

ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY

SEA POWER

SOUNDINGS



Issue 33, 2021

ANZUS in the 2020s: A Blessing or a Curse for Australians?

By LCDR Chris Watson

LCDR Chris Watson currently is the Gunnery Officer based in HMAS Stirling, Fleet Base West.

ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY

SEA POWER

SOUNDINGS



Issue 33, 2021

© Commonwealth of Australia 2021

This work is copyright. You may download, display, print, and reproduce this material in unaltered form only (retaining this notice and imagery metadata) for your personal, non-commercial use, or use within your organisation. This material cannot be used to imply an endorsement from, or an association with, the Department of Defence. Apart from any use as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, all other rights are reserved.





Introduction

The security treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America (ANZUS)¹ came into force on the late Emperor Hirohito's 51st birthday, 29 April 1952. Without Japan's warmongering in the Pacific, even given the rise of communism, the treaty is unlikely to have existed. On its face, the treaty seems to be a blessing for Australia. However, this paper asks us to consider an alternative view.

The benefit of the ANZUS Treaty is implicit in the Australian government's 2020 Defence Strategic Update (DSU), which stated: "the prospect of high-intensity military conflict in the Indo-Pacific is less remote than at the time of the 2016 Defence White Paper (DWP), including high-intensity military conflict between the United States and China".²

Gesturing to an alternative, this paper interrogates the prospects of neutrality, asking us to wonder if the Commonwealth might be more secure without ANZUS; less likely to be embroiled in a third world war. The paper recognises that any alternative course must meet the government's "*firm commitment to the Australian people*" in the first sentence of the DSU's foreword "*that we will keep our nation safe and protect our way of life for future generations*".

PART 1

A clear and present danger

The 2016 DWP identified the primary driver shaping Australia's strategic environment as "the roles of the United States and China". Today, notwithstanding the pandemic and the result of the US presidential election, the competitive relationship between the major powers remains key to the future geo-political structure of the region. There is no hint this will change in decades to come. Indeed, the 2020 DSU recognises the determining power of the United States, and the protection this power offers to Australia.³

Even so, Hugh White has suggested the DSU has moved Australian defence strategy away from either of the previous post-war options of self-reliance or the closest possible alignment with and dependence on the United States. He suggests "Both approaches are largely abandoned, and instead, Australia will seek its security principally as part of a coalition of Asian countries".⁴ At the same time he objects to "the ill-considered idea to put deterrence at the heart of Australia's defence posture". However, Australia's strategic dependence on its military relationship with the USA exists and there can be little doubt that a series of well-intentioned but tenuous Asian defence relationships would not withstand the pressures of an impending major war:



The ADF must be better prepared for [high-intensity conflict in the Indo-Pacific] if deterrence measures fail, or to support the United States and other partners where Australia's national interests are engaged.⁵

Australia is a staunch and active ally of the United States, which continues to underwrite the security and stability of the Indo-Pacific.⁶

The Government will also continue deepening our alliance with the United States.⁷

The ANZUS Treaty is implicated in these remarks. Article II of the treaty requires “the Parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid [to] maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack”. Article V states: “an armed attack on any of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific”. Reasonably, Article II has led Australia to buy primarily US platforms and equipment to ensure interoperability (plug and play, AEGIS) and sustain the defence budget at a rate of 2 per cent or more of GDP.



Able Seaman Communications Information Systems Alex Cramp and Leading Seaman Communications Information Systems Gabrielle Saunders hoist flags as HMAS Ballarat approaches USNS Big Horn for a replenishment at sea. Photographer: LSIS Ernesto Sanchez



The treaty has been invoked once, by Prime Minister Howard who found himself in Washington DC on 9 September 2001. Back in the Australian Parliament two weeks later, in a statesmanlike speech describing ANZUS, he set the nation on a course that would lead to Afghanistan and Iraq with all the secondary and tertiary effects which continue to cast deepening shadows in Australian society today:

In every way, the attack on New York and Washington and the circumstances surrounding it did constitute an attack upon the metropolitan territory of the United States of America within the provisions of articles IV and V of the ANZUS Treaty. If that treaty means anything, if our debt as a nation to the people of the United States in the darkest days of World War II means anything, if the comradeship, the friendship and the common bonds of democracy and a belief in liberty, fraternity and justice mean anything, it means that the ANZUS Treaty applies and that the ANZUS Treaty is properly invoked.

