Maritime military powers in the Indo-Pacific Region: A comparative analysis of Japan, Australia and India, 1980–2017

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Introduction

The global maritime domain exists not only for logistics and commercial traffic but also as a military operational domain in which state actors compete. It is important to understand each actor's maritime military strategies and the best framework for an analysis of these strategies. This paper uses a comparative analysis of Japan's, Australia's and India's military strategies in the maritime domain from 1980 to 2017. It examines their force building and their tendencies at the military-strategic level, as per the analytical framework illustrated in Table 1.

Name	Power direction	Definition
Area denial	Land/coast to the sea	Denying military threats from the maritime domain. This encompasses theatre-level operations, roughly 1–2000 kilometres from the coastline.
Sea control	On the sea	Securing military superiority in the maritime domain, and impeding opponents' military action at sea.
Power projection	From the sea to Land/coast	Projecting military hard power against other territories from the maritime domain, to accomplish military-strategic ends.

Table 1: *The analysis framework of this article*[1]

Based on this framework, this article reveals the three powers' military strategies in the maritime domain and whether they proactively aim to enhance their influence in the maritime domain or aim to project their hard power onto other countries/areas.

Firstly, the paper analyses previous naval strategic theories or maritime theories: 'sea power arguments'. Secondly, it clarifies the appropriateness of the strategies, based on an analysis of the military-strategic environments of the Far East theatre in the late Cold War era and the current Asia-Pacific theatre. Finally, this article examines case studies for the three countries and their transition of military strategies, and explains the cause-and-effect relationship between US military predominance in the maritime domain and their military strategies.

'Dualisms' in sea power

Many strategists' sea power arguments are derived from Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett, history's best-known sea power strategists. Elinor Sloan argues that 'a handful of scholars, analysts and practitioners' are associated with post-Cold War strategic thought on sea power. Their ideas have helped to modernise, elaborate and advance the limitations of Mahan and Corbett.[2]

Some previous sea power arguments were preoccupied with 'dualism', shaped by Mahan's 'sea control' and Corbett's argument of 'projecting power from the sea'. James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara examine Chinese naval strategy in the 21st century, and their main hypothesis is that 'Alfred Thayer Mahan's writings and theories on sea power furnish an indispensable framework for understanding China's emerging maritime strategy'.[3] A similar idea can be seen in *British Maritime Doctrine*, published in 2011:

> The principles of British maritime power apply across the full spectrum of maritime activity which delivers the military tasks detailed by the government. Using Alfred T Mahan and Julian Corbett's works, Ken Booth described a 'trinity' of '3 characteristic modes of action by which navies carry out their purposes: namely the military, the diplomatic and the policing functions'.[4]

During the Cold War, the US Navy regarded sea control as more important than power projection. In 'Project Sixty', the secret strategic document initiated by Admiral Elmo Zumwalt in 1970, the US Navy re-adapted this strategy against the Soviet threat. The report argued that the US Navy should regard sea control as taking precedence over power projection.[5]

The US emerged as the predominant military force and a unipolar superpower after the Cold War in 1989 and subsequent dismantling of the Soviet Union in 1991. Following this, the military-strategic environment drastically changed alongside the paradigm shift in the international political system, including the justification of interference and commitment based on 'the victory of democracy'. James Mayall explains the critical issue regarding international society in the post-Cold War era:

Since 1989, the problem of cultural and political diversity has resurfaced in international life. It manifests itself in three closely related, and over-lapping, debates, which form the main focus of this book. These debates are about sovereignty, democracy and intervention. To be more precise, they are about the meaning and relevance of sovereignty and its relationship to national identity and the principle of self-determination; about the claim that democracy should form the basis of the world order – with its upshot that democratisation should be both the objective and the primary instrument of conflict resolution; and about the possibility of using outside force, not merely to deter aggression and that justification for intervention should be humanitarian.[6]

This 'claim' to democratise the remaining non-democratic countries during the post-Cold War era justified interference in and commitment to certain foreign regimes. The 'Western pact' meant the victory of values: liberty and democracy. At that time, the US and its allies' military power enjoyed supremacy in the maritime domain without competitors. Their military power was one of the key enablers to realise commitment to international society and was underpinned by US sea control. Furthermore, the military focal point inevitably moved from sea control to power projection, which enabled physical commitment to other countries beyond the sea. In 1994 the US Navy publication, *Forward. . . From the Sea*, explained the strategic way ahead for the US Navy, which now gave power projection its highest priority.[7]

This fundamental shift was a direct result of the changing strategic landscape, away from global maritime threats and towards projecting power and influence across the seas in response to regional challenges. Additionally, many sea power arguments did not pay enough attention to area denial despite the fact that it relates to homeland defence directly and is an essential factor of military power. Further, there are other geopolitical viewpoints for sea power arguments. For example, Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, former Chief of the Royal Australian Navy, described the sea power concept: 'If there is a core concept that has underpinned traditional consideration of sea power, it is the interlinked ideas of sea control and sea denial.'[8] Barrett's words highlight another dualism, namely 'sea control and sea denial'. His geopolitical viewpoint was mirrored by Halford

Mackinder, who described the confrontation between Ancient Greece and Persia as an 'issue was joined between sea-power and land-power', over the domination of the Aegean Sea.[9] In a conventional geopolitical contention, sea power and land power configure an axis of conflict and a further dualism. This geopolitical argument, 'competition between land power and sea power', is significant in various fields such as diplomacy, economy, trade and history, and it is quite difficult to explain clearly whether one country can be defined as a sea power or land power in military strategy terms.

US dependence on sea lines of communication (SLOC) is relatively small because the country's domestic fuel market is less dependent on imported fossil fuels than China's. On the other hand, the US is regarded as a sea power because of its military overseas deployments and their influence in the maritime domain. In contrast, many people think of China as a typical land power. China depends on imported fossil fuels due to its rapid economic development since the end of the 20th century. Roughly 78per cent of the oil imported by China in 2011 sailed from the Middle East and Africa. China imports about 80 per cent of fossil fuels via the Malacca Strait, and based on this, it is possible to define China as a sea power.[10]

Previous sea power arguments can be classified into two dualisms: 'sea control and power projection', or 'sea control and area denial'. However, these two approaches cannot explain military strategy in the maritime domain comprehensively. The next two sections show the appropriateness of this article's analysis framework of area denial, sea control and power projection.

