURS AFTER DAWN.
 ENCLOSURE TO H.F 0022/4 OF 18TH AUG. 1914

The Battle Cruiser Squadron should remain within 25 miles of the line joining the two cruiser squadrons, and the Light Cruiser Squadron should not be more than 15 miles astern of the same line.

The reserve flotilla to join the Battle Cruiser Squadron at 20 knots, sweeping up to them on a broad front, and subsequently to join the battlefleet.

Commodore (T) and the advanced flotillas (1st and 3rd) to accompany the Light Cruiser Squadron until detached by the Commander-in-Chief.

BATTLEFLEET.

9. The position of the battlefleet during the reconnaissance will be made known to the forces taking part; it will probably follow the Battle Cruiser Squadron and be from 30 to 40 miles astern at dawn.

The battlefleet will be accompanied by the four attached cruisers, minesweeping gunboats, and 2nd Flotilla.

MISTY WEATHER.

10. The operation cannot be carried out with success in misty weather, and should this be met with when nearing the position from which the light cruiser and destroyer reconnaissance is to start, the Rear-Admiral Commanding, 2nd Cruiser Squadron, is to inform me at once by the signal T Z L (weather prevents), and the signal to retire may then be expected from me, viz., S U W, followed by the time at which the retirement is to commence. Under these circumstances the order of altering course, without further orders, is to be—the battlefleet and battle cruisers at the time mentioned in the signal; the flotillas five minutes later; cruisers and light cruisers five minutes later than the flotillas.

J. R. JELlicoe, *Admiral.*

APPENDIX D 1.

OPERATION ORDERS, GERMAN SUBMARINE SWEEP TO NORTHWARD, AUGUST 6-11.

1st Submarine Flotilla Command.

North Sea, 5 August 1914.

OPERATION ORDER, No. 1.¹

1. Intelligence of the enemy. Will be communicated verbally.
2. Object. Attack on the main body of the enemy's fleet, believed to be in the North Sea, attack on all battle cruisers, cruisers, and light cruisers which may be encountered, light cruisers only if opportunities for firing are favourable. On the return passage every type of ship is to be attacked and the enemy damaged by every possible means.
3. Method of execution.

(a) *Submarines*.—Commence leaving harbour at 3.20 a.m. on August 6.² Instructions will be sent by W/T if unfavourable weather should necessitate postponement of the operation. "Fixed lines" and courses of wing boats as in accompanying sketch.³ Boats to be seven miles apart on the fixed line, sequence of boats from east to west as follows: U.13, 14, 15, 16, 17,

¹ G.O.H., Appendix 2.

² All times are as given in original, viz., one hour fast on G.M.T.

³ See Plan III.

18, 9, 8, 7, 5." They will proceed out of harbour in succession, commencing with the westernmost boat, U.5.

Courses to Line No. 1.

| | |
|-----------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. U.7 .. 330° (mag.) | 6. U.18 .. 311.5° (mag.) |
| 2. U.14 .. 326° " | 7. U.9 .. 308° " |
| 3. U.15 .. 322° " | 8. U.8 .. 305.5° " |
| 4. U.16 .. 318° " | 9. U.13 .. 303° " |
| 5. U.17 .. 315° " | 10. U.5 .. 301° " |

General course after passing line No. 1 is 343.5° (mag.).

(b) *Cruisers*.—The *Hamburg* and *Stettin* will cover the departure of the submarines from the south harbour. The course of the *Hamburg* is shown in the sketch. Position of enemy vessels, if sighted, will be signalled by reference to squared chart.¹ The limit of the advance of the cruisers is left to their own discretion. The cruisers are in no case to press back any opposing enemy patrols,² but instead are to endeavour to draw them in the direction of Heligoland, so that the submarines may pass them as quickly as possible.