As Graeme Dobell has observed: “Howard marked another moment in an Australian tradition: Deakin inviting the US Great White Fleet; Curtin turning to the US in the Pacific war... Spender achieving the ANZUS Treaty; Menzies committing to Vietnam . . . Holt going all the way with LBJ; Whitlam hanging on to the alliance despite Vietnam and the controversy over the US bases in Australia; Hawke incorporating the US bases into the alliance”.⁸ History will almost certainly record Howard’s statement to Congress in 2003 that “America has no firmer friend anywhere in the world than Australia” as an accurate assessment of the past and present bilateral relationship, but is it the best policy for the future safety of the Australian people?

Unthinkable not implausible

How reliable would the United States be if Australia were attacked? America was late in two world wars, scarred by Vietnam and later by Iraq and Afghanistan; can Australia count on the United States?

The question is made pertinent since there are live questions over Taiwan. Would America go to war over a small island democracy just 70 nautical miles off China’s mainland coast? Would Australia contribute to such an action?

We are provoked by Taiwan to contemplate the unthinkable.

Is it feasible to expect the United States to come to the defence of Australia? Would a tactical strike be launched against areas such as Pine Gap by our closest allies themselves to protect US secrets? Perhaps a short time ago Australian politicians would have considered a crippling worldwide pandemic to be similarly outlandish.



However, the fact an event is unlikely does not mean the event is implausible. It is sensible to contemplate a more isolationist America, and equally sensible to contemplate the Australian response to such a foreign policy.

When New Zealand implemented a policy barring nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered warships from its ports, the United States refused to confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons on board its ships and suspended its ANZUS security obligations to New Zealand. Outside ANZUS, or at least on the periphery, New Zealand has found space, economically and politically, for strategic freedom of manoeuvre. It developed independently in its relations with China, as well as in matters concerning its own defence and deterrence. This was amply demonstrated in May 2001 when New Zealand disbanded its air force's air combat force. In short, New Zealand has demonstrated the feasibility of a more independent foreign policy position.



Royal New Zealand Navy warship HMNZS Aotearoa sails past the HMAS Sydney I Memorial as she prepares to go alongside Fleet Base East in Sydney, New South Wales. Photographer: ABIS Daniel Goodman



For the people

The stranding of Australian citizens overseas during the COVID pandemic reveals the need for our nation to reconsider the rights and responsibilities of citizens, and the reciprocal obligations of the government.

In his 1689 *Two Treatises of Government* the English philosopher John Locke viewed political power as the “*right of making laws . . . only for the Publick Good*”. From his exile in Holland, he proposed that a natural law protecting life, liberty and property was the rationale underpinning a social contract between citizens and those wielding power over them. For Locke, if the executive failed in that remit, then it could be justifiably removed, as in fact had just occurred in the 1688 Glorious Revolution with the removal of James II of England.

Unlike Machiavelli’s *The Prince*, and well before any form of universal suffrage, Locke recognised the moral responsibility of governments to serve the people. One United States senator argued that while some (American politicians) may secretly follow Machiavelli in their heart, most do not. “Instead, most men want a life of integrity and goodwill in which public officials are stewards rather than masters and treat their jobs as a means of helping people rather than dominating them.”⁹ In a modern pluralistic democracy, the lifeblood of the nation can be summed up by President Lincoln’s aphorism: “government of the people, by the people, for the people”.¹⁰ Yet, in Australia, this tenet is called into question.

Today, according to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, 29.8 per cent of the Australian population was born overseas. One and a quarter million Australian citizens are ethnic Chinese. Yet the Parliament is an almost homogenous, largely unrepresentative conclave. In its constitution if not its rhetoric, the Parliament resembles the White Australia policy.¹¹ This is the Parliament that has taken the country to distant wars, in unilateral decisions never tested by referendum.

Is Locke’s ‘Publick Good’ being met? Or, in the local vernacular, does the ANZUS Treaty fail the pub test?