The Far East theatre during the Cold War era

In the 1980s, the 'New' Cold War surfaced with a high-intensity military confrontation between two superpowers. At that time, the Soviet Union realised that submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), and nuclear-powered, ballistic missile-carrying submarines (SSBNs), were the country's most critical asset due to their stealth and mobility, assuring the Soviets second strike capability in their nuclear deterrence policy. This 'deterrence by punishment' capability was central to the strategic stability between the United States and the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the functionality of the Soviet Navy changed from an auxiliary force to one that enjoyed 'truly strategic missions'.[11]

But this did not mean that the Soviet Navy changed its order of battle symmetrically in comparison to the US Navy. Michael MccGwire regarded the Soviet Navy as 'not as self-contained as the U.S. Navy', but as 'task-specific fleets' to protect SSBNs.[12] MccGwire explained that the Soviet Navy concentrated on securing the Sea of Okhotsk, the SSBNs' patrol area, as a 'maritime bastion'.[13] The main mission of large surface combatants is to secure their nation's SLOC and to defeat an adversary's maritime forces in the open sea – this is called sea control. But the Soviet Navy often used its surface combatants as one of its area denial components. The main mission for the Soviet Navy was to deny US naval forces access to the Soviets' SSBN patrol area. This strategic direction was called 'sea denial', used as a synonym for area denial in this article.[14] To conduct a sea-denial strategy, Soviet forces used a variety of assets: nuclear submarines, surface vessels, missile-carrying and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) naval aviation, naval infantry and coastal missile-artillery troops.[15] Until the late 1970s, the Soviet Navy's order of battle surpassed that of the US except for aircraft carriers.[16] The Soviets deployed their supersonic long-range bombers, such as the Tu-22 'Backfire', to deny US forces operational access, as well as fortifying some of the critical sea areas. The US and its allies prioritised an offensive capability to capture these fortified seas.

At the beginning of the 1980s, the US Navy adopted the *Maritime Strategy* to overcome the Soviets' hard area-denial posturing. The 1984 version of the US *Maritime Strategy* recognised the Soviet Union's sea-denial capability, as reflected in Figure 1.[17] At that time, the US Navy recognised that Soviet forces had achieved sea control in the surrounding seas and were able to carry out sea denial within 2000 kilometres of the 'sea control' area's outer edge. 'Soviet sea control', which is defined in the *Maritime Strategy*, meant that the Soviets had exclusive use of geographic/climatic closed seas, including the Sea of Okhotsk, the North Sea and the Barents Sea. This definition has a quite different context in comparison with the conventional definition, which indicates freedom of use of the sea or SLOC in the open seas. Accordingly, 'sea control' in this context, which encompasses occupying geographic/climatic closed seas, will be categorised with area denial in this article.

INITIAL WARTIME AREAS OF OPERATION

SOURCE:
NIE 11-15

■ SEA CONTROL AREAS
▧ SEA DENIAL AREAS
▨ U.S. ALLIES/FORWARD DEPLOYED GROUND/AIR FORCES

Figure 1: *The Soviet Union's area denial in the late stage of the Cold War*

The US Navy estimated that Soviet air and maritime assets would deploy to the vast operational area beyond the Kamchatka Peninsula and the Aleutian Islands to deny US naval forces. Figure 2 illustrates the deployment of both forces in the late stage of the Cold War.[18] This shows that nuclear submarines deployed from their base in the Kamchatka Peninsula to the western Pacific, long-range bombers from inland, and surface combatants advanced from Vladivostok to the southern part of the Sea of Okhotsk. It was anticipated that the Soviet Navy would lay mines around the Aleutian Islands and the Tsushima Strait to deny the US aircraft Carrier Battle Group
.

Figure 2: *The Soviet Union's 'maritime bastion strategy'*

Japan's 'National Defence Program Outline', formulated in 1976, showed that Japan expected US nuclear capability as an extended deterrence,[19] and also expected US forces to secure SLOC in the open seas, coupled with a series of offensive operations.[20] The Japan Self-Defence Forces (JSDF)

complemented US sea-control and secured geographic space for US power projection by interrupting Soviet forces. To accomplish this, the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) aimed to interrupt Soviet surface combatants and submarines in the chokepoints, especially the Soya, Tsugaru and Tsushima Straits. The primary mission for the Japanese Air Self-Defence Force (JASDF) was air defence operations, while the Japanese Ground Self-Defence Force (JGSDF) protected the northern part of Hokkaido and provided shore defence with land-based anti-ship missiles.[21] The primary mission of the three services was to establish Japan's area denial against the Soviet Union's area-denial strategy. As Figure 3 shows, Hokkaido, the Soya Strait and the Tsugaru Strait were considered to be within the Soviet Union's 'inner-defence zone' for its maritime bastion strategy.[22]


Figure 3: *Japan's recognition of the Soviet Union's maritime bastion strategy*

Japan was the only location in the western Pacific Ocean that could provide sufficient industrial and technological infrastructure to US forces. Guam and other surrounding locations could supply water, provisions and fuels, temporarily. The increase in operational distance mitigated plans to conduct out-of-range operations to minimise battle damage and weakened conventional power-projection capability.[23] Despite vulnerability to military attacks, the Japanese needed to carry out an area-denial strategy before US forces performed their offensive strategy of sea control and power projection.

The Asia-Pacific theatre in the 21st century

Since the latter half of the 2000s, many military strategy analysts recognised that China has enhanced its military capability in tandem with its rapid economic development, using a military strategy often called 'Anti-Access/Area Denial' (A2/AD). A 2007 report published by the RAND Corporation claimed that China would not challenge US military superiority in symmetrical ways but would develop a surprise pre-emptive attack capability, otherwise known as an 'anti-access strategy'.[24] The People's Liberation Army (PLA) recognised its military technological inferiority and intended to reform its force structures to win the local 'high-tech' wars. The US and its allies showed their military superiority during the Gulf War, during which time the PLA could not respond to the US Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) deployed around Taiwan in the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. The CSGs showcased their highly accurate and lethal firepower; joint use of air, land and sea forces; intense use of information technology; and high mobility, lethality and resource consumption.[25] Moreover, the RAND report concluded that the 'anti-access strategy' imposed a huge 'operational access' cost on US forces.

Accordingly, the strategic end of the PLA's A2/AD strategy is to deny US power projection typified by the CSG asymmetric force structure. This concept is similar to the Soviet Union's 'maritime bastion strategy' or 'sea denial' during the Cold War and categorised as 'area denial' in this article. As shown in Figure 4, the PLA established its area-denial capability– the 'dragon's lair'– within an area stretching about 1500 kilometres from the Chinese coastline and covering parts of Japan's mainland, Taiwan and the northern half of the Philippines.[26] Therefore, all the facilities of US forces in Japan were positioned within the PLA's area-denial capability. The US

had few alternatives in the Asia-Pacific region, so both Japan and the US maintained these facilities for US power projection capability, despite pre-emptive attack possibilities.