(c) *Leader Boats*.—Half flotilla leaders are to follow behind and on the wings of the submarine line to act as W/T repeating ships, S.99 on the east, D.5 on the west. They are to turn back at their own discretion, at the latest after repeating the first sighting of the enemy report.

4. Instructions *re* W/T. In order to avoid discovery, submarines are not to use W/T except at 1 a.m. on the fourth day, when on line No. 3, according to the verbal instructions.

5. Torpedoes. These are to be fitted with net cutters.

6. Procedure in case of fog. Carry on with the operation.

7. Rendezvous. Heligoland.

(Signed) BAUER.

Korvettenkapitän.

Senior Officer, 1st Submarine Flotilla.

Issued to *Hamburg*, *Stettin*, 1st and 2nd Submarine Half Flotillas and all boats of the 1st Submarine Flotilla except U.10.

APPENDIX D 2.

OPERATION ORDERS, SUBMARINE ATTACK ON FORCES
COVERING BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

2nd Submarine Flotilla.

North Sea, 8 August 1914.

ORDER FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATION BY 3RD SUBMARINE HALF-FLOTILLA.³

1. The transport of the British Expeditionary Force is in progress, apparently to Zeebrugge, Ostend, Dunkirk, and Calais. Strong forces between the Dutch, Belgian, and English coasts are protecting the transports against attack from the North Sea. The first fleet is in the North Sea, presumably ready for action.

¹ "Quadratsignale."

² "Gegenwirkung."

³ G.O.H., Appendix 3.

2. The 3rd Submarine Half-Flotilla is to attack the covering forces. Ships only are to be attacked.

3. The 3rd Submarine Half-Flotilla is to leave Heligoland at once and proceed in company as far as 53° 50' N, 4° E, enemy counter-measures permitting. They are then to spread to a distance of 12 miles apart, so that the wing boats pass the line Swarte Bank Light Vessel—Terschelling Light Vessel as follows:—

Western wing boat in 53° 28' N, 3° E.

Eastern wing boat in 53° 28' N, 4° E.

If any counter-measures are met before this, the boats are to endeavour to reach the positions allotted to them on the line Swarte Bank Light Vessel—Terschelling Light Vessel independently.

4. Course for the advance S by W $\frac{1}{2}$ W. Submarines are not to advance beyond the line Outer Gabbard Light Vessel—Maas Light Vessel. If the enemy counter-measures are so strong that the boats can only advance submerged, they are to make certain of being able to pass the patrol lines submerged on their return without re-charging batteries, and are to regulate the distance of their advance accordingly.

5. Submarines are to return to Heligoland at their own discretion.

6. Torpedoes are to be fitted with net cutters.

(Signed) OTTO FELDMANN,

Korvettenkapitän.

Senior Officer, 2nd Submarine Flotilla.

APPENDIX D 3.

OPERATION ORDERS FOR SECOND GERMAN SUBMARINE
OPERATION TO THE NORTH, AUGUST 15-21.

2nd Submarine Flotilla Command.

Heligoland, 15 August 1914.

ORDERS FOR U.20 AND U.21.

LONG-DISTANCE OPERATION TO THE NORTH, 15 AUGUST 1914.¹

1. According to reports received British cruisers are stationed approximately on the line Peterhead (Kinnaird Head)—Ekersund (Obrestad). They probably patrol on this line at a great distance apart. The patrolling of the British coast by destroyers and aircraft as far as 120 miles from the coast must be counted upon.

2. U.20 and U.21 are to attack the cruisers stationed on the line mentioned above.

3. U.20 and U.21 are to proceed from Heligoland up the Norwegian coast, remaining in company, if possible, until reaching the coast of Norway. U.20 is to proceed as far as Ekersund, thence to steer for Peterhead. U.21 is to proceed to Obrestad, thence to Kinnaird Head. If the state of the submarines permits, U.21 is to go on to the Moray Firth (Cromarty Firth) and U.20 to the Firth of Forth, after which they are to return.