The first job

“The first job of national leaders is the safety of their citizens.” – Senator Penny Wong

In launching the 2020 DSU, Prime Minister Scott Morrison expressed his concern about the post-COVID world: “We have been a favoured isle, with many natural advantages for many decades, but we have not seen the conflation of global, economic and strategic uncertainty now being experienced here in Australia in our region since the existential threat we faced when the global and regional order collapsed in the 1930s and 1940s”. Almost a year later, the public servant in charge of the Department of Home Affairs, Mike Pezzullo, in his 2021 ANZAC Day



message said, “free nations again hear the beating drums and watch worryingly the militarisation of issues that we had, until recent years, thought unlikely to be catalysts for war”. Pezzullo echoes Thomas Hobbes, and it would seem that he might share Hobbes’ 17th-century assessment that “covenants without the sword, are but words and of no strength to secure a man at all”.

Senator Wong gestured to the risk of playing into the Chinese Communist Party’s narrative and providing Beijing with leverage by creating the sense that conflict is inevitable: “Our leaders do not make us safe by beating the drums of war with China”.¹²



People's Liberation Army - Navy officers and sailors wave goodbye as HMAS Melbourne departs Zhanjiang Naval Base, as part of HMAS Melbourne's North East Asia deployment. Photographer: ABIS Bonny Gassner

It seems unreasonable to suppose that the government is deliberately encouraging anxiety [about war with China](#) for domestic political gain. More reasonably, we might contemplate the possibility that a policy to contain Chinese ambitions has been agreed between the USA and Australia. The joint statement from the 2020 Australia–U.S. Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) is littered with statements supporting this antithesis and notes “a classified Statement of Principles on Alliance Defence Cooperation and Force Posture Priorities in the Indo-Pacific”.¹³



The rules

Australian politicians, including in AUSMIN and echoed by their military and public servants, have for several years regularly described the importance of a “rules-based order” (RBO). In December 2018 Prime Minister Morrison highlighted Australia’s obligations under international law and UN Security Council resolutions as “two things that are fundamental . . . to Australia’s interests in a RBO. You cannot look at these things in isolation. Our foreign policy is guided by our fundamental interest in ensuring that internationally agreed rules continue to safeguard our security and prosperity. We don’t get to pick and choose”.¹⁴

In late 2019, the then Defence Minister spoke in Washington DC, highlighting that “our collective challenge is to establish a RBO, one that is fit-for-purpose in the twenty-first century. One that continues to deliver regional and global peace and prosperity”.¹⁵ However, a former Director General of the Office of National Assessments remarked: “to the extent this system can promote global responses to global challenges and protect Australia from coercive power, it serves our interests”. This statement hints that an Australian government may neglect the RBO when the national interest calls.¹⁶ However, on its face, such a capricious grand strategy would seem politically and morally improvident.

A founding member of the UN, Australia was the first nation to hold the Presidency of the Security Council in 1946 and the following year the first to provide military observers under UN auspices. Today it is the 12th largest contributor to the UN’s regular budget. As the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s UN website declares: “Australia is committed to effective global cooperation . . . Engaging with the multilateral system is a key pillar of Australia’s foreign policy. This is because we live in a complex, inter-connected world where countries need to coordinate their responses to the major challenges we all face today”.

From a moral perspective, it is a global good that the Commonwealth is committed to enhancing adherence to international law to prevent conflict and restore peace and security. This claim is exemplified by Australian support to post-conflict justice mechanisms, including in Cambodia, Timor-Leste, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, and Bougainville, Papua New Guinea. The claim is further borne out by Australian commitment to the International Criminal Court. Australia, too, advocated for the historic adoption of provisions on the crime of aggression at the 2010 ICC Review Conference. In addition, Australia has been a strong supporter of the Geneva Conventions, ratifying all Additional Protocols. So, yes, morally and ethically, Australia is among the best as a good global citizen. Unfortunately, many nation states have little interest in an RBO.



A tiger by the tail

AUSMIN's 2020 statement says clearly that "the PRC cannot assert maritime claims in the South China Sea based on the 'nine-dash line,' 'historic rights,' or entire South China Sea island groups, which are incompatible with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)".¹⁷ Yet China continues its march for seabed exploitation of rare mineral rights through a policy of direct and indirect actions, and the South China Sea continues to be a magnet for global tension, as opposition to China appears irresolute.