"The Dragon's Lair"—Portions of the Western Pacific Most Vulnerable to Chinese Antiaccess Measures

Figure 4: *The PLA's area denial in 2007*

The weapons used specifically for A2/AD include ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, anti-satellite weapons, air-defence systems, submarines and mines.[27] Figure 5 shows Andrew Krepinevich's view on capability, and supposes that the PLA's area-denial strategy can interrupt US power projection in the seas remote from China's homeland, similar to the Soviet Union's 'maritime bastion strategy' shown in Figure 1.[28]

Figure 5: *The PLA's area denial assets*

Many argue about China's military strategy. Aaron Friedberg defined 'Air-Sea Battle' as a 'direct approach' against China's A2/AD strategy. He described various alternatives and categorised them in two ways: distant blockade and maritime denial.[29] Distant blockade aims to contain China's maritime transport, such as crude oil tankers, based on US sea control outside of China's A2/AD capability. Maritime denial aims to deny the PLA's air and naval assets deployment by using submarines, mines, stealth aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles operating within the PLA's A2/AD coverage. With maritime denial, US forces would abandon their sea control, with the strategic end of disrupting their opponents' sea control as the second-best way. This is called 'maritime no-man's-land' because each side cannot take sea control around the contested area.[30] It is possible to carry out highly precise area-denial strategies equally if each actor possesses advanced military capability. Contemporary military strategies in the maritime domain should be analysed not by dualisms – 'sea control or power projection,' and 'sea control or area denial' – but by these three elements: 'area denial, and sea control, and power projection'.

Sea power utilities

There are various utilities of sea power besides military use. Ken Booth famously argued that the navy has three roles: military, policing and diplomatic, as shown in Figure 6.[31] The military role encompasses strategic deterrence, conventional deterrence, extended deterrence and maintaining international order.[32]


Figure 6: *Ken Booth's 'trinity' of naval roles*

Booth argues that sea power has been used in both peacetime and war-fighting situations and is more flexible than land power that deploys force beyond its territory and which typically means invasion. In contrast, sea power's flexibility has seen naval forces used for various tasks in peacetime and deployed globally. Likewise, Edward Luttwak stated that 'in having a peacetime political function in addition to their combat capabilities, naval forces are like all other forms of military power, only more so'.[33] Luttwak also argued that various political uses of naval power can be outlined as 'suasion', which tells a nation's intention to all opponents. The US Navy carried out over 70 counts of 'suasion' between post-World War II to the 1970s.[34]

Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, President of the US Naval War College in the 1970s, argued that the missions of the US Navy were four-fold: strategic deterrence, sea control, projection of force ashore, and naval presence, as shown in Figure 7.[35]

INTERDEPENDENT NAVAL MISSIONS

USEFULNESS OF CATEGORIZING NAVY MISSIONS

Figure 7: *Missions of the US Navy in the 1970s*

Turner argued that peacetime uses of sea power were recognised as the navy's main mission from the 19th century as follows: 'the first and only mission of the earliest navies was sea control', but 'during the 19th century, the term "gunboat diplomacy" came into the naval vocabulary'.[36] The 2015 revised version of *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* explains the main functions of the different capabilities: all domain access in response to rising anti-access/area denial challenges, deterrence, sea control and power projection, and maritime security to combat terrorism, illicit trafficking, piracy and threats to freedom of navigation in the maritime domain.[37]

It is useful for each country and navy to explain its view of the utility of sea power in peacetime and not just during war-fighting. Such an explanation can appeal to naval forces' value during peace and verify their legitimacy at all times. But when we aim to assess military capabilities in the maritime domain, especially the analysis of high-intensity capabilities, it is not appropriate to confuse peacetime usage and war-fighting capabilities. For a capability-based assessment, it is appropriate to assess war-fighting capability, which is based on area denial, sea control and power projection, rather than political or diplomatic usefulness. In the following sections, this article analyses the military strategies of three major actors in the Indo-Pacific region: Japan, Australia and India.

Case study 1: Japan

Japan's maritime military strategy can be categorised according to three different time periods between 1980 and 2017. First, the late Cold War era, during which Japan dealt with the Soviet Union's maritime bastion strategy; second, the country's maritime commitment in the post-Cold War era; and finally, Japan's response to China's maritime expansion in the 21st century. Japan was located within the Soviet Union's area-denial capability and resided within the operational range of the Soviets' advanced command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) network, long-range bombers and missiles. Accordingly, Japan had to develop capabilities such as anti-air warfare (AAW), anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and mine warfare (MW) to offset the Soviet Union's hard area-denial capability and secure the geographic basis for US power projection and the protection of Japan's SLOC. *Defence of Japan 1986* described major maritime operations conducted by JMSDF and the US Navy as:

JMSDF
- Operations for the protection of Japan's major ports and straits;
- Anti-submarine operations in Japan's surrounding sea;
- Operations for the protection of shipping.

US Navy
- Support JMSDF operations;
- Providing mobility and strike power.

Also, *Defence of Japan 1986* explained JASDF operations as:[38]
- Air defence;
- Anti-airborne and anti-amphibious invasion;
- Close air support;
- Airborne reconnaissance;
- Airlift.

In the late 1980s, Japan's Defence Agency introduced a new interceptor, the F-15, and the P-3C maritime patrol aircraft in the *Medium Term Defence Program (FY1986–FY1990)*[39] and decided to develop an at-sea air defence capability by introducing the AEGIS combat system.[40] In this

way, the JSDF developed its area-denial capability within Japan and its surrounding seas. This development aimed to secure the geographic basis for US power projection and complemented US sea control through air defence capabilities such as an AEGIS destroyer and wide-area ASW capabilities like the P-3C.

After the Cold War, and based on US military predominance, Japan aimed to extend its overseas influence, especially in the security domain. Soon after the conclusion of the Gulf War in April 1991, the Japanese government ordered the JMSDF to deploy a minesweeper group to the Persian Gulf. This group consisted of four minesweepers, a minesweeper-tender and a replenishment vessel. This was the JSDF's first overseas deployment, after which it took part in various international and security peacekeeping activities, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations such as the Sumatra-Andaman earthquake and the 2004 tsunami.