¹ G.O.H., Appendix 5.

4. Ships only are to be attacked. If no ships can be attacked during the operation, endeavours should be made, before returning, to sink a few destroyers so that the enemy may unpleasantly be made aware of the presence of German submarines. In these circumstances an attack is only to be made if it appears absolutely certain of success.

5. Torpedoes are to be fitted with net cutters.

6. The neutrality of Norway is to be respected unconditionally.

(Signed) OTTO FELDMANN.
Korvettenkapitän.
Senior Officer, 2nd Submarine Flotilla.

APPENDIX D 4.

ORDERS FOR GERMAN MINELAYING OPERATION OFF THE TYNE, AUGUST 25-26.

Order for Special Service in accordance with the Order of the Commander-in-Chief, High Sea Fleet, Gg. 1492 A.1, dated 22 August 1914.¹

1. *Forces*.—*Stuttgart*, *Albatross*, 11th Destroyer Half-Flotilla.

2. *Rendezvous*.—Heligoland Düne O1² 9 p.m., 23.8.1914, 11th Destroyer Half-Flotilla after coaling at Heligoland.

3. *Speed*.—12 knots.

At 9 p.m. on 24 August force is to be in position 1 in 55° 5' N, 0° 28' E, and to steer thence to position 2 in 55° 11.5' N, 1° 15' E.³

4. At daybreak the 11th Destroyer Half-Flotilla is to form a screen in front of the *Stuttgart*, destroyers to be two miles apart. At nightfall or in thick weather three destroyers are to close the *Stuttgart* and two destroyers are to close the *Albatross*.

5. The *Albatross* and two destroyers will be detached from position 2 to lay a minefield off the mouth of the Tyne. The *Stuttgart* and three destroyers are to steer SSE for one hour at slow speed, in order to cover the minelayer, then to steer a course 290°⁴ at 15 knots. The *Albatross* will follow at high speed and rejoin the *Stuttgart* at dawn.

(Signed) RICHTER.
Fregattenkapitän.
Captain S.M.S. *Stuttgart*.

Copies to (? C.-in-C.), High Sea Fleet,
Senior Officer of the Scouting Forces,
Albatross, 11th Destroyer Half-Flotilla.

¹ G.O.H., Appendix 8.

² This is not understood.

³ Should apparently read 1° 15' W.

⁴ This course appears to be a misprint (? 110°).

INDEX TO WARSHIPS.

(Reference to Sections.)