For example, successive Australian governments have been circumspect on the employment of the Royal Australian Navy in the South China Sea. Transits of the South China Sea have increased markedly in 2021. These Regional Presence Deployments serve the aim of the DSU to "deploy military power to shape Australia's strategic environment". However, "the Royal Australian Navy is yet to sail within 12 nautical miles of a disputed territory in the SCS".¹⁸ Euan Graham said Australia had been stepping up its activities in the South China Sea but significantly, was doing so in co-operation with the US and other navies. "Lone transits are an operational risk, so my impression is Australian ships are dovetailing with US ships".¹⁹ This latter observation highlights the external view that Australia is very closely aligned to the USA in relation to military effects aimed at China. Culturally, China is very likely to have been antagonised. Its economic teeth have already been barred against various Australian interests and it is not in the security interests of Australian citizens or their politicians to hold onto this tiger's tail until its military teeth are finally employed against them, suggesting ANZUS is a curse, not a blessing.

PART 2

An alternative

"If you are neutral in situations of injustice, you have chosen the side of the oppressor. If an elephant has its foot on the tail of a mouse and you say that you are neutral, the mouse will not appreciate your neutrality." – Desmond Tutu

In the 2020 DSU, it is the government's stated intent for Australia to take greater responsibility for its own security. In Part 1 of this paper I considered perceived dangers entailed in enacting the first of the government's new direction for the ADF's Strategic Objectives emerging from the 2020 DSU: to "deploy military power to *shape* Australia's strategic environment". In this part I will suggest a passive way in which Australia can employ the second strategic objective to "*deter* actions against our interests" while giving the nation time to develop the third objective – the ability to "*respond* with credible military force".²⁰ The latter is a subject requiring further analysis, beyond the scope of this text. Suffice to say, the DSU refers to a



credible military response to an adversary as an ineluctable objective, and recognised as “essential that the ADF grow its self-reliant ability to deliver deterrent effects”.

The concept

There is a philosophy that one cannot be a neutral. From ancient Rome – “For we heard you say that we looked upon all as enemies that were not with us; but that you looked upon all as friends that were not against you”²¹ – to President George W. Bush after 9/11 – “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists”.²² Even Jesus Christ said, “whoever is not against us is for us” (Luke 9:50; Mark 9:40).

However, the concept of neutrality between states is as old as war itself. Neutrality is neither unrealistic, immoral nor against the rules-based order. In fact, neutrality is a key concept of international law. Well before World War One, European nations recognised it as a valuable tool, and international legal statutes were developed and formalised in agreements like the 1856 Declaration of Paris and the [1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions](#). In the latter, a “neutral country” means that the country has declared non-participation during a war and cannot be counted on to help fight a belligerent country. “Non-belligerent” countries are ones that offer non-combative support in times of war. These early examples of an RBO bound states to behave in certain ways and permitted neutrals to avoid involvement in costly wars. While neutrality may be a tough policy choice and tough to stay the course, it has helped shape the modern world, through laws, trade (especially maritime free trade) and finance and is now accepted as a peacetime status as well as one adopted in wartime.

The meaning of neutrality

Put simply, neutrality means a nation cannot take sides. The Law of Neutrality was codified in the pre-Great War Hague Conventions. A neutral nation cannot provide bases, recruit or arm a belligerent. Neutrality does not entail an obligation to prevent private companies or individuals selling commodities or advancing credit.

Significantly, though laws affecting or limiting such trade must apply equally to both sides, different countries interpret their neutrality in different ways. During the Cold War, for example, Yugoslavia claimed military and ideological neutrality. Japan’s constitution states its neutrality, reading, “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes”.



Roger Cohen sums up the ambiguous meaning of neutrality: “Neutrality, like virtue, is seldom absolute. Applied to the acts of a state during several years of war, the adjective ‘neutral’ is almost inevitably inadequate. Wars are hell. But they are also opportunity”.²³

Modern neutrality

This paper has described the importance of an RBO to the government of Australia. A policy of neutrality sits well within a global RBO. Turkmenistan has been neutral since 12 December 1995, a date celebrated every year with fireworks and concerts. Its neutrality came because of a UN resolution, which guarantees its status. In 2002, Switzerland became the first country to join the UN following a referendum, and neutrality neither precludes nor hampers membership of that august body. In order not to compromise its neutrality, Switzerland avoids alliances holding it to military, political or direct economic action, hence it remains outside NATO and the European Union.