In addition to HA/DR operations, the Japanese government ordered the JMSDF to deploy surface combatants and replenishment vessels to the Indian Ocean by the enactment of *Antiterrorism Special Measures Law* in October 2001. Since 2009, the JMSDF has participated in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. The JMSDF extended its maritime operational area rapidly, and the JSDF was not limited to peacetime activities, actively supporting low-intensity conflicts. In 2008, Rear Admiral Tomohisa Takei, Director General of Operations and Plans Department in the JMSDF Maritime Staff Office, stated that military forces or alliances are compelled to redefine their roles and significance because the possibility of a high-intensity or large-scale conflict had decreased. On the other hand, the Japanese military forces were committed to contributing to international stability. Not unlike other military forces around the globe, the operating environment surrounding the JMSDF has rapidly expanded globally.[41]

As a counterpoint to this view, the instability surrounding Japan in the post-Cold War era remains. North Korea is the most imminent threat to Japan because of its ongoing use of spy boats and development of prohibited nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. After the *National Defence Program Guideline for FY2005 and Beyond*, JSDF official publications highlighted ballistic missile defence as one of the JSDF's major missions.[42] Japan continues to support anti-terrorism operations and contributes to international security and expanding its political presence, while

recognising the direct military threat close to home. Takei argued the strategic ends of Japan's maritime defence as:[43]

- Defending Japan's surrounding seas;
- Securing freedom of use of the sea;
- Contributing to establishing a more stable security environment.

To adapt to the drastic changes in the security environment of the post-Cold War era and the expansion of its operational areas, the JMSDF developed its force structure in a self-contained fashion. This trend developed into a long-term operational capability in far seas known as 'sea-basing', as well as a stronger air defence capability. In particular, this has seen the introduction of *Osumi* class LST landing vessels, and *Hyuga* and *Izumo* class helicopter carriers (CVH). The JMSDF has continuously developed its ability to conduct independent sea control operations in far seas even after the 1980s.

Despite having a far-seas operational capability, Japan has maintained a strategic defensive posture since World War II. The JSDF does not possess power projection capability for high-intensity conflicts, such as a conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) aircraft carrier, or land-attack cruise missiles. In the same way, the JASDF does not possess long-range bombers, and its primary capabilities are interceptors, attack aircraft for close air support, and air defence missile systems.[44] The JASDF has operated airborne early warning aircraft since 1987 and possesses joint direct attack munitions (JDAM). Accordingly, the JASDF has basic land-attack capabilities, but does not possess a stand-off electronic jammer necessary for penetration of an adversary's air defence capability. The ability to conduct high-intensity operations can only be performed within Japan's homeland and surrounding air area, which means that the JASDF components should be categorised as having an area-denial capability. The JASDF has expanded its operational area to the maritime domain, a change that can be seen in the 2010 *National Defence Program Guideline for FY2011 and Beyond* as a 'response to attacks on offshore islands'.[45]

China has rapidly developed its military power during the 21st century. Its primary strategic objective is to construct advanced theatre-level area denial, including 1000 kilometres from its coastline, and to maintain local military supremacy. Since 2010, the PLA Navy (PLAN) has built

large surface combatants such as aircraft carriers, missile destroyers and amphibious assault landing vessels, rather than the diesel submarines and small missile patrol boats that are typical area-denial assets. Accordingly, the PLA is not only developing its A2/AD strategy against the US and allies, but continues to expand its sea control and power projection capabilities. Backed by this advanced military capability, China continues its assertive diplomatic behaviour with regards to ongoing territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas.

Similar to the environment during the Cold War, Japan is prepared to respond to any advanced area-denial strategy near Japan's territory. To do so, Japan has to establish its area-denial capability to secure US power projection infrastructure and complement US sea control for securing Japan's SLOC. While the US Navy argues the necessity of re-enforcing sea control capability, the JMSDF has increased its number of surface combatants.[46] In 1976 the JMSDF had 60 major surface combatants, as stated in the National Defence Program Outline (NDPO), but this decreased to about 50 in 1995's NDPO, then 47 in 2004's *National Defence Program Guideline* (NDPG). This decreasing trend in ship numbers was reversed in 2010's NDPG and increased to 48, and then revised up to 54 in the 2013 NDPG. On Japan's area-denial capability, the number of submarines increased from 16 to 22 in 2010's NDPG. The 2013 NDPG also stated that 'The JSDF will maintain surface-to-ship guided missile units to prevent the invasion of Japan's remote islands'.[47] In this way, the JSDF gradually revised its capability to deal with China's maritime expansion through adjusting the resource distribution between sea-control capability and area-denial capability.

Tables 2 and 3 outline the numerical transition of JMSDF's assets from 1984 to 2014.[48] The numbers of major JSDF assets were limited through the annexed table in each NDPO and NDPG and can be observed as quite static, thus it is important to pay attention to the qualitative transition. The number of major vessels in the JMSDF is shown in Table 2.

Type	1984	1994	2004	2014
Submarine	14	17	16	18

| Escort Vessel | 50 | 61 | 54 | 47 |
| Landing Ship | 6 | 6 | 3 | 3 |

Table 2: *The numerical transition of JMSDF submarines, escort vessels and landing ships, 1984–2014*

Table 2 shows the number of maritime assets that are designated by annexed tables in each NDPO and NDPG. 'Escort vessels' with a displacement of less than 3000 gross tons are classified as 'frigates', while vessels greater than 3000 gross tons are shown in Table 3.[49] A 'large surface combatant' (according to *Jane's Fighting Ships* or *The Military Balance)* is classified as a vessel that is larger than 3000 gross tons.

Type	1984	1994	2004	2014
Submarine	14	17	16	18
Helicopter Carrier	-	-	-	2
Cruiser	-	-	-	2
Destroyer	19	35	44	37
Frigate	31	26	10	6
Landing Ship	6	6	3	3

Table 3: *The numerical transition of JMSDF major sub/surface assets, 1984–2014*

Table 3 shows the increase in large surface combatants after the Cold War era. All platforms are equipped with advanced satellite communication, tactical datalink and anti-air missile systems to contribute ASW and AAW at sea. Also, the number of submarines is gradually increasing. The JMSDF's sea-control capability is limited, because it does not possess any CTOL aircraft carriers or other such powerful assault capabilities. However, it has, developed sea-basing and sea-control capabilities to respond to high-intensity conflicts to a certain degree. Conversely, the number of frigates smaller than 3000 gross tons has decreased remarkably because the total number of surface combatants is fixed by the NDPG. In conclusion, Japan's maritime military strategy is configured

to distributing resources between sea-control capability, which complements the US, and area-denial capability, aimed at countering China's military developments.