- A.10* (submarine), in the Clyde, 23.
A.11 (submarine), in the Clyde, 23.
A.12 (submarine), in the Clyde, 23.
A.A.29 (German trawler), reported laying mines, 68 f.n.
A.E.24 (German trawler), suspected of minelaying, 68.
Aboukir (armoured cruiser), 22; loss of, 63 f.n.
Achilles (armoured cruiser), at Shetlands, 19.
Adamant (depôt ship), 26.
Adventure (light cruiser), 8 f.n., 22.
Agamemnon (battleship), 2; joins 5th Battle Squadron, 22, 45.
Ajax (battleship), 20; operations, 39.
Albatross (German minelayer), 30; lays Tyne minefield, 65, 67.
Albemarle (battleship), joins Grand Fleet, 39, 45.
Albion (battleship), joins Cruiser Force I, 45; flagship in 7th Battle Squadron, 45 f.n.
Alsatian (armed merchant cruiser), joins 10th Cruiser Squadron, 64.
Amethyst (light cruiser), 15; tows *E.6* to Terschelling, 26; broad pendant of Comm. (T), 31, 32 f.n.; on Broad Fourteens Patrol, 45, 61; operations in Hoofden, 53; sweep of August 28, 64.
Amiral Aube (French armoured cruiser), on Western Patrol, 35.
Amphion (light cruiser), Captain D (3), sinks *Königin Luise*, 31; sunk, 32.
Anglia (fleet messenger), joins Grand Fleet, 36 f.n.
Antrim (armoured cruiser), coals at Scapa, 28.
Aquitania (armed merchant cruiser), 7; with Cruiser Force E, 36; paid off, 36.
Arethusa (light cruiser), broad pendant of Comm. T, 64.
Argyll (armoured cruiser), coals at Scapa, 28.
Ariel (T.B.D.), tows *E.8* to Terschelling, 26, 31.
Attentive (light cruiser), 8 f.n.
Bacchante (armoured cruiser), flag of Rear-Admiral Campbell, 22, 32.
Badger (T.B.D.), with Cruiser Force K, 67 f.n.
Beaver (T.B.D.), with Cruiser Force K, 67 f.n.
Berlin (German light cruiser), at Agadir, 1.
Birmingham (light cruiser), sinks *U.15*, 41.
Blanche (light cruiser), attached to 3rd Battle Squadron, 53.
Blücher (German armoured cruiser), 3; goes from Kiel to the Jade, 57; during raid on fishing fleet, 62.
Boadicea (light cruiser), 15 f.n.; brings Admiral Jellicoe to Scapa, 21.
Bonetta (T.B.D.), in the Clyde, 23.
Borkum (German trawler), sunk, 28 f.n.
Bulwark (battleship), 45 f.n.
Caesar (battleship), 45.
Cambria (fleet messenger), joins Grand Fleet, 36 f.n.
Canopus (battleship), joins Cruiser Force D, 45; in 7th Battle Squadron, 45 f.n.
Caronia (armed merchant cruiser), joins Force E, 36.
Centurion (battleship), 15; flagship of Second in Command of Grand Fleet, 21.

- Challenger* (light cruiser), patrols Bristol Channel, 22, 36; in North Channel, 23; joins Cruiser Force I, 36.
- Charybdis* (light cruiser), flag of Rear-Admiral Wemyss; on Western Patrol, 35.
- Châteaurenault* (French cruiser), on Western Patrol, 35 f.n.
- Circe* (minesweeping gunboat), in Pentland Firth, 33.
- Cochrane* (armoured cruiser), at Shetlands, 19.
- Cöln* (German light cruiser), reconnaissance west off Heligoland, 57, 62.
- Colossus* (battleship), operations, 43.
- Condé* (French armoured cruiser), in West Indies, 35 f.n.
- Cornwallis* (battleship), in dock, 45.
- Crescent* (cruiser), on Northern Patrol, 37.
- Cressy* (armoured cruiser), 22; loss of, 63 f.n.
- Cyclops* (repair ship) flag of Rear-Admiral Miller, 49 f.n.
- D.2* (submarine), off Ems, 55.
- D.3* (submarine), off Ems, 55.
- D.5* (submarine), attacks *Rostock*, 62.
- D.5* (German flotilla leader), operations, 41.
- D.7* (submarine), operations off Swarte Bank, 62.
- Danzig* (German light cruiser), reconnaissance, 62.
- Desaix* (French armoured cruiser), 35 f.n.
- D'Estrées* (French light cruiser), on Western Patrol, 35 f.n.
- Devonshire* (armoured cruiser), sweep of Norwegian coast, 28.
- Diamond* (light cruiser), goes to Ireland, 14; attached to Channel Fleet, 45.
- Diana* (light cruiser), on Western Patrol, 35.
- Doris* (light cruiser), flag of Rear-Admiral Hornby; patrols Western Approaches, 36.
- Drake* (armoured cruiser), guards Irish Sea, 22 f.n., 36; joins Grand Fleet, 36; searches Faeroes, 44; on Northern Patrol, 53.
- Dreadnought* (battleship), sights submarine, 39.
- Duncan* (battleship), in dock, 45.
- Dupetit-Thouars* (French armoured cruiser), 35 f.n.
- E.2* (submarine), operations off Swarte Bank, 62.
- E.4* (submarine), operations in the Bight, 62.
- E.5* (submarine), off Weser, 55; attacked by *Strassburg*, 61; operations off Swarte Bank, 62.
- E.6* (submarine), in the Bight, 26.
- E.7* (submarine), off Weser, 55; attacked by *Strassburg*, 61.
- E.8* (submarine), in the Bight, 26.
- E.9* (submarine), operations in the Bight, 62.
- Eclipse* (light cruiser), on Western Patrol, 35.
- Edgar* (cruiser), on Northern Patrol, 37.
- Endymion* (cruiser), on Northern Patrol, 37, 44, 53.
- Euryalus* (armoured cruiser), 22; flag of Rear-Admiral Christian, 51; sails to support *Fearless*, August 18, 61; sweep of August 28, 64.
- Exmouth* (battleship), joins Grand Fleet, 39, 45.
- Falmouth* (light cruiser), goes to Ireland, 14, 15.
- Fearless* (light cruiser), Captain D (I), sweep of Hoofden, 31, 32 f.n.; on Broad Fourteens Patrol, 45, 61; in raid on Broad Fourteens Patrol, 61.
- Firedrake* (T.B.D.), on Dover Straits Submarine Patrol, 26.
- Foresight* (light cruiser), 8 f.n.; goes to Ireland, 14; in Dover Patrol, 22.
- Formidable* (battleship), 45 f.n.