Switzerland, like Australia, considers itself a good global citizen and is home to many international institutions like the [International Committee of the Red Cross. Switzerland, too, has a written constitution, although written a century later than Australia’s, in 1999. In](#) Article 54 of the Swiss constitution, there is a resonance with the deeper registers of Australian policy: “The Confederation shall ensure that the independence of Switzerland and its welfare is safeguarded; it shall in particular assist in the alleviation of need and poverty in the world and promote respect for human rights and democracy, the peaceful co-existence of peoples”.²⁴ These are constitutional objectives, which reflect a first world nation’s moral obligation to undertake social, economic and humanitarian activities supporting global peace and prosperity. This does not mean Switzerland is militarily or economically naïve. Landlocked, it holds to “armed neutrality” to deter aggression with a sizeable military available numbering around 100,000 personnel. Economically the Swiss banking system has attracted controversy in the past, for example in connection with Nazi plunder, and during World War Two it supplied both sides with watches, metal goods and machinery, diplomatic protection, and insurance services.

There are distinct opportunities and advantages to being a neutral nation. As Professor Leos Müller points out, European long-term neutral nations are among the best countries to live in: “They are socially and culturally developed, and they enjoy high living standards. They have well-functioning welfare states. They function, too, as competitive economies, free-traders, well-endowed to prosper in today’s global economy. We find these states at the top of the ranking lists of most competitive economies, the best countries to live in, the wealthiest nations”.²⁵

Neutrality in war

In war, the claims of military necessity place neutrality under considerable pressure.



Among the dozens of European states that declared themselves neutral at the beginning of World War Two, only Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey remained independent or unaligned. Before the war, the traditionally neutral countries put their faith in collective security and did not rearm, despite the increasing militarisation in Europe after 1933. They believed that the League of Nations had removed the need for war. The 1938 Munich Agreement exposed their naiveté.²⁶

Geography provided a natural barrier for some, like Ireland and Turkey. For other countries, neutrality came at the price of concessions. For example, Sweden offered Nazi Germany iron ore and ball bearings.

For Australia, geography provides an opportunity to be neutral in a future conflict. Combine that natural advantage with the multicultural demands inherent in modern Australian society; the economic advantages of neutrality; the achievement (hopefully) of the DSU's existing strategic objective for the ADF to be able to “*deter* actions against our interests” and declaring Australia to be in a state of armed neutrality would appear logical and feasible.

Neutrality and the United States of America

In 1793, President [George Washington](#) issued a *Neutrality Proclamation* to define the policy of the United States in response to French Revolutionary Wars. Asserting “The duty and interest of the United States”, the Proclamation stated, “that [the United States] should with sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward the belligerent Powers”. In 1794, when Congress passed the *Neutrality Act*, President Washington's policy attained the force of law.

When war broke out in 1914, President Woodrow Wilson formally proclaimed the neutrality of the United States, a position the vast majority of Americans favoured. Wilson's initial hope was that America could be “impartial in thought as well as in action”.

As the shadow of war loomed again in Europe, Congress passed Neutrality Acts in 1935 and 1937. The latter prohibited Americans from travelling on ships owned by any belligerent nation, and declared American ships could not carry any arms intended for war zones. It also removed impartiality, allowing President Roosevelt to distinguish between warring nations when enforcing neutrality. Favoured nations could purchase non-military goods in the USA, paying in cash and using their own ships – “cash and carry”. The *Neutrality Act* of 1939 lifted a 1935 arms embargo and placed all sales on a “cash and carry” basis. The day after Pearl Harbor in December 1941, Roosevelt declared war on Japan but not on Germany. Only when after three more days Nazi Germany declared war on the USA was its neutrality ended, as a defensive measure.²⁷ If the USA can cherry-pick at neutrality to protect its citizens, why not Australia?



Conclusion

Blessing or curse? The main benefit of the ANZUS Treaty in the contemporary strategic climate is that it *may* give an aggressor pause for thought before attacking Australia. In the author's view this is far outweighed by the likelihood that US pressure would see Australia dragged into another proxy war far from home with likely disastrous economic and societal results even when on the winning side. Bipartisanship, a rare element in the Australian political landscape, is most often mined in support of the ADF and Defence strategies. It is perhaps never more required than in the 2020s grand strategic sphere.

