HMAS AE2

AE2 painted white during its voyage through the Red Sea in the hope that it would reflect the intense sunlight and improve conditions on board. Note also the canvas awnings rigged to provide additional shade.

From Colombo the second phase of the voyage began under the escort of HMS Yarmouth which shepherded AE1 and AE2 to Singapore where they arrived safely on 21 April 1914. In Singapore the submarines were met by the cruiser HMAS Sydney which assumed responsibility for them for the remainder of the voyage to Sydney where they arrived on 24 May, 83 days after leaving Portsmouth. A total of 60 days had been spent at sea and some 13 000 miles covered, a record for submarines at that time.
 

Service with the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force 

Following the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914, AE2 and AE1 were ordered to join the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force assigned to capture the German colonies in New Guinea. Stoker and his crew took part in the seizure of New Britain, culminating in the capture and surrender of Rabaul on 13 September 1914 and the general surrender of the New Guinea territories on 22 September 1914.

A key duty assigned to the 2 submarines throughout the operation was to guard St George’s Strait, lying between New Britain and New Ireland, and defend the RAN fleet from the approach of any enemy ships. It was during one such patrol on 14 September 1914 that AE1 disappeared with all hands. A search was ordered for the missing submarine using all available ships but after 3 days it was called off, with no trace of the ill-fated submarine being found.

Operations in Suva

On 4 October 1914 AE2 proceeded to Suva to join Admiral Patey’s force comprising HMA Ships Australia (I), Sydney (I), Encounter, Warrego (I) and the French light cruiser, Montcalm. Patey was under orders to counter any threat posed from the German cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau which had attacked the French Society Islands on 22 September and were still at large. Following 3 uneventful weeks based in Fiji, AE2’s service in the Pacific came to an end when it was detached on 8 November with orders to return to Sydney, where it duly arrived on 16 November.

AE2 in Fitzroy Dock, Cockatoo Island, following its deployment as part of the ANMEF.

HMAS AE2 passing through Suez Canal in 1915. (Allen C Green collection, state library of Victoria)

AE2 departing Malta for Tenedos in April 1915 after effecting repairs to its hull.

All previous attempts by Allied submarines to pass through the strait had failed due to an effective sea denial operation mounted by the enemy. Minefields, fixed and mobile gun batteries, searchlight surveillance and patrolling Turkish warships, coupled with natural navigational hazards, had made the Dardanelles seemingly impenetrable. The C-in-C remarked that if Stoker and his crew were successful there would be ‘no calculating the result it will cause, and it may well be that you will have done more to finish the war than any other act accomplished.’

On the morning of 24 April the attempt began, however, the mission was soon abandoned when one of the submarine’s forward hydroplanes failed, necessitating AE2 returning to Tenedos to effect repairs. With repairs complete, and with a heightened sense of tension among its crew, AE2 set off to try again the following day.

25 April 1915

Lieutenant Commander Stoker takes up the story:

Having proceeded from the anchorage off Tenedos, I lay at the entrance off the Dardanelles until moonset and at about 2:30am on 25th April entered the straits at 8 knots. Weather calm and clear. As the order to run amok in the Narrows precluded all possibility of passing through unseen, I decided to travel on the surface as far as possible.

Throughout AE2’s passage, searchlights continually swept the strait but it avoided detection continuing unmolested until 4.30 am when gun batteries opened fire from the northern shore. Stoker immediately dived, beginning an underwater passage through the minefields. Mooring wires tethering the mines continually scraped along AE2’s sides for the next half hour. Twice Stoker surfaced in the minefield to make navigational observations and at 6.00 am AE2 was within 2 miles of the Narrows at Chanak, submerged at periscope depth with the sea flat and calm. Forts on both sides of the Narrows then sighted its and soon opened heavy fire. Meanwhile, Stoker, watching through his periscope, observed a number of ships and quickly determined to attack what he thought to be a small cruiser of the Peik e Shetrek type.

At a range of 300-400 yards I fired the bow torpedo, at the same moment ordering 70 feet in order to avoid a torpedo boat destroyer (TBD) which was attempting to ram on the port side. As the vessel descended the TBD passed overhead close, and the torpedo was heard to hit. As the cruiser, dead ahead, might be expected to sink almost immediately, I altered course a point to starboard to avoid becoming entangled with its. At the time I believed the vessel to be in the centre of the strait. About 4 minutes later I altered back to the original course, and ordered 20 feet. As the vessel was rising it hit bottom and slid up on the bank to a depth of 10 feet, at which depth a considerable portion of the conning tower was above water. Through the periscope I saw that the position was immediately under Fort Anatoli Medjidieh.

The fort opened fire and for some minutes shells fell on all sides until efforts to refloat its succeeded. AE2 then slid back into the safety of deep water. The relief onboard the submarine was palpable but short lived, for AE2 then grounded on the Gallipoli shore, again exposing herself to the enemy.

Through the periscope I judged the position to be immediately under Serina Burnu, and further observed 2 TBDs, a gunboat, and several small craft standing close off in [the] Strait firing heavily and a cluster of small boats which I judged to be picking up survivors of the cruiser. In this position we remained for 5 minutes.

As my vessel was lying with inclination down by the bows I went full speed ahead. Shortly afterwards it began to move down the bank, gave a slight bump, gathered way and then bumped very heavily. She, however, continued to descend and at 80 feet I dived off the bank. The last bump was calculated to considerably injure the vessel, and probably impaired the fighting efficiency, but as I considered my chief duty was to prove the passage through the Straits to be possible, I decided to continue on course.

In connection with these 2 groundings, I have to report that the behaviour of the crew was exemplary. In these 2 highly dangerous situations it was only their cool and intelligent performance of their duties which enabled the vessel to be refloated.