- Forward* (light cruiser), goes to Ireland, 14, 15; Shetland Patrol, 19.
- France* (French battleship), returns from Baltic, 16.
- Friant* (French light cruiser), joins Admiral Rouyer, 35.
- Friedrich der Grosse* (German battleship), Fleet Flagship, 16.
- Gibraltar* (cruiser), on Northern Patrol, 37, 44, 53.
- Gloire* (French armoured cruiser), on Western Patrol, 35.
- Glory* (battleship), joins Cruiser Force H, 45.
- Goliath* (battleship), 45 f.n.
- Good Hope* (armoured cruiser), 6 f.n., 53.
- Goshawk* (T.B.D.), action in Broad Fourteens, August 18, 61.
- Gossamer* (minesweeping gunboat), in Pentland Firth, 33.
- Grafton* (cruiser), on Northern Patrol, 37.
- Grosser Kurfürst* (German battleship), preparing for war, 25; goes to Kiel for training, 57.
- Gueydon* (French armoured cruiser), on Western Patrol, 35 f.n.
- Guichen* (French cruiser), on Western Patrol, 35 f.n.
- Halcyon* (minesweeping gunboat), Lowestoft Flotilla established, 33; sweeping operations, 61 f.n.
- Hamburg* (German light cruiser), 16; operations, 41, 57, 62.
- Hannibal* (battleship), goes to Scapa for harbour defence, 45.
- Hawke* (cruiser), on Norwegian patrol, 53.
- Hecla* (depôt ship), 20.
- Hogue* (armoured cruiser), joins Cruiser Force C, 7, 51; loss of, 63 f.n.
- Hude* (German trawler), sunk, 28 f.n.
- Illustrious* (battleship), crew taken for *Erin*, 45; sent to Loch Ewe, 50.
- Implacable* (battleship), 45 f.n.
- Indomitable* (battle cruiser), to join Grand Fleet, 63.
- Inflexible* (battle cruiser), to join Grand Fleet, 63.
- Invincible* (battle cruiser), flagship of Rear-Admiral Moore, 63; leaves for raid of August 28, 66; ordered to Rosyth, 67.
- Iphigenia* (minelayer), 9.
- Iron Duke* (battleship), Fleet Flagship; proceeds to Scapa, 31 July, 15, 20; hoists flag of Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, 21; at Scapa, 29; sights submarine, 39; conference of September 17, 50; operations, 53.
- Irresistible* (battleship), 45 f.n.
- Isis* (light cruiser), guards Irish Approaches, 36.
- Jackal* (T.B.D.), with Cruiser Force K, 67 f.n.
- Jason* (minesweeping gunboat), in Pentland Firth, 33.
- Jean Bart* (French battleship), returns from Baltic, 16.
- Jeanne d'Arc* (French armoured cruiser), on Western Patrol, 35.
- Juno* (light cruiser), patrols Northern Irish Sea approach, 23, 36.
- Jupiter* (battleship), joins 7th Battle Squadron, 45; in dock, 45 f.n.
- Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* (German armed merchant cruiser), escapes into Atlantic, 27, 28, 31, 37.
- Kaiserin* (German battleship), passes through Kiel Canal, 1 f.n.
- King George V* (battleship), 20.
- Kléber* (French armoured cruiser), on Western Patrol, 35 f.n.
- Kolberg* (German light cruiser), reconnaissance August 2, 18; supports raid on Broad Fourteens Patrol, 61.
- König* (German battleship), commissioned, 25.
- Königin Luise* (German auxiliary minelayer), operation off Thames, 30, 31, 32 f.n., 33, 52, 65.