Australian politicians are elected to represent the views of their constituent citizens. Given positive bipartisan support for Australia to become a neutral state in the Australian Parliament, a referendum could be held on the issue to amend the constitution.²⁸ Whether or not Australia should be free or required to wage further wars because of a 70-year-old treaty is surely a subject worthy of formal debate. Neutrality should be the preferred foreign policy option for any government if it is assessed as providing the most likely option for the safety and well-being of its citizens – the “First Job”. Such a choice and the development of an effective and self-reliant deterrent capability, supported by a defence-industrial base, go hand in hand.

Endnotes

¹ Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia's Defence Relations with the United States, Appendix B, https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Completed_Inquiries/jfadt/usrelations/appen dixb.

² Defence Strategic Update 2020, page 14, 1.12.

³ Ibid., page 27, 2.22.

⁴ Hugh White, “Great Expectations: Can Australia Depend on its Neighbours?”, AFA10, *Friends, Allies and Enemies: Asia's Shifting Loyalties*, <https://www.australianforeignaffairs.com/articles/extract/2020/10/great-expectations>.

⁵ Ibid., page 29 2.25.

⁶ Ibid., page 22, 2.7.

⁷ Ibid., page 4.

⁸ Graeme Dobell, “Great Australian Foreign Policy Speeches: Howard on 9/11 and the US Alliance”, Lowy Institute Interpreter, 15 August 2014, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/great-australian-foreign-policy-speeches-howard-911-and-us-alliance>.

⁹ Paul Douglas, *Ethics in Government*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1952.

¹⁰ President Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, 19 November 1863.

¹¹ The White Australia policy is a term describing a set of historical racial policies targeted at those of non-European ethnic origin from migrating to Australia. It began in 1901 and was progressively dismantled between 1949 and 1973.



¹² Andrew Tillett, “PM Encouraging Anxiety Over Potential for China Conflict: ALP”, *Australian Financial Review*, 19 May 2021, <https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/pm-encouraging-anxiety-over-potential-for-china-conflict-alp-20210518-p57t00>.

¹³ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Joint Statement Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) 2020”, <https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/united-states-of-america/ausmin/joint-statement-ausmin-2020>.

¹⁴ Lowy Institute, ‘Australia’s Security and the Rules-based Order: Tracking a Decade of Policy Evolution’, <https://interactives.loyyinstitute.org/features/rules-based-order/>.

¹⁵ Ibid.; Linda Reynolds addressing The Hudson Institute.

¹⁶ Ibid.; Richard Maude, former Director-General of the Office of National Assessments and current Senior Fellow, Asia Society Policy Institute.

¹⁷ Not being a “middle power”, the United States gets to “pick and choose”; as a superpower, the United States still declines to ratify the UNCLOS Convention.

¹⁸ Andrew Tillett, “Navy Goes Full Speed Ahead on South China Sea Transits”, *Australian Financial Review*, 10 May 2021, <https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/navy-goes-full-speed-ahead-on-south-china-sea-transits-20210507-p57pru>.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Defence Strategic Update 2020, page 27, 2.22.

²¹ Pro Ligario 11 (33), translation from Cicero, Marcus Tullius; William Duncan, *Cicero’s Select Orations Translated into English*, Sidney’s Press, 1811.

²² Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20 September 2001.

²³ Roger Cohen, “The (Not So) Neutrals of World War II”, *New York Times*, 26 January 1997, <https://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/26/weekinreview/the-not-so-neutrals-of-world-war-ii.html>.

²⁴ Swiss Confederation, Federal Constitution, https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/1999/404/en#art_54.

²⁵ Leos Müller, *Neutrality in World History*, Routledge, New York, 2019.

²⁶ Neville Wylie, *European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents during the Second World War*, Cambridge University Press, 2002.

²⁷ Holocaust Encyclopedia, “The United States: Isolation-Intervention”, <https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/the-united-states-isolation-intervention#:~:text=The%20Neutrality%20Act%20of%201935,any%20foreign%20nation%20at%20war.&text=In%20November%201939%2C%20two%20months,“cash%20and%20carry”%20basis.>

²⁸ Chapter 8 Article 128 of the Australian constitution describes how alterations to the constitution can be made through Parliament and a popular vote.