Case study 2: Australia

Australia's approach is different from Japan's and India's because it has not yet recognised the imminent and advanced military threats that have arisen since the end of the Cold War, taking for granted US military dominance. For a long time after World War II, Australia complemented British or American sea control, yet also remained committed to helping regional neighbours during peacetime or low-intensity conflicts. Since the 1990s, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) has developed power projection through the acquisition of amphibious capabilities and simultaneously invested in their *Collins* class diesel submarines and Lockheed AP-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft. Accordingly, the ADF has gradually changed its force structure to control Australia's vast territory and surrounding seas. On the other hand, according to Paul Dibb and Richard Brabin-Smith, 'we're still planning on roughly the same number of combat aircraft as were considered appropriate 30 years ago for the "core force"', and 'The numbers of frigates and destroyers are also little changed'.[50]

The centre of gravity in the Cold War was located in the Far East theatre, especially in the Sea of Okhotsk, which meant that the Soviet Union's military presence deployed around Australia was limited both in quality and quantity. Since the Cold War, Australia's strategy has been to stabilise South East Asian countries, such as Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, and the surrounding maritime domain. For the most part, Australia has committed to low-level operations and conflicts in this area. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) has consistently emphasised sea control by surface combatants and has gradually invested in amphibious capability and power projection in the post-Cold War era. The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) has also focused on power projection rather than territorial air defence. However, since 2010 China has been expanding in the South China Sea and the Western Pacific theatre and Australia may soon face a large power directly in the maritime domain. Many experts, scholars and practitioners have argued back and forth on these developments, but these arguments have not caused any real strategic change, especially in the ADF's force structure.

During the Cold War, Australia was a Commonwealth member and party to the Western pact through the ANZUS Treaty. In the 1960s, the Soviet Union's military influence did not affect Australia directly. However, in Indonesia, the Sukarno administration took a pro-Communist posture, and its political regime was considered a potential threat to Australia. An Australian political document published in 1963 stated that 'a threat to Australia's strategic interests could arise from an ultra-nationalist Indonesia pursuing an expansionist policy'.[51] The political instability of Indonesia, or the Malay Peninsula, was a threat to Australia's SLOC.[52] At that time, the RAN's main force was composed of equipment purchased or supported technologically by the UK: the RAN's submarines were based on the Royal Navy's (RN) *Oberon* class; the RAN's aircraft carrier, HMAS *Melbourne*, was one of the RN's *Majestic* class; and the RAN *River* class frigates were a sister class of the RN's Type 12 frigates.[53]

The declaration of 'British withdrawal from the East of Suez' in the late 1960s had a huge impact on Australia's security and diplomacy. 'The British Withdrawal' is the name of a chapter in the 1968 strategic document 'Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy', which includes these lines:

> The withdrawal of British military power from Malaysia/Singapore by 1971 and the large reduction in its strategic support to South-East Asia will weaken the position in the Malaysian/Indonesian area. In respect of China and North Vietnam, the responsibility for preserving the balance of power has been, and will continue to be, the United States.[54]

Australia relied on US military power more than ever after the British withdrew from Asia in the early 1970s, and Australia fought alongside the US in the Vietnam War. Australia's geographic proximity to South East Asia was influential and of great benefit to the US during the geographic-limited conflict within the land domain. In the maritime domain, the strategic centre of gravity was consistently located in the Far East theatre, especially in the Sea of Okhotsk as the Soviet Union's 'sanctuary'.

From the late 1970s, the Soviet Navy expanded its operational area and strengthened its political presence around South East Asia. For example, Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam was the replenishment base for the Soviet Navy, though its activity was ad hoc due to the US Navy's sea control. In a

strategic document published in 1976, the Australian Department of Defence evaluated the Soviet Union: 'At present, the USSR offers Australia itself no direct military threat – although, in the improbable event of general war, the USSR might attack Australia with nuclear weapons.'[55] Because Australia's strategic environment held no imminent or high-intensity threat, the RAN and the RAAF existed to complement US forces and were committed to low-intensity conflicts as a primary mission during the late Cold War era.

The RAN has not possessed an aircraft carrier since the retirement of *Melbourne* in 1982. In a secret study about the future of naval air power carried out between 1970 and 1971, the transcript of a meeting between the Australian Defence Minister and Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Chief of US Naval Operations, noted that the Defence Minister was interested in a light aircraft carrier and vertical take-off and landing aircraft.[56] However, the main purpose of the study was to review amphibious and ASW capabilities. In that study, the RAN recognised that they did not possess large-scale ASW capability: 'It will include escort, support and/or focal area operations, but will exclude hunter/killer operations as being too unproductive for a force as small as Australia's.' A concept of 'helicopter ship and troop carrier (LPH) was at the forefront of the study'. This suggests that the RAN would implement ASW against Soviet submarines, whose operational area had expanded, and also deal with low-intensity conflicts with a commitment to South East Asia in mind, rather than supporting US sea control.

Australia's assessment of its strategic environment was consistent and did not change in the late Cold War era. The 1987 Defence White Paper, *The Defence of Australia 1987*, showed its strategic end-state as 'independent defence of Australia and its interests, promoting strategic stability and security in our region and limiting the spread of influences in our region inimical to Western interests'.[57] The paper mentions the alliance with the US: 'redistribution of power in favour of the Soviet Union in the central balance, or an extension of Soviet influence in our region at the expense of the United States, would be a matter of fundamental concern to Australia and would be contrary to our national interests'.[58] It goes on to say that 'no regional country now has the capability – nor the motivation – to sustain high level intensive military operations against Australia'.[59] Australia

did not recognise any imminent high-intensity threat around its homeland and territorial waters. This paper proposed 'priorities for force development' and explains low-level conflict.[60]

Travis Hallen, a staff member at the RAAF Air Power Development Centre, argues 'this [self-reliance] direction would be provided... in Paul Dibb's 1986 *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities* published and the subsequent 1987 Defence White Paper'.[61] But power projection capability, which is key for commitments to surrounding areas, was limited to major RAAF assets, such as the F-111, at that time. The RAN's amphibious capability was quite limited because the RAN did not acquire large landing ships during the Cold War era and possessed only one landing ship, HMAS *Tobruk* (5700 gross tons); only later, in 1994, did it acquire two larger *Newport* class LSTs from the US.[62]