- L.3* (German airship), 24.
Lance (T.B.D.), sinks *Königin Luise*, 31.
Landrail (T.B.D.), sinks *Königin Luise*, 31.
Lapwing (T.B.D.), action in Broad Fourteens August 18, 61.
Latona (minelayer), joins flag of Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, 9; employed as cruiser, 37.
Lavoisier (French light cruiser), on Western Patrol, 35 f.n.
Leander (depôt ship), 67 f.n.
Leda (minesweeping gunboat), 33.
Leviathan (armoured cruiser), guards Irish Sea, 22 f.n.; goes to Azores, 36.
Liverpool (light cruiser), on Irish coast, 15; in Grand Fleet, 53.
Lizard (T.B.D.), action in Broad Fourteens August 18, 61.
London (battleship), 45 f.n.
Lord Nelson (battleship), Flagship of Vice-Admiral, 2nd and 3rd Fleets, 45.
Lowestoft (light cruiser), 15.
Lurcher (T.B.D.), broad pendant of Comm. (S); on Dover Straits Patrol, 26; operations, 62.
Lusitania (armed merchant cruiser), 7, 36.
Magnificent (battleship), goes to Scapa for harbour defence, 45.
Maidstone (depôt ship), 26.
Mainz (German light cruiser), defences of Bight, July 31, 16; Reconnaissance August 2, 18; operations, 62; lays Humber minefield, 65, 68.
Majestic (battleship), in dock, 45; gunnery ship, 45 f.n.
Mantua (armed merchant cruiser), joins 10th Cruiser Squadron, 64.
Mars (battleship), goes to Humber for harbour defence, 45.
Marseillaise (French armoured cruiser), flag of Rear-Admiral Rouyer; on Western Patrol, 35.
Mauretania (armed merchant cruiser), 7, 36.
Minerva (light cruiser), patrols Western Approaches, 36.
Moltke (German battle cruiser), 16; during raid on fishing fleet, 62.
Monarch (battleship), attacked by submarine, 39.
Naiad (minelayer), joins flag of Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, 9; employed as cruiser, 37.
Natal (armoured cruiser), at Sheerness, 15.
Nottingham (light cruiser), 15.
Nautilus (German minelayer), 30; lays Humber minefield, 65.
New Zealand (battle cruiser), reports submarine, 53; joins Cruiser Force K, 63; leaves for raid of August 28, 66; ordered to Rosyth, 67.
Oak (destroyer), 15.
Ocean (battleship), joins Cruiser Force E, 45; in 7th Battle Squadron, 45 f.n.
Oceanic (armed merchant cruiser), to join 10th Cruiser Squadron, 64.
Orion (battleship), operations, 39.
Pactolus (depôt ship), 23.
Panther (German gunboat), at Agadir, 1.
Pathfinder (light cruiser), 21.
Pelorus (light cruiser), joins Cruiser Force E, 7; in Bristol Channel, 22, 23, 36.
Phoenix (T.B.D.), action in Broad Fourteens, 61.
Preussen (German auxiliary minelayer), 30.
Prince George (battleship), Flagship of Vice-Admiral Bethell, 45; private ship in 7th Battle Squadron, 45 f.n.

