Amongst the most enduring tasks of any warship from its inception as a tool of war many years ago, has always been its ability to project firepower inland. Before troops go ashore and before air superiority can be achieved, a warship can move into a hostile area and quite literally define the littoral, by the reach of its guns alone.
Certainly, the ability to provide naval gunfire support (NGS) has played a part in every major campaign fought by the Five Eyes Nations since World War I. For the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), the last time it fired live ammunition at an enemy, in a Naval Gunfire Support capacity, was on the Al Fawr peninsula in 2003. Tellingly this was not just an NGS engagement but a combined Joint Fires Operation the type of which the RAN had not conducted for a significant period.
The RAN has made the best use of its experiences in 2003 to improve and develop this capability, but this paper aims to present an opinion, exploring whether we are at an adequate standard to integrate into a large scale Joint Fires mission amongst other Five Eyes allies.
HMAS Anzac (III) conducting Naval Gunfire Support in the Al Faw peninsula, 2003. Image by POIS Phil Cullinan.
This paper, designed as an opinion piece, argues that to integrate into a large scale Joint Fires tasking, a truly operational capability in this sphere must be achieved. For the capability to be considered fully operational, it must be well-considered and highly coordinated effort within the overall campaign plan from the initial planning stages and not as an additional task at the end.
History has demonstrated the enduring need to have this capability, but as an organisation, we are more content to allocate resources to the more visible but in many ways more defensive disciplines of Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW). It is not my intention to understate the importance of either of these disciplines but they are primarily defensive in allowing the Amphibious Force to move into its Amphibious Area of Operations (AOA) and commence projecting the force ashore. As a developing amphibious force, the ability to project fire ashore in support of that Amphibious Operation is critical. Without the guarantee of allied carrier or host nation support where we can base our strike aircraft, Naval Fires from surface units are the primary option and this can only be used as a deterrent if we possess both the capability and the means.
With defence budgets worldwide subject to ever-increasing levels of scrutiny, Governments are quite rightly demanding greater efficiency and adaptability from their militaries. That strike missions likely carried out by very expensive missile systems such as the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM), Harpoon or the equally expensive option of basing an aircraft carrier close to the coast will become a luxury and the more extensive use of guided munitions fired from large calibre guns, both shore-based artillery and naval guns will become more widespread. Options for precision-guided munition fired from weapons platforms that already exist in the RAN inventory such as BAE’s Multi-Service Standard Guided Projectile (MSSGP)[1] are available and could provide the capability enhancement that the RAN needs to meet future conflicts.
HMAS Stuart (III) conducts a live Harpoon Missile firing off the coast of Hawaii during Exercise Rim of the Pacific 2020. Photographer: LSIS Christopher Szumlanski.
Within the construct of the recent OE17, a Joint Fires serial was included in the programme but due to various constraints, the ability to properly plan and the subsequent realism from which the Ops Teams could draw proper conclusions was limited. As it was a live-fire exercise containing elements from all three services it is considered regrettable that more resource in terms of time and attention was not paid to this phase of the exercise.
Seaman Boatswains Mate Scott Whitaker mans the 12.7mm machine gun during action stations, as HMAS Darwin enters the Western Australian Exercise Area for Exercise Ocean Explorer 2017. Photographer: LSIS Bradley Darvill.
This paper concludes that as a growing amphibious power, it is time that the importance of a realistic and sustainable Joint Fires capability is recognised. To have any real capability it needs to be ranked alongside the other warfare disciplines such as ASW and AAW and be resourced in terms of equipment and manpower as such. If this is not made the case I believe Australia will be left behind in terms of its ability to participate in offensive Amphibious Operations.
Sources/References
1. http://www.baesystems.com/en/feature/precision-guided-munitions.
2. Naval Gunfire Support of Amphibious Operations, Major General Donald M Weller, USMC (Ret’d).
3. http://defense-update.com/20130627_5-inch-guided-projectile-test-fired.html.