The announcement in 2021 that Australia would acquire nuclear-powered submarines for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) signalled a significant shift in Australia’s defence policy.
RUSPAC remains the least analysed and assessed Russian naval fleet. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, there was a continuous decline in interest of developments in the Russian navy.
The announcement in September 2021 that Australia would acquire nuclear-powered submarines (NPS) signalled a significant shift in Australia’s defence posture.
This paper proposes an Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) strategy that leverages the author’s experience as a submariner and views the ASW problem through Effects Based Operations theory and Boyd’s OODA (observation, orientation, decision, action) Loop
There have been many articles raised on the obsolescence of submarines within the future maritime battlespace. With the advent of unmanned underwater vehicles and increasingly sophisticated sensors, the difficult art of submarining will become increasingly challenging in several crucial respects. The idea that submarines could no longer safely remain submerged is a great aim point but we are not there yet, and we will not be there for some time yet.
"With “more activity from Russian submarines than we’ve seen since the days of the Cold War”, an improved European force posture becomes vital for the US Navy and NATO.
Each volume of Australian Maritime Issues: SPC-A Annual is a compilation of the year’s Semaphore newsletters and papers on a variety of na
A Critical Vulnerability: The Impact of the Submarine Threat on Australia’s Maritime Defence 1915-54
This volume examines the impact of the submarine threat on Australia’s maritime defence from 1915 to 1954 and assesses the effectiveness of the RAN in dealing with the trade defence problem over this period.