- Prince of Wales* (battleship), Flagship of Rear-Admiral, 5th Battle Squadron, 45 f.n.
Proserpine (light cruiser), attached to Channel Fleet, 45.
Queen (battleship), 45 f.n.
Roon (German armoured cruiser), *Rostock* mistaken for, 62.
Rostock (German light cruiser), reconnaissance west of Heligoland, 57; *Stralsund* mistaken for, August 18, 61; raids fishing fleet, 62.
Roxburgh (armoured cruiser), 15.
Royal Arthur (cruiser), on Norwegian Patrol, 53.
Russell (battleship), joins Grand Fleet, 39, 45.
S.99 (German flotilla leader), operations, 41.
S.138 (German T.B.D.), in Humber minelaying operation, 65 f.n.
S.139 " " " " " "
S.140 " " " " " "
S.141 " " " " " "
S.142 " " " " " "
S.143 " " " " " "
S.149 " " S.O., 3rd Half-Flotilla; in Humber minelaying operation, 65 f.n.
Sandfly (T.B.D.), with Cruiser Force K, 67 f.n.
Sapphire (light cruiser), Admiral Christian hoists flag in; off Ems, 53, 61; sweep of August 28, 64.
Scotia (fleet messenger), patrols Bristol Channel, 36.
Seagull (minesweeping gunboat), in Pentland Firth, 33.
Sentinel (light cruiser), 8 f.n., 22.
Seydlitz (German battle cruiser), Flagship of Admiral Hipper, 16; during raid on fishing fleet, 62.
Shannon (armoured cruiser), at Sheerness, 15.
Skipjack (minesweeping gunboat), in Pentland Firth, 33.
Spanker (Fleet sweeper), ordered to Humber, 66.
Speedwell (minesweeping gunboat), in Pentland Firth, 33.
Speedy (Fleet sweeper), ordered to Humber, 66.
Squirrel (fishery gunboat), 36.
Stettin (German light cruiser), on guard at Heligoland, 25; operations, 41, 57.
Stralsund (German light cruiser), defence of Bight, July 31, 16; reconnaissance August 2, 18; raid on Broad Fourteens Patrol, 61-63.
Strassburg (German light cruiser), returns from foreign service, 18; raid on Broad Fourteens Patrol, 32 f.n., 61, 63; raids fishing fleet, 62.
Stuttgart (German light cruiser), operations, 57, 62; lays Tyne minefield, 65, 67.
Surcouf (French light cruiser), joins Admiral Rouyer, 35.
Sutlej (armoured cruiser), joins Cruiser Force I, 7.
Swift (T.B.D.), Captain D (4), 20.
Swiftsure (battleship), 1 f.n.
Talbot (light cruiser), on Western Patrol, 35.
Tara (fleet messenger), patrols North Channel, 36.
Theseus (cruiser), on Northern Patrol, 37.
Thetis (minelayer), joins flagship of Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, 9; employed as cruiser, 37.
Thrush (fishery gunboat), guards Valentia cable landing, 36.
Topaze (light cruiser), attached to Channel Fleet, 45.