Shortly afterwards AE2 again rose to periscope depth where Stoker established his position as approaching Nagara Point. On all sides he was surrounded by pursuit craft and each time he showed AE2’s periscope the pursuing destroyers turned to ram. Consequently, in an attempt to shake off the enemy, Stoker bottomed the submarine on the Asiatic shore to await developments.

Throughout 25 April, AE2 lay in 80 feet of water while enemy ships continually searched overhead. Those of its crew who could be spared were ordered to rest but most found sleep impossible. On one occasion the AE2’s casing was struck by a heavy object being trailed along the bottom by one of the vessels above but fortunately it did not snag or critically damage the submarine.

At approximately 9.00 pm Stoker blew ballast tanks and surfaced having been submerged for over 16 hours. All signs of shipping had vanished and the opportunity was taken to recharge the submarine’s batteries and to send a signal to the Commander-in-Chief notifying him of the successful passage through the ‘Narrows’ and past Nagara Point.

At that time a council of war was taking place in the British flagship HMS Queen Elizabeth as it steamed off the coast of the Gallipoli peninsula. The British Commander-in-Chief, Sir Ian Hamilton, was in conference with his senior staff discussing the progress of the Allied troops ashore.

Moments earlier Hamilton had received a message from Lieutenant General William Birdwood who had reluctantly recommended an immediate evacuation. This was based on advice from Birdwood’s 2 divisional commanders ashore who feared the exhausted troops could not withstand a Turkish counterattack the next day. The situation appeared grave and the matter of re-embarkation required immediate deliberation.

The duty of sending the signal fell to 22-year old Victorian, Telegraphist William Wolseley Falconer. His use of the Morse key was about to have a profound impact on the discussions taking place in Queen Elizabeth, and forever cement AE2’s place in the history of the Dardanelles campaign. The submarine’s wireless had a range of only 30-100 miles, so a guard ship, the destroyer HMS Jed, had been stationed in the Gulf of Saros with a receiving window set between 40 and 50 minutes past the hour.

As Falconer tapped away at his wireless set from within, the submarine’s damp external wire aerial was seen by Stoker to be throwing off purple and blue sparks as the morse message was transmitted. The young telegraphist tried in vain to get an acknowledgment that his signal had been received but after several attempts it was assumed that that the wireless equipment had been damaged and therefore the fleet would remain unaware of their achievement.

Unbeknown to Stoker and Falconer, the message had in fact been received in Jed, pieced together and relayed to Queen Elizabeth at the crucial moment when Hamilton was deliberating with his staff whether or not to order a general evacuation. The council of war was dramatically interrupted when one of Hamilton’s aides handed a copy of Stoker’s signal to Commodore Roger Keyes who announced ‘Tell them [the troops on the shore] this. It is an omen. An Australian submarine has done the finest feat in submarine history and is going to torpedo all the ships bringing reinforcements, supplies and ammunition into Gallipoli.’

This was a tremendous fillip and in his response to Birdwood, Hamilton wrote:

Your news is indeed serious. But there is nothing for it but to dig yourselves right in and stick it out. It would take at least 2 days to re-embark you, as Admiral Thursby will explain to you. Meanwhile, the Australian submarine has got up through the narrows and has torpedoed a gunboat…Hunter-Weston, despite his heavy losses, will be advancing tomorrow which should divert pressure from you. Make a personal appeal to your men…to make a supreme effort to hold their ground. P.S. You have got through the difficult business, now you have only to dig, dig, dig until you are safe.

If nothing else AE2’s signal certainly provided morale boosting information at a time when it was most needed. Many believe that it directly influenced the decision made by Hamilton that night, resulting in the Allied forces remaining on the peninsula.

By then, the air inside the submarine was foul and its crew swarmed on deck ‘eager to breathe the cool night air’. At approximately 11 pm, cloud cover shaded the Moon, providing AE2 with an additional layer of concealment, and in the early hours of the morning it began to rain reducing visibility further.

26 April 1915

By 3 am the weather began to clear as Stoker and his crew continued their passage on the surface towards the Sea of Marmora before diving at dawn. As soon as light permitted, Stoker observed through his periscope ‘2 ships approaching, obviously men-of-war, one in front of the other’. Steering a parallel and opposite course to the enemy he approached before firing his port torpedo.

Only after making the attack did Stoker realise he had fired at the smaller leading ship, a cruiser, which successfully evaded his torpedo.

Finding it impossible to bring another torpedo tube to bear on the second ship, which he judged to be a battleship of the Barbarossa Class, a further attempt was abandoned.

I continued on course through [the] Straits, examined the Gallipoli anchorage, found no ship worthy of attack and so proceeded in the Sea of Marmora, which was entered about 9am.

About 9:30am AE2 sighted 4 ships, but since only 6 of its 8 torpedoes remained Stoker decided not to fire unless he was certain his target was a troop transport.

With this intention I dived close to the foremost ship - a tramp of about 2000 tonnes. Passing about 200 yards abeam of its I could see no sign of troops or ammunition; but as I passed under its stern it ran up colours and opened rifle fire at [the] periscope. I then dived over to the next ship and attacked at 400 yards with starboard beam torpedo. The torpedo failed to hit. I was unable to get within range of the other 2 ships.

The remainder of that day was spent on the surface recharging batteries and making good defects.

Shortly after dark, AE2 was attacked by a small Turkish vessel while again attempting to establish wireless communications with the fleet. The attacks continued whenever the submarine attempted to surface during the night of 26 April.

 AE2 at sea. The crew are in the process of raising/lowering her W/T mast and aerials.