Australia enhanced its commitment to surrounding areas and expanded its national interest based on US military predominance as a unipolar power during the post-Cold War era. The 1994 Defence White Paper defined the surrounding areas as 'comparatively peaceful' and mentioned the situation in the Korean Peninsula and territorial disputes around the South China Sea. The RAN developed its amphibious capability remarkably in the post-Cold War era. The RAN's capstone doctrine, *Australian Maritime Doctrine* 2010, examined amphibious capability under the heading 'The Fall and Rise of Australian Amphibious Capability, 1980s–2010'.[63] During the 1980s, government policy rejected an amphibious capability as inappropriate for Australia's defence force structure. However, a succession of regional crises highlighted inadequacies in the ADF's strategic lift, expeditionary and intervention capabilities, leading not only to the retention of existing amphibious vessels but also to the acquisition of additional capabilities. Since 1990, the RAN has continuously regarded amphibious operations as important. The RAN replaced the *Newport* class LSTs with two large amphibious assault ships, the *Canberra* class LHD (27,000 gross tons), and developed its power-projection capability.[64]

Australia's principal military strategy gave a high priority to proactive commitment during peacetime and low-intensity conflict rather than homeland defence against a high-intensity threat in the 21st century. The 2016 Defence White Paper indicates that Australia's strategic interests are 'a secure, resilient Australia, with secure northern approaches and proximate sea lines of

communication; a secure nearer region, encompassing maritime South East Asia and the South Pacific; and a stable Indo-Pacific region and a rules-based global order'.[65] To accomplish these strategic goals, the White Paper explains the strategic priorities as 'Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Space, Electronic Warfare, and Cyber Security', and names the P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft and MQ-4C unmanned aerial vehicle as capabilities. It refers to 'Maritime Operations and Anti-Submarine Warfare Forces' and examines air defence capabilities such as the *Hobart* class Air Warfare Destroyer and a shipbuilding plan for nine future frigates 'optimised for anti-submarine warfare' and replacing the *Anzac* class frigates.[66]

Australia's maritime military strategy is based around the assumption of US military predominance in the maritime domain, and gives high priority to sea control in surrounding seas and power projection in surrounding areas. Sea control is regarded as important for responding to contingencies in peacetime and low-intensity confrontations and stabilisation operations in surrounding areas, rather than for a self-contained, high-intensity war-fighting capability. The RAN's *Australian Maritime Doctrine* states that one of the purposes of sea control is for 'Maritime Trade Protection', with the main threats from piracy and terrorism.[67]

Table 4 shows the dynamics of the RAN's major sub/surface assets. The RAN has not possessed aircraft carriers since 1982 and its force has remained fairly static except for changes in the amphibious force.[68]

Type	1980	1990	2000	2010	2015
Submarine	6	6	4	6	6
Aircraft Carrier	1	-	-	-	-
Large Surface Combatant	7	7	10	12	12
Landing Ship	1	1	3	3	3

Table 4: *Numerical transition of the RAN's major assets, 1980–2015*

In the same way, the RAAF does not envisage high-intensity air defence being conducted in Australian airspace. The F-111, a major asset from the 1960s until 2010, was not optimised for air

defence but for land and anti-ship attacks. Similarly, as a successor to the F-111, the RAAF chose the F/A-18, which is not specialised in air defence but has a ground attack capability. The RAAF's website describes major aircraft with the categories 'strike; air mobility; intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance; aviation training' – no assets are described as specialised for air defence within Australia.[69]

Neither the RAAF nor the Australian Army possesses long-range anti-aircraft or anti-ship missile systems. The 2016 Defence White Paper argues for 'land-based anti-ship missiles', but as of March 2018, no specific acquisition plans have been seen.[70] As Paul Dibb and Richard Brabin-Smith argue, 'China's military presence over 1,200 kilometres is closing into our northern approaches. This development in itself should be a matter of considerable concern for our defence planning', and 'One option open to Australia is to develop our own version of an anti-access and area-denial capability, especially in our northern and western approaches and the eastern Indian Ocean'. There are many arguments as to China's maritime expansion but almost no specific force structure change has been realised.[71] Table 5 shows the number of major RAAF assets from 1980 to 2015.[72]

Type	1980	1990	2000	2010	2015
Mirage III	62	-	-	-	-
F-111	20	18	35	19	-
F/A-18, F/A-18F	-	48	71	71	95
P-3B/C	20	20	17	19	18

Table 5: *The RAAF's major assets, 1980–2015*

Case study 3: India

At the beginning of the 21st century, India drastically changed its military strategy from area denial aimed at the US Navy's sea control and power projection, to a strategy of sea control. Since its independence, India has characterised its basic diplomacy as 'omnidirectional', although in

August 1971 it concluded an 'Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation' with the Soviet Union. Arguably, India could have been considered as a potential adversary of the US, given the US–Pakistan relationship at that time. David Brewster argues that 'India used its position as a leader of the nonaligned movement'.[73] On the other hand, the nation-building of Hindu India itself caused territorial and religious disputes.

India became involved in disputes with the Islamic countries of East and West Pakistan (modern-day Bangladesh and Pakistan), and went to war with Pakistan over control of Kashmir; today, India is involved in several territorial disputes with Pakistan and China. Ken Nagao notes that up to 2010 India had carried out 28 'military actions' since independence.[74] Many of these actions were carried out on land, although some included landing operations by naval vessels. The second chapter of the Indian Defence Ministry's 2007 *India's Maritime Military Strategy,* 'Implications of Recent Maritime History', looks at the second Indo-Pakistan War, 1965, and the third war, in 1971. These two conflicts were categorised as land warfare in principle: naval operations, such as amphibious assault, were carried out in support of army operations.[75] Through this lens, in the period from independence to the end of the 20th century, India can be defined as a typical land power and did not depend on maritime trade or SLOC. The country's low industrialisation level did not require it to expand into the maritime domain. After the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict, India's military modernisation favoured the army and air force.[76]

During the Cold War, India regarded the maritime domain as an axis where potential threats might originate. The US cancelled military and economic support to India due to the third Indo-Pakistan War. Additionally, the US Navy redeployed the USS *Enterprise* carrier battle group from the Vietnam War to the Bay of Bengal until the Indo-Pakistan cease-fire in January 1972.[77] The US government did not express a clear intention for this carrier deployment, but the *Enterprise* incident prompted a shift in the Indian Navy's strategic focus towards one of sea denial.[78] India's sea denial strategy was reinforced after the early 1980s when the US strengthened and upgraded its military base on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia.[79]

Table 6 shows changes in major Indian naval vessels from 1980 to 1990.[80] As this figure shows, the number of landing ships and submarines rapidly increased between 1985 and 1990. This

tendency demonstrates the importance of amphibious operations for the Indian Navy when dealing with Pakistan. Further, the navy also invested in area-denial capability, aimed against US sea power.