- Triumph* (battleship), 1 f.n.
U.5 (German submarine), operation to northward, 40, 41; raid on fishing fleet, 62.
U.7 (German submarine), operation to northward, 40.
U.8 " " " " 40, 41.
U.9 " " " " 40.
U.13 " " " " 40, 41; lost, 42, 57.
U.14 " " " " 40.
U.15 " " " " 40, 57; sunk by *Birmingham*, 42.
U.16 " " " " 40; raid on fishing fleet, 62.
U.17 " " " " 40; raid on fishing fleet, 62.
U.18 " " " " 40, 41.
U.19 " " operations in Hoofden, 47, 48; raid on Broad Fourteens Patrol, 61.
U.20 " " operations in the Bight, 57; to the northward, 58.
U.21 " " operations in Hoofden, 47, 48; in the Bight, 57; to the northward, 58.
U.22 " " operations in Hoofden, 47, 48; off the Humber, 59.
U.23 " " operations in Hoofden, 47, 48; raid on Broad Fourteens Patrol, 61.
V.151 (German T.B D.), in Tyne minelaying operation, 65 f.n.
V.152 " " abandons Tyne minelaying operation, 65.
V.153 " " in Tyne minelaying operation, 65 f.n.
V.154 " " " " " "
V.155 " " " " " "
V.157 " " in raid on fishing fleet, 62.
V.161 " " S.O., 11th Half-Flotilla; in Tyne minelaying operation, 65 f.n.
V.189 " " on reconnaissance, 57.
Venerable (battleship), 45 f.n.
Vengeance (battleship), joins 8th Battle Squadron, 45; Flagship of 7th Battle Squadron, 45 f.n.
Venus (light cruiser), patrols Western Approaches, 36.
Victorious (battleship), office of A.O.P., 19 f.n.; goes to Humber for harbour defence, 45, 67 f.n.
Von der Tann (German battle cruiser), supports scouting operation, July 31, 16; in dock, 62.
Yorck (German armoured cruiser), *Stralsund* mistaken for, August 18, 61.

LIST OF NAVAL STAFF MONOGRAPHS (HISTORICAL) ISSUED TO THE FLEET.

- | | | | | | |
|-------------------------|----|-----------|----|-----------|---|
| C.B. 917 (octavo) | .. | Vol. I | .. | Monograph | 1. Coronel. |
| | | | | | 2. German Cruiser Squadron in Pacific. |
| | | | | | 3. Falklands. |
| | | | | | 4. <i>Goeben</i> and <i>Breslau</i> (superseded by Monograph 21). |
| C.B. 917(A) (octavo) | .. | Vol. II | .. | | 5. Cameroons, 1914. |
| | | | | | 10. East Africa, to July, 1915. |
| C.B. 1585 (foolscap) | .. | Vol. III | .. | | 6. Passage of B.E.F., August, 1914. |
| | | | | | 7. Patrol Flotillas at commencement of war. |
| | | | | | 8. Raid on N.E. Coast, December 16, 1914. |
| | | | | | 11. Heligoland Bight, August 28, 1914. |
| | | | | | 12. Dogger Bank, January 24, 1915. |
| C.B. 917(B) (octavo) | .. | Vol. IV | .. | | 15. Mesopotamia. |
| C.B. 917(C) (octavo) | .. | Vol. V | .. | | 14. First Australian Convoy, 1914. |
| | | | | | 16. China Squadron, 1914 (including <i>Emden</i> Hunt). |
| | | | | | 17. East Indies Squadron, 1914. |
| | | | | | 20. Cape of Good Hope Squadron, 1914. |
| C.B. 917(D) (octavo) | .. | Vol. VI | .. | | 18. Dover Command. I. |
| C.B. 917(E) | .. | Vol. VII | .. | | 19. Tenth Cruiser Squadron I |
| | | | | | 25. The Baltic, 1914. |
| C.B. 917(F) | .. | Vol. VIII | .. | | 21. The Mediterranean, 1914-1915. |
| C.B. 917(G) | .. | Vol. IX | .. | | 22. Atlantic, 1914. |
| | | | | | 26. Atlantic, 1915. |
| | | | | | 27. Battles of Coronel and Falkland Islands. |
| C.B. 917(H) | .. | Vol. X | .. | | 23. Home Waters. Part I. |