Type	1980	1985	1990
Nuclear Attack Submarine	-	-	1
Diesel Submarine	8	8	18
Aircraft Carrier	1	1	2
Destroyer / Frigate	30	27	25
Landing Ship	1	9	10

Table 6: *Numerical transition of major Indian naval vessels, 1980–1990*

In the 1990s, the navy's power-projection capability was accentuated to support land warfare against Pakistan. The navy possessed two aircraft carriers operating Sea Harrier light fighter aircraft and an embarked Russian helicopter. Considering these embarked assets, the aircraft carriers could contribute to sea control in coastal seas only and not within the greater Indian Ocean. In the same way, the number of surface combatants decreased, and the Indian Navy's sea-control capability could not compete with US naval power on the highs seas. To carry out large-scale military operations the navy did not possess sea-control capability without support from the air force. However, their area-denial capability was developed, to an extent, in the following five years. The navy introduced two *Shishumar* class (German Type 209) and seven *Shindhughosh* class (Russian *Kilo* class) submarines between 1985 and 1990. The air force also modernised, with many major assets replaced by newer aircraft such as the Jaguar, Mirage2000 and MiG23/27/29.[81] Nevertheless, these aircraft were relatively small, carried a limited payload, and had a limited operational cruising range. Accordingly, these assets did not possess sufficient capability to

operate in the vast Indian Ocean, and their major operations were air defence and close air support for land forces.

The importance of the Indian Ocean increased vastly over the next few decades, becoming a large highway for maritime transportation during the 21st century. According to Robert Kaplan, the Indian Ocean contains 'the principal oil shipping lanes, as well as the main navigational choke points of world commerce – the Straits of Bab el Mandeb, Hormuz, and Malacca. Forty per cent of seaborne crude oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz at one end of the ocean, and 50 per cent of the world's merchant fleet capability is hosted at the Strait of Malacca, at the other end – making the Indian Ocean the globe's busiest and most important interstate'.[82] Many threats face India in the region. To the west of India, several Middle Eastern and African countries face political instability, as well as being originators of terrorism and piracy. In order to ensure economic prosperity for India, it is vital to secure the Indian Ocean's stability and maintain good order at sea and protect the local and global SLOC. In the course of China's military developments in the maritime domain, the US, Japan and many South East Asian countries have engaged with and sought to enhance their strategic cooperation with India. Robert Kaplan also said of the Indian Ocean that 'overlapping configurations of pipelines and land and sea routes will lead more to *Metternichean* balance-of-power politics than to Kantian post-nationalism'.[83] Thus, the strategic value of India and the Indian Ocean will continue to soar.

Over time, the strategic relationship between the US and India has been strengthened, and military cooperation, including bilateral and multilateral exercises and dialogues, have evolved out of this closer relationship. Accordingly, 'by the end of the 1990s, the dominant emphasis in Indian strategic thinking had settled on building a new partnership with the U.S. as part of a multidirectional engagement with other major powers'.[84] India enhanced its position as a sea power because of growing strategic interests in the Indian Ocean. Consequently, the budget share of the Indian Navy increased from 11 per cent in 1992/93 to 18 per cent in 2008/09.[85] To that end, India has gradually changed its maritime strategic focus from area denial against the US to regional sea control in the Indian Ocean. In the view of David Brewster, 'the Indian Navy now sees itself as destined to be the predominant maritime security provider from the Red Sea to Singapore',[86]

and David Scott also argued that the Indian Navy pursues Alfred Thayer Mahan's conceptual thinking on sea control.[87]

Complicating the strategic situation, China is one of India's most important trading partners, a relationship that is vital for India's economic development. Fareed Zakaria argues that 'it will especially mean that India will not want to be seen as actively involved in a balancing strategy against China, which is becoming its chief trading partner'.[88] Nevertheless, India is cautious about China's maritime expansion beyond the South China Sea. In the 21st century, China has enhanced its economic and political relationship with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. China developed large-scale commercial ports such as Gwadar in Pakistan and Hambantota in Sri Lanka, regarded as important bases for maritime trade. Analysts argue that China's actions are a 'String of Pearls' strategy.[89] These commercial ports are far away from China's mainland and there are no specific prospects for securing their logistics in wartime, so 'China's power projection capabilities in the Indian Ocean are very limited and are likely to remain so far the foreseeable future'.[90] However, India remains concerned about the deployment of PLA submarines and surface combatants in the Indian Ocean. For example, one retired Indian army general 'worried about India's ability to sustain its claims to regional primacy, depicting China as "muscling its way into the Indian Ocean", which New Delhi has always considered its backyard'.[91] Also, a few Indian military officials expressed concern in 2013 that Chinese submarines operated in the Indian Ocean under the pretext of conducting anti-piracy operations and entered port in Sri Lanka.[92] To respond to this strategic environmental change, the navy developed its sea-control capability. Ken Nagao explained this trend by the numerical transition of the navy's large surface combatants (refer to Table 7).[93] There has been a consistent increase since 1990 in the number of large surface combatants (greater than 3000 gross tons) with long-term operational capability and equipped with anti-air warfare systems.

Number of vessels

Table 7: *The number of Indian Navy large surface combatants, 1950–2014*

Table 8 shows commissioning years of major vessels in the Indian Navy, demonstrating a renewal of surface combatants that has prevailed from the end of the 1990s to 2015. Aside from the ageing submarines, numbers of area-denial assets are rapidly progressing.[94]

Type	~1985	1986–1995	1996–2005	2006–2015
Nuclear Attack Submarine	-	-	-	1
Diesel Submarine	-	12	1	-
Aircraft Carrier	-	-	-	1
Destroyer, Frigate	5	2	9	11

Table 8: *Commissioning years of major Indian naval vessels in 2014*

In the same way, the air force has modernised and also seen its budget increase consistently since the 1990s. However, the air force has not experienced military operations and its ability to do so is unknown. Due to 'command and control' challenges, without the support of their army the air force is limited to South Asia's land domain as an operational area.[95] Estimated major air force assets in 2020 are shown in Table 9. A drastic change of force structure seems unlikely in the near future.[96]

In conclusion, one of the most critical military-strategic objectives for India has been to exclude outside major powers: the US in the Cold War era, and China in the 21st century.[97] To do so, India practised area denial against the US, which possessed military predominance, and must now confront China's sea control in the Indian Ocean.

TABLE 2. Prospective IAF Force Structure: 2020

Role	Aircraft	Number	Squadrons
Air Superiority	Su-30MKI	280	~15
	MiG-29	50	~3
Air Combat: MMRCA	Mirage 2000	50	~3
	MMRCA Selectee	126/200	~7/11
Air Combat: Light	Tejas	125	~7
Strike	Jaguar	110	~6
Total		741/815	~41/45

Table 9: *An estimate of the Indian Air Force's structure in 2020*

Conclusion

The military strategies of Japan, Australia and India have been influenced and modified by various factors in the maritime domain. Firstly, diverse and complicated elements influence a country's military strategy: geographical environment, industrial power, economy and trade posture, natural resources, population, educational standards, historical background, religion, values, political/military leadership and so on. Secondly, the influence of a country's military strategy on another country can be unpicked by understanding whether it accepts US military predominance in the maritime domain or not. Finally, the US itself has changed its maritime military strategy by giving priority to sea control or power projection at different times. This article has examined each maritime strategy with several critical assumptions. As a first point, this article argues through a realistic viewpoint, that all of the actors are rational. Accordingly: nuclear deterrence as effective; a bipolar world in the Cold War era; US dominance and a unipolar world in the post-Cold War

era; and a multipolar world in the 21st century. This article assumes that each actor has advanced military technology composed of advanced C4I, long-range precision strike capability and so forth. Based on these independent variables and assumptions, these three countries' military strategies in the maritime domain can be explained as dependent variables.

Japan expanded its maritime operational area and aimed to enhance its national interest by developing a sea-control capability in the post-Cold War era. But Japan assigned many of its military resources to area denial for homeland defence rather than sea control in the late Cold War era and 21st century, to deal with the Soviet Union and China, respectively.

Australia has enjoyed a moderate military-strategic environment since the 1980s without an imminent high-intensity threat in the surrounding seas, supported by the provision of a stable security environment provided by a solid US partnership. But Australia may soon need to respond to China's maritime expansion.

In the late Cold War era, India's potential adversary was the US and its primary military-strategic end-state was area denial against US sea control and power projection. But the relationship with the US improved after the Cold War, and India now regards sea control as important because of the country's economic development and globalised economy, driven by the Indian Ocean as a critical maritime transportation highway.

Assumptions
Each actor is rational at constant level / Nuclear deterrence effects /
Each actor possesses advanced military technology

Independent variable 1: The US military strategic priority in the maritime domain; sea control or power projection

Independent variable 2: Each actor accepts the US's military superiority or not

Accept the US's military superiority

Not accept the US's military superiority

Dependent variable 1-1	Dependent variable 2-1
> Relies on US sea control and expand its maritime influence > No imminent high-intensive threat a. Japan in the post-Cold War era b. Australia c. India in the 21st century	> Develop area denial capability against the US's military superiority a. India in the late Cold War era (China from 1990s to around 2010) (Soviet Union / Russia)

Affector 1	Affector 2
The country recognises imminent and powerful threats in its vicinity	The country has a necessity to expand its own maritime interest

| Dependent variable 1-2	Dependent variable 2-2
> Pursues both sea control and area denial a. Japan in the 1980s and after 2010 b. Australia in the near future?	> Develop area denial at first, but also develop sea control and power projection (China since around 2010)

Figure 8: *Causal relationships discussed in this article*

Figure 17 summarises these arguments and shows the causal relationships in this article. The figure includes some of the other countries referred to in this article, China and Russia, as references.[98] Not considered in the figure is the fact that the Indian Navy provides free education and training support on submarine operations for the Vietnam Navy, and that both navies purchased *Kilo* class submarines from Russia.[99] This phenomenon can be explained as part of India's area denial against China, hoping to use the Vietnamese Navy.

Endnotes

[1] The analytical framework of this article was first proposed in the doctoral thesis by Keitaro Ushirogata, *Kaiyo ryouiki ni okeru gunji-senryaku no hensen ni kansuru hikaku-kenkyu* (The Comparative Analysis of Military Strategies in the Maritime Domain, 1980–2017 – Viewpoint from Area Denial, SLOC Defence/Disrupt, Power Projection), Ph.D. Thesis, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, 2017, http://www.grips.ac.jp/en/dtds3/ushirogata_keitaro/ (accessed 9 March 2018), p. 8.

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[15] Barnett, 'Soviet Maritime Strategy', p. 320.

[16] International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance 1985–1986,* Autumn 1985, pp. 9, 24. Shingo Yoshida, *51taikou-ka no boueiryoku seibi – sea lane bouei wo cyuushinni, 1977–1987* (Force Building Based on the National Defence Program Outline in 1976, Focusing on Sea Lane Defence, 1977–1987), *Japan Association for International Security*, No. 44, Vol. 3 (December 2016), p. 37.

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[19] 'National Defence Program Outline', adopted by the National Defence Council and decided by the Cabinet on 29 October 1976.

[20] Yoshida, *51taikou-ka no boueiryoku seibi,* p. 37.

[21] At that time, Japanese and US military officials argued the possibility that the Soviet Union would invade the northern part of Hokkaido to secure operational access in the Soya and Tsugaru Straits, in order to establish its area-denial strategy. Shigeki Nishimura, *Nihon no bouei senryaku wo kangaeru – global approach ni yoru hoppo zenpo boueiron* (Thinking Japan's Defence Strategy – Forward Defence in the Northern Part of Japan), *Shin Boei Ronsyu (The Journal of National Defence)*, Vol. 1, No. 12 (1984), p. 63.

[22] Nishimura, Shigeki, *Rikujoujieitai no yakuwari no henka to shin-bouei senryaku no teigen* (A Proposal for Establishing Japan's New Defence Strategy through the Change of JGSDF's Primary Mission), *Shin Boei Ronsyu* (*The Journal of National Defence*), Vol. 2, No. 26 (1998), p. 4.

[23] This concept is called 'the tyranny of distance'.

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[39] Japan Defence Agency, *Defence of Japan 1986*, pp. 98, 112.

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[42] *National Defence Program Guideline for FY2005 and Beyond*, adopted by the Security Council and approved by the Cabinet on 10 December 2004, Section IV-1.

[43] Takei, *Kaiyo shin-jidai ni okeru kaijou-jieitai,* p. 16.

[44] Japanese F-2 fighters are capable of carrying anti-ship cruise missiles, so the JASDF possesses strike capability at sea, to a certain degree. But it is clear that the primary missions of the JASDF were to respond to the violation of territorial air space in peacetime and conduct territorial air defence in wartime.

[45] *National Defence Program Guideline for FY2011 and Beyond*, approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on 17 December 2010, Section V-1.

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